OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
10 March 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I am sending something which I think will be of interest to the President. Will you please see that he gets to look at it?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is a report on the military significance of political developments in Rome. It is the compilation of various items of intelligence coming from our units working behind the lines.

You may find it of interest.

William J. Donovan
Director
SUBJECT: The Military Significance of Political Conditions in ROME

TO: Director Strategic Services

1. The following is a report in four parts on political conditions in ROME. This is compiled for the benefit of operational sections of OSS who might deal with these groups, and is not a statement of political opinion by this Section.

2. Due to the fact that most of the men referred to are still in German-occupied territory, the greatest care must be taken in the use of this material. It should not be disseminated, even in part, outside the Organization. The sources, also, gave their information as an expression of cooperation with and confidence in OSS, and information should not be used, even inside OSS, in a manner which might reveal these sources.

3. This report contains:

Part One: Introduction and Organization of COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE
Part Two: BADOLIO-MONARCHIST Groups
Part Three: Other elements
Part Four: Operational Opportunities

Regraded Unclassified
PART ONE

INTRODUCTION.

Political interest in ROME is much keener than in most areas of Southern Italy. The average man seems to know more about the political currents and realizes how important to Italy will be the decisions reached in ROME. It is also important to remember that no organized irregular military action will be exclusively military. Despite the claims of certain groups to being "only military", "non-political", or to having "forgotten politics while the Germans are still in Italy", the unconditional cooperation of any group to the fight against the Germans will be relative to the political situation. This fact is usually regretted by the average man in each group, but nevertheless will be true of the final conduct of all groups.

There are many resistance organizations in ROME, some purely political or social, others definitely military. Of these the most important are the six parties of the COMITATO and the groups directed by the BADOGLIO Government. Other organizations like the Church and the "Carbonari" might be important, but will not be decisive.

COMITATO DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIONALE

Above is "action" Committee of the old Fronte Nazionale della Liberazione, which has lost its importance. The Committee is often referred to, even by party members, also as the Comitato della Liberazione or the Comitato dei Sei Partiti.

The Committee is divided into two sub-committees, political and military, with two representatives from each party.

The head of the Committee is Dr. BONOMI (a member of Democrazia del Lavoro). He is considered by all parties, including the outside groups and Badoglio elements,
as one of the few men with influence in Rome who is truly disinterested.

The head of the military sub-committee is General BENCIVENGA. Other military leaders are actually more important within the committee.

Parties are the same as those in Naples.

PARTITO SOCIALISTA ITALIANO
PARTITO DEMOCRATICO CRISTIANO
PARTITO D'AZIONE
PARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO
PARTITO COMUNISTA ITALIANO
PARTITO LIBERALE
DEMOCRAZIA DEL LAVORO

The Comitato Centrale in Rome is a great deal stronger and more unified than the Neapolitan group. The liaison between the Comitato and the regional sub-committees is supposed to be very good, with direction coming from Rome. (Many sources)

Socialists

PIETRO NENNI
BRUNO BUOZZI
Ing. ROMITA
GALLO (head of military section?)
LONGBARDIA (delegate to Bari)

Christian Democrats

ALCIDE DE GASPERI
CARLO GRONCHI, Sec'y gen'l
Avv. SPADARO
Col. EROCOLE CHIRI, head of military section
Prof. STEFANO SECONDO TIPALDI (delegate to Bari)
Lt. RINALDI (military sub-committee)
Lts. MEI (two brothers) "
ENRICO NAVARRO (not real name. Military committee)
Capt. RUGGIERI (military sub-committee)
Lt. BRACCINI " (communist?)

others: Duca SCOTTI (possibly a backer, Church influence)
Monsignor BOHEM (Osservatore Romano, Vatican)
Professor GONNELLA " " "

Action Party

UGO LA MALFA
FEDERICO COMANDINI
SERGIO FENSALTEA
RICCARDO BAUER (military section)

others: CALOGERO
DE RUGGERO (?)
GAROSCHI (military?)
GRAVERI (now in Naples)

Communist Party (see also PART THREE)

PAOLO SOCCIMARRO
MAIOLI
Di (?) VITTORIO (military sub-committee)
GARBARERI " "
LONGO " "
GIOVANNI DI GIORGIO AMENDOLA " "
Capt. GATTO " "
Lt. BRACCINI (milit. demo-Christians?)
GIOVANNI ROVEDA (reported by most reliable sources arrested and possibly shot. Two normally reliable sources say he is alive and free.)

Liberal Party

Sen. ALESSANDRO CASATI (Conte?)
Dott. ANTONIO CALVI (delegate to Bari)
Avv. Giustino ARPESANO (liberal leader in Milan)
Labor Party

MENCCIO RUINI
CARLO SCIALSIA
GASPAROTTO
RUINI (son)
BONOMI (is member of party and backs it)

NOTES ON COMITATO AND PARTIES

a. Estimates of strength in Rome alone vary from 60,000 to 400,000 as the figure for the adherents which are represented by the six parties of the COMITATO. It is impossible to judge, particularly as in Rome the population may unite in action directed by the COMITATO without necessarily sharing its political views.

b. The COMITATO has good liaison with its Northern Comitati (MILANO COMITATO mentioned as strong, also GENOVA). In the north resistance seems less political, one representative of the parties in Rome stating that bands in the North were very well organized, and the parties less so. There are only five parties in the Northern Comitati (no Democrazia del Lavoro).

c. The political opinion of the ROME COMITATO is now difficult to appreciate, since the landing and retarded progress of the Allies have evidently changed the situation. A monarchist coming from ROME stated that these six parties are tremendously influential in ROME and the North. He also stated that they were against the present King, but would accept the Badoglio Government temporarily, and he stated emphatically that monarchist parties in the North (as political groups) were non-existant.

d. A summary of opinions and recent information from both the Italian Government and local political representatives indicates important political strife in ROME today. One opinion is that the COMITATO is believed to have lost its former unity. The three strongest parties
(and the only ones with important military elements - the Demo-Christian groups are either communist controlled or controlled direct by the BADOLLO Government) are the Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione, they have declared themselves absolutely unwilling to accept the present government or their representatives in ROME. BONOMI and the three lesser parties are attempting to make a union of all forces. This opinion is being energetically forwarded by the present Italian Government and would be suspicious except that it is confirmed by other sources. On the other hand there are very recent indications that BONOMI has sided with the larger parties (nominally under his presidency) and only the Demo-Christians (who in Southern Italy have undoubtedly a secret agreement with the Prince, if not the King) still stand for unity with BADOLLO's representatives. A discussion of the COMITATO's relationship to the BADOLLO elements will be made in Part IV.

e. The Communists, Socialists and Partito d'Azione are, at least in ROME, the best organized and strongest of all groups. The Communists have the greatest security (due to their cell type organization) and have the only military men with experience in irregular warfare. The Socialists are the most popular party in Northern Italy. The Partito d'Azione has the reputation for having intellectual leadership and, judging from documents collected, does the greatest amount of printed propaganda, both political and patriotic.

f. Of the three smaller parties, the Demo-Christians are the strongest. They are presently backed by the Church and have the approval, if not the active membership, of many middle-class churchgoers. Although the ROME head of the Demo-Christians, and the Church, are opposed to the present King, local representatives of this party claim that most of their adherents would prefer that Victor Emmanuel remain in office until the end of the war in Europe. The Italian Government say the Liberal Party and the Democrazia del Lavoro will accept the King in ROME. This is improbable in view of the public statements of CROCE AND CERABONA, who probably have more influence in the North than they do in Naples. The ROME representatives of the Liberal Party also refutes that opinion.
PART TWO

BADOGLIO MONARCHICAL GROUPS

1. When the Armistice was signed and the Badoglio Government knew they would have to leave ROME, hasty plans were made to leave behind some sort of military government to represent the official Italian Government. This group was directed with several responsibilities. One, to hide all State documents from the Germans; two, to defend ROME with the divisions on hand (Badoglio stated to undersigned that the invasion came two weeks too soon, before his Staff had time to prepare a defense against the Germans); three, to maintain underground resistance if Allies failed to come on ROME within a short time; and four, to maintain civil order. These last two obligations were clarified and stressed only recently.

2. It is unimportant to review the now well-known circumstances preceding and immediately following the Armistice. However, it is important to bear in mind that the events of the 8th and 9th September and subsequently are completely different from the plans of the Italian Government. The haste forced on Badoglio partly accounts for the complete confusion which actually took place. It is now evident that there have been three stages of planning.

   a. The Italian Government, believed that the Allied advance on ROME would be swift. They also were told by some fairly high Allied authority that, temporarily, at least, they would remain the Italian authorities. The premature - from Badoglio's point of view - invasion and the harsh armistice terms prevented the Government from organizing resistance of military units and failed to secure the adherence of most units commanders in both Army and Air Corps. It is claimed (by Badoglio) that "fifth column" knowledge of the pending Armistice caused the issuance of false orders. This is the alleged reason for the failure of many of the high officers to resist the Germans. Events
of this phase were chaotic and uncontrolled.

b. The second phase came after the Allied entry into Naples. The anti-monarchical character of Neapolitan resistance and political activity; the lack of genuine cooperation from the ACC and AMG; the almost impossible administrative difficulties caused by the war; all of these brought about a lassitude in the official attitude towards resistance in occupied Italy. Both Badoglio and the King were physically tired and discouraged, and conscious of personal attacks from both Northern and Southern Italy. The efforts of the Comando Supremo towards organizing ROME had a completely non-political and almost passive character.

c. The third phase is the present one. The Government constantly receives unofficial, but highly placed, advice that the United Nations will follow a moderate policy for fear of "communists" outbreaks during the period of military activity in Italy. In the volatile atmosphere of Southern Italy popular opinion seems to change quickly from one extreme to another, and monarchist parties are gaining strength. The open support of the principal Italian military leaders, the retention by the Allies of men and units loyal to the present King, (such as Carabinieri), and the recent transfer of most of Southern Italy to Italian "control" have all heartened the King and Badoglio into a belief that the present government, or one selected by it, will rule Italy after the war. This current phase is marked by a tremendous effort towards monarchist control in ROME.

3. ORGANIZATION OF RADIO "M".

The Badoglio groups as of the 1st of the year were headed by the Colonel MONTEZEMOLO whose organizational ability, rather than position, made him the recognized head of the resistance movement. He had five agents sets, using many agents who were not men and women left behind by the Government, but simply patriots. MONTEZEMOLO was
also in close liaison with the COMITATO and apparently had harmonious relations with them. He was caught a few weeks ago by the Germans and evidently forced to reveal information regarding the organization.

4. Organization of military section.

General ARMELLINI, head for ROME
General ACCAME, head for North Italy (SIM)
General CARBONI, ex-head for ROME, now in disgrace (see part III) (SIM)
General (?) TOMASI
Colonel RUGGERO, head of Granatieri, shot in Nov.
Major Santini, (SIM Aeronautica)
Colonel TOMMASINI, resistance groups
Major JANNINI, Antonio
Captain MIANI,
TAMBURINI, Police Chief for ROME under Fascist, now arrested by the Germans.

The military section organized among a) disbanded military units, b) disbanded police units (Carabinieri, Granatieri), and c) police units working for Fascists who would be counted on at the last minute, (PAI, Guardia di Finanza, Metropolitani). These groups in ROME numbered a potential of at least 10,000 men armed. Most of these men received regular wages from the Badoglio Government.

Outside of ROME winter, lack of food, and conflicting political views have cut down the Badoglioist military units to a point where they are no longer very significant.

5. The arrest of MONTEZEMOLO and the recent repressive measures in ROME (many of the police units counted on for support have been moved North and replaced by MILIZIA and GUARDIA REPUBLICANA) have weakened this official organization. Certainly, several of their ROME radios are out. The control of SIM in the organization and the control of BADOGLIO in the City has lessened.
6. The Italian Government are taking steps to strengthen their position.

   a. BADOGLIO has informed the Allies officially that ARMELLINI will be Italian Military Commander for ROME in the interim period and Senator MONTA will be Civil Chief.

   b. Contact is being made and money given to monarchical groups. These groups previously were not well organized, but an effort is being made to have pro-Badoglio sections among the political parties as there are now in Southern Italy.

   c. A tremendous campaign is being directed at Allied policy. ACC, AMG and even military units are being warned constantly that the failure to order political groups in ROME to recognize BADOGLIO authority will result in a revolt dangerous to Allied military security.
OTHER GROUPS

1. In a military sense no smaller organizations are significant. The majority of groups in Rome and North Italy began inspired only by a hatred of the Germans. Particularly in the North these groups, workers, Army officers, and farmers, have retained to a large extent a non-political attitude. Their leaders, however, the men from whom they will take orders because it is from them or through them they receive supplies, organization and money, are almost all political. It is important, therefore, to realize that, though many bands in the North give themselves one name or another, they will follow the leadership of one of the large groups outlined in Parts ONE and TWO. The information given below will be useful for making contacts, but is not significant in any estimate of the future of Italian resistance to the Germans.

2. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Vatican and Church-led groups are the most important of these smaller groups. Church groups are here considered as distinct from the Partito Demo-Cristiano.

a. The Church politically

The Vatican is a neutral State and is anxious to preserve that neutrality for religious and political reasons. The Vatican cannot afford to alienate Catholic groups in Axis or pro-Axis countries, nor can it run the risk of giving the Germans the diplomatic excuse to enter Church lands. Consequently, overt activity in favor of any side, or of any party in Italy, is impossible. The Church subvertsly endorses the Demo-Christian party and the clerical elements of monarchical parties, but cannot afford to be committed to open endorsement of either. One is, after all, tied to the purely political COMITATO which includes Communists, the other supports a Masonic royal house, whose position is not secure.
b. The Church's pro-Allied activity

Committed morally to oppose much that is un-Christian in Nazism the Church has always been eager to oppose the Axis, if, in doing so, it does not lose the adherence of a large section of its international congregation. Evidently, Allied diplomacy and particularly the visit of Spellmann convinced the Vatican that support of Italian resistance against the Germans was imperative. The system of clandestine intelligence and propaganda so effective in Germany and Poland began in Italy. Today the majority of the clergy in German-occupied Italy work in some way with resistance organizations.

c. Organization of Vatican Resistance

The Palatine Guards in the Vatican City were 400 in number at the beginning of September and in December were 1500 strong. (Source: agent).

A colored American officer in hiding in ROME had to escape when the district he was in was to be searched house by house. The Vatican Ethiopian Legation, twenty strong, visited that house; after the visit twenty-one black delegates re-entered the safety of the Vatican City. (Source: agent).

Monsignor MAGLIONE, Papal Secretary of State officially informed the Allies that the Father Superior of a certain Church abbey was pro-Fascist and dangerous. This is, of course, the temporal voice of the Church speaking, - a neutral state breaking its neutrality. It is on this type of dual logic that the Church today can aid, as it has, everyone from anarchists to monarchists. Escaped prisoners, Jews, Italian officers, Badoglio's son, Roveda, communist leader, the Partito d'Azione and Ricciotti Garibaldi have all found haven and guidance in the church and convent net-work through North Italy. (Source: Messenger from ROME).

d. The above examples are to demonstrate that, operationally, the Vatican is a sure source of aid in fight
against the Germans. The Vatican's policy political has probably not been formed, and certainly not demonstrated. In any case, its political policy with regard to post-war Italy is of no interest to operations with resistance groups today.

3. SMALL POLITICAL GROUPS

The small political groups outside of the COMITATO are difficult to define as their organization is poor and frequently change their names.

a. There is evidently an orthodox branch of the Communists. The MOVIMENTO COMUNISTA D'ITALIA seems to be Trotsky-ist. Its publication is the "Bandiera Rossa" and its propaganda is not pro Stalin Russia, rather pro-Lenin. Other names for possibly the same group are Partito Socialists Rivoluzionario, and Trotsky Socialisti (latter probably a popularization). Their leader appears to be the son of MATTEOTTI.

b. Another so-called Communist group is the MOVIMENTO DEI CATTOLICI COMUNISTI, in reality a violent Demo-Christian group. The combination of names is designed to win the support of both church and workers, but, so far, the party is weak. Avvocato RODANO is alleged to be the leader.

c. The CRISTIANI SOCIALISTI is another group designed to appeal to both middle and lower classes. It may possibly appeal to Italian Protestants. Prof. BRUNI is the head. It is weaker still than the Cattolici Comunisti.

d. The PARTITO REPUBLICANO INDIPENDENTE led by the On. CONTI is still small. It may have some connection with MAZZINI inspired groups. (see CARBONARI below)

4. SMALL NON-POLITICAL GROUPS

There are numerous bands of "patriots" composed
of soldiers and peasants who fight locally, without control from any larger organization. These groups are generally suspicious of the Badoglio or political elements, although they frequently adopt "socialisti" and "comunisti" as popular titles. Usually, to maintain any considerable size they must ally with the larger groups.

Two organized fighting groups are the CARBONARI and GARIBALDINI. The first are MAZZINI Republicans and have a secret organization. It is, therefore, almost impossible to discuss them, except to say that escaping POW's encounter many mountain groups which are called "Carbonari". The "Garibaldini" are either local groups who have taken the name because of its connotation or groups organized by PEPPINO and RICCIOTTI GARIBALDI. These groups, as yet, do not appear to be numerous or strong. Politically both CARBONARI and GARIBALDINI are anti-monarchical.

Italian MASSONERIA, which is in contact with American, British and French Masons in Naples, seem to have maintained some sort of organization throughout Italy; at present, however, it is evident that they are only in a position to help existing resistance elements or Allied operations in a small way. Safe addresses and certainly financial assistance would be the form of such assistance. Politically, the Masons in Italy are temporarily stumped. The King is a Mason, but the Masons are extremely anti-Fascist and feel very uncomfortable supporting a Government which they feel is not whole-heartedly anti-Fascist. The Masons have declared themselves no longer clandestine in Allied-occupied territory, but have not yet made any statements of policy.
PART FOUR
OPERATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES

1. Irregular military operations in Northern Italy will soon be possible on a large scale. Unlike the divisions of partisan forces found in Yugoslavia and Greece, resistance groups in Northern Italy are at present relatively united.

2. There is great collaboration among the various military and political groups in the North. The example of the regular Army hiding in the mountains, fed and informed by socialist or communist workers, and financed by industrialists is an encouraging one. At present, Allied Special Operations agencies can work freely with Communist and Badoglio Groups, knowing that resistance organizations will work together.

3. Another advantage is the efficient Church organization and the willingness of the Church to collaborate. Other potential chains for cover and intelligence are labor unions, which are still weak, and the Freemasons.

4. This state of opportunity will not necessarily last. From the most reliable reports, it is apparent that the Italians place great importance on the decisions to be taken when the Allies arrive in ROME. Government sources seem alarmed over the alleged threat of armed opposition to their authorities in ROME. Some of the political parties have indicated that under present circumstances such a threat is real. Others deprecate such reports as exaggerations originating in the excited atmosphere of Naples and propagated with political intention. The most common theme, both in the defensive Government attitude and the attacks by the parties, is the abdication of the present King. One side argues that the abdication in these times would cause more disunion, the other side claims that, unless the King does abdicate, Italian resistance to the Germans will never be important.
5. Whichever decision is made by the Allies and whatever is the reaction of the Italians, the political future should be understood by Allied armies, particularly by OSS. At present, too few Americans are willing to admit the importance of politics in relation to irregular military activity. Of those that see this importance, the majority report and act with political bias. Operations based on a lack of information or misinformation could conceivably harm the Allied effort. This possibility should encourage vigorous, but unbiased investigation of Italian political activity.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I do not wish to burden you with detailed accounts of our work, but I think this report of OSS subversive operations among flag officers of the Royal Italian Navy will be of interest to you, especially as the project was planned and executed by three of my young naval officers.

This is an example of one type of activity being carried out by the OSS.

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

I do not wish to burden you with detailed accounts of our work, but I think this report of OSS subversive operations among flag officers of the Royal Italian Navy will be of interest to you, especially as the project was planned and executed by three of my young naval officers.

This is an example of one type of activity being carried out by the OSS.

William J. Donovan
Director
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. (25)

14 December 1943

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Miss Tully:

Prior to General Donovan's departure from the country, he dictated and signed the attached letter which he requested that I deliver to you for the President as soon as the inclosed report was completed.

I would appreciate it if you will be good enough to bring the document to the President's attention upon his return to Washington.

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director
February 2, 1944.

Dear Mr. Buxton:

I am sorry for the long delay in acknowledging receipt of the O.S.S. report. The President asks that you be good enough to thank General Donovan for sending it to him. He was much interested in seeing it and is putting it in his secret files.

Very sincerely yours,

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

G. Edward Buxton, Esq.,
Acting Director,
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, 25, D. C.
McGregor Project

Subversive work among
FLAG OFFICERS of the ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY

by OSS

Regraded Unclassified
1 Nov. 1943
Prior to the Allied invasion of Italy, the OSS, by underground means approached flag officers of the Royal Italian Navy. A letter outlining the reasons for Italy's withdrawal from the war was secretly delivered to Admiral Girosi of the Italian Joint Chiefs of Staff and read by him before this group, which received it favorably. The Italian Secretary of the Navy knew of the communication and immediately after the Allied invasion of Italy directed a number of high ranking officers to give valuable Naval information to OSS for the use of the United States Navy.

The OSS Mission made secret landings at various points on the German-held Italian coast to make contacts with certain Italian officers. Two days after the Allied landing at Salerno the group went ashore on a mission and until they left, six days later by motor launch, were under constant enemy fire. In the course of these operations, contacts were made with Vice Admiral Barone, Commander of Italian Naval Forces in Sicilian waters, and Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini, head of the Royal Italian Torpedo Works in Naples area.

Admiral Minisini was prevailed upon to place his secret devices and technical skill at the disposal of OSS for subsequent use by the United States Navy. The OSS secured authorization from the Italian Secretary of the Navy for him to cooperate fully with the Americans. He thereupon placed himself in the hands of the OSS party for protection and together with his wife was taken from Capri to North Africa in a PT boat and was flown to the United States, where he is now living.

The Royal Italian Torpedo Works had been destroyed by the retreating Germans. Acting under the guidance of Admiral Minisini, members of the OSS group explored the ruins and rescued a model of an underwater device and other valuable material. A barge-load of parts for a newly developed torpedo and other weapons had been sunk in the Bay of Naples. Four days after the Allied occupation of the city all of the material was rescued by divers. The model, torpedo-parts and two completed "Commando" submarines are now en route to the United States on a Naval vessel.

Admiral Minisini has placed his technical knowledge at the disposal of the United States Navy through the OSS. He has described in detail the secret under-water devices which were in production in Italian arsenals and the results of experiments on Naval and aerial weapons. Among these secret devices are radio-guided aerial torpedoes, a radio-controlled aerial bomb, a magnetic pistol for torpedoes, a powerful new-type motor for torpedoes, and a "Commando" submarine capable of high under-water speed.

Admiral Minisini gave the OSS letters of introduction to certain Italian scientists and technicians whose work is directly concerned with Naval weapons.

OSS has engaged ten of these men whom they are bringing to the United States. Two others are still in German-occupied Italy. OSS has sent agents to contact these men and to arrange for their escape from enemy territory.
Covering letter to the President by Brigadier General William J. Donovan, Director Office of Strategic Services.

Covering letter to Secretary of the Navy Knox by General Donovan.

Secretary Knox's reply to General Donovan.

Covering letter to General Donovan from Lt. Comdr. John M. Shaheen, USNR.

Report, McGregor Project; Subversive work among Flag Officers of the Royal Italian Navy by OSS.

Appendices:

A. Photostatic copy of letter to Admiral Girosi from OSS Agent Girosi.
B. English translation of Appendix A.
C. Message radioed in Operational Plan #2.
D. Delivery instructions for Operational Plans #1, #2, #3, and #4.
F. Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini's memorandum of October 29, 1943, to General Donovan: Experiment and Research on Italian Naval and Aerial Weapons.
G. Technical descriptions of New Italian secret ordnance devices:
   - Guided Missiles and Winged Bomb
   - Winged Torpedo
   - Oxygen Torpedo
   - Aircraft Torpedoes
   - SIC Magnetic Pistol
   - Three Man Assault Submarine
H. Orders to Lt. (j.g.) Henry R. North, USNR, from Lt. Comdr. Shaheen directing salvage operations in Naples area.
I. Secret Italian Torpedo Devices being brought to the United States by OSS.
J. Photographs of Salvage Operations at Royal Italian Torpedo Works.
K. Biography of Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini, Royal Italian Navy from facts supplied by subject.
L. Copy of contract between OSS and Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini, Royal Italian Navy.
M. OSS Inter-Office Memo re: McGregor contacts in present Italian Cabinet.
TO: General William J. Donovan, Director, Office of Strategic Services

FROM: Lieutenant John M. Shaheen, USNR, Officer in Charge McGregor Project

SUBJECT: Report, McGregor Project.

In accordance with your orders to carry on subversive work among flag officers of the Royal Italian Navy, the McGregor Project was planned and executed from May through October of 1943, as outlined in the accompanying report and appendices. The task was carried out by the OSS with close cooperation from U.S. Army and Navy officers including the direct assistance of the Secretary of the Navy.

This report consists of two parts: one, a brief summary in outline form of the Objective, Results, and Execution; and two, a detailed chronological report of the McGregor Project from its inception to its completion (bound separately).

John M. Shaheen
The Honorable Frank Knox  
Secretary of the Navy  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I know you will be interested in the accompanying report of the subversive work carried out by the OSS among Flag Officers of the Royal Italian Navy inasmuch as you have personally been consulted about this project from its beginning to its completion. Without your support, not only at its inception but at other critical points, this job could not have been done.

We are deeply appreciative of the invaluable assistance you personally gave this matter. The ranking U.S. Army and Naval officers in the theaters in which this operation was executed contributed significantly to its success.

I wish to thank you for the assignment of Captain Edward A. Hayes, USNR, of your office, who materially assisted the implementation of this project. The three U.S. Naval officers on duty with the OSS who were assigned to this Mission, did excellent and courageous work in the planning and execution of their assignment. These men are Lieutenant John M. Shaheen, USNR, the officer in charge who originated this project, Lieutenant (jg) Henry Ringling North, USNR, and Ensign E. M. Burke, USNR. I should like to recommend strongly that these officers be recognized for their outstanding achievement.

Separately, as discussed with you several days ago, I am sending letters recommending Shaheen and Burke for promotion. At a later date, when he has completed his present assignment overseas, I shall send a similar letter recommending North.

I should like to call to the attention of the Navy Department the exceptional and courageous performance of OSS civilian agent Marcello Girosi on this mission.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director
Dear General Donovan:

I wish to thank you for the intensely interesting report on the McGregor project, and your kind remarks about any support I may have given it.

I was glad to learn of the fine spirit of cooperation between the Navy and O.S.S. in planning and successfully executing this undertaking, and especially of the part played by Lieutenant John Shaheen, USNR, Lieutenant (j.g.) Henry Ringling North, USNR, and Ensign E. M. Burke, USNR.

In reading the report, I noted in particular the courageous performance of Marcello Girosi, O.S.S. civilian agent.

The results of this project cannot be fully determined as yet, but promise to be of inestimable value in the development of new weapons.

I extend my sincerest congratulations and respects to you and all those in O.S.S. who planned, organized, and executed McGregor.

Sincerely,

Frank Knox

Brig. General William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D. C.
SECRET

SUBVERSIVE WORK AMONG FLAG OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY BY OSS
(McGregor Project)

1 November 1943

I. OBJECTIVE

By subversive means, it was planned to approach flag officers of the Royal Italian Navy to (1) help get Italy out of the war; (2) transfer the Italian fleet to the Allies; and (3) obtain intelligence of both a strategic and technical nature.

II. RESULTS

1. Rear Admiral Massimo Girosi, member of Italian Commando Supremo (Italian Joint Chief of Staff) was contacted prior to D-Day. He read, before the Commando Supremo, our documents, signed by his brother OSS Agent Marcello Girosi, outlining reasons for getting Italy out of war. These were favorably received. However, it was just at this time that Marshal Badoglio had begun to treat with General Eisenhower.

2. OSS underground approach to Italian Navy was known by Italian Secretary of Navy, De Courten, prior to D-Day. He did not prevent communications but also did not aid us prior to D-Day. However, immediately after D-Day he:

   (a) Gave the OSS Naval officers valuable intelligence;
   (b) Gave the OSS specific information on the extent of OSS subversive work prior to D-Day;
   (c) Directed Vice Admiral Minisini to cooperate with the Americans.

3. Vice Admiral Barone, Commanding Italian Naval Forces in Sicilian waters, and his son Lt. Commander Barone who had been Italian Liaison Officer with German E boat squadrons based in Italy:

   (a) Gave OSS valuable intelligence;
(b) Helped convince Vice Admiral Minisini that he should cooperate with the United States Navy.

4. Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini, head of the Italian torpedo works was brought to the United States by OSS. His services have been made available to the United States Navy for research and development work. Minisini is now giving the United States Navy:

(a) Technical information regarding Italian Naval ordnance;

(b) Complete plans of four new secret torpedo devices which he has invented and which are classed as secret weapons;

(c) All new weapons and devices in production, models, plans, and results of experiments which have been salvaged by Lt. Henry Ringling North of the OSS from the Naval Torpedo factories and research laboratories in Naples, Bais, Fusaro, San Martino, and by divers from the bottom of the Bay of Naples where a barge holding some secret devices had been sunk, on orders from Badoglio, some days before we invaded Italy. This equipment is now aboard a U.S. Navy ship and is being transported to the United States.

Minisini has informed us of certain Italian scientists and technicians whose work is directly related to Army and Naval weapons. OSS has engaged ten of these men who are now aboard a U.S. Navy ship en route to the United States. Two others are still in German-occupied Italy and OSS has sent agents in to bring them out.

III. EXECUTION

In a joint effort by the United States Navy (Office of Naval Intelligence) and the Office of Strategic Services, a specially selected group of officers was sent to the North African Theater early in July to get in touch with various Italian Naval flag officers then
in Italy. Captain Edward A. Hayes, USNR, established the necessary authorizations and blanket approvals with the North African and Middle East Theater Officers so that the following operational plans could be carried out using the existing Allied Army, Navy, Air Force and OSS organizations and equipment. Vincent Scamperino, Officer in Charge of the OSS organization in Sicily, and his staff of specialists worked closely with the McGregor Mission in the preparation and implementation of these operational plans.

1. **PERSONNEL**
   
   (a) Captain Edward A. Hayes, USNR, representative of the Secretary of the Navy and the Office of Naval Intelligence.
   
   (b) Lt. Commander John M. Shaheen, USNR, representing General Donovan, Director of Strategic Services.
   
   (c) Lieutenant (j.g.) E. M. Burke, USNR, of the OSS.
   
   (d) Lieutenant (j.g.) Henry Ringling North, USNR, of the OSS.
   
   (e) Mr. Marcello Girosi, an American citizen and OSS Agent, brother of Rear Admiral Massimo Girosi of the Royal Italian Navy.
   
   (f) Mr. Joseph Savoldi, Jr., OSS Agent.
   
   (g) Mr. Peter Tompkins, OSS Agent.
   
   (h) Mr. Carlos Conti, OSS Agent.

2. **OPERATIONAL PLANS**

   Initial communications were to be sent to certain selected Italian Naval Flag Officers via underground methods as follows:

   **Operational Plan No. 1**

   During the proper period of the moon in July, a letter carefully prepared by Agent Girosi (personally approved by
General Donovan) addressed to Rear Admiral Massimo Girosi, Italian Commando Supremo, Rome, was to be included in a package dropped by parachute to the OSS underground operatives in Southern France who were to smuggle it across the border to the OSS Headquarters in Bern, Switzerland, from where the Italian railroad workers underground (affiliated with the OSS) would pass it on to Rome for delivery either to the Italian Admiral or to another brother who is a Lt. Commander in the Italian Navy, or to certain other "cutouts". Every detail of this plan was carefully prepared but it was not executed because there were no adequately equipped American aircraft available for parachute operations in the North African Theater during the proper moon period in the month of July. A request was made for one of the British aircraft adapted for parachutage operations which were then based at Bleda airport, near Algiers, but the OSS was informed by the British that none was available.

Operational Plan No. 2

A digest of the document prepared for delivery in Operational Plan No. 1 was sent in the latter part of July by secret OSS radio from Algiers to Switzerland from where it was passed into Italy via the underground, and successfully delivered to the Lt. Commander brother who at the time of receipt was stationed at the Italian Naval base in Pola. From that point, communications were continued with this brother who was in touch with Admiral Girosi.

Operational Plan No. 3

Based in Palermo four days after the first American troops entered that city, during the Sicilian campaign, the officers of this mission, working with United States Navy PT-Boat Squadron No. 15, successfully landed agents by PT-Boat and rubber boat along
the German-held Italian coast. In August one of these agents acting
as a courier successfully delivered a duplicate copy of the Girosi
letter through a "cutout" to Admiral Girosi in Rome.

Operational Plan No. 4

Through the OSS organization in the Middle East,
another copy of the Girosi letter was to be sent in the Italian
diplomatic pouch from Istanbul to Rome. OSS had successfully
arranged for a member of the Italian diplomatic staff in Istanbul
to send safely this correspondence through German-held territory
by Italian diplomatic pouch. However, this was considered the
least secure of all plans proposed and was to be used only if all
others failed. As Operational Plan No. 3 was successful in reaching
Admiral Girosi, Operational Plan No. 4 although set up in detail,
was not used.

Operational Plan No. 5

Using as a forward operational base the northern
most point on the Italian mainland invaded by the Allies, the
McGregor party of officers and agents went ashore with the invasion
forces on the Salerno beaches D plus 2. The Salerno beach head, the
City of Salerno, Vico, Maiori, Amalfi, the Islands of Capri and
Ischia, and Naples were successively used as operational bases. The
Salerno Italian Naval Commandant, the Ischia Italian Naval Command-
dant, Vice Admirals Barone and Minisini on Capri, and various other
Italian Naval officers were successfully reached and aided; and in-
telligence gathered from them. Through Vice Admiral Barone, contact
was established with Vice Admiral Minisini and OSS was informed of
the various Naval ordnance secrets and the new torpedo devices which
Minisini had perfected for the Italian Navy. Minisini was prevailed
upon to place his secret devices and experiments at the disposal of
the United States Navy through the OSS, subject to the approval of
Italian Secretary of the Navy de Courten. Lt. Shaheen, Agent Girosi,
and Captain James Rand, of General Clark's staff, flew to Brindisi,
the new seat of Italian Government and received written authorization
from de Courten for Minisini to cooperate with the Americans. Fearful
of attack by the Gestapo and unwelcome British efforts to take him
to London, Vice Admiral Minisini placed himself and his wife in the
hands of this OSS Mission for protection and was brought by PT boat
from Capri to North Africa and thence by air to the United States
where he is now resident.

3. TIME AND SPACE FACTORS

First Group left the United States by air July 5 followed
by second group July 8 arriving in Algiers four days later. Planning
and execution of operations commenced immediately upon arrival in
Algiers and occupied personnel until their return to the United
States late in October. Algiers, Tunis, Cairo, Palermo, Salerno,
Capri, and Naples were used as operational bases in various phases
of this Mission. Officers attached to this mission went into both
Sicily and Italy with the invasion and occupation forces and worked
with the G-2 sections of the 7th and 5th armies and the ONI Section
of Vice Admiral Hewitt's staff, as well as with the regular OSS or-
ganizations which functioned with the invasion forces.

4. TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

With the exception of transport into enemy or contested
territory, aircraft were used exclusively for transportation both
to, from and in the Mediterranean theaters. United States Navy PT
boats were used in the several thousand miles of transport to,
from and in enemy waters. Rubber boats were used to land agents
after PT boats brought them within several hundred yards of enemy shores.

Secret OSS radio was used wherever U.S. Army and Navy communication facilities were not available. Agents' shortwave "suitcase" sets connected field groups with the nearest OSS base station which relayed messages to A.F.H.Q., Algiers or Washington.

5. CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY

(a) Agents were landed and rendezvous kept three different nights along Western coast of Italy from Terracina south to Calabria prior to D-Day by Lts. Shaheen and North and Ensign Burke who were transported by PT boat from Palermo to prearranged pinpoints. In these operations on moonless nights the PT boats approached to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy shore and agents were landed by rubber boat.

(b) During the months of July, August, and September officers of this mission were nine different times under severe bombing and shell and mortar fire in Palermo, Salerno, Procida and with the Allied invasion fleet. From D plus 2 through D plus 5 Lt. Shaheen, Ensign Burke and Agents Girosi, Savoldi, Tompkins, and Conti were in towns of Vino and Salerno (with the British Commandos) and under constant mortar and 88 mm. shell fire. While sleeping in a half-bombed building in Salerno a German patrol stole into the city and machine-gunned the streets. After accomplishment of objective in Salerno the city was left under circumstances of escape. This party had to leave by sea although the German artillery in the hills overlooking Salerno harbor commanded its approaches. The party proceeded to the end of the mole which extended three-quarters of a mile into the harbor where a British landing boat had been made fast. The enemy in the hills spotted the group and laid down about twelve salvos from 88 mm. guns. The shells landed in the water as close as twenty
feet. The party was rescued by British Rear Admiral Morse (now COMNOB Naples) who came zigzagging in from the fleet at sea in a motor launch and took the party out to rejoin the fleet.

6. ARMY AND NAVY ASSISTANCE

Every request for cooperation made of U.S. Army and Navy Officers, including the very highest echelons, was given favorable and expeditious consideration during the five-month period in which this project was under way.

Secretary of the Navy Knox, and Vice Admiral R. S. Edwards, USN, Chief of Staff to Commander in Chief U.S. Fleet, were conferred with by General Donovan and other OSS officers in Washington during June of 1943. Secretary Knox was again consulted on the Isle of Capri in September of 1943 by Lt. Shaheen. North African Theater Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, USA, was approached through Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, USN, Commander U.S. Naval Forces North African Waters, for necessary approvals during October of 1943. Vice Admiral Hewitt gave this project his close personal cooperation and with his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Mays L. Lewis, USN, devoted considerable time to it. Rear Admiral Richard L. Conolly, USN, Commander, Southern Naval Task Force at Salerno landing, Captain Jerauld Wright, USN, of Vice Admiral Hewitt's staff, Captain Thomas A. Turner, USN, Commander Flight Air Wing 15, and Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, USN, (when Assistant Director, ONI) assisted the project at various crucial moments. Lt. Commander Stanley M. Barnes, USN, Commander, Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron, 15, spent many hours each week during the months of July, August, September, and October of 1943, in the planning and execution of the above operational plans. At different times various requests for assistance and authorizations were
personally made of Lt. General Mark W. Clark, USA, Commanding
General 5th Army, Major General Edwin J. House, USA, Commanding
General 12th Air Support Command, and Brigadier General Richard
E. Moran, USA, 5th Army Signal Officer, all of whom appreciated
the importance and urgency of this matter and cut through channels
to help get the job done. Various ranking members of Lt. General
George S. Patton, Jr.'s 7th Army Staff in Sicily, gave this project
their assistance.
Massimo mio carissimo,

La tua sorpresa nel ricevere questa lettera sarà eguale, se non più profonda, ai sentimenti che mi hanno indotto a scrivertela. — In quattro anni trascorsi da noi non ho mai conosciuto di eventi i quali, nel bene e nel male, hanno anche sentito uno dei tuoi dolorosi drammi che ha afflitto l'intera ombra mai

APPENDIX A.

Photostatic copy of letter to Admiral Girosi.

From OSS Agent Girosi.

ma anche per l'amore verso di noi che erano sempre amati, stimati, ammirati e aiutati.

Come profondamente i milioni di americani e di campi italiani, dei quali io sono soltanto un unico rappresentante, avranno coperto d'ancora soffranço la questa tragedia; com'; essi avranno sentito le conseguenze spirituali di questa innata distorsione storica, è cosa che io mi sento incapace di esprimere nella necessità brevità di questa mia

do ho ritenuto, così, e sono profondamente
convinto (se non lo fossi, io forse non
suviverei questa lettera affatto) che una
grande, una straordinaria magioranza
dei nostri fratelli di sangue in Italia
hanno diviso e divennero con noi
questa sensazione di trionfo assurda
e non al solo mi con cui loro abbiamo
restituiti le nostre riunioni di comprensione e
e aiuto - richiarono la prua andavi
Stati Uniti e America. —

Oggi, questi fratelli di America e
e Italia - ben quante obiezioni e trionfi
e il comito sta - sono ingaggiati in
una battaglia sanzionora sulle stesse
sponde di quella terra che noi tutti
rimaniamo e che è un fiore, a continuo
e millesime, hanno sempre trovato
in America negli ultimi cinquantà
anni un bene penoso, un aiuto
e, amore (e un prurito doloroso
e molto coesivo, il conforto di tricole
e pranzi torturose. —

Francamente, io falsifico miseramente—
e non me falso i miei di sangue
nosto in America - ne tentato di commen
tre tesi questa monotonità abbia
verificarsi e tenera, una volta
verificata a non commissione di un
grate errore storico, essa non fossa
annullamento cessare. —
Ma, piuttosto che intrattenermi più a lungo in questi toni e affini, imitare analisi di questo sfortunato capitolo della nostra storia, lascio in ti ti se i due punti che ti aiuteranno nel valutare, nel suo pieno valore, il significato e la portata di questa lettera:

1° io ti inizierò queste parole con la buona conoscenza e l'approvazione di affissime autorità americane e quale, indubbiamente e la me, ti considerano un brillante, indubbiamente e stimolasse, cado in esso più esatto, data cingu un po' più alle autorità di mio paese sono a conoscenza di questo mio desiderio — chiamato riso — se vuoi — ti comunicare con te e, il tuo volere, ti parlare con te al più presto possibile.

2°essere attato dall'americano e nessun caso di questi paesi, è a conoscenza di questo mio posto, di puro sulle nostre buie sacre trazioni, d'amici, sul nostro onore, sui nostri degni e sanguine, di l'autorizzazione di io ho ricevuto e mi autorizzazione strettamente americana. — le le mioni, eccellenti intenzioni di rispetto e di onore sono parte di questa autorizzazione.
Ti nuovo, lascia che ti ribeta che io non avrei scritto quest'attente ne avessi avuto anche la più remota sensazione che il tuo onore e il tuo ufficio tra sottoposti o fuori tali.

E a un nobilissimo onorevole Amministratore della Stazione Italiana delle Lettere e Scienze, con il consenso di altissime autorità del mio paese, di queste.

Tutto ciò che io ti dico, Massimo cara, è ti supplisco di non censurare questa mia richiesta tenendo conto che non vi è niente attualmente considerato di interesse e che innanzi e dopo averlo avuto esibito, onesto, finanzio scambio di riguardi.

Voscio intieramente al tuo piacere e al tuo onore come un rappresentante degli Stati del popolo italiano, il quale ha trovato da seguire per la decisione di tale vento che insiste in tua intelligenza e tua acuta comprensione. Sei partito stori e buonici coinvolto, se io ti raccomandassi che mi avessi la necessità di limitare al minimo indispensabile il numero delle persone te devi pure la consulenti in questa missione.

Te riporta pienamente conto del.
L'atto che le mie autorità ti sono
testato dal consultare il loro
maggiore atteggiamento. — Va massima
e una e discaricione vanno state adottate
a questo riguardo. —
Le rabbicoperi la decisione che
un incontro tra noi che è desiderabile
nelle presenti circostanze, io sono pronto
ad incontrarli in qualsiasi località di
 tua scelta. — In via generale, io ho
inserito oltre seguenti possibilità che ti
elenco in ordine di mia preferenza:

a) Incontro a mare, a mano incabience
o altro trasporto di tua scelta, ad
un determinato punto e latitudine
e lontane da me nel Mediterraneo o
nel polo di Atlantico, e con tutta immunità
garantita da entrambe le parti.

b) Qualsiasi punto della costa italiana
o ultramarino, o su una delle isole
del Mediterraneo.

c) Qualsiasi punto di tua scelta sulla
costa africana.

d) Un paese neutrale, come la Danimarca,
il Portogallo, la Svizzera o la Turchia.

E' possibile raggiungere uno di questi
paesi, se tu vuoi, senza essere
costretto ad altro.

§ Benevolmente e rabbiosamente
inteso che, nel caso la tua scelta ceda
su in punto contestato nei suddetti
(poi 1, 2, 3) completo immunità
tara, garantita la entrambi le conti. Ciò sarà in quanto ad attenermi a qualsiasi metòdo tu scegliessi per il "penzé-vous", ma quando tu deciderai il bosto e la data, conati dici giorni, la risposta a raggiungerti e cinque giorni per i preparativi allo incontro (totale 15 giorni). Però, se con il tuo aiuto, il latore della tua risposta potrà far ritorno a noi in un periodo inferiore ai dici giorni che noi brevettiamo, allora l'incontro potrebbe essere anticipato e un numero di giorni.

Poco conta, Massimo carissimo, per quel che mi riguarda, il tuo e la gravità del rischio che assumero tardi io solo avrebbero poteva tali se, io so quanto Leone e nobili sono li intimo, mi che appoggiato questa mia iniziativa. Ho volentieri impegno la mia vita e il mio onore per essa, saperlo che il tuo e tutto quello che li sauro e li, pronti ho imbrunato nella vita, rappresentano la mia forza e il mio sostegno.

Ma voglio ancora assicurarti che ho preso ogni precauzione ed ho avuto ogni desiderio, che la vita americana non la tratti...
Tuo onore, del tuo rango e della tua vita, ben sapendo che tu ami di tutto far accogliermi le stesse istruzioni.

Tutta cosa perduto, nulla sarà compromesso ascoltando ciò che ho da dirti; molto, invece, potrà essere guadagnato, non fuori ma individuamente. Massimo onore, ma per i milioni e milioni di esseri umani le cui vite, il cui onore e la storia futura possono essere stati afflittiti, fu una strana svolta del destino, nelle nostre umili mani.

Forse, quando tutto questo onore avrà avuto fine, ciascuno di noi, per noi contro, nei nostri rispettivi cambi, potrò fare la sua parte (tu molto più di me) e far cancellare questa traccia macchiata e non aiutare nella ricostruzione di ciò che è stato perduto.

Rivolta che il popolo italiano e tu sei uno dei suoi rappresentanti, migliora nella traccia italiana buona, avrai molti, molti amici di questa parte, almeno i tetti e gli errori saranno stati onorevolmente conosciuti.
con il mio sermo per cuori, ti
abbracci e chiedo a Dio di aiutarlo
e quelli entrambi

Tuo amm.

Manlio

P.S. Ostruzioni verò di scritti, avendo
generato questa lettera circa il metodo
con cui tu trovasi insofferente. Per
sassurvisi, terzo, che la risposta viene
attualmente da te, dalla incominciase
con una parola convenzionale che è il
nome di battesimo della bambina
ella nostra famiglia di cui chiamaremmo „Gigi“
Po bibli, a maggior sicurezza, trovasi sempre
l'accusato che la me personalmente rilevato. —
Naturalmente nella risposta trovasi
anche usano quanti 'dolore 'libere
tu ritorni necessarie.
Fati i motivi altamente sacri ci questa lettera, io ho credo che
tu non ti rammenti di alcuna misura
vena fresca contro le persone che si
sono d'entusiasmo e generosamente
frestate, perch'è questa lettera ti fosse
rivelata.

Ancora un abbraccio, con amore

Manlio
Inizia ogni tuo messaggio con il mio nome
"Gigi" (come vero e' battesimo)

Ti incontrerò: Morale
Un mio emissario ti incontrerà: Spirito
bescare t'incontrerà: buore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Numero</th>
<th>Nome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Sena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Maria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Giovanna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Giuseppina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nicola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Eduardo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Francesco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Antonio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Iliego</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bianca</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sottomarino</th>
<th>Oggi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Torpediniera</td>
<td>Neri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeroplano</td>
<td>Tromani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.A.S.</td>
<td>Fornemicia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nome aperto</th>
<th>Padre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bitta</td>
<td>Zio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isola</td>
<td>Feme</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nativitá</th>
<th>Rosa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Longitúdine</td>
<td>Nera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giàdi</td>
<td>Rosso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primi</td>
<td>Teresa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondi</td>
<td>Acqua</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aposto</th>
<th>Irene</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Settembre</td>
<td>Leone</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nord</th>
<th>Tennis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sud</td>
<td>Balcio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Est</td>
<td>Nuoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ovest</td>
<td>Remi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

La parola d'ordine
al momento dell'incontro
sarà la stessa del nome
mi battesimo è "Gigi"
Dear Massimo:

Your surprise in receiving this letter will no doubt equal, if not surpass, the very deep emotions which prompt me in addressing it to you. The four years that have gone by since the happy days of our last encounter have seen the gradual and tragic developments of events which, by placing our countries at war, have also unleashed one of the greatest dramas that the history of humanity have ever written; the drama of two peoples that not only by traditions but also by close ties of blood had always loved one another, esteemed, admired, helped one another.

How deeply the millions of Americans of Italian blood, of which I am only a humble representative, have suffered and still suffer from this tragedy, how keenly they have felt the emotional impact of this unnatural historical distortion is something which I feel utterly inadequate to express in the necessary conciseness of this letter. I am confident, however, I am convinced (and if I were not, I would probably not be writing this letter at all) that a great, great majority of our blood brothers in Italy have shared and do share with us this feeling of tragic absurdity since the day in which their representatives - not withstanding our pleas and our promises of understanding and help - declared war on the United States.

Today, these brothers of America and Italy, however tragic and distasteful the task may be, are locked in a bloody battle on the very shores of that land that we all love and whose sons by the hundreds of thousands have always found in America for the last fifty years a generous bread, a secure shelter, the love of a people and, quite often, the comfort of small and big fortunes.

Frankly, I fail miserably, and with me fail millions of my blood in America - to understand why this monstrosity had to occur at all and why, once occurred by the commission of a great historical mistake, it cannot be stopped.

But, rather than indulge further in this painful, and L'elas, useless analysis of this unfortunate chapter of our history, let me state at once two points that will help you in evaluating, in all its full significance, the meaning and the portent of this letter:

First, I address these words to you with the full knowledge and backing of highest American authorities who, independently of me, consider you a brilliant, independent and highly esteemed leader; to be exact only five of the top leaders of our country are acquainted with this desire of mine - call it desperate if you want - to communicate with you and, God may want, to talk with you at the earliest possible moment.

Second, no other Allied country or leader know of this. I swear to you on our most sacred family traditions, honor, and ties that this is a strictly American permission which I have received. The best, the very best intentions of respect and honor are behind this permission.
Again let me say that I would not have undertaken the writing of this letter at all had I sensed even in the remotest way that your honor as a man and as a great soldier would be questioned or suspected.

It is to a noble and honorable Admiral of the Italian nation that this letter is written with the consent of high authority of my country of adoption.

All I ask, Massimo dear, and I beseech you not to dismiss my request without very careful consideration, is to meet you and to be able to have with you a very explicit, honest, frank exchange of views.

I leave entirely to your best judgment and to your honor as a servant of the Italian people to decide the procedure of your final decision. I feel I would insult your intelligence and your keen grasp of the political and historical factors involved, if I stressed too much with you the necessity of limiting to the utmost the number of people - if any - that you have to consult in this matter.

In this respect, bear fully in mind that my authorities have refrained from consulting any of its Allies. The utmost care has been taken in this respect.

Should you reach the decision that an encounter of us two would be in order under the circumstances, I am willing and ready to meet you anywhere you may select. Offhand, I can think of the following possibilities, listed in the order of my preference:

A. A meeting at sea, or any other means of transportation you may select at any given degrees of latitude and longitude in the Mediterranean or the Atlantic Ocean; full immunity to be guaranteed by both parties.

B. Any point at shore on the Italian or Albanian coasts or on one of the Dodecanese Islands.

C. Any point of your own choice on the African coast.

D. A neutral country such as Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Turkey. I can reach any of these countries, if you can, without arousing suspicion.

It is fully and most sacredly understood that in case a point contemplated in paragraphs A, B, and C (above) should be decided upon complete immunity will be guaranteed by both parties.

I will be ready to comply with any of the above methods of rendezvous as stated. Specific instructions as to setting a date for rendezvous will be given to you in the accompanying instructions which designate the method of reply. When you designate a specific time and place allow ten days for the answer to get to us and five days for our preparation for the meeting. (Total fifteen days) However, if with your help the return of the bearer with your reply, can be accomplished in a shorter time than the ten days we anticipate, then we can meet that many days sooner.
Little it counts, my dear Massimo, as far as I am concerned, the amount and type of risk I have to take in order to have this all-vital conversation with you; I know how worthy, how noble are the intentions that are behind this move. I have gladly pledged my life and my honor to it knowing that God and all that I have learned to be sacred and just are my strength and my support.

But, I want again to assure you that I have taken every precaution and received absolute assurance from the American authorities for the protection of your honor, your rank, and your life, as I know only too well that you will accord me the same protection.

Nothing will be lost, nothing will be compromised by hearing what I have to say to you; much instead, can be gained, not for us individually, Massimo dear, but for the millions and millions of human beings whose lives, honor and future history may have been entrusted, by a strange turn of fate, in our humble hands.

Perhaps, when this bloody mess will be over, each one of us, in our respective fields, will be able to do his share (you, far more than I) in wiping out this tragic stain, and help a great deal in reconstructing and improving on what has been lost.

Remember that the Italian people, and you are one of its ranking leaders in the purest Italian tradition, will have many, many friends this side, once in the wrong, and the mistakes will have been honorably corrected.

With the purest of all hearts, I shake your hand and ask of God to help us and guide us both.

P.S. Instructions, either written or verbal will accompany this letter as to the method of sending your reply to me. In order for me to be sure that the reply is actually from you, be sure to mark the answer with a code word which is the first name of our childhood nurse whom we nicknamed "Gigi"; this you can use for additional security, the enclosed code which I have personally prepared. Naturally, in your answer you can intersperse as many open words as necessary.

Due to the highly peaceful motives of this letter, I trust implicitly that you will see that no measures of any kind be taken against the people who have so kindly and generously helped me in having this letter reach you.
Will meet you - Morale
My emissary will meet you - Spinto
Cesare will meet you - Cuore

0 Elena
1 Maria
2 Giovanni
3 Giuseppina
4 Nicola
5 Eduardo
6 Francesco
7 Antonio
8 Diego
9 Bianca

Latitude     Rosa
Longitude     Nera
Gradi        Rosso
Primi         Teresa
Secondi      Aigua
August      Irene
September    Leone
North         Tennis
South        Calero (Caliro)
East         Nuoto
West          Resni
Submarine     Oggi
Destroyer     Teri
Plane         Domani
PT            Domenica
Baia (Beach)  Grenello
Coast         Nadre
Open Sea      Padre
Città        Lio
Island        Seme
Albergo      Nipote
Villa         Cugino
Turchia       Pianta
Svizzera      Albero
Spagna        Triore
Portogallo    Erba

Rendezvous password - "Gigi" - Margherita
MESSAGE RADIOED IN OPERATIONAL PLAN #2.

For exchange of views of high interest to our countries, it is vitally desirable for you and I to have a personal meeting immediately. I act with consent and support highest American authorities. Discretion being indispensable limit your consultations with higher military authorities to the minimum necessary. Beseech you to do your best in the supreme interest of your people. I am ready to meet you on Italian or Allied territory or at sea but preferably coast of Amalfi at Positano beach at least eight days after you have given reply to the bearer of this message. Your reply should indicate place and time of rendezvous. Mutual word of honor understood guaranteeing absolute immunity and safe conduct for return. With brotherly affection, Marcello.
DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS FOR LETTER AND MESSAGE
IN OPERATIONAL PLANS 1, 2, 3 AND 4

Appendix D.

Use the following procedure in delivering the letter. One of the following carefully selected persons, listed in order of preference, is to be discreetly approached and asked to deliver the letter personally to the addressee, Admiral Massimo Girosi, Royal Italian Navy, last known to be in the Ministry of Marine on the Commando Supremo, in or near Rome.

First Choice - Capitano di Corvetta, Cesare Girosi, Italian Navy brother of Admiral. To learn address telephone the home of Ilo Nunes, Piazza in Piscinula 8, Rome, telephone 582-526 or call the motion picture propaganda section of the Ministry of Marine, Rome, 360-251.

Second Choice - Mrs. Elda Girosi, wife of Admiral, living in or near Rome.

Third Choice - Mr. Gino Girosi, another brother of the Admiral, Via Carlo Poerio 90 in Naples. His name is in the Naples telephone directory or telephone Naples 50-190.

Fourth Choice - Ilo Nunes, Piazza in Piscinula 8, Rome, telephone number 582-526.

If it is found that none of the above persons can satisfactorily deliver the letter then the Admiral himself is to be approached in an extremely discreet and cautious manner. The Admiral, a Navy member of the Commando Supremo, can be reached at or through the Ministero Della Marina, Piazza 28 Ottobre, Rome, telephone 360-251 or in the offices of the Il Capo di Stato Maggiore of the Ministry of Marine, telephone 360-991.

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR: General William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services

FROM: Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini,
President of the "Silvificio Italiano" (Italian Torpedo Works),
Naples, and Vice-President of the I.R.I. (Institute of Industrial
Reconstruction).

SUBJECT: Italian Naval Weapons in Production

The Italian Torpedo Works has put into production the following devices for underwater weapons, details of which are being made available to your organization.

1. Electro-magnetic pistol SIC (Silvificio Italiano Calosi)

The working of this electro-magnetic pistol is based on the variations of the magnetic field of the torpedo itself when it passes under the target.

Two types of this pistol exist: the first, which can operate only on a torpedo which has been magnetized by special process, and the second, the more recent one, which can operate without such process of magnetization of the torpedo itself.

Both types are practically insensitive to the "degaussing" protection of the ships. (For greater details on the electro-magnetic pistol, see separate report.)

2. A short and light torpedo propelled by a gaseous oxygen for very fast torpedo planes operating from aircraft carriers. Diameter 18 inches, length 9 feet, weight 1300 pounds, explosive charge 400 pounds, speed 38 knots at 4500 feet, launching altitude 300 meters with the plane going at 400 kilometers per hour.

The OSS has salvaged some models of this torpedo which should be shipped to the U.S. within a very short time.

3. A two-cycle motor actioned by gaseous oxygen or liquid of a high O² content for torpedo or "commando submarine" operating at very high speed. This motor on which the tests have been successfully completed with gaseous oxygen, has been found by OSS at Baia and could be shipped to the U.S. where further tests with the liquid of high O² content could be completed.
4. Air-actioned torpedo used by the Italian Air Force (speed 80 feet a second at a distance of 9,000 feet; speed 50 feet a second at a distance of 15,000 feet, with a direct trajectory or circular trajectory, and a special device for aero-dynamic lifting which assures a safe plunging into the water from a height of 600 feet and from a plane proceeding at a speed of 360 kilometers per hour. (For greater details, see separate report)

5. Heater for liquid of high O2 content suitable for feeding the present motors of both torpedoes and "commando submarines" at high speed. This heater has been tested by the Institute of Motors in Naples (National Board of Research) and the formula of the liquid is owned by Professor Ferretti of the same Institute. (See separate report)

6. Electric torpedo SIAR (Sivificio Italiano - Ansaldo Hensenberger), the tests on which have been completed, and it was to have been substituted for the German electric torpedo used by the Italian submarine (Speed 45 feet a second at 12,000 feet).

Two samples of this new electric torpedo were ready at the Torpedo Works in Baia and have been found by OSS and should be shipped to the U.S.

7. "Commando submarine" for tactical use at very high speed with motors fed by alcohol or gaseous oxygen. This submarine during trials has reached an underwater speed of 60 knots with an autonomy under water of 30 miles or above water of 100 miles. Its hull can withstand pressure to a depth of 100 meters and it is armed by two short torpedos of 18 inches diameter. The use on this submarine of the new motors described in paragraph 2 above, was being contemplated in order to obtain an increase in speed and autonomy. Two samples of these "commando submarines" have been found at Baia by OSS and should be shipped to the U.S.

8. Hydraulic catapult for the launching of the winged torpedos or other heavy weapons.

9. A new protective device against torpedos based on the use of special resonant hydrophones invented by Professor Calosi and of special bombs and bomb-throwers for an underwater barrage against torpedos.

10. A new organization of the war-heads of the torpedos (based on the experience of the war) in order to assure the complete detonation of the explosive charge in cases of direct hits.

Eugenio Minisini
MEMORANDUM FOR: General William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services

FROM: Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini,
President of the "Silurificio Italiano" (Italian Torpedo Works),
Naples, and Vice-President of the I.R.I. (Institute of Industrial Reconstruction)

SUBJECT: Experiment and Research on Italian Naval and Aerial Weapons.

In the month of May, 1942, using the assistance of the best technical minds available in Italy, the Italian Torpedo Works began the study of winged aerial projectiles, i.e., those weapons which, by virtue of their freedom of use, maneuverability and precision of aiming, should compare advantageously with the naval projectiles of great calibre and with the ordinary torpedo.

In particular, the Italian Torpedo Works was conducting extensive research and experimental work on the following weapons, details of which are being made available to your organization.

1. A radio-controlled, or radio-guided, or photo-guided, winged bomb, for direct descending trajectory (speed 450 feet a second on a flight angle of 25 degrees).

2. A radio-controlled, or radio-guided, bomb for indirect trajectory (last part of the flight horizontal).

3. A winged torpedo, radio-guided or radio-controlled as above (speed 300 feet a second on a flight angle of 25 degrees) for mixed trajectory (the last part of the flight under water 62 feet a second).

4. A winged torpedo, radio-controlled or radio-guided as above (speed 300 feet a second in horizontal flight with aerial propulsion) for mixed trajectory (last part of the flight under water at 60 feet a second).

The projectile No. 1 can be used from distances of 50,000 to 36,000 feet, and from altitudes of 12,000 to 15,000 feet, using reaction propulsion with the adoption either of gas or liquid of very high O₂ content with gasoline as fuel and water as the cooling agent.

The projectile No. 2 can be used at distances and...
Naval and Aerial Weapons - Experiment and Research.

altitudes mentioned for the projectile No. 1, but it offers greater facility of aim and a greater percentage of direct hits. Like No. 1, this projectile No. 2 uses reaction propulsion. For both No. 1 and No. 2, a deflector-precursor was considered for the perfect functioning under water of the explosive charge.

The projectile No. 3 can be used at the same distance and from the same altitude as Nos. 1 and 2. It also uses reaction propulsion and plunges into water less than 3,000 feet from the target. It destroys its own aero-dynamic support and completes its trajectory under water like a normal torpedo, from which it differs only by the use of a liquid of very high O2 content, instead of air. This fact permits the reduction of the size of the weapon which has a diameter of 18 inches, to a length of about 9 feet, and to a weight of approximately 1,000 pounds, and an explosive charge of about 400 pounds.

The projectile No. 4 can be used from distances of 30,000 to 56,000 feet, but also from a very low altitude because its aerial trajectory is effected by auto-propulsion (aerial propellers run by the motors of the torpedo itself). It plunges into the water less than 3,000 feet from the target, losing and destroying its own aerial propellers and aero-dynamic support. It runs its underwater trajectory like a normal torpedo, from which it differs only by the use of a liquid of high O2 content. This weapon has a diameter of 18 inches, is 13 feet long and weighs about 1400 pounds.

This winged torpedo Italy intended to use also from ships or coastal batteries, in which case it would have been launched into the air at great speed by using a special hydraulic catapult.

For the projectiles Nos. 3 and 4, the use of the electromagnetic pistol SIC was contemplated.

Eugenio Minisini
To avoid premature detection and minimize gunfire effect on bombers, SI has extended to bomb by analogy of the same ideas developed in the study of winged torpedoes. With the assistance of the same experts indicated in the memorandum on Winged torpedoes, SI has started preliminary work on winged bombs.

Bombs fitted with wings and suitable aerodynamic parts and devices to stabilize the course in gliding can be released 4000 to 5000 meters in height and directed at high speed on downward direct or indirect gliding course to the target at horizontal distances from 8000 to 10,000 meters. Bombs like torpedoes can be radio or photo directed or radio commanded. If radio directed, micro waves should be used; if photo directed infra-red light must be employed.

The comparison of radio or photo direction and radio command, points to the desirability of using the first system with direct gliding trajectories.

SI with the assistance of General Crocco has fixed his preference for the adoption of an indirect trajectory of the winged bomb. This solution consists of a normal drop of the bomb along its parabolic natural trajectory from 4000 to 5000 meters to about 500 meters over the sea level; at this height the bomb begins its gliding course with a downward inclination of 35 to 45 degrees reaching a height over the sea of about 50 meters, the bomb then begins its final course paralleled to the water at a height from 5 to 10 meters regulated from a special device which increases the angle of incidence of the wings and their surface.

On its horizontal flight, the bomb expends the energy acquired during its downward fall. The bomb strikes the target on the upper
works, its after part and the aerodynamic part are destroyed by a special explosive charge which deflects downward the course of the fore part containing the main charge. The fore part, therefore, drops in the water alongside the target exploding at a given depth.

The use by the Germans of winged bombs off Salerno justifies an exhausting discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the different types of Winged bombs and the preference to be given to radio or photo direction or radio command in the realisation.
WINGED BOMB

1. The winged bomb is the simplest form of missile that can be adapted for use, and whose trajectory can be made independent of the releasing or parent plane. The gravitation field or some self-contained propulsive unit supplies the necessary energy to maintain the missiles in flight. In order to obtain a trajectory that has the maximum independence from the parent plane, the following conditions should be met.

a. The course of the launching plane be independent from the direction of the trajectory of the bomb.

b. The height and speed of the launching plane be independent of the horizontal distance from the target.

c. The velocity of the bomb be as large as compatible with retaining visibility of it, in order that it may be well guided along its glide toward the target.

2. Maximum automatic aerodynamic stability of the flying bomb. These conditions have been studied, discussed, and partially tested in Italy with General A. A. Crocco (Royal Italian Science Accademi-an and Consulting Aeronautical Engineer to S. I.), and the following conclusions were reached.

a. The course of the launching plane can be independent from that to be followed by the bomb, because after a suitable stabilization on the most convenient glide angle, the direction of the bomb can be altered with reference to a direction defined in space by a gyro contained in the bomb.

b. The altitude and speed of the plane can be, within certain limits, independent from the horizontal distance of the target. The altitude, of course, is limited for non-auto-propulsive bombs by the minimum glide angle. The speed is limited by two requirements:

(1). The necessity of releasing the bomb at a speed very

* S.I. - Italian Torpedo Works.
nearly equal to the initial gliding speed of the bomb (in order to avoid plunging or rearing).

(2). The necessity of keeping the bomb within visibility if radio controlled, or inside the radio beam if radio guided or photo guided.

3. The speed of a well studied auto-stable winged bomb can be considered variable from a minimum of about 120 meters per second to a maximum of 180 meters per second, depending on the glide angle. The above mentioned minimum speed does not allow a good use of radio or photo guide, because it does not sufficiently differ from the minimum speed of the launching plane and thereby increases the difficulty of keeping it under control. The aforementioned maximum speed of 180 meters per second may be considered at present sufficient in relation to the actual speed of the plane without necessitating for the moment the study of auto-propulsive means, in order to carry out the first experiments.

4. At the present state of progress in radio and photo techniques and in automatic piloting, difficulties are not foreseen for the realization of devices enabling the bomb to be controlled or guided along its flight. The actual difficulties anticipated by experts on this subject concerned principally, weight, encumbrances, and aero-dynamic design. There was a difference of opinion in the best method of guiding the missiles:

a. Radio control.

b. Radio guide.

c. Photo control.

These discussions were carried on with the assistance of pilots and aerial observers especially experienced in remote control of torpedoes and the operation of planes without pilots, but by radio control. Their opinions were not unanimous, and no conclusions were reached when the collaboration between experts of the S.I. and the Royal Air Force was interrupted by war events which disrupted communications between Naples and Rome. This vital discussion should be resumed before beginning practical experiments.
5. Advantages and disadvantages of the fundamental control systems are summarized as follows:

a. With regard to the bomb itself, it has been decided with General Crocco, on the basis of study and trials with models in the aerodynamic tunnel of Guidonia, that an "anti-vessel" bomb would be realized, possessing the following characteristics.

(1) Weight of the bomb - 500 kilograms.

(2) Weight of the explosive - 200 kilograms.

(3) Weight of the deflecting charge - 5 kilograms.

(4) Length of the bomb - approximately 3 meters.

b. This bomb is so constructed, in order to obtain a maximum of destructability, with a deviating charge placed on the upper forepart of the bomb and an electric contact (a sort of feeler) extending about one meter in front of the bomb. On contact, this feeler sets off the deviating charge, deflecting the bomb sharply downward and causing it to explode in the hold of the ship or in the water beneath the bottom of the ship, depending on where the original hit was made.

c. It is desired that the bomb have an aerodynamic form, tending to achieve the maximum of penetration and automatic stability, consisting of a single wing with reduced fuselage which contains the explosive charge in the central part.

d. The elements of the project and the results of experiments with various models tested at the Guidonia tunnel.
are not in my possession, but General Crocco should have them in Rome or Guidonia, therefore I could indicate my recollection in this matter only by rough sketches.

6. Comparison of the various systems of control:

a. Radio controlled missiles:

(1). The bomb in this type of control is released by the plane at a speed very nearly equal to its initial medium gliding speed, depending on the altitude of the plane and the horizontal distance to the target. The balance fin having been set accordingly. The bomb is controlled by an observer on the releasing plane or on another plane. He has control over four directional controls with respect to the bomb; namely, right, left, up, and down. He can also control the exploding of the bomb in the air; deviate it sharply downward, cause it to emit a smoky wake, etc.

b. The Germans use this method. The controls do not act continuously, but change by fixed amounts the trajectory. The observer, therefore, must have in continuous view the bomb and the target, because he must at all times be aware of the position of the bomb axis in relation to the position of the target. The ability to do this is very difficult, because it necessitates keeping the bomb within the vision of an optical instrument. The radio control must be operated on short wave, in order to realize the maximum economy of weight and bulk in the equipment on board the plane and that carried by the bomb. The emission and reception of radio control can be spherical or sectoral. The possibility of
keeping uninterrupted control of the bomb from a plane which is forced to make rapid maneuvers in order to protect itself from the pursuit of fighters, makes spherical emissions advisable. The bomb must remain clearly visible to the pilot at a distance, but this visibility must not be achieved by means which would also render the bomb more visible from the target. For this reason, coloration of the bomb, or intense flashes and the emission of smoke over great or short distances, should be given consideration with the automatic radio control bomb.

c. The bomb once stabilized in free flight is oriented in direction by the pilot, in order to contact directly and at a maximum speed the presumed future position of the target; therefore, in this case of radio control, the bomb is oriented on the line connecting the plane and the target. This relative situation is, up to a certain distance, favorable to observe the direction of the bomb in the vertical plane, but not favorable to a good appreciation of the direction in the horizontal plane. Beyond a distance which pilots and observers estimate to be about 4,000 meters (using powerful binoculars), a bomb with a length of 3 or 3.5 meters is no longer sufficiently visible for accurate direction, even when followed by a trailing pennant streamer. This distance of 4,000 meters can be considerably reduced if the atmosphere is not clear or if clouds, either artificial or natural, prevail, or defensive maneuvers of the plane allow the bomb to be lost from sight, even if only for a few seconds.

