

BOX 168.

3. A-16 PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL: March, 1942 - April, 1944.

bore the brunt of the battle in defending the American flag.

The explanation for this is simple. Disregarding old colonial methods, America followed in the islands a policy that was humane, altruistic, and progressive. Her dealings with the people have been characterized not only by sincerity and good faith, but also by a spirit of liberalism, equality, and justice. She has complied with every promise made to them. She has administered the affairs of the islands as a true trustee not for her own benefit but for the benefit and welfare of the Filipino people. "The Philippines for the Filipino" had been her guiding principle throughout all these years. She, therefore, has won not only the cooperation and support of the Filipino people but also their steadfast loyalty, gratitude, and faith.

In the building up of this faith we owe much not only to the pioneers of America in the Philippines but also to the multitude of men and women of good will and stout hearts who have since gone to our remote islands in the Pacific to join in the task of nation building, keeping in mind the welfare of our people and maintaining always the good name of America. Many of these have returned to the United States and are living here. Others like Dewey, Schurman, and Taft have passed away, but to all of them—living and dead—and, indeed, to those now suffering in enemy prison and concentration camps and to those still maintaining the spirit of resistance in the mountains of the Philippines, I wish to render a tribute of affection, admiration, and gratitude in behalf of my people.

Extending alongside Manila Bay, where 45 years ago Dewey won his laurels, there is the most beautiful boulevard in the Orient, which the Filipino people, in token of their affection and respect, named after Dewey. At

one end of this boulevard is the monument to Jose Rizal, our national hero, and from this monument begins the Bonifacio Drive, named after our great revolutionary leader of 1896. Not far from this, running parallel, is Taft Avenue which itself meets the Father Burgos Drive, named after our priest-martyr, and ends with the plaza named after General Lawton. To the left of this plaza is the most important bridge, crossing the Pasig River, and named after William A. Jones, author of the organic act which promised independence to the Philippines. Inside the walled city is the Plaza McKinley, which was the old Spanish Government center, with the supreme court building on one side and the cathedral on the other. In that plaza Mr. Taft took his oath of office as the first civil governor of the Philippines.

In addition, there are three public parks and a parkway named after four Governors General—Luke E. Wright, W. Cameron Forbes, Francis Burton Harrison, and Leonard Wood—while the main Philippine army post and training camp was named after the last Governor General and first United States High Commissioner to the Philippines—Frank Murphy.

As time goes on, other landmarks and monuments will doubtless be erected in honor of individual Americans and Filipinos who distinguished themselves in the service of the Filipino people, both in war and in peace. Among these, I envision a simple one—a great square block of native stone—dedicated to the imperishable memory of those who fell in the Battle of the Philippines, sealing with their sacrifices the enduring friendship and solidarity of our two peoples. I propose to have it lettered thus: "To all those, known and unknown, whose mingled blood was shed for the defense of America and the Philippines and for the glory of God."

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### Dewey's Naval Victory and the American Pioneers in the Philippines

Address delivered by

**Hon. Sergio Osmeña**  
*Vice President of the Philippines*

before the

**Naval Academy Women's Club**  
at Annapolis, Md.

April 3, 1944

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**Dewey's Naval Victory and the American  
Pioneers in the Philippines**

**EXTENSION OF REMARKS**

OF

**HON. RICHARD J. WELCH**

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, April 12, 1944

Mr. WELCH. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, I include the following address delivered by the Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Vice President of the Philippines, entitled "Dewey's Naval Victory and the American Pioneers in the Philippines," which was delivered on April 3, 1944, before the Naval Academy Woman's Club at Annapolis, Md.:

Madam President, distinguished members of the club, and friends: I am deeply thankful to you for the opportunity afforded me to address you today. I have chosen for my subject "Dewey's Naval Victory and the American Pioneers in the Philippines." I have done this for two reasons: First, because it is in Annapolis where your famous Naval Academy is located and I wish to honor one of the academy's most distinguished graduates—Dewey; second, because Admiral Dewey's gallant fight at Manila Bay almost 45 years ago cannot be considered any longer as an isolated exploit of a great commander. It is, in fact, the starting point of a political association between the United States and the Philippines—a partnership of mutuality and helpfulness that has been carried out successfully during all these years and has contributed greatly to the happiness and welfare of our two peoples.

The event that brought the United States to the Philippines in 1898 was the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Commodore Dewey, who was in command of the American Pacific squadron then in Hong Kong, was ordered to Manila Bay to engage the Spanish Fleet there. "You must capture vessels or destroy," instructed the cable of the Secre-

tary of the Navy. After waiting 2 days for information from the Philippines, Dewey left for Manila, entering its bay on the night of April 30 in disregard of the mines and fortifications therein. He then circled past the water front, ignoring shots fired by Manila batteries, and proceeded to Cavite where the Spanish Fleet under Admiral Montojo was formed in battle line.

The engagement did not take long. In the morning of May 1, at 5:41, with Dewey's command, "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley," the American squadron commenced the attack, keeping it up until 7:45 a. m., when Dewey, confident of victory, retired. At 11:16 a. m. he reengaged the enemy, but by this time most of the Spanish ships were aflame and sinking, while others had fled, seeking protection behind Cavite Point. At 12:30 p. m. a white flag was hoisted in the Government Building at Cavite and the firing ceased. Thus, Admiral Dewey, with his little squadron, composed of the *Olympia*, his flagship, and the *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Peter*, *Concord*, and *Boston*, in less than a day, destroyed the sea power of Spain in the Philippines. Having accomplished this, Dewey then proceeded to effect a blockade of the city of Manila, isolating it from the outside world.

Important as was the Battle of Manila Bay, it was only incidental to the big military operations conducted by the United States in the Caribbean. In that area she waged war on Spain with a definite purpose—that of liberating Cuba. In the Philippines she had no avowed objective except to destroy Spanish power in the islands. When this was accomplished the United States could have withdrawn from the islands after the signing of the armistice between the American and Spanish forces. But Dewey's great victory in Manila Bay had created an international situation from which the United States could not escape. Moreover, it brought the Filipino people within the domain of American solicitude and responsibility. The American people who had gone to war for the emancipation of Cuba could not, after Dewey's victory at Manila Bay, be reconciled with the idea of leaving another oppressed people any longer under Spain.

Thus, on October 28, 1898, the Secretary of State cabled this message to the American

Commissioners who were negotiating the peace treaty with Spain at Paris:

"The sentiment in the United States is almost universal that the people of the Philippines, whatever is done, must be liberated from Spanish domination. . . .

"Consequently, grave as the responsibilities and unforeseen as the difficulties which are before us, the President can see but one plain path of duty—the acceptance of the Philippine archipelago."

With the assumption of this new responsibility, the question arose as to what to do with the Philippine Islands. Should they be colonized in the manner and style of the old colonizing powers, embarking the United States on the road to imperialism? Or should they be admitted as a State or Territory into the American Union? Or should they be granted outright independence?

To help solve the Philippine problem, President McKinley sent the first Philippine Commission—headed by Dr. Jacob Gould Schurman, president of Cornell University, a great liberal and an outstanding scholar.

The Schurman commission arrived in Manila in February 1899, some time after the outbreak of hostilities between the American and Filipino forces. The only Philippine territory occupied by the Americans was the naval station at Cavite and the city of Manila. Manila was forced to surrender under a combined Filipino-American pressure. All the other provinces and islands of the Philippines were under the control of an independent government of the Philippines which was set up by the Filipinos a month before at Malolos. This situation naturally increased the responsibilities and difficulties of the commission. It not only had to make a study of the conditions of the islands among a hostile population but also had to help the United States Army in the task of acquainting the people with America's altruistic purposes.

To understand the situation that faced the Schurman commission at this time, it is necessary to consider the existing political temper in the islands. The Filipino people, repeatedly subjected to injustices and abuses, had tired of airing their grievances and of petitioning without avail for redress. Their clamors for urgent and essential reforms in the government remained unheeded. Having exhausted all peaceful means, they turned to the last recourse—revolution.

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When the revolt was of a local character it was easy for the Spanish Government to quell it. But in 1898 the revolution acquired national proportions. It spread not only to the provinces surrounding Manila but to other islands in the south as well. Indeed, it became so menacing that the Spanish Government had to compromise with its leaders in the famous Pact of Biak-na-bato—by the terms of which Spain agreed to initiate reforms in the government and to give indemnity to the Filipinos in exchange for the surrender of arms and the exile of the Filipino leaders. Neither of the parties—Spaniard or Filipino—intended to live up to his bargain. The Spaniard had hoped that with the exile of the Filipino leaders the people would calm down, while the Filipinos, with the indemnity money paid them, intended to purchase arms. It was at this time that the Spanish-American War broke out.

It is interesting to note that Dewey was instrumental in bringing Aguinaldo, the exiled leader of the revolution, back to the islands. In him, Dewey and the other military commanders found a ready ally in the war against Spain. On the other hand, Aguinaldo, in lending his support to the American forces, had hoped that the Philippines would be eventually independent. Given the signal to resume the struggle against Spain, the forces of the revolution swept from Province to Province, forcing the capitulation of Spanish garrisons and finally reaching the gates of the city of Manila.

When the Treaty of Paris, of December 10, 1898, was signed, by the terms of which the Philippines was ceded by Spain to the United States, the Filipinos became bitterly disappointed. They questioned the legitimacy of the transfer, since the ceding power no longer had any possession of the islands. In addition, they entertained doubts as to the real intention of the United States in the Philippines. To enlighten them and to win their confidence became, therefore, the immediate task of the Commission. They exhausted every method of conciliation to win popular support for the cause of peace and the acceptance of American sovereignty.

In a proclamation the Commission declared that the aim and object of the American Government " . . . is the well-being, the prosperity, and the happiness of the

Philippine people and their elevation and advancement to a position among the most civilized peoples of the world."

Although no immediate results could be achieved by the Commission in its peace efforts, Dr. Schurman and his colleagues rendered signal service to the United States by helping the military authorities in the islands expound to the people the liberal policy and beneficent aims of the United States in the Philippines. Upon the completion of its studies and investigations, the Commission returned to the United States and submitted its report. This report is one of the most important documents in the history of Philippine-American relations. It served as a basis for Executive pronouncements and congressional actions. Although the Commission did not recommend the granting of immediate independence or the admission of the Philippines into the American Union, it clearly stated in its report that ultimate independence is the aspiration and goal of the Filipinos, including the conservative elements that at that time were opposed to immediate independence. To reconcile the political rights and privileges of the Filipinos with the democratic traditions and sovereign rights of the United States, the Commission recommended from the very outset "to extend to the Filipinos larger liberties of self-government than Jefferson approved of for the inhabitants of Louisiana." In such a scheme of government the people were to be allowed to elect the members of the lower house of the legislature.

Filipino resistance, in the face of America's superior arms and of her liberal pronouncements, could not last long. Foreseeing the termination of hostilities, President McKinley sent to the Philippines a second Commission, headed by an outstanding jurist, William H. Taft, to exercise the powers of a quasi civil government in the islands.

For the guidance of the Commission, the President signed a letter of instructions drawn by a great statesman, Secretary Root. In those instructions, the President enjoined the Commission that the welfare of the islands should be a paramount consideration and, among other things, said:

"In all the fields of government and administrative provisions which they are authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that the government which

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they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government."

