3. A-16 FRANCE and FREE FRENCH; February, 1943 - April, 1945.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

MISS POPE,

LIEUTENANT ELSEY.

The President has authorized me to turn the attached summary over to Mr. Longer with the understanding that it is a secret publication.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

White House.

April 7, 1945.
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR: MISS TULLY.

When the President left for Hyde Park last week he took with him George Elsey's summary of White House dispatches dealing with French policy. These notes were assembled in accordance with instructions from the President to be given to Mr. Langer who is compiling a secret State Department record.

Today Secretary Hull enquired through Mr. Langer about progress.

Will you ask the President if he has had time to look through the papers and whether he approves turning them over to Langer?

WILSON BROWN.
2 April 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President:

There is attached hereto, for your files, a translation of a message received by me on 19 March 1945, from Rear Admiral Auphan of the French Navy, who was Deputy Minister of Marine during the period when I was American Ambassador to France.

[Signature]

Regraded Unclassified
TRANSLATION

PERSONAL

February 27, 1945

Admiral:

Since you have been so good as to ask occasionally for news of me and to inquire concerning my fate, I am taking the opportunity offered to me to correspond discreetly with you in order to send to you an expression of my faithful remembrance and to let you know the sentiments which animate me.

What events have occurred since I had the honor to greet you for the last time at Vichy? . . . that city which is painful for you as it is for us: for you because of the mourning which afflicted your household there, for us because of the memory which it left with us of the difficult times of the occupation.

You certainly know what I tried to do there in November 1942; if I had been forewarned of your African plans the matter might perhaps have turned out differently; not having been forewarned, I directed my efforts to halt the fighting as soon as possible; in fact it was I who sent to Admiral Darlan the mysterious telegrams which despite an official disavowal demanded by the Germans, brought to him the secret assent of the Marshal to treat with you to release the officers from their oath and thus to permit the French Army of Africa to cooperate anew with the Allies. At the same time I tried to bring about a change of policy in the mother country; but through fear of the Germans M. Laval prevented me, and I resigned as soon as I saw the futility of my efforts. Not having been able to bring about the departure of the Fleet I confirmed for the last time in writing the order that it should be scuttled in the event of threat and afterwards I "dove" deep as submarine officers say in order to escape the reactions of the Gestapo. Although separated politically from the Marshal after November 1942, I nevertheless saw him at infrequent intervals in order to try to "hamstring" M. Laval, the evil genius of France, and to change the orientation of policy. It was in regard to these efforts that the Marshal received in April 1943 a letter from Hitler making a point of "the machinations plotted in Vichy against the policy of the head of Government" and preventing him from making a new "coup of December 13", that is, to get rid of M. Laval. Since he could not get rid of him as Prime Minister the Marshal desired at least that he should not succeed him in the event that he himself was prevented from carrying out his functions through death or imprisonment. You know that in November 1943 he wished to promulgate a democratic law making provision for the return of his powers to the National Assembly (and not to M. Laval) in the event of his death. The Germans prevented him from promulgating this law. The Marshal for some time considered himself as a prisoner but as a result of a new German threat he had to take up again his painful watch. The Germans took advantage of his advanced age and of his poor state to impose upon him collaborators whose
nominations he did not wish to sign but whose presence he had to endure in silence. From this moment on he no longer attended the Council of Ministers and signed nothing.

I know that he received several times American emissaries. With the remembrance of the faithful friendship which he retained for you these emissaries encouraged him in his attitude. Thus a short time before the Allied landing in Normandy the Military Attaché of the U.S.A. in Switzerland sent him a message of comfort and simply requested him that at the moment when the war was about to revive on French soil not to try and build up public opinion against the Allies. This desire inspired the public declaration which he was forced to make at the moment when the war was about to revive on French soil not to try and build up public opinion against the Allies. This desire inspired the public declaration which he was forced to make at the moment of the landing.

You who have knowledge of the complexity of French internal politics know how much the "Resistance" Gaullists appeared uneasy under the occupation since the praiseworthy pretext of war against the Boches often hid less disinterested aims. Nevertheless the contacts made with the metropolitan resistance in 1944 showed the desire of certain of them to come to an understanding with the legal power held by the Marshal. Honest Frenchmen from one side or another were aware from the eve of the liberation of what supreme interest it was for the country to bring about unity. It was for this reason that the Marshal felt compelled, short-circuiting the Laval Government imposed by Hitler, to give me in writing on August 11, 1944 wide powers to work out an arrangement with General De Gaulle and to give to Frenchmen by their handclasp the example of a general reconciliation. After this gesture the Marshal would have agreed to transfer all his powers to General De Gaulle and to efface himself completely in the higher interests of the country. The very day after his arrival in Paris General De Gaulle was loyally informed of this offer: it has never received any answer. At this same period the Marshal who had not wished to come to Paris in order not to become involved in the last minute intrigues of M. Laval and the Germans was made prisoner and taken off into captivity.

This refusal of union and of reconciliation on the basis of legality is in my opinion the principal reason for the great disquietude which reigns at the present time in France. You who have lived at Vichy know very well that all the people who in one way or another worked to administer occupied France were not "traitors" sold to the Germans but that, however, is what they are now trying to make the country believe for a calculated political aim. All good Frenchmen, all the "men of order" who had served with discipline the Government of the Marshal (and who were ready moreover to serve the Government of De Gaulle in the same spirit from the moment he held the levers of command) are pursued, persecuted, put in prison, assassinated. All the Government officers are decapitated—"purged" as they call it. Despite the very beautiful speeches
of the General, an implacable hatred animates the Communist elements of disorder against the men of order who are accused on bloc of being Hitlerites because they are not Communists. But without the "men of order" they will not remake France and France—the real France, spiritual, democratic, and Christian—will be absent from the concert of nations who are preparing to organize the world of tomorrow. Despite the anxieties of your present high function I am certain that your experience of European affairs has already shown you the situation such as is presented to you by this letter for whose length I ask your pardon. I profoundly admire the manner in which your great country has given itself over entirely to this gigantic war, but thiselan and the success with which it has been rewarded places upon its responsibilities before history; the establishment of order in France, the place of landing chosen by you in 1942 and 1944, is one. I understand, of course, that you do not wish to interfere in our internal affairs just as you would understand the impossibility for a true Frenchman to wish a foreigner even an ally to interfere. It is important, however, that you know that the French trouble will not be dissipated until the "men of order" those who have served loyally their Government (at least during the entire period subsequent to November 1942 which you yourself have recognized), are allowed to resume their place and their position in the country. There will be no true peace in France—and in Europe—as long as the good Frenchmen of the "resistance", General De Gaulle at their head, do not place their hands in the hands of the good Frenchmen who have the merit of having kept watch over our heritage during the occupation, Marshal Petain at their head. If this general union is not made, if the "men of disorder" continue to ignore the "men of order" the Communist elements of the country will try to bring it under Slav influence in the heart of "the United Soviet States of Europe". But France is an old country with well established middle class elements who do not wish this solution. There are not ten percent of us who are Communists. The masses are crushed by the moral and physical sufferings of the occupation. They are terrorized by the Communists who have seized all the levers of command. They will perhaps have the cowardice through fear of the Tommy guns not to vote against them. But sooner or later they will rise again because the country of Christianity and liberty which did not accept Nazi materialism will no more accept a Communist dictatorship.

I beg your pardon Admiral for this long letter which gushes forth all my thoughts at one time and which is typed by me in order to avoid any indiscretion. If your present responsibilities allow you still the leisure to think of France you will find here, to nourish your reflections, thoughts of a Frenchman who has no other ambition than to serve his country. How I regret that the measures adopted in regard to me do not even leave me the honor and the satisfaction of making war at your side.

I ask of you that complete discretion be observed in regard to this correspondence and beg you to accept, Admiral, together with my wishes for the future victory, the assurances of my faithful remembrance and the expression of my most respectful sentiments.

(a) AUPHAN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVAL AIDE

Subj: Notes on the Invasion.

Encl: (A) Copy of translation of an article which appeared in the July-August, 1944 issue of Marine-Rundschau, the German equivalent of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceeding.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith as of possible interest.

J.W. Gregory,
Captain, U.S. Navy
Assistant Director, Intelligence Group
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
(Office of Naval Intelligence)

RECORD OF TRANSLATION

Translation requested by: Op-16-FA-4

Date of request: 2 November 1944

Language: German

Subject: Notes on the Invasion.

Source: Marine-Rundschau, July-August 1944, p. 441.

Original title: Bemerkungen zur Invasion

Author: Vice Admiral Lützow

Translation furnished by: Op-16-A-4-d

Date: 5 November 1944

Translated by: J.H.B.

Number of pages: 8

Number of copies: 5

Distribution: 4 = FA-6
1 = A-4-d

O.N.I. Translation No. 743

Copy No. 3 - Op-16-FA-4

Authenticated: Signature

Translator in charge.

ENCK (A) to Sec 5164216

Regraded Unclassified
The Soviet Union has demanded of the seapowers that they carry out the invasion on the west coast of Europe in order to relieve the Russian armies on the eastern front, which unaided were unable to check the German forces. In the eyes of the Soviet Union therefore the purpose of the invasion was to divide and weaken German strength. However, in observing the relations between Russia and Britain, it is reasonable to assume that in addition to this openly proclaimed purpose, there is the hidden intention (probably considered equally important) of forcing the seapowers to make greater sacrifices than heretofore, so that their forces will be reduced and they will be unable to get the upper hand in the competition with the Russian system and its supporters working for the Bolshevist world revolution. At any rate, it is clear that none of our enemies have regarded the invasion as the solely decisive blow to be delivered on land, although the London Radio took pains to describe the contemplated operations on sea and land as the greatest military undertaking that the world had ever known. Therefore, military science will classify the combined operations of our enemies, which were initiated on the 6th of June 1944 against the coast on the French side of the...
Channel, as one of those diversion attacks which were formerly called "diversions".

How the decision leading to the invasion was reached

It is needless to say that up to the present we have been able to obtain only incomplete information concerning the evidently rather confused and disorganized developments in the enemy's camp which finally led to the decision which resulted in the invasion. Nevertheless, we may be permitted to make some conjectures concerning these developments. Soon after the war in the Pacific started there was a battle of words in the press between the American Admiral Stirling and the British military expert Ward Price, whose statements probably reflected the opinion of influential circles. While Stirling recommended that the forces of both sea powers be concentrated on naval operations in the Pacific, Ward Price was in favor of regarding the war at sea as a unit, that is to say, he did not believe in neglecting the war in the Atlantic area in favor of the war in the Pacific area. It looked as if Washington had to yield to this demand of the British. Probably one of the reasons was the increasing shortage in tonnage as a result of the submarine campaign, which had a decisive influence on all enemy plans, and because due to this situation it was essential not to interrupt or restrict the anti-submarine defense. In addition to this there was the demand of the Soviet Union for a second front in western Europe to relieve the Russian forces on land. This demand was being made with increasing insistence. The traditional disinclination of the British to take part in military operations on the European continent, the main theater of operations of the land war (a disinclination which was
strengthened by the experiences of the first world war), also the shortage in
 tonnage and the pressure of public opinion in the United States, which was in
 favor of pushing the war against Japan in preference to all other plans, have
 obviously combined to induce the seapowers to evade Stalin's demand by engaging
 in the less dangerous and less ambitious undertaking involved in the landing opera-
tions in North Africa (November 1942). Nevertheless, in 1943 reports concerning
 differences of opinion among those responsible in America for the conduct of the
 war kept on cropping up. It was said that the politicians around Roosevelt were
demanding the combination of all forces for the purpose of defeating Germany first
 and that the defeat of Japan be delayed until this objective was accomplished,
 while the military collaborators of Roosevelt were demanding that Japan be crushed
 first and that Germany be dealt with afterwards. It would be logical to assume
 that the military advisers won out, as was rumored, because the pressure of the
 German war on commerce was appreciably reduced since April 1943, the Italian
 King's party and its supporters betrayed their allies behind the back of Mussolini
 and thereby largely contributed to the conquest of the North African coast areas
 by the seapowers. The situation in the Atlantic area seemed to favor a vigorous
 and energetic prosecution of the war against Japan. Thus, in July 1943 American
 naval forces again began to attack the Solomons, after operations had been sus-
pended (perhaps on account of the heavy losses in warships during the winter of
 1942-43) from March to June. At the conference between Roosevelt and Churchill
 at Quebec (August 1943) these plans were developed to a larger scale. It was
decided that after the monsoon rainy season was over (middle of October) the
British Admiral Mountbatten was to cut off the Japanese from the Burma Road, the only satisfactory line of supply to Chungking, China, while the American Admiral Nimitz was to direct the attack against the southeast flank of the area controlled by Japan from New Guinea by way of Bougainville (Solomons) to the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. While this decision was being reached, the British and American forces in Sicily were preparing to cross over to southern Italy. But this campaign in Italy, which began on the 3rd of September, was a bitter disappointment from the very beginning. The British Field Marshal Milne made the candid statement that the progress made in Italy was of doubtful value, because the gains were slight compared to the sacrifice of time and effort; and that the strategic objective of holding down comparatively strong enemy forces with weak forces had been much more effectively achieved by the Germans than by the British and Americans. In consequence the tonnage requirements for the Mediterranean campaign were two or three times greater than had been estimated; and that may have been one of the reasons why the large-scale attack against the Burma Road, which was announced for mid-October 1943, had to be postponed. On account of the victorious operations of the Japanese army against the Chinese in northern Burma in the late autumn, the project had to be abandoned during the entire dry season and then could not be undertaken for another six months due to the tropical rains which occur during the rainy season beginning in April. Another consequence of the setbacks in Italy was the more insistent Soviet demand for a second front in western Europe instead of in the Mediterranean area. Presumably Roosevelt and Churchill had to yield to this demand at the conference with Stalin in Teheran.
(December 1943), by giving a binding pledge to that effect. In accordance with
these circumstances and perhaps also in accordance with the views of Roosevelt
and Churchill, it would have been logical to also postpone the offensive oper-
tions against Japan at sea. However, this course may not have been practicable
due to the trend of public opinion in the United States, and also on account of
the impending election campaign, since Roosevelt was unwilling to spoil his chances
of re-election.

All this shows that the planned invasion from the outset could not be the
"mightiest military undertaking that the world has ever known" (as the London
Radio had bombastically announced), carried out by the combination of all the
available strength, but was merely another means of speeding up the war and reach-
ing a decisive stage in the conflict at an earlier date than the previous progress
of military operations seemed to indicate. In other words, like the Italian cam-
paign, the China campaign, the struggle in eastern Asia and its support by the
seapowers, the war in the Pacific and the anti-submarine campaign, it is just
another means for achieving the same purpose. Contrary to the wishes and expecta-
tions of the seapowers, the result was a division of forces instead of a concentra-
tion of power. The attempt of the British and Americans to represent the offensive
against the Axis powers launched from several sides (but not "all round") as a
plan for the conduct of the war conceived by master minds does not change very much
about this result. In reality this plan was developed more by force of circumstance,
due to the failures resulting from other methods (Italy and the South Seas).

The disinclination of the British (based on their experiences in the war at
sea) for a large scale diversion attack against the flank or the rear of the
German lines, is in agreement with the theoretical reflections of von Clausewitz
on the problem of "diversion". The British know just as well as we do that
surprise diversion operations on a comparatively small scale, carried out against
the enemy's flank or rear, can be very effective, because the enemy under attack
will as a rule be forced to throw into the balance a considerably larger force
of troops or ships due to apprehensions as to the mobility of the attacking forces
or the possible reinforcement of these forces, or for other reasons. That will
be necessary especially when the attack is made from the sea, because on the sea
(which has no boundaries and no obstacles) armed forces can be moved more un-
observed, more rapidly and in larger numbers than on land. Therefore, the aggres-
sor in such cases will be able to carry out more easily his plan to hold down with
a small force considerable forces of the enemy and divert them from the main
theater of operations. However, the larger the mass of men and materials which
the aggressor throws into his diversion operations the more uncertain is the
prospect that considerable forces of the enemy will be diverted, because the
operations will be more difficult and consequently the enemy will have more time
to meet the new situation. It follows that the aggressor, depending on the magni-
tude of his diversion maneuver, will have to give more careful consideration to
the question whether the other preliminary conditions for the attack are favorable.

In view of these considerations, the British-American war strategists are
doubtless aware of the serious objections that make a brilliant, spectacular "all
round" attack a risky undertaking. It divides the forces, which is dangerous due
to the fact that defense is the "stronger position in war" and offers the intrenched enemy more opportunity for successful operations and expedients. Sensational victories of a tactical nature, such as were won at Cannae or Tannenberg, are even less likely, since the element of surprise is absent, an advantage which it would certainly be harder to obtain in the fifth year of war than in the first year.

Will the enemy's forces be adequate?

At first glance it naturally looks as if the objection concerning the division of forces were not based on sound logic, in view of the inexhaustible resources of our enemies. For that very reason it is worthy of notice that one of the best known American military writers, Hanson Baldwin, in the April 1944 issue of Foreign Affairs has painted a rather pessimistic picture of the situation in this respect. He considers the war situation from the standpoint of production and seeks to determine whether the production of war materials of all kinds in the United States is really equal to the demand. The result is not favorable to his country. Baldwin made his investigation in the spring of this year, therefore his deductions are based on the experiences in Italy and in the Pacific area. First of all Baldwin, like other American military writers, admits that an error was made in underestimating the stubborn tenacity of German resistance in Italy "since the (Badoglio) Italians have proved to be of slight value from a practical point of view". In addition to the requirements of the Italian campaign, says Baldwin, there are the men and material required for the war in the Pacific.
These requirements curtail the deliveries of war material to the diversion fronts in Europe. Such statements, made by Baldwin again show that the interdependence between the events in the Atlantic area and the events in the Pacific area is a circumstance favorable to the Axis powers. As one of the consequences of this interdependence, Baldwin mentions in particular the "continued shortage of landing craft, which early in 1944 constituted one of the few bottlenecks in the allied war production program". From all this Baldwin concludes that the demands made upon the war production industry of the United States are increasing, both on account of the immediate necessity of the mass production of materials required for large-scale military operations and on account of the highly specialized equipment (largely of new design). He is particularly worried by the fact that in the face of such increased demands upon the war production industry, the prospects of obtaining the necessary manpower are becoming exceedingly slim due to the increasing number of men that are being drafted for war service. Another American military writer, Mark Sullivan, comes to the conclusion, as the result of his own observations, that mechanized warfare alone will not be the decisive factor, but that manpower will turn the balance, and that for this reason the American high command needs so many men for the army and navy. However, the increasing requirement of combat troops necessarily means a corresponding increase in auxiliary personnel. "The sum total of these requirements", says Mark Sullivan, "makes it necessary to scrape the bottom of the barrel again".

Naval Intelligence
Translation No. 743
Translated by: J.H.B.
Date: 5 November 1944
Language: German.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to this Indochina matter, it is my judgment on this date that we should do nothing in regard to resistance groups or in any other way in relation to Indochina. You might bring it up to me a little later when things are a little clearer.

F. D. R.
American Collaboration with the French to Aid Resistance Groups in Indochina.

A letter has been received from General Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services, asking the views of the State Department on the following contemplated operations:

"The staff of the Theater Commander for the CBI theater has under consideration operational plans involving the furnishing of supplies and equipment to resistance groups. It is contemplated that these operations will be under American command although there will be collaboration with the French."

In amplification of the foregoing, it was explained orally that the proposed assistance would be to resistance groups within Indochina; that the proposed collaboration would be with the French Military Mission at Chungking; that such collaboration would not prevent assistance to all resistance groups whether French or native, but that without such collaboration, it would not be possible effectively to assist resistance groups among the French military forces in Indochina, and that this would result in retarding resistance efforts.

Subject to your approval, the Department will reply to General Donovan that it has no objection to furnishing supplies and equipment to resistance groups, both French and native, actually within Indochina, nor to American collaboration with the French Military Mission at Chungking or other French officers or officials in furtherance of the contemplated operations or any other military operations in Indochina for the defeat of Japan.
French Participation in Liberation of Indochina

On August 26, 1944, I sent you a memorandum with a copy of a British aide-memoire dated August 25 stating that the French had requested British approval of:

(a) Sending a French Military Mission under General Blaizot to be attached to SEAC headquarters;
(b) Sending to India a light intervention force for later use in Indochina;
(c) Sending, later on, a French expeditionary force to participate in the liberation of Indochina;
(d) Participation by the French in planning the war against Japan;
(e) Participation by the French in planning political warfare in the Far East.

The British requested American concurrence on the first two points by August 29. You informed me orally that you planned to discuss the French proposals with the British Prime Minister at Quebec; accordingly no reply has been made to the British aide-memoire.

The Consul at Colombo has reported that on October 4, it was learned from an unimpeachable source that the British plan to bring a French Mission under General Blaizot to SEAC headquarters in the immediate future; that full collaboration is to be given the French Mission which will participate officially in activities of the SEAC; that as American agreement has not been obtained, the Mission will be ostensibly unofficial and will be housed at first in a hotel; that as soon as the concurrence of the Allies is forthcoming it is planned to move the Mission into permanent quarters; and that French parachutists are continuing to be trained by the British in groups of four or five for clandestine activities in Indochina.

As you will recall, the British proposed in their aide-memoire that all details of French political warfare relating to Indochina should be a matter for arrangement between SEAC and the French Military Mission, although, according to the latest information in the Department, Indochina is in the China theater and not in the SEAC theater.

Will you inform me whether the reported sending of this Mission is in accordance with any understanding which may have been reached with Mr. Churchill on the French requests together with an indication of whether you desire the Department to take any action?
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEARY:

I think this can be further delayed. The whole matter should be handled on the military level as the political level at this time is premature.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In a memorandum dated 25 April 1944, the United States Chiefs of Staff informed you that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff were not in agreement as to the level on which an agreement proposed by the French Committee concerning the employment of French forces in future operations should be negotiated.

In reply you informed the Chief of Staff, United States Army, by memorandum dated 28 April 1944 of your desire at that time that military questions which involved the French forces be handled on the military level.

Accordingly, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adhered to their position that the instrument be handled on a military level. However, the British Chiefs of Staff, as well as the French Committee, are insistent that the instrument be negotiated on the diplomatic level as between governments.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff after lengthy consideration of this matter have been unable to resolve their divergent views as to the terms of the proposed agreement and have agreed to accept the agreement as drafted and submit the points of divergence to their respective governments.

A copy of the proposed agreement, as drafted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is attached. The divergent United States and British views are set forth in parallel columns and pertain only to the level on which the instrument should be negotiated and the level on which the French Committee be granted the right of ultimate appeal in the event of controversial issues.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Encl.

TOP SECRET
Copy for White House Files
AGREEMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF FRENCH FORCES

Article 1.

United States View

The Combined Chiefs of Staff on the one hand,

British View

The Governments of the United States of America and

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on the one hand,

and the French Committee of National Liberation on the other hand,

are agreed upon conditions set forth below with regard to the employ-

ment in the struggle against the common enemy in collaboration with

the American and British forces and under a common command of French

forces of land and air, hereinafter referred to by the term "French

forces". The policy for the employment of French Naval and Naval Air

Forces will continue under existing Combined Chiefs of Staff Direc-
tives (C.C.S. 358 series) subject to such modifications as the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff may make from time to time.

Article 2.

The French Committee of National Liberation agrees that

the inter-allied body responsible for drawing up and execution of

strategical plans, including plans for the use of the whole of the

French forces earmarked for inter-allied operations, shall be the

organization known as the "Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington"
to whom the French Committee of National Liberation shall delegate

its powers in this respect. Similarly, the French Committee of

National Liberation agrees that military command in each theater,

shall be exercised by a Commander in Chief, designated by the

Combined Chiefs of Staff, who will be responsible for security and

the control of all movement and all forms of transportation within

his theater. The French Military Command shall be represented by

liaison officers at the Headquarters of the Commanders in Chief.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff will keep the French Military
commander of French forces operating under an Allied Command in
Command informed of their general plans involving the use of French
forces. The French Committee of National Liberation are entitled to
for reporting his situation and requirements direct to the general
appoint in Washington a representative to make known its views on
the French Military Command immediately superior to him, subject to
this subject to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the event of the
French High Command being unable to accept plans affecting French
French forces, points of disagreement should be in the first instance,
and provided that this right should not be exercised in a manner
likely to jeopardize current or intended operations, be discussed
between the French High Command and

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<th>United States View</th>
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<td>Allied theater commanders.</td>
<td>the Combined Chiefs of Staff.</td>
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<td>If agreement cannot be reached on this military level, the French</td>
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| Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject | United States and British Govern-
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Article 3.

The Allied Command shall endeavor to every possible extent
to respect the organic lines of the French units both large and
small which are placed at its disposal. The supply of equipment to
French forces will continue under existing arrangement, subject to
such modifications as the Combined Chiefs of Staff may make from
time to time. The French forces to be placed at the disposal of
Combined Chiefs of Staff is a matter for agreement between Combined
Chiefs of Staff and French Committee of National Liberation, it
being understood that the forces placed at the disposal of the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff will include all French forces which have been
rearmed and reequipped by the United States or Great Britain. The
commander of French forces operating under an Allied Commander in
Chief shall have the right and shall be given necessary facilities
for reporting his situation and requirements direct to the echelon
of French Military Command immediately superior to him, subject to
the cyphers employed being submitted for prior approval to the
British and United States authorities. The authority appointed by
French Committee of National Liberation shall be given every facility
for inspecting French forces in various theaters of operations.

Article 4.

The French forces shall be exclusively under the authority
of the French Commander in all matters pertaining to discipline, the
organization of troops and of various services, the assignment of
personnel and supplies, uniform, postal censorship, etc., within
framework of policy laid down by Allied Commander in Chief.
Arming of French Forces

On August 19, 1944 the British Embassy raised with the State Department the question of equipping adequate armed forces of the Western European Allies to enable them to maintain security in their own countries and to take part in the occupation of Germany.

The Netherlands Government has accepted in principle that the Dutch Army will be reequipped with British types of arms and, while desiring to avoid the appearance of competing with the United States, the British apparently desire to assume the same responsibility for rearming the Belgians, Norwegians and Danes. They suggest that during the next few years the equipping of the French Army should be carried out from American sources, not only because the French land forces are at present provided with American type equipment, but because it would be very difficult for the British to accept the added burden. The British conclude that if this Government is unwilling to accept the proposed commitment they will have to reconsider the situation.

Presumably the technical aspects of the question are being studied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to whom supporting figures have been furnished by the British. The financial ramifications will also require careful study.

Our present policy toward France is based on the belief that it is in the best interests of the United States that France resume her traditional position as a principal power, capable of playing a part in the occupation of Germany and in maintaining peace in Europe. The recruiting and equipping of French land forces would be a natural corollary of that policy, leaving for decision the question of the source from which the arms should be obtained and the quantity which should be provided.

It would seem advantageous to this country to have the rearming carried out from American sources. Politically it could be portrayed as a further evidence of American friendship for France and a proof of our desire
to see France restored to a strong position. American influence and prestige would be enhanced. Furthermore French reliance on the United States for arms would provide us with a lever which might enable us to exercise a certain measure of influence on French policy for a number of years. Conversely it is certain that, in their present highly nationalistic and aggressive frame of mind, the French will make every effort to obtain arms from one source or another. If they obtain them from a source other than the United States, they may be compelled to accept conditions of a political or other nature which run counter to American aims.

In making the above recommendation I have not failed to give careful consideration to the fact that British policy aims at forming, and playing the leading role in, a group of Western European countries, including France, and that one of the objects of the British Government in suggesting the rearming of France by the United States is thereby to create a link between this country and the Western European nations which might be useful to them in the future. This I believe is the primary and all important reason behind the British request and it may, of course, have important long-range strategic implications.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

In regard to your memorandum of August 26th on the subject of questions raised by Lord Halifax in reference to French Indo-China, I suggest this matter be deferred until after my meeting with the Prime Minister in Quebec.

The same thing applies to the Aide Memoire covering the French Committee's proposals. It should be remembered that in relation to (IV) participation in the planning of political warfare in the Far East involves one of the principal partners i.e. China.

F.D.R.
TO BE SHOWN TO ADMIRAL LEAHY
FOR HIS INFORMATION
BEFORE SENDING TO THE SECRETARY

Brown

Admiral Leahy

Memo H"ell
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 26, 1944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

There is attached herewith a copy of an aide-memoire left with the Department of State this morning by Lord Halifax in which the latter raises certain questions with regard to the French role in military operations in the Far East, with particular reference to French Indo-China.

The Ambassador stated that the question is of considerable urgency owing to Mr. Eden's desire to give an answer on two definite points before the latter leaves London on Tuesday, August 29. The two specific questions on which Mr. Eden desires to give an affirmative answer are:

(1) The attachment to the South East Asia Command Headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blaizot, and

(2) The establishment in India of a "Corps Leger d'Intervention" which apparently has already been established at Algiers.

Although these suggestions are ostensibly military in character, they have wide political implications and for this reason they are being referred to you for decision. If more time is needed for decision we can so inform Lord Halifax.

Enclosure:

Copy of aide-memoire from British Embassy.

Regraded Unclassified
TOP SECRET

His Majesty's Government have given consideration to a request by the French Committee of National Liberation that the French should take a more active part in the war against Japan.

2. In Brief, their proposals are:-

   (1) That a French Military Mission should be attached to the headquarters of South East Asia Command.

   (II) That French Forces should take a more active part in the war in the Far East.

   (III) That they should participate in the planning of the war against Japan.

   (IV) They should participate in the planning of political warfare in the Far East.

3. His Majesty's Government's views on the above proposals are as follows:-

   (I) The establishment of a French Military Mission with South East Asia Command would facilitate the work of SOE/OSS and would serve as the nucleus of the operational headquarters which may be required later. If the Mission is not accepted the French will probably concentrate on Chungking, where it would be harder to control them. The function of the Mission would be confined mainly to matters concerning Indo-China and it would not participate in questions of general strategy. It would therefore be much on the same basis as the Dutch and Chinese Missions attached to South East Asia Command.

   (II) The use of French land and air forces would stimulate resistance to the enemy among the French officials still in Indo-China, but with the administrative difficulties that would be involved now, His Majesty's Government think that the offer of these forces should only be accepted in the later stages of the war and on the understanding that they are made up of good and experienced fighting men. The French have also proposed the establishment in India of a "Corps Leger D'Intervention" composed, at the start of 500 men

Regraded Unclassified
500 men, and designed to operate exclusively in Indo-China on Japanese lines of communication. His Majesty's Government understand that the Corps Leger is in being at Algiers and they think that it should be accepted, provided it is properly handled and kept apart from regular military information.

(III) His Majesty's Government feel strongly that the French should take no part in military planning for the war against Japan until the detailed preparation of plans for the liberation of Indo-China is undertaken.

(IV) There would seem to be no objection in principle to French participation in political warfare in the areas in which the French are interested. This should be a matter for arrangement between South East Asia Command and the French Military Mission.

4. Lord Louis Mountbatten is prepared to accept the French Mission providing it is a small one consisting of a General, and, say, three other officers. He is also prepared to accept the Corps Leger and foresees considerable advantage in its employment.

5. The French are very keen to take their share in the war against Japan, and the Far East is the only area in which they are now not represented. The presence of Richelieu in Far Eastern waters means that they are already participating in fact if not in name.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were invited by the British members to concur in paragraph 3 in the early part of this month. No reply has, however, yet been received from the American members. Monsieur Massigli is pressing His Majesty's Government for a decision regarding the attachment to South East Asia Command headquarters of a French Military Mission under General Blairot and the establishment in India of a "Corps Leger d'Intervention" (see paragraph 3 (1) and (II) above. It is suggested that a decision could be taken regarding the "Corps Leger d'Intervention", whose numbers are small and whose activities correspond to those of American and British secret operations organisations, without prejudice to the wider question of from what source French forces operating in the Far East should be equipped. His Majesty's Government are particularly anxious to be able to give him an answer on these two points before he leaves London on August 29th.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
August 25th, 1944.
Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a memorandum giving the substance of my conversation with General de Gaulle. In addition, he went to great pains to ask me to present to you his compliments and highest regards, and to say that he felt deeply grateful for your hospitable and generous welcome.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President,
The White House.
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM:

18 August 1944

For: The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. James V. Forrestal.

Subject: General Charles de Gaulle; conference with.

After the usual exchange of greetings you asked the General what was the attitude in France with respect to the war in the Pacific. The General replied roughly as follows:

There is no question that the people of France are interested first in the war against Germany. They are concentrating on the liberation of France. However, once that has been accomplished, they will wish to join their Allies in the war against Japan. The loss of Indochina can hardly be considered a glorious episode for any one concerned. France is anxious to redeem herself.

You then asked the General what were his ideas for the post-war solution of the German problem. The essence of the General’s reply was as follows:

Germany cannot be destroyed. The German people, some 70,000,000 in number, are a strong, vital people and it is not feasible nor desirable to attempt to segregate them into isolated groups or to create separate entities out of Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Saxony, etc. The problem must therefore be approached on a factual basis and with regard for the safety of France. It must be remembered that France fought the War of 1870 alone; that France was very nearly defeated in the 1914-1918 War and suffered great losses in men and tremendous damage to property; and that in this war France was defeated and suffered enormous losses. The French people feel instinctively that they cannot stand another war with Germany. Accordingly it is essential that the French people be given adequate guarantees to prevent such a calamity.
The first step in the neutralization of Germany is the demilitarization of the Ruhr Valley and the exploitation thereof for the use of Europe and the world. In this fashion the mineral resources of the Ruhr will be devoted, not to the military aggrandizement of Germany, but to the economic evolution of a world at peace.

The Ruhr Valley must be included in a State to include the Rhineland, which must be occupied indefinitely by troops of the United Nations. Past wars with Germany have revolved around the Rhine as a frontier. The Rhine must, by the formation of a Rhine State, be converted from a frontier into a great commercial artery, which is what it intrinsically is.

To the east of Germany it is important to make certain concessions to Poland. These concessions impose themselves also because of the probability that Vilna and Lwow will fall within the Russian orbit. Accordingly, a surgical operation must be performed on East Prussia, which should be absorbed by Poland. The Danzig Corridor should once and for all be obliterated.

At this point you interjected that you had heard a remark that the peace must be predicated neither on sentiment nor on vengeance. The General agreed with this and said as follows:

It was idle to try to prevent the population of the Ruhr and the Rhine from talking German, or to keep them from their own culture.

There is no reason, of course, the General said, why Austria should be included within the borders of Germany. Austria, traditionally and temperamentally, is a separate power.

The General then recalled the speech delivered by President Roosevelt on the occasion of his return from his most recent trip. The President remarked on the national need for certain islands, certain bases for the security of the U.S. This, said the General, is the position of France. She has need of certain specific guarantees in order to protect herself. Those are the needs which are factual and which should determine France's attitude. For an attitude founded on the sentiment or emotion of the moment is as unstable as those sentiments and those emotions themselves.

The General emphasized the fact that France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and, collaterally, Great Britain, must form an economic group and that this group could then act as a counterweight to Russia. He stated that it must not be forgotten to what extent he had stood alone in 1940 and how many Frenchmen had been willing to follow Marshal Petain.
Unless the Democracies will make effective guarantees of peace in Europe, who can tell what protection the French people will seek in 5, 10, or 15 years time in order to avoid another war.

There is one, only one major power, said the General, with which France has never fought a war, and that is the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. and France are the only two major powers with no imperialistic aspirations; they are animated by a common ideal. It appears, therefore, most fitting that there should be between France and the U.S. perhaps not an alliance, but an entente. There are some who think that Great Britain can fill this position, but the General feels that this is not so. In the first place, Great Britain, not being really a continental power, has her attention constantly distracted from Europe by the needs of her Empire. In the second place, there are many points at which the interests of France and Great Britain conflict. In the third place Great Britain and France are too near each other to be able to achieve that solidarity which can be achieved between France and the U.S.

The French get along with the Russians and could easily make effective agreements with them, but there are many places where the French and the Russians never meet and the Russian is so very different from the Frenchman that a complete entente is thereby rendered more difficult. But with the U.S., France has a great community of interests and a common ideal.

It must be borne in mind, said the General, that there is at present a great recrudescence of the national spirit in France and a vital hope for the future. This spirit, this hope must be fostered and encouraged and not be allowed to falter for lack of adequate support.

You then inquired of the General to what extent there were Communists in France. The General replied that:

There were no Communists in the sense that Lenin and Trotsky were Communists; that is to say, there are no Communists who preach equal division of wealth, the rule of the proletariat, and other familiar Communist preachings. Instead you have a group of individuals who call themselves Communists, who are seeking for disciples and who are talking about the War, the Peace, Justice and Liberty.
Indeed, the Russians themselves are no longer Communists in the way that they were at the start of the Russian Revolution. They now have Marshals and an increasing hierarchy which gives evidence of this change.

He said, of course, that it was impossible to determine at this juncture to what extent there is Communism in France and he stressed the fact that the extent to which Communism developed in France would depend on the guarantees given and the help furnished by France's Allies.

You then asked the General what solution he had to quiet the widespread fears in America that a Russian menace would be substituted for a German menace. The General replied somewhat as follows:

Before answering this question, the General said that he must urge us not to repeat his answer to any one except the President of the U.S. or possibly one or two other preeminent personages:

Europe has been exhausted by this war. Europe has been impoverished, damaged and bled by this war; but Europe remains hard, resilient and strong. Europe still has a great capacity for suffering and for work. Europe still has great power of thought. World wars have emanated from Europe and they will continue to emanate from Europe. Consequently, Europe must not be excluded from peace talks and conferences. Great Britain is not, strictly speaking, an European nation. Neither is Russia. But there is no nation in Europe more European than France, and therefore it is of paramount importance to include France in all international conferences. Only in this way will France feel secure. Only in this way can a counterweight to Russian influence be created. France must be made strong and attractive; attractive to the smaller powers, so that, as was the case before the war, the smaller powers will gather around France and not seek to gather around some other powerful nation, such as Russia. As an example, the General referred to Yugoslavia where, roughly speaking, the Serbs followed Mihailovich and the Croats followed Tito. Had France not been defeated, France could have prevented this division and created solidarity in Yugoslavia.
You then informed the General that his recent trip to the U.S. had been a great success, and you recalled a remark which you had made at a gathering in honor of the General, that the American people, who had heard the General variously described as an ogre and an angel, had been very pleasantly surprised.

At this point the landings in Southern France were briefly discussed. The General stated that he had met Vice-Admiral Hewitt in Naples and had been very favorably impressed by him. This comment was heartily endorsed by you. You mentioned meeting Rear Admiral Lemormier and it was agreed that he had done a fine job.

Following this interchange you stated that you felt that you had taken enough of the General's time. The General protested and said that this type of conversation was a good thing. He stated that he was leaving that evening for Normandy. You stated that you would be there on Monday and that you hoped to see him.

We then arose and after the usual salutations left the General's Villa. The General stood at the door until our departure.

Respectfully,

/s/JOHN DAVIS LODGE
JOHN DAVIS LODGE,
Lieut. Comdr., U.S.N.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

In reference to the memorandum I sent you yesterday of a suggested letter to General de Gaulle about General Giraud, Admiral Leahy asked me to say that he thinks the last sentence of the first paragraph—"I do not believe that any of them covet great power or control of the processes of reconstruction"—should not be included as he thinks it might suggest the line of attack on the character of Giraud and others who have helped our armed forces.

WILSON BROWN.
August 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

The President wishes to consider writing a letter somewhat as follows:

Dear General de Gaulle,

I have been greatly shocked and distressed to learn of a recent attack on the life of General Giraud. My information about details is sketchy and I hope very much that his injuries may not prove to be serious. I am sending you this personal letter to urge in the interest of France and in the interest of continued cordial relations between our countries that every effort be made not only to safeguard the lives of all Frenchmen who have aided United States forces to help to liberate France, but also to assign to such Frenchmen some duties as a recognition of their service. In such a group it seems to me that General Giraud should deserve from our standpoint the greatest of consideration. I do not believe that any of them covet great power or control of the processes of reconstruction.

I send you this personal appeal in the hope that it may continue the good understanding we reached during our recent talks in Washington. I seize the opportunity to send you the felicitations of all of our citizens for the success of our united arms in the battle against our common enemy.

Cordially yours,
IMMEDIATE RELEASE

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
ON THE
LIBERATION OF PARIS

AUGUST 24, 1944

The joy that entered the hearts of all civilized men and women at the news of the liberation of Paris can only be measured by the gloom which settled there one June day four years ago when German troops occupied the French capital. Through the rising tide of Allied successes that patch of gloom remained and has only today been dispelled. For Paris is a precious symbol of that civilization which it was the aim of Hitler and his armed hordes to destroy. We rejoice with the gallant French people at the liberation of their capital and join in the chorus of congratulation to the Commanders and fighting men, French and Allied, who have made possible this brilliant presage of total victory.
August 31, 1944.

My dear Admiral Fenard,

I thank you for your recent letter in which you have done me the honor to express your profound joy at the deliverance of Paris; your appreciation of the assistance rendered by the United States; and the hope that our two countries shall continue to strive together for peace and liberty in the world. I can well understand the great joy that must come to you and to all other patriotic Frenchmen in the freeing of Paris, and in the rapid progress that our united arms are making to drive the enemy from French soil and to impose upon him the just punishment of an outraged world.

It is not necessary for me to tell you that I share with every American a sentiment of great satisfaction in the successful liberation of your nation.

With renewed expressions of esteem and affection, I remain,

Your friend,

Vice Admiral Raymond Fenard, F.M.,
French Naval Mission,
Washington, D.C.
Cher Monsieur le Président

À mon retour à Washington j'ai eu à

nous dire sans retard toute ma gratitude

pour la confiance que vous avez bien voulu

 mettre en moi.

Elle m'a permis d'être utile à mon pays

et m'a donné une joie que je ne pourrais être plus grande.

Je suis assuré réuni et suis convaincu

que l'avenir immédiat sera fécond en

 résultats fructueux.

Je me demande Monsieur le Président

de bien vouloir agréer l'assurance respectueuse

de mon dévouement le plus profond

et le plus reconnaissant.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. STEPHEN EARLY:

Hereewith is the proposed statement on the de Gaulle matter.

It has been approved by the State and Treasury Departments. We originally had in a reference to the Comité as the issuing authority for the currency but we decided to take it out for a number of reasons. It is probable that if this statement is put out you will be questioned on this point. If the question is raised, I think you can say that in accepting the Comité as the de facto authority you assume that this carries with it a recognition of the right of the Comité to issue currency.