7. It seems that the Germans in their attacks, were careful never to come within the range of antiaircraft fire during the descent of the winged bombs. Under these conditions, the attack does not offer good possibilities of hitting. The attack can easily be initiated at a distance greater than the actual range of detection by
Radar, thus increasing the probability of hitting, but the plane must subsequently following the bomb, draw nearer to the target, within a distance not greater than 4,000 meters, bringing it within the range of anti-aircraft fire and the fire of heavy calibre machine guns.

8. The use of radio control by the guiding aeroplane facilitates, of course, radio localization. A multiple attack by several crafts against the same or various targets requires the use of different frequencies for radio control, in order to avoid harmful interference with each other.

9. As a result of the fact that the bomb is generally not on the line connecting aeroplanes and target, and is not visible from the target except at a short distance (about 2,000 meters), a destructive barrage on the bomb cannot be effective. For this reason, only a destructive and clouding fire can be directed on the plane while the target itself will be screened by means of special smoke bombs thrown at an altitude of 100 or 150 meters on the line with the attacking plane. The plane not being visible from the target, is subject only to anti-aircraft fire directed by Radar. It would be better if the destructive fire on the plane were with explosive and clouding projectiles, and thus mask the target from the control plane. It is essential for the control pilot not to lose sight of the bomb, even for brief intervals. Pursuit action by fighters, if violent, can force the control plane to perform maneuvers which greatly increase the difficulty of controlling the bomb. In the case of a maneuvering target, a disturbance results in the cinematic mental orientation of the pilot and is most effective. All of the auxiliary maneuver measures recently devised to allow rapid changes in speed and direction, should be taken into consideration in order to diminish the probability of being hit by the winged bomb (hydrodynamic brakes, etc.).

10. Advantages of the system:

a. Greater difficulty in radio localization
   (in comparison with the radio guide):

   (1). Reduced possibility of alerting ground defenses in sufficient time for protection of the target, resulting in a less destructive fire against the aircraft.
(2). Less time available to cover the target with a smoke screen or possibly jamming the radio emissions of the directing plane.

(3). Impossibility of firing a destructive barrage on the bomb, since it is detected too late, if at all.

b. Greater liberty in maneuvering the bomb whose direction and speed can be widely varied during descent without incurring the disadvantages exposed in the case of the radio guide bomb.

11. Disadvantages of the system:

a. Serious piloting difficulties at a distance greater than 4,000 meters, owing to the necessity of having a clear and continuous view of the bomb in order to estimate with precision the direction of its axis with regard to the target. In order to realize a strong probability of making a direct hit, it is necessary for the plane to come closer to the target. This increases the probability of the plane being hit by anti-aircraft or by fighter planes.

b. Increased bulk and weight of the appliances on the bomb and on the plane, because of the need of a good optical device on the plane and a complete directing fundamental gyro system on the bomb, on which to base the intermittent variations in direction, while on the other hand, this is not necessary in the case of radio guide.

12. Radio Guide. The bomb is released towards the target at a speed very nearly equal to the initial medium gliding speed, depending on the altitude of the plane and the horizontal distance of the target (balance fins to be set accordingly).

Thereafter, the plane maneuvers according to tactical expediency, and the bomb is guided by radio beams on micro-
waves. This beam supported by a gyroscopic direction system can assume and maintain independently of the ship, any direction in space. Moreover, this beam must be susceptible to great expansion at the beginning of the flight of the bomb and later be reduced to a minimum when the bomb nears the target.

At the beginning the radio guide acts on the not yet stabilized bomb, while at the same time the plane may maneuver freely; in the proximity of the target the bomb is already stabilized and the beam must be reduced to a minimum angle of divergency to attain a maximum probability of making a direct hit.

The use of micro-waves gives the problem of radio-guides considerable affinity with that of the photo-guide. According to Italian and German radio technicians, the possibility of arriving at a radio beam of micro-waves sufficiently reduced to realize 50% effective hits on a Naval target at a distance guide of 10,000 meters does not exist at present. It should be developed through reduction of the wavelength and the projector.

It has been suggested that there be constructed for experimental and development purposes, a photo-guide with infra-red and ultra-violet rays with typical auto-centering devise through the photo-electrics of the bomb controls. The latter, however, should automatically keep the bomb with its axis parallel to the beam guide axis without the bomb necessitating a basic directional system which is essential in the case of radio command.

13. According to the photo-electric technical experts the inherent difficulties to the adaptation of auto-centering devices could be easily overcome. On the other hand, they were not able to come to an agreement concerning the luminous radiations to be preferred when considering the varied backgrounds on which the target is projected, the conditions of the atmosphere, and the presence of natural and artificial fog. The study of these questions was interrupted when communications between Rome and Naples ceased.

The radio-guide system entails the necessity of keeping stable the beam directed on the target, avoiding sudden angular movements of the beam itself which would cause the guide to be abandoned, therefore the projection system should be stabilized in space and modified by gyroscopic compass and by the artificial horizon of the plane. In order to keep the angular speed of rotation of the beam in
space at very low values to permit a minimum disturbance of the autocentering of the bomb in the beam as a consequence of the variations in direction of the latter, it is important that the relation between the speed of the plane and that of the bomb be the least possible.

In comparing radio-guide and photo-guide, one must keep in mind that the first system improves the radio localization conditions of the attacking plane and of its subsequent exact position in space by means of a rotating exploring radio locator.

The photo-guide does not present this disadvantage, especially if it is based on invisible radiations. In both cases, the disturbance of the guide by the target becomes practically impossible because of the protection presented by the tail of a bomb.


The releasing of the bomb requires only the visibility of the target; the bomb however, can be lost from sight without detrimental effect, especially if the rotations of the beam guide are limited during the course. This system avoids the necessity of constant control from the observation plane, which is difficult since both observer and target are moving at high speed.

In considering an automatic guide with beam, it is possible to make simultaneous tactical use of several attacking units without having to resort to differentiations of wavelengths which are indispensable in the case of radio command.

Difficulty in disturbing the radio or photo-guide by means of emissions from the target owing to the protective effect of the tail of the bomb.

Difficulty in localization in the space of the attacking plane if the photo-guide is used instead of the radio-guide.

15. Disadvantages.

Rapid and easy localization from the target of a continuous beam guide of microwaves by means of a relatively simple rotating exploring radiolocator. Consequent possibility of violent counter-measures by means of destru-
ctive anti-aircraft fire and fog laying on the attacking plane, destructive barrage against the bomb, covering the target by means of fog curtains to an altitude of 100 or 150 meters, changes in the motion of the target. This disadvantage could be greatly reduced according to the photo-electric technicians, by using the photo-guide with an invisible luminous beam.

16. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the S.I. decided in favor of direction by the radio or photo-guide, discarding the radio control which, on the other hand, was generally accepted for the bomb with indirect trajectory on a course approaching the target at low altitude parallel to the surface of the sea. This type of bomb was preferred by many pilots and observers because it required only piloting in direction and because it permitted, thanks to the contrast of the dark sea background, a good estimate of the direction of the axis of the bomb at a greater distance than in the case of the radio control bomb with a direct trajectory.

With regard to increasing the speed of the bomb to the highest possible value by means of auto-propulsion, it was considered more advantageous to use the radio or photo-guided bombs rather than radio control bombs. In fact, in the first case, the relation between the plane speed and the bomb speed must be the lowest possible to rectify (augmenting the curving radius) the trajectory of the bomb. In the second case, instead the bomb must be clearly and continuously seen from the plane which therefore must remain at a distance permitting continuous observation of tactical conditions during the employment period, therefore the bomb should not have too high a speed in relation to that of the plane.

17. In the case of a radio-control bomb, one should consider control by auto-propulsion in the neighborhood of the target to augment the penetrating effect. Considering the advantages of the propulsion type, it was agreed for reasons of organic simplicity that there would be employed direct reaction propulsion using a burner of the torpedo type, in which by using a liquid fuel with a high oxygen content, it would be possible to consume at the most preferable pressure, the highest quantity of hydrocarbon at the highest temperature compatible with resistance for at least 60° of the combustion chamber of the nozzle.

This fuel has been defined and experimented with at the Institute of Motors in Naples.
The following memorandum on winged missiles summarizes the state of development of studies and experiences in that field at the end of June 1943. The problem of winged missiles was presented to S.I. (Italian Torpedo Works) by the Italian Navy and Air Force at the end of 1941. At that time, the Navy was primarily interested in a winged torpedo, as indicated in the fourth point of the 25 October 1943 memorandum. The Air Force was particularly interested in the winged indirect trajectory bomb, which is indicated in the second point.

During 1942, both problems were fully considered by S.I. and its technical advisers, and it was realized that both problems were too complicated for a rapid solution, consequently work was shifted from the above mentioned missiles to the direct trajectory winged bomb and the winged torpedo to be launched from airplanes, indicated at points three and one of the 25 October 1943 memorandum.

At the end of June 1943, all communications between S.I., its technical advisers and the Firm O.M.I. (Ottico-Mecanica Italiana) were disrupted; therefore, the particulars regarding the advancement of the aeronautical, radio and photo technical studies and experiments are not at the present time known to me in detail. I do not know how soon the situation with respect to these subjects will change. I have therefore set forth in the memorandum for the guidance of the American Scientists, all basic questions that confronted us in Italy, with the hope that realizations may be attained in both the winged missile and suitable counter measures against the use of winged missiles by the enemy.
1. The winged bomb is the simplest form of missile whose trajectory can be made independent of the releasing or parent plane. The gravitation field or self-contained propulsive power supplies the necessary energy to maintain the missiles in flight. In order to obtain a trajectory that has the maximum independence from the parent plane, the following conditions should be met:

   a. The course of the launching plane should be independent from the direction of the trajectory of the bomb.

   b. The height and speed of the launching plane should be independent of the horizontal distance from the target.

   c. The velocity of the bomb should only be as large as compatible with maintaining a good direction toward the target, and achieving good effects on the target.

   d. Maximum automatic aerodynamic stability of the flying bomb.

2. These conditions have been studied, discussed, and partially tested in Italy with General A. A. Crocco (Royal Italian Science Accademician and Consulting Aeronautical Engineer to S.I.), and the following conclusions were reached:

   a. The course of the launching plane can be independent from that to be followed by the bomb, because after a suitable stabilization on the most convenient glide angle, the direction of the bomb can be altered with reference to a direction defined in space by a gyro contained in the bomb.

   b. The altitude and speed of the plane can be, within certain limits, independent from the horizontal distance of the target. The altitude, of course, is limited for non-auto-propulsive bombs by the minimum glide angle. The speed is limited by two requirements:

      (1). The necessity of releasing the bomb at a speed very nearly equal to the initial gliding speed of the bomb (in order to avoid plunging or rearing).

      (2). The necessity of keeping the bomb within visibility if radio controlled, or inside the radio beam if radio guided or photo guided.

SECRET
5. The speed of a well studied auto-stable winged bomb can be considered variable from a minimum of about 120 meters per second to a maximum of 180 meters per second, depending on the glide angle. The above mentioned minimum speed does not allow a good use of radio or photo guide, because it does not sufficiently differ from the minimum speed of the launching plane and thereby increases the difficulty of keeping it under control. The aforementioned maximum speed of 180 meters per second may be considered at present sufficient in relation to the actual speed of the plane without necessitating for the moment the study of auto-propulsive means, in order to carry out the first experiments.

4. At the present state of progress in radio and photo techniques and in automatic piloting, difficulties are not foreseen for the realization of devices enabling the bomb to be controlled or guided along its flight. The actual difficulties anticipated by experts on this subject concerned principally, weight, encumberances, and aero-dynamic design. There was a difference of opinion in the best method of guiding the missiles:

   a. Radio control;
   b. Radio guide;
   c. Photo guide.

These discussions were carried on with the assistance of pilots and aerial observers especially experienced in remote control of torpedoes and the operation of planes without pilots, but by radio control. Their opinions were not unanimous, and no conclusions were reached when the collaboration between exports of the S.I. and the Royal Air Force was interrupted by war events which disrupted communications between Naples and Rome. This vital discussion should be resumed before beginning practical experiments.

5. Advantages and disadvantages of the fundamental control systems are summarized as follows:

   a. With regard to the bomb itself, it has been decided with General Crocco, on the basis of study and trials with models in the aerodynamic tunnel of Guidonia, that an "anti-vessel" bomb would be realized, possessing the following characteristics:

      (1) Weight of the bomb - 500 kilograms;
      (2) Weight of the explosive - 200 kilograms;
      (3) Weight of the deflecting charge - 5 kilograms;
      (4) Length of the bomb - approximately 3 meters.
b. This bomb is so constructed, in order to obtain a maximum of destructability, with a deviating charge placed on the upper forepart of the bomb and an electric contact (a sort of feeler) extending about one meter in front of the bomb. On contact, this feeler sets off the deviating charge, deflecting the bomb sharply downward and causing it to explode in the hold of the ship or in the water beneath the bottom of the ship, depending on where the original hit was made.

c. It is desired that the bomb have an aerodynamic form, tending to achieve the maximum of penetration and automatic stability, consisting of a single wing with reduced fuselage which contains the explosive charge in the central part.

d. The elements of the project and the results of experiments with various models tested at the Guidonia tunnel are not in my possession, but General Crocco should have them in Rome or Guidonia, therefore I could indicate my recollection in this matter only by rough sketches.

6. Comparison of the various systems of control:

a. Radio controlled missiles:

(1). The bomb in this type of control is released by the plane at a speed very nearly equal to its initial medium gliding speed, depending on the altitude of the plane and the horizontal distance to the target. The balance fin having been set accordingly. The bomb is controlled by an observer on the releasing plane or on another plane. He has control over four directional controls with respect to the bomb; namely, right, left, up, and down. He can also control the exploding of the bomb in the air; deviate it sharply downward, cause it to emit a smoky wake, etc.

b. The Germans use this method. The controls do not act continuously, but change by fixed amounts the trajectory. The observer, therefore, must have in continuous view the bomb and the target, because he must at all times be aware of the position of the bomb axis in relation to the

SECRET
position of the target. The ability to do this is very difficult, because it necessitates keeping the bomb within the vision of an optical instrument. The radio control must be operated on short wave, in order to realize the maximum economy of weight and bulk in the equipment on board the plane and that carried by the bomb. The emission and reception of radio control can be spherical or sectoral. The possibility of keeping uninterrupted control of the bomb from a plane which is forced to make rapid maneuvers in order to protect itself from the pursuit of fighters, makes spherical emissions advisable. The bomb must remain clearly visible to the pilot at a distance, but his visibility must not be achieved by means which would also render the bomb more visible from the target. For this reason, coloration of the bomb, or intense flashes and the emission of smoke over great or short distances, should be given consideration with the automatic radio control bomb.

c. The bomb once stabilized in free flight is oriented in direction by the pilot, in order to contact directly and at a maximum speed the presumed future position of the target; therefore, in this case of radio control, the bomb is orientated on the line connecting the plane and the target. This relative situation is, up to a certain distance, favorable to observe the direction of the bomb in the vertical plane, but not favorable to a good appreciation of the direction in the horizontal plane. Beyond a distance which pilots and observers estimate to be about 4,000 meters (using powerful binoculars), a bomb with a length of 3 or 3.5 meters is no longer sufficiently visible for accurate direction, even when followed by a trailing pennant streamer. This distance of 4,000 meters can be considerably reduced if the atmosphere is not clear or if clouds, either artificial or natural, prevail, or defensive maneuvers of the plane allow the bomb to be lost from sight, even if only for a few seconds.

7. It seems that the Germans in their attacks, were careful never to come within the range of antiaircraft fire during the descent of the winged bombs. Under these conditions, the attack does not offer good probabilities of hitting.

The attack can easily be initiated at a distance greater than the actual range of detection by Radar, thus increasing the probability of hitting, but the plane must subsequently, following the bomb, draw nearer to the target, within a distance not greater than 4,000 meters, bringing it within the range of antiaircraft fire and the fire of heavy calibre machine guns.
8. The use of radio control by the guiding aeroplane facilitates, of course, radio localisation. A multiple attack by several crafts against the same or various targets requires the use of different frequencies for radio control, in order to avoid harmful interference with each other.

9. As a result of the fact that the bomb is generally not on the line connecting aeroplanes and target, and is not visible from the target except at a short distance (about 2,000 meters), a destructive barrage on the bomb cannot be effective. For this reason, only a destructive and clouding fire can be directed on the plane while the target itself will be screened by means of special smoke bombs thrown at an altitude of 100 or 150 meters on the line with the attacking plane. The plane not being visible from the target, is subject only to antiaircraft fire directed by Radar. It would be better if the destructive fire on the plane were with explosive and clouding projectiles, and thus mask the target from the control plane. It is essential for the control pilot not to lose sight of the bomb, even for brief intervals. Pursuit action by fighters, if violent, can force the control plane to perform maneuvers which greatly increase the difficulty of controlling the bomb. In the case of a maneuvering target, a disturbance results in the cinematic mental orientation of the pilot and is most effective. All of the auxiliary maneuver measures recently devised to allow rapid changes in speed and direction, should be taken into consideration in order to diminish the probability of being hit by the winged bomb (hydrodynamic brakes, etc.).

10. Advantages of the system:

a. Greater difficulty in radio localisation (in comparison with the radio guide):

(1). Reduced possibility of alerting ground defenses in sufficient time for protection of the target, resulting in a less destructive fire against the aircraft.

(2). Less time available to cover the target with a smoke screen or possibly jamming the radio emissions of the directing plane.

(3). Impossibility of firing a destructive barrage on the bomb, since it is detected too late, if at all.

b. Greater liberty in maneuvering the bomb whose direction and speed can be widely varied during descent without incurring the disadvantages exposed in the case of the radio guide bomb.

11. Disadvantages of the system:

a. Serious piloting difficulties at a distance greater than 4,000 meters, owing to the necessity of having a clear and continuous view of the bomb in order to estimate with precision the direction of its axis with regard to
the target. In order to realize a strong probability of making a direct hit, it is necessary for the plane to come closer to the target. This increases the probability of the plane being hit by antiaircraft or by fighter planes.

b. Increased bulk and weight of the appliances on the bomb and on the plane, because of the need of a good optical device on the plane and a complete directing fundamental gyro system on the bomb, on which to base the intermittent variations in direction, while on the other hand, this is not necessary in the case of radio guide.

12. Radio Guide. The bomb is released towards the target at a speed very nearly equal to the initial medium gliding speed, depending on the altitude of the plane and the horizontal distance of the target (balance fins to be set accordingly).

Thereafter, the place maneuvers according to tactical expediency, and the bomb is guided by radio beams on micro-waves. This beam supported by a gyroscopic direction on the plane system can assume and maintain independently of the ship, any direction in space. Moreover, this beam must be susceptible to great expansion at the beginning of the flight of the bomb and later be reduced to a minimum when the bomb nears the target.

At the beginning the radio guide acts on the not yet stabilized bomb, while at the same time the plane may maneuver freely; in the proximity of the target the bomb is already stabilized and the beam must be reduced to a minimum angle of divergence to attain a maximum probability of making a direct hit.

The use of micro-waves gives the problem of radio-guides considerable affinity with that of the photo-guide. According to Italian and German radio technicians, the possibility of arriving at a radio beam of micro-waves sufficiently reduced to realize 50% effective hits on a Naval target at a distance guide of 10,000 meters, does not exist at present. It should be developed through reduction of the wavelength and the projector.

It has been suggested that there be constructed for experimental and development purposes, a photo-guide with infra-red and ultra-violet rays with typical auto-centering device through the photo-electrics of the bomb controls. The latter, however, should automatically keep the bomb with its axis parallel to the beam guide axis without the bomb necessitating a basic directional system which is essential in the case of radio command.

13. According to the photo-electric technical experts the inherent difficulties to the adaptation of auto-centering devices could be easily overcome. On the other hand, they were not able to come to an agreement concerning the luminous radiations to be preferred when considering the varied backgrounds on which the target is projected, the conditions of the atmosphere, and the presence of natural and artificial fog. The study of these questions was interrupted when communications between Rome and Naples ceased.
The radio-guide system entails the necessity of keeping stable the beam directed on the target, avoiding sudden angular movements of the beam itself which would cause the guide to be abandoned, therefore the projection system should be stabilised in space and modified by gyroscopic compass and by the artificial horizon of the plane. In order to keep the angular speed of rotation of the beam in space at very low values to permit a minimum disturbance of the auto-centering of the bomb in the beam as a consequence of the variations in direction of the latter, it is important that the relation between the speed of the plane and that of the bomb be the least possible.

In comparing radio-guide and photo-guide, one must keep in mind that the first system improves the radio localization conditions of the attacking plane and of its subsequent exact position in space by means of a rotating exploring radio locator.

The photo-guide does not present this disadvantage, especially if it is based on invisible radiations. In both cases, the disturbance of the guide by the target becomes practically impossible because of the protection presented by the fore part of a bomb.


The releasing of the bomb requires only the visibility of the target; the bomb however, can be lost from sight without detrimental effect, especially if the rotations of the beam guide are limited during the course. This system avoids the necessity of constant control from the observation plane, which is difficult since both observer and target are moving at high speed.

In considering an automatic guide with beam, it is possible to make simultaneous tactical use of several attacking units without having to resort to differentiations of wave-lengths which are indispensable in the case of radio command.

Difficulty in disturbing the radio or photo-guide by means of emissions from the target owing to the protective effect of the fore part of the bomb.

Difficulty in localization in the space of the attacking plane if the photo-guide is used instead of the radio-guide.

15. Disadvantages.

Rapid and easy localization from the target of a continuous beam guide of micro-waves by means of a relatively simple rotating exploring radio-locator. Consequent possibility of violent counter-measures by means of destructive anti-aircraft fire and fog laying on the attacking plane, destructive barrage against the bomb, covering the target by means of fog curtains to an altitude of 100 or 150 meters, changes in the motion of the target. This disadvantage could be greatly reduced according to the photo-electric technicians, by using the photo-guide with an invisible luminous beam.

16. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the S.I. decided in favor of direction by the radio or photo-guide discarding the radio control which, on the other hand, was generally accepted for the bomb with indirect
trajectory on a course approaching the target at low altitude parallel to the surface of the sea. This type of bomb was preferred by many pilots and observers because it required only piloting in direction and because it permitted, thanks to the contrast of the dark sea background, a good estimate of the direction of the axis of the bomb at a greater distance than in the case of the radio control bomb with a direct trajectory.

With regard to increasing the speed of the bomb to the highest possible value by means of auto-propulsion, it was considered more advantageous to use the radio or photo-guided bombs rather than radio control bombs. In fact, in the first case, the relation between the plane speed and the bomb speed must be the lowest possible to rectify (augmenting the curving radius) the trajectory of the bomb. In the second case, instead the bomb must be clearly and continuously seen from the plane which therefore must remain at a distance permitting continuous observation of tactical conditions during the employment period; therefore the bomb should not have too high a speed in relation to that of the plane.

17. In the case of a radio-control bomb, one should consider control by auto-propulsion in the neighborhood of the target to augment the penetrating effect. Considering the advantages of the propulsion type, it was agreed for reasons of organic simplicity that there would be employed direct reaction propulsion using a burner of the torpedo type, in which by using a liquid fuel with a high oxygen content, it would be possible to consume at the most preferable pressure, the highest quantity of hydrocarbon at the highest temperature compatible with resistance for at least 60 of the combustion chamber of the nozzle.

This fuel has been defined and experimented with at the Institute of Motors in Naples.
WINGED TORPEDO

The normal nautical speed of actual ship torpedoes (from 20
to 25 meters per second) being at present too low to afford a good
percentage of hits at long range against speedy and distant targets,
SI started studies and experiments to devise a new type of torpedo
which would navigate in the air at aeronautical speeds (from 80 to
100 meters per second).

This torpedo should automatically keep a given height over the
water and be directed (on the horizontal plane) by radio or photo
devices (already available for such purpose) by a cinematic director
installed on the launching station (ship or shore).

The torpedo would plunge into the water at a command from the
launching station losing, in so doing, the air propellers, the
aeronautical carrier and the air stabilizing tail. It would perform
the last part of its course as a normal airplane torpedo would do,
striking the side of the target underwater or passing underneath.
(It should be fitted both with impact and magnetic pistols)

The normal motor and air container of the actual 45 m.m. SI
airplane torpedo braked to 100 h.p. can supply the necessary energy
to drive the winged torpedo in the air to a distance of about 8000
meters at a speed of about 80 ms. leaving enough energy to furnish
underwater a final run of about 1000 m. at 20 ms. speed.

From ship or shore launching stations, this torpedo ought to be
projected in the air at a very high speed (about 80 ms. on a gradient
of about 20 degrees) by a special catapult of such weight and dimensions
to be suited for installation on board light ships.

The problem here offers a particular difficulty due to the
necessity of not exceeding a given acceleration and stress on the
torpedo. It has been solved by a special hydraulic catapult.

The study of this torpedo was developed by SI with the assistance of General Crocco of Rome, the Royal Italian Air Corps, developed the aeronautical sector. The engineering Ministry of the Roman Firm OM1 developed the automatic stabilization on the air course, and Engineers de Agostino and Stanley of SI developed the plans of the torpedo.

The German firms, Siemens and Telefunken were tendered proposition to supply the radio and photo devices to direct the torpedo from ship or shore firing stations. On account of secrecy the two German Firms were instructed that the object of the devices was to direct an antitank car.

Catapult. The experiments were concluded with a model (½ of normal).

Air Carrier. Experiments on models at the aerodynamic testing tunnel at Guidania (Rome) were well advanced.

Stabilizer. Work was begun on a reduction in weight and bulk of a normal airplane automatic stabilizer.

Directing radio or photo devices. The German firms have not answered SI demand for tenders.

Principal Advantages and Possibilities of the Winged Torpedo. Very high speed of the torpedo and consequent higher probability of hitting.

Possibility of using the torpedo from ship by day time at greater ranges, avoiding heavy gunfire from enemy. This advantage to be obtained both in the use as an aimed weapon or as a barrage weapon (last part of the course in circular evolution if the target is covered by smoke screen).

Possibility of passing over land.
Note: The same torpedo can be released from an airplane and directed at long range to the target. (No catapult needed in this case)
In consequence of work previously developed for the realization of special submarine craft, SI has lately experimented on torpedoes, richly oxygenated air and also a liquid substance containing a high percentage of oxygen.

Trials were successful in both cases, but oxygenated air was not found so radical an improvement as the liquid containing a high percentage of oxygen.

Oxygenated air containing more than 80% oxygen gives a remarkable instability of temperature of the working fluid issued by the heater if the pressure regulator does not work perfectly.

There are also practical difficulties in keeping for a long time in the compressed fluid container a fixed percentage of oxygen in service conditions. Anyway, oxygenated air up to 80% was used with good results both in naval and aircraft torpedoes. To eliminate the large, heavy and costly air container, SI with the collaboration of Professor Ferretti of the Institute Nazionale delle Ricerche experimented with liquid fluids containing a high percentage of O₂. These liquids can be injected by pump in the heater together with petrol and the proper amount of cooling water.

The resulting high temperature fluid sent to reciprocating or turbine motors does not contain the high percentage of inert and insoluble nitrogen of the air and therefore the gaseous wake of the torpedo is thoroughly reduced.

The final successful trials of the last type of "comburent" fluid were lately concluded using one of our torpedo aircraft motors and Professor Ferretti is now in condition to dispose of a satisfactory formula.

For torpedoes already provided with air containers, the use of
oxygenated air allows a good increase in horse power and range or in both factors.

For new torpedoes (to be oppositely designed) the use of a combustent liquid disposes of the air container. The resulting torpedo is therefore shorter and lighter for a given speed and range (both great advantages in the case of aircraft torpedoes) or capable of more speed and longer range for a given total weight and length, a strong reduction in the volume of exhaust gas and visibility of the wake is manifest for a given horse power. Further reduction in the visibility of the gaseous wake can be obtained by the use of special absorbing devices and the resulting torpedo could then compete with the electric one for use on submarines without incurring the loss of speed and range entailed by the electric torpedo. For the use of this fluid with direct injection in the motor cylinders, a new motor was designed and successfully tried by SI.
AIR CRAFT TORPEDOES

SI production of 450 m.m. torpedoes was very large.

2000 torpedoes were ordered by the German Air Force (about 100 delivered) and 1000 by the Italian Navy and Air Corps (about 500 delivered). To suit the requirements of release from high-speed planes (up to 400 km. hr., at a maximum height of 200 meters, SI had to introduce changes in the normal type of ship torpedo of same speed (40 knots for 3000 meters). The most important factor of a successful launching in shallow water (25 meters) was found to be the aeronautical air tail which must be proportioned to the particular aerodynamics and mechanical elements of the torpedo and provided with flaps actioned by a special gyro device to keep the torpedo from turning around its axis during a high drop.

This problem was successfully solved by SI whose torpedoes in war conditions obtained a high record from any height up to 200 meters.

Air craft SI torpedoes are fitted with S.I.C. magnetic pistols and also with inertia pistols on war heads of a regulation weight of 200 kilos explosive charge, and exceptionally with 250 kilos charges. A special run of 5000 meters at 32 knots could be employed if the torpedo had to be used as a barrage weapon in circular evolution after a given straight course.
The SIC magnetic pistol is activated by the variation of the magnetic field under an iron or steel target. This field is a combination of the earth's field, the ship's field and the torpedo field.

The service type of SIC pistol in use (successfully tried in war) is so designed and proportioned as to act with great regularity and precision on torpedoes which have been previously magnetized in a magnetizing device. The SIC pistol acts under a ship of over 500 tons at a maximum depth of 4 meters under the keel provided the relative speed on the torpedo axis is greater (meters per hr.) than 18 meters.

Under ships of lighter tonnage and with lower speeds the depth under the keel is reduced.

The acting point is defined by a vertical plane tangent to the side of the ship.

An electric delaying device is so regulated as to obtain the explosion 12 meters after the acting point.

With a depth regulation of the torpedo to 8 meters the SIC pistol is effective on ships drawing from 8 to 4 meters of water.

It has been found that the effect of the variation of the magnetic field of the torpedo is much higher on the SIC pistol than the variations of the earth and ship fields. Degaussing is practically ineffective.

SIC pistol is normally and indifferently used on ship torpedoes and aircraft torpedoes in combination with an ordinary inertia pistol.

War heads have, in fact, two pistols, a magnetic one and an inertia pistol.

SIC has produced a combination of both pistols in the same body.
SI has received orders from Germany for 12,000 SIC pistols of the ordinary type to be used on magnetized torpedoes. (2000 pistols have been delivered)

SIC pistols have been delivered also in large numbers to the Italian Navy and Air Force.

An improved type of pistol has been successfully tried on non-magnetized torpedoes. This pistol works on the variation of the natural permanent magnetic field of the torpedo.

The use of this pistol dispenses with the necessity of magnetizing the torpedo with special magnetizing coils and the bother of combining opposite fields of the torpedo or otherwise neutralize magnetic disturbances of the ship's compasses. The acting point of this type of pistol is somewhat less precise but the practical influence of the imprecision is too small to be taken into account in service conditions.
THREE-MAN ASSAULT SUBMARINE

1. The S.A. submarine constitutes, with PT boats and the torpedo planes, the means to make use of, at short range, the torpedo in actual combat. It is carried by fighting ships and sent in action at the most favorable tactical opportunity. For this reason, the S.A. submarine provides the means whereby surface ships can lengthen ideally the range of their own torpedoes and control their course toward the target.

2. The S.A. is operated by a crew of two or three picked men, and can be directed toward the enemy from the ship which launches it, or from an airplane. In the strategic field, before being put to use, it has the autonomy of the ship which carries it; in the tactical field it possesses a subaqueous autonomy to last about two hours at high speed (about 20 knots) and a self-sufficiency of about 100 sea miles surface navigation, which allows it to rejoin the ship and be taken aboard at a point sufficiently distant from the battle zone.

3. The S.A. must be launched at sea by the ship which carries it, without requiring of the ship any variation of speed. The buoyancy should be close to zero when ready for release. In order to carry out all the conditions with a minimum weight and incumbrance, Italian Torpedo Works has discarded electrical propulsion and adopted internal combustion engines or diesel engines.

4. In the two existing experimental samples, a compromise of the various requirements was reached by making a hull weighing 13 tons, 13 meters long, with a maximum diameter of 1.5 meters which, with a 350 H.P. internal combustion engine (adaptation subsequently described), gave an underwater speed of 15 knots and a surface speed of 13.5 knots. In the first instance, gaseous oxygen contained in tanks was used; and in the second, air drawn directly from the atmosphere.

5. Two experimental four-cycle aviation type combustion engines were used and appropriately modified to:

   a. Use 97% alcohol, instead of gasoline.
   b. Run on oxygen while navigating under water and on air when surfacing.

In consequence of using four-cycle combustion motors, it became necessary to maintain the exhaust pressure of the motor at a constant level almost equal to that of the atmospheric pressure. The motor, in fact, proved to be extremely sensitive to exhaust
pressure. In order to keep this pressure unchanged even at a maximum underwater navigation depth of 25 meters, the gas discharged from the cylinders at a temperature of about 700°C is cooled to about 100°C by means of a radiator in contact with the sea. It is then aspirated by a specially provided pump (with barometric regulator), which discharges into the sea about 3/4 of its volume. The remaining 1/4 of this exhaust gas undergoes subsequent cooling, purification from alcohol and drying, and afterwards is mixed in a proportion of 25% to the gaseous oxygen; it is aspirated by the motor and enters the normal function cycle, in substitution for air.

6. The intake gas in sub-aqueous operation of the motor, results in a mixture formed by approximately 25% of O₂, 5% of CO, 65% of CO₂, and 5% steam. The exhaust gas, at a temperature of 100°C contains traces of O₂, about 5% of CO, about 70% of CO₂, and 25% steam. This exhaust gas furnishes a wake, scarcely visible because of the condensation of the steam and the solubility in sea water of the CO₂ under pressure, and the possibility to fix the CO₂ itself by means of a solution of caustic soda.

7. The use of the two experimental S.A. submarines with four-cycle internal combustion engines has led to the adoption of the following auxiliaries:

a. Radiators for the primary cooling of the exhaust gas.

b. Pump for the exhaustion of the gas with regulators which maintain the exhaust pressure equal with the atmospheric.

c. Condenser, purifier and cooler for the exhaust gas aspirated by the motor and pumps for the extraction of water.

d. Mixer distributor of the oxygen in the proportion of about 25%.

e. Pump and spray for the injection of alcohol in the cylinders.