In compliance with the instructions, the Commission proceeded to prepare a municipal code and a provincial law which invested the people with the power of exercising wide autonomy in their municipal governments and a considerable autonomy in their provincial governments. The Commission also passed a civil-service act which specifically provided that other things being equal Filipinos should be preferred for governmental positions.

Subsequently, three Filipinos were appointed to the Commission and when Congress had under consideration a bill providing a more definite organization for the government of the Philippines, Governor Taft, siding with Mr. Cooper, the chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, and with other liberals in the House, fought vigorously for the inclusion in the bill of the provision, giving to the Filipino people an elective assembly. In his whole administration, Mr. Taft, as President of the Commission, and as Civil Governor, emphasized that the motto of the government was "the Philippines for the Filipinos."

It is to the credit of the United States that for the purpose of the pioneering work in the islands, men of the highest qualifications were chosen. Mr. Taft and his colleagues of the Commission ably tackled the difficult initial problems of government. Through their patience and tact, limitless energy and enthusiasm, consideration, and sympathetic understanding, they won for the United States the good will of the Filipino people.

In the successful execution of America's high purposes in the Philippines, such competent and firm direction as that lent by Taft and his colleagues was, of course, indispensable. But this alone could not have been sufficient. It was necessary to enlist the full cooperation of all the other ele-

ments. I wish to speak of the magnificent contribution rendered by each of them.

In the first place, the American soldiers are to be commended for their exemplary conduct during the military campaign in the islands. Led and inspired by such outstanding military commanders as Generals Otis and Arthur MacArthur, they generally respected the rights and liberties of the civilian population as far as military necessity permitted. They treated their prisoners-of-war in accordance with the rules of international law.

In the administration of civil affairs during the military regime, their work was most constructive. They facilitated the resumption of the normal functioning of courts of justice and issued general orders governing marriage and criminal procedure which are in force up to the present. They supervised with fairness and impartiality the first municipal elections held in the Philippines under the American flag. Many of them accepted commissions in the Philippine Constabulary, a national police organization, which became a very important factor in the maintenance of peace in the islands. Others became teachers. Nothing was more inspiring than to see American soldiers, in the towns and barrios they had occupied, putting aside their rifles, and with book in hand, repairing to the public schools to teach the children of those whom they had only recently faced in the field of battle. But that was what actually took place—and that was the spirit that was to win over the Filipinos in those crucial days.

In its first proclamation in 1899, the Schurman commission declared the establishment of elementary schools and the provision for appropriate facilities for higher education to be of cardinal importance in the American program for the islands. And one of the first acts of the Taft commission provided for the appointment of more than 1,000 American teachers. These teachers and the others who followed them became missionaries of good will and the exponents of American democracy among the masses. They did a marvelous work because of their zeal and solicitude and considering the conditions they had to work under. Often, they had to stay in far and remote places, devoid of conveniences they had been used to. The zeal of these teachers was repaid fully,

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however, by the enthusiasm shown by the people for education. No people ever accepted the blessings of education more readily than the Filipinos. This is the reason why we never had to pass a law making public education compulsory.

In the report of the Schurman commission, there was recognized as a basic need for a sound organization of the executive branch of the Government, the existence of a body of honest and efficient government officials and employees. When the Taft commission was organized, the fifth act approved by them was that providing for a civil-service system in which merit and fitness alone should govern, and these qualifications were to be determined by competitive examination. Many Americans from the United States Civil Service went to the Philippines to take part in the work started by the Taft commission. They were diligent and honest, courteous, and efficient.

One of the early problems that faced the new government was that of public health and sanitation. The incidents and mortality due to certain diseases were high all over the islands. Every now and then epidemics of smallpox or cholera would break out. Under American leadership, vigorous health measures were taken, such as compulsory vaccination and the building of artesian wells, and steps were taken to prevent the transmission of disease by the rat, fly, and mosquito. Infant mortality, too, was reduced. In the organization of the bureau of health and its branches in the provinces, in the establishment of hospitals and dispensaries and maternity clinics, and in the quarantine service, American technical assistance was invaluable and doctors and nurses made a splendid record.

The lawyers who were appointed to the bench were men of honor, learning, and ability and they helped in establishing in the islands an independent judiciary. Those who entered into the law practice were fair-minded and able men, and they helped in setting up a high standard for the legal profession. Both judges and law practitioners, solicitous of the people's welfare, poor and rich alike, cooperated together in winning from the masses faith and confidence in the administration of justice.

In the building up of a strong national structure, roads and other transportation

facilities to develop trade and promote understanding are essential. When the civil government was established, with Governor Taft at the head, the old Spanish road system of less than a thousand miles throughout the islands was almost destroyed. Most of those roads were impassable during the rainy season, and the facilities for travel in the dry season were very limited. The problem facing the Commission was not only to repair and widen the old roads but to build new ones. A constructive policy for the building, repair, and maintenance of roads was adopted by the Commission, and experienced engineers were brought from the United States. These engineers, through their technical ability, industry, and endurance, carried out the program with marked success. These engineers were also helpful in the construction of waterworks, artesian wells, and public buildings.

The American missionaries of all denominations and sects who came to the islands were among those who rendered valuable service to the Filipino people. As soon as the flames of war died down, they established schools and missionary centers, to work among the native inhabitants, often in remote places, helping them to improve their lot and do away with diseases and prejudices. While these missionaries did their religious and missionary work with zeal, they did nothing to prevent other existing religious organizations from carrying on their religious activities and professions. Religious freedom, in place of religious intolerance, became the rule in the new regime in which the church became separated from the state. This was one of the blessings of democracy which America brought to the Philippines.

When the main body of the Army was withdrawn from Philippine service, many enterprising Americans who came with the Army established themselves in the islands as independent businessmen, farmers, and manufacturers. Many of them, after a few years of toil became prosperous. With the increase of Philippine trade with the United States and other countries, greater impetus was given to the economic development of the islands, and outside capital was especially needed. In a large measure, however, it may be said that the greater portion of American capital invested in the Philippines before the war did not come from the

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United States but was made right there and multiplied by these enterprising men.

In addition to these groups, there were individual Americans, scientists, researchers and economists, journalists and writers, educators, industrialists, and others, who came to the Philippines to add their contribution to the islands' political, social, educational, and economic development. Each, working in his own way, helped to lay the foundations of a new nation.

All these people were the pioneers of America in the islands. They worked closely together to make the American adventure in the Philippines a success. They were the ones who blazed the trails of good and humane government in the islands, and set the pattern which has been consistently followed in the succeeding years. They were the ones who, for a time, suffered the natural coldness and indifference of a people newly conquered and who waded through their prejudices and indifference to win for America in the end the everlasting and fervent affection, gratitude, and loyalty of the Filipino people.

Nothing, of course, could have been accomplished without the support and cooperation of the Filipino people themselves. The environmental factors were indeed conducive to progress and development, but the principal reason why so much success was made within a relatively short period of time was that America found in the Philippines a people possessing a basic culture, politically conscious, ready for the exercise of the prerogatives and duties of self-government, and responsive to the continuing demands of progress.

It is said that shortly after his victory over the Spanish Fleet, Dewey, professing to ignore the possibility that Spain might be succeeded by the United States in the Philippines, prophesied that in 40 or 50 years a Japanese naval squadron might enter Manila Bay, as he had done, demanding surrender of Manila and the Philippines. As Dewey predicted, so the Japanese came. But one essential fact is to be noted and it is this: When America came, we Filipinos sided with America and fought against the existing sovereign. When 45 years later, Japan came, we Filipinos not only sided with America, the sovereign power, but ourselves voluntarily and spontaneously

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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Hobeaw, South Carolina,  
April 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

The President entertained Prime Minister Curtin at lunch today. After luncheon the President was closeted with the Prime Minister for nearly an hour. The President directs that the following notation be made a part of the files of the Pacific War Council:

"In the course of conversation after lunch, Prime Minister Curtin expressed concern lest the accounts published about the agreement between Australia and New Zealand concerning the future control of the Pacific might be misunderstood and possibly resented in the United States and in the United Kingdom. He wished to explain to the President what had brought about the agreement. President Roosevelt said that he thought he had already figured out what had occurred. His guess is that Prime Minister Curtin had had very little to do with the drafting but that Evatt had done most of it and others had merely agreed. Curtin said that was exactly right: that a group had discussed the future of the white man in the Pacific and that they had all disapproved of the Government's India policy and feared that unless properly handled China might turn against all white men. While pursuing

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this theme the proposal for an agreement between Australia and New Zealand was made and carried in what may well prove to be an excess of enthusiasm.

"President Roosevelt directs that the record show that his present opinion is that it will be best for us to forget the whole incident. He told Curtin he hoped he would attend a Pacific War Council meeting when he returned to the United States."

*W. Brown*  
W. Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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January 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM

The thirty-sixth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C., at 12:30 p.m., on Wednesday, January 12, 1944.

Present:

The President.

The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. Loudon.

The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-ming.

The Canadian Ambassador, Hon. Leighton McCarthy.

Vice President Sergio Osmena, representing Hon. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth.

The New Zealand Minister, Dr. Walter Nash.

The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon.

Sir Ronald Campbell, E.E. and M.P., representing Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador.

In meeting, Ambassador McCarthy presented his credentials changing his rank from Minister to Ambassador. The President stated that he had made the suggestion through the State Department some time ago that all countries should do away with the distinction between Minister and Ambassador and make everyone Ambassador, but that Holland had objected on the ground that it would involve additional expense. He suggested that perhaps Australia and New Zealand might follow Canada's example.

President Roosevelt stated that although the Council had not met for over three months he felt that affairs in the Pacific are proceeding

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in a reasonably satisfactory manner and that he is pleased to note that Dr. Nash, in an interview with the press yesterday, had commented favorably on the Pacific situation and had expressed his opinion about what should be done about the future of the Pacific islands. President Roosevelt informed the Council that his discussions with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with Marshal Stalin were highly satisfactory--in that both had agreed that Japan should be stripped of her island possessions and that the civil control of the islands north of the equator should be taken over by the United Nations, while the policing of the Western Pacific and, therefore, the necessary air and naval bases should be taken over by those powers capable of exercising effective military control. Marshal Stalin had specifically agreed to the idea that Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores should be returned to China; that the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and that they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage; that Russia, having no ice-free port in Siberia, is desirous of getting one and that Marshal Stalin looks with favor upon making Dairen a free port for all the world, with the idea that Siberian exports and imports could be sent through the port of Dairen and carried to Siberian territory over the Manchurian Railroad in bond. He agrees that the Manchurian Railway should become the property of the Chinese Government. He wishes all of Sakhalin to be returned to Russia and to have the Kurile Islands turned over to Russia in order that they may exercise control of the straits leading to Siberia.

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President Roosevelt stated that it was extremely gratifying to him to find that the Generalissimo and Marshal Stalin saw "eye to eye" with him on all major problems of the Pacific and that he felt that there would be no difficulty in reaching agreements about the control of the Pacific once Japan had been completely conquered.

President Roosevelt stated that he thinks the Pacific War Council is the body that should work out preliminary studies about the final solution of the Pacific problems as all interested powers are represented in the Council except Russia, whose agreement might be expected in view of the discussions the President had already had with Marshal Stalin.

