Map Room Files.

Box 167. (Continued)


a. Included is report of the Morgenthau Report on partition of Germany.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

SUBJECT: Probable Developments in the German Reich

Following is a study prepared in the War Department concerning probable developments in the German Reich which I believe will be of interest to you. I have furnished the Secretary of State with a copy of this.

A. Military.

By about the end of April 1945, military operations on the continent of Europe will probably have reached the final stage -- mopping up. The month of April will likely prove to be the transition period for Germany between organized resistance and utter defeat.

United States armored forces, taking advantage of military vacuums which will probably develop at numerous points, as has already been the case during the past week, should be able to press forward deep into Germany, and by 20 April should be able to reach the Elbe River between Magdeburg and Halle. To the north, the British advance is likely to be slower and shallower. In South Germany, Nuremberg and Stuttgart will probably be in Allied hands by 20 April and Munich by 1 May.

The Russians should be able to begin their general offensive by 10 April and by about 1 May should be in contact with American forces along the Elbe and Saale, south of Berlin. Most of Saxony and Czechoslovakia will probably have been overrun. German troops will probably still be resisting within a large north German pocket, including the provinces of Berlin, Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein as well as the peninsula of Jutland and the Danish Islands.

In Austria, the Russians by 1 May probably will have cleared Hungary, captured Vienna and should be moving towards a junction with American forces near Linz.
On 1 May, neither a cohesive West nor East Front will probably exist. It is more likely that there will be a series of western and eastern pockets in which encircled fragments of the once formidable German armies will be fighting on with dogged fanaticism -- so long as Hitler leads them. Several small pockets commanded by less determined leaders already will have surrendered or will have been overrun.

The German High Command will probably still be in existence, but its influence probably will be limited to one or several of these pockets. In one of these pockets its headquarters will be located. Communication between pockets will be limited to radio traffic and occasional airplane flights. No general effective supply system will remain in existence; rather, each pocket will be depending on its local stock, which every day will be diminishing, without hope of ever being refilled. Armaments, petroleum and aircraft plants, with insignificant exceptions, will in all probability be in Allied hands. Under such circumstances, the end cannot be far off.

It is of importance to recognize now, where on 1 May such pockets of resistance will probably be located. However it is impossible to go further at this time than to suggest the likelihood of resistance in certain areas. Chance will play a leading role. Still unmade decisions of the Russian and Allied supreme commanders, and perhaps Allied logistical difficulties, will have much to do with the size and location of the resisting elements.

It is not believed that either Hitler or the German High Command have detailed plans at this time to continue resistance after the collapse of the German armies in any specific area. The probability is that a very large pocket will develop in north Germany. This pocket will develop, not as a result of German foresight but as a result of Allied and Russian advances from east and west towards Halle. It may contain fragments of many units, the equivalent of between 20 and 30 divisions. The many rumors as to German preparations for the defense of the "Alpine Redoubt" are believed to lack substance. No reliable information has reached the War Department of unduly large storage of supplies in the "redoubt area" and there are no indications that any fortifications are being constructed in Bavaria or Austria to prevent an Allied ingress into the "redoubt area" from the north. The Alpine terrain of the "redoubt area" lends itself to defense and is also highly suitable for guerilla operations. It is however a food deficit area and contains only a few armament works. A single large or several minor pockets may well exist in this area after 1 May and important troop fragments from Italy, the Balkans, Hungary, and the Upper Rhine fronts may be defending themselves within the "redoubt", possibly a mixed force, equivalent to between 30 and 40 divisions.
The "will to fight" of these troops will depend largely on whether Hitler and his subordinate Nazi leaders, or the German High Command will have transferred their headquarters into the "redoubt" area. If Hitler does so, a fairly formidable military task requiring a considerable number of divisions may still confront the Allies in the "redoubt" area. If no fanatic Nazi leadership is present in this area, resistance may have faded by 1 May, or can be diminished to a guerilla level.

A third potential pocket of resistance in the West is the "fortress Holland". This area is by nature extremely strong defensively and even with the present small German garrison its reduction will force a serious Allied operation, provided that the Germans are inspired to fanaticism by the presence among them of high Nazis. On 1 May, the garrison may amount to five divisions. There are indications that the garrison of the fortress Holland area has been strengthened recently and that the Germans are seeking to transfer still more troops into Holland. Possession of the fortress of Holland has great importance because while held by the Germans, the supply of the Allied forces in central and southern Germany will be difficult.

A fourth area in the West, the Black Forest, may contain a pocket of resistance, comprising about three divisions, which may be able to hold out until 1 May. This is considered a less likely area as it is limited in extent and the Allied forces available for its reduction are formidable in size and well located to crush resistance. Still another pocket may exist on 1 May in Thuringia, with the equivalent of two divisions. This, too, will be small and call for no more than a minor Allied operation.

The pockets of resistance which may be expected to exist on the Eastern Front are less easy to locate and to evaluate their strength. There is not a single area in the East except the Bohemian table-land in which nature favors an all-round defense. This latter area is populated by Czechs, who are traditionally hostile to the Germans and would attempt to impede their defensive efforts at every turn. Inasmuch as a complete Bohemian mountain front would be too long for the number of troops available, and exposed to attack from all directions, it is not believed a major center of resistance can be built up in this area for any appreciable period of time.

The direction of the probable Russian attacks probably will be such that as many as 20 to 30 German divisions may be isolated on 1 May in the north-western Bohemian table-land, in the general areas of Eger and Pilsen.

The successful German defense of northwestern Latvia over several months suggest that a large pocket of resistance probably will still exist there on 1 May, though with ever diminishing supplies at
its disposal. Its reduction will only depend on when Russia will free sufficient troops from other tasks to crush this isolated German army.

Elsewhere in eastern Germany, the location of large or small pockets will depend on the direction and weight of future Russian and Allied thrusts.

The fortresses of Heligoland, Borkum, Wangerooge, Nordency and Sylt will probably be holding out until May, thus barring Allied access from the sea to Emden, Wilhelmshaven, the estuaries of the Elbe and the Weser, and the ports of Bremen and Hamburg. The continued resistance of these island fortresses will make exceptionally difficult both our military supply problem in the interior of Germany as well as that of feeding the civil population in the occupied areas.

Other areas of potential resistance outside Germany must also be reckoned with:

Norway

Italy (in connection with troops in Alpine regions)

Western French ports, Channel and Aegean Islands.

Norway now contains 11 German divisions. Italy has 24 German and 4 Italian divisions. Both areas contain sufficient airfields to base an appreciable reinforcement of airplanes which could and probably will be sent to these areas from Germany, as pockets within Germany become restricted. In Norway, the defense may be further reinforced by dispatching the surviving naval units from Germany. Neither area contains adequate industrial resources to maintain a prolonged defense and resistance could be continued only as long as the existing reserve stocks last. The ammunition supplies in both areas are probably considerable, but the oil shortage in Italy is known to be acute and in Norway the reserves probably are not large.

In Norway and Italy, however, there is no evidence that the Germans have planned for continued resistance after the collapse of their main armies. Such resistance may well occur but it can be measured only in terms of weeks or months, as there has been no known advance stockage of supplies for this eventuality.

In all pockets of resistance, leadership or lack of leadership will prove a determining factor to how long the fighting will continue. Where Hitler goes, the strongest resistance will be encountered. The bulk of the army commanders will gradually yield as they come to feel that they have fulfilled their patriotic duty.
Once the debacle becomes generally apparent, probably only 100% Nazis and certain Nazi generals will possess sufficient control of their troops to keep them fighting. There are enough of these "last-ditch" leaders to warrant the prediction that a number of pockets will still be resisting beyond 1 May.

B. Economic.

No cohesive economic structure is expected to exist in Germany on 1 May. Some plants will still probably be manufacturing weapons and other essential ammunition in unreduced pockets. Most of these plants will not have access to adequate raw materials and their complete closing down will require only a matter of weeks.

Economic conditions in the Anglo-Saxon occupied areas will be chaotic and growing constantly worse, although the existing stocks of food, well administered, are sufficient to prevent actual starvation, except in isolated areas. Actual starvation conditions may exist in certain Ruhr and West German cities. Few railroads will be operating. River traffic will be paralysed. The governmental and food rationing systems will have collapsed and a highly organized modern society will have been transformed into an infinite number of local economies, each somewhat similar to a medieval village. Allied Military Government by 1 May probably will be more nominal than real and will already be encountering difficulties in recruiting from the civil population a non-Nazi petty bureaucracy efficient enough to serve the needs of the Allies.

Crop prospects in Germany for 1945, projected beyond April, may be regarded as fair. Disregarding seasonal fluctuations, at least a 10% decline from 1944 is to be expected as the result of lack of fertilizer and manpower. One of the most critical factors influencing the future of Europe will be to get every possible acre into intensive production.

It can already be foreseen that unless drastic measures are taken, starvation conditions will prevail over much of West Germany by September. This condition will be caused by the following:

1. Paralysis of railroad transportation.
2. Cessation of river traffic.
3. Breakdown of food rationing system.
4. Breakdown of civil government.
5. Hoarding by peasants.
6. Overpopulation of West Germany.
7. Cessation of food exports from the German eastern provinces, which normally send their surplus to West Germany. (Russia will certainly embargo food exports from her portion of occupied Germany.)

8. Possible requisitions by Allied forces.

C. Political.

For all practical purposes, a central German political authority in all probability will have ceased to exist about 1 May. Hitler and his principal Nazi subordinates will still be nominally exercising the powers of government, though outside the still unreduced pockets, Nazi influence will be limited to what can be exerted through the radio. Hitler’s theme probably will be that the German youth must stand firm to preserve both their national pride and love of country, no matter how catastrophic conditions may be. No attempt is expected to be made by Hitler in these last days of national catastrophe to surrender, abdicate, or attempt to negotiate with the Allies. Hitler has the creation of his myth of the future ever uppermost in his mind, and he knows full well that his future reputation with the German people, and his place in the history of the world, depends on the dignity of his exit. Any cowardice, faltering, or negotiating with the Allies in this last hour would destroy the great tragic myth he is seeking to create. If Hitler is true to the character he has shown in past crises, he will make his exit bravely and dramatically and thus remain a psychological force for his enemies to reckon with for decades.

It is believed that no attempt will be made by either the German military or civil elements to overthrow the Nazi government in the final stages of the catastrophe. No group in Germany has an interest any longer in negotiating unconditional surrender. The situation was very different last summer when General Eisenhower attempted to seize power, believing that he still possessed the chance of negotiating peace with Great Britain and the United States. The German opposition elements today are aware that surrender will not benefit them individually or collectively and that if they do act, they will compromise themselves with the German people — both the living and the generations still unborn.

An astonishing lack of interest in politics will be discovered in the Anglo-Saxon occupied areas. Liberal, democratic, socialist and communist elements will be weak in numbers and lack leaders of ability. Here and there small communist or other groups will be found to have seized power in towns and villages. Strange political ideas and formations may have appeared.
On the whole, however, the Communist Party will be weak and making headway only because of the political vacuum.

Hitler will continue to have the secret respect of a large part of the population and, undercover Nazism actually will be the most potent force our military government operatives should expect.

B. Social.

The German civil population, both in unreduced pockets of resistance and in the Allied occupied areas, will be dazed, bewildered and apathetic. The bulk will be thinking only of where to obtain food to live out the morrow. Resistance to the Western Allies will be on a decreasing scale. There will be no formidable large-scale guerrilla activity as in Yugoslavia and France. Germans serving the Allies, however, will be in constant danger of assassination and a considerable number will actually be killed. Both rural districts and cities probably will be preyed upon by armed bands composed of ex-soldiers, criminals and Hitler youths who will pillage both Allied and German property. These gangs will be regarded as "patriots" by elements of the population, who will conceal and succor them if they are pressed too hard by Allied military forces.

The area of Anglo-Saxon occupation will be found filled to overflowing with evacuees from Berlin and the eastern provinces. The present total population of Western Germany is thought to be several million above normal. The city elements of these millions will perform being living a communal existence, oblivious to the concept of private property as understood in the United States.

Housing will be desperately short and such as exists in the cities will be deplorably bad and infinitely congested. While disease, by 1 May, will not have reached epidemic proportions, it will be in process of developing into a serious threat to the health of the Allied armies. The German public health service will have largely disintegrated and our attempts to recreate it will have achieved by this date only a small measure of success.

E. The Weather Factor.

The weather factor in April will prove no great barrier to Allied air and ground operations. In North Germany, 16 days suitable for high-level bombing may be expected; in South Germany, 16 days. However, due to the expected constant decline in the effectiveness of German antiaircraft defense, the Allies will be able, more and more, to conduct their attacks at a low level. Some such low-level
attacks can be conducted almost every day in April (28 in North Germany - 29 in South Germany). The weather factors by the law of averages will not greatly impede Allied ground operations on either the East or West Fronts.

(Sgd) G. O. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff

1 Incl.

Map
MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN:

February 8, 1945.

Forwarded herewith is a volume of aerial photographs entitled "Target Germany" illustrating results of our strategic bombing against certain targets in Germany.

I think this will be of interest to you as indicating not only the success which has been achieved with this weapon in our unremitting aerial warfare against Germany, but also as indicating the possibilities of similar attacks from bases in territory controlled by the Soviets.

[Signature]

Presented to

Marshal Stalin
2-10-45
February 8th, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is recommended that the attached memorandum be handed to Marshal Stalin.

Chief of Staff.

[Signature]

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN:

An urgent need exists for the earliest possible survey of targets bombed by the U.S. Strategic Air Forces, similar to the survey made of Ploesti. To be effective, investigation must be instituted before tangible evidence is destroyed and personnel present during the bombing are removed from the area.

Details of the survey requirements are being passed to Marshal Khudyakov.

I request your agreement to the conduct of these surveys.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

\[Signature\] 2/8/45
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

It is recommended that the enclosed message be presented to Marshal Stalin.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

[Handwritten note: President kept originals. Said he would hand them to the Marshal personally at conference on 2/18/45. Rm]
7 February 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MARSHAL STALIN:

The full potential of the United States air forces now based in southeastern Italy is not being realized due to excessive distances from the only available bases to targets in enemy territory and bad weather that is frequently encountered over the Alps and the northern Adriatic. The staging or basing of fighters in the Budapest area would be of particular importance in providing the heavy fighter escort which is now required on deep penetrations and which may be increasingly necessary with the recent revival of German fighter strength employing jet-propelled aircraft. Also, the staging of heavy bombers in the Budapest area would considerably increase the radius of action and bomb tonnage delivered against targets north of the Alps by United States air forces.

Therefore your agreement is requested to the provision of two airdromes in the Budapest area for use by United States air units. If you agree, our military staffs can begin work on this project at once.

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt
МЕМОРАНДУМ ДЛЯ МАРШАЛА СТАЛИНА:

Полный потенциальная мощь ВВС США, базирующихся ныне в восточной Италии, не реализуется, исходя из того, что расстояние от единственно доступных баз до объектов в территори Андроника значительно далеко, и также в зависимости от неблагоприятных условий погоды, которых часто встречаются над Альпами и в северной части Адриатической Мори. Заправка или базирование истребителей в районе Будапешта было бы особенно важно в деле обеспечении сопровождения тяжелыми истребителями, необходимо в данной время при налетов в глубокий тыл противника, и поскольку это будет еще более необходимо в связи с надзором сожжением у немцев в деле использования истребителя с реактивными "дизем"/двигателями. Также, путем заправки тяжелых бомбардировщиков в районе Будапешта, радиус действия и тоннах нагрузки авиа-бомбами, который может быть брошен на объекты севернее района Альп военно-воздушными силами США, — и то и другое может быть значительно увеличено.

Поэтому, просим Вас согласиться с предложением относительно предоставления двух аэродромов в районе Будапешта для использования частями ВВС США. Если Вы согласны, наши военные штабы могут немедленно приступить к работе над этим проектом.
TO: Colonel Richard Park, Jr.  
White House Map Room

SUBJECT: Report Received in OSS.

Transmitted herewith for your information is copy of a memorandum which the Acting Director, OSS, is sending today to the President. This memorandum is based on a dispatch received from the OSS representative in Bern, and deals with Viennese reaction to the fate of Budapest and the influx of Hungarian refugees into Austria.

John Magruder, Brig. Gen.  
Deputy Director, OSS  
Intelligence Service

Enclosure.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern reports that the war-weary inhabitants of Vienna have been deeply impressed by the fate of Budapest and the influx of Hungarian refugees into Austria. He believes that any move by the Allies to spare Vienna a similar fate might have great effect on the Viennese.

Were the Allies to propose that Vienna be spared air bombardment and frontal attack or be treated as an open city, on condition that the Germans stopped troop and materiel transport through the city and ceased using Viennese armament factories and military installations, the Germans would likely refuse the proposal. Vienna's importance to them as a rail center would likely preclude acceptance. Such a rejection, however, might produce a Viennese reaction approaching open revolt, if such is possible in war-weary Vienna. At least the German rejection would impress the Viennese with the realization that the Allies are their friends and the Nazis their enemies.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
The OSS representative comments that the fate of Vienna may now largely be in Soviet hands, but is of concern to all.

Charles S. Cheston
Acting Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Following is the text of a message I have just received from Eisenhower:

"Thank you for sending me extracts from the President's message.

"I request that when convenient you convey to him my very deep appreciation of the personal confidence he expressed in me but more particularly for his excoriation of all efforts to drive wedges among the Allies.

"The frequency with which minor or extraneous subjects are seized upon by persons who are, to say the least, most thoughtless, and handled in such a way as to create mutual distrust and suspicion is one of the puzzling things of this stage of the war. His strong pronouncements on the matter should have a most wholesome effect.

"The parts of the speech you sent me will be widely distributed in this command."

[Signature]
Chief of Staff
WAR DEPARTMENT
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF
WASHINGTON

12/25/44

General Marshall
asked that this go
to the President

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Regrouping of Allied Forces on the Western Front to Counter the German Penetration.

The following changes in the Allied measures to counter the German penetration occurred during the 24-hour period ending 1200A on the 24 December:

1. In the Twenty-first Army Group Sector elements of the VII United States Corps and the XXX British Corps are in contact with the enemy in the vicinity of MARCHE.

2. In the Twelfth Army Group Sector the III Corps and the XII Corps of the Third Army continue attacking to the north and have gained two miles, making a total gain of 15 miles since 22 December.

The 17th Airborne Division has been attached to the Twelfth Army Group. The 11th Armored Division has been assigned to the Twelfth Army Group in SHAEF Reserve. No locations for these two divisions have been reported.

J. E. HULL,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Situation on the Western Front According to Reports Received up to 0000 December 25th.

1. Weather (Map Attached).

Skies will be generally clear over most of England and the Western continent although morning fog will restrict visibilities to near 1,000 yards at a few of the bases and some of the areas over the Western Front. Central and Eastern Germany will have mostly broken cloud cover. Prospects are excellent for full employment of all air forces over the Western Front except for the early morning fog hazard. The forecast for tomorrow indicates that practically the same weather conditions will prevail, although cloud cover will be increased late in the day with some light showers.

2. Ground Operations.
      No report.
   b. 16th Army Sector. Considerable tank and vehicular movement in the LINNIK - ROERMOND area is attributed by SHAFF as deceptive ruses. There is a possibility that this movement may be that of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Five (5) divisions are now in reserve in the 15th Army Sector -- the 15th Panzer Grenadier, 55th, 89th, 272nd and 544th Infantry Divisions. MONSCHAU was quiet except for active patrolling.
   c. 6th Panzer Army Sector. On the south and north flanks of the VIELSALM - STAEBELT salient, the Germans were forced to retire slightly. Several German counterattacks and infiltration efforts were repulsed. A prisoner of war from the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division south of MONSCHAU stated that the division has suffered very heavy losses and is short of fuel. Only one (1) division is available to the 6th Panzer Army as reserve -- the 10th SS Panzer Division.
   d. 5th Panzer Army Sector. German pressure is increasing on both flanks of the HORTON salient. The German thrust southwest is now reported 20 miles southwest of MARCHE and approaching DINANT. A German concentration was reported at LEROCHET. North of LEROCHET, German efforts to break through were repulsed. German infantry, armor and vehicle
concentration are reported about five miles northwest of BASTOGNE. The 9th SS Division, formerly in reserve in the 6th Panzer Army, has been identified in the SAINT VITH area. One division— the 9th Panzer Division—remains available to the 5th Panzer Army in reserve.

e. 7th Army Sector. In the ECHTERNACH area, several German attacks were repulsed with heavy losses and the Germans were forced to withdraw five miles in the area south of WILTZ. German resistance is increasing in this area.

f. 1st Army Sector. No additional information is available of the movement of the 21st Panzer or the 25th Panzer Grenadier Divisions which were expected to move northward from the 1st Army Sector possibly to the 5th Panzer Army. Heavy rail movement south through FRANKFURT may indicate the reinforcement of the 1st Army Sector by the 9th Volks Grenadier Division which was reported moving on 22nd December from DENMARK to an unspecified destination.

g. 19th Army Sector. No report.

3. Air. German air effort was on a reduced scale. The Germans flew about 1,150 sorties on 23 December as compared to yesterday's total of about 700 to 800. Reduction in the German air effort was due to (1) heavy allied attacks on German air installations and (2) considerable attrition of enemy aircraft (316 German aircraft were destroyed on 23/24 December). The following are the principal German air activities:

a. Nearly 300 German fighters opposed our attacks on communications in the immediate battle area, principally the KASSEL and KOBLENZ areas. 70 German planes were destroyed by our fighters and 18 by the bombers.

b. About 300 German fighters opposed our air attacks in close support of troops, principally strong-points, bridges, road and rail transport in the immediate battle area. 44 German planes were lost in the air. Additionally, 116 German tanks were reported disabled and nearly 800 motor vehicles wrecked by the air effort alone.


a. V-1. On 23/24 December, 50 of the flying bombs were plotted against England, of which 30 landed in England. There was no report of damage or of the exact plots of the missiles. Several, however, struck the north midland and in the Manchester City area. Against the continent for the 24 hours ending 0600 23 December, 25 struck the general ANTWERP area of which only one was within the close 5 km. radius of ANTWERP. 35 were fired at LIEGE.
b. V-2. Two large rockets were fired at LONDON, but the exact plot was not reported. 54 casualties were caused and extensive blast damage reported. Against the continent for the 24-hour period ending 0600 23 December, 16 were fired at ANTWERP of which only two struck within the 5 km. radius of the city.

S. Naval. 30 German submarines were plotted at sea on 24 December.

Clayton Bissell
Major General
A.C. of S., G-2.
FORECAST OF AVERAGE WEATHER OVER EUROPE
FOR
25 December 1944

Prepared 25 Dec. by Weather Division, Hq. AAF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF:

Subject: Situation on the Western Front according to Reports received up to 0900 December 24.

1. Weather.

The English bases, France, and the Low Lands, including the vital areas of the Western Front, will have only a few clouds this morning which will increase to about 5/10 cloud cover during the afternoon. Visibilities will be two to three miles at the bases, somewhat less in France, but no fog in these areas. North and west and central Germany will have fog during the morning which will disappear during the day. Air activity on both sides will not be greatly reduced in the battle area. The forecast for tomorrow indicates generally the same conditions. (Map of today's conditions attached.)

2. Ground Activity. (Fieldapproved with red marker herein)

a. Gruppe Christiansen. 1st Parachute Army Sector. No reported activity.

b. 15th Army Sector. The 15th Army boundary has been extended south to include Monschau which confirms previous estimates that the 15th Army's role was principally defensive for the present. Although not confirmed, it is reported that a Division from the Russian Front has been identified near Duren. If true, this is the first Division brought from the Russian Front in many months.

c. 6th Panzer Army Sector. On the northern flank the German covering force failed to advance. Particularly heavy fighting was reported in the STAVELOT area up to midnight 23/24 December. West of STAVELOT the Germans were forced to withdraw from STOUmont, but continued to occupy LAGLETZ where elms of the 1st SS Panzer Division are encircled. South of STAVELOT the Germans had driven in an Allied bridgehead but had been unable to cross the SAIN River. The Reserves of the 6th Panzer Army are unchanged, consisting of the 10th SS Panzer Division. 9th &

d. 5th Panzer Army Sector. On the northern flank of the 5th Panzer Army St. Vith has been taken according to press reports. The Germans are slowly advancing toward VIELSAUM. In the southern attack, the German spearhead advancing northwest from BASTOGNE have not been reported northwest of HUTTON-SOY area which they had reached yesterday. According to press reports, the Germans have reached MARCHE. On the south flank the Germans have BASTOGNE encircled. German forces south of WILTZ are reported in contact with the Allies.
e. 7th Army Sector. No German advance has been reported in the Echternach area. Heavy road and rail movement in the area north of THIER indicates possible additional troops arriving in this Sector. It can be assumed that the Germans will match Allied withdrawals from the THIER-SAARHAUTEN Sector by movement of troops north to the Echternach Sector to cover their second flank.

f. 1st and 19th Armies. No report.

3. Air.

a. General. The Germans flew at least 6700 sorties yesterday, their effort being divided equally against the heavy bombers which struck communications and rail targets from COLOGNE south, and against our tactical air force which was operating in support of our ground troops. One hundred seventy-eight German planes were lost in the air in addition to nine on the ground.

b. Operations. The principal German defensive yesterday against the bombers was during the attack on communications centers near COBLENZ, KAIERSLAUTERN, HOMBURG and EHRANG. About 350 German fighters opposed this strike of which 77 were destroyed. Three to four hundred German fighters opposed the Allied air support of our troops in the battle area of which 101 planes were destroyed in the air.

4. CROSSBOW.

a. V-1. No activity against England. Against the Continent 21/22 December 100 Flying bombs were launched against ANTWERP of which eleven struck within the target area. Thirty were fired against LIEGE.

b. V-2. No activity against England. Nine were fired at ANTWERP of which four were in the target area. No reports of damage were available.

CLAYTON RISSELL,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2.

JOHN WECKERLING,
Brigadier General,
Deputy A. C. of S., G-2
FORECAST OF AVERAGE WEATHER OVER EUROPE
FOR
24 December 1944

Prepared 24 Dec. by Weather Division, Hq. AAF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF: (See photo hereof for map. Unpublished)

SUBJECT: Regrouping of Allied Forces on the Western Front to Counter the German Penetration.

1. The SHAEF plan to counter the German penetration consists of two attacks at the flanks, made in conjunction with each other. The remainder of the front will go on the defensive.

   a. The Twenty-first Army group has assumed operational control of the First US Army, less the VIII Corps, and the Ninth US Army. It will attack the north flank of the penetration in a southeastern direction. It will also protect the Allied lines of communication and rear areas.

   b. The Third US Army will hold the front between SAARLUTERN and the MOSELLE River with one Corps of three divisions. The remainder of the Third Army will attack the south flank of the German penetration in a northeastern direction. The boundary between Third Army and Seventh Army is to be moved north to pass through SAARLUTERN. One division of the Third Army will pass to the Sixth Army Group.

   c. The Sixth Army Group will go on the defensive, except for attacks to reduce the COLMAR bridgehead.

2. Regrouping of Allied Forces.

   a. Twenty-first Army Group:

      (1) The XXX British Corps, consisting of one Armored Division and two Infantry Divisions, has concentrated in the LIEGE area. One British Infantry Division is in Ninth Army reserve in the MAASTRICHT area.

      (2) The VII US Corps, consisting of two Armored and two Infantry Divisions, is concentrating in the area south of LIEGE.
Regrouping of Allied Forces on the Western Front to Counter the German Penetration.

24 December 1944.

b. Twelfth Army Group:

(1) The III Corps, consisting of one Armored and two Infantry Divisions, moved to the LUXEMBOURG area and commenced attacking north on 22 December.

(2) The XII Corps, consisting of one Armored and two Infantry Divisions, is now concentrating in the vicinity of LUXEMBOURG.

c. Other Units:

The 17th Airborne Division and the 11th Armored Division are moving to the RHEIMS area from the rear. The 94th Infantry Division will move forward from the LORIENT-ST NAZAIRE area upon relief by the 66th Infantry Division. These facts were reported by visiting officers from SHAEB.

J. E. HULL,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff

* Nearly arrived from England.

We have 4 1/2 divisions and 12 regiments (in advance of their divisions) on the Western Front in England.

S. G. M.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following action has been taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in accordance with your memorandum of 7 December.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, on December 8 sent messages substantially as follows to the Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command; Commanding General, First Air Force; Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier; and Commander, Gulf Sea Frontier:

Information received from source of questionable reliability indicates possible attack aimed at cities on the Eastern Seaboard by stratospheric V-3 bombs. Attacks might begin within thirty days. You will take all practicable precautions within the capacity of your available forces. Consider this message as precautionary and not the declaration of an emergency.

A copy of this message was delivered to General Haskell, Director of Civilian Defense.

The Commanding General, Eastern Defense Command has directed the Commanding Generals of all East Coast Service Commands to confer as soon as possible with appropriate Civilian Defense authorities to bring to their attention the possibility of robot attacks and to stress the advisability for reviewing their plans to meet such an emergency which would involve primarily fire fighting, prompt rescue and attention to wounded and clearing up of blocked communications.

The intelligence agencies of the Army and Navy have evaluated the possibilities of German robot attack on the Eastern Seaboard and jointly examined the information supplied by Lt. Commander Earle. Their analysis is attached. German attack of the United States by long-range rockets launched in Europe is deemed impossible at this time. The capability
still exists, however, for small-scale attacks by flying bombs or by rockets, smaller than the V-2, launched from specially fitted submarines. Any attack made by the Germans at this time will be primarily for propaganda purposes and to reduce our total war effort by exciting a disproportionate mobilization against a threatened bombing which can achieve at best slight material damage.

Further measures against possible German attacks can be taken, but their effectiveness is doubtful and the implications of such actions need careful consideration. Experience in Europe has shown that the only successful counter to rockets is attack on the launching site, which in this case is the submarine. The Navy is now deployed to meet an increasing submarine threat. On the occasion of the alert of 4 to 10 November 1944 in the New York area against a V-1 threat, long-range reconnaissance planes were withdrawn from the Caribbean, Panama and Gulf Sea Frontiers and concentrated in the New York area. This action reduced the overall reconnaissance coverage. Inasmuch as the present situation applies to the entire Eastern Seaboard, redeployment is not practicable until the locality of the attack is determined. Additional planes are available only at the expense of active theaters and to the detriment of the total war effort.

The Army Air Forces can establish units solely for the air defenses of the Eastern Seaboard but this will seriously affect the supply of replacement fighter crews and planes to the Combat Air Forces in active theaters. The alert of 4 to 10 November caused a marked loss of training although it lasted only six days. In addition, the employment of several thousand anti-aircraft artillery troops during the alert delayed their conversion to infantry replacements for which they were earmarked. These diversions from the war effort were occasioned solely for the protection of the New York area and will be multiplied many times if similar precautions are taken for the entire Eastern Seaboard.

A general reconstitution of the Civil Defense organization will entail the diversion of personnel and material now devoted to war production. Because the scale of attack by robots will at worst be light, the existing municipal fire fighting, police, medical and other services should be sufficient to meet the emergency. The precautionary planning by the Eastern Defense Command in conjunction with the Civil Defense authorities will prepare civil reserves for augmentation of municipal services should they be needed.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that to establish an alert over the Eastern Seaboard on the basis of the present information would adversely affect the overall war effort and would only assist the enemy in achieving his probable objectives. The best course of action is to allow nothing to interfere with our assault on Germany.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the present precautionary measures represent the most that can be accomplished without detriment to the overall war effort, are adequate to meet the situation, and recommend that no further reconstitution of alert preparations be required.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

Subject: Agreed Joint Evaluation of the Possible Existence of the V-3 Rocket and Probability of Attack against the U.S.

1. The cable from Lieutenant Commander Earle, Naval Attache, Turkey is probably propaganda and represents a plant by the Germans. There is no reliable information available of German development of a long range rocket other than the V-2.

2. The V-3 may possibly be a rocket of smaller dimensions than the V-2 with shorter range. It would be possible to launch such a missile from specially designed or modified submarines. Attached is a sketch of a German submarine based in a southern Norwegian port showing a pair of rails extending from conning tower to the bow and terminating at a flat, rectangular surface. The purpose of this is unknown.

3. German attack from Europe of United States cities by long range rockets is deemed impossible now. Small rocket or flying bomb attacks from specially constructed submarines are considered possible. Any such action would be made with propaganda effect rather than material damage as the primary objective.

/s/ CLAYTON BISSELL,  
Major General,  
A.C. of S., G-2.  

/s/ HEWLETT THEBAUD,  
Rear Admiral,  
D.N.I.
INTERPRETATION REPORT N° S 103
Appendix A
German 740 ton U boat with modified deck forward.
Scale 1”= 50 ft.

- Dimensions: -
  Length 244'
  Beam 21'

- Armament: -
  Probably 1-37mm gun
  4-20mm guns

Special features:
  1. Narrowing of deck forward
  2. "Rails" on deck running from the port side of the Conning Tower forward to the narrow neck of the deck

Drawn from photographs taken by Coastal Command aircraft on 19th Sept '44
(H.Q.C.C. Ref A.2201-MIL - 19th Sept 44/Q.224-N°1)
From: Admiral King
To: Naval Aide to the President

The President is interested in a special board to evaluate the effects of mass bombing in Europe—damage, psychology, interference with communications, labor, services, etc.

The War Department is setting up this board under Mr. D'Olier and has asked Navy to name a member.

I am naming Rear Adm. Byrd

E. King
SECRET
C.O.S. 660/2
22 November 1944

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROSPECTS OF A GERMAN COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER
(As of 21 November 1944)
References: a. C.O.S. 506/2
b. C.O.S. 660/1

Note by the Secretaries

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of the
Enclosure to C.O.S. 506/2, as amended by "Decision Amending
C.O.S. 506/2," dated 9 June 1944, directed the Combined Intelli-
gence Committee to prepare estimates of the enemy situation in
the Pacific and Far East and European Theater, and keep such
estimates up to date. It was further directed that these
estimates, with subsequent amendments when necessary, should
be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for information.

2. The enclosed report of the Combined Intelligence Com-
mittee, an estimate of the enemy situation in the European
Theater as of 21 November 1944, superseding C.O.S. 660/1, is
submitted for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

A. J. McFARLAND,
A. T. CORMWALL-JONES, JR.,
Combined Secretariat.
SECRET

ENCLOSURE

PROSPECTS OF A GERMAN COLLAPSE OR SURRENDER
(As of 21 November 1944)

Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To review the principal factors bearing on German surrender or the collapse of German resistance and to estimate the form which such an event is likely to take and the time when it is likely to occur.

DISCUSSION

2. See Appendix.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

3. Germany has succeeded for the present in establishing cohesive fronts in the East and West, though her position in Southeast Europe has deteriorated. She must now concentrate forces for the defense of the Reich itself. For this purpose substantial forces may be withdrawn from Norway and, by retiring to more easily defensible lines, from Italy. New limited employment divisions are also being formed in Germany. Even so, it is unlikely that sufficient forces can be made available to defend any of the main fronts against continuous and heavy Allied pressure.

The German Air Force is at present incapable of exercising more than a local or limited influence on the course of military operations. Although considerable improvement in the strength of the fighter-equipped forces may be expected if the war continues into the spring, their effectiveness will be limited by difficulties of supply and servicing, particularly shortages of fuel and of alternative operational bases. Owing to these difficulties and in the face of Allied numerical superiority, the German Air Force will remain incapable of exercising a major influence on the course of the war.
SECRET

A revival of U-boat activity, which will be much more difficult to counter, is now taking shape and this, in conjunction with operations by small assault craft, may substantially affect the build-up and maintenance of our forces on the continent.

4. In view of the general decline in Germany's war potential, brought about by Allied bombing and by losses in territory, equipment, and manpower, there is such a substantial deterioration in her military power that no real recovery appears to be possible.

5. The present German government, or any Nazi successor, is unlikely to surrender. Control by the Party appears strong enough to prevent governmental overthrow or internal disintegration prior to an extensive collapse of military resistance.

6. Although causes for collapse are undoubtedly present, the lack of visible symptoms indicates that German national life is still mobilized behind the war effort. This support is not likely to break down until the military debacle has reached its final stage.

7. We believe that the end of organized resistance is most likely to occur as the result of a major breakthrough with sufficient means for exploitation, either on the eastern or western fronts. In some cases, piecemeal surrenders will occur rapidly, while in others, it is to be expected that resistance, even if in lessening degree, will continue for some time.

8. If a major breakthrough with sufficient means for exploitation is achieved before the end of the year, we believe it is unlikely that organized resistance under the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) will continue through the winter. On the other hand, if such a major breakthrough is not realized, such resistance is likely to continue into the Spring of 1945.
APPENDIX

DISCUSSION

1. Strategic situation.

a. Ground. On the Western Front, following their rapid and disorderly retreat across France and Belgium, the Germans finally were able to establish a cohesive front. A major contribution to this result was their success in denying port facilities to the Allies, thus bringing the Allied progress virtually to a standstill for a considerable time. The time gained afforded Germany the opportunity to reorganize battered forces, to improve the West Wall defenses, and to organize and move additional units to the front. Allied pressure is forcing the Germans to yield their positions in Holland and use of the port of Antwerp by the Allies should not be delayed much longer. Once the Allies are able either to outflank or gain the Rhine crossings to the Ruhr, the Germans will be unable to reorganize a cohesive front because of lack of completely refitted armored reserves, their limited mobility, and their critical shortages of manpower, equipment, and fuel.

In Scandinavia, German forces are withdrawing under pressure from northern Finland and the eastern part of northern Norway. Because of its economic and strategic importance, the Germans intend to defend Norway. The Narvik area will be important to them as long as they can continue shipping much needed Swedish ore from that port to Germany. The Norwegian ports are important as submarine bases. The Germans can defend Norway during the winter months with some 10 divisions, leaving them free to withdraw approximately 8 full-strength divisions of which 7 might under optimum conditions have arrived in Germany for use on other fronts by the end of the year.
SECRET

On the Eastern Front, the Germans have been forced to yield ground everywhere but in the Central Sector. We estimate that several of the German divisions which were in the Baltic States are now available for the defense of East Prussia. In Hungary, the Germans are faced with a serious situation and further substantial gains by Soviet forces, such as the capture of Budapest or a crossing of the Danube in strength, would lead to Hungary's collapse. Complete disintegration of the German position in Yugoslavia could not then be long delayed and the Germans would be forced to hold a line such as Vienna gap - Gorizia.

In the southern Balkans, most of the remaining German forces are now belatedly attempting to withdraw. Except for some forces which have been left behind as fortress garrisons in the Aegean Islands, particularly in Leros, Rhodes, and Crete, all of Greece, and most of Albania have been evacuated. The bulk of these forces are now attempting to make their way northward through difficult, guerrilla-infested country, with the main escape routes already cut and the remaining routes threatened.

In Italy, the Germans still elect to hold as long as possible to their general Apennines position and they have been able to hold Allied forces to limited gains. The Germans may hope by blunting the force of the Allied attack to withdraw relatively unmolested and, aided by the weather, to prepared positions on the line of the Alps and the Adige River. By so doing it is possible that 5 or 6 veteran divisions may be made available, even before rest and refit, for use elsewhere.
SECRET

General. The Germans must now concentrate their forces for the defense of the Reich itself. For this purpose they are withdrawing what forces they can from outlying areas and forming new limited employment divisions by combing out manpower regardless of age and condition. The effectiveness of these new divisions is further limited by lack of both weapons and equipment. Even so, it is unlikely that they will be able to make available the forces required to defend any of their main fronts against continuous and heavy Allied pressure. Once a major breakthrough has been achieved with sufficient means for exploitation, the German inferiority in mobility, armor, and air power will prove fatal.

D. Air. While the offensive strength of the German Air Force continues to decline owing to the heavy reduction in the size of the long range bomber force, its defensive strength, particularly in the category of single engine fighters, has shown considerable numerical increase during recent months. This is the result principally of an acceleration in the rate of fighter aircraft production, coupled with the control of wastage by limiting the scale of effort. The effective employment of this strength, however, is restricted by supply and servicing difficulties due particularly to shortages of fuel and to the reduction in the number of alternative operational bases available. In the face of Allied numerical superiority on all fronts, the German Air Force is at present incapable of exercising more than a local or limited influence on the course of military operations.

Nevertheless, if there is a continuation of present production trends and of present policies for controlling wastage, and if intensive training can be maintained during the winter months, the forces equipped with fighter-type aircraft are likely to continue to expand not only in numbers, but also in performance and fire power. An
increasing proportion of these aircraft will be jet-propelled. Such expansion, if not offset by other factors, would by the spring of 1945 increase the effectiveness of the German Air Force beyond that of the spring of 1944, at which time it was suffering severely from heavy Allied bombing attacks against the German aircraft industry. Supply and servicing difficulties, particularly shortages of fuel and alternative bases, however, are expected to restrict operations even more than at present. On balance, therefore, it is unlikely that the overall effectiveness of the German Air Force will by the Spring of 1945 exceed that of the Spring of 1944. The German Air Force will, therefore, remain incapable of exercising a major influence on the course of the war.

o. Naval. Until recently the German operations against Allied shipping and against Allied supply lines to the continent had degenerated into harassing activities, owing principally to the success of Allied anti-submarine methods and, to some extent, the impotence of the German Air Force.

The enemy, however, still disposes of a large U-Boat fleet and two new improved types with higher submerged speeds may soon become operational. A rerudescence in the U-Boat campaign is already taking shape, marked by the increased use of "snorts," the use of which has overcome to some extent the hazards of operating from bases in Norway and Germany and in focal areas close inshore. The "snort" and other technical improvements rendering detection and counter-measures more difficult are likely to result in an increase in Allied sinkings, particularly when the new types of submarines come into operation.
SECRET

New technical developments in mines, bombs or torpedoes may, as in the past, also prove of some material value to the enemy. The operation of one-man torpedoes, explosive motor boats and such weapons, will probably continue against the approaches to our continental ports. A revival of U-Boat activity, in conjunction with operations by these small assault craft, may substantially affect the build-up and maintenance of our forces on the continent.

All major surface units are in South Norway or the Baltic. Though these units may continue to play some part in delaying further deterioration of the situation in this area, it is most unlikely they will be able to exert any appreciable influence elsewhere. German light surface forces in all other areas have been reduced to negligible strength.

4. Manpower. Lack of combat-fit manpower constitutes one of the most critical over-all weaknesses in the German situation. The number of physically fit young men remaining in the entire German population is already substantially less than the minimum requirements of the armed forces. Since early June on the Western Front alone the Germans have suffered nearly one million permanent casualties, and to these must be added the heavy casualties they have suffered elsewhere, particularly in the Soviet summer offensive on the central sector of the Eastern Front. The fighting effectiveness of the German armed forces cannot be maintained in the face of this heavy attrition. In an effort to meet the situation, the Germans are throwing into battle, often with little or no training, every available man. They have mortgaged the next annual intake, and drastically curtailed their training program. Mobilization of the civilian labor force is already virtually complete. German measures for full mobilization cannot, therefore, have any substantial
effect in alleviating the manpower crisis. However, such measures as the creation of the Volkssturm illustrate the necessity of subordinating long-term considerations of war production to the immediate objective of prolonging the war by using industrial manpower to make up for the acute shortage of combat-fit Germans.

2. Political and psychological factors. The strongest elements in the German strategic situation are the political and psychological forces which maintain the German will to resist in spite of the overwhelming pressure exerted by the adverse military situation. Nazi controls governing every aspect of German life continue to be effective. Undoubtedly, the extent of the plot, which came to light on 20 July after brewing for months, indicates serious discontent in the armed forces, especially in the officer corps. This discontent was kept in check at the expense of further weakening the fighting power of the army through replacement of disaffected officers by Nazi officers of less ability and experience.

There is little sign that the mass of the German people has the inclination, the energy, or the organization to break the Nazi grip and to take active steps to bring the war to an end. In the absence of a popular revolt, the only group that might be able to overthrow the present Nazi government and bring the war to an end would be army leaders and civilians acting in concert with them. The failure of the coup of 20 July has greatly reduced the likelihood of such a move, even though it still cannot be entirely discounted.

3. Economic. As their prospects narrow down merely to the hope of prolonging the war through another winter, the Germans can continue to adopt certain desperate expedients which may somewhat alleviate their short-range supply position at the price of additional losses of 1945 production.
SECRET

German war production, considerably reduced by territorial losses, Allied bombing attacks, and the manpower shortage, is now clearly unable to meet Germany's military requirements. Recent enormous equipment losses cannot possibly be replaced, and shortages of tanks, military vehicles, and ammunition continue seriously to affect the fighting fronts. With the exception of certain finished products such as single-engine fighter aircraft, and prefabricated U-boats, production of which is increasing, almost all other major categories of war production are expected to decline even more rapidly than at present.

The most serious material shortage is that of liquid fuels, which lessens the offensive power of the German army, limits the operations of the German Air Forces, and endangers the German defensive position by greatly reducing the mobility and effectiveness of their forces. Other shortages, especially in ferro-alloys, will become still more acute. The remaining shipments of Swedish iron ore may be cut off entirely.

The civilian supply position, although increasingly tight, is unlikely directly to cause military difficulties or to precipitate a civil revolt, but may cause some political difficulties and reduce labor efficiency.

G. Occupied and satellite countries. Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland have signed armistice agreements with the Allies, and the first two have declared war on the Germans. Under the armistice terms, Finland is assisting Soviet forces in expelling Germans from her territory. Half of Hungary and most of Slovakia are still in German hands. German withdrawal from Finland and Greece can be considered as virtually complete. The Germans will hold Norway and Denmark as long as possible.
h. Relations with neutrals. The European neutrals may be expected to cling to their neutrality. They will nevertheless give greater assistance to the Allies at Germany's expense despite apprehensions over the increase of Soviet influence on the Continent.

i. German hopes. For many months the only bases for German hopes of avoiding unconditional surrender have been the possibilities of division among the United Nations, of the use of new weapons that would affect fundamentally the course of the war, and of war weariness or discouragement in one or more of the major United Nations.

Actually, however, the major Allies have never been more united in their determination to defeat Germany. The Germans are not likely to produce a new weapon that can fundamentally alter the course of the war. The use of flying bombs and long range rockets against objectives behind the Western Front or elsewhere must be expected to increase. Against England, on the other hand, Allied advances in the West have greatly curtailed the use of flying bombs and an advance into northern Holland should neutralize the use of long range rockets of the types so far employed. War weariness among the United Nations can scarcely be expected to become critical at a time when their military situation is more favorable than in any former period.
2. Explanation of continued German resistance. The preceding paragraphs indicate that the factors which should produce a collapse or surrender are already present in the German situation. Continued German resistance is due chiefly to the fanatical determination of the Nazi Party leaders to fight to the end and to their possession of the necessary political and psychological control over the German people. This determination is based on the doctrine held by the Nazis that Germany surrendered too quickly in 1918; their fear for their own safety; a fanatical belief in their own capabilities which prevents them from accurately appraising the situation; and the lack of any alternative to continued resistance which would seem to offer opportunities for a later revival of their power. It is probable that preparations are being perfected to maintain, even after defeat, an underground organization. The civilian population alone has neither the inclination nor the capacity to risk revolt, even if it is beginning to appreciate the hopelessness of continued resistance. In the Army, discipline remains reasonably firm although the confidence of the rank and file is being undermined by the shortage of men, equipment, and supplies and by the inescapable contrast between German and Allied artillery and air power. Therefore, although the strategic situation indicates certain defeat, German resistance has continued beyond the time dictated by any normal considerations.

3. Lack of symptoms of German collapse or surrender. There are still no certain indications that German groups are acting as though collapse or surrender is imminent. There is no evidence that the officers corps or the rank and file of the Army has been generally and seriously demoralized. Large scale mutinies or desertions have not yet developed. Since the Germans have reestablished cohesive fronts there have been few instances in which German soldiers have failed to fight
tenaciously. On the home front, strikes and demonstrations have apparently not yet assumed dangerous proportions. Serious peace feelers have not been put forth by the Germans, although the satellite states, repeating the events of World War I, have with the exception of Hungary broken away.

4. Form of collapse. It is unlikely that the present German government or any Nazi successor will surrender. We believe that the end of organized resistance is most likely to occur as the result of a major breakthrough with sufficient means for exploitation, either on the Eastern or Western Fronts. As the Allied advance by-passes resistance and seizes important political and industrial objectives, disintegration will spread to other areas. The duration of the resistance of these isolated pockets will be largely determined by their particular situation and by the character of their command. In some cases, piecemeal surrenders will occur rapidly, while in others, it is to be expected that resistance, even if in lessening degree, will continue for some time.

5. Time of collapse. It is not possible accurately to predict the time when organized resistance will end. The factors determining that time will be not only Germany's capacity to continue resistance in the face of mounting shortages of manpower and equipment, but also the achievement of a major breakthrough by the Allies.

If a major breakthrough with sufficient means for exploitation is achieved before the end of the year, we believe it unlikely that organized resistance under the German High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) will continue through the winter. On the other hand, if such a major breakthrough is not realized, such resistance is likely to continue into the Spring of 1945.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

September 16, 1944

The President

The White House

My dear Mr. President:

This will acknowledge receipt today of your letter of September 9 requesting action to initiate a thorough survey of the results of the Combined Bomber Offensive against Germany.

Steps have been taken to establish this project which will be known as the U. S. Bombing Research Mission (USBRM.) Plans and personnel have been discussed with President Conant of Harvard University, Dean David of Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Dr. Karl Compton of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Dr. Vannevar Bush, Chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and Development. It is hoped that a civilian chairman will be obtained within the next few days to take over-all charge of the Research Mission.

At the present time a small group has been constituted in London charged with planning the approach to the survey, the objectives to be visited and the personnel necessary to complete the task within the time limit desired. This group is obtaining assistance from the military personnel as well as the civilian experts presently engaged in damage assessment work in the Economic Warfare Division in London.
I believe that the suggestions in your letter can be carried out promptly as soon as the civilian chairman can be appointed and the group in London augmented by a few additional experts with whom we are in touch.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War
September 9, 1944

The Honorable
The Secretary of War
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary,

It seems to me that it would be valuable in connection with air attacks on Japan and with postwar planning to obtain an impartial and expert study of the effects of the aerial attack on Germany which was authorized in enlarged scale as the Combined Bomber Offensive at the Casablanca Conference. Its value obviously depends on the quality and impartiality of the group selected to make the study as well as on the scope of the study itself.

This study should, I believe, include not merely the visible, physical destruction caused by bombing, but should embrace the direct and indirect consequences of attacks on specific industries. This would include investigating the problems created in moving evacuees from a bombed city, the burden created in the communities into which the evacuees are moved, the complications such migrations cause in transportation, food distribution, medical attention and the strains imposed on the economic structure through dislocation of industry and commerce. It would be valuable to obtain some indication, if possible, of the psychological and morale effect on an interior community, which had hitherto been free from attack, of a large influx of evacuees with all of the attendant problems.

I suggest, therefore, that the War Department take steps to have a group selected and appointed to undertake this work as soon as possible.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President:

Here is a letter prepared by Bob Lovett for your signature, together with a note which he sent to me.

Bob's idea is to have a competent staff move into Germany immediately after the collapse to try to find out at first hand what the real effects of the bombing are and not merely follow the deductions drawn by the Army Air Forces who may, reasonably, be prejudiced. Bob's idea is to get some of the Harvard crowd to do it and he is going to have trouble getting people without a letter from you.

H.L.S.

encl.
August 26, 1944

The Honorable Harry L. Hopkins
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Harry:

I enclose a suggested draft of the letter from the President to the Secretary of War setting in motion the appointment of a group to investigate the effects of aerial attack on Germany. The two main purposes, as indicated to you yesterday, are to gather information which might be of great value to us in the air attacks on Japan; and, secondly, to provide us with the basic facts which will be so important in connection with our post war planning.

It is our hope that Harvard University can be persuaded to set up a group to undertake this work under the general supervision of President Conant. The request for this type of survey originated with our Strategic Air Forces in Europe. They feel that there is a unique opportunity to collect the facts if we have an organization prepared in advance to move in.

With kindest regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT
Assistant Secretary of War for Air

Enc.
Draft of a suggested telegram to be sent by the President and the Prime Minister to Marshal Stalin.

1. In the Moscow Conference of foreign Ministers before Teheran, the Prime Minister of Great Britain submitted a draft proposing the local punishment of war criminals in the countries and, if possible, at the scenes where their atrocities had been committed. With some small amendments this document was approved and has been published to the world with general acceptance and approval. This document however did not attempt to deal with the cases of the major war criminals "whose offences have no particular geographical localization". This matter was touched on in conversation at Teheran without any definite conclusion being reached. It has now become important for us to reach agreement about the treatment of these major criminals. Would you consider whether a list could not be prepared of say 50 to 100 persons whose responsibilities for directing or impelling the whole process of crime and atrocity is
established by the fact of their holding certain high offices. Such a list would not of course be exhaustive. New names could be added at any time. It is proposed that these persons should be declared, on the authority of the United Nations, to be world outlaws and that upon any of them falling into Allied hands the Allies will "decide how they are to be disposed of and the execution of this decision will be carried out immediately". Or alternatively, "the nearest General Officer will convene a Court for the sole purpose of establishing their identity, and when this has been done will have them shot within one hour without reference to higher authority".

2. It would seem that the method of trial, conviction and judicial sentence is quite inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge and assembling the evidence, the question of their fate is a political and not a judicial one. It could not rest with judges however
eminent or learned to decide finally a matter like this which is of the widest and most vital public policy. The decision must be "the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies". This in fact was expressed in the Moscow Declaration.

3. There would seem to be advantages in publishing a list of names. At the present time, Hitler and his leading associates know that their fate will be sealed when the German Army and people cease to resist. It therefore costs them nothing to go on giving orders to fight to the last man, die in the last ditch, etc. As long as they can persuade the German people to do this, they continue to live on the fat of the land and have exalted employments. They represent themselves and the German people as sharing the same rights and fate. Once however their names are published and they are isolated, the mass of the German people will infer rightly that there is a difference between these major criminals and themselves. A divergence of interests between the notorious leaders and their dupes will
become apparent. This may lead to undermining the authority of the doomed leaders and to setting their own people against them, and thus may help the break up of Germany.

4. We should be very glad to have your views upon this proposal at your earliest convenience. It is of course without prejudice to the great mass of German war criminals who will be handed over for the judgment of the countries where their crimes have been committed.

17.9.44
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 9, 1944

I attach a copy of a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicating their views respecting the ultimate disposition of the German fleet. So far as I am aware, this matter has not as yet been discussed in the European Advisory Commission.

Before communicating the contents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's letter to Ambassador Winant in London for eventual consideration by the European Advisory Commission, I should like to know if you approve of these views which may lead to considerable discussion. Although there has been no indication of the Russian position in this matter, the British Government has already indicated that in its opinion all materials taken after cessation of hostilities, including the German fleet, should be regarded as the property of the United Nations as a whole. The British propose the creation of a special board which, operating under broad policies laid down by the European Advisory Commission, shall determine the allocation of war materials so acquired. This plan does not conform, at least initially, to the alternative preferred by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, namely, that the German fleet be destroyed.

I should also point out, however, that if the first alternative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is adopted it would exclude the necessity of having to consider claims for units of the German fleet by the other United Nations or the French.

Enclosure:

From Joint Chiefs of Staff,
September 4, 1944.

CE: JWR: AMR  9/9  EUR
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

4 September 1944

TOP SECRET

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

It is understood that the immediate disposition of units of the German fleet in connection with the imposition of surrender terms upon the defeat of Germany is presently under advisement in the European Advisory Commission, and that it has been tentatively agreed that the ultimate disposition of the units of the German fleet will be a matter for decision by the governments of the United Nations concerned.

It is the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, except for the retention of a limited number of ships for experimental and test purposes, the German fleet should be completely destroyed.

In the event that agreement cannot be reached with the Russians and the British on this basis, the United States should press for either:

A. A one-third share of each category of ships in the German fleet; or,

B. Agreement that all capital ships, such as battleships, pocket battleships and heavy cruisers, and submarines be destroyed, while smaller craft and more lightly armed vessels be shared equally by the United States, Russia, and Great Britain.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I attach a copy of a letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicating their views respecting the ultimate disposition of the German fleet. So far as I am aware, this matter has not as yet been discussed in the European Advisory Commission.

Before communicating the contents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's letter to Ambassador Winant in London for eventual consideration by the European Advisory Commission, I should like to know if you approve of these views which may lead to considerable discussion. Although there has been no indication of the Russian position in this matter, the British Government has already indicated that in its opinion all materials taken after cessation of hostilities, including the German fleet, should be regarded as the property of the United Nations as a whole. The British propose the creation of a special board which, operating under broad policies laid down by the European Advisory Commission, shall determine the allocation of war materials so acquired. This plan does not conform, at least initially, to the alternative preferred by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, namely, that the German fleet be destroyed.

I should also point out, however, that if the first alternative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is adopted it would exclude the necessity of having to consider claims for units of the German fleet by the other United Nations or the French.

Enclosure:
From Joint Chiefs of Staff,
September 4, 1944.
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D. C.

4 September 1944

TOP SECRET

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

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For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 6, 1944

Subject: Recommendations for the Treatment of Germany

1. Appointment of an American High Commissioner

It has become urgent that an American High Commissioner for Germany be appointed. Immediately upon occupation of Germany many important problems will have to be decided on a tripartite basis between the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. These problems will have not only important military aspects but will require the working out of a common policy in the political and economic fields as well. The American High Commissioner should be an official of high political ability and considerable prestige who can speak with authority for this Government in all matters where a common policy must be worked out with the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. The appointment should be made as soon as possible.

2. American Policy for the Treatment of Germany

The following policies for the treatment of Germany are recommended as the objectives of the United States, and for which we should seek agreement with the U.K. and the U.S.S.R.:

(a) Demilitarization of Germany, including the complete dissolution of all German armed forces and all Nazi military, para-military and police organizations, and the destruction or scrapping of all arms, ammunition and implements of war. Further manufacture in Germany of arms, ammunition and implements of war should be prohibited.

(b) Dissolution
(b) Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations. Large groups of particularly objectionable elements, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be arrested and interned and war criminals should be tried and executed. Active party members should be excluded from political or civil activity and subject to a number of restrictions. All laws discriminating against persons on grounds of race, color, creed or political opinion should be annulled.

(c) Extensive controls should be maintained over communications, press and propaganda for the purpose of eliminating Nazi doctrines or similar teachings.

(d) Extensive controls over German educational system should be established for the purpose of eliminating all Nazi influence and propaganda.

(e) No decision should be taken on the possible partition of Germany (as distinguished from territorial amputations) until we see what the internal situation is and what is the attitude of our principal Allies on this question. We should encourage a decentralization of the German governmental structure and if any tendencies toward spontaneous partition of Germany arise they should not be discouraged.

(f) The American Government has no direct interest in obtaining reparations from Germany and consequently no interest in building up German economy in order to collect continuing reparations. However, the U.K. and the U.S.S.R., together with a number of smaller states which have been victims of German exploitation, may have claims on German production which they will require for purposes of rehabilitation and reconstruction. Consequently, we should not take a fixed position on reparations at this time but should await the views of governments which have a more direct interest.

(g) As the great Junker estates have provided the economic basis for the military caste in Germany, these estates should be broken up and the holdings distributed to tenants.

(h) The
(h) The primary objectives of our economic policy are: (1) the standard of living of the German population shall be held down to subsistence levels; (2) German economic position of power in Europe must be eliminated; (3) German economic capacity must be converted in such manner that it will be so dependent on imports and exports that Germany cannot by its own devices reconvert to war production.
It is suggested that the position of the United States should be determined on the basis of the following principles:

1. Demilitarization of Germany.

   It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the withdrawal or destruction of all war material) and the total destruction of the whole German armament industry as well as those parts of supporting industries having no other justification.

2. Partitioning of Germany.

   (a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia as indicated on the map.

   (b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Moselle Rivers.

   (c) As indicated in part 3 an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

   (d) Denmark should be given the territories between its present borders and the International Zone, north of the Kiel Canal.

   (e) The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

   There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

3. The Ruhr. Here lies the heart of German industrial power. It should be dealt with as follows:

   (a) An International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas. Included in the Zone should be the Kiel Canal and the Rhineland. The Zone should be governed by the international security organization to be established by the United Nations. The approximate borders of the Zone are shown on the attached map.

   (b) The internationalization of this area shall in no way interfere with: (a) total destruction of the German armament industry and supporting industries in the Ruhr in accordance with Part 1 of this memorandum, (b) restitution and reparations, including removal and distribution of industrial plants and equipment, in accordance with Part 4 of this memorandum.

   (c) Ownership and control of major industrial properties remaining shall be transferred to the international organization.

   (d) The international organization shall be governed by the following general principles:
(i) The natural resources and the industrial capacity of the Ruhr area shall not be used or developed so as to contribute in any way to the military potential of Germany or the Ruhr area.

(ii) The Zone will be a free trade area. However, the importation of capital should be discouraged.

4. Restitution and Reparation

Reparations, in the form of recurrent payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them.

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition.

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition.

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany.

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

5. Treatment of Special Groups

(a) A particularly intensive effort must be made to apprehend and punish war criminals.

(b) All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined:

(i) The S.S.

(ii) The Gestapo.

(iii) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.

(iv) All high Government and Nazi party officials.

(v) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.
(c) Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

(d) The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

(e) All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade:

(i) The Nazi Party.

(ii) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.

(iii) The Junkers.

(iv) Military and Naval officers.

(f) All Junker estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

6. There should be abrogated and declared null and void all pre-surrender laws, decrees, regulations or aspects of the same which discriminate on the basis of race, color, creed or political opinions.

7. Education and Propaganda.

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc., will cease publication immediately and shall not resume publication until so directed.

(c) All German radio stations will be discontinued immediately and shall not be permitted to resume operations until so directed.
8. Political Decentralization.

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany into three states. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(i) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(ii) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Lander) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.

(iii) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a loose confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy. Eventually such confederacies would assume sovereign functions, including separate currency and postal systems, powers of foreign representation and negotiation, etc.

9. German Economy.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations and are indicated above. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

(a) The responsibility for the execution of the post-Surrender program for Germany set forth in this memorandum is the joint responsibility of the United Nations. The execution of the joint policy agreed upon should therefore eventually be entrusted to the international body which emerges from United Nations discussions.

Consideration of the specific measures to be taken in carrying out the joint program suggests the desirability of separating the task to be performed during the initial period of military occupation from those which will require a much longer period of execution. While the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., will, for practical reasons, play the major role (of course aided by the military forces of other United Nations) in demilitarizing Germany (point 1), the detailed execution of other parts of the program can best be handled by Germany's continental neighbors.

(b) When Germany has been completely demilitarized there would be the following distribution of duties in carrying out the German program:

(i) The U.S. would have military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program and such representatives should have adequate U.S. staffs.

(ii) The primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany would be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

(c) Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time. Actual withdrawal of United States troops should not precede agreement with the U.S.S.R. and the U.K. on the principles set forth in the following parts of this memorandum.
Germany: Partition

In discussing the partition of Germany as set forth below, it should be made clear that these views on partition do not, of course, exclude the question of major and minor frontier adjustments affecting present German territory (East Prussia, Danzig, etc.).

This Government has not to date given its representative on the European Advisory Commission any instructions relative to a possible partition of Germany. Shortly after the European Advisory Commission was established, a Sub-committee on Partition was set up but no reports have ever been received and apparently no discussion on this question has taken place in London.

It is the view of the Department of State that this Government should oppose a forcible partition of Germany. An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. However, such a measure would not remove the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security control upon Germany for an undetermined period whether Germany is left united or is partitioned.

Furthermore, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany which has developed over the past 75 years, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed, but also maintained by force. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would assume a burdensome and continuing task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining a nationalistic determination to reunite, which would probably be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity might menace the economic stability of Europe as a whole.

In place of partition, the Department of State would favor a return to a federal system of government in Germany, including the division of Prussia into a number of mediumsized states. In reaction to Nazi over-centralization, the Germans might return to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia which in 1938 included 62% of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I am attaching a summary of recommendations prepared after careful study in the Department with regard to the treatment of Germany. I am also attaching for your consideration a longer paper giving the reasoning behind the recommendations and a memorandum on the present status of negotiations and discussions with regard to Germany.

This problem is, of course, of great importance and considerable urgency, for until an American policy has been decided upon with regard to the future treatment of Germany, we are not in a position to discuss the matter with the British or Russians. I hope, therefore, that you will be able to study the attached documents and let me have your comments thereon at an early date. The two former documents were transmitted to the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago with a request for their views.

Enclosures:
2. PCW-141b, August 5, 1944. The Treatment of Germany.
3. Status of Negotiations and Discussions on Germany, dated August 22, 1944.
I. LONG-TERM INTERESTS
AND OBJECTIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES

A. Frontiers

1. The Danish-German frontier should remain unchanged. (Recommended)

2. The water-boundary between the Netherlands and Germany should be moved from the western shore of the Ems Estuary to the main channel. The land-boundary should remain unchanged. (Recommended with request for further study of possible territorial compensation for the Netherlands for areas ruined by flooding.)

3. The Belgian-German frontier should be returned to the 1920-1940 line. (Recommended)

4. Alsace-Lorraine should be returned to France. (Recommended)

5. The transfer of the Sonthofen district from Austria to Germany should be recognized unless there is convincing evidence that the inhabitants wish to return to Austrian rule. (Recommended)

6. The pre-Munich frontiers of Czechoslovakia should in principle be restored, subject to any minor rectifications which the Czechoslovakian Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany. (Recommended)

7. This Government should not oppose the annexation by Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, and in German Upper Silesia the industrial district and a rural hinterland to be determined primarily by ethnic considerations. The United States, however, would
would not be disposed to encourage the acquisition by Poland of additional German-populated territory in the trans-Oder region. (Recommended)

8. This Government should oppose the mass transfer to the Reich of Germanic people from neighboring countries immediately after the cessation of hostilities but should approve the removal of individuals and groups who constitute an especially difficult problem; the transfer should be made, so far as may be feasible, under humane conditions and without undue strain on Germany's absorptive capacity. (Tentatively recommended; Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to study further the question of (a) criteria for selecting populations for transfer, (b) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia, and (c) establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of population.)

B. Political and Economic Conditions

9. This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war matériel. (Tentatively recommended subject to further study.)

10. The United States should encourage democratic self-government both at the local and national level as soon as security precautions make it feasible. (Recommended)

11. The German people should be assured that a democratic Germany can, by demonstrating its ability and
and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, earn an honorable place in the society of peace-loving nations. (Recommended)

12. A "war-guilt" clause should not be written into the surrender instrument or into the peace terms. (Recommended)

13. Partition should not be imposed upon Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)

14. The victors should make every feasible effort to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states. The imposition of a degree of political decentralization more extensive than that which moderate Germans would be willing to support might defeat its purpose by creating internal confusion and by arousing a lasting antagonism even among liberal and democratic German groups. (Recommended)

15. It should be an ultimate objective of this Government to assimilate Germany into world economy without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls. (Recommended)

16. The large German landed estates should be broken up. (Recommended, with a request to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany to continue its study of means of implementation.)

17. The great concentration of power exercised by German industrial and financial concerns should be destroyed. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany for further study.)

18. Free labor organizations possessing the power of collective bargaining should be revived. (Recommended)

19. The German people should be permitted, subject to security requirements, and to such international obligations
obligations as Germany may be required to assume, eventually to determine the nature of their economic system without foreign pressure or intervention. (Recommended)

C. German Foreign Relations

20. Germany should be admitted, as soon as its good faith is demonstrated, to participation without discrimination, other than for security objectives, in general political and economic arrangements. (Recommended)

21. Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression. (Recommended)

II. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Surrender Terms

22. The victor powers should secure through a single surrender instrument an unequivocal delivery of unrestricted rights and powers over Germany rather than rely on the rights of occupation and conquest or on undefined unconditional surrender. (Recommended)

23. The surrender instrument should be authorized and ratified by whatever German Government is in existence at the time. It should be signed by properly authorized military plenipotentiaries and, if a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government is in power, by authorized civilian agents. (Recommended)

24. The rights and powers surrendered by Germany should be acquired by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on behalf of the United Nations and should be exercised jointly by their three Governments acting in the interests of the United Nations. (Recommended)

B. Occupation
B. Occupation

25. The three principal United Nations should set up a military government which, while making extensive use of German administrative machinery and personnel, should supplant any existing central political authority. (Recommended)

26. While the military occupation of Germany should be effected on a zonal basis, the principal instrumentality of military government should be a tripartite agency in Berlin possessing the power, under instructions from the three Governments, to direct a uniform administration over the whole of Germany and to maintain the unity of those essential administrative functions and economic processes now operated on a nation-wide basis. (Recommended)

27. As soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency under whose authority military occupation would be continued. (Recommended)

28. This Government should favor the participation of the other United Nations in so far as would be compatible with the responsibility of the three major powers in planning and executing the measures for the treatment of Germany. (Recommended)

29. The German armed forces should be demobilized and disbanded as rapidly as considerations of internal order and the absorptive capacity of German economy will allow. (Recommended)

30. This Government is in principle opposed to the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units, but should not oppose the employment of Waffen SS and other Nazi Party military formations in reconstruction work outside Germany. (Referred to the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany with request for a separate study of this problem.)

31. German
31. German arms, ammunition and implements of war should be scrapped except as they are wanted for use in the war against Japan or are adaptable to peaceful uses. (Further study requested of the disposition of German armaments.)

32. All German military and para-military organizations, the General Staff, military training centers, supply services and all directly related groups should be promptly dissolved and permanently prohibited. (Recommended)

33. The manufacture and import of all arms, ammunition and implements of war should be forbidden, necessary security controls established over German economy, and those industrial plants dismantled which are not convertible to peace-time production or which otherwise present insuperable security problems. (Recommended)

34. The National Socialist Party and dependent organizations should be abolished and their records and assets seized. (Recommended)

35. The chief categories of Party "leaders", both local and national, and other active Nazis, should be removed from governmental service and posts in cultural and economic enterprises. (Recommended)

36. All parties and groups reflecting National Socialist views should be rigorously suppressed, but non-Nazi parties based on democratic principles should be encouraged to organize and appeal for support in so far as their activities do not jeopardize public order. (Recommended)

37. In order to prevent an economic collapse the existing German administrative machinery of economic control should be utilized, with necessary adaptations. (Recommended)

38. The mark should not be deliberately undervalued on the foreign exchanges. (Recommended)

39. Reparation exacted from Germany should be directed mainly to furthering reconstruction. Even though
it will not be large enough to meet the total cost, the payments should be confined to early years after the close of hostilities. The transfer of capital equipment should not be large enough seriously to cripple German economy. (Deferred for the consideration of the report of the Committee on Reparation.)

C. Establishment of Permanent Government

40. The direct inter-allied administration of Germany should terminate as soon as the prospects of order and the emergence of an acceptable German Government make it desirable. (Recommended)

41. The process of political reconstruction should begin with the establishment of democratic self-government in local communities and should be extended to larger units as the success of each step becomes apparent. (Recommended)

Original draft (CAC-181b) prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany.

Reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings of May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, 31.
Secret

THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY

I. INTRODUCTORY

The following discussion of the treatment of Germany makes a distinction between (1) long-range interests and objectives of the United States and (2) the problems of the occupation period.

The latter category embraces those immediate concerns of the victor powers from the moment of Germany's surrender or collapse until a time when it will be safe to establish a permanent system of controls and to permit the organization of a constitutional German Government. The major tasks of this period will be (1) to secure through the surrender instrument and to exercise an unqualified authority over Germany, (2) to establish the machinery of an effective military government, (3) to destroy the National Socialist Party and uproot its influence from German life, (4) to disarm and demobilize the German military machine and establish controls over Germany's war potential, (5) to institute a program of restitution and reparation, (6) to prevent an economic breakdown and to begin an economic reorganization which will destroy autarky and eliminate, in so far as possible, the economic and social bases of ultra-nationalism and militarism, and (7) to make a start towards the creation of an acceptable and durable political structure in Germany.

If this program is to provide more than temporary security and is to prepare the way for continuing European stability and peace, it must be worked out and applied in the light of long-range objectives with respect to Germany and to Germany's place in the projected world order.

II. LONG-TERM INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Axiomatically the basic long-term interest of the United States is peace, and so far as Germany is concerned, consequently, the basic objective is to see to it that that country does not disturb the peace.

Security
Security against a renewal of German aggression must be guaranteed during the foreseeable future—not only during but beyond the occupation period—through a rigorously enforced prohibition of a German military establishment and through vigilant control of German war potential.

An indefinitely continued coercion of more than sixty million technically advanced people, however, would at best be an expensive undertaking that would afford the world little sense of real security and, more important still, there exists no convincing reason to anticipate that the victor powers would be willing and able indefinitely to apply coercion. In the long run, therefore, the best guarantee of security, and the least expensive, would be the German people’s reeducation of militaristic ambitions and their assimilation, as an equal partner, into a cooperative world society.

These considerations dictate the search for a policy which will prevent a renewal of German aggression and, at the same time, pave the way for the German people in the course of time to join willingly in the common enterprises of peace.

The long-range objectives which might best protect the interests of the United States include (1) the settlement of disturbing frontier problems, (2) the achievement of political and economic reform within Germany, and (3) a constructive role for Germany, both political and economic, in international relations.

A. Frontiers

In order to strengthen the forces of peace throughout the world, it is a continuing interest of the United States that the significance of frontiers be reduced through the development of international organization and of freer international economic relations. In the establishment of post-war boundaries, the objectives of the United States can be best served by territorial settlements which, by doing least injustice to the peoples of all the states concerned, offer the most reasonable prospect of general acceptance and stability. In the case of Germany the principles of minimum change and minimum grievance apply fairly well to her northern, western and southern boundaries.
1. With Denmark.--The existing Danish-German boundary has not been challenged by the Danes, and there is no apparent reason to propose a change.

2. With the Netherlands.--No adjustment of the Netherlands land boundary seems desirable since it has heretofore been no source of disturbance. The Netherlands Government, however, has a justified claim for the relocation of the boundary in the Ems Estuary in the main channel rather than along the western shore as has been maintained by Germany in contravention of an established principle of international law. Unofficial Netherlands spokesmen have recently threatened to claim compensation in adjacent German territory if the German army should destroy the dikes and flood the reclaimed lands of their country.

Further study is being given to the question of possible territorial compensation in such an event.

3. With Belgium.--There appears to be no convincing reason why the 1920 line should not be restored. The justice of the Belgian frontier as established in 1920 was attacked by the Germans, and the pre-1914 line was restored in 1940. Despite Belgian abuse of the open plebiscite, the inhabitants of the disputed region had generally become reconciled to Belgian authority.

4. With France.--The United States Government is committed to the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Since there are no strong forces, either political or economic, working toward the creation of a separate state, or federation, composed of French, German, Luxembourg, Belgian and other territories within the watershed of the Rhine River, it would be undesirable for this Government to support such a proposal.

5. With Austria.--It is recommended that the present administrative boundary be maintained as the international frontier. After the absorption of Austria, the German Government made a slight rectification of the old frontier--now an administrative boundary--for reasons of convenience rather than for political motives. There is no cause to restore the pre-1938 boundary unless that should be desired by the 2000 inhabitants of the small Sonthofen area, which is shut off by mountains from close contact with Austria.

6. With
6. With Czechoslovakia.--It is recommended that the pre-Munich frontier be restored without prejudice to any rectifications which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to propose as part of a broader settlement of the issues in dispute between Czechoslovakia and Germany.

Since a viable Czechoslovakia, to whose restoration this Government is committed, must include a substantial German population, it is believed that the pre-Munich frontier with Germany should in principle be restored on grounds of historic, legal and strategic considerations. Such a conclusion is without prejudice to any cessions in the six northern salients (area, 772 square miles; population, 320,000, about 96 percent German) which the Czechoslovak Government might wish to negotiate with Germany or to slight rectifications in favor of Czechoslovakia. If such rectifications should be arranged by the two Governments concerned, this settlement could be approved by this Government, which is not committed to support any specific boundaries.

7. With Poland.--The principle of minimum grievance will be fairly well attained by the dispositions indicated above. In the case of the Polish-German frontier that principle may have to be overridden. To strengthen Poland strategically and economically and to compensate it for prospective losses of territories in the East, the Polish Government urges, with Soviet and British support, that East Prussia, Danzig, and a portion of German Upper Silesia should be ceded to Poland, and will probably insist that the approximately 3.4 million German inhabitants of the ceded areas should be transferred to Germany. The Soviet Government with apparently some British support, has suggested the cession of additional German territory up to the Oder River.

A basic question which has arisen in acute form is whether this Government should enter into active negotiations with the British and Soviet Governments with a view to determining a new Polish-German boundary or whether it should disclaim interest in this question and refrain from expressing approval or disapproval of a settlement agreed upon by its two major allies and Poland. If it is determined that this Government should play an active role, two questions arise. The first is whether a settlement of the future Polish boundaries should be negotiated now or be treated as part of the final peace settlement.
The second is whether this Government should admit the principle of the acquisition by Poland of territories containing large blocs of ethnically German population as compensation for the loss of only partially Polish-inhabited territories to the Soviet Union or for strategic and economic reasons.

Regardless of whether the United States takes an active or passive role with respect to the disposition of East Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia, it is recommended that the United States not encourage the cession of German territory in the lower trans-Oder region. The strategic considerations advanced in support of such an annexation are difficult to justify since no frontier arrangement between the two states could of itself suffice to maintain Poland's security against German aggression.

8. Transfer of Germanic Populations.—A problem closely related to that of establishment of equitable frontiers is presented by the presence of considerable German minorities in the various states of Eastern Europe. In particular, the Czechoslovak Government has indicated a desire to transfer a substantial number of the 3,200,000 Germans from that state; Poland will wish likewise to remove the Germans from Poznan, as well as from newly acquired territories; Yugoslavia may desire to take similar action.

These German minorities became the advance guard of National Socialist penetration, and the states which they helped to deliver to Hitler have a well-founded grievance against them. Their transfer to Germany would probably contribute to the tranquility of the countries concerned. Hitler himself has set an example by numerous forced migrations of the peoples of this region of Europe.

The problem, however, is one of enormous proportions. Serious economic injury would be done if these people should be summarily uprooted from their homes and thrown into Germany without compensation for their possessions and without provision for livelihood. By land reform in Germany it would be possible to absorb perhaps one million of the immigrants into agriculture. The great majority would have to enter urban life and would cause considerable strains unless there were an expanding German economy accompanied by an increase in foreign trade.
It is recommended, because of the above consideration, that this Government oppose the mass transfer of these peoples immediately upon the cessation of hostilities. It will perhaps be desirable, however, to sanction the relocation of individuals and groups who have constituted a special problem.

Further study is to be undertaken on the questions of (a) criteria for selecting populations to be transferred, (b) the establishment of an inter-allied commission to supervise transfers of populations, and (c) an inter-allied occupation of East Prussia.

B. Political and Economic Conditions

1. Disarmament.—This Government should advocate (a) the prohibition for an indefinite period of a German military establishment, (b) the prohibition for an indefinite period of the manufacture and import of arms (except the importation of small arms for police purposes), ammunition and implements of war, together with the prohibition of the manufacture of aircraft and the prohibition of the importation of military aircraft, and (c) a system of international audit, inspection, and enforcement, extending over the whole of Germany, for insuring the observance of disarmament stipulations and for preventing the accumulation of war material.

The details of this problem will be the subject of further study.

2. Democracy.—Since a peace maintained only by the continuous coercion of Germany would be a precarious and expensive one at best, it must be an objective of the United States to promote in Germany the largest degree possible of internal stability based on free institutions, on the psychological disarmament of the German people, and on tolerable economic conditions.

The most plausible hope for lasting political reconstruction and orderly development lies in the establishment of a democratic government, despite serious difficulties facing such an attempt. It is therefore recommended that the aim of American policy should be to prepare the German people for self-government as early as that may be compatible.
compatible with the operation of security controls over Germany and with the functioning of a general system of international security.

The survival of a new democratic regime will depend in considerable measure on the psychological disarmament of the German people as well as on a tolerable standard of living. Although a democracy will labor under a heavy burden because of its necessary submission to the will of the victors, it must be able to offer some claim on German pride and patriotism purged of its aggressive content. In order to encourage a constructive fresh start in German political life, the United States should favor holding out the prospect that a democratic Germany, by demonstrating its ability and intention to act as a peace-loving nation, can earn an honorable place in the society of nations. In order to avoid raising an issue similar to that which, after 1919, was exploited by the nationalists to discredit and destroy all attempts to promote liberalism and international cooperation, this Government should oppose writing into the surrender terms or the peace settlement a verdict of moral guilt against the German people as a whole.

3. Partition.—It is recommended that this Government oppose the forcible partition of Germany. (Referred to the Secretary for possible consideration with the President.)

An imposed dismemberment of Germany into two or more separate states has been advocated as a practicable means of forestalling any renewal of German aggression. Such a measure, however drastic in itself, would not obviate the necessity of imposing and enforcing far-reaching security controls upon Germany for an indeterminate future, whether Germany is left united or is divided. Moreover, because of the high degree of economic, political and cultural integration in Germany, it must be anticipated that partition would not only have to be imposed but also maintained by force. Such a drastic interference in German life would evoke a vastly increased resentment over and above the inevitable discontent with defeat and its consequences. The victor powers, by imposing partition, would take on themselves a burdensome and never-ending task of preventing surreptitious collaboration between the partite states and of restraining the

nationalistic
nationalistic determination to reunite, which would, in all probability, be the response of the German people. Finally, the disruption of German economic unity would carry with it grave dangers for the economic stability of Europe as a whole, and not merely to Germany.

4. Political Decentralization.—It is recommended that every feasible effort should be made to promote a return to a federal system of government and a division of Prussia into a number of medium-sized states.

In reaction to National Socialist over-centralization, the Germans will probably return, of their own accord, to a considerable degree of federal decentralization, including the breakup of Prussia, which in 1938 included 62 percent of the area and two-thirds of the population of Germany, into several states of moderate size.

Two risks may, however, be incurred by going beyond encouragement of decentralization. The first is that an imposed weakening of the governmental structure more sweeping than that favored by the moderate and liberal parties in Germany would, like an imposed dismemberment, provide a ready-made program for the nationalistic groups. The second risk is that a weak central authority would be unable to cope with the social and economic problems of post-war adjustment. In addition, a return to wide provincial autonomy might again offer to undesirable elements an advantageous means of penetrating the various state governments, as happened prior to 1933, when the National Socialists captured control of several of the smaller states. Finally, even the cumbersome federalism of the Bismarckian empire was no protection against the growth of German power and militarism. Too much importance should not be attached to movements for decentralization, in any case, for the democratic forces have generally favored greater unification of the Reich.

5. Economic Arrangements.—It is to the long-range interest of the United States that Germany be prosperous, but that, at the same time, German economy should not again be directed to war-like purposes. A prime concern of this Government, therefore, is that Germany for the indefinite future be forbidden the manufacture and import of arms, ammunition and implements of war and be denied the right to develop an economically unsound productive capacity convertible
convertible to war purposes. This interest points to the termination of an autarkic policy and to the assimilation of Germany, without discrimination other than that necessary for security controls, into world economy, the maximum reduction of the economic significance of frontiers and the development of responsible international agencies for transportation, power, and other functions. It is equally to the interest of this Government that Germany eventually should participate fully in such international economic organizations and agencies, but should not be permitted to use foreign trade or commercial relations as an instrument of nationalistic policy.

In the interest of eliminating the social and economic bases of recurrent militarism, it is recommended that this Government approve a program for destroying the privileged positions of the Junker estate owners and of the great financial and industrial monopolies. The problem of the Junkers can be solved by breaking up the large landed estates; the problem of financial and industrial monopoly could be met in part through disestablishing the top financial structures of the great industrial combines and redistributing the ownership of constituent operating companies, and in part through some effective form of public control exercised through a democratic regime. It is also possible that nationalization of certain industries would contribute to the elimination of militarism and of political and economic abuses arising from the excessive concentration of economic power in private hands. Moreover, this Government should oppose the development of new forms of industrial combinations, whether on a German or international basis, which could contribute to renewed German economic and political aggression in Europe.

Further study is to be undertaken of ways and means of implementing these recommendations with respect to landed estates and industrial concentration.

It is recommended that this Government propose allowing the German people, subject to such requirements as those outlined above, to determine the nature of their economic system. It is to the interest of the United States to see in Germany the revival of free labor organizations enjoying ultimately the rights of association and of collective bargaining. (See also PWC-71a, "General Objectives of United States Economic Policy with Respect to Germany".)

C. German
C. German Foreign Relations

The position of post-war Germany in world affairs will be conditioned largely by the success or failure of international cooperation for security and prosperity and by the degree to which Germany demonstrates its abandonment of aggressive and totalitarian ambitions. Although deprived for an undefined future of all military power, Germany will remain the most populous and productive country in Europe to the west of Russia. Germany would present a danger to peace only if the victors should fall out among themselves and if either Russia or Great Britain should try to bring Germany into its orbit. The best guarantee against such a development would therefore lie in the continued cooperation of the three principal victors in their treatment of Germany and in the solution of other problems, and in the early establishment of a general international organization within which the security of Germany, like that of other nations, would be assured.

In the post-war period Germany will presumably be debarred by its own weakness and by the continuing resentment of its smaller neighbors from pursuing independently any regional policy in Europe. If, however, European economic interests can be served by promoting, on a non-discriminatory basis, commercial exchanges between Germany and its neighbors to their mutual benefit and without undue advantage to Germany, this Government should be prepared to view such a development with equanimity. It is probable, however, that Germany's overseas trade will play a much larger part than before in any economy reoriented away from war and the pursuit of autarky. Germany should not be permitted to use trade policy as an instrument of aggression.

It is recommended that the United States encourage the earliest possible integration of Germany into the community of peace-loving nations and into world commerce through holding out to a reconstructed Germany the prospect of early admission to the general international organization and of participation without discrimination in world trade.
III. TRANSITIONAL PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS

A. Surrender Terms

This Government, by public commitment, demands the unconditional surrender of Germany.

1. The Psychological Result.—The exaction of an admission of total defeat might prevent the invention of new legends about the alleged invincibility of German arms. Against this future advantage is to be weighed the immediate disadvantage of the fact that German propaganda, by misinterpreting the intentions of the United Nations to mean subjugation and destruction, is encouraging the resistance of the German people and is to that extent prolonging the war.

2. The Legal Basis for the Authority and the Acts of the Victor Powers.—The basic problem of the surrender is the establishment of a firm legal basis for the authority and acts of the victor powers. The traditional rights of military occupation do not give all the authority that is necessary for dealing with unforeseen contingencies and for effecting the reforms prescribed by long-term objectives. It is open to question whether an assertion of rights of conquest would provide a more satisfactory legal basis. In any case, unconditional surrender of a state is an innovation which requires exact definition before unusual rights can be derived incontestably from it.

It would seem essential, therefore, that the terms written into the surrender instrument, rather than conventional rights of occupation or the rights of conquest, be the source of the authority of the victors, provided there is a German Government capable of signing, and that the instrument contain a clear and comprehensive statement of that authority.

3. The Extent of the Rights to be Surrendered.—A further problem is the definition of unconditional surrender in terms of the extent of the rights to be surrendered by Germany. The alternatives are (a) that Germany should deliver all rights and powers to the victors, and (b) that the stipulations of the instrument be limited essentially to military terms.

Previous
Previous statements of American policy and the draft terms of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have adopted the former interpretation. The British draft likewise embodies this definition. The Soviet view, on the other hand, is that the surrender instrument should contain primarily the military terms designed to render Germany incapable of renewing hostilities with the understanding that other provisions relating to political and economic matters should subsequently be imposed on Germany. In Soviet opinion, German military leaders would more readily accept military terms and would, if confronted with the sweeping demands of the American draft, use them to spur the German people to renewed resistance. It may be said in criticism of the Soviet approach that it would not assure to the victors an adequate legal basis for such measures as the punishment of war criminals, the abolition of the Nazi dictatorship, the reordering of German economy, etc., which are among the aims of this country. Furthermore, the political after-effects of increasing the stringency of the surrender terms step by step would perhaps play into the hands of nationalistic agitators against the peace settlement, as that procedure did after the last war.

4. A Long versus a Short Surrender Document.—In the discussions of the European Advisory Commission, question has arisen over whether the surrender document should contain detailed provisions or be limited to a general acknowledgment of the comprehensive rights of the victors and the unqualified obligations of the vanquished. Proponents of the longer instrument argue that German acceptance would be more readily given to it than to a "blank-check" instrument and that it would expressly obligate Germany to a complete range of military, political, and economic stipulations without limiting the freedom of the victors. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in support of their short document argue, in turn, that a comprehensive surrender of powers makes specific provisions unnecessary and that an enumeration of detailed stipulations in the surrender document would carry with it the implication of a limitation of powers to the provisions specified. They attribute certain difficulties in Italy to the restrictive character of the long document used there and contend that the application of the broad authority can best be effected by ordinances of the occupation commanders. The American position is in favor of a short document, and it is probable that the British Government will accept one if there is agreement on proclamations and ordinances designed to give effect to the surrender terms.

5. Who
5. Who Should Sign for Germany.—The transfer of the full powers implicit in unconditional surrender can be effected only by the German Government, and the signatory or signatories should be duly authorized, therefore, by the Government. For psychological reasons it is desirable that the instrument likewise be signed on behalf of the German High Command and by as important an officer as can be found. In case of the existence at the time of a Nazi or quasi-Nazi Government, the signature of a highly placed civilian representative would be equally desirable. If a moderate regime is in power at the time of surrender, it might well be advisable to compel the military alone to bear the onus of signing. A military signature, however, would have to be authorized by whatever government was in power at that time.

6. Ratification of the Signed Instrument.—A further problem already posed is whether the signed instrument should be ratified by the German Government. Since no official can sign away more authority than he legally possesses, the unqualified legality of the sweeping delivery of powers through surrender will depend in German eyes on whether it is properly authorized by the Government in power at the time. It is recommended that the surrender instrument be ratified by whatever German Government is in power at the time of surrender.

7. Who Should Acquire the Enemy's Surrendered Rights.—Whatever arguments might be advanced for vesting the rights over Germany in all of the states at war with it, the practical necessities for prompt action, and the responsibilities of the three major powers, make such an arrangement impossible. The real issue, therefore, is whether the rights surrendered by Germany should be transferred to the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Governments jointly, or to each of them separately. A provision in the surrender instrument explicitly naming the three powers as joint recipients would have the advantage of binding the three Governments to act jointly in the post-surrender treatment of Germany, and would help to avoid the confusions and suspicions which would arise if each had the right to deal separately with the defeated enemy. The disadvantage of vesting these powers in all three Governments jointly is that no one of them would, in theory at least, be allowed to act unless all three Governments were in agreement. On balance, however,
the likelihood of bringing about a policy of uniform action towards Germany would be improved by vesting power over Germany in the three Governments jointly, and this alternative is consequently recommended.

The rights and powers accruing from the surrender of Germany are to be acquired and exercised jointly by the aforesaid powers in the interests of the United Nations.

B. Occupation

1. Administrative Machinery.—Since the main responsibility for the occupation of Germany must rest with the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, a basic problem arises as to how the interests and policies of the three powers are to be coordinated. The choice of a form of administrative machinery appears to lie between (a) a unified tripartite system, (b) a completely separate and independent administration in each of three zones, and (c) an intermediate arrangement.

Uniformity of procedure throughout Germany would be most easily obtained, and undue exercise of influence by any one of the occupation authorities would be most effectively forestalled, if there were a smoothly working unified tripartite control. Linguistic and other difficulties, however, appear to argue for separate zones to be administered by each of the three armies of occupation. Such an arrangement, while avoiding local friction, would pose the problems of uniform security measures and general coordination of policy in the treatment of Germany as a whole. A strict application of the second alternative, by suddenly breaking the normal unity of the land, might easily lead to economic and social catastrophe. If prolonged prostration is to be avoided, the essential administrative functions and economic processes now operated on a national basis will need to be left intact and a high degree of uniformity maintained in the administration of any separate zones that may be established.

This Government has recommended the creation of a tripartite civil affairs agency for Germany to coordinate the military government of the proposed three zones of occupation. This plan emphasizes the consultative and advisory role of the tripartite board and the reservation of full administrative powers to the commander of each zone acting under direction of his own military superior.
A British plan, questioning the adequacy of a purely advisory agency for coping with the highly unified administration of so many aspects of German life, proposes the establishment of a tripartite administrative board possessing the authority, within the limits of the agreement of the three Governments, to direct the application of approved policies to Germany as a whole. This proposal would limit the duty of the zonal commanders primarily to that of enforcing the administrative regulations of the central tripartite organ.

The American plan, approved by the Department of State and presented to the European Advisory Commission, is general in character. Further clarification as to whether the tripartite agency should be primarily consultative or should constitute a genuine joint administrative authority will be needed.

It is recommended that this Government favor the establishment of a tripartite organization with authority to direct the uniform administration of the whole of Germany.

2. The Delimitation and Allocation of Zones.—It is recommended that, in case three zones of occupation are established, this Government accept the boundaries proposed by the British and Soviet Governments.

This recommendation is made on the grounds that (a) a tripartite governing machinery for the whole of Germany, in which the three powers would be equal partners, would tend to minimize the significance of the exact location of zonal boundary lines, (b) an arrangement which would make each zone contiguous to Berlin is not feasible because of the location of the capital.

A further problem is presented by the allocation of the zones. The plans hitherto advanced agree in assigning the eastern zone to Soviet command. The British and Soviet proposals assign the northwestern zone to British command and the southern to American control. The President has stated, however, that, because of convenience of access, American troops should control the northwestern zone.

3. Military
3. Military Government and Subsequent Method of Control.—At the time of post-surrender occupation the victors may either (a) set up a direct military government which would supplant the German political authorities while using more or less fully the administrative machinery, or (b) govern Germany by means of directives to a central political regime.

Although a final decision should be made only after future developments are assessed, it is tentatively recommended that this Government favor the first alternative. Direct military government will probably be necessary because of prospective internal confusion and would, in any case, be an effective means of impressing the totality of defeat on the German mentality. If a quasi-Nazi or military group should be in power at the time of surrender, it would be desirable to have that regime bear the onus of admitting defeat and of executing the orders of the occupation forces, but the procedure would entail the political limitation of dealing with a regime repugnant to the peoples of the victor states. If a group of moderates should gain control of Germany, there might be advantages administratively in working through it. Such a method, however, would have a very heavy disadvantage of exposing the moderates to the charge of being the tools of the allied powers. The moderates would have a better chance of survival in the court of popular German opinion if they came into power as the successors and supplanters of direct military government than as its instrument.

On the assumption of the probability of direct military government, it is further recommended that, as soon as military considerations cease to be paramount, the control of Germany should be transferred to an inter-allied civilian agency.

The importance of strictly military dispositions will tend to recede when the German forces have been disarmed and order is established under allied military occupation. Progressively from the time of surrender, consequently, the major concern of the victors will be the inauguration of political and economic reforms within Germany looking to the uprooting of National Socialism and the eventual integration of Germany into the organized community of nations. It is believed that these
these functions are more logically the work of the civilian authorities of the Governments concerned and can more effectively be performed by them. This recommendation does not envisage the termination of military occupation at the time of the transfer of authority to the civilian agency, but merely the subordination of the military to the civilian.

The point at which civilian control should supplant the military cannot be determined now, but it is recommended that in principle the change be made as soon as the maintenance of orderly conditions in Germany is assured.

4. Participation of the Smaller United Nations in the Control of Germany.--The primary military responsibility of the three principal United Nations requires that they make the basic decisions regarding the treatment of Germany in the transitional period and bear the principal burden of enforcing them. At the same time the smaller United Nations in Europe have a vital interest in what is done to Germany as well as in future international organization. Questions therefore have arisen as to their participation in (a) the formulation of surrender terms, (b) the military occupation of Germany, (c) the joint military governmental body, and (d) the proposed civilian control agency.

The first question has been resolved by the offer of the European Advisory Commission to receive their proposals. The others remain unanswered. While it is impossible here to present a comprehensive program for the future, it is recommended that this Government favor the principle of the fullest participation of the smaller United Nations compatible with the major military responsibility of the three Great Powers. Some positive role for the smaller nations, although making decision a more cumbersome process, would help to forestall the formation of a bloc of the lesser states and the appearance of disruptive political maneuvers. It would likewise establish a pattern of cooperation looking forward to international organization.

5. Relation of Machinery for Control of Germany with Machinery for European Reconstruction.--The security political and economic dispositions relating to Germany affect
affect in so many vital respects the general problem of the reconstruction of Europe that the British Government has raised a question as to the advisability of creating some kind of inter-allied body for coordinating policies and actions with respect to Europe as a whole.

Under such a plan an Allied Commission, or a similar body, for control of Germany would report to and receive directives from a European Council or similar body which would coordinate policies relating to Germany with those which affect Europe as a whole. In the absence of such an agency, the various governments and their intergovernmental agencies, such as those relating to economic disarmament, collection and allocation of reparation, regulation of property rights, and revival of international trade, may find themselves working at cross purposes. On the other hand, in view of the risk that the operations of such a regional organization might tend to jeopardize the willingness of the various countries to cooperate in the early establishment of a general international organization, this Government has hitherto tended to discourage establishment of such a European body.

6. Security Functions during Occupation.--The following problems, among others, will require immediate action by the occupation authorities:

a. Demobilization of German armed forces.-- Immediately upon the acceptance of Germany's surrender, the allies will be confronted with the problem of dealing with several million German soldiers. The alternative solutions will be (1) demobilization and disbandment carried out as expeditiously as considerations of internal order and, in so far as feasible, the absorptive capacity of German economy will allow, (2) a retention of the troops in their formations under some form of direct control, either to be held in restraint for security reasons or used for labor service until such time as their release will be expedient.

It is recommended that this Government favor in principle the first alternative because of the problems of control and maintenance involved in keeping so many troops in confinement. This recommendation would not exclude the use of Waffen SS and other Nazi military formations.
formations in performing labor service for the needs of European reconstruction but would oppose the use in labor service for an indefinite period of large numbers of Army units.

Further study is to be made of the problem of the employment of forced German labor in reconstruction work outside of Germany.

b. Disarmament and the disposition of surrendered German arms and military equipment.--It is recommended that German arms, ammunition and instruments of war be scrapped in so far as they are not wanted for use in the war against Japan or adaptable to peaceful uses.

Total and lasting disarmament of Germany is a formal commitment of the United States Government. Among the proposals for the disposition of German arms, ammunition and implements of war are (1) that they be given to the states overrun by Germany and (2) that they be scrapped in so far as they are not capable of conversion to peaceful purposes. While the first alternative might give Germany's neighbors a temporary sense of added security, the measure is fraught with dangers. The rearming of European nations with surrendered German war materiel would complicate the problem of restoring political stability, render future disarmament more difficult, tend to make the countries concerned look to Germany for spare parts and replacements, and might inaugurate an armaments race detrimental to international peace and security.

Further study is to be made of the post-surrender disposition of German armaments.

c. Dissolution of military and para-military agencies.--It is recommended that, except for a civil police force adequate to maintain order, the occupation authorities proceed to the immediate dissolution of the army, the General Staff, party military and quasi-military organizations, reserve corps, military academies and military training, the administrative agencies performing military functions, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition. All such organizations should be permanently prohibited.

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d. Immediate
d. Immediate measures for the control of German war potential.—The essential first steps in the control of German war potential involve (1) the immediate cessation of the manufacture of war matériel and prohibition of resumption except in so far as it may be desired to make a limited use of German industrial capacity in the prosecution of the war against Japan, (2) the establishment of controls over industrial production, importation, and other economic activities, and (3) the dismantling of industrial machinery and plants not convertible to peacetime production or presenting an insuperable security problem. Likewise, the occupation authorities should proceed to the early inauguration of reforms designed to eliminate a policy of German autarky and to integrate Germany into the world economy by increasing its dependence on foreign trade.

C. Political Dispositions

1. Use of German Agencies and Personnel during Military Government.—To the end that civilian life continue as smoothly as possible, it is recommended that the occupation authorities make maximum use of German administrative machinery in so far as it can serve the purposes of the occupation authorities and does not perpetuate Nazi control and abuses, and use of non-Nazi civil servants in so far as they are efficient and politically acceptable to the occupation authorities.

2. Treatment of National Socialist Party and Party Members.—The first act in the fulfillment of the commitment to eliminate National Socialism should be the abolition of the Party and the impounding of its assets and records. The numerous affiliated and supervised organizations should be dissolved promptly, although certain social services now performed by them should be transferred to state organs or to newly established voluntary associations.

It is recommended that the occupation authorities impose political and other restrictions on the categories of the more important leaders, both national and local, rather than on the whole membership of the Party. Theoretically the Party has probably more than 5 million members, about 2 million of whom are considered as "leaders". To impose comprehensive disabilities upon
all Party members would involve undertaking an enormous administrative task and giving the same treatment to the active and incorrigible nucleus of leadership as well as to the great mass of passive, and by then presumably disillusioned, followers. The punishment of war criminals will, in itself, serve to exclude a certain number of important Nazis. It consequently seems desirable to favor the exclusion from government office and from enjoyment of political rights of certain broad categories of Nazis, rather than of all nominal members of the Party. Careful attention will have to be given to the elimination of convinced Nazis and other politically objectionable elements from education, journalism, and from control of industrial and financial enterprises.

3. Political Activity and Association. -- Upon the establishment of military government, the uncertainties of the first days will probably require a complete ban on political agitation and on the activities of political associations. Commitments require the lasting suppression of parties assuming the trappings of quasi-military organizations or espousing National Socialist ideals.

It is recommended, however, that as soon as mil-
itary conditions permit, parties opposing Nazi and other kinds of ultra-nationalist ideology be permitted to organize and appeal for support. This recommendation is based on the conviction that the German people will need information, organization and public debate before they are prepared to decide their future form of govern-
ment and that there is advantage in beginning these activities while National Socialism is under the im-
mediate impact of defeat.

D. Economic Dispositions

1. The Prevention of Collapse. -- A major concern of the victors at the time of occupation will of necessity be the prevention of an economic collapse or the revival of economic activity if a collapse has already occurred. A memorandum, which has been presented to the Committee on Post-War Programs (PWC-72a), has outlined a series of measures which appear essential to that end; they include the maintenance and strengthening of the existing machinery for price and credit control, for distribution of food and other civilian supplies,
for the control of labor, for the allocation of raw materials and capital in the interest of maintaining production, and for reviving essential foreign trade.

2. **Exchange Rate**.--The rate of the mark for international transactions will need to be fixed with a view to both economic and political conditions, first consideration being given to stimulating confidence in the value of the currency. A rate which avoids undervaluation will be desirable in facilitating the best possible support for internal and external commerce.

3. **Reparation**.--The problem of reparation has been the subject of a separate report by the Committee on Reparation, Restitution and Property Rights (PWC-223, 224, 225, 226).

4. **Economic Reorganization**.--While the immediate economic objective upon occupation is the prevention of collapse, the victor powers can hardly avoid dealing with many of the basic problems of the German economy. Among those problems are: creation of organizations designed to promote the unification of European transport and power and communication facilities; the prohibition or regulation of enduring international agreements between private firms; the breakup of the large landed estates; the reduction of over-concentration of financial and industrial control; the revival of international commerce by the reduction of trade barriers; the eventual development of multilateral trade and elimination of uneconomical enterprises developed under the banner of autarky; finally, the definitive determination of the most effective means for the control of Germany's economic war potential.

E. Establishment of Permanent Government

The establishment of military government over Germany will give the victors an opportunity to observe the new political conditions which may emerge before making a final decision with respect to a permanent German Government. Certain issues, however, merit consideration at this time.

1. **Termination of Allied Government**.--It is recommended that this Government favor the policy of terminating direct
direct administration of the German governmental structure, whether by military or civilian agencies, as soon as prospects of order and the possibility of establishing an acceptable and competent German Government make its termination feasible. This recommendation would not affect the continued military occupation of Germany or the exercise of controls, by direct intervention if necessary, on the part of inter-allied agencies.

The duration of direct control, either military or civilian, will depend, among other things, on the continued need for order, on an assessment of the psychological effect of occupation government, and on an estimate of how ready the Germans are to organize a government. It may be anticipated that the major result of military government on German mentality will be achieved within a few months at the most. As they recover from the shock, the people may become progressively resentful over the delay in reviving their political activity, and friction would work to the advantage of the nationalistic elements. It is equally important, however, that the people should not give their decisive votes before an adequate period of public discussion has clarified the issues.

2. Procedures for Restoration of Permanent Government. -- There are three general alternatives of procedure:
   (1) restoration of the pre-Hitler Weimar constitution;
   (2) the convocation of a new constituent assembly; and
   (3) progressive extension of self-government from local units through the states to the federal Reich as the success of each step seemed assured. The principle of continuity would be observed by returning to the original Weimar text. Yet that document, while a good rational product, was not an organic part of German life, and it is doubtful if the mass of Germans would wish to go back to it. A new constitution drawn up after a decade of political sterility, however, might not prove a much more effective instrument. Fear has been expressed that an election for a constituent assembly as the first political experience of the German people would revive the old bankrupt political parties and focus all political attention on the central government to the detriment of healthy local and provincial political life. The third alternative, by reviving free local self-government, would provide a transition period in which the German people could develop new leaders and gain experience in democratic practice,
practice, central governmental functions being carried on meanwhile by civil servants under allied control.

If there is a period of direct military government, it is recommended that democratic self-government be established in local communities as soon as military necessities permit. Decision as to when the next step should be taken could profitably be made in consultation with responsible local leaders.

3. The Exercise of External Influence.--In fidelity to their commitment to uproot National Socialism, the victor powers will need to intervene in the process of reconstructing government to the extent of denying political rights to those categories of Nazis adjudged dangerous. An attempt positively to influence political decisions of the German people might be successful if the intervention were the joint work of the major powers, but in the course of time habit of intervention, if developed, would probably outlive joint action, and, if so, Germany would become the hunting ground of competing influences and would be able to play off one rival against another, with disastrous consequences for any system of controls and for the peace.

These considerations point to the desirability of limiting positive influence to the encouragement of popular self-government and not attempting to determine precisely the forms of government to be established. At the same time, however, it is a dictate of security that the victor powers, and after them the international organization, should reserve the right, and be prepared, to intervene in Germany to prevent the re-emergence of dangerous nationalistic activities and to hold Germany to the observance of the obligations imposed by the peace settlement and by the post-war security system.

Original draft (CAC-143b) prepared and reviewed by the Inter-Divisional Committee on Germany.

Reviewed and revised by the Committee on Post-War Programs at meetings of May 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, 31.
August 22, 1944

STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS ON GERMANY

Negotiations in the E.A.C.

The European Advisory Commission, after six months of discussions, has formally recommended the surrender terms for Germany to the Governments of the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. The American Government has notified Ambassador Winant of its formal approval of these terms. Approval by the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. is expected momentarily.

Attached to the recommendation of the Commission is a letter to the European United Nations inviting their views in writing on the question of the surrender of Germany. To date, we are not informed of what views have been submitted to the Commission.

Before the Commission at present are three other important matters: (a) the protocol on the occupation of Germany, (b) the protocol on the occupation of Austria, and (c) proposals for control machinery and military government in Germany.

With respect to the occupation of Germany, the boundaries of the three zones of occupation have been provisionally agreed upon, but the question of whether British or American troops will occupy the northwestern or southern zone is still undecided. The President has indicated he desires the American forces to occupy the northwestern zone and my information is to the effect that he is still awaiting Churchill's agreement on this point. Acting on the authority of the President, Ambassador Winant has agreed to a tripartite occupation of Austria but the protocol on this has not as yet been formally recommended by the EAC.

With respect to control machinery for Germany, British and American proposals have been before the EAC for some months. The American proposal envisages a
Supreme Authority consisting of the three Commanders-in-Chief and advised by a Control Council which would be established on a functional basis, (political, economic, military, transport, etc. sections).

Under this proposal the separate American, British and Soviet zonal administrations would retain their identity and operate separately in their respective zones. The policies pursued in the zones would be coordinated by the Control Council in Berlin, which would make recommendations on all policies to be executed throughout Germany.

The British have submitted a somewhat similar proposal, which has likewise been before the EAC for some months. The Russians have not submitted any proposal on control machinery and have recently indicated that they are unwilling to discuss any further questions in the EAC until the dispute between the British and Americans over their respective zones of occupation has been settled.

**Discussions in Washington on Treatment of Germany**

The Department has prepared, and the Committee on Post-War Programs has approved, a basic policy statement entitled "Treatment of Germany" to which is attached a summary of policy recommendations. This report was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about a month ago through the Working Security Committee. The JCS, however, have not as yet made known their approval to this document or the comments thereon. It is envisaged that as soon as the JCS have acted on it that it will be submitted to the President and, if he approves, will be transmitted to London for the guidance of Ambassador Winant in his negotiations on the EAC. A similar paper on Austria has been approved by the President and transmitted to Ambassador Winant.

In addition to the foregoing, a basic report on economic policy towards Germany and on reparations has been prepared in the Department and has been cleared by the Executive Committee on Foreign Economic Policy. These will be submitted to the Secretary in the near future with a suggestion as to how they should be taken up with the military authorities.
A vast amount of material has been prepared in the Department on a variety of problems which will arise from the occupation of Germany but it has not yet been approved. These papers cover a variety of subjects, of which a few are set forth below for the purpose of illustration:

Abrogation of Nazi Laws
Disposition of Nazi Organizations
Displaced Persons
Control of Political Activities
Supervision of Education
Use of German Officials in Administration
Control of Communications
Control of Industry Potential for War
Disposition of Merchant Shipping, etc.

The Working Security Committee has now drafted a paper entitled "Statement of General Policies to be Followed in the Administration of Germany". This report will lay down the general policies to be agreed upon by the U.S., the U.K. and the U.S.S.R. on most important matters requiring agreement by the three powers for the administration of Germany after occupation. It is based upon the assumption that agreement will be reached on zones of occupation and control machinery.

It is anticipated that this paper will be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval. If this approval is given, it will be possible for the Department to send to London a vast amount of detailed information respecting the policies to be applied in Germany after occupation.

Discussions with the British in London

The British authorities have prepared and submitted to the EAC a number of directives covering policies to be followed in Germany upon occupation. In general, they cover much the same subjects as those which have been prepared in Washington and which are briefly described in the preceding paragraph. On a number of them, our views are not very different from those submitted by the British, but a certain amount of negotiation will no doubt be necessary before complete agreement is reached on all directives submitted by them.
In addition, Ambassador Winant's Planning Group has likewise drafted a number of directives for consideration by the American authorities. The Working Security Committee is prepared to correlate the various statements that have been prepared as soon as the military members have received authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operate under the statement of general policies described above.

Conclusion

The slowness in arriving at agreed policies on the treatment of Germany has resulted primarily from the unwillingness of the Russians to discuss the control machinery proposal until the zones of occupation are definitely decided. Without agreement on control machinery, it is difficult for the Department to make any real progress on the detailed planning. We have attempted through the Ambassador at Moscow to get the Russians to continue discussions, but without success to date.
31 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Brown

The attached paper is an account of the controversy between the United States and Great Britain over zones of occupation in Europe. At the first Quebec Conference a year ago the President, the Prime Minister and the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved "in principle" tentative plans for the occupation but when the President and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff first examined the plans in detail last November on the IOWA en route Cairo they strongly disapproved of the allocation of southern Germany, France and Austria to the United States. The Planning Staff in London was following, in this respect, the lines established by the British Foreign Office and the War Cabinet. In spite of repeated protests and declarations by the President, the Joint Chiefs and Ambassador Winant in the European Advisory Commission, the British have refused to allow planning on any other basis than American occupation of southern Germany. Allied troops are now on the threshold of Germany, but there is not yet agreement on zones of occupation.

The solution of this controversy undoubtedly will be one of the major aims of the second Quebec Conference.

Very respectfully,

GEORGE M. Elsey

[Signature]
ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN EUROPE

At the Quebec Conference of the President and Prime Minister Churchill with their Chiefs of Staff in August 1943, an outline plan was presented by Lieutenant General Morgan for an emergency return to Europe by Allied troops should German resistance in the West suddenly weaken or collapse before the Invasion of France was launched in the Spring of 1944. General Morgan had been appointed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in May 1943 as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (abbreviated to COSSAC) to begin planning for the invasion, and, as a corollary, to prepare plans for the emergency return should that become possible. The purpose of COSSAC’s plan, named RANKIN, was to introduce as many Allied troops into western Europe as possible to prevent chaos and ruin resulting from disintegration of the German war machine. RANKIN proposed that France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Rhine Valley to Dusseldorf be regarded as a sphere under U. S. control while Holland, Denmark, and northwestern Germany from the Ruhr Valley to Lubeck be controlled by British forces.¹

RANKIN was approved “in principle” by the Combined Chiefs on August 23, 1943.² On the same day, at the second and final meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Chiefs of Staff at the Citadel, the President inquired if plans were being made for an emergency return to the continent and added that he desired United Nations troops to reach Berlin as soon as did the Russians.³ The President was informed of the COSSAC plan and in the final report of the conference submitted to him the next day a statement on RANKIN was included. "We have examined," the Chiefs of Staff said, "the plans that have been proposed by
General Morgan's staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have taken note of these plans and have directed that they be kept under continuous review."^4

By concurring with the British Chiefs in approving "in principle" the recommendations of COSSAC, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were accepting without thorough examination and without guidance or direction from the President the proposal that in any emergency entrance into the Continent U. S. forces would occupy France and Belgium and southwestern Germany. This decision was to have far-reaching consequences and was to become, in short order, a bone of contention between Great Britain and the United States which has not yet been buried.

After the Quebec Conference the U. S. Joint Chiefs shelved the question of RANKIN but the British Chiefs and COSSAC continued active study and planning.

In early November, on the eve of departure of the President and the Chiefs of Staff for the Sextant Conference at Cairo, General Morgan submitted in person to General Marshall a proposed revision of the RANKIN plan approved "in principle" at Quebec.\(^5\) The major change was in the delineation of spheres to be controlled by Great Britain and the United States. In discussing the problem, COSSAC stated: "In making our original recommendation ... we were handicapped by the fact that at that time (August 1943) no consideration had been given by the Allied Governments as to their policy for the disarmament and control of Germany." He had assumed, however, that Anglo-American forces would be required at least to control the Rhine and Ruhr Valleys and northwest Germany and to assist in the restoration of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark and had made his original recommendation for the two spheres on that assumption. After
Quadrant, the British Chiefs of Staff had examined RANKIN carefully and had asked COSSAC to reexamine the plan with a view to establishing mobile land and air forces in the best strategic positions from which control of German industry could be ensured. COSSAC's staff had consulted the Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet and documents prepared by the British Planning Staff and the Foreign Office. As a result of this additional study, COSSAC now wished to withdraw his original recommendation on zones and substitute a new one along the lines of the Post-Hostilities Committee's zoning. Accordingly, he now proposed that the U. S. sphere should comprise southern Germany, Austria and France and the English sphere should consist of northwest Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland and Denmark. The Russians should occupy territory to the eastward. This zoning, COSSAC remarked in his recommendation to General Marshall, provides a more equitable sharing in the task of restoring liberated countries than the original scheme and leaves the U. S. forces free to devote full attention to the "sufficiently formidable task of France." General Morgan added that planning was in progress on this basis.  

The changes proposed by COSSAC did not involve large areas. Belgium and Luxembourg were transferred from the American to the British zones and Austria was added as an American responsibility whereas it had not been included in the original COSSAC plan. France, with the largest population and area of the "liberated countries", remained American. The significance of the new COSSAC proposal was that it focused American attention on RANKIN as it had not been before. The allocation of spheres had been tentatively set down as "strategic recommendations" in August but now the Joint Chiefs of Staff learned that full-scale planning and preparations were proceeding in London along British lines.
General Morgan's recommendations were reviewed by the U. S. Joint Staff Planners who reported that action on them by the Joint Chiefs should be deferred pending information on our post-war political and economic policies. It was at once apparent to the Planners that COSSAC's plan reflected deep and careful study; he had coordinated his efforts with the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet; and his plan reflected British political and economic as well as military policy. Similar guidance and direction was needed, they felt, by the U. S. Chiefs before commitments on the COSSAC plan were made.

The U. S. Joint Chiefs acted on their Planning Committee's advice at once. At a meeting held aboard the USS IOWA on 17 November, enroute Cairo, the Chiefs prepared a paper for the British Chiefs stating that they had not approved the revision of RANKIN which appeared to have far-reaching political and economic implications extending beyond their cognizance and on which the Department of State and the President had not expressed themselves.

On the same day, the Joint Chiefs addressed a letter to the President. Explaining the new COSSAC proposals which divided Europe into three spheres of responsibility, the Chiefs stated that exact boundaries between U. S., British and Soviet zones could not be defined until agreement on the subject had been reached by the three governments. Due to a rapidly developing military situation it was necessary to come to this agreement as soon as possible but before it could be done, they needed guidance so that an occupation plan would be in accord with American political and economic policies and with international agreements.

The President replied immediately to the request of the Joint Chiefs for advice and for information on U. S. policy. He informed Admiral Leahy that he could not agree to the areas of occupation which General Morgan had proposed.
and that he wished American forces to occupy northern Europe, that is, Scandinavia, Denmark, and northern Germany and not the area which COSSAC had recommended. 10

On November 19, while still embarked in the IOWA, the President met with the Joint Chiefs for a full discussion of the problem. He again defined the area which he wished American forces to occupy, and stated that the British should be responsible for France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and southern Germany and that the U.S.S.R. should occupy eastern Germany.

The President also discussed other implications of RANKIN. He told the Joint Chiefs that British political considerations were very evident in the COSSAC plan and he again emphasized that we should get U.S. troops into Berlin as soon as possible after German collapse or surrender. 11

After the President had expressed his views to the Chiefs, it was possible for planning groups to initiate definite studies. The Joint Staff Planners examined the feasibility of American occupation of the northern area proposed by the President and concluded that it was more advantageous from a military as well as a political point of view. The people in the northern area are more stable racially and politically, ports and lines of communications are better and less liable to sabotage, and they concluded that we should have to remain there less time. The defeat of Japan is a primary concern, taking priority over restoration and rehabilitation of Europe; supplies and shipping must not be tied up in Europe when they can be used in the Pacific war. Hence the area committing least forces for the shortest time is most desirable for American occupation. The Joint Staff Planners also considered the problem of "cross-over". Plans for the invasion of France called for American forces on
the right or west flank of the Norman coast and British on the east. Should Germany not weaken suddenly or collapse and should we have a prolonged engagement in France, the line of battle would swing to a north-south axis with Americans still on the right and hence southern flank. Thus, if the U. S. should occupy northwestern Germany after her defeat or collapse as the President proposed, U. S. troops would have to transfer through British forces moving into southern Germany. This would be difficult with railroads, bridges and highways damaged by air bombardment but by careful coordination with the British our Staff Planners considered it feasible.\(^\text{12}\)

By Presidential direction and with this military study supporting their position, the U. S. Joint Chiefs on December 4 at Cairo replied to the British proposal on division of occupied territories. Rather than permit COSSAC to continue planning on American occupation of southern Germany and British occupation of the northwest, the U. S. Chiefs proposed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct him to revise his planning at once on the basis of the U. S. in the general area of the Netherlands, Northern Germany, Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with the British west and south of the American position.\(^\text{13}\)

To this reallocation of zones which was a complete reversal, the British Chiefs refused to consent. At the end of the Conference the British and U. S. Chiefs were still in disagreement and after lengthy discussion they could agree only that COSSAC should be directed to "examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres."\(^\text{14}\)

Here the matter rested for a month, during which the COSSAC staff continued planning on the basis of Americans in southern Germany and British in the north. On January 7 the British Chiefs replied to the American proposal
made at Cairo. "The difficulties in implementing it are such," they stated, "that it should not be proceeded further with." In a very lengthy report they elaborated the difficulties. If the occupation of Germany were not to occur until the invasion of France was well underway, transport difficulties of a "cross-over" would be insurmountable, as U. S. Army staffs operating in the southern sector would have to occupy later the northern area. COSSAC also believed that working up intelligence on the whole area from Denmark to the Swiss frontier which would be necessary for each Army Group would be too great a burden for the staffs. The greatest objection which COSSAC had to the change, however, was that diversion of his own staff to the replanning of RANKIN would be so serious a detriment to preparations for OVERLORD that the invasion target date would have to be postponed.\textsuperscript{15}

The U. S. Joint Staff Planners studied this rebuttal of their earlier recommendations and prepared a counter-claim. They informed the Joint Chiefs that they agreed that logistic difficulties of a "cross-over" would be great, but they strongly disagreed that they were insurmountable. As for replanning causing postponement of the invasion, they presented a letter from Lieutenant General Devers, Commanding General of the European Theatre of Operations, which stated changes could be made on the part of U. S. Forces without any prejudice to OVERLORD. The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department added that the proposed revision would not create additional burdens nor present additional difficulties; it was possible and desirable. The Staff Planners' paper concluded with the comment that "the most important point is that time is working against us. If the U. S. proposal is to be put into effect, the decision should be announced without delay."\textsuperscript{16}

The Joint Chiefs on January 25 made formal reply to the British re-
fusal to accept their proposals. Denying that a change in zones would so absorb planning staffs that OVERLORD would be postponed as a result, and suggesting ways to avoid "cross-over" difficulties by supplying British troops for the southern area from the Mediterranean theatre, the Americans again recommended that RANKIN be replanned on the U. S. basis. 17

On February 2 the British replied and added new objections to the change which they had not previously presented. Now they spoke about the desirability of British control of German naval bases in the Baltic and their close working relationship with the air forces and navies of Belgium and Norway during the war, and added the usual comments about the difficulties of "cross-over." Pointedly, they noted that the U. S. had failed to advance reasons for the proposed change but had simply demanded it and denied the difficulties of its execution. 18

There was now a deadlock. The COSSAC Staff, becoming General Eisenhower's staff when he assumed command of the Allied Expeditionary Force in January, had been directed to make plans for an emergency return to the continent in the case of the complete collapse or sudden surrender of Germany. These tentative plans had been approved "in principle" only by the Combined Chiefs at Quebec in August. The deadlock resulted because, without direction and without approval by the Combined Chiefs, General Morgan proceeded to make specific plans for the occupation by British and U. S. forces on the basis of zones proposed by the British War Cabinet and Foreign Office. When the U. S. Chiefs had been informed what the boundaries of these areas were, they ascertained the views of the President and protested, recommending that the zones be changed. The British Chiefs had refused the change. A series of papers had been exchanged.
without result. Now, on February 4 the Combined Chiefs agreed that they could not reach a decision, that the matter was beyond their cognizance, and that it would have to be referred to the President and the Prime Minister for decision.\(^{19}\)

The President acted at once. On February 7 he sent a dispatch to the Prime Minister outlining the impasse confronting the Combined Chiefs. A decision by them was necessary, he said, before the invasion. He put the problems squarely to the Prime Minister: "I am absolutely unwilling to police France and possibly Italy and the Balkans as well. After all, France is your baby and will take a lot of nursing in order to bring it to the point of walking alone. It would be very difficult for me to keep in France my military force or management for any length of time."\(^{20}\)

The Prime Minister's reply on February 23 echoed the old cries of the British Staff. He complained that the U. S. Chiefs had never given reasons for the reallocation of spheres. He ran through the standard objections: "crossing" of lines of communication, British need to control German naval ports on the Baltic, and the relationship between the RAF and Norwegian and Netherlands' air forces. The Prime Minister failed to understand, he said, the President's aversion to police work in France. Communications through France did not in his estimate involve policing and in any case, the French provisional government would be in effective control. The Prime Minister rejected the President's appeal. "All our thoughts and energies must be given to making a success of OVERLORD," he concluded. "I consider that only reasons of over-riding importance could justify such a fundamental change of plan as that proposed."\(^{21}\)

The President provided such reasons in a letter to the Prime Minister
on February 29. "'Do please don't' ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now."\(^{22}\)

To this letter Prime Minister Churchill made no reply.

Time was short before OVERLORD, and inasmuch as planning and preparations continued along the lines of British desire, every delay strengthened the British position and made it more difficult to advance our own views. When no reply had come from the Prime Minister after two months, the President in Georgetown, South Carolina directed General Marshall, senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, to prepare a directive to General Eisenhower. The directive should order Eisenhower to plan to send U. S. troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as occupation forces when the armistice should be signed.\(^{23}\) On April 25 General Marshall sent such a directive to the President.\(^{24}\) The President approved it but took no action for one more month. He then reconsidered it and inasmuch as there was still no reply from the Prime Minister to his letter of February 29, and on General Marshall's suggestion, the President sent the proposed directive to Mr. Churchill for his concurrence on May 27.\(^{25}\)

The directive stated:

"You are hereby directed to make such plans as are practicable to send American troops to the Netherlands and northwest Germany as forces of occupation when hostilities with Germany cease. For planning purposes, the area in Germany to be occupied by U. S. Forces will comprise the states of Schleswig, Hanover, Brunswick, Westphalia, Hesse-Nassau and the Rhine Province."
"It will be assumed in this plan that France, Austria and the Balkans will not be included in an American zone of responsibility and that Berlin will be occupied jointly by the U. S., British and Soviet Forces."

The Prime Minister's reaction was immediate. He said that he had not heard of the matter since he had rejected the President's first approach on February 23 and he had assumed that the subject was settled. This of course was ignoring the President's letter of February 29 which was the strongest statement of the American case. "A change of policy such as you now propose would have grave consequences" was the Prime Minister's manner of disapproving the proposed directive.26

The next round was the President's. By dispatch on June 2 he repeated his letter of February 29 and remarked that he had been awaiting the Prime Minister's reply to it. He had expected, he said, as a result of that letter that at least tentative plans would have been made for the occupation of northwestern Germany by American forces. "In view of my clearly stated inability to police the south and southwestern areas...I really think it is necessary that General Eisenhower should even now make such plans as are practical to use American forces of occupation in northwestern Europe during the occupation period....There is ample time for this," the President continued, "unless Germany suddenly collapses....Under my plan all of your needs can and will be taken care of in the northwest area, but I hope you will realize that I am in such a position that I cannot go along with the British General Staff plan. The reasons are political, as you well know, though, as a result, they enter necessarily into the military."27

The Prime Minister never replied to this dispatch.

The Chiefs of Staff had been unable to solve the problems of post-war
occupation because complex political factors beyond their scope confronted them. They had referred the problem to "highest quarters"; here the complexity of political factors was such that the Prime Minister chose to reject the American proposals when first presented to him and to fail to answer them when re-presented. The deadlock confronting the Combined Chiefs now extended to the President and Mr. Churchill.

While the President had been pressing the Prime Minister for a decision, preparations for occupation along British lines had been continued by General Eisenhower's staff. And, as the invasion date drew near, the European Advisory Commission in London intensified its work on surrender terms for Germany and control machinery for the post-surrender period. The Commission was a product of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of October-November 1943. Members were appointed at the Cairo-Teheran Staff Conferences and their first meeting was held in London in December. On January 15, the British proposals for surrender terms were presented to the Commission for consideration. The terms were based on the assumption that Germany would be divided into three zones for control purposes. The zones were those proposed by the Foreign Office and War Cabinet and were the same which the British Chiefs had introduced into Combined Chiefs of Staff discussions in November.28

British and Soviet foreign secretaries had agreed to this delineation of areas even before the Commission had been organized,29 hence the Soviet draft of surrender terms presented on February 16 proposed the same zones. In addition, the Soviets recommended that Austria and Berlin be occupied jointly by British, American and Red forces.30 The American representative, Ambassador Winant, lacked specific instructions on the American point of view and was unable to present the American case to the Commission until instructed. Hence
on February 19 the Acting Secretary of State wrote to the President asking for information. "We do not know what your thinking on this subject has been," wrote Mr. Stettinius, "and we have been unable to give instructions to Ambassador Winant relative to the American position."\textsuperscript{31}

The President outlined American policy with respect to post-war occupation of Europe very thoroughly in his reply to the Department of State. At the outset he denounced the British proposal that the United States should occupy southern Germany and France or have any responsibility for Italy and the Balkans. The burden of reconstruction of those areas is "not our natural task at a distance of 3500 miles or more." The President defined the principal object of the United States as "not to take part in internal problems in southern Europe but ...rather to take part in eliminating Germany as a possible and even probable cause of a third world war." This we could best do from the northwest. British objections to American occupation of this area were dismissed by the President. "Cross-over" of military forces is entirely feasible, the British desire to control naval bases on the Baltic is a question of long-range security, not of first occupation, and there will be, thought the President, ample time to work that out. "Americans by that time will be only too glad to retire all their military forces from Europe." Supply and shipping problems for our war with Japan will provide enough problems at a distance of 3500 sea-miles without our becoming involved in land transport to the center of the continent of Europe. The President nailed down tightly his arguments in conclusion, "If anything further is needed to justify this agreement with the British line of demarcation, I can only add that political considerations in the United States make my decision conclusive."\textsuperscript{32}

This statement of American policy was sent to Ambassador Winant on
February 25 together with a copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposals which had been submitted to the British Chiefs at Cairo in December. Ambassador Winant replied, in response to these instructions, that he was unable to present the Chiefs of Staff proposals to the European Advisory Commission. It was now out-dated by late developments. The area boundaries defined by the United States would cut the Soviet area into half of that already agreed upon by the British and the Soviets. Such a counter-claim without adequate reasons to substantiate it, and these had not been furnished, would only jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union. Furthermore the Ambassador felt that the Joint Chiefs' proposals were faulty in that the zone lines did not follow German administrative boundaries. Mr. Winant therefore asked for a restatement of the American position which he could present to the Commission and he recommended that we accept the occupation boundaries as agreed upon by the British and the Soviets withholding, of course, approval of the allocation of southern Germany to the United States.

The President approved the Ambassador's recommendation and the Working Security Committee, representing the State, War and Navy Departments, prepared a new statement of policy. Their restatement, in brief, concurred in the British-Soviet boundary lines, re-emphasized the original instructions of February that the northwestern area should be American and the southern British, and recommended that Austria be occupied by British forces alone.

This restatement received the imprimatur of the Joint Chiefs and the President and on May 1 was forwarded by the Secretary of State to Mr. Winant. The Ambassador presented the "restatement" to the European Advisory Commission and in short order the Commission agreed upon the area of Russian jurisdiction
which Mr. Winant had defined as "the objective of importance." The dividing line between northern and southern German occupation zones was also settled but inasmuch as Mr. Winant stoutly supported the President's views, within and without the Commission, that the British allocation of the two zones should be reversed, deadlock resulted again. Here as with the Chiefs of Staff and in the discussion between President and the Prime Minister it was still an open question which should be British and which American.

The problem became acute in early August. The Soviet member of the European Advisory Commission declared that unless a decision were reached at once on assignment of occupation zones between England and the United States, the Soviets would refuse to continue discussions on surrender terms and machinery for post-war control. In forwarding this information to the President, who was at sea in the Pacific, on August 2, Mr. Stettinius suggested a compromise to end the long drawn-out controversy. The British should agree to occupy France, Italy and the Balkans should that become necessary; the United States and Great Britain should have joint use or control of northwest German ports thus avoiding any American dependence on French routes; and American forces should occupy southwestern Germany. To encourage acceptance of the compromise, Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the northern area would be more difficult than the southern to control (contrary to estimates of the Joint Chiefs) and that whoever accepted responsibility for it would have to remain "in residence" longer. This State Department compromise of course put American occupation forces in the area against which we had been protesting for nine months but other provisions were designed to eliminate many of our objections to that area. The Undersecretary of State urged the President to approve because there was danger of a bad situation developing between Great Britain and the United States of which the Russians would be well
The President replied the next day. "It is essential," he said in rejecting the compromise, "that American troops of occupation will have no responsibility in southern Europe and will be withdrawn from there (Europe) at earliest practicable date." He foresaw no difficulty with England in regard to her naval problems in northwest Germany and he re-asserted the need for our use of Hamburg and Bremen in view of 3000 miles of transport. The President awaited, he informed Mr. Stettinius, an agreement from the Prime Minister that we would police only Northwestern Germany and he could see no reason why the Soviets should express concern at this time since their area was agreed upon.

The Soviets did not make good their threat to walk out of the European Advisory Commission discussions, but their ultimatum had served to call attention again to the deadlock on the allocation of zones at a time when Allied armies in France were advancing at so fast a pace that optimists were predicting the end of the war in two months.

It was this lightning advance in fact which caused discussion to open upon a "fourth front." The Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President and the Prime Minister, and the European Advisory Commission had been unable to agree; now the Allied Military Commander in the field raised the question. General Eisenhower reported to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on August 17 that he might be faced with the occupation of Germany sooner than had been expected. The only possible planning which he could attempt was on a "purely military basis," the rapid follow-up of his armies by direct pressure on the enemy. His armies, as deployed in France, were placed with the British on the left.
or northern flank and the Americans on the right or southern flank. Hence Eisenhower found himself, due to the exigencies of war and the absence of basic decision on zones of occupation, making plans for the occupation of southern Germany by his American troops and northwestern Germany by the English. Quite naturally this solution pleased the British Chiefs of Staff, since it was in perfect accord with their views, and on August 19 they reported to the U. S. Joint Chiefs that they were in complete agreement with General Eisenhower's solution.41

On August 23 General Eisenhower elaborated his estimate of the situation. Surrender terms as proposed by the European Advisory Commission and tentative control machinery were apparently based, reported the General, on the expectation that the German Army at some time would surrender en bloc. That now seemed very improbable and he believed it entirely possible that the German Army as a whole would never actually surrender, that Allied forces might enter the country finding no central German authority in control, "with the situation chaotic, probably guerilla fighting and possibly even civil war in certain districts. In these conditions the occupation of Germany will be a continuation of active operations. There can be no question of establishing central tripartite control...until Germany is occupied and order established."42

That is how the question now stands. On the eve of another conference between the President and the Prime Minister, basic decisions on Allied zones of occupation in Europe still have to be made. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander made plans in the Fall of 1943 for an emergency return to Europe by British and U. S. forces should Germany weaken or collapse
before the invasion of France was launched. Allocation of territory to be occupied by the two nations was on the basis of recommendations of various British agencies. This allocation was not to the liking of the President nor of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, but all efforts by the Chiefs to change it were fruitless, the President's appeals to the Prime Minister were unanswered, and the European Advisory Commission was deadlocked. COSSAC was superseded by the Supreme Allied Commander in January 1944 but planning along British lines continued as before. As the target date for the invasion drew near, and it was obvious that Germany would not collapse beforehand, the RANKIN plan was transformed from occupation of Europe after an "emergency return" to occupation after defeat in the field but areas to be occupied by Great Britain and the United States remained the same. The American reason for demanding a change in the allocation of occupation zones has remained the same throughout nine months of discussion—the political and military desire to be committed as little as possible in Europe after the defeat of Germany in order that our full attention can be devoted to the war with Japan. How effectively we can realize that desire will be determined by the second Quebec Conference.
APPENDIX

OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA AND THE BALKANS

Decisions concerning post-surrender occupation of Austria and the Balkans were made easily in contrast with decisions concerning Germany and France. In May, General Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for a directive to allow him to plan for the occupation of southeastern Europe, an area which had not been covered by COSSAC's planning as it was out of his sphere. The British Chiefs prepared a draft directive for General Wilson and sent it to the U.S. Chiefs for concurrence.43

They approved the draft but felt that a statement of U.S. policy should be included, a paper which should of course be approved by the President since it involved major political and economic considerations. The statement of our Balkan policy which the Chiefs prepared for Presidential study was based on the two letters of the President to the Secretary of State of February 21; ("I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans") and April 30 ("This Government is of the opinion that the southern zone and Austria should be occupied by British Forces.") The President approved the following statement on May 27 and the Joint Chiefs then sent it to the British Chiefs of Staff:44

"With regard to the occupation of southeast Europe the policy of the United States may be summarized as follows:

"A. No United States forces will be employed as occupational forces in southern Europe, including Austria, or southeast Europe, including the Balkans. Such United States forces as may be present in these areas due to military operations will be withdrawn as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities.

"B. United States participation in civil affairs in southern
and southeast Europe will be limited to procurement and shipment of supplies to Albania, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and to the employment of a small number of officers in connection with distribution until such time as U.N.R.R.A. can take over these duties."

These paragraphs were incorporated into the British directive to General Wilson and it was sent to him on June 9. The problems with respect to Austria and the Balkans which seemed to have been so quickly solved was suddenly confused, however, by twin inquiries from the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff requesting clarification of our position. The British commented that the June 9 directive to General Wilson stated that we would not occupy Austria, whereas on May 31 Ambassador Winant had informed the European Advisory Commission that "he was authorized to accept the proposal for the tripartite occupation of Austria." The State Department was taken by surprise and telegraphed Winant on June 15 that, so far as it knew, our policy on Austria had not changed; we still believed that "Austria should be occupied by British forces."46

Mr. Winant replied two days later. He explained that, although Russia and Great Britain had agreed on tripartite occupation of Austria, he had had no instructions on the subject. "On the last day I was in Washington [May 26/]," he wrote, "I accordingly took this matter up with the President and obtained his permission to agree to the tripartite control of Austria on the understanding that I would in no way commit us respecting the size of the contingent that we might be willing to contribute for this occupation. In working on the drafts concerning the subject of occupation of Austria, I rejected, for example, the phrase 'will be occupied by the forces of three countries' and have used the less concise phrase 'triplartite control.' When General Marshall was here I discussed this question with him and explained our limited position."47
Ambassador Winant's belated account of his discussion with the President clarified the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the British Chiefs on 12 July, in answer to their query, that "there is no change in the policy of the United States Government as regards occupational forces for Austria except that a token force similar to the force planned for Berlin may be sent to Austria in connection with a tripartite control of Austria that may be agreed upon." The State Department made a similar reply to the Foreign Office.

Meanwhile General Wilson had continued his planning for the occupation of Austria and at the end of July he reported that he plans, with General Eisenhower's approval, to occupy Austria with four British divisions.
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30. J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944.

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32. Memorandum from the President for the Acting Secretary of State, 21 February 1944.

33. J.C.S. 577/8, 27 February 1944. Memorandum for the President from General Marshall for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1944.

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45. C.C.S. 320/18, 11 June 1944.

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TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 52

C.C.A.C. 69/6

25 April 1944

C.G.S. 551

CCAC 69 Series

COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY
PRIOR TO DEFAT OR SURRENDER

Memorandum by the Working Party

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff by informal action approved the Basic and Political Directive for Germany in C.G.S. 551, the text of which is identical with C.C.A.C. 69/5. The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has been informed by the Chiefs of Staff that at a later date he would be furnished guidance on economic and relief matters (paragraph 7 of C.C.S. 551).

2. It is recommended that the Enclosure designated as Appendix "D" to C.C.A.C. 65/5, if approved by the C.C.A.C., be submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation that it be approved by the C.C.S. and dispatched to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "D" TO C.C.A.C. 69/5

ECONOMIC AND RELIEF GUIDE FOR GERMANY

The following directive relates to the period before the surrender of Germany. In areas where there are no military operations in progress, when practicable and consistent with military necessity you should:

(a) see that the systems of production, control, collection and distribution of food and agricultural produce are maintained, that food processing factories continue in operation and that the necessary labor and transport are provided to insure maximum production. German food and other supplies will be utilized for the German population to the minimum extent required to prevent disease and unrest. You will report on any surpluses that may be available as regards which separate instructions will be issued to you;

(b) instruct the German authorities to restore the various utilities to full working order, and to maintain coalmines in working condition and in full operation so far as transport will permit. Except in so far as their production is needed to meet your requirements, or as you may be instructed in subsequent directives, munitions factories will be closed pending further instructions. You will be responsible for procuring such goods and materials for export as you may from time to time be directed to obtain for the use of the United Nations. You will take steps to insure that no sabotage or destruction is carried out by the Germans of any industrial plant, equipment or stocks, or of any books or records relating thereto. Pending the issue of further directives you will take such steps as you think desirable to preserve intact all such plant, equipment, books and records, paying particular attention to research and experimental establishment;

-1-
(c) exercise control over German shipping, inland transport and communications primarily in the interests of the Allied military effort and see that they are maintained in a full state of efficiency;

(d) establish a system of control over export and import trade. In determining what exports shall be permitted, paramount consideration shall be granted to your military needs. Records will be kept of all import and export transactions;

(e) instruct the German authorities to maintain the limits on prices and wages in force under the most recent German regulations. The rationing system for important staple commodities shall be retained or re-established. Black market activities and hoarding will be severely punished. Generally you will take all possible steps to prevent inflation;

(f) where possible work through the existing German administrative and economic machinery in carrying out the above program, bearing in mind the principles as regards removal of Nazi personnel contained in paragraph 6 of the political guide at Appendix "A";

(g) permit the formation of a democratic trade union movement and other forms of free economic association.
COMBINED CIVIL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY
PRIOR TO DEFEAT OR SURRENDER

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure is C.C.A.C. 69/4 on the above subject as amended by the Combined Civil Affairs Committee at its 26th Meeting and as further amended by informal action.

It was submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a recommendation that it be approved and dispatched.

T. E. H. BIRLEY,
W. M. CAMERON,
Combined Secretariat.
ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

DIRECTIVE FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY
PRIOR TO DEFEAT OR SURRENDER

1. This directive is subject to such alteration as may be necessary to meet joint recommendations of the European Advisory Commission in regard to the post-surrender period. It relates to the period before defeat or surrender of Germany and to such parts of Germany and Austria as are overrun by the forces under your command during such period. The same policy will be applied to occupied parts of Austria as to occupied parts of Germany except where different treatment is required for Austria to meet the provisions of the Political Guide at Appendix "B" or other paragraphs dealing specifically with Austria.

2. Military government will be established and will extend over all parts of Germany, including Austria, progressively as the forces under your command capture German territory. Your rights in Germany prior to unconditional surrender or German defeat will be those of an occupying power.

3. a. By virtue of your position you are clothed with supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority and power in the areas occupied by forces under your command. This authority will be broadly construed and includes authority to take all measures deemed by you necessary, desirable or appropriate in relation to the exigencies of military operations and the objectives of a firm military government.

   b. You are authorized at your discretion, to delegate the authority herein granted to you in whole or in part to members of your command, and further to authorize them at their discretion to make appropriate sub-delegations. You are further authorized to appoint members of your command as Military Governors of such territory or areas as you may determine.

   -1- Enclosure
You are authorized to establish such military courts for the control of the population of the occupied areas as may seem to you desirable, and to establish appropriate regulations regarding their jurisdiction and powers.

The military government shall be a military administration which will show every characteristic of an allied undertaking, acting in the interests of the United Nations. Whether or not U.S. and U.K. civil affairs personnel will be integrated other than at your headquarters will be a matter for your decision.

4. The U.S. and British flags shall be displayed at headquarters and posts of the military government. The administration shall be identical throughout those parts of Germany occupied by forces under your command, subject to any special requirements due to local circumstances.

5. The military administration shall contain no political agencies or political representatives of the U.S. and U.K. U.S. and U.K. political officers appointed at your headquarters will continue in office.

6. Representatives of civilian agencies of the U.S.-U.K. Governments or of UNRRA shall not participate unless and until you consider such participation desirable when it will be subject, as to time and extent, to decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on your recommendation.

7. Appendix "A", Political Guide for Germany; Appendix "B", Political Guide for Austria, are attached hereto. Appendix "C", Financial Guide; Appendix "D", Economic Guide; and Appendix "E", Relief Guide; will be transmitted at a later date.
custody, except for those organizations specially directed by you in (2) above. A special effort should be made to seize and preserve all records and plans of the German military organizations and of the Nazi Party, and of the Security, Criminal, and Ordinary Police, and records of Nazi economic organizations and industrial establishments.

4. You will take steps to prevent the operation of all Nazi laws which discriminate on the basis of race, color, or creed or political opinions. All persons who were detained or placed in custody by the Nazis on such grounds should be released subject to requirements of security and interests of the individual concerned.

5. a. The operation of the criminal and civil courts of the German Reich will be suspended. However, at the earliest possible moment you should permit their functioning under such regulation, supervision, and control as you may determine. The operation of politically objectionable courts, e.g., People’s courts, will be permanently suspended with a view to eventual abolition. All Nazi elements will be eliminated from the judiciary.

b. Security Police, excluding Criminal Police, but including Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst, should be disarmed, disbanded and imprisoned. Criminal and Ordinary Police should be retained subject to the removal of Nazi or otherwise undesirable elements.

6. The replacement of local Government officials who may be removed will rest with the Supreme Commander who will decide whether the functioning of the military government is better served by the appointment of officers of the occupation forces or by the use of the services of Germans. Military Government will be effected as a general principle through indirect rule. The principal link for this indirect rule should be at the Bezirk or Kreis level; controls at higher levels will be inserted at your discretion. Subject to any necessary dismissals, local
APPENDIX "A"

POLITICAL GUIDE

1. The administration shall be firm. It will at the same time be just and humane with respect to the civilian population so far as consistent with strict military requirements. You will strongly discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the German officials and population. It should be made clear to the local population that military occupation is intended: (1) to aid military operations; (2) to destroy Nazism-Fascism and the Nazi Hierarchy; (3) to maintain and preserve law and order; and (4) to restore normal conditions among the civilian population as soon as possible, in so far as such conditions will not interfere with military operations.

2. a. Adolf Hitler, his chief Nazi associates, and all persons suspected of having committed war crimes will be arrested and held for investigation and subsequent disposition, including those who appear on lists drawn up by the United Nations which will be communicated to you. The heads of all ministries and other high political functionaries of the German Reich and those Germans who have held high positions in occupied allied countries found within occupied territory will be interned and held pending further instructions.

b. The same shall apply in the case of any national of any of the United Nations who is alleged to have committed offenses against his national law and of any other person whose name or designation appears on lists to be similarly communicated.

3. The intention is to dissolve the Nazi party throughout Germany as soon as possible. In furtherance of this object, you should: (1) take possession of offices and records of all Party organizations and make lists of them; (2) suspend activities of all Party organizations except those which you may require to continue to function for administrative convenience; (3) arrest and imprison high Party officials; (4) take Party property into
officials should be instructed to continue to carry out their
duties. No actual appointment of Germans to important posts will
be made until it has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. It should be made clear to any German, after eventual
appointment to an important post, and to all other Governmental
officials and employees, that their continued employment is
solely on the basis of satisfactory performance and behavior. In
general the entire Nazi leadership will be removed from any post
of authority and no permanent member of the German General Staff
nor of the Nazi Hierarchy will occupy any important Governmental
or Civil position. The German Supreme Command and General Staff
will be disbanded in such a way as will insure that its possible
resuscitation later will be made as difficult as possible.

7. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 10, and to the ex-
tent that military interests are not prejudiced, freedom of
speech and press, and of religious worship should be permitted.
Consistent with military necessity, all religious institutions
shall be respected and all efforts will be made to preserve
historical archives, classical monuments, and objects of art.

8. Diplomatic and consular officials of countries at war with
any of the United Nations and of neutrals will be dealt with in
accordance with instructions to be issued by the Combined Chiefs
of Staff.

9. a. Prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United
Nations and associated nations and their nationals confined,
interned or otherwise under restraint by German authorities
will be freed from confinement and placed under military
control or restriction as may be appropriate pending other
disposition.

b. So far as practicable after identification and examina-
tion, allied nationals should be given opportunity to join the
armed forces of their country if represented by units in the
theater, or to serve in labor battalions organized by the

Appendix "A"
military or in other approved civilian work, provided their loyalties to the allies have been determined and they qualify physically and otherwise. All practical measures should be taken to insure health and welfare of Allied nationals. They should not be allowed to disperse until plans are made for their employment or other disposition. Former prisoners of war released by the Axis may be found. They should be identified and requests addressed to their respective military commanders for instructions as to their disposition.

g. Allied and neutral civilian internees found in the territory should be placed in restricted residence with provision being made for their care until they show that they can provide for themselves. Work should be provided when practicable. They should be identified as to nationality in order that their presence in the territory may be communicated to their respective governments.

d. If feasible and practicable, enemy nationals, other than nationals of the country under occupation, will be identified and registered and those whose freedom of movement would endanger the security of the armed forces or be otherwise undesirable will be interned or their activities curtailed as may be necessary under the circumstances.

10. a. The propagation of Nazi doctrines and propaganda in any form shall be prohibited. Guidance on German education and schools will be given to you in a separate directive.

b. No political activity of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized by you. Unless you deem otherwise, it is desirable that neither political personalities nor organized political groups, shall have any part in determining the policies of the military administration. It is essential to avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, any political elements. German political leaders in exile shall have no part in the administration.
TOP SECRET

g. You will institute such censorship and control of press, printing, publications, and the dissemination of news or information by the above means and by mail, radio, telephone, and cable or other means as you consider necessary in the interests of military security and intelligence of all kinds and to carry out the principles laid down in this directive.

11. A plan should be prepared by you to prevent transfers of title of real and personal property intended to defeat, evade, or avoid the orders, proclamations, or decrees of the military government or the decision of the courts established by it.

12. All property in the German territory belonging to the German Reich or to any country with which any of the United Nations are at war will be controlled directly or indirectly pending further instructions, subject to such use thereof as you may direct.

b. Your responsibility for the property of the United Nations other than U.K. and U.S. and their nationals in areas to be liberated or occupied by Allied Forces shall be the same as for the property of U.K. and U.S. and their nationals except where a distinction is expressly provided by treaty or agreement. Within such limits as are imposed by the military situation you should take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve and protect such property.
TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

POLITICAL GUIDE FOR AUSTRIA

1. The political aims of the occupation of Austria will differ fundamentally from those of the occupation of Germany in that their primary purpose will be that of liberation. Though it will be of great importance that the occupying forces in Germany should make a good impression on the inhabitants, this will be of even more importance in Austria and the impression to be aimed at is of a different kind. You should try to insure that occupation by Allied Forces in no way suffers by comparison with occupation by Germans.

2. In applying the political guide at Appendix "A" to Austria you should bear in mind the following points:

a. Paragraph 1. The attitude to the Austrian population should be more friendly than in Germany. There will be no need to discourage some degree of fraternization. In addition to the four points enumerated in the last sentence in this paragraph the following should be added: "To liberate Austria from German domination and pave the way for a free and independent Austria."

b. Paragraph 8. A large proportion of the administrative posts in Austria have been filled by Reich Germans and the replacement of local government officials may therefore have to be more complete than in Germany. Their replacement should proceed as rapidly as practicable having regard to the requirements of military security and administrative possibilities. Every encouragement should be given to Austrians untainted by Nazi sympathies to fill the vacated posts. Only the highest appointments will require the prior approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

c. In Austria there is no intermediate administrative unit between the Reichsgaue and the Kreise and the principal

Appendix "B"
link for civil affairs must therefore be the former until it is possible to restore the old Austrian Länder.

d. Paragraph 10 a. In addition to Nazi doctrines and propaganda, it will be necessary to prohibit propaganda for pan-Germanism and renewal of association with Germany.

e. Paragraph 10 b. You should be prepared to give more latitude to political activity in Austria than in Germany.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM


DISCUSSION

2. Subsequent to the transmission of the above directive to General Eisenhower, the U.S. Treasury Department requested of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department, that this directive be revised as a result of a re-examination and reconsideration by the U.S. Treasury Department of some of the basic premises involved, in the light of recent Allied experience in the Naples and Rome Areas. Specifically the U.S. Treasury Department proposed that:

a. the closing of the banks and the declaration of a moratorium be made discretionary with the Military Commander rather than mandatory;

b. no instructions be issued to block accounts in financial institutions except for certain specified classifications of such accounts;

c. no instructions be issued to call in large denomination Reichsmark notes;

d. no prohibition be issued against servicing the public debt.
The U.S. Treasury recommends imposing only a minimum of new financial controls or regulations until it is possible to introduce a comprehensive anti-inflationary and control program, following an opportunity to observe and analyze the financial and economic factors inherent in Germany's post-occupation condition. It is the expressed opinion of the U.S. Treasury Department that such a comprehensive program cannot be practically placed into effect in the first few weeks, or more, of occupation and that it would be inadvisable to attempt such a program before adequate preparations and other conditions within the area are such as to insure its administrative feasibility. It should be noted that less administrative supervision by the Allied forces is required during the early military phase if U.S. Treasury proposals are adopted.

3. The views of the U.S. Treasury Department have been considered by the U.S. members of C.C.A.C. and a new draft Financial Guide for Germany (Enclosure "A") has been prepared which follows the recommendations of the U.S. Treasury Department. The British Treasury has been consulted through their representative in Washington on the long-term programme referred to in the paragraph above. While reserving their position pending the receipt of the U.S. Treasury's proposals relative thereto, they have signified their approval of this new draft directive.

CONCLUSION

4. That the enclosed draft Financial Guide for Germany (Enclosure "A"), incorporating the changes, proposed by the U.S. Treasury, should be approved.

RECOMMENDATION

5. That the Combined Civil Affairs Committee recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the revised Financial Guide for Germany (Enclosure "A") be approved and dispatched to General Eisenhower in substitution for "Financial Guide," Appendix "C," C.C.A.C. 69/7, "Directive for Military Government in Germany prior to Defeat or Surrender," as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and transmitted to General Eisenhower on 31 May 1944.

Regraded Unclassified
SECTENT

ENCLOSURE "A"

FINANCIAL GUIDE FOR GERMANY

1. United States, British and other Allied forces will use Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency or coins in their possession. Allied Military marks and Reichsmark currency and coin now in circulation in Germany will be legal tender without distinction and will be interchangeable at a rate of ______ Allied Military mark for ______ Reichsmark. Records will be kept of the amounts of the German marks used by the forces of each nation. Reichskreditkassenscheine and other German Military currency will not be legal tender in Germany.

2. In the event, however, that for any reason adequate supplies of Allied Military marks and/or Reichsmarks are not available, the United States forces will use yellow seal dollars and regular United States coins and the British forces will use British Military authority notes and regular British coins. Records will be kept of the amounts of currencies used by the United States and British forces.

3. If it is found necessary to use U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, the following provisions will apply to such use:
   a. The rate of exchange between the U.S. yellow seal dollar and the BMA notes will be ______ dollars to one pound, and the two currencies will be interchangeable at that rate. The United States Treasury will make the necessary arrangements with the British Treasury.
   b. You will issue a proclamation, if necessary, requiring all persons to accept U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes at the decreed rates. Transactions at any other rates will be prohibited.
   c. The issuance of yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will cease and Allied Military mark and/or Reichsmark currency will be used in their place as soon as available.

Enclosure "A"
d. U.S. yellow seal dollars and BMA notes will be withdrawn from circulation as soon as such withdrawal can be satisfactorily accomplished.

e. Records will be kept of the amounts of such currencies used by the United States, British and other Allied forces.

4. The rate of exchange to be decreed on your entry into the area will be ___ marks to the dollar and ___ marks to the pound sterling. Transactions at any other rates will be prohibited. Holders of mark currency or deposits will not be entitled to purchase foreign exchange without special permission. They will obtain dollars or pounds, or any other foreign currency or foreign exchange credits, only in accordance with exchange regulations issued by you.

5. The Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section for Germany will include in its functions the control of all funds to be used by the Allied Military forces within the area, except yellow seal dollars and BMA notes which will be under the control of U.S. and British forces respectively. It will maintain all the accounts and records necessary to indicate the supply, control, and movement of these currencies including yellow seal dollars and BMA notes, and other funds, as well as financial data required for the determination of expenditures arising out of operations or activities involving participation of Allied Military forces.

a. In so far as operations relate to the provisions of currencies for the pay and other cash requirements of military components of the Allied forces, the Financial Division will supply Allied military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the military force concerned.

b. In so far as operations relate to the provision of currencies for civil administration, the Financial Division will supply Allied Military marks from currency on hand and will record the debit against the Allied Military Government.

- 4 -

Enclosure "A"
SECRET

c. If found practicable and desirable, you will designate, under direct military control and supervision, the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or any other bank satisfactory to you, as agent for the Financial Division of Civil Affairs Sections. When satisfied that the Reichsbank, or any branch thereof, or other designated bank, is under adequate military control and supervision, you may use that bank for official business, and, if necessary, by making credits available, place such bank or banks in a position to finance other banks and branches thereof, for the conduct of their business as approved by the Allied military authorities.

d. The records of the Financial Division of the Civil Affairs Section established within the area will indicate in all cases in what currency receipts were obtained or disbursements made by the Financial Division.

6. Upon entering the area, you will take the following steps and will put into effect only such further financial measures as you may deem to be necessary from a strictly military standpoint:

a. You will declare a general or limited moratorium if you deem such measure to be necessary. In particular, it may prove desirable to prevent foreclosures of mortgages and the exercise of similar remedies by creditors against individuals and small business enterprises.

b. Banks should be placed under such control as deemed necessary by you in order that adequate facilities for military needs may be provided and to insure that instructions and regulations issued by military authorities will be fully complied with. Banks should be closed only long enough to introduce satisfactory control, to remove objectionable personnel, and to issue instructions for the determination of accounts to be blocked under paragraph c below. As soon as practicable, banks should be required to file reports listing assets, liabilities, and all accounts in excess of 25,000 marks.
SECRET

c. You will issue regulations prescribing the purposes for which credit may be extended and the terms and conditions governing the extension of credit. If banking facilities are not available you may establish such credits or make such loans as you deem necessary for essential economic activities. These will be restricted to mark credits and loans.

d. You will close all stock exchanges and similar financial institutions.

e. Pending determination of future disposition, all gold, foreign currencies, foreign securities, accounts in financial institutions, credits, valuable papers and all similar assets held by or on behalf of the following, will be impounded or blocked and will be used or otherwise dealt with only as permitted under licenses or other instructions which you may issue:

(1) German national, state, provincial, and local governments, and agencies and instrumentalities thereof.

(2) Other enemy governments, the agencies and instrumentalities thereof and their Nationals.

(3) Owners and holders, including neutral and United Nations Governments or national authorities, absent from the areas of Germany under your control.

(4) Nazi party organizations, including the party formations, affiliates, and supervised associations, and the officials, leading members, and supporters thereof.

(5) Persons under detention or other types of custody by Allied Military authorities and other persons whose activities are hostile to the interests of the military government.
SECRET

f. No governmental or private bank or agency will be authorized to issue banknotes or currency except that, if found practicable and desirable, you may so authorize the Reichsbank and the Rentenbank when they are under adequate military control and supervision.

g. You will issue immediately a proclamation prohibiting all transfers of or other dealings in real estate and securities, other than central government securities. You may, however, prohibit or limit dealings in central government securities, but only pending resumption of service on the public debt.

7. All dealings in gold and foreign exchange and all foreign financial and foreign trade transactions of any kind, including all exports and imports of currency, will be prohibited except as permitted under such regulations as you may issue relative thereto. Except as you may otherwise authorize, local banks will be permitted to open and operate only mark accounts, but if yellow seal dollars and BMA notes are legal tender, they may be accepted at the decreed rate of exchange and will be turned in as directed by you in exchange for mark currency at the decreed rate of exchange.

8. Non-yellow seal U.S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes will not be legal tender. No person, agency or bank engaged in the exchange of money will acquire or otherwise deal in these notes except as you may so authorize. U.S. Army and Navy Finance Officers and British Paymasters may, however, be authorized to accept non-yellow seal U.S. dollar notes and regular British pound notes from United States and British Military or authorized personnel for conversion into Allied Military mark or Reichsmark currency at the decreed rate of exchange, after satisfying themselves as to the source of the notes.

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Enclosure "A"
SECRET

9. All bona fide government pensions, allowances, and social security payments will continue to be paid, but steps will be taken as soon as practicable for a study of pensioners' records with a view to nullifying all unnecessary and undesirable pensions and bonuses of Nazi inception.

10. The railways, postal, telegraph and telephone service, radio and all government monopolies will be placed under your control and their revenues made available to the military government.

11. You will, consistent with international custom and usage, maintain existing tax laws, except that discriminatory taxes introduced under the Nazi regime will be abolished. Prompt action should be taken to maintain the inflow of revenue at the highest possible level. You will resume service on the public debt as soon as military and fiscal conditions permit.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I enclose a copy of a letter dated August 17, 1944 from Admiral Leahy, transmitting a telegram of July 10, 1944 from S.H.A.E.F. recommending the issuance at the proper moment of simultaneous orders of the day to the troops under the command of Marshal Stalin and Generals Eisenhower and Wilson to the effect that the final battle has begun and that "all is up" for Germany.

I see no objection to this proposal from the political point of view and consider it primarily a military matter. If you approve the proposal, you will no doubt wish to take it up with Churchill and Stalin.

Enclosure:

From Admiral Leahy,
August 17, 1944,
with enclosure.
17 August 1944.

SECRET

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has proposed the issuance of synchronized orders of the day by Marshal Stalin, General Eisenhower and General Wilson. This proposal is detailed in the telegram attached.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that the political implications in this proposal are such that, if implemented, it should be handled by the heads of state.

General Eisenhower has been informed that his proposal has been forwarded to the Department of State and the Foreign Office.

Sincerely yours,

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

Enclosure:
Copy of message SCAF 55.
SECRET

ENCLOSURE


To: Combined Chiefs of Staff.

No.: SCAF 55

10 July 1944

It is considered that we are approaching the psychological climax of the war and a decisive demonstration of military unity between the western, southern and eastern fronts may well turn flagging German morale into rapid demoralization. This is likely to be true not only of the German home front but of the German troops, whose relatively high fighting morale recently shows significant slackening.

It is proposed therefore that on a date to be synchronized by the 3 headquarters, orders of the day be issued by General Eisenhower, Marshal Stalin and General Maitland Wilson to their Armies. These orders would not be identical but would contain the following points:

a. Allied successes on the eastern, western and southern fronts.

b. In face of this combined attack Germany is finished as a military power and the German High Command knows it.

c. Let the Allied fighting men make a great combined effort to finish the job.

d. Into that combined effort will go the victorious enthusiasm the industrial workers.

e. The final battle has begun.

These orders should, ideally, be issued at the same hour but, short of that, on the same day so that the unity of intention will be manifest. This would be immediately followed by a concerted psychological warfare campaign on the basis that "the war is lost, all is up."

-1-

Enclosure
Orders would, on release, be broadcast in German on all available transmissions from Russia, the Mediterranean and the United Kingdom to impress on the German mind the idea of concerted and concentric action.

With the fall of Cherbourg and continuing successes in Italy ideal timing would be shortly after a notable success of the Russian offensive and when an important objective has been gained in the west such as a break out from the bridgehead area. Also if the release of these orders should occur several days before the surrender of Finland or Roumania, it would give the impression that they had obtained concrete results and the occupation of Germany from all sides is soon to follow.

If the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve this proposal it is requested they secure concurrence of the Russians and advise SACEUR of the approved proposal.

Upon approval, the exact timing of the publication of the 3 orders of the day would be recommended by SHAEF directly to the Russians through the Military Missions and to SACEUR through British Chiefs of Staff.

End

Enclosure
August 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State:

Referring to your Secret BC of August 21, 1944, in regard to General Eisenhower's proposal for the issue of synchronized order of the day to the troops under his, Stalin's, and Wilson's commands, to the effect that the final battle has begun and that "all is up" for Germany, I am directed by the President to inform you that he does not consider the present time appropriate for the issue of such a statement.

/S/ WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Copy to J. C. S.
TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

August 4, 1944

I am attaching the formal recommendation of the European Advisory Commission respecting surrender terms for Germany. The document includes the minutes of the meeting of July 25, 1944 at which the instrument of "Unconditional Surrender of Germany" was approved, a report by the Commission, the text of the surrender instrument, and a letter to the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia, and to the Representatives in London of Greece and the French Committee of National Liberation, inviting their views on the terms of surrender and the machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of those terms.

This afternoon I wired you the text of the surrender instrument.

The surrender instrument is essentially the same as that given to you by Ambassador Winant when he was last in Washington.

L. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Attachment:

Document, as stated, (in duplicate).
TOP SECRET

E.A.C. (44) 7th Meeting

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

MINUTES of Meeting held at Lancaster House, London, S.W.1 on TUESDAY, 25th July, 1944 at 6 p.m.

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PRESENT

Mr. J. G. Winant (in the Chair)
Brigadier-General V. Meyer
Mr. F. E. Hosely
Mr. F. T. Gousev
Mr. G. F. Saksin
Sir W. Strang
Brigadier F. C. French
Mr. C. O' Neill

SECRETARIAT

Mr. E. P. Donaldson
Mr. I. G. Prigorry

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AGENDA

1. Approval of text of the Unconditional Surrender of Germany.

2. Approval of the Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. Letter of the Chairman of the European Advisory Commission in regard to consultation.

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1. APPROVAL OF TEXT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY

THE COMMISSION -

(a) Approved the text of the Unconditional Surrender of Germany, agreed between the Delegations of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (The text in English and Russian is annexed; the text in German will be transmitted later)

(b) Decided to submit the Instrument entitled "Unconditional Surrender of Germany" to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for consideration and approval.
2. REPORT BY THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

THE COMMISSION -

Approved the text of the Report by the European Advisory Commission and decided to transmit it, signed by the three Representatives on the European Advisory Commission, as a covering document to the agreed text of the Unconditional Surrender of Germany, to the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (The text of the Report in English and Russian is annexed).

3. LETTER OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION IN REGARD TO CONSULTATION

THE COMMISSION -

Approved the text of the letter in regard to consultation and invited the Chairman of the European Advisory Commission through the Secretariat of the Commission to transmit it to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland (see note), Yugoslavia and the Representatives in London of Greece and the French Committee of National Liberation. (The text in English and Russian is annexed).

NOTE: The Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission reserves his position in regard to the Polish Government in London.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission

John S. Wenant

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission

William Strang

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission

[Signature]

LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, S.W.1.

25th July, 1944
In virtue of the Terms of Reference of the European Advisory Commission, agreed upon at the Moscow Conference, the Commission has given attention to the terms of surrender to be imposed on Germany and submits herewith, for the consideration of the three Governments, a draft Instrument entitled "Unconditional Surrender of Germany".

We have individually reported to our respective Governments on the course of the discussions which have resulted in the settlement of the terms of the draft Instrument. It is unnecessary for us therefore to rehearse the history of those discussions. It should be sufficient for us to say that the draft is designed as a predominantly military Instrument, consisting essentially of three parts. The first is the Preamble, which includes unqualified acknowledgment on the part of Germany of the complete defeat of the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air. The second part is a short series of military Articles, which provide for the cessation of hostilities by all German armed forces, and which will enable the Allied Representatives to carry out the more immediate measures of disarmament in Germany. The third part is a general Article setting forth the supreme authority of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with respect to Germany, including the power completely to disarm and to demilitarize Germany and to take such other steps as the three Governments may deem requisite for future peace and security. The Article further states that the Allied Representatives will present additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the surrender of Germany which the German authorities bind themselves to carry out unconditionally. The Commission will submit in due course, for the consideration of the three Governments, drafts of basic Proclamations.
Proclamations, Orders, Ordinances or Instructions laying down additional requirements as provided in the general Article.

There are three matters in the draft upon which the Commission makes supplementary observations and recommendations.

I.

The Preamble states that the Allied Representatives, "acting by authority of their respective Governments and in the interests of the United Nations, announce the following terms of surrender, with which Germany shall comply".

The Commission has considered what action it should take or what procedure it should recommend in order to give effect to the statement that the Allied Representatives would be acting "in the interests of the United Nations".

In virtue of the discretion extended to it in its terms of reference, the Commission has, as a first step, addressed a communication, a copy of which is annexed, to the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia and to the French Committee of National Liberation in view of their special interest in the terms of surrender for Germany. After taking into account any views expressed in response to this communication, the Commission will consider further practicable steps lying within its competence for consultation with these Governments and authorities, as well as with Governments of other United Nations.

Note: The Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission reserves his position in relation to the Polish Government in London.

II.

Article 2(b) of the draft Instrument states:-

"The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Allied State/"
State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the respective Allied Representatives."

The Commission recommends to the three Governments the following understanding as regards Article 2(b) :-

"Under Article 2(b) of the draft Instrument of Surrender of Germany, there is no obligation on any of the three Allied Powers to declare all or any part of the personnel of the German armed forces prisoners of war: it is their right. Such a decision may or may not be taken, depending on the discretion of the respective Commanders-in-Chief. Prisoners of war so declared will be treated in accordance with the standards of international law."

III.

Article 11 of the draft Instrument states :-

"The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine."

The Commission will submit for the consideration of the three Governments a draft Protocol on the Zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of "Greater Berlin".

The Commission will also submit for the consideration of the three Governments a draft Protocol regarding the military occupation of Austria.

John S. Winning, William Strange
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY.

The German Government and the German High Command, recognising and acknowledging the complete defeat of the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, hereby announce Germany's unconditional surrender.

The Representatives of the Supreme Commands of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter called the "Allied Representatives," acting by authority of their respective Governments and in interests of the United Nations, announce the following terms of surrender, with which Germany shall comply:

Article 1.

Germany will cease hostilities in all theaters of war against the forces of the United Nations on land, at sea, and in the air. The German Government and the German High Command will at once issue instructions to all German military, naval and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease hostilities at . . . . . . . hours Central European Time on . . . . . . . . . . (date) . . . . . .

Article 2.

(a) All armed forces of Germany or under German control, wherever they may be situated, including land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces, the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, and all other forces or auxiliary organisations equipped with weapons, will be completely disarmed, handing over their weapons and equipment to local Allied Commanders or to officers designated by the Allied Representatives.

(b) The personnel of the formations and units of all the forces referred to in paragraph (a) above shall, at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Allied State concerned, be declared to be prisoners of war, pending further decisions, and shall be subject to such conditions and directions as may be prescribed by the
Allied Representatives.

(c) All forces referred to in paragraph (a) above, wherever they may be, will remain in their present positions pending instructions from the Allied Representatives.

(d) Evacuation by the said forces of all territories outside the frontiers of Germany as they existed on the 31st December, 1937, will proceed according to instructions to be given by the Allied Representatives.

(e) Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.

Article 3.

(a) All aircraft of any kind or nationality in Germany or German-occupied or controlled territories or waters, military, naval or civil, other than aircraft in the service of the Allies, will remain on the ground, on the water or aboard ships pending further instructions.

(b) The German authorities will forthwith order all German or German-controlled aircraft in or over territories or waters not occupied or controlled by Germany to proceed to Germany or to such other place or places as may be specified by the Allied Representatives.

Article 4.

(a) The German authorities will issue orders to all German or German-controlled naval vessels, surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft, and merchant and other shipping, wherever such vessels may be at the time of surrender, and to all other merchant ships of whatever nationality in German ports, to remain in or proceed immediately to ports and bases as specified by the Allied Representatives. The crews of such vessels will remain on board pending further instructions.

(b) All ships and vessels of the United Nations, whether or not title has been transferred as the result of prize court or other proceedings, which are at the disposal of Germany or under German control at the time
of surrender, will proceed at the dates and to the ports or bases specified by the Allied Representatives.

Article 5.

(a) The German authorities will hold intact and in good condition at the disposal of the Allied Representatives, for such purposes and at such times and places as they may prescribe -

(i) all arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material;

(ii) all naval vessels of all classes, both surface and submarine, auxiliary naval craft and all merchant shipping, whether afloat, under repair or construction, built or building;

(iii) all aircraft of all kinds, aviation and anti-aircraft equipment and devices;

(iv) all transportation and communications facilities and equipment, by land, water or air;

(v) all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments;

(vi) all factories, plants, shops, research
institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions, designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of the articles, materials and facilities referred to in sub-paragraphs (i), (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) above, or otherwise to further the conduct of war.

(b) The German authorities will at the demand of the Allied Representatives furnish -

(i) the labor, services, and plant required for the maintenance or operation of any of the six categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above; and

(ii) any information or records that may be required by the Allied Representatives in connection with the same.

(c) The German authorities will at the demand of the Allied Representatives provide all facilities for the movement of Allied troops and agencies, their equipment and supplies, on the railways, roads and other land communications or by sea, river or air. The German authorities will maintain all means of transportation in good order and repair and will furnish the labor, services and plant necessary therefor.

Article 6.

(a) The German authorities will release to the Allied Representatives, in accordance with the procedure to be laid down by them, all prisoners of war at present in their power, belonging to the forces of the United Nations, and will furnish full lists of these persons indicating the places of their detention in Germany or territory occupied by Germany.
Pending the release of such prisoners of war, the German authorities will protect them in their persons and property and provide them with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical attention and money in accordance with their rank or official position.

(b) The German authorities will in like manner provide for and release all other nationals of the United Nations who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of any Nazi action, law or regulation which discriminates on the ground of race, color, creed or political belief.

(c) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions of this Article the German authorities will hand over control of the places of detention there mentioned to such officers as may be designated for the purpose by the Allied Representatives.

Article 7.

The German authorities will furnish to the Allied Representatives -

(a) full information regarding the forces referred to in Article 2(a), and in particular will within twenty-four hours of the time of surrender furnish all information which the Allied Representatives may require concerning the numbers, locations and dispositions of such forces, whether located inside or outside Germany;

(b) complete and detailed information concerning mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith. All such safety lanes will be kept open and clearly marked; all mines, minefields and other dangerous obstacles will as far as possible be rendered safe, and
all aids to navigation will be reinstated. Unarmed German military and civilian personnel with the necessary equipment will be made available and utilised for the above purposes and for the removal of mines, minefields and other obstacles as directed by the Allied Representatives.

Article 8.

The German authorities will prevent the destruction, removal, concealment, transfer or scuttling of, or damage to, all military, naval, air, shipping, port, industrial and other like property and facilities and all records and archives, wherever they may be situated, except as may be directed by the Allied Representatives.

Article 9.

Pending the institution of control by the Allied Representatives over all means of communication, all radio and telecommunication installations and other forms of wire or wireless communications, whether ashore or afloat, under German control, will cease transmission except as directed by the Allied Representatives.

Article 10.

The forces, nationals, ships, aircraft, military equipment, and other property in Germany or in German control or service or at German disposal, of any other country at war with any of the Allies, will be subject to the provisions of this Instrument and of any proclamations, orders, ordinances or instructions issued thereunder.

Article 11.

The Allied Representatives will station forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany as they may determine.
Article 12.

(a) The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament and demilitarisation of Germany, as they deem requisite for future peace and security.

(b) The Allied Representatives will present additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military and other requirements arising from the surrender of Germany. The Allied Representatives, or persons or agencies duly designated to act on their authority, will issue proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions for the purpose of laying down such additional requirements and of giving effect to the other provisions of the present Instrument. The German Government, the German High Command, all German authorities and the German people shall carry out unconditionally the requirements of the Allied Representatives and shall fully comply with all such proclamations, orders, ordinances and instructions.

Article 13.

This Instrument will enter into force and effect immediately upon signature. In the event of failure on the part of the German authorities or people promptly and completely to fulfill their obligations hereby or hereafter imposed, the Allied Representatives will take whatever action may be deemed by them to be appropriate under the circumstances.

Article 14.

This Instrument is drawn up in the English, Russian and German languages. The English and Russian are the only authentic texts. In case of any question as to the meaning of any of the provisions of/
of this Instrument, the decision of the Allied Representatives shall be final.

(Date and year) ............... (Place) .....................

................. (Hours - Central European Time).

Signed by the Allied Representatives:

(Name) ....... (Title) ....

(Name) ....... (Title) ....

(Name) ....... (Title) ....

Signed by the Representatives of the German Government and the German High Command thereunto duly authorised:

(Name) ....... (Title) ....

(Highest German civil authority)

(Name) ....... (Title) ....

(Highest German military authority)

The above text of the UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF GERMANY has been prepared by the European Advisory Commission on the instructions of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The text of the Unconditional Surrender, as agreed in the English and Russian languages, consists of fourteen articles and has been unanimously accepted by the Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission at a meeting of the Commission held on the 25th July, 1944 and is now submitted to their respective Governments for approval.

Representative of the Government of the United States of America on the European Advisory Commission

John S. Woodhead
Lancaster House, LONDON.
25th July, 1944.

Representative of the Government of the United Kingdom on the European Advisory Commission

William Strange

Representative of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the European Advisory Commission

Regraded Unclassified
Copy of letter dated 25th July, 1944, from the Chairman of the European Advisory Commission to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Yugoslavia, and to the Representatives in London of Greece and the French Committee of National Liberation.

SECRET

Under instructions received from the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the European Advisory Commission has been entrusted with the task of making recommendations to the three Governments on the terms of surrender to be imposed upon Germany and the machinery required to ensure the fulfilment of those terms.

The Commission has reached a point in its studies at which it would welcome an expression of the views of the European Allied Governments on any of these matters which those Governments would wish to convey to the Commission.

I am therefore desired by the Commission to say that if the French Committee of National Liberation should wish to lay before the Commission any statement of their views on any of the problems referred to above or any exposition of their special interests in any of these matters, the Commission would be glad to receive such statements in writing so that it could take them into account in its further deliberations.

I would emphasise that, since the work of the Commission in its present phase has important military aspects, the proceedings of the Commission are secret, and that it is essential that there should be no public disclosure either of the content of the communications which may be addressed to the Commission by the Governments concerned, or even of the fact that such communications have been made at all. The Commission therefore counts on the Governments concerned to take the necessary security precautions to this end.

NOTE: In the letter addressed to the Representative of the French Committee of National Liberation the words "or authorities" have been inserted in the text after "Governments".
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

July 17, 1944.

I have given careful consideration to the proposed draft tripartite statement to the German Army forwarded with your memorandum of July 11, 1944.

It does not appear to me that Allied progress on all the fronts has yet been sufficiently impressive to promise the best results that might be obtained from such a tripartite statement.

Later, when our combined attack shall have made further and more impressive advances an approach to Churchill and Stalin suggesting a tripartite statement may give better promise of agreement and more prospect of advantage to our attack.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADIRAL LEAHY

What do you think?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 11, 1944

The favorable progress on the Eastern, Western and Southern fronts recalls a suggestion made in a memorandum on June 3, 1944 regarding a tripartite statement to the German Army. You and your associate heads of Government may deem it advisable to give this further consideration at this stage. For that reason a revised draft, shortened and brought up to date, is attached.

If Churchill and Stalin are agreeable to the idea, I would suggest that the views of the Russian and Anglo-American military leaders be obtained both as to timing and substance.

Enclosure:
Draft statement.
DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Soldiers of Germany, attention! Our assaults from the East, West and South continue relentlessly and with ever increasing force. New blows will fall.

Your defeat is inevitable. In your hearts you know this is true. You know that you have nothing to hope for from prolonging the struggle. Nothing you can do can change the outcome.

Your Nazi leaders led you into war to satisfy their lust for power and conquest. They told you it would be a quick and easy victory. You know now how wrong they were. You marched across Europe – to Narvik, to Bordeaux, to Stalingrad, to Alamein. That was long ago. Since then you have begun to feel the force of our overwhelming power. Your homes are smoking ruins. Your comrades have died. You who have escaped from Russia, from Africa, from Italy, from Normandy, have known the long and bitter road of defeat. Where does that road end? You know the answer. It ends in crushing, total defeat, and in your own homeland.

Every German life lost from now on, soldier or civilian, is a needless loss. You who will die will die without hope, without
without faith in your cause. For what?

Your only escape lies in unconditional surrender.

Soldiers of Germany, what fate awaits you and your country when you lay down your arms?

We promise you nothing. Germany has made terrible and disastrous mistakes. Germany must atone for the wanton destruction of lives and property she has caused. That atonement will be hard. The false philosophy of Nazism, whose falsity, evil and futility must be now be very clear to you, must be totally destroyed. I repeat, we promise you nothing, but I tell you again certain fundamental things.

The Allied leaders - Stalin, Churchill and I - have made it abundantly clear that we do not seek the destruction of the German people. I repeat, we do not seek the destruction of the German people.

We seek the goal of human freedom, for all men - a greater true liberty - intellectual, political and religious; and a greater justice, social and economic. We seek a world in which all men may live and work together in freedom and in peace. In that free and peaceful world, Germany, in due time and as she makes and proves herself worthy, will have her place.

Until
Until you cease your hopeless fight, until your leaders surrender unconditionally, the blows of the Americans, the British, the Russians and our associates will increase in number and in intensity by land, by sea and by air until our inevitable victory is complete.
MEMORANDUM

From: Op-16-2.
To: Op-16-1.

Subject: Morale in German U-Boat Arm; Decline of.


Enclosure: (A) Op-16-2 Spot Item No. 286, dated 11 June 1944.

1. The general observations made in Reference (a) and Enclosure (A) still obtain.

2. Recent interrogation of U-boat survivors has produced no startling evidence of a change in the general level of morale. Certain salient points, however, may be said to have been confirmed in the course of interrogation.

(a) At this relatively late stage in the development of our anti-submarine warfare it is surprising that survivors from certain enemy units have exhibited relatively high morale. It has been consistently true, however, that morale has been high in absolute proportion to the amount of success enjoyed by a given enemy unit. Thus, survivors from several U-boats recently sunk in the Mediterranean which had successfully torpedoes a considerable volume of Allied shipping prior to their own sinking demonstrated high morale and expressed the conviction that Germany could still win the war. On the other hand, it was virtually the unanimous opinion of survivors from several Atlantic U-boats which had enjoyed little or no success that the German cause was hopeless; that the U-boats were "finished" and that Germany could not possibly expect to win.

(b) The majority of U-boat officer survivors interrogated recently have expressed in no uncertain terms the opinion that the U-boat is no longer practicable as an offensive weapon in view of the present magnitude of Allied anti-submarine operations. Even those officers who cling to a half-hearted belief that Germany might be able to win the war in the end seem convinced that the U-boat cannot be expected to play any part in a resurgence of German power.
Subject: Morale in German U-Boat Arm; Decline of.

It is generally considered that the introduction of new weapons for U-boats has had a stop-gap value at best, and that many modifications and improvements have had greater psychological than tactical importance.

(c) The effect of the devastation visited upon German cities by Allied bombings continues to play a significant part in the lowering of the morale of members of the U-boat arm. We have encountered occasional expressions of indignation of the "indiscriminate killing of helpless civilians" but, by and large, U-boat personnel whose families and friends have been rendered homeless are deeply depressed rather than personally outraged by the results of the raids.

(d) The Russian drive continues to obsess U-boat survivors, who fear the consequences of attack from the East far more acutely than the successes of the Allied armies in Italy and France. The fall of Rome and the invasion of Normandy occasioned no great surprise in the minds of U-boat survivors interrogated here, who appeared to expect these events as a natural sequel to the defeats Germany has already suffered. An occasional die-hard clings to the propagandistic theme that all of the defeats up to and including the present debacle in the east constitutes part of the broad, planned strategy of the German High Command.

John F. Hildebrand
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, 25, D.C.

SECRET

Op-16-Z

11 June 1944.

SPOT ITEM NO. 286

Subject: Morale of officers in the U-Boat Arm - as of December 1943.

1. Annexed memorandum was written by an officer P/W who had served on a German U-Boat which was sunk in December 1943.

2. P/W, who admitted being favorably impressed by the radio broadcasts of "Commander Horden", was requested to express himself in writing on the merits of the suggestion that Comdr. Horden should broadcast a carefully formulated appeal to the German Navy to give up the fight in order that all true Germans might save themselves for the task of rebuilding a new and better Germany.

3. The P/W, who has cooperated with his captors since he became P/W, is a member of an aristocratic Austrian family some of whose members showed sufficient lack of enthusiasm for the Nazis after the "Anschluss", to experience some disagreeable treatment at their hands. After the Nazis took over Austria in 1938, P/W after consultation with his father who felt that things were so serious for all Austrians that it was simply a matter of "sauve qui peut", joined the German Navy on the theory that it was the lesser evil of available choices, as he would be less exposed to Nazi influence there than elsewhere. P/W therefore entered the German Navy in October 1939.


DISTRIBUTION:

COLLINGH (P-21)
COLLINGH (P-25)
COLLINGH (FX-02)
Op-16
Op-16-1
Op-16-17
Op-16-17 (2)
MADE (1)
DH (Ottawa)
O-2 (Col. Sweet)
Translation of a German U-Boat Officer's Memorandum
on Personnel in the U-Boat Arm - as of December 1943

In order to gauge the possible effect of a radio appeal to surrender,
we must first of all take into consideration the politico-spiritual
education of the corps of naval officers and the attitude of the latter
with respect to the present war. It is the officer himself whom we must
consider because an officer is in command of a ship, and as captain he
is the only factor involved in reaching a decision on whether or not to
give up the fight. We shall restrict ourselves in our discussion to
the two main subdivisions into which all officers fall.

Let us designate as Group 1 all officers who belong to the crews
of 1930 to 1939, and as Group 2 all officers of subsequent crews, i.e.,
the younger officers, who have learned much from their elders in the
course of their training at their hands. For that reason we shall see
that the line of demarcation between these two groups is not very clear.
As prior to the war the naval officers' corps was not influenced by
National Socialist philosophy to the same degree as were the officers
of the other military services, it may be said that the beliefs held
by naval officers are in many instances not consonant with National
Socialist ideas. Thus a definite freedom of expression has survived in
the officers' corps of the German Navy and particularly in the ranks of
the officers of the first group. This freedom of thought extends even
to politics and to the field of foreign relations, and is relatively
independent of the opinions that appear in the German press and which
are hammer at the German people. Even before the outbreak of the
war and the advent of the Nazi regime, those officers, by reason of
their foreign travel and the traditions of the service, have been
accustomed to let their thoughts sweep beyond national boundaries.
Other foreign sources also contributed to the formation of their opinions.
It is for that reason that the corps of naval officers, stimulated by
the dearth of foreign newspapers, listens to foreign radio broadcasts
of both neutral and allied stations. The listening is usually done by
individual officers, and the discussions subsequently take place in
groups strictly "entre nous".

The officers who have been received into the Navy since the out-
break of war, i.e., all officers who have been designated as Group 2,
have without exception run the gauntlet of the Hitler Youth and have,
therefore, been exposed to a much more intensive Nazi education than
have the members of Group 1 who, although they too had received some
Hitler Youth training, were not affected by its teachings to the same
extent as those the major part of whose formative years were spent in
the Hitler Youth. Consequently those young officers possess little
ability to formulate their ideas objectively; they accept at face
value everything that is dished up to them not too cruelly by Nazi
propaganda. On the other hand these youngsters may with not too much
difficulty be convinced that the contrary is true.

Within Group 2 there are contained a lesser number of officers
who are definitely opposed to National Socialism without being conscious
of the why and therefore of their opposition. These officers are
equally susceptible to influence whatever its source.

Translator's Note:
† Unlike the American practice, a class of cadets in the German Navy is
designated by the year of its entry rather than by the year of its commis-
sioning.
Moreover there may be found in both groups an equal number of
fanatical Nazis and also of anti-Nazis, officers who employ such phrases
as "I didn't wish for war. Germany was big enough for me", half in
jest, but who have made such sentiment a part of themselves. But these
men constitute only a small fraction of the officers' corps.

It is generally recognized that the German Navy is by tradition
very conservative, and that the education of its officers was in accordance
with that tradition, viz., Prusso-German conservatism. It is precisely
this conservatism that is the backbone of Prusso-German tenets of power
and world-domination. These policies have been incorporated among the
cardinal points of the program of the National Socialist Party, and by
that means the conservative elements of the German Navy were given a
war aim in the war fostered by the party. This may be gleaned in part
from the cliché "German War of Liberation".

Thus the basic concept in the education of officers for the German
Navy is the indoctrination of Prussian militarism and in the sense of
obedience to the death, in its relation to the ultimate attainment of a
Greater Germany and the realization of a world-wide German empire.
This fundamental idea has been, and is still being hammered into all
officers, so that like a red thread it may be detected throughout the
pattern of their thoughts. It most certainly has given to these men
a goal to shoot for and a moral background for their actions.

And so in the course of the war a further rapprochement occurred
between the Supreme Naval Command and National Socialism, and thus
-Nazi terror propaganda came to find a more ready acceptance in the
German Navy. By terror propaganda we mean e.g., that the enemy's conduct
of warfare was represented as unfair, etc. However, with few exceptions,
this kind of propaganda found little acceptance in the U-boat arm, to
which we shall now confine ourselves, and in which branch of the service
the major part of the naval officers' corps is now active. The reason
for this disbelief in enemy unfairness may very well be found in the
fact that U-boat men are too strongly influenced by their experiences at
the front.

The influence of developments at the front on the attitude of
officers toward the war itself, its aims and purposes, is becoming more
and more noticeable. Especially in the course of the past two years
and particularly toward the end of 1943, many doubts and questions have
arisen concerning the outcome of the war and the ever-vaulted superiority
of German weapons. These doubts became stronger when, despite the many
promises of new weapons made by the U-boat Command, practically none
were supplied and things remained as heretofore. The former enthusiasm
and confidence in the power of their arms and in the competence of their
leaders turned into a kind of lassitude, and resulted in a mechanical
execution of commands. The phrase "Orders are orders" characterizes the
typical state of mind.

Nevertheless the war continued to be fought with bitterness, as
well as available and hurriedly supplied materials permitted. The
Supreme Command made its contribution to the war by repeating from time
to time its promise of new weapons and devices; by referring to the
enemy's anti-submarine warfare as of temporary effectiveness and
characterizing it as a mere bagatelle; and with such trite exhortations as
"Hang on, soon the worm will turn". But out on the lanes of the
Atlantic, officers observed only the negation of what the naval command
continued to reiterate, viz., that the enemy's anti-submarine measures
continued to grow in effectiveness and were anything but a bagatelle,
and that the new weapons did not and did not arrive.
And thus slowly doubts in the competence of their leaders and in the futility of the war became vocal; but of course, no one could so express himself in a larger circle. Voices were heard to say: "If something new doesn't come along soon there won't be any use of going out on patrol again", and also: "The Nazi commissars are whipping us out to the front". These remarks were made only half seriously, but they show the beginnings of a new state of mind. In very recent times lectures in a new course entitled "The Ideological Indoctrination of the Officers' Corps", were given by naval officers and Nazi propagandists specially selected by the Supreme Naval Command. The attendance at these lectures was ordered duty. The principal catchwords with which these lectures were identified were: "The War for Survival", "Ultimate Victory at all Cost", and "We have the better Morale, therefore we shall win". The reactions of both officer groups were almost identical; even dyed-in-the-wool Nazis murmured, "They would do better to give us decent weapons; we'll do the fighting even without all this talk".

From all this it is apparent that the older officers, those designated above as Group 1, recognize the hopelessness of the war and the impotence of the leaders in the face of happenings in the war at sea. But they are also too much aware of their own impotence vis-à-vis these same leaders, to address a voice of warning to them.

The second Group, i.e., the younger officers, also feel for the most part that the war is lost, but they still continue to trust and place their hope in the leadership by reason of their training and indoctrination described above.

But both officer groups continue to fight, though without enthusiasm, yet possessed of a certain fatalism, for all know only too well that for better or for worse they have been "sold down the river" by their leaders. And those few who may toy with the idea of rebelling against their leaders or of giving up the struggle, dare not to do so out of fear that even though not at this time, sooner or later they would be brought to book.

It is hardly to be expected, therefore, that naval vessels will give up the fight without exhausting all means at their disposal, be it then that the responsible officers are compelled by their crews to do so. But in view of the special conditions existing on U-boats this would be a most unlikely occurrence.

Nevertheless it may be assumed that in the event of lack of fuel and the impossibility of obtaining any fuel (e.g., in case of invasion), or by reason of other compelling circumstances, no resistance would be offered by a U-boat, provided opportunity were offered to scuttle the ship and the safety of the crew was assured.

Similarly, under like conditions, a boat would be willing to enter a neutral port, provided the possibility therefor existed and no hindrance were offered to her doing so.

Translator's Note:
"Vehopoltischeschulung" is a word that was coined by Ludendorf in 1918 when the sharpening necessities of those days brought about the institution of "Vaterländischen Unterricht" in the German Army in an effort to forestall the feared collapse that ultimately did come.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

The attached was received in the Map Room on 12 July as a copy for our files. We have no record of the original communication dated June 3, 1944.

We are informed that a revised message is being worked on at this time;

File

WILSON BROWN.
July 12, 1944

Lieutenant Rigden:

Copy for your files, as requested.

T. C. Achilles
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Statement to the German Army

Since receiving your memorandum of May 18, we have been giving constant study to the question of a statement designed to weaken the German will to resist.

We feel strongly that some such statement should be issued. General Eisenhower feels likewise. Ambassador Phillips, who has given considerable thought to it, has recently submitted a draft prepared jointly by him, Mr. Sherwood and officers of General Eisenhower's staff and placing more emphasis on military factors. We have accordingly prepared a new draft, which takes into account Mr. Phillips' and other suggestions and which is directed specifically at the German Army. A copy is enclosed herewith for your consideration.

If this statement meets with your approval, we would suggest submitting it to the Prime Minister and probably also to Stalin. We feel it would be wise to invite them to join with you in making it or to follow it with statements of their own, as they may think best. We realize, of course, that a Russian call for the German Army to surrender would not have much appeal but Stalin might consider such a message by you alone or by you and Churchill as an attempt to lighten only the task of our Armies in the west.

We believe the best timing for the statement would be as soon after D-Day as substantial progress has been made on the various fronts.

E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Enclosure:
Draft statement.
DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Soldiers of Germany, attention! The first assaults from the West have begun. The assaults from the East and South continue relentlessly. New blows will fall.

Your defeat is inevitable. You would like not to believe it, but in your hearts you know it is true. You can not forget it. You know, and your leaders know, that you have nothing to gain -- nothing to hope for -- from prolonging the struggle. You will suffer most while it lasts. Nothing you can do can change the outcome.

You know in your hearts that your Nazi leaders, who led you into war from no better motive than the lust for power and conquest, have failed. They told you it would be a quick and easy victory. You know now how wrong they were. You have bombed unprepared and unprotected peoples. -- I say begun -- For what? You have begun to learn what our bombs, which Goering and Hitler boasted could never touch the Reich, mean to you and to your loved ones. You have marched across Europe - to Narvik, to Bordeaux, to the gates of Leningrad and Moscow, to Stalingrad, to Alamein. For what? Your comrades have died. For what? You who have escaped
escaped from Russia, from Africa, from Italy, have known the long and bitter road of defeat. You have begun to tread the same road back from the West. Where does that road end? Soldiers of Germany, ask yourselves. Where does that road end? You know the answer. It ends in crushing, total defeat, and in your own homeland.

Your leaders knew that the total resources of the free world, in men and in the capacity to produce guns and tanks and planes and bombs, were incomparably greater than those of Germany and her feeble, unwilling satellites. But they believed, foolishly and blindly, that they could conquer the free countries one by one before they could unite to forge their overwhelming strength. You have only begun to feel the weight of that limitless strength. It grows day by day while that of Germany is wasted and shattered and bled away.

Your leaders are now making another mistake. Their one remaining hope is that if you can be made to resist long enough they can get a compromise peace. How utterly senseless. The Allied leaders - Churchill, Stalin and I -- have made abundantly clear the determination of our peoples to accept
to accept from Germany nothing but unconditional surrender. This means that the leaders of Germany must compromise. Why should we compromise? Our strength grows greater day by day as yours grows less. Victorious armies never compromise, and the time of our victory draws near.

Every German life lost from now on is a needless loss. You who will die will die without hope, without faith in what is right, you will die needlessly.

Allied life, too, will be lost, but our men will die strong in the certainty that their cause is just and that their sacrifice brings nearer the day of certain, overwhelming victory.

Soldiers of Germany, what fate awaits you and your country when the day of your inevitable defeat comes?

We promise you nothing. Germany, who now stands isolated and alone against a free and united world, has made terrible and disastrous mistakes. Germany must atone for the wanton destruction of lives and property she has caused. That atonement will be hard. The false philosophy of Nazism, whose falsity, evil and futility must by now be very clear to you, must be totally destroyed. I repeat, we promise you nothing, but I tell you again certain fundamental things.

The
The Allied leaders - Stalin, Churchill and I, have made it abundantly clear that we do not seek the destruction of the German people. I repeat, we do not seek the destruction of the German people.

We seek the goal of human freedom, for all men - a greater true liberty - intellectual, political and religious; and a greater justice, social and economic. We seek a world in which all men may live and work together in freedom and in peace.

The more quickly the fighting and the slaughter end, the more quickly can that better civilization come to the whole world. In that free and peaceful world, Germany, in due time and as she makes and proves herself worthy, will have her place.

Until you cease your hopeless fight, until your leaders surrender unconditionally, the blows of the Americans, the British, the Russians and our associates will increase in number and in intensity by land, by sea and by air until our inevitable victory is complete.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Plan that could be used at breaking of German Morale.

The memorandum attached contains ideas which may very well work out at a later date when and if the morale of the German Air Force is broken or appears to be on the point of breaking. I will keep this in mind, and during my next meeting with Air Chief Marshal Portal will talk to him about it.

H. H. ARNOLD
General, U.S. Army
Commanding General, Army Air Forces

Incl: Memo for Gen.
Arnold from F.D.R.,
5/21/44 /w/ Copy of
Memo for the President,
5/21/44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD:

To read and return for my files.

F.D.R.
SECRET

May 21, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1. Here is a thought which you might want to think about and possibly discuss with General Henry Arnold.

2. With proper timing and groundwork it might be worth while trying the long shot of inducing part of the German Air Force to head for Allied fields and give up. Although the problem is different from that of the Italian navy, an adapted and similar technique might be used.

3. A statement by Arnold, Harris, Spaatz, Portal and Eaker through the shortwave radio, leaflets, the underground, etc., at the proper time, might be made to the German Air Force somewhat along the following lines:

"Hitler, Himmler and the other Nazi leaders are using the German Air Force as their cat's-paw. These Nazi leaders think nothing of salting away money in the neutral countries so that they can run out on the Germans to save their skins when the going gets too tough—as it certainly will. They have treated the men of the German Air Force as mere expendables, and will leave them in the lurch before the war is over. The men of the German Air Force have courage and should not allow themselves to be misused by
the gangster leaders of Nazi Germany. The men of the
German Air Force have a way out. The German flyers are
a selected group, and leadership is expected from them
in saving Germany from the Nazis. They can easily fly
their planes to Allied airfields. They will get better
treatment there than they have had in Germany. They can
also then begin to show that the men of the German Air
Force have enough courage and leadership to help redeem
the honor of Germany which has been so besmirched by
Hitler, Himmler and the other Nazi bandits. At the
appropriate time, the men of the German Air Force will
be given the signals and instructions for landing at
Allied air bases, so that the requisite protection can be
afforded to them."

b. In point of time, it would seem best to wait with such a
possible plan until the German Air Force is more split up by attacks
from all points of the compass. At the present time, the Nazis
probably still have enough planes in Western Europe so that the men in
their Air Force feel they have reasonably good hunting. But when the
forces are split more than they are now, and the Air Force has seen
not only more of their comrades killed, but feel more strongly that
Germany can’t win and that the Allies are bound to win, there may be
a chance to get some of them to fly from the French, Norwegian and
Dutch airfields to the British Isles for the purposes of giving up them-
selves and their planes.
5. If such a plan works only to the extent that it worries the Germans to the point of forcing them to take additional safeguards to prevent their flyers from running out on them, it will have served a useful purpose. Since most of the airmen, even including the Germans, have a certain individuality and *noblese oblige*, nothing is likely to make them sorer than having some Himmler man with a pistol standing over them while they are engaged in combat operations.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany.

As you were recently informed by Mr. Kennan of the State Department, Ambassador Winant has requested a restatement of the views of this Government with respect to the allocation of zones for the occupation of Germany and Austria after surrender, for presentation to the European Advisory Commission.

The views of the Governments of the United Kingdom and Soviet Union have already been submitted to the European Advisory Commission. Ambassador Winant has considered it inadvisable to present the views of this Government to the Commission because (1) the United States proposal would considerably reduce the Soviet zone from what the Soviets and British have already agreed to, and would deprive the Soviets of the important railway junction of Cottbus; (2) our proposed borders of zones do not coincide with German administrative boundaries; and (3) the United States proposal does not state where the line would be drawn between the Soviet zone and the proposed British zone in the South. He has requested further instructions, and has expressed the hope that it will be found possible to accept the boundaries of the Soviet zone as already agreed to by the Soviets and British. Maps describing the proposals of each government and the differences between the United States and Soviet proposals as to populations and areas are enclosed.

A proposed restatement of the views of this Government, which has State Department approval and has been concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is enclosed. This proposed restatement would authorize Ambassador Winant to concur in the proposal to define the zones in
Germany in accordance with the British and Soviet plans, maintaining, however, the position of this Government as expressed in your memorandum to the Acting Secretary of State on 21 February 1944 that U.S. forces should occupy the Northwestern zone. The statement also expresses the view that Austria should be occupied by British forces, rather than by United States forces as proposed by the British or by forces of all three powers as proposed by the Soviets.

Subject to your approval, it is recommended that the views of this Government be transmitted to Ambassador Winant for presentation to the European Advisory Commission.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Enclosures:
(1) British proposal.
(2) Soviet proposal.
(3) U.S. proposal.
(4) Map showing differences between the U.S. and Soviet proposals.
(5) Statement of views.
British Proposal

GERMANY-ZONES OF OCCUPATION

REFERENCE

- Boundaries of Länder except Prussia
- Boundaries of Prussian Provinces
- Boundaries of Main Zones of Occupation
PROPOSALS FOR THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

POPULATION IN MILLIONS
AREA IN THOUSANDS OF SQUARE MILES

AMERICAN
Pop. 32.3
Area 77.7

BRITISH
Pop. 17.2
Area 49.2

AMERICAN PROPOSAL
WS-89, Annex B

SOVIET
Pop. 22.2
Area 71.0

BRITISH
Pop. 24.6
Area 50.5

JOINT
Pop. 22.2
Area 71.0

AMERICAN
Pop. 15.6
Area 45.6

SOVIET
Pop. 22.2
Area 71.0

AMERICAN PROPOSAL
WS-83, Annex B

VARIANT AREAS

Population figures based on Census of 1939

Compiled and drawn by the Department of State, Division of Geography and Cartography, March 5, 1944 — 1243 E
UNITED STATES VIEWS ON ALLOCATION OF ZONES OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY

1. Ambassador Winant should be instructed to concur in a recommendation by the Commission that the boundaries of the Soviet zone of occupation be defined as proposed by the Soviet Delegation.

2. Ambassador Winant should be instructed to concur in a recommendation by the Commission that the boundary between the Northwestern zone and the Southern zone be defined as proposed by the British Delegation.

3. With respect to the zones to be occupied by the United Kingdom and the United States, Ambassador Winant should be instructed to adhere to the directives which were given him under date of 25 February 1944 (EACOM 7) setting forth the decision of the President that American forces should occupy the Northwestern zone. This Government is of the opinion that the southern zone and Austria should be occupied by British forces.
April 10, 1944

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. President,

I have been in Istanbul fifteen months and I would like to take the liberty of making a short report to you of my activities in this period.

I

In regard to King Boris:

Following a talk with Ambassador Steinhardt upon my arrival, I decided to wait for King Boris to make the first advances. These came in May 1943. After several exchanges of messages during three months, transmission naturally being slow, the situation shaped up as follows: Boris felt Germany had lost the war, wanted Bulgaria out of it, but, like a man riding a tiger, did not know how to get off. Finally in the latter part of August I asked, that if American troops landed in Thrace, or in Bulgaria by parachute, would he agree that the Bulgarian Army would cooperate with them, or, at least, not oppose them. Three days before his fatal illness set in, I received a code message from Sofia that Boris was giving these requests serious consideration. That he would have agreed, I consider a fair chance.

II

Reports on German Secret Weapons:

As I constantly stated, I had and still have no idea whether this weapon or weapons really exist. My informants insist this weapon was bombed into desuetude by heavy air attacks on the Channel Coast and production factories, but may now be again produced to repulse invasion from the West.

III

Defection of German Officials in Istanbul:

Last September through a well-known Turkish adventurer I learned of certain German officials who were anxious to come over to us. While realizing the valuable information these men
might have and the moral effect of their desertion, I did not wish
to involve our Ambassador or Naval or Military Attaches in dealings
with them.

For two months I had weekly conferences with them alone,
taking precautions, because of the Gestapo, in meeting them that
would make you smile. They were then ready to leave Turkey, make
public statements and disclose all they knew of the Nazi, and Ger-
man military organizations.

Still not wishing to involve our permanent departments
in something that might go awry, I called in George Britt, Head
of the Office of War Information here, and asked him to arrange
their transportation out of Turkey with the British, and as our
head publicity man here to pick the most opportune time. This
Britt did in fine shape. The names of these German officials are
Hamburger and von Kleczkowski. Later, through von Kleczkowski,
was arranged the coming over to the British of Vermehren. These
men are now in Allied hands. I hope they are giving real informa-
tion and that their desertion provided us with good propaganda.

May I say in closing that I cannot speak too highly of
the official American agencies in Turkey. They are doing a fine job.

Particularly am I impressed by the great ability of
Laurence Steinhardt and the intelligent work of our Naval Attache,
Captain Trammell.

Cordially and respectfully yours,

Geoffrey Earle

George H. Earle

P.S. The situation as I see it today in Bulgaria is as follows:

Since the death of Boris, no strong Bulgarian has appeared. The
people and army, eighty percent of which are anti-German, are con-
fused, unhappy and in many cases, demoralized. Bulgaria is a ripe
fruit, ready to fall into the lap of the Russians at the first
opportunity.
April 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

I have spoken with Admiral Leahy in regard to a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff of March 25th.

I cannot agree with the proposed statement or the advisability thereof.

The trouble is that the reasoning of the memorandum presupposes a reconstituting of a German state which would give active cooperation apparently at once to peace in Europe.

A somewhat long study and personal experience in and out of Germany leads me to believe that German philosophy cannot be changed by decree, law or military order. The change in German philosophy must be evolutionary and may take two generations.

To assume otherwise is to assume, of necessity, a period of quiet followed by a third world war.

I think that the simplest way of approaching this whole matter is to stick to what I have already said, (a) that the United Nations are determined to administer a total defeat to Germany as a whole (b) that the Allies have no intention of destroying German people. Please note that I am not willing at this time to say that we do not intend to destroy the German nation. As long as the word "Reich" exists in Germany as expressing a nationhood, it will forever be associated with the present form of nationhood. If we admit that we must seek to eliminate the very word "Reich" and all that it stands for today.

F.D.R.

Regraded Unclassified
April 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:

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P.D.R.

TOP-SECRET
Proposed statement in regard to the (United Nations) - (United States) post-war attitude toward the German people:

1. The surrender of Germany announced as necessary to peace in Europe by the United Nations expresses their determination to administer a total defeat to the armed forces of Germany. The United Nations took this pledge not for the purpose of destroying the German people and Nation, but as a vitally necessary measure to put an end to German military aggression.

2. We know that only surrender can cleanse the German body politic of the elements which have brought Germany and the world to the brink of chaos. We know that only surrender can free decent and good thinking people of Germany from the tyrant sway of their gangster overlords.

3. These gangsters have falsely declared that we intend the extermination of the German people. They
have sought to transform our demand for surrender into a proof that we plan for Germany the fate which the Nazis planned for Europe. Nothing is further from the truth.

4. It is indeed the absolute purpose of the United Nations to take every precaution necessary against the renewal of German aggression, but it is not our purpose to extinguish the German people or Germany as a nation. The citizens and soldiers of the countries of the United Nations are not gangsters or barbarians, and barbarous and inhumane treatment of the German people is not an aim of the United Nations. The cruelties and wanton destruction planned by your leaders for other countries, and in great part carried out, shall have no part in the plans of the United Nations, and atrocities of that character will not be visited upon the German people.

5. It will be necessary for a time to occupy Germany which has by its actions made such occupation necessary. It will be a main task of Allied military occupation to create conditions for the rebirth of a peaceful German society. Only Allied occupation can give the German churches, the German schools, the German labor unions and other free institutions release from their present bondage.
TOP SECRET

6. The nations of the world well know that peace in Europe will ultimately require the active cooperation of a new German state. The common people of Germany, once they have proven they can no longer be made to follow false leaders who proclaim world domination and military conquest, shall be given the opportunity to shape their own free existence and establish a free government of their own choice. Only surrender of the Nazi Government and its armed forces can provide the necessary basis for a fresh start.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The unconditional surrender formula in its present form has apparently enabled the Nazis to invoke the spectre of annihilation and thus has stiffened the German will to resist.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a restatement of the formula of unconditional surrender should be made, elaborating on the points already made by the President and other United Nations leaders. If this restatement is to be fully effective in Germany, it should appear as the expression of the united intentions of the Governments of the United States, Britain and the U.S.S.R. Such a statement that is in line with British and Soviet statements concerning Germany should be possible of adoption without great difficulty.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff believe that some such announcement should be made at an early date so that it may establish a favorable condition precedent to OVERLORD. The announcement might be made immediately following a large-scale bombing raid of Germany.

The following is submitted as a suggestion for the proposed statement:

"The unconditional surrender demanded by the United Nations expresses their determination to administer a total defeat to the armed forces of Germany. We took this united pledge not for the purpose of destroying the German people and nation, but as a vitally necessary measure to put an end to German military aggression."
"We know that only unconditional surrender can cleanse the German body politic of the elements which have brought Germany and the world to the brink of chaos. We know that only unconditional surrender can free decent and good thinking people of Germany from the tyrant sway of their gangster overlords.

"These gangsters have falsely declared that we intend the extermination of the German people. They have sought to transform our demand for unconditional surrender into a proof that we plan for Germany the fate which the Nazis planned for Europe. Nothing is further from the truth.

"It is indeed the absolute purpose of the United Nations to take every precaution necessary against the renewal of German aggression, but it is not our purpose to extinguish the German people or Germany as a nation. The citizens and soldiers of the countries of the United Nations are not gangsters or barbarians, and barbarous and inhumane treatment of the German people is not an aim of the United Nations. The cruelties and wanton destruction planned by your leaders for other countries, and in great part carried out, shall have no part in the plans of the United Nations, and atrocities of that character will not be visited upon the German people.

"We shall indeed occupy Germany which has by its actions made such occupation necessary. It will be a main task of Allied military occupation to create the conditions for the rebirth of a peaceful German society. Only Allied occupation can give the German churches, the German schools, the German labor unions and other free institutions release from their present bondage.

"The nations of the world well know that peace in Europe will ultimately require the active cooperation of a new German state. The common people of Germany, once they have proven they can no longer be made to follow false leaders who proclaim world
domination and military conquest, shall be given the opportunity to shape their own free existence. Only unconditional surrender can provide the necessary basis for a fresh start."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
March 21, 1944.

SECRET

Dear Winston,

As I told you in my letter of February 29th, I have been putting the finishing touches on a directive to Eisenhower which would make him solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the administration of good order and reasonable justice when we get ashore.

The paper is now being cleared through the usual channels of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for presentation to Eisenhower, and I am sending you a copy herewith.

I hope you will agree that my efforts to keep it simple and to provide primarily for the first few months of occupation are on a sound basis and have not been in vain.

With warm regards,

As ever,

F.D.R.

The Rt. Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
10 Downing Street,
London, W. 1,
England
GENERAL EISENHOWER:

This memorandum is directed to you as Supreme Allied Commander in the event of the occupation of French territory:

I.

The three paramount aims which are to be the landmarks of your policy are the following:

A. The prompt and complete defeat of Germany.

B. The earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors.

C. The fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people as the government under which they wish to live.

II.

The following powers and instructions are given you for your guidance in the achievement of the foregoing aims:

1. The Supreme Allied Commander will have supreme authority in order that the war against Germany may be prosecuted relentlessly with the full cooperation of the French people. As such Allied Commander you will have the ultimate determination as to where, when, and how the civil administration in France shall be exercised by French citizens, remembering always that the military situation must govern.
2. When and where you determine that there shall be set up a civil administration in any part of France, so far as possible there shall not be retained or employed in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has acted in any manner imimical to the cause of the United States.

3. In order to secure the setting up of any such civilian administration locally in any part of France, you may consult with the French Committee of National Liberation and may authorize them in your discretion to select and install the personnel necessary for such administration. You are, however, not limited to dealing exclusively with said Committee for such purpose in case at any time in your best judgment you determine that some other course or conferee is preferable.

4. Nothing that you do under the powers conferred in the preceding paragraph 3 in connection with the French Committee of National Liberation or with any other group or organization shall constitute a recognition of said Committee or group as the government of France even on a provisional basis.

5. In making your decision as to entering into such relations with the French Committee of National Liberation or other committees or persons for that purpose, you should as far as possible obtain from it the following restrictions upon its purposes:
SECRET

a. It has no intention of exercising indefinitely in France any powers of government, provisional or otherwise, except to assist in the establishment by the democratic methods above mentioned a government of France according to the free choice of the French people, and that when such government is established it will turn over thereto all such powers as it may have.

b. It favors the reestablishment of all the historic French liberties and the destruction of any arbitrary regime or rule of personal government.

c. It will take no action designed to entrench itself or any particular political group in power pending the selection of a constitutional government by the free choice of the French people.

6. In any area of liberated France, whether or not there has been set up local control of civil affairs as aforesaid, you will retain the right at any time to make such changes in whole or in part which in your discretion may seem necessary (a) for the effective prosecution of the war against Germany; (b) for the maintenance of law and order; and (c) for the maintenance of civil liberties.
7. As Supreme Commander you will seek such uniformity in the administration of civil affairs as seems advisable, issue policy directives applicable to British, French, and American commands, and review all plans.

8. You may at your discretion incorporate in your Civil Affairs Section members of the French Military Mission and other French officials.

9. You will have no talks or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of terminating its administration in toto.

10. Instructions on economic, fiscal, and relief matters will be furnished you later by the Prime Minister, by the President, or by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Please read enclosed to Prime Minister Churchill. If you like it let it go, together with accompanying green documents.

F. D. R.
February 29, 1944.

Dear Winston:

I have been worrying a good deal of late on account of the tendency of all of us to prepare for future events in such detail that we may be letting ourselves in for trouble when the time arrives.

As you doubtless remember, at Quebec last Summer the Staff people took a shot at drawing up terms of surrender for Italy. The American draft was short and to the point and was finally adopted and presented.

But later on the long and comprehensive terms, which were drawn up by your people, were presented to Badoglio.

I did not like them because they attempted to foresee every possibility in one document. But, as so often happens, when such an attempt is made, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be later presented.

That is a good deal the way I feel about all this detailed planning that we are jointly and severally making in regard to what we do when we get into France. I have been handed pages and pages with detailed instructions and appendices. I regard them as prophecies by prophets who cannot be infallible.

Therefore, I re-drew them with the thought of making the Commander-in-Chief solely responsible for OVERLORD and for the maintenance of law, order and reasonable justice for the first few months after we get into France. I have suggested that he get in touch with local persons and with representatives of the French National Committee in such places as they have military status, but that he and his Staff bear the sole responsibility.

Now comes this business of what to do when we get into Germany. I understand that your Staff presented a long and comprehensive document — with every known kind of terms — to the European Advisory Commission, and that the Russians have done somewhat the same.
My people over here believe that a short document of surrender terms should be adopted. This, of course, has nothing to do with the locality of the occupying forces after they get into Germany, but it is an instrument of surrender which is in conformity with the general principles.

I am enclosing (a) an argument -- facts bearing on the problem and (b) a proposed acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by Germany.

I hope much that you will read the argument. I think it is very cogent.

I am trying as hard as I can to simplify things -- and sometimes I shudder at the thought of appointing as many new Committees and Commissions in the future as we have in the past!

I note that in the British proposal the territory of Germany is divided up in accordance with the British plan. "Do please don't" ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce and protest the paternity of Belgium, France and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for their schooling now!

With my warm regards,

As ever yours,

Honorable Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain,
London,
England.

(Enclosures)
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SURRENDER TERMS FOR GERMANY

You will recall that at the time of the Quebec Conference when word was received of an offer of Italian surrender there was considerable discussion between the American and British delegations whether a short form or a long and comprehensive surrender document should be presented to the Italian Government. You and Mr. Churchill eventually decided that the short terms as prepared by the American military authorities should be presented to Italy. Subsequently you agreed with Mr. Churchill that the long and comprehensive terms should also be given to Badoglio for his signature. As often happens when an attempt is made to foresee every possibility in one document, certain points were omitted and additional protocols with respect to naval and other questions had to be presented.

For consideration by the European Advisory Commission, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff with our concurrence have drafted a short instrument of surrender for Germany which by its terms provides that it may be implemented by proclamations, orders and directives as may be required. I have now learned that the British Government, which has presented a document with long and comprehensive terms to the European Advisory Commission, will insist upon this long and detailed form and that you may be approached by Mr. Churchill on this subject.

The Russian delegation to the Commission has also submitted an instrument of German surrender which in general is along the lines of our short terms.

I feel that I should acquaint you with this situation and particularly inform you that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff hold strongly to the opinion that the short surrender terms should be adopted. A copy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff paper is attached hereto, together with a copy of the proposed Russian instrument of surrender.

Enclosures:
   Copy of Joint Chiefs of Staff paper.
   Copy of Russian instrument of surrender.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter from the President to the Prime Minister relative to terms of surrender.

I think your letter of February 29 to the Prime Minister is excellent and it is going forward to him tonight via fast Army pouch.

[Signature]

SECRET

E.A.C. (ld) 2
16th February, 1944.

Copy No. 49

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

TERMS OF SURRENDER FOR GERMANY

Memorandum by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

In accordance with the decision of the European Advisory Commission of the 14th January, 1944, I submit the attached document "Conditions of Surrender for Germany" for the consideration of the Commission.

(Initialled) F.G.

LANCASTER HOUSE,
LONDON, S.W.1.
15th February, 1944.
PROPOSED TERMS OF SURRENDER FOR GERMANY,
SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION BY THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNITED SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

The German Government and the Supreme Command of the German
Armed Forces, recognizing the complete defeat of Germany in the war
unconditionally by her against the United Nations, announce the
unconditional surrender of Germany, and request the cessation of
hostilities against her.

On this basis the representatives of the Supreme Command of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of the United Kingdom, and
of the United States of America, hereinafter called "The Representatives
of the Supreme Command of the Allies", call upon the German Government
and the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces to sign the
following terms of unconditional surrender:

1. The Government and Supreme Command of Germany, at ........
hours Central European time shall cease hostilities against the United
Nations on land, at sea, and in the air in all theatres of war.

2. The land, air, anti-aircraft and naval forces of Germany,
formations and units of the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, stationed at
front and inside the frontiers of Germany as they were on the
1st January, 1936, shall immediately and completely disarm themselves
handing over their arms and all equipment to the local command of
the Allied forces, and the personnel of all these formations and units
shall be declared prisoners of war, pending further decisions.

In the same manner the armed forces of Germany, situated
outside her territories, shall be disarmed and declared prisoners of
war.

For the maintenance of internal order in Germany, at
the discretion of the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the
Allies, a certain number of detachments of the civil police may be
retained temporarily, armed with small arms.

3. The Government and Supreme Command of Germany shall
forthwith:

a). Hand over to the Representatives of the Supreme
Command of the Allies, without exception, all prisoners
of war belonging to the armed forces of the United
Nations at present in their power, with full lists of
these persons and with notification of the places of
detention of all prisoners of war both in Germany
itself and in territories occupied by her, so that they
may be repatriated to their own countries.

b). Provide the prisoners of war handed over, pending
their repatriation to their own countries, with
adequate food, clothing and money in accordance with
their rank or the official positions they hold, and
provide sick and wounded prisoners of war with the
necessary medical attention.

 overlooked
c). Hand over camps and places of detention of
the abovementioned prisoners of war to the control
of the Representatives of the Supreme Command of
the Allies.

4. The Government and Supreme Command of Germany shall
immediately hand over to the Representatives of the Supreme Command
of the Allies, in accordance with the procedure laid down by them, all
interned or forcibly removed nationals of the United Nations, with
full lists of these persons and details of the places where they are
detained both in Germany itself and in the territories occupied by
her; provide the persons handed over, pending their repatriation to
their own countries, with sufficient food, clothing, accommodation
and medical care, and also carry out all requirements which the
Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies may present in
the future in connection with the fulfilment of the abovementioned
obligations of Germany.

5. From the moment when hostilities cease it is prohibited
for German military or civil aircraft of all types and descriptions,
wherever they may be, and likewise aircraft of the Allies of Germany
in Germany itself or in territories temporarily occupied by her, to
leave the ground without special permission of the Representatives
of the Supreme Command of the Allies.

All aircraft and aviation repair shops to be handed over
with all their equipment to the Representatives of the Supreme Command
of the Allies in accordance with the procedure and at the times laid
down by them.

The transfer of aircraft to the flag of any other Power
whate’ersoever is forbidden.

6. The Supreme Command of Germany shall hand over to the
Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies, in accordance
with the procedure and at the times determined by the latter, all
permanent and temporary aerodromes (on land or sea) wherever they may
be, with all their equipment, stores of all kinds, all transport
vehicles and means of communication.

7. The Government and Supreme Command of Germany shall hand
over in accordance with the procedure and at the times laid down by
the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies all plans
of anti-aircraft defence, all anti-aircraft artillery and machine guns,
all their aircraft, barrage balloons, means of communication, appliances
and means of location of aircraft, appliances for direction of fighters,
etc.

8. The Government and Supreme Command of Germany immediately
after the signature of the present Instrument, shall issue orders to
all naval vessels (surface or submarine), auxiliary naval craft,
vessels of the mercantile marine, and also to aircraft of the German
Naval Air Service, wherever these ships, vessels or aircraft may be at
the moment of signature of the present Instrument, to return immediately
to ports and bases to be specified by the Representatives of the
Supreme Command of the Allies.

9. All naval vessels of all classes, auxiliary craft, and
vessels for special purposes, and also vessels of the mercantile marine
designated by the representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies,
at sea, under repair, or under construction, and also aircraft of the
Naval Air Service which are in German docks or bases at the time of
signature of the present Instrument or in ports and bases of countries
occupied by Germany, shall be disarmed, deprived of all means of radio communication and handed over to the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies in the manner, and at the times and places, indicated by them.

The transfer of German ships and vessels, and also the transfer of ships and vessels seized by Germany, to the flag of any other power is prohibited.

10. All ships and vessels of the United Nations which are at the disposal of Germany at the time of signature of the present Instrument are to be returned at the dates, and to the ports or bases, specified by the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies.

11. The German Supreme Command, within a period of 24 hours from the time of signature of the present Instrument, shall present to the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies full information regarding its armed forces, regarding formations and units of the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo and particulars of all fortresses, fortified areas and minefields wherever they are situated, and of the safety lanes through them.

12. The Supreme Command of Germany shall carry out, at the times fixed by the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies, the work of sweeping all navigational channels rendered dangerous by mines, and areas of safe navigation together with the reinstatement of all aids to navigation.

13. The personnel of the German Armed Forces, and of the formations and units of the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo which are at the fronts at the time of the signature of the present Instrument, and are declared prisoners of war after disarmament, shall be stationed at such places and in such manner as may be determined by each Allied Commander-in-Chief on his own front.

The remaining personnel of the German Armed Forces, and of formations and units of the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo which are in countries allied to Germany, occupied by Germany, or in the interior of Germany itself, shall remain at their present stations and shall be maintained in the manner prescribed by the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies.

14. The Government and Supreme Command of Germany shall, at the demand of the representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies, provide all facilities for the movement of allied troops on the railways, roads and other land communications, or by sea, river or air.

15. In order to carry out the disarmament of the German Armed Forces, and of formations and units of the S.S., S.A. and Gestapo, the following zones of occupation are hereby established between the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

a). The territory of Germany, including East Prussia, situated to the east of a line drawn through the town of Heiligendahmen (exclusive) along the western shore of the Mecklenburg Bay to the town of Lübeck (exclusive); thence along the western administrative frontier of Mecklenburg to the River Elbe; thence upstream along this river to the administrative frontier of the Prussian province of Altmark; thence along the eastern frontier of the province of Brunswick;
thence to the western administrative frontier of Anhalt; thence along the western administrative frontier of the Prussian province of Saxony; thence along the administrative frontier of the province of Thuringia to where it meets the Bavarian frontier; thence eastwards along the northern frontier of Bavaria to the Czechoslovak frontier at the town of Hof; shall be occupied by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, with the exception of the special system of occupation for the territory mentioned under sub-paragraph (d) below.

b). The territory of Germany situated to the west of the line defined in sub-paragraph (a) above, bounded on the south by a line drawn from the point where the western administrative frontier of the province of Thuringia meets the administrative frontiers of Bavaria; thence eastwards along the northern administrative frontier of Bavaria to the river Main; thence along this river to the point where it joins the river Rhine; thence along the northern frontier to the province of Westmark; shall be occupied by the armed forces of the United Kingdom.

c). All the remaining territory of Western Germany situated to the south of the line defined in sub-paragraph (b) above shall be occupied by the armed forces of the United States of America.

d). There shall be established around Berlin a 10/15 kilometer zone which shall be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

e). The territories of Austria shall be occupied jointly by the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

16. The Supreme Command of Germany shall hand over to the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies, in the manner and at the times determined by these Representatives, all such storage depots (whether fixed, mobile or in transit), arms, munitions, fuel, other war material, foodstuffs, clothing and other equipment, repair shops of all kinds, naval ports and bases as are at the disposal of the German Armed Forces.

17. The Supreme Command of Germany shall hand over to the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies, in the manner and at the times determined by these Representatives, all research institutions, drawing and planning offices, laboratories, testing stations, and ranges, factories and industrial undertakings, together with all records, technical data, patents, plans and inventions belonging to the military, naval or air Departments.

18. All permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses, fortified areas and lines in good order, together with all equipment, arms, means of communication, military plans, depots, explosives, stores of all kinds, installations, repair equipment, plans and drawings of the said fortifications, shall be handed over to the Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies, in the manner and at the times determined by these representatives. In order to ensure unobstructed and safe approach to these fortifications, the Supreme Command of Germany shall place detachments of unarmed technical troops/
troops at the disposal of the above mentioned Representatives.

19. From the time of signature of the present Instrument, all
German radio transmission, telegraph and telephone communications both
inside Germany and in the districts temporarily occupied by her, shall
cease pending the institution of control by the Representatives of the
Supreme Command of the Allies over all means of communication in
Germany, and over censorship of broadcasting, the Press and public
performances of all kinds.

20. The Representatives of the Supreme Command of the Allies
will present additional requirements on political, economic, military
and all other questions connected with the surrender of Germany; and
the German Government and the German Supreme Command undertake to
carry out these requirements unconditionally.

Date and year...........town............

.............hours (Central European Time).

In accordance with the powers delegated
by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Representative of the Supreme Command of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics,

(Signature)

In accordance with the powers delegated by
H.M. Government in the United Kingdom,
Representative of the Supreme Command of the United Kingdom.

(Signature)

In accordance with the powers delegated by the
Government of the United States of America,
Representative of the Supreme Command of the United States of America.

(Signature)

In accordance with the powers delegated
by the German Government.

(Signature)

In accordance with the powers delegated
by the German Supreme Command.

(Signature)
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

What are the zones in the British and Russian drafts and what is the zone we are proposing? I must know this in order that it conform with what I decided on months ago.

F.D.R.
February 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

I disagree with the British proposal of the demarcation of boundaries which would go into effect in Germany after their surrender or after fighting has stopped.

1. I do not want the United States to have the post-war burden of reconstituting France, Italy and the Balkans. This is not our natural task at a distance of 3,500 miles or more. It is definitely a British task in which the British are far more vitally interested than we are.

2. From the point of view of the United States, our principal object is not to take part in the internal problems in southern Europe but is rather to take part in eliminating Germany at a possible and even probable cost of a third World War.

3. Various points have been raised about the difficulties of transferring our troops, etc., from a French front to a northern German front — what is called a "leap-frog". These objections are specious because no matter where British and American troops are on the day of Germany's surrender, it is physically easy for them to go anywhere — north, east or south.

4. I have had to consider also the ease of maintaining American troops in some part of Germany. All things considered, and remembering that all supplies have to come 3,500 miles or more by sea, the United States should use the ports of northern Germany — Hamburg and Bremen — and the ports of the Netherlands for this long range operation.

5. Therefore, I think the American policy should be to occupy northwestern Germany, the British occupying the area from the
Rhine south, and also being responsible for the policing of France and Italy, if this should become necessary.

6. In regard to the long range security of Britain against Germany, this is not a part of the first occupation. The British will have plenty of time to work that out, including Helgoland, air fields, etc. The Americans by that time will be only too glad to retire all their military forces from Europe.

7. If anything further is needed to justify this agreement with the British lines of demarcation, I can only add that political considerations in the United States makes my decision conclusive.

You might speak to me about this if the above is not wholly clear.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy.

The attached copy of a memorandum from the President to the Acting Secretary of State is forwarded for your information.

The file copy of this memorandum, together with certain related correspondence, is on file in the Naval Aide's office.

Respectfully,

CHESTER C. WOOD.

[Signature]

Demarcation - Germany
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Occupation Zones in Germany

This is in reply to your urgent memorandum of yesterday's date.

1. The British proposal presented to the European Advisory Commission on January 15 envisages three occupation zones in which the main Soviet forces would occupy eastern Germany, the main British forces northwestern Germany, and the main American forces southern Germany. The zones are delineated on the map accompanying the British document attached hereto.

2. The Soviet proposal presented to the European Advisory Commission on February 16 likewise envisages three zones, which Ambassador Winant states appear to be the same as those set forth in the British proposal. The text of the Soviet document with its geographical description of the zones is now en route to the United States by air pouch. It specifies joint occupation for Austria and the Berlin district.

3. No American proposal for zones of occupation has been made to date. A report on the occupation machinery for Germany is now awaiting action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before being transmitted to Ambassador Winant for presentation to the European Advisory Commission. It is based on the premise of zonal occupation of Germany, but does not make any proposals respecting the geographical demarcation of the zones or the distribution of the occupying forces.

You will recall in a recent discussion relative to the importance of the State Department having available for its guidance a record of the Teheran discussions your agreement that on Harry's return he would edit a set of the minutes which would be presented to Mr. Hull. Owing to Harry's absence from Washington this has not yet been possible, so as a result we are not certain what understandings were reached on this subject nor do we know what your thinking on the subject has been. Therefore, we have been unable to give instructions to Ambassador Winant relative to the American position.

Perhaps you would care to give me a note outlining your views in order that we may send Ambassador Winant instructions at an early date.

[Signature]

Regraded Unclassified
Enclosure No. to despatch No. 13324 of 1-18-44


SECRET

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EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION

MILITARY OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

15th Jan. 1944

Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative.

1. The Commission has decided to begin its work by examining the group of questions relating to Germany indicated in paragraph 3 of its terms of reference, namely the elaboration of the terms of surrender to be imposed on Germany and of the machinery required to ensure the fulfilment of those terms.

2. The Commission will therefore have to draft an instrument of surrender for submission to the three Governments. It will also have to advise on the constitution and functions of the various Allied or United Nations bodies, such, for example, as a Control Commission, required for enforcing the terms of surrender upon Germany.

3. There is, however, one measure which is fundamental for this latter purpose, and is indeed the indispensable condition for the enforcement of the terms of surrender upon Germany, namely military occupation.

4. The Commission will recall that the question of the military occupation of Germany appears in the item about Germany which was placed on the agenda of the Moscow Conference (Item No. 7) by the United Kingdom Government, (see Section 3 of E.A.C. (P)43/2 of the 20th December 1943) and was subsequently referred by the Conference to the European Advisory Commission for detailed study.

5. In the paper on Germany circulated at the Moscow Conference by the United States Delegation it was recommended that, for the purpose of securing the execution of surrender terms and ensuring the creation of conditions for a permanent system of security, the occupation of Germany should be effected by contingents of British, Soviet and American forces. During the discussion of this question at the Conference at its 7th meeting on October 25th, Mr. Eden said that he agreed generally with the American proposal. He suggested that the scheme might be worked out by experts chosen from the members of the London Commission. According to the records of the Conference prepared by the United Kingdom Delegation, M. Molotov and Mr. Hull agreed to this.

6. The annexed memorandum on the military occupation of Germany is circulated by the United Kingdom Representative as a contribution to the discussion of this question by the Commission.

7. It should be understood that the boundaries of the zones of occupation of the United Kingdom, United States and Soviet forces suggested in Part IV of the annexed memorandum and shown in the map are put forward tentatively and may have to be reviewed in the light of any examination of this question by the military staffs. The United Kingdom Government should not be regarded as being committed to them.

W. S.

LANCASTER HOUSE
LONDON, S.W. 1

15th January 1944.
SECRET

EUROPEAN ADVISORY COMMISSION.

MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION.

THE MILITARY OCCUPATION OF GERMANY.

PART I.

ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS.

1. Throughout the present memorandum the following assumptions have been made:
   (a) That the war against Japan will continue for some time after the defeat of Germany.
   (b) That, although widespread rioting and disorder are to be expected in Germany after her defeat, and although Ministers and high officials must be presumed to have fled or to have been removed, yet there will exist, at any rate for some considerable time, some kind of central administration (although not necessarily a central government) as well as local authorities, both civil and military, with whom it is possible to deal.
   (c) That the bulk of the troops needed for the occupation of Germany will be provided, at any rate for a considerable time, by the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union, preferably in substantially equal shares.
   (d) That other Allied States whose territory borders on Germany will wish to participate in the task of occupation as soon as they are in a position to do so, beginning by sending token contingents, and later making a more substantial contribution.
   (e) That Austria will not form part of Germany after the war.
   (f) That East Prussia and Danzig, and possibly other areas, will ultimately be given to Poland.
   (g) That it will be the policy to confine Germany elsewhere within frontiers no wider than those which obtained in 1937.
   (h) That, if a "Zoning" plan is agreed on as the basis of the allied occupation of Germany, the boundaries of the zones will have been agreed on before hostilities cease, and will consequently not depend on the positions which the forces of the three principal allies respectively may have reached before the fighting stops.

2. Throughout the present memorandum the following phrases have been used in the senses set opposite to them respectively:

   "Total Military Occupation" The right to move forces into any part of Germany. (N.B. This does not imply that there would be Allied troops in every part of the country at all times.)

   "Partial Military Occupation" The right to move forces into certain specified areas only.

PART II.

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST TOTAL OCCUPATION.

3. The object of this part of the memorandum is to set out the arguments for and against total occupation, and to arrive at a conclusion whether this is necessary or not. The memorandum also considers the extent to which air forces could replace land forces in carrying out the military occupation of Germany, and the degree to which it will be necessary to employ land forces, notwithstanding the development of Air Power since 1918.

12247 [26715]
United Nations Objectives.

4. When hostilities against Germany cease, the objectives of the United Nations should be:

(a) to prevent or, at least, minimise disorder in Germany;
(b) to ensure the rapid and total disarmament of Germany and the break-up of the German military machine;
(c) to complete the destruction of the Nazi Organisation;
(d) to bring home to every German the realisation that Germany has suffered complete military defeat;
(e) to ensure that tolerable living conditions for the German people are restored, in order to promote objective (a).

Arguments in favour of Total Occupation.

5. These five objectives are considered below in relation to the question how far total military occupation of Germany will help towards their attainment:

(a) and (e) Prevention of Disorder and Restoration of Tolerable Living Conditions.

Order must be maintained. Without an orderly Germany, there cannot be an orderly Europe. Without order in Germany tolerable living conditions for the German people cannot be brought about.

Immediately after the last war, it was found that the ordinary German police were inadequate to deal with various disorders and, in the absence of an Allied army occupying more than a small fraction of the country, voluntary bodies composed of the "toughest" ex-soldiers were called upon by the German Government to maintain order. They defended the frontiers in the East, and suppressed disturbances at home, thereby regaining some of the prestige which the army had lost through defeat in war.

Moreover, in the early days, before the new Reichswehr was constituted, Germany was able to build up considerable local para-military forces such as the various "Wehrverbände" which were ostensibly formed for purposes of local self-defence. Thus, the German General Staff were able to begin the reconstruction of the German military machine.

After the present war the prospects of riot and disorder in Germany will be greater than in 1918, and it is reasonable to suppose that similar problems will arise but in a more acute form. This time, however, no German armed forces will be available to restore order since complete disarmament of all German military and para-military forces will be necessary. Accordingly, responsibility for the suppression of disorder will rest on the forces of the United Nations alone and unaided: total allied occupation of the country is, therefore, essential.

(b) Disarmament.

The effective and rapid disarmament of Germany must depend on the efficient working of the Control Commission. The Reports of the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which operated in Germany from 1920 onwards show how their tasks were made more difficult by the lack of military force behind them. There were many evasions and much obstruction, and these led to delays and difficulties in enforcing the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. In the result, many concessions had eventually to be made. These conditions should not be tolerated again; and it seems clear that only the presence of adequate armed forces distributed throughout Germany and the will to use them firmly when necessary, will suffice to ensure speedy and complete disarmament.

It is of the utmost importance that effective disarmament should be carried through with the least possible delay since, until this has been done, it will be impossible to begin working for the reconstruction of Germany as a reasonable and pacific member of the comity of nations.

(c) Destruction of the Nazi Machine.

The essential pre-requisite for the abolition of the Nazi system is the conviction in the minds of all Germans that this system has failed in the
military field as elsewhere, and there can be little doubt but that the most effective means of bringing this failure home to the minds of the ordinary German will be a foreign military occupation of his country.

(d) Realisation of Defeat.

After the last war, the visible signs of military defeat were not apparent to the German people except in one small area in the west. This fact made it easy for the German military class to develop the legend of the "stab in the back," and many people were genuinely brought to believe that the German army had never been beaten in the field. It is most important that this time no room should be left for the legend of German military invincibility, and that the military "caste" should be discredited in the eyes of every German.

Only total military occupation on a substantial scale can achieve this end. Such occupation, however, had best not be prolonged beyond the period needed to achieve complete disarmament, since this might check any possible development towards a healthy and pacific German State, or even encourage a swing back towards militarism and the preparation of a war of revenge.

6. There are two further considerations which suggest that total military occupation of Germany by the United Nations is desirable:

(i) Once the smaller nations of Europe are freed from the fear of Germany, they will be less amenable to pressure from the Great Powers, and they will almost inevitably march in to fill any vacuum not already filled by military forces.

(ii) Frontier adjustments will have to be carried out, e.g., East Prussia and Austria. In some cases, large-scale transfers of population may also be necessary. Although mere frontier adjustments might well be carried through by Commissions working with the ultimate sanction of forces in the background, large-scale transfers of population will be impossible unless substantial military forces are present.

Arguments against Total Occupation.

7. The chief argument which is likely to be advanced against total occupation and in support of a policy of partial occupation is that of economy. Such a partial occupation, it may be urged, would be less costly in material, and in men. It can hardly be doubted that, within a very few months of a German collapse, there will be a strong demand for the release of troops, both for the war in the Far East and to provide for the release of man-power to industry. Clearly, the smaller the army of occupation in Germany, the easier it will be to meet these other demands. Moreover, conditions have changed a great deal since 1918. Vast strides have been made in the development of air power, and the mobility of land forces has also very greatly increased. The striking power of weapons is also far greater than it was twenty years ago. It may, therefore, be argued that once Germany is thoroughly disarmed the control of a few air bases might be sufficient to ensure effective Allied control of the country.

8. Another argument which it is possible to raise against total occupation, at any rate for more than a short time, is that, whilst it is important to bring home to every German that the "Wehrmacht" has been utterly defeated, it would be a political error to prolong the humiliation of Germany unduly, with the risk of driving the whole German people into the Nationalist camp. In support of this argument it may be urged that the sense of injustice created in the minds of the younger generation of Germans by the Ruhr occupation of 1923 was one of the main causes of the swing of German opinion from the social democratic to the Nazi camp. It may also be argued that psychological factors of this kind were at least as important as the economic and general policy of the Allies in undermining the authority of the Liberal elements of the Weimar Republic, and preventing a co-operative German Government from striking firm roots.

The Alternative to Total Occupation.

9. The alternative to total occupation would be to exclude certain areas from the scope of the occupation. These would inevitably become breeding grounds for subversive activities, or even deliberately fomented disorders, which
would, as happened after 1918, lead to a demand by the German Government for permission to maintain military forces for the preservation of order. Underground military activities are traditional in a defeated Germany, and total occupation constitutes the only means by which these activities can be effectively countered.

Moreover, should disorders break out in an unoccupied area, our lines of communication leading through that area would inevitably become imperilled, and any stoppage of traffic might seriously prejudice the security of some part of the Allied forces. Finally, if we were to begin by partial occupation, it might be difficult to pass on to total occupation at a later stage if this should prove to be necessary. It would be very much easier to begin with total occupation and then to modify the system if this should prove practicable. Thus, total occupation at the beginning may very well prove the more economical course in the long run.

**Conclusion on Total or Partial Occupation.**

10. On balance, the conclusion reached is that the only satisfactory solution of the problem, at any rate in the earlier stages, is total occupation.

**Stages of Occupation.**

11. The stages by which the military occupation and control of Germany should proceed will now be considered. This occupation falls naturally into four stages:—

(a) *Stage 1.* (*The immediate aftermath of hostilities.*)

At the moment when fighting ceases, the Allies will probably have in or near Germany very large land forces, a large proportion of which will be available, at any rate for a short period, for occupation duties. Indeed, for administrative reasons alone, it might not be possible to remove any substantial proportion of the troops involved immediately after the "cease fire," even if this were desired.

During this stage, therefore, total occupation presents no grave manpower difficulties.

(b) *Stage 2.* (*The first stage of disarmament.*)

This stage covers the period between the date on which the work of disarmament begins and the time when, although disarmament and the destruction of war industries are not complete, yet such substantial progress has been made that Germany has been deprived of the capacity for any effective military action. Towards the end of this period, as conditions settle down, and when the disarmament and demobilisation of German forces are nearing completion, it may, perhaps, be possible to reduce the strength of the occupying army, though forces should still be stationed at the more important centres throughout the country.

It is estimated that, if proper steps are taken, the first two stages might be completed within some two years.

(c) *Stage 3.* (*The period during which the disarmament of Germany and the destruction of her armament industry will be completed.*)

During this stage air forces could probably be used to an increasing extent to reduce the number of land forces needed to support the authority of the Control Commission.

(d) *Stage 4.* (*An indefinite period running from the moment when Germany has been totally disarmed until the time when the new German Government has become sufficiently established and the Allied Powers are convinced that its peaceful intentions are such as to render it possible to withdraw entirely the forces of occupation.*)

When the disarming of Germany and the destruction of her armament industries are complete, and the problem has become one of ensuring that the work accomplished by the Control Commission is not undone by renewed attempts to create a war potential, it might be possible to provide the necessary backing for the Control Commission by the use of air forces alone, operating either from bases in Germany or, perhaps, from bases in neighbouring United Nations territory, including the United Kingdom. In any case, it may be hoped that during this last stage the number of land forces required would be small.
During the last two stages the speed with which and the extent to which it will be possible to reduce the size of the forces of occupation must largely depend on the progress made in the political re-education of Germany. Only when it becomes clear that the spirits of militarism and revenge are dead, and that a sincere desire for peaceful co-operation exists, will it be wise to abandon all methods of control and, notably, some form of occupation.

**Use of Air Forces.**

12. The question how far air forces could replace land forces in achieving the necessary degree of control has been carefully considered. During the earlier stages a state of disorder is likely to exist which, coupled with the existence of large German forces to be disarmed and controlled, will make it essential for substantial Allied land forces to be present. No doubt air forces will be able to give great help, and their presence will make it possible effectively to occupy Germany with far fewer land forces than would otherwise be the case, but during this period control by air forces alone would almost certainly not be a completely effective substitute.

It is to be noted that considerable moral effect could be produced during this period by periodical mass formation flights of Allied aircraft over the territory. Such flights would serve to impress upon the population the fact that the German Air Force no less than the German Army has been defeated.

**Use of Naval Forces.**

13. Just as occupation by land forces will bring home to the Germans the defeat of their army, and flights by Allied air forces will make clear the failure of their Air Force, so also steps should be taken, at least during the earlier period of occupation, to demonstrate the failure of the German navy and of the U-boat campaign.

This could probably best be done by basing a small number of Allied warships and shore-based personnel at certain major German ports from which frequent visits should be made to the remainder.

**Conclusions on Part II.**

14. The conclusions of the memorandum on the question of total versus partial occupation may therefore be summarised as follows:

(a) Total occupation of Germany is essential if Germany is to be effectively disarmed and her military spirit broken.

(b) At first the occupying forces should be as much in evidence as possible so as to bring home to the German public the fact that their armed forces have been utterly defeated. After this object has been achieved and Germany has been disarmed the occupation should be adjusted so as to give Germany a chance of developing along peaceful lines, and so that the continued presence of foreign troops may not be used by German militarists as an argument in favour of planning a war of revenge.

At the same time, we must continue ready at any moment to use force without hesitation at the first sign of any recrudescence of military activity.

(c) A strong air striking force will be essential at all stages, but control by air forces alone would not be an effective substitute for occupation by land forces under conditions in which internal disorder is the main problem to be faced. Such conditions are likely to obtain during the earlier stages of occupation.

(d) When the disarming of Germany and the destruction of her armament industries are complete and when internal conditions are more stable, the problem will become one of ensuring that the work accomplished by the Control Commission is not undone by renewed attempts to create a war potential. It may at that stage be possible to provide the necessary sanction by the maintenance of a strong air striking force. In these circumstances the number of land forces required would be small.
PART III.

MIXED ALLIED FORCES OR OCCUPATION BY ZONES.

The Two Possible Methods.

15. It would be theoretically possible to organise the occupation of Germany on either of two bases. On the one hand, all the troops involved, from whichever of the United Nations they came, could be "mixed up" in small units alongside each other, each district of Germany being occupied by a polyglot force consisting of soldiers of all, or substantially all, the United Nations. On the other hand, Germany might be divided into a number of zones in the occupation of each of which one or other of the Allied Powers would be predominant, although contingents of the forces of the other United Nations might be present in each case.

The Arguments for Mixed Allied Forces.

16. The main advantages which would appear to result from "mixing" the Allied troops together are:—

(a) that the entire military occupation would be visibly carried out by the United Nations as a body rather than by any one State;
(b) that a single policy would presumably be applied throughout the whole of the occupied area;
(c) that the close liaison which would be necessary at all levels between all ranks of the Allied Forces concerned might be expected to favour the development of habits of co-operation between them, and it might be hoped that these habits once formed might bring about a greater mutual understanding leading to a more confident political co-operation between the peoples concerned;
(d) the removal of fears of the creation of national "Spheres of Influence."

The Arguments against Mixed Allied Forces.

17. Against these arguments in favour of "mixing" the Allied Forces, it is necessary to take account of the following disadvantages:—

(a) Complicated problems of command and liaison would inevitably arise, and considerable friction could hardly be avoided.
(b) The difficulty of administering and maintaining troops from their home bases would be greatly accentuated, more especially as the weapons, munitions and supplies of the forces concerned, generally differ.
(c) "Mixed" forces would be less efficient in dealing with any large-scale disturbances. The suppression of such disturbances is in the nature of an operation of war, and cohesion in formations, at any rate up to a certain size, is essential if forces are not to be wastefully employed. For example, it is evident that three battalions found from the armies of different nations, differently armed, equipped, disciplined and administered, do not make a brigade even if they are provided with a joint staff and ancillary services.
(d) The existence of "mixed" staffs at any but the highest level could hardly fail to lead to trouble and confusion. Not only would the Staff Officers concerned have been trained according to widely different systems, but it would be optimistic to hope that sufficient officers could be found with the necessary linguistic qualifications and knowledge of national characteristics to prevent the lack of these becoming a major obstacle to effective collaboration.
(e) The "mixing" of forces would inevitably greatly increase the danger of disorder and quarrelling breaking out between the troops of the different nations; the difference in rates of pay alone would be enough to cause discontent and envy. The resulting mutual ill-feeling between Allies, and the disturbances which would probably result, could not fail to supply first-class material for enemy propaganda, quite apart from the serious effect on the prospects of long-term internation co-operation.
(f) The decreased efficiency of the occupying forces which, for the reasons set out above, might be expected to result from a policy of "mixing" would entail an increase in the total numbers of the forces of occupation.
Conclusions in Favour of Occupation by Zones.

18. The occupation and control of Germany by the United Nations in the years immediately following the end of hostilities in Europe will, under the best possible conditions, present formidable problems, requiring for their solution very great goodwill, skill and tact on all sides. It would be a mistake to augment these difficulties by "mixing" the troops of the different Allied nations. In 1918, when British, French and Belgian troops had been fighting side by side for more than four years, it was found necessary to organise the occupation of the Rhineland on a basis of separate national zones.

After Waterloo (June 1815) about two-thirds of France was occupied in force by troops of the four principal Powers, the United Kingdom, Prussia, Austria and Russia, assisted by contingents furnished by the smaller Powers. Administrative difficulties and protests by the French Government against abuses and disorders almost immediately led to the adoption of a system of zoning similar in principle to that referred to in this paper.

19. The better part of the advantages which it might be hoped to achieve by a policy of "mixing" could be better and more surely attained under a policy of "zoning" by:

(a) control by a United Nations High Commission at the top designed to bring the military policy, actions and behaviour of the contingents of the constituent armies into line:

(b) the fostering of a spirit of "host" and "guest" between the forces of the predominant nation in each zone and the smaller self-contained Allied contingents stationed there. Experience has shown that this kind of sentiment can most easily be engendered where one party is in a heavy majority.

20. It has been suggested that the division of Germany into zones for the purposes of military occupation might give rise to political difficulties and that it might make difficult the adoption of a common policy towards Germany as a whole. The force of this argument is more apparent than real: subject to the overriding control of the High Commission, the attitude adopted towards the German population will inevitably differ from place to place according to the nationality of the senior allied officer in the area.

The main functions of the forces of occupation will be to preserve law and order, to prevent hostile action and to provide the necessary force to ensure compliance with the orders originating from the Allied Control Commission. Provided these tasks are satisfactorily accomplished, we shall have every reason to be satisfied, whether the methods adopted in different areas to secure the same results are similar or not.

21. There is one further consideration which may be relevant in deciding whether or not to divide Germany into zones for the purposes of occupation. It is possible that, as occurred after the last war, the defeat of Germany may be the signal for the re-emergence of separatist movements in that country. Whether the United Nations decide or not to split Germany up into smaller States, or whether spontaneous movements towards particularism or separatism are merely encouraged by the Allies, there must be an advantage in dividing the country for purposes of occupation into areas whose boundaries approximate to the lines on which such tendencies towards division may be expected to develop.

Conclusions on Part III.

22. Taking into account all the arguments set out above, the following conclusions have been reached:

(a) The Allied forces of occupation should be disposed in three main zones.

(b) In each zone forces of one of the three Powers (United Kingdom, United States or Soviet Union) should predominate. Each zone should, however, contain contingents from the forces of the other two Powers and of the smaller Powers interested, so that the principle of military occupation by the United Nations may be maintained.

(c) The boundaries between the zones should, as far as possible, be drawn so as to encourage rather than to prejudice any separatist or particularist tendencies which may develop in Germany after her defeat.
PART IV.

ZONE BOUNDARIES.

Scope of Part IV.

23. On the assumption that, as recommended in Part III above, it is decided that the Allied forces of occupation in Germany should be disposed in three main Zones, it is proposed in this part of the memorandum to consider how these Zones should be delimited.

Proposed Zones of Occupation.

Considerations affecting the determination of Zone boundaries.

24. In delimiting the three Zones it is clearly desirable to have regard to the following considerations:

(a) That the boundaries between the Zones should, so far as possible, be drawn so as to encourage rather than to prejudice any separatist or particularist tendencies which may develop in Germany after her defeat.

(b) That the lines of communication and supply to the occupying troops from their home bases should be as convenient as possible.

(c) That the three Zones should be approximately comparable in size and population.

(d) That the boundaries between the Zones should, so far as possible, be co-terminous with Military and Civil administrative boundaries in Germany.

Geographical arrangement of the Zones.

25. The arrangement by which the main Soviet Forces would occupy Eastern Germany, the main British Forces North-West Germany, and the main American Forces South Germany would, on balance, provide the most convenient lines of communication and supply, and there do not appear to be any countervailing factors to justify another solution. Our proposals are, therefore, based on this main sub-division of the area to be occupied.

Boundaries between the Zones.

26. It is not possible to foresee what spontaneous movements (if any) may emerge in Germany tending towards a division of the Reich into separate States or towards a system of regional autonomy. Any such movements will, however, almost certainly be based on the revival of old loyalties to States or Provinces within certain natural internal boundaries dictated by geography, history and economic considerations. An example of an autonomous State which might possibly emerge is afforded by the South German Region south of the Main. An anti-Prussian bias may well develop in certain areas, and there are strong grounds for weakening the present preponderance of Prussia.

27. The division of Germany into Zones for the purpose of occupation may not, in itself, encourage the development of separatism or particularism. At the same time, if the boundaries between the Zones were so arranged as to cut across the natural lines of cleavage this could hardly fail to act as a check on spontaneous tendencies towards such developments. Accordingly, as far as possible, the Zone boundaries should be so drawn as not to divide areas in which local autonomous movements are likely to take place.

28. Taking all these considerations into account it is suggested that the most satisfactory Zone boundaries will be those delineated on the attached map, although, for reasons connected with operations and communications, there may be some delay in establishing the Southern Boundary of the British
Zone so far South. These boundaries are drawn, as far as possible, in such a way as to follow the former boundaries of German States or Provinces. An exception to the general rule is that Prussia has been divided between two Zones. This has been done intentionally, since the undue preponderance of Prussia in the past has been one of the chief causes of the growth of the aggressive spirit in Germany, and we feel that the division of this State into two halves during the period of occupation is likely to discourage the rebirth of the Prussian military spirit.

In drawing the Zone boundaries shown on the attached map it has been found necessary to cut across the boundaries of certain Wehrkreise (military districts) but, with one exception, the boundaries coincide with those of the administrative areas known as Gaue into which Germany has been divided for certain administrative purposes during the period of the Nazi Regime. We consider that the relatively minor and temporary disadvantages which may result from the discrepancy between the Zone boundaries and the Wehrkreis boundaries are outweighed by the advantages of making the Zone boundaries coincide with the old State or Provincial frontiers.

**Size of Zones.**

29. The Areas and populations of the three Zones proposed are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>(North-West Germany)</th>
<th>Mainly British</th>
<th>Area, square miles</th>
<th>Population, millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zone I</td>
<td>57,450</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone II (Eastern)</td>
<td>76,600</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zone III (Southern)</td>
<td>47,100</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These population figures are approximate only, being based on the figures of the census of 1933. The present population figures are not precisely known, and these figures must be regarded as providing only a rough guide to the present position.

30. It will be noticed that under the arrangements proposed the predominantly American Zone is smaller in both area and population than either of the other two Zones. For this reason it is suggested below that the United States might be invited, if they so desire, to assume the preponderant role in the occupation of Austria.

The Zone which it is proposed should be predominantly Soviet is the largest in area. The extent of this Zone will, however be subject to reduction if it is decided to alter the Eastern boundaries of Germany to the benefit of Poland.

**Combined Zone.**

31. It is considered that the Berlin area should be a separate Combined Zone occupied by selected troops representing, in due proportions, all the Allied forces of occupation. The principal role of this mixed force would be to support the authority of any Allied Military Government, the Control Commission and other Allied bodies, and also to ensure the maintenance of order in the Capital.

**East Prussia and Danzig.**

32. In view of its special position East Prussia has not been included in the main Zoning system. If it is intended ultimately to hand over this territory to Poland, the most satisfactory course would be for the Poles to undertake its occupation from the start. If, however, the Polish Armed Forces available prove inadequate to undertake this commitment, the next best solution would be for East Prussia to be occupied by a mixed inter-Allied force.

It is most desirable that an agreement should be arrived at beforehand as to the occupation and ultimate disposal of East Prussia and other territories in a similar position, such as Danzig and Upper Silesia.

**Austria.**

33. The three Governments have declared it to be their purpose to restore the independence of Austria. It will accordingly be desirable from the start to make separate arrangements for the occupation of that country.
Having regard to the way in which the Allied forces are disposed under the main Zoning proposals for Germany, and to the fact that the suggested American Zone is considerably smaller than the other two, the United States Government might conveniently be invited, if they so wish, to undertake the main responsibility for the occupation of Austria. The area involved is of some 32,300 square miles and the population (according to the 1938 census) is of some 6.7 millions. The total area of predominantly American occupation would thus amount to some 79,400 square miles, and include a population of some 22.4 millions. This would have the effect of making the American Zones together approximately equal in both territory and population to the proposed Soviet Zone.

In order to establish the fact of United Nations occupation in the minds of the Austrians, it might be desirable to station a British Division in that country, even if the principle is accepted that it is to be a predominantly American Zone.

**PART V.**

**SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS.**

34. To facilitate reference, the main conclusions reached in this memorandum are recapitulated below:

(a) Total occupation of Germany by Allied Forces is essential if Germany is to be effectively disarmed and her military spirit broken.

(b) At first the occupying forces should be as much in evidence as possible, so as to bring home to the German public the fact that their armed forces have been utterly defeated. After this object has been achieved and Germany has been disarmed, the occupation should be adjusted so as to give Germany a chance of developing along peaceful lines, and so that the continued presence of foreign troops may not be used by German militarists as an argument in favour of planning a war of revenge.

At the same time we must continue ready at any moment to use force without hesitation at the first sign of any recrudescence of military activity.

(c) A strong air striking force will be essential at all stages, but control by air forces alone would not be an effective substitute for occupation by land forces under conditions in which internal disorder is the main problem to be faced. Such conditions are likely to obtain during the earlier stages of occupation.

(d) When the disarming of Germany and the destruction of her armament industries are complete and when internal conditions are more stable, the problem will become one of ensuring that the work accomplished by the Control Commission is not undone by renewed attempts to create a war potential. It may at that stage be possible to provide the necessary sanction by the maintenance of a strong air striking force. In these circumstances the number of land forces required would be small.

(e) The Allied Forces of Occupation should be disposed in three main Zones, with a combined Zone round Berlin.

(f) In each Zone forces of one of the three Powers (United Kingdom, United States or Russia) should predominate. Each Zone should, however, contain contingents from the forces of the other two Powers, and of the smaller Powers interested.

(g) The boundaries of the three Zones should be those drawn on the attached map, for the reasons given in paras. 24 to 33 above.

London, 15th January, 1944.
My dear Mr. President:

I have carefully studied your memorandum to me of January 18, enclosing a note from the Crown Prince of Norway. In analyzing the possibilities my Staff and I, including my political advisors, have reached the conclusion that even if Finland should make peace with the Russians the Germans will continue to occupy Finnmark, the northern part of Norway, until Allied action actually forces them to withdraw. Such Allied action, whether Russian or British-American, would be of great difficulty. The retention of German bases in Finnmark is of great value to the enemy, not only for interfering with our convoys, but for covering a vulnerable iron-ore route through Narvik. It is contrary to Germany's known policy to withdraw from any territory until she is forced to do so by military necessity.

Outline plans are at present in preparation, in the event of the Germans withdrawing from the whole or part of Norway. In such circumstances, the sole military reason justifying operations by us in Northern Norway is the establishment of fueling bases for naval forces to assist in the protection of shipping on passage round the North Cape. Our plans envisage the establishment of such a base at Trondheim or Narvik or both, as soon during the withdrawal as opportunity permits - possibly before the Germans have completed their withdrawal from Southern Norway.

Based upon this examination, I suggest that your reply to the Crown Prince of Norway might run somewhat as follows:

"The President believes it unlikely, from his present sources of information, that the Germans will retire from Northern Norway before they retire from Norway as a whole. While the President appreciates the point which the Crown Prince makes, he does not believe the Norwegians need be unduly apprehensive. The liberation of Norway is an American-British military responsibility; the American and British Governments respectively have reached identical agreements with the Norwegian Government and the Russian Government has been made aware of the terms of the British agreement. As Crown
Prince OLAF will know, the military plans for the liberation of NORWAY are now under discussion between the Staff of the Supreme Commander and the NORWEGIAN Authorities in LONDON; as and when appropriate, questions of an operational nature will be brought into the orbit of these discussions."

While your memorandum did not call for a reply, I felt that you would like to know the exact status of this matter and therefore I am sending the above to you direct. May I suggest however, that if you desire to make any use of these views they be referred first to the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, since it is entirely possible that they may have different views, or information of which I am ignorant.

With respectful regard.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Operations in Italy.

I thought you would be interested in the following estimate of the situation that is developing in the operations in Italy:

The enemy along the original front of the Eighth and Fifth Armies has continued to resist our advances with violent counterattacks. This is normal German procedure.

General Kesselring has utilized the following procedure in opposing our landing forces: instead of withdrawing divisions from the Fifth and Eighth Army fronts he has "milked" practically every division of a few organizations, usually those that were in reserve. Infantry regiments, artillery battalions, engineer battalions and companies, antitank units, division staffs, corps artillery, etc., are in process of movement or have arrived to face our troops south of Rome. By this procedure he has been able to carry out the movements more rapidly and at the same time has not ripped up the defensive deployment of the divisions on the Eighth and Fifth Army fronts.

He has provided more divisional and corps headquarters than would seem normal but apparently this has been done to meet the inevitable difficulties of handling a hurriedly concentrated collection of separate units.

The enemy is apparently engaged in two purposes, an immediate resistance to further penetrations by our troops approaching the Apennin Way and the highway to the north, while at the same time he is gathering a counteroffensive group to the east of Rome.

The enemy is apparently determined to hold the front of the right Corps facing the Fifth Army but there are evidences of his willingness to give ground in the center Corps and the Corps facing the British Eighth Army.

Only one enemy unit facing the Anzio beachhead has been identified as coming from the north,

SECRET

copy for white house

OCS GCM

26 January 1944
SECRET

At the present time the enemy has built up a force approximating about 2 1/2 divisions. We have another larger force but of a much more homogeneous nature.

We have gotten ahead of schedule in supplies for the landing forces and are increasing these from the previously planned eight-day reserve supplies to fourteen-days, which places us in a more secure position while the Fifth Army is endeavoring to crash through and form a junction.

The weather the past two days has been unfavorable but we are now given a promise of favorable weather. Yesterday was a good day and today and tomorrow should also be fair with only occasional rains. Incidentally, the advance forecasts have been remarkably accurate. I attach the most recent. The pencil figures indicate the degree of overcast represented by the color.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL
Chief of Staff.

Note: The basis for the data regarding the German method for building up resistance against the Anzio beachhead is of an ultra-secret nature and therefore has to be regarded very carefully.

Handwritten
January 17, 1944

The President

The White House

Dear Mr. President:

Thanks for passing on the story purporting to come from the German Minister to Switzerland. You state in your concluding sentence, "The only thing for us to do is to remember that the Germans seem to be taking your name in vain." Of course, this is not the first time they have done it. But it seems to me there is much more to this particular incident than you see. It indicates to me very clearly that the keystone of the German foreign policy is to drive a wedge between Russia on the one hand, and the British and the Americans on the other. Such a wedge, successfully driven, represents the only hope the Germans have (barring a secret weapon of unexpected power which I don't think they have. But in this connection I have something which I want to pass on to you face to face in the not too distant future).

The hope of an enduring future peace depends in very large measure on closer relationships between the United States and Russia. The Germans are willing to go to any lengths to prevent that from coming to pass.

Another thought suggests itself to me and that is that the German counter-espionage may have reached such a high degree of perfection that it may plant certain documents for the specific purpose of promoting dissension.

Respectfully yours

HAN/sh

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following paraphrase comes from German sources, the ultimate source allegedly being the German Foreign Office. It purports to be a report to Berlin by the German Minister to Switzerland, embodying the substance of a report from the Swiss Minister in Washington to the Swiss Foreign Office:

1. K. O. Schweiz (Note: Kriegs Organization, the Swiss secret intelligence agency) has seen reports of the Swiss Minister, which were based upon talks with the Vice President. According to these reports, at the start of the Moscow Conference the Americans and British tried to vindicate both the past and future actions of the Allied GHQ's; however, their Russian partner exhibited practically no sympathy or appreciation of their position. On the other hand, it seems that the foundations were laid for coming military cooperation. Not until a second front has been opened up, i.e., not until the Allies have carried out a successful invasion of France, will this plan for cooperation go into effect. Until then Russia retains the right to unrestricted action in military and political matters. The Vice President stated, however, that Russian conditions for more complete military cooperation will soon be met.

2. There was no agreement on the German question. The Soviet requested that the ravaged areas of Russia be rebuilt by German labor, and with the use of German materials. On the theory that this would involve complete Soviet control over Germany, the granting of this request was refused, and the decision was put off; the question is to be referred to the European Commission for a solution.

3. The request was made by the British and American delegations that Russia agree to total German disarmament. However, no agreement was reached. Russia favored the establishment of an anti-Nazi "Kampf Gruppen" (combat groups). The American opinion on this proposal was that, if carried out, it would constitute the building of a Communist army controlled by Russia. This problem was also left to be decided by the European Commission.
4. Russia indicated her willingness to a plebiscite, controlled by the Allies, in the Baltic states. Aware of the farce of the 1940 plebiscite, the British and Americans were worried about the freedom of the polls.

5. The Vice President declined to discuss the Finnish question with even his intimate friend, which signifies that Russia is adamant on this point. Special problems arise relative to this in view of the fact that the 1939 Russian aggression in Finland was emphatically denounced by public opinion in the United States.

6. Russia made two proposals in regard to Poland; (1) An independent Poland, governed by the exile London government, provided Britain and America agreed to the Ribbentrop line. (2) If the first proposal is not acceptable, Russia is prepared to establish a large European republic which would include all the original Polish territory and should then seek to become connected with the USSR. The Vice President says that Russia promised not to take any steps toward the fulfillment of this plan, either politically or through propaganda, as long as there is a chance of effecting an agreement with the exile London government. The Russian opinion of the exile government is that it is made up of 'an entirely unrepresentative bunch of emigres'. No solution was reached, and this problem was turned over to the European Commission, which in effect means that Russia will take steps to carry out the second suggestion.

7. There was only an interchange of opinions on the question of South East Europe. The Swiss Minister was not in a position to state whether or not Russia discontinued her opposition to landings on the Dalmatian coast in return for a guarantee that Bulgaria and Rumania would not be involved in the operations. The European Commission was presented with the Balkan question also.

8. The paragraph on Austria is regarded as nothing but political strategy to attack a vulnerable point in Germany's inner front. The consensus of opinion was that Austria is the first place that disorders and revolutions might be expected to break out.

9. The Vice President's general political comments on the Moscow Conference were the most interesting parts of the Swiss Minister's report. The American
delegation set out for the Conference with little optimism. And now that it is over everyone who is familiar with the results of the Conference is certain that the British and Americans alone must win World War II, possibly even against Russia, and that Russia means to dominate the whole of Europe and has already made substantial progress toward this end. The main outcome of the Moscow Conference is not apparent so much in the resolutions adopted as in the realization that the ideology of a World Revolution is still alive. Although Russia agreed to the majority of the British and American suggestions, she always succeeded in leaving herself a loophole. The assumption is that she will endeavor to put the western powers on the defensive so that after the war the various national communistic organizations in all countries will be guaranteed freedom of action. Since this is diametrically opposed to American ideals for peace, the American government may be compelled to make momentous decisions very soon. The gravity of these conclusions is in no way tempered by the conciliatory atmosphere in which the conference was conducted. Secretary of State Hull was not blinded by the Russian subterfuge, however, and admitted 'that he knew less now about what was going to happen than he did before he arrived in Moscow'.

"10. The report of the Swiss Minister is a valuable supplement to the reports from friendly diplomats which I (the German Minister to Switzerland) sent earlier. The reason that the above report contains so much more concrete information than the data which came to Bern from the American and British governments is due to the fact that the Vice President was talking to the Swiss Minister, his brother-in-law, in the greatest confidence".

"The German Minister inserted a final remark in his report to the effect that the Moscow Conference reminded him of the Molotov Berlin tactics in 1940. It was clear then as now that Russia had not abandoned her inclination toward World Revolution."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Exhibition in U. S. of Air Marshal Harris' Blue Book

I am making a careful study of the possibilities suggested by your friend that stereopticon views of bombed German cities from Air Marshal Harris' Blue Book be placed on public exhibition in this country.

If at all feasible, I believe the exhibition should include both AAF and RAF bombing views. However, since the RAF conception of bombardment rests on area devastation and the AAF mission is based on precision bombing, RAF pictures in general show greater expanses of devastation. My aim is to determine whether we can arrange a joint exhibit which will not minimize the more important but less spectacular results obtained by the AAF and at the same time not cast aspersion upon the British effort.

Sgd. H. H. Arnold

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. Army,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
December 29, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Attached are the recommendations of the Special Committee on Shipping relating to surrender terms for Germany and to the principles which should govern the handling of surrendered tonnage. It is also recommended that the same terms be applied to other European enemy countries.

This document is based, in principle, upon the surrender terms recommended for Italy which were transmitted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower last September. However, the conditions to be applied to German shipping are more severe than those recommended for Italy.

This document has been transmitted to Admiral Leahy for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is being sent to you for your information.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Attachment:
Shipping D 4

The President,

The White House.
Secret

December 8, 1943.

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON SHIPPING:
SURRENDER TERMS FOR GERMANY

The Special Committee on Shipping submits the following recommendations regarding the terms to be imposed upon Germany with respect to merchant shipping. The recommendations also include a statement of principles to guide the occupying authorities in handling the surrendered tonnage. It is obvious that no hard and fast rules can at this time be laid down, for it is impossible to anticipate many of the conditions which will be encountered at the time hostilities cease. The Committee also recommends that these same provisions be incorporated in the terms of surrender submitted to any other European country.

Subject to these limitations the Special Committee on Shipping recommends that:

1. The following provisions should be included in the terms which are imposed upon Germany.

   a. All merchant tonnage, including yachts and miscellaneous small craft, wherever located, of German ownership or operated under or subject to German control, (including ships which may be under foreign control but subject to recall by right of option, in which case such option shall be promptly exercised and the return of the vessel facilitated by the German Government), shall be immediately turned over to the Allied Powers acting on behalf of the United Nations, their action to be taken without prejudice to the ultimate disposition of such vessels.

2. The merchant tonnage turned over to the Allied Powers shall be handled according to the following principles:

   a. No commitments should be made to the German authorities which would affect our freedom of action with respect to use or ultimate disposition of surrendered tonnage.

   b. All
b. All surrendered tonnage wherever located should be taken into physical custody at the earliest possible moment to prevent sabotage or escape.

c. All vessels which come under the control of the theater commander and which he deems may be suitable or required for military purposes should be retained for such purposes. Those vessels not suitable or required for military purposes and all such vessels for which the theater commander has no further need should be placed under the control of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. Vessels acquired outside of the German theater of operations should be placed under the control of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

d. With respect to the vessels placed under the control of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, those suitable for United Nations purposes should be allocated in accordance with the needs of the war effort and with particular reference to military and naval efforts which may still exist in other theaters. If any vessels are left in the hands of owners or operators (i.e., vessels for the use of German nationals, such as those employed in coastwise, inland or minor trade, fishing vessels, pleasure craft, etc.) they should be placed under the control and supervision of the local agency established by the theater commander for this purpose.

e. All German vessels acquired, insofar as practicable, should be repaired and equipped by Germany. This procedure would tend to relieve the strain on Allied resources, would be more expeditious and would prove easier because of the suitability of spare parts, the operations of various types of machinery, etc. Within the limits of practicability and consistent with the war effort, the burden and cost of equipping, maintaining and operating German tonnage should be borne by the national administration of Germany. In any event, this should apply to the expenses of any vessels which may be assigned.
assigned to the appropriate administration of the conquered country.

f. It is not necessary or advisable at once to take title to the German vessels seized or surrendered, although, until the situation in Germany has settled down, it may be necessary to place ships, before they are put into service, into Prize Courts of one or more of the Allied nations as may be deemed the more expedient and appropriate and to requisition them out for use without condemnation. This procedure would enable ships to be brought into service more quickly and would not prejudice the subsequent disposal of title at the appropriate time. The nationality of the Prize Court employed will not affect the disposition of the vessels by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. All other vessels captured, taken, turned over pursuant to the terms of surrender or found in German waters, with the exception of any neutral vessels which may be covered by Allied safe-conduct, should be placed into a Prize Court when and under such jurisdiction as may be dictated by the exigencies of the particular case.

g. Vessels that were seized by Germany from Allied and occupied countries should be assigned, if feasible, to the National Government under which they were formerly registered, with the provision that they be used to further the war effort in a manner acceptable to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and with due regard for the rights of the National Government concerned.

Approved: December 7, 1943.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM:

Show the attached to Admiral
Leahy and ask him to return it to Admiral
Brown for file when he has finished with it.

F.D.R.
Report of 3 Communications Sent to Tokyo by Japanese Ambassador Oshima after His Inspection Tour of the German Defenses in France

Ambassador Oshima made an inspection tour of Germany's defenses on the Atlantic Coast of France between 24 October and 1 November. Upon his return to Berlin, the Ambassador prepared a detailed report outlining what he himself had observed, what the Germans had told him about their defenses in France and the Low Countries, and his overall conclusions. Oshima's report was sent to Tokyo in 3 separate messages, which are set forth below.

Berlin to Tokyo—9 November*:

I submit herewith my itinerary. A complete report will follow.

24 October — Departed from Berlin for Brest, by way of Paris.

26 October — Arrived at Brest, inspected the defenses in that region and spent the night at Le Bourg d'Ire. Our party was joined in Brest by General Fahrmacher, in charge of the defenses in that area.

*Reported in Magic Summary for 12 November.
27 October - Inspected the defenses in the region of Lorient and spent the night at La Baule, where we witnessed night maneuvers.

28 October - Visited St. Nazaire and spent the night at Nantes.

29 October - Returned to Paris, where we were entertained by Marshal Rundstedt.

30 October - Traveled to Bordeaux and inspected the coastal defenses and 2 blockade runners. Our party was entertained at dinner by General Blaskowitz.

31 October - Left Bordeaux and went to La Rochelle, where we were joined by General Gallenkamp, in charge of defenses in that area.

1 November - Visited Poitiers, and then began the return trip to Berlin.
Berlin to Tokyo—10 November:

1. [Heading and two subparagraphs missing.]

2. On the basis of this point of view the Dover Straits area is given first place in the German Army's scheme of fortifications and troop dispositions, and Normandy and Brittany come next in importance. The other areas are regarded as only secondary fronts. Although the possibility of invasion by means of an Anglo-American landing on the Iberian Peninsula, followed by a crossing of the Pyrenees, is not altogether ruled out of consideration, no special defenses have been constructed for that area. Instead, mobile forces are held in reserve at strategic points, and those forces are prepared to hold the mountain passes in the Pyrenees in case of emergency.

2. Disposition of the German forces.

a. Field Marshal Rundstedt in Paris has a double role to fill. As Commander-in-Chief of Army Group D he controls (1) the Netherlands Defense Army (Air Chief Marshal Christiansen),

*Reported in Magic Summary for 10 December.
(2) the Fifteenth Army (General Salmuth), (3) the Seventh Army (General Dollmann), (4) the First Army (General Blaskowitz) and (5) the Nineteenth Army (General Sodenstern). At the same time, as Supreme Commander of the Armies in the West, he has jurisdiction over (1) the forces under the command of the Military Administrators in Belgium (General Falkenhauzen) and France (General Stulpnagel), (2) the Third Air Fleet (Marshal Sperrle) and (3) Navy Group West (Admiral Krancke).

b. Subparagraph missing.

c. The coastal defense divisions are distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands Defense Army</td>
<td>4 divisions</td>
<td>The Netherlands as far south as the Rhine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifteenth Army</td>
<td>9 divisions</td>
<td>Rhine to west of Le Havre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Army</td>
<td>8 divisions</td>
<td>West of Le Havre to southern bank of the Loire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>4 divisions</td>
<td>Southern bank of the Loire to Spanish border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineteenth Army</td>
<td>6 divisions</td>
<td>French Mediterranean coast</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Approximately one-third of those divisions have a strength of three regiments each; the rest have two regiments each, but are now being gradually reinforced so as to bring all the divisions up to a strength of three regiments.

The coastal defense divisions stay put, but the mobile divisions which constitute the general reserve are available for service on other fronts (recently, for instance, 2 divisions from the general reserve were dispatched to the Eastern Front). The number of the latter divisions, though of course it varies according to circumstances, is at present as follows: infantry divisions, 6; armored divisions, 4; mechanized divisions, 5.* In addition to these, 3 armored training divisions are being sent from Germany, 2 airborne divisions from Italy and a number of infantry divisions from other fronts. These

*Apparently Oshima meant that there were 15 mobile divisions in addition to the 31 coastal defense divisions previously referred to, making a total of 46. As of the time of Oshima's tour, Order of Battle Branch placed the total at 41. Since that time several divisions are believed to have been shifted in and out of the area, and O/B Branch believes that the figure may now be as high as 42.
infantry divisions, however, require a rest and will have to be brought up to strength after they get to France.

The mobile divisions come under the direct control of the Army Group and are distributed in such a way that they can be rushed anywhere by vehicle (in the Netherlands by bicycle) at short notice.

The forces under the Military Administrators of Belgium and France are garrison troops and consist of twenty-five battalions and seventeen regiments, respectively.

d. The total number of troops which the German Army maintains in the area commanded by Marshal Rundstedt amounts to 1,400,000, including naval and air forces.

e. In addition to the above, recruit training schools for various branches of the armed forces have been moved from Germany to France. There is a cadre unit which maintains a constant flow of tank troops for twelve independent tank battalions (Tiger and Panther). There are also ten depot divisions training recruits sent to France, and
several field divisions are now being formed from among their ranks. They are not, however, under Field Marshal Rundstedt’s command; they come under the control of General Fromm in Germany.

3. **Coastal defense points d'appui.**

In areas centered on the principal harbors and naval bases (in the area which I inspected, these were Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire, La Rochelle and Bordeaux), works have been specially strengthened and fortified zones have been established with the necessary equipment to meet attack by land, sea and air. Each of these zones has a Commander of the Fortified Zone (the equivalent of a fortress commander) who exercises unified control over the land, sea and air forces in his area subject to the local divisional commander.\[7\]

4. **Naval.**

\[Sentence missing\] This area is divided into three sections, namely the English Channel, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean (which includes the coast of the Italian Riviera as well as the coast of Southern France). Each of these sections is under the command of a Commanding Admiral, who in turn has two or three "Sea Commanders" under him. Each "Sea Commander" is responsible for naval operations and defense in the
waters assigned to him. In land actions he cooperates with the military forces on the spot.

5. Responsibility of command.

a. The Army Group Commander [Rundstedt], in addition to commanding his own Army Group, exercises control over the naval forces (except in sea operations), the air forces, and the forces of the Military Administration and the Organization Todt in his defense zone, not only in the actual conduct of operations but in the various arrangements for defense. Unit commanders below the rank of Divisional Commander have power of command only in operational matters which concern their units.

b. Commanders of Fortified Zones have command of all three arms of the fighting forces within their respective fortified zones. Although they are independently responsible for the defense of these zones, they are in each case under the command of the divisional commander for the area concerned. The divisional commander, on his part, has at his disposal not only the fortified zone garrison but all the other defense troops and reserves, and he is ultimately responsible for
the defense of the zone assigned to him.

c. [Subparagraph missing]

d. Fortifications and armaments.

a. The fortified zones centered on naval bases for the most part follow established principles of fortification. Several lines of defense fortifications facing strategic points have been prepared for action (most of these have airfields near them), and there are strong double entrenchments. The main feature of these defense lines is that they are not arranged in one continuous and connected line, but are arranged to operate independently down to the smallest unit. In the other areas, Nests of Resistance have been constructed in large numbers all along the coast. The gaps between these Nests are closed by various types of obstructions (mainly mines). Each of the Nests is equipped with various types of arms and is so arranged as to be capable of defending itself independently (they are normally kept supplied with food sufficient for three weeks). All along behind the permanent line of fortifications, field works are being constructed as support positions.
b. [Subparagraph missing]

c. The camouflaging has been carried out very thoroughly and everything possible has been done for protection against tanks on the basis of practical experience gained since the war began. This work is vastly superior to the work on the West Wall fortifications.

d. In the areas which I inspected it is probable that heavy coastal guns between 170 and 340 millimeters in caliber are used, but 120 and 150 millimeter eight-barreled projectors are also used. There are 80, 105 and 120 millimeter anti-aircraft guns, and I noticed a large number of anti-tank guns of various calibers and, among the small arms, a large number of captured weapons (French, Belgian, Czech and Russian). Most of these weapons, however, are of modern pattern. The Nests of Resistance are equipped with the very latest German weapons, and there are automatic hand grenade throwers (which throw at the rate of 120 a minute) and flame-throwers installed in casemates. The principal feature of these weapon locations is that all the guns can be

-10-
concentrated to fire on one object at the same time whether at sea or on land. For example the anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns can be fired on warships at sea, and the fortress guns can be fired on tanks. (This feature was greatly impressed upon me by night firing practice at La Baule in which all the guns fired out to sea together.)

9. The fortifications were begun in April, 1942, the locations being decided by the garrison commanders in their respective areas. They were designed by military fortification experts, and constructed by the Organization Todt. They were completed in June or July this year, but, as I have already stated, the Germans are now engaged in strengthening them. Since, apart from a small number of Germans, the workers used by the Organization Todt have been foreign, chiefly French, secret information about the fortifications leaks out to the enemy, as even the Germans realize.
Berlin to Tokyo—10 November*:

On the basis of what I learned upon my trip, I submit the following observations:

Fortifications and Reserves

a. All the German fortifications on the French Coast are very close to the shore, and it is quite clear that, when and if the enemy makes an attempt to land, the Germans intend to smash the landing as close to the water's edge as possible.

b. Even the smallest forts are constructed and provisioned in such a way that they can hold out independently for a very long time. And even the individual machine gun nests are liberally strengthened with ferro-concrete, which serves to protect men and materiel from shelling and bombing and helps to attain the maximum defense from the minimum number of soldiers.

c. The Germans have large reserve units which can be moved swiftly to the area of attack. This is true of the entire German organization from the Army groups down to the regiments.

*Reported in Magic Summary for 13 November.
d. All this is the same idea that was evident in the West Wall, but in these fortifications the quality is ever so much better.

**Likelihood of Success of an Allied Invasion**

The coast to be defended is very long, and we must admit that the enemy air forces are of high quality. Therefore, if the enemy should gather together a powerful fleet and attempt to land without regard for losses, it cannot be expected that they would necessarily be stopped everywhere along the coast. However, even if some men did succeed in getting ashore, they would be cut to pieces by the lateral shell fire from neighboring defense posts, and by the powerful German mobile reserves, which can be concentrated with lightning speed. The fortified areas have been prepared with great efficiency, and the Germans are constantly improving the engineering work. When one appreciates what a good job has already been done, and takes into account what they are still planning to do, then one can realize what a hard time the enemy would have. In fact, it is my opinion that, even though the American and British forces might establish a bridgehead for a short time, it would be utterly impossible for them
to form any new second front in France.

**Morale**

What pleased me most on this tour was the morale and military spirit of the German soldiers. Just to give you an example, the aging veteran officers of the last war treated the higher young officers with great kindness and spoke well of them. The soldiers garrisoning the fortresses, especially those past forty, handled their weapons with love and affection and also with confidence. I could see from many examples how cheerfully they go about their work.

Everywhere I engaged in casual chats with the soldiers, and I was often struck with the depth of their respect and affection for Chancellor Hitler. The complete unanimity of spirit of the German soldiers, high and low, and the honest seriousness with which they apply themselves to their work are the result not only of the general nature of the German people, but also must be regarded as a product of the Nazi education which they have received. This spirit permeates the very last soldier; I could see that and I breathed a sigh of relief and my heart was at peace.
Effect of Air Raids

Concerning the effect of the Anglo-American raids, my trip was so limited that I am not able to give you much of a general picture. From what we could see there has not been a great deal of material damage. The metropolitan areas of Lorient and Saint Nazaire have been 90% destroyed, and in other important ports not only the metropolitan areas but also the harbor installations have been damaged.

Amazing as it may seem, however, the submarine sheds have stood firm as a rock and the HQ buildings--very important targets--have received hardly any damage. Why on earth should the Americans and British not hit the submarine sheds? Why on earth did they not strike other important German structures while they were being prepared? God only knows!

In March 1942 the flood gates at Saint Nazaire were destroyed by an attack, but the inconvenience did not last long; it didn't cause any military embarrassment to speak of. Now a new and very firm flood gate has been made out of concrete, assuring safety in the future.
Danger of French Cooperation
with the Allies

England and America hope that, when the time comes for establishing a second front, the French will cooperate. The Allies are doing all they can to foster this. In my opinion, however, even though the Anglo-Americans attempt an invasion, the French will not put up enough resistance to hinder German operations.
SECRET SECURITY

WAR DEPARTMENT

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attached report of three communications received by the Special Branch, Military Intelligence Division, is being brought to your attention at the request of the Prime Minister.

[Signature]

Acting Chief of Staff

SECRET SECURITY

Regraded Unclassified
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

25 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN FREEMAN:

General Marshall requested that I deliver the attached MAGIC reports for the information of the President and Admiral Leahy.

Return of the enclosures is not necessary.

FRANK T. HURLEY,
Major, G.S.C.
From Sexton (57) to Lt. Col. McCarthy:

The Inspector General of the German Air Force has issued an order on 18 November in substance as follows: Our pursuit plane formations have not been able to secure decisive success against enemy four-engine formations even with the introduction of heavy weapons on pursuit planes. The main reason is failure to close to shortest ranges. There has been set up therefore a Pursuit Assault Force whose task will be to break up enemy formations using more heavily armored pursuit planes in all-out attacks in close formation from the closest range and pushing the attack home even to the extent of ramming without regard to losses. The so-called storm units will be immediately followed by other pursuit planes. Volunteers for these storm units are being obtained on a secret basis.

The German Air Ministry concludes that local air superiority contributed probably in decisive degree to the success of the operation against Leros. Allied bombing of air fields in Greece, Crete and the Aegean did not succeed in influencing the course of German Air Force operations.

Two groups (about 50 aircraft) of 217's equipped for radio projectiles have been transferred from Southern France to the Bay of Biscay area for operation against Atlantic Ocean convoys.

Orders issued on 18 November for the transfer to Bulgaria of reconnaissance sea rescue air units now in the Crimea indicate that the German Air Force doubts that the Crimea will be held for long.

On 19 November the commanders of four German submarines at Panay, Malaya were informed that it was absolutely essential for all submarines to bring back enriching alloy ores, and guns, ammunition and keel ballast was removed and this weight replaced by wolfram, molybdenum and tin.
24 November 1943

From Sexton (55) to Lt. Col. McCarthy:

From Vichy, Mitani reports that the "acts of terrorism" in France numbered 1040 during October, which is a slight drop from the September total of 1250. In July there were 400, in August 1050. Terrorist acts are most prevalent in southeast France, more than half of them in the neighborhood of Lyon, Grenoble and Leceusot.

In Franch Indo-China the Japs are trying unsuccessfully to get greater cooperation from the Governor General, Decoux. Laval has resisted attempts to have Decoux removed.

No Sig
From Sexton (52) for McCarthy:

On 17 November the German Admiral, Aegean, announced that he intended to make Leros his main base in the Dodecanese Islands.

The 16th Armored Division is being moved from the front in Italy and sent to Russia.

On November 15 an estimate prepared by the German Commander on the west front stated substantially as follows in a report to the German High Command: Impossible to establish in England any indications of immediate attack. However, must be pointed out that plane reconnaissance hardly can be/carried out over the relevant areas on account of the weather and strong defense. Withdrawal of landing craft, chiefly LCT's, from the Mediterranean towards England continues although not in large numbers. It is certain that the enemy is methodically and on the largest scale proceeding with his preparations to attack.

Apparently the Germans contemplate the employment of mountain divisions in Italy, withdrawing armored and motorized units for other uses.

The Germans are contemplating a series of operations to be undertaken against several island groups on the Dalmatian coast in the vicinity of Xara. These include islands of Uljan, Pasman, Bar, Pag, Vir, Solta, Brac and Hvar.

The island of Ikaria in the Aegeans has been taken by the Germans. The Italian forces have surrendered but a weak guerilla force commanded by a British captain is still operating.

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It is believed that as a result of the Italian surrender the Germans were required to send net reinforcements of about 10 divisions in the Yugoslavia area.

The Germans have informed their MA at Malta that the delivery of Allied cargoes bound for Calcutta harbor in January, February and March, 1944, is of vital significance.

Spain is worried over the political maneuvers of the Algeria Committee which is obviously inclined towards Communism.

In the Lebanon affair, the French reply to the British ultimatum places a large part of the responsibility on British agents and states, "The French reasserts the right intention to put the Lebanese in a position to realize the independence that was promised to them in 1941. The French is determined to exercise the rights of France which follow from the pledges made in 1941, as well as from the mandate." The reply then goes on to state that it is hoped that General de Gaulle will take things down to states that the great publicity given the incident has been a large cause of agitation among Arabs. It is estimated that as of the 15th of November German forces in the Orient were the equivalent of about 5 German and 3 Romanian divisions.

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No. 1052 23 November 1943

From Colonel Sexton (51, repeat of 40) for Lt. Col. Frank McCarthy.

In an effort to solve their military manpower shortage, the Germans are now culling defense plants of all except special skills and apparently are taking some men as old as 59 (class of 1984).

French National Party of Liberation feels that it was deceived as to its role in the Italian Armistice negotiations and on the commissions established to deal with European affairs.

The Japanese Ambassador in Moscow has cabled to Tokyo a description of a dinner party given by Molotov which ended up with Molotov and the British Ambassador engaging in a heated and bitter argument. He infers that both were fairly drunk.

Re Lebanon affair. The French reply to the British ultimatum places a large part of the responsibility on British agents and states, "The Potim solemnly reaffirms its firm intention to put the Levant states in a position to realize the independence that was promised to them in 1941. The Potim is determined to exercise the rights of France which follow from the pledges made in 1941, as well as from the Mandate." The reply then goes on to state that it is hoped that General Catroux will calm things down and states that the great publicity given the incident has been a large cause of agitation among Arabs. It is estimated that as of the 18th of November German forces in the Crimea were the equivalent of about 2 German and 3 Romanian Divisions.
From Sexton (49) for Marshall:

The Germans have prepared plans for the evacuation of the Crimea apparently to be carried out under the supervision of the Admiral commanding the Black Sea. No indication of execution of the plans yet.

The raid on Sofia killed 35 people and injured 100. Two factories and 110 dwelling houses were wrecked. The shock which the raid gave to the citizens was considerable.

With respect to German retaliatory raids on England, a German general told Oshima (Ambassador to Germany), "At length the hour of our revenge is at hand."

Helleu advises the French Committee that the disturbances in Lebanon has been accentuated by distribution of propaganda by U.S. OWI and the British.

Increase of Japanese expenditures in Indo-China indicates an increase in the number of troops stationed there. Since 1 July, 1943 the number has progressively increased and at present is about 4,500.

From Berlin the Japanese Attache reports that Berlin has not been heavily bombed for some time and even old people and children who had been evacuated are trickling back owing to unsatisfactory living conditions in the areas to which they had been removed. Still no signs of agitation except that increasing anxiety is felt about what may happen on the Eastern Front this winter.

Menemencioglu notified Turkish Ambassadors in London, Washington, and Moscow that Turkey will conform in principle to Eden's request but will stall the matter off. Menemencioglu told the Japanese Ambassador that he
HAD TOLD Eden that Turkey did not intend to enter the war and that Eden had not pressed the matter. It was also reported that the Turks refused to grant Russia use of the Dardanelles.

From Vichy the Japanese Ambassador reports that in Pétain's cancelled broadcast he had intended to promulgate a new decree designed to make sure that in case he dies before the constitution is revised the National Assembly will convene immediately to decide upon the successor. Pétain's reason for this was to forestall any tricks that might be perpetrated by the North African Regime. The Germans wanted to study the decree and asked him to delay the broadcast.

The Spanish are dubious of Japan's claims of a great victory at Bougainville and have asked the Japanese Ambassador for some proof, such as photographs.

German Air Force reports that the Sofia raid damaged only a few freight cars but did not interrupt rail traffic.

On 11 November the Turkish Ambassador reported from Basra the following from "Russian sources": "The Russians are preparing a series of attacks which it is estimated will reach the frontier by January. Beyond, they will halt on the frontier line. Thereafter, if the Anglo-American forces open a second front in the spring, the Russians will undertake further operations from the East."

Apparently the Turks are still telling the Germans and the Argentines that they do not intend to enter the war (November 30th).

Also have the Argentine Alleys reports indicate that the President Republican Foreign Ministry will shortly set up general relations with

SECRET
From Col. Sexton (47, repeating 39) to Lt. Col. McCarthy.

On 13 November German general headquarters circular to submarine commanders indicated German submarine operations of recent weeks have miscarried through failure to find convoys and stated this difficulty has been overcome by far-reaching air reconnaissance and mentioned the first JU-290 four-engined long distance reconnaissance plane with a cruising radius of 1,400 miles as being ready. Apparently the effect of depth charge pursuit on German submarines has lessened. Also the Germans have introduced a 37mm automatic gun on submarines which uses explosive ammunition, and it is believed that one hit will bring an airplane down. The message ends with a pep talk for submarine commanders as to their value in keeping tied down large enemy air and naval forces and protecting the homeland.

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On 11 November the Turkey Ambassador reported from Moscow the following from "Russian sources:" "The Russians are preparing a winter army which it is estimated will reach the frontier by January. However, they will halt on the frontier line. Thereafter, if the Anglo-Americans open a second front in the Spring, the Russians will undertake further operations from the East".

Apparently the Turks are still telling the Germans and the Japanese that they do not intend to enter the war (November 22-?).

From Rome the Argentine Aleppo reports indicate that the Fascist Republican Foreign Ministry will shortly set up general headquarters in
Venice.

Apparently Japan's recent exaggerated claims to a great victory off Bougainville were designed to raise the morale of the people. The Portuguese Minister to Japan indicated that the "Japanese people are enthusiastic over the news since for months on end they have known vaguely that things were not going well."

No Sig

From Tokyo a report from Vichy French ambassador Penel, recently died, indicates that the situation in years of war in which the Japanese people have undergone have left them dissatisfied, particularly regarding food supply and high cost of living. The ambassador reported that the enthusiastic speeches made at the recent Greater East Asia Conference were received with indifference by the Japanese public.

From Moscow Area. The Soviet Chelyb states, "Observing the war in which the war is going, government circles here are now convinced that neither side will be victorioso.

The German Air Force which attacked key convoys in the Mediterranean on November 6 and 11 was composed of airplanes carrying glider troops and torpedoes. It appears that the convoy raid was a single attempt which neutralized the glider troops but opened conditions favorable to torpedo planes. Continuation of the war may be expected in the future attacks.

Certain airplane losses were high amounting to about 25 percent.

An analysis of the possibility of moving certain troops from north Black and north Tag constitutes no evidence indicating that there are no troops in above areas which are not now fully employed and that, at the most,
SECRET

22 November 1943


Concensus Vatican City that bomb recently dropped thereon was from Nazi aircraft. Portuguese Ambassador declares the obvious purpose was to destroy the radio station and, although one bomb fell close, damage was slight. Also hinted Vatican officials share this opinion.

From Tokyo a report from Vichy French Ambassador Safi, recently died, indicates that the sacrifices of six years of war which the Japanese people have undergone have left them dissatisfied, particularly regarding food supply and high cost of living. The Ambassador reported that the enthusiastic speeches made at the recent Greater East Asia Conference were received with indifference by the Japanese public.

From Buenos Aires. The German Chargé states, "Observing the way in which the war is going, Government circles here are now convinced that neither side will be victorious."

The German Air Force which attacked two convoys in the Mediterranean on November 6 and 11 was composed of airplanes carrying glider bombs and torpedoes. It appears that the convoy laid down a smoke screen which neutralized the glider bombs but created conditions favorable to torpedo planes. Combinations of the two may be expected in the future attacks. German airplane losses were high amounting to about 22 percent.

An analysis of the possibility of moving German troops from north Rinal and north Ying Croatia to Russia indicates that there are no troops in above areas which are not now fully employed and that, at the most
two Cirths may be available for the Russian Front at present and these only if guerrilla activity has been suppressed to a greater extent than now appears.

Apparently morale of the Russians in the Kieve-Kremenchug area is high in all ranks. The Russians are convinced that the Germans have exhausted their reserves and are short of tanks while the Russians are well supplied with tanks and artillery. No signs of well-prepared defenses on the Dneiper line and the Russians consider the Germans are too extended to hold the line strongly.

No Sig

The German Air Force is carrying small numbers of captured Pocke Wolf 190's from the Mediterranean to South Russia, indicating a shortage of new fighter bombers. This may reflect damage to the 39 plant at Mariupol from the Eighth Air Force raid of the 29th of October.

Apparently the Germans are short of aircraft fuel in the Black Sea Area.

On his trip along the French coast Gobin also observed two German blockade runners about to depart from the vicinity of Bordeaux. The Germans feel that the occupation of the North would solve greater difficulties in blockade running.

The German propaganda line with regard to the Lebanese Incident is to accuse Egypt as the prime mover, disclaiming the idea that Lebanon intends to play off its leaders and the Arabs against each other so as to be able afterwards to pose as the "savior", this for the purpose of eventually creating a British protectorate over Lebanon and Syria, German sympathy for the Arab community is to be weighed.
From Col. Sexton (45, repeat of 36) for Lt. col. McCarthy:

Between October 14 and November 4 air attacks in Italy have caused damage to railroads at 58 places.

The German Air Force is reestablishing a small Italian air force primarily SE Fighter Group for the purpose of reinforcing the defenses of the ball bearing works at Rurin.

Night fighter defenses of Germany have been reinforced in the last few days by the transfer of 20/30 twin-engined fighters from Belgium to the area west of Berlin.

The German Air Force is ferreting small numbers of repaired Focke Wulf 190's from the Mediterranean to South Russia, indicating a shortage of new fighter bombers. This may reflect damage to the FW plant at Mariupol from the Eighth Air Force raid of the 10th of October.

Apparently the Germans are short of aircraft fuel in the Black Sea area.

On his trip along the French coast Oshima also witnessed two German blockade runners about to depart from the vicinity of Bordeaux. The Germans felt that the occupation of the Azores would make even greater difficulties in blockade running.

The German propaganda line with regard to the Lebanon incident is to show England as the prime mover, developing the idea that London intends to play off De Gaulle and the Arabs against each other so as to be able afterwards to pose as the "rescuer", this for the purpose of eventually creating a British protectorate over Lebanon and Syria.

German sympathy for the Arab community is to be wrought.
Moscow - Following is summary of text in translation of letter received from Molotov:

I consider it necessary to inform you for communication your government of certain recent German peace feelers in Stockholm. In October Soviet Mission Sweden received anonymous letter indicating willingness give Soviet Government information possibly leading to liquidation war 1943. Member staff mission met author of letter Edgar Klaus, a German businessman. He alleged that group German industrialists headed by unknown man named Kleist is in close touch Ribbentrop and group favoring conclusion separate peace with Russia. Representatives industrialists having failed previous attempt establish contact Soviet Mission had empowered Klaus make attempt. Klaus maintained that Germans would agree any Soviet demands including 1914 frontiers. He admitted German conviction that war lost and stated worsening morale German people and lack sufficient armed forces for further prosecution war. He asked whether he could assure persons sending him of possibility establishing contact and inquired whether Soviet representative wished meet Ribbentrop. On instructions from Mission approved by Soviet
Soviet Government Klaus was told that there could be absolutely no question of contact with Soviet representatives nor could there be further conversations with him.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information was believed to be so secret by the author that he wrote it to me in long hand and had it delivered from England "for my eyes only".

While I cannot guarantee the accuracy of the reports, from their general tone I am inclined to believe they are correct and believe that you will find them of interest.

"October 9 - Hanover very hard hit by R.A.F. They have asked for a great deal of help from other cities, even from Berlin - 50,000 loaves of bread, 40,000 lbs of sausages - extensive fires are out of control and city asking for fire fighting apparatus from other towns - also in need of drinking water to be brought in - 50,000 people homeless - (Note: All places called on for help were to the east - this may indicate Bremen badly hit in U.S.A.A.F. and R.A.F. raids.)

October 10 - Now 200,000 homeless in Hanover - an area of 3 or 4 square kilometers is a complete furnace - no rescue work in area possible.

October 11 - Most telephone and teletype lines at Hanover knocked out - state fires worst ever occurred in Reich - occurred right in center of town and spread all over - many armament industries destroyed. Telephone, gas, water, electricity all gone - H.E. burst water mains.

October 10 - Special orders have been issued rerouting, etc., of Me 109, and F.W. 190 direct from factories to the front line operational stations - flights must be made regardless of weather, also at night and during air raids - (Note: A clear indication of existing shortage of these types.)

October 11 - Instructions to Luftflotte IV (South Russia Front) state "in view of lack of Me 109" use of Maci 202 (captured Italian planes) will be made for fast reconnaissance purposes.

October 11 - In Aegean 9 Ju 87 and 1 Ju 88 failed to return from attack on Allied Naval Units on October 9th - (Note - These
aircraft were intercepted by 20 Beaufighters and 60 P-38's who claimed
destroyed 15 Ju 87 and 1 Ju 88, probably destroyed 3 Ju 87, and damaged
5 Ju 87 - this is one of the rare occasions where claims can be verified
as to their exactitude.

October 11 - German officers proceeding through Sweden in civilian
clothes (similar to our arrangements in Eire) have lately been involved
in brawls. Swedes more and more upset and opposed to this traffic which
they have threatened to stop completely if further incidents occur."

H. H. ARNOLD,
General, U. S. A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.
May 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

To keep the attached for me and when I make a statement, pull it out and give to me.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ELMER DAVIS:

I talked about some further statement in regard to the Italian and German peoples, but we all agree that the matter should be held in abeyance for a short time at least.

F.D.R.
24 May 1943

Dear Mr. President—

Here is a revised draft of the suggested statement as German policy, as Admiral Leahy, Mr. Welles and I see it. The principal change is in Paragraph 4, where original form, it was felt, might stiffen German resistance. Respectfully submitted,

[Signature]
DRAFT STATEMENT: POLICY TOWARD THE GERMAN PEOPLE

1. The objective of the United States is the unconditional surrender of all our enemies. The United States Government will not conclude a peace or armistice, nor will it enter into any negotiations whatever, with the present German government or with any other groups or individuals in Germany.

2. The United Nations have in their possession evidence concerning the crimes committed by officials and agents of the Hitler regime. Persons guilty of such crimes will be suitably punished. The United States will not be a party to any mass reprisals against the German people.

It must be noted, however, that any further executions of hostages or other nationals of the United Nations, whether outside or inside of Germany, must be taken into account. Also that internal disturbances may prevail in Europe at the close of hostilities; and it will be impossible to guarantee the personal safety of any German national in the liberated countries, even if he be innocent of crimes.
against non-combatants, unless he is a prisoner of war of the
United Nations armies.

3. The United States will insist on the restoration of all
property looted or stolen from the occupied countries, by whatever
means.

4. After the end of hostilities German resources will be
held in trust for the German people and order will be maintained
in Germany by the United Nations.

5. The United States at the end of the war will aid in
feeding the hungry and in general economic rehabilitation. Our
first responsibility, however, is to our allies, particularly to
those who have been plundered, starved, and enslaved by the Nazi
Regime. The longer the war continues, the less food will be available
for the German people.

6. The United States is not fighting the German people as
a race; we are fighting the Nazi and militarist philosophy of
aggression, and all persons in whom that philosophy is embodied.
Those German people who support their government which has brought war upon the world must be presumed to adhere to that philosophy. German individuals or groups who repudiate it must prove their repudiation not only by words but by acts.

7. The United States and its allies are working for a world based upon the four freedoms. The German people will be encouraged to reorient their lives toward a faith in freedom under law; and will be invited to take part in the free world of the future when and if they demonstrate that they have accepted their share of its duties and responsibilities, and will forego the use of force or the threat of force in their relations with other nations.
Memorandum for the President:

I think you will find the attached estimate interesting.

Mrs. Tradd

January 20, 1943

(Casablanca)

I shall return it to the British files.
SECRET.

J.I.C. (42) 462. (Final.)

December 3, 1942.

Circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff

TO BE KEPT UNDER LOCK AND KEY

It is requested that special care may be taken to ensure the secrecy of this document.

WAR CABINET.

Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee.

GERMAN STRATEGY IN 1943.

REPORT BY THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE SUB-COMMITTEE.

1. IN recent reports we have referred to the factors which limit the courses of action open to Germany in relation to particular theatres of war. Evidence is accumulating of weaknesses which limit German strategy as a whole. In this appreciation of German strategy, therefore, we begin by summarising and assessing the effect of these weaknesses. We then consider the courses of action open to Germany, and attempt a forecast of the strategy Germany will adopt.

PART I.—GERMANY'S STRATEGIC LIMITATIONS.

Man-power.

2. Germany's greatest weakness is her shortage of man-power. Germany needs (a) a large army and air force to fight her battles and to garrison the conquered territories, and (b) an enormous industrial and agricultural force to produce and move the munitions, equipment and food required for the armed forces, and to feed, clothe and house the workers themselves. She no longer has enough men for both requirements, and it seems inevitable that the strength of the German Army, which is at present some six and a half million men, must fall by at least a million men by the end of 1943. This reduction is equivalent to some 40 divisions, including a proportion of Corps and Army troops. To maintain the Army, even at this level, will involve considerable economic risks, and may not be possible.

Transport.

3. Germany's transport difficulties, mainly created by her need to maintain her communications in Russia, will not prevent her from carrying out large-scale movements of forces by land, but will restrict their speed and must deter the High Command from engaging in new campaigns in areas inadequately provided with transport facilities.

Raw Materials and Food.

4. Germany's oil situation is critical. She cannot hope to obtain any substantial additional supplies from her present resources before the middle of 1943, even if she retains Maikop. Despite ruthless economies in service and civilian use, there are already distributional breakdowns which are beginning to affect military operations. During the next six months at least her oil situation will continue to embarrass her operations and restrict her plans. It will prevent
her from providing the oil necessary for the 1943 Ukrainian harvest, without which her food position will remain precarious, and will continue to depress her industrial capacity. If in these circumstances she is forced this winter to consume oil for military purposes at the same rate as in the winter of 1941-42 she will be increasingly handicapped in holding her present position and will be unable to undertake an offensive against South or even North Caucasia in the summer of 1943. In these circumstances she may be forced or may decide to shorten her line. On the other hand, if she is allowed to remain inactive during the winter, the resultant saving in oil, plus the new source of domestic supply that will become available to her in the middle of 1943, should enable her to undertake the military effort necessary at least to complete the occupation of North Caucasia.

5. If Germany is given the opportunity to complete next year the occupation of North Caucasia and secures the sea passage across the Black Sea, she should command enough oil (including increased domestic supplies which are expected in mid-1943) to meet her future military commitments, to ensure a substantial grain surplus from the Ukraine in the 1944 harvest and to provide her industry with the minimum requirements for her war effort. If, on the other hand, she has shortened her line and abandoned hope of Caucasian oil and is heavily engaged by the Allies, her supplies will be so limited as to deprive her of all power of undertaking major offensive operations.

6. There are other raw materials and industrial products in which she is deficient, and which she already imports from European neutrals—Turkey, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland and Sweden. The extent by which Germany could, by further aggression, increase the supplies of these is insufficient to provide a substantial motive for an attack upon any of them. Even if a changed attitude on the part of any or all reduced or denied her present supplies, it is unlikely that on this ground alone she would attack them. The most important for her are Swedish iron ore, Turkish chrome (of which she has been promised the greatest part in 1943 and 1944), Portuguese tungsten and the industrial products of Switzerland and Sweden. On the other hand, it will be increasingly important, as her stocks decline, for her to defend the mineral resources of Yugoslavia, Greece and Norway: indeed Italy and parts of Russia are the only territories which Germany could evacuate without increasing rather than reducing her economic strain.

The Armed Forces.

Navy.

7. The German surface fleet has not been much in action, but there is no evidence that its efficiency has declined since the beginning of the war. The submarine fleet is increasing in size and potency, the only sign of weakness being a slight decline in efficiency due to a shortened period of training.

Army.

8. During the first two years of the war the German Army expanded rapidly, both in men and material. Now, however, after 18 months of the Russian campaign, expansion has ceased. It is estimated that the Army has suffered some 4,000,000 casualties in dead and permanently disabled, and these casualties comprise the flower of the German Army. This must inevitably reduce the size and quality of the German Army in 1943.

9. The failure to defeat the main armies of Russia, the failure to complete the conquest of Caucasia, the major reverses at Stalingrad, and yet another winter spent in Russia—all these, coupled with the defeat of the Afrika Corps, will induce doubts as to the invincibility of the army and will lead to a decline in morale. There is evidence that the High Command is dissatisfied with Hitler’s strategic conduct of the war. There have been signs of friction between the Army and the Party. High-placed generals have been dismissed, and in some instances more loyal Party men have taken their places.

10. The picture we have of the German Army to-day is that of a formidable, well-disciplined force of high fighting value, but with such extensive commitments, and in relation to those commitments such inadequate reserves, that, if pressure by the Russians, and by the Allies on other fronts, is vigorously maintained, a sharp decline must be expected and the German Army will be unable to meet the combination of threats which will face it.
Air Force.

11. During the past few months evidence has accumulated that the stamina of the German Air Force crews is deteriorating, owing to the severity of the calls made upon them and that, in order to stem the decline, the German High Command has been forced to adopt a policy of economy in the employment of the bulk of the air force. There are signs of deterioration in the training of pilots and crews.

12. The first-line strength of the German Air Force had only been maintained up to October at the expense of depth. I.R. strength, stored reserves, operational types used in training and R.T.U.s. (particularly single engine fighter units) have declined. Consequently the ability of the German Air Force to meet casualties and reverses has been seriously impaired. There is evidence that since October even the I.E. strength has not been maintained. On the Russian front and in the Mediterranean area the decline is believed to be as high as 20 per cent.

13. The situation has further deteriorated owing to Germany's increased defensive commitments and shortage of man-power. The offensive arm of the German Air Force, namely, the bomber strength, which is to-day less than it was at the time of the Battle of Britain, will probably be further curtailed so that the defensive arm can be expanded. German Air Force personnel have been drawn upon, not only to fulfil duties connected with the Air Force hitherto performed by the Army, but even to fight on the ground with the Army itself.

14. To sum up, the German Air Force is to-day inadequate to meet the commitments with which it is faced, and has reached the stage when it can only be strong on one front at the cost of weakness on others. The weakness of the Air Force is probably the most serious limiting factor in the German military machine to-day. No increase in I.E. strength is to be expected. Indeed, provided that the Germans are given no respite in the air on any of the three fronts, a serious decline is probable.

Political.

15. It is becoming an increasing strain to hold down the peoples of German-occupied Europe. In Yugoslavia the garrisons are even now barely sufficient to retain control. In Norway sabotage is becoming increasingly skilful and effective. Recent events in France have added to German commitments.

16. Germany's European allies are no longer convinced of her ability to win the war. They are less and less prepared to accept the heavy sacrifices which attachment to Germany's war effort imposes on them. Germany cannot, however, do without the satellite troops, and must, therefore, devote part of her effort to the support of her allies. This will apply particularly to Italy. Italy's increasingly low morale must be one of Germany's greatest concerns. Hatred of Germany, coupled with military reverses, air raids and the growing threat to Italy herself, have produced a situation in which, for the first time, Italians are beginning seriously to think in terms of an alternative régime. This movement may not yet have gone very far, but Germany must certainly reckon with the possibility of a complete Italian collapse, and, as Italy's determination to stay in the war disappears (in so far as it has not already vanished), Germany will have to undertake additional commitments to replace Italian forces in Russia and the Balkans.

17. The European neutrals are also losing faith in Germany's prospects of victory and are correspondingly encouraged to stand up to her. Even Spain is showing an increasing independence, for example, in her reaction to the Allied landing in French North Africa. This means that more pressure has to be applied to get results, and with Germany's diminishing threat her chances of getting any results must progressively recede.

Morale.

18. The increasing drabness, discomfort and hopelessness of life in Germany, fatigue, air raid damage and immense army casualties have combined to induce a serious condition of physical and nervous strain in the German people at home. Already the state of public feeling is causing concern, and precautions are being taken against demonstrations in cities subject to, or
threatened with, air bombardment. The state of morale on the home front affects military strategy in two ways. The need for strengthening police and defensive measures must cause a drain on military strength. Secondly, the need to bolster up morale may impel Germany to persist in operations which are strategically unsound.

The Possibility of a German Collapse.

19. While many of the symptoms that preceded Germany's collapse in 1918 are already observable in Germany to-day, the fear of the consequences of defeat is an incentive to continue the struggle. Further, the power of the Gestapo will probably prevent any internal collapse until the people as a whole and the rank and file in the army realise that Germany is losing the war. The possibility, however, of such a collapse in 1943 cannot be entirely excluded, and, if it came, it might come with startling rapidity.

PART II.—COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO GERMANY.

20. The Allied occupation of French North Africa and the defeat of Rommel present Germany with a new and apparently unexpected situation. She has probably not yet decided how she will adapt her long-term strategy to meet it, and will be unable to do so until the course of events in the Mediterranean theatre has become clear. She must, however, in any case realise that her hopes of winning the war by establishing herself in a strategically impregnable position are fast disappearing.

21. If the Allies complete the occupation of the whole of the southern shores of the Mediterranean, all Germany's southern flank will become vulnerable. This situation must directly affect her plans for the Russian war, for she must realise that she may not be able even to capture Caucasus, still less to defeat Russia, except at the cost of jeopardising her position in the Mediterranean and the Balkans.

22. Faced with this situation Germany has the following courses open to her:—

(a) to attempt to make peace with Russia, while continuing the war against the remaining United Nations.
(b) to attempt to make peace with the English-speaking Powers while continuing the war against Russia.
(c) to seek a general armistice.
(d) to continue the war against all her enemies.

(a) A Russo-German Peace.

As it becomes obvious to Hitler that he cannot defeat Russia, Britain and the United States, a separate peace with Russia may seem the only alternative to complete disaster, even though it involves the evacuation by Germany of all Russian territory now occupied. Stalin, however, at any rate while his operations continue successfully, will remain determined to eliminate for ever the German threat which has been for years Russia's principal anxiety.

So long as this prospect and the hope that the Allied operations in the Mediterranean will develop into an effective second front remain, Stalin is unlikely to consider any terms of separate peace offered by Hitler. If, however, by next spring Allied success in the Mediterranean had not, in Stalin's opinion, been followed up with such vigour as to promise an effective second front, and the Russian offensive had not achieved the success Stalin hoped for, we cannot forecast what might happen. Stalin might in these circumstances make a separate peace with Hitler, though it is difficult to see how terms acceptable to both sides could be found.*

* The Foreign Office consider that one other factor must be mentioned: the relations between the U.S.S.R., on the one hand, and the United States and the United Kingdom on the other. Stalin's speech of the 6th November announced to the Soviet peoples the decision to give a trial to whole-hearted co-operation with the United States and the United Kingdom. If Stalin were to become convinced that he could not expect real co-operation on the basis of equality and a fair deal from the United States and the United Kingdom during the war and at the peace settlement, this might incline him to make a separate bargain with Hitler and devote himself to building up the strength of the Soviet Union in order to be able to play a strong lone hand after the war.
(b) Peace with the English-speaking Powers.

Peace feelers directed towards Britain and the United States through neutral countries have undoubtedly been made. It seems, however, clear that the Germans realise that neither Britain nor the United States will entertain any idea of a separate peace.

(c) A general armistice.

Hitler probably realises that in no circumstances would we make peace with him. It is conceivable that at a later stage leaders in the Army, having become convinced of the hopelessness of continuing the struggle, might impose their will on Hitler and make peace despite him. So long as the principal Nazi and S.S. leaders remain loyal to Hitler, it is improbable that the Army leaders would succeed in imposing their will upon him.

(d) The continuance of the war against all the United Nations.

In the next Part we forecast the strategy which the German High Command is likely to follow, assuming that Germany decides to continue the war against all her enemies.

PART III.—GERMAN MILITARY STRATEGY.

The War at Sea.

23. Whatever her strategy on land or in the air may be, Germany will develop U-boat warfare to the utmost extent.

24. The German surface fleet is likely to be maintained in Norway, where it fulfills three roles, namely, (i) the pinning down of a large Allied fleet; (ii) the threat to the convoys to North Russia; (iii) the strengthening of defences against any Allied attack on Norway. At some stage it might be used to support the U-boat campaign if Hitler thought that decisive results could be attained.

Situation on Land and in the Air.

25. Germany’s army, although still a formidable fighting machine, is numerically and qualitatively on the decline—a decline that may well be rapid if Russian successes continue and if Allied pressure in the Mediterranean is maintained.

26. In the air she is engaged on a war on three fronts. Her air force is also on the decline, while that of the Allies is mounting steadily.

27. In face of her dwindling resources Germany has to resist a Russian offensive, which has already started on a large scale; to meet the Allied threat in North Africa; to bolster up Italy; to reinforce the Balkans and Crete; to meet our growing air offensive; to provide garrisons for the whole of France; and, by next spring, to be prepared to meet the threat of large-scale raids on, if not invasion of, her Western Front from the British Isles.

28. Faced with the situation outlined above, Germany’s strategy during the winter is likely to be essentially defensive and governed by the need to economise land and air forces in every possible way. Germany’s strategy next summer will be entirely dependent upon the ability of Britain and the United States during the winter to exploit their success in the Mediterranean and to maintain the air offensive against Germany from the British Isles, and upon the ability of the Russians to maintain their pressure upon the enemy.

The Russian Front.

29. For the time being the campaign against Russia is likely to remain Hitler’s chief preoccupation. The Germans cannot afford to go on using military man-power and air forces indefinitely on an extended front in the East, without securing and developing the Caucasian oil. If they withdrew to a shorter line (say, from Leningrad to Rostov) they would achieve some economy of effort and a position where they could still defend the resources of the Ukraine. They would not, however, possess the oil with which to exploit them and meet their other commitments. Hitler is, therefore, not likely to abandon the campaign in Caucasus unless and until he is compelled to do so by Russian action, because
the demands from the Mediterranean and Western Front make it inevitable and urgent that he should shorten the Russian front, or by shortage of oil, or by a combination of the three.

30. If, through the collapse of Italy and resultant trouble in the Balkans, the Germans were compelled to assume the whole military commitment for the defence of the Southern European front, Germany would, in order to provide the necessary troops, almost certainly be compelled to shorten her line in Russia, abandoning North Caucasus, in the first instance.

The Mediterranean Front.

31. The Axis Commanders responsible for operations in the Mediterranean and Western theatres of war are likely to be compelled to meet Allied threats as they arise with such forces as they now possess, reinforced on an inadequate scale, with land and air forces released mainly from France and, if possible, from the Russian Front. This strategy will impose upon the Commanders a continuation of a policy of improvisation, such as has been apparent in recent months. This means that German strategy in the Mediterranean and Western theatres of war must be fundamentally defensive and that employment of the forces available will be dictated throughout by Allied action.

32. The Germans and Italians will be unable for long to maintain a bridgehead in North Africa, and will probably be unable to evacuate any but a negligible proportion of the forces still there. The shock of such a disaster may not be sufficient to bring about the immediate collapse of Italy, although this is possible, particularly if heavy air attacks are maintained. If, however, Italy is to be kept in the war, Germany will be compelled to reinforce her air forces in Sardinia, Sicily and Crete, which will form the next line of defence. Germany will probably also have to reinforce these islands, and possibly Italy itself, with land forces.

33. At the same time Italy will probably demand the return to her of a part of the Italian forces fighting on the Russian Front, and possibly also some of the divisions garrisoning the Balkans. The departure of any Italian divisions from the Balkans, the intensive guerilla activities which will result from Allied successes in the Mediterranean, and the Allied threat to the Balkans will compel the Germans to increase their garrison in that area.

34. The loss of the Roumanian oil supplies would make it impossible for Germany to continue the war and the loss of the mineral resources of Yugoslavia would be serious. An Allied landing in the Balkans would threaten Germany’s communications with Russia and with Turkey. Whatever dispositions, therefore, she makes elsewhere in the Mediterranean, Germany cannot afford to allow the Allies to obtain a footing in the Balkans.

35. If Italy collapsed either as a result of the North African campaign or as a result of the capture by the Allies of Sardinia or Sicily, Germany would be faced with the problem of deciding whether to assume the full liability of holding Italy as if it were an occupied territory, or of cutting her losses and of shortening her line by retiring behind the Alps. The consequences of abandoning Italy, both from the point of view of prestige and of strategy, are so serious that we believe that only lack of forces would compel Germany to take this step. So long as Russia continues to fight Germany will be unable to withdraw sufficient troops from the Russian Front and from France both to garrison Italy and to garrison the Balkans. We believe that she would, in these circumstances, concentrate her forces on the defence of the Balkans, leaving Italy to her fate.

36. The best counter to the Allied offensive in the Mediterranean area would be for the Germans to move into Southern Spain and deny to the Allies the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar. Every day that passes, however, will increase Spanish will to resist. It is most improbable that Germany would attempt such a move against Spanish resistance during winter, even if she had the forces. She is unlikely to have the forces available to do so next Spring unless unexpectedly Russian collapses.

37. Allied successes in the Mediterranean have similarly strengthened Turkey’s will to resist and have diminished the threat to her, since even if Germany is able to withdraw troops from Russia, they will be required for the defence of Italy and the Balkans. Indeed, the only circumstances in which we foresee any German operation against Turkey would be if Germany believed that
Turkey was about to join the Allies, in which case she might endeavour to embroil Bulgaria with Turkey and render assistance to the former. Such action would only be taken as part of her plan for defence of the Balkans.

The Western Front.

38. Germany, throughout the winter of 1942/43 will remain strictly on the defensive on land in the West. The air forces maintained there will be essentially for defensive purposes. Bombing raids against the British Isles are likely to be of negligible proportions. Air attacks on shipping to further the U-boat campaign are likely to be the only substantial offensive operations.

39. Germany will probably appreciate that the Allies will be unable to mount a large-scale invasion of the Continent from the British Isles before the summer of 1943. She would hope that any attack on a smaller scale could be repulsed by the existing garrison.

PART IV.—SUMMARY.

40. The conclusion to be drawn from the factors considered above is that the present is a critical moment when the duration if not the final outcome of the war may be dependent on the vigour of Allied action during the winter. The following is our forecast of German strategy:—

(a) The Russian front will remain Hitler's chief preoccupation. He will continue his attempt to gain control of the whole of Caucasia, until he is compelled to abandon it by Russian action, by the demands of the Mediterranean and Western fronts, or both.

(b) In the Mediterranean and Western theatres of war Hitler's strategy will be fundamentally defensive. The employment of the forces he can make available will be dictated throughout by the action taken by the Allies.

(c) Hitler will do his best to retain a foothold in Africa and to keep Italy in the war. If, nevertheless, Italy collapses, he will concentrate on the defence of the Balkans and leave Italy to her fate.

(d) Intense air and submarine attack on our shipping will, in any event, be carried out.

(Signed) V. CAVENDISH-BENTINCK.
E. G. N. RUSHIBROOKE.
F. H. N. DAVIDSON.
F. F. INGLIS.
C. G. VICKERS.

Offices of the War Cabinet, S.W. 1,
December 3, 1942.
ELP
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Bern
Dated November 25, 1942.
Rec'd 8:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

5437, November 25, 6 p.m.
FROM MILITARY ATTACHE FOR WAR DEPARTMENT,
source 206 W.

New air-division left Belfort for east 17 November. Replaced by remnants of infantry divisions 61 and 62 from Russia.

Following troop movements to south of France:
712 infantry division from Bruges 15 to 17 November.
Infantry division from Russia passing Seerbruck 15 and 16 November.

30 trains with munition and anti aircraft guns left Heinz 12 November.

46 trains with gasoline and oil left Frankfort between 8 and 14 November.

3500 panzer and infantry reserve troops from Seltz passed Strasbourg 15 November to Epinal Vezoul Besancon.

From 14 November 30 to 40 big transport planes have been leaving Freiburg daily for south France.

15000 motorized
-2-#5437, November 25, 6 p.m. from Bern.

15000 motorized and reserve AA and artillery from Freiburg to Albi Montauban Toulouse 14 November.

Three new German divisions arrived recently Dalmatian coast replacing Italians for fear Allied debarkation.

German GHQ for Yugoslavia in Croatian War Ministry, Zagreb.

Repeated to London for Commanding General, European Theatre of Operations, United States Army.

HARRISON

NK
FOR THE SECRETARY, UNDER SECRETARY, AND CURRENT INFORMATION:

Following is a resume of AP and FCC ticker reports received up to 6 a.m. EWT November 11 on Hitler's invasion of unoccupied France.

The first flash was over FCC at 2:28 which quoted a London radio speaking in English to the Pacific area stating that "Paris radio just announced that German troops were marching into unoccupied France and Corsica to prevent American and English aggression". At 2:33 Associated Press carried an item from London quoting Reuters which in turn quoted the Paris radio broadcasting that Hitler had ordered German army to march across unoccupied France. The announcement over the Paris radio quoted by the Associated Press was read by a spokesman of the German army and was addressed to "Frenchmen, officers and men of the French Army", and was signed by Adolf Hitler. At the same time Hitler sent a letter to Petain which was also read over the Paris radio. The text of this letter will be given later in this report.

FCC ticker quoted Buenos Aires in Spanish at 10:15 p.m. to Argentina which in turn gave a Madrid source for the statement that Laval and Hitler "are now putting through a new Franco-German agreement providing for total occupation of
of France, the handing over of the French Fleet to the
Reich and a compulsory conscription of French workers."

Paris radio quoting to the FCC ticker at 3:06 stated
that the Vichy Government would return to Versailles.

The following summary of the situation was put out by
AP at 2:56 a.m. written by John H. Martin, Associated Press
war editor. The summary reads as follows:

"The Paris radio reported early today (Wed.) that
Adolf Hitler had ordered his army to march into the
unoccupied zone of France to repel a possible American
or British landing as United States troops were reported
racing eastward to complete allied domination of the
North African coast of the Mediterranean.

"Hitler said in a letter to Marshal Pétain that
the German Government 'desires as far as possible in
collaboration with the French army to protect the
African possessions of European powers'.

"German occupation troops have been given orders
for 'joint action', Hitler said, indicating a move
for combined action of German and French troops.
Hitler's letter was read over the German-controlled
Paris radio by a spokesman of the German army.

"The action was taken as United States troops
were reported speeding toward Tunisia to nail Axis forces
in Libya beyond."

At 3:07 the Chicago Tribune reported over AP ticker
that BBC interrupted program with flash that Paris radio
"troops" are occupying Portugal. This was
checked by AP and at 3:55 they said that London reported
that BBC denies broadcasting any report regarding Germans
occupying Portugal.
The Vichy radio reported that the French Council of Ministers met early Wednesday at 6:15 a.m. French time and stayed in session for one hour.

The FCC ticker carried a Berlin-English broadcast which stated that first German troops crossed line of demarcation at Chalons sur Saone heading toward Lyons. Later report over AP ticker stated that German armored cars passed through Limoges and Lyon at 10 a.m. French time today. This report came through at 6:22 a.m.

Text of Hitler's letter to Petain is as follows, as reported by FCC quoting the Paris 2 a.m. radio. This report came over at 5:58 a.m.

"Monsieur le Marechal:

"Since the day when destiny called upon me to lead the fortunes of my people, I (have) made sincere efforts to improve our relations with France (at the cost of) painful renunciations on the part of Germany. If these efforts remained hopeless, this is not my fault.

"The war declarations made by England and France to Germany September 30, 1938, have the more deeply affected me, and with me the German people, that neither England nor France could allege the least plausible motive to this war.

"In spite of the precipitous and so disastrous issue of this campaign for France, I could not get rid of the idea that there should be room left, at least in the future, for the establishing of improved European solidarity.

"Bearing this in mind, I had no clause inserted
in the armistice which could be in contradiction to the aims announced in the preamble, or that would not be absolutely indispensable to reach these aims. Therefore, the German Reich took no advantage at that moment of France's weakness to extort anything from her, but was satisfied with claiming solely what any conqueror is forced to claim under such circumstances, namely, to insure his successes and obtain the guarantee that the armistice should not be a passing episode.

"But circumstances (show that) this armistice, for the very reason of its moderation, gives rise to the weakening of Germany's military situation, in case the intransigence of France's former allies would provoke a prolongation of the war.

"At that time Germany made no claims on the French battle fleet. In no way whatsoever did she encroach on the sovereignty of the French Government, or its colonial empire.

"In hopes of being able still to bring the war into Europe, England and America, from that time forward, began to attack and to occupy French territories in West and North Africa. On the other hand, France is not in a position in the long run to resist these aggressions.

"On the other hand Germany and Italy could in no case tolerate that the armistice convention should bring a consequence which would in the end necessarily be to their disadvantage.

"A close examination of Anglo-American military transport, as well as a good deal of information which allows no room for doubt, have shown the governments of the Reich and Italy that the next objectives of the Anglo-American invasion are Corseca and the south of France.

"Consequently, the premises and basis of the armistice convention are canceled, and this default cannot be imputed to Germany or Italy. Considering these facts, the German and Italian Government have agreed to take urgent measures to arrest, in the most efficient manner possible, any further Anglo-American aggression.

"Circumstances
"Circumstances being what they are, Monsieur le Marchal, I have both the honor and regret, to inform you that in order to avert the danger threatening us, I have been forced, in conjunction with the Italian Government, to order my troops to cross France, to occupy the Mediterranean coast, and also to participate in the protection of Corsica against the imminent aggression of the Anglo-American armored forces.

"It is chiefly the conduct of a certain French general which has led me to act in this way. The latter, in the course of his captivity, had reigned illness, and for that reason certain facilities were granted him which he took advantage of to make his escape.

"In contradiction of the assurance that was given to me of his pledge to you, Monsieur le Marechal, he has now decided not only to fight against Germany in the service of the Anglo-Saxon powers--the authors of the aggression--but even against his own country.

"Moreover, I inform you, Monsieur le Marechal, that the activities of the German troops are not directed against you, the head of the State and venerable commander of the brave French troops of the World War, nor against the French Government, nor against all Frenchmen who desire peace and who want to avoid above all that their beautiful country should become once more a theater of war.

"To this end I should also like to assure you that the entrance of the Allied troops into France is not directed against the French armed forces, and that I sustain the hope of defending one day, jointly with them, Europe, as well as the African possessions of France, against a coalition of the Anglo-Saxon pirates.

"Finally this entrance of the Allied troops is not aimed at French administration, which I hope will continue to function as in the past. For the sole aim of our action is to prevent the situation prevailing in North Africa from suddenly recurring on the coasts of southern France.

"As to the precautions to be taken to this effect, I feel in fact responsible, not only to my own people, but
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"As to the precautions to be taken to this effect, I feel in fact responsible, not only to my own people,
but in a wider sense to the whole of Europe, for the annihilation (sic) of all European states and also of all European culture.

"Will you allow me, Monsieur le Marechal, to give you the assurance that from the moment when the situation in the Mediterranean has improved to the point where no further prejudice to the interests of the Reich, as set out in the armistice convention, can be questioned, I have decided immediately to withdraw my troops beyond the old demarcation line.

"I should further like to assure you that you and your government, Monsieur le Marechal, will be able to move freely henceforth and without any hindrance all over France.

"In days gone by, I have pronounced against the transfer of the Government to Versailles, solely because I feared that enemy propaganda would never cease to claim that you, Monsieur le Marechal, and your Government, had been deprived of all liberty, and that consequently you were no longer free, under those circumstances, to devote yourselves to your task.

"Seeing, however, that as a result of the circumstances explained above, the Reich and Italy are obliged, in order to safeguard their interests set out in the armistice convention, to face the threat of Anglo-American invasion, and therefore also to occupy the frontiers of the rest of France.

"The reason for the maintenance of the seat of the French Government at Vichy disappears. Let me then profit from this occasion to communicate to you the abrogation of the reservation in this respect.

"I can understand, Monsieur le Marechal, how hard is the fate which has hit your country. Let me, however, beg you to think of the fate of my own people, for several years forced to wage a war imposed upon it through no fault of its own, and which now has had to take the above-mentioned decision only under the most urgent necessity.

"I express the hope that circumstances will not lead to further bloodshed between France and Germany, but that on the contrary these measures taken against
the disturbers of peace outside the European continent will bring about a rapprochement between the European peoples. Germany is therefore resolved, if possible, to defend, side by side with the French soldiers, the frontiers of your country, and with them the frontiers of European culture and civilization.

"As for the German troops, they will do all that is required to achieve this aim by their behavior and their attitude to the French people and its soldiers.

"I would, however, ask you again, Monsieur le Marsechal, that the French Government should also take the necessary measures to avoid all tension and to guarantee, for the sake of French interests as well, the immediate application of these measures.

"I beg you, Monsieur le Marsechal, to accept the assurance of my highest esteem and to believe me your most devoted, etc."

(Signed) ADOLF HITLER

The first mention of the invasion by the Vichy radio occurred at 10:46 a.m. French time in an announcement simply stating that German troops had entered unoccupied France. Announcement urged them to be on guard against "false reports" and told French people of Hitler's letter to Pétain.

According to AP at 6:29 first Germans in uniform appeared in the suburbs of Vichy at mid-morning. The Vichy radio reported according to AP at 6:48 that Pétain saw German Field Marshal von Rundstedt at 10:30 a.m. French time today and protested against German breach of armistice terms.
This concludes dictation of report at 7:25 a.m.
United Press ticker which starts at 8:30 a.m. will carry
subsequent developments.

Thomas D. Blake
Night Watch Officer
Current Information

Cl: TDB: MLM

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Daylight Bombing of German Targets.

I am quoting three messages from London regarding the development of precision bombing by our Flying Fortresses, for your special information.

Message 1812 from Eisenhower: "As a result of heavy bomber operations conducted in this theatre thus far we are becoming convinced that high altitude daylight precision bombing is not only feasible but highly successful and that by increasing the scale of attack, effective results can be obtained. I intend to use if necessary all of the US air force now in UK in Torch. It is imperative that a strong air force particularly in heavy bombers be built up quickly in the UK for two reasons, first, that this force will be available in the UK for rapid movement to Torch if necessary prepare to engage in operations for a limited period from Torch bases and second, by intensive operations from UK fix the GAF in Western France and the low countries. At present we have here or afloat enroute or notice of early shipment nine heavy groups three medium groups and one light group. The mediums, light and two of the heavy groups are now set up for the Twelfth Air Force. I urge that the Eighth Air Force remaining in the UK be brought up to a strength of ten heavy groups and five fighter groups by October fifteen this year and following this, it is to be augmented as rapidly as possible to a force of about twenty heavy groups, ten medium groups and ten fighter groups. This build up should be completed by January one next year. My further view is that the UK is one of the few places in the world today that is adequately organized to support the operations of the above air forces and at the same time be in a position to strike at the heart of the principal enemy or support our new effort and further, where a continuity of action is obtained through the air operations of our Allies. It is therefore important that if we are to capitalize on the assistance the air arm can provide it must be done immediately."

Message 161 from Spaatz: "Increasing resistance to our bomber operations indication attacks are having effect. In yesterday's operation estimated approximately two hundred German
fighters opposed our main bomber formation in continuous fighting from Channel to target and return to Channel. In today's operation against Rotterdam bombers were attacked continuously from Dutch coast to target and return to North Sea. Total enemy fighter losses in these two operations were fifteen destroyed twenty-four probable destroyed thirty-eight damaged. This does not include those claimed by friendly fighters. Probably destroyed almost certain destroyed but were not seen to crash due to high altitude cloud coverage and preoccupation of gunners in succeeding fights. All intelligence officers and crews cautioned to err on side of conservatism in claims and Eaker and myself believe claims are conservative. Our losses in these operations two missing five damaged but repairable. Germans pressed home attacks today in own AA fire which was most intense, giving indication of command direction to destroy our bombers at all costs. British fighter command (eleven group) believe considerable recent augmentation of German fighter strength front and a new determination and aggressiveness on part of GAF fighters which heretofore have only attacked when conditions were favorable, now they are closing in apparently regardless of cost. Our present strength inadequate and essential that we be reinforced rapidly if we are to take full advantage of present situation."

Message 1372 from Eisenhower: "Preliminary reports on Sundays bombing as follows: total of forty-two B seventeens in two groups took off to attack airplane factory near Albert. Enemy fighters encountered in high Channel on way to target and thereafter our planes were under continuous attack but most of them pushed through to target and are reported to have bombed accurately and destructively. We lost two B seventeens. One was seen to be gliding down near target, followed by three enemy fighters. Another went down in Channel and there is some hope the crew may be picked up. Two other B seventeens suffered some damage but extent is not yet known. One tail gunner was killed. Enemy fighter losses from bomber defensive fire were five destroyed, thirteen probable and twenty-five damaged. In other sorties during day thirteen of our heavies and twelve lights proceeded to Targets and back without meeting fighter opposition.

"The Albert action may be of considerable significance. It is possible that the enemy is beginning to feel the effects of daylight precision bombing and is bringing his fighters into the air in the hope of defeating our effort by interception. There has always been some doubt that the enemy would pay any attention to bombing action in this area. If the ratio of losses reported in this action is any index of what we may expect when under continuous fighter attack, then we have taken another long step in proving the case for the heavily defended, high altitude bomber operating on a precision basis in daylight. Moreover if both the above assumptions are proven to be correct, then the inevitable results will be the withdrawal of enemy Air Force from other points to combat the American effort there."
"In any event I repeat my belief that the purpose of building up quickly a strong U.S. Force of B seventeens in the U.K. should remain priority feature in all our future plans, and that the mounting of Torch tends to emphasize rather than diminish the importance of developing and maintaining such a bombing force here.

"Later today General Spaatz will submit to Arnold a detailed technical report on yesterday's operations. This morning Monday, we have more than thirty B seventeens on a mission."

[Signature]
Chief of Staff
This was done by Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his people. In the conversations with the Prof (Lord Cherwell) we used it in discussing the financial problems, but not the recommendations on the allocations of zones in Germany.

F.D.R.
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Program to Prevent Germany from starting a World War III

1. Demilitarization of Germany.

It should be the aim of the Allied Forces to accomplish the complete demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible period of time after surrender. This means completely disarming the German Army and people (including the removal or destruction of all war material), the total destruction of the whole German armament industry, and the removal or destruction of other key industries which are basic to military strength.

2. New Boundaries of Germany.

(a) Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the U.S.S.R. and the southern portion of Silesia. (See map in 12 Appendix.)

(b) France should get the Saar and the adjacent territories bounded by the Rhine and the Meuse Rivers.

(c) As indicated in 4 below an International Zone should be created containing the Ruhr and the surrounding industrial areas.

3. Partitioning of New Germany.

The remaining portion of Germany should be divided into two autonomous, independent states, (1) a South German state comprising Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden and some smaller areas and (2) a North German state comprising a large part of the old state of Prussia, Saxony, Thuringia and several smaller states.

There shall be a custom union between the new South German state and Austria, which will be restored to her pre-1938 political borders.

4. The Ruhr Area. (The Ruhr, surrounding industrial areas, as shown on the map, including the Rhineland, the Keil Canal, and all German territory north of the Keil Canal.)

Here lies the heart of German industrial power. This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it can not in the foreseeable future become an industrial area. The following steps will accomplish this:

(a) Within a short period, if possible not longer than 6 months after the cessation of hostilities, all industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall be completely dismantled and transported to Allied Nations as restitution. All equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines closed.

(b) The area should be made an international zone to be governed by an international security organization to be established by the United Nations. In governing the area the international organization should be guided by policies designed to further the above stated objective.
5. **Restitution and Reparation.**

Reparations, in the form of future payments and deliveries, should not be demanded. Restitution and reparation shall be effected by the transfer of existing German resources and territories, e.g.,

(a) by restitution of property looted by the Germans in territories occupied by them;

(b) by transfer of German territory and German private rights in industrial property situated in such territory to invaded countries and the international organization under the program of partition;

(c) by the removal and distribution among devastated countries of industrial plants and equipment situated within the International Zone and the North and South German states delimited in the section on partition;

(d) by forced German labor outside Germany; and

(e) by confiscation of all German assets of any character whatsoever outside of Germany.

6. **Education and Propaganda.**

(a) All schools and universities will be closed until an Allied Commission of Education has formulated an effective reorganization program. It is contemplated that it may require a considerable period of time before any institutions of higher education are reopened. Meanwhile the education of German students in foreign universities will not be prohibited. Elementary schools will be reopened as quickly as appropriate teachers and textbooks are available.

(b) All German radio stations and newspapers, magazines, weeklies, etc. shall be discontinued until adequate controls are established and an appropriate program formulated.

7. **Political Decentralization.**

The military administration in Germany in the initial period should be carried out with a view toward the eventual partitioning of Germany. To facilitate partitioning and to assure its permanence the military authorities should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Dismiss all policy-making officials of the Reich government and deal primarily with local governments.

(b) Encourage the reestablishment of state governments in each of the states (Länder) corresponding to 18 states into which Germany is presently divided and in addition make the Prussian provinces separate states.
(c) Upon the partition of Germany, the various state governments should be encouraged to organize a federal government for each of the newly partitioned areas. Such new governments should be in the form of a confederation of states, with emphasis on states' rights and a large degree of local autonomy.

8. Responsibility of Military for Local German Economy.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy shall be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government shall not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy, except those which are essential to military operations. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

9. Controls over Development of German Economy.

During a period of at least twenty years after surrender adequate controls, including controls over foreign trade and tight restrictions on capital imports, shall be maintained by the United Nations designed to prevent in the newly-established states the establishment or expansion of key industries basic to the German military potential and to control other key industries.

10. Agrarian program.

All large estates should be broken up and divided among the peasants and the system of primogeniture and entail should be abolished.

11. Punishment of War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups.

A program for the punishment of certain war crimes and for the treatment of Nazi organizations and other special groups is contained in section 11.

12. Uniforms and Parades.

(a) No German shall be permitted to wear, after an appropriate period of time following the cessation of hostilities, any military uniform or any uniform of any quasi military organizations.

(b) No military parades shall be permitted anywhere in Germany and all military bands shall be disbanded.

13. Aircraft.

All aircraft (including gliders), whether military or commercial, will be confiscated for later disposition. No German shall be permitted to operate or to help operate any aircraft, including those owned by foreign interests.
14. **United States Responsibility.**

Although the United States would have full military and civilian representation on whatever international commission or commissions may be established for the execution of the whole German program, the primary responsibility for the policing of Germany and for civil administration in Germany should be assumed by the military forces of Germany's continental neighbors. Specifically, these should include Russian, French, Polish, Czech, Greek, Yugoslav, Norwegian, Dutch and Belgian soldiers.

Under this program United States troops could be withdrawn within a relatively short time.
If we were to insist Germany is pay reparation reparations, whether in the form of money or goods, we would be forced at the very beginning to start a rehabilitation and reconstruction program for the German economy. For instance, we would have to supply her with transportation equipment, public utility repairs, food for her war-time population, machinery for heavy industry damaged by bombing, reconstruction of housing and industrial raw materials. No matter how the program would be dressed up, we would, in effect, be doing for Germany what we expect to do for the liberated areas of Europe but perhaps on an even greater scale, because of Germany’s more advanced industrialization.

When reparation deliveries cease, Germany will be left with an even more powerful economy and a larger share of foreign markets than she had in the Thirties.

Therefore, a program of large-scale reparations must be rejected for the following reasons:

1. Politically it would be very difficult to persuade people of liberated Europe and of the other United Nations, including the U.S., to accept a program of immediate reconstruction of the German economy.

2. If liberated Europe becomes economically dependent on Germany for reparations, her economic dependence cannot be broken off when reparations cease. The rest of Europe would continue to be dependent on Germany as a source of supply and as a market. These economic ties would also mean political ties. Germany would be right back where she was in the Thirties when she was able to dominate the rest of Europe economically through her industrial power and to exert her economic power to achieve political domination.

3. An economically powerful Germany imposes constitutes a military threat to world security.

4. The payment of reparations is directly competitive with the export industries of the U.S., the U.K., and France and would create political dissensions among the United Nations.

(a) Whatever the recipient countries get in reparations, they will not buy from the Allied industrial powers in the post-war period.
Reparations mean a powerful Germany.

If we were to expect Germany to pay recurring reparations, whether in the form of money or goods, we would be forced at the very beginning to start a rehabilitation and reconstruction program for the German economy. For instance, we would have to supply her with transportation equipment, public utility repairs, food for her working population, machinery for heavy industry damaged by bombing, reconstruction of housing and industrial raw materials. No matter how the program would be dressed up, we would, in effect be doing for Germany what we expect to do for the liberated areas of Europe but perhaps on an even greater scale, because of Germany's more advanced industrialization.

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2. If liberated Europe becomes economically dependent on Germany for reparations, her economic dependence cannot be broken off when reparations cease. The rest of Europe would continue to be dependent on Germany as a source of supply and as a market. These economic ties would also mean political ties. Germany would be right back where she was in the Thirties when she was able to dominate the rest of Europe economically through her industrial power and to exert her economic power to achieve political dominations.

3. An economically powerful Germany ipso facto constitutes a military threat to world security.

4. The payment of reparations is directly competitive with the export industries of the U. S., the U. K. and France and would create political dissensions among the United Nations.

(a) Whatever the recipient countries get in reparations they will not buy from the Allied industrial powers in the post-war period.
(b) If Germany is placed on a reparations basis she will have to export industrial goods to non-European markets in order to get the necessary foreign exchange to import the raw materials for her industry. Therefore, she will again compete with England and the United States in the Latin American, African and Asiatic markets.

5. An economically powerful Germany would be able to compete more effectively with other countries as and when the payment of reparations ceases.

A reparations program for Germany after this war holds no greater promise of success than the Dawes and Young plans tried after the end of the first World War.
Abridged restitution by Germany to United Nations

In lieu of recurring reparations payments the nation entitled to such payments will receive from Germany a lump sum payment in the form of German material resources, German human resources, and German territory.

This lump sum payment, which may be described as restitution rather than reparations will be affected in the following manner:

(a) The transfer of German territory to liberated countries including the industrial installations located there. It is proposed that the great industrial areas of Silesia be transferred to Poland and the industry of the Saar and the adjacent territories be transferred to France. These territories will represent enormous wealth to the recipient countries.

(b) By removal and distribution among devastated countries, of industrial plants and equipment and transportation facilities including railroads, situated within the remaining German territory and the Ruhr. It is expected that complete factory units, machinery, equipment, stocks of raw materials, railroad and shipping will be transferred to the devastated countries and will constitute a real basis for the reconstruction and industrialization of liberated Europe. To the extent possible the whole industry of the Ruhr will be so transferred.

(c) By the creation of German labor battalions to be used for reconstruction work outside Germany.

(d) By confiscation of all German foreign exchange assets of any character whatsoever.

The type of restitution described above will be more beneficial both politically and economically to recipient countries than would be any form of recurring reparations payments.
Economic restitution by Germany to United Nations

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The type of restitution described above will be more beneficial both politically and economically to recipient countries than would be any form of recurring reparations payments.
Benefits will be realized almost immediately by the receipt of machinery, equipment and manpower, and the economies of the recipient countries will be strengthened absolutely as well as relatively to that of Germany.

To the extent that the need of these countries for industrial products is supplied by U. S. and U. K. instead of by Germany, the receiving nations benefit by obtaining delivery more rapidly in the immediate post-war period. Also by supplying such goods U. S. and U. K. enjoy expanded foreign post-war markets.
It is a fallacy that Europe needs a unified industrial complex.

The assumption exists that Germany is the indispensable source of industrial supplies for the rest of Europe is not valid.

U.S., U.K., and the French-Luxembourg-Belgian industrial group could easily have supplied any increased industrial capacity practically all that Germany supplied to Europe during the pre-war period. In the post-war period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, particularly the U.S., can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs of Europe without German assistance.

Total German exports to the entire world in 1938 were only about $2 billion. of which machinery and steel products amounted to about $1.7 billion. coal $1.55 million and chemicals $240 million.

These amounts are trivial in comparison with the increased industrial potential of the U.S. alone, or of the U.K. One-fifth of our lend-lease exports of 1943 would be sufficient to replace the full exports of Germany to the whole world.

2. A plan has been made that Europe is dependent upon Ruhr coal. The French-Belgian steel industry and some of the new industrial units which will arise in Europe after the war will need imported coal supplies. However, the British coal industry which suffered from German competition before the war will be able to supply a major part if not all of these needs. The coal industries of France, Poland, Estonia and the Saar are also capable of further expansion if the competition of the Ruhr is eliminated. Further supplies if necessary could be obtained from the United States though at a much higher price. The different quality of the substitute coals may require some technological changes but the adjustment can be made.

Germany had a net export of coal 55% by weight in 1937. The difference between the British coal production in a good year and a depressed year was more than the total German exports of coal. Moreover, at no time in the last 2 years has the British coal industry worked at full capacity.
It is a fallacy that Europe needs a strong industrial Germany.

1. The assumption sometimes made that Germany is an indispensable source of industrial supplies for the rest of Europe is not valid.

U.S., U.K. and the French-Luxembourg-Belgian industrial group could easily have supplied out of unused industrial capacity practically all that Germany supplied to Europe during the pre-war period. In the post-war period the expanded industrial capacity of the United Nations, particularly the U.S., can easily provide the reconstruction and industrial needs of Europe without German assistance.

Total German exports to the entire world in 1938 were only about $2 billion, of which machinery and steel products amounted to about $750 million, coal $155 million and chemicals $230 million.

These amounts are trivial in comparison with the increased industrial potential of the U.S. alone, or of the U.K. One-fifth of our lend-lease exports of 1943 would be sufficient to replace the full exports of Germany to the whole world.

2. A claim has been made that Europe is dependent upon Ruhr coal. The French-Belgian steel industry and some of the new industrial units which will arise in Europe after the war will need imported coal supplies. However, the British coal industry which suffered from German competition before the war will be able to supply a major part if not all of these needs. The coal industries of France, Poland, Silesia and the Saar are also capable of further expansion if the competition of the Ruhr is eliminated. Further supplies if necessary could be obtained from the United States though at a much higher price. The different quality of the substitute coals may require some technological changes but the adjustment can be made.

Germany had a net export of coal of 32 million tons in 1937. The difference between the British coal production in a good year and a depressed year was more than the total German exports of coal. Moreover, at no time in the last 25 years has the British coal industry worked at full capacity.
3. Germany has been important to the rest of Europe as a market principally for surplus agricultural products. In 1937 Germany's food imports from the world were $800 million, of which Europe supplied $450 million. Total German purchases of raw materials from Europe in 1937 were about $350 million. The loss of the German market will be largely compensated for by the following developments:

(a) If German industry is eliminated, no doubt the bulk of the industrial raw materials which Germany used to purchase will now be bought by other European nations which will henceforth produce the industrial commodities which Germany exported before to Europe.

(b) The industrialization and the heightened standard of living of the rest of Europe will absorb a part of the food surpluses which formerly went to Germany.

(c) Those part of Germany which will be added to other countries (the Rhineland, Silesia, East Prussia) may have as high a volume of food imports as before, perhaps higher.

(d) The remaining part of Germany will continue to import some food, perhaps 25%-50% of former food imports.

4. Germany was important to the rest of Europe as a market to the following extent:

Percentage of each country's exports to Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The U.K. exported principally coal and textile materials to Germany and the principal French exports were iron ore and wool. The elimination of German industrial exports will provide adequate markets for these exports and more.
The loss of the German market may be important to the Balkan countries. Agricultural exports of these countries to Germany were abnormally large in 1938 because of Germany's unscrupulous exploitation through clearing agreements and other devices. These countries will find markets for part of their food surplus through industrialization and a higher standard of living within their own country. German areas will continue to import some food from them. However, there may be a net loss of markets to Denmark, Holland, and Yugoslavia, and these countries will need to make an adjustment in their economies which should not be difficult in the period of greater adjustments which will come with liberation.

5. In short, the statement that a healthy European economy is dependent upon German industry was never true, nor will it be true in the future. Therefore the treatment to be accorded to Germany should be decided upon without reference to the economic consequences upon the rest of Europe. At the worst, these economic consequences will involve relatively minor economic disadvantages in certain sections of Europe. At best, they will speed up the industrial development of Europe outside of Germany. But any disadvantages will be more than offset by real gains to the political objectives and the economic interests of the United Nations as a whole.
For the resources of the Ruhr should be locked up and the equipment removed.

During the last hundred years the basis of modern German militarism has been the industrial capacity of the Ruhr. Very large reserves of high quality coal that lends itself particularly well to the production of coke and a fortunate geophysical location which facilitated the importation of iron ore, were the foundation of an industrial apparatus that is unique throughout the world and the development of which has been deliberately guided by military objectives.

The elimination of this industrial apparatus is indispensable to rendering renewed German aggression impossible for many years to come. No other device could serve this main objective of the United Nations with such effectiveness. Disenchantment of Germany alone would not suffice since political developments several decades hence may make a reunion of the several German states possible. In that case the reunited German state would immediately possess a huge industrial potential unless the Ruhr industry were destroyed.

If the Ruhr industry were eliminated, new iron and steel industries would unquestionably be built up in the rest of Europe to provide for those needs in iron and steel which the Ruhr used to satisfy, and to make use of the French iron ore production. Coal would become available from the Saar, from increased production in France, Great Britain, Belgium and Poland. The elimination of the Ruhr would hence be a welcome contribution to the prosperity of the coal industry of several United Nations. Great Britain has very large reserves of coal; her proved reserves are held to represent, at the present rate of extraction, about 250 years' supply.

Britain's coal production has severely declined in the inter-war period and never again reached its maximum of 1913 (230 million metric tons). The level of production in the years preceding this was that of the turn of the century, the increase between 1900 and 1913 having been lost. The production in 1925 was 68 million tons lower than in 1913.

The new iron and steel industries which will arise in Europe to take the place of the Ruhr will have such a powerful vested interest that they will constitute a permanent and effective barrier to the re-industrialization of the Ruhr.
Why the resources of the Ruhr should be locked up and the equipment removed.

During the last hundred years the basis of modern German militarism has been the industrial capacity of the Ruhr. Very large resources of high quality coal that lends itself particularly well to the production of coke and a fortunate geographic location which facilitated the importation of iron ore, were the foundation of an industrial apparatus that is unique throughout the world and the development of which has been deliberately guided by military objectives.

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Britain's coal production has severly declined in the inter-war period and never again reached its maximum of 1913 (293 million metric tons). The level of production in the years preceding this was that of the turn of the century, the increase between 1900 and 1913 having been lost. The production in 1938 was 60 million tons lower than in 1913.

The new iron and steel industries which will arise in Europe to take the place of the Ruhr will have such a powerful vested interest that they will constitute a permanent and effective barrier to the re-industrialization of the Ruhr.
The British coal industry would receive from the United States considerable benefits in the form of new markets. Britain's total hard coal output, about one-fifth of the annual coal production of the United States, has declined steadily since 1930. The consequent reduction of British coal output, while allowing the development of a consensus program for the reconversion and modernization of the mines, has helped to create the conditions necessary for the development of a genuine program for the reconversion and modernization of Britain's coal industry since 1946 and facilitate the alleviation of the depressed areas.

The reconstruction of German industrial capacity would eliminate a major competitor with British exports in the world market, but this will be a position to recapture later as the markets of Europe, now lost to Germany after 1918, will be recaptured by the reunification of Europe with all her resources under a common economic organization.

The reunification of a large section of German shipping, both commercial and naval, and subsequent access to the Channel will be an important item in the Allied program of economic reconstruction at a later date.

The return of trade and foreign exchange position will be an important factor in economic reconstruction, and the volume of exports and imports will be determined by the volume of shipping services.

The improvement of trade and exchange would constitute a major contribution to Britain's economic benefit from the United States, whose economic assistance to the United States in a position after the war in order to achieve an effective war on the continent. England would be able to undertake the programs for economic and social reconstruction advanced in the Beveridge plan and the Government would be able to implement without having to worry about the necessity of maintaining a large army and large armament industries indefinitely.

Britain's political stability would be assured by her increased ability to meet the inevitable economic demands for reconstruction resulting from the necessity of security and of an extension of her exports.
How British Industry Would Benefit by Proposed Program

1. The British coal industry would recover from its thirty year depression by gaining new markets. Britain would meet the major portion of the European coal needs formerly met by the annual Ruhr production of 125 million tons. The consequent expansion of British coal output would allow for the development of a coherent program for the expansion and reorganization of what has been Britain's leading depressed industry since 1918 and facilitate the elimination of the depressed areas.

2. The reduction in German industrial capacity would eliminate German competition with British exports in the world market. Not only will England be in a position to recapture many of the foreign markets she lost to Germany after 1918, but she will participate in supplying the devastated countries of Europe with all types of consumer and industrial goods for their reconstruction needs in the immediate post-war years.

3. Transference of a large section of German shipping, both commercial and naval, and shipbuilding equipment to England will be an important item in England's program of post-war economic expansion of restitution.

4. Britain's foreign exchange position will be strengthened and the pressure on sterling reduced by the expansion of her exports and shipping services.

5. The assurance of peace and security would constitute England's greatest single economic benefit from the proposed program designed to put Germany in a position never again to wage effective war on the continent. England would be able to undertake the program for economic and social reconstruction advanced in the Beveridge plan and the Government program for full employment without having to worry about the future financial burdens of maintaining large army and huge armament industries indefinitely.

6. Britain's political stability would be reinforced by her increased ability to meet the insistent domestic demands for economic reform resulting from the assurances of security and of an expansion of her exports.
The economic rehabilitation of Germany is one of the aims of the occupying
Allied authorities. The German people should take
the consequences of their own acts.

The sole purpose of the military occupation of the German economy should be to facilitate
a recovery which may be military occupation. The
Allied Military Government should not assume
responsibility for most economic problems, as price
control, building, unemployment, production, re-
construction, distribution, consumption, housing,
transportation, or take any measure designed
to maintain or strengthen the German economy. The
responsibility for sustaining the German economy
the people rests with the German people with early
institution as may be available under the circumstances.

No relief supplies should be imported, or
Distributed from German stocks, beyond the minimum
necessary to prevent disaster and such disaster as
might endanger or impair military operations or
occupation. The Allied Military authorities shall
have no responsibility for the provision and distribu-
tion of relief, including food and medical
supplies. German import requirements should be
strictly limited to emergency needs of specific
items, and should not in any instance take precedence
over the supply requirements of liberated territories.

Agricultural exports to Germany should be
utilized for the German population, provided,
however, that German consumption shall be held
to a minimum so as to maintain the volume of
agricultural products available for liberated
countries.

Allied Military authorities should not be
concerned with restoring any physical destruction
caused during hostilities, except as absolutely
essential to the health of the population. The
Germans will have that responsibility, to do the
job as best they can.
The well-being of the German economy is the responsibility of the Germans and not of the Allied Military authorities.

The economic rehabilitation of Germany is the problem of the German people and not of the Allied Military authorities. The German people must bear the consequences of their own acts.

The sole purpose of the military in control of the German economy should be to facilitate military operations and military occupation. The Allied Military Government should not assume responsibility for such economic problems as price controls, rationing, unemployment, production, reconstruction, distribution, consumption, housing, or transportation, or take any measures designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy. The responsibility for sustaining the German economy and people rests with the German people with such facilities as may be available under the circumstances.

No relief supplies should be imported, or distributed from German stocks, beyond the minimum necessary to prevent disease and such disorder as might endanger or impede military operations or occupation. The Allied Military authorities should have no responsibility for the provision and distribution or relief, including food and medical supplies. German import requirements should be strictly limited to minimum quotas of critical items and should not in any instance take precedence over the supply requirements of liberated territories.

Agricultural supplies in Germany should be utilized for the German population, provided, however, that German consumption shall be held to a minimum so as to maximize the surplus of agricultural products available for liberated countries.

Allied Military authorities should not be concerned with restoring any physical destruction caused during hostilities, except as absolutely essential to the health of the population. The Germans will have that responsibility, to do the job as best they can.
Controls over Development of German Economy

A long-range program should be put into effect for the purpose of neutralizing the strategic elements in the German economy for a prolonged period, at least 20 years. The elements which should be controlled are:

1. German foreign assets, including patents and copyrights.
2. German foreign trade.
3. Clearing and trade agreements with foreign countries.
5. Industries producing strategic materials other than those for which special provision has been made.
6. The German commercial and fishing fleet.
7. Inland navigation, e.g., canals and rivers.

It is essential that the foregoing strategic elements in the German economy be controlled lest through their use, the Germans once again proceed to build up various aspects of their industrial and economic structure for future militaristic and aggressive purposes. Germany has been the leader in the world in using customs tariffs, trade preferences, foreign exchange control, control over transit trade, import quotas, international cartels, patents, and copyrights for discriminatory and unfair trade advantages against her neighbors. It has been the focal point for many of the jittering zones and competitive trade wars throughout the 1930's and 40's.
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What Is to apost Germany Education

The militaristic spirit which pervades the German people has been deliberately fostered by all educational institutions in Germany for many decades. Schools, colleges and universities were used with great effectiveness to implant into the children and the youth of the nation the goals of aggressive nationalism and the desire for world domination. Re-education of the German people must become a part of the program to render Germany inoffensive as an aggressive power.

Re-education cannot be effectively undertaken from outside the country and by teachers from abroad. It must be done by the Germans themselves. The hard facts of defeat and of the need for political, economic and social rehabilitation must be the teachers of the German people. The existing educational system which is utterly reformed must be completely reconstructed and reformed. The chief task will be to locate politically reliable teachers and to educate, as soon as possible, new teachers who are animated by a new spirit.

A United Nations Commission of Education should be created which will have supreme authority in all matters of education and organs of public opinion. All educational institutions of any type and character will be closed. Their reopening will depend (1) upon the possibility of assuring faculties in whose political confidence can be placed; (2) upon reorganization of curricula; and (3) upon the completion of new textbooks to replace the utterly unpalatable books of the past. During a preliminary period only appointments to faculties of educational institutions should be subject to the approval of the United Nations Commission of Education. While it may be possible to re-educate faculties for primary schools after a relatively short time, all institutions of higher learning, the chief centers of militaristic, pan-German propaganda in the past, may have to remain closed for a number of years.
What to do about German education

The militaristic spirit which pervades the German people has been deliberately fostered by all educational institutions in Germany for many decades. Schools, Colleges and Universities were used with great effectiveness to instill into the children and the youth of the nation the seeds of aggressive nationalism and the desire for world domination. Re-education of the German people must hence be part of the program to render Germany ineffective as an aggressive power.

Re-education cannot be effectively undertaken from outside the country and by teachers from abroad. It must be done by the Germans themselves. The hard facts of defeat and of the need for political, economic and social reorientation must be the teachers of the German people. The existing educational system which is utterly nazified must be completely reorganized and reformed. The chief task will be to locate politically reliable teachers and to educate, as soon as possible, new teachers who are animated by a new spirit.

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German militarism cannot be destroyed by destroying the nation alone.

(1) The Nazi regime is essentially the culmination of the unwholesome German drive toward aggression.

(a) German society has been dominated for at least three generations by powerful forces fashioning the German state and nation into a machine for military conquest and self-aggrandizement. Since 1871 Germany has launched five wars of aggression against other powers, each war involving more destruction over larger areas than the previous one.

(b) As in the case of Japan, the rapid evolution of a modern industrial system in Germany has irreversibly strengthened the economic base of German militarism without weakening the Prussian, feudal ideology of its hold on German society.

(c) The Nazi regime is not an excursion on an otherwise healthy society but an organic growth cut off from the German body politic. Even before the Nazi regime seized power, the German nation had demonstrated an unequalled capacity to be induced by a militarist ideology offering the promise of economic security and political domination in exchange for disciplined acceptance of its leadership. What the Nazi regime has done has been to systematically denude the passive German citizen on an unprecedented scale and shape it into an organized and dehumanized military machine integrated by all the forces of modern technique and science.

(2) The dissolution of the Nazi Party will not, therefore, by itself ensure the destruction of the militaristic spirit insinuated into the German people over generations and given an overwhelming impetus in the last decade. This will of necessity be an arduous process, and for a long time to come it would be gambling with the very destiny of civilization to rely on an unproven German capacity for self-regeneration in the face of its proven capacity for creating new weapons of destruction to be used in wars of aggression. Therefore, in addition to disarming and weakening Germany as a military power, the interests of world security will best be served by:

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German Militarism cannot be destroyed by destroying Nazism alone.

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(a) German society has been dominated for at least three generations by powerful forces fashioning the German state and nation into a machine for military conquest and self-aggrandizement. Since 1864 Germany has launched five wars of aggression against other powers, each war involving more destruction over larger areas than the previous one.

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(c) The Nazi regime is not an excrescence on an otherwise healthy society but an organic growth out of the German body politic. Even before the Nazi regime seized power, the German nation had demonstrated an unequalled capacity to be seduced by a militarist clique offering the promise of economic security and political domination in exchange for disciplined acceptance of its leadership. What the Nazi regime has done has been to systematically debauch the passive German nation on an unprecedented scale and shape it into an organized and dehumanized military machine integrated by all the forces of modern technique and science.

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(a) Forcibly reducing Germany's industrial capacity so that she will cease to be a major economic, military and political power.

(b) Strengthening all Germany's neighbors politically and economically relatively to Germany. The more powerful her neighbors, the more likely she is to realize the futility of the militarist philosophy from which aggression ensues.
Establishment of Certain War Criminals

A. Prosecution of Certain War Criminals

1. War Criminals

A list of the war criminals of this war whose offenses shall have generally been recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and transmitted to the governments of the United Nations. The military authorities shall be instructed with respect to all persons who are on such list as follows:

(a) They shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer of the General rank.

(b) When such identification has been made the person identified shall be put to death forthwith by firing squad made up of soldiers of the United Nations.

2. Certain Other War Criminals

(a) Military commissions shall be established by the Allied Military Government for the trial of certain criminals who have been committed against civilization during the war. As soon as practicable, representatives of the liberated countries of Europe shall be included on such commissions. These criminals shall include those crimes covered by the following section and such other crimes as such military commissions may be ordered to try from time to time.

(b) Any person who is suspected of being responsible for (through the instigation of others or otherwise), or having participated in, causing the death of any human being in the following sections shall be arrested and tried promptly by such military commissions, unless prior to trial one of the United Nations has requested that such person be placed in its custody for trial on similar charges for acts committed within its territory.

(i) The death was caused by active, in violation of the rules of war.

(ii) The victim was killed as a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of other persons.

(iii) The victim was killed because of his nationality, race, color, creed, or political conviction.

4. Any person who is convicted by the military commission of the crime specified in paragraph (b) shall be sentenced to death, unless the military commission, in exceptional cases to be fixed by law, are estimating circumstances, in which
Punishment of Certain War Crimes and Treatment of Special Groups.

A. Punishment of Certain War Criminals.

(1) Arch-criminals.

A list of the arch-criminals of this war whose obvious guilt has generally been recognized by the United Nations shall be drawn up as soon as possible and transmitted to the appropriate military authorities. The military authorities shall be instructed with respect to all persons who are on such list as follows:

(a) They shall be apprehended as soon as possible and identified as soon as possible after apprehension, the identification to be approved by an officer of the General rank.

(b) When such identification has been made the person identified shall be put to death forthwith by firing squads made up of soldiers of the United Nations.

(2) Certain Other War Criminals.

(a) Military commissions shall be established by the Allied Military Government for the trial of certain crimes which have been committed against civilization during this war. As soon as practicable, representatives of the liberated countries of Europe shall be included on such commissions. These crimes shall include those crimes covered by the following section and such other crimes as such military commissions may be ordered to try from time to time.

(b) Any person who is suspected of being responsible for (through the issuance of orders or otherwise), or having participated in, causing the death of any human being in the following situations shall be arrested and tried promptly by such military commissions, unless prior to trial one of the United Nations has requested that such person be placed in its custody for trial on similar charges for acts committed within its territory:

(i) The death was caused by action in violation of the rules of war.

(ii) The victim was killed as a hostage in reprisal for the deeds of other persons.

(iii) The victim met death because of his nationality, race, color, creed, or political conviction.

(c) Any person who is convicted by the military commissions of the crimes specified in paragraph (b) shall be sentenced to death, unless the military commissions, in exceptional cases, determine that there are extenuating circumstances, in which
case other punishment may be meted out, including deportation to a penal colony outside of Germany. Upon conviction, the sentence shall be carried out immediately.

B. Detention of Certain Groups.

All members of the following groups should be detained until the extent of the guilt of each individual is determined:

(a) The S.S.

(b) The Gestapo.

(c) All high officials of the police, S.A. and other security organizations.

(d) All high Government and Nazi Party officials.

(e) All leading public figures closely identified with Nazism.

C. Registration.

An appropriate registration program will be formulated designed to identify all members of the Nazi Party and affiliated organizations, the Gestapo, S.S. and S.A.

D. Labor Battalions.

Apart from the question of established guilt for special crimes, mere membership in the S.S., the Gestapo and similar groups will constitute the basis for inclusion into compulsory labor battalion to serve outside Germany for reconstruction purposes.

E. Dissolution of Nazi Organizations.

The Nazi Party and all affiliated organizations such as the Labor Front, The Hitler Youth, The Strength-through-Joy, etc., should be dissolved and their properties and records confiscated. Every possible effort should be made to prevent any attempts to reconstitute them in underground or disguised form.

F. Prohibition on Exercise of Certain Privileges.

All members of the following groups should be dismissed from public office, disenfranchised and disqualified to hold any public office or to engage in journalist, teaching, and legal professions, or, in any managerial capacity in banking, manufacturing or trade:
(1) The Nazi Party.

(2) Nazi sympathizers who by their words or deeds materially aided or abetted the Nazi program.

(3) The Junkers.

(4) Military and Naval officers.

G. Prohibition on Emigration.

(1) A Proclamation shall be issued prohibiting any person resident in Germany from leaving or attempting to leave Germany, except with permission from the Allied Military Government.

(2) Violation of this Proclamation shall be an offense triable by military commissions of the Allied Military Government and heavy penalties shall be prescribed, including death.

(3) All possible steps shall be taken by the military authorities to prevent any such person from leaving (without permission).
EUROPEAN COAL PRODUCTION IN 1929 AND 1937
By Geographical Areas

METRIC TONS
Millions

1929
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0

U.K.
Western Europe
Ruhr
Eastern Europe
U.S.S.R.

1937
275
250
225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0

U.K.
Western Europe
Ruhr
Eastern Europe
U.S.S.R.

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PRODUCTION OF COAL, IRON AND STEEL IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES IN 1937

(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Iron Ore</th>
<th>Pig Iron</th>
<th>Steel</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ruhr</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
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<td>244</td>
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COAL PRODUCTION IN UNITED KINGDOM AND RUHR
Yearly, 1922-1938

United Kingdom

Ruhr