The presence of these bulky and delicate parts which are subject to breakdowns and need diligent upkeep, and the necessity of using a soluble fuel like alcohol (for the purification of
the exhaust gas from any trace of unburned fuel) and the necessity of using heavy and cumbersome gaseous oxygen containers, caused the Italian Torpedo Works to study a motor particularly adapted to sub-aqueous propulsion. This motor is not an internal combustion motor, but a two-cycle Diesel motor. The burnt gases used for the dilution of the oxygen are discharged directly into the sea at a pressure about 25 meters. The gases remaining in the cylinders are mixed with oxygen, by means of injecting the correct quantity of this gas necessary to the combustion of the charged Diesel engine oil. This motor which has already been proved to be insensible to the variations of the exhaust pressure, can function with gaseous oxygen compressed to 35 atmospheres or with the oxygen contained in a special combustent liquid. In the latter case, the right proportions of the combustent to the fuel is assured with more simplicity and exactness than with the use of gaseous oxygen, because the injection occurs by means of a pump of the same type as that used for the injection of the fuel.

8. It was found necessary with the two-cycle motor, to cool the cylinders by an internal cylinder cooling operation effected by means of sprayed water. This motor was tested by "brake" and produced such interesting results that it was considered suitable for future use on torpedoes. In fact, this motor has proved the possibility of furnishing without great mechanical and terminal effort, a power of 40 H.P. per liter of cubic displacement, weight of 3 kilograms per H.P., which could be reduced to 2 kilograms per H.P. if the motor were applied to torpedoes (short functioning period).

9. The Italian Torpedo Works had also under study, sub-aqueous propulsion by means of a turbine engine which could function on previously compressed oxygen and another type of burner working with the oxygen contained in a liquid solution, thus minimizing the bulk of the oxygen containers. However, the construction of this turbine has not yet begun.

10. The problem could be taken up by the United States, where recently the progress of combustion turbines has been noteworthy. Similar turbines were used in the past for torpedo propulsion, with compressed air. The two experimental S.A. submarines are provided with two forward coaxial screw propellers, which were adopted after tests and experiments carried out with an 18" torpedo and a model of the submarine built to a 1/4 scale. As a result of the tests at the Rome Froude basin and at sea, there emerged equivalent propulsive results for immersed fusiform bodies and for tractor and pusher propellers; also, the experiments revealed a superior automatic stability of course from tractor propellers as opposed to pusher...
propellers. Many interesting discussions arose from these experiments, because some technical experts had previously believed that tractive propellers would prove unsuitable.

11. A preference for forward tractor propellers was considered advisable, because they possess the following advantages:

a. The possibility of installing in the stern of the submarine, two 18" cage torpedo tubes. These torpedo tubes are the only possible solution for firing two torpedoes at high speed from a 13-ton hull, without producing excessive reaction resulting in surfacing or submerging the ship over or under the required depth.

b. Good automatic stability in the course, in both planes, and therefore great steering facility.

c. Good performance of the ship when launched from the vessel transporting it, because any initial surfacing caused by skipping would result in automatic slackening of propulsion and prompt nose dive, favorable to resumption of sub-aqueous navigation.

c. Good performance in a rough sea, for the same reasons as above.

12. In opposition to the above mentioned advantages, the ship lacks maneuverability in auto-propulsion, because it cannot stop quickly and go into reverse and perform evolutions on the spot with the same ease of a normally propelled craft. For the same reason, the surface of fins and rudders must be about 50% larger than the equivalent surfaces required by a normal propelled boat.

13. These considerations were believed to be of secondary importance when compared to the above mentioned advantages of employing tractive propellers on such a special ship. The ship in sea tests, has proved to have a maximum sub-aqueous speed of 15 knots, an evolution diameter of approximately 200 meters, and the possibility to withstand the launch of its torpedoes without requiring important corrections with the rudders to maintain its course under water.
14. The best sub-aqueous conditions are obtained when
the ship possesses a positive buoyancy of about 300 kilograms. This buoyancy is neutralized in sub-aqueous navigation by a hydro-dynamic reaction, which corresponds to an angle of about 20° below the horizontal at 15 knots. A given speed of the motor and a consequent speed of the ship, require a certain fixed angle of the horizontal rudders at which the submarine is automatically stable in depth, and no steerage is needed if the sea is calm. A change in depth can therefore be obtained by a transitory maneuver of the horizontal rudders or by a variation of the pace of the motor.

15. With a given position of the horizontal rudders, an increase in the turnover of the engine can effect a further descent or vice versa. The ship was found to be sea-worthy even in the heavy weather experienced in the Mediterranean, when possessing a positive buoyancy of 600 kilograms. By detaching the lead security ballast, the positive buoyancy can be increased to 1800 kilograms.

16. Special balancing devices make it possible to maintain a constant buoyancy in spite of the fuel and comburent consumed.

17. Horizontal rudders are operated by a vertical lever engaging the connecting gear directly, or acting on the same gear through a hydraulic servomotor.

18. Automatic control in depth and direction has been planned by means of a system analogous to that of the torpedo depth regulator, but no experiments have yet been made. The automatic control should be used in the launching stage to allow the "Skipper" the necessary liberty to observe the target aim and decide when the torpedo should be fired.

19. The projection of the periscope is 1.5 meters from the top side of the ship. This length was considered insufficient and the Galileo firm was preparing a periscope measuring 2.5 meters from the top side. The present periscopes and magnetic compasses were to have been replaced by more efficient instruments, if this type of craft had finally been adopted.

20. The principal drawbacks to these ships demonstrated during the trials were the following:

a. Danger of poisoning of the crew, because of infiltration of CO in the control room.

b. Gas wake, which could be spotted by enemy
aircraft or light sub-chasing units.

c. Impossibility of firing the torpedoes directly forward.

d. Difficult to operate the present four-cycle motors, because there are too many delicate auxiliaries and instruments to regulate.

The first difficulty could be eliminated by creating a liquid diaphragm communicating with the exterior, placed between the engine room and the control room. The second difficulty can be only partially eliminated by determining for a limited period (about thirty minutes) the absorption of the CO₂ contained in the exhaust gas, employing for this purpose a spray of concentrated solution of caustic soda. This arrangement has been successfully employed on French torpedoes. It could also be used on the S.A. (when employing two-cycle motors and liquid fuel) by utilizing the space occupied at present by the containers for the compressed O₂.

21. Taking into account that the quantity of gas discharged is limited, because this gas does not contain nitrogen, as with air-fed motors, that the CO₂ is mostly soluble in seawater at a pressure above 1.5 Atm, and that steam is condensed, one should imagine that absorption of CO₂ by means of caustic soda might suffice during the most delicate period of combat when it is most important that the S.A. should leave no visible traces.

22. The third disadvantage cannot be eliminated. There is no method of firing torpedoes forward without subjecting a vessel of such small tonnage to intolerable longitudinal reactions.

23. Since the attack will take place on an angle from the course of the target equal to or less than 90°, the shift in course of the submarine to allow the torpedoes to be launched astern with a deflection of 90° right or left is not very great.

24. It is important that the angulation of the torpedo might be possible with continuity from the control room.

25. The last difficulty can be overcome by employing two-cycle Diesel motors discharging directly into the sea, which eliminates the delicate accessories essential to the function.
of four cycle motors.

26. Considering the maneuvering difficulties of the boats fitted with tractive propellers and the greater available space when using two-cycle Diesel motors or gas turbines, instead of four-cycle combustion engines, Italian Torpedo Works had under study a project in which the submarine, while conserving its actual dimensions and present tonnage, would be armed with three 16" torpedoes instead of two and would have a speed of twenty knots with pushing instead of tractive propellers. In this second type, the control room would be placed in the forward part rather than amidship.

27. The launching of the S.A. must not require any variation in the speed of the mother ship which, when in the vicinity of the enemy, is presumably engaged in firing its main and antiaircraft guns, necessitating a minimum variation of speed and course.

28. The submarine is placed on deck on the stern of the ship, mounted on a series of rollers rimmed with rubber. The submarine is connected by means of a steel cable to a "drogue" which is kept suspended over the side by means of a spar. On falling into the sea, the "drogue" takes hold on the water and subtracts for three or four seconds from the propulsive power of the ship, the power required to overcome the inertia of the submarine and to make it run for 20 or 25 meters on the rollers placed on the rear of the ship and on the runway extension which protrude from the stern. On leaving the runway, the S.A. falls into the sea inclined stern first. Therefore the stern, hydrodynamically sustained, forms the fulcrum of support as the prow dives deep into the sea. During this launching stage, the pilot starts his propellers and begins his course toward the enemy according to directions communicated to him on leaving the ship and modified during the course by means of radio direction from the mother ship or from an observation plane. During the attack, the S.A. surfaces to make contact by radio with the ship or with the airplane or to observe the situation through the periscope.

29. This maneuver requires only a variation of the horizon-rudders. The visibility through the periscope is not affected by vibration, because the periscope is enclosed in a large streamlined fin and is protected against hydrodynamic pressures.

30. Owing to war circumstances, the Italian Navy was not able to put at the disposal of the Italian Torpedo Works, the ship with which the launching tests of the apparatus above described were to be carried out. However, these tests were carried out by motor boats employing models on a variety of scales.
and the results were favorable. In addition, tests were carried out, dropping the boat in the water vertically from a height of 5 meters, to ascertain the attitude of the ship and its parts in resisting the shock and braking action of the water. Results of the tests proved that the shock and deceleration were tolerable for the human organism.

31. Sea tests have proved that because of the severe physiological conditions imposed on the ships crew, these small units are not suitable for purposes other than attack in the tactical field. Ambush, cruising at slow speed, etc., require, especially when the sea is rough, too much discomfort and fatigue to be endured in such a restricted space.

32. S.A. boats therefore must be used only for offensive operations and not last for more than three or four hours of underwater navigation. The use of these small submarines for defensive purposes was not considered.
TO:          Lt. (jg) Henry Ringling North, USNR
FROM:    Lt. John M. Shaheen, USNR
SUBJECT: Special Order

1. Under the authority of my orders from Brig. Gen. Wm. J. Donovan, AUS, you will carry out the following instructions with the highest operational priority under the direction of Col. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., AUS.

2. Through a Mr. Genzato, Chairman of the Board of Navale Meccanica, 42 Via Imbriani, Naples, contact Fortunato D'Agostino, a Mr. Staly and a Mr. Pasqualigo who will help you locate certain material and documents. These men should be told to hold themselves in readiness to come to the assistance of Willie. You will be supplied with letters to D'Agostino, Staly and Genzato from Willie. You will receive further instructions as to what action to take after your initial work has been completed.

3. Willie has prepared a letter to Professor Pericle Ferretti, Instituto Nazionale Del Motori Naples, asking Ferretti to turn over to us a formula. This letter should be delivered and the formula obtained at the earliest possible date.

4. Contact should be made with a Mr. Carlo Calosi, Societa F.A.T.M.E., Via Appia Nuova, Rome. You will be supplied with a letter from Willie to him. Tell Calosi, who is Italy's leading figure in the field of radio and photo-electronics, to hold himself in readiness to join Willie and in the meantime to turn over to you the results of any new work he has engaged in with Willie.

5. At the I.R.I. Works in Baia are a model for a winged torpedo hydraulic catapult and a hidden box containing plans, blue prints and the results of experiments. You will be supplied with a map and sketch indicating the location of the hidden box. With the assistance of D'Agostino and Staly you should recover these items along with various other items which Willie's above-mentioned associates will indicate can be found in Baia, Pusaro and San Martino.

6. A barge loaded with parts for a newly developed torpedo has been sunk in the Bay of Naples. You will be supplied with a sketch indicating the approximate location of this sunken barge. With the assistance of Willie's associates you should make every feasible effort to salvage this cargo.

7. Under armed guard you will personally bring by best available
means of transport all of above items to Algiers for trans-shipment to Washington as later directed.

JOHN M. SHAHEEN
Officer in Charge
McGregor Project

Numbered Copies to:

Lt. North #1
General Donovan #2
Col. Huntington #3
Col. Eddy #4
Wayne Nelson
SECRET ITALIAN TORPEDO DEVICES
BEING BROUGHT TO THE UNITED STATES BY OSS

150 complete electro-magnetic SIC pistols.

1 model of winged torpedo.
1 hydraulic catapult for winged torpedoes, (1/4 size).
2 lateral launching devices for PT boats.
1 tail fin with stabilizing flaps for SI aircraft torpedoes.
1 set elements of protective hydrophonic devices against torpedoes.
6 circular gyrating devices for torpedoes.
8 gyro transversal stabilizers for airplane torpedoes.
1 fixed 4-blade net cutter for torpedoes.
2 complete fittings of free propellers and other special devices for airplane torpedoes.

53 directional gyros for ship and airplane torpedoes.
2 special (spherically enclosed) directional gyros.
1 heater fitted with burners for high oxygen content, with motor and accessories.

1 or 2 two-cycle cylinder heads for high oxygen content diesel motor and accessories.

1 uranine tracer for SIAH electrical torpedo.
1 complete after-part of SIAH electrical torpedo, with motor.
1 German mechanical pistol, modified to suit SIC electro-magnetic principle.
1 gyro testing outfit.
1 motor testing outfit.

2 sets of registering apparatus for control of underwater navigation of torpedoes.

1 automatic regulator and distributor for diving work with compressed air.
1 gyro testing outfit for gyro-transversal-stabilizers.
1 testing apparatus for electro-magnetic SIC pistols.
1 testing apparatus for the mechanical part of SIC pistols.
1 set of optical and mechanical instruments.
1 model of a torpedo recovering boat.
4 after-parts of MA 18" torpedoes.
4 motors for MA 18" torpedoes.
4 18" MA torpedoes.
10 practice heads for MA 18" torpedoes.
2 SB 18" torpedoes.
1 practice head for SB 18" torpedo.
1 AC 18" short torpedo.
3 practice heads for AC 18" short torpedoes.
1 war head, complete of SIC pistol.
2 21" SI torpedoes for submarines.
4 practice heads for 21" SI torpedoes.
1 set of spare parts for 21" SI torpedoes.
1 1/10 scale SA model.
1 or 2 SA submarines with periscopes, propellers, gas pumps, barometric regulators (motors, if available).
1 pressing apparatus for torpedo war heads.
1 complete series of shop drawings for 18" and 21" torpedo production.
1 collection of drawings on experimental work.
1 collection of SA drawings.
1 collection of drawings of SIAH electrical torpedoes.
Vice Admiral Eugenio Minisini, Royal Italian Navy, was born in Ospedaletto (Udine) Italy November 19, 1878. His father was Francesco Minisini of Italian nationality; and his mother was Eugenia Fremont of Irish nationality.

He entered the Royal Naval Academy in 1892 and graduated as an Ensign in 1898. After serving in China during the Boxer rebellion, he attended the "Naval Superior Course" at the Leghorn Academy, graduating in 1902, and was promoted in the same year to the rank of Lieutenant. In 1903 he took a special course in Electrotechnical Engineering at the Royal Academy, receiving the degree of "Superior Specialist".

He was then assigned to the task of improving the first submarine of the Royal Italian Navy; later he completed the same assignment on other Italian submarines of the "Squalo" class.

For family reasons in 1907 he resigned from active service and was placed in the Naval Reserve. From 1907 to 1914, in Paris, he attended the Eiffel School and took courses in Aerodynamics and worked at Salomon's (airplanes) and at Breguet's (airplanes). In 1912 he was licensed as an airplane pilot.

Recalled to active service in 1914, he flew as a Navy pilot and as an observer until 1916 when he was assigned to the task of adapting Naval ordnance for shore defenses of the "Isonzo" and "Piave" rivers. During this assignment he also designed and built many river craft and monitors and designed several types of ordnance including 10", 12" and 15" guns.

During the first World War, he was promoted to Lt. Commander, and Commander and was given the designation of "Superior Specialist in Artillery". He remained on active duty at the end of the first World War and was assigned to the building and organization of the ordnance works at the Arsenal of Venice. While there he invented and constructed the 4" anti-aircraft gun, and other special armaments used by the Italian Navy.

In 1926 he was promoted to Captain and transferred from the deck officers list to Naval Ordnance. In 1928 he was appointed by the King to the Presidency of the "Permanent Board for Research and Experiment on War Weapons for the Royal Navy". He held this position for seven years until 1934, and was responsible for most of the rearrangement of the new Italian fleet.

While President of the above board he was successively promoted to the ranks of Rear Admiral (1929) and Vice Admiral (1931).

In 1934 he was assigned to the I.R.I. (Institute of Industrial Reconstruction) Rome, to reorganize and coordinate all Italian war industries. At the same time he was elected President of the "Sviluppo Italiano" (Italian Torpedo Works) at Naples. He held these posts at the time of the Italian capitulation.
COPY OF CONTRACT BETWEEN OSS AND VICE ADMLR EUGENIO MINISINI, ROYAL ITALIAN NAVY

The following agreement between Lt. John M. Shaheen, USNR, representing the Office of Strategic Services of the Government of the United States of America and Admiral of Division of the Italian Naval Reserve, Eugenio Minisini has been entered into:

Admiral Minisini, in accordance with the authorization received from the Secretary of the Navy of the Italian Government, Admiral De Courten, agrees to cooperate with the Office of Strategic Services and the United States Navy as technical consultant and commits himself to place at the disposal of the Office of Strategic Services and the United States Navy all his knowledge and experience in Naval ordnance matters and Allied technical branches. He further agrees to keep the utmost secrecy on any study or findings which will result from this cooperation and also on any secret information that will come into his possession as a result of this work.

Any study or finding, inventions, etc., resulting from personal activity of Admiral Minisini as a consequence of this agreement will become the exclusive property of the United States Government.

Admiral Minisini, during the life of this agreement will be assisted by some trustworthy individual chosen by the U.S. Navy Department.

The order of precedence of the research work to be undertaken by Admiral Minisini will be fixed and indicated to him by the United States Navy Department. All contacts between Admiral Minisini and individuals, public or private bureaus, or commercial firms, or other technical bodies must be approved by the U.S. Navy Department and the Office of Strategic Services, while any contact with Italian individuals, commercial firms, or technical bodies must receive the approval of the U.S. Navy and the Navy Ministry of the Italian Government.

During the life of this agreement, Admiral Minisini will receive from the Office of Strategic Services of the United States Government, the same remuneration given Vice Admiral of the United States Navy.

During Admiral Minisini's stay in the United States of America, he will reside in any locality indicated to him by the U.S. Navy as best suited to meet the requirements of his work.

All traveling expenses from Europe to the United States of America and from the United States of America to Europe (the latter being at the termination of this agreement) for Admiral Minisini and his wife and his traveling expenses while in the United States of America (in connection with official business) are guaranteed by the Office of Strategic Services.

In view of the exceptional and emergency circumstances in which Admiral and Mrs. Minisini leave Italy, it is agreed that Admiral Minisini will receive one thousand dollars in money of the Government.
Salvage Operations
AT
ROYAL ITALIAN TORPEDO WORKS
MEMORANDUM for Mr. Whitney H. Shepardson, Chief, SI.

FROM: Joseph M. Scribner, Deputy Director, OSS.

SUBJECT: OSS Contacts in new Italian Cabinet.

1. The OSS has excellent connections with four of the men holding portfolios in Marshal Badoglio's new Cabinet.

2. Two of these men, Admiral de Courtin, Minister of Marine (Italian Secretary of the Navy), and Admiral Barone, Minister of Merchant Marine, rendered invaluable assistance to our own Lieutenant Commander Shaheen and OSS Agent Marcelllo Girosi, in execution of the McGregor project. The details of this assistance are recorded in the report on the McGregor project, which dealt with subversive work among Flag Officers of the Royal Italian Navy by OSS.

3. General Orlando, head of the War Ministry, and Guido Jung, heading the Ministry of Finance, are old friends of OSS Agent Girosi.

4. de Courtin and Barone have been appointed as full Ministers, while Orlando and Jung have been designated as Under-Secretaries, but empowered to act as Ministers until Rome is reached and a new government is formed.

5. It is not often that contacts of this nature exist within the Cabinet of another government. It is suggested that your Intelligence organization give serious and immediate thought to utilizing these leads. We will give you our every cooperation in this matter.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 20, 1943

The New York Sun

REPORT AMBROSIO ON WAY OUT NEXT

Italian Government Headquarters in Southern Italy, Nov. 17 (A. P.).—Gen. Vittorio Ambrosio, whom the Yugoslavs have accused of war crimes, may soon be replaced as Chief of Staff of the Italian Army, it was understood today, following the announcement by the Italian Premier, Marshal Badoglio, of the personnel of his "technical government."

Gen. Ambrosio recently replaced Gen. Mario Roatta, who was removed as Chief of Staff after an investigation of similar charges brought against him by the Yugoslavs.

Marshal Badoglio's new Cabinet included Gen. Taddio Orlando, who was released from an Allied prisoner-of-war camp at the Marshal's request to take the post of Under-Secretary for War. Deputies-secretaries are Vito Reali, Internal Affairs; Giovanni Cuomo, Education; Raffaele de Caro, Public Health; Tomaso Biccheli, Industry, Commerce and Labor; Gen. Giovanni de Raimondo, Civil Transport; Admiral Pietro Barone, Merchant Marine; Mario Paoli, Telegraphs and Communications, and Giuseppe de Santis, Justice. Guido Jung, who once held a Cabinet post in Mussolini's government, is Under-Secretary of Finance.

The under-secretaries are all empowered to act as ministers until Rome is reached and a new government is formed.

The Air and Marine ministries, headed by Gen. Renato Sandalli and Admiral de Courtin, remain unchanged.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the statement in your message to Congress regarding our forces in Italy, the following has just been received from General McNaurney, our Commander there and the Deputy Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in that theater:

"I greatly appreciate the reference to Italy in the President's message to Congress on the state of the nation. It was headlined in the Sunday Stars and Stripes, broadcast over the Armed Forces radio station and is being brought to the attention of all personnel of this Command through the medium of General Orders.

"I feel that it will be an outstanding factor in maintaining the morale and fighting efficiency of our soldiers.

"Please convey my thanks to the President."

Chief of Staff
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 21, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

Please let me see proposed answer to this. Most certainly we cannot tell the Italians that if they cease hostilities they will have a peace with honor. We cannot get away from unconditional surrender. All we can tell them is that they will be treated by us and the British with humanity and with the intention that the Italian people be reconstituted into a nation in accordance with the principles of self-determination. This latter would, of course, not include any form of Fascism or dictatorship.

F. D. R.

Message from Algiers to Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated May 18, 1943, re Italian situation.
The President today made the following statement:

"In accordance with the policies with respect to Italy which were outlined jointly by the Prime Minister and me in a statement issued to the Press on September twenty-sixth, measures are now being taken to provide Italy with supplies necessary to prevent civilian hunger, sickness, and fear during the forthcoming winter. Steps are also being taken to restore the damaged transportation and electrical generating facilities of Italy to the extent necessary to enable the Italian people to throw their full resources into the fight against Germany and Japan.

"A delegation of supply officers has been called from Italy to Washington to review the needs and requirements of the Italian civilian population. In addition to the substantial quantities of food and clothing which are now being shipped, and have for sometime been shipped into Italy, 150,000 tons of wheat and flour are now scheduled for shipment. Steps are being taken to increase the bread ration in those areas in Italy where food supplies are below the standard necessary to maintain full health and efficiency. The distribution of food and essential supplies within the country has been seriously impeded by the damage done to the transportation system and the wholesale commandeering of trucks by the enemy. To meet this emergency need it is planned to send 1,700 additional trucks to Italy.

"In addition, preparations are under way to supply substantial quantities of generating equipment including temporary power facilities to furnish electricity to essential industries and public utilities in central Italy which have been brought to a standstill by the almost complete destruction by the Germans of power plants.

"The aid which the Allies have already given to Italy has been substantial. Since the invasion of Sicily to the end of this year, 2,500,000 long tons of civilian supplies will have been shipped to Italy. Of this total, 1,107,000 tons were food and the balance consisted of coal, fertilizer, seeds, medical and sanitary supplies and clothing. As an integral part of military operations the Army has done a great deal to repair roads and bridges and railroads and to repair water and power systems and motor transport.

"Through these and other measures of assistance which are now in preparation, the Italian people will be enabled to increase their already significant contribution toward the defeat of the enemy. By doing these things, this country is serving the military aims and objectives of the United Nations which require the greatest possible contribution from the manpower and the resources of every nation engaged in the final overthrow of Germany and Japan."
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS

With reference to our recent memorandum concerning current problems with Italy, we would like to submit the following considerations to the President during his conversations with the British Prime Minister.

Certain areas of Italy's northeastern frontier will probably be in dispute after hostilities. In order that the final disposition of these disputed areas would not be prejudiced by occupation by the armed forces of claimant states, it is suggested that Allied Military Government be extended to all Italian metropolitan territory within its 1939 frontiers. In the South Tyrol and the Iastrian Peninsula (Venezia Tridentina and Venezia Giulia), Allied Military Government should be maintained and these areas not restored to Italian administration (as is the present practice with respect to liberated areas in southern Italy). Allied Military Government would thus be maintained until the disputed areas are finally disposed of by peace treaty or other settlement. Any other course, such as letting the Tito forces occupy the Peninsula or Free Austrian forces occupy the South Tyrol prior to final disposition at the peace settlement, would undoubtedly prejudice the final disposition of these territories, cause deep resentment on the part of the Italian people, and result in the loss of considerable prestige by the Allies in Italy.

The British have already suggested a plan along these lines and would, it is believed, be willing to maintain Allied Military Government in frontier areas likely to be in dispute for the required period. It is reported that this is also the plan of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, at least with respect to the Iastrian Peninsula. On our part, it would mean keeping a certain number of American Military Government officers and soldiers in Northeastern Italy.
The President and the Prime Minister held further discussions Monday and Tuesday at Hyde Park, on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe. The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed at this time for strategic military reasons, and pending their consideration by our other Allies.

The present problems in Italy also came under discussion, and on this subject the President and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

"We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed "The Allied Commission".

"The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London."
"Our governments are also willing to consider a revision of the present long terms of the Italian armistice, to bring them more in line with the present realistic situation.

"First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of food and clothing, medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.

"At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy - an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

"These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed on the basis of exchange of goods."
"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain - the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper place in the great family of free nations."

September 19, 1944.
GUNFIRE NO.

PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET.

Following for Foreign Secretary from Prime Minister:

Have agreed with President text of joint statement on Italy which I send you in my immediately following telegram in case there are any points I have overlooked. Intention is to release in approximately 48 hours. Pray inform President through Lord Halifax whether you concur or have any amendments to suggest. I am prepared to accept without reference any suggested amendments you agree with President.

19.9.44
ANNEX B.

Following are my comments:

1. I much hope the President will agree to leave out paragraph referring to a revision of long armistice terms. We did not include this in our original list of concessions because (1) to do so opens the whole of our position in relation to Italian surrender and would enable Italy to call in question all its provisions including fleet, colonies, etc., (2) We could not do this without prior consultation with Russia who is also a party to armistice terms. To omit such consultation would cause great offence. Dominions who have also approved armistice terms would certainly expect consultation before any announcement was made. It should also be remembered that long armistice terms have never been made public and that military authorities have hitherto been unwilling to do so. Parliament would certainly press to see terms if their revision is announced.

2. As regards paragraph dealing with relief of hunger and sickness, as we understand it UNRRA's help will be solely in medical aids, supplies for child welfare and displaced persons. Therefore it seems unwise to mention specifically foodstuffs and clothing which would certainly make more difficult the task of our representatives at UNRRA in obtaining agreement. I suggest therefore that these words: "foodstuffs and clothing" should be left out.

3. Paragraph dealing with trading with the enemy as at present worded with its reference to exchange of goods would give Italy privileged position over all our allies and ourselves and would undermine United States - United Kingdom supply machinery. To avoid this danger I suggest that in this paragraph we should therefore omit last words: "on basis of exchange of goods."
4. I should be grateful if you could tell me when President desires to issue text. It would be desirable to tell other United Nations who are represented on Italian Advisory Council before this statement is made since it represents important changes of policy. If the President would let us know date he considers suitable we would summon Soviet, French, Yugo-Slav and Greek representatives to inform them beforehand. No doubt State Department will do the same.
"We believe we should give encouragement to
The President and the Prime Minister held
those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth
further discussions Monday and Tuesday at Hyde Park,
in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the
on subjects dealing with post-war policies in Europe.
will Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italian.
The result of these discussions cannot be disclosed
a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our
at this time for strategic military reasons, and
common enemies.
 depending their consideration by our other Allies.

"The American and the British people are
The present problems in Italy also came
of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome,
under discussion, and on this subject the President
but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the
and the Prime Minister issued the following statement:
Italian people and on their own government will cost.

"The Italian people, freed of their Fascist
readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.
and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months

"An increasing measure of control will be
demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the
gradually handed over to the Italian Administration,
side of the democracies, and to take a place among the
subject of course to that administration's proving
United Nations devoted to principles of peace and
that it can maintain law and order and the regular
justice.
administration of justice. To mark this change the
allied Control Commission will be renamed "The Allied"
We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our common enemies.

"The American and the British people are of course horrified by the recent mob action in Rome, but feel that a greater responsibility placed on the Italian people and on their own government will most readily prevent a recurrence of such acts.

"An increasing measure of control will be gradually handed over to the Italian Administration, subject of course to that Administration's proving that it can maintain law and order and the regular administration of justice. To mark this change the Allied Control Commission will be renamed 'The Allied..."
The British High Commissioner in Italy will assume the additional title of Ambassador. The United States representative in Rome already holds that rank. The Italian Government will be invited to appoint direct representatives to Washington and London.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare for the sending of medical aids and other essential supplies to Italy.

At the same time, first steps should be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy — an economy laid low under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction. Last German will have left Italian soil,
These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. For military reasons we should assist the Italians in the restoration of such power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications as enter into the war situation, and for a short time send engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to help them in their own rehabilitation.

"The application to Italy of the Trading with the Enemy Acts should be modified so as to enable business contacts between Italy and the outside world to be resumed for the benefit of the Italian people.

"We all wish to speed the day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, and when the last German will have left Italian soil,
and when there will be no need of any Allied troops
to remain - the day when free elections can be held
throughout Italy, and when Italy can earn her proper
place in the great family of free nations."
The Italian Situation

Bonomi's Government has successfully weathered its first two months. Its position, however, will remain precarious without tangible proof of Allied sympathy, especially as the industrial north is liberated.

The British last May proposed the conclusion of a "preliminary peace treaty". They felt that this would end the anomalous situation whereby Italy is both defeated enemy and co-belligerent, clear the way for normal relationships, and yet not prejudice the ultimate peace settlement. We agreed to discuss possible terms but differed from the British thesis that no concessions should meanwhile be made to Italy. The more urgent problems should be solved wherever possible without delay. Mr. Churchill has now told Ambassador Kirk in Rome that he disapproved of a preliminary treaty and preferred UNRRA participation in Italian relief and "a recognition of the present government along the lines already accorded by the Soviet." Press reports portraying the Prime Minister as sympathetic to the Bonomi Government and convinced that the Italian have "worked their passage" foreshadow a more favorable British policy toward Italy. We should welcome such a change in attitude, having felt for some time that it is to the general interest to strengthen Italian confidence in democratic government and in the democratic powers.

The most urgent problems are those of civilian relief and rehabilitation. The physical obstacles to their solution have been augmented by divergences in British and American views.

Economic Problems. The civilian supply program thus far has been entirely a military responsibility, of which the U.S. Army now wishes to be relieved. It is proposed to finance United States supplies, except such limited supplies as the Army may temporarily continue to provide, by making available to the Italians under appropriate Allied controls the equivalent in dollars of lire paid to our troops in Italy. Though willing for us to finance our own share in this way, the British have questioned extending the present limited military scope of the supply program and appear sensitive about the reaction of our European Allies to any appreciable aid to Italy. We believe the most essential items of rehabilitation should be included to help the Italian economy to begin functioning and are seeking British agreement.

We
We have intended proposing at the UNRRA Council meeting
in September limited UNRRA participation in relief activities
in Italy, involving care and repatriation of displaced persons
and public health activities including the furnishing of
needed medical supplies and technical assistance. The total
estimated cost would be between 35 and 50 million dollars.
There has been some indication of British reluctance to support
such a program.

The present food supply in Italy would suffice for bare
subsistence rations if means of transportation from one region
to another were available. Additional trucks and coal to
operate local railroads are needed.

Other major questions now in the foreground are:

Allied Control Machinery. Military interest in the Allied
Control Commission is decreasing. It will be necessary to
determine its future status, particularly whether its control
functions should continue after they are no longer needed to
protect military operations. This will depend on (a) the
status to be accorded Italy, (b) Italy's relations with
bordering states pending a final peace settlement, and (c)
the internal situation. Such of its economic functions as
must continue after termination of military control can be
handled either through a control organization as at present or
an economic mission to the Italian Government.

Ambassador Kirk believes that the Commission should now
be headed by a civilian, who would continue for the present to
be responsible to the Theater Commander. Kirk also recommends
appointment of an American, who should be an expert on economic
matters. The British might agree. It is expected that the
Commission's Economic Section will shortly be staffed by
civilian experts, continuing, however, under military command.
Many other functions of the Commission can soon be abandoned
or turned over to the Italians.

The Moscow Declaration provided that the Theater Commander
would in time turn over his presidency of the Commission to the
Advisory Council. We have recommended to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff that the Advisory Council be tied in more closely with
the day to day problems of the Commission both to improve its
present advisory role and to prepare it to assume the above
functions if this course proves desirable.

The Armistice Terms. The severe long terms of surrender
are a source of weakness to any Italian government. They are
unquestionably out of date, and many of them have never been
applied.
applied. In reply to the Bonomi memorandum of July 22, we agreed to study any specific suggestions for their revision. We have not pursued this question in view of the British proposal for a preliminary peace to replace the armistice regime.

We did not wish to publish the long terms until some step to offset the reaction could be announced. Pressure in Italy for publication is growing, however, and we have advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if this becomes advisable the Italian government itself should take the responsibility for publication.

Italian Armed Forces. The Italians continue to press for fuller military participation. It has finally been decided to furnish combat equipment for three divisions of the Corps of Liberation. General Wilson also recommends increasing the Italian armed forces from 444,300 to 470,000 men.

Prisoners of War. Italian troops captured before the surrender continue to be prisoners of war, even those now employed in combat zones as service units. It should be possible to remove that stigma without prejudice to any military interest. In June we recommended this course to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, who referred it to the British Chiefs of Staff and APHQ.

Italian Participation in International Affairs. The Italians should not be precluded from all international contacts. We proposed inviting an Italian observer to the Bretton Woods Conference. The British, French and Yugoslavs were opposed, while the Russians and Greeks agreed. We also favor Italy's participations in such bodies as the International Labor Office.

Some form of Italian representation with the Allied Governments besides the U.S.S.R. seems advisable. We have informed Bonomi of our willingness to receive in an unofficial capacity an Italian technical representation to discuss financial and economic questions and report directly to the Italian Government on such matters as the treatment of Italian prisoners of war here.

Territorial Problems. Our preliminary studies have been based on the criteria: (1) territory should not be taken from Italy merely to punish a defeated enemy or reward an ally; (2) ethnic considerations should predominate, though economic and strategic factors would be kept in mind; (3) as to colonies, native welfare is the first concern; other colonial empires should
should not be aggrandized by the addition of Italian colonies; and, if Italian colonies are placed under international trusteeship, efforts might be made to place under similar trusteeship at least some other colonial possessions.