President Roosevelt also recalled that Stalin is familiar with the history of the Liuchiu Islands and that he is in complete agreement that they belong to China and should be returned to her, and further that the civil administration of all islands now controlled by Japan should be taken over by the United Nations with, as stated before, military control of specific strong points assigned as necessary to maintain the peace. President Roosevelt stated that he believed that everyone agreed that the civil administration of the Pacific Islands is a responsibility that should be carried out for the benefit of the populations and that their administration will always be a source of expense rather than profit.

After some general discussion it was agreed that military requirements would have to be studied and the studies reviewed from time to time and that the Council should not make any definite

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of subjects to defend her northern approaches and that she is  
commitments until such studies had been fully considered.

President Roosevelt stated that he believes the United States  
would be willing to act as police agent throughout the Marshalls,  
Caroline Islands and Bonins until China is ready to take over  
her share of policing.

There was general discussion of how a committee could be  
formed that would represent the United Nations, and President  
Roosevelt reminded the Council that at Quebec a number of the  
members had agreed in principle that all of the United Nations  
would have a function similar to a board of directors, but that  
it would be necessary to have a small executive committee with  
authority to take immediate action when action is necessary to  
maintain the peace.

Discussion then shifted to the islands south of the equator  
and President Roosevelt stated that it seemed to him that after  
the last war the distribution of islands in the neighborhood of  
New Zealand and Australia had been rather hit or miss and that  
perhaps a reassignment of these islands might be considered. Dr.  
Nash suggested that New Zealand's interests went as far east as  
the Society and Tuamotu groups, and President Roosevelt laughingly  
suggested that since they were so very ambitious perhaps New Zealand  
should extend its control to Australia.

Dr. Nash replied that he was quite serious in pointing out the  
very great interest that New Zealand has in establishing ownership

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of outposts to defend her northern approaches and that she is necessarily interested in air routes linking her to the rest of the world. The future ownership of Timor was raised and the Netherlands Ambassador reminded the Council that part of Timor belongs to Holland and that they are very much interested in maintaining their hold there.

A general discussion of the value of New Caledonia followed during which the French administration of the islands was quite generally criticised, but lightly defended in some respects by Sir Owen Dixon. President Roosevelt quoted Admiral Halsey as saying that the French administration had been very bad and that they should not be permitted to continue control of the islands.

Sir Owen Dixon stated that he thought the French were at a disadvantage in trying to develop the resources because of their lack of shipping and because they have no markets to which the great mineral wealth of the islands might be shipped. On the other hand, he pointed out that New Caledonia is one of the natural outposts and barriers for the future security of Australia and New Zealand and that the mineral resources of New Caledonia are badly needed by those two commonwealths. Dr. Nash added that the New Hebrides and the Fiji Islands are also a part of the natural protection for Australia and New Zealand. President Roosevelt stated that he freight from Europe to Australia, but are they really why they should not have shipping and air lines from New York to San Francisco. Dr. Nash pointed out that some of the United States air lines might

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personally felt very sympathetic to transferring control of those islands to Australia and New Zealand and that he does not feel that the part that France has played in the war, particularly in the Pacific, entitles her to any decisive voice in the peace of the Pacific.

President Roosevelt repeated what he had stated to the Council at a previous meeting--that Admiral Byrd is making a study of the Marquesas and Tuamotu groups with the idea of selecting air field sites.

Dr. Nash said that if the President considered it a proper question he would like to ask whether the United States will grant free passage of aircraft from Europe through the Panama Canal to the Marquesas, as on that decision rests all of New Zealand's future commercial air plans. President Roosevelt stated that his own view is that the aircraft of all respectable nations should be permitted to refuel and reservice at any island or continental air base they might desire to and that the only restrictions placed upon them should be to forbid the carrying of passengers or freight from one point in a country to another point in the same country. In other words, he saw no reason why British planes should not use the ports of New York and San Francisco to refuel when flying passengers and freight from Europe to Australia, but saw every reason why they should not carry passengers and freight from New York to San Francisco. Dr. Nash pointed out that some of the United States air lines might

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well hold that carrying passengers and freight from Honolulu to San Francisco is an internal transportation question and that, if so, we might establish other islands in the Pacific farther west which virtually would block the development of air lines by any other power in the Pacific. President Roosevelt said that he had no doubt there would be difficulty in obtaining general agreement, but that his own belief is that air lines should be made as free as we are able to make them except that for a good many years to come the Germans should not be allowed any planes or plane factories or even to teach aviation with gliders.

Ambassador McCarthy predicted that American air companies will struggle to have exclusive rights over a considerable area of the Pacific, and that Canada expects to handle her air problems by government control of all air lines. He stated that Canada may find herself in a very favorable position, in that many useful air fields will be within her domain, particularly if northern routes are developed between Russia and Siberia. He stated that, of course, they expect to continue to allow the general use of their fields in Nova Scotia and elsewhere by airlines of other nations.

Dr. Nash asked if the President is familiar with Mangariva in the Tuamotu group. He said that he had been informed that there was a fine lagoon there and that it might be very valuable.

The Netherlands Ambassador raised the question of the investment of foreign money in air lines and pointed out that this is a matter that requires careful scrutiny as the Germans may use it

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to evade any restrictions placed them. He stated that he is informed that they have already started developments in Sweden that will be of use to them when they lose their own factories and facilities.

Ambassador McCarthy asked whether it could be assumed that Russia would exercise state ownership of all her air lines and there was general agreement that that may be expected. President Roosevelt pointed out how guarded the Russians have been in not allowing any of our fliers to operate in either Siberia or Russia and that although we are delivering a great many fighter planes through Alaska and Siberia, the Russians will not allow our fliers to go into Siberia, but take over the planes at Fairbanks, notwithstanding their admitted shortage of pilots.

The Netherlands Ambassador assured the Council that in future discussions of the redistribution of Pacific islands, Holland would offer no difficulties in matters of security based on a purely reciprocal agreement.

President Roosevelt stated that in the matter of future world security and peace, he feels that the nations who have borne the brunt of the fighting have a right to exercise continued control of bases whose loss would jeopardize future security and that he had definitely in mind that the interests and security of the United States are involved in maintaining military air fields in the Cape

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Verde Islands and at Dakar, whereas the sovereignty and civil administration of those areas are not a matter of profound concern except as they affect the exercise of air power in those areas.

In adjourning at 1:20 p.m., the President suggested that all members be prepared to continue further discussions of Pacific islands at the next meeting.

*W. J. Brown*

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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September 29, 1943.

M E M O R A N D U M

The thirty-fifth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C., at 12:20 p.m., on Wednesday, September 29, 1943.

Present:

The President.  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. T. V. Soong.  
The Canadian Minister, Hon. Leighton McCarthy.  
The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon.  
Sir Ronald I. Campbell, E.E. and M.P., representing Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador.  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P., representing Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Ambassador.  
Vice President Sergio Osmena, representing Hon. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth.  
Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary, Charge d'Affairs ad interim, representing Dr. Walter Nash, the New Zealand Minister.

President Roosevelt informed the Council that he had been delayed because of the necessity of holding a conference with the Governor of North Dakota on the important subject of wheat production for next year. He stated that, of course, the world food supply is becoming more and more of a problem as the greater part of the world becomes dependent on the help they can get from the Allied nations and that although all Allied nations are now producing more food than we ever have before, our own people are having less and less to eat because of the quantities we are sending to others. The United States, therefore, plans to greatly increase wheat production next year and it is understood that Canada and Australia are making similar preparations. The Australian Minister (Sir

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Owen Dixon) stated that in Australia the great problem is labor and that the shortage of labor will prevent them from doing all that they otherwise might.

President Roosevelt said that his only current war news of the Pacific is the confirmation of the news despatches concerning our devastating air attack on the Japanese forces at Wewak during which seven ships and nearly 60 enemy planes were destroyed. As this is the third major loss the Japanese have suffered at Wewak, it is hoped that it will be an important interruption to whatever plans they may have had for the defense of that area. Sir Owen Dixon said that he had purposely not enquired about what the Allied plans may be; but that it is apparent even to a layman that we must establish an air base near Cape Gloucester in western New Britain in order to protect the approaches to Lae and Salamaua and that he believed that the Japanese strength in that area has been so weakened that this should not be too difficult to accomplish. He said that the fighting around Lae and Salamaua had been tough and determined but that the Japanese troops encountered were not nearly as determined and skillful as had been expected; so that, while our losses had been less than we expected, the Japanese had been practically annihilated, frequently by artillery fire alone, and that the survivors had taken to the bush where it is expected they will starve to death.

President Roosevelt stated that everybody is at a loss to understand the reason for General MacArthur's recent press announcement about "island hopping", as it gave the impression that MacArthur's plans of campaign were being ignored, whereas, as the Council knows, the President had spoken

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against "island hopping" at least eight months ago and that our intention is to strike direct blows at the heart of Japan as soon as we are in a position to do so. The President continued that he is very disappointed at our failure to live up to expectations in delivering supplies to China by air and that our failure is due to "bugs" that have developed in C-46 transports in flying the Himalayas. These planes, which had given a good performance in other areas, had developed difficulties in the Far East and it had taken some time to overcome the mechanical troubles. Although past performance has been disappointing, we have actually succeeded in delivering 6,000 tons during August and hope to reach the goal of 7,000 tons next month.

After some discussion it was agreed between President Roosevelt and Dr. Soong that the latest information indicates that Vice Admiral Mountbatten will leave for his new station early in October and that he will confer with the Generalissimo sometime about the middle of October. Regret was expressed that the public had been given to understand that a conflict in authority and interests would develop between Mountbatten and MacArthur; whereas, of course, it was well understood by everyone in authority that geography itself required the maintenance of entirely separate commands which would, of course, help each other as circumstances might require and permit.

President Roosevelt said that he ~~was~~<sup>is</sup> very grateful to all countries who ~~had~~ contributed to the reception of Mrs. Roosevelt during her recent air journey to the Southwest Pacific. He said that Mrs. Roosevelt thoroughly enjoyed every moment of it and was greatly touched by the cordial reception

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she had received. It will take her a long time to detail all that she saw and did, as all of her days were so crowded, but one outstanding fact is that she actually saw over 500,000 troops in the Southwest Pacific. She was very much interested by the colorful and fine appearance of the native troops in Fiji and Samoa.

President Roosevelt said that one of the outstanding events in the Pacific since the last meeting was the occupation of Kiska. He said that while we can rejoice that it had not cost us any lives for the occupation, it will remain one of the amusing incidents of the war that, after careful preparation and training, fifty thousand troops succeeded in capturing only three deserted dogs. Reference was also made to the successful, though costly, air raid on Paramushiro when ten of our planes landed and were interned on Kamchatka; the devastating bombardment of Marcus Island; the occupation of Nanumea, and the successful campaign in the Solomons and New Guinea. Repeated reference was made to the failing performance of Japanese pilots and the constant attrition they are suffering in their merchant marine.

President Roosevelt stated that everyone knew that he and Prime Minister Churchill hoped to have a conference with Stalin in the near future, and that when such a meeting occurred an opportunity might offer to sound out Mr. Stalin about the use of Siberian airports for our attack on Japan. President Roosevelt said that he would not embarrass Mr. Stalin by making a direct request for such use but that he hoped an opportunity might offer to give us some inkling about Mr. Stalin's probable attitude as the war advances.