Inc.

J.F. McC.
(It is understood that) the President is prepared, pending the free selection of a government by the French people, to accept the Comité as the de facto authority for the civil administration of France. In this respect it is believed that he is prepared to use as a base the drafts prepared by certain French and British officials. If the President, however, is firm as to the necessity of providing General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander with clear-cut authority to cause to be taken all steps which in his judgment are necessary to advance the military operations and to drive the Germans from French soil.

There is every indication that General de Gaulle has expressed himself in full agreement with these principles.
THE RECORD OF GENERAL DE GAULLE.

Throughout our dealings with General de Gaulle he has indicated very little interest in the defeat of the Axis. He has shown great zeal however in scheming to increase his own power, to eliminate rival Frenchmen and to force the world to recognize him as the ruler of the French Empire. A casual study of our files furnishes the following examples of his peculiar behavior:

(a) After our successful landings in North Africa in '42 General de Gaulle was invited to join with General Giraud and other Frenchmen who had helped us to drive out the Axis, in directing the civil and military affairs of North and West Africa. This invitation was issued in the hope of uniting all patriotic Frenchmen against the common enemy. The invitation was a generous one because de Gaulle had bungled his effort to occupy Dakar and had made bitter enemies among Frenchmen in North Africa. He had helped not at all in our successful landings. Instead of accepting with gratitude the opportunity offered him to take an active part in the war, de Gaulle haggled and bargained with Giraud, the Prime Minister, and the President of the United States as to the conditions under which he would consent to share control of French North and West Africa with Giraud and other Frenchmen. The tone of his communications at this time are reminiscent of exchanges between Crown heads of the Seventeenth Century, the divine right of kings and other ideologies for which this war is not being fought.

(b) Having finally agreed to join with Giraud, as co-presidents, and six members to constitute a Committee of Liberation, he first jockeyed
Giraud out of the co-presidency, later he deprived Giraud of the command of the French Armed Forces and finally forced him to retirement. This amazing maneuver forced to the sidelines Giraud, the patriot who had helped us secure our hold on North Africa, organized, equipped and trained a French Legion of North Africans, while de Gaulle, the man who had contributed nothing, usurped almost dictatorial powers. Part of his agreement was that he and the committee would be subject to the control of the Allied Commander in Chief in North Africa. This phase of the agreement was consistently ignored.

(c) In addition to eliminating Giraud, Boisson, Peyroutin, Flandin, and other Frenchmen who had helped us to land in Africa, were placed under arrest and threatened with trial for treason. A promise to delay trial until after the liberation of France was exacted only after the most insistent demands of the Allies. Boisson, the man who delivered Dakar to the Allies, is even now a close prisoner in Africa as are other Frenchmen who helped the Allied cause.

(d) Thanks to the ability of General Giraud and to the equipment provided by the United States and Great Britain for French troops, divisions of African troops have been organized and prepared for battle. Of these, divisions have distinguished themselves in the Italian campaign. It is rumored that General Juin, the Commander of French troops in Italy, instead of winning a high place in General de Gaulle's esteem by virtue of his victories, is on the black-list and will not be permitted to return to France. It will be interesting to see whether this rumor will prove to be correct.
(e) Soon after taking office in Algiers the so-called "Fighting French", presumably under de Gaulle's direction, began a recruiting campaign to take troops and sailors away from already existing units. This unwise policy seriously delayed the readiness of French forces for battle.

(f) The Committee of Liberation over which de Gaulle had established control suddenly and without warning to the Allied Commander in Chief or consultation with him, increased its membership from seven to fourteen. The time chosen for this act was such as to vitally affect the entire United States military position in North Africa. We were unable to precipitate a clash with the Committee of Liberation without sacrificing our plans for the occupation of Sicily.

(g) Throughout his time in Algiers General de Gaulle has carried on an active anti-United States propaganda campaign through the medium of the press. In addition he intrigued at every turn toward dissention within the Committee and between each of the various factions of the services. We have no record of General de Gaulle ever expressing gratitude for the sacrifices made by the United States in its efforts to defeat our enemies nor for any of the measures taken to rehabilitate the French Army and Navy and to feed the populace of the French territories.

(h) General de Gaulle's unwise and precipitate action against the Lebanon Government aroused a storm in the Arabian world that was quelled only by complete retrenchment. This unwise action again
threatened the entire Allied position in North Africa at a most critical period of the war.

(i) On various occasions General de Gaulle or his Committee interfered with the use of French troops in the manner that had been planned by the Allied Commander in Chief. These interruptions reached such a point that at one time we had to threaten not to provide any more arms for French troops and this threat alone was effective in enabling the Commander in Chief to carry out his war plans. In June of 1944 in a curt communication General de Gaulle informed the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean Theatre that he had no right to interest himself in the manner in which the manpower of French North Africa is utilized in the common war effort.

(j) General de Gaulle's recent disturbing behavior throughout the early stages of our landings in Normandy is too well known to require repetition here. His childish pique at the temporary security measures that suspended free intercourse with Africa; his refusal to broadcast on D-day when asked to do so; his refusal to allow French liaison officers to enter France as planned for months before; his denunciation of the Allied currency as counterfeit money: - all indicate what may be expected of him if he succeeds in obtaining world power.

Having the above record in mind, it is hard to understand why the British press and some of the American press are so insistent that American soldiers shall place de Gaulle in power over France and why this press attempts to convince the public that the welfare of France
and the people of France is synonymous with the recognition of de Gaulle as their accepted leader. It may be, of course, that France will make that choice and yet it seems probable that some of the Frenchmen who have remained in France and risked their lives to grant as little as possible to the enemy may not favor the selection of a Frenchman who throughout the sad days of occupation enjoyed the comparative comfort of England and with the sanction of the press became their self-appointed leader.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM:

To go into the Map Room DeGaulle file. This letter from J. Lemaigre Dubreuil presents the view of some patriotic Frenchmen in criticism of de Gaulle's political activities. He points out to DeGaulle that the major problem should be to drive the Germans from French soil rather than to sow discord and dissention among Frenchmen.

WILSON BROWN.
Copy for the President
General Helm, Eisenhower
Chief Civil Staff, approved
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached you will find a proposed agreement on civil affairs administration for France which we feel embodies the points necessary to carry out the principle of the proposed arrangement with the Comité. If it appears a bit cumbersome, it is due mostly to the fact that it is cast in the form of a revision of the British-French drafts. We thought it best to attack it this way rather than to make what would purport to be an entirely new draft.

Extensive changes have been made in those drafts to clarify the Supreme Commander's final authority in all military zones and his rights elsewhere to have such steps taken as will enable him to conduct his military operations. This revision also makes clear that the agreement is essentially temporary, pending the selection of a French Government by the free choice of the French people. The result is an agreement which, in content, is very much like the agreements on civil affairs which General Eisenhower recently entered into with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, except that this agreement is drawn on the theory that it is entered into with a de facto authority, rather than with a recognized government.

Like all of these agreements, this one contains a good deal of "boilerplate" dealing with such subjects as jurisdiction of courts, immunity from taxation, and requisitioning of supplies, all of which have been worked out and approved by the staffs as a result of our prior experience. These, I believe, you can disregard. The important part of the agreement is contained in the preamble and in Articles 1 through 5.

It is requested that we be authorized to clear this agreement on an official level with both the French and the British.

It is contemplated that this agreement would be signed by General Eisenhower on behalf of the United States. It is likely, however, that the British would want to sign any such agreement on the governmental level, as they did in the case of the agreements with Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. In either case the matter would proceed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff so that in the end General Eisenhower would have a combined directive in the same general form he had in the case of the other countries mentioned above.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND JURISDICTION
IN FRENCH TERRITORY LIBERATED BY AN ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.

The present agreement, relating to the administration and jurisdictional questions which will arise in the course of military operations for the Liberation of Metropolitan French Territory, is intended to be essentially temporary and practical. It is designed to facilitate as far as possible the accomplishment of the following common objectives:

(1) The speedy, total and final defeat of the Nazi invader, the restoration of the soil of France to the full sovereignty of the French people, and the resumption by a free France of her historic place among the nations of the world. To this end it is recognized that the Supreme Allied Commander must possess the necessary authority to ensure that all measures are taken which in his judgment are essential for the successful conduct of his operations.

(2) The free exercise by the French people at the earliest opportunity of their sovereign right to select a government of their own choice.

(3) That Civil Administration in France pending the full liberation of the country shall be exercised insofar as practicable exclusively by Frenchmen.

The agreed arrangements set forth herein are intended to further the accomplishment of these basic purposes and shall be interpreted in that light. They are based on the acceptance of the French Committee of National Liberation as the DE FACTO Authority which should assume the leadership and responsibility for the administration of civil affairs in the liberated areas of France. This status is based upon the continuing support which the Committee receives from the majority of Frenchmen who are fighting for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of France.

1. (i) Liberated French Metropolitan territory will be divided into two zones: a forward zone and an interior zone.

(ii) The forward zone will consist of the areas affected by active military operations and zones immediately adjacent thereto; the boundary between the forward zone and the interior zone will be fixed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (iv) below.

(iii) The interior zone will include all other regions in the liberated territory, whether or not they have previously formed part of the forward zone. In certain cases, having regard to the exigencies of operations, military zones may be created within the interior zone in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 (ii) below.

(iv) The delegate referred to in Article 2 below will, in agreement with the Supreme Allied Commander, effect the delimitation of the zones in accordance with French law. It is understood that this delimitation shall meet the requirements of military necessity, as determined by the Supreme Allied Commander, in regard to the extent of the forward zone.
2. (i) In accordance with Article 1 of the ordinance made by the French Committee of National Liberation on March 14th, 1944, a delegate will be appointed for the present theatre of operations. Other delegates may be appointed in accordance with the development of operations.

(ii) The delegate will have at his disposal an administrative organization, a military delegate and liaison officers for administrative duties. The delegate's task will be in particular to centralize and facilitate relations between the Allied Military Command and the French authorities.

(iii) When the powers conferred on the delegate by French law are transferred to higher French authorities, it will be for those authorities to execute the obligations of the delegate under this agreement.

3. In the forward zone:

(i) The delegate will take, in accordance with French law, the measures deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander, including the issuance of regulations and the making of appointments in and removals from the public service.

(ii) In emergencies affecting military operations or where no French authority is in a position to ensure the operation of the necessary administrative services, the Supreme Allied Commander may, as a temporary measure, take such measures as are required by military necessity.

(iii) At the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, the French military delegate will take such action under the powers of the state of siege in accordance with French law as may be necessary.

4. (i) In the interior zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefor, including the powers under the state of siege, will be entirely a matter for the French authorities. The competent French authorities will, at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, take such special measures for the conduct of military operations which he considers necessary.

(ii) Moreover, in accordance with Article 1 (iii) certain portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special regime on account of their vital military importance; for example, ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes, and troop concentration areas. The delimitation of these military zones shall be made by the delegate in agreement with the Supreme Allied Commander. It is understood that this delimitation shall meet the requirements of military necessity as determined by the Supreme Allied Commander. In the military zones the Supreme Allied Commander shall have the right to operate and control ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes, troop concentration areas, and such other facilities of military importance as in his opinion military necessity may require, and the French authorities will, at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander, take all measures for security and efficient operation which the latter considers necessary. The conduct of the territorial administration and the responsibility therefor will nevertheless be solely a matter for the French authorities.
5. The liaison officers referred to in Article 2 (ii) will be placed by the military delegate at the disposal of the French Administration and will ensure liaison between the said Administration and the Allied forces.

6. (i) Members of the French Armed Forces serving in French units with the Allied Forces in French territory will come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts. Other Frenchmen, who at the time of entering France as members of the Allied Forces are serving in conditions which make them subject to Allied Naval, Military and Air Force law, will not be regarded as members of the French Armed Forces for this purpose.

(ii) Persons who are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the French Authorities may, in the absence of such Authorities, be arrested by the Allied Military Police and detained by them until they can be handed over to the competent French Authorities.

7. (i) In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the delegate will make the necessary arrangements for ensuring the speedy trial, in competent French courts in the vicinity, of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offenses against the persons, property or security of the Allied Forces.

(ii) For this purpose the military delegate will place at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander military tribunals as laid down in the ordinance of June 6th, 1944. The Supreme Allied Commander will designate the military formations to which he wishes a military tribunal to be attached. The military delegate will immediately take the necessary measures to set up these tribunals accordingly. The Supreme Allied Commander will be kept informed of the result of the proceedings.

(iii) The above paragraphs (i) and (ii) are without prejudice to the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander in the forward zones under Article 3 (ii) of this agreement.

8. (i) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 12, Allied service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of their respective forces.

(ii) All persons of non-French nationality not belonging to the Allied Forces but who are employed by or who accompany those forces and are subject to Allied Naval, Military, or Air Force law, will for this purpose be regarded as members of the Allied Forces.

(iii) The Allied military authorities will keep the French authorities informed of the result of proceedings taken against members of the Allied Forces charged with offenses against persons subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of the French courts.

(iv) The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen of non-French nationality as are not subject to Allied service law will require special treatment and should form the subject of separate arrangements.
9. Persons who, in accordance with Article 8, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied service courts and authorities may however be arrested by the French Police for offenses against French law, and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied service authority. The procedure for handing over such persons will be a matter for local arrangements.

10. A certificate signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in Article 8 shall be conclusive.

11. The necessary arrangements will be made between the Allied military authorities and the competent French authorities to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and ensuring the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or French jurisdiction.

12. Should circumstances require provision to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-French members of the Allied Forces present in France, the Allied Governments concerned and the competent French authorities will consult together as to the measures to be adopted.

13. (i) The Allied Forces, their members and organizations attached to them, will be exempt from all direct taxes, whether levied for the state or local authorities. This provision does not apply to French nationals, nor, subject to the provisions of paragraph (iii) below to foreigners whatsoever their nationality, resident in France and recruited by the Allied Forces on the spot.

(ii) Articles imported by the Allied Forces or for their account, or by members of those forces within the limit of their personal needs or for the purposes of relief, will be exempt from customs duties and from all internal dues levied by the customs administration, except insofar as imported articles are re-sold later to the civilian population. In no event, however, shall taxes be levied on imported articles re-sold to the civilian population, if the result of such levy would be that the Government of the United States would bear the tax, directly or indirectly.

(iii) The application of the above provisions will form the subject of later negotiations, which, at the request of either party, may be extended to cover taxes which are not referred to in this Article.

14. The immunity from French jurisdiction and taxation resulting from Articles 8 and 13 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments, present in France in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Forces, as may from time to time be notified by the Allied military authorities to the competent French authority.

15. The respective Allied authorities will establish claims commissions to examine and dispose of any claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred in Metropolitan France against members of the Allied Forces concerned (other than members of the French Forces), exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy.
16. (i) The Allied Forces may obtain, within the limits of what is available, the supplies, facilities and services which they need for the common war effort.

(ii) In the forward zone, the Supreme Allied Commander may requisition labor, goods, the use of land and buildings, means of transport and other services necessary for military operations. Save in the exceptional case referred to in Article 3 (ii) above these requisitions shall be made in accordance with French law, in particular as regards prices, wages and forms of payment, and through the French authorities.

(iii) In the interior zone, the delegate will specify the administrative authorities who will be responsible for procuring for the Supreme Allied Commander the supplies, facilities, and services needed by the Allied Forces, decisions being taken by mutual agreement; nevertheless, the French authorities shall have the right of final decision, subject to their undertakings with regard to the conduct of the war. However, to the extent deemed necessary by the Supreme Allied Commander to support, maintain and supply his forces in the forward zone, he shall have the power to requisition civilian labor, billets, and supplies and make use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for the military needs of his command. Such requisitions will be effected where possible through French authorities and in accordance with French law.

(iv) The French and Allied Military Authorities shall jointly take the measures necessary to ensure that the provisions of this Article are carried out.

17. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of French Territory by the Allied Forces (for example, inland transport, disposition of booty, and the custody of enemy property) which are not dealt with in this memorandum or covered by other agreements shall form the subject of separate arrangements. In particular, special arrangements will be made under which the French Committee becomes the issuing authority for the supplemental franc currency, with appropriate arrangements to facilitate Allied military operations.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 7, 1944.

Attached is a proposed agreement on the issuance of supplemental French currency in France, under which the French Committee is treated as the issuing authority for such currency. This agreement contains appropriate safeguards so as not to prejudice in any way our military operations.

It is requested that we be authorized to clear this agreement on an official level with both the French and the British. You may wish to get General De Gaulle to give it his general approval.

It is contemplated that this agreement would be signed by General Eisenhower, as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces.
WHEREAS, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces is dealing with the French Committee of National Liberation as the de facto authority in France;

WHEREAS, in the military operations in France supplemental French franc currency is being used to fulfil the currency needs of the Allied Armed Forces;

NOW THEREFORE, in order to further such objectives, it is understood and agreed as follows between the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (hereinafter called the Commander) and the French Committee of National Liberation (hereinafter called the Authority):

(1) All such supplemental franc currency which has been and may be issued in France will be treated as having been issued by the Authority.

(2) The Commander may retain the supplemental franc currency in his possession on the date of this Agreement for use of the Allied Forces in France. The amount of such currency in his possession (including that held by his finance officers) and the amount held by Allied Troops or otherwise put into circulation totals as of the date of this Agreement.

(3) All supplemental franc currency, which is not now in circulation or which is not now in the possession of the Commander, shall be placed in circulation or made available to the Commander only by the Authority.

(4) The Authority will promptly make available to the Commander upon his request additional French franc currency in such amounts, of such types, at such times and at such places as the Commander states may be necessary for the use of the Allied Forces in France.

(5) Records and accounts will be maintained by the Commander which will reflect the transactions effected hereunder and the uses which are made of the French franc currency furnished hereunder. Such records and accounts will be made available for inspection at reasonable times by such liaison officer or officers as may be mutually agreed upon by the Commander on the one hand and the Authority on the other.
(6) If it should become essential in the conduct of military operations to cause currency other than the French franc currency furnished hereunder to be used, such currency shall only be used with the approval of the Commander and after consultation with the Authority.

(7) Any dollar or sterling payment arrangements which may be made with the Authority in connection with the costs arising out of operations or activities in France, including pay of troops on the one hand and payment for civilian supplies on the other, shall be negotiated separately by the United States Government and the British Government.
WHEREAS, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces is dealing with the French Committee of National Liberation as the de facto authority in France;

WHEREAS, in the military operations in France supplemental French franc currency is being used to fulfil the currency needs of the Allied Armed Forces;

NOW THEREFORE, in order to further such objectives, it is understood and agreed as follows between the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (hereinafter called the Commander) and the French Committee of National Liberation (hereinafter called the Authority):

(1) All such supplemental franc currency which has been and may be issued in France will be treated as having been issued by the Authority.

(2) The Commander may retain the supplemental franc currency in his possession on the date of this Agreement for use of the Allied Forces in France. The amount of such currency in his possession (including that held by his finance officers) and the amount held by Allied Troops or otherwise put into circulation totals as of the date of this Agreement.

(3) All supplemental franc currency, which is not now in circulation or which is not now in the possession of the Commander, shall be placed in circulation or made available to the Commander only by the Authority.

(4) The Authority will promptly make available to the Commander upon his request additional French franc currency in such amounts, of such types, at such times and at such places as the Commander states may be necessary for the use of the Allied Forces in France.

(5) Records and accounts will be maintained by the Commander which will reflect the transactions effected hereunder and the uses which are made of the French franc currency furnished hereunder. Such records and accounts will be made available for inspection at reasonable times by such liaison officer or officers as may be mutually agreed upon by the Commander on the one hand and the Authority on the other.
(6) If it should become essential in the conduct of military operations to cause currency other than the French franc currency furnished hereunder to be used, such currency shall only be used with the approval of the Commander and after consultation with the Authority.

(7) Any dollar or sterling payment arrangements which may be made with the Authority in connection with the costs arising out of operations or activities in France, including pay of troops on the one hand and payment for civilian supplies on the other, shall be negotiated separately by the United States Government and the British Government.

i. Memorandum No. II relating to currency not mutual aid.
ii. Memorandum No. III relating to property in Metropolitan France.
iii. Memorandum No. IV relating to publicity arrangements.
iv. Agreed minute regarding the distribution of relief supplies for the civil population in liberated Metropolitan France.

b. Copies of these telegrams should be given to Ambassador and to Treasury representative, but should not yet be shown or given to any American.

c. Foreign Office will send instructions to Embassy in due course as to how these documents are to be handled with the Americans. In the meanwhile no action of any kind should be taken.

T.O.S. 0121055

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Regraded Unclassified
COPY NO. 6

TO: Joint Staff Mission.
From: War Cabinet Offices.
Dated: 1st July, 1944.

O.T.P.
SECRET

NOS 227

1. At request of Foreign Office, we send you in our six immediately following telegrams the following documents prepared by Anglo-French Committee of officials, F.O. Telegram No. 24 Citizen to Algiers, repeated as No. 172 Citizen to Washington refers.

   Mod 228 = Covering Minute by Sir Henry MacGeagh and M. Vienot.
   Mod 229 = Memorandum No. I relating to administrative and jurisdictional questions.
   Mod 230 = Memorandum No. II relating to currency and mutual aid.
   Mod 231 = Memorandum No. III relating to property in Metropolitan France.
   Mod 232 = Memorandum No. IV relating to publicity arrangements.
   Mod 233 = Agreed minute regarding the distribution of relief supplies for the civil population in liberated Metropolitan France.

2. Copies of these telegrams should be given to Ambassador and to Treasury representative, but should not yet be shown or given to any American.

3. Foreign Office will send instructions to Embassy in due course as to how these documents are to be handled with the Americans. In the meanwhile no action of any kind should be taken.

   T.O.O. 012105Z

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COD NO. 228

Covering minute (dated 30 June 1944) by Sir Henry MacGeagh and M. Vienot. BEGINS:

The discussions which have taken place between the British and French Delegations, over which we have respectively presided, and in which other experts have assisted, have resulted in the attached three memoranda of agreement:

Memorandum No. I relating to administrative jurisdictional questions (Nod 239).

Memorandum No. II relating to currency and mutual aid (NOD 230).

Memorandum No. III relating to property in Metropolitan France (Nod 231).

The text is also attached of an agreed minute (Nod 233) regarding the distribution of relief supplies for the civil population in liberated Metropolitan France.

At the request of the French Delegation discussions have also taken place relating to publicity arrangements. This question was discussed by a separate Anglo-French Committee which reached an agreement upon the memorandum No. IV relating to publicity arrangements, the text of which is also attached (Nod 232).

In accordance with our terms of reference, we hereby jointly submit the accompanying texts for consideration by the authorities concerned.

(Initialized) H.M. P.V.

ENDS.

T.O.O. 012115z

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Memorandum No. 1 relating to Administrative and Jurisdictional Questions.

The present agreement, relating to the administrative and jurisdictional questions which will arise in the course of military operations for the liberation of Metropolitan French territory, is intended to be essentially temporary and practical. It is designed to facilitate as far as possible the task of the Allied Commander-in-Chief and to further the common purpose, namely the speedy expulsion of the Germans from France and the final victory. It will provide the means for the direction and coordination of the assistance which the French authorities and people will be able to render to the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Metropolitan territory liberated by those forces, and the adoption in that territory of all measures necessitated by the military operations.

1. In areas affected by active military operations the necessity is recognised for the Allied Commander-in-Chief to possess the necessary authority to ensure that all measures are taken which in his judgment are essential for the successful conduct of his operations. The necessary arrangements for this purpose are set out in Articles 2 to 6 below.

2. (1) Liberated French Metropolitan territory will be divided into two zones: a forward zone and an interior zone.

   (ii) The forward zone will consist of the areas affected by active military operations referred to in Article 1; the boundary between the forward zone and the interior zone will be fixed in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (iv) below.

   (iii) The interior zone will include all other regions in the liberated territory, whether or not they have previously formed part of the forward zone. In certain cases, having regard to the exigencies of operations, military zones may be created within the interior zone in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 (ii) below.

   (iv) The delegate referred to in Article 3 below will, in agreement with the Allied Commander-in-Chief, effect the delimitation of the zones in accordance with French law. It is understood that this delimitation shall meet the requirements of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, as dictated by military necessity, in regard to the extent of the forward zone.
3. (i) In accordance with Article 1 of the ordinance made by the French Committee of National Liberation on March 14th 1944 a delegate will be appointed for the present theatre of operations. Other delegates may be appointed in accordance with the development of operations.

(ii) The delegate will have at his disposal an administrative organization, a military delegate and liaison officers for administrative duties. The delegate's task will be in particular to centralize and facilitate relations between the Allied Military Command and the French Authorities.

(iii) When the powers conferred on the delegate by French law are transferred to higher French authorities, it will be for those authorities to execute the obligations of the delegate under this agreement.

4. In the forward zone:

(i) It will be for the delegate to take, in accordance with French law, the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of Article I and in particular to issue regulations and to make appointments in the public services.

(ii) In exceptional cases, where no French authority is in a position to ensure the operation of the administrative services, the Commander-in-Chief may, as a temporary measure and pending the designation of a French authority by the delegate, take such urgent measures as are required by military necessity.

(iii) The powers under the state of siege will be exercised by the Allied Commander-in-Chief through the French military delegate in accordance with French law.

5. (i) In the interior zone the conduct of the administration of the territory and responsibility therefor, including the powers under the state of siege, will be entirely a matter for the French Authorities. Special arrangements will be made between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the competent French authorities in order that all measures necessary for the conduct of military operations may be taken.

(ii) Moreover, in accordance with Article 3(iii) and by agreement between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the delegate, certain portions of the interior zone (known as military zones) may be subjected to a special regime on account of their vital military importance, for example ports, fortified naval areas, aerodromes and troop concentration areas. In the military zones, the Allied Commander-in-Chief may request the French authorities to take all measures resulting from the state of siege which he considers necessary. The conduct of the territorial administration and the responsibility therefor will nevertheless be solely a matter for the French authorities.

6. The liaison officers referred to in Article 3(ii) will be placed by the military delegate at the disposal of the French Administration, and will ensure liaison between the said Administration and the Allied forces.

7. (i) Members of the French Armed Forces serving in French units with the Allied forces in French territory will come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the French courts. Other Frenchmen,
who at the time of entering France as members of the Allied Forces are serving in conditions which make them subject to Allied Naval, Military or Air Force law, will not be regarded as members of the French Armed Forces for this purpose.

(ii) Persons who are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the French Authorities may, in the absence of such Authorities, be arrested by the Allied Military Police and detained by them until they can be handed over to the competent French Authorities.

8. (i) In the exercise of jurisdiction over civilians, the delegate will make the necessary arrangements for ensuring the speedy trial, in competent French courts in the vicinity, of such civilians as are alleged to have committed offenses against the persons, property or security of the Allied forces.

(ii) For this purpose the military delegate will place at the disposal of the Allied Commander-in-Chief military tribunals as laid down in the ordonnance of June 5th 1944. The Allied Commander-in-Chief will designate the military formations to which he wishes a military tribunal to be attached. The military delegate will immediately take the necessary measures to set up these tribunals accordingly. The Allied Commander-in-Chief will be kept informed of the result of the proceedings.

9. (i) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 13, Allied Service courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of their respective forces.

(ii) British (or American) nationals not belonging to such forces who are employed by or who accompany those forces, and are subject to Allied Naval, Military or Air Force law, will for this purpose be regarded as members of the Allied forces. The same will apply to such persons, if possessing the nationality of another Allied state provided that they were not first recruited in any French territory. If they were so recruited they will be subject to French jurisdiction in the absence of other arrangements between the authorities of their state and the French Authorities.

(iii) The Allied military authorities will keep the French Authorities informed of the result of proceedings taken against members of the Allied forces charged with offenses against persons subject to the ordinary jurisdiction of the French courts.

(iv) The question of jurisdiction over such merchant seamen of non-French nationality as are not subject to Allied Service law will require special treatment and should form the subject of separate arrangements.

10. Persons who, in accordance with Article 9, are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Allied Service courts and authorities may however be arrested by the French Police for offenses against French law, and detained until they can be handed over for disposal to the appropriate Allied Service authority. The procedure for handing over such persons will be a matter for local arrangements.

11. A certificate signed by an Allied officer of field rank or its equivalent that the person to whom it refers belongs to one of the classes mentioned in Article 9 shall be conclusive.

12. The necessary arrangements will be made between the Allied military authorities and the competent French Authorities to provide machinery for such mutual assistance as may be required in making investigations, collecting evidence, and ensuring the attendance of witnesses in relation to cases triable under Allied or French jurisdiction.

13. Should circumstances require provision to be made for the exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters over non-French members of the Allied
forces present in France, the competent French Authorities will consult the Allied military authorities regarding the measures to be adopted.

14. (i) The Allied forces, their members and organizations attached to them, will be exempt from all direct taxes, whether levied for the state or local authorities. This provision does not apply to French nationals, nor, subject to the provisions of paragraph (iii) below to foreigners whatsoever their nationality, resident in France and recruited by the Allied forces on the spot.

(ii) Articles imported by the Allied forces or for their account, or by members of these forces within the limit of their personal needs, will be exempt from customs duties and from all internal dues levied by the customs administration, except insofar as imported articles are re-sold later to the civilian population.

(iii) The application of the above provisions will form the subject of later negotiations, which, at the request of either party, may be extended to cover taxes which are not referred to in this Article.

15. The immunity from French jurisdiction and taxation resulting from Articles 9 and 14 will extend to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments, present in France in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied forces, as may from time to time be notified by the Allied military authorities to the competent French authority.

16. (i) The respective Allied authorities will establish claims commissions to examine and dispose of any claims for compensation for damage or injury preferred in Metropolitan France against members of the Allied forces concerned (other than members of the French forces), exclusive of claims for damage or injury resulting from enemy action or operations against the enemy.

(ii) If the claims commission concerned is unable to settle any claim referred to it, the matter shall be referred to the competent French Authority, who will deal with it as if the claim were one preferred against a member of the French military forces. The Allied Authorities concerned agree to accept liability in respect of any claim so referred to the French authority in the same way and to the same extent to which the French Government would be liable in similar circumstances for damage or injury caused by a member of the French Armed Forces.

(iii) The competent Allied and French Authorities will later discuss and determine the detailed arrangements necessary for examining and disposing of the claims referred to in this Article and the machinery for referring contested cases to the competent French Authority.

17. (i) The Allied forces may obtain, within the limits of what is available, the supplies, facilities and services which they need for the common war effort.

(ii) In the forward zone, the Allied Commander-in-Chief may requisition labour, good, the use of land and buildings, means of transport and other services necessary for military operations. Save in the exceptional case referred to in Article 4(ii) above these requisitions shall be made in accordance with French law, in particular as regards prices, wages and forms of payment, and through the French Authorities.

(iii) In the interior zone, the delegate will specify the administrative authorities who will be responsible for procuring for the Allied Commander-in-Chief the supplies, facilities and services needed by the Allied forces, decisions being taken by mutual agreement; nevertheless, the French Authorities shall have the right of final decision, subject to their undertakings with re
regard to the conduct of the war.

(iv) In exceptional cases, especially when it is a matter of small quantities of supplies, facilities and services the Allied forces may procure these by direct purchase made in accordance with current French prices and wages.

(v) The French and Allied Military Authorities shall jointly take the measures necessary to ensure that the provisions of this Article are carried out.

18. Other questions arising as a result of the liberation of French territory by the Allied forces (for example, inland transport) which are not dealt with in this memorandum or covered by other agreements shall form the subject of separate arrangements. In particular, special arrangements will be made to secure the observation by the Allied forces of the French regulations concerning the exchange of currency and export of capital.
Memorandum No. II relating to Currency and Mutual Aid.

1. Subject to Articles 2 and 7 below, the provisions of the Protocol of Mutual Aid between the Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Committee of National Liberation signed at Algiers on February 8th, 1944, shall apply to Metropolitan France. For this purpose the French Armed Forces shall be such French forces wherever constituted, including the French forces of the Interior.

2. (i) The competent British and French authorities shall consult together immediately to determine the modifications and adjustments of the provisions of the above mentioned Protocol which are necessary in order to adapt the said provisions to the circumstances and conditions in Metropolitan France. Whilst each party retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own potentialities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, in pursuance of the common plans for winning the war.

   (ii) Whenever, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of Memorandum No. I, the British Armed Forces procure supplies, facilities and services as mutual aid within Metropolitan France, by way of requisition or direct purchase, payment will be made:

      (a) By the French Authorities for articles requisitioned;

      and

      (b) By the British Armed Forces for articles directly purchased, in which case they will use the funds in French currency placed at their disposal in accordance with Article 3 of this Agreement.

3. (i) The competent French Authorities will place at the disposal of the British War Office such funds in French currency as are required in Metropolitan France by the British Armed Forces. The detailed application of this paragraph will be settled by an agreed exchange of letters.

   (ii) No reimbursement shall be made by the Government of the United Kingdom of any funds provided in accordance with paragraph (i) above and used for the procurement of supplies, facilities or services which would normally be provided by the French Authorities as mutual aid.

   (iii) In so far as such funds are used for the pay, allowance and other emoluments of the British Armed Forces in Metropolitan France the Government of the United Kingdom shall set aside quarterly to the credit of the competent French Authorities in London the sterling equivalent of the funds so used. The
Government of the United Kingdom shall also set aside the sterling equivalent of such funds as are used for other purposes which do not fall within the scope of paragraph (ii) above.

(iv) On the termination of this Agreement, the British War Office shall return to the competent French Authorities any such funds which have not been used.

4. In order that the satisfaction of the local requirements of the British Armed Forces may have the least possible disruptive effect on the economy of France, the British Military authorities and the French Authorities will consult together, whenever operations permit, as to the stores and supplies which British Army Procurement Agencies and individual officers and men are permitted to obtain locally. The British Military Authorities will place such restrictions as are agreed to be necessary on purchases, whether by agencies or troops.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom undertake to replace or to refund in sterling the cost of any articles requisitioned or purchased with francs by the British Armed Forces, which require replacement from abroad. This does not apply to component parts or component material.

6. In order to facilitate financial settlements between the United Kingdom and France, a separate agreement will be concluded at the appropriate time to govern the monetary agreements between the two countries.

7. This Agreement shall be regarded as having come into force on June 6th, 1944.

T.O.O. 012035Z

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MEMORANDUM NO. III RELATING TO PROPERTY IN METROPOLITAN FRANCE.

1. (i) War material falling into the hands of forces operating under the command of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, shall subject to the provisions of para. (iii) below, be excluded from the operation of the succeeding articles of this memorandum, but in disposing of such war material the Allied Commander-in-Chief will take into account any representations made to him by the competent French Authorities. The French Authorities will be responsible for accounting, as may be necessary, to the other United Nations for all such war material handed over to them by the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

(ii) The term "war material" means any arms, equipment or other property whatsoever belonging to, used by or intended for use by any enemy military or para-military formations or any members thereof in connection with their operations.

(iii) The Allied Commander-in-Chief may release any war material as defined in paragraph (ii) above and not required by him, in which case it shall be treated in accordance with the succeeding Articles of this memorandum. Where he requires any such war material, other than arms, which prima facie appears to the French Authorities to have been in French private ownership, it shall be requisitioned in accordance with Article 17 of Memorandum No. I.

2. The Allied Commander-in-Chief shall, as soon as practicable, release all property which comes into the hands of the forces operating under his command in Metropolitan France, and the competent French Authorities shall then resume in respect thereof their normal administrative functions and powers.

3. The French Authorities will accept responsibility for the protection and, in the event of the owner or his accredited agent not being present, the administration of any property referred to in Article 2 above which is not in public or private French ownership, and does not belong to any state or national of a state with which any of the United Nations has been at war at any time since the 1st September, 1939.

4. The French Authorities will assume responsibility for the custody, in accordance with French law, of any property referred to in Article 2 above, which belongs to any state or national of a state with which any of the United Nations has been at war at
any time since the 1st September 1939. It is understood that the French Authorities will be responsible for account, as may be necessary, to the other United Nations for all property referred to in this Article.

5. Nothing in this memorandum shall affect the right of the Allied Commander-in-Chief to requisition any property in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of Memorandum No. I.

6. Nothing in this memorandum shall affect the arrangements already agreed between the competent British and French Authorities concerning the use and disposal of vessels captured or found by Allied forces in the course of operations for the liberation of Europe.
MEMORANDUM No. IV RELATING TO PUBLICITY ARRANGEMENTS.

1. The functions, which at the beginning of the war were exercised by the French Information Commissariat in respect of all that concerns publicity in France (press, radio, cinema, news agencies), will be exercised in liberated Metropolitan France by the French Services designated for the purpose by the delegate referred to in Article 3 of Memorandum No. I.

2. (i) In the forward zone the Allied Commander-in-Chief will exercise the right of strictly military censorship of the press, radio, cinema, news agencies and in general all publications.

   (ii) In the interior zone the French Services will consult the censorship authorities of the Allied Commander-in-Chief on all matters relating to military operations and will carry out the military censorship instructions communicated by him.

3. Newspapers and publications intended for Allied troops other than French shall not be subjected to any control resulting from the application of Article 1, except in cases where such newspapers or publications are distributed or sold to the French public.

4. Equipment used or intended for use by the various organs of publicity enumerated in Article 1 above, e.g. premises, plant, supplies etc., will not be requisitioned by the Allied Commander-in-Chief except on grounds of urgent military necessity or by agreement in each case between the delegate and the Allied Commander-in-Chief or their representatives.

5. The French Services responsible for publicity will facilitate in every possible manner the task of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. They will be instructed to collaborate with him in regard to the issue of notices to the population necessitated by the conduct of operations or by the security requirements of the Allied forces or of the population itself.

T.O.O. 01214OZ

DGN distribution
TO: Joint Staff Mission.
From: War Cabinet Offices.
Dated: 1st July, 1944.

O.T.P. 

SECRET 

K.O.D. 233. 

Agreed Minute regarding the Distribution of Relief Supplies for the Civil Population in Liberated Metropolitan France.

The French Delegation have requested that Memorandum No. I should provide that:

(a) The places where the French Administration take over supplies imported for the civil population, and the arrangements for this purpose, shall be determined by agreement between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the delegate.

(b) From the moment of taking over these supplies, the French Administration shall be responsible for their distribution to the civil population.

The British Delegation are able to state that they agree in principle that the detailed distribution of relief supplies in liberated Metropolitan France should be handled by the French Administration. Detailed arrangements for this purpose would, of course, be made after consultation between the Allied Commander-in-Chief and the delegate. It is recognized, however, that military necessity may in certain circumstances require that relief supplies are distributed direct to the civil population by the Allied Military Authorities.

In view, however, of the fact that a large proportion of the civil relief supplies imported into France by the Allied Commander-in-Chief will come from sources other than British, the competent British authorities do not feel that it would be appropriate to include the provisions proposed by the French Delegation in Memorandum No. I.

T.O.O. 6121452

DON
Distribution
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

6 July 1944

MEMORANDUM

From: Op-16-FA-3
To: Op-13 (Attn: Comdr. Gary)
Via: (1) Op-16-F

Subj: Biographical Notes on General de Gaulle's Party
Accompanying him to the United States.

Encl: (A) Biographical Notes.

1. Enclosure (A) contains biographical notes concerning the following men who are reportedly accompanying General de Gaulle on his trip to the United States.

   Lieut. Gen. Marie Emile Bethouart
   Lieut. Comdr. Charles de Levis Mirepoix
   Lieut. Col. de Rancourt de Hiberand
   Gaston Palewski
   Jacques Camille Georges Paris
   Herve Alphand
   Jean Baube
   Captain L. Teyssot
   Andre La Guerre
   Lieut. Col. Hartemann

2. It is emphasized that much of these data are of a nature which cannot be confirmed.

   L. A. Abercrombie

CC: Naval Aides to the President
Lt. Gen. Marie-Félix Béthouart

He is at present Chief of Staff of National Defense, and as such, issues orders to the heads of the land, sea and air forces. His position corresponds in a measure to that of the head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He was born in Dole, Jura, France, although his family originally came from Picardy. He has a sister living in Marseilles and his mother-in-law was last reported living in the Cévennes in France. His son was at Saint Cyr military academy in November 1942, at the time of the North African landings, and he has had no word of him since that time. He is in his early fifties, and a graduate of the French military academy of Saint Cyr. He served with distinction in the First World War 1914-1918 when he was wounded and won the Decoration of a Chevalier d'Honneur for heroism. Between the two wars he served in various assignments with troops and the French General Staffs including special duties in Finland and Norway, and a tour as military attache to Yugoslavia.

General Béthouart was in command of the French Expeditionary Forces at Narvik in the spring of 1940, fought with bravery and was made Honorary G.B. by King George VI. His feats at Narvik were one of the few bright spots in French military history at the beginning of this war.

General Béthouart was an early admirer of General de Gaulle and was with him in London. However, after the French Armistice, he reportedly could not agree with General de Gaulle and is reported to have said he preferred to wait until the fight against the enemy could be resumed in North Africa. He went to Rabat where he stayed six months. In January 1942, he was given command of a Division at Casablanca and at the same time became a member of the Armistice Commission in Morocco. He was made head and used this position to resist Axis encroachments in Morocco. He assisted the Allies before the North African landings. He was arrested by order of General Nogues for leading a pro-Allied revolt, was condemned to death but saved by the armistice signed between the Allies and the North African French.

General Giraud, after the North African landings made him his chief liaison officer and he was appointed head of the French Military Mission in Washington to coordinate the movement of equipment and supplies to the troops of the French Army. General Giraud was setting about building up. He was well liked and most successful as head of this mission until his replacement by General Beynet in November 1943 at which time he returned to North Africa. Well liked by General Giraud and respected by General de Gaulle, he is believed to have been very instrumental in mediating between the two generals. As a mediator he is said to have shown great tact and discretion in persuading General Giraud to accept virtual retirement on the active reserve when he was ousted by General de Gaulle as Commander in Chief.

Although on intimate terms with General de Gaulle, General Béthouart is far from being an original Gaullist. A year ago he was reported not to believe that de Gaulle had the following in France proper that was widely believed in the United States. He never admired the colleagues with whom General de Gaulle has surrounded himself and dislikes particularly New York de Gaullists.

Enclosure (A)
Lieutenant General Marie-Emile Bethouart

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He admires General de Gaulle but reportedly does not share his political views. He prides himself on not having anything to do with politics. His political leanings are said to be Royalist. He is energetic, forceful, not considered a "yes man" and would appear to be guided throughout by what he considers to be France's best interests. Even by those who disapprove of him, he is considered to be one of the ablest younger Generals, and has a considerable following among the younger superior and general officers.