In order not to prejudice final settlements, we have advised the extension of Allied Military Government to all metropolitan territory within the 1939 frontiers as liberated; administration thereof by Anglo-American military forces exclusively; and in disputed areas the employment of more Allied and fewer local Italian officials than elsewhere in Italy.
The President told the P. M. OK to keep copies if attached. he also said he wanted an answer from the British on it.

FEB 19

SB
MR. PRESIDENT.

I return the Memorandum you gave me about Italian Colonies.

The Foreign Office would like to treat this as an official communication if you would allow us to keep a copy of it.

It seems that the usual broad and substantial measure of agreement exists between us, but we should like to look into the details more closely.

16.9.44
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals of British Chiefs of Staff for Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories

I refer to your memorandum of April 28 in regard to certain proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for the future disposition of Italian overseas territories.

In accordance with your request, I am enclosing a memorandum on the subject which embodies the comments and recommendations of the experts in the Department charged with these matters. While the conclusions drawn are in no sense final, they represent long and careful study.

I may add that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the view that from the limited viewpoint of our national security, there are no direct objections to the British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories since United States postwar military interests are not directly affected. From the broader view of national and worldwide security, however, the Chiefs of Staff have expressed the opinion that the United States should not support any such British proposals prior to ascertaining Russian views.

In my memorandum of May 6 I mentioned that according to our information the proposals in question had not been considered by the British War Cabinet and in no way represented the policy of the British Government. I have, therefore, not discussed the subject with the British nor has any indication been given that we are aware of these particular proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosure:

Comment on British Proposals for Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories
1. The preferred solution to the problem of Eritrea is for all of this territory to be assimilated to Ethiopia under an arrangement whereby the Ethiopian Government would assume certain obligations by agreement with the International Organization. Among these obligations would be an undertaking by Ethiopia, in the event of a threat to the security of the Red Sea or Northeast African areas, to open all ports, airfields and means of communication in Eritrea to the forces of the United Nations. Such obligations would also include the employment, in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, of technical personnel for the operation of ports, railways and roads, and of technical experts and advisers in the central and provincial government and administration.

This arrangement would satisfy the claims of Ethiopia for the return of Eritrea and for an outlet to the sea at Massawa, under safeguards for proper administration and with due regard for the security interests of the United Nations. However, if the British should insist, for overriding strategic reasons, on the dismemberment of Eritrea, so that a portion of the territory would be ceded to the Sudan, no objections are perceived strong enough to justify the opposition of this Government, provided that the area ceded lies north and west of Asmara and Massawa.

The Greater New Somaliland as proposed by the British would include Italian and British Somaliland and the Ogaden district of Ethiopia. Since the Ogaden is an integral part of the territory of an independent sovereign state and ally, a change in its status should not be considered. On the other hand, economic, administrative and cultural considerations support the view that Italian Somaliland, together with the British and French Somalilands, might advantageously be placed under International Trusteeship and directly administered as a single unit by an authority appointed by and responsible to the International Organization. Such an authority should be composed of experts or of representatives of the interested powers. If it should prove impossible to obtain French acceptance of this plan, it would still appear desirable to place Italian and British Somalilands under International Trusteeship, with special arrangements for a genuinely free port at Djibouti and the possible purchase of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway by Ethiopia.
No objection is perceived to the fusion of the northern frontier district of Kenya with a greater Somaliland, as mentioned in the British proposals.

2. **Libya** The preferred disposition of Libya would be to place this entire area (Cyrenaica and Tripolitania) under International Trusteeship to be administered by a commission of experts responsible to the International Organization. This would not preclude the establishment of an autonomous Amirate of the Senussi, whom the British have declared shall never again come under Italian rule. However, if it should prove difficult to obtain British agreement to this over-all solution, a feasible though less desirable arrangement would be to establish Cyrenaica as an autonomous Senussi Amirate under Egyptian (or possibly British) trusteeship, along the lines of the British proposal, and to place Tripolitania under an International Trusteeship to be exercised by Italy.

3. It would be taken for granted that United Nations air and naval requirements would be satisfied in the Benghazi area. Likewise, should Great Britain wish to use the Castel Benito airfield for security purposes, there would be no objection, provided that no exclusive commercial rights or privileges were involved.

4. Limited frontier rectifications in the Fezzan area favoring the French would not appear objectionable, but any outright cession of territory in violation of the Atlantic Charter would be undesirable.

5. No compelling reasons are perceived for the return of the Uweinat oasis or the Sarra triangle to the Sudan, particularly in view of the possible violation of the Atlantic Charter thereby.

6. The Department is in accord with the British suggestion that some United Nations security scheme might provide for bases in Crete—possibly administered by the British—and for similar facilities in the Islands of the Dodecanese, particularly Rhodes. It is agreed that with the exception of Castelrosso, which would be given to Turkey, sovereignty over the Dodecanese should be transferred to Greece.

7. Pantelleria and the Isole Pelagie should be retained by Italy but completely demilitarized.
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals of British Chiefs of Staff for Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories

I refer to your memorandum of April 26 in regard to certain proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for the future disposition of Italian overseas territories.

In accordance with your request, I am enclosing a memorandum on the subject which embodies the comments and recommendations of the experts in the Department charged with these matters. While the conclusions drawn are in no sense final, they represent long and careful study.

I may add that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed the view that from the limited viewpoint of our national security, there are no direct objections to the British proposals for the disposition of Italian overseas territories since United States postwar military interests are not directly affected. From the broader view of national and worldwide security, however, the Chiefs of Staff have expressed the opinion that the United States should not support any such British proposals prior to ascertaining Russian views.

In my memorandum of May 6 I mentioned that according to our information the proposals in question had not been considered by the British War Cabinet and in no way represented the policy of the British Government. I have, therefore, not discussed the subject with the British nor has any indication been given that we are aware of these particular proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff.

Enclosures:

Comment on British Proposals for Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories
MEMORANDUM

August 3, 1944

COMMENT ON BRITISH PROPOSALS FOR DISPOSITION OF ITALIAN OVERSEAS TERRITORIES

1. The preferred solution to the problem of Eritrea is for all of this territory to be assimilated to Ethiopia under an arrangement whereby the Ethiopian Government would assume certain obligations by agreement with the International Organization. Among these obligations would be an undertaking by Ethiopia, in the event of a threat to the security of the Red Sea or Northeast African areas, to open all ports, airfields and means of communication in Eritrea to the forces of the United Nations. Such obligations would also include the employment, in both Eritrea and Ethiopia, of technical personnel for the operation of ports, railways and roads, and of technical experts and advisers in the central and provincial government and administration.

This arrangement would satisfy the claims of Ethiopia for the return of Eritrea and for an outlet to the sea at Massawa, under safeguards for proper administration and with due regard for the security interests of the United Nations. However, if the British should insist, for overriding strategic reasons, on the dismemberment of Eritrea, so that a portion of the territory would be ceded to the Sudan, no objections are perceived strong enough to justify the opposition of this Government, provided that the area ceded lies north and west of Asmara and Massawa.

The Greater New Somaliland as proposed by the British would include Italian and British Somaliland and the Ogaden district of Ethiopia. Since the Ogaden is an integral part of the territory of an independent sovereign state and ally, a change in its status should not be considered. On the other hand, economic, administrative and cultural considerations support the view that Italian Somaliland, together with the British and French Somalilands, might advantageously be placed under International Trusteeship and directly administered as a single unit by an authority appointed by and responsible to the International Organization. Such an authority should be composed of experts or of representatives of the interested powers. If it should prove impossible to obtain French acceptance of this plan, it would still appear desirable to place Italian and British Somalilands under International Trusteeship, with special arrangements for a genuinely free port at Djibouti and the possible purchase of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway by Ethiopia.
No objection is perceived to the fusion of the northern frontier district of Kenya with a greater Somaliland, as mentioned in the British proposals.

2. **Libya** The preferred disposition of Libya would be to place this entire area (Cyrenaica and Tripolitania) under International Trusteeship to be administered by a commission of experts responsible to the International Organization. This would not preclude the establishment of an autonomous Amirate of the Senussi, whom the British have declared shall never again come under Italian rule. However, if it should prove difficult to obtain British agreement to this over-all solution, a feasible though less desirable arrangement would be to establish Cyrenaica as an autonomous Senussi Amirate under Egyptian (or possibly British) trusteeship, along the lines of the British proposal, and to place Tripolitania under an International Trusteeship to be exercised by Italy.

3. It would be taken for granted that United Nations air and naval requirements would be satisfied in the Benghazi area. Likewise, should Great Britain wish to use the Castel Benito airfield for security purposes, there would be no objection, provided that no exclusive commercial rights or privileges were involved.

4. Limited frontier rectifications in the Fezzan area favoring the French would not appear objectionable, but any outright cession of territory in violation of the Atlantic Charter would be undesirable.

5. No compelling reasons are perceived for the return of the Uweinat oasis or the Sarra triangle to the Sudan, particularly in view of the possible violation of the Atlantic Charter thereby.

6. The Department is in accord with the British suggestion that some United Nations security scheme might provide for bases in Crete--possibly administered by the British--and for similar facilities in the Islands of the Dodecanese, particularly Rhodes. It is agreed that with the exception of Castelrosso, which would be given to Turkey, sovereignty over the Dodecanese should be transferred to Greece.

7. Pantelleria and the *Isola Pelagie* should be retained by Italy but completely demilitarized.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMLRAL LEAHY:

Do you think these should be paraphrased and condensed and sent to Churchill?

F.D.R.
SECRET

BE-147

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers

Dated June 14, 1944

Rec'd 8:35 a.m.

Secretary of State

Washington

U.S. URGENT

2003, June 13, midnight

FROM MURPHY

MacFarlane's action as Chief Commissioner of Allied Control Commission in approving the formation of Bonomi Government was taken without prior consultation with either MacMillan or myself. Your 1848, June 12, 7 p.m. what advice if any he received on this subject from either Kirk or Reber I do not as yet know. As you know the Allied Control Commission is the agency providing official contact between the Supreme Allied Commander and the Italian Government. Requests of Supreme Allied Commander are conveyed to the Italian Government by Allied Control Commission and it in turn is responsible to Supreme Allied Commander.

The question of this change of Government was not presented to the Advisory Council for Italy nor to the Supreme Allied Commander. In agreement with MacMillan
Macmillan I recommend to General Wilson and General MacFarlane at the time of our recent visit to Italy that the Italian Government be prevented from proceeding immediately to city of Rome and that the political leaders in Rome be invited by Government to come to them at Salerno. MacFarlane accepted this advice reluctantly but seemed eager to facilitate the visit of the Crown Prince and members of Badoglio Government to Rome.

Whatever may have been the wisdom of course adopted I believe it would be damaging to Allied prestige now to endeavor to retrace the steps taken. Should the Allies insist on return to office of Badoglio his critics in and without Italy would be afforded tremendous ammunition and in the transaction Bonomi might well become an Italian public hero.

The only course feasible would be to give Bonomi Government a trial after it has: (A) assumed the obligations of the short term armistice; (B) assumed the obligations of the long term armistice; (C) assumed the obligations which the former Italian Government has vis-a-vis the Allied Control Commission.

The delay in the official announcement of the formation of the Government could be explained on the ground
-3- #147, June 13, midnight from Algiers

Ground that time was required for the purpose of advising the respective Governments of the assumption of these obligations.

MacFarlane is being summoned to Algiers by SAC immediately for a thorough discussion of this matter.

CHAPIN

NPL REP

Regraded Unclassified
DSH-984
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Naples
Dated June 13, 1944
Rec'd 8:00 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

NIACCT
US URGENT
1847, June 13, 8 p.m.
SECRET FROM KIRK

I assume Department has by now received my telegrams No's 160, June 10, 6 p.m.; 166, June 11, 11 a.m.; 167, June 11, 170, June 12, 11 p.m.; 173, June 12, 1 p.m.; 174, June 12, 6 p.m.; 175, June 12, 8 p.m.; 179, June 13 and 181, June 13.

As regards the message from the Prime Minister quoted in Department's 163, June 12, 7 p.m., I submit that in reference to his statement that the members of the proposed Bononi Government are an "absolutely unrepresentative crew" it may be said that the members seem to have been chosen from all parties (see my 167, June 11 and 179 June 13). Furthermore it might be said that as Badoglio's replacement was according to reports received effected by the Italian politicians themselves (see last paragraph of 151, June 9, noon) and as the proposed new Government has given assurances that it is
-2-, 1847, June 13, 8 p.m., from Naples.

that it is bound by the undertakings given by the Badoglio Government (see second paragraph section two of my 157, June 10, 1 p.m.) the consequences of the Marshal's replacement, however regrettable it may be regarded, need not necessarily prove a "great disaster".

I must reaffirm the comments contained in my 172, June 12, noon. Regardless of other considerations the Bonomi Government represents to all appearances the expression of the Italian party leaders and, meager as my possibility of judging opinion here may be, indications are that an interference from foreign sources in the establishment of that Government would shift to those responsibility for possible internal disturbances in Italy and would raise a question in the minds of many within and without the country as to the intent of the United Nations to practice what they have preached.

As Reber and General MacFarlane were together in Rome during the negotiations among the party leaders I assume that MacFarlane's reports contain the pertinent available information on these matters. Communications with Rome have improved to a certain extent and as I have been compelled to postpone my visit there which was scheduled for today I have sent
-3-, 1847, June 13, 8 p.m., from Naples.

have sent a message to Reber asking him to inform me if he has any further information on the negotiations in Rome.

Sent Department repeated Algiers.

BRANDT

MEV
HTM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

FOR YOUR GUIDANCE.

F.D.R.

Regarded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 13, 1944

Subject: Telegram no. 699, June 10, 1944 from the Prime Minister, concerning the composition of the new Italian Government.

I have asked the views of Mr. Murphy in Algiers, as you suggested, on the Prime Minister's message of June 10 concerning the new Italian Government. As soon as his comments are received, I shall draft a reply to Mr. Churchill for your consideration.

Meanwhile Mr. Kirk in Naples comments that our adherence to a decision at this late date to discredit the Italian efforts to form a representative government under difficult circumstances appears irreconcilable with our established policy. He reports also that General MacFarlane, British Deputy President of the Allied Control Commission, and Sir Noel Charles, representative on the Advisory Council for Italy, have received messages in which the Prime Minister protests against the composition of the new Government, states that he has sought the views of the American and Soviet Governments, and directs General MacFarlane to inform Premier Bonomi that his new Government shall not be inaugurated until approval is given by the Allied Governments.

I feel that we should not be unduly influenced by Mr. Churchill's precipitate action. His alarm may be unwarranted, and his attitude toward a solution of the political problem presented by the liberation of Rome appears at variance with American policy. You have emphasized many times that we will assure the Italian people the opportunity to choose their own form of government. The Moscow Declaration regarding Italy calls for the democratization of the Italian Government by the inclusion of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism. Until all the country is liberated there appears to be no better indication of popular will than that expressed through the six parties of varying shades of political thought comprising the Italian Committee of National Liberation. Bonomi was president of the Committee in Rome.

Many
Many members of the new Government are former cabinet ministers of the pre-Fascist era. They are men of considerable prestige and stature in the country. Our policy has been to welcome democratic political solutions worked out by the Italian people themselves with minimum interference from the Allied Governments. The present Government appears to be such a solution, evolved without civil disturbance or damage to the Allied military effort. Its anti-Fascist and democratic character, including the best elements of Italian resistance to the Germans during the long occupation of Rome, augurs well for Italy's political future and should, I feel, be welcomed and supported by this Government and the other democracies.

General MacFarlane and his American and British political advisers have been in Rome during this period, and it is reported that they have obtained the necessary assurances from the various parties comprising the new Government regarding Italian obligations under the Armistice and other Allied safeguards. Any interference on our part at this time to change the complexion of a government which we have every reason to believe is friendly to the Allies and bitterly anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi, would be misunderstood generally and would appear to be contrary to the Moscow Declaration on Italy and to our general policy of encouraging the development of a truly democratic and representative Italian Government.
FMH-156

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
2004, June 13, midnight
FROM MURPHY
(Repeated to London) Your 4065, May 22, 9 p.m. to London (Department's 1589 to Algiers) and related exchange of telegrams regarding NWE by FWB of AFW of title "Provisional Government" in reference to the FCNL.

The Foreign Office telegraphed MacMillan on June 10 that in all of its individual output OWI will not mention "Provisional Government" as such under any circumstances. However, according to Foreign Office it is Sherwood's feeling that OWI cannot impose its policy unilaterally on FWB and that Sherwood suggested that this highly delicate matter should be discussed with MacMillan and Murphy for adjustment of FWB policy.

Both MacMillan and I feel, and he is telegraphing...
#2004, June 13, midnight from Algiers

Foreign Office accordingly, that in light of the stricture laid down in the Department's 1589 and of the instructions from the President referred to in AGWAR W-45518 of June third PWB must necessarily be guided by American wishes in this matter. While it is true that PWB is an Anglo-American organization it is a staff section of AFHQ and responsive to wishes of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In such a partnership arrangement the wishes of one of the principal partners must be respected in the partnership is to continue. The maintenance of the partnership involves far broader considerations of greater importance than this particular problem for which undoubtedly a mutually satisfactory solution will eventually be found. Therefore, MacMillan and I are advising the Supreme Allied Commander that PWB will be guided strictly by spirit of AGWAR telegram above-mentioned as read in light of Department's 1589, May 22 to London. Nevertheless it is obvious that the final solution of this matter cannot be held up indefinitely and I hope Department may be in a position to telegraph me shortly some comment on suggestions made in my 1886, June 7, 8 p.m.

CHAPIN

REP NFL
Secretary of State,

Washington.

NIACG US URGENT
185, June 13, 9 p.m.
FROM KIRK
(See my 184, June 13, 8 p.m.)

The British High Commissioner for Italy, my colleague on the Advisory Council, has just informed me that he has received a message from London stating that he should call a meeting of the Advisory Council and that further instructions are being sent to him. This message referred to his previous message on the formation of the Italian Government.

The High Commissioner added that he would attempt to call the members of the Council together for June 15 although the Greek representative who should call the next meeting and preside may be in Rome and the Soviet representative is in Algiers. I told my British colleague that I would be unable to take any active part in the meeting unless I should receive the views of my Government on the matter in question and accordingly I should appreciate advice as to whether the United States Government wishes to express its views.
-2-, #185, June 13, 8 p.m., from Naples.

views in the premises and if so, as to when the necessary instructions may be expected here.

I consider that speed in reaching a decision in this question is of great importance and if Advisory Council must be brought in at all at this late hour, every effort should be made to reduce delay so that a government can start to function here at earliest possible moment.

Sent to Department. Repeated to Algiers.

BRANDT

LMS
EJH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone SECRET

June 11, 1944
1 p.m.

NO DISTRIBUTION
U.S. URGENT
AMBASSADY
LONDON
4636

The following telegram has been received from Algiers.

(Code Room: Repeat here Algiers' telegram No. 1932, June 10, 6 p.m.).

The Department has replied as follows:

(See No. 4637, June 11, 1 p.m., to London for reply to Algiers as Department's No. 1639, June 11, 1 p.m.).

Please see Mr. Eden at the earliest opportunity and inform him of the developments described above. Tell him that we are surprised that General Macfarlane in representing the Allied Governments in Rome, would undertake to express the opinion of the United States Government on a question of this nature without first consulting it. Point out that the position taken by Macfarlane did not represent the views of this Government and express our expectation that he will in any future representations assure himself of this Government's views beforehand.

STETTINIUS
ACTING
U.S. URGENT
NO DISTRIBUTION
AMREP,
ALGIERS,
1839
FOR MURPHY.

You should inform General Wilson with reference to
General Macfarlane's messages concerning Sforza (your 1932
June 10, 6 p.m.) that this Government would have no (repeat
no) objection to Bonomi's appointment of Sforza as Foreign
Minister. Since Macfarlane represents and has acted in
this matter for both Governments you must request General
Wilson to direct him immediately to inform Bonomi that
his (Macfarlane's) position does not represent the views
of the United States Government; that Sforza's appointment
to the post of Foreign Minister would be entirely agree­
able to this Government. If possible you should send a
personal and confidential message to Reber asking him
also to inform Bonomi in this sense.

Sent to Algiers; repeated to London and Naples for
Kirk.

STETTINIUS, ACTING
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY EARLY.

The President authorizes you to have published the following paraphrased message, dated June 5, 1944, from Premier Stalin to the President:

"The news of the capture of Rome was received in the Soviet Union with great satisfaction. I congratulate you upon this great victory of Allied Anglo-American troops."

The President also authorizes you to publish the attached paraphrased message, dated June 6, 1944, from Marshal Badoglio.

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: General Devers.

The following is the quotation mentioned by me this morning, from a courier letter sent by General Eaker to General Arnold:

"I wish there were some way in which you could get to General Marshall a very important fact which I have observed here and which in my opinion has had a more important effect than any other one thing on the current successes in the air and on the ground in this theater. I refer explicitly to the personal leadership of General Devers. Since he is the senior American here there is no one to acquaint General Marshall with his activity. I am convinced that it is largely his personal effort and example, and particularly his boundless energy and drive, which have made it possible for him to visit practically every combat unit in this theater, air and ground, that have enthused everyone with the will to fight and the spirit that is required to win.

"I have accompanied him on many of these inspections and I know what a tremendous effect his visits, his talks to the men, and particularly his encouragement to commanders, have had in the preparation for the present battle and on its progress. I feel certain that General Wilson shares my view. Devers' personality and leadership have been a large factor in the very fine showing that our American units have made during the past two weeks.

"Personally I shall always be thankful for the uniform support and encouragement we on the air side have had from him at every turn. He has been largely instrumental in energizing thorough coordination and good feeling among commanders of all nationalities in this theater."

Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: British Proposal for Disposition of Italian Territories Overseas

With reference to my memorandum of April 26, 1944, concerning a British proposal for disposition of Italian overseas territories, a further telegram has been received from our Mission at Algiers, stating that the British Chiefs of Staff telegraphed General Wilson on April 29, 1944 that the proposals in question had not been considered by the War Cabinet and in no way represented the policy of the British Government. General Wilson was instructed to inform the addressees of the previous telegrams that they were canceled.

Accordingly, I do not believe that anything need be said to the British Government at this time, but Ambassador Winant has been advised of the proposals and of your feeling as indicated in your memorandum of April 29, 1944, for his background information in case the subject should be raised.
April 26, 1944.

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Cordell:

Referring to your memorandum of 26 April in regard to a current British study of the future disposition of Italian overseas territories, I am not prepared at the present time to give you an expression of opinion.

When I return to Washington please let me have a memorandum on the subject and your recommendation.

You may tell the British that I am not ready now to express an opinion or to be in any way committed.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Disposition of Italian Overseas Territories

The Mission at Algiers has telegraphed the following proposals upon which the British Chiefs of Staff have requested General Wilson's views in connection with a study of the strategic phases of British policy in connection with the forthcoming conference of Dominion Prime Ministers:

1. Eritrea would be dismembered with the western highlands going to the Sudan and the highlands and Danakil coastal plain to Ethiopia. It is assumed that the United Nations would not request a base at Massawa. A greater new Somaliland would be created including Italian Somaliland, the northern frontier district of Kenya and British and Ethiopian Ogaden Somaliland, the whole preferably under British trusteeship.

2. Cyrenaica would be an autonomous principality under Egyptian suzerainty with adequate safeguards for United Nations military requirements, including facilities for air and naval bases in the Benghazi area. The offer of suzerainty to Egypt is considered a useful bargaining counter.

3. Tripolitania would be restored to Italy subject to guarantees of demilitarization and retention by the British of the right to use Castel Benito Airfield as a staging point.

4. There would be frontier readjustments with the French except in the Fezzan area.

5. The Owenat and Sarra triangle would be returned to the Sudan.

6.
6. Castelrosso would go to Turkey and the remainder of the Dodecanese to Greece, subject to the right of Great Britain to use bases in Crete and other facilities for bases in the islands, particularly Rhodes. Such facilities might be provided under some United Nations scheme.

7. Pantelleria and the Pelagians would be under effective British control either directly or through some general security scheme.

General Wilson recalls that the British Government is already committed to recognition of an independent Ethiopia and to prevent the resumption of Italian rule over the Senussi in Cyrenaica.

Admiral Leahy has been advised.

Why answer this today? Let me have recommendations when I get back to Washington? I will the British I am not ready to answer or to in any way commit...
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the letter of the Apostolic Delegate dated 13 March, a copy of which was forwarded with your memorandum of 31 March, and in which are contained certain observations of the Holy See with respect to the preservation of religious shrines and monuments in Rome and other parts of Italy, and a proposal to by-pass Rome.

Your expressed views concerning the necessity of avoiding damage to religious edifices and historic monuments whenever possible are fully and clearly understood by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean. The instructions issued to the Theater Commander by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and by him to his forces, preclude the possibility of misunderstanding. We fully recognize the fact that unfortunate circumstances will arise which will result in unavoidable damage to property we wish to spare.

In so far as concerns the by-passing of Rome, the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that in view of the fact that the United Nations are on the offensive it would be unsound from the military point of view to make an agreement of such nature at this time. The situation in Italy is dependent on so many factors that any decision on making a direct attack on Rome must await further developments.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN PENCE:

Subject: Inquiry of (? March 1944 from Capt. Wood, White House Aide, regarding U.S. Naval members of the Allied Control Commission in Italy.

Capt. Wood, White House Aide, called by telephone March 9 to learn names of U.S. Naval Officers on Allied Control Commission, Italy, and to know especially what Commodore Ziroli and Captain Stone were doing. He was interested only in the top men. The following information was supplied:

Commodore H. W. Ziroli, USN -
Head Naval Sub-Commission
U.S. Member Allied Control Commission
(Senior U.S. Naval Liaison Officer, Italy)

Captain Ellery W. Stone, USNR -
Deputy to the Deputy President of the ACC
(Lt. Genl. MacFarland)
Was vice-president of the Communications Section of ACC before reorganization

Captain Richard B. Tuggle, USN -
Deputy on the Naval Sub-Commission

Commander H. St. J. Butler, USN (Ret.) -
Represents Commodore Ziroli on the Commission and serves as a member of the Naval Sub-Commission

Lt. Cdr. F. A. Southard, USNR -
Chief Finance Sub-Commission of the Economic Section

Lt. Cdr. Chas. F. Darlington, USNR -
Chief, Foreign Trade section
(Exports - Imports).

[Signature]

Ept 5018 (Mar)
March 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Is there anything to
add to this?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 1, 1944

Subject: Italian Political Situation

On February 22 I received your approval of a proposed cable from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Wilson authorizing the General to support the program of the six anti-Fascist opposition groups in solving the present political crisis in Italy. The proposed cable was submitted to the British here for approval the next day, February 23. British concurrence has not yet been received. The reasons given for the delay are that an exchange of views is going on between yourself and the Prime Minister and that as long as this continues it is useless to discuss the problem at the level of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee where it was referred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Our advice from Italy indicate that the situation there is deteriorating to our disadvantage and that an immediate decision in solving the present impasse in the political field is highly desirable. We also are of the opinion that there will be strong repercussions in this country if we appear to acquiesce in the British position that all these questions must be postponed until after we are established in Rome.

I am enclosing copies of recent telegrams from our representatives in Italy which are pertinent.

Enclosures:
1. No. 639 from Algiers, February 27, 1944.
2. No. 662 from Algiers, February 29, 1944.
February 29, 1944.

Dear Winston:

I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives.

As you doubtless remember, at Quebec last Summer the Staff people took a shot at drawing up terms of surrender for Italy. The American draft was short and to the point and was finally adopted and presented.

But later on the long and comprehensive terms, which were drawn up by your people, were presented to Badoglio. It is very cogent.

I did not like them because they attempted to foresee every possibility in one document. But, as so often happens, when such an attempt is made, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented.

That is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are jointly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been handed pages and pages with detailed instructions and appendices. I regard them as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible.

Therefore, I re-drew them with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the maintenance of law, order and reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and with representatives of the French National Committee in such places as they have military status, but that he and his Staff bear the sole responsibility.

Now comes this business of what to do when we get into Germany. I understand that your Staff presented a long and comprehensive document -- with every known kind of terms -- to the European Advisory Commission, and that the Russians have done somewhat the same.
My people over here believe that a short document of surrender terms should be adopted. This, of course, has nothing to do with the locality of the occupying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument of surrender which is in conformity with the general principles.

I am enclosing (a) an argument -- facts bearing on the problem and (b) a proposed acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by Germany.

I hope much that you will read the argument. I think it is very cogent.

I am trying as hard as I can to simplify things -- and sometimes I shudder at the thought of appointing as many new Committees and Commissions in the future as we have in the past!

I note that in the British proposal the territory of Germany is divided up in accordance with the British plan. "Do please don't" ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now!

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.

(Enclosures)
BJR - 362
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated February 27, 1944
Rec'd 12:48 a.m., 28th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
639, February 27, 7 p.m.
SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM REINHARDT AND REBER

One. As we understand it present position of U.S. Government with regard to the Italian political issue is that no changes will be permitted at present time which might adversely affect military situation. The Prime Minister's statement to House of Commons would further indicate that U.S. has provisionally assured that the time when such changes might be contemplated would be after capture of Rome.

Two. To implement such a policy and to minimize risk of disturbances behind the lines, it is essential however, that intervening period prior to Rome be utilized both by the King and by the opposition, with the encouragement of the Allies, to prepare a program for adoption in Rome. Otherwise we shall continue to be faced by
faced by the gap between the King and his people which might require imposition of radical solutions after Rome or even before if its liberation is greatly delayed. The maintenance of status quo without any assurance that a solution is under way would be likely to lead to pressure for direct action, therefore, not only must the parties be given some encouragement that a solution acceptable to them will be agreeable to Allied governments but the King must also be encouraged to feel that the Denicola proposal represents a step in the right direction.

Three. At the present the primary importance of King's acceptance of this proposal is that it constitutes the first indication that Victor Emmanuel has begun to appreciate the depth of the feeling against him and to recognize that unless he does something to meet the wishes of the majority that feeling may easily turn against the institution of the monarchy itself. As at present conceived the proposal probably does not go far enough to secure a sufficient measure of acceptance to make possible collaboration of all parties. If after arrival in Rome a government of the center alone can be formed a strong left opposition would continue as a disturbing factor in
#3—#639, February 27, 7 p.m., from Algiers.

factor in the new Italian administration. Furthermore although King should retire for time being to private life, he would always be in the background. His presence would complicate the issue between the monarchy and the republic. Sforza's advocacy of the proposal must moreover be considered in the light of his personal ambitions to become Prime Minister.

Four. It is important to recognize that the King's decision now means that he is, without pressure from the Allied governments, prepared to abandon his previous position. Consequently, although his plan may not be entirely satisfactory he must be required to make it known that he is considering a step of this sort and is ready to enter into negotiations looking toward an agreed settlement.

Five. In the meanwhile the Junta's memorandum is still under consideration by the Allied governments. The opposition has been warned and has agreed that pending this consideration they must do nothing to aggravate political tension. The reply, therefore, should not be too long delayed. Should it be necessary in that reply to state that no final solution is possible until Rome the opposition must be admonished to keep the truce until such time
such time; but in order to maintain the degree of tranquility required by the military situation they must at the same time be shown that their views are influencing the final solution and that similarly the King's supporters will not be allowed on their side to take provocative action.

Six. Since both sides are now awaiting an indication of Allied policy it is important that some guidance be given them. For this purpose an early Allied agreement is essential. The program should further be agreed prior to Rome as this will inevitably be a period of confusion and in particular the Allied commander desires to be in a position to give a directive to the Allied military governor in advance.

Seven. In answering the Junta memorandum or the King's message it would not be sufficient simply to reiterate that the entire position will be discussed after entry in Rome. Both factions have indicated that agreement is possible with respect to Humbert either as Lieutenant or as King with little or no power until such a time as the constituent assembly can ultimately decide the institutional question. From the local point of view it would, therefore, be most desirable if we could now inform them that the principles of the King's withdrawal in favor
-5- #639, February 27, 7 p.m., from Algiers.

in favor of Humbert has been approved by the Allied. The opposition could also be told that Victor Emmanuel had himself proposed the lieutenancy. We could then bring pressure to bear on both factions to negotiate the conditions of succession and of the formation of the new government.

CHAPIN

REP
AMJ - 986
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated February 29, 1944
Rec'd 10 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT
662, February 29, 7 p.m.

SECRET FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY FROM REBER AND REINHARDT.

MacFarlane telegraphs that leaders of action, Socialist and Communist Parties propose to call ten minute strike in Naples area on March 4 as protest against statement of Prime Minister. Work loss will be compensated by overtime during lunch interval. General Wilson has approved MacFarlane’s proposal to inform Junta leaders that any strike is inimicable to the Allied war effort and cannot be tolerated. Censorship in Italy in regard to proposed strike has also been approved by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

MacFarlane has also inquired what reply he is authorized to give to repeated requests whether Prime Minister’s statement is to be regarded by the parties as an answer to the Junta’s memorandum. He has been told
told to state that he is awaiting instructions, but if pressed that he may add that the Prime Minister’s statement would appear to give an indication as to the position.

Reference Department’s no. 600, February 26, 7 p.m. Makins has shown us a telegram from London stating that the President has reiterated the agreement contained in the Department’s 468, February 12, 7 p.m. paragraph two section two.

CHAPIN

EDA
MEMORANDUM:

The attached strikes me as being a very helpful idea but it seems to me that it should include the references — i.e., wherever a despatch or letter is referred to it should include some symbol to show how to find the particular letter or despatch easily.

W.B. [Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

The attached paper is a short summary of the background of the proposal to transfer certain units of the Italian Navy to Russia, from the time the subject was first broached to the time of the Teheran Conference.

The paper is submitted for your comment and suggestions as to the type of study you might wish made, and is not intended as a finished product.

A report in final form would, of course, be brought up to the current data.

Very respectfully,

George H. Elsey
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.

1 Incl.
During the Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States in October, 1943, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, proposed to the other delegates that certain Italian naval vessels and merchant ships which had fallen into the hands of the Allies in September be turned over to the Red Navy for use in the Arctic Ocean and in the Black Sea.

On the fourth day of the Conference, during a general exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans, Mr. Molotov proposed that Russia be given one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping. The Red Navy wished to have the naval vessels sent immediately to northern ports, while it wanted the merchant ships delivered to the Black Sea ports. Molotov justified the Soviet request by stating that Italian participation in the war had done incalculable harm to the Union and especially to its naval and merchant fleets.

Neither Mr. Eden nor Mr. Hull was in a position to comment on this totally unexpected military problem thrust upon them during a political conference; they could only agree to submit the proposal to their governments, urging upon them, as Mr. Hull told Molotov, "sympathetic consideration on a fair and equitable basis." Hull's proposal for sympathetic consideration was accompanied by an urgent plea to the President for instructions.