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In reply to a question from the President, Dr. Soong said that he had no subject to discuss with the Council and all other members stated that they had no subject to bring up. President Roosevelt said that he knew all members would be interested to hear how much he had enjoyed his two visits to Canada and the friendly welcome he had received there. Mr. McCarthy was persuaded to recount his outstanding fishing experience of the summer in having a muskel-lunge seize a bass just as he was pulling it into the boat and the President responded with a story of catching a sail-fish without a hook. The fishing stories led to completely informal discussion of the recent elections in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The President expressed the opinion that the people of all of our countries are tired of old faces and want to get some new blood in office.

President Roosevelt said that he thought it would be a good thing for all members of the Council to present the war in Italy to their people as a crusade to drive the Hun from Rome and to free the Pope. He said that he thought we should all try to emphasize that it is a crusade and that such propoganda would be helpful to the Allied cause among people of all religions and of all creeds.

The Charge d'Affairs of New Zealand (Mr. Cox) asked if we had any information about the present Japanese rate of building airplanes. President Roosevelt said that unfortunately we have not and that he felt we should look to China for information about that as well as about Japanese shipbuilding. Dr. Soong said he thinks the Japanese have developed a very much improved pursuit plane but that they are losing in total numbers


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of planes and the quantity of their pilots is falling off rapidly, owing to the great number of experienced pilots who have been killed in the various actions. Dr. Soong also stated in reply to a question that the Chinese are being forced by the Japanese to build a great many wooden ships for Japanese service and that engines for such craft are sent out from Japan.

There being no further subjects for discussion, the meeting was adjourned at 1:00 p.m.

After the meeting, Dr. Soong had a long private conversation with the President, and Sir Owen Dixon discussed with the President Australia's feeling about a rumored visit by Mr. Willkie.



Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM

The thirty-fourth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C., at 12:20 p.m., on Wednesday, August 11, 1943.

Present:

The P r e s i d e n t.  
The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. A. Loudon.  
The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-ming.  
The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon.  
Sir R. I. Campbell, E.E. and M.P., representing Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador.  
Mr. J. M. Elizalde, Resident Commissioner of the Philippine Commonwealth, representing Hon. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine Commonwealth.  
Mr. Merchant Mahoney, Counselor, representing Hon. Leighton McCarthy, the Canadian Minister.  
Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary, representing Dr. Walter Nash, the New Zealand Minister.

President Roosevelt informed the Council that he had just made a voice record of a message to the people of the Philippines and arranged with Resident Commissioner Elizalde that a copy should be sent to President Quezon. The Resident Commissioner informed the Council that President Quezon is making satisfactory progress and that his previous recoveries from attacks of tuberculosis give hope that he will soon be well again. President Roosevelt informed the Council that, as they might infer from the news of the arrival in Canada of the Prime Minister, he, President Roosevelt, looks forward to conversations with the Prime Minister in the next day

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or so and that he expects to go to Quebec before very long for discussions between the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff. He hopes that the visit to Quebec may include some opportunities for fishing. Various members of the Council expressed the hope that he would have successful fishing of all kinds.

President Roosevelt stated that the only war development in the Pacific of importance since the last meeting is the capture of Munda on New Georgia Island. He announced that the Japanese defense of Munda had been stubborn and that its capture had resulted in comparatively heavy losses on both sides. This experience, he continued, serves to emphasize again the tremendous cost in time and lives in an island-to-island drive on Japan. He expressed the opinion that it is another proof that we must find a more direct attack on Japan, since the present rate of progress would take one hundred years to bring complete victory.

The President continued that he is glad to announce that, whereas at the last meeting he had to admit great disappointment in the slow trickle of supplies to China, he can now report that there has been great improvement and that by September we have every reason to hope that supplies will be delivered by air at the rate and in the amounts we had set as our goal several months ago.

President Roosevelt continued that while he believed it is highly improbable that the Germans will collapse this fall, he, nevertheless, believes that the recent change in government in Italy indicates that collapse may occur more abruptly than we expect. Since this is a

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possibility, it is evident that the Pacific War Council should be considering plans for the energetic prosecution of the war against Japan as soon as forces are released from the war in the West. When Germany is subdued it is evident that greatly increased forces will be immediately available to the United States, Great Britain, Holland, and possibly French forces, to be employed against Japan. We must have clearly in mind how they can be employed to the best effect. It seems evident that one of our most effective steps is to provide modern arms and equipment for the Chinese Army and that plans must be ready to carry out that measure. Realizing, as we do, that China has a vast number of trained aviators and soldiers who lack only the equipment to wage successful offensive war against Japan, the importance of supplying China with arms is evident. We may also have the hope of using Siberian bases for air attacks against Japan. The complete destruction of Hamburg is an impressive demonstration of what can be done by long-range bombing. If we can use Siberian air fields, the only requirement is a sufficient number of long-range bombers to attack the heart of Japan in a manner that she will find it hard to endure. We have no assurance that the Russians will agree to the use of their bases but we have evidence in the recent disputes between Japan and Russia that the Russians have no cause to love Japan. President Roosevelt said that he hoped the members of the Council would consider ways and means of attacking Japan as the power and strength of our forces in the Pacific are increased.

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Dr. Loudon stated that he agrees emphatically that we must make up our minds to go to Tokio direct without too much struggling around the edges.

President Roosevelt said that he believes more and more military and naval men are reaching the conclusion that we must cut in north of the Philippines to break the Japanese line and thereby gain control of all of Japan's conquests to the south by severing their line of supply.

Dr. Loudon said that he agrees fully but that he thinks we should not lose sight of the fact that an attack on the Japanese, wherever they may be found, is always a direct contribution toward winning the war. He said that the reports they have of the recent bombing of Surabaya are most encouraging, both because of the amount of damage inflicted and because of the demonstration to the conquered people that the Allied nations are, in fact, battling to come to their rescue.

President Roosevelt stated that only that morning he had received reliable reports that our bombing of the Ploesti oil fields was a very great success in that the Germans had not expected accurate bombing and that as a result nearly seventy percent of the facilities have been destroyed. General Chennault also reports that he has destroyed 45,000 tons of Japanese shipping during July. The success of these long-range bombing measures are impressive and gives us good reason to believe that we can punish Japan, itself, as soon as

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a sufficient number of long-range bombers can be brought into action against her.

President Roosevelt expressed his admiration of the fine diplomacy with which Molotov has been handling the Japanese in the discussions of the seizing of Russian ships by Japan. Molotov has brought the Japanese to terms by refusing to be sidetracked to any side issues or discussions of international law and has held to his blunt demand that Japan release without delay the Russian ships that they have seized.

President Roosevelt said that he thought he had no other subject to discuss and called for comment by any member of the Council. None were made. President Roosevelt then volunteered that he thought the Council might be interested to know that he is planning to have surveys made by commercial air lines of two areas in the Pacific - the Marquesas and the Tuamotu group. This is being done as a preliminary to post-war planning. The President stated as his opinion that after the war certain Pacific airports should be available to all nations. In furtherance of this general policy, the results of our present survey expeditions would be made available to other nations.

President Roosevelt explained that his opinion is that three general routes to Australia and New Zealand should be carefully investigated now. These routes he described as follows:

- (a) New York to Acapulco, to Clipperton, to the Marquesas, and thence to the westward via bases that are now being developed.
- (b) Europe and North Africa to the West Indies, to Panama, to the Galapagos, to the Tuamotu Archipelago and west.

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- (b) Europe and North Africa to the West Indies, to Panama, to the Galapagos, to the Tuamotu Archipelago and west.

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- (c) As a possible route but probably not one that need be carefully considered now -- from Chile to Easter Island, to the Henderson Island, and westward.

Admiral Byrd, with some civilian and naval advisors, is expected to commence a survey in the near future. As before stated, the recommendations will be the common property of all nations, and it is hoped that the French will be willing to release the bases that the world may need.

Sir Owen Dixon said that, of course, his country will be very much interested. He said that he had heard that the Japanese are making some progress in winning over the natives of New Guinea by telling them that their ancestors live in Japan.

There being no further subjects to discuss, the Council adjourned at 1:00 p.m. to await the call of the President.

  
Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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July 21, 1943.

M E M O R A N D U M

The thirty-third meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:20 o'clock p.m., Wednesday, July 21, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Present:

The President.  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong).  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena).  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy).  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon).  
Sir Ronald Campbell, E.E. and M.P. (representing Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador).  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P. (representing Dr. A. Loudon, the Netherlands Ambassador).  
Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary, New Zealand Legation (representing Hon. Walter Nash, the New Zealand Minister).

President Roosevelt stated that he was encouraged by recent action in the Pacific. This action, he pointed out, consisted of a series of minor engagements - about four in number - in which the Japanese had suffered much greater losses than the United States, having lost numerous light cruisers, destroyers and cargo ships. In the air also they have suffered much greater losses, the President said, citing one recent case in which, in one action, a total of 60 out of 90 Japanese planes were shot down. If we had this sort of attrition of United States forces, the President pointed out, it would worry us greatly, and it must constitute considerable worry to the Japanese. However, the important point is that we lack accurate knowledge of current Japanese

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construction in aircraft. The President then asked Dr. Soong if he could help us in obtaining data on this subject. Dr. Soong replied that he would pass this request back to his people and he thought there was something they could do as they had various sources of information. The President suggested contacts that the Chinese must have through businessmen who went into occupied China and Korea.

Dr. Soong then mentioned the recent change in the Air Force Chief in Japan, the newly appointed Chief being a prince of royal blood. Dr. Soong pointed out that such an exalted personage took charge of affairs in Japan only when there was trouble below.

The President added that we did not have any information on ship construction either. He stated that he felt the destruction of merchant shipping was almost more important than naval ships. Dr. Soong said that shipping in certain key ports, like Hong Kong, had fallen off recently, indicating a scarcity of Japanese ships. The President stated that he figured at the start of the war the Japanese had 6,000,000 tons of shipping, including all the ships they acquired from Siam, Indo China, etc. The President figured that we have been sinking one and one-half million tons a year and, accordingly, the Japanese would have had four and one-half million tons left as of last January, but that the trouble was we do not know what the Japanese ship construction is and so it is difficult to figure out what they now have on hand. The Army and the Navy figure Japanese ship construction to be three to four hundred thousand tons per year. The President said that he figured it was close to five hundred thousand tons, which would leave the Japanese with a net loss of one and one-half hundred thousand tons, but he added that this was pure guess work.

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Dr. Soong repeated that they had certain sources of information and he felt they could obtain something accurate about Japanese airplane and ship construction. The President asked what the Chinese estimate Japanese airplane construction to be. Dr. Soong said that they estimate it to be very low - about 600 planes per month. The President figures this to be about six to seven thousand per year, about 5,000 combat planes.

Dr. Soong added that in recent Allied raids, over Canton for instance, the Japanese had sent up as interceptors very old types of planes, which was a strong indication of a shortage of first-line Japanese airplanes.

The President then stated that everything seemed to be coming along well in the Aleutians. He said that he and Admiral King frequently put themselves in the position of the Japanese and tried to figure out what they would do if they were in command of the Japanese fleet. They figure that the United States forces are very much extended all the way from the Aleutians to Hawaii, the one principal strongpoint, down through the South and Southwest Pacific. Accordingly, they feel that our one weakness would be an attack by the entire Japanese battle fleet as a strong single concentration of sea power; that if this attack were preceded by certain deception so that we were caught totally unaware, we might suffer serious consequences. He mentioned that the Japanese had attacked Midway with a very large force but that we were not caught by surprise and got there first, with the result that all of us know. He added that if the Japanese sent a strong concentration of sea power suddenly against us in the Solomons we would, if lucky, be able to withdraw to Australia, and, without luck, we might lose our naval forces in the Solomons Area.

