

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*Admiral Brown
to file
W.B.*

11 June, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Eisenhower, with reference to German morale in Tunisia:

"Our estimate of German morale in Tunisia is as follows:

"A. Generally German morale is not so high as in opening phases of the war though there is no sign of a collapse in morale.

"B. In Tunisia there were two categories of troops:

1. Elite troops such as the 10th Panzer and Herman Goering Divisions with uniformly high morale, offensively minded, well trained and who continued to fight well until the last stages.

2. Other units such as some Marsch battalions, 334th and 999th Divisions, who did not have such a high standard of either morale or training. These troops were more defensively minded and the soldiers were of lower fighting value. For instance the 999th Division contained many low grade troops some of whom were not convinced of final victory. Marsch battalions were of mixed types, including proportions of other nationalities. It is, however, extremely difficult to generalize on such subjects, as units from which there were many deserters fought excellent defensive battles when attacked. Therefore, although morale of individuals was on many occasions bad, yet unit or formation morale was often good.

"C. So far, percentage of 1924/25 age groups has proved to be low in Tunisia. Therefore any true comparison between these classes and older men is impossible but morale of young soldiers was usually high. A few of the older soldiers showed certain war weariness. To the average soldier, fighting in Tunisia was however infinitely preferable to the Russian front.



SECRET

DIRECTOR OF THE JAMES EARL RAY
AND COMPANY


"D. Morale of German Air Force units, such as Barenthin and Jaeger and antiaircraft units, particularly 88MM gun crews, was high and little to choose between these and elite troops.

"E. The Italians were constantly a source of irritation to the Germans and failures were frequently considered due to the former.

"F. German troops were extremely badly informed and a great number were under the impression that Tunisia could be held indefinitely.

"G. Reports are perhaps too inclined to attribute cessation of fighting in Tunisia to a sudden collapse in German morale. Once the last defensive line protecting Tunis and Bizerte had been pierced, German formations in the line realized what higher staffs and probably some soldiers had known for some time, that further resistance was hopeless. They were anxious, however, to do their duty as soldiers and carry on resistance to the last. The elite units did their duty in this respect. Some of the other units merely put up a token of resistance, their chief concern being that the world at large should think that they had done what the Fatherland expected of them.

"When the fighting was finished there was general relief amongst all concerned but this could not be termed a collapse in morale. Discipline remained good and officers and non-commissioned officers had full control of their men. Future operations are likely to find the German soldier capable of hard fighting and with a will to win, but if the hopelessness of the situation should begin to dawn on him, events may follow the same course as in Tunisia. Lower standard of training among divisions formed since 1941 may have an influence on the war of maneuver. Fighting value may therefore not be so high, particularly when deep penetrations are made in their main defensive positions."



Chief of Staff

SECRET

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Inform to file

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1943.

File NS

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Eisenhower:

"Naturally I am extremely pleased with the important tactical gains we have made since Thursday morning. The 2nd Corps has been superb throughout the operation and a great amount of the credit must go directly to Bradley. I recommend his promotion to the grade of lieutenant general. Recommendation for a suitable decoration is included in a list now being prepared and which Smith will bring to Washington.

"Yesterday I found the 2nd Corps in wonderful spirit. The 1st Division has suffered a great deal of attrition, particularly in infantry combat elements, since it went into action on March 17th. The 3rd Division is now relieving it in line and should get good experience in cleaning up the considerable amount of German force still north of Tunis. Now that we have the enemy at a disadvantage, I am driving everybody at top speed to complete the victory quickly as possible. I even have some hopes that we can prevent him from organizing the Bon Peninsula strongly enough to hold us off. I would far rather pay a considerable cost now in impulsive but decisive attacks than to let this thing drag on any longer.

"I had a long conference last night with General Handy. I assume that your mind has been at rest about my firmness in dealing with questions where the matter of American prestige and nationalism is involved.

"I have had a tremendously busy week. When this affair is all cleaned up, I am going to take a 24-hour leave where no one in the world will be able to reach me."

E. A. Tamm

Chief of Staff.



SECRET

Churchill folder 1-45

NWA
~~*SECRET*~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
Confidential*

May 8, 1943.

Memorandum for

Hon. Cordell Hull

I enclose copy of memorandum
I thought of taking up with the
Prime Minister.

F.D.R.

*For complete file on this
See A16/France*

11/11/43
MURKIN
THE WHITE HORSE

May 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
W.S.C.

I am sorry, but it seems to me the conduct of the BRIDE continues to be more and more aggravated. His course and attitude is well nigh intolerable.

The war in North Africa has terminated successfully without any material aid from De Gaulle and the civil situation with all its dangers seems to be working out well.

I think that MacMillan concurs in this.

However, De Gaulle is without question taking his vicious propaganda staff down to Algiers to stir up strife between the various elements, including the Arabs and Jews. He is expanding his present group of agitators who are working up counter demonstrations and even riots.

Unfortunately, too many people are catching on to the fact that these disturbances are being financed in whole or in part by British Government funds.

De Gaulle may be an honest fellow but he has the Messianic complex. Further he has the idea that the people of France itself are strongly behind him personally.

This I doubt. I think that the people of France are behind the Free French Movement; that they do not know De Gaulle and that their loyalty is to the fine objectives of the movement when it was started and to the larger phase of it which looks to the restoration of France. If they only knew what you and I know about De Gaulle himself, they would continue to be for the movement but not for its present leader in London.

That is why I become more and more disturbed by the continued machinations of De Gaulle.

In my judgment, there should be a reorganization of the French National Committee, removing some of the people we know to be impossible such as Philippe, and include in it some of the strong men like Monnet and others from Giraud's North African Administration, and possibly one or two others from Madagascar, etc.

Furthermore, I am inclined to think that when we get into France itself we will have to regard it as a military occupation run by British and American generals.

In such a case, they will be able to use 90% of the Mayors of Arrondissements, many of the subordinate officials of the cities and departments. But the top line, or national administration must be kept in the hands of the British or American Commander-in-Chief. I think that this may be necessary for six months or even a year after we get into France, thus giving time to build up for an election and a new form of government. The old form simply will not work.

I enclose extracts from some of the reports I recently have received from North Africa relating to De Gaulle.

dictatorial

"De Gaulle's/speech in London on May fourth, Catroux intimated, made it clear that Catroux's role as negotiator has been ended, because De Gaulle is conducting his own negotiations by public speeches.

"De Gaulle in messages to Catroux, and in an almost childish manner, kept saying that he would come to North Africa when he pleased and to whatever place he chose.

"De Gaulle charged Giraud of welching on his original invitation to come to the City of Algiers. Catroux agreed that Giraud had never invited him to come straight to Algiers. Citroux seemed wholly disgusted and felt that De Gaulle's speech was an open confession that he was seeking personal power.

"Momet thought the speech sounded like pages out of Mein Kampf.

"MacMillan felt that De Gaulle's speech dodged every question of principle involved.

"In De Gaulle's telegram to Catroux on May third, there were derogatory references to the United States, saying in effect that it was the power against which the French must join forces.

All in all, I think you and I should thrash out this disagreeable problem and establish a common policy.

I think we might talk over the formation of an entirely new French Committee subject in its membership to the approval of you and me.

- 3 -

I do not think it should act in any way as a provisional government, but could be called advisory in its functions.

Giraud should be made the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army and Navy and would, of course, sit on the Advisory National Committee. I think he has shown fine qualities since we saw him in Casablanca.

I do not know what to do with De Gaulle. Possibly you would like to make him Governor of Madagascar!

F.D.R.

P.S. I hear the rumor that Leclercq forces in Tunisia have been permitted to recruit from the neighboring forces of Giraud because Leclercq offered more pay and better rations and clothing than Giraud's men got. I do not know if this is true. The same source reports that the De Gaulle mission in Algiers seems to have abundant funds and has put together an active and effective propaganda.

F.D.R.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*File
WR*

April 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Eisenhower:

"Yesterday I visited the 1st Army, 2nd Corps, and 34th Division, following a two-day inspection of lines of communication. Everywhere troops are in good heart but the going is tough and terrain is definitely against us. The enemy counter-attacks constantly. On Wednesday 9 of these were launched on front of 2nd Corps alone.

"I cannot speak too highly of Bradley. He is doing a great job and McNair's report states: 'Bradley definitely impressive'.

(new commanding 2! Corps)

"While I was at 2nd Corps Headquarters, the British liaison officer who is an experienced veteran, stated categorically that the first U.S. Division is one of the finest tactical organizations that he had ever seen.

"We are rushing the 3rd Division eastward to provide a reserve and final punch for Alexander as our infantry losses have been rather high. Although the 3rd Division will be inexperienced in this particular type of fighting, it is definitely a good organization and has an outstanding commander. I am confident that it will give a good account of itself. The move to the front should be completed in a week.

"The Tunisian fight appears to offer a good indication of what we can always expect when we meet the German in defensive positions, especially where the terrain is favorable to him."

*PM
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290
1-2*

W. H. Arnold
Chief of Staff.



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*afrika
Return to
Amptown*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

W.S.B.

April 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following is quoted from a personal letter to me from General Patton, Headquarters II Army Corps, dated March 29th. I think you will find it quite interesting.

"We have actually fought every day since the 17th, sometime with one part of the Corps, sometime with another. At the moment, all four Divisions are in action on slightly better than a one hundred-mile front. However, this is not as bad as it sounds because three Divisions are well-grouped and the fourth--the 34th--is on a sort of raiding mission to the northeast. Of course the general scope of the operations is specified by the Commanding General, 18th Army Group. All I have is the actual conduct of the operation prescribed. I would like to interpolate here the fact that I find General Alexander extremely able and very fine to serve under.

"On the 23rd, the 10th Panzer attacked our 1st Infantry Division at 6:30 A.M. with about 100 tanks. The initial rush carried the tanks through a gap in the 18th Infantry but before the fighting stopped we had put thirty enemy tanks out of action--fifteen of which he later recovered and fifteen of which we blew up. The best part of it was that in spite of being passed through, not a single American battalion gave up any ground and when we regained contact everyone was where he had been when the fight started. We did have what I consider unnecessarily large losses in the Tank Destroyer units. This is due to two causes, first to the absolutely open nature of the ground (there is no cover of any sort) and second to the fact that the tactics taught at the Tank Destroyer School are not applicable to this theater. Tank Destroyers can not pursue tanks here. They must await the arrival of the tank and get in the first aimed shot at effective range. They had been warned of this before the battle but in the heat of the fighting reverted to former teachings. I believe that hereafter they will do better.




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"For the last forty hours, the 1st and 9th Divisions have been attacking through very rugged mountain country with a view to opening a pass through which the 1st Armored Division can be launched. So far we have succeeded but the fighting has been very hard and the losses in battalion and company commanders higher than average. However we are still advancing. I was interrupted at this point by the receipt of news that one of our batteries of 155mm guns, firing at a range of 15,000 yards, had just put out three tanks, three armored cars, and a truck. In the fight on the 22nd, two enemy tanks were put out of action with the rocket gun.

"Our supplies both of food and ammunition and also of gasoline are working out extremely well but it takes a great deal of planning to insure that we have the things at the right place and time. In battle one can never tell what is going to happen, but up to the present I believe that you have cause to be satisfied. We are trying to be simple, not change our plans when once made, and keep on fighting.

"We have taken and brought in 17 guns and 33 Prime Movers. I think we got at least two 88mm just now. The 21st Panzer now has some elements against us. I have just been down to the cage to see the prisoners, they are pretty sorry looking. All prisoners mention the "devastating" effect of our artillery fire."


Chief of Staff

CONFIDENTIAL

COMINCH FILE

FF1/A4-3

Serial: 006/3

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

4-1-43

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Rear Admiral Brown.

SUBJECT: Small escorts, etc., in Northwest African Waters.

1. In compliance with request made to Captain Thomas' office by Lieutenant Commander Mott, the following information is furnished:

(a) Now in Northwest African Waters assigned to the Moroccan Sea Frontier for defense of the Sea Frontier, and United Nations sea forces in that area, duration of duty indefinite:

8 PC, 8 SC, 9 YMS.

(b) En route to Northwest African Waters or scheduled to sail to arrive there not later than 15 May, for the protection of U.S. Forces at sea during training for and execution of a special projected operation:

8 AM or DM, 18 PC, 36 SC, 24 YMS.

Of the above, 3 PC, 6 SC, and 4 YMS are en route.

E. J. King
for
E. J. KING

4/12.2

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*Adm. Brown
has file.
Pres has
seen
File
WB*

March 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Eisenhower:

"Forward movements of the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored Divisions were well conducted on the 17th. Gafsa was taken without resistance. Bad weather and execrable condition of roads made the advance of the 1st Armored Division exceedingly difficult, but through extraordinary efforts Ward was able to concentrate northeast of Gafsa as directed. Reaction from the enemy has been almost nil, whereas we felt sure we would get a tank battle in the Sened region. The enemy may calculate that condition of roads and terrain makes it impossible for us to carry a sustaining offensive any farther to the front and, therefore, that he does not need to meet the threat at this time.

"We are pushing out reconnaissance with a view of drawing on a battle under favorable circumstances. The prolonged rains in this part of Tunisia at this season of the year have been most unexpected, yet I believe that this condition will soon pass and more activity ensue. The officers and men of both divisions are in fine shape and eager to fight. Patton, assisted by Bradley, has done a splendid job in a very short time and I have no fears of the outcome if we can produce any fight along the line Gafsa-Maknassy-Faid.

"I have a late report that the enemy is again attacking 5th Corps in the north near Medjez El Bab.

"Upon my return from Patton's front this evening, I was handed a long message containing an exchange of messages between Prime Minister and Stalin. The former has apparently committed himself definitely to the June Husky date.


"All planning constantly reveals new complications and increased demands, whereas it is reported to me this evening that shipping in sight fails to meet minimum requirements by 42 vessels. While I will immediately go into these matters, it appears that possibly the seriousness of the problem facing us has not been fully appreciated by Prime Minister.



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"I have been given until April 10th by Combined Chiefs of Staff to make a final report on possibilities. I notice that Prime Minister has been basing his calculations on a completion of the Tunisian campaign in April, whereas Alexander refuses to make an estimate earlier than May 30th. Personally, I believe that the current operation should be completed in 5 to 6 weeks after the 8th Army breaks through the Gabes bottleneck. "



Chief of Staff.

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Report
file

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WSP

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Personnel and Equipment for North Africa.

The following is the current situation. All shipments are as directed by General Eisenhower.

Convoy which arrived February 19th:

Combat troops - 6,800 (which includes 2,800
Air Corps personnel,
one Field Artillery
Regiment and one Regi-
ment of Antiaircraft)

Service troops 33,000
Miscellaneous cargo

Convoy enroute, arrives about February 25th:

Tanks 146
Airplanes 159 (fighters)
Dry cargo and tankers

Convoy enroute, arrives about March 7th:

Tanks 43
Airplanes 80 (fighters)
Dry cargo and tankers

Convoy leaving March 5th, arrives about March 17th:

Combat troops 6,000 (including two medium
Tank Battalions and
two Regiments of Anti-
aircraft)

Service troops 30,000
Miscellaneous cargo

Convoy leaving March 4th, arrives about March 24th:

Tanks 415
Airplanes 195 (fighters)
Dry cargo and tankers




SECRET

RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
MAY 1943

In addition to the foregoing, General Somervell is negotiating with the Navy for an additional convoy sailing about March 19, 1943, to carry 100,000 tons of material for French troops. This will comprise about fifteen shiploads. For this convoy, present indications are that fifteen ships will be made available and ready for departure about March 19, 1943. The exact date of departure will be determined by availability of naval escorts.

If additional ships to the fifteen above mentioned can be obtained, they will be loaded with either equipment for the French troops, or for the U.S. troops, according to General Eisenhower's desires and priorities as determined by him.

As stated above, General Eisenhower dictates what use will be made of both troop and cargo space on these convoys. As an example I am attaching a message from him received this morning which relates to convoys yet to be loaded.


Chief of Staff.

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Message from General Eisenhower dated February 22nd
reference Convoys

"Not clear whether convoy scheduled to arrive on or about May 31st is in addition to combat loaded 45th Division. Also query whether increases in personnel lift indicated in your 2634 will result in corresponding increase in cargo convoys for equipment.

"Effect of approved target date means that units in the above convoy (45th Division not included) are too late for inclusion in assault and that last convoys which can influence operation are those scheduled to arrive on or about May 6th and on or about May 9th.

"Minimum essential requirements for April and May convoys to include 36th Division, 82nd Airborne Division, supporting Arms, Service and SOS troops, additional Naval and Air Corps personnel and replacements for Tunisia and HUSKY total 120,000. With increase in these convoys to total 82,000, as in your 2634, and with assumed corresponding increase in cargo convoys to lift all equipment of units included, deficiency is 38,000.

"Only ways of meeting this deficiency are:

- "A. To provide the required additional shipping in both fast and slow April and May convoys. This course requires provision of sufficient cargo shipping to lift equipment of all units included in personnel convoys.
- "B. To include 36th Division, but cut by forty percent all supporting Arms, Service and SOS troops, additional Naval and Air Corps personnel and replacements. Such a cut cannot be accepted without prejudicing success of operation.
- "C. To omit 36th Division from May convoys and reduce above mentioned cut to twenty percent.

"Course B, above, is unacceptable. Should A prove impracticable, I have decided to adopt C and substitute 1st or 9th Division for 36th. Priority troop lists for April and May convoys being prepared for courses A and C, but request every effort be made to achieve course A, because you will realize adoption of course C will result in such limited time for training as to seriously reduce efficiency of assault.

"Your 2582 does not affect decision in above paragraph. Question of filling additional allotment to totals 37,000 and 44,000 in convoys scheduled to arrive March 17th and April 11th, respectively, being dealt with separately, as stated in my 2262, February 21st."

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Eisenhower:

"Algiers
February 8, 1943.

"The Prime Minister and General Brooke have just completed a two-day visit here and now that they are safely home, I am quite pleased that they stopped here. We had many long talks and some concrete accomplishments resulted, particularly in getting an additional badly needed infantry division. Among other things, the Prime Minister stated that on this coming Thursday, February 11th, he was going to 'announce' the transfer of the 8th Army to this command. There is one possible development of this purpose that should be carefully considered in Washington.

"All of the principal subordinates that are affected by transfer or enlargement of responsibility will be British; that is, Cunningham, Tedder and Alexander. Consequently, there will be innocently created through these announcements, a popular impression of an overriding British control of this great area and operation. This impression is likely to be strengthened if the British announcement follows their normal practice of specifying duties of subordinates.

"We must rigidly avoid the creation of a popular or official belief that we are going back to command by council rather than by individual. I believe that such publicity as is given in the U.S. should stress the American grip on the whole affair. All of the principal people cheerfully accept American command with the best of spirit and cooperation, but I have the feeling that it would be unfortunate at home, as well as in the African and European Theaters, to permit the growth of an impression that an undue share of the control of this great affair is slipping out of the hands of the Americans.

"In my opinion, U.S. publicity should avoid personalities to the greatest possible extent except as represented in the leadership of the President and the War Department. I believe that we should take the slant that the United States has assumed




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a definite responsibility and control in the particular area for a special operation, and that American direction with the complete support of both Governments is continuing to guide the issue to its final conclusion.