On 25 October, three days after the initial proposal, Ambassador Harriman sent to the President an analysis of the Soviet request prepared
by Major General Deane, head of the American military mission to Russia, Rear Admiral Duncan, Naval Attache, and Commodore Olsen, a member of Deane's staff. These officers considered that the Russian demand had been made primarily for reasons of prestige rather than military necessity. To boost the moral of the Russian people, to exhibit tangible evidence of three-power cooperation, to prove that Great Britain and the United States recognized that Red Army pressure on the German east flank had contributed to Allied success in Italy—these were the reasons behind the Red Navy's desire for Italian naval vessels. The delegation felt it was unlikely that the Red Navy really contemplated using these ships, for technical difficulties were too great. Study and training with the latest type of European construction would be of greater value to the Red Navy than actual employment of the ships in convoy or patrol operations.

As to the request for forty thousand tons of merchant shipping, the American delegation believed it was based on a real need due to the Russian successes in the Black Sea area, and that it would be profitably employed.

The delegation concluded its report with a positive recommendation. Recognizing that there might be logical reasons for refusing merchant ships on the grounds that we had already allocated enormous tonnage from our own reserves, it nevertheless stated: "This moment is not, in our view, the time to be logical. We believe that we should recognize the psychological factors. We recommend therefore that the request for merchant ships be accepted now, to be implemented when it is possible to
get them to the Black Sea with reasonable safety. As to the naval vessels, our primary view is that we should make some gesture in this respect. We recommend for psychological reasons that the request at least for the battleship and cruiser be accepted at once as is, and that the destroyers and submarines be approved if and when not required in our own service."

The proposals received immediate attention in Washington. All messages were sent to the President upon receipt, and he instructed Admiral Leahy to prepare a reply to Secretary Hull's request for instructions. This the Admiral did, submitting his draft reply to the Department of State for comment. The Department made minor changes. The President, after further alterations, sent instructions to the Secretary of State in Moscow on 26 October that he desired that Italian shipping "be used wherever it may promise the best service to the common Allied cause ... without any final transfer of title to any Nation at the present time." He further stated that the question of permanent title of material surrendered by Italy could be determined at a later date.

This statement of policy, without specific reference to the Soviet request, failed to provide a direct answer to the Secretary's request for instructions. Mr. Hull was unable to give a positive decision to Molotov, and when he presented the President's reply in the form of a note to Mr. Molotov, the latter misunderstood its implications and was bitterly disappointed. He felt that the United States was bluntly refusing to consider the Soviet claim.
The Secretary and General Deane reported this disappointment to Washington on the 30th. Mr. Hull stressed that the Soviets felt they had yielded much ground in other Conference subjects and they could not understand American reluctance on this point. "I cannot overemphasize," he reported, "the importance they appear to place on the acceptance by us of this request and I believe it would be of great importance in cementing the spirit of cooperation initiated in this Conference if an acceptance of their request in principal at least could be given promptly, even though the technical questions would have to be reserved for detailed examination and negotiation."

General Deane's report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff revealed clearly that he had misunderstood the President's message of the 26th, and considered it a direct refusal. He was even more emphatic than Mr. Hull in urging a change in the American reply. To grant the Russians their request would have extremely beneficial results. In concluding, he stated, "I probably have 'localitis' but I have been tremendously impressed with the possibilities for cooperation engendered during this conference."

The President's response to these messages was immediate. In three dispatches to the Secretary of State, following in close succession on 30 October, he clarified the stand of the United States. The first two, although in personal terms, expressed the official attitude of the Chiefs of Staff.

"I meant to convey that I was in favor of the request of the Russian Government for the use of these ships. The only proviso I made was that the Italian ships which were turned over to our respective countries would be used to prosecute the war against our enemies and that final
determination of what would become of these ships would be made at the peace conference." The proviso applied to ships used by the British and Americans as well as those by the Russians.

In the third message the President expressed his personal views to Secretary Hull. He asked the Secretary to convey his regrets to Mr. Molotov that the staff telegram of the 26th had not been clear. "All I want is that the ships be used for whatever is the most useful war purpose. I hope the Soviet can use their third, and I see no reason why they should not do so. Personally, I think that after the war the Italian tonnage should be distributed equitably for the permanent use of the Allies. In the meantime, it ought to be used by the three nations."

As a result of these messages, Mr. Hull sent Mr. Molotov a note indicating a more favorable U.S. attitude and advising that "sympathetic consideration" was being given in Washington to the Soviet request. He was confident, he wrote, that a satisfactory solution could be reached but he did not make a definite commitment.

The Secretary's caution is understandable. He informed the President that Molotov seemed satisfied with general replies and he had not said more, fearing to complicate the issue. Even had this not been the case, two points in the instructions from Washington prevented clear understanding of the U.S. official attitude.

First, U.S. acceptance of the Russian request was with the proviso that the Italian ships "be used to prosecute the war against our enemies" and the President had expressed his own wishes in the phrase "most useful purpose." However, General Deane and Admiral Olsen were firmly convinced
that the Russians wanted ships for psychological rather than military reasons, and both doubted that the Russians would ever operate the vessels. Hence, in the minds of those at Moscow there were considerable misgivings lest the U.S. decline to carry through with the transaction when a thorough study of the request had been completed in Washington and it was realized by the Joint Chiefs and the President that the vessels would probably not be profitably employed—at least not in their "most useful war purpose."

A second point of potential misunderstanding was the President's use of the word "third" in stating that he hoped the Soviet could use "their third" of captured Italian ships. This was confusing inasmuch as the Moscow delegates had not relayed any request for a third to Washington. Secretary Hull did not inform Molotov of this issue, but wired back to the President that he felt "discussion should be confined to the acceptance of the specific Russian request. Opening up the discussion to a proportionate division of the Fleet would, in my view, lead to serious complications."

Offering of additional ships to the Russians voluntarily should be done, he recommended, after the most careful scrutiny of the shipping which they have the capacity to use. The U.S. Naval officers in Moscow informed him that the Soviets had made so modest a request only because they were unable to employ more vessels and to offer them one third might force them into the embarrassing admission that they could not utilize a full third.

A third reason why the matter remained in a highly unsettled state was uncertainty over the British attitude. The Prime Minister had informed the British Foreign Secretary at Moscow that the request was favored in principle but that there were a number of reservations. There had been no
correspondence between London and Washington on the problem, and the lack of coordinated instructions to Eden and Hull on the joint Anglo-American military issue gave an additional element of uncertainty to the latter's position.

The Conference closed therefore with the problems of allocation of Italian ships as an unfinished item of business. It was, as a matter of fact, the only unfinished item of the entire Conference. The Soviets had the satisfaction of an acceptance in principle, with reservations, of their request for captured Italian shipping, and Mr. Harriman reported that they would be satisfied provided a definite conclusion were reached in the near future. That it was not also a settled subject was due to the lack of adequate instructions from Washington and ambiguity in those which were received. In spite of the uncertainty of our final reply, the Russians seemed satisfied by the results of the Conference.

The problem was not clarified during the following month. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to shelve the issue, and they intended to ignore the Soviet request at the Teheran Conference in early December, unless, of course, it were forced upon them by the Soviets themselves.

In a memorandum to the President, written in Cairo on 30 November, the Joint Chiefs expressed their belief that the allocation of captured Italian ships to the Soviet Navy would have a serious adverse effect on the prosecution of the war. This memorandum was based on the premise that "the allocation . . . of one third of the Italian Fleet for the use of the U.S.S.R. was concurred in by the United States." according to their memorandum, Italian crews might scuttle their ships, invaluable ammunition for enemy propaganda would be provided the enemy, use by the U.S.S.R. would
require alterations which that country could not provide, and it could neither employ nor man one third of the Italian Fleet. The Joint Chiefs concluded their memorandum by recommending that it be "agreed in principle that one third of the Italian warships that are allocated for transfer to powers other than Italy be allocated to the use of the U.S.S.R. It is further recommended that any question of allocation of Italian naval ships to other powers be deferred, at least until after the conclusion of Allied offensive operations in Italy."

Thus at Teheran in December, the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met Marshal Stalin and his advisors for the first time with the only unsettled business of the Moscow Conference of October still unsettled and even more confused. The Soviets had been disappointed by a misunderstanding of the first U.S. reply to their request for Italian naval ships, which they regarded as a refusal to grant them a small favor; they were mollified by a later note that the United States was giving sympathetic consideration to their request.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, however, proceeded to consider the problem on a false assumption that at Moscow the United States had assented to a transfer of one third of the Italian Fleet—a figure never agreed to or even proposed by the U.S. representatives at Moscow in October and only mentioned once by the President to Secretary Hull in expressing personal views. On the basis of objections to a transfer of one third, the Chiefs of Staff recommended to the President on the eve of his departure for Teheran against any transfer at all and they hoped to avoid the issue by not raising it as a subject of discussion. The tangled skein of
misunderstanding was not to be unravelled by silence however, and the fate of the Italian Fleet was discussed at Teheran by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin.
9 March 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VICE ADMIRAL R. S. EDWARDS

1. The Prime Minister has agreed to the following statement to be given confidentially to Italian officials. He has sent it to General Wilson as from Combined Chiefs of Staff for use at his discretion:

"It was agreed at Teheran that the ships of the Italian Navy should be used where they could be most effectively employed against the common enemy. In principle it was also agreed that Russia is entitled to her share in the increase of Allied Naval strength which resulted from the Italian Fleet surrendering. Additional Naval strength is now urgently needed by Russia. The United States and Great Britain will for the present lend to Russia some of their ships to compensate for the help they are receiving from the Italian Navy. It is not intended at present to transfer to Russia any Italian ships."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

SECRET
Admiral Leahy has about one degree fever and Admiral McIntire has told him to go home and go to bed. He asked me to say:

(a) That the British assumed the responsibility for providing the eight (8) destroyers for the Russians and he thinks it is their job to satisfy the Russians and not ours, particularly as all destroyers are urgently needed for OVERLORD. He therefore recommends that you agree to the joint message the Prime Minister has suggested be sent to Stalin in reference to providing new destroyers.

(b) In reference to the urgent request from Hewitt and others that we clarify the press statement about the disposition of Italian ships, Admiral Leahy would prefer another 24 hours to think it over. His present thoughts are that we might notify the Prime Minister and Stalin somewhat as follows:

Suggest that no further statement be given to the press at present about the eventual disposition of the Italian Fleet. Authorize General Wilson to inform the Badoglio Government as follows:

"At Teheran it was agreed that ships of the Italian Navy should be used where they could be employed most effectively against the common enemy. It was also agreed in principle that Russia is entitled to her share in the increase of Allied naval strength resulting from the surrender of the Italian Fleet. For the present Great Britain and the United States will transfer to Russia some of their naval forces in order that the Italian Fleet may continue to operate as at present. For the present Great Britain and the United States will lend some of their ships to Russia to compensate for the help they are receiving from the Italian Navy."

Whatever message may be sent to the Prime Minister, Admiral Leahy recommends that Hewitt and others be authorized to pass on to Italian Naval personnel but not for publication.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.
February 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

I think there has been no change in the situation. Anything that is done should come after consultation with the military authorities, British and American, in Italy.

F. D. R.

Dispatch from Mr. Tittmann, Vatican City, dated Feb. 17, 1944, repeating request to Allied authorities to have precise instructions issued for the protection of Rome.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram dated February 17 received directly from our representative in Vatican City. It concerns the "open city" character of Rome and I feel that I should call it to your particular attention. You will remember that we have had this question up on several occasions, the last time in December when you replied that after discussing the matter with the British military authorities you considered it inadvisable to reopen the question at that time. I wonder if there has been any change in the situation since that time.

Enclosure:

Telegram from Mr. Tittmann, no. 50, February 17, 1944.
4 February 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE GENERAL STAFF

With reference to General Marshall's letter to the President, dated 31 January 1944, the President has directed that the question of providing emergency power equipment for Rome be taken up with Mr. Donald Nelson by the War Department.

BOYCE P. PRICE,
Captain, C.E.
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

A cable has just been received from General Wilson in Algiers stating that the Honorable Henry F. Grady, Deputy Vice President of Economic and Administrative Section, Allied Control Commission for Italy, requests that the following message be transmitted to you:

Evidence is growing that electric power facilities in Rome will be destroyed by the enemy. The only means of supplying essential civilian needs is emergency power equipment. If such equipment is to be obtained, it is understood that it must be diverted from other uses. The importance of doing this is emphasized by political and humanitarian considerations. The giving of your support to the Office of War Utilities, War Production Board, to make this equipment available at once and to arrangements for forwarding at soonest possible date is urgently requested.

The War Department has called for additional information from the Theater Commander and upon its receipt will request the necessary priority from the War Production Board.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

31 January 1944.
31 January 1944.

The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

A cable has just been received from General Wilson in Algiers stating that the Honorable Henry F. Grady, Deputy Vice President of Economic and Administrative Section, Allied Control Commission for Italy, requests that the following message be transmitted to you:

Evidence is growing that electric power facilities in Rome will be destroyed by the enemy. The only means of supplying essential civilian needs is emergency power equipment. If such equipment is to be obtained, it is understood that it must be diverted from other uses. The importance of doing this is emphasized by political and humanitarian considerations. The giving of your support to the Office of War Utilities, War Production Board, to make this equipment available at once and to arrangements for forwarding at soonest possible date is urgently requested.

The War Department has called for additional information from the Theater Commander and upon its receipt will request the necessary priority from the War Production Board.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

I have received the following messages in regard to the question of effecting any change in the Government of Italy at this time:

From the Prime Minister of Great Britain:

"I am much concerned at any attempt at working with Sforza and the Italian Junta at this critical moment in the battle. If you read Sforza's original letter to Berle you will see how completely he has broken his undertaking. I do beg that no decisions will be taken without our being consulted and without you and me trying to reach agreement. We are in for a very heavy struggle on the Italian front."

From the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Area, General Wilson:

"I should be much embarrassed if steps were taken by one or the other Government which would have the effect of showing that any divergence of view existed.

"As regards the immediate future, I should much
regret any action being taken which could increase internal difficulties or political unrest at a moment when with good hope of success I am committed to a major battle for the capture of Rome. I should not wish to have to take any precautionary measures which might involve an alteration of military plans and it would therefore suit me best to leave the political set up in Italy as it is until the issue of the battle is decided."

Please take such action as is necessary and feasible in the Department of State to insure that no effort is made by the United States Government to effect any change in the existing Government of Italy at the present time, and until our military situation in the Italian campaign is sufficiently improved to warrant risking the disaffection of those Italians who are now assisting the Allied Armies.

FDR
My dear Mr. President:

I have received through the office of your Military Aide a memorandum dated January 24 enclosing a paraphrased copy of a message (no. 553) from the Prime Minister concerning the Italian political situation in the light of recent military developments in Italy.

I and my advisers on the Department's Policy Committee have reached the conclusion that any political reconstruction in Italy is impossible under the present King and that there should be no further delay in the reconstruction on a broad political base of the present Italian Government.

I consider this an admirable opportunity to submit our views, if you approve, to the Prime Minister and enclose a suggested draft telegram in reply.

I am receiving indications continually from various serious sources that there is widespread feeling in this country concerning what appears to be our continued support of a discredited King. While I recognize that it has been the

The President,

The White House.
the British policy to support the King, I feel that it is
now essential for us to state our position to the British
Government and to make that position public if necessary.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosure:

Draft telegram.
Thank you for your telegram no. 553, January 23, containing the text of a message which you have sent to Harold MacMillan concerning our policy with respect to the King of Italy and Marshal Badoglio in the light of recent military developments in Italy. I have come to the conclusion that there can be no political reconstruction in Italy or any effective and united cooperation from the Italian people under the present King. While I have no desire to see the constitutional question of the monarchical institution in Italy raised until the entire country is liberated, I am convinced that Victor Emmanuel, in view of his long association in the minds of Italians with the Fascist regime, must complete the anti-Fascist revolution begun on July 25 by withdrawing himself from the Italian political scene. I am informed that he will never abdicate voluntarily and it is obvious that the longer his abdication is postponed the more difficult it will be to facilitate it. Consequently, I am opposed to his return to Rome, even for a visit, since this indication of our support for him would strengthen, if anything, his own determination to remain.

In brief, our position is that the reorganization of the Italian Government on a broad political base should no longer be delayed and that, since Victor Emmanuel is an obstacle to the cooperation of the liberal anti-Fascist forces in liberated Italy, his abdication must be arranged without further delay. The formula suggested by the anti-Fascist groups in Naples last November providing for the King's abdication in favor of his grandson, the Prince of Naples, would appear to be most satisfactory under the circumstances. American public opinion would never understand
understand our continued tolerance and apparent support of Victor Emmanuel.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Operations in Italy.

I thought you would be interested in the following estimate of the situation that is developing in the operations in Italy:

The enemy along the original front of the Eighth and Fifth Armies has continued to resist our advances with violent counterattacks. This is normal German procedure.

General Kesselring has utilized the following procedure in opposing our landing forces: instead of withdrawing divisions from the Fifth and Eighth Army fronts he has "milked" practically every division of a few organizations, usually those that were in reserve. Infantry regiments, artillery battalions, engineer battalions and companies, anti-tank units, division staffs, corps artillery, etc., are in process of movement or have arrived to face our troops south of Rome. By this procedure he has been able to carry out the movements more rapidly and at the same time has not ripped up the defensive deployment of the divisions on the Eighth and Fifth Army fronts.

He has provided more divisional and corps headquarters than would seem normal but apparently this has been done to meet the inevitable difficulties of handling a hurriedly concentrated collection of separate units.

The enemy is apparently engaged in two purposes, an immediate resistance to further penetrations by our troops approaching the Appian Way and the highway to the north, while at the same time he is gathering a counteroffensive group to the east of Rome.

The enemy is apparently determined to hold the front of the right Corps facing the Fifth Army but there are evidences of his willingness to give ground in the center Corps and the Corps facing the British Eighth Army.

Only one enemy unit facing the Anzio beachhead has been identified as coming from the north.
At the present time the enemy has built up a force approximating about 2 1/2 divisions. We have a shore a larger force but of a much more homogeneous nature.

We have gotten ahead of schedule in supplies for the landing forces and are increasing these from the previously planned eight-day reserve supplies to fourteen days, which places us in a more secure position while the Fifth Army is endeavoring to crash through and form a junction.

The weather the past two days has been unfavorable but we are now given a promise of favorable weather. Yesterday was a good day and today and tomorrow should also be fair with only occasional rains. Incidentally, the advance forecasts have been remarkably accurate. I attach the most recent. The pencil figures indicate the degree of overcast represented by the color.

Incl.

Note: The basis for the data regarding the German method for building up resistance against the Anzio beachhead is of an ultra-secret nature and therefore has to be regarded very carefully.
October 6, 1943.

PERSONAL AND SECRET.

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of the minutes of the conference aboard the H.M.S. NELSON in Valetta Harbor, Malta, on September 29, 1943, which followed immediately after the signature of the long term document by Marshal Badoglio.

There are also enclosed copies of notes of conversations had with Marshal Badoglio at Brindisi on September 27 and 28, preceding his departure for Malta.

These may be useful for reference purposes.

Faithfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy.

Enclosures:

As stated.

The President,

The White House,

Washington, D. C.

SECRET
Notes of the conference aboard the HMS NELSON in Valetta
Harbor, Malta, 11 a.m., September 29, 1943.

There were present:

His Excellency Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian
Government.

His Excellency, Admiral Rafael de Courten, Minister of the Navy.

His Excellency General of Aviation Renato Sandalli, Minister of
Air and Chief of Staff.

His Excellency General Vittorio Ambrosio, Chief of the Joint
Stiffs.

His Excellency General Roatta, Chief of the Army Staff.

Captain Ernesto Guirati.

Captain Gustavo Lovatelli.

Major R. A. Ruspoli.

Colonel Valensano, Aide to Marshal Badoglio.

Captain Enrico Briosi, Aide to Admiral de Courten.

General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces.

Major General W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff Allied Forces.

Field Marshal Lord Gort, Governor of Malta.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham.

Admiral Willis, R. N.

Commodore R. Dick, R. N.

General Sir Harold Alexander.

Lieutenant General Mason Macfarlane.

Major General Richardson, Chief of Staff to General Alexander.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder.

Air Commodore Foster.
Air Vice Marshal Keith Bart.
Major General Charles Miller.
The Right Honorable Harold Macmillan.
The Honorable Robert D. Murphy.

Marshal Badoglio opened the conversation with a statement on several points which he said he had in mind:

(1) His desire to see the formation of a government on a broad, liberal basis.

(2) A declaration of war by the Italian Government against Germany on the return of the government to Rome.

(3) In the interval, he emphasized, the Italians are in a de facto state of war and fighting against the Germans in Corsica, Dalmatia, etc.

(4) He stated that as soon as it would be possible to move Italian troops from Sardinia, he would be able to put eight Italian divisions at the disposal of the Allies.

(5) He expressed the fear that Italian prisoners taken by the Germans might be liable to treatment as français tireurs and, as such, to summary execution.

General Eisenhower stated that in his opinion the effort which the Italians are at present making is ample proof of their intention to cooperate, but that in view of (5) above, it would appear necessary that Marshal Badoglio's government, which, after all, is the only legal Italian Government, declare war immediately.

Marshal Badoglio replied that he had already considered that point of view, but that the power of the government at the moment extended over only a small part of Italy which rendered a declaration of war in these circumstances extremely difficult.

General Eisenhower, however, pointed out that to the contrary the other exiled governments, occupying not an inch of their national territory, have declared war against Germany. He expressed a desire to have the Badoglio administration undertake the administration of Sicily and other liberated areas, but it is not clear to him how such an arrangement can be made unless a declaration of war is undertaken.

SECRET
Marshal Badoglio promised to refer this question to the King, who, he said, in any event must decide. Under Italian law only the King can declare war. Badoglio therefore stated that he would reserve his answer until he could consult with the King.

General Eisenhower stated that everything Marshal Badoglio does to wage war actively against Germany will raise his government by that much in the esteem of the United Nations. He pointed out that for three long years Italy has been an enemy of the United Nations and there has been built up a mass psychology which is not as willing to accept the Italians as soldiers in the field might be. Therefore, General Eisenhower stated, it is marshal Badoglio's duty today to do so just as quickly as possible. He inquired if Marshal Badoglio would so advise the King.

Marshal Badoglio replied that he understood General Eisenhower's point of view and would present it exactly to the King as stated because his point of view corresponds to that of General Eisenhower.

General Eisenhower inquired whether it is Marshal Badoglio's purpose to seek anti-Fascists and invite them to participate in his government.

Marshal Badoglio replied that the choice of members of the government will be made by the King—he himself is only a soldier, he stated, knowing very little of politics.

General Eisenhower expressed his sympathy as a soldier but stated that the Italian Government must assume an anti-Fascist complexion if it is to fight with the Allies.

In the letter which he will give him General Eisenhower will so state, but Fascism is one of those things we are fighting which we regard with deadly enmity.

Marshal Badoglio indicated that he understood all this.

General Eisenhower reiterated that the extent he would be permitted by his governments to cooperate with the Italians will depend upon this point.

Marshal Badoglio said that the fight will be: (1) against Fascism; (2) against Germany; in that order.

Marshal Badoglio read a letter from the King asking for the participation of Count Dino Grandi, stating in effect that Grandi made the initial attack against Mussolini and really is responsible for Mussolini's downfall. Grandi's presence in the government would ruin the status of the Republican Fascist Government.

SECRET

General...
General Eisenhower said he would refer this question to his governments. In his personal opinion, however, Grandi had been so closely associated for so long a period of time in the minds of our public opinion with Fascism that now for him to be included in the Italian Government would be subject to adverse misinterpretation.

Marshal Badoglio said that Fascism fell with the dissolution of the Grand Council. The leader of the attack was Grandi. If Grandi should today fall into the hands of the Fascists, he would be torn to pieces by them.

General Macfarlane at this moment pointed out that it would be necessary to make use of some men who in the past have been associated with Fascism owing to the twenty years that have passed.

Marshal Badoglio then read another portion of the King's letter to the effect that Grandi would be able to create a schism among the Fascists and his presence in the Italian Government as Minister of Foreign Affairs would be a factor of tremendous importance in the war against Fascism and in injuring the Republican Fascist Government.

General Eisenhower replied that as soldier to soldier he fully understood all this, but he could not overlook the fact that public opinion in Allied countries had crystallized on this subject and, as he had stated before, on a matter of this importance it would be necessary for him to consult his governments.

Marshal Badoglio then said that the King's idea is to invite the chiefs of the different parties—that is, the political parties—in Italy as they are now constituted, with especial reference to the most influential people. In his opinion the King has today the best knowledge of available men in Italy. The King would name these men, Marshal Badoglio said, because while the Marshal is competent to choose generals, he is not able to choose politicians. He assured General Eisenhower that he would give a liberal character to the government. If he discovers that anyone of the ministers does not follow the policy line laid down, he will be obliged to leave.

General Eisenhower said that he would refer the matter to his governments. The President and the Prime Minister have indicated an outline of things which are necessary for collaboration. He said that it would be advisable that if the King takes additional people into his government that he submit their names a priori informally through General Macfarlane's mission, as this kind of cooperation would facilitate matters.

General Eisenhower then explained that he had no desire to interfere in internal Italian affairs, but that he could not overlook our Allied public opinion.
Marshal Badoglio said that he had every intention to avoid any possible friction between the Italian Government and the Allies and he is certain that he will come to a general accord.

General Eisenhower said that he could count on our understanding.

At this point General Eisenhower informed Marshal Badoglio of the message from Washington regarding the American desire to have Count Sforza visit Brindisi in the near future.

Marshal Badoglio said that he knows Count Sforza well and recalled having been with him at the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo. He said, however, that the King does not regard Sforza with sympathy because of a declaration against the Monarchy made by Sforza some time ago. Marshal Badoglio recognized, he said, that Sforza is doing useful work in the United States and he fully appreciates it. Marshal Badoglio stated that he would make a further effort to persuade the King of the advisability of permitting Sforza to visit Brindisi.

General Eisenhower stressed that our governments attached great importance to Sforza's return to Italy and that it would have an excellent effect in our taking Italy into the Allied fold.

Marshal Badoglio stated that he hopes that by now General Eisenhower considers him a complete collaborator and that he would be grateful if General Eisenhower would tell him something about the Italian campaign and what the Allied goal might be—just an idea of the plan of the campaign.

General Eisenhower replied that we are building up to drive the Germans out of Italy. The first move is to drive the Germans out of southern Italy—then out of Rome. He said that he had not as yet consulted General Alexander regarding certain details of the plan, but that personally he considered that German departure from Rome is something of the not too distant future.

Marshal Badoglio suggested that if Italian troops are necessary, there are troops in Sardinia (two divisions of infantry and one paratroop division). Marshal Badoglio hopes that some Italian troops would be allowed to participate in the entrance into Rome. General Alexander said that complete plans of the Italian campaign had been prepared but that participation of the Italian troops would depend upon an Italian declaration of war.

General Eisenhower offered the suggestion that if Italy declares war and cooperates with the Allies, he personally would promise that a token participation of Italian troops would be approved for entry into Rome.
Marshal Badoglio said that he understood perfectly that when military plans are made it is difficult to change them. In connection with his suggestion regarding the entry of Italian troops into Rome, he has in mind: (1) the effect it would have on the Republican Fascist Government in the north; and (2) he is certain that the Germans will do in Rome what they have done in Naples, that is, rob, loot and kill. He pointed out that Rome is not only the capital of Italy, but that there was a distinct obligation resting on the Italian Government to defend the Vatican. For that reason Badoglio asked that Italian troops participate. They would come from Sardinia to Tunicino and would be in Rome in one day—the Nimbo paratroop division.

General Eisenhower said that General Alexander would consider the use of the Italian paratroop division in every way. He said that we have heard lots of good about that division. There is no difficulty about that point.

Marshal Badoglio said that German resistance at Salerno is due to Kesselring who stands for resistance all along the line. In his opinion, he said, and you must excuse me, the Allies always give the impression of helping Kesselring's plans. He offered a suggestion that the Spezia-Rimini line has one weak spot which is near Rimini. Marshal Badoglio spoke of his knowledge of Italy which justified his assurance in offering strategic suggestions and apologized with a smile for the characteristic love of old men to offer advice to younger men.

General Eisenhower made the suggestion that speaking as a soldier it is apparent that Italian troops have been through three years of a discouraging war. He suggested that as we go along and have Italian troops participate with us, it is regarded as of the highest importance that Marshal Badoglio select the very best Italian divisions and concentrate the equipment of others if necessary so that these divisions will be well equipped and well supplied when the battle starts. He further suggested that Marshal Badoglio take other troops of lesser value and use them on lines of communication, labor battalions, work on the docks, etc. He added that as the United Nations' armies expand he could not promise to undertake to equip all Italian divisions. We shall help, of course, he added, with the enormous amount of Italian equipment now in our hands as the result of the Tunisian and Sicilian campaigns.

Marshal Badoglio replied that he agreed and, in fact, was already in the process of taking the action recommended.

General Eisenhower requested that General MacFarlane be kept advised of whatever progress might be made along these lines so that at the proper time the necessary inspection could be made.
Marshal Badoglio pointed out that at the present moment he is the head of the Italian Government and that these matters would be ironed out by the respective staffs. Marshal Badoglio would be grateful, he said, if we could pass on to him whatever enemy intelligence might be available and keep him informed of the Allied build-up.

General Eisenhower informed Marshal Badoglio that General Alexander's headquarters will shortly be moved to Italy (Bari), during the first week of October, and would provide liaison with Marshal Badoglio's staff.

Marshal Badoglio said that he would be very happy to provide General Alexander with any facilities necessary.

General Alexander promised to provide Marshal Badoglio with such enemy intelligence as might be available and said that he would be able to give him a vast amount of detailed information regarding the position of enemy units now in Italy.

General Eisenhower said that he would direct his staff to the effect that the only publicity regarding today's meeting would be that limited to discussion of details of military occupation against Germany and that no reference would be made to the signing of any document. General Eisenhower requested that Marshal Badoglio adopt a similar policy.

Marshal Badoglio said that he had as much affection for the press as he had for the Fascists.

General Eisenhower said that that view is widely shared by everyone in the room.

General Eisenhower added the request that Marshal Badoglio endeavor to galvanize the Italian military action against Germany and to expedite as much as lay in his power a declaration of war against Germany.

Marshal Badoglio pointed out that one of his chief difficulties lies in the field of propaganda. Only the Bari radio station is available to him.

General Eisenhower requested Marshal Badoglio to present him with an estimate of his needs in this respect and said that the Allies would do their best to cooperate with the Marshal, using the experts available in the theater.

Marshal Badoglio asked that he be permitted to contact Marshal Messe, now a prisoner of war in England. Messe formerly

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
was Aide to the King and in Marshal Badoglio's opinion could effectively go on the air at the BBC in England. Marshal Badoglio suggested the use of outside radios as being most listened to and respected by the Italian population.

General Eisenhower asked Marshal Badoglio to send whatever material he desired to Marshal Messe for broadcasts and promised to send the suggestions to London through the proper channels.

General Eisenhower expressed his thanks to Marshal Badoglio and said that he hoped that great good would come from the meeting. Marshal Badoglio in reciprocating referred to the situation prevailing in 1918 when the Italians, he said, gave the decisive blow to the Germans. He said that at that time there were with the Italian army three British divisions and one American regiment, all of whom cooperated closely in the German defeat.

The meeting was adjourned at about 12:15 p.m.

Robert D. Murphy.

RDM/jgh

SECRET
Brindisi, September 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

Macmillan and I accompanied General Smith and General Macfarlane on a visit to Marshal Badoglio at 5 p.m. today. By agreement with and under direction of the Commander-in-Chief, General Macfarlane presented to Marshal Badoglio two copies of the long armistice terms. He recalled to the Marshal that the military armistice referred, in article 12, to the political, economic and financial condition which will be imposed and said that the signature of the present long terms, which included all these conditions, was the principal item on the agenda of the Malta meeting scheduled for September 29.

Macfarlane called the Marshal's attention to the amended preamble and said that signature to the present document was required by the Allies for two reasons: (1) to satisfy Allied public opinion; and (2) to avoid the possibility of misunderstandings about points of detail at some later date. It was, however, to be understood that General Eisenhower had authority to make such modifications in the application of the terms as he thought fit. Moreover, some of the terms had already been rendered out of date by the process of events and the application as a whole would be carried out in the spirit of the declaration by the President and the Prime Minister.

Marshal Badoglio agreed to discuss the text immediately with the King and to meet with General Macfarlane and General Smith, as well as ourselves, at 10:30 a.m., September 28.

There followed a discussion of the other points on the agenda of the Malta meeting. Particular reference was made to the question of an Italian declaration of war against Germany. General Smith emphasized a military feature, namely, that Italian personnel who might be captured by German forces risked treatment as francs-tireurs and the danger of being shot instead of being accorded privileges customarily granted prisoners of war.

We emphasized the importance of a declaration of war if our public opinions were to support the considerable concessions from the strict armistice terms which
it was proposed to make, such as the modification of
the Allied Military Government, the return to the Badoglio
administration of Sicily, and the decision to support
the King and his Government. Both of these points were
understood by the Marshal.

Badoglio seemed to be content with the status of a
co-belligerent, if that could be obtainable. He did not
emphasize unduly a desire to be regarded strictly as an
ally.

A suggestion was made by General Smith that, for
propaganda purposes and for the purpose of inciting the
Italians to the maximum war effort, the Italian Govern-
ment might blur the edges of co-belligerency in speaking
to their own people of the promised land of alliance, but
that the technical, legal status must remain that of co-
belligerency. He mentioned that there was no indignity
in this because that was the technical relationship be-
tween the United States and Great Britain and France and
Italy during the last war. He also pointed out that, for
example, today the United States had no military alliance
with Great Britain or the Soviet Union.

Here again Badoglio said that he would discuss the
matter with the King and be prepared tomorrow morning to
give us an answer. Our strong impression was that there
was no need to make any concession on this point. We have
the distinct feeling that the status of co-belligerency
will be acceptable to the Italians.

The Marshal indicated that the other desiderata of
the Allied Governments, such as the broadening of the
basis of his government and similar matters, could only
be effectively dealt with after the King and his Govern-
ment returned to Rome. He accepted it, in principle, as
desirable.

With regard to the expression: "It is understood
that the right of the Italian people to choose their own
system of government after the war", mentioned in the text
of the armistice terms, Marshal Badoglio wished to see
this altered to: "It should be understood that free
elections will be held after the war". In other words,
he did not wish to pledge the King and the Government to
throw open the question of the Monarchy by their own act.
We must consider whether the form of words can be inter-
preted to mean merely that the Allies do not in any way
by ..
by their actions now commit themselves to maintain the Monarchy. Marshal Badoglio ventured the opinion also that the Italian people are not adapted to a Republican form of government and feels that the retention of the Monarchy is essential to stability and unity of the country.

It was obvious throughout our conversation with the Marshal that in his own mind, and apparently in the minds of his associates, and this is confirmed by General Macfarlane, almost everything hinged on the return of the administration to Rome.

After the conclusion of the main discussion, General Macfarlane asked whether the King would assent to the introduction of certain words into the text of the broadcast speech already registered by him on a disc which would introduce the name of the Soviet Union by the side of those of Great Britain and the United States. Badoglio said that he would mention this to the King and obtain his consent. It was understood that it would not be necessary to have the King repeat the whole broadcast but merely to assent to the introduction of the desired phrase by the necessary mechanical means. Personally, Badoglio seemed to find no objection to the idea.

The meeting ended by the Marshal observing that tomorrow would be his 72nd birthday.

(signed) Robert D. Murphy
Brindisi, September 29, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

At the meeting held at 10:30 on September 28 at the Admiralty, Brindisi, there were present: Marshal Badoglio, General Ambrosio, Duca d'Acquarone, and Colonel Jung, on the one side; and Lieutenant General Mason Macfarlane, Major General W.B. Smith, Harold Macmillan and Robert D. Murphy, on the other side.

General Macfarlane explained that a necessary preliminary to the agenda which he had already given notice of to the Marshal was the signature of the long term document, of which we had left him a copy yesterday. Marshal Badoglio stated that he had studied the text of the long term document which had been appropriately referred to the King, and that he was now prepared to discuss it with us. The Marshal then went through the document of the long terms clause by clause. It became apparent that there were two points to which the Marshal took strong objection: (a) the title: "Instrument of Surrender"; and (b) Clause 1(a): "Italian forces hereby surrender unconditionally."

Both of these, he said, would have the most lamentable effect upon the Italian morale and their capacity to continue the fight against Germany and he strongly urged that they be amended.

With regard to the other clauses he pointed out, over a considerable number, that the Italian Government were not in a physical position to carry them out literally. In addition, two verbal amendments were suggested in the finance clauses by Colonel Jung, both of which we accepted at once as improvements of drafting. At this point the Allied representatives withdrew and conferred together.

It was decided that we must insist upon the signature of the terms without amendment since these were the instructions of our governments, and that even General Eisenhower was not in a position to take any other course.

SECRET

After ..
After the conference was resumed General Macfarlane and General Smith saw the Marshal and General Ambrosio and Colonel Jung alone. After considerable discussion it was agreed that the signature should take place, but that to assist the Italian side two steps would be recommended to General Eisenhower: (a) the writing of a letter by General Eisenhower to Marshal Badoglio which would set his mind at rest with regard to the point of physical incapacity to carry out the terms and which would also explain that some of the terms were, in fact, superseded by the developments since September 3, etc.; and (b) that General Eisenhower would verbally put before his government the strong wishes of the Italians to amend the title and omit clause 1(a), and at the same time would transmit his strong recommendation that no publicity whatever should be given to the long term clauses as a whole and more particularly to the unconditional surrender clause.

Immediately after the meeting, the Allied team, meeting together, drafted such a letter, which was in effect signed without amendment by General Eisenhower and given to the Marshal at the meeting on September 29. A copy is attached.

Immediately before departure we reminded Marshal Badoglio of the inquiry made on the preceding day, whether the King would be disposed to include in his forthcoming broadcast, of which a phonographic disc has already been prepared, a specific reference to the Soviet Union. Marshal Badoglio replied in the affirmative and authorized in the King's name an amendment conforming to our suggestion.

We also left with him an aide-memoire, copy attached, regarding the return to Italy, under the authorization of Marshal Badoglio, of Professor Pazzi and Signor Agnino.

Harold Macmillan.

SECRET
MEMORANDUM

Professor Pazzi and Signor Agnino arrived in Lisbon some days ago with the intention of proceeding to London to make contact with various political leaders in England in the hope of being of some use in the present situation. We understood that they claimed that their mission was undertaken with the good will and knowledge of Marshal Badoglio.

It was decided not to allow these gentlemen to proceed to London, but to bring them to North Africa, where they now are.

It was agreed at today's conference that these gentlemen should be sent forthwith to Brindisi to get into direct touch with the Marshal. These gentlemen claimed to speak for the five parties, but Marshal Badoglio said he was not acquainted with these individuals and had no cognizance of their mission. It was, nevertheless, thought best that they should come to Brindisi.

(signed) HAROLD MACMILLAN
Harold Macmillan

Brindisi, September 27, 1943.

SECRET

HM/RDM/Jgh
Copy to General Macfarlane, General Smith and Mr. Murphy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy.

Referral.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

October 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN.

Will you take this up with the Joint Staff.

State Dept Memo 10-16-43 - Rome as an Open City
MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

"John Martin" called me back at 4:10 P.M. and stated that if the President would agree he would like to have General Marshall meet him, presumably at General Eisenhower's headquarters at once. I told him that I would talk to you about this and let him know.

H. L. H.

I have acquainted General Marshall and I will acquaint Admiral Leahy with the purpose of these two telephone calls.

H. L. H.
PERSONAL AND SECRET.

Dear Mr. President:

You might be interested in having copies of the enclosed memoranda prepared by my British colleague Macmillan and myself after our visit last week to Brindisi as associates of Lieutenant General Mason Macfarlane, Head of the Military Mission sent to be near the Badoglio administration by General Eisenhower (copy of directive enclosed).

The enclosures relate to telegram sent by the Commander-in-Chief (NAF 409 September 18) and myself (telegram No. 1618 September 19, 3 p.m. to SECSTATE).

There is also enclosed a copy of Marshal Badoglio's letter of September 16, 1943, addressed to General Eisenhower.

You may be amused to know that during the course of my conversation with General Rocella, Chief of the Italian Army Staff, I inquired whether he had ever listened to the broadcasts of Mayor Laguardia. He and several other Italian officers who were with us at the time immediately replied that they frequently listened to New York broadcasts and that in the United States we had some good Italian broadcasters, but that Laguardia spoke "such bad Italian that we don't understand him!"

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
Robert D. Murphy.

Enclosures.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
ITALY

This is the picture, as I see it.

A.  Dramatis Personae.

The King.  74 years old: physically infirm, nervous, shaky, but courteous, with a certain modesty and simplicity of character which is attractive. He takes an objective, even humorously disinterested view of mankind and their follies. "Things are not difficult" he said, "only men". I do not think he would be capable of initiating any policy, except under extreme pressure, e.g., Mussolini's march on Rome and the Communist threat, which led to his decision of 1920; the hopeless state of the Fascist regime which led to his decision of July 25th, 1943; the German threat to Rome, which led to his decision to leave on September 9th, 1943.

I would imagine his interests to be his family, his dynasty, and his country, in that order. I think, under pressure, he would be inclined to take any decision which could be shown to him as serving those interests.

The Prince.  A middle-aged youth. Speaks good English. Pleasant and attractive manner. Good physique. I would not say a strong character but presumably not an objectionable one and of course much less committed than the King by the mistakes of 20 years.

Marshal Badoglio.  72 years old. Honest, broadminded, humorous. I should judge of peasant origin, with the horse common sense and natural shrewdness of the peasant. A loyal servant of his King and country, without ambitions. He states a case with clarity, in a few words. He is a little like General Georges but with more restraint and dignity. He is a soldier and clearly without much political sense, believing that he has the popular support at the moment and that all can be concentrated in a military movement without a political side. In this he is a little like Giraud but with more modesty and less egotism.

General ...
General Ambrosio. Chief of Combined Staffs (Navy, Army, Air). A neat, efficient, but not very impressive mind, at least to the layman. Gemelin, at his age, I should have judged to be about Ambrosio's twin.

General Rossi. Ambrosio's deputy. I saw little of him. From General Mason Macfarlane's account he seems one of the ablest, if you could get him really on your side. Rather an obscure character.

General Roatta. A good linguist; a travelled and intelligent conversationalist, with tendencies to be a bore. The perfect military attaché. I would say that his brains were more developed and effective than his guts. Nor would I trust his loyalty to any cause that should show remote signs of becoming a lost one. A natural coward.

General Zanussi. "Stooge" to Roatta. The impression formed at Algiers remains. He does not carry many guns, but I really believe he would fire them off. He is an enthusiast. He believes in the general point of view which the Allies represent. His position in this rather dreary military hierarchy is low. It would pay us to get it raised. He should make an excellent liaison officer with us for S.O.E. and C.S.S. work.

Admiral de Courten. (Minister for Marine). Hardly came into my life. He lunched well; seemed a friendly and sensible man, and has clearly loyally carried out his duties under the armistice. (If he keeps back anything, e.g., 4 destroyers, some corvettes, and a modern cruiser called Scipio Africanus, which I saw at Brindisi, it is no doubt to protect the person of his King.

Duca d'Acquarone. (Minister of the Royal Household). He is a combination of Keeper of the Privy Purse and Principal Private Secretary. I should say his advice to the King would be of importance. I cannot tell his relation with Prince Umberto. Aristocratic, intelligent, and I should say, opportunist. In default of any civil Ministers having left Rome with the King, he has been commissioner for Civil Supply and for Finance.
(General Calvi di Bergolo, the son-in-law of the King, has remained in Rome, and now commands the troops there and apparently gave the order for Cease Fire as a result of the negotiations conducted by Guariglia. (Telegram No. 350 from Holy See dated September 10th).


The Brindisi party can hardly be signified by the name of Government. It consists only of the King and his family, an aged Marshal as Head of the Administration, and a sprinkling of Generals and courtiers. There are no civilian ministers (with the exception of the Duca d'Acquarone, elevated from a courtier to a portfolio). Nevertheless they contend that the civilian ministers left in Rome are not disloyal but merely separated from the Head of the Government by force majeure. I am not without some doubt on this point. I should have thought that at least Signor Guariglia (Foreign Minister) would have accompanied the party. Moreover, a train actually reached Brindisi from Rome yesterday (September 15th), and one would suppose that energetic men could have made their way out in the confusion.

It may also be significant that the King's son-in-law (General Calvi di Bergolo) stayed in Rome and was party to the arrangement made with the German commanders.

These doubts were confirmed by the Duca d'Acquarone. He said that there had been much dissension and disputes in the ministry over the armistice decision.

In any event, the Government, from the military and civil point of view, is little more than a name. Its importance is that it has unchallenged claim to legality. Except for the Fascist Republican Party now being reorganized in Germany by Mussolini and his gang, no other Government has so far claimed authority.

From the military point of view, the Government can only lay its hands on a few divisions in territory free from the Germans. It is not even in touch with the Commanders of the other divisions, and cannot be so until some wireless communication can be got (with help of S.O.E.).

From a civil aspect, whatever sentimental support it may command, its writ does not run except in those parts of the territory which are:

(a) ...
(a) not in effective German occupation;
(b) not under Allied Military Government.

Brindisi, perhaps Bari, the provinces in the south are yet unoccupied by (a) or (b) are the limits of its territorial, as apart from its moral, authority.

The characters of the men we have seen so far inspire sympathy rather than confidence. They are old and unimaginative. The King is (of his own motion, at any rate) ineffective; the Marshall has courage and a high sense of duty. The rest are men of ordinary parts, professional soldiers who will carry out orders precisely and to the best of their ability. They hate the Germans, but they fear them equally. All their divisions, in Italy and the Balkans, are "surrounded" by a smaller number of German troops. They are "finito". There is an atmosphere of well bred defeatism. The spirit may be willing, but the flesh is very weak.

The Problem.

The chief question which faces the Allies is the status to be given to this Government and to Italy as a whole. A decision on this vital point of policy will govern all executive action, whether in the military, political or propaganda sphere. It was excellently posed by the Marshall to us on the evening of September 16th.

"The Italian Government", says the Marshall, "has signed an armistice. It was necessary for Italy to do so. The Government have tried loyally to carry out the terms of the armistice. The Navy has been surrendered, and whatever orders the Government have been given which have been in their power to execute, have been carried out. But to the Italian people and armed forces, an armistice connotes a cessation of war. That is what they expect. Nevertheless, in the spirit of the message from President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister, the Government of Italy stands for not peace, but war against the Germans. How will the people and the army understand that this is their duty, unless some status of ally or quasi-ally can be given to Italy. How can the enthusiasm for military and para-military effort (particularly the latter) be created, if Italy has no better position that the signature of severe armistice terms?"

"Therefore", asks the Marshall, "can we be regarded as an ally, not merely till the Germans are cleared out of Italy, but till the end of the war?"

"Shall we, as we should like to do, in order to make clear the position to our people, declare war on Germany?"

"The ..."
"The Fascist Government propaganda is already saying that they too would have made peace, but not on such dishonorable terms."

"Can we, therefore, hold out any hopes that the terms of the armistice will in fact be modified by events? Can we make the transition from victim of an armistice to beneficiary of alliance?"

"Moreover," he continued, "since I have to contend against the Republican Fascist Government, sponsored by the Germans, which will enjoy status of an ally of Germany, how can I do so if I have still an inferior position to that traitor Government, and the Government of H. M. the King is still only in the armistice situation."

On the reply which the U.S.A. and British Governments make to this hangs the answer to nearly all the other problems which face us in Italy.

1. Military.

Are the Italians to be disbanded in accordance with armistice, or used as help to us in accordance with new policy? (Some artillery brigades have been asked for to support Airborne troops at Taranto).

Are they to be rearmed or disarmed? Is Navy to be seized or used with Italian sailors?

2. Para-Military.

S.O.E. and O.S.S. to work with Italian Deuxième Bureau when reorganized? Are radio sets, etc. to be supplied? Is the Italian resistance movement, official or unofficial to be encouraged?

3. Administration.

(a) Is AMGOT to cover area of occupation south of Naples? (At present, proclamations have not been posted at Taranto, Bari or Brindisi, on the ground that there is not really effective occupation and that it would be discourteous to put up a notice suspending the King's authority just under his nose).

(b) Or is a policy of indirect control of Government to supersede, at least in certain areas? This urgently needed, as the armies proceed and approach area where Government conceives it has authority. If system (b) is adopted, is Sicily to be included under it and AMGOT directed to forward areas.

Or (c) is all liberated Italy, including Sicily, to be handed back to Government?
4. **Armistice Terms.**

Long terms were "transmitted" to General Castellano after signature on September 3rd. But since General C. has not returned to Italy, Government do not know about them, except by hearsay. They cannot be said to have been effectively communicated to Government.

Are we to carry out our original instructions and demand signature?

Where is this to be done?

Are the long terms to be modified? They are really quite inappropriate to present situation.

But if they are to be modified will we look ridiculous viz-a-viz the United Nations Governments who have been informed?

Is there to be a ceremony of signature? If so, when?

It would be difficult and rather absurd to have this ceremony if we intend to modify the terms, and it will be very bad propaganda, especially in view of Fascist Quisling Government. Also King and Badoglio might resign rather than sign.

5. **Propaganda.**

It is clearly impossible to make any effective propaganda to people of Italy until structure of Government and country is clarified. This is specially true in view of German and Fascist propaganda that may be expected.

A Possible Plan.

There is a danger of our merely sliding into "de facto" recognition that the armistice is obsolete.

Would it not be better to devise a formula, short of alliance, but better than armistice.

Such a formula might agree to provisional recognition of Government as co-belligerant subject to certain conditions.

(1) Political.

(a) Strengthening of the national character of administration. At present they are a fugitive court and a few generals.
We should insist on immediate formation of a Council of State containing representatives of all the old parties, from Right to extreme Left, including Communists.

If, as is possible, most suitable men cannot be got across the line, at least representative men can be appointed from Sicily or liberated provinces. They can be replaced as other more suitable men can be got across.

(b) Immediate decree restoring old constitution and declaring for free elections after the war for a constitutional assembly.

(c) Abdication of the King in favor of either his son or grandson. (The grandson is in N. Italy or Switzerland and may not be available). This needs considerable thought. It might be more popular in America than in Italy.

(d) Dismissal of all higher officials of Fascist period.

(ii) Military.

Agreement to accept without question any orders from the Allied Command, on best military use of all forces.

If they are best used at the moment as Dock Laborers or on airfield construction, they must comply in common interest.

Every effort must be made to get into touch with and obtain obedience of divisions now out of the control of Badoglio, Ambrosio, etc. (in North and Balkans).

(iii) Administration.

An organization to be formed on the lines of the proposed Armistice Commission, but under another name (Allied Council) and Government must agree to accept its guidance and ultimate instruction.

In return, all AMGOT territory to be returned to the King and Government and the Council to act in future through indirect or their direct control. Change-over to be gradual and right to revert to AMGOT where needed to be reserved by the Allies.

In consideration of such undertaking, the Allies would agree to suspend correspondingly the application of their rights under the short armistice and to regard the reformed and liberated Italy as co-belligerent.
Declaration of War.

Having signed a military armistice with the Allies, it appears from our conversations with the Badoglio Government in Brindisi that it is the latter's hope of altering the present relationship by achieving the equivalent of Allied status. Marshal Badoglio, for example, asserts that Italy is now in a de facto state of war with Germany. His Government, however, is free to exercise its authority with Allied consent for only five provinces of Italy, namely, Bari, Taranto, Lecce, Brindisi and Matera, with a population of two millions including about three divisions, an insignificant air force, and a certain amount of naval personnel. The bulk of the country is now under German control. All of Badoglio's civilian ministries remained in Rome. This, Badoglio and his associates claim, is due to the haste and secrecy of their departure from Rome. On the other hand, the Duke of Aquarone, Minister of the King's household, told me confidentially that there had been much dispute in the government in Rome regarding the wisdom of the steps taken by the Badoglio Government and a number of Ministers preferred to remain in Rome. All of those with whom we discussed the matter stated, however, that the majority of ministers were loyal to the King and to Badoglio.

Badoglio argues that there has been established in Northern Italy, apparently having its seat in Rome, a so-called Republican Fascist Government. Whereas his government is loaded down with armistice obligations and actually in a de facto state of war with Germany, it occupies an inferior position to that of the newly established Fascist regime. Notwithstanding his handicap, his purpose is to steadfastly prosecute the war at the side of the Allies, confident that the Italian people repose no confidence in the German puppet government, and whether we decide to treat him as an Ally or not he will always, he states, act as such.

Badoglio states that he is decidedly embarrassed in respect of the armed forces presently at his disposition, as well as those as yet impeded by German opposition, because they do not understand why, after the declaration of an...
of an armistice, they are supposed to take an active part in the war against their ally of yesterday. Badoglio agrees that it is obviously necessary to give them a reasonable amount of time to permit an evolution of thought under proper guidance, through the radio and otherwise, but he claims that he must be able to say to them that the present arrangement is more than a simple armistice. He must be able to say, in other words, that his - the recognized government of Italy - is now fighting alongside the United States and Great Britain as an Ally.

There is only a short step necessary to a formal declaration of war, which I believe the Badoglio regime will take.

It would seem that the Allies have the choice of: (1) insisting on the rigorous execution of the terms of the armistice, treating the Italians as a conquered people, introducing military government throughout such Italian territory as may be liberated, accepting Italian military and civilian aid wherever Italians can be induced to extend it, and disregard the present Brindisi regime; or (2) extend de facto recognition to the Badoglio regime, accord it the equivalent of Allied status, through our support and cooperation obtain through it the maximum Italian contribution to the Allied war effort, transform the Allied Military Government project into a form of liaison organization which would perform a limited control activity both over civilian and military affairs, but avoid the use of the words "Allied Military Government" or "Control Commission". (It would, of course, be necessary to maintain a limited Allied Military Government in combat zones.) This organization might be called "The Allied Council" or "Allied Liaison Commission."

Our insistence on (1) would, of course, present advantages and disadvantages. We would deal with such local authorities and individual military commanders who might be well disposed. For the present at least we would lack a central administration. Our authority in the occupied territories would be absolute. It is conceivable that under such conditions the present Italian armed forces would rapidly disintegrate into a rabble with possibilities of large scale disorder and looting. Some might join the Axis. It is believed that under this arrangement very little assistance to our military effort would be forthcoming. In fact, it might be gravely disturbed.

Politically...
Politically, on the other hand, we would assume no obligations and undoubtedly escape the criticisms of certain elements in Britain and the United States who very possibly will disapprove any dealings with the King, or even the Royal House and the Badoglio administration.

Approval of a plan along the lines indicated in (2), while it will undoubtedly incur the risk of criticism of some elements abroad, seems to present very definite practical advantages, particularly from the military point of view. In its favor is its performance thus far in executing the clauses of the armistice meticulously and faithfully. Politically, it has also to its credit the dissolution of the Fascist Party and a number of steps liberalizing the Italian regime. True, it does not have control over the bulk of the Italian armed forces, but does command a substantial nucleus which will be undoubtedly augmented. It is beginning to organize a liaison with the Italian armed forces, intelligence services and civilian groups in that part of Italy now under the control of the Germans. This has immense possibilities from the standpoint of OSS and SOE work, cooperating with PWE.

It is my opinion that the Royal House, which has existed in Italy more or less for a thousand years, is firmly entrenched in Italian tradition. The most substantial elements in the army today are the peasants, and the King seems to have the strongest hold on that element. It is impossible to say whether this may be true of the industrial workers of the north, but we understand, for example, that the Communist element in Milan has voiced limited approval of the Badoglio regime on the score that the action he has taken in joining the Allies is better late than never.

Whatever policy may be decided upon, it would seem doubtful that we could, over any considerable period, maintain an equivocal position, insisting on the execution of the terms of a severe armistice, while accepting from the Italians active military cooperation in the prosecution of the war against Germany. I am, of course, unable to judge the military position, but it would seem to me that the forces at our disposal in this theater are too slender to contemplate anything in the nature of a total occupation of even a substantial part of Italy. If we are able to obtain full and active cooperation from...
the Italians, I believe that our chances of a relatively early expulsion of German forces from a substantial portion of Italy are greatly enhanced. In according the Italians the equivalent of Allied status we need not necessarily incur onerous obligations, and certainly the benefits of the bulk of the armistice conditions would inevitably accrue to us.

Political Future.

Should public opinion in Britain and the United States render association with the present King too embarrassing, it is always possible that his abdication could be arranged. I am confident that his principal interest is in the continuance of his dynasty, which has a certain political value. Should he abdicate, the present Crown Prince Umberto, who is in his early forties, active, speaking good English, and with no particular political handicap, would be available. Should this, for any reason, be politically unacceptable, the solution of a regency council would be for consideration. There is here an added complication, however, as the young son of the Crown Prince is now in Switzerland. His physical presence might be considered necessary for the formation of a regency council.

While both the King and Badoglio have come a long way in political reform involving the dissolution of the Fascist organization, Badoglio's expressed ideas about the form of his government would undoubtedly need some adjustment. He informed us that he proposes a government of functionaries without regard to representation therein of political parties. We discussed with him the possibility of having some representation of the different party elements, such as the Catholic group, the Socialists, Labor, Communists, etc. He sais this represented many difficulties because twenty years of Fascism had virtually eliminated parties in Italy. However, we emphasized again to him the advantages from our point of view of a gesture on his part toward liberalization. It is believed that he will go along on this basis if persuaded. His plan, he said, contemplates general elections in Italy about four months after the cessation of hostilities.

Economics..
Economics.

Cooperation with Italy on a friendly basis would raise grave questions concerning supplies. The country is undoubtedly in need of a huge volume of goods. For example, in the small liberated area of southern Italy today, which includes about two millions of population, the authorities handed us an estimate of required food and other products totalling approximately 100,000 tons per month. While this estimate, of course, appears more or less exaggerated, the need for supplies in Italy is undoubtedly great. General Ambrosio informed me that under the arrangements with Germany originally, Italy was to receive 1,200,000 tons of coal monthly. It had actually received about 800,000 tons until recently, when deliveries fell below that figure. This, of course, is in addition to liquid fuels.
SUBJECT: Instructions for Military Mission with the Italian Government

TO: Lieutenant-General P.A. Mason MacFarlane.

1. The Italian Government, to whom an Armistice has been granted, is now established in the BRINDISI area.

   The Commander-in-Chief has decided that a Military Mission shall be dispatched to the Italian Government.

   You are appointed Head of the Military Mission and will assume your duties forthwith.

2. Object

   The task of the Mission is to transmit the military instructions of the Commander-in-Chief to the Italian Government, collect and transmit intelligence, and arrange for such coordinated action as the Italian armed forces and people can be induced to take against the Germans.

   In fulfilling this task you, and all members of your mission, will bear constantly in mind the extreme importance of inculcating in the Italian Government, armed forces and people, the will to resist and hamper in every way the German forces in Italy and the Italian possessions.

3. Composition

   The Military Mission will consist of Naval, Ground Force and Air Sections. The heads of these sections will report to you on all matters of policy; on technical matters they may report direct to the appropriate service from which they are drawn.

   The names of the heads of the sections will be notified to you in due course.

   Attached is chart showing provisional organization.

4. Political Questions

   The British Resident Minister in North Africa (Rt. Hon. H. M. MacMillan) and the U.S. Minister (Mr. Murphy) or their representatives, will be associated with your Mission, in order to make the necessary diplomatic contacts with the Italian Government. They will however report to you, and all instructions from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, on political as well as military questions, will be transmitted to them through you.
5. Communications

You will report to the Allied Commander-in-Chief. On matters affecting only one service, you may communicate with Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, G.O.C. 15 Army Group and Air Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, as appropriate, with copies to AFHQ.

You will not communicate direct with any agencies in Washington or London (e.g. War Department, Admiralty).

Suitable facilities will be provided for you by Chief Signal Officer, AFHQ.

6. Armistice Terms

Copies of the Armistice Terms, together with the political, economic and financial condition referred to in para 12 of the Armistice Terms, are attached herewith for your information and guidance. The latter have not yet been presented to the Italian Government and you will not inform the Italian Government of their contents.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

W. B. SMITH,
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff.

Attached:
Organization Chart
Armistice Terms.
Rough Translation.

Brindisi, September 16, 1943.

General:

All the clauses stipulated by the armistice, as much as has been possible to us, have been carried out by us in perfect good faith.

Also, following the message of His Majesty the King and my two proclamations, our armed forces and the population, in a big part of Italy, have risen against the Germans. There are sharp combats in Corsica and in Dalmatia. At present we have in Brindisi an army corps which will unite itself with your army corps which is to come shortly to Tarento.

In Sardinia, which is completely in our power, we have four divisions which at the proper time can be used if wanted on the continent.

We hope to be able to bring together certain troops from Albania. Our anti-aircraft is all concentrated at Brindisi and in Sardinia.

All this demonstrates our sincere desire to cooperate with our American and British friends in the way that the message sent to me by Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill has indicated.

But at this point naturally a question arises.

In the north of Italy a Fascist Republican Government has been set up, allied with the Germans of course. On the other hand, in the south there is the regular government with His Majesty the King which is in good relationship with the Anglo-Americans, but which is in a state of armistice with them.

Thus, the government of the south is in a condition of inferiority with respect to the irregular government of the north.

Moreover ...
Moreover, if I wish to keep alive the flame of hate in all of Italy against the Germans, if I wish to achieve the result that our troops will fight well against the Germans, it will be necessary for me to have at my disposition an argument much more powerful than an armistice: it will be necessary for me to be able to announce to all Italy and to all the world that I have concluded an American-English-able Italian alliance. Thus, also, our warships will be immediately to collaborate with yours against the common enemy.

General, I simply am posing the question of an alliance without any conditions on my part. I beg you, General, to give kindly consideration to this proposal of mine and to be so kind as to bring it to the attention of the American and English Governments. This idea of mine is known to the general in charge of the mission and to the American and British Ministers who have counseled me to address myself to you.

I beg you, General, to accept the expression of my high consideration.

(Signed): BADOGLO.

To: General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Moreover, if I wish to keep alive the flame of hate in all of Italy against the Germans, if I wish to achieve the result that our troops will fight well against the Germans, it will be necessary for me to have at my disposition an argument much more powerful than an armistice: it will be necessary for me to be able to announce to all Italy and to all the world that I have concluded an American-English-Italian alliance. Thus, also, our warships will be immediately to collaborate with yours against the common enemy.

General, I simply am posing the question of an alliance without any conditions on my part. I beg you, General, to give kindly consideration to this proposal of mine and to be so kind as to bring it to the attention of the American and English Governments. This idea of mine is known to the general in charge of the mission and to the American and British Ministers who have counseled me to address myself to you.

I beg you, General, to accept the expression of my high consideration.

(Signed): Badoglio.

To: General Dwight D. Eisenhower.
PERSONAL AND SECRET.

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief I departed from Algiers on August 31st with General Walter B. Smith, the Chief of Staff, Mr. Harold Macmillan, British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, and General Zanusse, the second emissary sent to Lisbon by General Ambrosio, arriving at Cassibile airport, near Syracuse (this is a landing field which our forces carved out of an almond grove and is a splendid piece of work), and stopped at Fairfield Camp nearby. We arrived simultaneously with Brigadier General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, who had gone to Palermo in advance to meet Giuseppe Castellano, who, accompanied by Signor Montanari (of the Italian Foreign Office acting as interpreter—his mother is an American), arrived from Rome that morning. Castellano, you will recall, was the first emissary sent by Marshal Pietro Badoglio to Lisbon. Castellano and Montanari were the emissaries at Lisbon with whom General Smith and Brigadier Strong conferred two weeks ago. In the party at Fairfield were also Brigadier Sugden (G-3 at Allied Force Headquarters), Commodore Dick, Chief of Staff of Admiral Cunningham, General Joseph Cannon and General Lemnitzer, both of whom are now with the 15th Army Group.

General Zanusse and General Castellano got together for a few minutes and then entered into a military conference with General Smith and the others above-mentioned, Macmillan and I staying in another tent with General Alexander who had come over from the headquarters of the 15th Army Group.

This meeting lasted until about 2 p.m. According to General Smith, General Castellano's attitude had stiffened considerably since his meeting in Lisbon. Both General Smith and Brigadier Strong attributed this to the arrival in Italy of increased German forces which now amount to nineteen divisions. It was apparent that in the minds of the Italians the great question was not the

character . . .

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
character nor the harshness of our armistice terms (you will recall that the British Ambassador in Lisbon had communicated to General Zanussi informally the complete armistice terms), or even the question of unconditional surrender. The outstanding factor is that the Italians are not free agents at liberty to do as they please. It is a nice balance in their minds whether we or their German allies will work the most damage and destruction in Italy. They are literally between the hammer and the anvil.

The Italian representatives in this first conversation at Fairfield insisted that they could do but little and were not prepared to sign anything, long or short terms, unless we could guarantee an Allied landing north of Rome—even a little bit north of Rome. They asserted that if we only land south of Rome the Germans will take the city and everything north of it. In their minds the slaughter, pillage and destruction would be too awful to contemplate.

General Smith made no commitments but said there was a possibility of our landing—for example, a force of airborne troops north of the Eternal City. The Italians said that in such a case their forces would guarantee no opposition to the landings on the Rome airfields and would aid our forces in holding them.

There was lengthy discussion of the military situation, eventual German plans, the possibility of a German deal with Russia and also the question of the Italian fleet. Commodore Dick appeared confident that the Italians are prepared to yield on the fleet and come over. There was considerable question of an operation in Taranto which was subsequently developed and now contemplates the landing of the First British Airborne Division in cooperation with the fleet and with the promised cooperation of the Italian forces.

After the military meeting, Macmillan and I had a brief conversation with Generals Castellano and Zanussi. We impressed on them the urgency of stimulating their government to take immediate steps, reminding them that this is their last chance. The Allies, we pointed out, had not bombed the city of Rome as yet, but there was no reason to defer such action. We suggested that if the Italians declined now to accept and sign, three things were indicated:

(1) The King and the present Italian Government would be all through as far as the Allies are concerned.

(2) We would be obliged to incite disorder and anarchy throughout Italy, even though it might not appear that it would be in our interest to do so and from the military point of view such a state of affairs might present certain disadvantages.

(3) . . .
(3) We would obviously be obliged to bomb relentlessly and on a large scale until all the major Italian cities, including Rome, would be reduced to ashes and piles of rubble.

The reaction of the Italians remained the same and in a sense it was like preaching to the converted. The fact remained that the Rome Government still appears more afraid of the immediate German peril than of the Allies. Generals Castellano and Zanussi both said that it is a question of inducing the cautious and frightened men at Rome who, as much as they yearned to be rid of the Germans, lack the bold initiative to act against them, especially as they are not entirely convinced that the Allies are strong enough to take immediately a major part of Italy, even with Italian help, and protect the country against the large German forces. The latter, in their fury against the Italians, they believe, would unquestionably destroy ruthlessly.

Generals Castellano and Zanussi were permitted to depart from Sicily about 5 p.m. August 31st, returning to Rome by Italian plane via Palermo. It was understood between them and General Smith that if Allied Force Headquarters had no reply indicating Italian acceptance by midnight September 1st, the Allies would find it necessary to bomb Rome heavily.

That evening we dined with General Alexander and after dinner General Smith, Brigadier Richardson, Macmillan and I went with General Alexander to his trailer for a discussion. General Alexander, as he had done in our earlier conversation that day, emphasized the weakness of the Allied position and the danger that unless the Allies are actively aided by the Italians in landing in AVALANCHE and elsewhere, the operations might fail or at least gain a limited success at a very heavy cost of lives. It was obvious that in his mind, as well as that of Macmillan, a disaster at the present time would have a catastrophic effect in England even to the extent, they say, of causing the fall of the British Government and seriously compromising Britain's determination to remain in the war. They talked much of the fatigue, both of the British people as well as of the soldiers, many of whom have been away from home over three years. General Alexander pointed out that the Germans now have at least nineteen divisions in Italy which, added to the sixteen Italian divisions, makes a total of thirty-five divisions. AVALANCHE contemplates an initial landing of three to five divisions and a build-up over two weeks of a maximum of eight divisions. He also emphasized that a landing on a hostile shore is the most dangerous of military operations. General Alexander, therefore, is positive that literally everything must be done to persuade the Italians to help our forces, both during the landing as well as afterwards. Without that aid he would have no assurance of success. There would be, in his opinion, a grave risk of disaster. He urged that nothing be neglected to persuade the Italians to cooperate.
and said that he would be quite willing to risk his reputation and, if necessary, to retire from the army should his Government disapprove his insistence on immediate signature by the Italians of the short armistice terms, and Allied acceptance of Italian military cooperation.

On September 1st a radio message was sent from Allied Force Headquarters to Rome, in accordance with the recommendation of Generals Smith and Alexander, that Allied airborne forces should land in the Rome area incident to AVALANCHE. This was done after Brigadier Strong, Commodore Dick and Brigadier Sugden returned to Algiers and reported to General Eisenhower, who considered their recommendations, as well as that of Admiral Cunningham, who has always vigorously supported the idea of an operation in the Rome area.

We therefore waited at the Fairfield Camp, which is pleasantly situated in an olive grove, making a side trip to Palermo (one hour by air) to inspect the Allied Military Government organization there. Incidentally, we found that the Allied Military Government has performed remarkably well and we greatly admired both the efficiency as well as the fine spirit of both the American and British officers who are engaged in that task.

After dinner September 1st, we received a radio message from Rome saying that the emissaries would return on the morning of September 2nd. This was most encouraging and General Smith decided to go to the Termini airfield to meet their plane. On August 31st the Italian plane had landed at the Palermo airport by mistake and caused somewhat of a sensation. It had been expected at Termini, a more isolated airport which is a bit east of Palermo.

Early on September 2nd General Smith met the Italians at Termini and accompanied them to Fairfield—General Castellano, Signor Montanari, Major Marquesi and the Italian pilot who, incidentally, knows the Rome airports well.

General Smith ascertained from the Italians that they were not yet authorized to sign either the short or the long armistice terms, but that they were instructed to discuss the matter of military cooperation with the Allies. They suggested that the signature be postponed until after the Allied landing on the mainland. This sounded bad and General Smith indicated great dissatisfaction. The Italians had brought with them considerable military data—maps showing the disposition of the German forces, etc.

It was decided at this point that General Alexander should make an impressive entrance in full dress uniform, approach the Italians, who were in a tent which had been assigned to them at Fairfield ...
Fairfield, and indicate that he was coldly furious that they had returned unprepared to sign, thus wasting our time. He went through with this performance very well, making thereafter a stern exit, and the Italians seemed impressed. General Alexander insisted also afterwards, in discussing the matter with us, that under no circumstances were the Italians to leave Fairfield unless and until they signed. General Smith missed no opportunity to impress on the Italians the terrible destruction and chaos which their country would suffer if they failed.

Shortly thereafter the Italians requested the transmission of a radio message to Rome in which they urgently recommended that immediate authorization be given them to sign and discuss afterwards the details of military cooperation with the Allies. This was done about noon.

It was decided also that, in the interval, it would be best to let the Italian representatives "stew in their own juice" and all conversation with them was avoided.

General Alexander, in a conversation with us, reviewed again the disproportionate situation of fighting thirty-five Axis divisions with an initial five or six divisions available in the first days of AVALANCHE, and those not even landed but faced with the perilous test of getting ashore under the fire of several first-class German divisions. He again and again said that our forces needed every possible aid we could induce by hook or crook the Italians to extend. He said he was ready to stake his military career in the effort to prevail upon the Italians to come over to our camp, employing any ruse or subterfuge to gain this end. Everyone agreed that the odds against the Allies without Italian aid are unreasonably great and were determined to prevail on the Italians to sign the short terms and then work out the details of military cooperation.

In the afternoon of September 2nd we were greatly relieved to receive from the Commander-in-Chief a message saying that you and the Prime Minister were agreed that our dealings with the Italians should be governed by military considerations alone. We had all been disturbed over the thought that it might be believed that the stage was all set for a public Allied-Italian armistice ceremony, forgetting that the Italians are living in the cage with the tiger and are not free agents. Military necessity required that the negotiations be conducted with the Italians in the greatest secrecy.

During the afternoon I participated in a conference attended by Generals Cannon, Timberlake, Lemnitzer and Taylor, who are engaged in the preliminary planning for the landing of the 82nd Airborne Division on the Rome airports. They all agreed that
it is a hazardous undertaking which could only succeed if the four Italian divisions in the Rome area, or part of them, actively cooperate in resisting the German panzer forces said to be six hours distant. They all thought the risk was worth taking, even if the divisions were lost.

No news was received from Rome late September 2nd because the last message from Allied Force Headquarters despatched from Castellano to General Ambrosio was only transmitted at 9 p.m. due to atmospheric difficulties. In that message General Castellano informed General Ambrosio that it was urgently necessary that he be authorized to sign immediately and that Marshal Badoglio transmit to the British Minister in the Vatican a document confirming the authorization to accept the terms unconditionally and to sign the short armistice terms.

We received on the morning of September 3rd an encouraging message from Rome saying that the matter was under consideration. At 4:30 p.m. a radio message was received from the Badoglio Government granting General Castellano the necessary authority and stating that the deposit of the document confirming the authorization had been made. The British later received advice that the document had been deposited with the British Minister in the Vatican.

In the meantime General Eisenhower had arrived on a visit to Sicily in connection with the BAYTOWN operation and conferred with General Smith, several officers, Macmillan and myself. He approved General Smith's signing the armistice terms as his representative as a strictly military arrangement which must be regarded as highly secret until announcement can be made a few hours before the AVALANCHE operation.

At 5:30 p.m. on September 3rd, at Fairfield Camp, the short armistice terms with Italy were signed in behalf of Field Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Head of the Italian Government, by Brigadier General Giuseppe Castellano, and in behalf of Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower, Allied Commander-in-Chief, by Major General Walter B. Smith, Chief of Staff.

After congratulations and amenities, General Eisenhower informed General Castellano that the latter had acted in the best interests of his country. General Eisenhower stated that in the case of the Italian people, as had been the case of all other peoples determined to combat Nazi Germany, the Italians could count on the Allies for full cooperation to this end. General Eisenhower thereupon bade General Castellano goodbye and departed for North Africa.

Thus . . .
Thus, precisely four years after Great Britain and France declared war on Germany, the duly constituted Italian authorities acknowledged Italy's defeat, surrendered unconditionally to an American General acting as Chief of Staff to another American General, the Allied Commander-in-Chief. But the Italians went further and agreed to place the resources of their country in the fight on the side of the Allies against Germany. It is truly an historic milestone.

Incidentally, the signature occurred under an olive tree and I enclose a branch of the olive tree as a souvenir.

General Alexander arrived immediately thereafter and a discussion of Italian military cooperation with the Allies ensued between the Italians and Allied staff officers through the night.

Before the military conversations several questions were asked by General Castellano and Montanari regarding the possibilities which would face the Italian Government in the event of a German spearhead movement to seize Rome. General Castellano talked of the Italian Government and King proceeding to Corsica or Sardinia or Sicily, but expressed a preference for Albania. Macmillan and I took no position but mentioned that possibly in such an event the Palermo region of Sicily might be considered should circumstances require, in which case the Allied forces might delimit a region where Italian sovereignty would be maintained. It was pointed out, however, that the Italian mainland would be available after the future Allied military operations, the details of which, of course, had not been disclosed to the Italians, had been successfully completed.

Immediately after the military surrender terms had been signed General Smith, in accordance with your instructions, handed General Castellano the text of the full armistice terms with a covering letter which made it clear that these terms must be accepted. It is our thought that as soon as direct contact with the Italian Government can be established after landing, the complete armistice can be signed with appropriate ceremony on behalf of the United Nations and in the presence of their representatives.

At this point I want to speak a word of sincere praise for the superb manner in which General W. B. Smith has handled these negotiations under the intelligent supervision of General Eisenhower. It is an excellent example of what our military men are capable when put to the test.

General Castellano seemed perturbed over some of the conditions, but a detailed discussion of them was avoided.

Macmillan . . .
Macmillan and I also discussed with General Smith the matter of setting up a program for the radio announcement by the King and Badoglio of the signing of an armistice. This would be made immediately prior to AVALANCHE. Macmillan made the point that the announcement should be prepared and registered on phonographic discs so that they could be given immediate and widespread publicity by radio stimulating the maximum aid for our military operations from the Italian people and armed forces. It was agreed to order General McClure to Fairfield immediately to work out the details of this program.

Among the miscellaneous items of information we gathered from the Italians was that Farinacci left Rome wearing a German uniform by the German Embassy plane, which took him to Germany. They also informed us that von Rahn, a German diplomat with the rank of Minister, arrived in Rome four days ago. We recalled his odorous reputation in French affairs. He was the agent who proceeded to Syria in 1941 and was one of the most effective German elements in France after the armistice. We believe that his arrival in Rome may portend the imminence of a German political spearhead involving an effort to capture the King and the Badoglio Government, looking to the establishment of a Farinacci Quisling regime. The Italians stated that Farinacci has absolutely no popular support.

The Italians told us also that over 600,000 additional persons, refugees from the northern bombed cities in Italy, especially Turin and Milan, are now in Rome, because they believe that Rome will be protected from Allied bombing. This is one of the weak points of the Italian position and explains the Italian reaction to our suggestion that it would probably be necessary to bomb the city if prompt and favorable action were not immediately undertaken. It would appear that not much would be necessary to create complete demoralization of a surplus population of hundreds of thousands who have literally no other place to go.

General Castellano informed me in strictest secrecy that Mussolini is now in Maddalena (a small island off the northeast corner of Sardinia). Ciano has departed from Rome but Castellano does not know his whereabouts. Castellano also indicated that during the course of Mussolini's last meeting with Hitler at Verona, Hitler promised numerous German divisions from the Russian front but said they could not arrive in Italy before October when the mud in Russia would reduce operations in that area.

All of the Italians said that food conditions in Italy are unsatisfactory, largely due to the prevailing lack of transportation. There are important supplies of food in the country,
resulting particularly from the excellent cereal crop, but inadequate distribution reduces the supply in urban centers. There is a flourishing black market.

You may have heard the story of General Patton at Licata. The Podesta at that place pointed out to General Patton the ruins of a former Greek temple, saying that it had been destroyed in the last war. General Patton expressed surprise and said that he had not realized that Licata had been shelled in the 1914-18 war. The Podesta explained that he was not referring to the 1914-18 war, but that by the last war he meant the second Punic War.

Faithfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy

Enclosure:

1 olive branch.
MR. PRESIDENT.

1. It would surely be convenient before we separate to have a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of the Staff in order to take stock of the new world situation which will arise on the assumption that the present battle for Naples and Rome is successful and that the Germans retreat to the line of the Apennines or the Po.

2. Assuming we get the Italian Fleet, we gain not only that Fleet but the British Fleet which has hitherto contained it. This very heavy addition to our naval power should be used at the earliest possible moment to intensify the war against Japan. I have asked the First Sea Lord to discuss with Admiral King the movement of a powerful British Battle Squadron, with cruisers and ancillaries, to the Indian Ocean via the Panama Canal and the Pacific. We need a strong Eastern Fleet based on Colombo during the amphibious operations next year. I should be very glad if it were found possible for this Fleet to serve under the American Pacific Command and put in at least four months of useful fighting in the Pacific before taking up its Indian Ocean station. We cannot afford to have idle ships. I do not know, however, how the arrival of such reinforcements would enable
the various tasks assigned to United States forces in the Pacific to be augmented. Apart from strategy, from the standpoint of high policy His Majesty's Government would desire to participate in the Pacific war in order to give such measure of assistance as is in their power not only to their American Allies but on account of the obligations to Australia and New Zealand. Such a movement of our ships to and through the Pacific would undoubtedly exercise a demoralizing effect upon Japan who must now be conscious of the very great addition of naval weight thrust against her, and besides this it would surely give satisfaction in the United States as being a proof positive of British resolve to take an active and vigorous part to the end in the war against Japan.

3. The public must be gradually led to realize what we and our Combined Staffs have so fully in mind, namely, the conversion of Italy into an active agent against Germany. Although we could not recognize Italy as an Ally in the full sense, we have agreed she is to be allowed to work her passage and that useful service against the enemy will not only be aided but recompened. Should fighting break out between Italians and Germans, the public prejudices will very rapidly depart and in a fortnight or so matters may be ripe, if we can so direct events, for an Italian declaration of war against Germany and Japan. The question

Regraded Unclassified
of the Italian flag flying from Italian ships, and even some arrangement of Italians manning those vessels under British or American control, requires consideration. The whole problem of handling and getting the utmost use out of the Italian Navy requires review now on a high level.

4. On the overall assumption of a decisive victory in the Naples area, we are I presume agreed to march northwards up the Italian Peninsula until we come up against the main German positions. If the Italians are everywhere favourable and their Army comes over to help, the deployment of at least a dozen Italian Divisions will be of great advantage in holding the front across Italy and in permitting relief of Allied forces. If, after the battle of Naples is over, we are not seriously resisted south of the main German line, we ought not to be long getting up against it with light forces, and I should hope that by the end of the year at latest we should be confronting it in full strength. If sooner, then better. There can be no question of whittling down OVERLORD. We must not forget at this juncture our agreement to begin moving the seven Divisions away in succession from the beginning of November.

All the more important is it to bring Italian Divisions into the line, and our State policy
should be adapted to procure this end.

5. I have been contemplating the 1944 campaign in the light of these new possibilities and I remain strongly convinced that we should be very chary of advancing Northward beyond the narrow part of the Italian Peninsula. Of course, if the Germans retreat to the Alps, another situation is presented, but failing that, it would seem beyond our strength, having regard to the requirements of OVERLORD, to broaden out into the Plains of Lombardy.

We have also to consider that the Germans, working on interior lines, may at any time bring a heavier force to bear upon our front in Italy than we shall have at the end of the year. The possibility of a strong German counter-attack cannot be excluded. I should like it to be considered whether we should not, when we come up against the main German position, construct a strong fortified line of our own, properly sited in depth. Italian military labour could be used on a large scale for this purpose. Italian troops could naturally take part in defending the line. Thus, by the Spring, we should be able in this theatre either to make an offensive if the enemy were weak, and anyhow to threaten one, or on the other hand stand on the defensive, using our Air power which will in the meanwhile have been built up, from behind our fortified line and apportion our troops for action.
elsewhere either to the West or to the East. I hope this may be studied.

6. We are both of us acutely conscious of the great importance of the Balkan situation. We should make sure that the Mediterranean High Command, absorbed in its present battle, does not overlook the needs of the patriot forces there. The problem of the Italian forces requires immediate study. The orders of the C.-in-C. Middle East, General Wilson, published today, are well conceived for the moment, but we require to see more clearly exactly what is intended. On the assumption that the Italians can be drawn into the war against Germany, far-reaching possibilities seem to be open. There is surely no need for us to work from the bottom of the Balkans upwards. If we can get an agreement between the patriots and the Italian troops, it should be possible to open quite soon one or more good ports on the Dalmatian coast, enabling munitions and supplies to be sent in by ship, and all forces that will obey our orders raised to good fighting condition. The German situation in all this theatre will become most precarious, especially from the point of view of supplies. When the defensive line across Northern Italy has been completed, it may be possible to spare some of our own forces assigned to the Mediterranean theatre to emphasize a movement North and North-Eastward from the Dalmatian ports. For the moment the utmost efforts should be
put forth to organize the attack upon the
Germans throughout the Balkan Peninsula and to supply
agents, arms and good direction.

7. Lastly, the question of Islands is now ripe for
consideration. Sardinia, I imagine, will come over
immediately, though we may have to send some help to the
Italians in procuring the disarmament of any German units
there. In Corsica the Germans have perhaps already been
overcome, but surely here is the place for a French
expedition. Even if only one Division could be sent by
the French National Committee, the Island could probably
be quickly liberated and there is little doubt that its
manhood would enable at least another Division or two to
be raised. General Wilson's telegram about the operations
against Rhodes and other Islands in the Dodecanese is all
right so far as it goes, but I am not satisfied that
sufficient use is being made under the present conditions
of the forces in the Middle East. I am making an immediate
enquiry into the exact location of all troops above
Battalion strength, hoping that improvised expeditionary
forces and garrisons may be provided for various minor
ventures.

8. We must expect far-reaching reactions in Bulgaria,
Rumania and Hungary, and these again may produce a movement
from the Turk without our having to make any request or
incur any obligation to him. All this again requires
military and political consideration on the high level and I feel that we should do well to take a preliminary survey this afternoon if you are agreeable.

9. 9. 43.
C/4160.
LONDON.

14th August, 1943.

PRIME MINISTER.

I have asked Sir Alexander Cadogan to be good enough
to hand you the attached six B.J. Reports:

121257.
121258.
121273.
121289.
121290.
121317.
JAPANESE REPRESENTATIVE, THE VATICAN, REPORTS

CONVERSATION WITH CARDINAL MAGLIONE.

No: 121257
Date: 12th August, 1943.

From: Japanese Representative, Vatican.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 125.
Date: 6th August, 1943. [ Intercepted 1100 10th August].

[ Grade 1 Cypher].

On the occasion of a talk which I had with MAGLIONE, the Secretary of State, on the 6th, the latter said that:

(1) There was a report to the effect that the Italian Foreign Minister, GUARIGLIA, had left for a consultation with the German authorities and it looked as though arrangements had at last been made for contact between GERMANY and ITALY. There were many people, it seemed, who wanted to know why, in this hour of ITALY's extremity, the Vatican did not come to her aid, but if the Vatican were, at this juncture, to venture upon any sort of action, the Germans would certainly raise an objection as to why they [the Vatican] were interfering in matters which concerned only GERMANY and ITALY; and as this would undoubtedly be injurious to the Vatican's status as a neutral, the Vatican was not in a position to do anything. GUARIGLIA would be returning to his post within a day or two, and there was nothing for it but to await the result of the consultation. On the other hand so long as AMERICA and BRITAIN continued, without giving any "indication" [English word], to harp on ITALY's unconditional surrender, there was no ground for discussion. Moreover, ITALY's reversion to neutrality, while easy to talk about, was impossible in practice.

(2) It was a fact that, as one of the neutral States, the Vatican had received the notification from the British Government concerning asylum for
political refugees, but the Vatican, though a neutral State, was in fact sorely lacking in territory and accommodation, so that such a problem did not in practice arise. However, they intended, he said, in any case to see what attitude the various neutral countries adopted, and to send a reply.

(3) As regards the assembly of the Cardinals which was recently held, that is convened from time to time, and there was no particular reason for it, so I refrained from touching upon its private affairs.

Repeated to ROME.

[Dept: Note: Text will be made available to U.S. War Department, Washington].
ITALIAN SITUATION: REPORT FROM TURKISH AMBASSADOR, ROME.

No: 121258
Date: 12th August, 1943.

From: Turkish Ambassador, ROME.
To: Foreign Ministry, ANGORA.

No: 102.
Date: 10th August, 1943.

GUARIGLIA had a talk with RIBBENTROP on Friday and returned to ROME on Saturday. According to information from an official source, the German Foreign Minister said that GERMANY had decided to continue a defensive war on Italian soil. The Italian statesmen think that in this decision the Germans are not so much concerned with defending ITALY as with delaying the approach of the Allied forces to the frontiers of GERMANY. The German air forces in ITALY have not increased, but German land forces have been arriving for the past fortnight. ITALY is in no position to resist, for while the Germans have armoured forces in the country the Italians have none. The German-Italian frontier is open and the Germans could therefore [three groups] forces in a short time.

ITALY’s forces at present in the Mother Country are estimated at 16 divisions. There are 42 Italian divisions in the BALKANS, but in view of the deficiencies in their [? equipment] it is very difficult to bring them back to the Mother Country. In this situation [he] has reached the view that so long as the present military conditions on the mainland continue, there is nothing for it but to continue the war, if only in theory. GUARIGLIA evidently found the situation in ROME on his return from TURKEY more confused and more difficult than he expected. If ITALY were now to attempt to come to terms with the Allies, the Germans would lay hands on the country, and indeed have already done so. The
country is now in a situation resembling that of FRANCE and it seems almost inevitable that it will become a theatre of war.

Furthermore, public opinion hopes for and desires peace which it expected to follow the change of government. If peace is delayed there is a possibility of an internal social revolution. The government, harassed by the Germans on one side and the Anglo-Saxons on the other and finally by considerations of domestic peace and order, seems at a loss to know how to maintain itself amid these different pressures. In [?] interview with GUARIGLIA on Saturday, [?] found him sunk in pessimism and despair.

That is how I see the Italian situation at present.

BAYDUR.
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, BERLIN, COMMENTS ON HIS
INTERVIEW WITH HITLER.

No: 121273
Date: 13th August, 1943.

From: Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 900.
Date: 4th August, 1943.
[Grade 1 Cypher].

My telegram No. 858 [not received but see our No. 120795].

I submit the following impressions which I have formed as a result of my conversation with Führer HITLER.

1. As far as concerns relations between GERMANY and ITALY, GERMANY was afraid that, having regard to the rottenness of domestic politics in ITALY and to the decline in the war consciousness of the Italian people, ITALY would some day drop out, but she does not seem to have anticipated that the defection would take place just at this time nor that it would take the form of the withdrawal of MUSSOLINI from the Axis camp. It is not as yet clear what the character of the new Cabinet is or what its future policy is going to be, but my humble opinion is that, by and large, it will be limited to [one of] the following three courses (a) to continue to fight as hitherto to the utmost (b) to make a separate peace with GREAT BRITAIN and AMERICA or (c) to make a show of cooperating with GERMANY for the present, whilst in the meantime negotiating with the British and Americans and planning to drop out of the war.

[Part II. There are some 50 groups missing]

Director (4).
F.O. (3).
Admiralty (2).
War Office (4).
India Office (2).
Air Ministry.
M.I.5.
M.B.W. (2).
Sir E. Bridges.
missing in the body of the text and the remainder is too corrupt to admit of even a summary].

Part III.

If ITALY were to agree to this [Dept: Note: which, as far as can be gathered from the corrupt passage immediately preceding, seems to mean the use by the Allies of Italian airfields and harbours] it would naturally lead to military action by the Germans against ITALY and, although such a development would not come about abruptly, I am of the opinion that there is a decided possibility of course (c) above being followed in the end. Naturally GERMANY hopes for course (a) but in the present condition of things she cannot expect it (several missing and corrupt groups).

. . . . GERMANY would need time to make preparations and in the meantime there is a great likelihood that the Allies, following on after their occupation of SICILY, would utilize the interval to carry on military operations on the mainland of ITALY, which is the weak point of the Axis. This will require time, however, and it will be necessary to await the results of the Allies' political machinations in ITALY, so that, putting everything together, I think that there will not be any sudden developments and that, for some time, things will go on as they are [Missing and corrupt groups]. The meaning of the passage is possibly "The Germans' ultimate intention is to abandon the South of ITALY and to defend the North in the interests of the defence of EUROPE".

It is worthy of notice that the leaders in GERMANY do not look upon the defection of ITALY as implying a serious military liability which explains HITLER's [? statement] to me that ITALY was a militarily heavy burden to GERMANY. Politically, of course, the effects are considered by the Germans to be serious and ten additional divisions of German troops are said to have recently been sent to the BALKANS. This action [? is considered to have been taken] to meet British and American landing operations and at the same time to keep the Balkan countries in check and to preserve peace and order.

Part IV.

2. Speaking about the state of the war with the U.S.S.R., HITLER said to me that just at the time when he was invading the CAUCASUS last year with the object of advancing later into the Middle and Near East his armies suffered a serious and unexpected break-through in the STALINGRAD area. He had racked
his brains for some means of holding on to the CAUCASUS in spite of this set-back, but he was regretfully compelled to abandon it on account of his fear of being cut off in the rear. During the course of the conversation, however, I formed the strong impression that [some corruption and omissions: ? this year the Germans had altered the tactics of the previous two years in favour of a policy of inflicting as heavy losses as possible on the Soviet armies by drawing them into a war of attrition but that the sudden turn of events in the South had prevented them from getting too deeply involved in the war with the Russians]. The Soviet armies are suffering heavy losses this year, but I cannot believe that, on that account, their power of attack has become exhausted. Of course the Germans expect to see the Russians turning to the offensive from now on, and it will not be an easy task to put up a defence all along the extended line but, thanks to the full preparations they have been making during the past six months, they have increased the numerical strength of their armies, and, as there are as many as 220 divisions of these on the Eastern front, I believe that, even if the war continues into the winter they will be able to carry on a more effective defensive war than in the previous two winters. Regarding operations on the Eastern front, therefore, I am of the opinion that the position is not critical, though there is no present prospect of a brilliant German victory.

[Part V missing].

[Part VI].

The situation in GERMANY with regard to raw materials, food stuffs etc. is "normal" and there are no symptoms of unrest. It is natural that the lack of success in the war situation and the intensification of the air-raids should have a [? gloomy] effect on the minds of the people, but it is well comprehended everywhere in GERMANY that this war is a life or death struggle and therefore, given the political power of the Nazis and the morale of the country's defence forces, I fail to find any cause for anxiety. The political events in ITALY, too, are taken with comparative calmness and I do not believe that any unrest will arise from that quarter in connection with the defence of GERMANY.

4. [Corrupt passage, the general sense of which appears to be : - The extent to which GERMANY can replenish her offensive strength and what definite plans she has for coping with developments in the hostilities against the Soviets the British and Americans and, finally, on all fronts are questions of
great importance to other countries, but for the moment the Germans are concentrating on making EUROPE into their main fortress and they would not find it easy to give a clear answer. In my talk with HITLER I did not enquire into the subject because I felt that the moment had not arrived. In the light of the developments in the war situation, there will be uneasiness in some quarters about the future, and GERMANY has certainly encountered some difficult situations since hostilities began, but that was inevitable in a war of this magnitude. Having tasted hardships in conducting operations, last year and the previous year, with inadequate forces over a wide area and in maintaining a stubborn defence when her rear lines of communication were imperfect, GERMANY may now be said to have corrected her strategy, and I see no wavering in her resolve to carry the war through to a successful conclusion.

[Part VII].

Peace is accordingly quite unthinkable. As HITLER said in reply to my questions about peace between GERMANY and the U.S.S.R., [fifty groups missing]. From GERMANY's point of view it is absolutely imperative to hold on to the UKRAINE in order to carry on a long drawn-out war against the British and Americans, and I cannot at all envisage a peace with the Soviets, which is premised on the abandonment [by GERMANY] of victories already won, nor would the Soviets at the present time contemplate agreeing to a peace which involved the loss of the UKRAINE. It would accordingly be difficult to find any concrete evidence of peace.

[Dept: Note: Text will be made available to U.S. War Department, Washington].
JAPANESE AMBASSADOR, ROME, REPORTS ON RIBBENTROP-GUARIGLIA MEETING.

No: 121289
Date: 13th August, 1943.

From: Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 565.
Date: 8th August, 1943.
[Grade 1 Cypher].

My telegram No.540 [our No.121037].

The following is the substance of confidential information given to me on the morning of the 8th by the Italian Foreign Minister:

1. His interview [with RIBBENTROP] had taken place on the 6th at TARVIS in North ITALY (on the old Austrian border) and had lasted some eight hours. As was to be expected, the attitude of the Germans was somewhat firm at first and they showed concern about the internal political situation in ITALY, but as a result of the heart to heart explanations he had given, an understanding was gradually reached. They had lunch together (at first the atmosphere was such that it had been decided not to lunch together) and they separated amidst jokes and laughter. He thought that for a first interview it had been tolerably successful and he was satisfied.

2. They began with intimate conversations between himself and AMBROSIO, RIBBENTROP and KREITEL during which he [GUARIGLIA] gave detailed explanations of the recent political changes in ITALY and said that, while the people of ITALY were fully aware that MUSSOLINI had gone into the war unprepared, in full reliance on the words of the Germans and in the belief that the war would end speedily in a German victory, now was not the time to talk about the past. So far as ITALY was concerned, the only course was to carry on...
From: Japanese Ambassador, ROME.
To: Foreign Minister, TOKYO.

No: 565.
Date: 8th August, 1943.
[Grade 1 Cypher].

My telegram No.540 [our No.121037].

The following is the substance of confidential information given to me on the morning of the 8th by the Italian Foreign Minister:

1. His interview [with RIBBENTROP] had taken place on the 6th at TARVIS in North ITALY (on the old Austrian border) and had lasted some eight hours. As was to be expected, the attitude of the Germans was somewhat firm at first and they showed concern about the internal political situation in ITALY, but as a result of the heart to heart explanations he had given, an understanding was gradually reached. They had lunch together (at first the atmosphere was such that it had been decided not to lunch together) and they separated amidst jokes and laughter. He thought that for a first interview it had been tolerably successful and he was satisfied.

2. They began with intimate conversations between himself and AMBROSIO, RIBBENTROP and KEITEL during which he [GUARIGLIA] gave detailed explanations of the recent political changes in ITALY and said that, while the people of ITALY were fully aware that MUSSOLINI had gone into the war unprepared, in full reliance on the words of the Germans and in the belief that the war would end speedily in a German victory, now was not the time to talk about the past. So far as ITALY was concerned, the only course was to carry on with...
with the war, and the present government had taken over from the Fascists and was working to make the people understand the realities of the situation.

3. Then there followed a frank exchange of views between himself and RIBBENTROP alone. He had explained that MUSSOLINI and his party had completely lost the confidence of the people. The Government was securing the safety of MUSSOLINI from the masses but this was a purely domestic question for ITALY. The national structure of ITALY was different from that of GERMANY, the implications of Fascism and Nazism were not the same, and there was a difference in the time taken in the two countries in crushing the communist parties and seizing the reins of authority. Everyone would acknowledge that both countries had achieved enormous success, but the organization and policies of the party did not suit the national structure of ITALY and, having forfeited the nation's confidence, it had gone into voluntary dissolution. The people had got rid of MUSSOLINI, but they would not follow him. Seeing that (a) the war was still being waged (b) the German army was actually conducting joint military operations in ITALY and (c) the enemy were displaying a lack of understanding towards ITALY, the new government had decided that their only course was to continue the war. It was true that the people as a whole desired [three groups corrupt: ? an early peace] and accordingly the government were striving to get them to appreciate the realities of the position and to arouse them to defend their home-land under the leadership of the new government. The newspapers had gradually begun to say the same thing, and so the intention was to go ahead with the war, with GERMANY giving military and moral support to the new government, signifying her confidence in it and cooperating with it. Should GERMANY desert the new government and out of selfish motives send her troops into the mainland of ITALY in order to defend it, the BADGOLIO Cabinet would lose its standing and internal conditions would be thrown into confusion. He had, he said, given RIBBENTROP detailed explanations of the reasons why such action would certainly not be GERMANY's best policy since an extremely troublesome situation would arise from the inability of all classes in ITALY to understand the significance of the German army's movements.

4. Although the Germans understood the situation as given above, he himself, he said, proposed to work for the promotion of an even closer understanding between the two countries. In military matters too there had been a certain amount of preliminary discussion - for example there are many questions like the transfer to the homeland for defence purposes of a
part of the large Italian forces at present stationed in the BALKANS and other countries outside ITALY. These matters demanded further discussion and, in the conviction that mutual trust was the basis of all things, he was concentrating his efforts on them.

5. It had been arranged to publish a simple official announcement, but as a result of discussions with Premier BADOGLIO since his return it was decided that a too simple statement would give rise to all manner of speculation of which the enemy would make use, and a detailed announcement would, it was to be feared, bring immediate enemy air-raids. As a matter of fact, negotiations were at the moment proceeding, through the Vatican, with GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES for making ROME an open city, and if ROME and others were to be bombed now there was a danger that the negotiations would fall through. So in the end, after agreement with GERMANY, the proposal to issue an announcement was abandoned.

6. He said he was extremely grateful for the sympathetic attitude of the Japanese Government, and he requested their further assistance in connection with promoting understanding between GERMANY and ITALY. (I said that I thought that ITALY’s ready recognition of the independent government of BURMA would create a particularly good impression in JAPAN and would have a good effect on German-Italian relations).

Repeated to BERLIN.

Communicated to Vatican.

[Dept:Note: Text will be made available to U.S. War Department, Washington].
A well-known politician who has returned from ROME has explained BADOGLIO's conduct as follows. On the one side the Germans are putting intense pressure on the government to continue the war, and on the other the English are urging it to conclude peace. The practical obstacle to the Marshal's making peace at once which is constituted by the presence of German troops all over ITALY is a powerful one. The Marshal's desire to gain time, [? though he realises] that peace with ENGLAND is imperative, arises from his wish to remove the Germans from ITALY by persuasion without becoming involved in a cruel conflict with them. The person with whom I spoke remarked, "The Roumanian Foreign Office hopes that the Turkish Foreign Minister will play a valuable part in explaining this situation to the English." What I have learnt here from other sources consists well with this interpretation of the Marshal's attitude.
ITALIAN SITUATION: REPORT FROM PORTUGUESE MINISTER.

From: Portuguese Minister, ROME.
To: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, LISBON.

Date: 14th August, 1943.
No: 121317

From what I hear, see and gather (I had a friendly chat with the Minister for Foreign Affairs the day before yesterday) the situation remains confused and intricate. There is obviously a great discrepancy between the general feeling of the population and the idea of continuing a state of belligerency. Even among circles in authority, both civil and military, there is no unanimity in this latter respect.

The position has become still more difficult since the decision of the German High Command to satisfy Italian requests to increase supplies of men and war material. A refusal of the request, so it is said, would have been considered a valid excuse for the rescission of the pact and would have had useful consequences, especially as a diplomatic manoeuvre.

Meanwhile, whatever may be the eventual cost in life and material, there are some who refer to the apparent ineptitude of the Allies in giving an opportunity for a German war on Italian soil and others envisage social chaos in ITALY spreading by contagion to other countries. The rigid Anglo-American intolerance is dissimulating badly its policy of vassalage and sectarian rage [Dept: Note: ? ideological rage against Fascism].

Meanwhile the Italian press, with blank columns due to the censorship, speculates on antagonism between LONDON, WASHINGTON and MOSCOW.

Director (4).
F.O. (3).
Admiralty (2).
War Office (4).
Air Ministry.
M.I.5.
Sir E. Bridges.

Conditions
Conditions of life are becoming increasingly difficult and perturbations of the spirit are becoming intensified and widespread. Everything indicates that the paroxysm of the Italian crisis is approaching.

[Dept: Note: Message paraphrased throughout.]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 11, 1943

Attached is a draft of a possible statement to be issued by you and Mr. Churchill in the same way as you issued your statement jointly with respect to the Italian situation.

I am laying it before you, and you may or may not wish to use it. In the event that you both decide to make a statement along these lines, as it bears on the German situation you might also wish to consider whether you would not wish to have it sent to Stalin for his information and comment before you gave it out. It seems to me that we should probably all be careful these days to keep the Soviets informed of anything we can with respect to moves of this kind.
Mussolini has fallen, Italy has disintegrated. The Axis thus ceases to exist as a political and military instrument. The forces of the United Nations stand inside Europe. They are prepared to crush the German armies from the South, from the East, from the West and from the North. They are prepared to continue their shattering attacks by air upon your centers of production and transportation. They are prepared to continue to send your submarines to the bottom of the oceans.

The military end of the war is clear for all to see. You have lost millions of men, your cities are being laid waste. You have suffered terribly and grown poor under the Nazis. Hitler and his accomplices and the National Socialist Party have terrorized you, looted you, ruined you for ten long years. They have plunged you needlessly into a terrible war which has earned Germany only hatred and brought her only to the brink of disaster.

It is the inexorable intention of the United Nations to bring to bear on Germany every ounce of the crushing, superior military force which they control, to the end that the leaders of Germany who have brought about this war may be destroyed. Those leaders sought to impose their rule and their false doctrines upon the democratic nations at a moment when the latter were militarily weak.

They
They sought by treachery to destroy their neighbors to the east. But the moral strength of liberty and justice has proven itself and the sword which was drawn by the Nazis has turned back upon them.

The needless prolongation of your suffering and moral slavery rests in your hands. The United Nations demand your honorable surrender, your unconditional military surrender. Overthrow Hitler and his corrupt colleagues, turn your arms against their Gestapo and their SS. Thus will you speed the day of Germany's restoration to a position of respectability in the family of nations.

The United Nations demand your surrender, not your destruction. If you surrender now to the United Nations, Germany will not be destroyed, the German people will not be destroyed. The United Nations do intend to destroy Nazism, its leaders, its organization, and its doctrine. They intend to put an end to militarism and its destructive threat to the peace and happiness of all peoples including the Germans.

These are the principles on which we fight. These are the principles on which we base our appeal to you to surrender and so to spare yourselves the agony of a continued struggle which can only temporarily benefit the criminal leaders of your country. The end is inevitable in
in the face of the overwhelming power which confronts a Germany fighting alone. Regain your self respect, rejoin the world of free men, and redeem Germany.
THE PRESIDENT.

In accordance with the Prime Minister's instructions last night, I attach his suggestion for an expanded Section 5 of the telegram FORTUNE III of April 16 - Statement of Policy with regard to Operation HUSKY.

24. 5. 43
MOSF SECRET.

GENERAL ISMAY FOR CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

I should be prepared to go further on Point 5 of Fan 117, as follows:--

(Begins)

Statements will be made in public (possibly by the President and the Prime Minister) making it perfectly clear that the Italian people would have a free and independent life as one of the historic nations of Europe. We wish to see Italy freed from its Fascist tyranny to resume its place, under a democratic system, as a member of the European family. In these months Italy has a last chance of avoiding the further tribulations which will otherwise fall upon her.

(Ends)

The Army propaganda should work in harmony with this theme.

W.S.C.

21.5.43