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Dr. Soong said he could not understand how the Japanese could reconcile themselves to the heavy losses they have been sustaining. The President said nobody really knows, but perhaps it is their imitative characteristics; having suffered them once, they don't mind doing it again.

The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy) said that the answer, in his opinion, is that the Japanese can not stop the losses.

The President then mentioned that although we are approaching Munda from two sides we are only gaining about four or five feet a day and that the Japanese, unlike the Germans or the Italians, fight on until each individual is killed on the spot where he is fighting, which makes our advance against the Japanese very slow.

Dr. Soong said he had heard that recently four Japanese divisions had been sent from the Russian front as replacements to the Solomons. The President said he could not understand why they should do this because they certainly should not be suffering a shortage of manpower. Dr. Soong said that it was undoubtedly the quality of troops in which they were interested as these divisions brought from the Russian front were crack outfits.

The President then said that probably Vice President Osmena would be interested in his next remarks. He said that our progress against the Japanese was so slow on the island-to-island basis that he figures it would take 101 years to get to Tokio. Accordingly, he figures the proper strategy would be to proceed up through the middle of the Japanese-held area, which would take us through the Philippines, and in this manner we would strike

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at the heart of Japan proper more quickly, as well as isolate a large portion of Japanese-held territory, such as the Dutch East Indies, Indo-China, Burma, etc., and also threaten Truk and other mid-Pacific Japanese islands. The President said that he thought it was an attractive idea but that we are not quite ready to do it. (Note: At this point a letter was handed to the President, who, upon reading it, said he would like to see Vice President Osmena after the conference to discuss the letter with him).

The President said that the transportation of supplies from India across Burma into China was very slow, many things contributing to this, such as bad weather and the difficulties of river transportation. He said we make plans in July to be executed in August and so often when August comes we find that we can not execute them until September. Things in general are not going well along this transportation line, he said, but we have made certain changes in personnel, sending new people out there with the hope that a new broom will sweep clean. The Generalissimo knows all this and knows that we are doing, as he said, our damnest to do what we can.

The President said to Hon. Leighton McCarthy that he would like to see him after the meeting to discuss a fishing trip.

Speaking of trips, he said, Dr. Soong is about to leave on a secret mission to the South Pole.

The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) said that he had been wondering whether our plans in the Southwest Pacific called for an advance of Allied forces along the northern coast of New Guinea, because from their standpoint New Guinea, at best, was difficult terrain to overcome. The President said that he had his doubts about the New Guinea campaign because

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of the great time involved in gaining a limited objective. Sir Owen Dixon then mentioned the fact that they were certain now, if given enough ground troops, that they could do a job out there, but that it would be very, very slow, and this brought out the importance of air power which could do the same job more economically and more quickly.

The President said that, incidentally, he had gotten a letter from an American doctor, a friend of his, in New Zealand, who stated that after the war he wanted to settle down in New Zealand for life as it was the grandest country he had ever seen.

Mr. Cox said that General Freyberg, who had recently passed through here, had made remarks which substantiated Sir Owen Dixon's remarks concerning the use of ground troops and air power in the Southwest Pacific. General Freyberg had said that if we have to use one Australian or one American for each Japanese soldier we killed, it will be like, in chess, using a queen to take a pawn, and even with the large ground force we had assembled in that area there were still relatively small points of contact with the enemy. The President said, however, that in the past year we have gained a lot, and that when General MacArthur came out of the Philippines he felt that the Japanese was a great warrior and fighter and he was very pessimistic about how we were going to defeat them, although defeat them we must. The President said that, however, it now looked as though we had learned a little about jungle warfare ourselves.

Sir Owen Dixon said it was interesting to observe what the Australian soldiers who had recently returned from fighting the Germans thought about the Japanese. These Australians think the Jap a very, very tough individual

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but that tactically and strategically they are not great opponents.

Mr. Cox then asked the President if he had any information on our air raid from the Aleutians over Paramushiro. The President said that the newspapers had played up the story a great deal but that the other side to it was that the flight was a very long one; the fog is always treacherous up there; only a small bomb load can be carried; and so the whole thing was only a gamble and more nearly approached a reconnaissance flight. He also said that these islands were not very important to the Japanese and it would not be a particularly big thing even if we occupied them, but that we would then have the same difficulty supplying ourselves there as the Japanese had supplying themselves in Attu and Kiska. He said incidentally, so far as we know, no supplies had gone into Kiska recently, not even by submarine.

The Canadian Minister pointed out that now that we have gone to the great trouble of driving the Japanese out of the Aleutians we don't seem to know what to do with the islands. The President said that the most important part of it was the psychological effect on our people and the Canadians.

The President turned to Vice President Osmena and said that in the letter which had been handed to him a few minutes earlier a comment was made with reference to Japanese promises of independence which were being made to the Philippines, Burma and others. Baron Van Boetzelaer said that they had heard from broadcasts that a local government had been set up in Java. The President said he could not imagine the Japanese giving independence to anyone but that it called

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to his mind the question of Indo-China. He said that he felt Indo-China should not be given back to the French Empire after the war. The French had been there for nearly one hundred years and had done absolutely nothing with the place to improve the lot of the people. He then asked Dr. Soong how many people there were in Indo-China. Dr. Soong replied about 35,000,000 and that they were somewhat similar to the Siamese. The President said that he felt 35,000,000 people should not be exploited; that the French had taken a great deal from them. Probably for each pound they got out of the place they put in only one shilling. The President said that after the war we ought to help these 35,000,000 people in Indo-China. Naturally they could not be given independence immediately but should be taken care of until they are able to govern themselves. He compared the situation to the Philippines. He said in 1900 the Filipinos were not ready for independence nor could a date be fixed then when they would be. Many public works had to be taken care of first. The people had to be educated in local, and, finally, national governmental affairs. By 1933, however, we were able to get together with the Filipinos and all agree on a date, namely 1945, when they would be ready for independence. Since this development worked in that case, there is no reason why it should not work in the case of Indo-China. In the meantime we would hold Indo-China as a trustee. This word, he said, can not even be translated into some languages. It means to hold for the benefit of the owner.


The Canadian Minister asked what the status of Indo-China was at the present time. The President pointed out that the French there had

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submitted to occupation at the point of a sword and so any agreements reached were of no value. Dr. Soong said that the French Governor was only a shadow at present and completely surrounded by Japanese sentries. Mr. McCarthy said that if the Japanese won the war they would hang on to Indo-China as the French had given it up without a fight and so title to it had already passed out of France's hands. He added that the Atlantic Charter should not be overlooked in this whole matter. The President said that in that connection self-determination is an important thing but that there are many people in the world, such as the head-hunters of Borneo, who are not ready for self-determination. The President said that even to please Generals Giraud and DeGaulle he would not change his views on Indo-China; that he felt the issue there was too fundamental and important to be altered by French politics in the Mediterranean Area. He said that he had mentioned this question of Indo-China to Prime Minister Churchill and that the Prime Minister did not agree with him in the above discussion.

The President closed by mentioning twice the very splendid speech which Queen Wilhelmina had made recently which pointed toward a federation for the Dutch East Indies after the war. He pointed out that in a federation sovereignty goes toward the members of a federation.

The Council adjourned at 1:02 p.m. to await the call of the President.

  
Chester Hammond,  
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff, U.S.A.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

The thirty-second meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:05 o'clock p.m., Wednesday, June 9, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Present:

The President.  
The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. H. A. Evatt).  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax).  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong).  
The Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. Welco N. Van Kleffins).  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon).  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy).  
Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary, New Zealand Legation (Representing Hon. Walter Nash, the New Zealand Minister).

President Roosevelt announced that he had practically no news and, therefore, feared that perhaps there was no need to hold a meeting at this time as we appeared to be passing through one of the quiet spots of the war, which may be the lull before the storm.

Dr. Evatt presented President Roosevelt with a ring made from a part of one of the Japanese two-man submarines captured at Sydney Harbor. He said that they had sunk all three attacking submarines and that the only damage suffered by the Australians was a small corvette or ferry.

President Roosevelt said that, of course, the Japanese withdrawal to the north bank of the Yangtze was the important event of the past week and that he thinks we owe that victory very largely to the excellent work performed by the joint American and Chinese air force.

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Lord Halifax stated that one of the former resident governors of the Solomon Islands is visiting Washington and that his experiences in escaping the Japanese are very instructive. The former governor sought refuge with natives in the hills for some time and was able to follow in considerable detail the difficulties the Japanese had in maintaining their supplies of food and munitions.

President Roosevelt stated that he and Mr. Churchill had discussed the strategy of the Pacific many times and that they are agreed that we can expect the Japanese to fight stubbornly wherever they have a foothold; so that an island-to-island struggle would, indeed, continue for a great many years before they could be driven out of occupied territory, but that by striking in at the Malaya Peninsula we could sever their lines of communication to the south and, thereby, lessen their ability to hold on to Timor, Java and Borneo. Even from the present air bases in China General Chennault expects to be able to destroy 500,000 tons of shipping a year along the sea-lanes and, in addition, control of the air will enable us to destroy vast quantities of river traffic which will seriously weaken the Japanese holdings in China.

Dr. Soong stated that he thinks perhaps we overestimate the staying qualities of the Japanese troops, because the American and British troops have, so far, come in contact only with the very best Japanese troops. Dr. Soong believes that it is only the professional soldier who will die rather than surrender, and that these professionals were the first troops to invade China; but that in later years an entirely

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different grade of troops are employed in China who will surrender when they see conditions going against them. Dr. Soong stated that he thinks we may expect a similar experience in other Japanese occupied territories.

Lord Halifax asked the Netherlands Foreign Minister whether he had told the President about the recent German effort to secure "good behavior certificates" in Holland. Dr. Van Kleffins explained that German troops are individually attempting to secure testimonials from Hollanders that they, as individuals, have invariably treated the Hollanders with consideration and politeness. This effort is believed to be a forerunner of preparing the individual defense against the expected charge and trial for the barbarous treatment of the occupied countries. The Netherlands Foreign Minister continued that they even have a remarkable example of a Japanese officer in Singapore who voluntarily took charge of the three Dutch children of a former Dutch officer in Java and treated them for three weeks with the greatest consideration and thoughtfulness.

President Roosevelt asked Dr. Soong to inform the Council of the recent Japanese defeat in the vicinity of Ichang. Dr. Soong stated that he felt sure the Japanese had misjudged the ability of the Chinese for further resistance. The Japanese, therefore, commenced an ambitious three-pronged drive, directed not only at the destruction of this year's rice crop but at the actual capture of Chungking, expecting that the people and armies of China were so discouraged and starved

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that they would be unable to deliver effective resistance. In this they had been very badly mistaken, as the Chinese armies are intact and their counterblow was delivered most effectively. The counterattacks, combined with the very effective air support, had taken the Japanese completely by surprise; their line of supplies via the river was destroyed and they had no choice but to beat a precipitated and costly retreat. He said that it was quite true that the puppet troops fighting with the Japanese had turned on their officers and had assisted the Chinese in the crushing defeat of the Japanese invasion. Dr. Soong says that while some provisions had been destroyed in storehouses, no harm has been done to the Chinese rice crop which will not be harvested until July or August.

