BOX 166.

2. A-16/3 WARFARE -- INDIA-BURMA AREA: May, 1942 - December, 1944.

Regraded Unclassified

October 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to this Indochina matter, it is my judgment on this date that we should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any other way in relation to Indochina. You might bring it up to me a little later when things are a little clearer.

F.D.R.

A letter has been received from General Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, asking the views of the State Department on the following contemplated operations:

> "The staff of the Theater Commander for the CBI theater has under consideration operational plans involving the furnishing of supplies and equipment to resistance groups. It is contemplated that these operations will be under American command although there will be collaboration with the French."

In amplification of the foregoing, it was explained orally that the proposed assistance would be to resistance groups within Indochina; that the proposed collaboration would be with the French Military Mission at Chungking; that such collaboration would not prevent assistance to all resistance groups whether French or native, but that without such collaboration, it would not be possible effectively to assist resistance groups among the French military forces in Indochina, and that this would result in retarding resistance efforts.

Subject to your approval, the Department will reply to General Donovan that it has no objection to furnishing supplies and equipment to resistance groups, both French and native, actually within Indochina, nor to American collaboration with the French Military Mission at Chungking or other French officers or officials in furtherance of the contemplated operations or any other military operations in Indochina for the defeat of Japan.

Regraded Unclassified

A16/asia

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

American Collaboration with the French
to Aid Resistance Groups in Indochina.

A letter has been received from General Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, asking the views of the State Department on the following contemplated operations:

> "The staff of the Theater Commander for the CBI theater has under consideration operational plans involving the furnishing of supplies and equipment to resistance groups. It is contemplated that these operations will be under American command although there will be collaboration with the French."

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Regraded Unclassified

October 10, 1944

TOP SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

French Participation in Liberation of Indochina

On August 26, 1944 I sent you a memorandum with a copy of a British aide-memoire dated August 25 stating that the French had requested British approval of:

(a) Sending a French Military Mission under General Blaizot to be attached to SEAC headquarters;
(b) Sending to India a light intervention force for later use in Indochina;
(c) Sending, later on, a French expeditionary force to participate in the liberation of Indochina;
(d) Participation by the French in planning the war against Japan;
(e) Participation by the French in planning political warfare in the Far East.

The British requested American concurrence on the first two points by August 29. You informed me orally that you planned to discuss the French proposals with the British Prime Minister at Quebec; accordingly no reply has been made to the British aide-memoire.

The Consul at Colombo has reported that on October 4 it was learned from an unimpeachable source that the British plan to bring a French Mission under General Blaizot to SEAC headquarters in the immediate future; that full collaboration is to be given the French Mission which will participate officially in activities of the SEAC; that as American agreement has not been obtained, the Mission will be ostensibly unofficial and will be housed at first in a hotel; that as soon as the concurrence of the Allies is forthcoming it is planned to move the Mission into permanent quarters; and that French parachutists are continuing to be trained by the British in groups of four or five for clandestine activities in Indochina.

As you will recall, the British proposed in their aide-memoire that all details of French political warfare relating to Indochina should be a matter for arrangement between SEAC and the French Military Mission, although, according to the latest information in the Department, Indochina is in the China theater and not in the SEAC theater.

Will you inform me whether the reported sending of this Mission is in accordance with any understanding which may have been reached with Mr. Churchill on the French requests together with an indication of whether you desire the Department to take any action?

Regraded Unclassified

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

October 5, 1944

Supplementing my memorandum of September 8 on Indochina and Southeast Asia, it is interesting to note that on that day Premier Koiso, in a speech before the Japanese Diet, promised independence to the Netherlands East Indies.

In a radio address extolling the pledge of independence, Soekarno, President of the Java Central Council and principal native leader of Indonesia, emphasized the contrast between the Japanese program and the alleged imperialistic designs of "the Anglo-American-Dutch coalition". Noting the difference in laws and culture and the distance separating Indonesia from these Western powers he asked: "Why do you want to return to our country so eagerly if not for your own profit and the benefit of your nations?" It is significant that throughout his address Soekarno stressed the identification of America with British and Dutch imperialism.

An Indonesian national flag has now been officially adopted which is almost identical with the revolutionary flag used by the Indonesian Nationalists during the 1920's. "Indonesia Raya", outlawed by the Dutch, has been officially adopted as the Indonesian national anthem.

The Japanese, conscious of native sentiment, presumably hope by this move to outbid United Nations propaganda and to secure more active native cooperation in the war, including, possibly, Indonesian troops. On September 28, Soekarno publicly read a petition for the speedy adoption of conscription in Java.

The Japanese move is more important, however, as indicating adoption of a "scorched earth" political course as they retreat, in order to put the United Nations on the defensive and to lay the foundations for a possible resurgence of Japanese influence in Asia by identifying themselves as the champions of liberation who were thwarted and defeated by Western imperial powers. In their defeat, they are doing their best to plant seeds of revolt in the lands they are being forced to abandon and to jeopardize future friendly relations between the Western powers and the Oriental nations.

The Japanese pledge of Indonesian independence emphasizes the need for prompt formulation of American policies towards the regions of Southeast Asia and the importance - as a measure of psychological warfare - of a concerted, dramatic announcement by the appropriate United Nations regarding the future of these regions.

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A16/India Burma

SEP 8 1944

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Indochina and Southeast Asia

The French seek restoration of Indochina and have promised some reforms to offset the independence sentiment which exists among the Indochinese and to enlist American support which they presently consider vital. They are fearful of Chinese ambitions. The French and British believe that French participation in the liberation of Indochina will stimulate Free French resistance within the country and thus aid military operations, but the extent and value of such aid is open to question. It is thought that the Japanese may shortly disarm all French troops and take over the country, possibly establishing an independent puppet regime. It seems doubtful if outside assistance could prevent such Japanese action. The experience of our military intelligence authorities is that few of the French in Indochina or in Yunnan and Kwangsi in China are to be relied upon. Very little useful intelligence has been furnished by the Free French. There is much mutual distrust among the French with whom our people have come in contact. The French divisions in Indochina are considered ineffective.

Despite Mr. Eden's apparent approval in March 1943 of placing Indochina under trusteeship, British policy has swung behind restoration of French authority. It is believed that an important factor in the British position is a desire to strengthen their claim for restoration of Hong Kong. In May the French, it is thought at British instigation, requested the British, with Lord Mountbatten's approval, for permission to send a military mission to SEAC, a light intervention force to India for subsequent use in Indochina, and, later on, an expeditionary force to Indochina. They have also asked to participate in planning political warfare in the east and in planning military operations against Japan. The British have indicated they approve of all but the last.

Although

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Although Indochina is not at present in the SEAC theater, it is to be noted the British desire that the details of the proposed French political warfare be worked out between SEAC and the proposed French military mission. Even prior to May the British SOE was training a large number of French officers for officering the light intervention force. Recently, using American facilities and misleading Chennault as to the purpose, the British dropped a de Gaullist agent in Indochina and agreed on two such further operations (one agent carrying a letter of credentials from de Gaulle) despite insistence by American officers attached to SEAC that the purpose was primarily political and not military and must be approved in Washington.

Reports indicate a British hope to extend the SEAC theater so as to include Indochina, most of the Dutch East Indies, Borneo and Hong Kong.

The Chinese are actively backing the Annamite Revolutionary party which seeks Indochinese independence. There are persistent reports that the Chinese hope for political ascendency in northern Indochina, or at least creation of a free port and release from the economic stranglehold on southwest China which the French formerly exercised through the Yunnan railroad. They are particularly concerned over the danger to Chinese security inherent in French control of the railroad and their inability to defend it. The Chinese have indicated interest regarding the military government to be established in Indochina.

It would seem of substantial military importance to secure for the United Nations the good will of the native peoples of southeast Asia among whom, for some years, there has been increasing nationalistic sentiment, and who, for the past three years, have been subjected to intense Japanese propaganda exploiting the old slogan of "Asia for the Asiatics". In this objective Indochina cannot be considered apart from other countries of southeast Asia.

It is suggested that early, dramatic and concerted announcements by the nations concerned making definite commitments as to the future of the regions of southeast Asia would save many American and Allied lives and facilitate military operations. It would be especially helpful if such concerted announcements could include (1) specific dates when independence or complete (dominion) self-government will be accorded, (2) specified steps to be taken to develop native capacity for self-rule, and (3) a pledge of economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment towards other nations. Such announcements might

well

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well be accompanied by a reaffirmation of American determination to grant Philippine independence, a joint commitment to restore the independence of Thailand, and a pledge to establish a regional commission for consultation on social and economic problems in the region, on which all countries and peoples concerned would be invited to have membership. The value of such concerted announcements would be still further enhanced if each of the colonial powers concerned would pledge a formal declaration of trusteeship under an international organization for the period of tutelage, but it might be unwise for the United States to attempt to insist upon such a declaration of trusteeship by one country if similar declarations could not be secured from the others.

In addition to their great value as psychological warfare, such announcements would appear to be directly in line with American post-war interests. These areas are sources of products essential to both our wartime and peacetime economy. They are potentially important markets for American exports. They lie athwart the southwestern approaches to the Pacific Ocean and have important bearing on our security and the security of the Philippines. Their economic and political stability will be an important factor in the maintenance of peace in Asia. Emergence of these regions as self-governing countries would appear desirable as soon as they are capable of self-rule, either as independent nations or in close voluntary association with western powers, for example as dominions. Such association might indeed lend them political and economic strength (the weakness of Asiatic powers has long been a cause of war) and help prevent future cleavage along regional or racial lines.

Failure of the western powers to recognize the new conditions and forces in southeast Asia and an attempt to reestablish pre-war conditions will almost surely lead to serious social and political conflict, and may lead to ultimate unifying of oriental opposition to the west.

A memorandum on British attitudes towards southeast Asia, generally, is attached.

Will you advise me if you wish the Department to develop details of policy along the lines indicated in the above suggestions.

Enclosure:
Memorandum.

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TOP SECRET

SEP 8 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Southeast Asia: British Attitudes: There are persistent reports of a British desire to create a Southeast Asia federation of Burma, Malaya, Thailand and Indochina under British aegis, if not direct control. This apparently develops from a report prepared last year by five officers of the Burma government. It is strongly denied in London which points to the expectation of eventual dominion status for Burma and British support of French restoration in Indochina. However, the British anticipate a fairly extended military occupation of Thailand and anticipate the need of strong economic control of all these regions to assure revival of sound industrial and agricultural practices. It seems clear that the British envisage economic ascendancy in these areas.

It is significant that the British government has refused to make a public statement in line with yours and the Generalissimo's on the restoration of the independence of Thailand. They have suggested that security questions may be involved in the Kra Peninsula (rich rubber area of Thailand) and have raised the question of boundary adjustments. Winant has been instructed to secure, if possible, at least a confidential statement of the position of the British government. There is strong evidence that the British hope to gain predominant influence over the post-war government of Thailand.

Desire for dominion status for Burma has received public British affirmations but is apparently distant. Military government is believed planned for a considerable period and various liberal reforms reportedly urged by the Burmese government-in-exile are believed to have been rejected by London.

In Malaya also it is understood that military government is planned for a period of at least two years. Reform in administration has been urged by business interests and elimination of special treatment and "protection" of racial groups.

Despite rumors of British desire to secure Sumatra, it is believed that the British are in favor of restoring Dutch authority in the Netherlands Indies. A desire to strengthen the restoration of British prestige and controls in Southeast Asia is believed to be an important factor in this position.

All reports indicate that the military operations of SEAC are aimed primarily at the resurgence of British political and economic ascendancy in Southeastern Asia and the restoration of British prestige. To minimize American association in the public eye with restoration of British imperialism which is admittedly highly unpopular in Asia, no American civil affairs officer is to serve in any area in the SEAC theater unless under independent American command, and no American officer may collaborate in SEAC political warfare.

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TOP SECRET

AIDE MEMOIRE

TOP SECRET

His Majesty's Government have given consideration to a request by the French Committee of National Liberation that the French should take a more active part in the war against Japan.

2. In Brief, their proposals are:-

(1) That a French Military Mission should be attached to the headquarters of South East Asia Command.

(11) That French Forces should take a more active part in the war in the Far East.

(III) That they should participate in the planning of the war against Japan.

(IV) They should participate in the planning of political warfare in the Far East.

3. His Majesty's Government's views on the above proposals are as follows:-

(I) The establishment of a French Military Mission with South East Asia Command would facilitate the work of SOE/OSS and would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be required later. If the Mission is not accepted the French will probably concentrate on Chungking, where it would be harder to control them. The function of the Mission would be confined mainly to matters concerning Indo-China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would therefore be much on the same basis as the Dutch and Chinese Missions attached to South East Asia Command.

(II) The use of French land and air forces would stimulate resistance to the enemy among the French officials still in Indo-China, but with the administrative difficulties that would be involved now, His Majesty's Government think that the offer of these forces should only be accepted in the later stages of the war and on the understanding that they are made up of good and experienced fighting men. The French have also proposed the establishment in India of a "Corps Leger D'Intervention" composed, at the start of

500 men

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500 men, and designed to operate exclusively in Indo-China on Japanese lines of communication. His Majesty's Government understand that the Corps Leger is in being at Algiers and they think that it should be accepted, provided it is properly handled and kept apart from regular military information.

(III) His Majesty's Government feel strongly that the French should take no part in military planning for the war against Japan until the detailed preparation of plans for the liberation of Indo-China is undertaken.

(IV) There would seem to be no objection in principle to French participation in political warfare in the areas in which the French are interested. This should be a matter for arrangement between South East Asia Command and the French Military Mission.

4. Lord Louis Mountbatten is prepared to accept the French Mission providing it is a small one consisting of a General, and, say, three other officers. He is also prepared to accept the Corps Leger and foresees considerable advantage in its employment.

5. The French are very keen to take their share in the war against Japan, and the Far East is the only area in which they are now not represented. The presence of Richelieu in Far Eastern waters means that they are already participating in fact if not in name.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were invited by the British members to concur in paragraph 3 in the early part of this month. No reply has, however, yet been received from the American members. Monsieur Massigli is pressing His Majesty's Government for a decision regarding the attachment to South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot and the establishment in India of a "Corps Leger d'Intervention" (see paragraph 3 (1) and (II) above. It is suggested that a decision could be taken regarding the "Corps Leger d'Intervention", whose numbers are small and whose activities correspond to those of American and British secret operations organisations, without prejudice to thewider question of from what source French forces operating in the Far East should be equipped. His Majesty's Government are particularly anxious to be able to give him an answer on these two points before he leaves London on August 29th.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
August 25th, 1944.

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A16/Burma

WS
WAZ

TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29 August 1944

Major General Edwin M. Watson
Military Aide to the President
The White House

Dear General:

Admiral Mountbatten and I recently visited London with a view to discussing with British officialdom projected strategy in Southeast Asia. In the course of conversations and conferences with the Prime Minister, the British War Cabinet and members of the Chiefs of Staff, it was suggested that I visit Washington in order to explain British views concerning military operations in Burma, as well as the employment of British forces in the Pacific. The Prime Minister asked me to make clear to the President the British reasoning behind their proposals in connection with operations in Southeast Asia, but he seemed particularly interested that I explain to the President the British views concerning operations in the Mediterranean, against southern France vis-a-vis an advance on Trieste into the Balkans through the Ljubljana Gap.

Upon arrival in Washington, I related the above to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff and General Handy, and I was told to contact Lieutenant Colonel Davenport with a view to making an appointment with the President. Colonel Davenport informed me the following day that the President was too busy to see me. I fully realize that he is very much involved, particularly at this time, so will relate briefly in this letter what I might have told the President personally, in order that I can report in London that I attempted to carry out the Prime Minister's request.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AREA

In connection with operations in Burma post-monsoon 1944-45, there have been two plans proposed as follows:

a. Plan "Y" envisages an attack by British-Indian troops from the Imphal area, advancing east against Mandalay, and concurrently the Chinese force in Upper Burma advancing south against Mandalay, and also the Chinese-Yunnan force advancing southwest

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

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on the same objective. With this coordinated converging of Allied forces on the Mandalay area, it is expected that the entire Upper Burma area would be cleared of the enemy, thus permitting the construction of land route and pipelines from India to China.

b. Plan "Z" envisages airborne and sea assaults on Rangoon with a view to capturing Rangoon and severing enemy lines of communications leading into Burma in the expectation that this would cause early and violent reaction by the Japs, resulting in withdrawal of their forces in the North, and thus permitting the construction of land route and pipelines to China.

DISCUSSION

Officials in London, particularly the Prime Minister, were opposed to operations that employed British troops in the jungles of Burma (Plan "Y"). Both the Prime Minister and Mr. Atlee vehemently denounced operations that envisaged advances in the interior of Burma (Plan "Y") to maintain the supply line to China. They reiterated that the tremendous efforts the Allies had made to create a supply line to China were wholly incommensurate with the returns they could reasonably expect. The Prime Minister was still advocating operations against Sumatra--known as Culverin Plan. At Quebec one year ago, the President asked about that plan, and I advised him that it was militarily unsound. Conditions have not changed sufficiently to justify the Culverin operation, and I still believe it to be unsound. The British Chiefs of Staff want to employ their forces in South Burma against Rangoon (Plan "Z"). They maintain that this operation would compel the Japs to withdraw from Upper Burma, and further, that Allied troops would be fighting in an open area where their superiority in tanks and planes could be more effectively employed against the Japs.

I expressed the opinion that with the resources now available or foreseeable in Southeast Asia area, we could not possibly accomplish Plan "Z." At least the operation would not have sufficient strength to cause early and violent reaction by the Japs. The British Chief of Staff (Air Alan Brooke) agreed. The British then agreed that they would furnish more divisions, six in all, as well as auxiliary formations. However, it developed that these reinforcements would not be available until next spring, about mid-March, and further their release at that time is based on the premise that Germany capitulates in October. I emphasized the dire necessity for vigorous operations during the period mid-November (when the monsoons cease) and mid-March when these resources for Plan "Z" might be made available. I gave as my reason that the Japanese would unquestionably seize the initiative and concentrate their forces against the Mogaung-Myitkyina area, neutralizing the tremendous effort already made to create favorable conditions for increased supply

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to China. I suggested that phases one and two of Plan "Y" should be the minimum objectives established and that operations should be initiated as early as practicable after the monsoon (mid-November) with a view to the attainment of these objectives. It is my conviction that the Americans should insist upon giving first priority to Plan "Y" and only agree to the execution of Plan "Z" if the preparations for and the execution of Plan "Z" do not militate against the successful accomplishment of the objectives envisaged in phase two of Plan "Y."

OPERATION ANVIL (DRAGOON)

The Prime Minister was visibly perturbed about the insistence of the U.S. officials to execute Anvil (Southern France). He enumerated many reasons why, in his opinion, it would be militarily unsound to commit our forces in Southern France when, as he expressed it, there were so many wonderful opportunities to inflict damaging and decisive blows upon the enemy in the Bay of Biscay area or through the Balkans. He mentioned that we could use the ports of Brest, St. Nazaire and Bordeaux, which he predicted would quickly fall into our hands and which would permit landings without opposition, whereas he foresaw unacceptable losses in personnel, materiel and time if we carried out operations against Southern France. Events have already overtaken these discussions in that our operations in Southern France have been most successful. Every argument that the British presented against Anvil is now being made ridiculously far-fetched. The Prime Minister stated that he could not understand the American failure to grasp the great significance of a blow through the Balkans. It was evident in the course of our discussion that Mr. Churchill is keenly disappointed in not being able to implement a Balkan strategy which he has so strongly advocated the past several months. I sensed that he is much concerned about the judgment history will place upon his role in this great war. Every time I have had a conference with the Prime Minister concerning strategy, he invariably refers to the decision to do the Torch Operation, a decision for which he accepts full responsibility. He reverberates down to his toes when I state categorically that in my opinion the Allies could and should have undertaken the Overlord Operation a year earlier, instead of the Torch Operation, and thereby might have hastened the Nazi defeat.

At the next conference, I am confident the British will press for a decision relative to the employment of their naval forces in collaboration with our own in the mid-Pacific. The Prime Minister told me that if the United States refused to accept British naval assistance in the mid-Pacific, he wants to have such refusal in writing. He also indicated that he would propose an alternative employment of British naval forces in the Southwest Pacific, collaborating with MacArthur. The British are determined to employ their fleet in some manner in the Far East. However, they recognize the lack of suitable or adequate

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maintenance facilities and they expect the U. S. either to share existing facilities in the Pacific or to assist in establishing bases and fleet trains.

I think that the Prime Minister's desire to have a written record of negotiations with us concerning the employment of the fleet is further and conclusive evidence of his real concern relative to the judgment history will place on his recommendations and decisions in this war. He was definitely irked relative to the Anvil decision. As you know, he has always toyed with grandiose plans for the penetration of Europe through the Balkans—the so-called soft underbelly. The Americans' determination to implement Anvil makes more remote than ever the campaign through northeast Italy under a Britisher (Alexander). The Prime Minister now realizes that the pens of historians cannot possibly credit British war leaders with the important strategic decisions or with direction of the decisive military operations of the war.

I hope that the above information and observations may be of some assistance at the forthcoming conference.

Sincerely yours,

A. C. Wedemeyer

A. C. WEDEMEYER,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Deputy Chief of Staff,
Southeast Asia Command.

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A16/India

Quebec file

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

~~ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS~~

OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS

August 28, 1944

Brom

File WB

S - Mr. Secretary:

If you find an opportunity to do so you may wish to mention to the President, when you see him this afternoon, that we have as yet received no reply to the memorandum which you sent him, dated August 15, 1944, (copy attached) regarding the representations which the British have made and are still making to us over the unwarranted publication by Drew Pearson of a letter on India which Ambassador Phillips sent to the President last May.

I am also enclosing a copy of a personal letter dated August 25, 1944 from the British Ambassador to Mr. Stettinius, asking whether this matter had been taken up with the President and suggesting a form of statement which the Ambassador hopes might be made, "publicly disassociating the United States Government" from some things that Mr. Phillips said in his letter.

I am also attaching, for your convenient use, a further blast published by Drew Pearson on this subject in this morning's Washington Post of August 28, 1944 stating that the Department has been informed by the British Embassy in Washington, acting on instructions of Mr. Eden, that Mr. Phillips is persona non grata in London and that the British Government would not permit him to return to India as Ambassador.

NEA:WSM:JR

Wallace Murray

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August 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Drew Pearson recently published in one of his columns a letter which Ambassador Phillips had sent you on India. The Department has expressed its regret over its publication but Sir Ronald Campbell recently asked if a statement could be issued by this Government disassociating us from the views expressed in Mr. Phillips' letter. He referred especially to the following points:

1) The damaging reference to the morale of the Indian Army.

2) The unfair reference on the part that Britain was going to play in the war against Japan.

3) Churchill's reference to the fact that the Atlantic Charter did not apply in India.

It is the Department's feeling that it would be impossible to issue a statement satisfactory to the British inasmuch as we share in general the views expressed in the Ambassador's letter. Unless you feel that we should comply with the British request, I would appreciate having your permission to tell the British that we consider it preferable to make no public statement on the subject.

FDR

Enclosure:
Copy of Mr. Pearson's article of July 25.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.
25th August, 1944.

My dear Ed,

You will remember that Ronnie spoke or wrote to you on the 8th August about Drew Pearson's article on William Phillips' report to the President about India. In your reply of the 9th August, you said that you were taking the matter up with Mr. Hull, and that either he or you would take it up with the President as soon as he returned.

Have you been able to do anything about it? Of the points Ronnie mentioned, I think the most essential and urgent are that something should be said publicly disassociating the United States Government from what Phillips had said about:-

a.) the morale of the Indian Army, and,

b.) the future attitude of the British Commonwealth towards the Japanese war.

It would appear to me that the matter might be handled in a positive way by means of some speech or statement in appreciation of the achievements of the Indian Army in Africa, Europe, and Burma, and referring to the many statements by the Prime Minister and other British Ministers about United Kingdom participation in the war against Japan.

I hope you will have had a good time in New York, and that none of you will have got into trouble!

EDWARD

The Honourable E. R. Stettinius, Jr.,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

Regraded Unclassified

The Washington

Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

U. S. AND FOREIGN diplomats have been in a backstage ferment over the ousting of Ambassador William Phillips from London as political adviser to General Eisenhower.

Officially, Phillips came home for "personal reasons." Actually, however, he was asked to leave London because, last year, he wrote a letter to President Roosevelt criticizing British policy in India and recommending Indian independence.

The Phillips letter, published in this column on July 25, has caused the cables to burn up between Washington and London ever since. The British first demanded an official explanation from the State Department. Later, Foreign Minister Eden personally demanded Phillips' recall.

In addition, the British demanded the recall of George Merrell from New Delhi. Merrell, a career man of long standing, has been acting chief of the U. S. mission in India during Phillips' absence, and was sympathetic toward Indian independence. He has resigned and will return home shortly.

Phillips technically is still the President's special Ambassador to India, though for the last few months he has been attached to Eisenhower's personal staff in London to advise on French, Belgian and other European problems. Since Phillips was on Eisenhower's staff, not accredited to the British Government, his recall is considered highly unusual, almost without precedent.

In effect, the British objected to the fact that Phillips made a report to his chief, the President of the United States, regarding India. Members of the Diplomatic Corps point out that, in 1888, the United States asked British Ambassador Lionel Sackville-West to leave Washington because he wrote to a private United States citizen advocating the election of Grover Cleveland. However, in this case, Ambassador Phillips expressed his views, not to a private citizen, but to his chief in the White House. President Roosevelt had asked him to report on India, and Phillips carried out instructions.

British Objections

WHAT THE BRITISH are reported to have objected to in the Phillips report was his argument that India was of great concern to us on account of the Japanese war. He told FDR that we could not "accept the British point of view that conditions in India are none of our business."

"It is not right for the British to say this is none of your business when we alone presumably will have the major part to play in the struggle with Japan," Phillips said.

He also used plain, hard-boiled language regarding the failure of the Indian army to fight.

"The present Indian army," he told FDR, "is purely mercenary. General Stilwell has expressed his concern over the situation and in particular over the poor morale of the Indian officers. The attitude of the general public toward the war is even worse."

He concluded, "It is time for the British to act. This they can do by a solemn declaration from the King-Emperor that India will achieve her independence at a specific date after the war."

Protest to State Dept.

FOLLOWING WASHINGTON Merry-Go-Round publication of the Phillips letter, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden cabled Sir Ronald Campbell, British charge d'affaires in Washington, stating that he and Prime Minister Churchill were greatly perturbed and instructing the British Embassy to approach the State Department with a formal demand for an investigation. Sir Ronald then called on Secretary Hull and informed him that the British Government viewed the matter seriously and wanted a full explanation.

Secretary Hull informed Sir Ronald that the Phillips letter had undoubtedly leaked out through former Undersecretary Sumner Welles—which the British, of course, knew was not the case.

Secretary Hull then went on his vacation, and Eden cabled the British Embassy ordering Sir Ronald Campbell to approach the State Department again and demand a public statement dissassociating the Roosevelt Administration from the views expressed by Ambassador Phillips.

Sir Ronald saw both Acting Secretary Stettinius and Assistant Secretary Berle, both of whom stalled, offering no encouragement. Berle said they had a suspicion regarding the news leak but were not prepared to reveal it at that time.

In London, meanwhile, both Churchill and Eden had put the heat on U. S. Ambassador John Winant, telling him how bitterly they resented Phillips' views. They also had a Foreign Office official ask Phillips if he still held the same views he had expressed to the President.

Phillips replied that he most certainly did and was more convinced than ever that he was right. However, he added that he was sorry his letter had been published, and said:

"I hope that my other reports, which were even stronger, will not leak out."

At this point, Foreign Minister Eden cabled the British Embassy to inform the State Department that Phillips was persona non grata in London. In the cable, he said, "India is more important than a thousand Phillips."

Simultaneously, the Embassy was instructed to tell the State Department that Phillips could never go back to India as Ambassador.

NOTE—Phillips has been Undersecretary of State, Assistant Secretary, Minister to Canada, Ambassador to Belgium and Italy. George Merrell, now recalled from New Delhi, has held posts in Peiping, Amoy, Calcutta, Harbin and many other places in the Orient.

"His opponent merely kis
Snort promises to print the
gressional

Swiss Pass Nazi Hospital Trains

London, Aug. 27 (AP).—The German Transocean news agency said in a broadcast dispatch today that Swiss authorities were permitting hospital trains with severely wounded Germans from the Italian front to pass through Switzerland to Germany.

Regraded Unclassified

A16/Burma

SECRET

COPY

March 31, 1944

From: Lieut.General J.W. Stilwell

To: General G.C.Marshall

Y Force will not attack. For purpose of crossing Salween and working around north flank towards Myitkyina, 1 division may be released to me but I could not get a definite commitment on this. Generalissimo gave 1 division which we will fly into Moingkwan.

Imphal situation becoming very serious in my opinion. Believe both 17th and 20th Indian Divisions out of picture. British have not checked Jap advance from Ukhrul. Kohima now in danger. Railway to our Assam Base will be threatened unless British immediately take vigorous action. Will wire results of conference which I have requested with Mountbatten. At Ledo am holding 1 Chinese Regiment with artillery. It may be necessary to move some of our units back to help prevent break, depending on developments in next few days. To prepare you for eventualities am giving you darkest situation. Our liaison officers located at Imphal Port of Embarkation very pessimistic.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

File
WS

31 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a message just received from Stilwell. You will notice that he states he is giving us the "darkest situation." Reports from Mountbatten's Headquarters have not indicated that the situation is as serious as Stilwell's message shows. Stilwell may have different ideas after his conference with Mountbatten.

W. D. Leahy
Chief of Staff

SECRET

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

File WS

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

15 March 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Air development in Burma.

There is now taking place in upper Burma a unique military operation. It is a test of the employment of air power after the manner of sea power, that is, selecting a landing point, convoying the troops to it, supplying them and protecting them in at least their initial occupation of it. Kenney did something of this sort in preparation for the occupation of the Markham Valley west of Lae.

Following discussions in Quebec with Brigadier Wingate of the British Army, it was decided that if the British would authorize him to organize three or four long range penetration groups (LRPG's) a similar group would be organized by the U.S. Army, composed of volunteers trained for jungle warfare, a large percentage of whom would have had experience in actual jungle fighting.

Later here in Washington, Mountbatten appealed to me to see if something could not be done to provide a means of evacuating the wounded of these LRP groups since the abandonment of the wounded which had been necessary the previous year presented the most depressing morale aspect. General Arnold and I then took up with him the proposition of organizing a special Air Force to be part and parcel of Wingate's force. Arnold organized this force, its special characteristic being the employment of planes capable of landing in very restricted areas.

Under Colonel Philip Cochran the 1st Air Commando Force of some 200 planes was organized and trained. This includes fighters, bombers, transport planes, gliders and a large number of puddle jumpers of several types. This force was carefully organized and trained here in the States, a special effort being made to develop facility in landing gliders in rough and unknown terrain at night. It was sent to India and there trained with the LRP groups, awakening great enthusiasm on the part of Wingate. Our principal trouble was to prevent its being broken up to meet the special requests of various commanders who would have liked to use a piece of it.

On March 5th this Air Commando Force transported at night American engineers and British LRPG men to the vicinity of Kawdaw, approximately 160 miles in the rear of the Japanese line. The gliders had to be taken through at about 12,000 feet; several broke loose, 15 were returned to

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

should be "anti-aircraft"

their starting point and there were other accidents. However, the main force made a successful landing at night. An air strip 300 by 5000 feet was developed in less than 24 hours by our Engineers and by March 10th 8,000 men and 1400 mules, and light aircraft, radar warning equipment, etc., were established, also U.S. P-51's and P-38's.

In preparation for this move a heavy attack was made on Japanese airfields by the U.S. fighter and bomber planes of the Commando Force just referred to. It was estimated that they destroyed on the ground in one day over 20% of the Japanese aircraft in Burma.

Immediately upon effecting the landing referred to another field was developed 60 miles to the south. Supplies had steadily been going in at night.

We therefore have a sizeable force of highly trained volunteers with air, antiaircraft, radar and supply backing established in the rear of the Japanese lines in close proximity to the principal line of communications to the units on the Salween and Chindwin Rivers and in such a position that no more than three Japanese regiments could be brought into action against this force for quite a period of time.

There is a further and most important factor in the present situation: so far as we can tell the Japanese have no knowledge of the movement, and even when the destructive interruption of communications commences - which it probably already has - they for quite a long time will probably not have any knowledge of the size of the force and of its solid establishment. Unless some untoward event occurs, and assuming that the British press on south and that Stilwell's Chinese troops keep up their good work, we may find a somewhat different situation in north Burma rapidly developing.

Chief of Staff.

Regraded Unclassified

A16/Burma-

A16/Clubia

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED STATES FLEET

MEMORANDUM

Date 28 Feb/44

From: Admiral King

To: Naval Aide to the President

1. Orders have been sent to Adm. Nimitz to prepare SARATOGA and 3 DD's for immediate temporary allocation to British Eastern Fleet - and to report earliest date detachment can arrive in Ceylon.

2. This done at urgent request of Admiralty to help them meet threat impending - by reason of Jap heavy ship concentration in Singapore area - until they can get VICTORIOUS out there this coming May to work with ILLUSTRIOUS and several BB's, already there.

3. Please let the President know.

E.J. King

Secret - Security

File

Action Taken

(by a white message to Hyde Park - 4 mi)

VB

CW

Regraded Unclassified

A16/Burma-India

Admiral Brown
To file

SECRET-SECURITY

Files

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

19 February 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Recently you sent a message to the Prime Minister on the matter of control of transportation from Calcutta to Assam. Admiral Leahy informed me that you desired this followed up. Information from the theater is that the following arrangements have been agreed to by all concerned in India.

A British military director, from GHQ India, advised by a U.S. deputy and by civilian officials representing civil requirements and rail and steamship companies, will be responsible for all movements on the Assam lines of communication.

Allocation of transportation capacity will be made by a committee consisting of this director, his U.S. deputy, a representative of the British Army Group, the Regional Controller of Priorities, and representatives of the Bengal and Assam Railway.

Another committee headed up by the British director will implement the allocations and is empowered to issue the necessary orders to transportation companies. The U.S. deputy is a member of this committee.

The above plan was to go into effect 10 February. General Stilwell's headquarters states that while it does not meet theater's full demands, it is probably the best arrangement which could be made at the present time.

Also, the government of India has agreed to the appointment of a single Port Director for Calcutta replacing the former Board. He will be assisted by an American and a British Deputy Director. The British Director is to be a civilian especially selected from England.

United States railway troops (about 4200) arrived in India in early January and are progressively taking over the operation of a section of the Bengal and Assam Railway.

G C Marshall

Chief of Staff.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

Regraded Unclassified

India/Burma

Cur

IMMEDIATE RELEASE FEBRUARY 1, 1944

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The American objectives in India or elsewhere in continental Asia are to expel and defeat the Japanese, in the closest collaboration with our British, Chinese and other Allies in that theatre.

Our task in expelling the Japs from Burma, Malaya, Java and other territory is military. We recognize that our British and Dutch brothers-in-arms are as determined to throw the Japs out of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies as we are determined to free the Philippines. We propose to help each other on the roads and waters and above them, eastward to these places and beyond to Tokyo. No matter what individual or individuals command in given areas, the purpose is the same.

There will, of course, be plenty of problems when we get there. Their solution will be easier if we all employ our utmost resources of experience, good will and good faith. Nobody in India or anywhere else in Asia will misunderstand the presence there of American armed forces if they will believe, as we do at home, that their job is to assure the defeat of Japan, without which there can be no opportunity for any of us to enjoy and expand the freedoms for which we fight.

- - -

Regraded Unclassified

India-Burma

PRIVATE

March 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GEORGE MARSHALL

Thank you for letting me see the copy of Stilwell's letter of February ninth in regard to Arnold's and Somervell's trip. I have read this letter with a good deal of care and my first thought is that Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with Generalissimo Chiang who, after all, cannot be expected, as a Chinese, to use the same methods that we do. When Stilwell speaks about the fact that the Generalissimo is very irritable and hard to handle, upping his demands, etc., he is, of course, correct; but when he speaks of talking to him in sterner tones, he goes about it just the wrong way.

All of us must remember that the Generalissimo came up the hard way to become the undisputed leader of four hundred million people -- an enormously difficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse group of all kinds of leaders -- military men, educators, scientists, public health people, engineers, all of them struggling for power and mastery, local or national, and to create in a very short time throughout China what it took us a couple of centuries to attain.

Besides that the Generalissimo finds it necessary to maintain his position of supremacy. You and I would do the same thing under the circumstances. He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander-in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco.

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The other matter relates to the complete omission by Stilwell of any mention of air action in China in 1943. He is thinking of the Burma end of things and he is thinking of the ground forces now being trained in China.

While I am hopeful of the Burma operation, I still believe that important emphasis be placed on the strategic value of Chennault's air operations in 1943. I am glad to see it being pushed.

I know you will see that the directives sent to Stilwell and Chennault are so clear about our air plans that there will be no misunderstanding of our intentions.

It is essential that Chennault get his share of the supplies, and I believe he should get all above 4,000 tons a month until he gets an amount that will really keep his force operating. I understand from Arnold that is something over 2,500 tons a month on all all out basis.

The construction and improvement of airfields both in India and China should be pushed to the limit.

I am assuming that the big bomber group now en route will be directly under Chennault's command.

Of more importance is the assurance -- the air policy having been fixed in China -- that Chennault, with Stilwell's approval, will have complete control over his operations and tactics.

While I am sure the relationship of Stillwell and the Generalissimo has improved, I hope nothing will be done to prevent Chennault from discussing air operations with the Chinese in an appropriate manner.

Our relations with China are important and I wish you would impress on Stilwell and Chennault that they are our representatives over there in more senses than one. Compatible with their military duties, they may well turn out to be the best "Ambassadors" we have in China. I hope they will.

Above all, I am depending on you to see that Chennault gets his chance to do what he believes he can do.

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I do not think that the Staff plans either in Casablanca or here have given sufficient weight to the attrition against Japan each week and each month, or that that attrition can be greatly accelerated through increasing air power in China, by the sinking of Japanese ships off the coast of China, the destruction of Japanese aircraft, and the occasional bombing of Japanese cities.

Just between ourselves, if I had not considered the European and African fields of action in their broadest geographic sense, you and I know we would not be in North Africa today -- in fact, we would not have landed either in Africa or in Europe!

F. D. R.

Regraded Unclassified

A16/India
under

SECRET

Cairo, Egypt.
18 November 1943.

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

During my recent trip to India I conferred with many British and American civil and military officials. Foremost among them was Lord Wavell, now Viceroy of India.

I had the pleasure of serving with Lord Wavell, then General Wavell, in Java shortly after we entered the war. During our conversations at New Delhi I found the Viceroy very frank and lucid in all matters pertaining to Indian problems. He showed a keen perception of the existing political and diplomatic issues in that country. In addition, his long experience as a military leader enables him to understand completely the military strategy and tactics of the Asiatic Theatre.

I had a number of conferences with Lord Louis Mountbatten, the Supreme Commander of the Southeast Asia Theatre. I found Lord Mountbatten direct and eager to give me a general picture of the problems with which he is confronted.

Lord Mountbatten is quite anxious to include the Chinese Theatre in his

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command. The President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, told me that he likes Lord Mountbatten but, as President of China and Generalissimo of the Chinese Armies, he felt it would be injurious to him and an unsettling factor on all China if he were to accept a position subordinate to anyone in the Chinese Theatre of Operations. He said, however, that if a Chinese Army or Armies were operating outside of China, in cooperation with American and British forces, he would, if conditions at that time made it seem proper, consent to having such Chinese forces under Lord Mountbatten or such other United Nations officer as might be deemed appropriate.

Among other military officials with whom I conferred in India were Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck, Commander in Chief in India; Maj. Gen. George E.Stratemeyer, Commanding General of U. S. Army Air Forces India-Burma Sector; Maj. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, Deputy Chief of Staff to Lord Mountbatten; and Brig. Gen. B. G. Ferris, Deputy Chief of Staff, Rear Echelon, China-Burma-India Theatre Command.

I have kept notes on my conversations in India so I might be able to discuss with you the problems of that area but I have not made a written report to you on India. My reason for refraining from preparing such a report is that you already have a personal representative to India, Mr. William Phillips. Mr. Phillips was absent from the theatre while I was there but I conferred with Mr. George Merrill, acting head of the American Mission. Under the circumstances, however, I thought that a written report from me on India might be inappropriate unless specifically requested by you.

I am grateful to you for having given me the opportunity to see India

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and to get a first hand knowledge of the problems with which the United Nations are confronted in that area.

Respectfully yours,

PATRICK J. HURLEY,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

Regraded Unclassified

A16 Burma

SECRET — SECURITY

admiral Brown to file

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

7 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Preparations for Burma.

The following is a summary of a lengthy radio that has just been received from New Delhi, signed by Stilwell's Chief of Staff.

U. S. Operations to Aid China this Year.

Our immediate jobs in Assam are to fly 10,000 tons a month over the hump for the support of air forces in China and Chinese Yunnan forces, to support the Chinese Ramgarh Corps operating from Ledo, to support offensive employment of our air from Assam, and to build the Ledo road from Assam to China.

Dependency of Our Operations Upon British.

The British control all rail and river movements from the port of Calcutta to Assam. Both British operations from Imphal and ours from Assam (including tonnage to China) depend upon this British-controlled line of communication. Admiral Mountbatten will have to resolve these competing requirements on this line.

British Transport Plane Requirements for Burma Campaign.

The British estimate their needs for a North Burma campaign to be 579 transport planes. They consider that supply of their forces by air is required due to the lack of adequate surface routes.

British Pessimism Retards All-Out Support.

The thoughts of the British in India regarding combined British-American-Chinese operation against Burma are strongly influenced by somewhat intangible factors.

The British have little confidence in the Indian divisions and are therefore unwilling to take risks, calculated or otherwise.

They have no confidence that the Chinese will fight, especially the Yunnan force, and shy at an operation the success of which depends upon Chinese offensive action.

Their approach appears to be that of the Quartermaster rather than that of the General. Whereas we determine upon

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a strategic operation as being necessary and then move heaven and earth to support it, the British staff in India appear too sensitive to logistical limitations and too indifferent to means of removing them.

Apparently there is a strong opinion in parts of the British GHQ in India that we should by-pass Burma. They seem to look upon the operation in North Burma as an American and not as a combined British-American plan. The inevitable result is that General Auchinleck, lacking enthusiastic support from all hands, has difficulty in making Combined Chiefs' of Staff decisions effective.

Present Status.

We are currently discussing these matters in the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a view to changing the frame of mind of the British in India so that we can break the blockade of China.

Chief of Staff.

Summary British Transport Plane Requirements.

Supply of Wingate columns.	20
Supply of forces north of Akyab.	30
Supply of advance forces in North Burma. . . .	137
Supply for advance airfield construction, North Burma	325
Continuous parachute training.	25
India internal air lines	37
Replacements for casualties.	5
Total transport planes	579

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SECRET

June 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Tonnage Moved into China from India During June, 1943.

I regret very much that the tonnage of supplies moved into China from India has not been at a rate to bring the total during June to 4,000 tons. Unless the operating conditions change materially, the total tonnage during June will only be about 3,000 tons.

For your information, there are 145 planes from the Air Transport Command and 20 from CNAC available for this work.

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

with action Brown to file

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the airfield situation in Assam, the following message has just been received from General Wheeler:

"New Delhi
May 14, 1943

"All parts of the work on airfields in Assam are now either under way or being initiated and reinforced by American personnel and machines diverted from Ledo road construction project. No part of work being delayed awaiting arrival of Engineer Battalions from U.S. which were requested to meet requirements of heavy and continuous maintenance that will later be necessary to keep these fields in operating condition. Difficulties regarding materials and labor are being surmounted. British here were not informed by U.S. that we are taking charge although we are actually assuming responsibility to you for progress of the work. It is believed that best progress will be achieved through cooperation. Conference with British officials involved indicates that increased assistance may be expected. Regardless, however, of amount of their contribution, we are reinforcing the work with our personnel and equipment sufficiently to secure maximum effort on each job. British Engineer in Chief has been advised that we will have our own staff on each job constantly. It is believed that we may expect satisfactory cooperation and that he will accord U.S. freedom of action at all times to expedite completion."

G. C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

Admiral Brown
to file

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the airfields in Assam matter the following radio was sent to General Brereton last night:

> "A dire need exists for two Engineer Battalions, Aviation, in India China Theater. Can one or both Engineer Battalions, Aviation, now in Middle East be spared to fill this requirement, replacement being furnished from the U.S. if necessary? What is the earliest date personnel and equipment of these two battalions can be concentrated at Suez for water shipment to India?"
>
> "Marshall"

The third Engineer Battalion requested by General Wheeler leaves the United States this month.

G C Marshall

Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Claudia
Adm. Burns file

File
WR

May 13, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message was sent this morning to General Wheeler in New Delhi:

"Your request for information Engineer Battalions indicates long delay before some of the work may be initiated. The President desires to know how quickly you can get the project under way, whether or not there are any difficulties in obtaining necessary priorities for forwarding material from Calcutta or in obtaining native labor or in securing freedom of action in this British sphere. Rush reply."

G. C. Marshall
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

A16/Chiefs Bureau

-COPY-

MOST SECRET

19th January, 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL E. J. KING:

With reference to your Memorandum of 17th January regarding Eastern Fleet. At the moment the Eastern Fleet consists of the WARSPITE and 2 "R" Class Battleships. They have no carrier.

2. The Eastern Fleet leaves KILINDINI on 3rd February to cover the convoy conveying the 9th Australian Division from Egypt via Ceylon to Australia and according to present arrangements returns to KILINDINI on 18th February.

3. I am signalling the contents of your Memorandum to ADMIRAL SOMERVILLE who may be able to modify his plans to a certain extent, but his return to KILINDINI is due to the fact that one of the periodical waves of U-boat activity in the Cape Area is due to commence about February 18th. If it does he will have to immobilise his capital ships temporarily whilst his destroyers deal with the U-boats at the Cape.

4. I cannot hold out any hopes that Somerville's surface forces will be able to do anything effective against Japanese shipping in the Straits of Malacca to Rangoon route.

Air reconnaissance from the Amdamans, which would no doubt be at its maximum if a convoy was passing up this coast, covers all the approaches to this route and our surface forces would be located in sufficient time for a weekly escorted convoy to turn back to the straits of Malacca or Rangoon.

5. Under present conditions the only effective method of dealing with this traffic is by submarines and as Somerville only has three submarines available, he would, I am sure, welcome the co-operation of the force of submarines you propose to base at Freemantle.

/s/ DUDLEY POUND
A.F.

Regraded Unclassified

-COPY-

S E C R E T
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

UNITED STATES FLEET

Casablanca
17 January 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR SIR DUDLEY POUND:

1. Can you see your way clear to move forward part, if not all, of the Eastern Fleet to Ceylon?

2. If so, we can make all Dutch units in the Pacific available by transfer - there are now two cruisers and two or three destroyers in Australia.

3. Also, we will endeavor to make available up to six submarines (based at Fremantle) to operate against Japanese lines of communications to Burma via the Straits of Malacca.

4. The purpose of (1), (2), (3) above would be to menace and to strike against Japanese lines of communications to Burma and for the attrition of Japanese ships, shipping, etc.

E. J. KING
ADMIRAL, U.S. Navy

S E C R E T
(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET)

Regraded Unclassified

Arlie Burke File

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

December 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM: for Captain McCrea.

There are forwarded herewith a copy of Admiral King's letter to Admiral Patterson of December 5, 1942, and a copy of the reply thereto by Admiral Noble dated December 21st, 1942.

These are forwarded to you at the direction of Admiral King.

R. E. LIBBY.

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

Sir Stafford Cripps'
Private Office

A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY FOR INDIA

I INTRODUCTION

1. During the last forty years great advances have been made in the social and economic life of India. ~~The main features of recent social advances in India are admirably summarised in the document, prepared by the India Office, which accompanies this paper.~~ Yet it cannot be said that much impression has been made on the poverty, ignorance, and ill-health which characterise the Indian scene. The reports of the International Labour Office and of the League of Nations refer to the low standards of nutrition among the Indian agricultural and industrial workers. The 'Blunt' Report on Social Services in India (1938) speaks of parents 'living in penury and steeped in debt', children 'withdrawn from school as soon as they can work...and add, however, minutely, to the family income'. Only 11 per cent of the population is literate. Peasant and industrial workers are in debt for the greater part of their industrial lives. Many are born in debt. Over a wide range of industry working conditions are deplorable. Disease is rampant and mortality rates are high. The average expectation of life at birth is 25 years, compared with 54 in England and Wales. Yet the annual expenditure on public health throughout British India is considerably less than that of the London County Council.

2. It is plain that there is no lack of room for progress. The exigencies of war and internal politics may set limits to what is immediately possible. Even so it is hardly open to doubt that some things could be pushed on with immediately and that preparations could be made now for going ahead with other matters as soon as conditions are favourable.

3. In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to describe briefly the nature of the problem and to indicate what appear to be some promising lines of advance. Finally suggestions are made concerning the precedure which might be adopted to give effect to some of the proposals which are made.

II THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

4. The fundamental explanation of India's low social standards is to be found in the fact that, in spite of its external trappings, India is an ancient society with a medieval economy. The questions at once arise: How can the ancient society of India, and its medieval economy, be modernised? How can a scientific agriculture and a large industry be created? A similar social and economic problem has been tackled in Japan and Russia with some success. On what lines should it be tackled in India?

5. In India the solution of the problem is rendered far more difficult by the unfortunate historical incidence of the growth in population. The fall in the death rate and the rise in the survival rate has accompanied the growth of modern economies everywhere. But in "Western" industrial countries the contemporary increase in the physical productivity of agriculture and industry raised output disproportionately to the growing population. As a result average production and consumption - i.e. the standard of living - rose steeply

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In India this has not happened. British rule removed war and plague - the main checks to multiplication - long before any widespread mechanisation of industry of agriculture had taken place. In the last forty years famine has been conquered, and the rate of population growth has received yet another stimulus. It is now increasing by tens of millions in every decade. Yet industry still offers employment to no more than one tenth of India's population; and the average productivity of agriculture is increasing very slowly.

The "Malthusian devil" has therefore been unchained in India. An increase in the general standard of living is thereby rendered peculiarly difficult. Temporary improvements in average production are soon submerged by an increase in the number of mouths, and the pressure upon land grows heavier. As a consequence many proposals - e.g. for the reduction of infant mortality by greater medical care - though inspired by the highest motives, are not likely to touch, and in certain cases will exacerbate, the real problem.

6. The crucial object of policy must be to bring the growth of population - or at least the birth rate - under control.

In other countries the vicious circle has been broken by two forces: the slow spread of rational ideas and of scientific knowledge has rendered the population willing and able to limit the size of their families; the increase of productivity has provided men and women, or large numbers of them, with a higher standard of living that they were eager to protect. No other factors compare in importance with these.

Both these methods of improvement presuppose, however, a growth of scientific rationalism in the village and the emancipation of the peasant from his ignorance and his superstitions. These are plainly <u>educational</u> problems.

7. In view of the vital importance of the Indian population problem it is desirable that it should be the subject of an investigation by a team of experts, including an experienced medical officer, an economist, a statistician, and a sociologist with intimate knowledge of social conditions in different parts of India. Ten years ago it could not have been possible to embark on such an enquiry. Since then there have been great changes in the public attitude to the discussion of population problems, including birth control; and it seems that useful results could now be obtained.

8. If it is assumed that some parallel progress can be made towards limiting the increase of population, then the second requirement of economic policy is an improvement in the productivity of agriculture, and of the vast range of handicraft industries closely linked with agriculture.

9. Finally, it is reasonable to ask whether the process of industrialisation itself - the vast industrial revolution that India is only just beginning - cannot be better guided as a result of the experience that we and other industrial countries have painfully gained in the last hundred and fifty years.

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10. There are, therefore, three things that India needs above everything else:

(i) More education (and a reduction in the birth rate);

(ii) Higher productivity in agriculture (and associated industries);

(iii) A rapid increase in non-agricultural employment.

III THE VILLAGE

11. Nine tenths of the people of India live at very low standards in 750,000 villages that are largely self-contained, most of which are still cut off from urban life, practising a primitive form of cultivation, burdened by a heavy weight of debt, excessive rates of interest and, in some parts of the country, high rents, gripped firmly by the Malthusian devil and dominated by superstitions. The villager, therefore, needs more education, better health services, and a more satisfactory diet.

12. (i) Education

Only 1 in 10 of the Indian villages possesses a school. Only 1 in 3 have access to a school. Only 11 per cent of the adult population is literate.

The existing primary schools are for the most part suitably housed but are badly staffed by underpaid men (instead of women) who concentrate far too heavily upon literacy - forcing the children to spend too much of their time upon the gloomy repetition of letters and numbers and controlling them by far too liberal a use of corporal punishment. These schoolmasters usually receive about 5s. a month, never more than 10s.

There is no widespread mass movement for adult education in existence.

13. The intricate problems of mass education have been dealt with imaginatively during the course of this century in Russia, Japan and Turkey; by the Americans in the Phillipines and by our own colonial administration in parts of Africa. There should be no insuperable obstacle in India. It is not difficult to see what is wanted.

(a) It is necessary to build more village schools for young children and to staff them with better paid teachers who are compelled to attend regular "refresher" courses and who are persuaded to practice modern methods of education.

In the meantime it would be desirable to work "double shifts" in the existing schools both to increase the output of literacy, and to provide more time for the other activities of the children. This arrangement is working satisfactorily in all other countries with similar educational problems.

(b) No large and permanent improvement in the teaching of young children can be maintained until the difficulty of supplying qualified women for the village schools has been overcome. It is, therefore,/

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therefore, plainly desirable to increase the number of Training Colleges that will send out a stream of teachers and nurses to the villages, who can live in pairs in the school buildings. The nurses would be charged with the task of improving the health of the children and, possibly, spreading a knowledge of contraception.+

The difficulty of securing women for this work in India is extreme and familiar. The early age of marriage and the subsequent segregation of the wives limits the supply of women greatly. At the same time, the existing Colleges have not been empty and there are certain groups of women - widows and the wives of the male teachers - whose services are available. Moreover, the provision of medical care in the schools would, in all probability, increase the number of girls who were sent to them.

(c) The time is ripe for the launching of larger campaigns than in the past - similar to those that yielded such remarkable fruits in Russia and Turkey - for the mass education of adults. For this purpose a special mobile Service of Indian students and graduates, specially trained for the work, who would go to the villages but who would not settle in any one of them, is required.

All this is familiar ground. A programme of this kind could be started tomorrow if the necessary impulse were given from the centre. Here an incoming Viceroy would have a great opportunity. There is no lack of interest in the subject and a great deal of good work is already being done in many parts of the country. What is needed is a strengthening of the central directorate of education - at present hardly more than embryonic - and the provision of funds at the centre to be used as grants in aid of new educational developments in the Provinces. Thus strengthened, the Central Government would be in a position to embark on an ambitious educational campaign on the lines suggested above with reasonable prospects of success.

14. In preparation for a development of this kind it would probably be helpful if studies were made of the new techniques which have been used in rural education in Russia, Turkey and in the British colonies.

In particular it is almost certain that it would be profitable to send a small expert commission of enquiry to investigate the position in Russia where radio, itinerant exhibitions, wall newspapers and other devices are said to have been used with great effect.

15. There is, however, a different and more difficult problem to be tackled. It is essential, if newly acquired literacy is to be maintained, to provide the literate with something to read.

Literacy/

+ Congress has suggested that a cultural centre could be built and financed in each village by the grant of a land endowment for the construction of a school and the payment of a teacher - the building to be used for the education of two groups of children, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, and of adults in the evening. It is not quite clear why the endowment should be made upon a voluntary basis, nor why the medical education of the villagers should not be equally pressed.

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Literacy is no use without literature. It is essential to produce and distribute to the village a supply of vernacular news-sheets, books, wall sheets, and travelling films. Obviously this is not a task for the British. It should, however, be possible to stimulate the production of suitable material by the Indians themselves.

16. (ii) Agricultural Productivity.

Greater agrarian efficiency depends upon higher levels of education. Better methods of production, and the use of co-operative societies to provide cheaper credit and profitable markets, can rarely be established or maintained without considerable scientific understanding on the part of the peasant. But a direct attempt to raise productivity should, nevertheless, go hand in hand with the educational programme, since knowledge without prosperity would be sterile.

17. The main methods for improving the crops of a primitive agriculture have been established by the experience of a dozen other countries and the most fruitful available to India are: (i) better strains of seeds, (ii) better breeds of animals, (iii) the consolidation of holdings, and the limitation of rents, (iv) the development of co-operative credit (by which the undue power of the money-lender can be broken) and (v) the development of co-operative selling (and buying).

All these policies are being followed to some extent in India already. What is needed is a new and more powerful stimulus all along the line. The simultaneous extension and intensification of these five improvements could bring about an immense increase in the output of the fields.

18. The modernisation of peasant agriculture can either be secured (as in Russia) by the practice of ruthless compulsion or (as in France and Germany during the nineteenth century) by the longer paths of peaceful persuasion. It is only the second method that can be seriously considered for India. The peasants must be shown village by village, and above all by practical demonstration in their midst, that new practices do not call down the vengeance of angry gods, nor merely fail to work, but really do produce more food.

To develop this work of technical emancipation it will be necessary to extend, parallel to the educational and nursing service for women, the existing itinerant Agricultural Service, for men. The purpose of this greatly extended service would be to secure the co-operation of the peasants. Such a service would provide a second outlet for the unemployed graduates from Indian Universities, who should, however, be carefully selected for the task. Academic attainment would be less valuable than a real knowledge and sympathy in dealing with the problems of rural life.

19. (iii) Model Villages.

The enemy of progress, in India as elsewhere, is lack of imagination and faith.

It would, therefore, be well to begin with small experimental areas, single villages or small groups of villages, that could be richly provided from the beginning with women teachers, nurses, agronamists, and co-operative societies. In such restricted areas the possibility of full emancipation could be demonstrated and "doubting Thomases" could find conviction and inspiration.

20. (iv) Transport to and from the Village.

The key to village reconstruction in India is greatly improved transport. Most Indian villages lack a good road. Yet until satisfactory roads exist the cost (and in many

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parts of India, the physical difficulty) of transport will keep the inhabitants of villages shut in and the rest of the world shut out. Neither education and amenities, nor tools and implements can come into the village. Nor can its produce go out to realise its potential value in the markets of the world or even in those of nearby country towns. Nothing would do more to raise the standard of living of the Indian village than a great road building campaign in which village co-operations should be engaged. Metalled roads, suitable for motor transport, are needed on a large scale, especially in the populous alluvial soil areas. Elsewhere the provision of 'Kachah' roads by communal effort in the villages, under technical direction provided by the Government, would be a great step forward.

~~Many experiments of this kind have already been tried~~ - particularly ~~Mr. Braynes' campaigns in Gurgaun. The results have often been disappointing but this has been due to the temporary nature of the missions to the villages. It is essential that permanent services should be supplied to small areas.~~

IV THE TOWN WORKER.

21. It is less easy to see what can be done for the urban worker. The lessons of history in his case are not so plain to read. It is not clear what could have been done to ease the lot of the industrial proletariat in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, for the fundamental fact is that urban civilisation cannot be developed overnight and the peasant, forced out of the village, does not want to live in the town.

Three things, however, might be done:

22. (i) Factory Legislation

A considerable body of enlightened legislation has already been enacted. The chief need is, therefore, to extend it to the smaller factories (those employing less than 10 workers) in which the most appalling conditions continue to exist, and to intensify its observance by an increase in the size of the factory inspectorate. The creation of an efficient inspectorate has always been the crucial administrative problem in the development of reasonable conditions in the factory.

(ii) Housing and Sanitation

Urban housing conditions in India are extremely bad. In most cities large slum clearance is necessary and a good deal more could be done to enforce higher standards of sanitation and to provide cheaper and better housing (in the form of hutments) near the new factories in the less congested cities. This is particularly important for the seasonal worker from the village who now lives in conditions of appalling squalor. Again it would be better to concentrate upon providing a small number of properly equipped housing estates, or permanent camps, to act as models, rather than to spread limited resources too thinly over a vast field.

(iii) Destitution

Plainly the development of complex "social services" - with registration, compulsory contributions and covenanted benefits - belongs to a later stage of industrialisation. The stability and understanding of the Indian proletariat is not yet great enough to make such schemes practicable. But it would seem desirable to provide some permanent relief in kind (the most primitive form of the Poor Law) for the destitute and starving in order to supplement private and religious charity, and this need might be met by maintaining a permanent skeletal form of the machinery for Famine Relief in each province and

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and empowering it to provide food, in return for compulsory unskilled labour, to those in danger of starvation.

These measures, though very modest, would do something to improve the condition of the industrial worker and make the movement from the village to the town less painful.

V THE PROMOTION AND CONTROL OF INDUSTRIALISATION

23. The fact that India, by the end of the war, will have wiped out her external debt and accumulated considerable sterling balances, should make it possible to embark on an ambitious programme of capital development without recourse either to a high degree of forced saving (such as practices in Russia and other authoritarian countries) or to heavy foreign borrowing.

In view of the deeply rooted Indian legend of "the drain" the resumption of the traditional forms of external borrowing should be avoided. But this need not rule out the investment of international funds in India altogether. Such investment may, indeed, be necessary to facilitate socially desirable enterprises where Indian entrepreneurs are not prepared to venture. It may be hoped that the mobilisation and direction of British, American and other foreign funds for investment in India (and, indeed, in other undeveloped countries) after the war will become the responsibility of some organ of the 'United Nations'.

24. But there is no reason why India should not make use, straight away, of modern techniques of economic planning and the modern device of the Public Corporation. In order to avoid the economic distortions which arise from exaggerated Provincial Loyalties, a start should, at once, be made with the construction of an All-Indian Programme of Industrial Development into which could then be fitted, after negotiations with the Provincial Governments, a series of Provincial Programmes. These programmes would consist of a list of projects for: the building of railways and roads, the development of sources of power, and extending the capacity of the industries that have already been established.

The Central and Provincial Governments could maintain control of, and secure consistency in, the programme by offering the protection of their guarantees for approved and licensed projects and by an appropriate creation of Public Corporations. These devices could be extended later to the planned development of new industries.

25. Some measures of this kind are absolutely essential if the development of Indian industry that has taken place during the war is to continue smoothly and profitably. They represent an adaptation of Russian and European methods of planning to the Indian scene. It is understood that a number of promising studies of Indian reconstruction problems have already been set on foot by the Government of India. It might well be that these studies will provide the basis for the programme-building which is needed. They should certainly be given every encouragement and assistance.

26. The great success of the scheme for training Indian workers in Great Britain initiated by the Minister of Labour under which they have not only received technical training but have also obtained a better understanding of British institutions, should be greatly extended without delay. It should be supplemented by other schemes of a similar character so that a large number of Indians competent to take posts up to all grades of management may be trained both here and in India with close ties with British Industrial practice and organisation. A large number of technicians have already been sent to India and their number should be increased. Such measures would create good will and the inevitable and necessary growth in the industrialisation of India would be accompanied by a growth of personal ties which would be in the best interests of both countries.

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VI FINANCE

27. The proposals for development in village and town are not new, but they require money and upon this obstacle previous suggestions of this kind have broken down.

28. There are, however, a number of reasons for supposing that financial stringency can be overcome or, at least, greatly reduced:

(a) The foreign debt of India is being rapidly repaid and the interest is being saved.

(b) In spite of greatly increased direct taxation considerable fortunes are being made as a result of war expenditure. There is reason to believe that the direct taxes upon landowners could be further increased and it might not be impossible to raise more from the normal sources of revenue (i.e. the peasant) if responsible governments could really show that disproportionate benefits were accruing to the village.

(c) Small saving is already encouraged by favourable rates of interest but a vigorous drive to 'mop up' the savings of 'small' people whose incomes have recently been greatly increased might produce a handsome yield. The deeply rooted tradition of borrowing to spend on marriages, funerals etc. is one of the great curses of Indian life. Now is the time when propaganda encouraging peasants and handcraft workers to save for future spending might have great success.

29. What is essential, however, to the success of any far-reaching policy of social reform and development is the availability of funds at the centre which can be used to prime provincial pumps, stimulate investigation and experiment, and to train personnel.

30. It appears that considerable funds are now being set on one side by the Government of India for post-war reconstruction purposes. These might be augmented by the British Government in the form of a grant to an Indian Social Research and Development Fund. If there was a real programme of social reform and development in India it is not out of the question that several American Foundations would be willing to give financial assistance for the training of personnel, research projects and experimental development work.

VII PROCEDURE

31. If it were thought desirable to proceed with some such programme as this it would be desirable:

(a) To communicate a Memorandum to the new Viceroy expressing the wish of His Majesty's Government to pursue a Forward Social Programme and to suggest a number of positive measures to be included in it.

(b) For a sympathetic and determined Viceroy to formulate in detail, and mobilise considerable Provincial and All India Support for, such a Programme of economic and social improvement.

(c) To consider the possibility of holding an Eastern Regional Conference of the International Labour Organisation to discuss some of the issues such as nutrition, health, labour legislation etc. touched on in this Memorandum in a wider setting. If the I.L.O. received an invitation to hold such a Conference in India it should be possible for them to arrange for strong visiting delegations from the United States, China,

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Australia and New Zealand, as well as from Great Britain and Russia (though not a member) might send technical representatives whose experience would be specially valuable. The Conference would attract a great deal of attention in India and would focus attention on the need for economic and social reforms.

In spite of the difficulties in the way of arranging a conference of this kind in war-time it is desirable that it should take place before the war comes to an end. If it is postponed everyone will probably be too busy with the urgent problems which peace will bring to a head to attend such a conference for at least two years. Even if, as is probably the case, a full-scale conference cannot be arranged during the war, the same effect would be achieved by a meeting in India of the Emergency Committee of the I.L.O. together with small expert delegations from the countries mainly interested.

Although it is hardly possible that even a modified conference of this kind could be held sooner than the Autumn of 1943, preparatory studies could be initiated as soon as the decision to hold it was reached. The results of the conference would be certain to strengthen the hand of the new Viceroy and of everyone in India seeking to develop a progressive economic and social policy.

10th December 1942

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COPY

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 5, 1942

SECRET

Rear Admiral W. R. Patterson, R.N.,
British Admiralty Delegation,
Combined Chiefs of Staff Building,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral:

I have been directed to bring up, again, the matter of "early employment of the Eastern Fleet against Japanese-held islands in the Bay of Bengal and the eastern Indian Ocean".

I have been further directed to inquire if it would not be feasible "to launch an air attack at an early date against the refineries in the Palembang area".

I request that you take appropriate steps to ascertain the present views of the Admiralty on these matters, and inform me thereof.

Sincerely yours,

Admiral, U.S. Navy.

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21st December, 1942.

MOST SECRET - U.S. SECRET
PN-4

I have received the Admiralty views on the questions you raise in your letter of 5th December, 1942.

Admiral Somerville, who has recently visited London, is fully aware of the desirability of doing anything possible as a diversion and will keep this continually in mind. Unfortunately it does not appear that any action within the capabilities of the Eastern Fleet at the present time would effect any worthwhile diversion of Japanese effort from other theatres.

The Eastern Fleet has been reduced, as regards important units, to two fast and two slow battleships, and one Fleet aircraft carrier, to provide the necessary forces for Operation TORCH, and even what remains of the Fleet has had to be temporarily immobilised in order that its destroyers may be used to counter the U-boat menace at the Cape and in the Mozambique Channel. It may be necessary to deplete it even further by the removal of ILLUSTRIOUS to European waters.

For an operation against the Palembang refineries it would, in the present circumstances, be necessary to use ILLUSTRIOUS only for the air striking force. Her targets are some 180 miles inland at the extreme range of her present aircraft, and even if she were to be brought close in under enemy shore-based attack her Albacore aircraft would be an easy prey for enemy fighters. It is not therefore considered that an operation of this nature is feasible at the present time.

/s/ Percy Noble

Admiral E. J. King,
Commander-in-Chief U.S. Fleet,
Room 3054,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

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A16-3/Burma

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Operations against Burma.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the Generalissimo and General Stilwell can launch an effective operation in March to open up a land supply route into China connecting Ledo with Myitkyina and Bhamo thence to Wanting on the Burma Road. A British operation is now under way to seize Akyab which will be followed up by a thrust toward the Chindwin River by a British Corps in February.

The 32,000 Chinese troops being equipped and trained under a keen instructor staff of American officers at Ramgarh will be ready to jump off from the Ledo area about March 1st. The Chinese commanders have been carefully selected and all will have American officers alongside them. The Generalissimo is reorganizing his forces in Yunnan both as to equipment and men, and is carefully selecting leaders. The Generalissimo is going to personally command these troops. American officers will be with each regimental and higher unit of this force.

The forces above referred to will operate for the first time in Chinese history with reasonably trained men as to weapons, with artillery support, air coverage, communications, and an organized supply system. Under these circumstances it is believed that they will give a good account of themselves.

The opening up of the supply route referred to will permit the rapid build-up of air operations out of China. If an increase in the number of our bombers and fighters is made possible by better facilities for transporting gasoline, bombs, and maintenance equipment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that a highly destructive campaign against the Japanese can be launched. Such air operations should seriously complicate the Japanese situation in the South and Southwest Pacific as well

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

SECRET

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as have a tremendous psychological effect on India, China, and the Russian forces in Siberia.

General Stilwell has the normal arms and equipment for his infantry and artillery. He lacks road building machinery and engineers, limited medical service and communications troops.

These deficiencies require that 63,000 measured cargo tons and 6,000 men be shipped from the U. S. during January and February, the bulk in January. The problem is to secure the necessary shipping.

The Army and Navy will provide shipping for the troop lift. The cargo vessels must come from Lend-Lease or similar commitments.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you direct the War Shipping Administration to increase the Army's January allotment of shipping by 40,000 measurement tons, and its February allotment by 23,000 measurement tons.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy.

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

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A16-3/Index

27 November 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL KING

This will confirm our conversation of yesterday. The President suggests that you take up with the British the possibility of the early employment of the Eastern Fleet against Japanese-held islands in the Bay of Bengal and the Eastern Indian Ocean.

The President also wondered if it would not be possible for that force to launch an air attack at an early date against the refineries in the Palembang area.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

jlmccrea:jh

11-27-42

Delivered to Commander Russell Flag Secretary, by me at 4:45 P.M. this date.

JH

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A 16-3/Burma

SECRET

1230, November 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

The following message has been received by Mr. Hopkins from Dr. T. V. Soong. Mr. Hopkins has requested me to transmit it to the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

"Chungking, November 13, 1942.

"I feel I have succeeded in helping the Generalissimo and General Stilwell to cooperate closely. Agreement between us and the British has been reached regarding the plans for land operations in Burma. However, destructive naval operations have yet to be decided by the British.

"The question of central command is of some urgency, particularly when one remembers that the failure of the last campaign was in large measure due to the absence of real cooperation. The following solution, which is suggested after the discussion with the Generalissimo and General Stilwell, seems to be the ideal: General Stilwell to be made Commander-in-Chief of Burma operations, with all Allied forces under his command until the Japanese have been defeated, immediately after which event General Stilwell and Chinese troops will leave Burma. China is prepared to give any necessary assurances that our sole object is to clear Burma of the Japanese in order to reopen the supply route.

"A precedent has been established by placing all Allied land, air and naval forces in the North African operations under General Eisenhower, so I trust that the solution proposed is feasible.

"We understand that General Irwin has been placed in command of the British forces for this campaign. Both Chinese and Americans here regret that General Slim, who distinguished himself as Army Corps commander under General Alexander in the last Burma campaign and received universal admiration for his aggressiveness and efficiency, could not have been appointed.

"In view of your high moral authority with the British, I hope that after studying them, you will find it possible to induce the British to consider the above views."

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U. S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Capt. McCrea
to file

October 17, 1942.

Personal and confidential.

Dear Mr. President:

Stilwell, who writes me personal letters every now and then, has sent me by the hand of Major Mason, who was in Willkie's party, a letter of which the enclosure is a copy.

This letter seems to me to indicate that Stilwell is making as much progress as we can very well expect under the obstacles which have confronted him. It also gives inferentially the reasons why we must have a ground route through Burma in order to successfully aid China. Stilwell, who has been continuously on the ground, is, I notice, more pessimistic than some others as to the adequacy of the air transport line alone for this purpose.

Very sincerely yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

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SECRET

Chungking, Oct. 6, 1942.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is an attempt to give you an idea of the situation and recent developments.

I am hammering on the necessity of getting Burma back. The air transport line will never be able to do more than supply very small quantities of important materials; in fact, it can do little more than support itself and the aircraft needed to protect it. To supply the Chinese Army, we must have Rangoon and motor and rail transport. This is the first vital necessity. As you know, Chiang has promised to furnish twenty divisions for the effort. The British show signs of an intention to make the attempt, and I am going down to see Wavell about it soon. In eastern India there are now six Indian divisions in training that could be used. They are full of recruits, however, and many units are lacking.

At Ramgahr we have 9000 men undergoing artillery instruction (two thirds) and infantry weapons instruction (one third). Progress is excellent. Chiang has agreed to the dispatch of 23,000 more men, whom we hope to start ferrying on Oct. 21. The British have not yet definitely sanctioned the increase, although Wavell agreed to it when I first proposed it. I hope they do not obstruct the plan; if they do, I fear serious consequences here. If all goes well, by Feb. 1 we should have at Ramgahr a well-trained force of at least two divisions with heavy artillery backing.

It is proving extremely difficult to make any real progress on the 30-division plan, although recently some hope has appeared.

SECRET

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I have shifted my attack to Ho Ying Ch'in and given him a plan to designate the units at once, group them by tens in three areas, fill them up, equip them, attach artillery, and start training. Their argument against doing anything will be that we have not delivered the arms and equipment. I keep telling them that the only possible way to get the arms is to retake Burma, and they are beginning to see the light. I find that Chiang has considerable difficulty in getting units away from the Zone commanders; there are only some ten armies over which he has unquestioned authority, and if he orders the transfer of others, pressure is at once brought to bear to stop it. I have told Ho Ying Ch'in that our W.D. is anxious to know what is being done about this plan, and I have hinted broadly that failure to take action may ruin the supply program. He has taken this notice seriously.

In general, I feel that we are making gradual progress. The Ramgahr idea has caught on in a big way, and Chiang recently backed me up in an attempt by Lo Cho Ying, the vice-commander there, to get out from under my authority. If we can get these 23,000 men down there, we shall have accomplished something worth while. But it is Chinese action on the 30-division plan that will prove whether or not they intend to do anything serious.

It seems sure that orders from the top reached the troops in Chekiang and Kiangsi to take it easy and withdraw before the jap attack. And they did it most efficiently. Beyond a botched-up action at Ch'ü Hsien early in June and a minor action to the south-west, there was no real fighting at all, and the "re-conquest" has been merely a following up of the jap withdrawal, making sure at each step that the

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japs had really gone. The press reports of "fighting" are so many false statements. Chiang himself once again "directed operations" from Chungking and ordered the retreat from Ch'u Hsien just as the troops were ready to fight. Of course the japs attacked as the orders were received. This inability of Chiang to leave the field commander alone will continue to ruin any chance of success unless it can be stopped in some way.

In brief, our prestige is rising through the demonstration at Ramgahr. There is some hope for action on the 30-division plan. There is hope for a combined offensive against Burma in the spring. Many subordinate army officers have expressed to me their confidence and hope for the development of an efficient force. By the attack on Ho Ying Ch'in I hope to reduce somewhat the obstruction in the staff. But this is a long road we are travelling, and you must be the judge as to whether or not we are earning our pay by sticking to it. Intrigue, obstruction, delay, personal interest, etc. are still predominant; it's a good deal like burrowing in a rubbish pile. However, if we come out of it with a pearl necklace, instead of an old shoe, it may be worth the effort.

My apologies for writing this in longhand, but I thought it better that third parties should not get a look at the contents.

Hoping that this finds you in your usual good health and bearing up under your heavy load,

Sincerely yours,

J. W. STILWELL

P.S. Recent reports indicate the possibility of a jap attempt to break up the ferry line by air attack from Burma.

JWS

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: 30-Division Plan in China.

The following is quoted from a message received from General Stilwell this morning. It shows the progress that is being made in the plan to train effectively thirty Chinese divisions for the recapture of Burma.

> "Now have tentative permission to place American officers as observers with units of Thirty Division Plan. My hope is that their functions can be amplified after they join. To take full advantage this opportunity should have more personnel. Need additional 100 experienced infantry officers and 50 experienced artillery officers."

(Remainder of message relates to details of personnel desired.)

Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

Capt. McCrea
to file

Confidentially to The President
E.M.W.

Regraded Unclassified

A16-3 / Burma + India

SECRET

Capt McCrea to file

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: China - India - Stilwell.

I am deeply concerned over Stilwell's situation in China. Apparently in the last few weeks he has succeeded in getting agreements from the Generalissimo that are of vast importance. The opening of the Burma Road is of immense importance to the support of China. I do not believe this is a remote possibility without efficient Chinese action in cooperation with a British effort out of India - all with American air coverage, that is, unless the situation in the Pacific should develop so favorably that we could threaten or cut the Japanese ocean supply line through the Malay Barrier.

On September 22 Stilwell succeeded in overcoming the Generalissimo's resistance to the increase in the Chinese force at Ramgahr in India to Corps strength (see message attached). On October 5 he reports his fears regarding General Wavell's acceptance of the proposition to increase the Chinese force being trained by our people in India (see message attached).

On October 8 he reports that the Generalissimo has committed himself to a start of the bitterly opposed 30-Division plan, which means the reorganization of the Chinese forces on a real fighting basis (see message attached).

In the message dated October 9 which was received this morning he again reports his fears regarding British action on the increase in the Ramgahr Garrison and its effect on the Generalissimo (see message attached).

Dill and Cunningham agree with me, and better, will press point with London.

I understand that you have not accepted the draft proposed for a reply to the Generalissimo and that therefore no message has yet been sent by you to him. However I had the matter of Wavell's action up with Dill and he understands thoroughly what our reasons are, and I think he wholeheartedly accepts them. I am having another talk with him this morning in the light of Stilwell's message of October 9, and as Admiral Cunningham is paying me a farewell visit this morning before joining Eisenhower, I purpose having him present when I talk to Dill.

What worries me most in this matter is that Stilwell apparently is securing the important agreements with the Generalissimo that it was supposed he would never accede to, and a British refusal to agree to the plan in India might well produce a vigorous reaction on the part of the Generalissimo. I am hopeful that through Dill I can manage the matter but I wished you to know what is going on.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS

Chief of Staff.

SECRET

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SECRET

Karachi, India
September 22, 1942.

From: General Stilwell
To: General Marshall

"Chiang Kai-shek has agreed to increase the force at Ramgarh by about twenty-three thousand men. This will give us two full divisions, three regiments of artillery, a regiment of engineers, and the ten battalions of artillery now under instruction. Later I expect to get one more division. This is of course contingent on British approval, for which I hope to enlist your aid if we meet with obstacles in India. We will fly the men, without equipment, to India and arm and equip them there. Due to the importance of this project, I must interrupt temporarily the shipment of tin and tungsten, and request your approval of this matter.

"By February we can have an efficient trained force of three divisions with strong artillery support ready for Burma adventure, in addition to ten battalions of artillery and fifteen hundred weapons specialists for assignment to other divisions. British apparently making some preparations for possible operation about same time. They will have six divisions of Indian troops available by then. I have nothing new or definite from Wavell, but opinion of many British officers is that they must recover Burma in spring.

"Ramgarh training scheme has caught attention of intelligent class in Chinese Army. They are strong for it, and this action of Chiang Kai-shek indicates he is at least partially converted. If I were subject to nervous prostration, I would have had it by now, but unless British stop us I believe we have taken at least one more step forward."

Chungking, China
October 5, 1942.

From: General Stilwell
To: General Marshall

"After sanctioning increase of Ramgarh Garrison, Wavell making conditions. Viceroy has to be consulted. British Ambassador tells me London has not finally acted. I made official request through Sibertson to Wavell, and he concurred. Now he wants further official request, asking for reasons for the increase. My answer was to help our British Allies retake Burma. If the British obstruct this plan the consequences here will be serious.

"There is now a possibility that we will get some action on the 30-Division plan and any lack of cooperation in India may prejudice our chances. As I understand my instructions, British originally agreed to make available to me bases in India for operations in Burma. This matter may smooth out, but want you to know what is going on at present."

SECRET

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Chungking, China
October 8, 1942.

From: General Stilwell
To: General Marshall

"The divisions in the 30-Division Plan have been designated. The majority are good units. They have been marked for 'adjustment and training', for the most part in their present areas. They are to be 'reinforced with light weapons'. Am trying to get authority for American inspector - instructors with these units to supervise training. This is the next hurdle.

"Wavell wants me to transfer my headquarters to India. Am sure this would have bad effect on Chiang Kai-shek and would impede our progress with Chinese Army. Will go to Delhi about October 15th for preliminary talk with Wavell, at his request, about future operations."

Chungking, China
October 9, 1942.

From: General Stilwell
To: General Marshall

"Delhi Headquarters has just informed me that unfavorable action on increase of Ramgahr Garrison is to be expected from Indian Government.

"Although Wavell approved plan up to capacity of Ramgahr, Viceroy has referred matter to London. If this project is disapproved I expect Chiang Kai-shek to blow up. It will, in my opinion, nullify all the work we have done to lay a foundation for efficient training in the Chinese Army. It will increase the already bitter feeling against the British. It will jeopardize any chance of Chinese participation in the Burma offensive. We as well as the British have interests here that should be considered, and arbitrary action in this matter is a slap at us as well as at the Chinese.

"Your immediate help is needed to prevent the British from repeating a mistake that has already cost us considerable grief and that may seriously affect the Allied effort in this theater. I am taking stand that my original instructions were approved by British and included right to use bases in India."

Regraded Unclassified

A16-3 (India-Burma)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

28 WVNA
Filed 154/8
ame

INCOMING MESSAGE

CSWD
May 8, 1942
9:55 P.M.

URGENT

From: Karachi
To: AGWAR

No. Aquila 857, May 7, 1942.

For Arnold from Brerton situapion in Burma critical and control of entire country by Japanese, with exception sporadic guerrila warfare and Allies bombing raids from India, is now an accomplished fact. 5 Japanese Divisions known to be in Burma with aircraft in excess of requirements within country. There is particular concentration medium and heavy bombers. Number of fighter planes in R X Icbvyr known although believed considerable. Probable Japanese air strength in Burma far exceeds total Allied air India and is estimated to outnumber Allies by 4 to 1. Japanese attack Calcutta area by sea, land, and air now possible.

No Sig.

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CM-IN-2336 (5/9/42) AM 12:46

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