As soon as General de Gaulle entered the government, he took up residence in Paris and has remained there ever since. He has been active in political affairs, both at home and abroad. He has been a member of the French National Assembly, and has been a member of the Government of National Liberation.

He was educated at the Ecole Militaire, where he was a student in 1903. He was commissioned a second-class officer in the French General Staff in 1905, and was appointed to the 1st Division of the 1st Corps in 1906. He was promoted to captain in 1909, and to major in 1912. He was appointed to the 1st Division of the 1st Corps in 1914.

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LIEUTENANT COMMANDER (CAPITAINE DE CORVETTE) CHARLES DE LEVIS MIREPOIX

Charles-Henri-Constantin-Marie-Joseph Ghislain de Levis Mirepoix was born in France on 4 January 1912, son of the Duke de Levis Mirepoix. His family is one of the oldest and most illustrious in France.

He entered the French Naval service in 1929, was made Ensign (Enseigne de Vaisseau 21eme Classe), 1 October 1933; Lieut. (jg) (Enseigne de Vaisseau liere Classe), 1 October 1933; Lieutenant (Lieutenant de Vaisseau), 4 February 1939; and Lieutenant Commander (Capitaine de Corvette), 4 February 1943.

He was qualified "brevete" in aviation and commanded a Naval Dive Bombing Squadron in Northern France during the 1939-1940 phase of the war. For his services he received the Croix de Guerre.

After France's capitulation, he was appointed Assistant Naval Attache to the United States, and reported October 1940. In the fall of that year, while in Washington, he married Mlle. Lorette Jacourt, daughter of the Viscount and Viscountess Jacourt, from Buenos Aires.

In November 1941, he came to the conclusion that he could no longer serve Vichy with its collaborationist policy. He handed in his resignation to M. Henri-Haye, the Ambassador, stating his intention to join the Royal Canadian Airforce; and refused to obey cabled orders from France to return.

He ferried bombers from Canada to England until October 1942, when he joined the Fighting French Forces. In 1943 he was promoted Lieutenant Commander in the Fighting French Naval Air Forces and served as Commander of the special Fighting French Naval Air Unit (VFP-1) which trained at Dallas, Texas, Jacksonville and Pensacola, Florida.

He is entirely trusted by the Fighting French and has impressed most United States Naval Officers who have been in contact with him as a very earnest, honest, capable and efficient naval officer. While at Jacksonville, he apparently cooperated to the fullest degree with American Naval representatives stationed there.

He is tall, of aristocratic manner and attitude, and somewhat abrupt. He is, however, a superior individual.
LT. COL. HENRI MARIE GEORGES DE RANCIER DE MINERAND

He heads the French Air Force Groupe "Lorraine". On 11 March 1922, he and three of his men were decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross by Sir Archibald Sinclair, British Air Minister.

He was born 2 July 1910 at Cernoy in Loiret Department, France. He entered the French Air Service in 1931, became a 2nd Lieutenant in 1933, 1st Lieutenant in 1935. The dates of his subsequent promotions are not available at present.

Of the French red cross, he received until October 1943 then took an official of the de Gaulle administration then at the "major institutions", as a representative of General de Gaulle he made a second trip to the United States in May 1943, returning to London in August of that year. During this trip to the United States, he reportedly see working with Adrien Victor as a "Frequency Controller".

He previously had served as a Councillor of Aviation in the French Government service and was deprived of his French Nationality by Nure in 1946.
JACQUES CAMILLE GEORGES PARIS

He was reported in June 1944 to be one of the French negotiators in London seeking a solution with the British of the status of the French Committee of National Liberation.

He is a son-in-law of former French Ambassador to the United States, Paul Claudel and is in his early forties.

He made his first trip to the United States in May 1941 as representative of the French Red Cross. He remained until October 1941 then went to Lisbon, Portugal. Instead of returning to France he went to London where he became an official of the de Gaulle administration then at its London headquarters. As a representative of General de Gaulle he made a second trip to the United States in June 1942, returning to London in August of that year. During this trip to the United States, he reportedly was working with Adrien Tixier as a "Temporary Counsellor".

He previously had served as a Counsellor of Embassy in the French Diplomatic Service and was deprived of his French nationality by Vichy in 1942.

Then the Strasbourg settlement was made in 1943 and their respective missions were amalgamated, Mr. Raabe became French representative at the United Nations delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation headed by Mr. Raymond. However, Mr. Raabe has always continued to maintain close ties with the original de Gaulle element in Washington.

Raabe has been covering the various recent conferences at Atlantic City and elsewhere to which delegates of the French Committee of National Liberation have been invited to attend.

He is a pleasant, though somewhat cynical man, an extremely ardent de Gaulleist, a leftist in political leanings, and not a great admirer of the President, especially in what he believes his policy to be in regard to General de Gaulle and France. He is nevertheless a personally likable person, quick and intelligent, and hardworking. He is, however, believed to be successor of a Gaullist-FrancoFREE and French.
JEAN BAUBE

Press Relations representative.

Mr. Baube is in his late forties or early fifties. He was born in Paris, France, and married a Scotswoman. They have two children. Mr. Baube worked for a while in Geneva where he was closely connected with League of Nations activities and probably where he worked closely with Adrien Tixier. Previous to 1941 he was Havas French news agency representative in Washington where he has many connections. In the fall of 1941, becoming dissatisfied with the Vichy government's policy, he resigned his Havas position and offered his services to General de Gaulle. His wife at that time was an employee of the British Purchasing Commission in Washington. He went to London where he worked as a civilian with the French National Committee of General de Gaulle, serving as press representative of General de Gaulle. He was replaced by Henri Villiers as Havas representative.

He returned to Washington in 1941 and served as press attaché at the Washington delegation of the French National Committee of General de Gaulle (later known as the Fighting French delegation) where he was closely associated with Captain Georges Gayral, Naval Representative of General de Gaulle, Col. de Chevigne, Military Representative now assigned by General de Gaulle to the liberated area of France, Adrien Tixier, Philippe Baudet and others.

When the Giraud-de Gaulle settlement was made in 1943 and their respective missions were amalgamated, Mr. Baube became Press representative at the Washington civilian delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation headed by Mr. Bopprenot. However, Mr. Baube has always continued to maintain close ties with the original de Gaulle element in Washington.

Baube has been covering the various recent conferences at Atlantic City and elsewhere to which delegates of the French Committee of National Liberation have been invited to attend.

He is a pleasant, though somewhat cynical man, an extremely ardent de Gaullist, a leftist in political leanings, and not a great admirer of the President especially in what he believes his policy to be in regard to General de Gaulle and France. He is nevertheless a personally likeable person, quick and intelligent, and hardworking. He is, however, believed to be somewhat of a Chauvinistic Frenchman and Gaullist.

It has been said that he is a son of the patriotic sentiment of a time when the Sun was the Sun. However, it is reported a story that his friends have been refused to attend a reception as with foreigners in their country.
He heads General de Gaulle's Cabinet or private office, a position akin to that of one of our presidential secretaries.

He is said to be of Russian extraction. Previous to the collapse of France he served as head (or Directeur de Cabinet) of Paul Reynaud's staff. Reynaud's mistress, Helene des Portes allegedly was jealous of Palewski because of his influence over Reynaud and intrigued to have him removed. He then went off to the front as a volunteer in an air fighter squadron for which service he received a citation.

Pierre Lazareff, well known French newspaperman, who escaped from France claims to have tried to get Palewski back into Reynaud's good graces and to have arranged a meeting between the two. At this meeting, Palewski is said to have urged Reynaud to call upon the services of Charles de Gaulle. Although it is not definitely known, it is believed that he again served in Paris while de Gaulle served under Reynaud.

Palewski joined de Gaulle in London. He became Fighting French representative in Addis Ababa after the Ethiopian liberation and then headed General de Gaulle's cabinet or secretariat in London. He is rumored to have accompanied de Gaulle on his trip to the Casablanca (or Anfa) Conference attended by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. He is also said to have acted as right hand man between General de Gaulle and Eisenhower in negotiations.

General Bethouart reportedly considered him, at one time, a nefarious influence on de Gaulle and said it was largely his influence that kept de Gaulle adament for a period of over a week during some delicate negotiations.

He is sometimes referred to as de Gaulle's "Eminence Grise".

In 1943 he reportedly was advising de Gaulle to play the constitutional game rather than attempt a "coup de force". His advice being that de Gaulle should be elected as deputy or senator in which case he would certainly be elected prime minister or president.

Palewski is an experienced government official and is acknowledged to be a highly intelligent man. On the other hand he is one of the most distrusted of de Gaulle's person advisers and disliked even by many ardent de Gaulists.

It has been said that he is one of the leading exponents of a close tie with the Russians. However, it is reliably reported that the Russians have twice refused to accept his nomination as FCNL representative to their country.
HERVE ALPHAND

Alphand was reported to be one of the French negotiators recently in London seeking a solution of the status of the FCNL with the British.

He was born in 1907. He served for a period as Inspector of Finances and Director of Commercial Bureaus of the Commerce Ministry until March 1938. He then served as Secretary-General of the Ministerial Committee of National Economy until 1940. He then came to the United States where he served at the French Embassy under Henry Haye as Financial or Commercial Attache. He is said to have attempted to resign but that Henry Haye refused flatly to transmit the letter of resignation. The letter then was allegedly sent abroad secretly by a friend. It supposedly stated "I am firmly convinced that -- there is no hope for existence of France, as a nation, unless Germany is defeated."

He is a brother-in-law of Serreules, high in de Gaulle's favor, and after leaving the French Embassy under Henry Haye, joined the Free French of General de Gaulle. He was deprived of his French nationality by a decree of the Journal Officiel of Vichy.

He has returned to the United States on several occasions and attended the International Food Conference in the United States in 1943 as head of the French Delegation jointly appointed by Generals Giraud and de Gaulle.

His wife is a singer and a well-known figure in the more expensive New York night clubs.
CAPTAIN L. TEISSOT

Military aide to General de Gaulle.

ANDRE LA GUERRE

Chief of the FGNL Press Bureau in Algiers.

LT. COL. HARTMANN

He is reported to be on the General Staff of the Air Army connected with operations.
June 29, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

Admiral Leahy has studied the proposed message as presented by the Joint Staffs and asks me to say that he questions the necessity of paragraph three and thinks perhaps it is better not to make any admissions. Also, in paragraph twelve he suggests that we change the lines "We must discuss with the French the use of their forces" to "It will be necessary to ascertain the possibility of using the French Army from Africa."

He also suggests that the first paragraph should state that you have given careful personal consideration to Prime's No. 718 and have had our Joint Staffs give the whole subject further consideration.

He also agrees with me that a final paragraph somewhat as given below might through its appeal to history, cause the Prime Minister to give up his effort to get away from ANVIL:

"At Teheran we agreed upon a definite plan of attack. That plan has gone well so far. Nothing has occurred to require any change. Now that we are fully involved in our major blow, history will never forgive us if we lose precious time and lives in indecision and debate. My dear friend, I beg you let us go ahead with our plan."

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.

Copy to: Admiral Leahy
UPGENT - 2 -

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 26, 1944.

I am transmitting herewith a copy and translation of a communication just received from General de Gaulle through M. Hoppenot, the representative of the French Committee of Liberation in Washington.

In transmitting this communication to the Department, M. Hoppenot said there was one further point on which General de Gaulle would desire information, but one which he did not wish to present in a formal communication. M. Hoppenot said that General De Gaulle would like to know whether there would be any restrictions or limitations upon his status during this short visit to the United States such as was announced with respect to General Giraud's visit last summer. You will recall that at that time it was your desire that the status of General Giraud during his visit here was to be considered entirely military and the press was informed that no discussions were to be entered into with General Giraud other than those relating to military subjects.

I .............
General de Gaulle, as he has sent word to President Roosevelt through Admiral Radford who carried the response to the invitation which had been received, will be happy to come to Washington for conversations with the President on problems at this time of interest to France and the United States.

I should be very glad to transmit to General de Gaulle your decisions with respect to the questions raised in his memorandum and any information you wish me to convey to him with regard to the question of his status here.

Considering the rather obscure atmosphere which for some time has surrounded official Franco-American relations, and the state of uncertainty of the public opinion of these two countries with regard to their relations, the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic considers it essential that the program of his voyage be carefully outlined in advance. He would be particularly happy to know the subjects which the President intends to bring up in these conversations.

General de Gaulle for his part naturally does not exclude any question whatsoever from the framework of these conversations. While fully recognizing the inestimable value of the present and future role of the United States in the liberation and in the reconstruction of France, as well as in the organization of the world of tomorrow, he has not, however, in his thought any specific request or any recommendation to present. In particular, the question of formal recognition of the Provisional Government of the French Republic by the Government of the United States has little interest in itself for the General and he has no intention of raising that question. The general harmony of Franco-American relations appears to him much more important and of more urgent interest.

Because of pressing duties of government and of command on the one hand, and the necessity of being in Algiers the day of the National Holiday on the other hand, do not make the period from the 5th to the 14th of July the most convenient for the visit of General de Gaulle. In deference, however, to the President who has suggested these dates, General de Gaulle, if the projected voyage comes about, would count on spending three full days in the United States between the 6th and 9th of July. His definitive decision cannot be made, however, until he knows the exact program for his visit, as well as the subjects and procedure of the conversations which the President of the United States proposes to have with him.
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It is the thought of General de Gaulle that this voyage will be for the purpose of rendering homage on the part of France at war to President Roosevelt, as well as to the American people and the American Army, now undergoing so many sacrifices and exerting such great efforts in contributing to the liberation of Europe and Asia.

Considering the rather obscure atmosphere which for some time has surrounded official Franco-American relations, and the state of uncertainty of the public opinion of these two countries with regard to their relations, the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic considers it essential that the program of his voyage be carefully studied and fixed in advance. He would be particularly happy to know the subjects which the President intends to bring up in these conversations.

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SECRET

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I.........
I should be very glad to transmit to General de Gaulle your decisions with respect to the questions raised in his memorandum and any information you wish me to convey to him with regard to the question of his status while here.

Dans l'esprit du Général de Gaulle, ce voyage servait avant tout un hommage rendu par la France en grâce au Premier Secrétariat ainsi que son peuple et ses amis américains, qui subissent tant de sacrifices et déployent tant d'efforts dans leur contribution à la libération de l'Europe et de l'Afrique.

Concernant l'intéressante note adressée par les deux pays depuis quelque temps sur les relations franco-américaines et l'état d'insécurité, en se trouvant à leur sujet les opinions publiques des deux pays, le Président du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française estime essentiel que le programme de cet voyage soit attentivement étudié et fixé à l'avance. Il suggère notamment l'avoir de savoir de quelle question le Président à l'intention de l'auditeur.

La question du Général de Gaulle, pour sa part, n'est qu'artificiellement soulevée question du cadre de ses instructions. Tout ce que je peux dire, pleinement le valoir indispensable du rôle actuel et futur des États-Unis dans la libération et dans la reconstruction de la France, ainsi que dans l'organisation du monde de demain, il n'a plus d'importance dans l'esprit non plus des pays ou même des relations spécifiques à présenter. La question relativement de la reconnaissance formelle du gouvernement provisoire de la République Française par le gouvernement des États-Unis, intéresserait en elle-même le Général et il n'a pas l'intention de la soulever. L'importance générale aux rapports franco-américains lui paraît beaucoup plus importante et d'un intérêt plus urgent.

Des raisons d'obligations personnelles de gouvernement et du commandement d'autre part, la nécessité de ne trouver à Alger le jour de la fête nationale, d'autre part, sont que la période de 6 au 14 juillet n'aurait pas celle qui serait le mieux en général de Général de Gaulle pour sa visite. Par différence estant pour le Président, qui a proposé ces dates, le Général de Gaulle, et le projet de voyage
Le Général de Gaulle, comme il l'a fait savoir au Président Roosevelt par l'Amiral Fénard qui lui portait sa réponse de principe à l'invitation qu'il lui avait transmise, serait heureux de se rendre à Washington pour s'entretenir avec le Président des problèmes intéressants en ce moment la France et les États-Unis.

Dans l'esprit du Général de Gaulle, ce voyage serait avant tout un hommage rendu par la France en guerre au Président Roosevelt ainsi qu'au peuple et aux armées américaines, qui subissent tant de sacrifices et déPLOYent tant d'efforts dans leur contribution à la libération de l'Europe et de l'Asie.

Considérant l'atmosphère assez obscure qui pèse depuis quelque temps sur les relations officielles franco-américaines et l'état d'incertitude où se trouvent à leur sujet les opinions publiques des deux pays, le Président du Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Française estime essentiel que le programme de son voyage soit attentivement étudié et fixé à l'avance. Il serait notamment heureux de savoir de quelles questions le Président à l'intention de l'entretien.

Le Général de Gaulle, pour sa part, n'exclut naturellement aucune question du cadre de ces entretiens. Tout en reconnaissant pleinement la valeur incalculable du rôle actuel et futur des États-Unis dans la Libération et dans la reconstruction de la France, ainsi que dans l'organisation du monde de demain, il n'a cependant dans l'esprit aucune demande ou aucune recommandation spécifiques à présenter. La question notamment de la reconnaissance formelle du gouvernement provisoire de la République Française par le gouvernement des États-Unis, intéresse peu en elle-même le Général et il n'a pas l'intention de la soulever. L'harmonie générale des rapports franco-américains lui paraît beaucoup plus importante et d'un intérêt plus urgent.

Des raisons d'obligations pressantes de gouvernement et de commandement d'une part, la nécessité de se trouver à Alger le jour de la Fête Nationale, d'autre part, font que la période du 6 au 14 juillet n'est pas celle qui conviendrait le mieux au Général de Gaulle pour sa visite. Par déférence cependant pour le Président, qui a proposé ces dates, le Général de Gaulle, si le projet de voyage
se concrétise, envisagerait de passer aux États-Unis trois jours pleins, entre le 5 et le 9 juillet. Sa décision définitive cependant ne pourra être prise que lorsqu'il connaîtra exactement le programme de son séjour ainsi que le sujet et les modalités des entretiens que le Président des États-Unis se propose d'avoir avec lui.

Considérant le calme actuel atmosphère qui règne en ce moment dans toutes les relations entre les États-Unis et la France, il est nécessaire de mentionner que le Président, en plus de ses entretiens avec le Président de la République Française, aura également des entretiens privés avec le Président de la France. Ces entretiens auront pour but de discuter des questions d'ordre international et de développer les liens entre les deux pays. Le Président des États-Unis a également exprimé son intention de rendre visite à des personnalités françaises réputées pour leur contribution à la délivrance de l'Europe.
General de Gaulle, as he has sent word to President Roosevelt through Admiral Fenard who carried the response to the invitation which he had received, will be happy to come to Washington for conversations with the President on problems at this time of interest to France and the United States.

It is the thought of General de Gaulle that this voyage will before anything else be for the purpose of rendering homage on the part of France at war to President Roosevelt, as well as to the American people and the American army, now undergoing so many sacrifices and exerting such great efforts in contributing to the liberation of Europe and Asia.

Considering the rather obscure atmosphere which for some time has surrounded official Franco-American relations, and the state of uncertainty of the public opinion of these two countries with regard to their relations, the President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic considers it essential that the program of his voyage be carefully studied and fixed in advance. He would be particularly happy to know the subjects which the President intends to bring up in these conversations.

General de Gaule for his part naturally does not exclude any question whatsoever from the framework of these conversations. While fully recognizing the inestimable value of the present and future role of the United States in the liberation and in the reconstruction of France, as well as in the organization of the world of tomorrow, he has not, however, in his thought any specific request or any recommendation to present. In particular, the question of formal recognition of the Provisional Government of the French Republic by the Government of the United States has little interest in itself for the General and he has no intention of raising that question. The general harmony of Franco-American relations appear to him much more important and of more urgent interest.

Because of pressing duties of government and of command on the one hand, and the necessity of being in Algiers the day of the National Holiday on the other hand, do not make the period from the 6th to the 14th of July the most convenient for the visit of General de Gaulle. In deference, however, to the President who has suggested these dates, General de Gaulle, if the projected voyage comes about, would count on passing three full days in the United States between the 5th and 9th of July. His definitive decision cannot be made, however, until he knows the exact program for his visit, as well as the subjects and procedure of the conversations which the President of the United States proposes to have with him.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

MISS TULLY.

In response to the request of the Secretary of the Treasury for a paraphrased copy of the Prime Minister's message number 703 (14 June 1944) to the President, with reference to the French currency question, the following is believed to be the part of the message he desires:

Paraphrased extract from message No. 703, from the Prime Minister to the President:

"It is my understanding that last night a statement about the currency was issued by you. Rest assured that I shall endeavor to support you in every way possible. Should an old lady in Bayeux sell a cow to an American quartermaster and be paid with this currency, I feel sure that Morgenthau will have to see that she is no loser on the transaction when she presents the currency at his office in Washington. The French people are taking this currency according to my information from France last night."

WILSON BROWN.
1. (Message sent)

Algiers, Algeria
June 20

HULL (Secretary)

FRANC.

(June 23, 1944)

If the true story of what deGaulle has said and done were explained by some one like General Marshall, those who have been propagandizing for deGaulle would be left high and dry, according to David Lawrence, whose recent article in the Washington Star is summarized for the information of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Chapin. The ardent deGaulle enthusiasts would then find it difficult to support the thesis that only some personal antipathy toward the French General by Mr. Roosevelt, himself, has been responsible for the U.S. Government's policy in going slow about recognizing deGaulle as the head of the Provisional French Government.

The deGaulle movement is to be distinguished from the personal ambitions of General deGaulle to win political power. There is no doubt the deGaulleists are the uncompromising Frenchmen who have been militant against Germany ever since the surrender of France in June, 1940, but when General deGaulle, as their leader, has sought to capitalize this movement for political purposes, he has overplayed his hand... 

There's no closed door against deGaulle. He can come to Washington to visit the President and Secretary of State and he will be welcomed cordially. He must, however, realize the U.S. Government isn't turning over the millions of dollars of gold owned by the French people, and held in America, to any provisional group, nor is there the slightest desire to pick a President or Premier for France.

Above all, General deGaulle must realize the 15,000 casualties on the beachheads of Normandy were not suffered by the U.S. people just for the doubtful privilege of messing in French politics, or of letting some French politician come to the invasion area in the heat of battle and play French politics behind General Eisenhower's back in a manner calculated to interfere with the orderly task of liberation.

General deGaulle ought to come to Washington. He ought to come repentant for his extraordinary behavior and sit down with U.S. officials, not to plan the future of any one man, but the future of the French Republic, for whose freedom and independence U.S. and Canadian and British soldiers and sailors are making such a magnificent fight today.
SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

We have been informed by the British Embassy that the British Government on June 19 was to have begun discussions with representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation in London, looking toward the conclusion of a civil affairs agreement for Metropolitan France. According to a telegram from Mr. Eden to the British Embassy, General de Gaulle informed Mr. Eden that it might be desirable to advance the Franco-British discussions prior to General de Gaulle's visit to the United States. Mr. Eden remarked that if progress were made in the next few days the United States Government would be informed of the results and that "this in its turn would be helpful to the Washington conversations."

It is apparent from the above information that the British Government contemplates discussions beyond the scope envisaged in your directive of March 15 to General Eisenhower and that any agreement which may be reached with the French will, in accordance with the British practice in negotiations with the other governments-in-exile, be on a governmental rather than a military basis. Furthermore, should an agreement be reached between the British Government and the French Committee of National Liberation prior to consultation and agreement with this Government, we will be faced with a fait accompli and will be compelled to go along with it, or be placed in the position alone of having to object to the terms of the agreement.

I understand that the matter is the cause of concern to our military authorities and since in the past we have always felt that the British and ourselves should act along parallel lines in our relationship with the French Committee, I shall assume in the absence of anything to the contrary that you will give to the Prime Minister such comment on the matter as you desire.

C.H.

Sent to President at Hyde Park
as BLUE 76, 20 June 44.
Army Chiefs Declared Opposed to De Gaulle

Observer Says French Leader Has Overplayed His Hand

By David Lawrence

Many criticisms, fair and unfair, have been directed against President Roosevelt in his 11 or more years in the White House but none so unfair as that which is coming at him from his own left-wing supporters—and from some other critics with an ordinarily balanced viewpoint—because of this Government’s policy toward Gen. de Gaulle.

First the fire was aimed at Secretary Hull, and when that failed the President was accused of having some sort of a personal antipathy or grievance against Gen. de Gaulle.

But the truth about De Gaulle is that the opposition to him within our own ranks comes from the Army. It comes from men like Gen. Marshall and Gen. Eisenhower. It comes from the military people in whose side Gen. de Gaulle has been a thorn from the very beginning. It comes out of strictly military considerations.

If the true story of what De Gaulle has said and done were explained some day to the American people by some one like Gen. Marshall, for instance, the folks who have been propagandizing for De Gaulle would be left high and dry. They would find it difficult to support the thesis that only some personal antipathy toward the French general by Mr. Roosevelt himself has been responsible for our Government’s policy in going slow about recognizing him as the head of the provisional French government.

Hand Overplayed.

The De Gaulle movement is to be distinguished from the personal ambitions of Gen. de Gaulle to win political power. There is no doubt that the De Gaulistes are the uncompromising Frenchmen who have been militant against Germany ever since the surrender of France in June, 1940. But when Gen. de Gaulle, as their leader, has sought to capitalize this movement for political purposes he has overplayed his hand.

It is fortunate that De Gaulle has gone back to Algiers. He butted into the invasion picture last week and gave Gen. Eisenhower a deplorable problem just as the French general butted in on the military operations in North Africa. When the Sicilian invasion was launched, Gen. de Gaulle cried out that he hadn’t been consulted.
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The truth is Gen. Eisenhower had little faith in De Gaulle as a military man and still less as a practical co-operationist in civil matters. It is one of the tragedies of our war operation in Europe that at moments when Gen. Eisenhower carried the main burden of Allied responsibility in military operations of the greatest complexity he has been harassed by Gen. de Gaulle.

The patience of the American military men has been superb. Doubtless President Roosevelt has restrained many an outburst of public condemnation by our military spokesmen against De Gaulle.

Used by Enemy.

The enemy, of course, has been using the dissension for local propaganda in France but that can hardly be helped. Lately also an effort has been made to paint the President as an imperialist bent on breaking up France's colonial empire. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The United States doesn't want to own one inch of France's colonies or any other nation's colonies unless it be some of Japan's strategic islands near our bases. What America wants is some means of leasing or securing naval and air bases from France and internationalizing these so as to prevent American lives from being sacrificed again because of the criminal neglect by French politicians in Paris of national armament and overseas protection.

There's no closed door against De Gaulle. He can come here to visit the President and Secretary of State and he will be welcomed cordially. He must, however, realize that the United States Government isn't turning over the millions of dollars of gold owned by the French people and held in America to any provisional group, nor is there the slightest desire to pick a President or Premier for France.

Above all, Gen. de Gaulle must realize that 15,000 casualties on the beaches of Normandy were not suffered by the American people just for the doubtful privilege of measing in French politics or of letting some French politician come to the invasion area in the heat of battle and play French politics behind Gen. Eisenhower's back in a manner calculated to interfere with the orderly task of liberation.

Gen. de Gaulle ought to come here. He ought to come repentant for his extraordinary behavior and sit down with American officials not to plan the future of any one man but the future of the French Republic for whose freedom and independence American and Canadian and British soldiers and sailors are making such a magnificent fight today.
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(Reproduction Rights Reserved.)
June 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

Admiral Brown:

The attached original and one copy of a memorandum for the President, dated 8 June, 1944, signed by Admiral Leahy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was shown to the President on June 8 and approved by him subject to the addition of a fourth paragraph to Enclosure "B", page 4, CCS-565, quoted herewith:

"General de Gaulle is expected to see the President the last week in June or about the middle of July."

The Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has been requested to deliver to you a copy of CCS-565.

Respectfully,

J. V. Smith
Lt. Commander, U.S.N.
Aide
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. On 20 April 1944 General Eisenhower requested authority to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation to arrive at working agreements on such matters as the provision of goods and services including civilian labor, treatment of the banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property and that of the United Nations, matters of public safety, public health, distribution of civilian supply, displaced persons, etc.

2. The proposed reply from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, as amended and approved by you on 3 May 1944 (page 4 of the attached paper) authorizes General Eisenhower to begin conversations with representatives of the French Committee but stipulates that all conversations, working arrangements and agreements with the Committee must be tentative. It directs him to make clear to the Committee that arrangements with them do not preclude consultation with and assistance from other elements of the French people. It requests information as to the meaning of the term "transfer of property" as used in paragraph 1 above.

3. The Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff now suggest that a reply to General Eisenhower is unnecessary in view of a recent exchange of messages on the highest level with regard to the discussions which will take place on the arrival of General de Gaulle in the United Kingdom.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that they cannot concur in the view of the British Chiefs of Staff.
TOP SECRET

Staff and, if you concur, will press for the dispatch to General Eisenhower of the reply referred to above.

5. Your views are requested.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Encl.
C.C.S. 565, Copy No. 66.

Regraded Unclassified
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 14, 1944

Many thanks for letting me see the attached, which is returned herewith in accordance with your request.

C H
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1944.

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

For your eyes only and will you return for my files.

F.D.R.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: THE PRIME MINISTER
NO: 546, 31 May 1944.

I have received your 684 and 685.

I should like to make this matter of de Gaulle clear from my point of view beyond peradventure of a doubt.

On May 25, less than a week ago, I said goodbye to Admiral Fenard, who is on his way to Algiers to see de Gaulle. We had a very satisfactory talk. Besides being Senior Officer of the French Navy, he impresses me as being in every way a first-class man.

When he asked if I had any message for de Gaulle, I replied that I had been hoping that de Gaulle would send me a message asking if I would see him if he came over here. I said that de Gaulle could be told that if such a message were received by me, my answer would be an immediate and cordial affirmative.

I explained to Fenard, as I thought I had made my stand clear to many people before, that I, as head of the Government and the head of the State, could not well invite de Gaulle to come, as he is not the head of the French Government or the French State, but only the head of a Committee. Fenard completely agreed; by now de Gaulle should have this message.

Considering de Gaulle's position, I very strongly feel that he in person and through no one else, should ask if he will be received. This is simple, straightforward, and my answer would be expressed in cordial terms.

Further replying to your #682. We must, of course, do everything we possibly can to encourage French national spirit, and to get it working immediately with us at top speed.
What the state of this French spirit is, we do not definitely know. We will not know until we get to France, but we hope for the best.

General Marshall will be in London about D plus 4. However, since this de Gaulle matter is wholly in the political and not in the military field, we cannot give him plenary powers to negotiate with you and de Gaulle jointly, or with de Gaulle singly. General Marshall can, of course, talk about all matters in the military field.

I suggest that after you have finished your talks, de Gaulle should ask me whether I would receive him if he came here direct from London. You could, in the meantime, send me a summary of your talks with him, and by the time he reached here, we could be in complete accord.

The French military strength could not, as a matter of practical fact, be used on OVERLORD until then anyway, since all plans are for later than D-day.

I think I can only repeat the simple fact that I cannot send anyone to represent me at the conversations between de Gaulle and you.

I hope at a later date to accept Dr. Churchill's advice to make a sea voyage in your direction, which I should like to do very much. Conditions here will not permit it shortly after D plus fourteen as you suggested.

We had best await developments of OVERLORD, I think, before making a decision as to the next meeting of the full staffs. Developments of the OVERLORD campaign should point with some accuracy to the time when a meeting of the Combined Staff is necessary.

ROOSEVELT
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

London
Dated June 14, 1944
Rec'd 11:07 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
4738, June 14, 5 p.m.

TO THE SECRETARY AND THE PRESIDENT

Please see Embassy's 4738, June 14, just forwarded.

WINANT

CSB

Regraded Unclassified
Regraded Unclassified

MJB-174

FLAIN

London

Dated June 14, 1944

Rec'd 10:35 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT

4738, fourteenth

There were seven questions put down in the House of Commons today regarding French matters. These covered recognition of the committee as a provisional government, negotiations with de Gaulle, whether an agreement had been reached regarding administration of occupied territory in France, and currency. Mr. Eden said that he would not answer these questions but that a statement would be made by the Prime Minister at the end of question time.

Accordingly, Mr. Churchill dealt with the questions as follows: He said that he did not think this matter could be dealt with by a number of separate questions and that, on the other hand, he must advise the House most seriously that a debate on this matter would have very great
-2-#4738, fourteenth, from London

great danger. He asked the forbearance of the House and requested it to follow his advice; however, he said, the wishes of the House must be followed by the government and a full debate ensue if the House so desired. He thought that a debate would emphasize any difficulties which may exist with the French committee and that he would deplore seeing these issues prematurely forced to a decision. Not only, said the Prime Minister, are British relations with the French Committee involved, but consideration has to be given to the very close Anglo-American relations and the latter's relations with the committee. He thought that it would be better to allow the relations prevailing between de Gaulle and the United States to proceed further than to have a full-dress debate which might give great comfort to the enemy.

Various members, all on the opposition benches, endeavored to press the Prime Minister for definite answers to specific questions, such as, "had his attention been drawn to the statement of the President of the United States that the issue of French notes is backed by the British and United States treasuries?" With regard to this
to this particular question Mr. Churchill stated that it seemed quite clear to him that, if notes are given out to the French population in return for live-stock or other services, the responsibility for meeting the notes, in the first instance at any rate, would lie with the government issuing them. He avoided answering most of the questions, but he did say that in this last week of great success he thought that more time had been given to de Gaulle and his affairs and his committee than to any other subject.

Other members then indicated the great anxiety throughout the country on this general subject, but Mr. Churchill replied that he did not agree that there is great and widespread anxiety on the subject but that it is a subject which needs the closest and constant attention.

The question of holding a debate was not pressed, and therefore a debate will not be held at the present time.

Please inform Treasury.

WINANT

WSB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I telephoned to General Eisenhower's Headquarters the gist of the Press Conference on the French currency matter and they were very well pleased with it.

They told me that a Civil Affairs officer had just returned from a survey of the entire sector - British and American - and reported that while he was there the money was well received and a good bit of it was already in circulation. This, however, was prior to any general dissemination of General de Gaulle's denunciation. The reception by the civil population was extremely good everywhere. There seemed to be plenty of food but there were shortages of medical supplies, which we were filling. We were building up reserves of food to take care of larger centers of population as they came within the liberated areas. The whole situation in the civilian areas was better than we had anticipated so far as food and other supplies were concerned. The local authorities seemed to be cooperating fully but acted as though they were "rudderless." They all want to know "what is the French Government." This officer's estimate was that de Gaulle seems
to be generally accepted as the coming leader. They ask frequently "when is he coming" and General Holmes advised me that, according to the report he had heard today, Mr. Churchill is arranging for de Gaulle to go to Normandy tomorrow. So far General de Gaulle has not lifted the ban against the balance of the French officers going to France.

General Marshall and the other Combined Chiefs of Staff are having a meeting tonight to determine whether or not they should make any recommendations regarding the civil situation.

General Eisenhower takes the position that he does not care which way we move so far as the French are concerned but he is greatly concerned about the advertised divergence of view between the United States and British Governments. The press is emphasizing it and Eisenhower says it is almost an intolerable situation for him as long as the British and American Governments cannot give him common instructions.

I think the President should certainly act at once.

H.S.
MFC-148

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Secretary of State,

Washington.

US URGENT

1997, June 13, midnight

In course of my conversation this morning with Massigli I asked if there was any news with regard to de Gaulle's visit to United States (Department's 1949, June 12, 8 p.m.) Massigli replied he had received a cable from de Gaulle instructing him to send a message to Hopkins expressing appreciation for the opportunity to visit the United States. He said the matter would be discussed at a special meeting of the Committee this afternoon, but it was not necessary to take a vote of the Committee on de Gaulle's visit.

Massigli appeared greatly concerned that there was little likelihood of laying the groundwork of an over-all political agreement between the United States and French authorities prior to General's visit to the United States.
June 13, 1947, from Algiers

The United States, a prerequisite in his opinion to a successful visit. He feared that without such a basis the differences between President Roosevelt and de Gaulle might even be widened.

I stated my conviction that the General's visit would be most useful particularly in apprising the latter of our war effort and of general trend of public opinion in United States not only as regards conduct of the war in Europe but of the Far East and as respects postwar plans. I suggested that in any case we should not cross bridges before we came to them and expressed hope there would be no further declarations with regard to allied currency for time being and that a period of detente might elapse until the visit to the President took place.

CHAPIN

MPL
REP
June 15, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEARY:

To read and then give to Wilson Brown to file.

F.D.R.
LC - 812
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers
Dated June 12, 1944
Rec'd 10:56 a.m., 13th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
1902, June 12, midnight
FROM MURPHY.
Your 1840, June 11.
I dined with Massigli this evening. He was in a very depressed state of mind. He stated that he felt that everything was in a hopeless mess. He had worked day and night for months to try and improve relations between the United States and French Committee and just as he felt he was beginning to make some progress everything has taken a turn for the worse. He said that it was all well and good if we did not want to recognize the FCMF as the Provisional Government of France but he thought it was brutal at a moment when all of France was looking forward to liberation after four years of slavery and starvation for the United States Government to have prevented leaders of French
of French resistance in North Africa to use the United Nations radio simply because the words "Provisional Government" were contained in a speech. He obviously was referring to Emmanuel Aatier de la Vigerie's speech which was cancelled because it referred to the "Provisional Government" of France.

When the subject of the issuance of the special currency for France was brought up Massigli stated that never was there the slightest question of Monnet or anyone else approving anything. He could not believe Monnet has done so and if he did he had exceeded his authority.

Massigli went on to say that some people in the British Government were still hopeful for some sort of compromise being worked out on the questions of the issuance of currency and of civil administration in France. In this connection he remarked ironically that the Allies had gotten off to a "good" start in France by retaining as Mayor of Bayeux the notorious Vichyite appointee.

Massigli added that de Gaulle would make every effort to set foot on French soil (probably Bayeux) before
before returning to North Africa. In any event he did not expect de Gaulle to return to Algiers before the end of this week. The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs then went on to discuss the projected journey of de Gaulle to the United States. He said that he was frankly disturbed. In the first place he did not at all like the manner in which the invitation had been transmitted. Hoppenot should have been the channel of communication and not Admiral Fenard. He had reached the conclusion that the whole matter had been the invention of Fenard. When Fenard had been in Algiers he had called on him (Massigli) and apprised him of the purpose of his quick trip to North Africa. Massigli said he had telegraphed Hoppenot to see Fenard immediately on the latter's return to Washington in order to get full information on the reasons for Fenard's journey. Fenard apparently had failed to keep Hoppenot informed. He, Massigli, was frankly disgusted with the manner in which French affairs in Washington were being handled what with Monnet and Fenard always interfering with what are normally Hoppenot's functions.

Massigli then asserted that unless something practical
practical could be worked out before de Gaulle left for the United States he feared the trip might have the opposite effect from that so much desired. He did not mean by this that the United States must recognize the French Committee as the Provisional Government but something satisfactory to both sides must be worked out on civil administration in France. A compromise should be worked out on all financial questions also. He appealed for my support in this matter.

CHAPIN

BB-RR
DSH-11
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers
Dated June 13, 1944
Rec'd 9:10 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE
1995, June 13, 7 p.m.

Although Murphy had discussed with Massigli informally last night the recent French utterances on currency matters (Department's 1840, June 11, 7 p.m.), I called on Massigli this noon and made formal representations. I stated that I could not hide the concern and shocked surprise of the Treasury and of the Department of State at the statements made in London, particularly since we had been given to understand that no publicity was to be given to the matter. Some of the statements were in fact a reflection upon the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. At a time when military operations were paramount, it was regrettable that the currency issue which was only incidental to those operations should receive such prominence as a point of disagreement. I added that this attitude if persisted in might adversely affect operations and hence have unfortunate results not only for the United States and Britain but for France itself.

Massigli
Massigli who took notes of these statements and said that he would transmit the substance thereof to London appeared very much worried. He attempted rather half-heartedly I felt to defend the position and suggested that the continued refusal by the United States Government to enter into an over-all political agreement with the French authorities was through its injurious effect upon French public opinion also harmful to the general war effort.

As I knew that Mendes France had told Murphy (our 1981, June 12, midnight) that he did not feel it worthwhile to go to London at this stage, I asked Massigli if the General was returning shortly and could discuss currency matters with Mendes France. He replied that he was returning within the week,

CHAPIN

LMS
EJH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers
Dated June 11, 1944
Rec'd 6:20 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

US URGENT
1949, June 11, 4 p.m.
FROM MURPHY

I have learned from a member of De Gaulle's secretariat that a further report has been received from General De Gaulle for information of FCNL. It appears that when De Gaulle saw Churchill and began to explain French position with regard to various matters including the financial question Churchill said he regretted that there had been no agreement made with the French but now that the battle was beginning for the liberation of France all efforts should be concentrated on the battle and the various questions on which there was no agreement could be taken up later on. De Gaulle apparently went into a rage.

Later on De Gaulle saw Eden alone. Eden was most sympathetic according to De Gaulle and could not have been more kind. He went on at great length to explain how much he deplored France's present situation how he and his
and his colleagues in the Foreign Office had tried to do everything they could with House of Commons, with the press, et cetera, to be of assistance to French Committee. He reminded De Gaulle that as he had stated in House of Commons Great Britain needed France now more than ever before and he intended to see to it during his administration as Foreign Minister that everything possible was done to restore France to her former position and prestige.

Eden asserted that as for himself he had done everything he could to be of assistance to the French but that the Prime Minister and the President of United States of America did not feel anything more could be done than had been done up to the present time.

De Gaulle then went on to say in his report that Eden had counselled him (De Gaulle) to sit down patiently in London with him and try to work out something which represented at least some progress. If De Gaulle would do this, his hand for his conversations in Washington would be considerably strengthened and his position would be much improved vis-a-vis the United States. De Gaulle said he derived impression from Eden that there was a possibility of working out some sort of a compromise on the issuance of bank notes.

The Secretary
-3- #1949, June 11, 4 p.m., from Algiers.

The Secretary General of the FCNL stated last evening that in spite of the bad beginning of the De Gaulle visit to London he was convinced from reports he had seen that the trip will turn out to have been useful and he is certain the General's position will have been considerably strengthened.

CHAPIN

EJH
JRL
HM-232
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Algiers
Dated June 10, 1944
Rec'd. 8:40 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

1923, June 10, 2 p.m.
SECRET FROM MURPHY.

A reliable source in the French administration, who prefers that his name be not mentioned, said this morning that two telegrams had been received in Algiers from General de Gaulle. De Gaulle was in a very bitter state of mind. He had telegraphed French Committee on the details with regard to his arrival in London and briefly outlined his conversations with Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower, et alia. He complained that he had been tricked into coming to London and had been presented with a fait accompli. Everything had been prepared for the invasion. The British had even had the impertinence to tell him he would be expected to make a speech over the radio on morning of D Day immediately following Eisenhower. This he refused to do on the ground that he had not wanted to give the impression that he approved of everything (repeat everything) that Eisenhower was doing with regard to France.

Consequently
-2-, #1923, June 10, 2 p.m. from Algiers

Consequently he did not make his speech until the afternoon of D Day.

De Gaulle was furious over the question of the issuance of what he terms "counterfeit currency" (see our 1894, June 8).

Our friend went on to say that General de Gaulle had permitted his technical liaison officer to accompany Allied armies which went into France, but had refused to permit his administrative liaison officer to go in with the Allied troops and thus create the impression that he condoned the acts of American and British military commanders in connection with civilian affairs. General de Gaulle did report to French Committee that he was satisfied with military preparations for invasion and indicated confidence that invasion would be a success.

In one of the two messages which had thus far arrived in Algiers from London de Gaulle sought to give impression to members of French Committee that General Eisenhower was most apologetic with regard to the arrangements which had been made for handling of civilian administration in France; that he preferred not to have anything to do with it; that he was a soldier and not a politician; and that none of the present arrangements was
-3-, #1923, June 10, 2 p.m. from Algiers

was his doing. In this connection de Gaulle asserted to his commissioners that when General Eisenhower left North Africa last December he had called on him, de Gaulle, to say goodbye and that Eisenhower had admitted that he did not have a good grasp of the situation in North Africa and that he was sorry there had been so much difficulty and even apologized for the many mistakes which had been made. De Gaulle ended his comments on his conversation with Eisenhower with statement that Eisenhower was a good soldier who was being made to do something he did not want to do.

CHAPIN

EH

JT
MEMORANDUM FOR

Subject: Interim civil affairs doctrine (France).

The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has requested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirm that he will be responsible for coordinating civil affairs planning as between northwest and southern France and also confirm to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the terms of the interim directive issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The enclosed draft of a cable from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is submitted to you for your approval prior to submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

TOP SECRET

9 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Interim civil affairs directive (France).

The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has requested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff confirm that he will be responsible for coordinating civil affairs planning as between northwest and southern France and also confirm to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, the terms of the interim directive issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.

The enclosed draft of a cable from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is submitted to you for your approval prior to submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEARY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Copy also filed in
map room.

TOP SECRET
PROPOSED CABLE FROM COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF TO SUPREME COMMANDER, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, MEDITERRANEAN

1. The responsibility of SCAEF for coordination of civil affairs planning as between northwest and southern France is confirmed. Also confirmed is responsibility of SACMED for civil affairs planning subject to approval by SCAEF in areas of southern France designated by SCAEF.

2. For use only until the basic civil affairs directive for France is issued by CCS the interim civil affairs directive for France issued by SCAEF to SACMED is approved with the addition of the following basic principles which do not appear to have been sufficiently covered:

   a. There will be no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.

   b. So far as possible, there shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has willfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the Allies.

   c. No recourse should be had to French authorities for legislative enactments until there has been established a provisional French government accepted by both US and UK. However, recourse may be taken to local French authorities for punishment under existing legislation of civilians committing offenses of concern to the Allied authorities.

   d. The responsibility of SACMED for the initial provision and distribution of relief supplies for those areas of southern France under his jurisdiction will not include areas or territories outside the combat zones or lines of communication if it is determined that conditions within such areas or territories are not sufficiently stabilized to warrant the provision of relief supplies therein.

3. It is assumed the word "French" in last line of paragraph 5 of SCAEF's transmitting letter to SACMED should be "British".

16 June. This is approved for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff

(SHAPE/05/1001)

14 May 1944

SUBJECT: Interim Directive for Civil Affairs Operations in FRANCE

TO: Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater

1. Under the authority conferred by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in FAN 318, dated 8 January, 1944, this Directive is issued to you for coordinating operations in FRANCE. The interim directive attached hereto and marked Enclosure "A" is forwarded for your guidance in planning Civil Affairs activity in Southern FRANCE.

2. The Annex has been framed to cover all possible operations in Southern FRANCE and is intended to cover operation ANVIL whenever, or if ever, it is staged, as well as operations arising out of RANKIN conditions.

3. Copies of the Interim Directives on Civil Affairs shortly to be issued to Commander in Chief 21 Army Group, will be sent to you, in order that your plans may, to the fullest possible extent, conform to those which will govern operations in FRANCE mounted from this theater.

4. The directives, on the basis of the latest available political information, assume that extensive reliance may be put by SHAPE and you upon French authorities for the conduct of civil administration in FRANCE. If the basic assumption of the directives proves to be mistaken, supplementary directives will be issued. You are, of course, authorized in the absence of such directives, to exercise to the fullest extent necessary in the military interest supreme powers throughout the area of your responsibility. It is believed, however, that direct control of Civil Affairs will be unnecessary and that the full enforcement of the policy of the present directives will be in the military interest.

5. Throughout the attached directive frequent use has been made of the words "French Authorities." This term is intentionally vague and is intended to cover those authorities...
in FRANCE (be they local, departmental or national) which we shall make use of for civil administration whether or not they have received formal recognition by the French and U.S. Governments.

6. Excluding of course Vichy, the Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) is, at present, the only French authority in the field with which we can do business. It is possible, however, that you may find it necessary, after your entry into FRANCE, to make use of the leadership afforded by local authorities which are not specifically associated with the FCNL. You are authorized to take such action so long as the authority so made use of is not a Vichy organization.

7. You will, from time to time, receive copies of the detailed orders and instructions on Civil Affairs issued from this headquarters to Commanders and Civil Affairs Staffs and Detachments serving in Northern FRANCE. In view of the ultimate responsibility of SCAEF for the whole of FRANCE, it will obviously be desirable if policies and procedures established in those orders and instructions are to the fullest extent practicable followed in Southern FRANCE.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/
W. B. SMITH
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Chief of Staff.
1. This directive is issued to you under the powers conferred by CCS in FAN 318, and is transmitted to you for your guidance in administering civil affairs in the six administrative Regions of which the capital cities are MONTPELLIER, MARSEILLES (excluding Corsica), CLERMONT-FERRAND and LYONS and in the whole of the Departments of HAUTE-GARROSE, TARN, GOTE D'OR and DOUBS. Except as military necessity may otherwise dictate you will conform to the guides herein set forth either under ANVIL conditions or under any RANKIN conditions which may develop.

2. Within boundaries established by this Headquarters (HQ), you will have, de facto, supreme responsibility and authority at all times and in all areas to the full extent necessitated by the military situation. However, Military Government will not be established in liberated France. Civil administration in all areas will normally be controlled by the French themselves. In order to secure uniform civil administration SCAEF will utilise the leadership of French authorities (other than Vichy) in national administration and will maintain communications with you regarding policy and decisions in such matters. If initial recourse to French authorities fails, such executive action as the security of the forces or the success of the military operations may require is authorised. Appropriate redelegation of powers to subordinate Commanders is further authorised.

3. Through a liaison mission to be sent to this HQ or by direct channels if more practicable, you will collaborate in the formulation of policy and the preparation of the basic civil affairs plan for the "OVERLORD" area. Upon the issuance of that plan you will prepare detailed plans for the enforcement of the policies established, throughout the total area of your responsibility, by means of those procedures which may be practicable in your command. Such plans will be reviewed by this HQ.
4. In the operational phase the mission referred to
in the preceding paragraph, will, with such changes in per-
sonnel as may seem to you to be appropriate, be maintained
at this HQ.

5. You will, in coordination with this HQ, prepare
phased estimates of and requisitions for civilian supply
and relief needs in that portion of liberated FRANCE which
is your responsibility. These needs will be assessed by
an appreciation of the extent to which failure to fulfill
civilian claims to relief might interfere with military
operations or with broader objectives as defined by SCAEF
or CCS.

6. At such time as you believe that considerations
of security permit, you will obtain from the FRENCH Authori-
ties in NORTH AFRICA the assignment of personnel to your
command for planning and field duties in Civil Affairs.

7. Security consideration permitting, and within the
framework of policy announced by SCAEF or CCS, you are free
in urgent matters relating to the technical problems in the
area of your responsibility, to consult with the members
and representatives of the French Committee of National
Liberation or other groups.

8. There will be BRITISH and AMERICAN participation,
in such proportions as you deem desirable, in the adminis-
tration of civil affairs in the area of your responsibility.

9. You will, to the fullest extent consistent with
the security of the troops and the prosecution of the war,
assist French Authorities to secure, or if military neces-
sity requires, yourself take steps to secure:

a. The preservation of public health.

b. The restoration and supervision of public
services.

c. The maintenance of public order.

d. The supervision of economic institutions,
practices and controls including those relating to
banking and other financial functions.

e. The regulation of the movements of civilians
within the whole of your area.
1. The protection and preservation of archives, historical monuments and works of art.

10. a. Initial recourse shall be had to French Authorities for necessary legislative enactments and for the punishment of civilians committing offences of concern to the Allied Forces. It is not, therefore, contemplated that any Proclamations, Ordinances or other enactments (except the initial Proclamation establishing your powers as in Para 2 above) will be issued, or that military courts will be established.

b. If issuance of military enactments should become necessary such enactments may be issued by subordinate Commanders only if:

(i) They conform to the general policies laid down by this HQ, and

(ii) They are of a character and application purely local to the area of the Commander's responsibility, and

(iii) They have been specifically authorised by you or by a Commander to whom you have delegated area responsibility, unless military or other exigencies make such authorisation impracticable.

You may delegate authority to issue such enactments when and as experience reveals the necessity for such delegation. All military enactments other than those referred to above, will be issued only within the policies laid down by this HQ, on your authority.

c. No allied Military courts will be established until an order authorising such action has been issued by you, within policies laid down by this HQ. After the issuance of such order, such courts may be established as required by Commanders having area responsibility. They may delegate such power to establish courts when and as experience reveals the necessity for such delegation.
TOP SECRET

d. Allied service and naval courts and authorities will have exclusive jurisdiction over all members of the Allied Forces respectively and over all persons of non-French nationality not belonging to such Forces who are employed by or who accompany those Forces and are subject to Allied naval, military or air force law, or British naval courts. SCAEF may from time to time by subsequent directives or orders extend such immunity from jurisdiction of French courts to such selected civilian officials and employees of the Allied Governments, present in France on duty in furtherance of the purposes of the Allied Forces, as may be designated therein.

11. The French Authorities will be charged with the duty of reorganizing or re-establishing French administrative and judicial services insofar as may be necessary to facilitate the discharge of Civil Affairs responsibilities. The suspension and appointment of French administrative and judicial services and officials will be effected, upon request and after consultation, through the agency of French officers from the French Authorities. Subordinate Commanders may effect, by their own direct action, such suspensions and temporary appointments only when and as specifically authorised by the Force Commander or Commanders of L/Z of C, who may delegate such authority when and as experience may reveal the necessity for such delegation.

12. You will advise this HQ of the time, when and extent to which you believe that civilian relief agencies should be permitted to function in your area, but will not admit them without prior consultation with and authorisation of this HQ.

13. Upon the liberation of any given locality you will take all appropriate steps, in accordance with the directives of SCAEF and in conjunction with the French Authorities, for the full utilisation of its industrial, natural, and other economic resources for the support of your forces, the needs of United Nations Forces in other areas, and the basic needs of the French people.

14. Requisitioning of civilian labor, billets, and supplies, and the use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for military needs, will be effected,
where possible, through French authorities. For this purpose the fullest use will be made of the attached French officers.

15. Except in areas directly important to military operations you will permit orderly political assemblies and meetings to be conducted to the end that when it is possible for elections to be held, the people may express their free choice.

16. You will so administer civil affairs in your area that when it is transferred to the immediate command of SCAEF the policies and procedures which have been followed and utilised will, to the greatest extent possible, conform to those in the rest of liberated FRANCE.

For the Supreme Commander:

W. B. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM

The White House
Washington
5 June 1944

Admiral Brown wishes the President to know of the following highlights of the conversation with Admiral Fenard:

(a) To the best of Admiral Brown's recollection Admiral Fenard stated that "De Gaulle would be very happy indeed" to come to this country. Admiral Brown thought it best to not probe further but to let the full story come out in the audience with the President.

(b) Admiral Fenard offers his services as an intermediary between the President and De Gaulle and is ready to leave for the other side on short notice. He stated that in his belief, he may be of assistance to France as he intimates that the subject needs very careful handling.

(c) De Gaulle was so anxious for Fenard to see the President as soon as possible that he sent Fenard back from Algiers immediately upon conclusion of their conversation. The impression is that Fenard did not even spend the night.

Chest. Wood,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

10 May 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Supply of Arms to Resistance Groups in France.

On 27 April 1944, the Chief of Staff informed you that Generals Eisenhower and Devers had been queried with reference to the amount and source of supplies furnished French resistance groups during the past three months.

This data has now been obtained from the theaters and indicates a predominance of effort on the part of the British both in furnishing and delivering these supplies to the French. Of the total supplies delivered during the past three months from both the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean Theater, the United States has delivered 220 tons of supplies and the British have delivered 1230-3/4 tons. The United States flew a total of 253 air missions and the British flew a total of 1536 air missions in effecting these deliveries. Of the total tonnage of supplies furnished French resistance groups, 415-3/4 tons have been from U.S. sources and 1166 tons from British sources.

With the view of increasing the U.S. effort in furnishing supplies to French resistance groups, General Devers has reported that nine additional U.S. aircraft have just been made available in the North African Theater. General Eisenhower has reported that in the European Theater of Operations two additional squadrons of U.S. aircraft have been permanently allotted by the Supreme Commander for delivery of supplies to French resistance groups, and that requirements for U.S. equipment have been considerably increased.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff have this matter under continuing review and General Eisenhower has reported that he will explain fully to General Koenig, the representative of the French Committee in London, the position of the United States Government in this matter.

[Signature]

Acting Chief of Staff.

[Stamp: TOP SECRET]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Watson has informed me that you desire my comments on the accuracy of an alleged statement by General DeGaulle to the effect that "Arms supply to French resistance greatly improved last three months, thanks to British."

Two squadrons of U.S. Liberator bombers based in England have been engaged in delivering supplies to the French mainland. It is reported that air lift rather than availability of supplies is the bottleneck in supplying the French groups and that the Prime Minister has made available additional British planes for this purpose. The United States Chiefs of Staff on 17 April 1944 sent a message to General Eisenhower concerning this matter. A copy is attached.

At present we do not have accurate data as to the amount and sources of supplies furnished French resistance groups during the past three months. Generals Eisenhower and Devers have been asked to furnish this information as early as possible. It will be sent to you as soon as it is received.

Chief of Staff.

1 Incl.
Paraphrase of message from U.S. Chiefs of Staff.
PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE
FROM U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF TO COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. ARMY FORCES,
EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, Dispatched 17 April 1944

Assistance to French resistance groups is subject. We have been
informed that the impression has spread that the U.S. is opposed to
furnishing supplies for resistance groups for political reasons and
that the British are doing all that is being done in this field. The
State Department advises that this question has become an important
political matter.

Insofar as is consistent with military operations requirements,
it is desired that you take such action as is within your authority
to equalize the effort as between the U.S. and the British in deliver-
ing and furnishing equipment for resistance groups in France.
A few days ago the British Ambassador furnished me with a copy of the Prime Minister's telegram to you of April 12 (no. 643).

With regard to the final portion of that message, which deals with a possible visit of General de Gaulle to this country, I believe it would be well, if you approve, for me to send a telegram in the following sense to our representative at Algiers.

"Secret for Chapin. The President has received a message from Prime Minister Churchill stating that latter has instructed Duff Cooper to inform de Gaulle in the following sense.

'The danger of bad relations growing between de Gaulle and the American Government is a source of anxiety to Mr. Churchill. Latter believes that after Mr. Hull's important speech it would be a good thing for de Gaulle to pay a short visit to the United States and make personal contact with the President. Such a visit would also prove beneficial to British relations with the French Committee since de Gaulle will understand that the foundation of British policy is to keep in step with the United States with whom the British share important war schemes. If de Gaulle should be favorably disposed and would let Duff Cooper know, Prime Minister would suggest to the President that a formal invitation be extended by the latter.'

"For your secret information consideration has been given by the President to the possibility of inviting General de Gaulle to this country, but no final decision has been reached and the instructions sent by the Prime Minister to Duff Cooper were drawn up without the President's knowledge or authorization. Any final decision in the matter will of course be communicated through American and not British channels."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Employment of French Forces.

The United States Chiefs of Staff are aware of your desire that all military matters be handled directly between the Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, and the French Military authorities, and not on a government or committee basis.

Guided by this policy, the United States Chiefs of Staff, during Combined Chiefs of Staff consideration of an agreement proposed by the French Committee concerning the employment of French military forces in future operations, insisted that the instrument be accomplished on a military level. As a result of the United States stand, the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched an amended draft agreement to General Wilson who was instructed to negotiate the agreement with the French Committee.

Subsequently, the Secretary of State was informed by the American Mission at Algiers that the French Committee insists that this agreement be consummated between the Committee and the United States and British Governments. On receipt of this information the British Chiefs of Staff informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they now believe the matter should be handled on the political level as between governments, and that the Foreign Office agrees with this view. The British Chiefs of Staff are, therefore, examining the comments of the French Committee in detail and will forward their views to the Foreign Office.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Signature]
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

TOP SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL MARSHALL,

For recommendation as to the
advisability of assigning General Giraud
to duty on the Staff of General Eisenhower
in an advisory capacity.

F. D. R.

Secretary of State Memorandum, 4-19-44,
subject: Future plans of General Giraud.

see White 132
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET
April 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

GENERAL MARSHALL.

The President handed me the attached memorandum with the request that I return it to you. Please note his penciled comment on the margin thereof.

W. D. LEAHY.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Since my note to you of April fifteenth transmitting General T. Bentley Mott's comments regarding the situation in France, the group of officers to which I referred called on Mott and discussed in detail his written statement which you have.

It now appears that General Mott has somewhat tempered his views which I summarize as follows:

Secretary Hull's announcement of our plans for a civil government in Reoccupied France was statesmanlike by proposing to use De Gaulle but not to set him up as a dictator.

The French people are in dire need of a leader but there is no one in France who can qualify. Being pro-Giraud does not prevent a Frenchman from being pro-De Gaulle; only extremists find that there is a cleavage.

The French people fear the Committee of National Liberation more than they fear De Gaulle. The De Gaulle organization has been inept in its propaganda broadcasts to France.

At the present time in all echelons the government of France is accomplished by officials with a German at their side. Requisitions are made by French officers who are targets for part of the unpopularity which requisitions occasion. Mott feels that a practicable means of controlling civil government in the early stages would be merely to replace these Germans by Americans.

Mott states that there are plenty of active men in France. Germany received no conscripted laborers from February 1943 to February 1944. The highest proportion of available young men is probably in the former Unoccupied area.

There are 60,000 to 100,000 Communists, many of whom escaped from Spain who are now running loose in France. These are troublemakers and as a result there is a great deal of thuggery going on.

There is adequate food in France for all but young children and mothers. Butter is being sent from Normandy to Germany. Fuel is the greatest need.
Discussing Giraud, Mott said that Weygand's son, who served under Giraud, told him that G was very much of an individualist and was inclined to be non-cooperative; in battle he would move ahead without bothering to notify either his higher commander or the units on his flank.

While living in Paris General Mott stayed at the Bristol Hotel, largely occupied by German Army and Gestapo officers. His sources of information were old French Army friends, career civil servants and important business men who were producing war materials for the Germans. He had no specific knowledge of resistance movements and felt that reports have exaggerated their importance.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.
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Since my note to you of April fifteenth transmitting General T. Bentley Mott's comments regarding the situation in France, the group of officials to which I referred called on Mott and discussed in detail his written statement which you have.

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SECRET

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(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached notes on conditions in France were dictated by General T. Bentley Mott, whom you perhaps know. If not, he was our Attache in France for many years and has spent most of his adult life in France. He married a Frenchwoman, with Foch as his best man. She has since died.

Frank McCoy tells me that Mott was allowed (apparently through oversight) more or less complete liberty in Unoccupied France for a long time and only rather recently was he taken under surveillance. He therefore had a good opportunity to sense French reactions.

The attached notes were given, I think, to General McCoy and sent by him to Mr. Stimson. I am having a group of three officers, one from Operations, one from G-2 and one from the Civil Affairs Division, call on General Mott in the hospital near New York to collect all the data that he is able to give them which bears on our immediate problems.

[Signature]

Chief of Staff.

Incls.
The following badly written notes come from my sick bed, for I have been much worried since my return from France three weeks ago by the ignorance that seems prevalent regarding that country. I have lived in France - both zones - since before 1939, except for seven months absence in 1941-'42. I know intimately people in every walk of life - very old friends who trust me as one of themselves. From October 1943 to February 17, 1944, I was in Paris, where I tried especially to get an idea of what Frenchmen thought about the government set-up in Algiers under General Giraud and then under General de Gaulle and then under the Committee of Liberation.

T. Bentley Mott

April 11, 1944

Future notes on:
Underground activities
Banditism
M. Marty
M. Pierre Cot

French journalists:
- in France
- in America

German officers opinions of American Army

French manufacturers
peasants
shop keepers

Collaborationists

Food
Delegation
In reading the New York newspapers, one would suppose that the people in France were very unhappy because the President refused to accept General de Gaulle's Algiers Committee as the supreme authority over continental France. This is in no sense true. Most French people are afraid of the Committee. They regard it as a body of self-appointed ambitious politicians, and not solely as patriots striving unselfishly for France's liberation. They are deeply concerned over the purges and executions carried out. They fear that if given full authority as French soil is liberated they would occupy themselves with revenge, rather than dispassionate reconstruction. One hears on every side in France, "these men seem to be giving us a repetition of 1793."

There is now no longer any Frenchman whom the French look upon as a savior or even as the symbol of salvation. For two years they felt that way about Marshal Petain. They surrounded him with the mysticism that people who have no hope from earthly sources instinctively create for themselves. They have never felt this way about General de Gaulle - not many nor for long. His noble attitude and dramatic appeal in June 1940 were admired. He was a rallying point for the ardent and adventurous; he showed the way to those still eager to fight. But he had neither the personal magnetism nor the political intelligence that were needed to feed and fortify his first appeal. His speeches over the London Radio and the daily tirades of his mouthpiece gradually convinced most Frenchmen that he was not much of a fellow. They were asking for bread and during two long years they got only a stone. They felt he ought to have
surrounded himself with good men; he chiefly chose politicians
with grievances, the ambitious and the vengeful. His Committee in
London filled the air with hatred instead of hope. It seemed like
Mr. Blum and his "Populaire" once more turned loose.

The above is the briefest possible sketch of the reasons
why very few people in France look to de Gaulle to save, guide or
reconstruct their country. And there is nobody else. Petain has
entirely lost his hold. A few hate him, most feel sorry for him.
The personal attacks upon his honor and his patriotism by General
de Gaulle have done more harm to de Gaulle than to Petain. No
Frenchman who served in 1914–1918 can forgive him for it. One of
those errors that are worse than crimes.

But the more the French lost their faith in Petain the more
they became inspired by a new belief. And their hopes no longer go
forth to a mere symbol; they lift their prayers to a mighty nation
in arms. This faith of broken men and women in American power and
willingness to help them has grown in intensity since November 1942
and today it stirs the hearts of even the collaborationists. In
the common people it is like the vision that came to Paul as he
neared Damascus. Their faith in "The Americans" is now as ardent —
as unreasoning if you like — as his became in the Jesus he had persecuted.

The great mass of Frenchmen believe and pray that it will be the
Americans who are going to drive the Germans out of France, the
Americans who are going to occupy and administer the country. It is
not the Algiers Committee nor General de Gaulle nor even the French
Army from North Africa that they want to do this thing. Time was when
they dreamed of seeing Giraud and his Moroccans pouring into their
country; with that General's eclipse and the Committee's recent actions this dream has faded (like so many others.) Ninety per cent of all Frenchmen are deadly afraid of two things happening when the Germans leave: the handing over of their country to de Gaulle's Committee and the arrival of Russian troops. The one means, in their eyes, persecution, revenge, anonymous denunciations, a reign of terror; the other pictures to them the return of Leon Blum and his followers, with Communists in the saddle as in 1938, only far worse. It is not just the Right elements that feel this way but the humbler classes, many workingmen and every soul that owns somewhere a tiny house or a speck of land. Dyed in the wool Communists (they are comparatively few) and the anarchists who fled from Spain, along with every-day French bandits (they are comparatively numerous), are the men who want the Committee to exercise power. It would suit their book. They would be able to fish in troubled waters.

Whatever has happened in North Africa during the past year which Frenchmen did not understand or did not like has been accepted (by all but the intellectuals and professional skeptics) in terms of this blind faith in America. "It would not have been done if the Americans had not wanted it!" "if they allowed it, there must be a reason for it." The daily flood of German propaganda all over France concerning North Africa broke harmlessly against the rock of this faith. Living in the midst of it, I was astonished at its strength. This blind faith has enabled the French, cut off from all real news, calmly to accept many disturbing things. It made them hail enthusiastically General Eisenhower's appointment of Giraud to supreme command; it excused later on the sharing of that command by de Gaulle; it
softened the regret when their paladin, whose feet turned out to be of clay, was ejected from the control of affairs. Even when we publicly proclaimed that we had no intention of telling the Algiers Committee what it might or might not do, the French people consoled themselves with the belief that "those politicians" would not be allowed by the Americans to really put over anything very harmful.

"You have a million soldiers in North Africa; do you want us to believe that you are turning over their base of operations to a committee of self-appointed ex-congressmen who six years ago represented a tiny fraction of France?"

I was not in France when de Gaulle's recent defiance of America and his assumption of complete power was asserted; but judging by my experience of the last eighteen months, I should say that it would have gravely disturbed all Frenchmen, except for President Roosevelt's announced policy regarding civil administration after we have landed. I believe that his plan satisfies more Frenchmen than any other could, short of declaring that as Allied troops occupy France, civil affairs will everywhere be under the control of Americans. Such a thing would be hailed with delight by over nine-tenths of the people. However divided may be their belief in our competence, their faith in our honesty and our unselfishness is entire. This faith does not extend to the British (an easily explainable fact), and as for the Russians, Frenchmen are simply scared to death of them. A year of ceaseless Vichy propaganda has fortified their dread of Communism; - remember they had a taste of it from 1936 to 1939.
This fact, then, has got to be faced: Whatever takes place in North Africa is considered in France as done with the approval of the American Army. All Frenchmen are too militarily minded to conceive of anything else. If we want to enlist the full support of the French population for our invading armies, we must find some way of assuring them that these armies are not bringing with or behind them the Algiers Committee. That way does not seem easy to invent except by crash-bang methods. At present the average man in France has no means of learning what goes on in America or in North Africa. The BBC for French listeners at 9 p.m. is and has always been pure de Gaulle propaganda; Radio France from Algiers gives nothing except what helps the Committee; Broadcasts from America, even when in English, give only war news. Absolutely nothing is received in France to offset the flood of propaganda poured out from London and Algiers on the subject of the French Committee. This has been very confusing to the French; they want to know the truth and they have no means of learning it. And the subject interests them passionately. It means "who is going to organize and govern us, who is going to protect us, to whom are we to look for justice?" And to people whose spirit has been broken, these are terrible questions. We alone can answer them. Algiers can now no more reassure continental France than can Brazzaville. Most everything the Liberation Committee has done so far has excited the distrust of well over ninety per cent of the French population. The claims of de Gaulle to absolute power over
continental France seen to them ridiculous unless he has the Allies behind him. Vichy they say is still the de facto government of France because the German Army supports it, not because the French people want it; the Algiers Committee is the de facto government of North Africa because the American Army supports it; it can become the de facto government of continental France only by the same means. Its authority over France rests on no legal grounds and if a vote were taken it would be seen that it has little popular backing. Frenchmen want to choose their new governors under the auspices of the American Army, not under the manipulation of the Algiers Committee. It is purely a matter of confidence.

No information goes from France to North Africa except that which is favorable to de Gaulle; none goes to London except what the de Gaulle organization and the Communist cells in France send. Nobody outside of these categories has facilities for transmitting his opinions. Even if he did, he would be afraid to express any ideas except those favorable to the Algiers Committee; for his name would be set down by them on their list of criminals booked for punishment.

It is, therefore, not surprising that American newspaper men in Algiers, in London, and in New York should know practically nothing of what Frenchmen in France think of de Gaulle. All of their information comes from sources favorable to him. All other sources of information are closed by fear of death or persecution. These men have to cable the news; none but what lauds de Gaulle is
available. The de Gaulle organization for the control of news concerning him and his committee is air tight.

In a long conversation in Lisbon on March 4th last, with Colonel Soldorg, our military attache, we touched upon this subject. He confirmed entirely the statements made above. He had just returned from North Africa and he told me he was "most uneasy". Neither of us thought on March 4th that the subject we were discussing was going to become critical on April 4th.

Some newspaper men doubtless want to harry the President over "refusing the French people what they so ardently desire"; may it not be that others, perhaps a majority, simply don’t know the truth and have no means of learning it?

T. BENTLEY MOTT
March 21, 1944.

SECRET

Dear Winston,

As I told you in my letter of February 29th, I have been putting the finishing touches on a directive to Eisenhower which would make him solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the administration of good order and reasonable justice when we get ashore.

The paper is now being cleared through the usual channels of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for presentation to Eisenhower, and I am sending you a copy herewith.

I hope you will agree that my efforts to keep it simple and to provide primarily for the first few months of occupation are on a sound basis and have not been in vain.

With warm regards,

As ever,

FDR

The Rt. Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
10 Downing Street,
London, W. 1,
England
March 15, 1944.

Dear Mr. Secretary:-

After much thought, and many revisions, and with the approval of yourself and the Secretary of State, I request that the following order be sent to General Eisenhower. I think it covers the practical objective of giving the final command in the forthcoming occupation to General Eisenhower and, at the same time, leaving him free to consult any and all French organizations as circumstances may be determined by him.

GENERAL EISENHOWER:

This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory:

I.

The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are the following:

A. The prompt and complete defeat of Germany.

B. The earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors.

C. The fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people as the government under which they wish to live.

II.

The following powers and instructions are given you for your guidance in the achievement of the foregoing aims:
1. The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people. As such Allied Commander you will have the ultimate determination as to where, when and how the civil administration in France shall be Exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.

2. When and where you determine that there shall be set up a civil administration in any part of France, so far as possible there shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the United States.

3. In order to secure the setting up of any such civilian administration locally in any part of France, you may consult with the French Committee of National Liberation and may authorize them in your discretion to select and install the personnel necessary for such administration. You are, however, not limited to dealing exclusively with said Committee for such purpose in case at any time in your best judgment you determine that some other course or conferee is preferable.

4. Nothing that you do under the powers conferred in the preceding paragraph 3 in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation or with any other group or organization shall constitute a recognition of said Committee or group as the government of France even on a provisional basis.

5. In making your decision as to entering into such relations with the French Committee of National Liberation or other committees or persons for that purpose, you should as far as possible obtain from it the following restrictions upon its purposes:

   a. It has no intention of exercising indefinitely in France any powers of government, provisional or otherwise, except to assist in the establishment by the democratic methods above mentioned a government of France according to the free choice of the French people, and that when such government is established it will turn over thereto all such powers as it may have.
b. It favors the reestablishment of all the historic French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime or rule of personal government.

c. It will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people.

6. In any zones of liberated France, whether or not there has been set up local control of civil affairs as aforesaid, you will retain the right at any time to make such changes in whole or in part which in your discretion may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.

7. As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of civil affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French, and American commands, and review all plans.

8. You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

9. You will have no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.

10. Instructions on economic, fiscal, and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

ROOSEVELT

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
February 29, 1944.

Dear Winston:—

I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives.

As you doubtless remember, at Quebec last Summer the Staff people took a shot at drawing up terms of surrender for Italy. The American draft was short and to the point and was finally adopted and presented.

But later on the long and comprehensive terms, which were drawn up by your people, were presented to Badoglio.

I did not like them because they attempted to foresee every possibility in one document. But, as so often happens, when such an attempt is made, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented.

That is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are jointly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been handed pages and pages with detailed instructions and appendices. I regard them as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible.

Therefore, I re-drew them with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the maintenance of law, order and reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and representatives of the French National Committee in such places as have military status, but that he and his Staff bear the sole responsibility.

Now comes this business of what to do when we get into Germany. I understand that your Staff presented a long and comprehensive document — with every known kind of terms — to the European Advisory Commission, and that the Russians have done somewhat the same.
My people over here believe that a short document of surrender terms should be adopted. This, of course, has nothing to do with the locality of the occupying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument of surrender which is in conformity with the general principles.

I am enclosing (a) an argument -- facts bearing on the problem and (b) a proposed acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by Germany.

I hope much that you will read the argument. I think it is very cogent.

I am trying as hard as I can to simplify things -- and sometimes I shudder at the thought of appointing as many new Committees and Commissions in the future as we have in the past!

I note that in the British proposal the territory of Germany is divided up in accordance with the British plan. "Do please don't" ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now!

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill, 
Prime Minister of Great Britain, 
London, 
England.

(Enclosures)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TOP-SECRET February 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

I enclose a draft of a memorandum to General Eisenhower.

This takes the place of the three pages submitted to me.

I do not want Annex A Political Guide used in any way. This Political Guide at this stage of OVERLORD goes into all kinds of unnecessary details. Such a political directive can come later if it then seems advisable. I shall be glad to review the matter about the first week in April.

F. D. R.
February 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL EISENHOWER

This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory.

1. The paramount aim is the defeat of Germany.

2. The next aim is the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors.

3. The third aim is to foster conditions in which a democratically constituted French Government may be established; the ultimate aim being the free choice by the French people of the government under which they will live.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly, with the full cooperation of the French people.

5. As Supreme Allied Commander you will determine where, when and how the civil administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.

6. When and where you determine to set up a civil administration in any part of France, you will not retain or employ in any office any person who has filially collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the United Nations.

7. In setting up any civilian administration locally in any part of France, you will consult, but not exclusively, with such of the local inhabitants as you may desire, including representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation.
8. This French Committee of National Liberation, operating in and from Algiers, has expressed its intention or relinquishing its powers to a provisional government to be later established in France in conformity with the laws of the Republic; that it favors the re-establishment of all French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime and the rule of personal power.

9. The Committee has asserted that it will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people. You will make every effort to see to it that this assertion is carried out in spirit as well as in letter.

10. This does not in any way authorize recognition of the Committee as the Government of France, for the simple reason that before any Government of France is recognized it is obviously necessary to obtain the consent of the people of France to such a Government. At the present time, of course, we have no factual information on this point.

11. Consultation with the French Committee of National Liberation in matters of civil administration in such areas as for military reasons do not require military control, does not constitute recognition of that Committee even on a provisional basis. All decisions rest with the Supreme Commander.

12. In any area of liberated France, whether or not you have set up local control of civil affairs, you will have the right to make such changes, in whole or in part, which in your discretion seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) the maintenance of law and order and (c) the maintenance of civil liberties.

13. As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of civil affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French and American commands, and review all plans.
14. You may, in your discretion, incorporate in your civil affairs section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

15. The French Flag, together with the American and British Flags, shall be displayed at the headquarters and posts of the Allied military organization for the administration of civil affairs.

16. You will have no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.

17. Instructions on economic, fiscal and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the C.C.S.

F. D. R.
ANNEX A

POLITICAL GUIDE

The following provisions are transmitted to you for your guidance and information only and are not to be construed as a directive to you.

I. Areas in Which You Retain Authority for the Administration of Civil Affairs.

(1) The administration of units of local government should be by French citizens to the greatest extent possible. You or your authorized Allied Military Commanders shall have, however, the final authority to decide whether the functioning of the military control is better served by the appointment of Allied civil affairs officers or by the use of the services of French officials. The decision as to these officials should be based upon their abilities and experience for the position, and not upon their political views, except of course, that no person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has deliberately acted in a manner hostile to the Allied cause shall be retained or employed in any office.

(2) You should permit French civilian courts to operate subject to any military requirements and subject to the considerations set forth in Section 1. You should abolish all political courts established since June 22, 1940. The military authorities should have exclusive jurisdiction over the armed forces and those U.S. and U.K. civilians who are subject to your courts-martial jurisdiction. Military tribunals should have jurisdiction to try all persons for violations of proclamations, orders, and instructions issued by the Allied
administration for civil affairs. Every effort consistent with military necessity should be made to turn over to the French civil authorities French civilians charged with violations of local laws and with political offenses not directly related to Allied military operations.

(3) Your supreme authority for civil affairs will of course include the power to requisition public or private property, billets, supplies, labor or facilities, and make use of lands, buildings, transportation and other services for the military needs of the forces under your command. In exercising this right you should be guided by the appropriate provisions of the economic and labor guides. If you desire, such requisitions will be effected through the local authorities.

(4) It should be made clear to the local population that continued Allied military control after liberation from the Germans is only for the purpose of prosecuting the war and that the government of French territory will be left to Frenchmen as soon as this can be done consistently with military necessity.

(5) Measures should be taken to dissolve such German or Nazi inspired organizations as the "Service D'Ordre de la Legion" and the "Partie Populaire Francais".

(6) Known Nazi leaders and partisans of German nationality should be arrested and all property belonging to Germany and her satellite powers will be impounded or sequestered. Except in the case of war criminals charged by the United Nations, it should be your general policy to turn over to the French authorities such Nazi leaders or partisans who may be French as soon as you are satisfied that such authorities have adequate facilities and procedures to insure the security of their prisoners.
(7) War criminals charged by the United Nations (names will appear on lists to be furnished you) should be imprisoned and held subject to further directive.

(8) Any persons detained by the German or the Vichy regime because of race, color, creed or political opinion should be released subject to the requirements of security and the interests of the individual concerned.

(9) Subject to military necessity, as you may determine, you will permit freedom of speech and assembly and religious worship. You will institute such censorship and control of press, printing, publications and the dissemination of news or information by the above means and by wireless radio, telephone and cable as you consider necessary in the interests of military security.

(10) Your authority for the administration of civil affairs is to be exercised in your capacity as Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and the degree of control which you are to exercise is dependent upon military necessity. You will exercise such controls as have been enumerated above, or exercise a lesser degree of control over any zone as to which you may determine such lesser control to be sufficient in order to accomplish your mission, namely the defeat of the armed forces of Germany and the liberation of Nazi dominated Europe.

II. Protection of Interests in Areas for Which French Committee of National Liberation has Responsibility for the Administration of Civil Affairs.

(1) In notifying the French Committee of National Liberation in order that it may assume the responsibility for the administration
of civil affairs in an area, you should specifically reserve such
rights in the area as you deem necessary for the effective operation
of the Allied Armies. It should be pointed out that the specific
reservation of rights is not in derogation of the general authority
referred to in Section 3 of the Basic Directive. The following
rights should be reserved together with such other rights as you
deeem necessary for the effective operation of the Allied Armies:

(a) The operations and transit of Allied military forces
and supplies throughout the area and the actions of Allied officials
shall be free from any restraint, regulation, taxation, public
charge or other impediment.

(b) No French court in such area shall be allowed,
without your consent, to exercise jurisdiction over any member of
the Allied forces other than the French forces, or any person ac-
companying any of the Allied forces other than the French forces,
or any official of any Allied nation other than France.

(c) Allied military tribunals shall retain jurisdiction
and the right to try any person charged with an offense committed
in such an area at any time during the period of your authority for
the administration of civil affairs in the area.

(d) You may require the appropriate local authorities
to requisition on your behalf public or private property, billets,
supplies, labor or facilities or to make available the use of lands,
buildings, transportation, and other services for the military needs
of the forces under your command. Compensation is to be paid in
accordance with French laws and practices, so far as possible.
(a) You may require the appropriate French authorities to try in the appropriate courts any person acting contrary to the interests of the Allied Forces.

(f) You may require the appropriate French authorities to institute such censorship and control of press, printing, publications, mails and the dissemination of news or information by the above means and by wireless radio, telephone and cable as you consider necessary in the interests of military security.

(g) You should make appropriate arrangements for the importation and distribution of civilian relief supplies furnished by the Allies free from any tax, regulation, public charge or other impediment.

(2) Allied liaison officers should serve as observers and in liaison with the appropriate French authorities.
DIRECTIVE TO SCAEF FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AFFAIRS FOR FRANCE

This directive is for your guidance in the administration of civil affairs in France. The first principle underlying this directive is that in your capacity as commander in chief you have authority to undertake any measures relating to civil affairs which you consider to be necessary for the carrying out of your mission, the defeat of the armed forces of Germany and the liberation of Nazi-dominated Europe. The Second principle is that the administration of civil affairs in France and the institution of such measures as are necessary for the reestablishment of a representative form of government in France should, subject to the paramount demands of military necessity, be by Frenchmen. A plan has been evolved for your guidance in harmonizing these two principles, involving two types of zones in liberated areas of France, in which the exercise of Allied military control is progressively reduced, in step with military requirements.

The ultimate selection of a government of France will be by the choice of the French people. But in the meantime, you are authorized to deal provisionally with the French Committee of National Liberation with regard to the administration of those areas of France as to which you do not feel that military necessity requires you to exercise such authority.

It is hoped that the French people and all French political groups, having as their primary objective the freeing of their country from Nazi domination will assist in maintaining law and order and will subordinate political activity to the necessity of united action in the eviction and destruction of the enemy.
I. Basic Directive.

(1) Except where military necessity requires you to exercise control over the administration of civil affairs in combat zones, zones of military importance containing seaport, airports, railroads, roads, lines of communication, military installations or facilities and such other zones of communication and security as you deem necessary, you are authorized to deal with the French Committee of National Liberation as the authority responsible for the administration of civil affairs in areas of France which are liberated by recapture or by evacuation by the enemy.

(2) Upon the liberation of an area of France by recapture or by evacuation by the enemy, you shall assume authority for the administration of civil affairs in combat zones, zones of military importance as described in section 1 and such other zones of communication and security as you deem necessary. In the event that you do not consider that military necessity requires you to assume authority for the administration of civil affairs in an area, or if you have previously assumed such authority but do not consider that military necessity requires you to maintain it, you shall notify the French Committee of National Liberation of this determination in order that it may assume responsibility for civil administration in those areas.

(3) In any area of liberated France, irrespective of whether you have retained authority for the administration of civil affairs, you will have the right to exercise control of civil affairs, in whole or in part, if, in your discretion, this is necessary for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany.
(4) To insure that there is uniformity in the administration of civil affairs throughout France you are authorized to undertake the responsibility for the issuance of policy directives in coordination with AFHQ and prescribe the policies for both commands and review the plans for both commands.

(5) For the purpose of planning for civil affairs the French authorities appointed to your headquarters for this purpose by the French Committee shall be consulted and consideration given to the policies recommended by them.

(6) Members of the French Military Mission and other French officials approved by you may be incorporated in your civil affairs section and take part in the direction of civil affairs.

(7) The French Flag, together with the American and British flags, shall be displayed at the headquarters and posts of the Allied military organization for the administration of civil affairs.

(8) You will have no dealings or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration.

(9) Attached hereto is an Annex to be used as a guide on political matters. Further instructions on economic, fiscal and relief matters will be furnished you later by the C.C.S.

(10) In order to acquaint you with the position of the French Committee of National Liberation, as an inclosure there is attached the joint announcement of the President and the Prime Minister, together with an announcement by the French Committee of National Liberation.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

French Committee

In several discussions recently relative to
the clarification of the status of the partici-
pation of the French Committee in the admini-
stration of civil affairs in France during
military operations. We have agreed on the
importance of clarifying the matter publicly
as soon as possible.

After consideration, however, we feel
before this is done we and the War Department
should explain the arrangements to the British
so that all will be informed of your views.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM

The United States and British Governments have been discussing with representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation civil and military matters connected with the liberation of France and general understandings on these matters have been reached.

It is the declared intention of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain that, except where military necessity requires the Supreme Allied Commander to exercise control over combat zones and zones of communication and security, civil affairs in France should be administered by Frenchmen. It is recognized that the subsequent task of reestablishing a representative government in France and the restoration of France to its rightful place among the family of nations is one which, of course, must be performed by the French people.

A large number of French patriots both within and without France have indicated their adherence to the French Committee of National Liberation, and that Committee and the Consultative Assembly with which it is now associated have shown their determination to see that democratic processes are reestablished in France.
In keeping with this, the Committee has asserted that it will take no action designed to intrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people. The French Army, operating under the Committee's authority and acting under the Supreme Allied Commander, will take its part in the operations for the liberation of France. Its splendid performances throughout Africa and in Italy gives striking evidence of the contribution it will make. For these reasons the United States and British Governments will deal on a provisional basis with the French Committee of National Liberation as the authority responsible for civil administration in all areas of liberated France which for military reasons do not require military control.
February 18, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

Today after Cabinet you expressed the view that the draft memorandum to the French Committee, which McCloy has prepared and which is before you, went into too much detail and you said that you thought all those details should be left to Eisenhower.

When I returned to my office I asked McCloy about that and he told me he had discussed that matter with Eisenhower and that Eisenhower had requested that it should go into such detail. I enclose herewith a memorandum on this subject which McCloy has drawn, giving you the exact facts.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

The form of the proposed directive to General Eisenhower which the President now has in respect of the length, subjects and detail is the result of our talks with General Eisenhower and Beadle Smith and members of his Civil Affairs Staff as well as the result of our experience with his wishes in the Sicily and Italy directives.

One of the points made by Eisenhower was that in order to aid him he should be given as much guidance as possible as to how we feel the administration should go, but to frame his directive so that it is primarily guidance rather than directive.

This is just what we have done. Everything from Page 4 on is entitled "Guidance" and so made clear by paragraph 10 of the directive proper and even the directive itself (which is only 3 pages long) gives him complete leeway in the event of an emergency.

It should also be borne in mind that we intend to submit this to General Eisenhower and his staff for comment before the Combined Civil Affairs Committee recommends it for adoption by the Combined Chiefs of Staff for formal transmittal to General Eisenhower.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Secretary Hull asked Mr. Dunn to advise me that following my conversation with the President the other day he had also discussed the matter briefly with the President. He told me that he felt the President wished to have inserted language which made it quite clear that the action being taken did not constitute a recognition of the Committee as the government of France. I have taken the liberty of making a suggestion to cover this point. I would suggest this statement to be included in the directive to General Eisenhower:

"The ultimate selection of the government of France will be by the choice of the French people. The French people are not now in a position freely to exercise that choice. The majority of Frenchmen, both within and without France, who have been able to express an opinion have, however, indicated their support of the French Committee of National Liberation as the group which should put into effect the measures which will enable the French people to select a representative government. You are therefore authorized to deal provisionally with the Committee, not as
the government of France, but as the group responsible
for the administration of civil affairs in those areas
of France as to which you do not feel that military
necessity requires you to exercise such authority and as
the group which will institute measures for the reestablish-
ment of representative government in France."

In the proposed statement, a copy of which the President
already has, I would alter the last sentence to read as follows:

"For these reasons the United States and British Governments
will deal on a provisional basis with the French Committee
of National Liberation, not as the government of France, but
as the authority responsible for civil administration in all
areas of liberated France which for military reasons do not
require military control and as the group to institute
measures for the reestablishment of representative government
in France."

I believe the inclusion of the phrase "not as the government
of France" completely covers the President's point.

Would it be possible to obtain the approval of the papers
by the President with these insertions? The State Department
could then work out the procedures by which the assurances would
be obtained and General Eisenhower could proceed with his civil
affairs planning.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to your remarks to me that you might choose the occasion of your next press conference to make some observations in clarification of the French situation, I attach some general thoughts on the subject which I have had put together and which you may, or may not find useful.

Enclosure:
Draft of remarks.
The Government of the United States, in pursuit of its paramount aim—the defeat of Germany—is determined to bring about the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors and to foster conditions in which a democratically constituted French Government may be reestablished. As has been repeatedly said, the ultimate aim of this Government is the free choice by the French people of the government under which they will live.

In the conduct of military operations in France, and as long as military necessity requires, it is manifest that the Supreme Allied Commander must have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people.

It is equally clear that civil administration in France should, in so far as the military situation permits, be exercised by French citizens.

It is our intention that no person will be retained or employed in any office who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in a manner inimical to the cause of the United Nations. It goes without saying that we will have no dealings or relations with "Vichy", unless the abolition of that despised regime can be so regarded.

The
The French Committee of National Liberation has expressed its intention of relinquishing the powers which it now exercises to the provisional government that will be established in conformity with the laws of the Republic. It has likewise expressed itself in favor of the reestablishment of all French liberties through the destruction of the arbitrary regime and the rule of personal power imposed upon France today. In view of the wide variety of problems which will have to be faced by the Supreme Allied Commander, it is our hope that the French Committee of National Liberation will work in close cooperation with him in the elaboration and execution of necessary plans.

We know that at the proper time all French patriots will rise to the aid of the Allies in ejecting the Nazi oppressors from their land. In addition, we will count upon them to assist in the maintenance of public order and to work for the early return of conditions which will permit the restoration of government in France by consent of the people.
PROCEDURE -

1. Clear draft No. 1 with the Department of State and after clearance with the State Department determine whether further clearance with the President is necessary before taking matter up formally with the British.

2. Announce the results to the French Committee representatives but only after they have given the assurances to cover the statements contained in draft No. 2. Such assurances might be given by Massigli perhaps in connection with a visit here.*

3. Either by agreement with the French Committee or after notification to the Committee of the results and after receipt of such assurances, have the two governments make an announcement in the general form of draft No. 2.

4. At the time of the invasion have the P.M. and the President issue a general proclamation to the French people - perhaps accompanied at the same time or approximately at the same time by an announcement by General De Gaulle.

*Directive should be dispatched to Eisenhower without waiting for French concurrence so that he may be informed of the nature of the directive in ample time to start his own planning.
FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: GENERAL EISENHOWER
NO: 493, 17 June 1943.

Wish you would read carefully again War Department No. 9 relative to your #2382 June 10th. Murphy's telegram 1108 very disturbing.

This government's position is that we will not tolerate, during our military occupation of North Africa, the control of the French Army by any agency not subject to the direction of the Allied Supreme Commander. We must have someone whom we wholly and completely trust. Under no circumstances would we continue the arming of a force unless we had complete confidence in their willingness to cooperate in our military operations, nor are we interested in the formation of any committee or government that in any way presumes to indicate that it will govern in France until such time as the French people select a government for themselves. When we get into France the Allies will have a plan for Civil Government that is in complete consonance with French sovereignty and, finally, it must be perfectly clear that we have a military occupation in North and West Africa and, therefore, no independent civil decision can be made without our full approval.

As you know, our policy has been to encourage local officials to run their own affairs so long as they cooperate with our military interests. Our policy is to encourage an extension of this but we must not tolerate a military or civil direction which, in any way, might endanger our lines of communication, the safety of our troops, or otherwise interfere in our military operations. This would include the necessity of keeping more troops in North Africa than we now plan for.

For your exclusive information I want to state that we will not permit, at this time, De Gaulle to control through his partisans on any committee, or direct himself, the French Army in Africa, either in the field of operations or training or supplies.

I want to assure you again that you are authorized on behalf of this government to take such action as you think best.

This message has been seen by and has the approval of Marshall and Hull.

*References attached.
References. (Summaries only of Eisenhower's #2382 and the President's #9 included since they made no mention of stopping supplies to French troops.)

#2382, 10 June 43, from EISENHOWER to CCS.

Eisenhower advises that he has been informally but specifically advised of General De Gaulle's withdrawal as co-President and member of the French Committee, and that the real issue at stake was apparently a struggle for control of military forces.

#9, 10 June 43, from the PRESIDENT to EISENHOWER.

Answers EISENHOWER's #2382, advising Eisenhower that although British and US would like to have civilian functions run by the French, the military objective was absolutely paramount. The President further states, "As I wired you in my previous message, it is my judgment that any control by De Gaulle of French Military Forces in North Africa or West Africa would seriously jeopardize the safety of the British and American military operations. Go as far as you like in carrying out the prerogatives of your position. Tell this to Murphy and MacMillan."

#1108, 16 June 1943, from MURPHY to the PRESIDENT and the SECRETARY OF STATE. (Quoted in full.)

A situation has developed in which General Eisenhower and I should have guidance. Yesterday morning we were informed for the first time of the issuance of a number of decrees dated June 7 which enlarged the membership of the French Committee of National Liberation from seven to fourteen persons. The membership in our opinion insures supremacy to de Gaulle.

Giraud informs me that he signed the decrees as co-President on the recommendation of Monnet and not understanding that the enlarged committee became the repository of power over all affairs both civil and military. He believed up to this morning that the original committee of seven would automatically become the subcommittee of war which would determine all questions relating to the conduct of the war. However, there is nothing in any of the decrees signed thus far to support his opinion.

General Giraud informs me this morning that in his opinion Monnet has betrayed him. As you know I have worked closely with
Monnet and he has communicated to me daily the progress he was making. During the past week he has made no mention to or MacMillan of the fact that he had persuaded General Giraud to sign the decrees increasing the membership of the committee to fourteen regardless of the fact that this was contrary to his own commitment. I reproached him with this yesterday but the reproach left him indifferent. It is obvious to us that things have gone to Monnet's head and that he feels as strongly as possible like de Gaulle that French rights and sovereignty must be more aggressively asserted in respect to the Allies. He also seems to feel he can control the committee whereas it is increasingly clear that he is being used by de Gaulle and will probably later be discarded.

De Gaulle, having withdrawn his resignation now that the committee is so constituted that he is assured of authority, is insisting on a plenary meeting this afternoon at which might be discussed the question of the military establishment. I have suggested to Giraud that he refuse to permit this question to be decided until Eisenhower's return here Friday. I am recommending that Eisenhower call in de Gaulle and Giraud and state to them clearly the American position as we understand it with particular reference to our military requirements and that it be made abundantly clear that in the light of recent developments it is necessary for the U.S.A. to review its present policy of rearmament of French forces.

I have insisted with Giraud and he agrees that it would be disastrous for him to return (apparent omission ..) make a determined stand insisting that the committee agree that as CINC he remain as co-President until France is liberated. His present legal strength lies in the fact that no decree of the French Committee is valid without the signature of both presidents.

De Gaulle and Massigli came to MacMillan late last evening and asked him whether in his opinion our rearmament policy would be affected by de Gaulle's dominance of the situation and other questions indicating uneasiness on their part. MacMillan refused, he says, to give an opinion stating that these would be questions for the CINC to answer.
FROM: GENERAL MARSHALL                      17 JUNE 1943
TO:    GENERAL EISENHOWER
NO:    492

Mr. Hull is most seriously disturbed over Murphy's recent messages reference the French Committee. He feels that vital ground has been lost and that we may be confronted by a tragic situation in relation to the French forces in North Africa. The Secretary of War is similarly disturbed but has more confidence in Monnet than is indicated in Murphy's messages. I have proposed to the President the following and will inform you as soon as possible of his decision:

That General Eisenhower should be directed by the President to exercise his direct influence, as Commander-in-Chief in Africa, over the developments on the French Committee; that he be authorized to inform the Committee, if he sees fit, that in view of its action or proposed actions the United States will reconsider the matter of the armament, equipment, payment, etc., to the French forces; that the President consult with the Prime Minister with a view to authorizing General Eisenhower to use the necessary pressure to prevent the control of the French Army from falling into the hands of De Gaulle.

The President undoubtedly will feel that he must coordinate his action with that of the Prime Minister and will probably send a message to the Prime Minister on the subject. Meanwhile I wish you to know of our attitude here, particularly Mr. Hull's, who is extremely worried that you are not now in Algiers.
SECRET

Following is General Eisenhower's summary of oral presentation to the French National Committee of the President's instructions (#3024 from Algiers, 19 June 1943):

This morning's meeting with De Gaulle and Giraud produced nothing decisive. De Gaulle stated that my demands could be answered, on the French side, only by the action of the French National Committee, since I insist on naming the Commander-in-Chief of French North African Forces and, in addition, demanding assurances that his command of those forces will be effective and real. De Gaulle asked that my statements and demands be reduced to writing. I agreed to this but stated also that so far as I was concerned, General Giraud is now—as he has been since last November—the Commander-in-Chief of French Forces in North Africa and that I would continue to deal with him on this basis. I stated categorically that any attempt to deprive Giraud of his authority over French Forces in this region would require complete recasting of all plans that had been going forward under General Giraud, including commitments as to supplies and equipment made to Giraud at Anfa. My advisors, including Murphy and MacMillan, are confident that the action we want will be taken by the French themselves, thus avoiding the necessity of dictatorial action on our part, which would certainly create some antagonism.
March 16, 1944

Dear Pa,

The Secretary handed me the President's letter to him embodying the memorandum to General Eisenhower on the matter of the occupation of French territory. The Secretary told me that he had understood from the President that he, the President, was sending a copy of this memorandum directly to the Prime Minister.

Wish to do 1. Did he do this?

2. Whether he did or not, are we now free to clear the memorandum through the Combined Chiefs of Staff procedure with the British for transmission to General Eisenhower as a combined directive?

John F. McCloy

3. We have already transmitted it to Eisenhower that we will eventually need combined authority.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

[Handwritten note: "Copy to J. S."]

[Handwritten note: "W. A. and copy to FDR"]
MAIL RECEIPT
Op-16-A-3-g.

DATE 22 March 1944

To: Lt. (jg) R. H. Myers

Received from the Foreign Mail Unit of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the below listed article(s) to be (forwarded or delivered) to the proper destination(s) as indicated:

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W. M.
1944 MAR 22 PM 4 02

SIGNATURE

DATE RECEIVED

NUMBER OF ARTICLES

PLEASE RECEIPT AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL COPY TO THE ONI, FOREIGN MAIL UNIT
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

February 25, 1944

I enclose a draft of a memorandum to General Eisenhower.

This takes the place of the three pages submitted to me.

I do not want Annex A Political Guide used in any way. This Political Guide at this stage of OVERLORD goes into all kinds of unnecessary details. Such a political directive can come later if it then seems advisable. I shall be glad to review the matter about the first week in April.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL EISENHOWER

This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory.

1. The paramount aim is the defeat of Germany.

2. The next aim is the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors.

3. The third aim is to foster conditions in which a democratically constituted French Government may be established; the ultimate aim being the free choice by the French people of the government under which they will live.

4. The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly, with the full cooperation of the French people.

5. As Supreme Allied Commander you will determine where, when and how the civil administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.

6. When and where you determine to set up a civil administration in any part of France, you will not retain or employ in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner inimical to the cause of the United Nations.

7. In setting up any civilian administration locally in any part of France, you will consult, but not exclusively, with such of the local inhabitants as you may desire, including representatives of the French Committee of National Liberation.
8. This French Committee of National Liberation, operating in and from Algiers, has expressed its intention of relinquishing its powers to a provisional government to be later established in France in conformity with the laws of the Republic; that it favors the re-establishment of all French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime and the rule of personal power.

9. The Committee has asserted that it will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people. You will make every effort to see to it that this assertion is carried out in spirit as well as in letter.

10. This does not in any way authorize recognition of the Committee as the Government of France, for the simple reason that before any Government of France is recognized it is obviously necessary to obtain the consent of the people of France to such a Government. At the present time, of course, we have no factual information on this point.

11. Consultation with the French Committee of National Liberation in matters of civil administration in such areas as for military reasons do not require military control, does not constitute recognition of that Committee even on a provisional basis. All decisions rest with the Supreme Commander.

12. In any area of liberated France, whether or not you have set up local control of civil affairs, you will have the right to make such changes, in whole or in part, which in your discretion seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) the maintenance of law and order and (c) the maintenance of civil liberties.

13. As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of civil affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French and American commands, and review all plans.
14. You may, in your discretion, incorporate in your civil affairs section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

15. The French Flag, together with the American and British Flags, shall be displayed at the headquarters and posts of the Allied military organization for the administration of civil affairs.

16. You will have no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.

17. Instructions on economic, fiscal and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the C.C.S.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

REUTER'S MISSTATEMENT ON FRENCH COMMITTEE

With reference to your memorandum of March 6, we had already wired to Chapin at Algiers to correct the story transmitted in his 714, March 4. A copy of our reply, which went out the night of the fourth is attached.

Chapin's message and our reply were also repeated to London for their information.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram.
March 4, 1944

U.S. URGENT
AMREP,

ALGIERS.
689, Fourth.

Reuter's despatch as reported your 714 March 4 entirely erroneous.

The President is never specifically quoted in his press conferences but in reply to a question as to whether he had recently been giving personal attention to some sort of new understanding or agreement with French Committee concerning the part the latter might play in liberated France, President stated in substance that entire matter was still under discussion and had been for a considerable period.

STETTINIUS, ACTING
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

February 12th, 1944.

Dear Mr. President,

Anthony Eden has sent me a copy of Duff Cooper's report on the Prime Minister's conversation with de Gaulle at Marrakesh. I believe that Winston promised to let you see this and I am therefore enclosing a copy.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
Office of the British Representative with the French Committee of National Liberation, ALGIERS.

No. 19. 16th January, 1944.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that, on 14th January, General de Gaulle came to luncheon with the Prime Minister at the Villa Taylor, Marrakech. The General was accompanied by Monsieur Palewski and Captain Burin de Rosier. The others present at the lunch were Mrs. Churchill and my wife, the British Consul and Mrs. Nairn, the Lord Privy Seal, Commander Thompson and Mr. John Martin. I had not seen the General since my arrival in North Africa and he was good enough to say how very glad he was to see me. He recalled incidents of the summer of 1940 when I was of some service to him at the Ministry of Information.

2. After luncheon, which passed off pleasantly, the Prime Minister, Lord Beaverbrook, the Consul and I sat in the garden with the General and Monsieur Palewski when a conversation took place which lasted for about two hours. The Prime Minister pointed out to de Gaulle the unwisdom of alienating his own goodwill and that of the President of the United States by the prosecution of those who, whatever their previous misdeeds might have been, had rendered services to the allied cause and who had therefore reason to believe that they could rely upon the Prime Minister's and the President's protection. There could be no doubt that had Monsieur Boisson not handed over Dakar to the allies, invaluable time would have been lost and much British and American blood would have been spilt.

3. Monsieur Peyrouton had been definitely encouraged by the British and American Governments to leave his safe retreat and to return to North Africa, where so long as he continued in office he had rendered useful services. The Prime minister had attended a luncheon party where both these gentlemen were present and on leaving them had said "Comptez sur moi".

4. In the case of Monsieur Flandin there was no similar commitment on the part of the British or American Governments, but of the three who had been arrested he was certainly the least guilty. He had served in the Vichy Government only for a very short period and could not be identified with any of its more reprehensible actions. The Prime Minister felt that if the line dividing the guilt from the innocent were to be drawn at a level which would include Monsier Flandin among the guilty, the future of France would prove very tragic and civil war would be almost inevitable.

5. There happened to be lying on the table a copy of the local newspaper which announced in large headlines the debate which had taken place in the French Assembly on the previous day, on the subject of Espuration when all the members had demanded more severe penalties for those who had been guilty of collaboration with the enemy. General de Gaulle pointed to it and said that that was his answer. He had caused the Assembly to be set up in pursuance/
pursuance of his democratic policy, and having set it up he was bound to be influenced by its opinions and to listen to its demands. At the same time he could assure the Prime Minister that the men under arrest would come to no harm until they were tried after the liberation of France and that meanwhile they were not being ill-treated.

6. Mr. Churchill endeavoured to impress upon the General the folly of acting upon decisions without consultation with his allies. The Prime Minister himself, head of a victorious and united empire, bore continually in mind the views and wishes of the President and Marshal Stalin and constantly consulted them. How much more did it behove the General to walk warily. The sudden and violent action which his representative had taken in Syria had produced a deplorable impression. In these days the administration of colonial empires was a common cause of criticism, especially in countries like the United States and Russia, who were not themselves subject to embarrassments of this nature.

7. The General excused himself lamely, saying that there had been no need to present him with an ultimatum and that the action which he had finally taken he would have taken in any case in order to rectify the blunder of Monsieur Belleu.

8. The Prime Minister mentioned the case of General Georges, an officer for whom he had the highest regard, whom he had himself encouraged to come out of France and who had now been dropped from the Committee. General de Gaulle replied that he also respected General Georges but that it was not possible always to find a place in the Government for everyone whom one respected. He had offered General Georges the post of Grand Chancellor of the Legion of Honour and had not even received a reply to his offer.

9. The Prime Minister then referred to General de Lattre de Tassigny whom he did not know personally and of whom he had never heard until he was informed by his advisers that the General was a very distinguished soldier whom it would be desirable for him to meet. He had therefore sent him an invitation only to be informed that de Gaulle had forbidden him to accept it.

10. General de Gaulle protested that he had intended nothing of the kind. He had known that General de Lattre had duties to perform elsewhere at the time suggested for the visit and had therefore said that it would be inopportune.

11. Although the Prime Minister spoke with great frankness, the tone of the interview throughout was friendly and there was no danger at any time of its degenerating into a quarrel. The attitude of de Gaulle was that he was more sinned against than sinning. He had shot nobody, although many of his supporters had been shot, he had spoken ill of nobody, though many people had spoken ill of him. He was accused of not having informed his allies before taking action, but the whole of the North African expedition, the invasion of French territory, had been planned and carried out without his being informed.

12.
12. The question of civil administration in France after the invasion was raised, but I ventured to suggest that circumstances were hardly suitable for its discussion. It was a technical and complicated matter better dealt with either in London or in Washington where legal and other experts could be consulted.

13. The General pleaded for more assistance in equipping the resistance movement in France, and the Prime Minister said we would gladly give such assistance so far as our resources permitted.

14. At the conclusion of the interview the General said that he was holding a review of the troops on the following morning and that he would be delighted if the Prime Minister would attend it. The Prime Minister consented and the review took place among scenes of very great enthusiasm. The Prime Minister and the General stood side by side at the saluting base and took the salute. The troops - French, Moroccan, Algerian, and Senegalese - presented a smart appearance, and the obvious endeavour of these small contingents worthily to represent the great tradition of the French Army presented a moving spectacle. There was much shouting of "Vive Churchill" and "Vive de Gaulle", and when the Prime Minister had left, the General said a few words through the microphone. He spoke of the rebirth of the French army and the renewal of the Anglo-French alliance and referred to the privilege they had enjoyed of having the British Prime Minister present on such an historic occasion.

I have, etc.

(Signed) DUFF COOPER
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
(By Pouch)

In accordance with your memorandum of 17 January, I am forwarding herewith the "Dossier Mornay" referred to by Mr. Sumner Welles in his letter to General Watson.

I am unable to see how any useful action can be taken at the present time on the Dossier.

It may, however, be of interest to you in considering the pending proposal of Mr. McCloy that we turn over the Civil Government of Continental France to General de Gaulle's Committee.

[Signature]

January 25, 1944
January 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

I think you should look into this personally. As far as I know, the papers have never been received at the White House.

F. D. R.

Ask General Marshall to give me an explanatory memorandum on this week's recommendations if practicable.
MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN FREEMAN,
The White House:

Attached is a copy of the Dossier Mornay, about which we spoke this morning.

Mornay, Girard, and Mr. C. are all the same person.

In presenting this to Admiral Leahy, I suggest that you attach General Marshall's memorandum of January 21, explaining the circumstances under which it was received and how it was treated.

[Signature]

McCarthy

Enc.
SECRET

METROPOLITAN FRANCE.

General Situation at the End of September 1942

(These notes are drawn up after consulting French and Allied General Staff officers now in Occupied France and in the General and General of Giraud's army. The information on the situation came from France between September 20th and September 30th.)

In order the better to understand these notes, the methods used by the organization C should be remembered.

Propaganda

Directed solely towards the struggle against the enemy. A system of "listening notes" (Notes d'écoutes) is used, drawn from the documentary section of B.B.C. broadcasts or other American or Allied broadcasting stations.

These notes which, according to local means, are typed, multi-graphed or printed, have an infinitely greater propaganda value than clandestine papers. They appear daily and are more precise. Through these organized listening-posts one can order general warning in phrases previously agreed upon, start practice maneuvers by radio and sometimes even carry out military operations by radio.

Military Instruction

Carried on by two specialized officers' corps.
1) Guerrillas with light weapons — pistols and machine-guns
2) Sabotage

Past experience has shown that one hundred officers can cover France very thoroughly in two months (with an eye to instruction only). Their duty is to go from village to village, from one trustworthy address to another, to gather information and to train in each place at least two local officers, who, through a chain system, will instruct all the secret fighters.

Military Operations

Study of positions to be taken in order to start operations at the moment of an allied invasion. This entails preparing the materials and tactics destined to block or hamper the arrival of enemy reserves, thus permitting the Allied Command to choose its battlefield and somewhat limit the adversary's possibilities.

Creation of Assembly Points for Fighting Units

The gathering of a fighting unit consisting of between fifty and five hundred men, we call the Assembly Point. These volunteers are at the disposal of regional chiefs and live outside all populated regions, in mountainous or forest sections which are easy to defend.

Their way of life is very specialized. It entails a very rigorous discipline. In most cases their equipment is most insufficient in arms as well as in food, supplies and shoes. The most urgent help is needed for these groups.

The enemy has not yet seriously attacked them because the terrain and their armament would allow a mere hundred men to stop a regiment, and this regiment, in case of success, would not even
then be sure of stopping the patriots. The number of German effectives do not permit such an attempt to "clean up."

Results of the Relevé

Arrests have had less effect on our organized groups than we had feared, but they continue, and the lack of food and winter will play into the enemy's hands.

Losses through arrests are, in general, inferior to increases in effectives owing to the fact that many persons take to the woods without waiting to be directly threatened.

Naturally a very careful selection is made of those men who wish to join.

The scattering of officers and men in the Armistice Army had the effect of providing all the more local instructors.

Prisons and Camps

We know the hardships of life in prisons and in camps. Often there are one hundred and fifty men to a cell, and six women to a cell, unable to get up. There is no food.

We foresee, from the very start of the invasion, attacks to free the prisoners, of whom some are very much in touch with the work of resistance. In the meantime, a special service to provide them with food, as much as this is possible, is indispensable.

Food

In spite of difficulties, there still exist stocks hidden by patriots who have no great financial resources. These clandestine stockpiles should be supported and better organized, for they may help feed the population on the day of liberation as well as part of the allied forces.

Local Problems

From national or regional, social problems have today become very varied and essentially local.

This is due to decentralization and to requirements imposed by food-needs.

No one, therefore, will be able to solve them who has not seen their birth.

Organized Resistance

Only two forces are so organized to be able to count from the military point of view.

1) Groups formed by the army, the S.T., the S.T.S., and the organization C, mentioned above.

2) The Communist Party.

In third place --- of no military value, but very active politically --- must be considered small Gaullist groups with few members, seeking only personal seizure of power by General de Gaulle (seizure of town halls, prefectures, propaganda, and distribution of political slogans.)

Position of Military Groups

The very numerous groups, too numerous when considering the amount of support they receive, must be considered in a completely different study, in order not to enlarge this present memorandum.

They can, however, be broken down into the following groups:

1) Partisans

These men, of the greatest fighting value, are already trained and ready for use in Commando raids against enemy Command Posts, military objectives difficult to
attain, etc.
In the formerly occupied zone — about 20,000
In the formerly free zone — about 12,000
These elite corps have mostly sought refuge in the assembly
points in the mountains.

2) Sabotage Troops
Village or city groups, either having received technical
training, or prepared to receive it.
These men serve for liaison purposes, for supplying food,
receive planes, transport arms, etc.
In the formerly occupied zone — about 25,000
In the formerly free zone — about 20,000

3) Sympathetic Troops
Of lesser definite valuation. Owing to lack of sufficient
help, the persons in charge prevent recruiting more than
they encourage it.
These masses can be evaluated, however, as consisting of
several hundred thousand men, determined to fight, but
lacking arms and equipment.

Altogether these military groups are made up of very brave people
who come from every political party and who, for the most part, are
faithful to their pre-war convictions, thus in the vast majority
they are deeply democratic.
Except for approximately 8,000 men, who, with enormous diffi-
culty, have been armed and equipped, these groups are lacking in
absolutely everything.
The most needed articles are shoes, fuel, light weapons, lighting
and potatoes.
These troops have no link with General de Gaulle, for his agents
are not interested in such formations except in so far as they might,
as a group, adhere to de Gaulism.
In these groups there is indifferent admiration for Giraud, de
Gaulle, Georges, Delattre de Tassigny, and especially the chiefs who
have remained hidden in France, whose actions are noted, and who
lead an exceptionally difficult existence.
Every gift of arms, every beginning of local help has the imme-
diate effect of enlarging the number of recruits, for the whole of
France, only slightly mindful of the emotions of Algiers, thinks of
only two needs:

To fight
To feed itself

Position of the Communist Group

Unpopular in 1939-1940 because of the Russo-German alliance,
this party, after the armistice, continued to hinder the budding
movement of resistance.
Russia's entry into the war brought the Communist Party tardily
into the camp of resistance, where it was greeted with reserve.
It received important subsidies from Moscow and remained one of
the isolated groups in French underground life.
One of Vichy's policies was to condemn all resisters as Commu-
nists.
Towards November fifteenth, 1942, the Geneva Communist Bureau,
presided by Nicole, passed the word that General de Gaulle was to
be claimed as political chief.
This caused a profound surprise in France, for the Communist
Party, ever anti-military, had never before chosen a general as
political chieftain.
It was understood that this astonishing support had, as a counter
measure, the gift of an acknowledgement of patriotism to the Communists
by the General which would have the effect of re-introducing them
into French political life.
Moreover, General de Gaulle at about this time, once more started up the deepening anti-Anglo-Saxon propaganda of the Russians, who represented the democracies as the last refuge of agonizing capitalism, thus picking up here the very themes of German propaganda.

Recently, the visible understanding between the German Communist Party and members of the German General Staff in Russia presages a new understanding between a so-called repentent Germany repentent towards Russia. This understanding would be destined principally to struggle against America. Such, in any case, are the views which the heads of the secret General Staff have of it in France.

Effectives of the Communist Party number about 90,000 militants (Number of votes in 1936 was about 1,000,000). These effects have only a relative military value, but they can hamper operations by political manifestations and revolutionary moves.

Their present doctrine is the following:
1) Purely anti-Nazi, excluding anti-Germanism and opposition to the German General Staff.
2) Anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism.
3) Setting up of a de Gaulle dictatorship, so-called "socialistic."

Position of the de Gaullist Groups

These groups for electoral propaganda are composed principally of three newspapers:

- Combat, with approximately 20 to 25 thousand adherents
- Liberation, with approximately 5 to 6 thousand adherents
- Franc-Tireur, with approximately 10,000 adherents at the most.

These estimates are large. No precise census is taken. The quasi-military groups formed by these newspapers propose especially to seize town-halls and prefectures, posts favoring General de Gaulle.

British organs (among others the C.G.S.) received from the Foreign Office, towards the end of March, the order to concomitantly maximum efforts in supporting General de Gaulle (the Algiers Committee being no more than a mask and the General's dictatorship tolerating no opposition).

The definite indication of such a move is to be found in the stopping of broadcasts by the station "Radio Patrice" organized in London to give out orders requiring military action, according to indications by the organization C.

Eight days after the interruption the post was handed over to de Gaulle's men, without warning Mr. C., who was in London.

Allowing Boris to censor French broadcasts by the B.B.C.
Radio Algiers and Radio Brazzaville contribute.

Moreover, large sums of money were suddenly handed to de Gaulle's agents to give them a monopoly in recruiting and in the struggle against the relève.

This annoys the persons who are resisting in France, and who see a minority using sums necessary to all, but helping only those who belong to their political group.

De Gaulle's internal propaganda is based on the following themes:

- Violent anti-Americanism
- Present arguments:
  - "America wishes to colonize France"
  - "Americans do not respect the lives of Frenchmen" (Bombing of Rennes, Nantes and Paris)
  - "American occupation will be almost as disagreeable as German occupation."

And there are even more violent arguments.

Anglophobia — which has toned down only recently

Need for a strong, national, socialistic regime, which can
only be presided over by de Gaulle. Anti-Vichy feeling, which is violent, in order to carry out the publicity for "purification."

DANGERS IN THIS SITUATION

1) Political Agitation

All political discussions weaken the morale of the secret army and Gaullist technique hinders resistance, which is composed of volunteers who are discouraged by these polemics.

2) Anti-Americanism Contrary to French Interests and Sentiments

This propaganda is so much prodded that it may end by rendering difficult the sojourn of American troops on French soil. It may break the ardor of the volunteers and provoke heavy losses on the battlefield. Finally, it is contrary to French sentiments.

3) De Gaulle's Military-Socializing Dictatorship

If opposition to the General from the political point of view is not supported and cannot slow down his excesses, he will succeed in profiting of the joy created by deliverance to impose on the people a dictatorial regime friendly to the Russians. This may lead our local populations to revolts followed by revolution.

France, which is already suffering, will lose her balance (which is so necessary to European peace).

4) Russo-German Union

The union of Russia with the Free-Germans and the Free French will cause the toleration and maintenance of a certain German General Staff, which will mean the continuance of the war on the economic and political field, while awaiting a new clash of arms. This change in the realm of hostilities is mainly directed against America.

A well-informed and free French people will never accept such a situation.

REMEDIES TO THE SITUATION

In agreement with General Giraud a new, purely French and autonomous secret service will directly co-ordinate the action of Allied chiefs of staff with the secret general staffs situated in France.

This service will work with French military groups in France to hasten the defeat of the Germans and the arrival of Allied troops. By synchronizing the different resistance activities in France they will be given at once a democratic form and military possibilities.

This service will have to include the following branches:

-- Internal and external information services
-- Information in France
-- Arms
-- Liaison between different General Staffs to organize military operations
-- Formation of groups of officer-instructors to organize provisional political order and liaison with Allied troops, as the country is liberated.

This particular service, by avoiding the political in-
intrigues in Algiers and in direct contact with the secret General Staff's working in France, will insure their liaison with American authorities and General Giraud.

The greatest discretion is to be observed towards the British secret services in so far as they support de Gaulle.

Possible Use of the Gaullist Factor

It is evident that inside France there is continual crookedness to cinch adhesion to the personal regime of General de Gaulle.

For instance, Gaullist agents do not say:

"America recognized the Algiers Committee as a provisional one."

But rather:

"America has recognized General de Gaulle."

The conclusion drawn is:

"Therefore the French must also recognize him."

Advantage is taken of French ignorance in regard to personalities composing the Committee to make the people believe that this Committee is free, when it is evident to our specialists in the metropolis that this Committee is completely in the hands of de Gaulle.

Gaullist agents promise political positions.

Mayors, municipal counselors are designated arbitrarily in order to obtain their allegiance. They boast of it, and are well paid. Young men, hunted by the releve, are also taken in — they are named "District Leaders" by Algiers, when actually they have never commanded anyone in France. Of course, they cry "Long live de Gaulle."

French and metropolitan districts are pushed towards xenophobia. Advantage is taken of the necessarily "socialist" spiritual state in a country where all classes have been moulded by suffering into a sort of single proletariat in order to push towards Communism or rather towards a red dictatorship.

Certain profits may be reaped from the Gaullist party when thinking of pushing his propaganda which concerns the liberties which are expected in a delivered France (with or without de Gaulle).

The more this program of guaranteed liberties for liberated peoples is visibly assured by the Americans and compromised by de Gaulle's arbitrary tendencies the more the French people from place to place will recover its moral health and its equilibrium.

SECRET SERVICE WITH MILITARY ORGANIZATION

M. GIRARD agreed with the Commander in Chief when he passed through London to ask for the methods listed below (and which will permit the creation of the secret service for France mentioned above). M. GIRARD will be directly responsible to the American authorities and Commanders-In-Chief. No superfluous communication to subordinate elements must compromise the action of this service of which the Algiers Committee will surely be extremely jealous.

For this reason, bases in Sardinia and Italy are envisaged which would be independent of de Gaulle's intrigues.

INFORMATION

1) Broadcasts from America of commands requiring action, to last a quarter hour. Ask for re-broadcasting of these dictated commands by the B.B.C.

2) Reception by receiving stations run on batteries, and with small power, easy to hide, and by taking "receiving notes" printed on film

3) Radio-telephone, with the same aim, and with a range of 1500
kilometers, if possible installed on trucks, one in Sardinia, one in Italy.
3) The clandestine printing in France and in America of democratic
documents of the "Free French type".
4) Messengers and officer-instructors to prepare the solution of the
local provisional political problem, which will give security
to the allied troops.

LIAISON

1) If possible, one diplomatic courier per week to connect our
secret bureaus in Algiers (or Sardinia), in London, in Wash-
ington, as the organization C already possesses liaison spe-
cialists.
2) Special aviation for picking-up and parachuting.
It would be necessary to begin by having, very autonomous
1 squadron in Sardinia (10 crews)
1 in Italy (20 crews)
1 in England, if no interference on the part of the
R.A.F. and the secret services is to be feared.
3) Radios of the S-Phone type for verbal transmissions by planes
flying over one of our assembly-points.
This technique is necessary to prepare invasion operations.
4) Liaison through Switzerland. Looking out for communications
between the American and British embassies in Berne. Make sure
of the person in charge of these contacts.

ARMS

1) Light automatic weapons, numbering 30,000 to be delivered quickly
and to go mainly to our assembly-points.
2) Pistols — with silencers — the same quantity.
3) Standard sabotage equipment to equip 50,000 saboteurs (the
men being ready now). Equipment should be camouflaged. British
deliveries have not furnished enough to equip more than a
thousand men.
4) One hundred thousand grenades.
5) 3000 anti-tank guns (for the arms depots (assembly points).
6) 200 suitcases of the sabotage instructor and C.P. type.
7) The ship and submarine question is to be studied according to
possible installations in Corsica and Sardinia.

EQUIPMENT

1) Good grade gasoline in quantities to be ascertained later
according to local needs in France.
2) Special shoes (especially the sole) studied from the point of
view of reduced packing space and placed in special containers.
Socks.
Be prepared to furnish 150,000 men — delivery to be determined
as recruiting goes on.
3) Condensed rations of 12 Kgs per man per month. Count on 25,000
men to be fully nourished.
4) Flashlights (tubular-type) (200,000), stationery, envelopes,
typewriting paper — the stock to be created and used according
to demands.
5) Thread, needles, clothing material, based again on an average
number of 150,000 men — for sees a possible development

EXPENSES

1) Officers' compensation, workers and young men's salaries for
those who have taken to illegal life in order to fight.

For these payments our military regulations should be followed, and our trade-union rules likewise, and from them should be organised the methods of the hidden financial control in Sardinia and France.

It is possible to transfer funds through Switzerland.
The evaluation of these salaries can be based on an average of 4000 francs per man per month.

Foreseen at the start a total of 80,000 men, and this number will be reached only through contacts with real and controlled recruiting.

2) Travelling expenses for liaison purposes, requiring a fund in France, one in Sardinia, one in London and one in America, organized under the same financial control.

Approximate evaluation

In France, 20 million francs per month to be distributed between Paris, Marseille, Lyon, Nantes, Nancy.

In Sardinia, one million per month.

In America, ten thousand dollars a month.

In London, three thousand pounds per month.

According to monthly controls, the numbers will have to be adjusted.

These sums are to be considered as credits of the French Government.

DISTRIBUTION OF WORK

In America

Administration of the radio and elaboration of propaganda elements (Liberals might work on this).

Administration of the service itself.

In Sardinia

Co-ordination of liaison

Administration of the radio (re-broadcasts)

Archives of the General Staff and the S.R.

Arms depot

Administration of aviation

In London, the bureau already created keeps in touch with the S.R., and the OSS.

The information bureau and the radio are already in existence.

France or Switzerland

There is already a secret organization in Geneva for military instructions. It should be supplied with food.

These works aim at the following consequences:

1) Reorganization and equipping of France's internal army.

2) Disposition of these forces with a view to the help to be brought immediately to the French and Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3) Studying and proposing anything that facilitate the Allied invasion.

4) Wiping out in metropolitan France and results of political disputes launched by General de Gaulle and the Communists.

Wiping out the effects of anti-American propaganda.

5) Give birth in France to a more and more active spirit of collaboration with the allied armies.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEARY:

Referring to Mr. Welles' letter of 8 January and The President's 17 January memorandum to you, enclosed, a copy of the Dossier Morny was given to Lieut. Colonel Kenyon of G-2, about November 1, 1943, by Mr. Matthews, State Department, at the request of the author, Mr. A. Morny, for review by War Department G-2. The eight-page paper outlines activities of the organized resistance groups now in France commanded by French Regular and Reserve officers, and proposes specific American financial and material assistance to these groups. The paper was reviewed by the Deputy for Intelligence, G-2, who decided the matter was more political than military and should be handled by the State Department.

Mr. Matthews and Mr. Dunn of the State Department were so informed. They considered it primarily a military matter, but indicated that it would be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State. No further action is known to have been taken by anyone connected with the State Department until Mr. Welles' letter of 8 January.

Mr. A. Morny was in Palm Beach about 1 January, 1944, in touch with Mr. Welles, and can be reached through G-2.

It is recommended that General Eisenhower be furnished a copy of the paper and his recommendations procured before further action is taken.

Chief of Staff.

2d Jan
Added War Dept for Cptn.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Referring to Mr. Welles' letter of 8 January and The President's 17 January memorandum to you, enclosed, a copy of the Dossier Morrey was given to Lieut. Colonel Kenyon of G-2, about November 1, 1943, by Mr. Matthews, State Department, at the request of the author, Mr. A. Morrey, for review by War Department G-2. The eight-page paper outlines activities of the organized resistance groups now in France commanded by French Regular and Reserve officers, and proposes specific American financial and material assistance to these groups. The paper was reviewed by the Deputy for Intelligence, G-2, who decided the matter was more political than military and should be handled by the State Department.

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Mr. A. Morrey was in Palm Beach about 1 January, 1944, in touch with Mr. Welles, and can be reached through G-2.

It is recommended that General Eisenhower be furnished a copy of the paper and his recommendations procured before further action is taken.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.
Dear Pa:

I had hoped, as I wrote the President ten days ago, to be able to spend a couple of days in Washington before the middle of this month and have the chance of seeing him at that time. I am afraid now that it will be impossible for me to be there until the latter part of January and I am therefore troubling you with this question which I had hoped to mention to him if I saw him in the near future.

I have seen a good deal during the past year of some of the confidential representatives in this country of General Giraud, and from them I recently learned that a memorandum known either as the "Dossier Mornay" or the "Dossier Giraud" is supposed to have been submitted to the President for his knowledge. This memorandum, which gives detailed information as to the arrangements made within Occupied France by the Intelligence Services of the French General Staff for cooperation with any United States invasion forces, was prepared by M. Girard under the highest officers in the French General Staff. He escaped from France and is now in Washington under orders of General Giraud himself. I am informed by Girard that the British Services have been very anxious to prevent any action being taken upon these recommendations by our own General Staff, for the purpose, it is alleged, of keeping all of this machinery in their own hands.

I am told that Girard has had several conversations with Colonel Kenyon, Deputy to General Strong of G-2, but that there is no certainty that the papers have actually been sent to the White House.

In view of what seems to me the real importance of this question, I wonder if you will be kind enough to speak to the President about it, since he may feel that he will wish to look into it himself.

Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Military Aide and Secretary to the President,
The White House, Washington, D.C.
I shall also appreciate it if you will let me know if there is anything in it, since I do not want to take up the President's time with the matter unless he feels it is of value.

Mathilde and I send to Mrs. Watson and to you every good wish for the best of New Years, and believe me, as always,

Yours most sincerely,

[Signature]
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Rearmament of French Forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the question of rearmament of French Forces in the light of a letter to you of 18 September 1943, from the French Committee of National Defense and a letter from the Chief of the French Military Mission to General Marshall, attached hereto as Enclosure "A".

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the present U.S. rearmament program for the French will provide them with the means for assisting in the war against Germany in so far as the French can effectively absorb and utilize such equipment. They also believe that it is undesirable at this time to promise the French further augmentation in armament for the purposes of post-war occupation of Axis territories, assisting in the war against Japan and restoring French Sovereignty to all territories of the Empire.

In so far as military considerations are concerned, they recommend the following general policy as regards rearmament of French forces:

a. That, except for minor readjustments from time to time to utilize trained French personnel, no additional U.S. military assistance and equipment be promised the French beyond that now contemplated.

b. That the proposal to utilize one French division in OVERLORD, transported directly from North Africa as soon as the first lodgment has been made upon the coast of northern France, be accepted in principle, and steps taken to implement it in so far as it will not seriously interfere with the build-up of forces in northern France, utilizing French shipping and naval forces to the maximum practicable degree.
Provided this general policy is acceptable to you, it is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff be invited to send a combined reply to Generals De Gaulle and Giraud along the lines suggested in Enclosure "B".

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army
Room 3E-921, Pentagon Building
Washington, D.C.

Subject: Rearmament of the French Forces in 1944 and 1945.

A memorandum prepared by Headquarters, Army Service Forces, and dated October 9, 1943 requested the French Military Mission to estimate the requirements of the French forces for the years 1944 and 1945 in order to include them in the Army Supply Program.

An officer of the French Mission was thereupon sent to Algiers for the purpose of obtaining the necessary figures. He has now returned and brought a memorandum, translated copy of which is attached herewith, prepared by the Committee of National Defense, and considerable detailed and supporting data.

The development of the war in the European theater of operations and more particularly the landing of troops in Metropolitan France will have as a consequence the liberation of a certain number of Frenchmen either of the regular army or of the reserve. These men will serve not only as replacements but also as new units which will be formed.

The accompanying memorandum sets forth the program which the French intend to put into effect in 1944 and 1945. It will be noted that it is a much larger program than the one foreseen and agreed to at the Anfa (Casablanca) Conference.

It is so because of the will of the French to make the maximum
contribution possible to the liberation of their country. Such a program, however, it is recognized, involves certain questions of principle of the utmost importance about which there must be the fullest agreement.

If there is not, on the part of the United States, complete agreement regarding the principle and the provisions of the program or if its provisions require explanation, it is requested that the representatives of the French Military Mission be invited at the earliest opportunity to discuss the questions that are raised with the representatives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

/s/ M. E. Bethouart
Major General
Chief, French Military Mission in the United States

1. It should again be recalled that the French Committee of National Liberation fighting with the Allies are as follows:
- To fight the Axis powers in Europe to the finish.
- To contribute to the internallied war effort in the occupation of Axis territories and to security in Europe.
- To aid the internallied war effort in the Far East.
- To restore French sovereignty to all the territories of the Empire.

The basis of the French restoration program is the achievement of these goals.

2. There is no doubt that the decisions to be made in this matter cannot in any way affect either the approximate date of the suspension of hostilities or the conditions under which the security of Metropolitan France and the Empire must be assured, but whatever the turn of events may be, France will always be bound to maintain her military strength at a certain level.
SECRET

ANNEX

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANCAISE
AUX ETATS-UNIS
Washington 9, D.C.

ALGIERS, October 16, 1943

COMMITTEE OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE

SECRETARIAT

MEMORANDUM

CONCERNING THE REARMING OF
THE FRENCH FORCES

**************

1. It should again be recalled that the war aims of the French Committee of National Liberation fighting with the Allies are as follows:

- To fight the Axis powers in Europe to the finish.
- To contribute to the interallied war effort in the occupation of Axis territories and to security in Europe.
- To aid the interallied war effort in the Far East.
- To restore French sovereignty to all the territories of the Empire.

The basis of the French rearmament program is the achievement of these goals.

2. There is no doubt that the decisions to be made in this matter cannot in any way affect either even the approximate date of the suspension of hostilities or the conditions under which the security of Metropolitan France and the Empire must be assured, but whatever the turn of events may be, France will always be bound to maintain her military strength at a certain level.
SECRET

The decisions to be made in this matter commit the future of the country for a period of several years. It must be pointed out, in this connection, that Metropolitan France, due to the invasion, runs the risk of being without any war industries.

On the other hand, it should be borne in mind that as far as troops are concerned, only the youngest classes who have not yet been called up by labor conscription can be counted on in 1944 provided liberation in effected in the course of that year. This is due to the following factors:

- the gaps caused by men being prisoners or being called up by labor conscription,

- the necessity of maintaining economic and particularly agricultural life at a certain level and of improving physical condition of the population in the cities.

In 1945, however, France might be able to call a first group of older men (and women). This group could double the active forces, and although it would only be called under certain conditions, the necessary equipment and arms should be made available.

3. It is on this basis that the following tabulation has been drawn up. It states the number of troops which France would thus be in a position to put in service in 1944 and 1945. This tabulation further takes into account the general data concerning the allotment of these available troops (land, air and sea forces):

   - The following should be given special consideration:

     a. - Air Forces

     b. - Land Forces (armored units)
        {airborne troops}

     c. - Navy Naval Air Force
The following program is therefore proposed:

- **END OF 1943**
  - Land Forces 500,000
  - Air Forces 30,000
  - Naval Forces 45,000
  Total: 575,000

(of these approximately 300,000 natives)

(at the present time there are 550,000 men and women in service)

- **END OF 1944**
  - Land Forces 720,000
  - Air Forces 180,000
  - Naval Forces 107,000
  Total: 1,007,000

(of these approximately 350,000 natives)

- **END OF 1945**
  - Land Forces 1,000,000
  - Air Forces 300,000
  - Naval Forces 127,000
  Total: 1,427,000

(of these approximately 430,000 natives)

The Air Force would not achieve its total program until May 1946 with a total force of 360,000 men.

4. The troops would on the whole be organized as follows:

- **Land Forces**
  - 36 divisions, 10 of these armored and 3 air-borne - General Headquarters reserves and corresponding services.

- **Air Force**
  - 2,800 first line aircraft divided in 172 groups of which 90 will be fighters, (65%) - 50 bombers (20%) 20 transport (9%) - 12 reconnaissance (6%).
  - Troops for general protection and 80 Anti-Aircraft battalions - and Services.
SECRET

- Navy -

a. 2 battleships - 9 cruisers - 4 aircraft carriers
   (3 fleet aircraft carriers, one auxiliary) 13 light
cruisers or destroyer leaders - 36 destroyers - 30 sub-
marines.
   Altogether 350,000 tons (approximately) of warships.

b. Submarine chasers, escort vessels, patrol vessels,
   minesweepers, P.T. boats, and general utility ships.
   Altogether 175,000 tons (approximately) of auxiliary
   vessels.

c. 10 flotillas (groups) of the Navy Air Forces - not
   carrier based.

5. The program includes, parallel to the rearming of our
land, sea and air forces, the military reequipping of the
territory in materiel for transportation, communications,
various facilities and services.

6. The staggering of the time when the orders anticipated
should be placed depends on the assumption that all or some
of the national territory will be liberated in the first four
months of 1944. By a mere shift in time, our anticipated
needs can be adapted to the future possibilities of filling
them.

It is furthermore specified that the French war effort
as defined above is *subordinated to the application of the
Lend-Lease agreements to all parts of the program.

Finally, that part of the rearmament program which deals
with 1945 is a maximum amount which can be revised as circum-
stances demand, and particularly in regard to the date of the
suspension of hostilities.

* Meaning under the terms of lend-lease issues.
SECRET

COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
SECRETARIAT

PROGRAM OF ARMAMENT FOR THE TERRITORIAL FORCES

The delivery of the following materiel, destined to the territorial units during the first four months of 1944, is requested:

1. Armament:
   50,000 Stens guns
   35,000 Pistols, 7.65
   35,000 Pistols, 9

   Besides this individual armament, a certain amount of heavy armament should be provided for:
   5,000 automatic rifles
   500 machine guns
   500 mortars
   1,000 anti-tank guns

2. Munitions:
   Should be provided:
   1,000 cartridges for each Stens gun.
   100 cartridges for each pistol.
   1,000 cartridges for each automatic rifle.
   2,000 cartridges for each machine gun.
   100 rounds for each mortar.
   1,000 cartridges for each anti-tank gun.

   which gives a final total of:
50 million cartridges for the Stens

3,500,000 cartridges for pistols, 7.65

3,500,000 cartridges for pistols, 9

5 million cartridges for automatic rifles

1 million cartridges for machine guns

50,000 rounds for mortars

1 million cartridges for anti-tank guns

160,000 grenades

3. A stock of food supplies weighing one hundred tons should be provided, consisting principally of:

Canned meats

Canned fish (salmon, tuna, etc...)

Preserves

Sugar and coffee

4. Clothing and Equipment:

a. Clothing

20,000 pairs of shoes, or leather for their manufacture.

20,000 Sweaters

20,000 Pairs of trousers

20,000 Jackets of different types

20,000 shirts

20,000 shorts

40,000 pairs of socks

b. Equipment

50,000 Suspenders

50,000 belts

100,000 cartridge pouches.
SECRET

ENCLOSURE "B"

PROPOSED DRAFT

1. The President has requested the Combined Chiefs of Staff to reply to your communication dated 18 September 1943. The proposals contained therein for the employment of French forces and the rearmament of the French air and naval forces have been carefully studied.

2. Your desire to assure the employment in offensive operations of the major part of all French forces is deeply appreciated. This spirit further confirms the wisdom of the decision made almost a year ago to rearm the French forces at the earliest possible moment.

3. The psychological importance of the employment of a maximum number of French troops in the liberation of France and of the French colonies is recognized and will be given due weight. The first consideration in the distribution of forces and equipment is always that of placing them where they will be brought to bear most effectively against the enemy. To this fundamental criterion all others are secondary. The available French forces will be employed in a manner designed to ensure their maximum effectiveness.

4. However, insofar as it can be accomplished without serious interference with the over-all build-up of forces in northern France, your proposal to transport one French infantry division directly from North Africa to northern France as soon as the first lodgment has been made is accepted in principle. We are directing the appropriate Allied commanders to prepare plans for implementing this agreement, in collaboration with the French Committee of National Defense, and it is hoped that it will be possible to utilize French shipping and naval forces in this movement to the maximum practicable degree.
5. In view of the overall air program, any acceleration of the proposed French air rearmament plan now under consideration would dislocate presently planned allocations of available Allied resources.

6. Basic policies to be followed in all matters pertaining to the French Navy are contained in Combined Chiefs of Staff document No. 358 (Revised), copies of which have been furnished you. A survey of Allied Naval resources and commitments indicates that no additional transfer of vessels to the French Navy can be made at this time.

7. The overhaul and repair of vessels is covered in C.C.S. 358 (Revised) and the matters therein have been carefully and repeatedly studied. The requests raised again by your committee were all carefully considered at the time C.C.S. 358 (Revised) was prepared. The decisions made were based upon the most effective employment of Allied resources in the prosecution of the war, and are reaffirmed.

8. You may be assured that it is the desire of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to employ all elements of the French forces with those of other United Nations, in a manner that will most effectively utilize their striking power.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Equipment of French Divisions

Following the receipt of your memorandum of October 13th, directing me to keep in close touch with this matter, I have had a careful examination made by General Handy, which included a thorough going over the problem with General Bedell Smith.

General Smith's comments are listed below:

General Eisenhower needs French divisions in order to carry out planned operations in the Mediterranean. A French Corps is to relieve a British Corps now on the left of the Fifth Army.

If all 11 divisions are formed there will be insufficient French manpower remaining to form the necessary Corps and Army units and to supply replacements for 11 divisions.

Probably only 8 divisions should be formed and the remaining manpower and equipment be used to equip and form supporting troops for these divisions.

General Smith expects that shortly after his return to Algiers a message will be dispatched recommending that action be taken to equip only 8 French divisions and the necessary Corps and Army troops.

In the meantime it would appear that no particular action should be taken. The bulk of the equipment required for 10 or 11 divisions is already in North Africa or on route.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ask President to direct War Department to take such action as is necessary to accomplish the release of Americans taken to Germany from France. Is it possible to ask Churchill to detain de Gaulle in England until Churchill returns and to then accomplish a further delay—possibly permanent delay if possible.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Please wire Murphy for Giraud:
"I entirely agree it would be
mistake for Giraud to come here soon
and that he should defer it until the
time is right, and things are going
smoothly in North Africa."

F.D.R.
SECRETARY HULL SENDS TO PRESIDENT THIS MESSAGE FROM MURPHY ADDRESSED TO THEM BOTH DATED ALGIERS MAY THIRTY NUMBER NINE NINE SIX X IT HAS BEEN REPEATED TO LONDON X PARA X I SPENT LAST EVENING IN THE COMPANY OF THE PRIME MINISTER MACMILLAN AND CUNNINGHAM X WE DISCUSSED THE VARIOUS RAMIFICATIONS OF THE FRENCH PROBLEM X EDEN WILL ARRIVE AT NOON TOMORROW X PARA X THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE WAS HERE TO VISIT THE TROOPS AND THE BRITISH NAVY AND TO CONTRIBUTE WHAT HE COULD TO A FAVORABLE ADJUSTMENT OF THE FRENCH SITUATION WHICH WILL AND MUST CMA HE SAID CMA DEMONSTRATE
Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

PAGE TWO WTE NUMBER NINE 31ST

ANGLO DASH AMERICAN SOLIDARITY X PARA X HE ARRAIGNED DE GAULLE MORE
VEHEMENTLY AND VITERATIVELY THAN AT ANFA CWA SAYING THAT DE GAULLE
IS ANTI BRITISH AND ANTI AMERICAN AND THAT WE COULD COUNT ON
DE GAULLE TO PLAY THE FOOL X PRIME MINISTER VOICED MUCH MISGIVING X
HE REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENTS INVITATION TO GIRAUD TO VISIT THE UNITED
STATES AND SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE YOU TO KNOW THAT HE BELIEVES IT
WOULD BE MOST UNWISE FOR GIRAUD TO ABSENT HIMSELF IN THE FIRST PART
OF JUNE AS PLANNED CWA BECAUSE
Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

PAGE THREE NUMBER NINE 31ST

Dash and he repeated this several times dash in his opinion. De Gaulle is fully capable of a putsch x he said he had no illusions about De Gaulle's thirst for personal power x Para x in resume from what he told me he plans that the British government will cancel its present arrangements with the French National Committee which will be transferred to Algiers lock cma stock cma and barrell x British financial subsidy cma which I am told approximates about twenty million pounds annually cma will cease during
THE MONTH OF JUNE WITH POSSIBLY A LUMP SETTLEMENT TO ASSIST THE COMMITTEE IN MEETING CERTAIN OBLIGATIONS X WE WOULD THEN DEAL JOINTLY WITH THE CENTRAL ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED IN NORTH AFRICA CMA MAKING WHATEVER FINANCIAL CMA LEND LEASE AND POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WE MAY SEE FIT X THE PRIME MINISTER SAYS THAT THE FACILITIES OF THE BBC REPEAT BBC IN LONDON WILL NO LONGER BE AVAILABLE TO DE GAULLE X PARA X WE DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH THE CONSTITUTION OF THE NEW FRENCH EXECUTIVE COUNCIL WHICH CMA
AS THE MATTER STANDS CMA WILL INITIALLY CONSIST OF SIX PERSONS
COLON GIRAUD CMA DE GAULLE CMA AND TWO MEMBERS TO BE SELECTED BY
EACH X DE GAULLE HAS INDICATED HIS CHOICE OF MASSIGLI AND PHILLIP
SEMICOLON GIRAUD CMA UP TO LAST EVENING CMA HAD NOT DECIDED
DEFINITELY EXCEPT TO INDICATE THAT HE WILL INSIST THAT JEAN MONNET
CMA GENERAL CATROUX AND GENERAL GEORGES CMA NOW IN ALGIERS CMA MUST
BE IN THE COUNCIL X HE IS DECIDING THIS MORNING WHICH TWO PERSONS
HE WILL INCLUDE ORIGINALLY X YESTERDAY
HE THOUGHT HE WOULD SELECT TRON REPEAT TRON AND ODIC REPEAT ODIC
AND THAT HE COULD PERSUADE DE GAULLE TO AGREE TO THE APPOINTMENT OF
MONNET CMA GEORGES CMA AND CATROUX TO MAKE UP THE TOTAL MEMBERSHIP
OF NINE X BOTH MONNET AND I DO NOT AT ALL SHARE THIS OPINION AND
ARE INSISTING THAT GIRAUD APPOINT IN THE BEGINNING TWO STRONG MEN X
MONNET IS URGING THAT ODIC WOULD BE A GRAVE MISTAKE X PARA X THE
PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE HAD PERSUADED AND AIDED GENERAL GEORGES
TO LEAVE FRANCE AND THAT HE BELIEVED THAT
GEORGES COULD MAKE A REAL CONTRIBUTION X AT ANY RATE HE HAS KNOWN HIM FOR MANY YEARS AND SAYS THAT HE REPRESENTS A CERTAIN CONTINUITY IN ANGLO DASH FRENCH RELATIONS WHICH IS MOST DESIRABLE X THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO URGED THAT IF POSSIBLE ALEXIS LEGER REPEAT ALEXIS LEGER BE INDUCED TO PROCEED TO ALGIERS AND I AGREED THAT WE SHOULD SUPPORT HIM IF NECESSARY AS A POSSIBLE MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE X I BELIEVE THAT AFTER SEVERAL DAYS GENERAL DE GAULLE AND HIS PARTISANS WILL BECOME AGGRESSIVE X THE PRIME
MINISTER SAID HE IS CONVINCED THAT THIS IS SO X I ASKED HIM FOR HIS OPINION REGARDING THE CLARK DASH DARLAN ACCORD OF NOVEMBER TWENTY TWO WHICH IS THE FORMAL BASIS FOR OUR OPERATIONS IN THIS AREA X HE SAID THAT IN HIS OPINION NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT AND NO CONCESSIONS MADE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS AT LEAST UNTIL WE KNEW WHETHER QUOTE DE GAULLE WOULD PLAY THE FOOL OR NOT UNQUOTE X AGAIN HE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY FOR A UNITED FRONT IN THAT REGARD X END OF MESSAGE FROM MURPHY TO PRESIDENT AND SEC HULL
The recruiting activities of the de Gaulist elements are causing considerable difficulty here. Despite formal orders from AFHQ, and in spite of Catroux’s objections (see my 906, May 18th), an active recruiting campaign in Tunisia has been in progress by Le Clerc’s forces. This has gained a certain number of adherents among the French armed forces, especially in the Corps Frano. Particularly in the air corps and navy, every advantage has been taken of the continued presence of Vichy elements in the North African forces to demonstrate an alleged difference between the two armies. One of these armies is said to be composed entirely of volunteers, the other of mobilized men under the orders of Vichyites. Whereas, Giraud’s past policy has been to agree that an opportunity should be given to individuals to serve either the High Command or de Gaulle, action on his part has been made necessary to halt this attempt to create two French armies and to emphasize differences by recruiting activities on a large scale. As a result, the army of Le Clerc has been ordered to withdraw with the Eighth Army to Cyrenaica. The British war office has requested that an inquiry be made as to the necessity for such an order because objection may be raised that the Allied Commander-In-Chief should not require French troops to withdraw from Tunisia.
May 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER:

The following has just come from London:

Massigli's Chef de Cabinet, De Jean, is much disturbed. He says the so-called Council of French resistance and its organization were the work solely of Andre Philip.

He sees little chance that De Gaulle will accept any agreement with the administration in North Africa which does not leave De Gaulle in completely effective control and with every facility "to prepare for his dictatorship after the liberation of France".

It was also said by De Jean that De Gaulle had told Palevski to find out whether decisions of the French Council of Ministers were customarily taken by majority vote. De Jean said that this had obvious reference to any future council or executive committee overseas.

One of De Jean's friends just back from Mexico told De Gaulle of the importance of coming to an agreement with Giraud not only for the sake of France, but because of the good effect all through the world. De Gaulle replied that unity is really unimportant because he, De Gaulle, had already been selected by the people of France as their present and future leader.

It was also said by De Jean that the reason for De Gaulle's insistence on Algiers as the meeting place was for the purpose of stirring up such acclamations by the crowds as would make it possible for him to refuse any and all concessions to Giraud which would not give De Gaulle full political control. De Gaulle also said he could always say that he was personally prepared to step aside but that such action would betray the people's wishes.

The dispatch notes that this admission from the inside of Carlton Gardens seems to be of interest.

All the above was sent from London to Murphy and MacMillan.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 19, 1943

I herewith send you despatch 906 from Algiers, in particular, and also 3412 from London, regarding the De Gaulle-French situation. You will notice that despatch 906 quotes General Catroux directly and personally with regard to the inside of the present De Gaulle situation. I feel that you and Prime Minister Churchill are becoming more and more equally interested in disposing of this increasingly troublesome, serious, and not to say, dangerous problem.

I am also sending you Algiers 902 of May 17 containing Giraud's last proposal to De Gaulle. I call your special attention to the marked paragraph in Section Two urging the importance of you and Mr. Churchill now reaching an agreement regarding this entire matter.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

In the event that this telegram has not been brought to your attention, I believe you will wish to see it without delay.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enc.

The President,

The White House.

The UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1943
London
Dated May 17, 1943
Rec'd 7:24 p.m.

...recently came from France as detained at Vals-les-Bains with a Nationalist attitude, has, we believe, seconded General de Gaulle's appointment of "Armée" in Metropolitan France.

He saw Roger Cambon and Comert several days ago and told them that in his assessment General de Gaulle had said privately to him that he had no longer confidence in the Anglo-Saxons and that in the future he would base his policy solely on Russia "and perhaps on Germany (repeat Germany)."

VIGNAIX

FNM
London
Dated May 17, 1945
Recl'd 7:24 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3415, May 17, 9 p.m.

General Cochot, who recently came from France and who several times was detained at Vals-les-Bains for his anti-collaborationist attitude, has, we understand, accepted General de Gaulle's appointment to head up his "secret army" in Metropolitan France.

He saw Roger Cambon and Comert several days ago and told them that to his amazement General de Gaulle had said privately to him that he had no longer confidence in the Anglo-Saxons and that in the future he would base his policy solely on Russia "and perhaps on Germany (repeat Germany)".

WMINT

IRM
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Algeria

Dated May 17, 1943
Rec'd 3:39 a.m. 18th

Secretary of State

Washington

PRIORITY

902, May 17, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

FROM MURPHY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE.

Giraud has handed Mac Millen and me a copy of his reply to De Gaulle's last memorandum which reads in translation as follows: "Thank you for your letter of the 10th of May which replies to my letter and my memorandum April 27.

This latest exchange of views convinces me that our preliminary discussions have come to an end; and that the hour of action and of our common responsibilities has come. Time presses, among other questions, the rapid fusion of all the French forces in a single army of victory is urgent.

I propose that we should pass to action and immediately bring about our union.

The method is simple and can be rapid.

It is sufficient for us to form immediately the Central Executive Committee and at the same time to record our
We...#902, May 17, 9 p.m. from Algiers.

record your agreement on its essential bases, namely that its responsibility should be collective and that its life should be limited. Thus we shall conform to the tradition and to the laws of the republic.

Thus established the Executive Committee will meet immediately at Algiers.

The formation of the Executive Committee. The Committee is the central authority. It possesses the general direction of and the responsibility for all matters at present within the scope of the national committee or of the high command, civil and military, at Algiers. It will discuss all the other questions which have been the subject of our exchange of views based on the notes which we have exchanged. In particular it will organize the national consultative council and the committee on resistance, appoint the commissioners, fix their functions and cetera.

'The responsibility of the executive committee must be collective'. All the essential decisions will be
will be discussed and taken by the executive committee acting as a whole. In accordance with the proposal made by General Catroux, you and I will preside in turn; our responsibilities will be merged in the collective responsibility of the executive committee. With the commissioner or commissioners who may be responsible, we shall together sign the decrees or ordinances which may be discussed and decided in the committee.

'The duration and the functions of the committee must be limited'. In the action which we are now taking we are convinced that we are acting according to the wish of the French people. However, we must recognize that our authority derives from a situation of fact. We are not and cannot be the Government of France.

Immediately the executive committee begins its functions it should solemnly make known to the French people that it hands over its powers to the provisional Government which as soon as the country is liberated, will be constituted in France according to the law of February 15, 1872.

The application
-4- #902, May 17, 9 p.m. from Algiers

The application of this law is contemplated when the legislative assemblies have ceased to function, which is the case today, and can be adapted by having recourse to other elected bodies on the advice of the national consultative council and of the council of legislation taking into account the changes brought about by the action of the enemy or by the development of the situation in France (id est since the law of 1872 was passed).

If I have correctly represented the essential points of the opinions expressed by the national committee and by myself on this subject, I beg you to give me the agreement on these points, which is essential for the establishment of our union. At the same time we can rapidly agree upon the composition of the committee. To begin with it will consist of 2 members proposed by you and 2 members proposed by me, making the first members of the executive committee 6 in all. I suggest that 3 places should be left vacant in order that the executive committee may fill them later."

EMB

WILEY
S.A.M.  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)  

Algiers  
Dated May 17, 1943  
Rec'd 1:09 a. m. 16th.  

Secretary of State  
Washington  

MOST IMMEDIATE.  
902, May 17, 9 p. m.  
(SECTION TWO)  

We feel here that the two principles of collective  
responsibility and relinquishment of power preserve the  
essentials of French Democratic tradition and return to  
the laws of the Republic and unless they are accepted no  
unity is possible. The proposals avoid the danger that  
any single individual can assume dictatorial powers since  
the committee as a whole accepts responsibility for all  
actions. Care, will, however, have to be exercised in the  
selection of the members of the committee to preserve the  
balance and to prevent any individual from assuming com-  
plete control.  

I hope that during the present visit of Mr. Churchill  
to Washington an opportunity will be found for both the  
British and American Governments to concert their policy as  
regards this proposal. If de Gaulle should refuse to accept  
this last offer he will have demonstrated unwillingness to  
achieve real unity and to preserve the fundamental rights  
of the
of the French people. Whereas the previous discussions were primarily a matter of French concern, a refusal on De Gaulle's part to accept fundamental Democratic principles becomes of concern to the United Nations as a whole and in particular to the American and British Governments as co-authors of the Atlantic Charter. In such an event it should be made clear that De Gaulle is only interested in a personal drive for power and consequently can no longer count upon the support and subsidies furnished him by the British Government. Mac Millan is urging this course of action upon his Government.

It is anticipated that Catroux will leave immediately for London to endeavor to obtain De Gaulle's acceptance. If he fails he proposes to resign. Mac Millan may also decide to proceed to London for two or three days.

Repeated to London.

(End of Message)
RCC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

London
Dated May 16, 1943
Rec'd 4:16 p.m.

SECRET
FOR MURPHY FROM MATTHEWS.

Your 64, March 30, 6 p.m.

We have now obtained from British Security sources and from independent French sources the text of the oath which all Fighting French (Passy's agents and members of their resistance groups recruited in France or abroad) are compelled to take:

"I swear on my honor to work under the orders of the leaders given me before as well as after the liberation.

I swear to recognize General De Gaulle as the sole legitimate leader of Frenchmen and to devote myself to having him recognized by Frenchmen employing to this end if need be the means and methods I would have used against the Germans".

The
-2-#5378, May 15, 5 p.m., from London.

The sources mentioned in the last sentence of the Embassy's telegram No. 3269, May 11, 9 p.m., to the Department are now inclined to place more credence in reports of a Gaullist plot to assassinate Giraud. They have records of conversations at the time in Passy's organization in which they openly boasted of their success in having Darlan assassinated and announced their intention of doing away with Giraud at some future date.

Repeated to the Department.

WINANT

JRL
May 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of May 8 for W.S.C., I am in complete agreement that the issue presented in the French situation has come to a head and we must take a definite position that will determine the future of this controversy which, although outwardly between two French factions, may, if permitted to continue, involve both the British and American Governments in difficulties. I say this because the issue at stake is not only the success of our future military operations, but the very future of France itself. I am in complete agreement that either Allied or United Nations military must at the conclusion of hostilities be on hand in France to prevent anarchy and remain just so long as the French people in Metropolitan France, unhampered and unthreatened, need to formulate machinery to carry on a French Government.

It is very evident that the French National Committee is basing its whole policy on the idea that when France is liberated from the Germans, organized elements under deGaulle
de Gaulle may be in control. At the moment, this policy is leading the de Gaulliests to attack all French and other elements not with them. To obtain this control, de Gaulle has permitted to come under his umbrella all the most radical elements in France. Under their statement of April 1, the Communists in France, probably the most highly organized political group there today, have announced their insistence that de Gaulle be their leader. The British Government has given its full weight, both financial and official, to the de Gaulle movement so that the active propaganda which has been carried on in this country and in North Africa against any or all elements believed to be insistent upon the free and untrammeled will of the French people to determine their own future has had more weight than would have been otherwise possible. Today, however, we face a situation where de Gaulle’s active political propaganda directed from London immediately threatens the military success against the Axis powers to which we have dedicated our every effort. It cannot but be realized from your message of congratulation for the Allied victory in North Africa that the real French contribution was given by the French forces under General Giraud, while throughout the period of the battle de Gaulle, through his political agitation directed
directed from London, caused nothing but disturbance and concern to our military commanders.

The remedy for this situation is in our hands today but, if not used, may not be tomorrow. We must reach agreement with the British on the fundamental question as to the future of France and the manner in which the free expression of the French will as to their Government may be obtained. Once this is determined neither deGaulle nor Giraud personally is an issue. If we cannot reach agreement with the British on this fundamental point, then the one thing left is candidly to state in your forthcoming conversation that since General Giraud is fully cooperating and contributing to the military purposes we have in view and his military aid in North Africa is an essential in our war effort, we intend to support him in every way as military head of the French Allied forces whose collaboration is not only essential to the British and Americans, but to the cause of the United Nations as well.
May 8, 1943.

Memorandum for
Hon. Cordell Hull

I enclose copy of memorandum
I thought of taking up with the
Prime Minister.

F.D.R.
May 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

W.S.C.

I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the BRIDG continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is well nigh intolerable.

The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any material aid from De Gaulle and the civil situation with all its dangers seems to be working out well.

I think that MacMillan concurs in this.

However, De Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various elements, including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and even riots.

Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British Government funds.

De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex. Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally.

This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do not know De Gaulle and that their loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration of France. If they only knew what you and I know about De Gaulle himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its present leader in London.

That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued machinations of De Gaulle.

In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be impossible such as Philippe, and include in it some of the strong men like Monnet and others from Giraud’s North African Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar, etc.
Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals.

In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and departments. But the top line, or national administration must be kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I think that this may be necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France, thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of government. The old form simply will not work.

I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received from North Africa relating to De Gaulle.

dictatorial

"De Gaulle's/speech in London on May fourth, Catroux intimated, made it clear that Catroux's role as negotiator has been ended, because De Gaulle is conducting his own negotiations by public speeches.

"De Gaulle in messages to Catroux, and in an almost childish manner, kept saying that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever place he chose.

"De Gaulle charged Giraud of welching on his original invitation to come to the City of Algiers. Catroux agreed that Giraud had never invited him to come straight to Algiers. Catroux seemed wholly disgusted and felt that De Gaulle's speech was an open confession that he was seeking personal power.

"MacMillan felt that De Gaulle's speech dodged every question of principle involved.

"In De Gaulle's telegram to Catroux on May third, there were derogatory references to the United States, saying in effect that it was the power against which the French must join forces."

All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable problem and establish a common policy.

I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me.
I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government, but could be called advisory in its functions. Giraud should be made the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Navy and would, of course, sit on the Advisory National Committee. I think he has shown fine qualities since we saw him in Casablanca.

I do not know what to do with De Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar!

F.D.R.

P.S. I hear the rumor that Leclercq forces in Tunisia have been permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud because Leclercq offered more pay and better rations and clothing than Giraud's men got. I do not know if this is true. The same source reports that the De Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to have abundant funds and has put together an active and effective propaganda.

F.D.R.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1943.

Memorandum for the President

The attached telegram from Murphy contains additional facts and circumstances which render still more aggravated and intolerable the course and attitude of De Gaulle. I hope you can examine this telegram carefully. You will observe that at one point Murphy says "in De Gaulle's telegram to Catroux of May 3 De Gaulle made derogatory references to the United States in effect, as the power against which the French must join forces" etc.

It is manifest that the fighting part of the war to conquer Africa having terminated without any material aid from De Gaulle, he is bent on taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to keep bitter strife stirred up among all elements, including the Arabs and Jews, by expanding his present group of agitators and propagandists and their work, which will be likely to result in counter demonstrations, riots, and other serious disturbances. Apparently the British, as heretofore, are doing the financing in whole or in chief part. I try to emphasize the view which I think you have, and this calls for a clean-cut, final talk with Churchill, showing the intolerable and impossible person De Gaulle has developed into, largely through British financing.
HELD
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated May 6, 1943
Rece'd 12:27 p.m., 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY
805, May 6, 5 p.m., (SECTION ONE)

SECRET FOR THE SECRETARY FROM MURPHY
General Giraud invited me to call last evening. [There were also evening] There were also present Catroux, MacMillan and Monnet.

The reason for the meeting was General de Gaulle's dictatorial speech in London on May 4th. General Catroux read the entire speech to us and also read his recent exchange of telegrams with de Gaulle, including one which he transmitted yesterday after reading the speech. Catroux makes it quite clear that he believes his role as negotiator has terminated in view of the fact that de Gaulle has chosen to conduct his own negotiations by public radio.

In his recent telegrams to Catroux, de Gaulle, in an almost childish manner, insisted that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever
-2-, #605, May 6, 5 p.m., from Algiers.

whatever town he wished. He accuses Giraud of inviting him to the city of Algiers and then withdrawing on that invitation. Giraud on the other hand, states he has never invited de Gaulle to the City of Algiers. Catroux admitted, and everyone agreed, including Macmillan, that de Gaulle's speech is an open confession of a drive for personal power. I suggested that the speech is Hitlerian in character and reminiscent of many I had heard in Germany. Monnet characterized it as pages out of MEIN KAMPF.

Macmillan, who is visibly disturbed over these developments, takes the position that the matter is a serious one for his government and that, as would be done in the case of a domestic political manoeuvre, it would not be well to let the opponent take advantage of an insignificant issue such as whether the meeting would be held in one town or another. The issue, he suggested, must be joined on substantial questions of principle which would be understood by the public. He made the suggestion, which he said was only personal as he had no instructions from his government, that Giraud inform de Gaulle that, as his speech dodges every
May 6, 5 p.m., from Algiers.

every question of principle involved, no meeting can occur between them at any place if de Gaulle does not agree in advance to: (1) recognition of the procedure, including the application of the Revenue law of 1972 for the establishment of the future provisional Government of France; (2) selection of the persons who will make up the executive committee of the French Central Council.

WILEY

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated May 6, 1943
Rec'd 9:48 p.m., 7th

Secretary of State
Washington

PRIORITy

809, May 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The suggestions appealed to Giraud and Catroux except that Giraud said he saw no reason for making any concession regarding meeting in the city of Algiers as this would only be construed as another concession and another sign of weakness.

This informal discussion was left on the basis that an urgent reply de Gaulle from Giraud is not necessary. He will make one after careful reflection.

It seems to me that the speech of de Gaulle clearly demonstrates once more that the National Committee will take advantage of every conciliatory gesture to endeavor to reduce Giraud's power in this area. Either de Gaulle wishes to come to Algiers, where he feels that his increased popularity brought about by effective propaganda and Giraud's
-2- Dec 5's, 5 p.m. (SECTION T & G) from Algiers

and Giraud's delay in fortifying his administration will enable him to seize power, or he feels that the longer he delays giving any commitment regarding the future government of France thus putting off the meeting the greater will be the pressure of French opinion for fusion on any basis. Thus also will he be able to dominate the situation. In either event Giraud's prestige and consequently our own are seriously compromised.

WILEY

JT
BJR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated May 6, 1943
Rec'd 11:18 a.m. 7th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

805, May 6, 5 p.m., (SECTION THREE)

Positive action, preferable in concert with the British Government, should be taken to prevent the situation from further deteriorating, since it is further clear that the National Committee, feeling that it may have the support of the British Government, is making definite efforts to weaken our own position here. For example, in De Gaulle's telegram to Catroux of May third, de Gaulle made derogatory references to the United States in effect, as the power against which the French must join forces. He said that he could not consider meeting Giraud in Marrakesh because it was nothing more than an annex of an American aviation base. It will furthermore be claimed that if Giraud refuses to meet de Gaulle on the issue of the places of meeting the Americans are responsible for this action and consequently we shall have to accept the responsibility for blocking French unity in the face of a popular demand therefore.

In my opinion
In my opinion the time has come when this matter must without delay be thrashed out with London and the necessity of establishing a common policy must be realized by the British Government. It may be difficult to induce the public, in the face of recent build ups, to believe that Giraud has suddenly become "democratic" and de Gaulle a fascist, but on the other hand the British Government is in effect subsidizing and facilitating the operation of an organization which evinces hostility to the United States. In Tunisia, for example, the eighth army has permitted General Leclercq forces to recruit from neighboring forces of General Giraud because Leclercq was enabled to offer more pay, and better clothing and rations than the men received in Giraud's army.

WILEY

WWC
BH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

PRIORITY
805, May 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

The CINC has now ordered a cessation of this activity. The Eighth Army proposed to install representatives of the Fighting French in the civilian administration of the various towns occupied but this program was stopped by our civil affairs officers in the area. The de Gaulle mission in Algiers has been coordinating an active and effective propaganda effort throughout French North Africa. It is seemingly equipped with abundant funds.

To Department and to London repeated.

WILEY

JT
(FRENCH)

FROM: SECR Y OF STATE FOR NAVY AND COLONIES, VICHY
TO: ADMIRAL ON THE BEARN

#59121-23 SYSTEM FN-1

1648 5 MAY 1943

ABSOLUTELY SECRET.

THIS MESSAGE FROM THE CHIEF OF GOVERNMENT: "I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF 4 MAY, TELLING ME OF THE BREAKING OF YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND INDICATING TO ME THAT THE INTERNAL SITUATION AS TO BOTH FOOD AND POLITICS PUTS OUR POSSESSIONS FROM NOW ON IN A POSITION WHERE ANY INCIDENT MAY LOSE THEM. I AM, LIKE YOU, CONVINCED THAT THE AMERICANS ARE SEEKING SUCH AN INCIDENT, TO HAVE THE OCCASION FOR ACTION. UNDER THESE CONDITIONS, AND BEFORE IT IS TOO LATE, I ASK YOU TO EXECUTE IMMEDIATELY THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCUTTLING. I BEG YOU TO CONSIDER THE PRESENT TELEGRAM AS A COMMAND OF EXECUTION.

I KNOW WHAT GRIEF IT IS FOR A SAILOR TO SET ABOUT SCUTTLING HIS SHIPS. BUT AS CHIEF OF THE GOVERNMENT I TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS MEASURE. IN EXECUTING IT, YOU WILL REMAIN FAITHFUL, AS YOU HAVE ALWAYS BEEN, TO THE ORDERS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

SIGNED PIERRE LAVAL."

TOI 2044/5 Z
REC 1910/5 (EWT) Q
From: Vichy
To: Bearn
5/061010/1943
(FN-1)

#S9124, 5, 6, 7.

ABSOLUTELY SECRET.

This is a telegram from the Chief of Government continuing telegram #S9121-23 of 5 May, begin quote:

"As a continuation of my telegram of yesterday, I (wish to) make it definite that the order to carry out the instructions involves not only the scuttling of all the ships but also the destruction of the planes and sinking the gold.

These instructions correspond to those which you received last January* and whose receipt you acknowledged in your telegram of 8 January**. In case we should find it physically impossible to exchange messages, I delegate to you all powers to govern and protect our possessions in the name of France on your own single responsibility.

You are there as the sole repository of French sovereignty and authority. You must in all cases refrain from any relations with the French "dissidents" and, naturally, from (adopting) any subordinate position with respect to them.

Under the dramatic circumstances through which you are living, I feel I must send you once again assurance of the confidence of the Marshal and the Government, and tell you we are certain that your mission thus defined is in the interests of France and the future of her empire.

/s/ Pierre Laval"

Respectfully,

B. F. ROEDER, Lieut. Comdr., USN
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Naval Aide to the President.

March 26, 1943.

Captain Hastings, British Naval Intelligence Officer here in Washington, called to say that the British Prime Minister would like to be sure that the attached had been seen by the President.

Respectfully,

A. D. Struble

[Handwritten note: In reply refer to initials and No. Op-13/eh]
SECRET

(wm)

From: Admiral on the BEARNO.
To: Navy Secretariat, Vichy.
(FN-1)
#55570-3(inc.)

The blockade has become complete and the radio propaganda has not diminished in spite of my protests. The consequences, already perceptible, become more serious and are undoubtedly the prelude to diplomatic pressure, or else to American or "dissident" aggression, but more probably and more immediately to serious internal disorders. "Dissident" manifestations have already occurred in Guiana, whose governor will very shortly be unable to stem the tide.

Even here, those who, backing me intend to remain faithful to their word to the end are a minority daily diminishing; hence resistance to aggression will be weak and armed repression of disorders will be difficult, with extremely painful consequences besides which will be exploited against to our cause and will provoke American intervention, with certain and final loss of our sovereignty.

In short I am obliged to (say I) fear we shall shortly be crushed between external pressure and internal uprising, with the danger of losing these colonies for France. The problem is to emerge from this final phase with honor and the minimum of useless sacrifices, lasting resentment by the population, and danger of losing (French) sovereignty. I should be grateful for any directives which you might be disposed to give me as a guide. The tankers are all I have left to bargain with. I hope I can delay the final outcome if you can authorize me to use them.

(Unsigned)

FN-3: 148
(French)
(U) Navy Trans. 3/18/43.
Typed. 3/18/43.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
PA/D

March 20, 1943

S - Mr. Secretary:

Question of Recognition of Provisional Government of France.

1. On November 17, 1942, the President made a statement with respect to the political arrangements made by General Eisenhower for the time being in northern and western Africa. Included in that statement was the following paragraph:

"The future French Government will be established -- not by any individual in metropolitan France or overseas -- but by the French people themselves after they have been set free by the victory of the United Nations."

2. In an Aide Memoire dated January 7, 1943, from the British Embassy, the following statement was contained:

"The best solution would be the establishment in Algeria on the soil of a department of France of a single authority in the place of both the French National Committee in London and General Giraud's administration in Algiers. This authority would be recognized by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government and no doubt by other Governments merely as a de facto administration provisionally exercising French sovereignty over certain parts of France and over the whole French Empire (except Indo China) pending the establishment of a government chosen by the French people themselves. It would not be recognized as the Government or even as the provisional Government of France."

3. By
3. By letter of January 17, 1943, the British Ambassador transmitted to the Secretary a copy of a telegram from the British Foreign Office which set forth clearly the relations between the British Government and General de Gaulle. The first two sentences of this telegram read as follows:

"We do not recognize or contemplate recognizing or supporting de Gaulle or French National Committee as Government or Provisional Government or Prospective Government of France. We regard them as a de facto administration provisionally exercising French sovereignty in certain parts of the French Empire pending the establishment of a Government chosen by the French people themselves."

4. The Anfa Agreement between the President and General Giraud as revised by Mr. Churchill contained the following paragraph numbered 3 in the revised first memorandum:

"The French nation and the French people are the only ones who may fix their representation and designate their government. Because it is impossible for the French motherland to pronounce freely her will, France does not now possess a recognizable government and the question of the future government of France is not capable now of final solution."

5. The United States Government has consistently held the view that no French provisional government should be established in North Africa or elsewhere until France is liberated and the French people are able freely to express their will and select their own Government. It has been the view of this Government that no regime should be established or recognized which would in any way jeopardize or
or impair the absolute freedom of the French people when liberated to choose their own Government, and that the administration existing in North Africa should be considered primarily as an instrument to bring about the most effective possible military contribution to the defeat of the Axis, and that for this purpose unification of the French military forces fighting the Axis is the prime essential.

6. When M. Lemaigre Dubreuil came to Washington accompanying General Bethouart, the head of the French Military Mission here, the President, when they both called at the White House, informed them that this Government had no intention of recognizing any provisional government of France, and that no steps would be taken which would interfere with the right of the French people to select their own Government when they were able to freely express their own will.

7. In his public address of March 15, 1943, General Giraud included the following reference to this question:

"The people of France will form their provisional government in accordance with the constitutional laws of the republic. The expression of the sovereignty of the French people has been interrupted by German occupation and it will be re-established only when France has been liberated.

"I give to the people of France my most solemn assurances that their sacred right to determine by themselves
themselves their own government shall be fully conserved. I promise them that all conditions permitting them to make such a choice in lawful order, with all their liberties re-established, shall be assured. I assure them that such a situation will be created as soon as France has been freed.

James Clement Dunn
March 4, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Naval Aide to the President.

There is attached hereto a copy of a letter from Admiral Glassford to Admiral King enclosing his estimate of the political and economic situation in French West Africa.

A. D. Struble

CONFIDENTIAL
My dear Admiral:

I enclose a brief of my estimate of the political and economic situation in French West Africa, with recommendations, made at the request of Mr. Wallace Murray of the State Department, to whom a copy has been sent.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ WILLIAM GLASSFORD
William Glassford

Admiral Ernest J. King,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.
FRENCH WEST AFRICA

Brief of a political and economic estimate.

1. Importance of French West Africa.

a. The short view. By the short view it is meant the duration of the present war. From this point of view it is felt that French West Africa can be of substantial assistance to the Allies in the prosecution of the war. The principal product of the French West African provinces is peanuts and the oils derived therefrom. At present production is at a very low ebb. It is estimated that overall production this year is only 25% of normal. This decrease is due largely to the fact that for the last two years the country has suffered a severe drought. But at the same time a vitally important factor contributing to this deficiency is lack of productive labor. Productive manpower is available but it is either not at work or largely otherwise engaged. The areas that are normally supplied by French West Africa, unless something is done to improve the situation, must be supplied from other sources, at the cost of diverting shipping and materials which are vitaliy needed elsewhere. French West African products can be shipped in French coastwise bottoms retained by the French not in the Allied pool. The importance of taking the necessary steps to improve the production of French West Africa in the interest of the Allied cause is obvious.

With respect to military assistance, a considerable number of troops can be provided from French West Africa. These are negro battalions, Senegalese among others, which according to present plans are to be trained in French West African provinces, provided equipment can be supplied to them from either the United States or the United Kingdom. The number of these troops that may be made available from French West Africa is a matter of record. At the present time the great difficulty is in properly equipping these troops for training prior to sending them to the fighting fronts planned for them.

b. The long view. The strategic situation of French West Africa, with special reference to Dakar, is a most important and significant one in its relation to the security of the two American continents. Dakar, by reason of its geographical location, must henceforth be in the hands of those who are our friends, with whom our relations are such that there can be no danger at any time in the future that Dakar will threaten the Americas across the Atlantic. Since the opening of Dakar, the line of communications from the United States via South America to North Africa has become one of the vitally important links with the present and contemplated operations in the Mediterranean. It readily can be understood, therefore, what a great disadvantage it would be should the French West African provinces be in the hands of an enemy and these lines of communication be reversed.
2. Present situation. As is well known, the Governor General of French West Africa, M. Boisson, has allied himself with the North African regime of General Giraud. There is reason to believe that this affiliation is a genuine and permanent one for the purpose of aligning French West Africa with the French effort headed by General Giraud to liberate France. From the naval point of view, the French based at Dakar have already integrated their naval, surface, and air forces with those of the Allies in operations against the enemy in the Atlantic. Whatever may be the political implications with respect to the Free French (de Gaulle) and the ex-Vichy French (Giraud and Boisson) uniting on a common front for the expulsion of the Germans out of France and the liberation of the French nation as a whole, the military movement now headed by General Giraud is supported energetically by Governor General Boisson and is a military effort of the first order of importance and genuine reliability. It is the feeling of Governor General Boisson that the forces of de Gaulle and Giraud will in due course of time come together. He thinks that it will take time, largely by reason of the differences in the personalities and characters of de Gaulle and Giraud. The former he describes as a politician - the latter as a general. He feels, further, now that the leadership of General Giraud has been shown in its political aspects, the military union of the two French major factions may well be advanced.

There is a very decided feeling among people who know Africa that French West Africa belongs politically and economically to West Africa and not to North Africa. In a very large sense this is true, even though for the present Governor General Boisson has allied himself to North Africa both politically and economically. This may be simply an expedient to get on with the war under the leadership of Giraud, but the truth is that the natural barrier between North Africa and West Africa, that is to say the Mauritanian Desert, still exists. This natural barrier between North Africa and West Africa is recognized by the British in the presence in North Africa at Algiers of Mr. McNeill and in West Africa at Accra of Lord Swinton. These two British officials of cabinet rank proceed largely independently of each other. I believe that the short view, so called, of Lord Swinton with respect to French West Africa is entirely and genuinely one that contemplates simply what French West Africa can best do for the Allied cause. Yet I am convinced by personal contact with Lord Swinton that he has the general development of French West Africa very much in mind, and I have not the slightest doubt that Lord Swinton, in common with others of the British Empire administration, has an eye on the assimilation of French West Africa into the British post-war scheme of things. Lord Swinton is an extremely able gentleman, forceful and active; he knows his business and was quite frank in conversation with me as to what he personally would like to do with respect to the development of French West Africa along the lines of the development that he has already achieved for the Allied cause in the British colonies in West Africa. Not only the British colonies
but he has the Belgian Congo very well in line, so he told me, and also has more or less been able to regiment the Portuguese; the latter because they saw the advantages of such regimentation as he has effected elsewhere. In other words, Lord Swinton would wish to consider French West Africa as part and parcel of his West African responsibility in getting on with the war. He will make every effort, as I see the situation, to bring French West Africa into line with his views. I do not know of a better man for this purpose than Lord Swinton, so far as the duration of this war is concerned. He knows Africa and he knows how to go about getting those people to work. He told me that he hoped his personal relations with the Governor General of French West Africa would be such as to enable him to help the French in the business of increasing the efficiency of their economy for the war effort. On the other hand, I know of my own knowledge that Governor General Boisson, in spite of high regard for Lord Swinton, would far rather deal with an American than an Englishman in relations of this character. He does not like the English; he does not understand them; and he feels that they do not understand the French. He feels that the Americans do understand the French better and have a sympathetic feeling for them, which is reciprocated.

3. Economic Situation. As mentioned above, the economy of French West Africa may be said to be about 25% efficient at the present time for reasons that have been set forth. I do not believe, and I share this disbelief with others, that the French will be able to substantially improve their economy without the assistance and the advice of the Americans or the British at this time. I say this because I do believe that the French are not accustomed to or even know the tempo that is necessary to speed up the production of their country in accordance with the requirements of the war. These people have been isolated from the world for the past two years. They are in a rut and they have scant appreciation of methods required by the necessities of the situation. They are willing and anxious, however, to get on with the job. But the French need guidance, and they need the guidance of either a Lord Swinton or an American of his calibre and rank. If they do not get guidance from America, they will get it from Lord Swinton. The French want it and are very anxious to have it. It is never a question, in my opinion, of doing anything for the French on our own, but always helping the French to help themselves - any other attitude I am sure would not be acceptable. This assistance, this high order assistance it might be called, Governor General Boisson I feel sure would far rather receive from an American diplomat and economist rather than from a British gentleman of the same calibre.

4. Recommendations. Accordingly, for reasons I have attempted to set forth above, both from the political and economic points of view with respect to French West Africa, I have to recommend that there be sent to French West Africa an American of the calibre and rank of Lord Swinton, not only as foil for Lord Swinton, but to insure that American interests in French West Africa now, and after the war, will be preserved for the Americas. I think it exceedingly
important that we take such a step at this time in order that we may be assured that hereafter under no circumstances will French West Africa, the importance of which stems from Dakar, be in the hands of people who are not friendly toward us. In order to accomplish this, we must in my view start now making fast friends there. It should be recalled in this regard that the President was unable to confer with Governor General Boisson when recently he was in Africa. It is my impression that this would be more than offset by sending to French West Africa a person such as Mr. Murphy in North Africa or Lord Swinton in Accra. I believe that such a representative should have his seat at Dakar and not be a formal associate of Lord Swinton. I do believe, on the other hand, that he should achieve the closest possible cooperation with Lord Swinton in the development of the whole of West Africa. Under present conditions he should be guided in matters of broad policy by the North African regime of General Eisenhower (Mr. Murphy). I feel that French West Africa in the long view is more vital to American strategic interests than to the British. Accordingly, I believe we should go about the business of seeing to it that our interests there are safeguarded.
My dear Admiral:

Admiral King has asked me to acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 27, 1943, transmitting your estimate of the political and economic situation in French West Africa.

Respectfully yours,

G. L. RUSSELL,
Commander, U.S.N.,
Flag Secretary

Rear Admiral William Glassford,
United States Navy Yard,
Charleston, South Carolina.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

Will you check up on this
and talk to me about it?

F.D.R.

Letter, 2-25-43, to the President, from Hon. Cordell Hull, regarding telegram (copy attached) sent to Murphy, 2-15-43, giving State Dept.'s interpretation of the first memorandum which was presented to the President at Anfa by General Giraud.
February 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What do you think of sending the following from me personally to Murphy -- in addition to the formal reply which you will be making to him?

"I wish our good friends in North Africa would get their feet on the ground. You can tell them that at no time did I or General Marshall promise equipment for the French divisions on any given date. What was agreed on was the principle of rearming them -- to be done as soon as we found it practicable from a shipping point of view.

You are at liberty to tell them from me also that I have the same kind of cries for help from Russia on the north route, Russia through the Persian Gulf, the British for supplies in England, the British for building up strength in Burma, the Chinese throughout China and several South American States who believe they will be bombed out of existence before the week is out. I had hoped that our French friends in Africa would not join the chorus, for the very simple reason that they can well realize that I am shipping everything that the available ships will carry.

Tell them that it is uncooperative to start stories that they are disillusioned, that they have been let down in equipping an Army to go into France, or that slowness in supplying armaments is holding up political progress. You can intimate that they ought not to be children but should act quickly in denying all these silly rumors. Tell them the whole outcry can be summed up in the French words "une béthane."

I am going ahead with their rearmament as fast as I can get it over. But, of course, it is also true that the present situation in Tunisia is
necessarily affecting dates of delivery.

Give General Giraud my very warm regards and to tell all his people that they must remain calm and sensible.

ROOSEVELT

F. D. R.
HEL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

ALGIERS
Dated February 18, 1943
Rec'd 4:17 p.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON,

PRIORITY

228, February 18, 4 p.m., (SECTION ONE)
SECRET FOR THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE

FROM MURPHY

We believe that the following resume of the situation in North Africa should be brought to your attention. MacMillan is sending an identical telegram to the British Prime Minister as the basis of possible consultation with you.

One. The Tunisian campaign will take much longer to terminate than was anticipated when military operations began in North Africa and subsequently when the present political arrangements with the local authorities were concluded.

Two. As a result of the Anfa conference the immediate situation in North Africa improved owing (a) to the support which the conference gave to General Giraud's position and (b) to the promise which it held out to a political settlement between Giraud and de Gaulle.
-2-, 8828, February 18, 4 p.m., (SECTION ONE) from Algiers
de Gaulle.

Three. Since the conference there has been some further improvement in the local political atmosphere which has, however, not yet been translated into many positive administrative achievements. The progress towards a Giraud de Gaulle understanding has been marked by hesitation on both sides and has been too slow to overcome the tendency towards divergence which will continue so long as effective and permanent contact is not established between the two groups. On the Allied side, although nearly a month has passed, there has been no realization of the promises held forth at Anfa in particular as regards military supplies, and in consequence there is growing disillusionment here. (The purely military aspect is the subject of a separate telegram).

WILEY

CSB
RCC
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated February 18, 1943
Rec'd 7:20 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

URGENT
228, February 18, 4 p.m. (SECTION TWO).

Four. This disillusionment is giving rise to a belief both in the Administration and the Army here that the United Nations have no intention of supporting a French army except as a defensive force; that the military effort here is being held back, as a matter of policy; and that as a result French troops will have no share in the conquest of France and France will not be present at the victory. This belief is having its effect on the morale of the French army. The slow course of the Tunisian campaign contributes to this concern which in turn is holding up progress on the political side. The conclusion is that we are in a vicious circle. The failure to supply armaments is holding up political progress and the lack of progress may be having an adverse effect on the supply of
-2-#228, February 18, 4 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from Algiers.

of armaments.

Five. In the light of this situation we feel obliged to suggest that the policy of two governments towards the French problem should be further defined. The prolongation of the Tunisian campaign and the potential deterioration of the general situation in North Africa in particular raise the question it is desirable to defer until a later stage of the war, a decision whether the various elements of the French Empire are to be regarded and treated as separate administrative units or whether it is not now indispensable to bring about their fusion in the interests both of the present campaign and of those in contemplation.

WILEY

LMS
HEL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated February 18, 1943
Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT
228, February 18, 4 p.m., (SECTION THREE)

It is certain that if the position is not clarified the benefits of the Anfa Conference for the French situation will be dissipated.

Six. The present moment is suitable for further definition of policy, since political changes can still be exacted in return for undertakings in regard to the supply and armaments and the future participation of the French army in the war. It is clear that if we wish to improve the situation and indeed to prevent its further decline we must be prepared to give and execute definite commitments on these two points and also to contemplate the acceptance of a provisional French authority which will speak for all French territories and French men adhering to the movement of Giraud and de Gaulle.

Seven. If you agree to the foregoing we recommend that a new joint approach should be made to General Giraud and de Gaulle in the sense that the present French
French Situation is unsatisfactory; that it is compromising the future role of the French army, that it is having an adverse effect upon opinion in occupied Europe; and that the basis should be found without delay for an agreement between all Frenchmen and French territories outside France with such minimum changes of policy and personnel as may be necessary to bring this about.

Eight. Should you approve we should submit suggestions on procedure.

(END OF MESSAGE)

WILEY

WJC
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Murphy's recent telegrams concerning the memoranda which General Giraud placed before you immediately prior to your departure from Anfa raise a question concerning the letters supposed to have been written by Mr. Murphy, with your approval, to General Giraud prior to the landing in North Africa.

There are attached herewith copies of three letters said to have been written by Mr. Murphy to General Giraud on November 2. The texts were furnished the Department of State by Mr. Lemaigre-Dubreuil upon his arrival in this country with the French Military Mission headed by General Bethouart. This Department does not know whether these letters were in fact authorized or, if so, whether the attached copies are authentic.

The British Ambassador raised the question of these letters with me last week and, if the texts as given are correct, I assume that there is no objection to providing the
the Ambassador with copies. In this connection there is also attached a copy of a memorandum left with me by Lord Halifax on the same occasion setting forth the position of the British Government, as communicated to General de Gaulle on August 7, 1940, regarding the restoration of France.

Enclosures:

1. Copies of three letters.

2. Memorandum from British Ambassador, February 1, 1943.
In a letter to General de Gaulle dated August 7th, 1940, the Prime Minister said, "I would take this opportunity of stating that it is the determination of His Majesty's Government, when victory has been gained by the Allied arms, to secure the full restoration of the independence and greatness of France." At the same time it was considered necessary to give no pledge in regard to actual frontiers and in an unpublished letter of the same date, the Prime Minister said, "I think it necessary to put on record that the expression 'full restoration of the independence and greatness of France', has no precise relation to territorial frontiers. We have not been able to guarantee such frontiers in respect of any nation now acting with us but of course we shall do our best".

Mr. Eden repeated the above pledge in reply to a question in the House of Commons on May 22nd, 1941, when he said: "On the 7th of August last, His Majesty's Government assured General de Gaulle that it was their intention when victory was won to secure the full restoration of the independence and greatness of France."

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 1st, 1943.
Letter no. 1.

With reference to the declarations made by President Roosevelt on several occasions and to the engagements already undertaken by the American Government as well as by the British Government, I am in a position to assure you that the restoration of the full independence of France in all its greatness and to the full extent of its pre-war possessions both in Europe and beyond the seas is one of the war objectives of the United Nations. It is clearly understood that French sovereignty will have to be restored as soon as possible in all the Metropolitan and Colonial territories which in 1939 were under the French flag.

The Government of the United States regards the French nation as an ally and will deal with it as such.

I may add that in the event of military operations in French territory (either in Metropolitan France or in the Colonies) whenever there is French collaboration, the American authorities will not in any way interfere in matters which solely pertain to national administration or are derived from the exercise of French sovereignty.

As regards the Command the Government of the United States has no thought or desire except to place the military command of any such region in the hands of Frenchmen as soon as possible. Nevertheless, during those phases of the operation including landing, establishment of the security of French North Africa and supplying the necessary base, it is considered essential that the American Command and the organization which has been created with such effort and difficulty particularly for this operation shall remain unchanged (the foregoing provision results from the recent conference between French and American representatives. It was prepared before the receipt of your note of October 27 which reads as follows:

"It is perfectly normal and it is understood that all landing operations shall be controlled by the Chief of Staff of the American Army. The Inter-Allied High Command shall assume control after the landing, that is
to say, at each landing point 48 hours after the hour fixed for the beginning of the initial operations of landing the first convoy. As regards subsequent operations the American troops will be placed under the Inter-Allied Command as soon as they are on land."

I am communicating your suggestion to the General Staff of the American Army and I am certain that an acceptable formula will be found. During this period the Government of the United States will make every effort looking toward the supply of arms and modern equipment to the French forces. While the equipment and organization of French forces is thus being carried out, details concerning the command shall be arranged so that Frenchmen may be in a position to assume the High Command at the desired time. In order to facilitate the direction of operations it would be desirable to attach a general of the French Army to the High Command immediately after landing.

Letter no. 2.

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 28 as follows:

"I consider it of the greatest importance that, in the event of combined military operations in French territories (either in Metropolitan France or overseas) which are not occupied by the Axis powers in accordance with the armistice terms, the United Nations expeditionary force which will collaborate with local French troops should be an essentially an American expedition placed under an American command.

It should include no dissident French elements.

Only later and following an understanding between the local French authorities and American authorities should it be necessary, could non-American formations, Allied or dissident French, be introduced into these French territories."

I am glad to assure you that your point of view is perfectly in harmony from the point of view of my Government.

Letter
Letter no. 3.

In response to the different questions which have been presented to me in your name I have the honor to inform you that—

1. The American Government will extend the benefits of the Lend-Lease law to the orders which are placed in the United States for the purpose of giving the French Army the means of participating in the common struggle.

2. The American Government will facilitate the negotiation and execution of these orders.

3. In the same fashion the American Government will facilitate ordering in the United States and the delivery of foodstuffs necessary for the supply of civil populations in French territories which liberate themselves or will be liberated from Axis control.

4. Up to the present time, adequate measures have been taken to reserve, with a view to these deliveries, the quantities of merchandise the need of which is particularly urgent not only to relieve the civil population but also to assure the improved operation of transport and to aid the resumption of local production. As regards French North Africa the list of these first requirements which the Government of the United States agrees to fill as soon as possible when the break between these territories and the Armistice Commission is accomplished figures in the attached annex. The latter is not restrictive in character.

5. In order to hasten the arrival of such goods the Government of the United States expects, however, that French merchant ships now in the ports of French North Africa shall contribute to their transportation at the proper time.

6. The deliveries of goods shall be considered as official French purchases and shall be billed at the world price. For the acceptance and billing of merchandise the rules actually followed in the application of the Franco-American agreement of 1941 for the supply of North Africa will apply in principle.

7. Payment therefor shall be made through exchanges. Credits corresponding to the total of deliveries shall be
be opened in North Africa for the account of the American Government. These credits shall be utilized either for the American Treasury's requirements as regards military expenditures and its procurement purchases in French Africa or for payment of North African exports to the United States.

9. Should it appear that expenses and American purchases in Africa will not cover these civilian deliveries the question of the means of payment to be utilized will be reexamined in common agreement.

10. The American Government undertakes to facilitate in so far as possible the allocation of North African products which as a result of circumstances are deprived of their normal outlet. As soon as military collaboration is brought about conversations will be begun for a common study of the conditions under which these products can be allocated. A list of them should be furnished by the French authorities.

11. Having the firm desire to do everything compatible with the conduct of the war not to increase the sufferings of the French metropolitan population which has already been so seriously tried, the American Government will raise no objection to measures of assistance which the French populations liberated from Axis control should wish to take in favor of other populations of the French community. With the reserve that such shipments must be covered by the guarantees necessary prevent them being deviated from their destination, the shipment of family packages, assistance to towns in metropolitan France adopted by towns in Africa, gifts to the Red Cross, etc., shall be in its opinion continued between North Africa and Metropolitan France.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a telegram which, with your approval, we intend sending to Mr. Murphy at Algiers.

Mr. Murphy has reported that he and General Eisenhower were instructed to work out with the French Commander-in-Chief in Algiers the details of an understanding based on the two memoranda presented to you by General Giraud on January 24.

The first purpose of the telegram is to ensure that we and our authorities in North Africa are in accord as to what are the documents on which the understanding is to be based.

The second purpose is to confirm to Mr. Murphy and General Eisenhower our understanding that the paragraph in General Giraud's first memorandum quoted below relates only to French interests in French Africa together with such interests outside that area as have rallied or may adhere in the future to General Giraud's authority.

The paragraph in question from General Giraud's first memorandum reads as follows:

"In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France's past, her present, and her future, the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain recognize in the Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters in Algiers, the right and duty of preserving all French interests under the military, economic, financial, and moral plan. They bind themselves to aid him by all the means in their power until the day when, in complete freedom, the French people and the French nation shall be able to designate their regular government."
DRAFT TELEGRAM

TO: ALGIERS

Secret for Murphy from Atherton.

Your 124, February 1.

PARAGRAPH ONE. With reference to the first memorandum, it is desirable that in working out with General Giraud details of the understanding we should first be in accord with respect to the precise documents upon which the understanding is based.

PARAGRAPH TWO. With reference to the letters exchanged between you and General Giraud prior to the landing we have copies of following documents, all dated November 2, given us by Lemaigre-Dubreuil: Letter number 1 from you to Giraud. Letter number 2 from you to Giraud, which consists of text of Giraud's letter to you of October 28. Letter number 3 from you to Giraud containing eleven numbered paragraphs.

PARAGRAPH THREE. By your reference to QUOTE conversations exchanged in Washington between the twenty-eighth of December and the second of January, UNQUOTE we assume you have reference to memorandum of December 28.
drawn up by Reber. We find no other document within those dates but also have Reber's memoranda of January 9 and January 11, the first covering a conversation between Lemaigre-Dubreuil and Georges-Ficot with the Secretary, Atherton and Reber and the second covering a conversation between the same persons omitting the Secretary.

PARAGRAPH FOUR. Full note has been taken of your understanding that phraseology in second paragraph of Article 3 of first memorandum relates to French interests in French Africa together with such interests outside of that area as have rallied or may adhere in the future to General Giraud's authority. It is in line with this interpretation, in which we concur, that the Secretary told Lemaigre-Dubreuil in his conversation of January 9 that this Government wished to do everything in its power to make things easier for General Giraud in his conduct of the military campaign in North Africa, which necessarily included some recognition of the fact that he would be in charge of the maintenance of civil order in these
DLA
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

124, February 1, noon (SECTION ONE)
SECRET FOR AHERTON FROM MURPHY.
NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION

A few minutes before his departure from Anfa the President had a short conversation with General Giraud during the course of which Giraud presented two memoranda dated January 24, 1943. The first memorandum reads as follows:

One. The intervention of the Anglo American troops on the 8th of November on French territory in Africa, brought about at the demand of the French who, since 1940 have wanted to take up the fight against Germany, was the first act of liberation of an oppressed nation accomplished by the United Nations.

Two. The form of the relations between France and the Foreign powers temporarily occupying part of French territory, the post war consequences of the association of France
of France and the United States in the fight against German:
the military, economic and financial aid given to France,
have all been defined in letters exchanged between the
Consul, Mr. Murphy, in the name of President Roosevelt,
and General Giraud, before the landing. They remain in
force. However, the paragraph dealing with the military
question and with the Inter Allied command is excepted.

Three. Because of the fact that the French nation
and the French people are the only ones who may fix their
representation and designate their government, and because
it is impossible for the French in other land to pronounce
freely her will, France no longer possesses a government.

WILEY

WWC
JMB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers

Dated February 1, 1943
Rec'd 5:46 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

124, February 1, 3 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France's past, her present, and her future, the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain recognize in the Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters in Algiers, the right and duty of preserving all French interests under the military, economic, financial, and moral plan. They bind themselves to aid him by all the means in their power until the day when, in complete freedom, the French people and the French nation shall be able to designate their regular government.

General Eisenhower and Minister Murphy will work out with the French Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters as Algiers, the details of the present understanding. In so doing, they will be governed by the conversations exchanged in Washington between the twenty-eighth of December and the second of January, by the representative of General Giraud and the State Department,
-2- #124, February 1, 3 a.m. (SECTION TWO) from Algiers

Department, and the decisions which have been made by President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and General Giraud in the interviews at Casablanca between the seventeenth and twenty-fourth of January 1943.

The foregoing was endorsed "approved" by the President.

It is my understanding of the second paragraph of Article Three from the conversations between the President and General Giraud that this phraseology relates to French interests in French Africa together with such interests outside of that area as have rallied or may adhere in the future to General's authority.

WILEY

LMS
BH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated February 1, 1943
Rec'd 6:55 a.m., 2nd

Secretary of State,
Washington.

124, February 1, noon. (SECTION THREE)

The second memorandum is entitled "resume of the agreements in principle resulting from the conversations at Anfa. First paragraph reads as follows:

"Under the military plan, it has been agreed between the President of the United States and General Giraud that the French forces will receive, by priority, the equipment which is indispensable to them and that this shall be made up of the most modern material."

The President made a marginal notation okaying the foregoing paragraph. The second paragraph relates to conversations with General Marshall and General Somervell regarding the delivery of military materiel. I shall not quote this paragraph for reasons of military security.

The third paragraph reads as follows:

"In regard to transport, it has been agreed with General
February 1, noon (SECTION THREE) from Algiers

General Somervell that there—supplying of French Africa would be assured by the monthly allocation of six 5000 tons (50,000 tons of wheat, 12,000 tons of sugar, and 3,000 tons of material) and that the shipment of this material would be made before next summer. France would furnish to the interallied pool as share of 165,000 tons of shipping and the Allies would furnish the remainder necessary for the delivery to be completed within the agreed time. The aviation material would be sent, as far as possible, by air).

WILEY

RR
EJ
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Algiers
Dated February 1, 1943
Reol'd 7:01 a.m., 2d

Secretary of State,
Washington.

121, February 1, noon (SECTION FOUR)

The President made a marginal notation regarding paragraphs two and three as follows:

"Okay in principle. Work out with Eisenhower and Somervell". Paragraph four reads as follows:

"Under the political plan, it was agreed between the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and General Giraud that it was to their common interest for all the French fighting against Germany to be reunited under one authority, and that every facility would be given to General Giraud in order to bring about this union". The paragraph was okayed by the President. Paragraph five reads as follows:

"In connection with this, it has been agreed by the President of the United States that the exchange would be brought to fifty francs to the dollar in order to ameliorate the existing differences with the exchange rate given to the territories placed under the control..."
control of General de Gaulle (it being the strong hope that, in the latter territories, the rate will be lowered from forty-three to fifty francs to the dollar). The parenthetical reference is language inserted by the President. He made a marginal note to this paragraph "okay as amended." Paragraph six reads as follows:

"It has also been agreed that the necessary propaganda (for France in the French language) should be carried on from the African territory by the French authorities and that, for this reason, (conferences should be held regarding the use of the short wave radio stations)."

INLEY

BB
Algiers

Dated February 1, 1943
Rec'd 7:09 a.m., 2d

Secretary of State,

Washington,

12th, February 1, noon (SECTION FIVE)

The President made a marginal notation to this paragraph "amend". In the conversation he agreed that in principle propaganda by radio from French North Africa in the French language for metropolitan France should be directed by the French authorities in consultation with Allied authorities. Allied authorities would conduct propaganda activity destined for other European countries. It was understood between the President and General Giraud that this entire subject is one for conversations between the French and Allied authorities looking to the most advantageous use of French North African radio facilities in the prosecution of the war.

These two memoranda were not discussed in advance with the British as there was no opportunity to do so, but I have provided copies of them to MacKinnon. General Eisenhower of course is fully informed.

Giraud
February 1, noon (SECTION FIVE) from Algiers

Giraud acted extremely well throughout the conference, making a favorable impression on both the President and the Prime Minister. I believe everyone noted Giraud's obvious simplicity and sincerity of purpose to prosecute the war against the Axis - a consideration with him which overrides everything.

This telegram is addressed to you as I believe that the Secretary would wish to limit distribution.

Repeated to Matthews for his information only.

(END OF MESSAGE).

WILEY

NPL
February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a telegram which, with your approval, we intend sending to Mr. Murphy at Algiers.

Mr. Murphy has reported that he and General Eisenhower were instructed to work out with the French Commander-in-Chief in Algiers the details of an understanding based on the two memoranda presented to you by General Giraud on January 24.

The first purpose of the telegram is to ensure that we and our authorities in North Africa are in accord as to what are the documents on which the understanding is to be based.

The second purpose is to confirm to Mr. Murphy and General Eisenhower our understanding that the paragraph in General Giraud's first memorandum quoted below relates only to French interests in French Africa together with such interests outside that area as have rallied or may adhere in the future to General Giraud's authority.

The paragraph in question from General Giraud's first memorandum reads as follows:

"In the interests of the French people, in order to safeguard France's past, her present, and her future, the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain recognize in the Commander-in-Chief, with his headquarters in Algiers, the right and duty of preserving all French interests under the military, economic, financial, and moral plan. They bind themselves to aid him by all the means in their power until the day when, in complete freedom, the French people and the French nation shall be able to designate their regular government."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL
February 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I wish you would send a message
to Anthony Eden somewhat along the
following lines:

"The President has shown
some annoyance at the continued
propaganda emanating from the
deGaulle Headquarters in London.
The President labels their
attitude as a continuing
irritant. He knows that the
Prime Minister would agree
with him and hopes that you
can take further steps to
allay the irritation."

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I think you might tell Monsieur Tixier that I shall be very happy to see General de Gaulle if he comes here about the end of the month, and we can fix the actual time a little later.

F. D. R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith a translation of a letter I received this morning from Monsieur Tixier, the de Gaulle representative in Washington.

Will you let me know if you wish me to make any reply to this communication.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,

The White House.
January 5, 1943

Mr. Minister:

In a cable dated January 4 General de Gaulle asked me to let you know that he is always anxious to come to Washington.

He remains convinced of the usefulness of his visit even if nothing were involved beyond a preliminary exchange of views with President Roosevelt.

I shall be grateful to you if you will be good enough to transmit to the President this communication from General de Gaulle.

Please accept, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my high consideration.

A. TIXIER
Chief of Delegation

The Honorable Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
State Department,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Negotiations regarding French West Africa.


(B) Pink British Message dated Dec. 5, 1942, Copy No. 30.


The white message attached hereto was sent to General Eisenhower today, giving him your views with reference to the present negotiations regarding French West Africa. The same message was sent to London for comment yesterday.

The long pink message attached hereto gives the views of the British Government. This was evidently sent last night prior to receipt in London of your views.

General Eisenhower now has the separate views of each Government, and it is anticipated that he will attempt to arrive at a workable solution which is in conformity with them.

His Number 1285, which is attached, has just been received. At the time it was sent he had probably not received the British message and certainly had not received the message expressing your views.

JOHN R. DEANE,
Secretary,
Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.
SECRET

General Eisenhower, Freedom, Algiers.

The President desires that you be informed that it is not proper at the present time to enter into any "protocol", "agreement", or "arrangement", with any government officials in French Africa.

He approves the following "announcement" by you as Commander of the Allied Forces in Africa. He suggests that Admiral Darlan or Governor Boisson or both might be requested to make an identical "announcement", and that they may give themselves the name "French Imperial Federation", or any other name, but that we cannot at the present time, and until the military situation is cleared up, give formal written recognition to any French government. He states that we, therefore, cannot in any way give formal approval to the name "French Imperial Federation."

He approves the following "announcement":

1. The General Commanding American Forces in North and West Africa having discussed the problems of French Civil Administration, and French Military aid, and having reached a meeting of the minds with French leaders, announces: French West Africa and Togoland have spontaneously decided to adhere to the high Commissariat of Admiral Darlan and to resume the fight against the powers of the Axis for the liberation of French territory.

2. Furthermore, the Commanding General of the United States forces in French North Africa announces:

(a) that French sovereignty in French West Africa and in Togoland remains intact,
SECRET

(b) that the French authorities in these territories are alone qualified to promulgate instructions and regulations,

(c) that no measures will be taken by United States authorities which would result in French troops combating other French troops, and

(d) that French naval vessels and French merchant shipping will not be detained in ports under United States control.

3. The closest cooperation will prevail between the military authorities of the United States on the one hand, and the competent authorities of French West Africa and Togoland on the other, in order to accomplish the purpose mentioned above.

4. The ports and port facilities, including watering, fuelling, repairs and docking, and the airports in French West Africa and in Togoland, as well as telecommunications, may be used by the American forces, it being understood that the Command of the Ports and of the airports will remain under the direction of the French local authorities.

5. For this purpose, the American authorities may establish in French West Africa and in Togoland such services and specialists as may be necessary, it being understood that armed forces will not be stationed permanently in French West Africa or in Togoland.

6. In case it may be necessary to transport armed forces across these territories, and in case of their temporary sojourn in transit in these territories, the Governor General of French West Africa and of Togoland will be requested to give his advance authorization.

7. Transit by sea without landing in French West Africa and in Togoland, or transit by air without departure of personnel from the airports is in any event authorized. French warships will operate in close cooperation with the military and naval authorities of the United States for the accomplishment of the above mentioned purposes. Such ships will continue to fly the French Flag and will remain under French command. They will maintain their
personnel and equipment and will receive fuel and provisions of all sorts necessary to permit them to operate effectively as combat units. By agreement, they may be repaired in ports under the control of the United States.

8. American Merchant shipping in French West African ports and in Togoland will be returned to its owners.

9. French Merchant shipping in French West African and Togoland ports will operate under the French Flag and with crews preferably French, for the common cause. An agreement regarding their use will be negotiated between the competent French authorities and the CSAB (Combined Shipping Adjustment Board). It is understood that the military and civilian needs of French North Africa, of French West Africa, and of Togoland will be fully considered in the negotiation of such an accord.

10. All facilities will be provided to American forces for the accomplishment of their transit operations under the most favorable conditions across French North Africa and Togoland.

11. Requisitions necessary for the installation of American services in French West Africa or in Togoland will be carried out by the French authorities and in conformity with French Legislation.

12. Persons at present in detention, including all service personnel and all sailors of the United States Merchant Marine at present interned in French West Africa or in Togoland, will be set at liberty immediately and transferred in accordance with the instructions of the competent American authorities.

13. It is understood that the competent authorities in French West Africa and in Togoland will take all measures considered appropriate or useful with regard to the control of foreign property, as well as the persons and property of foreign nationals, neutral Consular Authorities, and any other persons as may be required for the realization of the purpose indicated above.
14. In French West Africa and in Togoland the property of the United States Government, and its representatives, civilian officials, governmental organizations or authorized relief organizations, transactions carried out by the representatives of those governments or those organizations will not be subject to any other tax than those applied to property belonging to the French state or the colony or transactions carried out by the military or administrative services or organizations of the state or of the colony.

15. The American military authorities, their government, the representatives of that government and its civilian officials, will enjoy the privileges of extraterritoriality; they will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the civil or criminal courts of the territory.

16. The mixed economic commission, established at Algeria, will also be charged with the study of the economic needs of French West Africa and Togoland. This commission, in close liaison with the authorities of French West Africa and Togoland, will suggest the measures which seem to it appropriate for exports and imports, for the establishment of economic stability and prosperity in French West Africa and in Togoland.

17. The above numbered paragraphs will also apply to the government of the United Kingdom and British forces and to the other Allied governments and forces when the government of the United Kingdom will have undertaken:

   (a) to respect French Sovereignty in French Africa and French West Africa;

   (b) not to allow, from the territories under its authority, any action contrary to that sovereignty.
To: Joint Staff Mission
Rptd: General Eisenhower (through ETOUSA)
From: Chiefs of Staff
Dated: 5th December, 1942.

MOST SECRET
IMMEDIATE

Following from Chiefs of Staff No. C.O.S. W 383.

Reference telegrams to C.C.S. Nos. 1060 and 1115.

H.M. Government in the United Kingdom are willing that General Eisenhower should inform M. Boisson that they have no desire to interfere with his authority in French West Africa and that they will not permit action or propaganda from British West African territories directed against that authority since by the terms of the agreement he is to collaborate with the United Nations in the war against the Axis. This assurance should not be incorporated in the text of the agreement itself, but should be given separately. It is given on the understanding that article 14 of the draft will be omitted.

2. The question of internees is much more difficult and H.M. Government could not repeat not assent to the conclusion of an agreement which would leave the matter of the exchange of internees to be settled later. An agreement between United States and French authorities which left British subjects imprisoned in disgraceful conditions in French hands in West Africa could not repeat not be defended here.

3. Further H.M. Government for their part could not give an undertaking on behalf of de Gaulle that Vichy prisoners in Camerouns and Equatorial Africa will be released since we can see no possibility of obtaining de Gaulle's agreement to this in present circumstances. Position as we understand it is that, while de Gaulle still has 200 or so Vichy prisoners taken in the Gaboon operations and two Colonial officials, the Gaullists taken prisoner at Dakar in 1940 and those who have been interned since have mostly been sent to France and are probably now in German hands and few, if any, now remain in West Africa. De Gaulle once proposed an exchange in the past which was refused by Vichy in insulting terms. This is a matter which has a bitter past history and has aroused deep feelings and is not one which could be quickly solved even if Boisson had a qui pro quo to offer to de Gaulle which he apparently has not.

4. We realise Boisson's desire to get his people out and will do what we can for him as opportunity offers. We suggest that General Eisenhower should insist on an undertaking from Boisson to release British and other Allied prisoners or internees in French West Africa.
immediately upon the conclusion of the agreement.
In return, H.H. Government will release Vichy prisoners
or internees in British West African colonies (there
are between 30 and 40 of these, chiefly the crew of
the submarine "Poncelet"), and in addition repatriate
to North Africa the necessary number of Madagascar
prisoners now held in the United Kingdom to make up
the figure of those to be released by Boisson.

5. General Eisenhower should tell Boisson that
we look forward to the time when all those Frenchmen
who are willing to fight the Axis for the liberation
of France will join together in a common effort and
that we shall at all times be willing to do our best to
promote an agreement between their army and the
United States. We shall ask the impossible. We will do what
we can to help him as time goes on.

6. As regards the text of the agreement contained
in telegram No. 1060, subject to the above views
are as follows:

(i) As regards form of the agreement and terms
of the preamble, we assume account will be
taken of principles laid down in Marshall’s
telegram No. 3752 of 29th November and in
his telegram of 3rd December in reply to
telegram No. 1010.

(ii) We agree that draft should extend facilities
to "United States, United Kingdom and their
Allies".

(iii) Article 1, after the words "Repairs and docking
and the airports", add "and airport
facilities".

(iv) Article 2, after the words "armed forces", add
"other than air forces employed on protection
of sea communications".

(v) Article 6, we suggest the following amendment -
Delete the first sentence and have the second
sentence read as follows: "An agreement
regarding the use of French merchant shipping
in French West Africa and Togoland ports will
be negotiated between the competent French
authorities and the Combined Shipping
Adjustment Board". The rest stands. Use
of French flag is major and highly technical
question on which the Combined Shipping
Adjustment Board negotiations ought not to
be prejudiced. Though we fully understand
the natural desire of the French to sail under
the French flag, to agree to the French flag
being used in all cases might make it
impossible for ships to be used in certain
trades.

(vi) Article 13, we assume the object of this
article is to give the French an assurance
that their economic interests will be
considered and we accept this principle.
However Departments here consider that to
coorperate West African economic affairs in

-2-
Algiers is unworkable. In our view it is essential that shipping, supplies and bulk purchases of food and other material in French West Africa should be linked with other West African territories. Administrative arrangements on our side would be impossible if our representatives in West Africa had to refer to North Africa. Where Boisson may refer to Algiers our representatives must refer to London or Washington. From the point of view of convoy, the Admiralty attach the utmost importance to the treatment of West Africa as one unit. We therefore suggest an amendment to the first part of the article to read "A mixed commission at Dakar will be charged" etc. We suggest adding at the end of the article the following "and for suitable development of their economic contribution to the common cause". We think it a mistake to imply that economic assistance will be entirely one-sided. If the first amendment above is not acceptable, we ask that either the article be omitted entirely from the agreement and the question left over for subsequent negotiation or that any suggested modification be referred back to us with reasons.

T.O.O. 19502/5

Distribution
Restricted
H.E.
URGENT

From: Algiers - 1523/6  
To: AGWAR

No. 1285, December 6, 1942

When may I possibly expect (to AGWAR, ABFOR from Freedom Algiers) some answer on Dakar matter? Urgent from C in C to CCS. Boisson grows suspicious and is determined to return home, although I have explained to him that it is merely the technical difficulties involved in certain minor points that is causing the delay. He is embarrassed by messages received from his Provincial Governors who fear he is merely a dupe and that our intentions concerning French West Africa are not friendly. Unless I am able to give him some written assurance immediately covering major points this whole matter appears likely to be set back for weeks. For the purpose of conferring on ferry routes Boisson has already invited Generals Fitzgerald and Smith to visit him in Dakar the day after he returns to that place with a substantial accord.

No Sig

Action Copy: GEN DEANE (CCS)
Info. Copies: OPD
ADM KING
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CM-IN-2570 (12/6/42) 1701Z nw
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Operations Division, WDGS
European Section, WDOPD
OPD 336 Africa (12-6-42)
JEH XXX-A

December 6, 1942

To
FREEDOM
ALGIERS

Number 35

We understand you have already received from London the views of the British government as indicated in their number COSW 383 with reference to French West Africa negotiations. (From Marshall to Eisenhower Freedom Algiers) The following represents the President's views which have been communicated to London. As yet no statement from London has been received indicating attitude of the British government concerning President's views. As comments are received from London they will be forwarded to you.

We feel that having both President's and British views you may be able to work out a solution on the ground satisfactory to all. The President's instructions follow: The President desires that you be informed that it is not proper at the present time to enter into any "Protocol", "agreement", or "arrangement", with any government officials in French Africa.

He approves the following announcement by you as Commander of the Allied Forces in Africa. He suggests that Admiral Darlan or Governor Boisson or both might be requested to make an identical "announcement", and that they may give themselves the name "French Imperial Federation", or any other name, but that we cannot at the present time, and until the military situation is cleared up, give formal written recognition to any French government. He states that we, therefore, cannot in any way give formal approval to the name "French Imperial Federation."

He approves the following "announcement":

1. The General Commanding American

CM-OUT-2034 (12-6-42)

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
Forces in North and West Africa having discussed the problems of French Civil Administration, and French Military Aid, and having reached a meeting of the minds with French leaders, announces: French West Africa and Togoland have spontaneously decided to adhere to the High Commissariat of Admiral Darlan and to resume the fight against the powers of the Axis for the liberation of French Territory.

2. Furthermore, the Commanding General of the United States Forces in French North Africa announces: (A) that French sovereignty in French West Africa and in Togoland remains intact, (B) that the French authorities in these territories are alone qualified to promulgate instructions and regulations, (C) that no measures will be taken by United States authorities which would result in French troops combating other French troops, and (D) that French Naval vessels and French merchant shipping under control of French West African and Togoland authorities will not be detained in ports under United States control.

3. The closest cooperation will prevail between the military authorities of the United States on the one hand, and the competent authorities of French West Africa and Togoland on the other, in order to accomplish the purpose mentioned above.

4. Same as your article 1.
5. Same as your article 2.
6. Same as your article 3.
7. Same as your article 4.
8. Same as your article 5.
9. Same as your article 6.
10. Same as your article 7.
11. Same as your article 8.
12. Same as your article 9.
13. Same as your article 10.
14. Same as your article 11.
15. Same as your article 12.
16. Same as your article 13.

17. The above numbered paragraphs will also apply to the government of the United Kingdom and British Forces and to the other Allied governments and forces when the government of the United Kingdom will have undertaken: (A) to respect French sovereignty in French Africa and French West Africa; (B) Not to allow, from the territories under its authority, any action contrary to that sovereignty.

Originator: OPD
Info. Copies: Admiral King
General Deane (Admiral Leahy)
LOG

CM-OUT-2084 (12-6-42) 1936 Z mvs

SECRET
THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN
27 November 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY, U.S.N.

A few days ago the attached despatch was sent in in connection with the fall of Dakar.

The President suggests that you give consideration to supplementing it to the extent that we will undertake to furnish food to Dakar, return those persons recently sent out of Dakar, pay the pensions, etc., — as we are doing elsewhere in French Africa.

Very respectfully,

JOHN L. MCCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

Attachment

jlmccrea:jh
The Secretary of State
Washington
November 26, 1942.

This is a translation from the French text of a telegram no. 479 received this morning from the American Consul at Dakar.

Declaration by the High Commissioner by Radio
Dakar at 12:15 November Twenty-Third

French men and women of West Africa, since I took over the command of French West Africa my constant care has been the maintenance of French sovereignty in the territories which were confided to me.

It was this same care which inspired my decision, taken in full accord with the responsible military authorities, to place West Africa under the orders of Admiral Darlan.

This consideration, important as it is, would not alone have sufficed to bring us to this determination if we had not been certain that in doing so we were remaining true to the oath which we have given to the Marshal.

After my message there will be read to you the messages
messages of Admiral Darlan through which there will be made clear to you the series of events and the definitions of the aims which he is adopting.

West Africa desires to take part in the realization of his plans. In doing so it will remain wholly and absolutely free from foreign occupation of whatever kind. You have been thinking – I know it only too well – that your leaders have been slow in taking a stand. Today you will think, with better right, that they have passed through days hard to endure because of the responsibilities which they are taking over. Now that the decision has been reached, accept it with full seriousness. Think of France.

The path West Africa now will follow, together with North Africa, for the liberation of France and its Chief, will demand from all of you, however, a complete devotion of effort in absolute discipline.

Long live France. Long live the Marshal.

END OF QUOTATION

This was followed by the following broadcast of General Order Number sixteen of General Barrau, Commander in Chief of the Land, Sea, and Air Forces of the A.O.F. (French West Africa) Colony:

The
The A.O.F. (French West Africa) has joined the North African bloc. The Governor General has made known the full reasons for his determining this course.

But no consideration would have been able to bring the general commander in chief to agree to that declaration if this act had seemed to him to be incompatible with military honor, and particularly with the oath given by the troops to the Marshal of France, the Chief of State, an oath from which no one can absolve them.

A careful study has made him completely certain that the action of the civil and military authorities of North Africa is entirely along the lines designed by Marshal Petain.

Under these conditions the General Commander in Chief places himself and you, all of you, as well as all formations subject to your authority, under the orders of Admiral Darlan.

END QUOTATION

FAYETTE J. FLEXER
American Consul

Eu: C.W. Cannon
S/FED
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
February 1, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN McCREA

This is a copy of Winston Churchill's speech to a secret session of the Parliament in regard to the Darlan affair.

F. D. R.
MOST SECRET

A NOTE ON THE DARLAN AFFAIR

I have first of all an announcement to make about the unshackling of prisoners. Last week the Germans officially informed the International Red Cross that they intended to unshackle all prisoners for the Christmas week. We had previously suggested to the Protecting Power that they should ask both countries to unshackle and we had told them that we would immediately comply with such a request. The Protecting Power has now made the request and instructions have been given by us to unshackle the German prisoners in our hands on December 12th. I do not know what the response of the Germans to the Protecting Power will be but in view of their statement about unshackling for Christmas there certainly seems a good chance that they will relieve our officers and men from the indignities they so wrongly inflicted upon them. At any rate that is what we are going to do.

I should like to make it clear that we have
never had any object but to get our men unchained and it remains to be seen whether we shall achieve that object or not. There has never been in our minds any thought of reprisals in the sense of inflicting cruelty for cruelty's sake. On the other hand it does not do to give way to a bully like Hitler. I am aware that many good people have criticized the action we took but it may be that that action and the timing of its cessation will produce the result we aimed at, namely, the relief of our men. If so, it will be a matter for general satisfaction.

In order that the Swiss action may have the best chance of success, you will realize the importance of discretion in public discussion during the next few days.

I now come to certain aspects of the considerable enterprise which we and the U.S. have launched in French N.W. Africa, to which for convenience some months ago I gave the code name of TORCH.

On August 26, on my return from Moscow I telegraphed as follows to President Roosevelt:

"AS
"As I see this operation, it is primarily political in its foundations. The first victory we have to win is to avoid a battle. The second, if we cannot avoid it, to win it. In order to give us the best chances of the first victory, we must (a) present the maximum appearance of over-whelming strength at the moment of the first attack, and (b) attack at as many places as possible. This is an absolutely different kind of operation from the Dieppe business. There we were up against German efficiency and the steel bound fortified coasts of France. In TORCH we have to face at the worst weak, divided opposition and an enormous choice of striking points at which to land. Risks and difficulties will be doubled by delay and will far outstrip increase of our forces. Careful planning in every detail, safety first in every calculation, far-seeing provisions for a long-term campaign, to meet every conceivable adverse contingency, however admirable in theory, will ruin the enterprise in fact.

"In order to lighten the burden of responsibility on the military Commanders, I am of opinion that you and I should lay down the political data and take the risk upon ourselves. In my view, it would be reasonable to assume (a) that Spain will not go to war with Britain and the United States on account of TORCH; (b) that it will be at least two months before the Germans can force their way through Spain or procure some accommodation from her; (c) that the French resistance in North Africa will be largely token resistance, capable of being overcome by the suddenness and scale of the attack, and that thereafter the North African French may actively help us under their own Commanders; (d) that Vichy will not declare war on the United States and Great Britain; (e) that Hitler will put extreme pressure on Vichy, but that in October he will not have the forces available to overrun unoccupied France while at the same time we keep him pinned in the Pas de Calais, etc."
The last of these forecasts was falsified because the French never made any resistance to the over-running of the Unoccupied Zone, but all the others have so far been borne out by events. I quote them to show how much politics apart from strategy were involved in our joint plan, and how we hoped to reduce bloodshed and risk of failure to a minimum by utilising the help of Frenchmen who were then in the service of the Vichy Government. Into this scheme of things there swam quite unexpectedly as I shall presently relate the very important figure of Admiral Darlan. I do not at all wonder that this Darlan business has caused a good deal of concern in this country, and I am glad to give an explanation of it.

The question however which we must ask ourselves is not whether we like or do not like what is going on, but what are we going to do about it. In war it is not always possible to have everything go exactly as one likes. In working with allies it sometimes happens that they develop opinions of their own. Since 1776 we...
we have not been in the position of being able to
decide the policy of the U.S. This is an American
expedition in which they will ultimately have perhaps
two or three times as large ground forces as we have,
and three times the Air force. On sea the proportion
is overwhelmingly in our favour, and we have of
course given a vast amount of organization and
assistance in every way. Nevertheless the U.S.
regard this as an American expedition under the
ultimate command of the President of the U.S. and they
regard N.W. Africa as a war sphere which is in
their keeping just as we regard the E. Mediterranean
as a theatre for which we are responsible. We
have accepted this position from the outset and
are serving under their command. That does not
mean we have not got a great power of representation
and I am of course in the closest touch with the
President. It does mean however that neither
militarily nor politically are we directly
controlling the course of events.

I.....
I hold no brief for Admiral Darlan. Like myself he is the object of the animosities of Herr Hitler, of M. Laval and of Mr. Stokes, M.P. for Ipswich. Otherwise I have nothing in common with him. But it is necessary to realize that the Government and to a large extent the people of the U.S. do not feel the same way about Darlan as we do. He has not betrayed them. He has not broken any treaty with them. He has not vilified them. He has not maltreated any of their citizens. They do not think much of him, but they do not hate and despise him as we do over here. Many of them think more of the lives of their own soldiers than they do about the past records of French political figures. Moreover the Americans have cultivated up to the last moment relations with Vichy, which were of a fairly intimate character and which in my opinion have conduced to our general advantage. At any rate the position of the Americans at Vichy gave us a window on that courtyard which otherwise would not have existed. Admiral Leahy has.....
has been Ambassador to Vichy until quite recently. He lived on terms of close intimacy with Marshal Pétain for whom he conceived an inordinate respect. He has at all times used his influence to prevent Vichy France becoming the ally of Germany or declaring war upon us when we have had to fight Vichy troops at Cran or Dakar, in Syria or in Madagascar. On all these occasions I have believed, and have recorded my opinion beforehand, that France would not declare war; but a factor in forming that opinion was the immense American influence upon all Frenchmen which influence of course increase enormously after the U.S. entered the war. Admiral Leahy is a close friend of President Roosevelt and was recently appointed his personal Chief of the Staff. The attitude of the U.S. executive and State Department towards Vichy and all its works must be viewed against this background.

Since we broke with Vichy in 1940, this country has had no contacts with French North Africa, or only.....
only very slender and hazardous secret contacts. The Americans on the other hand have roamed about Morocco, Algiers and Tunisia without the slightest impediment, with plenty of money and with a policy of trade favours to bestow. They have worked all this time, both before and after they came into the war, to predispose French North Africa to them, to have the closest observation of the country, to have a strong footing there and to make all kinds of contacts with all kinds of people, especially important military and civil functionaries. When we began to plan this expedition with them they redoubled their efforts not only to acquire information and to create goodwill but also to make a regular conspiracy among the high French officers there to come over with their troops to the Allies, should an American landing take place.

Great Britain is supposed in American circles to be very unpopular with the French. I do not think it is true, and, certainly our troops have had the
the very best reception in N.W. Africa once we got ashore. Nevertheless as we had been firing on the French on so many different occasions and in so many places, it was not worth while to contest the point. The whole enterprise therefore was organized on the basis not only of American command but of having Americans everywhere in evidence at the crucial moment of landing. If you keep in your mind the supreme object, namely the destruction of Hitler and Hitlerism, there is no room for small points of national self-assertiveness. As long as we get the job done, I do not feel we need be too particular who gets the credit. We have no need to be anxious about the place which our country will occupy in the history of this war nor, when the facts are known, about the part which we have played in the great enterprise called TORCH.

I now turn to examine a peculiar form of French mentality, or rather of the mentality of a large proportion of Frenchmen in the terrible defeat and...
and ruin which has overtaken their country. I am not at all defending or still less eulogizing this French mentality. But it would be very foolish not to try to understand what is passing in other people’s minds and what are the secret springs of action to which they respond. The Almighty in his infinite wisdom did not see fit to create Frenchmen in the image of Englishmen. In a State like France which has experienced so many convulsions Monarchy, Convention, Directory, Consulate, Empire, Monarchy, Empire, and finally Republic — there has grown up a principle founded on the "droit administratif" which undoubtedly governs the action of many French officers and officials in times of revolution and change. It is a highly legalistic habit of mind and it arises from a subconscious sense of national self-preservation against the dangers of sheer anarchy. For instance, any officer who obeys the command of his lawful superior, is absolutely immune from subsequent...
subsequent punishment, nor even is his honour held to be impugned. Much therefore turns in the minds of French officers upon whether there is a direct, unbroken chain of lawful command, and this is held to be more important by many Frenchmen than moral, national or international considerations. From this point of view many Frenchmen who admire General de Gaulle and envy him in his role nevertheless regard him as a man who has rebelled against the authority of the French State, which in their prostration they conceive to be vested in the person of the antique defeatist who to them is the illustrious and venerable Marshal Petain, the hero of Verdun and the sole hope of France.

Now all this may seem very absurd to our minds. But there is one aspect about it which is important to us. It is in accordance with orders and authority transmitted or declared to be transmitted by Marshal Petain that the French troops in N.W. Africa have pointed and....
and fired their rifles against the Germans and Italians instead of continuing to point and fire their rifles against the British and Americans. I am sorry to have to mention a point like that, but it makes a lot of difference to a soldier whether a man fires his gun at him or at his enemy; and even the soldier's wife or father might have a feeling about it too.

Whatever may be the truth about British unpopularity in N. Africa, all our information showed that the real red rag to the bull would be de Gaulle. It was the opinion of those officers who were ready to come over to our side that any admixture of De Gaullist troops at the outset would destroy all hope of a peaceful landing. Although we were prepared to bear down all opposition and in fact did overcome a very considerable degree of opposition, it is my duty to confess that neither we nor the Americans were looking for additional trouble, there being quite enough going about at the present.....
present time. The Americans, who, as I have said, were in command from the beginning, for their part refused to allow the slightest intervention of De Gaullists into this theatre or even any consultation with them beforehand. There was, however, one French figure upon whom our hopes were set - General Giraud - a very senior French officer who was taken prisoner before the French surrender in 1940 while fighting gallantly in a tank and who a few months ago made his second remarkable and dramatic escape from German captivity. Giraud is an undoubted hero of the French Army. General Juin, who commanded the important Algiers Garrison and Army Corps, was ready to act as his Lieutenant. From our point of view there was nothing wrong with General Giraud.
We therefore, at General Eisenhower's request, sent a British submarine under the American flag to cruise off the French Riviera coast and on the night of November 6, two days before the dawn of Zero, we picked up the General, took him out to sea, transferred him to a seaplane and brought him to Gibraltar where he arrived on the afternoon of the 7th. We all thought General Giraud was the man for the job and that his arrival would be electrical. In this opinion General Giraud emphatically agreed and he made the most sweeping demands for plenary authority to be given to him as Supreme Commander in Chief of all the Forces in or ever to be brought into North West Africa. Some hours passed in persuading him to reduce these claims to the bounds of reason.

Under the influence of General Juin, Algiers surrendered on the evening of the 8th. By the afternoon of the 9th General Clark had established Allied Advanced Headquarters there. Here was found Admiral....
Admiral Darlan, who had been in our hands though treated with all consideration since the day before. He had come back after his official tour to visit his son who is said to be dying.

The landing at Casablanca was proceeding very slowly in the face of obstinate opposition. Large numbers of ships crammed with troops were lolling about outside the range of the forts and the U-boats were arriving on the scene in ever-increasing numbers. On four days out of five off Casablanca the surf is too great for landing on the beaches. The Americans had hitherto been astonishingly favoured by fortune in the weather, but it might have broken at any moment, and, if so, the greater part of the armada off Casablanca would have had to crowd into the Bay at Gibraltar or go on cruising about in the open sea among the U-boats. Although Oran capitulated on the 10th the landing facilities there would have been wholly insufficient to.....
to deal except very slowly with double the force which we had already assigned for it. Indecisive and protracted operations in this area would have put a peculiar stress on Spain whose interests were affected and whose fears and appetites alike might easily have been excited. It was therefore of the utmost importance to bring the fighting at Casablanca to a close as soon as possible. Of course, looking back on all these events after they have turned out right, it is not easy to recall how hazardous they looked to us, to the American Chiefs of the Staff or to General Eisenhower beforehand and while they were going on. The United States might have lost 10,000 to 20,000 men drowned by U boats apart from the fighting on the beaches and the fire of the harbour batteries.

Moreover, the need for speed in the whole campaign was intensely felt by us all. Morocco and Algeria were only stepping stones to the real prize which is Tunisia which held and holds the key to the Central Mediterranean....
Mediterranean. To get Eastward with the utmost rapidity was only possible if the French would not only cease fighting but would abstain from sabotaging railways and roads and actively assist in unloading the ships. Delay in getting Eastward would give the Germans the time to fly and ferry over a powerful Army, and every day lost might mean a week's heavy fighting with thousands of extra casualties. This was the situation on the 10th with which General Clark at Algiers and his superior General Eisenhower at Gibraltar had to deal.

All the high French authorities in Tunis, Algeria and Morocco had been invited to Algiers, and most of them had complied. Darlan, Giraud, Juin, Nogues, Chatel and various others were gathered. Admiral Esteva, in whom we had great hopes, was held in Bizerta by the enemy. All these Frenchmen wrangled together in the most bitter manner. But under the vehement pressure of United States' General Clark for a decision one way or the other, Giraud and all the other French authorities present....
present agreed to accept Darlan as their leader and custodian of the mystical authority of the Marshal and the honour of France. Darlan, although virtually a prisoner at first refused to do anything but eventually late in the afternoon, he agreed to accept General Clark's terms and to send orders by air to stop all French resistance to the Allied Forces. All fighting at Casablanca thereafter ceased, though whether as the result of Darlan's order is not known, and the heavy American disembarkations began. The provisional emergency agreement made in these circumstances by General Clark and Admiral Darlan was approved, for what it was worth, by General Eisenhower. This was the beginning of the relationship with Darlan.

Next day the 11th another great event occurred. Hitler over-ran unoccupied France in the teeth of the protests of the venerable and illustrious Marshal. This constituted a breach of the Armistice. The French....
French Officers considered themselves released from its conditions. All bets were off. There was a new deal. It could be said that the venerable and illustrious Marshal was no longer a free agent. His authority was therefore even more clearly held to reside in Admiral Darlan. Darlan was the only authority plainly derived from Marshal Petain. General Giraud could not claim that authority. He had left France without the permission of Marshal Petain and even as was suggested, breaking his written promise to him. The remarkable thing is that General Giraud was himself impressed by the arguments of the other Frenchmen. He was quite soon convinced that he had no power whatever to influence the decision and, more than that, he seems to have felt himself at a disadvantage compared with these other Frenchmen who could prove they had obeyed the orders emanating legally from the Head of the State.

On the 13th General Eisenhower, with Admiral Cunningham, arrived at Algiers from Gibraltar for the....
the first time and began more formal conversations with General Clark, Admiral Darlan, General Giraud and other French high officers. His object now was not merely to obtain a cessation of resistance but to bring the whole French military and administrative machine actively over to our side.

On the 14th he telegraphed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington under whom he is serving that he had reached an agreement with the Frenchmen; that they would accept only Darlan's leadership and that Darlan would co-operate with the Allied Army. The main point was that General Eisenhower recognized Admiral Darlan as the supreme French authority in North West Africa. This was not a Treaty. It was an arrangement made by the American Commander-in-Chief in the field with the local authorities to facilitate the safe landing of his troops and the eastward movement of his army. Not only all the American Generals but Admiral Cunningham who....
who knows the Mediterranean from end to end and who had been in the TORCH enterprise for several months and also the representatives of the Foreign Office and State Department who were present, strongly urged acceptance of the subsequent written agreement by their Governments. All the French forces and officials came over to our side, thus relieving the Americans of the anxieties and difficulties which a forcible taking over of the Administration of these vast regions would have imposed upon them and us, and of the still more imminent risk of sabotage of our communications to the Eastward. Giraud was appointed by Darlan Commander in Chief and hastened to rally the French troops to their new allegiance. The French garrison in Tunis, who had made no resistance to the German landings, which had already begun there, marched out of the city to the westward and took up positions facing east against the Germans. Fraternization ensued between the British, American and....
and French soldiers. The populace, whose sympathies were never in doubt, but who in some places seemed sunk in coma and in bewilderment became enthusiastic, and the whole enterprise proceeded with speed and vigour. So much for what happened on the spot.

In these emergency transactions H.M.G. had not been consulted in any way; nor did we know the details of all the violent events which were happening. The decision which the President had to take was whether to disavow or endorse what his General had done. He backed him up. The question before us was whether we should repudiate General Eisenhower at the risk of a very serious break with the United States. I have no doubt whatever that we should have been very careless of the lives of our men and of the interests of the common cause if we had done anything of the kind. However, on November 17, I telegraphed to the President in the following sense:

"I ought to let you know that very deep currents of feeling are stirred by the arrangement with Darlan. The more I reflect upon it the more convinced I become that...."
that it can only be a temporary expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle. We must not overlook the serious political injury which may be done to our cause, not only in France but throughout Europe, by the feeling that we are ready to make terms with the local Quislings. A permanent arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan Government in French North Africa would not be understood by the great masses of ordinary people whose simple loyalties are our strength.

My own feeling is that we should get on with the fighting and let that overtake the parleys, and we are all very glad to hear that General Eisenhower expects to be able to order the leading elements of our First Army to attack the Germans in Tunis and Bizerta in the course of the next few days."

On this the President a few hours later made the statement to his Press conference which was published and gave so much general satisfaction. To me he telegraphed at midnight on 17th the text of the statement he had just given out at his Press conference:

"I have accepted General Eisenhower's political arrangements made for the time being in Northern and Western Africa. I thoroughly understand and approve the feeling in the United States and Great Britain and among all the other United Nations that in view of the history of the past two years no permanent arrangement should be made with Admiral Darlan. People in the United Nations likewise would never understand the recognition of a reconstituting of the Vichy Government....."
Government in France or in any French territory. We are opposed to Frenchmen who support Hitler and the Axis.

No one in our Army has any authority to discuss the future Government of France and the French Empire. The future French Government will be established not by any individual in Metropolitan France or overseas — but by the French people themselves after they have been set free by the victory of the United Nations. The present temporary arrangement in North and West Africa is only a temporary expedient, justified solely by the stress of battle.

The present temporary arrangement has accomplished two military objectives. The first was to save American and British lives on the one hand, and French lives on the other hand. The second was the vital factor of time. The temporary arrangement has made it possible to avoid a 'mopping up' period in Algiers and Morocco which might have taken a month or two to consummate. Such a period would have delayed the concentration for the attack from the West on Tunis and we hope from Tripoli.

Every day of delay in the current operation would have enabled the Germans and Italians to build up a strong resistance, to dig in and make a huge operation on our part essential before we could win. Here again, many more lives will be saved under the present speedy offensive than if we had had to delay it for a month or more. It will also be noted that French troops under the command of General Giraud have already been in action against the enemy in Tunisia, fighting by the side of American and British soldiers for the liberation of their country. Admiral Darlan's proclamation assisted in making a

'mopping....
'mopping up' period unnecessary. Temporary arrangements
made with Admiral Darlan apply, without exception, to the
current local situation only. I have requested the
liberation of all persons in Northern Africa who had been
imprisoned because they opposed the efforts of the Nazis
to dominate the world, and I have asked for the abrogation
of all laws and decrees inspired by Nazi Governments or
Nazi ideologists. Reports indicate that the French
of North Africa are subordinating all political
questions to the formation of a common front against the
common enemy."

It seemed to me that these statements by the
President safeguarded what I may call the long-term policy
and we should do very well to rest upon them. I must
however say that personally I consider that in the
circumstances prevailing General Eisenhower was right,
and even if he was not quite right I should have been very
reluctant to hamper or impede his action when so many
lives and such vitally important issues hung in the balance.
I do not want to shelter myself in any way behind the
Americans or anyone else.

Now how far are we committed to Admiral Darlan?
There is no doubt that if you ask for a man's help and
he gives it in a manner that is most valuable to you,
on the faith of an agreement entered into amid dangers
which...
which are thereby relieved, you have contracted a certain obligation towards him. I do not want you to have any illusions about this. Both Governments had undoubtedly the right to reject General Eisenhower's agreement with Admiral Darlan, but in view of what had happened it is perfectly clear that a certain obligation had been contracted towards him. More than that, we had benefited greatly from the assistance we had received. I do not consider that any long-term or final agreement has been entered into. I do not consider that the agreement is a document to be interpreted by legalistic processes. It is a question of fair dealing, and of this General Eisenhower is in the first instance the judge. He states that he does not consider that he is in any way bound permanently to Admiral Darlan. He claims that he has the sole right of interpretation. Darlan and the other French leaders are certainly in his power, and I for my part hope that he will interpret his obligations in a reasonable and honourable manner, even to a man like Darlan.

Since then events have moved at a gallop. The American....
American and British armies, several hundreds of thousands strong, with all their complicated and ponderous tackle have now landed and are in control of the whole of French N.W. Africa an area over 300 miles long from west to east, with the exception only of the 20 or 30 miles of the Tunisian tip on which the Germans and Italians are endeavouring to build up an army and where the Germans are desperately and vigorously resisting. The whole French Army and Administration are working whole-heartedly on the side of the Allies. It is much too late for their leaders to turn back now. We need their aid, but they are in our power. The French troops have fought well on two occasions. On the first 600 of them repelled a German attack without yielding an inch of ground although they suffered 25% casualties. On the second, supported by U.S. Artillery and some parachutists, they destroyed a German battle group at Faid and took the position together with 100 prisoners, mostly German. They are guarding a long line from about 40 miles south of the Mediterranean...
down to the Tripolitanian Frontier, holding back
the German and Italian patrols and pressing forward as
far as their strength allows towards Sfax and Gabes.
As our troops come up we shall reinforce them strongly.
Meanwhile Admiral Darlan succeeded in bringing the whole
of French West Africa including the key strategic base
of Dakar to our side against the enemy. I asked the
President whether I might refer to certain secret
telegrams and I have just received the following from
him:

"You might add from me if you wish that General
Eisenhower has definite instructions from me to enter
into no agreement or bilateral contract with Admiral
Darlan, but that all decisions by Eisenhower shall be
unilateral on our part, and shall take the form of
announcements from the Military Commander in Chief
of our Armed Forces. Furthermore, I hope you will call
attention to the fact that Dakar instead of being a
menace is today open to use by British and American
ships....."
ships and planes in the prosecution of the war.

The advantages of Dakar coming over are enormous, and saved us a costly and perhaps bloody expedition. We are to have all the facilities of the port. The United States deal for us in the matter; they have adopted the claims the Admiralty made and we are to share with them all these facilities. The powerful modern battleship RICHELIEU can go to the United States to be completed. Other French vessels are being formed into a squadron which obeys the orders of Admiral Darlan. Darlan is actively endeavouring through his emissaries to persuade Admiral Godfroy, who commands the French Squadron interned in Alexandria Harbour and paid by us, to come out on our side. So far he has not succeeded, but we are hopeful. Questions of honours appear to be specially complicated in this case.

All this is done in the sacred name of the Marshal and when the Marshal bleats over the telephone orders to the contrary and deprives Darlan of his nationality, the Admiral rests comfortably upon the fact or fiction, it does not much matter....
matter which, that the Marshal is acting under the duress of the invading Hun, and that he, Darlan, is still carrying out his true wishes. In fact if Admiral Darlan had to shoot Marshal Pétain he would no doubt do it in Marshal Pétain's name.

While all this has been going on, Admiral Darlan was naturally somewhat affected by the President's outspoken declaration and other statements which reached his ears. It may be of interest to hear a letter which he wrote to General Clark. We are not called upon to approve or sympathise with his position, but it is just as well to understand it.

Monsieur....
"Monsieur le General, information from various sources tends to substantiate the view that 'I am only a lemon which the Americans will drop after they have squeezed it dry'.

In the line of conduct which I have adopted out of pure French patriotic feeling, in spite of the serious disadvantages which it entails for me, at a moment when it was extremely easy for me to let events take their course without my intervention, my own personal position does not come into consideration.

I acted only because the American Government has solemnly undertaken to restore the integrity of French Sovereignty as it existed in 1939 and because the Armistice between the Axis and France was broken by the total occupation of Metropolitan France against which the Marshal has solemnly protested.

I did not act through pride, ambition or calculation but because the position which I occupied in my country made it my duty to act.

When the integrity of France's sovereignty as an accomplished fact - and I hope that it will be in the least possible time - it is my firm intention to return to private life and to end my days, in the course of which I have ardently served my country in retirement."

I must now say a word about General de Gaulle. On behalf of H.M.G. I exchanged letters with him in 1940 recognizing him as the Leader of all Free Frenchmen wherever they might be who should rally to him, in support....
support of the Allied cause. We have most scrupulously kept our engagements with him and have done everything in our power to help him. We finance his movement. We have helped his operations. But we have never recognized him as representing France. We have never agreed that he and those associated with him, because they were right and brave at the moment of French surrender have a monopoly on the future of France. I have lived myself for the last 35 years or more in a mental relationship and to a large extent in sympathy with an abstraction called France. I still do not think it is an illusion. I cannot feel that de Gaulle is France, still less that Darlan and Vichy are France. France is something greater, more complex, more formidable than any of these sectional manifestations.

I have tried to work as far as possible with General de Gaulle, making allowances for his many difficulties, for his temperament and for the limitations of......
of his outlook. In order to sustain his Movement at the moment of the American occupation of French North Africa and to console him and his friends for their exclusion from the enterprise we agreed to his nominee, General le Gentilhomme, being proclaimed as High Commissioner for Madagascar, although this adds somewhat to our difficulties in pacifying that large island, which oddly as it seems to us would much prefer Darlan. We are at the present time endeavouring to rally Jibuti to the Free French Movement. Therefore I consider that we have been in every respect faithful in the discharge of our obligations to de Gaulle, and we shall so continue to the end.

However you must not be led to believe that General de Gaulle is an unfaltering friend of Britain. On the contrary, I think he is one of those good Frenchmen who have a traditional antagonism ingrained in French hearts by centuries of war against the English. On his way back from Syria in the Summer of 1941 through the French Central and West African Colonies, he left a trail of anglophobia behind.....
behind him. On August 25, 1941 he gave an interview to the Correspondent of the "Chicago Daily News" at Brazzaville in which he suggested that England coveted the African colonies of France and said: "England is afraid of the French Fleet. What in effect England is carrying out is a war-time deal with Hitler in which Vichy serves as a go-between." He explained that Vichy served Germany by keeping the French people in subjection and England by keeping the fleet out of German hands. All this and much more was very ungrateful talk, but we have allowed no complaint of ours to appear in public.

Again this year in July, General de Gaulle wished to visit Syria. He promised me before I agreed to facilitate his journey, which I was very well able to stop, that he would behave in a helpful and friendly manner, but no sooner did he get to Cairo than he adopted a most hectoring attitude and in Syria his whole object seemed to be to foment ill-will between the British military and Free French civil administrations and state the French claims to......
to rule Syria at the highest, although it had been agreed that after the war, and as much as possible even during the war, the Syrians are to enjoy their independence.

I continue to maintain friendly personal relations with General de Gaulle and I help him as much as I possibly can. I feel bound to do this because he stood up against the Men of Bordeaux and their base surrender at a time when all resisting will-power had quitted France. All the same, I could not recommend you to base all your hopes and confidence upon him, and still less to assume at this stage that it is our duty to place, so far as we have the power, the destiny of France in his hands. Like the President in the telegram I have read, we seek to base ourselves on the will of the entire French nation rather than any sectional manifestations, even the most worthy.

During the last summer I have established close and friendly relations with General Eisenhower. I do not think I can give a better general picture of the situation than the latest message which he has...
to has sent me. It was despatched on the 5th December.

"In the political field it is easily apparent that our war communications system has not served us well in attempting to keep you fully informed. This has been aggravated by the fact that difficulties in censorship here have permitted stories to go out that have no foundation in fact. Among these stories is one that the American Military Authorities are dealing with Darlan on matters that have nothing to do with the local military situation, and are supporting him in his claims to a permanent authority rather than as merely the temporary head of the local government. Nothing could be further from the truth. Admiral Cunningham, Mr. Mack and Brigadier Whitely and other British officers are kept closely and intimately informed of every move made, both in our local dealings with Darlan and in the weary process we have been going through straightening out the Dakar tangle. At every meeting with Darlan, I tell him that so far as this Headquarters is concerned, he is the head of a local defacto organization through which we are enabled to secure the cooperation, both military and civil, that we need in the prosecution of this campaign. He knows that I am not empowered to go farther than this. I assure you again that we are not entering a cabal designed to make Darlan the head of anything except the local organization. Here he is absolutely necessary for he and he alone is the source of every bit of practical help we have received. If you will picture the situation existing along our line of communication, which extend 500 miles from here through mountainous country to Tunisia, you can understand that the local French could, without fear of detection, so damage us that we would have to retreat hastily back on to ports from which we could supply ourselves by sea. Giraud quickly gave up in trying to help us and it was only through Darlan's help that we are fighting the Boche in Tunisia instead of somewhere in the vicinity of Bone or even west of that. It appears to us that both Boisson and Darlan have committed.....
committed themselves irrevocably to an Allied Victory.

The military outlook depends upon several factors of which the most important is our ability to build up fighter cover over our ground troops. This, in turn, depends upon getting supplies, establishing forward fields and keeping up a rapid flow of fighter craft until the battle is won. It also depends upon weather, until we can get steel mats on all our mud fields. The next thing we must accomplish is to get forward every available atom of ground reinforcement and replacement for troops now on the line, who need a short rest. Finally, we must get our lines of communication to working so well that all ground and air troops can be assured of adequate reserves when more intensive fighting begins again. The third great factor is the prevention of rapid reinforcement by the enemy. Our bombing fields are so far removed from targets that the scale of our air bombing is not what we should like, but we are doing our best. Finally, during all this process we must provide adequate protection for our land and sea lines of communication, particularly our ports. All these jobs strain our resources and keep everyone going at maximum pace, but we shall yet get it done. But all this shows you how dependent upon French passive and active cooperation we are and, to date, we have no evidence of reluctance on Darlan’s part to help us.”

There might be a considerable danger to the Allied Cause which I am most anxious to avoid. It would be a pernicious nuisance if we here had our particular set of French favourites and the U.S. had another lot who m they ran. To avoid this it is very necessary that the two.........
two Governments and if I may say so, the President and I keep very closely together, as we are doing. After all, what is it we want? We want the maximum possible united French effort against the common enemy. This I believe can be achieved but it can only be achieved gradually and it will best be achieved by the action of Frenchmen. If Admiral Harlan proceeds to render important services he will undoubtedly deserve consideration in spite of his record, but that consideration gives him no permanent claims even upon the future of the French possessions which have rallied to him, still less upon the future of France. The Germans by their oppression will soon procure for us the unity of Metropolitan France. That unity can now only take an Anti-German form. In such a movement the spirit of the Fighting French must be continually in the ascendant. Their reward will come home on the tide. We must try to bring about as speedily as possible a working arrangement and ultimately a consolidation between all Frenchmen outside the German power. The character and constitution of...
of Admiral Darlan's Government must be continuously modified by the introduction of fresh and from our point of view, clean elements. We have the right and I believe we have the power to effect these necessary transformations so long as Great Britain and the United States act harmoniously together. But meanwhile, above all, let us get on with the war.

I must say I think he is a poor creature with a jaundiced outlook and disorganized loyalties who in all this tremendous African episode, west and east alike, can find no point to excite his interest except the arrangements made between General Eisenhower and Admiral Darlan. The struggle for the Tunisian tip is now rising to its climax and the main battle impends. Another trial of strength is very near on the frontiers of Cyrenaica. Both these battles will be fought almost entirely by soldiers from this island. The 1st and 8th British Armies will be engaged to the full. I cannot take my thoughts away from them and their fortunes and I expect......
expect that will be your feeling. You will, I believe, feel that you are being well and faithfully served by H.M. Government. I ask you to support us in refusing to do anything at this juncture which might add to the burdens and losses of our troops. I ask you to give your confidence to the Government and to believe in their singleness and inflexibility of purpose. I ask you to treat with proper reprobation that small, busy and venomous band who harbour and endeavour to propagate unworthy and unfounded suspicions and so to come forward unitedly with us in all the difficulties through which we are steadfastly and successfully making our way.