Lord Halifax asked President Roosevelt if there was anything he would tell the Council about the threatened Axis use of gas which had prompted the President's declaration to the press on the previous day that the Allies would retaliate in kind if the Axis should use gas against any of our allies. President Roosevelt said that he had nothing specific that he could repeat except persistent rumors continued that the Germans are making extensive preparations for the use of gas and that there is a theory that they might use gas against Russia this summer because the prevailing westerly winds made it easier for them to use gas than the Russians. A general discussion followed and it seemed to be the consensus of opinion that the Germans, themselves, are so vulnerable to gas attack by our superior air force that it seems extremely improbable that they will use gas against the Russians. There was some mention of the Japanese charge that American

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troops had used gas at Attu, which was denounced as ridiculous.

Dr. Evatt asked whether there is any new information to indicate how extensive a trade is being carried on between Japan and Russia - whether Russia continues to receive quantities of rubber from Japan. No one volunteered any information on this subject but it was generally conceded that Japan might be glad to exchange rubber for some of the minerals or scrap metals that she needs urgently.

The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy) asked the President whether Mr. Davies had returned with any interesting news from Russia and whether he thinks the Russians are confident of success in the threatened summer campaign. The President said that Mr. Davies is enthusiastic in his report of Russia's confidence and of the tremendous progress that has been made in Siberia in the extension of their agriculture, industry, and war preparations of all kinds.

President Roosevelt expressed some doubt as to whether the Germans will risk a full offensive against the Russians this summer. In a general discussion of the pro's and con's of the German summer campaign, the Netherlands representatives present expressed the opinion that there is a strong rising sentiment in both France and Germany for Communism. Mr. McCarthy stated that this was probably just another evidence of Axis propoganda, as was the recent campaign in the United States to slander the morals of the WAACs in the United States.

The Council discussed the recent food conference and generally expressed great satisfaction in its accomplishments. Dr. Evatt was particularly emphatic in stating that he believed it must have a tremendously beneficial effect for the Allies and, consequently, a

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demoralizing effect on the Axis, because it indicated a calm confidence in our final victory and a plan to help all the world except the arch-criminals. The hope was expressed that President Roosevelt would follow the food conference by another Allied conference at an early date. It was stated with pride that this was the first time in the history of the world when a greater part of the world joined together in finding out what the total source of food supplies are, what kind of food the different peoples eat, and an estimate, based on an exchange of information, of what the necessary food supplies should be for a contented world.

President Roosevelt stated that tomorrow invitations will be issued to "associated nations" to attend a relief conference in the near future. The purpose of the relief conference will be to prepare plans for the immediate rehabilitation of devastated countries when the progress of the war may permit.


As a result of some questioning, President Roosevelt stated that he and Mr. Churchill agree that if there is a break in German morale it will probably occur first in the submarine service, as it did in the last war, or in the air force. Germany placed her hope in these two services and they are the two that are now threatened with an almost hopeless task because of our rapidly increasing strength. When our superiority is such that an enemy submarine or aircraft has a small prospect of returning alive, we may expect them to refuse further duty and such refusal may again precipitate a general mutiny. However, the President again pointed out that we must not place our hopes on such a collapse but, on the other hand, we must continue

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to exert every effort to compel unqualified surrender.

It was suggested that the Vatican is beginning to show greater interest in peace efforts and that this might be influenced by the possibility of an air bombardment of Rome. President Roosevelt expressed the opinion that this was a situation which must be handled with great care as the Axis are quite capable of bombing Rome with their planes and putting the blame on us in order to continue their hold on Italy and that our flyers will always be forbidden to bomb the Vatican. After a further general discussion of the further great advantage we would enjoy if, and when, we secure air fields near the River Po, with the resulting ability to bomb all of the industrial Germany, the Council adjourned at 1:05 p.m., to await the call of the President.

  
Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

The thirty-first meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:05 o'clock p.m., Thursday, May 20, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Present:

The President  
The Prime Minister of Great Britain (Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill)  
The Prime Minister of Canada (Hon. Mackenzie King)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T.V. Soong)  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. H. A. Evatt)  
The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary, New Zealand Legation (Representing Hon. Walter Nash, the New Zealand Minister)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins.

The President informed the Council that he considers the Prime Minister's address to the Congress to be the clearest and best exposition of global war that has ever been given. There appeared to be general agreement with this statement.

President Roosevelt then, with the aid of a chart, gave a brief explanation of the operations now in progress for the capture of the Island of Attu - the westernmost of the Aleutians. He described the physical difficulties that had to be overcome and laid special stress on the almost continuous bad weather that has prevailed during the month

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of the year when the best weather of the year is to be expected in the Bering Sea area. The commencement of the attack had to be delayed several days because of fog and gales; fog and occasional gales have kept up ever since; we have rarely been able to use either aerial or gun support; the physical difficulty of moving through the tundra is great; snow has impaired progress in the high spots; more men have been hospitalized with frozen feet than from enemy bullets; but nevertheless we have progressed and have now squeezed the defending forces into the high land surrounding Chicagof Harbor where they are making a final stand. The President stated that so much misinformation has been written and expressed about the significance of the capture of Attu Island that he thought members of the Council should have in mind that the capture of Attu and the establishment of an air field there will not open the way to bombing the Japanese homeland even though we have moved appreciably nearer our final objective. The reason Attu will not facilitate bombing of Japan is due to the tremendously uncertain weather which is such that, even if we launched attacking squadrons, the chances of their return would be very slim. The occupation of Attu will secure and tend to neutralize the value of enemy bases at Kiska. This should enable us, in time, to push the Japanese out of the Aleutians. When, and if, Russia should join in the war against Japan, our position in Attu will help very much to take full advantage of Siberian bases. The Honorable Mackenzie King stated that the Japanese occupation of the Aleutians had been a matter of grave concern to Canada and that Canada welcomes and applauds every measure to evict the Japanese from the Aleutian Area.

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President Roosevelt stated that he had not any further information to give the Council except that throughout the world we are assiduously continuing our pressure on our enemies and weakening his position by daily attrition of his land, sea and air forces. In the case of Japan, the combined submarine and air action is steadily reducing the Japanese merchant marine to the point where the maintenance of her outlying stations will become more and more difficult. He wished to inform Dr. Soong that the Prime Minister plans to lend material help in revitalizing the air forces in China and that British air squadrons are to be added to the American and Chinese air forces in order that we may create in China a united Allied force that may learn by experience to work together effectively.

Dr. Soong stated that this prospect of additional aid would be highly valued by China.

President Roosevelt stated that, of course, everyone realized the principal difficulty of building up a powerful air force in China is in providing sufficient petrol; but that General Chensault, who is now here, feels perfectly confident that sufficient petrol can be brought in by air and that if we will give him sufficient planes he can accomplish two very positive things:- (a) He can break up any extensive Japanese land offensive that aims at the demolition of Chinese air fields; (b) Within a year he can destroy 500,000 tons of Japanese shipping by constantly raiding their sea lanes and their river boat supplies. Dr. Soong stated that the people of China are very much heartened by the Prime Minister's speech to Congress yesterday and that they, too, are very hopeful that

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the difficulties of maintaining a strong air force in China will be solved. However, he wishes to state with all earnestness that it is the opinion of his government and of all of the Chinese that it is essential that we must continue the offensive in Burma for the purpose of restoring the Burma Road, as it is through the Burma Road alone that sufficient supplies can be brought into China to enable that country to drive out her invaders. Dr. Soong stated that he felt sure everyone would agree that air force alone can not win the war and that we must provide a land route to equip Chinese armies. To do this we must carry out the promises made at Casablanca and send a combined naval and land expedition to recapture Burma.

The Prime Minister said that (while we will continue our offensive in Burma when the weather permits) it is his understanding that the Burma Road has been so damaged by the Chinese and Japanese that it could not possibly be restored to a point where it would be of any value in bringing in supplies until the year 1945.

Dr. Soong stated that, although it had been badly damaged, the Japanese are repairing their part of the road and the Chinese are repairing the part they still control, so that the road could be restored to useful condition very soon after we gain physical control.

Dr. Evatt, the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs, stated that he thought perhaps all of the members of the Council failed to realize what extremely heavy casualties are involved in tropical warfare. He stated that in New Guinea the combined Australian and American forces have suffered nearly 45,000 casualties up to February and that of

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the 50,000 Australians who had fought in New Guinea, over 7,000 have been lost in killed or missing, but that malaria had run the combined casualties up to above 40,000. President Roosevelt agreed that in the New Guinea campaign the casualties had amounted to nearly fifty percent of the forces involved, and that this was, of course, a terribly high mortality rate; but that, on the other hand, we must remember that the Japanese losses had been very much greater than ours and that he thought, in general, the proportion was nearly three to one. It was agreed by the President and Dr. Evatt that the bad cases of malaria should not be sent back into malaria countries, but it was also agreed that patients who have recovered could be used very effectively for garrisoning important non-malarial stations and thereby release other men to fight who had not been exposed to malaria.

The President asked Prime Minister Churchill whether he had anything to say to the Council.

The Prime Minister said that he welcomed the opportunity to inform the Council of several problems that he had very much in mind. He then delivered a very able brief statement of his theory of the general strategy that should be followed by the Allies now that we have gained the initiative and while we are building up an overpowering superiority in all weapons. In brief, the Prime Minister stated that we must recognize that we are limited in what we can do by the number of ships we have available to carry men and supplies to the chosen theatres of war and that, therefore, our purpose must be to force the enemy to fight in areas that are advantageous to us and disadvantageous to him. Tunisia was selected as a fine example of what the Prime Minister considers sound strategy. The enemy

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was compelled to lengthen his lines of communications; to overstrain his line of supply and to eventual collapse, because of his inability to maintain and reinforce his armies.

The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that an extensive campaign in Burma, instead of putting the enemy at a disadvantage, would place all of these burdens on our forces, because the rainy season would give us only six months to gain our objective; the heat of the jungle would decimate our forces, as had been demonstrated by our fighting in New Guinea; and that the problems of supply for our troops would be tremendous. The Prime Minister stated that he noted a comment of an American Senator that the British had two million men in India who were apparently unable to drive a few thousand Japanese out of Burma. The Prime Minister stated that such a declaration completely ignored the practical problems of logistics; that the forests and swamps of Burma are such that only a limited number of men can work and fight in any given area, and that, therefore, it becomes a question of quality rather than quantity - when we put troops into Burma they must be experienced fighters who can overcome difficulties and defeat superior numbers of the enemy; and it is for that reason that the Prime Minister has offered British air squadrons to fight in China as the most effective assistance that Great Britain can contribute at this time. The Prime Minister stated that this is in support of the view that President <sup>Roosevelt</sup> has held and enforced for the past several months. Mr. Churchill said that he wished to go on record as believing that President Roosevelt has a penetrating insight into the sound strategy of the present world war and that his instinct for lending

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immediate air support to China is wholly sound.

The Prime Minister also stated that, as a result of recent conferences, he was pleased to be able to announce for himself and for President Roosevelt that at least 450 planes would be added to the Australian Air Force for the prosecution of the war in that area. He stated that everyone knows that the Australian fliers are among the best in the world and that the planes would be provided for the Australians to man in order that they might take a more active part in the defense of their homeland.

The Prime Minister said there was only one other subject that he wished to touch on and that was that a disturbing rumor had reached him that China is massing troops on the borders of Tibet, and that he hoped that it was in error, both because the borders of Tibet had been secure for so many years and, also, because it would mean diverting forces away from the true enemy - Japan - and that he would regret to see the Chinese take offensive action against a neutral.

Dr. Soong stated emphatically that there was no truth whatsoever to the rumor, either that troops were being massed on the border or that China had any present intention of attacking Tibet. He stated, however, that Tibet is not a separate nation; that it is a part of China and that eventually China may have to take necessary action to maintain her sovereignty, but that they have no intentions of taking such action at the present time. Dr. Soong went on with considerable heat to state that he can not accept the Prime Minister's statement about the impossibility of undertaking a campaign in Burma. He stated that his people are greatly cheered by Allied successes in Tunisia and that it has demonstrated to the people of China that the Allies are able to defend their own. He stated that in his country

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the question is often asked, "How can the Englishmen, who were so feeble in their conduct of the war in Malaya, fight such magnificent battles as they have fought in Africa?". Dr. Soong said that his answer is that the Briton is always a good soldier when properly led and that perhaps the difficulty in Burma rested with the leadership. The Prime Minister interrupted to say that he hoped that no country would feel that it was their privilege to select the generals for the armies of their allies and that he believed that the leadership in Burma left little to be desired.

Dr. Soong stated with great earnestness that China expects and hopes that the United States and Great Britain will live up to their commitments.

The Prime Minister stated emphatically that he denied that any commitments had ever been made.

Some discussion continued, during which Dr. Soong held that the military discussions at Casablanca and later at Calcutta and Chungking were definite commitments; whereas, Mr. Churchill held that the Allied governments had never made any pledges to recapture Burma but that they had lent their full support to military studies which necessarily had to be modified from time to time as conditions changed. He stated that he had not seen the plans of attack until February. Dr. Soong said he did not understand how that could be so. The Prime Minister stated that it would be of no help to an ally to do anything foolish and that it would be a very foolish thing to consider pushing troops into Burma at the present time.

President Roosevelt intervened to state that he thought perhaps we were talking at cross purposes and about different things and that

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if Dr. Soong had gotten the impression that we had abandoned all thought of a Burma campaign that he was entirely wrong; we do expect to prosecute that campaign as soon as conditions will permit, but in the meantime our present need is to provide something that will benefit China at once and that there is a general agreement that air power can do this more effectively than any other way. He repeated that there was no change in intention and that the general policy remains the same, whereas the tactics of the situation had to be modified since the studies were initiated at Casablanca.

President Quezon stated that when an authority like Mr. Churchill informed him that an actual invasion and restoration of Burma was not practical at this time, he fully accepts that statement. He is, therefore, glad to support the request for additional aircraft for the Western Pacific as the best step that can be taken now to bring about the eventual defeat of Japan.

Dr. Evatt asked to be informed of the Japanese troop strength in China at present. He said that he had been given to understand that the Japanese had been withdrawing troops from China for sometime and that, therefore, it would appear that the threat to China is not as great now as it has been at times in the past. Dr. Soong stated emphatically that he believes Japan will try to finish China this summer and that rather than removing troops from China they have merely replaced some of their troops that have been there for sometime and are using China as a training ground for inexperienced troops.

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The Prime Minister stated that Russia is, of course, the real answer to bringing about the coupe de grace of Japan, but because of the tremendous burden Russia is already bearing, neither the Prime Minister nor the President had ever requested Russia to join in the war against Japan as she is already doing her full share. When Germany is defeated, however, it is the Prime Minister's personal opinion (he gave it only as a personal opinion without any suggestion that he had received any assurances) the Russians will be glad to join in the final defeat of Japan, as Russia disapproves of Japan's treachery and her menace to stability as much as any other country.

Dr. Soong stated with considerable feeling and emotion that he must impress on the Council that the situation of China is indeed desperate and that she requires help by land as well as by air. He stated that the recovery of the Burma Road is not only a material necessity; that its recovery is necessary for the psychology of the Chinese people; that they regard it a symbol of the armed support of their allies.

Dr. Evatt stated that Australia also feels that she is seriously threatened and that the Japanese must be pressed on all fronts in order to prevent them from again assuming the initiative.

President Roosevelt reminded the Council that one of our most serious problems has been the German submarines in the North Atlantic. He stated that measures taken recently to increase our offensive action against enemy submarines, both by surface craft and by aircraft, encourage us to hope that our shipping situation will improve rapidly and that

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
we may then develop more ambitious plans of action. However, he pointed out that the Japanese submarines have had marked success against our shipping in the South Pacific during the past month and that this requires more planes and more escort vessels to keep existing lines of communication open.

Mr. Churchill stated that he wished to make it perfectly clear that the British Empire would do everything humanly possible to support China but that he is convinced that the only effective aid we can give to China this summer is an increase of her air power and that this measure will be pressed with every possible atom of our energy. He hopes that Dr. Soong will not send a report home that will be too discouraging to his people. We must all try to maintain the morale of all of our allies.

Dr. Soong said that he greatly appreciated the Prime Minister's assurances; that he had the highest respect for Mr. Churchill's great ability as a strategist and an authority on war and that he begged the Prime Minister to devote his great talent to the relief of the people of "Tortured China", to whom he had referred in his speech the day before. Dr. Soong repeated that the people of China are indeed a tortured people after four years of war and that the results of the failure to help them in time could not be predicted.

Mr. Evatt stated that before the Council adjourned he wished to express his sincere thanks to the soldiers, sailors and airmen of Holland who have continued to render outstanding services in the war against Japan.

At the suggestion of President Roosevelt, the Council then adjourned to have a photograph of the group taken by news photographers.

  
Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

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NOTE

The note affixed below accounts for the rather abrupt ending of the meeting. The note about the photographers was handed to the President by the usher. The President passed it to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, while seriously attempting to mollify Dr. Soong, scribbled his comment, "a pleasure in which the Prime Minister will gladly share".

The photographers  
await the President's  
pleasure.

a pleasure in which  
Prime Minister will gladly share.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1943.

M E M O R A N D U M

The thirtieth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:15 o'clock p.m., Wednesday, March 31, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Present:

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong).  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Honorable Sergio Osmena)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E., and M.P. (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon)  
Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary, New Zealand Legation (Representing Honorable Walter Nash, the New Zealand Minister)

President Roosevelt opened the meeting by announcing that everyone about the White House is in a more cheerful state of mind than they have been for some time because they have just received some very pleasant news. The news is that a press correspondent, who has been a thorn in everybody's side for a considerable time, has been thrown in jail by General Montgomery. This act of justice should keep us all cheerful for some time. The President stated that he wished to repeat what he told the press yesterday - that he felt that Mr. Eden's visit had led to an exchange of views on a great many subjects and that it was a great satisfaction to know that not only did Great Britain and the United States see eye to eye on practically all subjects that were discussed, but the President believes that there is at least 95%

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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agreement among all of the United Nations on almost all subjects having to do with the war and post-war period. President Roosevelt stated that the conviction grows upon him that the world of the future will benefit greatly by frequent and continuing conferences now. This exchange of views will help each country to understand the problems of other countries and people will learn to know and to trust each other. The President continued that it would, of course, not be possible to discuss all of the subjects that Mr. Eden covered during his visit but that the Pacific Council would be particularly interested in what had been said about the Pacific Islands and what should be done with them after the war. Mr. Eden had suggested that the United States should take over the Japanese Mandates and President Roosevelt said emphatically that the United States does not want them, and he suggested as an alternative that the present Japanese Mandated Islands, as well as many other islands of the Pacific, should, in fact, become the responsibility of all of the United Nations in order that a proper economy should be set up, the inhabitants assured of a decent living and the maximum use made of all the islands as strong-points of defense for the United Nations and full benefit to the world in the establishment of air bases.

Sir Owen Dixon commented that he supposed, of course, the President had in mind the necessity for assigning certain islands to specific nations in order that they might be used for their own defense and suggested that perhaps the island of Truk should be taken over by the United States as an outpost for the defense of the Pacific.

President Roosevelt stated that he agreed that, quite apart from the economic problems of the Pacific Islands, a board or committee of the

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United Nations must consider future defense and maintenance of peace and the establishment of appropriate strongpoints. He suggested that for northern latitudes China, Russia and the United States were particularly concerned in establishing a system that would prevent future Japanese aggression and that, on the other hand, Australia had a particular interest in Timor, which the President and Mr. Eden had discussed but did not pursue because of complications about Dutch and Portuguese ownership. President Roosevelt stated that in his opinion the boards that may make studies of Pacific defenses should have civilian representation as well as the military because he believes that the responsible civilian has a point of view that may not be considered by the military - for instance, Vice President Osmena certainly has sounder ideas about the future defense of the Philippines than some of the officers of the Philippine Army. There was general agreement that civilians must play a prominent part in future discussions of the strategy of the Pacific.

President Roosevelt repeated that he believes that for the present all of our conferences should be exploratory; that we should avoid hasty and premature decisions or agreements and that we must help each other to formulate ideas that will be helpful to all countries in the establishment of peace. He stated that he and Mr. Eden were both agreed that Formosa should certainly be returned to China and that China must work closely with Russia in deciding what would be best for their own people. President Roosevelt and Mr. Eden are agreed that the idea of the free port should be encouraged in various parts of the world as a stimulus to trade; they are also agreed that Korea is not yet ready for self-government and

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that she will require help for some time to prepare herself for complete independence.

A general discussion was held of Pacific air routes. It was agreed that they fall naturally into certain definite lines:

- (a) Alaska to Kamchatka.
- (b) San Francisco to Honolulu, to Canton, to Samoa, to Suva and Noumea.
- (c) New York to Mexico, to Clipperton, to the Marquesas, to the Society Islands.
- (d) Panama to Galapagos, to the Society Islands, and on to the west.
- (e) Chile to Easter and the Tuamotu Archipelago.

The idea was expressed that France might be glad to exchange her islands in the Pacific for something that would be of greater help to her in rebuilding her empire and that these islands would be of great value in developing air routes. The Australian Minister stated that in previous meetings he had urged the development of the Clipperton-Society Islands route as a substitute for the Hawaiian-Samoan Island route in case the enemy might succeed in, even temporarily, upsetting our present air traffic. He stated that his government felt very strongly that this should be done even though they admit it is not now as pressing as it was six months ago. He understood that the Combined Staffs are studying possibilities. President Roosevelt stated that we are working on the southern route problem.

The Canadian Minister, Honorable Leighton McCarthy, asked if President Roosevelt could give them any information about the naval

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action that is reported by the newspapers to have taken place to the westward of Attu. President Roosevelt stated that we are all very pleased with that action as our forces had been outnumbered nearly two to one, but that we had, nevertheless, attacked and, after four hours of very skillful maneuver, had imposed severe punishment on the enemy forces and turned them back home with comparatively minor damage to our forces. Our damage had consisted of two 8-inch hits below the waterline on our single heavy cruiser which had slowed her to fifteen knots; minor damage to the upper works of all of our ships, very little loss of life considering the length of the action and a comparatively small list of wounded. Notwithstanding unfavorable weather conditions, our aircraft have maintained a patrol of the sea area west of Attu and no sign of the enemy has been found since they broke off the engagement. We feel, therefore, that their effort to reinforce their present holdings in the Aleutians has, at least, been delayed.

A general discussion followed as to why the Japanese persist in attempting to establish themselves in the Aleutians in spite of the loss of life and ships. President Roosevelt stated that they have succeeded in making us assign stronger naval, air and land forces in Alaska than we otherwise would have done and that this, of itself, prevents those defending forces from being exerted in other theatres. Others expressed the view that they wished to prevent the United States from extending their air fields nearer Japan.

Vice President Osmena asked whether the Japanese are not suffering

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steady losses in their shipping and aircraft and whether those losses will not eventually be very embarrassing to them. President Roosevelt agreed that our submarines are doing a great job and that the average of our returning submarines reported 20,000 or more tons of enemy shipping sunk. He stated that, compared with our shipping losses in the Atlantic, this might seem small, but he believed that it must cause the Japanese great concern as the size of our submarine force has improved steadily and rapidly and all of them seem to do excellent work.

Honorable Leighton McCarthy stated the whole world is beginning to understand that it is all a matter of ships and that the scale of overseas operations must depend upon the amount of shipping available to carry on such operations.

President Roosevelt stated that he was very much interested to hear that one of our press correspondents in Moscow had announced over the radio this morning that the Russian newspapers are playing up with enthusiasm our successes in Tunisia and the devastating effect of our air raids on Berlin and other German cities. The Russian press has heretofore appeared to be so reluctant to admit to their own people that anybody was doing any effective fighting except themselves, that the present action of their papers might lead to the hope that eventually they might even thank us for some of the help we had tried to give. Mr. McCarthy reminded that Mr. Litvinov/<sup>had</sup>expressed acknowledgment and appreciation on the occasion of the dehydrated luncheon. All appeared to agree that perhaps Admiral Standley's blunt statement, about withholding the truth from their people, might have a beneficial effect after all.

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The meeting adjourned at 1 o'clock p.m., in order to permit Dr. Soong and Sir Owen Dixon an opportunity to hold scheduled appointments with the President.

  
Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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March 17, 1943.

The twenty-ninth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12 o'clock noon, Wednesday, March 17, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D. C.

Present:

The P r e s i d e n t.  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P. (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon).

President Roosevelt opened the conference by stating that although he had no important news of developments in the South Pacific or Southwest Pacific, he had just completed a most interesting discussion with two of our Air generals from the Southwest Pacific. They had informed the President that they believe we are making very satisfactory headway against Japan by steady attrition and continuous destruction of Japanese shipping and air power. They stated that in order to continue an offensive in the Southwest Pacific, as well as in the South Pacific, it will be absolutely necessary that their number of planes be increased radically. The President stated that while he appreciates fully that they are correct and sound in their demand for more planes, yet the same situation exists in all theatres of war. Notwithstanding the huge combined building program

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of Great Britain, Canada and the United States, we have not enough planes to meet the needs of any theatre. While we recognize that all theatres are in need of increased air power, the most compelling need is for more long-range bombers to be used against enemy submarines. Additional air coverage for our convoys gives the greatest promise of destroying more submarines and providing better protection for our shipping. The President discussed at some length the difficulty of changing the assignment of planes from one area to another because no area now has all that it needs and so many planes are not available for active use because of the number that must be undergoing overhaul, modification or use as trainers. He stated, by way of illustration, that he has been making every effort to increase the number of transport planes for China as he understands fully the great importance of increasing the effectiveness of our air force in China at the earliest possible date. He stated that he has been unable to find nearly 350 transport planes that should be available for assignment to China,

The Australian Minister stated that he was sure they were not in Australia.

Dr. Soong stated that perhaps they had been "diverted" while enroute to China.

The President continued that even though we are building 82,000 planes this year (there was some discussion as to whether all of these were combatant or some training), it is certain that we will not, even then, have enough to meet the requirements in all theatres of the war; but that,

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nevertheless, attrition is getting in its deadly work in the Pacific and in Africa.

Mr. Nash asked whether we are succeeding in delivering supplies to Russia by the Southern, as well as the Northern, route. Lord Halifax agreed with President Roosevelt that at present deliveries are going along in good shape. In the course of the discussion it was again brought out that the Russians do not want our fliers but that they are glad to have as many planes as we can give them, to be flown by their own pilots. Their recent refusal to allow a British squadron to operate from Murmansk was cited. Mr. Nash said he is quite sure that one squadron of Hurricanes, manned by British pilots, fought on the Russian Front for some time and that Mr. Stalin had personally thanked the squadron leader for their important services. He wondered why the Russians are no longer willing to have any of our pilots work with them. It was brought out that the Russians must have an excellent system for the replacement of pilots and mechanics and that their mechanics must be very efficient since they are able to assemble, overhaul and repair so many different types of planes with very limited tools.

The Minister of New Zealand asked if he might refer to a statement that President Roosevelt had made in a recent conference concerning the amount of venereal disease in British Samoa. Mr. Nash said that he had inquired for the facts and had been assured that there was absolutely no venereal disease in British Samoa a year ago, and that since the arrival of American troops there were some few cases but that the strictest

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possible regulations are now enforced to prevent the spread of venereal disease and to take immediate steps to cure any who may be afflicted.

The President stated that he agreed that venereal disease does not appear to be a serious question in any part of the South Pacific but that it is a most serious problem in Africa, where in Liberia the extent of incipient contagion is said to be very close to one-hundred percent.

The Australian Minister, Sir Owen Dixon, asked if President Roosevelt would inform him what the American appreciation is of the Japanese intention in strengthening their forces northwest of Australia. He stated that the Australians recognize that the move might be defensive, but that on the other hand it might indicate a change in policy to attack Australia from a position where the United States Navy could not exert its full strength in resisting further moves to the southward, as the Torres Strait would prevent any considerable number of our ships from opposing any overseas move west of the Torres Strait.

Mr. Nash pointed out that the number of Japanese planes in the attack on Darwin a day or so ago might be interpreted as a forerunner of a serious threat against Northwest Australia.

Sir Owen Dixon stated that he is also informed that the serious spread of malaria in a very malignant form is another source of weakness to Allied forces in Australia and that atabrine is a very ineffective substitute for quinine.

President Roosevelt stated that he had discussed possible interpretations of Japanese moves in western New Guinea and the Dutch East Indies and that he had understood that the seriousness of malaria might be lessened if we

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did not expose our troops to repeated malarial infection.

President Roosevelt stated that it had been suggested to him by various people that we should hold some form of memorial service on the anniversary of the fall of Bataan and asked Vice President Osmena whether he thinks it would be a good thing to do or whether he thought the Filipino people would not wish to commemorate so tragic a defeat. Vice President Osmena said that he would have to consult President Quezon, but that he felt it would be better not to commemorate that day in any way. President Roosevelt agreed that it seemed the sounder policy, as the attack on Pearl Harbor and other tragedies of the war had not been recognized in any way. After some general discussion, it seemed to be the consensus of opinion that it is not sound to commemorate any defeat, no matter how much bravery and heroism might have been involved.

The subject of war films was discussed. There was general agreement that such films constitute valuable records of the war. President Roosevelt stated that it is important that we should perpetuate many incidents that might be lost sight of and cited as an example the stirring proclamation by the Generalissimo to the people of Siam. Mr. Nash stated that he believed that perhaps in his part of the world more attention had been paid to the Generalissimo's pronouncement than in the United States. Dr. Soong agreed that this was so, and that the Chinese had always had a particularly friendly feeling for the people of Siam because so many Chinese had always lived in Siam and so much of the population of Siam had Chinese blood. However, he stated that we must judge them by their present actions and not by ancient

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history.

President Roosevelt agreed that we must judge countries by their actions and that in that connection we should all avoid any hasty promise to return French Indo-China to the French. This comment led to a general discussion of what promises have been made to the French, and Lord Halifax stated that he thought neither President nor Mr. Churchill had made any promises other than their hope to restore France to her former state of power and independence, but that no promises had been made about restoring all the French Empire. Lord Halifax said he thought perhaps Mr. Murphy had gone a little beyond anyone else with definite promises about definite portions of North Africa.

Lord Halifax asked whether Admiral Robert of Martinique had changed his attitude towards cooperating with the Allies. President Roosevelt stated that he thought there had been no great change but that one might occur at any time and that, at any rate, Martinique was not worth the necessary naval and land forces that would be required to seize it by force and that at present it is of no value to the Axis and is, therefore, doing us no harm. Lord Halifax stated that valuable shipping was, of course, being held up there and that hasty action might cause its destruction. He agreed that we should continue to be patient and in reply to a question stated that he knew of no change of heart with the French naval forces at Alexandria.

The Chinese Foreign Minister stated that he thought perhaps we failed to understand what a serious shortage of manpower exists in Japan. He stated that he is convinced it is very serious and that the Japanese have transported over 600,000 Chinese to Japan to help to fill their shortage. The

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
Minister also stated that the Korean Independence Group in the United States is gaining in importance even though he agreed with the President that at present the Koreans are not capable of self-government.

Mr. Nash asked President Roosevelt whether he does not believe the Japanese hold on Salamaua and Lae is weakening and whether if General MacArthur's forces seized those two places it would not seriously threaten the Japanese hold on Rabaul. There was general agreement that the capture of Salamaua and Lae by Allied forces would be important.

Baron van Boetzelaer asked whether there have been any developments about the holding of an Allied conference as discussed in the last Council meeting. A rather confused discussion followed from which the Recorder understood:

- (a) That Lord Halifax has already instituted some inquiries about the willingness of Allied nations to attend,
- (b) That he has suggested organizing an executive committee of four,
- (c) That the attitude of Russia and Canada present complications and that he prefers to delay any definite plans until the views of other countries have been received,
- (d) But that he still hopes that when all returns are in a general meeting may be held about the 27th of April.

The meeting adjourned at 1:00 p.m. to await the call of the President.

  
Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

S E C R E T

February 17, 1943.

The twenty-eighth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12 o'clock noon, Wednesday, February 17, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, the White House, Washington, D.C.

Present:

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon).

President Roosevelt stated that he had no important military or naval news of the Pacific except what has been announced in the public press. The capture of Guadalcanal has been completed; the naval and air forces of both sides have been exchanging blows which have resulted in much greater losses to the Japanese than to our own forces, notwithstanding our loss of the U.S.S. CHICAGO; we are continuing our war of attrition and at the same time making plans for further major offensives. The President explained that we never have subscribed to the plan of recapturing island by island, as such a plan would keep

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us at war for the next twenty years, but that we would seek vulnerable points in the whole sector that Japan has to defend, to the end that we may speedily strike straight home at Tokio, the heart of the Japanese Empire. He stated that when the Japanese supply lines, by ship and air, have been sufficiently interrupted, many of the Japanese present holdings will drop of their own weight.

The President said there are several subjects that he would like to discuss with the Council but that he felt he must ask all of the members not to discuss any of the subjects with representatives of the press (he stated smilingly, "looking straight at my friend Walter Nash"). President Roosevelt went on to say that although he had not discussed the subject with Prime Minister Churchill at any time, he wished again to bring up for discussion the advisability of calling a meeting of representatives of the United Nations. He thinks the Council should consider whether it might not be helpful to call a meeting to discuss the single subject of world food supply after the war, as the discussion of a single subject might prevent the introduction of subjects that would lead to controversy and bad feeling. A general discussion of such a United Nations conference followed during which Mr. Walter Nash of New Zealand and Sir Owen Dixon of Australia discussed at considerable length the

S E C R E T

measures already taken by Australia and New Zealand to buy up from the individual producers all food supplies available for export and the government acting in a national capacity as sales agent. The Dutch Ambassador, