SECRET

JULY 25, 1942

FOR: AMERICAN EMBASSY

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR HOPKINS, MARSHALL AND KING.

REPLYING YOUR TELEGRAM OF 25 JULY AND MARSHALL-KING TELEGRAM NO. 625 OF 24 JULY PROPOSALS CONTAINED THEREIN FOR 1942 - 1943 APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE DETAILS AND TIME TO BE SETTLED AFTER CON¬
FERENCE WITH YOU, MARSHALL AND KING FOLLOWING YOUR RETURN.

PLEASE INFORM BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF IT IS MY OPINION GYMNAST SHOULD BE STARTED WITH LANDING NOT LATER THAN OCTOBER 30,
1942, AND THAT PLANS TO THAT END PROCEED AT ONCE.

TELL FORMER NAVAL PERSON I AM DELIGHTED THAT DECISION IS MADE.
WE WILL GO AHEAD FULL SPEED. EMPHASIZE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY SECRECY.
I HOPE YOU CAN LEAVE AS PLANNED.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1245, EWT, July 25, 1942.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President

SECRET
URGENT

CABLEGRAM

SECRET

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

JULY 25 1942

5:20 AM EST M.

To THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MOST SECRET MESSAGE FROM HARRY TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT PERSONNALLY AND TO BE READ BY THE CODE CLERK ONLY REPEAT ONLY THE CODE CLERK ONLY PERIOD BEGINNING OF MESSAGE PD. THE INTENT AND DETERMINATION ON BOTH SIDES IS CLEAR AND ANY QUESTIONS OF PRECISE LANGUAGE CAN ONLY BE CLARIFIED BY PERSONAL CONFERENCE YOU MARSHALL AND KING PD THE PLAN PROVIDES THAT US TROOPS SHALL LEAD THE LANDING IN NORTH AFRICA SO THAT ALL LANDINGS SHALL BE UNDER OUR FLAG BUT WITH BRITISH SUPPORT OP NORTH SIDE PD I BELIEVE THE PLAN CONFORMS TO YOUR VIEWS PERIOD WHETHER OR NOT YOU HAVE CABLED MARSHALL AND KING IN RESPONSE TO FINAL PROPOSALS CMA I URGE THAT YOU TELEPHONE US NINE THIRTY YOUR TIME THAT THE PROPOSALS ARE APPROVED BY YOU

EISENHOWER

Despatches Received

LONDON COUNCIL OF WAR

JULY 1942

Action Copy

IN - # 6 - PAGE 1 OF 1.
24th July 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

In Sir Ronald Campbell's absence I enclose herein a copy of the telegram which has just been received from the Foreign Office for you. In accordance with the arrangements made with Mr. MacIntyre I am delivering this to the White House this evening.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very respectfully yours,

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D.C.
Telegram from London dated July 25th, 1942.

MOST SECRET

Following for President Roosevelt from Mr. Hopkins. (To be delivered to the President in person immediately wherever he may be).

I hope you can agree to proposals for operations in 1942 and 1943 which have been cabled to you. I think however that you should consider following points carefully:

(1) Section "C" seems to me to postpone a flat and final decision to go for GYMNST. I believe decision should now be made to launch the operation rather than postponing that decision until September 15th. The situation in Russia is very serious and I can see no advantage in delay in decision.

(2) I urge very strongly that you recommend a date not later than October 30th, 1942.

(3) I believe that No. 4 in Section "C" includes language which you can work out when we return and hope you will not make an issue of that at this time.

(4) I believe No. 1 in section "E" is too specific but that that precipitant can be ironed out after our return.

Finally I am sure that there is a complete understanding on all sides here that we are going to an expanded GYMNST. Your representatives here have explored every possible alternative and I am sure that they are satisfied in the light of all the circumstances that this is the best move. I believe that if you agree /to
to amendments that I have suggested that no delay will be caused in our return. The thing I fear is that if a firm decision is not made now to go for GYMNASIUM and a reasonably early date fixed, delay and procrastination may take place. While I think that intention is to mount the operation aggressively, the written language may cause difficulties when it hits secondary personnel.

I am well. All of us anxious to return quickly.

HARRY.
FOR HOPKINS, MARSHALL AND KING

RE: YOURS OF JULY 23RD.

It seems to me from a common sense viewpoint that ROUNDUP is dependent on two very grave contingencies. First, concentration on ROUNDUP from now on and, therefore abandonment of GYMNAST or any other new assignment of American troops in 1942. Second, the maintenance of resistance by Russia on Western Front without which ROUNDUP would be impracticable.

Therefore, if the American objective of putting ground forces into useful action in 1942 is maintained, ROUNDUP as planned must be abandoned as the primary objective at this time.

In its place, if we leave out of consideration Norway and Persian Gulf, we have the choice between GYMNAST and reinforcements to Egypt.

I still think that GYMNAST is preferable on the ground that because of relative distances we can obtain control of Mediterranean more quickly and more surely than if we decide on more reinforcements in Near East.

I wish you would consider in relation to GYMNAST this plan which I spoke of before you left, namely, that the initial operations be wholly American, using British and American transport; that the American mission, after securing bridgeheads and ports, be directed due east through Algiers and Tunis; that after the initial task is successfully completed, British ground troops and air, in sufficient number, use American controlled ports and move south in direction of Dakar so as to secure the bulge of Africa.
I think previous logistic figures of troops to be landed per month are much too low because transports need not be combat loaded if the initial expedition obtains control of ports.

For example, I see no reason why we cannot put 80,000 American troops and air into the initial operation, using many of our troops now in England and Ireland, together with expeditionary force from the United States.

Time is of the essence to prevent German air concentration as you indicate.

I should like to have you give favorable consideration to this problem with the purpose of accomplishing it if it possibly can be done.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 1220, July 24, 1942.

W. C. Mott,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.R.
JULY 22, 1942

TO: AMBASSADOR, LONDON

FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HOPKINS, MARSHALL, AND KING.

YOUR TWO MESSAGES OF JULY 22 DO NOT WHOLLY TAKE ME BY SURPRISE. AND I AGREE THAT MERE ACQUIESCENCE ON THE PART OF OUR FRIENDS IS NOT SUFFICIENT.

I THEREFORE REPEAT THE DIRECTIVE THAT SOME OTHER OFFENSIVE BE WORKED OUT FOR AMERICAN GROUND FORCES IN 1942.

SUCH AN OFFENSIVE OUGHT NOT TO BE AT SUCH A DISTANCE AS TO REQUIRE VERY LONG SEA TRIP. THEREFORE I ASK STUDY OF FOLLOWING IN THE ORDER OF WHAT I REGARD AS BEST CHANCE OF SUCCESS COMBINED WITH POLITICAL AND MILITARY USEFULNESS AND COMBINED WITH SPEED.

AFIRM. A NEW FORM OF ATTACK ON ALGIERS AND OR MOROCCO.

BAKER. THE OLD GYMNAST BUT CONFINED IN BEGINNING TO AMERICAN TROOPS ONLY.

CAST. NORTHERN NORWAY.

DOD. EGYPT.

EASY. PERSIA TO CAUCASUS.

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM HARRISON IN BERN OF WHICH FOLLOWING IS PARAPHRASED:

QUOTE. THE FOLLOWING FROM FRENCH EMBASSY SOURCES SEEMS CREDIBLE. PLANS UNDER WAY IN MOROCCO FOR CONSTRUCTION LARGE SCALE COAST DEFENSES AND AIR FIELDS. IF ALLIED OPERATION ANYWHERE NORTH AFRICA BEING CONSIDERED THEY SHOULD NOT BE TOO LONG DELAYED. THEY SHOULD TAKE PRIORITY OVER CONTINENTAL ATTACKS IN FRANCE. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT AMERICAN FORCES OF ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND WOULD

* See file of "Incoming" despatches for Harrison's despatch as actually received.
SUCCEEDED IN OCCUPATION ALL FRENCH NORTH AFRICA BUT WOULD NOT BE
SUFFICIENT LATER. OCCUPATION FRENCH AIRFIELDS ESPECIALLY NEAR
TUNIS SEEMS ESSENTIAL. PROBABILITY FRENCH UNITS WOULD JOIN
ANTI-VICHY FORCES QUICKLY IN LARGE PERCENTAGE GREATER IN MOR-
OCCO, THOUGH LESS IN TUNIS. GENERAL NOGATZ NOT TO BE RELIED ON
AT FIRST BUT PROBABLY WOULD JOIN ANY QUICK SUCCESS. UNQUOTE.

TELL OUR FRIENDS WE MUST HAVE SPEED IN A DECISION.

ROOSEVELT

Released at 2335, EWT, July 22, 1942.

J. D. COFFEE, JR.
Ensign, U.S.N.R.
White House Chart Room
MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS
GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE -- JULY, 1942.

1. You will proceed immediately to London as my personal representatives for the purpose of consultation with appropriate British authorities on the conduct of the war.

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(a) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.
(b) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1945.

3. (a) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.
(b) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(c) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(d) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(e) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.

4. British and American matériel to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that every reason calls for accomplishment of it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russian collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse
SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time, and determine upon another place for U. S. Troops to fight in 1942.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

(b) If Russia collapses and German air and ground forces are released, ROUNDUP may be impossible of fulfillment in 1943.

8. The Middle East should be held as strongly as possible whether Russia collapses or not. I want you to take into consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such loss means in series:

(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

(a) Loss of Syria.
(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells.

(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.

(5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.

(6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.

(7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and their territories.

(8) You will determine the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely either or both of the following:

   (a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.

   (b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.
9. I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa.

On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.

10. Please remember three cardinal principles -- speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone. This affects the immediate objective of U. S. ground forces fighting against Germans in 1942.

11. I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
July 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE - JULY, 1942.

1. O.K.

2. The military and naval strategic changes have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington that it becomes necessary to reach immediate agreement on joint operational plans between the British and ourselves along two lines:

(A) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.

(B) Tentative plans for the year 1943 which, of course, will be subject to change in the light of occurrences in 1942, and which should be initiated at this time in all cases involving preparation in 1942 for operations in 1943.

3.

(A) The common aim of the United Nations must be the defeat of the Axis Powers. There cannot be compromise on this point.

(B) We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.

(C) Absolute coordinated use of British and American forces is essential.

(D) All available U. S. and British forces should be brought into action as quickly as they can be profitably used.

(E) It is of the highest importance that U. S. ground troops be brought into action against the enemy in 1942.
4. British and American material to Russia must be carried out in good faith. If the Persian route of delivery is used, preference must be given to combat material. This aid must continue as long as delivery is possible and Russia must be encouraged to continue resistance. Only complete collapse, which seems unthinkable, should alter this determination on our part.

5. In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the possibility of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the turning point which would save Russia this year. SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that grave reasons are to accomplish it. You should strongly urge immediate all-out preparations for it, that it be pushed with utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or not Russia's collapse becomes imminent. In the event of probable Russian collapse, SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not merely advisable but imperative. The principle objective of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air Forces from the Russian Front.

6. Only if you are completely convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER is impossible of execution with reasonable chances of serving its intended purpose, inform me.

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definitely out of the picture, I want you to consider the world situation as it exists at that time.

It is my present view of the world picture that:

(a) If Russia contains a large German force against her, ROUNDUP becomes possible in 1943, and plans for ROUNDUP should be immediately considered and preparations made for it.

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(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

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(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf through attacks from the north and west, together with access to all Persian Gulf oil.
(8) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable loss of the Indian Ocean.

(9) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Dakar and the cutting of the ferry route through Freetown and Liberia.

(7) Serious danger of all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.

(8) You will the best methods of holding the Middle East. These methods include definitely:

(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to Syria and to Egypt.

(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algeria intended to drive in against the backdoor of Rommel's armies. The attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.

(9) I am opposed to an American all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan with the view to her defeat as quickly as possible unless no plan can be worked out for British and American unity of action in Europe and Africa beginning in 1942. It is of the utmost importance that we appreciate that defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany and that American concentration against Japan this year or in 1943 increases the chance of complete German domination of Europe and Africa. On the other hand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany, or the holding of Germany in 1943 or in 1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Germany in the European and African theatres and in the Near East. Defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.

(10) Please remember three cardinal principles — speed of decision on plans, unity of plans, attack combined with defense but not defense alone.

(11) I hope for total agreement within one week of your arrival.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

SECRET
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA:

Will you give this to Admiral Leahy to read and return for your confidential files?

F.D.R.

Firing of C. Marshall to the President 26 July 1941
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Immediately after our arrival in London on July 18th, we began discussions with Ambassador Winant, the Army and Navy Commanders in the European Theater and their staffs. We found that while the U. S. staffs were convinced that SLEDGEHAMMER should be undertaken at the earliest practicable moment, it was the consensus of opinion of the U. S. staffs that the British, from the Prime Minister on down, were unalterably opposed to any operation of this nature centering on the British Isles, and that unless the whole-hearted approval of the Prime Minister could be obtained, any attempt to implement SLEDGEHAMMER effectively was foredoomed to failure.

We found that the U. S. staffs in London, in conjunction with the British Planners, had fully investigated the possibilities of Pas de Calais, Le Havre, Cherbourg, and Brest as objectives for SLEDGEHAMMER, and that the U. S. staffs were agreed that Cherbourg was the most favorable objective within effective range of British-U. S. supporting aviation.

We felt that even though our first meetings with the British were to be "off the record" it was desirable for the sake of accuracy to present our views in written form. We therefore prepared the following memorandum outlining our general conception of the importance and practicability of the SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUNDUP operation:

"20 July 1942.

MEMORANDUM

1. The defeat of Germany will be decisive and is the surest path to winning the war.
"2. Russia is the paramount factor in the war at this time. Hence our considerations must be premised on the outcome of the current campaign in Russia.

"3. Defeat of the Russian armies would compel a complete reorientation of Allied strategy. It would practically eliminate all opportunity of defeating Germany by direct action, and would throw the Allies permanently on the defensive throughout Europe. Except for bombardment of aircraft, in which Germany would have the advantage of geographical position, there would be little of a positive nature that the Allies could undertake to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

"4. The bleakness of this outlook needs no emphasizing.

"5. Because of conditions existing throughout the world, including the bottlenecks in the preparatory program of the United States and Great Britain, it has been determined that a major attack against German-held Europe cannot be made before 1943. This leaves Russia fighting virtually unaided against the full power of the German nation until winter can again intervene. During all of this period the fate of the rest of the Allied world is largely bound up in the endurance and efficiency of the Russian army.

"6. The possibility of a Russian defeat makes it desirable to build up Allied defensive strength in certain localities throughout the world to provide greater insurance to us against such a contingency. Each of these requires shipping and airplanes and productive capacity. The satisfaction of these requirements imposes additional strain on the principal bottlenecks of our war effort. More important than this is the fact that they subtract from our ability to hit Germany while Russia is still fighting.

"7. The diversion of the forces and munitions required reflects a defensive, conservative, and somewhat dispersed effort as contrasted with an offensive,
unified, even if somewhat risky, effort to seize our
great - perhaps only - opportunity to take an initia-
tive which is essential to the defeat of the principal
enemy - Germany.

"8. The purpose of ROUND-UP is to bring to bear
against Germany, simultaneously, the full strength of
the U.K., Russia and the U.S. It is the counter to the
German hope of acting with her full strength against
each of her several enemies in rotation. Time is vital;
synchronization of effort will not be possible if Russia
is defeated before the U.K. and the U.S. are in a posi-
tion to act effectively.

"9. SLEDGEHAMMER was premised on the realization
that circumstances in 1942 might be such as to require,
even compel, definite action within the general frame-
work of ROUND-UP, before that attack can be fully mounted.

"10. With respect to the Russian situation, there
are three possible conditions that could develop during
the remainder of this year:

"a. A deterioration of Russian strength
becoming apparent, with a possibility of collapse.

"b. A gradual turn for the better in the
Russian situation with a progressive absorption
of German strength onto the Eastern Front.

c. A continuance of the struggle on the
Russian front with the battle progressively
approaching the crisis, with a consequent effort
on both sides to bring to bear every available
ounce of strength in order to clinch the victory
or to avoid defeat.

"11. If the situation develops as indicated first
above (10a), the question for the Allies to decide now
is whether or not SLEDGEHAMMER shall be undertaken in a
desperate endeavor to relieve the Russian situation. We
would be guilty of a gross military blunder if Germany
should be permitted to eliminate an Allied army of
8,000,000 men, when some stroke of ours might have saved
the situation.
"12. If the Russian campaign develops as indicated in paragraph 10b above, the Allies must decide whether SLEDGEHAMMER should not be undertaken on the ground that it provides for the seizure and expansion of a foothold on the Continent as a preliminary useful step towards the full evolution of ROUND-UP in 1943.

"13. If a situation comparable to that set forth in paragraph 10c above should develop, with German defensive forces in Europe reduced to a minimum, SLEDGEHAMMER would constitute the most effective action that the Allies could take on behalf of Russia and, indeed, for the Allied cause in general.

"14. To sum up, it is our view that every consideration - including that of risk involved - points definitely to the necessity that we should determine to mount and carry out SLEDGEHAMMER in early September 1942."

We met at No. 10 Downing Street at 12:30 P.M., July 20th, with the Prime Minister and the British Chiefs of Staff. After welcoming the American delegation the Prime Minister said that he did not propose to discuss the merits of the various operations under consideration. He considered that we should survey the general scene and determine the most convenient method and sequence of conferences which should be held. He then reverted to the question of SLEDGEHAMMER and stated that the British had failed to devise a satisfactory plan but would give the most earnest and sympathetic attention to any American plan. He said the British were ardently in favor of ROUNDUP but questioned whether ROUNDUP was necessarily confined to an attack on the western seaboard of France or that the idea of a second front was confined within those limits. Hitherto SLEDGEHAMMER had been discussed on the basis that Russia was either triumphant or crushed. It seemed more probable that an intermediate situation would confront us with the Russian battle hanging in the balance for some time or with the Russian front still maintained although somewhat further to the east. The third question for consideration was if SLEDGEHAMMER is excluded what is the most appropriate line of action. He felt that CYMMNAST should be examined in all of
its various forms and from every angle. He concluded by mentioning the Pacific Theater which was recognized as almost exclusively an American sphere but where the British would naturally desire to make a contribution. We agreed with the outline of procedure proposed by the Prime Minister. Brief notes of the above conference are attached.

We met informally with the British Chiefs of Staff immediately after our conference with the Prime Minister and found them unanimous in opposing the SLEDGEHAMMER operation which they thought would have no direct or indirect influence on the Russian situation and which they believed would be subjected to such heavy attack by German land and air power now in France that it could not survive the winter. The discussion which followed produced no tangible result. On Tuesday morning, July 21st, the discussion was resumed, but the British Chiefs of Staff continued to adhere firmly to their previous objections.

Consideration by the American Staff of British objections to the SLEDGEHAMMER operation and an intensive restudy of our own estimates confirmed our previous conviction and the fact that Cherbourg was the most promising objective. The entire United States delegation felt, however, that no successful cross-channel operation was possible unless it had the whole-hearted, enthusiastic support of the Prime Minister and the British Staff and not merely their acquiescence. In order to bring the first phase of our discussion to a head, we prepared the following definite proposals for presentation to the British Chiefs of Staff at our next meeting:

- - - - - - - -

MEMORANDUM

July 21, 1942.

1. We propose that SLEDGEHAMMER be immediately adopted as a combined British-American operational plan for execution at the earliest possible date in 1942, not later than October 15, under the following conditions and intentions:

a. That SLEDGEHAMMER be regarded as the opening phase of ROUNDPUP with a consequent
purpose, not only of remaining upon the continent, but of building up ground and air forces and logistic facilities, and expanding our foothold, to the limit of our capabilities.

b. That the immediate tactical objective be Cherbourg and the Channel Islands.

c. That a Task Force Commander for the operation be designated now, and charged with full responsibility for planning, organization, special preparation and training of the Combined U.K.-U.S. force, and for the execution of SLEDGEHAMMER. Ground, naval and air will be directed to report to the Task Force Commander immediately. He must be given a firm commitment of the ground, naval and air forces allocated for the operation.

(Note:- The reasons supporting these proposals, and a discussion of the previous British objections to the SLEDGEHAMMER Operation are attached to this report.)

At our request, the Prime Minister was present at the next conference which took place on July 22d. General Marshall, at the suggestion of the Prime Minister, opened the discussion. He said that the American Chiefs of Staff had now had three meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff and a point had been reached where it was necessary to report to the President. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff thought it right before doing so to have a discussion with the Prime Minister, who had already seen our memorandum proposing the Cherbourg operation.

The Prime Minister replied that he entirely agreed with the spirit of our proposals and he fully shared the ardent desire of the President and the American Chiefs of Staff to engage the enemy in the greatest possible strength at the earliest possible moment. He remarked that it was very easy to assemble powerful arguments against any scheme of hazard and daring, and he himself disliked a negative attitude intensely. Nevertheless he could not help feeling, having regard to the strength which we could dispose on the continent this year, that
we should not be justified in attempting Operation SLEDGE-HAMMER. It was very doubtful whether this operation would succeed in drawing off any substantial German forces from Russia. He mentioned a number of ugly possibilities looming in front of us, for instance a collapse in Russia or a German move into the Caucasus, or victory in the Nile Delta, which would enable them to occupy the Suez Canal; or again, that The Germans might establish themselves in North Africa and West Africa, thereby putting an almost prohibitive strain on our shipping.

He considered, however, that disagreement between America and Great Britain would have much graver consequences than any of the above possibilities. At present there was merely failure to reach an agreement on the question of an operation in 1942. He thought that the time had come when the report of this failure should be made to the President and to the War Cabinet.

Mr. Hopkins suggested that the Staffs should not address themselves to the consideration of any other alternative until the American Chiefs of Staff had received directions from the President, who had been emphatic that the question of SLEDGE-HAMMER should be settled quite apart from anything else.

The Prime Minister reiterated his ardent belief in ROUNDUP which he felt to be successful must be on a sufficiently large scale with a certain degree of German demoralization. He felt that we had not engaged our honor to the Russians to do SLEDGE-HAMMER this year and read an extract from a memorandum to M. Molotov, which specified that no promise could be given in the matter of a landing on the Continent in August or September although preparations were being made for this operation provided it appears sound and sensible.

General Marshall emphasized that it would be a very serious matter, regardless of the decision taken on SLEDGE-HAMMER, if there were any outward or visible sign that we had abated our efforts. He thought it of grave importance that there should be no indication of a difference of view between us. We had accepted that SLEDGE-HAMMER was a most difficult operation filled with hazards and not at all one which would be deliberately chosen if choice were possible and that he personally had come to the conclusion that for various reasons it could not be launched before October which increased the hazards of weather and of the appearance of German air forces from the Russian front. However, from the point of view of
the U. S. Chiefs of Staff there was no choice in the matter. Time was tragically against us. Without SLEDEGEHAMMER we were faced with a defensive attitude in the European Theater.

Continuing he said that he regarded the conception of ROUNDUP as of the highest importance since it seemed the only way of gaining an early decision. The only alternative was to wait for Germany to starve and disintegrate. We are under continued pressure to subtract from BOLERO and are embarrassed by the necessity for air reinforcements in the Pacific-Alaska Area and the Southwest Area, the temporary movements to the West Coast of BOLERO air units, the reinforcement of the Middle East, the continued proposals for other operations such as GYMNASI, the Persian Gulf region, etc. He felt we should do our utmost to concentrate on ROUNDUP.

After some further discussion, the Prime Minister said that he would report to the War Cabinet that afternoon and arrange for the American Chiefs of Staff to be informed of the reactions of the War Cabinet in order that they might report to the President.

As reported in our telegram of July 22d we were informed that evening that the War Cabinet confirmed the views of the British Chiefs of Staff that any scheduled operation of the character of SLEDGEHAMMER is impracticable and unwise. This confirmation was anticipated and the American Staff had been engaged in the consideration of alternative lines of action. These were narrowed to three possible operations:

1. Reinforcement of the Middle Eastern Area either in the Iran-Iraq, the Egyptian Area, or both.

2. An attack in Northwest Africa with the purpose of clearing the enemy from the North African Coast and proceeding eastward against the rear of Rommel's Army.

3. The seizure of eastern Atlantic islands including the Azores, the Cape Verdes, the Canaries, and the Madeiras as an alternative to 2.
Each of these plans had several possible variants dependent upon the nature of the air operations carried out in conjunction therewith. Nothing developed which changed our considered opinion that Great Britain is the only area from which the combined strength of the United Nations can be brought to bear against our principal enemy - Germany, so that no avoidable reduction in our preparation for ROUNDUP should be considered as long as there remains any reasonable possibility of its successful execution. A Russian collapse this Fall or a termination of the present campaign leaving Russia relatively impotent and incapable of offensive action would, however, make the objective of a continental operation in 1943 impossible of attainment. In this event the United Nations are forced to a defensive, encircling line of action against Germany for the coming year unless a crackup in German morale, of which there is no present indication, should occur unexpectedly. Combined operations against the West and Northwest Coasts of Africa for the purpose indicated above is the logical line of action in this alternative.

Based on the above we drafted the following proposals for operations in 1942-1943, as reported to you in our message of July 24th:

"COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF"

"July 24, 1942.

"MEMORANDUM from U.S. Chiefs of Staff."

"TO: British Chiefs of Staff."

"It having been decided that SLEDGEHAMMER is not to be undertaken as a scheduled operation, we propose the following general plans for 1942-3:

"a. That no avoidable reduction in preparations for ROUNDUP should be favorably considered so long as there remains any reasonable possibility of its successful execution before July 1943.

"(1) That Allied air strength continue to be built up in U.K. to provide
for a constantly increasing intensity of air attack on GERMANY.

"(2) That, for purposes of deception and to be ready for any emergency or a favorable opportunity, all preparations for SLEDGEHAMMER continue to be pressed except as to concentration of landing craft or other details that seriously interfere with training for ROUNDUP, and that a task force commander be appointed with authority to organize the force, direct the training and maintain a contingent plan for execution. The troops and supporting units, so far as possible, to be immediately placed under his control.

"b. That, if the British COS propose to ship an armored division to the MIDDLE EAST, a U. S. reinforced armored division (about 19,000 men) be substituted therefor, moving in BRITISH shipping.

"c. That, if the situation on the RUSSIAN front September 15th indicates such a collapse or weakening of Russian resistance as to make ROUNDUP appear impracticable of successful execution, the decision should be taken to launch a combined operation against the NORTH and NORTHWEST COAST of AFRICA at the earliest possible date before December 1942.

"(1) That the combined plans for this operation should immediately be developed and that the latest date be determined after which the necessary shipping, naval forces and troops units can be assembled in time to permit the initial landing operations before the limiting date - 1 December 1942.

"(2) That it be understood that a commitment to this operation renders ROUNDUP, in all probability, impracticable of successful execution in 1943 and
therefore that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for the CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN THEATER, except as to air operations.

"(3) That the U. S. commitment for this operation will require BRITISH assistance in aircraft carriers, covering forces and escort vessels.

"(d) That for the purpose of furthering offensive operations in the PACIFIC the following readjustment of present U. S. commitments to BOLERO will be made:

"(1) Withdrawal of the following air forces:

3 groups heavy bombers
2 groups medium bombers
2 groups light bombers
2 groups fighter planes
2 groups observation planes
4 groups transport planes

"(2) Probably shipping to move one infantry or marine division from U. S. WEST COAST to SOUTHWEST PACIFIC.

"e. That it be understood that heavy and medium bomber units in the UNITED KINGDOM are available for transfer to AFRICAN THEATER as required.

"f. That the security of the BRITISH ISLES is a first charge upon the military resources of both the U.K. and the U.S."

s/ E. J. KING
Commander-in-Chief
United States Fleet

s/ G. C. Marshall
Chief-of-Staff
United States Army
We considered the decision involved to be of such importance as to require formal presentation, and we presented our proposals at our first formal meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in London. (Minutes of this meeting are attached.)

The British Chiefs of Staff found our proposals generally acceptable. Discussion brought out only minor points which had little direct bearing on the basic strategic questions. The few changes suggested were incorporated in a revised draft which was presented to the Prime Minister and approved by him and by the War Cabinet.

In our final meeting, (minutes of which are attached) we discussed the command arrangements and the mechanics of planning and agreed upon a U. S. Supreme Commander who will coordinate planning both for ROUNDUP and for the combined African operation, which has been given the code name of TORCH by the British. SLEDGEHAMMER planning and general preparation, which is to remain alive if only for purposes of deception, is to have a British Task Force commander. The United States is to provide a commander for the West African landing force (GYMNAST). The task force designated for the North African Coast phase of the operation will be under British Command and we were informed that General Alexander had been selected.

A detachment of the U. S. Joint Staff Planners should proceed to London as early as possible to combine with the British Planners and carry forward the production of an outlined plan for TORCH. This combined planning team will be placed under the control of the Supreme Commander as soon as he is available in London. General Eisenhower, in his present capacity as Theater Commander, will exercise this control immediately. We agreed with the urgent reports of the British Chiefs of Staff that the initial landings at all points in Africa should be made by American troops and for this purpose American Combat Teams would be attached to the British Task Forces.

Summary

It was vital that this conference should result in a definite, agreed, long-range, British-American strategic plan,
and this has been done. Briefly, our strategy, as agreed upon in this conference, is summarized as follows:

a. Continue to press preparation for ROUNDUP as long as there is a chance that this operation may be possible in 1943. We should be able to estimate this possibility with reasonable accuracy by the middle of September.

b. Complete all preparations for an alternate line of action, i.e., operations against North and Northwest Africa so that actual operations can be initiated as soon as it is determined that ROUNDUP is no longer possible in 1943 and before Germany can disengage strong forces, particularly air forces, from the Russian Front.

c. Continue preparation and training for SLEDGEHAMMER for purposes of deception, but not to an extent which would interfere with the other two projected major operations.

d. Accept the fact that the necessity for delaying ROUNDUP beyond 1943 commits us for that year to a defensive, encircling line of action with respect to Germany except for air operations (which are to be intensified as much as possible) and for the blockade.

E. J. KING

G. C. MARSHALL

Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Chief of Staff.

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The indispensable prerequisite to successful attack against Western France is the intensive preoccupation of the German Army and Air Forces in operations against Russia. This condition prevails this fall probably more markedly than it will again.

Even though the forces that can be transported to France this fall are relatively small, they may well be stronger in proportion to the opposition expected than the numerically greater strength we will have available next spring.

With a foothold on the continent, the opportunity is afforded us to continue expansion through every type of aggressive action. It will afford some relief from the continued inaction we are now enduring.

Successful offensive action this fall will provide valuable training and experience to the attacking forces and commanders, and it will tend to promote an offensive spirit throughout the entire British and American armies and peoples.

Speed in such an undertaking will have a bolstering effect upon Russian morale and will either force some material diversions from the Russian front or will allow us to operate in France against the weakest forces we can ever hope to find there.

Because of the necessary concentrations for the defenses of the U.K. and the character of the convoy routes from the U.S., B.B., it is the only region in which the bulk of our forces can be combined for a unified offensive effort against Germany. To avoid further useless dispersion of forces, the major offensive effort should be initiated in this region. The concept of ROUNDFUP must not be abandoned as long as there remains any possibility of its successful execution.

Possession of a port, even if reduced by bombing to a fraction of its normal capacity, may prove to be a determining factor in our ability to undertake a large scale continental operation. Any expansion of our foothold, realized during the winter, will further increase our chances for success in ROUNDFUP.

Cherbourg is proposed as the first objective because the prospect of initial tactical success appears greatest in that area, and the prospect of sustaining ourselves, with a relatively good port and secure flanks, appears favorable.

Occupation of Cherbourg will seriously interfere with German communications throughout the length of the English Channel.
SECRET

1. The seizure of this important area will be carried out before the enemy has opportunity further to fortify the locality and increase the effectiveness of beach defenses. Its capture will facilitate raiding and reconnaissance operations during the winter throughout the length of the French coast.

k. It will provide, for next spring's operations, the best deepwater port within reach of supporting fighter aircraft. It will give positive evidence to the people of France and other occupied countries of our will to carry the war to the enemy.

Major disadvantages so far advanced against the plan are commented upon as follows:

a. Lack of air support. Other than Calais, the region is one of the most favorably situated localities on the French coast for supporting air operations based in England. While our air strength is not so great as it will be next spring, its action will be completely concentrated in one area.

b. Interference with training for ROUNDUP. This is one of the inescapable costs of the operation, but it is believed that, by careful planning and intensified effort in the production and transfer of landing craft from U.S. to Great Britain, this interference will be minimized. In this connection, the transfer of personnel from the Cherbourg assaulting units to divisions in the United Kingdom will give the latter a leavening of men with combat experience in this type of operation.

c. The risk of having the occupation force decimated by hostile air action. The enemy bomber force now in France is estimated at 250 planes. The offensive effort of this force, if directed entirely against the Cherbourg Peninsula, would be serious, but will be met in several ways. Day bombing will be combatted by such pursuit as we can station in the area, supported by pursuit stationed in England. Night bombers will be forced to relatively high altitudes by the use of barrage balloons and A.A. defense. Our own bomber forces should seek out and neutralize the principal bombing fields used by the enemy. We will constantly seek to enlarge air facilities by construction of temporary fields. Some night fighters will be included in the defending air forces.

d. The prospect that the operation will have no effect whatsoever on the Russian front. It is believed that this operation must have a beneficial effect on Russian morale, and it is again pointed out that if the enemy makes no material withdrawals from the Russian front, our prospects for future success will be greatly enhanced.

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COMBINED STAFF CONFERENCE.

MINUTES of a Combined Staff Conference
held at No. 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on MONDAY, 29TH JULY, 1942, at 12.30 p.m.

PRESENT:


Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations.


THE STATEMENTS IN THE ATTACHED MINUTES HAVE NOT BEEN CHECKED BY THOSE TO WHOM THEY ARE ATTRIBUTED. CONSEQUENTLY THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED MERELY AS GIVING A GENERAL INDICATION OF THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION.
THE PRIME MINISTER, after welcoming the American delegation, said that he did not propose to discuss the merits of the various Operations under consideration, but rather that they should survey the general scene and consider the most convenient method and sequence of the conferences which should be held. The American Chiefs of Staff might like to have an 'off the record' meeting, or series of meetings, with the British Chiefs of Staff in the afternoon. He himself would like to have an opportunity of discussing the problems with the American Chiefs of Staff at a fairly early date and he hoped that they would also be willing to attend a meeting of the Defence Committee or War Cabinet. Thereafter the Combined Chiefs of Staff might draw up a report for submission to the President and to himself. The decisions which confronted the United Nations at the present time would affect the whole course of the war, but there was no reason why the process should be protracted.

The first question was "SLIDEGHAMMER". Should we do it or not? And if so, in what form? We, ourselves, had failed to devise a satisfactory plan, but we would give the most earnest and sympathetic attention to any American plan. It was most important that no-one should come to these discussions with a closed mind, either for or against any particular project. It was, of course, necessary to consider not only whether a project was or was not practicable, but whether, on balance, it would be a profitable use of our resources at the present time.

Secondly, it was necessary to consider the effect on "ROUND-UP" of doing, or not doing, "SLIDEGHAMMER". We, ourselves, were ardently in favour of "ROUND-UP". But here again what was "ROUND-UP"? Was it necessarily confined to an attack upon the western sea-board of France? Was the idea of a Second Front necessarily confined within those limits? Might it not be extended with advantage? There had been a tendency to think that "SLIDEGHAMMER" might delay or even preclude "ROUND-UP". On the other hand, it might be contended that the fortunes of "ROUND-UP" did not depend on large extent on the British and Americans, but on what might happen in Russia. Hitherto "SLIDEGHAMMER" had been discussed on the basis that Russia was either triumphant or crushed. It was more probable that an intermediate situation would confront us. The Russian battle might hang in the balance for some time; or again the Russian front might be maintained, though somewhat farther to the east.

The third question for consideration was this. If "SLIDEGHAMMER" is excluded, what are we going to do? This brought us to consideration of Operation "GYMNAST" which should certainly be examined in all its various forms and from every angle. The Germans would probably not wait indefinitely before occupying the "GYMNAST" area and drawing Spain and Portugal into their system. Even though they might not be strong enough to invade Great Britain with Russia still on their hands, they might have to face the prospect of a German occupation of the North African coast and the West African coast. How serious would be the disadvantages of their doing so?

The case for and against "GYMNAST" was powerfully affected by the course of the battle raging in Egypt. If General Auchinleck won, his advance westward might be rapid. "ACROBAT" might then again come into view with possibilities of action against Sicily and Italy, and also of regaining the Air control of the Southern Mediterranean with all the saving of shipping that would result therefrom.

- 1 -
A wide gap now existed in our defences. The Levant-Caspian front was almost bare. If General Auchinleck won the battle of Egypt, we should no doubt build up a force of perhaps 5 Divisions which, together with the Polish Divisions now under training and expected from Russia, would play a strong part in delaying a German Southward advance. But if General Auchinleck could not drive the enemy to a safe distance from Egypt, or if, having driven them, he pursued them into "ACROBAT," then the only shield for the vital region south of the Caspian was the Russian southern armies. It was far too early to assume that they would break. Even at the worst, they should retire in force through the Caucasus and hold the mountain ranges through the Winter, and retain, possibly with our air assistance, the naval command of the Caspian Sea. We were studying the possibility of sending some 20 squadrons of the R.A.F. to the Russian Southern flank, but this was, of course, dependent on the result of General Auchinleck's battle. It must be recognised that if the Russian front were to show signs of breaking, we, by ourselves, could not even think of "ACROBAT." On the other hand, the movement of a large American army to Basra and the north would entail an almost prohibitive drain on shipping.

Continuing, the Prime Minister said that travelling further east there was the question of Operation "ANAKIM." He read out the circumstances in which this Operation might be launched.

Finally, there was the Pacific theatre. This was almost exclusively an American sphere, but we should naturally desire to make a contribution. What could we do to help?

In conclusion, the Prime Minister asked General Marshall and Admiral King whether they agreed with the general programme of business which he had suggested at the outset of the meeting.

GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL KING expressed agreement.

It was arranged that they should have an informal meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff at 3 p.m. the same day.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

General of the Army, General G. C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations.


20TH JULY, 1942.
THE CIRCULATION OF THIS PAPER HAS BEEN STRICTLY LIMITED.

IT IS ISSUED FOR THEIR PERSONAL USE OF ..................

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT HE HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF SEEING THE BRIEFING PAPERS OF STAFF HAD LAID BEFORE THE MEETING DURING 3 YEARS OF WAR, AND HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE DESIRE OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE AMERICANS TO CONCENTRATE EVERY EFFORT IN THE GREATEST POSSIBLE STRENGTH AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO ASSEMBLE POWERFUL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE SCHEME AND IT WAS DARING, AND HE HIMSELF DISLIKED IT SOMEWHAT INTENSELY. NEVERTHLESS, HE COULD NOT HELP FEELING, HAVING REGARD TO THE STRENGTH WHICH WE COULD DISPOSE ON THE CONTINENT, THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE?):ELUSIVE TO THE STRATEGY WE HAD ADOPTED.

IN DRAWING OFF ANY SUBSTANTIAL GERMAN FORCES FROM RUSSIA SINCE THE GERMANS PROBABLY HAD SUFFICIENT STRENGTH, BOTH ON THE GROUND AND IN THE AIR, PARTICULARLY THE LATTER, TO DEAL WITH ANYTHING IN THE CONTINENT. THEY HAD THE KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WE WANTED TO DO. CONSEQUENTLY, THE ARGUMENTS WE SHOULD NEVER HAVE A BETTER CHANCE OF MAKING THE PEACE AT THE CURRENT TIME WAS NOT CONSIDERED TO BE DESIRABLE.

THE Rt. HON. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, THE Rt. HON. HARRY HOPKINS, W.P., PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE;

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR DUDLEY POUND, FIRST SEA LORD AND CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF;

GENERAL SIR ALAN F. BROOKE, CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF;

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR CHARLES F.A. PORTAL, CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF;

VICE ADMIRAL THE LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN, CHIEF OF COMBINED OPERATIONS;

MAJOR GENERAL SIR HASTINGS L. IYAM, OFFICE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE;

THE STATEMENTS IN THE ATTACHED MINUTES HAVE NOT BEEN CHECKED BY ALL THOSE TO WHOM THEY ARE ATTRIBUTED. CONSEQUENTLY THEY SHOULD BE REGARDED MERELY AS GIVING A GENERAL INDICATION OF THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION.
General Marshall, on the invitation of the Prime Minister, opened the discussion. He said that the American Chiefs of Staff had now had three meetings with the British Chiefs of Staff and a point had been reached where it was necessary for them to report to the President. They had thought it right, before doing so, to have a discussion with the Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that he had had the advantage of seeing the paper which the American Chiefs of Staff had laid before the British Chiefs of Staff at their meeting this morning. He entirely agreed with the spirit of this paper, and he fully shared the ardent desire of the President and the American Chiefs of Staff to engage the enemy in the greatest possible strength at the earliest possible moment. It was very easy to assemble powerful arguments against any scheme of hazard and daring, and he himself disliked a negative attitude intensely. Nevertheless, he could not help feeling, having regard to the strength which we could dispose on the Continent this year, that we should not be justified in attempting Operation Sledgehammer. It was very doubtful whether it would succeed in drawing off any substantial German forces from Russia since the Germans probably had sufficient strength, both on the ground and in the air, particularly the latter, to deal with such things that we could do on the Continent. They had the knack of calculating these things to a nicety. Consequently, the argument that we should never have a better chance of getting a footing than we had at the present time was not conclusive.

Continuing, he said that there were a number of ugly possibilities looming in front of us. For example, there might be a collapse in Russia, or the Germans might move into the Caucasus; or they might succeed in beating General Auchinleck and occupying the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal; or again, they might establish themselves in North Africa and South Africa and thereby put an almost prohibitive strain on our shipping. But disagreement between America and Great Britain would have very grave consequences than any of the above possibilities. At present there was merely a difference of opinion - or rather there had been a failure to reach agreement on the question of an operation in 1942 of the character hitherto known as Sledgehammer. He thought that the time had now come when the report of this failure to reach agreement should be made to the President and to the War Cabinet.

General Marshall agreed. He thought that at this stage the report should relate only to Sledgehammer. Mr. Hopkins suggested that the Staffs should not address themselves to the consideration of any other alternatives until the American Chiefs of Staff had received directions from the President. Mr. Roosevelt had been emphatic that the question of Sledgehammer should be settled quite apart from anything else. He would be unhappy to hear that agreement had not been reached. It was imperative that no breath of this disagreement should get abroad; neither America alone, nor Great Britain alone, could win this war. It had to be a joint effort.

General Marshall then referred to the continuing pressure to subtract from Bolero, the necessity for air reinforcements in the Pacific-Alaska area and the Southwest area, the temporary movement to the West Coast of Bolero air units, the reinforcement of the Middle East, the limited proposals for other operations, Ghurka, the Persian Gulf region, etc. He felt that we should do our utmost to concentrate on Roundup.
ADMIRAL KING expressed the fear that the same arguments which had been advanced by the British Chiefs of Staff against SLEDGEHAMMER would apply equally to ROUNDUP, and that the latter would never take place. If, therefore, it were decided to carry on with preparations for ROUNDUP and to defer the decision as to whether it ought or ought not to be launched until October, the only result would be a waste of three months.

THE PRIME MINISTER hoped that Admiral King’s fears were groundless. He himself was an ardent believer in ROUNDUP; in fact, one of his reasons for disliking SLEDGEHAMMER was that it would eat up the seed corn of the larger operation. The essential prerequisites of a successful ROUNDUP were, first that the Operation should be on a sufficiently big scale, and secondly that there should be a certain degree of German demoralisation. It could not be said that we had engaged our honour to the Russians to do SLEDGEHAMMER this year since he had been at pains to hand to M. Molotov an aide memoire in which it was emphasised that we would do our best, but that we made no promise to act. The relevant extract read as follows:

"...we are making preparations for a landing on the Continent in August or September 1942. As already explained, the main limiting factor was the size of the landing force and the availability of special landing craft. Clearly, however, it would not further either the Russian cause or that of the Allies as a whole if, for the sake of action at any price, we embarked on some operation which ended in disaster and gave the enemy an opportunity for glorification at our discomfort. It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such as to make this operation feasible when the time comes. We can therefore give no promise in this matter, but, provided that it appears sound and sensible, we shall not hesitate to put our plans into effect."

GENERAL MARSHALL expressed the hope that whatever decision was taken about SLEDGEHAMMER, there would be no outward and visible sign that we had abated our efforts. He thought it of grave importance that there be no indication of a difference of view between us. He stated that it had been accepted that SLEDGEHAMMER was a most difficult operation filled with hazards and not at all the operation that one would deliberately choose, if choice had been possible; that he personally had come to the conclusion that for various reasons it could not be launched before October, which increased the hazards as to weather and as to appearance of GERMAN air forces from the RUSSIAN front. However, there was no choice in the matter. Time was tragically against us. Without SLEDGEHAMMER we were faced with a defensive attitude in the EUROPEAN THEATER. Continuing, he said that he regarded the conception of ROUNDUP as of the highest importance, since it seemed the only way of gaining an early decision. The only alternative was to wait for GERMANY to starve and disintegrate. GENERAL MARSHALL then referred to the continued pressures to subtract from BOLERO, the necessity for air reinforcements in the PACIFIC-ALASKA AREA and the SOUTHWEST AREA, the temporary movement to the WEST COAST of BOLERO air units, the reinforcement of the MIDDLE EAST, the continued proposals for other operations, GYMNASI, the PERSIAN GULF REGION, etc. He felt that we should do our utmost to concentrate on ROUNDUP.
After some further discussion, THE PRIME MINISTER said that he would -

(a) report to the War Cabinet at 5:30 p.m. that the outcome of the discussions which had taken place between the American and British Chiefs of Staff was that the latter had failed to reach agreement with the former on the question of launching in 1942 an operation of the character hitherto known as SLEDGEHAMMER; and

(b) arrange for the American Chiefs of Staff to be informed by 7 p.m. of the reactions of the War Cabinet, in order that they might report to the President.

Compared Chiefs of Staff

Great George Street, S.W.1.

Tel: 25TH JULY, 1942.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff outlining their proposals with respect to operations during 1943.

GENERAL MARSHALL in response to a question by Air Alan Brooke outlined the position of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. They believe very strongly that an unavoidable reduction in preparations for ROUNDUP should be considered so long as there remains any possibility of its successful execution prior to 1st July, 1943. After that date the odds are definitely against ROUNDUP for the
U.S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 32nd Meeting

JULY, 24th 1942.

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held in Conference Room B, War Cabinet Offices, Great George St.
London on FRIDAY, 24th JULY, 1942 at 12 noon

PRESENT

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and
Chief of Naval Staff

General Sir Alan F. Brooke,
Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the
Air Staff

General G.C. Marshall
Chief of Staff

U.S. Army

Admiral E.J. King,
Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Fleet

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined
Operations.

Major General Sir H. Ismay

SECRETARIAT

Brig. General W.B. Smith
Brigadier V. Dykes.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF considered a memorandum by the
U.S. Chiefs of Staff outlining their proposals with respect to
operations during 1943.

GENERAL MARSHALL in response to a question by Sir Alan
Brooke outlined the position of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. They
believe very strongly that no unavoidable reduction in preparations
for ROUNDFUP should be considered so long as there remains any
possibility of its successful execution prior to 1st July, 1943.
After that date the odds are definitely against ROUNDFUP for the

Regarded Unclassified
remainder of the year, unless the German army shows unmistakable signs of rapid deterioration. If ROUNDUP becomes impracticable of successful execution, GYMNAST as a combined operation seems the best alternative. However, they consider that a commitment to GYMNAST implies the definite acceptance of a defensive encircling line of action for the Continental European theatre, except as to air and blockade operations against Germany.

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF then examined the memorandum paragraph by paragraph.

GENERAL MARSHALL emphasised the importance of carrying on all preparations for SLEDGEHAMMER as a measure of deception and in case some unexpected opportunity for it arose. The fact that it had been decided not to carry out the operation should be known to as small a number of people as possible, and subordinate staffs should continue with their planning and preparations. All training should proceed without interruption. The forces for SLEDGEHAMMER should be earmarked and this would present no difficulty so far as the U.S. ground forces in the United Kingdom were concerned, though it might not be so easy in the case of the British air and naval forces. He emphasised the importance of appointing a Task Force Commander and of breaking away from the present system of planning by committees. The Commander designated for SLEDGEHAMMER should, he thought, be one of the subordinate commanders in the ROUNDUP forces.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that it might be better for the SLEDGEHAMMER commander to be the same as the Supreme Commander for ROUNDUP. This officer would then carry through all the training, preparation and planning for the whole operation, inclusive of SLEDGEHAMMER.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN stressed the importance of the SLEDGEHAMMER commander and staff being an integral part of the ROUNDUP force organization. It would be undesirable to change over from one staff, which had been planning SLEDGEHAMMER, to a completely new staff for the larger operation of ROUNDUP.

GENERAL MARSHALL thought that it would be necessary to keep preparations for SLEDGEHAMMER up to the mark until probably 1st October at least.

ADMIRAL KING agreed and pointed out that circumstances might possibly arise in which SLEDGEHAMMER would develop into a full scale invasion.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBATTEN said that he would always have about 25,000 men in his organisation standing by for minor operations on the Continent. These would form a nucleus on which SLEDGEHAMMER could be built up fairly quickly. It must be realised, however, that it was impossible to have SLEDGEHAMMER at full scale, as well as GYMNAST mounted at the same time. Even starting with a nucleus, SLEDGEHAMMER would take at least two months to prepare. It took a long time to move round all the small craft from the North West Coast to the South Coast, and two months' notice would be the minimum. As regards deception, it would be very difficult for the Germans to know whether the 25,000 men held ready for raids were not part of a larger force for a more ambitious operation.
SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that it would be important to appoint a commander for the whole of the African operation right at the outset.

ADmiral King and General Marshall agreed that this was essential, to pull the whole of the planning together and supply the necessary drive. His staff could be built up gradually as planning developed. Before 15th September, when the final decision had to be taken, he would not require a very large staff.

General Marshall explained with regard to the proposal to send a U.S. reinforced armoured division to the Middle East, that although he disliked the idea of the command and supply complications which would ensue from mixing British and American units in the Middle East, it seemed more practicable, in view of our present shortage of shipping to send an American armoured division directly to the Middle East rather than to transport this division to Great Britain and then move a British armoured division from Britain to the Middle East. It should be possible to arrange to have the transports to join a W.S. convoy at Freetown.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that he was anxious not to reduce in any way the shipments to the Middle East, where needs were great. The shipping and escort implications of this proposed move would have to be examined but the proposal was acceptable in principle.

General Marshall said that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff felt the success of Gymnast as an effective operation depended to a large extent on the German army being still preoccupied on the Russian Front. Even if Russia continued to resist effectively, the slowing down of active operations during the winter would permit the Germans to withdraw certain units from the East, and, consequently, it was necessary that the operation in North Africa should be initiated before 1st December.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL questioned whether Gymnast could be correctly described as a purely defensive line of action. It would, in fact, open up a second front and might commit Germany to the occupation of Italy and Spain. It was even conceivable that she might be so weakened by this that Roundup might be undertaken in 1943.

General Marshall emphasised that once large forces had been put into North Africa Roundup, as originally conceived, was no longer practicable at all. The only offensive operation possible on the Continent would be a form of Sledgehammer using the troops which were in the United Kingdom for the defence of that country.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff were fully determined to go ahead with preparations for an invasion of the Continent on a large scale. The troops in the unted Kingdom must have their minds continually directed towards that object.

Admiral King pointed out that the Heads of the U.S. and British Governments must be under no delusions. Once Gymnast was undertaken with all the commitments that it might involve, there was no possibility of carrying out Roundup in its original form. An entirely new operation would have to be prepared. He agreed, however, that the organisation for training and planning must be maintained.
SIR DUDLEY POUND pointed out that if we undertook GYMNAST it was possible that even if very favourable conditions were suddenly presented on the Continent for an invasion, we might not have sufficient resources available to take proper advantage of it.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the greatest shortage was in vessels modified for combat loading. Most of those available to the United States are engaged in operations in the Pacific from which they cannot for some time be withdrawn. By September, there will be 9 and possibly 12 combat loading ships available on the Atlantic Coast.

LORD LOUIS MOUNTBatten said that only three such vessels were now available in Great Britain, but that the four employed in the Madagascar operation might be brought back in time for GYMNAST. However, the number available would hardly be sufficient to transport the British contribution in troops for this operation.

ADMIRAL KING emphasised the fact that there is no prospect of withdrawing any considerable U.S. Naval forces from the Pacific without weakening our position in that area below a point of reasonable security. Three to four cruisers, however, could be made available. The principal difficulty is in providing aircraft carriers in which the United States Pacific forces were now relatively weak.

SIR DUDLEY POUND said that the British Navy would put into the pool for this combined operation everything that could be made available in the way of covering forces, carriers and so forth.

GENERAL MARSHALL in reply to a question by SIR ALAN BROOKE agreed that the first wave of the initial landing forces at each point of attack should be U.S. troops and the United States was prepared to furnish a sufficient number of combat teams for this purpose. It had been their conception, however, that the landings in the Mediterranean should be predominantly British, while that on the North West Coast should be predominantly American.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL remarked that the Royal Air Force might be able to assist in the Casablanca operation, working from Gibraltar where the presence of British aircraft would raise less suspicion of impending operations in the neighbourhood. He asked if the U.S. Air Forces required for the North African operation must also be withdrawn from those allocated to BOLERO.

GENERAL MARSHALL replied that this was the case. The U.S. conception of the air offensive against Germany was that U.S. Air Forces would operate from any suitable base whether in Great Britain or in North Africa. Because of more favourable weather conditions during the winter, operations from North African bases would probably be more effective.

Referring to the shipping required to move one division from the United States West Coast to the South West Pacific, GENERAL MARSHALL said that this would be an encroachment upon the BOLERO shipping, but it was not yet definitely established that it would be necessary to make this commitment.

THE COMMITTEE: -

Directed the Secretaries to prepare a revised draft of the Paper, amended in the light of the discussion which had taken place.
(The Meeting recessed at 1.30 p.m. and reassembled at 3 p.m.)

On reassembling, THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF examined the revised draft prepared by the Secretaries and agreed to certain amendments.

**THEY AGREED:**-

(i) That the revised draft, as amended,* should be submitted by the British Chiefs of Staff to the Prime Minister.

(ii) That the question of Command and the general arrangements for planning should be discussed at a Meeting to be held at 10.30 a.m. on Saturday, 25th July.

(iii) That the British Joint Staff Planners, should produce as a matter of urgency a first Outline Plan as a basis for further combined planning.

Great George Street, S.W.1.

July 24th 1942.

* Circulated as C.C.S. 94.
C.C.S. 33rd Meeting.

SECRET

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF.

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held in Conference Room B, War Cabinet Offices, London on SATURDAY, 25th JULY, 1942 at 10.30 a.m.

PRESENT.

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.

General G.C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

General Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

Admiral E.J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT.

Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations.

Commander R.E. Libby, USN

Major General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Office of the Minister of Defence.

SECRETARIAT.

Brigadier V. Dykes.

Brig. General W.B. Smith.

Brigadier L.C. Hollis.
THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF had under consideration the arrangements for command and planning which would be required on the assumption that their proposals for operations in 1942/43, contained in C.C.S. 94, were approved by the two Governments.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that in view of the necessity for the African expedition being American, at least in appearance, the Prime Minister had agreed to propose to the President that the Supreme Commander should be an American.

GENERAL MARSHALL agreed that this would be desirable and said that the U.S. would be prepared to furnish a Supreme Commander. He had been considering which U.S. troops would be allocated to the operation. The 1st Division now in process of moving to Great Britain could be made available for the operation against the North Coast, to furnish the spearhead of the operation under British command. General Clark, who is the Corps Commander here and one of the best American officers, might be used with his Corps Staff if ROUNDUP was abandoned.

SIR ALAN BROOKE discussed the organisation for planning of the operation, which had been given the code name of TORCH. He believed that planning should be centralised in London. The American Commander would be here and planning would proceed under his direction. He would of course have occasion to visit Washington from time to time.

ADmiral King pointed out that the two operations on the West Coast and the North Coast would have to be closely co-ordinated in time, though widely spaced in distance. Each would be under a task force commander and the co-ordination must be done by the Supreme Commander.

GENERAL MARSHALL observed that a very important part of the Supreme Commander's duties would be the allocation of resources. The detailed planning for the assault on the West Coast would be carried out in Washington, and that for the North Coast would be done in London. He stressed the importance of avoiding competition between ROUNDUP and TORCH for means and resources.

SIR ALAN BROOKE suggested that this could well be avoided by having initially one commander responsible for both Operations. If ROUNDUP was abandoned and TORCH mounted, the Supreme Commander, who would be in London, might then carry out the TORCH Operation. Planning for SLEDGERHAMMER-ROUNDUP would be carried on by another commander who, initially, might be the task force commander of SLEDGERHAMMER.

After some discussion it was agreed that the command set-up for TORCH and ROUNDUP should be as shown in the diagram appended as an Annex to these Minutes.
GENERAL MARSHALL observed that the Supreme Commander of ROUNDPUP would not have operational command of ground forces in the United Kingdom which would be required for Home defence, neither would he exercise direct command or control over major units of the R.A.F. His function would be planning and training. The forces would only come under his operational command when the operation was mounted. Bolo movement would continue uninterrupted as long as possible until the requirements of TORCH interfered with them.

The preparation of the outline plan for TORCH was then discussed.

ADAMIRAL KING suggested that the Supreme Commander should present the plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Combined Staff Planners could, in the meantime, be working at it and must pay considerable attention in the early stages to solving the difficult problems of command and planning organisation. He suggested that a detachment from the U.S. Planners should come over from Washington to London to work with the British Planners. This combined group in London could be placed under the direct control of the Supreme Commander to form the nucleus of his staff. Because time is of the essence, it is essential that planning procedure be simplified as much as possible and that it be carried out on a staff basis rather than on a committee basis.

After some further discussion on the command and staff set-up of the Supreme Commander, THE COMMITTEE agreed:-

(a) that the code name for the operation in North and North West Africa should be TORCH;

(b) that the command arrangements for TORCH, ROUNDPUP and SLEDGEHAMMER should be as shown in the diagram annexed to these Minutes;

(c) that a detachment of the U.S. Joint Planners should proceed to London as early as possible to combine with the British Joint Planners and carry forward the production of an outline plan for TORCH. This Combined Planning team to be placed under the control of the Supreme Commander as soon as he is available in London;

(d) that the Supreme Commander should present his outline plan to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for their approval as early as possible;
(e) that the direction of political and S.O.E. activities in North Africa should be covered by a British Section working under the Supreme Commander;

(f) that a British Deputy Supreme Commander be appointed for TORCH, details of the Staff being a matter primarily for the Supreme Commander.

Great George Street, S.W.1.

25th July, 1942.
ANNEX

COMMAND OF TORCH AND ROUNDDUP

Initially.

Supreme Commander. (U.S.)

TORCH

ROUNDUP

SLEDGEHAMMER
Task Force Commander (British)

Western Landing Task Force Commander (U.S.).

Northern Landing Task Force Commander (British).

After decision to mount TORCH.

Supreme Commander. (U.S.)

TORCH

ROUNDUP

SLEDGEHAMMER
Task Force Commander (British)

(to act as Deputy Commander of ROUNDDUP until the appointment of the Supreme Commander).

Western Task Force Commander (U.S.).

Northern Task Force Commander (British).

* To be the same officer.
RECALLED BY THE PRESIDENT 11-22-42

MEMO FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HOPKINS, MARSHALL AND KING 7-16-42

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE - JULY 1942.
July 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILLIAM B. LEAHY:

Attached hereto is a radiogram received from General Marshall and Admiral King last night.

[Signature]

JOHN R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff;
Secretary, General Staff.

Incl.
URGENT

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 62/5 July 24th, 1942

This most secret message is to be delivered to The President at the White House, copies to War and Navy Departments. Beginning of message. We met twice today Friday with British Chiefs of Staff who after some discussion as to details have agreed to recommend approval to The Prime Minister of our proposals which follow.

"It having been decided that Sledge Hammer is not to be undertaken as a scheduled operation, we propose the following general plans for nineteen forty two and nineteen forty three:

First, that no avoidable reduction in preparations for round up should be favorably considered so long as there remains any reasonable possibility of its successful execution before July nineteen forty three; that Allied Air strength continue to be built up in UK to provide for a constantly increasing intensity of air attack on Germany; that for purposes of deception and to be ready for any emergency or a favorable opportunity, all preparations for Sledge Hammer continue to be pressed except as to concentration of landing craft or other details that seriously interfere with training for round up, and that a Task Force Commander be appointed with authority to organize the Force, direct the training and maintain a contingent plan for execution; this Command should be either the officer designated for supreme command of the final invasion of Northwest Europe or one of his Subordinate Commanders acting as his deputy; the troops and supporting units, so far as possible, to be immediately placed under his control.

Second, that, if the British Chiefs of Staff propose to ship an Armored Division to the Middle East, a US Reinforced Armored Division (about nineteen thousand men) be substituted therefor, moving in British
Third, that, if the situation on the Russian Front September fifteenth indicates such a collapse or weakening of Russian resistance as to make round up appearance impracticable of successful execution, the decision should be taken to launch a combined operation against the North and Northwest Coast of Africa at the earliest possible date before December nineteen forty two; that the combined plans for this operation should immediately be developed and that the latest date be determined after which the necessary shipping, Naval Forces and Troop Units can be assembled in time to permit the initial landing operations before the limiting date, the first of December nineteen forty two; that the US Commitment for the African operation will require British assistance in aircraft carriers, covering Forces and Escort Vessels (Land and Air Forces for North Africa would be predominantly British and Land and Air Forces for Northwest Africa would be predominantly American); that a Task Force Commander for the entire African Operation should be appointed forthwith; that it be understood that a commitment to this operation renders round up in all probability impracticable of successful execution in nineteen forty three and therefore that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for the Continental European Theater, except as to Air Operations and Blockade; but that the organization, planning and training, for eventual entry in the Continent should continue so that this operation can be staged should a marked deterioration in German Military strength become apparent, and the resources of the United Nations, available after meeting other commitments, so permit.

Fourth, that it be understood that heavy and medium bomber units in the United Kingdom are available for transfer to the African Theater as required.

Fifth, that over and above the US Forces required from Bolero for operations in North and Northwest Africa, the following readjustment of present US Commitments to Bolero will be made for the purpose of furthering offensive operations in the Pacific.
Fifth (continued)

A. Withdrawal of the following Air Forces: three groups heavy bombers, two groups medium bombers, two groups light bombers, two groups fighter planes, two groups observation planes, and four groups transport planes.

B. Probably shipping to move one Infantry or Marine Division from US West Coast to Southwest Pacific.

Sixth, that the security of the British Isles is a first charge upon the Military Resources of both the UK and the US.

We are now informed that The Prime Minister and War Cabinet approve the quoted proposals and we recommend them for your approval.

If all goes well we expect to leave for home on Sunday morning via Iceland where we plan to stop a few hours and would expect to reach Washington some time Monday.

Marshall and King

Distribution:

Copy No. 1 - The President
Copy No. 2 - General McNaurney
Copy No. 3 - Navy

CM-IN-8536 (7-24-42) 2334Z
URGENT

From: London
To: AGWAR

No. 625 July 24th, 1942

This most secret message is to be delivered to The President at the White House, copies to War and Navy Departments. Beginning of message. We met twice today Friday with British Chiefs of Staff who after some discussion as to details have agreed to recommend approval to The Prime Minister of our proposals which follow.

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Second, that, if the British Chiefs of Staff propose to ship an Armored Division to the Middle East, a US Reinforced Armored Division (about nineteen thousand men) be substituted therefor, moving in British
Third, that, if the situation on the Russian Front September fifteenth indicates such a collapse or weakening of Russian resistance as to make round up appear impracticable of successful execution, the decision should be taken to launch a combined operation against the North and Northwest Coast of Africa at the earliest possible date before December nineteen forty two; that the combined plans for this operation should immediately be developed and that the latest date be determined after which the necessary shipping, Naval Forces and Troop Units can be assembled in time to permit the initial landing operations before the limiting date, the first of December nineteen forty two; that the US Commitment for the African operation will require British assistance in aircraft carriers, covering Forces and Escort Vessels (Land and Air Forces for North Africa would be predominantly British and Land and Air Forces for Northwest Africa would be predominantly American); that a Task Force Commander for the entire African Operation should be appointed forthwith; that it be understood that a commitment to this operation renders roundup in all probability impracticable of successful execution in nineteen forty three and therefore that we have definitely accepted a defensive, encircling line of action for the Continental European Theater, except as to Air Operations and Blockade; but that the organization, planning and training, for eventual entry in the Continent should continue so that this operation can be staged should a marked deterioration in German Military strength become apparent, and the resources of the United Nations, available after meeting other commitments, so permit.

Fourth, that it be understood that heavy and medium bomber units in the United Kingdom are available for transfer to the African Theater as required.

Fifth, that over and above the US Forces required from Bolero for operations in North and Northwest Africa, the following realignment of present US Commitments to Bolero will be made for the purpose of furthering offensive operations in the Pacific.
Fifth (continued)

A. Withdrawal of the following Air Forces:
three groups heavy bombers, two groups medium bombers,
two groups light bombers, two groups fighter planes,
two groups observation planes, and four groups transport planes.

B. Probably shipping to move one Infantry
or Marine Division from US West Coast to Southwest
Pacific.

Sixth, that the security of the British Isles
is a first charge upon the Military Resources of
both the UK and the US”.

We are now informed that The Prime Minister and
War Cabinet approve the quoted proposals and we recommend
them for your approval.

If all goes well we expect to leave for home on
Sunday morning via Iceland where we plan to stop a few
hours and would expect to reach Washington some time
Monday.

Marshall and King

Distribution:

Copy No. 1 - The President
Copy No. 2 - General McNarney
Copy No. 3 - Navy

CM-IN-8566 (7-24-42) 2334Z
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated July 23, 1942
Rec'd 8:20 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

4083, July 23, 1 p.m.
FROM HOPKINS
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY (REPEAT FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY).

MOST SECRET.

I want you to know that Marshall and King pushed very hard for sledgehammer and while there is a natural disappointment on our part, nevertheless, good will prevails. Now that the decision has been made we are hard at work on the next steps. Your message has been received but it is important that you press your ideas today by cable. I believe our people will finally turn to an expanded gymnast, first because it is difficult to mix our troops in Egypt; and secondly, because we may not fight if we go to Syria. The logistics particularly escort vessels bother us but I am hoping that will work out today. I believe we can give King some air and landing craft in Pacific. I hope you will consider putting
2-4083, July 23, 1 p.m. from London

putting some of our air squadrons in Russia. I will press for early decisions. Signed Harry.

WINANT

AILC
From: LONDON
To: AGWAR.

XXXA URGENT JULY TWENTY THIRD UNNUMBERED.
FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MARSHALL, HOPKINS AND KING FD
THIS MESSAGE IS TO BE READ BY THE CODE CLERK ONLY.
WE HAVE NOT YET RESUMED DISCUSSIONS WITH
BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF BUT HAVE REACHED FOLLOWING
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS:
THAT IF "ROUNDUP IS TO BE BUILT UP AS PLANNED
FOR NEXT SPRING, NO DIVERSIONS FROM PRESENT
COMMITMENTS TO ROUNDUP ARE POSSIBLE OTHER THAN A
REINFORCED DIVISION TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND A
SMALL AIR REINFORCEMENT TO THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
THAT IF A NEW MAJOR COMMITMENT IS UNDERTAKEN,
SUCH AS ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND TROOPS TO THE MIDDLE
EAST OR GYMNAST, THEN ROUNDUP IS DEFINITELY
IMPRAXICABLE SINCE THE INEVITABLE DELAY WOULD
CARRY IT SO LATE INTO NINETEEN FORTY THREE AS
TO MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE THAT RUSSIANS WOULD STILL
BE HOLDING APPRECIABLE NUMBERS OF GERMANS.
THAT IF GYMNAST IS TO BE EXECUTED, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE LAUNCHED THIS FALL BEFORE GERMAN AIR STRENGTH WOULD BE AVAILABLE FROM RUSSIAN FRONT, AND THAT THE DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE NOW IN ORDER TO ASSEMBLE COMBAT LOADED TRANSPORTS ETCETERA. THIS OPERATION ASSUMES BRITISH COOPERATION ON NORTH AFRICAN COAST WITH AMERICAN UNITS FOR INITIAL LANDINGS. IT COULD BE CARRIED OUT AND AT THE SAME TIME SOME AIR AND A SMALL TROOP REINFORCEMENT BE MADE IN SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. WE ARE GIVING YOU THESE VIEWS NOW TO ENABLE YOU TO THINK THEM OVER WHILE WE ARE ENTERING INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH BRITISH AS TO THEIR VIEWS AND AS TO DETAILS SUCH AS BRITISH CARRIERS FOR US IN GYMNAST, COMBAT LOADED TRANSPORTS, ETCETERA.

NO SIGNATURE.
From LONDON

To AGWAR

Copies furnished as noted: XXXA URGENT JULY TWENTY SECOND UNNUMBERED

FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM MARSHALL AND KING PD THIS MESSAGE IS TO BE READ BY THE CODE CLERK ONLY...

PRIME MINISTER AND WAR CABINET HAVE CONFIRMED THE VIEWS OF BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF THAT ANY OPERATION OF THE CHARACTER OF SLEDGEHAMMER IS IMPRACTICABLE AND UNWISE.

SINCE MERE ACQUIESCENCE ON PART OF BRITISH WOULD NOT AFFORD THE DRIVING SUPPORT OF WHOLEHEARTED CONVICTON NECESSARY TO SUCCESS OF SUCH A DIFFICULT OPERATION WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY TO RECOMMEND THAT NO FORM OF SLEDGEHAMMER BE FURTHER CONTEMPLATED.

WE AWAIT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS AND WILL MEANWHILE BEGIN EXPLORATION WITH AMERICAN STAFF ONLY OF MATTERS DEALT WITH IN PARA SEVEN TO TEN OF YOUR DIRECTIVE OF JULY SIXTEENTH.

NO SIG
From London

To Agwar

Copies furnished as noted:
Unnumbered, July 22, 1942.

For the President this to be read by the code clerk only from Marshall and King.

In accordance with your directive of July 16th, we wish to report that the first two and one half days following our arrival were occupied in a searching investigation with the American Staff of the situation with respect to preparations for Sledgehammer and the practicability of this operation, which confirmed the British opinion that the operation could not be carried out on the Pas-de-Calais or Harve front. On Monday at twelve thirty we were received by the Prime Minister in the presence of the British Chiefs of Staff and heard a resume of his views on the various theaters of war, and particularly on Sledgehammer. At three PM the same day we met for the first time with the British Chiefs of Staff and presented to them a memorandum outlining our general views which culminated in our urging the necessity for the execution of a Sledgehammer operation. They were unanimous in stating that they considered it inadvisable from the following points of view:

Action Copy

Regraded Unclassified
Page #2 of Unnumbered message, July 22, 1942

That it must of necessity be on such a small scale that it would not influence the Russian situation.

That it would be subjected to such heavy attack by the German land and air power now in France that it could not survive the winter.

Following a long discussion we adjourned to meet the following morning, in the meantime resurveying the matter with the American staff. During the second meeting we found the British Chiefs of Staff firmly fixed in the same opinion expressed on the previous day, and the discussion which followed was without profit so far as Sledgehammer was concerned.

Following this meeting, and after further study with the American staff, we prepared a specific proposal urging the occupation of the Cherbourg Peninsula and later the channel islands. The movement of troops to UK, the assembly of troops and boats and at least some training in the teamwork required for the particular operation convinced us that it would be impracticable to set a date earlier than October, and we accepted the risk involved in such delay because of the advantages gained in thoroughness of
The above proposal was submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday morning and pressed vigorously by us. After a prolonged discussion it was clearly apparent that they were opposed as a group to the proposed operation and were individually emphatically of the opinion that no good and probably great harm would result. While it was admitted that an initial success was probable they felt that the distance involved and the unfavorable weather conditions usually prevailing during the months would seriously reduce the effectiveness of air support; that the small force of six divisions available for the initial operation would be penned up in the peninsula; that the port of Cherbourg would be bombed into ineffectiveness and the troops themselves either overrun or forced to withdraw through lack of supplies.

We had urged throughout the conference that in all probability there would not be another occasion where owing to preoccupation if Russia, German resistance in northern France would be so limited as at the present time and that if we gained a foothold on the continent,
including a port, the development of round up in 1943 would be greatly facilitated. We represented also that once we were on the continent, further operations during the winter to expand our foothold would possibly be practicable as additional troops and equipment arrived in England.

Following these fruitless discussions we arranged to meet the Prime Minister Wednesday at 3 pm. He stated that while he had every good will in the world to meet the American viewpoint, his views coincided with those of the British chiefs of staff in opposition to the Sledgehammer Operation. He is taking the matter to the War Cabinet this afternoon and will communicate their decision at 7 pm. Meanwhile he stated that in all probability the Cabinet will confirm his views and those of the British chiefs of staff.

We will notify you at once of the exact decision of the Cabinet, but this is transmitted for your immediate information.

No Sig
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PLOG - MARSHALL
BARRETT - KING
KEUREN - EISENHOVER
DEFEW - 
ROBERT - GENERAL CLARK
DRAISS - STARK
MOSES SMITH - CHURCHILL
MRS. JOHANSEN - CRIPPS
REV. WILSON - PORTAL
MR. REE - BROOKES

London Council of War
July 1942

Dispatches Sent
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

3363, July 21, 10 p.m.

According French Embassy sources ranking French financial official recently Bern stated plans prepared construction air field and coast defenses Morocco on scale comparable those already constructed France. Insisted Allied operations French North Africa to forestall strong German defensive positions organized with Vichy assistance should not be long delayed and should in any case take priority this year over debarkation continental France. Estimated powerfully equipped Allied force of 100,000 to 150,000 sufficient now but not later to seize whole French North Africa. Also believed essential operation preceded by airborne force occupy French air fields particularly those Tunis. Estimated about French units Morocco would quickly join anti-Vichy forces considerably larger percentage Algeria perhaps less Tunis.
2- #3363, July 21, 10 p.m., from Bern

less Tunis. General Nogues emphatically not to be counted on although in event rapid successful operations could be expected join anti-Vichy forces.

HARRISON

RR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated July 20, 1942
Rec'd 11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.
4000, July 20, 4 p.m.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY FROM HARRY HOPKINS.

Following is summary of situation here until mid-afternoon today: Trip over good. Weather bad in London and Prime Minister made train available. Saturday given over entirely to conferences our own group. Keuran, Dibert and Robert anxious to go ahead with sledgehammer. Draiss lukewarm. Plog had his men working all night on details. I spent Sunday and last night with Moses Smith. He pretty restless and quite unhappy at not seeing us. This, however, cleared up before the weekend and he is in best of spirits this morning.

Churchill

Plog, Barrett and I had long conference this morning and are going to push for sledgehammer. First formal conference this morning when whole field thoroughly outlined but no discussion of the merits of various enterprises. We all remained for lunch and Plog and Barrett now holding
-2- 4009, July 20, 4 p.m. from London

now holding conference with Mr. Bee, Reverend

Wilson and others. I will meet with them at six
this afternoon. Am dining with Moses Smith tonight.

Would say in general that things are progressing well.

Moses Smith threw the British Constitution at me
yesterday with some vehemence but it did no serious
damage. As you know it is an unwritten document.

Moses is his old self and full of battle. Signed

Harry.

WINANT

ALC