"Initially I did not understand that any public announcement was to be made and in this connection General Brooke appeared astonished to learn that publicity was to be given to the reorganization. I did not discuss this particular phase of the matter with you while you were here. But it seems apparent to me that at least the British believe that the opportunity to demonstrate to the British and U.S. populations the existence of a complete unification of effort throughout this portion of the Mediterranean is more important than any information that may thus be given to the enemy and which he would, in any event, find out sooner or later. Consequently, I agreed with the Prime Minister that a public announcement would not be harmful. I urged, however, that nothing be said as to the particular duties of the Deputy. I told him that so far as Alexander is concerned the announcement should merely state that he is reporting to me as Deputy."



Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Thank

*Admiral Brown
to file
secret*

WS

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


With reference to your comments to me on the reduction of General Patton's Western Task Force by transfers towards Tunisia, General Eisenhower took the decision while I was in Algiers to move the 9th Division, which you reviewed near Lyautey, to the battlefront.

This morning his operation radio reports the following:

"Dispatch from Casablanca of the 9th Infantry Division, less one regiment, to Oran, the 68th Antiaircraft Regiment, less one battery, to Algiers.

"From Oran, the headquarters of the 34th Division and one combat team to Maktar, one battalion of Field Artillery to Tebessa.

"From Algiers, one British Infantry Brigade to Chasdimaux, one U.S. Infantry Battalion to Tebessa, and one U.S. Tank Destroyer Battalion to Constantine."


Chief of Staff.

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*116/NN of via
Adm /
T. P. [unclear]*

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WS

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1943.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Prime Minister desires that you see the attached message. It was received from London dated January 27th and was originally sent by Mario Duca Badoglio, the Italian Consul General and Minister Plenipotentiary at Tangier, to his Rome headquarters.

The message describes a conference between Badoglio and Dr. Kurt Rieth, the German Consul General and Minister Plenipotentiary at Tangier. Rieth is considered a rather disreputable character, being credited with organizing the assassination of Chancellor Dolfuss in 1934. In February 1941 Rieth went to Brazil on a diplomatic mission and then came to the United States by plane, but was arrested on May 29 and deported on July 16, 1941, by the State Department along with other Axis consular officials.

The occasion for the conference described in the attached message was a secret communication which Rieth had received from the Sultan of Morocco. In this communication the Sultan referred to "the American request that he (the Sultan) should recognize a Protectorate by the United States over Morocco."

Faithfully yours,


Chief of Staff.

SECRET

Message

"I have discussed with the German Consulate the matter (blank) in the telegram under reference.

"With regard to the Sultan's message, he said that he had received it through the local German mission. The bearer was an Arab personage of Tangier who had relatives belonging to the Sultan's household.

"As to the possible motives for this gesture the Minister RIETH said that his impression was that the Sultan, foreseeing that it would be difficult to resist much longer the ever-increasing pressure of the Americans and French to induce him to assume an attitude of open hostility to the Axis powers, had tried in the less compromising way to secure a sort of counter-insurance from us.

"The information which the Sultan gave in his message was in fact of little value both because it was very vague in its form and because almost all of it has been known to our missions for some time. The sole item of importance is the American request that he should recognize a Protectorate by the U.S. over Morocco. On this point the German Minister thinks that the Sultan's statement is not strictly true. It is in fact known that the Americans have begun a (blank) towards the native population: but this policy cannot absolve them, as long as military operations are in progress, from the necessity of not offending too openly the (blank) who, apart from other conditions negotiate a position to supply (blank) for the native army which the Americans intend to form.

"The German Minister told me that in his opinion we should, of course, not break off this contact and that he had advised his government that a reply should be sent to the Sultan to the effect that his request to us for assurances ought to be accompanied by some visible sign of his good will. It will be suggested moreover that the Sultan should use (blank) influence to impede the recruitment of natives on any large scale and to cause the native units already formed to adopt an uncertain attitude.

"I entirely agree with my German colleague about the desirability of a reply in such terms and we arranged that as soon as instructions reach him from Berlin we would draft the reply together."

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*adm Brown
to file*

RB

COMMANDER IN CHIEF
IN FRENCH AFRICA

Anfa, January 24, 1943

- I -

The intervention of Anglo-American troops November 8th on French territory in Africa, effected at the request of the French who, since 1940, have intended to take up the battle against Germany again, was the first act of liberation of an oppressed nation to be accomplished by the troops of the United Nations.

- II -

The form of relations between France and the foreign nations which are temporarily occupying a part of French territory; the after-war results of the association of France and the United States in the battle against Germany; military, economic, and financial aid provided France; were defined in the letters exchanged between Counsellor MURPHY, in the name of President ROOSEVELT, and General GIRAUD, before the disembarkment. They remain in force. However, the paragraph which dealt with the military question and interallied command is excepted.

- III -

Since the French Nation and the French people are alone qualified to determine the manner of their representation and to indicate their own Government, since the French capital at present finds it impossible to declare itself freely, France, as a result, no longer has a Government.

In the interest of the French People, to safeguard their past, their present, and their future, the Government of the United States and the Government of Great Britain recognize the right and the duty of the French Commander in Chief, with his headquarters in Algiers,

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to preserve all French interests in a military, economic, financial, and moral plane. They pledge themselves to assist him with all means in their power, until that day when the French People and the French Nation, with complete freedom, may be able to set up their regular Government.

- IV -

General EISENHOWER and Minister MURPHY, with the French Commanding General in Chief, with his headquarters in Algiers, will settle all implications of the present stipulations. In doing this, they will keep in mind the conversations exchanged in Washington between December 28, 1942 and January 11, 1943 by the representative of General GIRAUD with the State Department, and the decisions which were made by President ROOSEVELT, Mr. CHURCHILL, and General GIRAUD in the interviews at Casablanca from January 17th to 24th, 1943.

(text signed by President ROOSEVELT)

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CONFIDENTIAL

*adm. from
to file* *US*
Algiers
January 19, 1943.

Amendatory order to December 19 order being issued by Eisenhower creating a Civil Department of NAEB and placing responsibility in the department for the formulation and execution of plans and policies in respect of all matters affecting civilian and industrial economy of the territories placed under the board's jurisdiction. Algeria and Morocco have been placed under the board's jurisdiction and economic policies will be formulated in Algiers. The order states that initially, since requirements of military operations are dominant, the board shall consist of both military and civil representatives, and Robert Murphy and Major General Gale have been named Joint Chairmen. Colbertson is Executive Vice Chairman and Colonel Keveny is Secretary.

The board in cooperation with the French civil authorities shall work out and execute plans for dealing with the economy of such territories relating generally to the following:

1. Survey and determination of essential consumer and industrial needs of the civil population with appropriate participation in the distribution of imported and other supplies.
2. Purchase of strategic materials and other articles for export storage sale or other disposition.
3. Monetary fiscal exchange and property control matters.
4. Survey and determination of requirements for equipment and expansion of finished articles, foodstuffs and other materials needed for civil population together with rendering technical advice and assistance.
5. Establishment of liaison with military authorities charged with responsibility for maintenance, repair and expansion of transportation and communication facilities for purpose of keeping informed generally in anticipation of these responsibilities being vested in the board when warranted by military operations.
6. Survey and determination of public welfare, health and relief need.
7. Examination of prices.
8. Collation and analysis of pertinent statistical and economic intelligence data.
9. Establishment of liaison with North African Shipping Board and Military Oil Subcommittee.

On the same date an order was issued creating an Executive Committee with Culbertson as Executive Officer and Herbert as Associate Officer and forming 5 divisions of the Civil Department of the board as follows:

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1. Procurement and development, responsible for purchases of commodities and their exportation or other disposition in the development of local resources and economic intelligence work with Rosenthal and Chief.
2. Import, responsible for information and distribution of goods for civilian use with Short as Chief.
3. Financial and Control, responsible for monetary fiscal exchange control and trading with the enemy matters and matters relating to control of undesirable local commercial and financial transactions with Bernstein as Chief.
4. Public Health and Relief, including importation and distribution of goods for medical and relief purposes with Richard Allen as Acting Chief.
5. Coal Division, responsible for importation and distribution of coal and development of local coal production in civil Briquette manufacture with Norman Smith as Chief.

Chiefs of Divisions are members of the Executive Committee. Shipping matters do not come within the purview of NAEB but are the responsibilities of NASBO. Similarly petroleum matters are the responsibility of the military oil subcommittee, but the board will naturally coordinate its functions with those of NASBO (North African Shipping Board) and MOSC. Thus it is seen that responsibility has been placed in the civilian side but pending arrival of adequate civilian personnel, military men will be detailed temporarily to civil department. Detailed report being sent airmail.

MEMORANDUM FOR Joseph THE PRESIDENT

January 6, 1943

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are querying Admiral Leahy concerning the action you intend to take on this.

G.

Areas of Administrative
Responsibility - No. Africa
dated Dec. 30

1942.

J.C.S.

MEM

ility -

At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 10th, a message from General Eisenhower was discussed which recommended that the boundary between the American and British areas of administrative responsibility in North Africa be the eastern border of Tunisia. At the conference, you indicated that you thought Tripolitania should be included in the sphere of American responsibility because of its geographic and economic relationship to Tunisia. You directed, however, that the matter be referred to the State Department for comment.

Mr. Hull has consulted with Lord Halifax, and they both conclude that the dividing line should be the frontier between Tunisia and Tripolitania. They state that the social and economic ties between these two states are not strong, that the communications are poor, and that they are not connected by rail. Contact between Tunisia and Tripolitania before the war was minimized, owing to Franco-Italian hostility in the Colonial sphere.

The British are of the opinion that the administrative and economic ties between Tripolitania and Cirenaica to the east are extremely close and should not be separated. They also point out that the Tripolitania-Tunisia border has long been an effective currency frontier, with exchange control separated on both sides so as to separate completely the financial systems of the two territories. All of the former Italian possessions in Africa except Tripolitania are already under British administration, and arrangements of long standing which have worked quite satisfactorily are in force with regard to the status of local currency.

The boundary between the military theaters of the Middle East and the Allied Expeditionary Force is now the eastern border of Tunisia, and it is the view of the State



SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1942.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Areas of Administrative Responsibility -
North Africa.

At your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 10th, a message from General Eisenhower was discussed which recommended that the boundary between the American and British areas of administrative responsibility in North Africa be the eastern border of Tunisia. At the conference, you indicated that you thought Tripolitania should be included in the sphere of American responsibility because of its geographic and economic relationship to Tunisia. You directed, however, that the matter be referred to the State Department for comment.

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Department and the British Foreign Office that the boundary between the areas of administrative responsibility should coincide with it.

In view of the above, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Secretary of State be authorized to come to an agreement with the British Government, establishing the eastern border of Tunisia as the boundary between the areas of administrative responsibility of the U. S. and Great Britain, and that they be authorized to inform General Eisenhower to that effect.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

JK
LJK

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*Capt. M. C. ...
to file ...*

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON


January 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message, addressed to the President from General Giraud, was received last night, transmitted through General Eisenhower.

"Algiers
January 1, 1943

"I thank you most profoundly for your message through the difficult hours which my country is living. The responsibility which I assume is made much lighter by the military support brought by the United States and the Allied Nations and by the promise of help which you were kind enough to send me. Thanks to American materiel, the restored French Army will be able to resume at the side of the United Nations a strong and effective action for the liberation of France and of Europe, and for the achievement of a just peace."


Chief of Staff.

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
McCrea

**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

December 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I think you will be interested in this personal and informal report from General Eisenhower, particularly as to logistics of railroad and highway to Tunisia.


Chief of Staff.

Incl.

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O
P
Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

30 November, 1942.

Dear General:

In these crowded days I lose all track of the calendar and have no idea whether it is a matter of three days or two weeks since I last wrote to you. In any event, I have just returned from a trip in the forward areas and felt you would be interested in a review of the current situation.

First of all, you will understand that when I made the decision to rush our forces into Tunisia as rapidly as possible, I did so in full realization that we were assuming the inescapable risk of having bases damaged, particularly by night air attack, of sabotage on lines of communication, and of having some of our small columns get into bad tactical situations. However, I felt that the Axis was startled and upset by our initial landing and that I was perfectly justified in assuming any risks that did not actually jeopardize seriously what we had already gained.

As a result of this decision, Anderson is already well forward. (I am dictating this from my bed where I am confined today with a heavy cold, and do not have the benefit of maps and other aids. Consequently, there may be a misspelled word or two - particularly in names of places.) Yesterday Anderson's right was just east of Tebourba with his light reconnaissance forces reaching out well to the Southeast. The left of his main force was at Mateur. He had two Brigade Groups on the general line with the "Blade" Force, of something over a regiment of armor, operating in their support. Working with Blade were two American Tank Battalions - one light and one medium. The mediums were still largely in reserve. Coming up behind is the Guards Brigade of Anderson's 78th Division. One battalion of this brigade has gotten well forward and the remainder is pushing up as rapidly as possible. On top of this, the remainder of Oliver's Combat Command "B" was moving rapidly into the forward areas. At noon on November 29th his tanks were in the region of Souk-elArba and his Armored Infantry was marching forward, with its tail just west of Guelma. With luck he should be in position for taking part in the advance by tomorrow morning, December 1st. When Oliver gets on the line, he will take command, under Anderson, of all Armored Forces.

To the south of this general region, French Forces are providing protection for Anderson's right flank. Scattered among these French Forces, particularly in the Tebessa-Gafsa region, is a small mixed detachment of Americans commanded by Colonel Raff, who has done a magnificent piece of work. By his dash and skill, and the exemplary conduct of the U.S. Troops, he has vastly raised the morale of the French Forces and we have derived untold benefit from the coverage we have thus secured.

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On the airdrome near Tebessa are 54 of our P-38's, of which at least 40 are operational, and a squadron of DB-7's. The British Air Force has two small fields - one at Souk-el-Arba and the other somewhat to the rear of that, from which they are operating Spitfires to give an umbrella to our foot troops. It is in this job we're having real difficulty. (A message received from Anderson since writing this letter stated he must cease large scale effort until we can reduce Axis air activity--strafing, etc.)

Malta Air Forces are working against Axis shipping, Axis ports of embarkation and against the Ports of Tunis and Bizerte. In addition, our B-17's have been attempting to smash the North Quay at Bizerte, where it seems apparent the greater portion of the German debarkation is taking place.

Because of great distances and very poor signal communications, certain errors in operation and execution of combined air-ground plans have taken place. So far as these are avoidable through definite orders and constant circulation of Staff Officers and Commanders, we are eliminating them, so that everything is coordinated to the single objective of taking Tunisia. We are devoting everything to Anderson's support. Over and above forces previously mentioned, the 6th Armored Division (British) will soon come into the forward area. It will not be up in time for the next push but its early entry into that region will furnish a fine reserve that will give Anderson a lot of confidence. Coming up now, from the Casablanca area, are 25 of the latest U.S. medium tanks. They are going by railroad and, if all goes well, should reach the Souk-el-Arba area in a matter of a week to ten days. I ordered them up a week ago, but it has taken time to get rolling stocks, etc.

Under current conditions, the forces I have mentioned represent the maximum that we can sustain in Tunisia. Even by using transport airplanes for supply of critical items, the logistics situation is one to make a ritualist in warfare go just a bit hysterical. From Algiers to the eastward, we can run a total of 9 small trains per day. 2 of these have to haul coal to operate the railroad; 1 is the barest minimum to keep the civilian population from starving. This leaves 6 for military purposes, and since we have been trying both to crowd troops forward, particularly armor, and to supply what we have already there, you can see that reserves of munitions and rations are almost at the vanishing point. The highway is in fairly good condition and strafing by the enemy has not been serious west of Souk-el-Arba. However, motor transport is something we just don't have and, in spite of impressing every kind of scrawny vehicle that can run, we have not been able to do much by road, except in pushing forward parts of Armored Units. So far as we can, we ship by sea to Bone, but the job of providing satisfactory air cover is one that is just a bit beyond our means. However, Cunningham is bold and in spite of some losses we have gotten a lot of stuff forward that way.

My immediate aim is to keep pushing hard, with a first intention of pinning the enemy back in the Fortress of Bizerte and confining him so

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closely that the danger of a break-out or a heavy counter offensive will be minimized. Then I expect to put everything we have, in the way of air and artillery, on him and to pound him so hard that the way for a final and decisive blow can be adequately prepared. While that preparation is going on, we can clean up the territory to the south. In this plan, our greatest concern is to keep the air going efficiently on inadequate, isolated fields.

In a confused, fluid situation, such as this, rumors flow thick and fast and are so conflicting that it is a real job to separate the true from the false. By the same token, a commander quickly learns which of his subordinates are to be trusted under all circumstances to do a fine workmanlike job and which ones he has to watch closely and handle by special means in order to get the best out of them.

Anderson, Commanding the First British Army, is apparently imbued with the will to win, but blows hot and cold, by turns, in his estimates and resulting demands. Oliver has impressed me more favorably than any other Division or lower Commander I have encountered. Cunningham is a joy to have around. Welsh, the British Air Commander, is a sound statistical planner but rather devoid of imagination and, I think, lacking in drive. Doolittle is a curious mixture; he has certain strong points and fine qualities and I am going to considerable trouble to handle him in such a way as to help him eliminate his faults, in the belief that he will develop into a really brilliant air force commander. Young Raff, 35 years old, is apparently a find. I will want more opportunity to observe before I go completely overboard on him, but I think that he is a natural leader, possesses a very fine tactical sense, has the admirable quality of visualizing his own minor operations within the framework of the whole, and is an energetic, resourceful officer.

Yesterday, during my absence, my Headquarters had the embarrassing duty of asking you to hold up the promotion of Colonel Duncan, Air Corps, whom we had previously recommended for Brigadier General. Since last June, this is the second time a thing like this has happened and, in both instances, I was originally skeptical of the individual and held up for several weeks the recommendation of the man's immediate superior. In both cases, I finally felt compelled to go along with my immediate subordinates, but I assure you that when anything like this happens my face gets extremely red. I try to be most conservative and sure of myself in submitting to you recommendations for promotion to higher positions.

Boisson arrived from Dakar yesterday and conferences started with him immediately. He has obviously come here, according to Mr. Murphy, to complete a definite written agreement that places himself under Darlan, and in which he apparently expects to subscribe, generally, to the same type of assistance to the Americans that Darlan has agreed to give in this region. In accordance with the general understanding I have with you by radio, I had hoped to secure here only an agreement as to principle and to have all other negotiations take place in Dakar, carried on for the United States by a mission specially selected in Washington. So far as it

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is possible to do so, I will still observe this principle; but I feel that we cannot possibly throw cold water in Boisson's face, when he has come here in an attitude of going overboard for us. In any event, the presence of an American Mission in Dakar will be necessary, both to develop details of agreement and to supervise the execution of the cooperative effort. I will keep you fully advised as to developments here.

This morning I received your telegram concerning the functions of the State Department in developing the economy of this particular theater. I agree with every word of it and I can assure you that no trouble whatsoever will occur in the execution of the plan. I shall be obliged if you will assure the Secretary of State of my desire to assist him in every possible way. The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.

Upon my return from the east this morning, I was handed a most commendatory message sent me by the Secretary of War. I answered immediately but, if it is not imposing upon you too much, would you please assure him, in person, of my intense satisfaction in receiving word of his official approval of what we've done to date.

With best wishes for your continued good health,

Sincerely,

(Sgd.) Dwight D. Eisenhower

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff,
Washington, D. C.

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*A 16-3/Torah
Capt. Hoover
T. F. [unclear]*

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**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**


December 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message, just received from General Eisenhower, is reassuring and I know will be of interest to you:

"Algiers, December 11, 1942

"Believe you will be interested to read slightly paraphrased message just received from the Prime Minister. 'Have never known the House so unanimous as it was in secret session today. I explained the story and they understood it as well as you and I ourselves. I read parts of your letter to me which gave great confidence and satisfaction'."


Chief of Staff

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to file*


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**WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

December 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The inclosed message has just been
received from General Eisenhower.


Chief of Staff.

Incl.

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APPROVED BY
THE CHIEF OF BUREAU
FOR SIGNATURE

From: Algiers

December 9, 1942.

Your No. 56 (copy inclosed) received and I will clearly set forth to Darlan the attitude of our Government in this matter. I have previously expressed to him my conviction that the U. S. would look at the matter in this way. Fortified by this message I feel sure I can stop ill-advised action on his part of the kind indicated.

Terrible weather with two days of wind and incessant rain, difficulty in supply and some knocking about of our small forces in front have combined to force a postponement of offensive action. We realize that the enemy has his troubles also and we are doing our best to improve our own situation and to take advantage of every opportunity.

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THE CHIEF OF STAFF
THE GENERAL

From: Algiers

December 9, 1942.

Your No. 56 (copy inclosed) received and I will clearly set forth to Darlan the attitude of our Government in this matter. I have previously expressed to him my conviction that the U. S. would look at the matter in this way. Fortified by this message I feel sure I can stop ill-advised action on his part of the kind indicated.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

OPD 381 Torch (12-7-42)

Operations Division WDGS
European Section, WDOPD

December 7, 1942

TO: FREEDOM
ALGIERS

NUMBER 56

We feel that it is important that you should seek the earliest moment you consider expedient orally to explain to Admiral Darlan the attitude of the United States Government along the following lines:

"The United States Government fully appreciates the important military contribution which Admiral Darlan has made and is continuing to make in the campaign which began in Africa but which is a prelude to the complete liberation of all French peoples both at home and in the Empire from Axis domination and rule. (From Marshall and the Secretary of State to Eisenhower Freedom Algiers.) It has been the consistent policy of this Government, expressed on many occasions by the Secretary of State, to welcome the active cooperation of all Frenchmen who desire to resist Axis aggression and the extension, wherever it may be found, of Axis domination and control. It is the common purpose of the United Nations to continue the struggle until the aims of the Atlantic Charter are fulfilled and the peoples of each country are free to express their own will and to decide their future for themselves. Until these purposes are achieved, other considerations must be left for subsequent determination since dispersion of effort must weaken the military unity of purpose. It is in the sense of the foregoing that we feel that Admiral Darlan is continuing to supplement the contribution which he has already made. As long as his efforts are directed to the specific end of resistance to the Axis, we feel he has a definite role and a positive military contribution to make to our united effort consistent with the policy of the United States Government as outlined above. This will not be the case if he devotes his efforts to building up an organization, not directly connected with the military effort, since it must be borne in mind that other Frenchmen are likewise making contributions

CM-OUT-2325

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

OUTGOING MESSAGE

Page 2.

in the Military Field of considerable importance whose political aims have likewise never been "Gone along with" by this Government. This Government has too great a respect for France and the Sovereignty of the French people to attempt to predetermine the choice which the French people will eventually have to make.

"You may further wish to add that any exhortation directed to Frenchment to support the military effort is timely but to go beyond that into what is primarily a political appeal may now be detrimental to the cause of France".

For your private information, efforts of the character which we have in mind here as being contrary to this policy are Admiral Darlans recent message to former Ambassador Peyrouton at Buenos Aires asking the latter to serve as his accredited political representative to the Argentine Government, as well as his messages to other Chiefs of French Missions soliciting their political adherence.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
INFO COPIES: ADM. KING
GEN DEANE (ADM. LEAHY)
LOG

CM-OUT-2325 (12-7-42) 2350Z eob

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COPY No.

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Regraded Unclassified

A16-3/Torahs
File

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Subject: Employment of Latin American units in Africa.

General Marshall and his associates handling matters in North Africa do not believe that it would be advisable at the present time to undertake the sending of Latin American token forces to North Africa as recommended by Ambassador Hayes. They give a number of reasons for this point of view, the principal one being that General Eisenhower is now engaged in a difficult battle in Tunisia and the organization of his forces against the possibility of a surprise descent by Germany through Spain to close the mouth of the Mediterranean. He is also heavily involved in the necessary diplomatic adjustments with Darlan and Boisson, and will soon have on his hands a number of civilian agencies from the United States concerned with economic questions in North Africa.

Detachments of foreign troops of the character suggested are difficult at best to handle, and under the present circumstances it is felt that the complications for General Eisenhower seriously outweigh the suggested advantages. At a later date such an arrangement probably will be found desirable.

There are also the problems of the availability of shipping, the delicate issues involved in pay and rations, and the further fact that the attitude of the French would probably have to be ascertained.

This matter I find has been under discussion by General Marshall with Secretary Hull for some time. It has been given very careful consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as they wish to take every precaution against a threat to our communications through the Straits of Gibraltar.



Acting Secretary of War.

FOR DEFENSE



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A16-3/1000

For file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Please ask the Joint Staff to let me have, by Tuesday afternoon if possible, a very informal memorandum not, however, giving conclusions but only how their thoughts are running at the present time in regard to the following:

1. If the battle for Tunis and Tripoli is long drawn out and becomes essentially a battle of attrition, should we undertake any other move this coming Spring, and, if so, what move?

2. If we succeed in occupying the whole of the south shore of the Mediterranean from Gibraltar to Suez within the next sixty or seventy days, "where do we go from there"?

F. D. R.

DEC 5 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL EDWIN M. WATSON:

Subject: Award of Decoration to Civilian.

The attached correspondence pertains to the award of a decoration to a civilian for wounds received in connection with our landing operations in North Africa.

This award is contrary to the expressed instructions from the President.

I would appreciate your bringing this matter to the attention of the President in order that he may be informed of the steps taken by the War Department to comply with his wishes, and to obtain from him an approval of this particular award.

(SIGNED) ROBERT P. PATTERSON
ACTING Secretary of War

Inclousures

See "P"

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 28, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The Mareth Line.

At your conference with the Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday you asked for information relative to the fortified position in the southeastern part of Tunisia. Inclosed is a map showing the location of this position. The map and the following information were obtained from General Strong, G-2, War Department General Staff.

Prior to the Armistice in 1940, the Mareth Line consisted of strongly fortified interconnected positions effectively barring passage into southeastern Tunisia between the de Matmata Mountains and the coast. In front of this line and facing Tripolitania, were four fortified towns and an area at Ksar Rebounten, two of which (Ben Gardane and Medenine) and the area mentioned, were situated squarely on the main road from Tripolitania to Tunisia. The main Mareth Line was some 40 kilometers in length. The flanks of the line were considered secure, as one end reached the coast and the other rested on a range of mountains impractical for wheeled vehicles. The country to the west of these mountains is considered one of the worst deserts in North Africa, with no roads and no water.

The fortified towns (centers of resistance) and the line itself were so situated as to make use of the natural terrain features. Positions were prepared for all around defense, with a very strong system of barbed wire entanglements encircling the entire sector and each strongpoint within the sector. Communicating trenches were prepared to permit access to any part of the defenses. The communicating trench in the two centers of resistance in the mountains entailed much labor as it was necessary to blast almost every foot of the trenches. All centers of resistance had considerable depth and corresponded to a normally organized position with several lines of blockhouses. The depth of the line varied from six to nine hundred yards.



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
The guns installed in the defenses were 75 mm. naval guns, 47 mm. anti-tank guns and machine guns.

The Mareth Line was demilitarized at the insistence of the Germans and Italians soon after the Armistice in 1940. The guns were sent to other parts of North Africa or put in storage and French troops no longer occupied the works.

Since the start of hostilities in French North Africa, there has been no indication of the French occupying or defending the demilitarized Mareth Line. Gabes was occupied by the enemy November 19 and 20, and since that time, enemy troops have come into southeastern Tunisia from Tripolitania by way of the coastal road which previous to the Armistice was blocked by the Mareth Line. One column of 1,500 men with tanks and trucks was reported to have spent the night of November 21 at Medenine, one of the previously important fortified towns.

There is no report that indicates that the passage of Axis forces through the Mareth Line was contested by the French.

As long as the enemy holds the area to the northwest of the line, the defenses are quite useless in their intended purpose of keeping the enemy out of Tunisia.


JOHN R. DEANE,
Secretary.

Incl.
Map.

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Capitulation
to file
November 27, 1942.
1925 Z

From: London
To : The President of the United States

No number, November 27, 1942.

To the President from Winant. In the House debate on November twenty sixth the following question was asked by Mister Gallacher: "Can the Leader of the House inform us whether it is the case that a protocol has been prepared, and will be signed within a very short time, making Darlan the High Commissioner of North Africa? Is it not desirable that there should be a discussion in this House before such a step is taken?"

Gallacher is the Communist member of the House. He is not the sort of man who would normally ask this type of question. Eden felt that it was not likely that he had put this question without outside suggestion and perhaps some knowledge that there was an agreement between General Eisenhower and Admiral Darlan. Who his informant might be he has no idea. Eden tells me that although he refused to answer the question yesterday he is bound to be pressed in debate on this point Tuesday or Wednesday of this coming week. General Eisenhower has urged that no announcement of any kind be made about the agreement. Eden asks that if the United States government share this view would they authorize him to say that "The United States government do not wish any information given about the arrangements between General Eisenhower and the French authorities in North Africa during the present active phase of military operations."

I have forwarded to the Department today (my six six nine seven of two seven November) Eden's statement in the House on the twenty fifth and the exchange of questions on the twenty sixth covering references to Darlan and DeGaulle.

This morning Admiral Stark forwarded a message through the Navy which I hoped you would see stating that General DeGaulle had paid a friendly call on him yesterday. There was no statement made in parliament as to DeGaulle's trip to the United States. I thought if a reference was made to a possible journey the papers would misinterpret it as an invitation.

The use of Darlan has allowed the small minority who make a profession of attacking the government to do so. Eden tells me that this is not important but that the supporting members are also troubled and he feels that that is equally true of the British public. They have

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No Number, November 27, 1942 (Page 2)

confidence in your statement, respect for Eisenhower and real appreciation for the North African campaign; but as he explained the situation it is a reaction of the non-conformist conscience which prompts some people to feel that using Darlan has detracted in some sense from a great operation. The large number of letters written in protest to the Times, Guardian and other newspapers and the weekly secret intelligence report on public opinion would seem to confirm Eden's estimate of public reaction. The Prime Minister feels that DeGaulle's visit will be helpful. He is less disturbed than Eden by opinion here. As I see it the issue in North Africa forced us to make a practical decision that saved life and time. The problem here is a psychological and moral as it relates to public opinion. An already established propaganda affects values here. It would help if we could get more information on the freeing of political prisoners, cancellation of the anti-Jewish laws, recognition of the rights of labor unions and similar actions giving a sense of liberalization within the occupied area. I think these things are important. I know how difficult it must be to accomplish them within a battle area and immediately following occupation.

OK

but be careful about
 Muslim + Tribal feelings
 Ask F. Frost

No Sig

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Tarah
appt. memo to file

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following has just been received from General Eisenhower, dated November 17th:

Darlan issue

"General Clark and I have worked like dogs on this political situation, but I think there is no need to repeat the story here since my lengthy cable of last Saturday told it pretty well. I am pleased that the President and you saw the thing in realistic terms and realized that we are making the best of a rather bad bargain. In any event the so-called North African Army and Navy are placed under our two best friends, Giraud and Michelier."

Morocco

"A particular problem exists in Morocco where conditions are much different from what they are in the rest of North Africa. First of all, the tribal question there is always a serious matter and we must uphold the local French regime or we will encounter great difficulties. In fact, we are forced to keep the French relatively strong militarily. At first General Nogues was particularly difficult to handle. At bottom, however, he is a sail-trimmer and he now believes that his best interests parallel ours. His protestations of cooperative intent are most emphatic but he is unquestionably 'slick'."

Tunisia

"The early capture of Tunisia is a job that presents peculiar problems. I will not weary you with the details but since we had to come into this country with a minimum of transport and the distances involved are almost stupendous, you can well see what a headache we have in logistics and in troop movements. We are working our transport planes hard but of course cannot use them in advance of fighter cover since the Axis has got quite a bit of air into the Bizerte-Tunis region. I have reinforced Anderson with all the mobile elements that are immediately available. I must say that I have been highly pleased with Anderson's (British commander) dash and determination and although we are badly extended down there and operating by



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driblets (this is November 17th) it is my view that boldness rather than numbers is needed and I have encouraged and directed him to keep driving."

(The British First Army landed 22,000 men in the first convoy of November 9th. Between the 11th and the 13th they landed 30,000 men. November 22nd they were supposed to have landed 50,000 men, bringing the total to 102,000 British troops. Whether the later landings were made at Algiers or scattered down the coast towards Bone we do not know.)

Submarines

"Recent messages show that the U.S. Navy is getting some extra anti-sub stuff into Casablanca where it is badly needed and the British are doing a pretty good job inside the Mediterranean. The approaches to the Strait, however, are our weakest spot and from the chart of submarine locations it looks like the Axis was ganging up on us to take advantage of the opportunity. We have worked frantically to get ships unloaded and started on their return trip but after the first two days we began losing more vessels than we had hoped would be the case. It is a problem that requires eternal effort in order to keep ahead of the other fellow."

Spain

"I believe that the British diplomatic people have done a good job in the region and the latest advices are to the effect that we have a very sympathetic attitude in that country. However, all are agreed that Spain could offer little resistance if the Germans should attempt to come through in any amount of force and, unless Spain should attempt to resist the Germans, they might resist us when we tried to enter Spanish Morocco and we would be badly embarrassed. The next 60 days are going to be anxious ones in this regard but at the end of that time our forces should be sufficiently well concentrated and prepared to give a good account of themselves in the Straits region. In the meantime, I have to watch the French who would, I think, like to pick a quarrel with Spain. "

Communications

"My own worry is communications. For some strange reason radio seems to work at its lowest level of efficiency in this area and I am constantly battling with airplane messengers and aerial reconnaissance to keep contact with our scattered forces." (His command post is now in Algiers.)

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Personnel

(He refers in very complimentary terms to a number of commanders, singling out General Fredendall especially, and states that the British Naval officers, including the British Naval Commander of the Central Task Force, give Fredendall a very fine send-off, also that "They think he is doing a marvelous job". Eisenhower further states that he is going into the Oran region and then can be more definite in these matters.)

Appreciations

"We were all delighted with the warmth of the President's congratulatory message and I had it published to the entire command without delay. The British were highly delighted that he included them so generously in his message. I was personally pleased that he commented on the unification achieved in this Allied venture.

"As I have told you before, I am well satisfied with all my people and don't believe that any commander was ever sent to the field with his principal staff and command subordinates representing a higher average of professional ability and a higher sense of loyalty and devotion to duty than it has been my good fortune to have here. Long hours and incessant work roll off their backs like water off a duck. "

Letter from General Patton

In a personal letter just received from General Patton he makes one or two statements that I think will be interesting to you.

Surprise landing

"It is my opinion that the success of this operation was largely dependent on what people generally call 'luck' but what I believe to be Divine help.

"In the first place, we landed in a perfectly flat calm with practically no surf until Sunday morning. Had the normal surf been running our casualties by drowning would have reached several thousand.

"In the second place, the attack was a complete surprise. As we approached the land the lighthouses were still functioning. Admiral Michelier, who commanded both Army and Navy defenses, told me that he had been planning on defense of the beaches for over a year but that since he had received a creditable report


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on the 7th that there was no American Fleet at sea, he countermanded the order to man the beaches which he had contemplated putting into effect on the night of the 6th."

Casualties

"Today (November 15th) I visited the wounded and found them in excellent spirits and eager to get back to their units. Our losses approximate 196 killed and 427 wounded. The new steel helmet was effective in turning fatal wounds into minor injuries. Some of our wounded seem born to be hung. We put them on a transport on the 12th which was sunk that night; transferred them to another transport on the 13th which was sunk that night. They are now on their third vessel, apparently none the worse for wear for their two duckings. "


Chief of Staff.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have received the following message from General Eisenhower regarding his treatment of the Darlan issue. While it is expressed as a personal message to me I think it desirable that you see it.

"From Eisenhower to General Marshall for his eyes only.

"Many messages from London indicate great concern and anxiety of our governments because we have had to deal here with a skunk.

"There seems to be a fear that we will make indiscreet commitments or are attempting to deal with questions that have nothing to do with this operation.

"I should like for you, personally, to be assured that we are not committing ourselves and certainly are not attempting to commit our governments as to future political action, nor are we touching upon any questions that extend beyond the scope of our own ranks.

"We have worked desperately to establish an internal situation that would permit us to go after the great objective of Tunis. It has been a time consuming burden to keep Smith in London fully informed on these matters so that he could allay anxieties, at the same time that we are trying to win a battle.

"I want to thank you personally, and the American High Command, for the confidence implied in me and my principal subordinates by your patience in giving us time and opportunity to work out these most difficult matters. I know you understand that the necessity for dealing with turncoats and crooks is as distasteful to me as to anyone else, and I am grateful indeed that you have taken such an understanding attitude on the situation explained in my long telegram of last Saturday.

"We are straining every nerve to begin a general advance in Tunisia by next Sunday morning. You are aware of the extent to which we cut down on transport and other types of equipment for the initial landing. This is hurting us now, particularly because of low quality and quantity of other types of land communications.



11-19-42

Pres saw and directed that it be filed


V. L. McC

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However, I am convinced that the enemy is relatively weak and most unhappy, and that a good punch will defeat him. I am, therefore, going to attack at the earliest possible date that a reasonable force can be assembled in Tunis. Every mobile element of United States force that can be gotten to Tunis will support the British attack."


Chief of Staff.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The inclosed message has just been received from General Eisenhower. I recommend approval of General Eisenhower's proposed message to the Sultan of Morocco.

W. H. Taylor
Chief of Staff.

Incl.

OK
LHR

SECRET



SECRET

WASHINGTON
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1942

The following message has been prepared after long consultation with General Patton and his American political advisor, Mr. Culbert, and the staff of this headquarters:

Early Sunday morning, the 8th of November, the American Vice-Consul in Morocco attempted, through the Resident General Of Morocco, to deliver the letter from the President of the United States to the Sultan of Morocco. It did not reach the Sultan.

Personal and urgent from Eisenhower to General Marshall for his eyes only.

Since that time relationships between this force and the French are considerably different from those that were anticipated at the time the President's letter was written. Effective cooperation with the French in controlling that region requires us to observe customs and procedures of administration and this involves, on our part, strict observance of the machinery the French have set up, particularly avoiding anything whatsoever that tends to destroy the prestige of the French Administration in Morocco.

The original letter of the President does not mention France or the French Administration and General Patton and his American political advisors believe that presentation of the letter in its present form would tend to cause irritations between ourselves and the French and possibly bring about difficulties in the control of the Moroccans.

In the meantime, General Patton has made, in company with the French Resident General, a formal call upon the Sultan of Morocco and has discovered that the latter is most sympathetic toward the United States and disposed to cooperate with us in every possible way. General Patton's relationship with the French are equally satisfactory.

In these conditions, I request authority to present to the Sultan of Morocco a short message of greetings from the President of the United States, of which the purpose will be merely to subscribe to the amenities of the situation. The message proposed is as follows:



SECRET

WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
BY MAIL DELIVERY

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

"Your Majesty: I have been highly pleased to learn of the admirable spirit of cooperation that is animating you and your people in their relationship with the French Administration and with the forces of my country. This is particularly pleasing to me because our traditional friendship dates from the time of George Washington, the first President of the United States of America, to whom your noble predecessor gave, as a mark of personal affection, the building which houses the American Legation in Tangier. Today the Axis powers are foes of both our countries. This foe seeks to impose on North Africa a scheme of military and political domination. His lust for booty has reached into every phase of Moroccan life. I consider it fortunate that we are bound together in a common effort toward his destruction.

"Our victory over the Germans and Italians will, I know, inaugurate a period of peace and prosperity, during which the Moroccan and French people of North Africa will flourish and thrive in a manner which befits their glorious past and be pleasing to God.

"May God have Your Majesty in His safe and holy keeping. Signed Franklin Roosevelt, President of the United States."

If the above is approved, I will send it to the Sultan as a telegram received here for transmission to him. These things look like relatively minor matters, but in Morocco they appear so important that General Patton and two staff officers made a special trip to my headquarters today to recommend submission of this telegram. It appears that some message to the Sultan is important, that such message should be careful to recognize the special position of the French in that region.

OK
JAR



SECRET

*Capt. McCreary
to file*

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from General Eisenhower, addressed to the President:

"Your generous words of congratulation have stimulated the morale of the entire command and inspired us to increased effort in the accomplishment of assigned tasks. Personally and on behalf of all American and British ground, naval and air forces assigned to this expedition I thank you sincerely for the thoughtfulness of your message.

Dwight D. Eisenhower,
Commanding"


Chief of Staff.

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

LONDON NOVEMBER 15 1942

1155am

THE PRESIDENT

Number 090 Nov 15 1942

Former Naval Person to President Personal and
most secret

General Eisenhower's number five two seven on
Political arrangements in French North Africa
We cannot say that our doubts or anxieties are
removed by what is proposed or that the solution
will be permanent or healthy. Nevertheless, in
view of the dominating importance of speed and
of the fact that the Allied Commander in Chiefs
opinion is so strongly and ably expressed that
it is endorsed by our officers including Admiral
Cunningham who were with him on the spot, we feel
we have no choice but to accept General Eisenhower's
arrangements for maintaining local and interim
equilibrium and for securing the vital positions in
Tunis.

TELEGRAM

TELEGRAM

The White House
Washington

----2----

We feel sure you will consult us on the long term steps pursuing always the aim of uniting all Frenchmen who will fight Hitler.

Great care must be taken that we are not double-crossed. There were some disquieting evidences in our magics two days ago. On the other hand we have these men in our power and should be vigilant lest they escape from us.

We do not see any need to publish the press release contained in General Eisenhower's number five four four or anything like it at present, pending further developments in Tunis and Dakar and hope our views may be met.

(Signed Prime)

To save time we are repeating this telegram to you to General Eisenhower for his immediate information.

-end-

A16
Torah

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Memo for Chief Clerk Terry

The attached papers are all "dead" and should be filed. I suggest that those despatches not sent should be so marked.

J. S. Freeman

I want to show these to the President -

m.c.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT
FOR THE RECORD THAT YOU SEND A
MESSAGE TO EISENHOWER AND I AM
SUGGESTING THE ENCLOSED DRAFT.

H.L.H.

S

ME

ma
ha
su
h

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 15, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Eisenhower's message relating to arrangements made with Darlan, Nogues, Giraud, and Chatel in North Africa have been forwarded to you. I do not believe that we have sufficient information here to issue detailed instructions to him. The arrangements he has made represent probably the only practical course at the moment when his interest is necessarily focused on the vast importance of a hurried conquest of Tunisia, the possible acquisition of the French fleet at Toulon, and the avoidance of a necessity for large reinforcements in order to hold his present position.

Eisenhower evidently hopes that Giraud will provide a means for mollifying or absorbing the de Gaullists. However it appears essential that we should not be placed in the position of abandoning the Fighting French. Final arrangements with Darlan should, therefore, include collaboration with them in some manner.

I am repeating the contents of this memorandum to Eisenhower with the information that it is now being submitted to you; this for the purpose of obtaining his reaction prior to detailed consideration of the whole matter by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, with whatever instructions are received in the meantime from you. I consider it necessary that General Eisenhower and his advisers in Africa should be given a free hand in this matter.

General Marshall is in full agreement.

William D. Leahy

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.



SECRET

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TELEGRAM

NOVEMBER 16, 1942

TO: GENERAL EISENHOWER

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

MARSHALL HAS SHOWN ME YOUR DESPATCH GIVING YOUR REASONS FOR PLACING DARLAN IN CHARGE OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF NORTH AFRICA. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I APPRECIATE FULLY THE DIFFICULTIES OF YOUR MILITARY SITUATION. I AM THEREFORE NOT DISPOSED TO IN ANY WAY QUESTION THE ACTION YOU HAVE TAKEN. INDEED YOU MAY BE SURE OF MY COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THIS AND ANY OTHER ACTION YOU ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE IN CARRYING OUT YOUR DUTIES. YOU ARE ON THE GROUND AND WE HERE INTEND TO SUPPORT YOU FULLY IN YOUR DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

HOWEVER, I THINK YOU SHOULD KNOW AND HAVE IN MIND THE FOLLOWING POLICIES OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

1. THAT WE DO NOT TRUST DARLAN.
2. THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP A COLLABORATOR OF HITLER AND ONE WHOM WE BELIEVE TO BE A FASCIST IN CIVIL POWER ANY LONGER THAN IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.
3. HIS MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE WATCHED CAREFULLY AND HIS COMMUNICATIONS SUPERVISED.

I HAVE NOT CONSULTED CHURCHILL IN REGARD TO THIS MESSAGE

BUT I AM SENDING A COPY OF IT TO HIM AT ONCE AND I AM SURE HE
WILL APPROVE.

NOVEMBER 18, 1942

I WANT TO ADD A PERSONAL NOTE TO YOU AND CLARK TO TELL YOU
WHAT GREAT CONFIDENCE WE HAVE IN BOTH OF YOU AND HOW SATISFIED
WE ARE WITH THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS.

THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO BE MADE PUBLIC.

I HAVE YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING THE DARLAN MATTER AND
NATURALLY IT DISTURBED ME AS MUCH AS IT DID YOU. I HAVE EXAMINED
KIMMSHORN'S DISPATCHES CAREFULLY, HOWEVER, AND I AM SURE THAT
Roosevelt
HIS JUDGMENT ON THE MATTER IS BETTER THAN OURS AND THAT HE MUST
SUPPORT HIM. I HAVE SENT HIM THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TODAY WITH
WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE.

IT LOOKS VERY MUCH AS THOUGH EITHER YOU ARE GOING TO THROW
SOMEBODY INTO THE SEA OR WE ARE GOING TO HAVE HIM IN A MUTCHER
BEFORE LONG.

TO KIMMSHORN:

MARSHALL HAS SHOWN ME YOUR DISPATCH GIVING YOUR REASONS FOR
PLACING DARLAN IN CHARGE OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF NORTH
AFRICA. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I APPRECIATE FULLY THE DIFFICULTIES
OF YOUR MILITARY SITUATION. I AM THEREFORE NOT DISPOSED TO IN ANY
WAY QUESTION THE ACTION YOU HAVE TAKEN. INDEED YOU MAY BE SURE OF
MY COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THIS AND ANY OTHER ACTION YOU ARE REQUIRED
TO TAKE IN CARRYING OUT YOUR DUTIES. YOU ARE ON THE GROUND AND
WE HERE INTEND TO SUPPORT YOU FULLY IN YOUR DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

BUT I AM SENDING A COPY OF IT TO HIM AT ONCE AND I AM SURE HE
WILL APPROVE.

I WANT TO ADD A PERSONAL NOTE TO YOU AND CLARK TO TELL YOU
WHAT GREAT CONFIDENCE WE HAVE IN BOTH OF YOU AND HOW SATISFIED
WE ARE WITH THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS.

THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO BE MADE PUBLIC.

ROOSEVELT

SECRET

TELEGRAM

NOVEMBER 16, 1942

TO: THE PRIME MINISTER

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

NO. _____

I HAVE YOUR MESSAGE REGARDING THE DARLAN BUSINESS AND NATURALLY IT DISTURBED ME AS MUCH AS IT DID YOU. I HAVE EXAMINED EISENHOWER'S DESPACHES CAREFULLY, HOWEVER, AND I AM SURE THAT HIS JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND IS BETTER THAN OURS AND THAT WE MUST SUPPORT HIM. I HAVE SENT HIM THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TODAY WITH WHICH I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE.

IT LOOKS VERY MUCH AS THOUGH EITHER YOU ARE GOING TO THROW ROMMEL INTO THE SEA OR WE ARE GOING TO HAVE HIM IN A NUTCRACKER BEFORE LONG.

TO EISENHOWER:

"MARSHALL HAS SHOWN ME YOUR DESPATCH GIVING YOUR REASONS FOR PLACING DARLAN IN CHARGE OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF NORTH AFRICA. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I APPRECIATE FULLY THE DIFFICULTIES OF YOUR MILITARY SITUATION. I AM THEREFORE NOT DISPOSED TO IN ANY WAY QUESTION THE ACTION YOU HAVE TAKEN. INDEED YOU MAY BE SURE OF MY COMPLETE SUPPORT FOR THIS AND ANY OTHER ACTION YOU ARE REQUIRED TO TAKE IN CARRYING OUT YOUR DUTIES. YOU ARE ON THE GROUND AND WE HERE INTEND TO SUPPORT YOU FULLY IN YOUR DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

" HOWEVER, I THINK YOU SHOULD KNOW AND HAVE IN MIND THE FOLLOWING POLICIES OF THIS GOVERNMENT:

- "1. THAT WE DO NOT TRUST DARLAN.
- "2. THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KEEP A COLLABORATOR OF HITLER AND ONE WHOM WE BELIEVE TO BE A FASCIST IN CIVIL POWER ANY LONGER THAN IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.
- "3. HIS MOVEMENTS SHOULD BE WATCHED CAREFULLY AND HIS COMMUNICATIONS SUPERVISED.

"I HAVE NOT CONSULTED CHURCHILL IN REGARD TO THIS MESSAGE BUT I AM SENDING A COPY OF IT TO HIM AT ONCE AND I AM SURE HE WILL APPROVE.

"I WANT TO ADD A PERSONAL NOTE TO YOU AND CLARK TO TELL YOU WHAT GREAT CONFIDENCE WE HAVE IN BOTH OF YOU AND HOW SATISFIED WE ARE WITH THE PROGRESS OF EVENTS.

"THIS MESSAGE IS NOT TO BE MADE PUBLIC."

Received by phone from Captain MacCrex at 4:30 pm

ROOSEVELT

PLAIN LANGUAGE BROADCAST, FROM TOULON TO ALGIERS

November 14, 1942

For Admiral Darlan:

I note your telegram to the Chief of State. You should defend North Africa against American aggression. The decision which you have taken in violation of my orders is contrary to the mission that you received. I gave the order to Africa to take no action under any circumstances against forces of Axis and not to add to the misfortunes of the homeland.

Philippe Petain

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]

Received by phone from Captain McCrea at 4:30 pm

Handwritten note:
J. H. R. to the President
7:00 PM EST

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page.]



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● SECRET ●

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

London, England
November 14, 1942

Some evidence has reached me that British Foreign Office is quite disturbed concerning nature of agreement we have evolved with North African French, particularly because we have found it mandatory to deal with Darlan.

I am submitting to Combined Chiefs of Staff a long telegram of explanation which will show that no other arrangement is possible except at cost of huge army of occupation and even with possibility of resumption of hostilities in Morocco where Armistice was brought about by order of Darlan rather than complete defeat of defending forces. Any further trouble in Morocco will stir up tribes with disastrous effect upon Spain.

To prevent all this, Darlan must be accepted because he is only man, other than Marshal Petain himself, that French officialdom in North Africa, including Nogues who controls Morocco, will follow. We are not blind to reputation of Darlan and have not been sold a bill of goods. Moreover, Giraud is active participant in arrangement and agrees to every condition laid down since he recognizes his own inability, alone, to do anything constructive in compromises, even with our moral and military support.

Giraud is our most active and honest supporter but is so fully alive to controlling factors that he agrees his connection with movement must temporarily be kept confidential. Giraud's name will come out preeminently in connection with agreement and as head of French Armed Forces in North Africa as soon as we have succeeded in clearing his name of a certain stigma now attaching to it because his prior sympathy with our intention to enter Africa is well known. Giraud's attitude should reassure Fighting French, who may be told as much as is necessary of this feature. Cunningham, Clark, Murphy and all British and United States Staffs here are of conviction that our case is unanswerable.

I am sending you this telegram so that if any repercussions come to your ears in advance of official explanatory message, you will have personal knowledge of situation. If you deem it desirable, may I suggest that you give the President some early knowledge of these facts so that any messages possibly reaching him from other sources may not unduly disturb him.



Eisenhower

SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

London, England
November 14, 1942

Can well understand some bewilderment in London and Washington with the turn that negotiations with French North Africans have taken. The actual state of existing sentiment here does not agree even remotely with some of prior calculations. The following salient facts are pertinent and it is extremely important that no precipitate action at home upset such equilibrium as we have been able to establish.

Foremost is the fact that the name of Marshal Petain is something to conjure with here. Everyone from highest to lowest attempts to create the impression that he lives and acts under the shadow of the Marshal's figure. The Civil Governors, Military leaders and Naval Commanders will agree on only one man as having an obvious right to assume the Marshal's mantle in North Africa. That man is Darlan. Even Giraud, who has been our most trusted adviser and staunchest friend since early conferences succeeded in bringing him down to earth, clearly recognizes this overpowering consideration and has drastically modified his own ambitions and intentions accordingly.

The resistance we met initially was offered because all ranks believed this to be the Marshal's wish and for this reason Giraud is deemed to have been guilty of at least a touch of treachery in urging non-resistance to our landing. Giraud himself understands and appears to have some sympathy for this universal attitude. All concerned profess themselves to be ready to go along with us provided Darlan tells them to do so, but they are absolutely not willing to follow anyone else. For example, Admiral Esteva in Tunis says he will obey Darlan, while Nogues stopped fighting in Morocco by Darlan's order. Recognition of Darlan's position in this respect cannot be escaped.

The gist of the current agreement is that the French group will do what it can immediately to assist us in taking Tunisia. The group will organize French North Africa for effective cooperation and will begin reorganization, under Giraud, of selected military forces for active participation in the war. It will exhaust every expedient in an effort to get the Toulon Fleet. We will support the government in controlling and pacifying the country and in helping equip selected Abite Units. Many details still under discussion.



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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

Our hope of early conquest of Tunisia and of gaining here a supporting and organized population can not possibly be realized unless there is accepted a general agreement along the lines which we have just concluded with Darlan and his Admirals, with Giraud, with Nogues, who controls the tribes in Morocco, with Juin and others. Giraud is now so fully aware of his inability to do anything by himself, even with Allied moral and military support, that he has cheerfully accepted the post of Military Chief in the Darlan group. He fully agrees also that his own name should not be mentioned in connection with this movement for a period of several days. Without a strong French government of some kind here we would be forced to undertake complete military occupation. The cost in time and resources would be tremendous. In Morocco alone, General Patton calculates that it would require 60,000 Allied troops to hold the tribes quiet, and in view of the effect that any tribal disturbance would have on Spain, you can see what a problem we are up against.

Giraud is honest and will watch Darlan. Moreover, Murphy, who has done a grand job, will as head of my Civil Affairs Section, practically live in Darlan's pocket. Mack and other capable men will cooperate with him. I realize that there may be a feeling at home that we have been sold a bill of goods, but I assure you that these agreements have been arrived at only after incessant examination of the important factors and with the determination to get on with military objectives against the Axis and to advance the interest of the Allies in winning this war.

While Giraud's name must not be associated with this movement publicly for the moment, you may assure any of the Free French to whom it is necessary to impart this information that Giraud is an enthusiastic participant in this arrangement. At my final conference with the group Giraud expressed himself to me as pleased with the turn of events. This should mollify the De Gaullists. We clearly realize that our Governments have commitments to certain elements of the French people throughout the world and we are not attempting to extend the agreement here beyond the area in which it is necessary to do so. However, in this connection, these French leaders firmly believe that if they are permitted to send an emissary to Dakar they can draw French West Africa into this organizational arrangement very quickly and make sure that that area is secure for the Allies. Since this group is committed to going along with us for the defeat of Germany



(2)

SECRET

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

and staying in the war until the end, it appears that I should be authorized at once to assist the group in sending an emissary to the Governor of Dakar.

At the final conference with this group I was accompanied by Admiral Cunningham who had a personal conversation with Darlan. They agreed upon a final appeal to the French Fleet at Toulon in an effort to get it to move. In any event we are convinced that Darlan is making a determined effort to get that fleet and even if he fails there should be realized that Darlan is not empty handed so far as affairs in North Africa are concerned.

It must be remembered that hostilities in Morocco ceased by order of Darlan and not by full military conquest. French military position in that area is still such as to be capable of causing us additional trouble particularly if Nogues, who will obey no one but Darlan, chooses to influence tribes. The certain and deleterious results on Spanish Moroccan situation are obvious.

Finally, it must be clearly appreciated that if Darlan is repudiated and we attempt from the outside to dictate the personnel of the coalition to run this section of the world, the following will be the consequences:

A. Our hope of securing organized cooperation in this region must be gone, at great cost to us in additional troops and in stagnation of operations.

B. All French armed forces in this region will resist us passively and in certain instances actively.

C. Our hope of getting Tunisia quickly will not be attainable because Esteva will not cooperate. He may already be helpless to do so but there is still a good chance.

D. The opportunity for gaining some military assistance from remaining French Naval, and Air and Military Units in North Africa will disappear.

E. The last glimmer of hope with respect to the Toulon Fleet will be gone.

Assisted by General Clark and Admiral Cunningham and our full staff, I have made what we consider to be the only possible



(3)

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WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

workable arrangement for securing advantages and avoiding disadvantages I have outlined in this telegram. I am certain that anyone who is not on the ground can have no clear appreciation of the complex currents of feeling and of prejudice that influence the situation. Also it should be clear that Giraud's earnest participation in this arrangement gives indication of the necessity for the agreements we have made.

Finally I suggest that if the two governments after analysis of this radio are still dissatisfied with nature of agreements made that a mission of selected British and United States representatives, and including Free French if deemed advisable, be immediately dispatched to this headquarters where, in ten minutes, they can be convinced of the soundness of the moves we have made.

Colonel Stirling, special British Military Assistant on my staff, is returning to London tonight to provide more background on this whole subject, with which he is thoroughly familiar. He is badly needed here and has been instructed to return as quickly as he has performed this mission.

Eisenhower



(4)

SECRET

1
A16-3/Torch

Capt. Kichen?

BH
This telegram must be
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone
other than a Governmental
agency. (BR)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated November 8, 1942

Rec'd 8:04 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

RUSH

1648, November 8, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

Reference your en clair message 1647, 8th.

The Marshal received me at 9:10 this morning.

Jardel and Dr. Menetrel both members of his entourage
were present. I handed the Marshal the text of the
President's unenciphered message which he already
had in translation before him on his desk. He read
the French translation of the message which I had
prepared and then signed and handed me his already
prepared reply to the President of the United
States of which the following is a close translation:

"Vichy November 8, 1942.

Message from Marshal Petain to President
Roosevelt.

It is with stupor and ~~astor~~ ^{debut} that I learned ~~during~~
~~the~~ ^{to} night of the aggression of your troops against
North Africa

-2- #1648, November 8, 10 a.m. (SECTION ONE) from
(Paris) Vichy.

North Africa.

I have read your message. You invoke pretexts which nothing justifies. You attribute to your enemies intentions which have ^{not} ~~never~~ been manifested in acts. I have always declared that we would defend our empire if it were attacked; you ~~know~~ ^{should know} that we would defend it against any aggressor whoever he might be. You ~~know~~ ^{should know} that I would keep my word.

In our misfortune I had, when requesting the armistice protected our Empire and it is you who acting in the name of a country to which so many memories and ties bind us have taken such a cruel initiative.

France and her honor are at stake.

We are attacked. ^{we}

~~we~~ shall defend ourselves; This is the order I am giving.

Philippe Petain."

TUCK

RR

PMW
This telegram must be
paraphrased before being
communicated to anyone
other than a Governmental
agency. (BR)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated November 8, 1942

Rec'd 7:45 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

RUSH

1648, November 8, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO).

The Marshal said that he had told Admiral Leahy that France would resist any attack on her empire by whomsoever and that there was no other course of action left open to him than to order measures of defense. He then showed me the text of the order which he had sent early this morning to the Chief military authorities in Morocco, Algeria, Tunis and Dakar. The text of the messages to the first three places mentioned reads in translation as follows:

"Am sending you under the following number the telegram from the Marshal, Chief of State, to President Roosevelt.

Your duty is clear. The Government counts on you. You should quell any tentatives of dissidence which have taken place or which may take place."

A translation

-2- #1648, November 8, 10 a.m. (SECTION TWO), from
(Paris) Vichy

A translation of the text of the message to
Governor Boisson at Dakar is as follows.

"Am sending you under the following number the
telegram from the Marshal, Chief of State, to Presi-
dent Roosevelt.

The attack on North Africa has taken place. Be
ready for all emergencies. The Marshal and the Govern-
ment count on you".

I informed the Marshal that I would immediately
transmit the text of his reply to my Government.

TUCK

KLP

PIW
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

(Paris)
Vichy

Dated November 8, 1942

Rec'd 7:23 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

RUSH

1648, November 8, 10 a.m. (SECTION THREE)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

As I rose to take my leave he took both my hands
in his looking at me steadfastly and smiling. He
accompanied me to the antichamber and turned briskly
back to his office humming a little tune.

(END OF MESSAGE).

TUCK

MCR

TELEGRAM

A16-3/Torch

*Capt. The...
to file*

The White House
Washington

w139 /szs229 176 WORDS

VICHY NOVEMBER 8, 1942 FILED 0725

SON EXCELLENCE MONSIEUR FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
PRESIDENT DES ETATS UNIS D AMERIQUE

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT - C EST EVEC STUPEUR ET TRISTESSE QUE J
AI APPRIS CETTE NUIT L AGRESSION DE VOS TROUPES CONTRE L AFRIQUE
DU NORD - PARAGRAPHE -

J AI LU VOTRE MESSAGE. VOUS Y INVOQUEZ DES PRETEXTES. QUE RIEN
NE JUSTIFIE. VOUS PRETEZ A VOS ENNEMIS DES INTENTIONS QUE NE SE
SONT JAMIS TRADUITES EN ACTES. J AI TOUJOURS DECLARE QUE NOUS
EDEFENDRIONS NOTRE EMPIRE S IL ETAIT ATTAQUE, VOUS SAVIEZ QUE
NOUS LE DEFENDRIONS CONTRE TOUT AGRESSEUR, QUEL QU IL SOIT.
VOUS SAVIEZ QUE JE TRIENDRAIS MA PAROLE - PARAGRAPHE -

DANS NOTRE AMALHEUR J AVAIS, EN DEMANDANT L ARMISTICE, PRESERVE
NOTRE EMPIRE ET C EST VOUS QUI AGISSANT AU MOM D UN PAYS AUQUEL
TANT DE SOUVENIRS ET DE LIENS NOUS UNISSENT VENEZ DE PRENDRE
UNE INITIATIVE SI CRUELLE - PARAGRAPHE -

LA FRANCE ET SON HONNEUR SONT EN JEU -PARAGRAPHE -

NOUS SOMMES ATTAQUES, NOUS NOUS DEFENDRONS, C EST L ORDRE
QUE JE DONNE.

PHILLIPPE PETAIN.

RECD 745PM

A16-2/Torah

SECRET

*Capt McCar
to file*

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

November 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message has just been received from Mr. Cole, the United States Consul General in Algiers:

Giraud sends word this morning, November 4th, that he has decided to come over immediately. Submarine should call for him at rendezvous spot indicated my 577, November 2, at 11:00 P.M. French time today, November 4. If this fails, rendezvous scheduled same hour and place, November 5.

Apparently your strong stand in this matter has convinced the French that we mean business and that they should cooperate with us.

[Handwritten Signature]
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

A16-3/Tan

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

John Edgar Hoover
11/2/42

November 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message, just received from General Eisenhower, will be of interest to you:

I cannot leave the United Kingdom without expressing to you once more, and to all of your assistants in the War Department, my lasting appreciation for the perfect assistance and support you have provided us. For eyes of General Marshall only. The past weeks have been for us a period of strain but the keenness with which every member of the expedition is approaching his duties in the next phase of the operation is, to an extraordinary degree, based on our unwavering confidence in your leadership.

If you deem it appropriate and a convenient occasion should occur, I should like for you to pay my respects to the President and to the Secretary of War and to say to them that all of us are determined to make this operation a real success.

J. Edgar Hoover
Chief of Staff.

SECRET

A 16-3/Torch

Capt. McLean
to file

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 2, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information the following is a copy of a message sent this morning to Mr. Murphy in reply to his message to me, which I am informed was transmitted to you by General Marshall:

answering

"Reference your seven four nine Personal for Leahy.

It is utterly impossible to arrange for delay of operation to which we are already committed. Therefore the decision of the President is that the operation will be carried out as now planned and that you will do your utmost to secure the understanding and cooperation of the French officials with whom you are now in contact. You should explain to Flagpole that the extreme hazards involved in any leakage of our plans makes it impossible to give notice far in advance of the movement, even though we were assured, of full French cooperation. Point out to Flagpole that a premature disclosure, which is an inevitable possibility where so many people are involved, would jeopardize not only our plans but their hopes. Furthermore, TORCH represents the only hope in the predictable future for the redemption of France and it involves a tremendous Naval, shipping, air, and troop concentration. It cannot be delayed. It must be executed. Therefore there can be no change in the plan as recommended by you.

You will not repeat nor divulge the date or location of landings to anybody until authorized to do so by Eisenhower."

Respectfully,
William Leahy

The Honorable,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America.

Trish
McGow

A 16-3/Trish

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1942.

FROM: THE PRESIDENT
TO: U. S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

I fully concur in General Eisenhower's recommendations. Please inform him to that effect at once. Perhaps also he might make, on my behalf, a special appeal to Kingpin to conform.

F. D. R.

Trot

[ca. 2 Nov 42]

McGowan is Murphy, our State Department
man in North Africa

Kingpin is General Giraud

Flagpole is Mast, Chief of Staff to The French
commanding general in North Africa

General Marshall is attempting to secure a
concurrence from ~~Admiral Leahy~~ and
Admiral King on General Eisenhower's
recommendations this morning and will
telephone me here when he has done so. It
has just been reported to me by telephone that
Admiral Leahy concurs.

McCarthy

SECRET

Classified Message
Received at
War Department Code Center

Date: November 2, 1942
Filed: Midnight, Oct. 31, 1942

From: ALGIERS
To : HANDY
No. : 749, October 31, 1942

Personal for Leahy to be communicated immediately. I must appeal urgently to President and yourself on following because of grave political factors involved and time element: On Oct. two two a secret conference was held between American and French officers in Algeria regarding Franco American cooperation for Torch. This conference was requested by French months ago ways and means of debarkation of American Forces in French North Africa in cooperation with French Army were discussed as also question whether General Andre Giraud would accept command French and eventually Allied Forces in area. Question of authoritative French military leader is of essence. At conference no indication of our intentions regarding date of operation was supplied and French officers were left with impression that at least several weeks would intervene.

Confidential messenger was immediately despatched to France to inform Giraud who agreed in principle but Giraud is still ignorant of imminence of our intentions.

Messenger returned from France this evening bringing letter addressed to me by Giraud stating that American and French Armies in close liaison will assure final victory; also technical memorandum regarding Torch operation and his participation therein.

Messenger states positively that Giraud cannot depart from France by November four and Mast now fully supports this view. Latter points out after reflection that our proposition verges on the hostile because on October two two Clark gave no intimation of date of Torch but did suggest that approximately three weeks would be required between departure of first convoys and landing. Therefore he concludes that our notification to him on Oct. two nine as instructed to effect that action is imminent and submarine already on way for Giraud although French are as yet only allowed to guess date of operation amounts virtually to ultimatum.

Mast proposes that we demonstrate some confidence in Giraud if we wish him as a partner and at least be willing to give him a reasonable number of days to organize what he considers the more important part of the operation that is France.

SECRET

No. 749 from ALGIERS

Page 2

Mast and returned messenger who is a civilian with important contacts in French political and business world both insist that Giraud's departure later in November will be a natural outgrowth of a rapidly disintegrating political situation evolving in our favor and thus Giraud will not be considered dissident. Giraud has taken residence in Marseille.

I am convinced that with out French Army cooperation and the danger of its active opposition if we do not have French command with us that Torch may fail. I urgently recommend that it is not unreasonable that Giraud be given three weeks interval to perfect his metropolitan organization and arrange his departure with maximum advantage to us. Giraud is stated not to believe that Axis intervention is imminent and Mast asserts now that there is no indication of immediate Axis move. No one here doubts that Torch will lead to separation of Europe from Africa and total occupation of France. Therefore Giraud's decision is a grave one and we should go as far as we can to cooperate with him. Please reply by radio urgently.

Cole, American Consul

Torch

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

2 November 42
(?)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

The following messages have just been received from General Eisenhower:

"From: London
TO: AGWAR

No. 4372, November 1, 1942

Following message has just been received from McGowan:

The Eisenhower Kingpin messenger returned last night from Marseilles reporting that it utterly impossible for Kingpin to depart until November twentieth at earliest. Flagpole supports this view.

I have had several hours heated discussions with Flagpole at end of which I am convinced we should yield on date.

I am telegraphing the President recommendation as I am convinced that Torch without favorable French High Command will be a catastrophe. The delay of two weeks unpleasant as it may be involving technical considerations of which I am ignorant is insignificant compared with result involving serious opposition of French Army to our landing.

Flagpole points out that no warning of our imminent attack was given him by Clark at conference of October twenty second which led him to believe that at least three or four weeks were available.

Our present proposition he suggests amounts to an ultimatum of hostile action. We must give Kingpin a reasonable time to prepare not merely his departure but French resistance in Northern France to designate his replacement



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SECRET

which undoubtedly will be Delattge De Tassigny and arrange numerous details. These simply cannot be accomplished in four days.

Kingpin does not share opinion that Axis intervention in French North Africa is imminent. He believes desirable operation for us is a combined European and African operation in full cooperation between American and French Forces but he is willing to yield if we insist on African operation now, granted he is given a reasonable time to make his preparations.

I suggest your most serious consideration of this question as it seems to me that if you are to accept Kingpin as a partner he is entitled to three weeks notice. End of message. My comments will follow in another message soon.

Eisenhower."

General Eisenhower's comment on this proposal is contained in the following:

"From: London
To: AGWAR

No. R 4373, November 1, 1942

gmk
It is inconceivable that McGowan can recommend such a delay with his intimate knowledge of the operation and the present location of troops and convoys afloat. It is likewise inconceivable to me that our mere failure to concede to such demands as have been made would result in having the French North African Army meet us with serious opposition. Recommend the President advise McGowan immediately that his suggested action is utterly impossible in view of present advanced state of operation, and that we will proceed to execute this operation with more determination than ever. He should also be directed not to divulge on November fourth the exact date of the operation unless complete cooperation by Flaggpole is assured. Submarine will remain available for the present. Will notify McGowan when it becomes


SECRET

necessary to withdraw it.

Eisenhower"

I concur in Eisenhower's recommendation but will consult with Admirals Leahy and King immediately.

There is also enclosed a copy of the message which Murphy has addressed to you.


Chief of Staff

Missing

SECRET

WAT

A16-3 / Tarek

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

October 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Support of Our Operation by Latin American Countries, Particularly Brazil.

General Eisenhower has forwarded a suggestion of the British Foreign Secretary, in which he concurs. The suggestion is that you instruct your Ambassador at Rio on D day to see President Vargas within the hour and, emphasizing the importance of the operation in forestalling an Axis threat to the Western Hemisphere, urge him to dispatch immediately a strong message to the Spanish and Portuguese governments expressing the full approval of the Brazilian government in the action we are taking. General Eisenhower suggests that similar steps might be taken at other Latin American capitals, depending upon the state of their relations with us at the time.

For security reasons, I strongly recommend against instructions being dispatched to any of our representatives in Latin America until we receive word on D day that a landing is in progress. The risks, I think, are too many and too great. I recommend immediately after the operation is launched that you dispatch a message to our Ambassador in Brazil, and in such other Latin American capitals as may appear appropriate, along the lines suggested by the British Foreign Secretary.

Mr. Eden also suggested to General Eisenhower that it would be useful if a token Brazilian Liaison Mission were rushed to General Eisenhower's Headquarters as soon as possible after the operation has commenced. General Eisenhower does not concur in this suggestion, and in my opinion he is correct. Such a gesture could have little if any influence on Spain's attitude and the mission would in any event only arrive after the critical early days in which presumably Spanish policy will be determined. Such a step might also prove unwelcome to the French and it would certainly open the doors for requests from our other Latin American allies to send similar missions. Furthermore, it would probably arouse some resentment on the part of the latter that they did not receive an invitation to send a mission simultaneously with Brazil.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.



SECRET

Torch
SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR Captain McCrea:

Admiral Leahy requests
that you have the attached papers filed
in the Map Room.

Respectfully,

Freeman

SECRET

September 15, 1942.

DIRECTIVE FOR MR. ROBERT D. MURPHY

1. You are hereby designated personal representative of The President before the civil governments and administrations of the Empire of Morocco the Regency of Tunisia and before the Government of Algeria.

2. You will work in close cooperation with General Eisenhower, United States Army, Allied Commander in Chief, European Theatre, in the preparation and execution of plans of a civil and political nature for the occupation of French North Africa by American military forces. In the performance of this task you will retain your present status of Foreign Service Officer, Class I, assigned as Counselor of Embassy, Vichy. All communication between the President and you and between General Eisenhower and you will be carried out through such channels as General Eisenhower and you may arrange.

3. You will at an early date contact personally and through your Psychological Warfare and other assistants those French nationals whom you consider reliable, and give them the following information:

Information having been received from a reliable source that the Germans and Italians are planning an intervention in French North Africa, the United States contemplates sending at an early date a sufficient number of American troops to land in that area with the purpose of preventing occupation by the Axis and of preserving French sovereignty in Algeria, and the French administrations in Morocco and Tunisia.

No change in the existing French Civil Administrations is contemplated by the United States.

Regraded Unclassified

Any resistance to an American landing will of course have to be put down by force of arms.

The American forces will hope for and will welcome French assistance.

The American forces will provide equipment as rapidly as possible for those French troops who join in denying access to French North Africa to our common enemies.

Money, in addition to that provided by French sources, will be made available for additional expense incurred through cooperation with American forces.

The American Government will guarantee salaries and allowances, death benefits and pensions of those French and other military, naval and civilian officials who join with the American expeditionary forces.

The proposed expedition will be American, under American command, and it will not include any of the forces of General De Gaulle.

After the necessary preparation is made by French patriots in French North Africa, which should be accomplished with the utmost expedition, at least twenty-four hours' notice will be given to our friends of the ~~place and~~ time

of landing, *and in your discretion of the approximate place*

4. Upon the receipt of the following message in code which will be despatched through at least two channels

to insure delivery "Allotments approved effective (date) _____"

you may ^{*in your discretion*} inform our friendly officials that ~~a~~ landing ^{by}

American troops will be made on that date as planned at *approximate*

localities ~~ports~~ which are known to you. The date should be repeated in the message to avoid error.

5. As Political Adviser to General Eisenhower you will prepare and submit to the President for approval:

(a) Recommendations regarding policies to be followed


SECRET

-3-

by the American government in the area, including economic supply and financial support, and such additional matters as you may deem appropriate.

(b) Drafts of proclamations to be issued to the inhabitants of the areas to be entered by Allied forces and recommendations regarding the means of transmitting them.

(c) Drafts of proclamations or messages to be addressed by the President to the French State and to officials in French North Africa to which in your opinion they should be despatched, together with recommendations regarding the method of transmission.



SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

File with directive

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Directive for Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy has just returned from his hurried trip to England. General Eisenhower reports that as the result of his conversations with Mr. Murphy he has the utmost confidence in the latter's judgment and discretion, and he feels that they will be able to work together in perfect harmony.

In the draft of the proposed directive to be given Mr. Murphy which Admiral Leahy has shown to me, there appears to be a need for clarification of Mr. Murphy's status with respect to General Eisenhower.

Prior to the commencement of the operation, Mr. Murphy must have a status as your personal representative in the area. However, as General Eisenhower is responsible for the success of the operation, it is essential that final authority in such matters in the theater be vested in him subject to your directions. Mr. Murphy's position I think, and Eisenhower recommends, should be that of his operating executive and advisor for civil affairs. There is the possibility that unless the directive is revised somewhat as indicated, there would develop in the minds of the French officials, after the operations commence, the idea that there is a division of authority between the American Civil and Military officials. Mr. Murphy agrees with the necessity of presenting the French with a clean cut authority in these matters.

I therefore recommend that a statement in substance as follows be embodied in the Directive issued Mr. Murphy:

You will act as the operating executive head of the civil affairs section and advisor for civil affairs under General Eisenhower. Prior to the arrival of military forces in the area, you will have the status of the personal representative of the President.


Chief of Staff.

SECRET

WH 3 66 WD WTE 220630Z 500 WASHINGTON

*File with
directives*

MAP BLACK NUMBER NINE

220430

(Sgt) 42)

FOR ADMIRA L LEAHY. I A PPROVE OF CHANGE IN MURPHYS DIRECTIVE. TELL HIM HOWEVER THAT HE SHOULD KEEP ME ADVISED OF ANY MAJOR CHANGE IN THE GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF LEAVING CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION AS FAR AS POSSIBLE IN FRENCH HANDS AND THAT EVERY EFFORT BE MADE TO OBTAIN EITHER COOPERATION OR AT LEAST NEUTRALITY IN THE INTEREST OF MILITARY SUCCESS.

ROOSEVELT

0834Z

A16-3(Torch)

*Captain
to file*

General Clark has taken to Washington with him copies of papers prepared by General Eisenhower's staff about proposed message from the President to French leaders, proposed proclamation by the President and proposed letters from the President to Sultan of Morocco and Bey of Tunis.

The British Government fully approve suggestions made in these papers and attach particular importance to the proposal embodied in the papers that President's proclamation should be made in the name of the United Nations.

The British authorities for their part propose to issue a statement at the opening of the operation supporting American action in the same way as the U.S. issued a statement supporting the British action in Madagascar.

The British authorities very much hope that the President will accept the recommendations about these documents which have been made by General Eisenhower.

September 29th, 1942.

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 3
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alt

INCOMING MESSAGE

CCWD
9-19-42
0933Z

Admiral Leahy copy

U R G E N T

From: London
To: Agwar

No. 2394, September 19, 1942

Para one. The following was communicated by the British Foreign Office to Mr H Freeman Mathews now acting in the place of Murphy (for General Marshall's eyes only) as my political advisor and executive, with the request that it be presented to the President as representing their suggestions for communication with Franco in connection with the special operation: "After consultation with Sir S. Hoare we suggest that the United States and British communications to Franco, the former being from the President and the latter from His Majesty's government, should, after explaining the character and purpose of the operation, continue on the following lines:

Para two. (1) We realize the particular interest that Spain takes in North Africa, and that it is on this account that a special message is being delivered to General Franco.

(2) Our action in no way threatens Spanish territory, metropolitan or overseas.

1

SECRET

COPY No.

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

From: London
To: Agwar

Page II

No. 2394, September 19, 1942

(3) Our action is unavoidable as General Franco, with his military knowledge, will realize that we cannot allow French African territory to be used as a base by Axis forces.

(4) Our action will not compromise the trade agreement and exchange of goods between Spain and the United States government and His Majesty's government. In fact, it should facilitate them as, when once the North African coast is removed from Axis control, there will be much less risk of Spanish ships being sunk by Axis submarines.

(5) This being so, we are convinced that General Franco need have no fear as to our intentions. We desire, as he does, to save the Iberian Peninsula from the evils of war and to see Spain given the opportunity to recover from the devastation of the Civil War, and to take its due place in the reconstructed Europe of the future.

Para three. Sir S. Hoare suggests, and I agree, that it would be better to avoid in the first instance any threat or suggestion of sanctions if General Franco were to react against us. This

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: London
To: Agwar

Page III

No. 2394, September 19, 1942

might be left to the next stage.

Para four. If the President could add some paragraphs about Latin American ties with Spain, so much the better. American and British messages might be supplemented at a convenient moment later on by diplomatic action by the Brazilian and other Latin American governments.

Para five. Whether the President's message should be delivered to Franco by United States Ambassador alone or whether two Ambassadors should wait on him together can be considered nearer the time."

Para six. Mathews agrees with the general character of the proposed communication and I concur, recommending only that precautions be taken to avoid premature action. Request that presentation to the President of this proposal be made as soon as possible.

Eisenhower

ACTION: GENERAL MARSHALL

INFO COPIES: NONE

CM-IN-8193 (9/19/42) 1112Z MLK

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS

*Capt in file
to file*

Francisco Franco Bahamonde

Generalísimo of the Armies of Land,
Sea, and Air, National Chief of
Falange, Supreme Chief of Falange
Militia, President of the Council
of Ministers.

Salizar ?

A16-3 (Torch)


SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HARRY HOPKINS:

Enclosed are two messages -- one from General Marshall to General Eisenhower in London; the other General Eisenhower's reply. The latter message was read by General Marshall at Leesburg and he directed that they be delivered to you this afternoon.


R. W. YOUNG
Colonel General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

2 Enclosures



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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

AXWAR 7
filed 1519Z/29
ASL

ECWD
Aug 29
1757 Z

INCOMING MESSAGE

U R G E N T

From: London
TO: AGWAR

No. 1624, August 29, 1942

I have just read your number R one sixty six delivered to me at Chequers. For the eyes of General Marshall only. We understand the purport of the plan and the need for extreme secrecy. The following comments are immediate reactions and will be followed soon by results of such investigation as is possible to make consistent with secrecy.

First of all the British will be greatly disturbed by the failure to include Algiers in the proposed assault. They believe that Algiers is the softest spot, from our viewpoint, in the whole region and that its capture will have a profound effect throughout the theater whereas the taking of any other place might not be so effective. However, it is clear that the matter of air support alone requires that any assault at Algiers be accompanied by one at Oran, consequently, if we can make only one attack inside the Mediterranean, it must be at Oran. In spite of their convictions concerning Algiers, I consider it very likely that the British will support an effect of the kind you describe. Since your plan still contemplates an early entry of British forces into the theater, no change on our present scheme of high command and staff organization will be required.

At a conference at Chequers this morning, there was discussed in the presence of General Clark and myself British reaction to the proposed directive submitted by the United States Chiefs of Staff. It developed that the British were quite ready to have the smaller attacks at Bone and Philippeville eliminated if necessary, but even intimated that they might have to "Go it alone" if there was no other way of assuring that the assault would include Algiers. There was nothing acrimonious nor even particularly critical in the attitude of those at the conference. They recognize that differing viewpoints have developed and are seeking a way to compose them. What they actually suggested at the end of the

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

Page 2 No. 1084 August 29, 1942 from London

INCOMING MESSAGE

conference was that all of us again reexamine our total resources to determine whether it would not be possible to attack at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers simultaneously. This possibility has been so often examined without producing essential naval and shipping resources, that it appears to be an entirely hopeless quest. In this connection and to demonstrate the deadly earnestness of the British government, there was seriously discussed the proposition of bringing the home fleet from its present station into the Casablanca area in order to support the Casablanca landing. This proposal had to be rejected because of the fact that the type of craft principally needed (destroyers) is too low in the home fleet even to furnish proper protection for the capital ships themselves.

At the conference the First Sea Lord stated that Great Britain had now in sight for the support of the Torch operation one hundred six destroyers and corvettes and fiftyfive mine sweepers and similar vessels, aside from larger ships.

On the basis of your telegram, we are pushing with all possible speed every practical preparation that can be made here. This can proceed for several days without compromising the secrecy of the intent. Your message indicates that the Casablanca attack will be made with the Patton force as originally set up for Oran augmented in accordance with availability of combat loaders. We take this to mean that the Patton force could leave the United States in early October and that the limiting date would be fixed by the time required to organize a balanced American attacking force from here. To expedite the organization of such a force, I will direct Clark, in addition to other duties, to plan for and conduct the Oran attack using the first and thirty fourth Inf Divisions, part of the first Armored and all base and auxiliary units that were to have been included from here in the original Oran Force. Our first guess as to the earliest date for the attack is around October twenty fifth. This contemplates the First Division getting its equipment no later than September seventh. Attention is invited to the fact that Patton will therefore have to secure base units in the United States that he may have been counting on from here. Under the new proposal there will be, for a very considerable period, two separate and distinct American bases. It would appear also

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WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 3. No. 1624, August 29, 1942 from London

that Patton may have to bring from the United States the ground elements of fighter squadrons for his expedition, with flying echelon transferred from the UK, through Gibraltar, to Casablanca.

Naturally anything I can say as to British subsequent participation in such a plan is purely conjecture. However, it is obvious that if we use all British combat landing vessels to attack at Oran, the British themselves cannot attack at Algiers and to the eastward of that place until the combat loaders have gone back to England, reloaded and returned to the Mediterranean. Since the route the convoys are compelled to follow requires eighteen days for one way passage, it is obvious that any attack at Algiers would have to follow the one at Oran by at least six to seven weeks this would not repeat not be true if the French had in the meantime capitulated and units could come on the basis of ordinary unit loading. However, even if a unit loaded British force were following the assault units at one weeks intervals, the simultaneous escorting problems involved might be beyond available means.

Eisenhower

Action Copy: Gen. Marshall

CM-IN-11128 (8/29/42) 1951Z

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SECRET

**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

August 28, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER:

Subject: Personal Message for Gen. Eisenhower

The Chief of Staff directs that the following secret message in code be transmitted to USFOR, London, by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy: WDOPD:

FOR GENERAL EISENHOWER'S EYES ONLY PERIOD THIS MESSAGE IS FOR YOUR PRIVATE INFORMATION AND IS NOT TO BE DISCLOSED TO ANYONE OTHER THAN SELECTED U S MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF UNTIL THE PRESIDENT HAS COMMUNICATED HIS DECISION AS INDICATED HEREIN TO THE PRIME MINISTER PERIOD PARA I HAVE JUST COMPLETED A CONFERENCE WITH THE PRESIDENT PERIOD HE IS INFORMING THE PRIME MINISTER THAT REPLY WILL BE MADE TO HIS TORCH MESSAGES IN A FEW DAYS COMMA PROBABLY MONDAY PERIOD THE PRESIDENT APPEARS TO HAVE DEFINITELY REPEAT DEFINITELY DECIDED THAT THE INITIAL OPERATION MUST BE A PURELY AMERICAN ONE EXCEPT FOR BRITISH NAVAL FORCES COMMA AIR FORCES AND SHIPPING COMMA INCLUDING COMBAT LOADERS PERIOD PRESUMABLY THE OPERATION WOULD NECESSARILY BE RESTRICTED TO ORAN AND CASABLANCA PERIOD BRITISH TROOPS ARE NOT TO COME IN UNTIL AT LEAST A WEEK AFTER OUR LANDINGS PERIOD THE PRESIDENT BELIEVES THAT IF HE HAS A WEEK AFTER WE LAND HE CAN ARRANGE MATTERS



SECRET

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WITH THE FRENCH SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO COMPLICATIONS
TO LANDINGS OF BRITISH TROOPS LATER PERIOD HE FEELS THAT
JOINT LANDINGS EVEN THOUGH LED BY AMERICAN TROOPS WILL NOT
SUFFICE PERIOD THE PRESIDENT IS APPARENTLY UNWILLING TO
ACCEPT THE HAZARDS OF A SINGLE LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH
GIBRALTAR PERIOD HE DOES NOT ACCEPT THE BRITISH ARGUMENT
THAT THE ACTION INDICATED WILL MEAN THE LOSS OF TUNISIA AND
POSSIBLY ALGIERS TO THE GERMANS PERIOD HE ALSO IS IMPRESSED
WITH THE NECESSITY FROM THE U.S. VIEWPOINT FOR THE SAFEGUARDING
OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC PERIOD THIS CONSIDERATION SHOULD NOT AT
ANY TIME BE COMMUNICATED TO THE BRITISH PERIOD THE PRESIDENT
IS CONVINCED THAT NAVAL RESOURCES ARE NOT REPEAT NOT SUFFICIENT
FOR THE SUPPORT OF MORE THAN TWO LANDINGS PERIOD THE PRESIDENT
PICTURES THE LANDING OF SOME EIGHTY THOUSAND MEN IN THE TWO
ASSAULT CONVOYS AND THINKS SUCH A NUMBER WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
HIS POLITICAL PURPOSES PERIOD PARA I AM CONVINCED THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAS FULLY MADE UP HIS MIND AS OUTLINED ABOVE AND THAT
HE INTENDS TO DICTATE THAT PROCEDURE PERIOD PARA THE PURPOSE
OF THIS MESSAGE IS TO FOREWARN AND TO ALLOW YOU TO DO SUCH ADVANCE
PLANNING AS IS PRACTICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES PERIOD I
CAUTION YOU AGAIN THAT ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST
BE COMMUNICATED ONLY TO SELECTED U.S. MEMBERS OF YOUR STAFF
UNTIL THE PRESIDENT ACTUALLY TAKES THE DECISION AND COMMUNICATES
IT TO THE PRIME MINISTER PERIOD PARA MY FIRST IMPRESSION IS
THAT THE ORAN FORCE WILL HAVE TO BE MADE UP IN THE MAIN FROM
AMERICAN TROOPS NOW IN THE BRITISH ISLES AND TRANSPORTED BY

- 2 -

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

BRITISH COMBAT LOADERS PERIOD THE PATTON FORCE AUGMENTED
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AVAILABILITY OF COMBAT LOADERS AND OTHER
SHIPPING WILL FURNISH THE CASABLANCA FORCE PERIOD THE BRITISH
AIR AND NAVAL FORCES PROVIDED BY YOUR OUTLINE PLAN WILL
UNDOUBTEDLY BE REQUIRED PERIOD PARA I AM PREPARING A DRAFT OF
A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER FOR SUBMISSION
TO THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW COMMA AUGUST TWENTY NINE THOUGH HE
PROPOSED PREPARING HIS OWN DRAFT AND DID NOT REQUEST ONE FROM
ME PERIOD I WOULD WELCOME YOUR COMMENTS IMMEDIATELY COMMA PARTI-
CULARLY AS TO THE EARLIEST DATE THE OPERATION AS INDICATED HEREIN
CAN BE LAUNCHED AND YOUR ROUGH ESTIMATE OF WHAT THE BRITISH MIGHT
DO IN THE WAY OF UTILIZING ALL THE COMBAT LOADERS AND THE NECESSARY
ESCORTS TO MAKE THE SECOND MOVE COMMA THAT TO THE EAST OF ORAN

MARSHALL

R. N. YOUNG,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

SECRET

A16-3 (Torch)

Memorandum for the President:

SECRET

C O P Y

The following message from General Eisenhower is most informative regarding the attitude and conceptions of the Prime Minister as to TORCH.

From London, England

To AGWAR

No. 1559, August 27, 1942.

J. M. [unclear]
Chief of Staff.

Replying to your R 132 (Request for immediate notification of British reactions to proposed new - Casa Blanca - directive and Eisenhower's possible plans). Last night I asked the Prime Minister to have the British Chiefs of Staff reply to United States Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately. The Prime Minister sent his wire to the President prior to receipt by him of United States proposed directive.

Delays involved in building up in the United Kingdom exclusive United States force to attack Oran as reported in my #151 are occasioned by improvising organizations of various kinds, amphibious training of additional troops and securing certain auxiliary and service units from United States. In the outline plan as submitted, with Philippville added, only two United States combat teams plus Ranger Battalion had to be provided from here for the attacks east of Oran, with all service, base and supporting troops provided by United Kingdom. The bulk of the United States Oran force would have come from United States. This accounts for the delay in attempting to make all United States attacks at Casa Blanca and Oran simultaneously.

✓✓
With respect to proposal by the Prime Minister concerning terms of directive, it is my impression that having seen outline plan that I prepared under original directive, he has jumped to the conclusion that unless prevented by special instructions, I would attack at least as far east as Bone. It is possible that for this reason he now wants to take everything out of the directive except attack quickly because he definitely wants to attack at earliest possible date and as far east as possible. I explained to him that two conceptions are involved, one a purely political gamble, the other a combination gamble with some regard for obvious tactical considerations although disregarding prospects of early strategic results. The former conception urges an east shift, the latter a drawing back of the attack to the west. I felt he paid little attention to this statement but he is anxious to make the attack appear as big as possible. What I really believe he favors is the attack as given in the outline plan plus a feint at Casa Blanca which could be turned into an issue if the force were invited in by France due to influence of Mediterranean attack. It is possible such a feint might be managed if the first follow-up convoy from United States could arrive off Casa Blanca on D-day.

- 1 -

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SECRET

The British Chiefs of Staff reaction to the proposal by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as given me informally by Ismay, is one of considerable doubt and puzzlement. They say "It doesn't accomplish anything. What is the reason for going at all if we don't gain Tunisia? We cannot get Tunisia unless we do it quickly and attack as far east as Bone."

It is clear that differences of opinion as to concepts must be disposed of by definite language in the final directive. If the directive should contain nothing more than is now proposed by the Prime Minister he would assume that these differences no longer exist and would expect every move to conform to his own extreme confidence that Spain will do nothing, French resistance will be negligible and German reaction will be encountered only through Tunis. These opinions, which are in the political more than the military field, apparently do not agree with those of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and the United States Government. Many British and Americans here likewise disagree with these views. In any event in conducting this campaign I must be assured that the basic features of operations conform to the general concepts of my own Chief.

Eisenhower

SECRET

To: Chiefs of Staff
From: Joint Staff Mission
Dated: 25th August, 1942.

MOST SECRET.

IMMEDIATE.

J.S.M. No. 365.

We have just been handed following memorandum.

BEGINS:

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their approval of the following "Directive for TORCH Operation" and request that the British Staff Mission submit it at once to the British Chiefs of Staff in London for their approval.

(a) "The TORCH operation as originally conceived involves simultaneous landings at several points along the North and Northwest coasts of Africa, the ultimate objective being the complete military domination of North Africa from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. The information now available as to troops, planes, ships, escorts and naval support, indicates that it will not be possible to launch an attack on the West Coast simultaneously with operations in the Mediterranean, and that the operations on the North coast must be conducted with very limited forces and extremely limited air support, together with the hazards involved in keeping open the western entrance to the Mediterranean and the vital staging flying field at Gibraltar.

(b) It therefore has become necessary, in our opinion, to prepare a new directive outlining objectives commensurate with the limited military forces available. The following is a proposed modification of the present directive:

(c) The operation will be conducted at the earliest practicable date with a view to accomplishing as rapidly as possible the following initial, intermediate and ultimate objectives:

- (1) Establishment of mutually supporting lodgements in the Agidir-Marrakech-Casablanca-Rabat-Fez area in French Morocco and in the Oran-Mostaganem-Mascara area in Algeria.
- (2) Rapid exploitation in order to acquire complete control of the area including French Morocco, Spanish Morocco (if the situation requires) and Western Algeria, to facilitate the extension of effective air and ground operations to the eastward.
- (3) Combined air, ground and sea operations with a view to insuring complete control by the United Nations of the entire North African area from Rio de Oro to Tunisia inclusive, and to facilitate air operations against the enemy's forces and installations in the Mediterranean Area."

2. Above message handed to us without any request for discussion. Americans had received report from General Eisenhower of his discussion with you as recorded in your C.O.S.(T) 263 and considered whole question this afternoon. Apparently they have satisfied themselves that they can produce no more resources in order to attack Casablanca concurrently with other landings. Presumably in these circumstances and in view of your feeling that concurrent attack on Casablanca is essential they consider only safe course is to secure safe base before reaching out eastward.

T.O.O. 2327Z/25

Distribution.

Restricted.

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~~Secretary~~ President
I will have some
additional information
on this tomorrow
Friday afternoon
following the
meeting of the
combined Chiefs
of Staff
W.H.L.

500.11

SECRET

A16-3 (Torch)

WAR DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942.

ENT:

t: Torch Operation.

Plans are being developed in London and as picture of the operation which can be mounted. The initial detailed plan was sent to us by route material changes were made in the roughly indicated to us by radio. This is a confusion as to exactly what can be cleared up during the course of the next day, the Chief of Operations for the War Department yesterday to clear up various points from him.

The original concept has been seriously modified for the use of aircraft carriers, combat loaders and naval support. The loss of carriers in the Malta convoy alone is a serious matter in planning.

Furthermore our best trained division for landing operations, the 1st Division, apparently will be barred from the initial operation because of the grounding of a ship carrying its artillery weapons in Halifax Harbor. This necessitates employing troops of the 34th Division now in Ireland who have not been particularly trained for such an operation and lack the high general standard of efficiency of the 1st Division.

For your information, and for a simplified portrayal of the development of the project, there are attached four charts to illustrate graphically material alterations (reductions) in our plans. The abandonment of an initial landing at Casa Blanca has been forced on us. While we hope to find it possible to approach Casa Blanca both with land forces from Oran and from the sea within a month after the initiation of Torch, we will be confronted with the dangers inherent in a line of communications via the Gibraltar entrance to the Mediterranean.



SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET

A16-3 (Torch)

WAR DEPARTMENT
OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942.

MENT:

st: Torch Operation.

Plans are being developed in London and as picture of the operation which can be mounted. The initial detailed plan was sent to us by a route material changes were made in the roughly indicated to us by radio. This may confusion as to exactly what can be cleared up during the course of the next day, the Chief of Operations for the War in London yesterday to clear up various points from him.

Original concept has been seriously modified after carriers, combat loaders and naval support loss of carriers' in the Malta convoy alone in planning.

For our best trained division for landing operations, the 1st Division, apparently will be barred from the initial operation because of the grounding of a ship carrying its artillery weapons in Halifax Harbor. This necessitates employing troops of the 34th Division now in Ireland who have not been particularly trained for such an operation and lack the high general standard of efficiency of the 1st Division.

For your information, and for a simplified portrayal of the development of the project, there are attached four charts to illustrate graphically material alterations (reductions) in our plans. The abandonment of an initial landing at Casa Blanca has been forced on us. While we hope to find it possible to approach Casa Blanca both with land forces from Oran and from the sea within a month after the initiation of Torch, we will be confronted with the dangers inherent in a line of communications via the Gibraltar entrance to the Mediterranean.



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Dear Admiral Leahy:
The President called on me for the attached information by Thursday - today.
I think it best to forward it thru you.
Photostat copies will be available later today for you and Admiral King.
S.C.M.

4 of 6
The original
MYERSHOLLO
OFFICE CHIEF OF
NAVY DEPARTMENT

SECRET

A16-3 (Torch)

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

August 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Torch Operation.

The detailed plans are being developed in London and as yet we have not a clear picture of the operation which can be mounted. The general outline of the initial detailed plan was sent to us by courier. While it was en route material changes were made in the plan in England and only roughly indicated to us by radio. This has resulted in a temporary confusion as to exactly what can be done, which should be cleared up during the course of the next three days. General Handy, the Chief of Operations for the War Department, arrived in London yesterday to clear up various points and I have not yet heard from him.

In brief the original concept has been seriously modified by deficiencies in aircraft carriers, combat loaders and naval supporting craft. The recent loss of carriers in the Malta convoy alone has directly affected our planning.

Furthermore our best trained division for landing operations, the 1st Division, apparently will be barred from the initial operation because of the grounding of a ship carrying its artillery weapons in Halifax Harbor. This necessitates employing troops of the 34th Division now in Ireland who have not been particularly trained for such an operation and lack the high general standard of efficiency of the 1st Division.

For your information, and for a simplified portrayal of the development of the project, there are attached four charts to illustrate graphically material alterations (reductions) in our plans. The abandonment of an initial landing at Casa Blanca has been forced on us. While we hope to find it possible to approach Casa Blanca both with land forces from Oran and from the sea within a month after the initiation of Torch, we will be confronted with the dangers inherent in a line of communications via the Gibraltar entrance to the Mediterranean.



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Present Plans

All our efforts at the present time are concentrated on a sailing date from the United States of October 1st. Plans contemplate simultaneous landings at Oran, Algiers and Bone, with the immediate objective of seizing airfields and ports and establishing lines of communication for a further advance towards Tunisia, and Casa Blanca. The United States will be responsible for the attack on Oran, and the British for that on Algiers and Bone.

Ground Forces

It has been found that available shipping will only permit an initial landing by 35,000 U.S. troops at Oran and 12,000 British and U.S. troops at Algiers and Bone. We may find that the British will be able to muster some additional troop carriers (not combat loaders but suitably equipped to handle heavy troop equipment which can be transferred to smaller boats for landing on beaches).

Eventually a total of 13 divisions are to be landed of which 6 will be British and 7 American. The U.S. force will consist of 2 armored divisions and 5 triangular divisions.

Initial Assault

Plan contemplates landing the initial assault at Oran from two separate convoys, the first of 35,000 to be combat loaded, to be followed four days later by a force of similar strength, but convoy loaded. The composition of the first convoy from Britain is not yet known. Combat loaders are available for 12,000 men. Our Ranger Battalion is to lead the assault at Bone. The troops of the 1st or 34th Division will lead the assault at Algiers.

Air Support

The initial air support will be provided from carriers. We had originally planned for the use of three large carriers in the Casa Blanca operation but apparently we will be reduced to the Ranger and one Long Island type converted carrier for the operation at Oran (100 aircraft). For the operation at Algiers and Bone there will be available 1 CV and 3 AVG's (93 aircraft). A small British carrier will be available with a Naval covering force to the eastward of Bone.

Army air support will be moved into the theater as rapidly as possible. The U.S. Torch Air Force is being built up in England of the following units:

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2 Heavy Bombardment Groups
3 Medium Bombardment Groups
1 Light Bombardment Group
1 Reconnaissance Squadron
2 Spitfire Groups
2 P-38 Groups.


All except the Spitfire groups can be flown from the United Kingdom to Algeria via Gibraltar. Just how the Spitfires are to be put in Africa we do not yet know.

Naval Support and Escorts

There is sufficient U.S. and British naval surface craft to support the contemplated landings. The U.S. Navy will escort the initial convoy from the U.S. and succeeding convoys at the approximate rate of two per month.

Logistics

The build-up of U.S. and British forces must be pushed with the greatest possible rapidity. The limiting factors will be hostile action against convoys entering the Mediterranean and port capacities. Oran can receive 4,000 long tons daily, Algiers 5,000, and Bone 2500. This will permit the passage through these ports of approximately four divisions per month. The seizure of the port of Casa Blanca with its capacity of 8300 tons per day will be urgently necessary. It is estimated that if Casa Blanca can be opened to our traffic within five weeks, seven U.S. divisions can be landed in Africa by D+123.


Chief of Staff.

SECRET


SECRET PLAN I

PLAN AS ORIGINALLY SUGGESTED
JULY 30, 1942 by CG ETO (EISENHOWER)


CASABLANCA LANDING



MEDITERRANEAN LANDING



LAND BASED AIRCRAFT



THE PORTION TO BE COMBAT LOADED NOT INDICATED


LEGEND	
1 US DIV	US LAND BASED AIRCRAFT
1 BR DIV	BR LAND BASED AIRCRAFT
	CARRIER AIRCRAFT

SECRET

SECRET PLAN II



PLAN AS RECOMMENDED by
CG ETO IN LETTER OF AUGUST 9, 1942

CASABLANCA LANDING




AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
1 CV
2 AVG
(108 Aircraft)

MEDITERRANEAN LANDING



AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
2 CV
6 AVG
(219 Aircraft)

LAND BASED AIRCRAFT




LEGEND			
1 US DIV		US LAND BASED AIRCRAFT	
1 BR DIV		BR LAND BASED AIRCRAFT	
		CARRIER AIRCRAFT	
		US COMBAT LOADED REGT CBT TEAM	
		BR COMBAT LOADED REGT CBT TEAM	

SECRET


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PLAN IIIa

PLAN AS REVISED BECAUSE OF SHORTAGE OF NAVAL CARRIERS



PLAN IIIb

SHORTAGES- PLAN III AS COMPARED WITH PLAN II




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LEGEND			
I US DIV	US LAND BASED AIRCRAFT	US COMBAT LOADED RGT CBT TEAM	
I BR DIV	BR LAND BASED AIRCRAFT	BR COMBAT LOADED RGT CBT TEAM	
CARRIER AIRCRAFT			


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EFFECT OF VARIOUS SAILING DATES
ON AVAILABLE US CARRIERS, AP's, AK's, XAP's


COMBAT LOADERS
AVAILABLE



TROOP LIFT




CARRIERS AVAILABLE &
INTENDED FOR ATLANTIC




TRAINING OF
COMBAT LOADED COMBAT TEAMS

- Only two divisions in the U.S., the 3rd and 9th, have had any of this training and, because of the shortage of combat loading ships, they are partially trained at present.
- In addition essential equipment may not be available to the 1st Division in the UK in time to make the October 10th date. Consequently, one regimental combat team of the 34th Division must be trained for this date of landing. If October 30 were adopted, two regimental combat teams of the 1st Division could be allotted the initial convoy from U.K. as originally planned.

SHORTAGE - AP's & AK's



SHORTAGE - TROOP LIFT



SECRET

A16-3 (Torch)

SECRET

August 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL
ADMIRAL KING

I have your memoranda of August 5th and August 7th in regard to Torch.

In view of the general situation, I hope that you will have the date re-studied -- with the possibility of advancing it 28 days.

It is my thought that there could be one of several possible developments which would make the earlier date imperative or advisable, even if the total forces would have to be cut one-third at the beginning.

I fully realize the difficulty of the problems involved but I would like to have the contingency of necessity given immediate consideration as such.

F. D. R.

(Memo) E-J/A
SECRET

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS
WASHINGTON

??

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We suggest the following message to the Prime Minister:

I have decided that the Torch operation should be undertaken by our combined forces at the earliest possible date. U.S. forces can execute the landing on November 7, 1942. I hope that your forces can join with ours in meeting this date. Your agreement is requested.

I consider that this operation is now our principal objective. Immediate decision is therefore necessary, in order to insure the assembling of means to carry it out. Needless to say, it must take precedence over all other operations, including Bolero.

W. B. Lawrence
Chief of Staff

E. J. King
Commander in Chief
U.S. Fleet

*This proposed message was
not sent.*

SECRET

Alb-3 (Torch)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

August 7: 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL SMITH:

The attached was prepared in response to Admiral Leahy's memorandum of August 2 to General Marshall.

General Marshall suggested that the attached memorandum be given to Admiral Leahy informally as a response to his memorandum mentioned above.

Thos Handy
THOS. T. HANDY
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff



SECRET

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM:

Subject: Torch.

Break-down of U.S. Forces.

The strength of the U.S. initial force and follow-up forces cannot be accurately determined until plans of the operation have been made and the task forces (British as well as U.S.) for the various areas have been set up. It has been agreed that overall planning for Torch will be done in London. Until at least an outline plan is produced, it is impossible to state with any certainty the size of the initial or follow-up forces.

Initial Force.

Our present estimate is that the initial American force may consist, in its main elements, of 3 infantry divisions and 1 or 2 armored divisions together with some corps troops and other supporting arms and services. Some of these troops will be taken from those now in or en route to the British Isles.

Such a force would number approximately between 100,000 and 125,000 men, air forces not included.

Three or more British divisions may accompany the above American units or a British force of about 60,000 men.

All of the above figures are dependent upon availability of shipping and number of points at which landings are made.

Follow-up Force.

The first follow-up forces should probably consist of 1 infantry and 1 armored division, together with supporting arms and services. These should be followed by another infantry division and a motorized division. This total would be approximately 90,000 men.

Succeeding follow-up forces must be of a total strength sufficient to achieve the strategic mission accepted and their constitution and numbers will depend upon developments of the situation. The total force required has not been determined. However, a force of 11 or 12 divisions, (about 300,000 men exclusive of air forces) is considered necessary to achieve the domination of northwest Africa as far east as and including Tunisia. The original Gymnast Plan, which set up only 7 divisions, was predicated upon the assumption of French cooperation.



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Regraded Unclassified

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An extension of the operation to Libya and beyond, which is included in the strategic concept, will require additional forces. In case of Russian collapse and the availability of appreciable German forces for an African campaign, the number of additional troops will probably be large.

Air Forces.

The U.S. Air Forces now tentatively selected number approximately 40,000 men.

Armament.

The 1st Armored Division in the U.K. has M-3 tanks mounting the 75 mm gun. It could not be reequipped with M-4 tanks in time for the operation.

The 2d Armored Division can be reequipped with M-4 tanks for use in the initial force. (Its M-4s and self-propelled 105 guns were withdrawn and shipped to Egypt in July.)

The 3rd Armored Division cannot be equipped with M-4 tanks if it moves in the initial force. If in the follow-up force, it can be so equipped.

No M-4 tanks are in the U.K.

A16-3 (Torch)

GPD

SEM

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

SECRET
SECRET

August 5, 1942.

Dear General Marshall:

I presented the enclosure to the President yesterday afternoon and he asked me to tell you he desires a "breakdown" which will show more clearly the number of troops to be landed at the first and the subsequent landings.

He wishes to be informed as to the total number of men to be landed. His idea is that 120,000 men would be landed in the first debarkation, and 120,000 in following waves.

I understand the total included in your memorandum is eleven Divisions. The President is not sure that I am right.

He also asks why latest type of armament for the first wave cannot be provided from the United Kingdom.

I am sending this in order that you may be prepared for questions that may be asked at your next interview.

Respectfully,

Leahy

General George C. Marshall, USA,
Room 2030,
Munitions Building.

(A-1-5) General 186 V. 590m

SECRET

**WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS
WASHINGTON**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Torch.

Date.

The earliest practicable date by which the landing involved in Torch plan can be made by the initial force is November 7, 1942. The governing factor in arriving at this date is the time required to arrange for the necessary combat loaded transports.

Since the dark of the moon occurs on the nights of November 8 and 9, those dates would be the most suitable for the landing of the assault elements, but November 7 is acceptable.

Transports.

Combat loaded transports are not numerous enough at present to lift the assault elements. Partial conversion of ships into combat loaders has already been started. The time required for this partial conversion, for proper training of crews and for rehearsals precludes setting a date earlier than November 7.

Troops.

The ground forces tentatively selected can be equipped by September 17. To meet this date some troops must be equipped with armament not of the latest or best type. Latest types of armament can be provided by October 10. Assuming newly converted transports are available by September 20, it is anticipated that training and rehearsing of troops can be completed by October 25th.

Planes.

All Air Force units tentatively selected, except one Light Bombardment Group, can be made ready by October 1, 1942. The Light Bombardment Group can be ready by late October.

British.

Assembly of transports is also the determinant for the British forces. British shipping can be ready to sail by October 30, according to information given General Eisenhower by the British Planners.

Purpose of Operation.

The strategical purpose of the Torch operation is envisioned as follows:

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Establishment of complete military control of North Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

Initial objective - to establish firm and mutually supporting lodgements in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on the north coast and in the Casablanca area on the northwest coast, in order that appropriate bases for further air, ground and sea operations will be available.

Intermediate objective - the rapid and complete domination of all French Morocco, Algeria and Tunis, and, if developments require such action, of Spanish Morocco.

Final objective - advance through and seizure of Libya and annihilation of all Axis forces in Africa, with a view to reopening the Mediterranean to Allied communications and to facilitating operations against the Axis on the European continent.

Size of Force.

The British now estimate that 11 or 12 divisions will be needed for the operation. The original U.S. estimate was 7 divisions for an operation limited to Northwest Africa. The present operation as outlined above is much more extensive.

The initial U.S. force can be 3 infantry and one armored division with appropriate supporting arms and services.

Within one month the initial force could be reinforced by one infantry and one armored division, within three months by an additional infantry division and a motorized division, all with appropriate supporting arms and services.

SOS.

Approximately 60,000 SOS troops will be necessary to support the operation. These troops will be required for rapid preparation of airfields, establishment and improvement of communications including roads and railroads, operation of ports, hospitalization, etc. The bulk of these will have to be taken from U.S. forces now in or under orders to the U.K. as there are insufficient trained units in the U.S.

Bolero.

The effect on Bolero will be as follows:

First, to reduce troop shipments to U.K. immediately by about 20,000 a month as ships are withdrawn for partial conversion to combat loaders.

Later, to reduce the shipments of troops to the British Isles for at least four months, and probably longer, to a negligible number.

Also, to remove or divert from the British Isles the main elements listed below, together with many supporting arms and services of the Bolero Force:


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
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1st Division
1st Armored Division (possibly)
Antiaircraft Artillery
3 Groups Bombardment (H) 115 planes
2 " " (M) 114 "
1 " " (L) 57 "
4 " Fighter 320 "
2 " Troop Carrier 104 "
2 " Obsn. 168 "
60,000 Service of Supply units

The effect on the scheduled program for the Middle East would be the diversion of one fighter group from the Air force now scheduled for Egypt.

The exact effect of Torch on the general Naval escort problem will depend on arrangements made as to allocation of British units to this operation. It is anticipated however, that the demands of the initial and the first one or two of the follow-up troop movements will be such as to require the use of practically all Atlantic Ocean going escorts, including those for the Middle East.


Chief of Staff.


Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.

SECRET

A16-3 (North Africa)

Most Secret

Memorandum
of the
of a second party.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

21 July
W.H.W.

July 30, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEAHY:

In order to

any case to crush the
plans may be followed
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This is extremely interesting.
It was given to me in strict confidence
by the Dutch Ambassador. Please read.
I do not think it should go any further.
Please return to Captain McCrea for my
confidential files.

F.D.R.

the scope of this memorandum.

Hereunder I will only consider the following question:

How can the chances of war in Europe, including the
Mediterranean theatre, be turned in favor of the
Allied forces?

The simplest way would be to help Russia in which country
the main battles are fought at present, directly by sending millions
of men in a similar way as the American Armies helped the allied
forces in France in 1917 and 1918. The present difficulty is that
the lack of shipping prevents the sending of millions of men to
Russia. I assume that in this respect no improvement will occur
in the near future.

Memorandum containing the personal opinion of Major General A. Q. H. Dijkhoorn of the Royal Netherlands Army on the subject of a second front.

In order to destroy the enemy military forces or in any case to crush the resistance of the enemy, various strategical plans may be followed. I will not consider all these strategical plans and will therefore not deal with:

- the question whether it is preferable to knock out Japan first in order to attack with united strength the other Axis powers;
- the question whether it would be preferable to deal with Germany - Italy first in order to attack thereafter Japan with all forces;
- the question whether it may be better strategically to attack both main groups of the Axis simultaneously respectively in the Pacific and in Europe;
- other strategical plans.

All these plans require separate study and are outside the scope of this memorandum.

Hereunder I will only consider the following question:

How can the chances of war in Europe, including the Mediterranean theatre, be turned in favor of the Allied forces?

The simplest way would be to help Russia in which country the main battles are fought at present, directly by sending millions of men in a similar way as the American Armies helped the allied forces in France in 1917 and 1918. The present difficulty is that the lack of shipping prevents the sending of millions of men to Russia. I assume that in this respect no improvement will occur in the near future.

As it is necessary, and I need not enlarge on this necessity, that the general war picture changes in favor of the allies as early as possible, I will not deal further with the strengthening of the Russian front. I take it that the sending of material will continue, either along the Northern route or via Iran.

It is therefore necessary to look for another plan to improve the situation in Europe within a relatively short period, even if through the execution of such a plan Russia would not be helped directly, but only indirectly. Such a plan is amongst others the establishment of a second front.

In order to establish a second front, an expeditionary Army will have to be transported overseas. As mentioned above the available tonnage limits this transport and therefore also the strength of the expeditionary force. I have insufficient data at my disposal regarding the shipping position so that I cannot base this memorandum on a certain strength of such an expeditionary force. This is not necessary as it is in any case certain that at the beginning the strength can only be small, small in comparison with the millions of men which the United States of America sent to the continent of Europe in World War I.

Any operational plans to establish a second front will have to take into consideration:

- A) - The limited shipping facilities and consequently the limited strength (in any case in the beginning);
- and further:
- B) - Sufficient protection against enemy sea action;
 - C) - Sufficient protection against enemy air action, not only during the transportation but also after landing.

A. It must be assumed that the expeditionary force, whatever its strength, should not act defensively by being satisfied, after the landing, with occupying a bridgehead. Should this be done, the effectiveness of the operation would be small, as the enemy would then keep an eye on this bridgehead until the time he chooses to attack the allied positions with concentrated forces which need not necessarily be strong. If such an attack occurs the chances are that the allied positions are broken through and that the allied troops are cut off from their bases. Such an attack with concentrated troops on a certain point is a typical German tactical operation.

If the expeditionary force, whatever its strength, is to be successful, there is only one possibility viz. that it acts offensively. It must be admitted that the operations will be more difficult if the terrain provides for less easy flankal protection of the expeditionary force, or if the strength of this force is small. Under these circumstances the chances to be encircled by the enemy and to be cut off from one's base are greater. One should be careful not to give the expeditionary force a task which goes beyond its strength. I mention this as the press in various countries strongly propagates the establishment of a second front, whereby this primary demand is completely overlooked and people constantly make comparisons with the actions of the American expeditionary forces of World War I. However, the circumstances under which an expeditionary force would operate at present are totally different from those prevailing in the first World War.

In order to illustrate the above, I give the following example. Assuming that there are no objections for the protection at sea and in the air, a landing somewhere in France would in my opinion meet with great difficulties. Everywhere in France, the terrain is suitable for tanks. As soon as the expeditionary force has landed the question arises which direction is to be chosen. And further, how the ultimate aim is to be attained.

Threatened on all sides, it will be necessary to safeguard the ports of disembarkation for which purpose a large proportion will have to be reserved. As soon as this has been done the force can only advance in an Easterly direction after reconnaissance units have been dispatched to all sides both on the ground and in the air. These reconnaissance units are not enough, however. On the ground the force will have to be surrounded by protective units. These reconnaissance and protective measures will also use up a large proportion of the expeditionary force. It is easy to imagine what would remain as a striking force, particularly if, as mentioned above, the strength of expeditionary force is necessarily limited. Where would this force be heading for? Let me overreach my goal and select a target which would go far above the strength of the expeditionary force, for instance, the Ruhr basin. It is selfevident that a weak force would be unable to protect itself on the long road to the Ruhr basin and that the danger is great that it would be attacked and destroyed by the enemy on its way.

In the above considerations, I intentionally left out the possibility, although undoubtedly existing, that as a result of the arrival of American troops in France, the population in that country, and perhaps elsewhere, would start an open revolt. In my opinion, this is too speculative a factor to be taken into account when drawing up one's plans. The population is disarmed and French or other allied troops are not present. In my opinion, a revolt may only be counted upon after an expeditionary force has had success, not before.

A landing of an expeditionary force in Belgium, Holland and or Norway, will meet with similar difficulties, even though it may be in a different way. As far as North Belgium and Holland are concerned, an additional difficulty is that the terrain does not lend itself so easily to an offensive, as heavier transports, such as tanks, are confined to the roads, whilst there are an

innumerable/^{number}of wet ditches, canals and rivers, as a result of which the enemy can easily prevent the advance of an expeditionary force or at least retard its forward movement considerably.

B. It is absolutely necessary to protect sufficiently the transport of troops over sea and during the landing against the Naval forces of the enemy and the coast artillery. Measures have also to be taken against the danger of mines. It is evident that this protection would require an allied effort depending on the spot on which one chooses to land, which is limited by the Pyrenees on one side and the North Cape on the other. For instances, in my opinion it would be less difficult to land troops near Bordeaux than somewhere in Norway as the protection at sea would be easier, whilst, I think, it is practically impossible to land a force of any strength near Calais. The Channel is within the range of the German coast artillery on the French coast, while it may be expected that the approaches to the coast are heavily mined. The fact that a Commando raid in this area may be successful, in other words a raid whereby a small number of troops is landed within a short period, does not necessarily imply that it is possible to land large forces on the same spot. The latter requires considerably more time and it is impossible to land under the cover of darkness only as is done in Commando raids.

I will not enlarge on this point further as I am of the opinion that with the exception of the area around Calais, the allied naval forces can, if necessary, sufficiently protect the transportation of troops. As mentioned above, near Calais, the enemy coast artillery and intensive danger of mines intervenes.

C. The most difficult problem is probably the protection required against enemy air action during transportation of the expeditionary force as well as immediately after landing.

A landing of an expeditionary force on the continent of Europe can only take place under an umbrella of allied air forces as long as the landing takes place within the range of fighters based in England. Consequently only a small portion of the

continent of Europe can be chosen and this is the portion which is less attractive for the above reasons due to the dangers at sea. (Calais and vicinity.) For an operation against the Norwegian Coast or the Southern Coast of France other measures will have to be taken to protect the transport sufficiently against enemy air attacks as these areas are outside the range of fighters stationed in England. How far it is possible to form an umbrella to protect the transport to the above mentioned areas with the aid of air plane carriers I will not discuss, but it is in any case difficult.

Wherever a landing is made, either in the vicinity ~~in~~ of Calais or in southern France or in Norway, it is always essential that air bases are erected on the continent immediately after the landing in order to be able to protect the further offensive from the air. This implies that after landing it is necessary to establish a bridgehead immediately in order to protect the aerodromes against enemy ground forces. The forming of a bridgehead is also necessary in order to protect the ports of disembarkation against enemy attacks. It is further evident that the aerodromes cannot be built too near to each other. For these reasons a bridgehead should in my opinion, have at least a depth of twenty miles. This means that the semi-circle which will have to be occupied by our troops has a minimum length of 3,40 times twenty miles or 62 miles, necessitating at least 12 to 20 divisions, all depending on the terrain. This is certainly a difficult problem for an expeditionary force which initially cannot be very strong in any case.

In view of the above, I have come to the following conclusions with regard to the establishment of a second front:

- 1) It is advisable to chose the point of landing as far as possible to the South in view of the protection at sea.

2) In view of the protection in the air it would be advisable to land as near as possible to England, were it not that there are serious objections for other reasons. A landing in Norway has serious disadvantages both as regards the protection at sea as well as in the air. It thus remains to choose a point of landing as far as possible to the South which the air forces of the enemy cannot or cannot easily reach as a result of their dislocation and performance.

3) As a result of the relatively small strength of the expeditionary force, it is advantageous to choose a point of landing from where an offensive can be started without being immediately surrounded on all sides by Axis troops. Wherever a landing is made on the continent of Europe, the chances are that fighting will immediately ensue, and in that case the question is whether the offensive can be maintained. In any case, the results of the expedition cannot be great as the risk to be defeated is considerable in view of the small strength of the force. This consideration leads me to select a place of landing far to the south, if possible, outside the range of the Axis forces.

4) A spot should be chosen where an important goal can be reached with relatively small forces.

In view of these conclusions I am of the opinion that the best spot to open a second front is in the Northern part of Africa. I leave the question open as to whether the landing should be performed on the West Coast of Africa or the transport should proceed through the strait of Gibraltar. This does not affect the principle where a landing should be made, either in French Morocco, Alg~~e~~ria or Tunisia.

If American troops are landed in North Africa and advance from there in Eastern direction, the following advantages are evident:

- 1) The transportation overseas can be easily protected against enemy naval and air action.
- 2) The landing itself is easier than anywhere on the continent of Europe.
- 3) The point of landing itself will be less exposed to enemy ground and air action than anywhere on the continent of Europe.
- 4) After the landing the force will not be immediately be surrounded by a determined enemy and can use its greater part as a striking force.
- 5) The aim to be attained, which naturally is the mopping up of Axis troops in North Africa is extremely important and should not exceed the strength of the expeditionary force even if this strength is limited by the shipping facilities available. I would like to raise the question which results could be obtained with an American expeditionary force of 10 or 15 divisions in North Africa.
- 6) If American troops only are landed in North Africa the chances are that the French forces in Morocco and in Tunis will join up with the Americans.
- 7) After the first aim has been attained, namely, after North Africa has been purged of Axis troops, all sorts of prospectives are opened. The Mediterranean can then again be controlled from the air from North African bases and later, after the arrival of more troops actions can be organized against Italy. It should even be possible after the Italian islands in the middle of the Mediterranean have been taken to invade the Italian peninsula itself. Also the possibility should not be excluded that as a result of such an operation Italy dissolves its ties with Germany. In any case, after an invasion of Italy, Germany could

be more easily bombarded from the air.

8) An additional advantage is that a successful landing of American troops in North Africa would stiffen the morale of the allies considerably, whilst on the other hand the Axis morale would receive a serious blow.

9) A simultaneous operation of American forces against Delmar may be suggested.

It is, of course, possible that Hitler invades Spain, which would enable England to land troops in that country. It may be expected that British troops would be heartily welcomed by the Asturian miners in North West Spain.

Washington, D. C.

July 27, 1942.

A16-3 (North Africa) 0

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 31, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

Attached are two papers which the President directed I get to you.

The memorandum attached to each paper is self-explanatory.

Very respectfully,

John L. McCrea

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy
Naval Aide to the President

Attachments-4

Copy delivered to Marshall +
King 1 August

WAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

This is interesting. You might wish to show it to Marshall and King, but I do not think the authorship should be disclosed without the permission of Donovan.

F.D.R.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

Room 1706, 703 Market Street
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

From: David Prescott Barrows

July 13, 1942

Subject: An American Front in North Africa

*Africa north 7421
x American front
x Barrows -*

*Copies sent SA/B
SA/S
R & A*

1. The following notes embrace ideas that are purely suggestive. They would require careful staff examination. This examination would be based on G-2 and G-3 information which is not available to the writer. Thoroughly informed examination of them might prove them impractical, "inutiles," as the French say. Nevertheless, they are presented in the conviction that if they have not already been examined they should be examined, as every other reasonable proposal demands examination in view of the increasingly critical state of the war in the Eastern Mediterranean.
2. They are based on the conviction that the German-Italian armies in Western Egypt cannot be thoroughly defeated there and danger removed by fighting, even though it be locally victorious, in the area where this fighting has finally been joined (the El Alamein-Qattara sector).
3. German progress on the Don toward Stalingrad and the Caspian Sea is the most ominous occurrence in the bloody warfare between Germany and Russia. It may end very shortly, or at any time within the next four or five months, in Russian disaster. It will be impossible for British forces or American aid to organize effective resistance in Iran and the Caucasus, as long as Rommel threatens Egypt. This threat must be relieved.
4. The only way in which Rommel's powerful thrust upon Egypt can be weakened is by a threat to his own rear. This means primarily a threat to the German-Italian hold on Tripoli. If a new front is to be organized against Germany in the west to relieve German pressure on southern Russia and the Near East, northern Africa would seem to present the front where American assistance can be most readily and most effectively given. The fields of operation which might be open to American arms in this part of Africa are two: one lies north of the Sahara (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia), the other south of the Sahara, in French West Africa, whence a diverting operation across the Sahara from the middle course of the Niger might have its effect upon Rommel if directed upon Tripoli. It is the purpose of this memorandum to make some suggestions upon these two lines of operation, or both of them utilized simultaneously. The writer's only excuse for venturing to offer these suggestions lies in the fact that he has been in these two parts of Africa and has some appreciation of their strategic importance through personal observation.
5. It is recognized that neither of these theatres of operation is at this moment open to American forces, due to the fact that they are nominally under authority of the French Government at Vichy and that our policy continues to be a recognition of the legitimacy of Vichy's claims to be neutral and to

have her colonial territory protected by neutrality.

The truth is recognized that, while war is a continuation of policy (Politik) by means of violence, this warfare or violence does not supersede policy even when it is adopted as the agency for attaining political results. Even in war military strategy remains subject to political considerations as determined by the civil authority, even though limitations imposed upon military forces by political consideration make harder, more dangerous, and more dubious the tasks of the soldier and of the sailor. Nevertheless, and although this is true, the danger of defeat may become so acute that civil policy is compelled to yield to military consideration. Such a situation seems likely to occur in the present relations between our own Government and the Government of Laval. In such case, the United States would not only be free to act militarily in North Africa, but it should have mature plans for such action and be ready to act instantly. For this reason, the writer is emboldened to submit for staff examination his personal conception of how attack upon the German army in Libya might be delivered from the United States.

6. An American attack upon Rommel's rear would have to be based upon North African ports of supply. What might be considered in some ways the most attractive port of this kind is Oran in Western Algeria. To reach Oran, however, would require transport through the Straits of Gibraltar and the penetration of the western Mediterranean. This may be already so strongly dominated by German and Italian air and naval power as to be unduly dangerous, in which case the possibility of an Atlantic port should be examined.

The West African coast is singularly deficient in natural harbors, and this is as true of the coast of Morocco as elsewhere. The sole port of consequence here, and it is an artificially improved port, is Casablanca. It would be the port most strongly held by Vichy French forces, and if these are not already supported by German power they probably would be in the event of a complete American break with the Laval Government.

There is another point on the west coast of Morocco where a landing from the sea could be made, and perhaps with the advantage of surprise, and that is the estuary of the Bou Regreg. This is a small estuary with a depth of some miles in from the shore. It would not be available for ships of any draft. It might, however, readily be taken by troops landing from naval vessels and transports in small boats and barges, imitating the technique of the Japanese army in such situations. On the north side of this little break in the coast lies the Moorish city of Sallee, where Robinson Crusoe, in the narrative of Defoe, served as a captive slave. Immediately opposite, on the south shore, is Rabat. This is the modern center of the government of Morocco and the French Protectorate. Here is a palace of the Sultan, and here are the buildings of the French Resident General. Even if the officers of the French administration were disposed to obey Vichy in resistance to American forces, and every effort should be made to prevent this attitude,

a surprise attack might result and preferably would result in their apprehension and a consequent paralysis of the civil and military administration of Morocco. I judge it would be more practical and would involve less military measures to take Casablanca after Rabat was occupied, rather than before.

Another possible landing place of a minor character, at times when the weather on the Atlantic permitted, might be found in the tiny old Portuguese port of Mazagan, south of Casablanca. This little port is mentioned only because in building up forces on the west coast of Morocco probably every landing spot would have to be utilized to the full extent of its feasibility.

7. Assuming that a beach head could be built up around Casablanca, through which an initial force of 100,000 men, largely mechanized and motorized, with accompanying air power, could be landed, advance eastward should be relatively simple and rapid. There is the famous passageway through the Couloir de Taza from Fez to Algeria, through which a force could be rapidly moved. In fact, the advance part of a motorized force could clear it in a single day. There is a light railroad and an automobile route, by means of which Algeria could be occupied. From Algeria the line of movement and transportation extends into Tunisia and against Tripoli. The seizure of Tripoli and the cutting off of the main base of Rommel should be the mission of this force. The air arm should be very large in proportion to whatever the Germans and Italians can oppose. From land air bases extended along the line of advance, it should be able to win and keep air superiority.

8. The route by which such forces could reach Africa, moving either directly from the Chesapeake or from the extreme eastern coast of Brazil, should be far safer for troop movement than the northern route into North Ireland or Great Britain. It would be protected in some degree by Gibraltar and by its own land based planes in western Morocco. If a base for submarines and other craft, both air and surface, could be secured in the Azores, or even in the Canaries or the Madeiras, a strong protection could be offered to the line of convoy against enemy sea-craft or air power. The advantage of such a front in Europe would lie primarily in the fact that the Mediterranean would intervene between its forces and German might utilizing Italy and the Island of Sicily. The Mediterranean would still remain difficult for German-Italian transport, and it could be made very much more difficult by air power based on Algeria. In fact, the United States should be able to close access from Europe to the armies of Rommel.

9. Another alternative route against enemy forces in Libya, longer and far more difficult, is the route from Senegambia to the head waters of the Niger and down the Niger to the vicinity of Gao, and by truck transport across the Sahara upon Tripoli. Such a route might seem impractical, but for a reduced expedition, designed as an additional threat to Rommel's rear, I believe it is not impractical. The railroad line from Dakar to Bamako on the Upper Niger is a light and small affair, probably still ill provided

with rolling stock, but it would serve a definite need. The major transportation all the way through the Sudan and across the Sahara would have to be trucks. Gasoline and oil would have to be brought in in due quantities. Nevertheless, such an activity would be useful in two ways: It would bring under American control a part of Africa, embracing Dakar, indispensable to American protection of South America; and, second, it would constitute an additional menace to the German-Italian forces that would have a real effect upon their freedom of action against Egypt.

There are no real physical barriers to such a line of operations. From Gao on the River Niger below Timbuctoo, through to Algeria, the French have maintained for some years a line of motor transport across the Sahara. Something over a year ago a report upon this route was obtained from an American anthropologist, Mr. Miner, who reached Timbuctoo by this truck line across the Sahara in 1939 and came out in 1940. The journey between Gao and Colomb-Bechar consumed five days, though this time could be greatly shortened by competent handling of truck transportation, in the opinion of a French officer whose views were obtained by Mr. Miner at Gao. The truck line terminus, instead of being Colomb-Bechar, would probably be Ouargla and then eastwardly against Tripoli itself. Attention is invited to the report of Mr. Miner which is attached to this memorandum.

10. Of course, a military movement of this kind, which seems to the writer to be almost imperative, is dependent upon the policy of our own Government with respect to Vichy. The ease with which it could be done would also be affected by the attitude of the French forces in North Africa. Every effort should be made to overcome their hostility and win their participation. The writer has received very recent assurance from high French authority that the French commander and troops in Africa, if they were convinced of the seriousness of the American effort and its prospect of success, would unite their strength with that of an American expedition.


May I repeat again this recommendation of such an American operation. It would realize something of extreme strategic importance to the United States, namely, a temporary possession of a part of Africa, which if secured by the enemy will jeopardize our own defense of the South Atlantic. American participation in the defeat of the enemy in Europe should, wherever possible, contribute to the defense of American interests, and should be of such character that it can be best handled by American forces under American command.

11. As an alternative to the direct occupation of Dakar, provided there are political and military objections against American seizure of this position, an advance by way of the Niger River can be made further down the coast from French Guinea and the Atlantic port of Konakry. A light railroad runs from Konakry to the upper navigable waters of the Niger. Bamako can be reached quite as directly by this route as by way of Dakar and the upper Senegal River. These routes are indicated on the sketch maps A and B accompanying this memorandum.

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DPB:BP
Att.



CARTE DES ROUTES SAHARIENNES

- A. Route Tripoli-Lac Tchad. Parmi celles qui mènent du nord de l'Afrique au Soudan, c'est la meilleure et la plus anciennement connue. C'est par cette route que Laing atteint Tombouctou. C'est également celle que suivit Barth (1849-1856).
 - B. Route Algérie-Air. Les premiers à l'utiliser furent Foureau et Lamy (1898-99). Cette route traverse le plateau escarpé de Tassili, contourne à l'est le massif du Hoggar (ou Ahaggar) et atteint la région relativement peuplée d'Air.
 - C. Route des oasis du Sud-Algérien, qui passe à l'ouest du Hoggar (Ahaggar), contourne le massif montagneux de l'Adras des Iforas et aboutit à la grande boucle du Niger. Cette route a été ouverte par le Général Laperrine (1904). C'est généralement cet itinéraire qu'empruntent les voyageurs d'Algérie désireux de gagner le Soudan français. Il a aussi été suivi par Haardt et Audouin-Dubreuil lors de leur raid automobile de décembre 1922.
 - D. Route Maroc-Tombouctou. Elle traverse l'Oued Draa au sud du Petit Atlas et passe près des fameuses mines de sel de Taodéni.
 - E. Route reliant le Sud-Marocain à la vallée du Sénégal à travers la région montagneuse d'Atar. Elle passe par le Rio de Oro, et aucun Européen ne l'a jamais suivie de bout en bout en raison de l'hostilité des tribus désertiques qui la sillonnent. Certains la préconisent pour le tracé du futur Transsaharien.
- Pour plus de détails, consulter Victor Beauregard, *l'Empire colonial de la France*, Paris, 1924 et Gautier, *le Sahara*, Paris, 1923.

See Reverse Side

Sketch Maps from BERBERS AND BLACKS by David P. Barrows, Century Co., New York

SOUDANLINE OF OPERATIONS B

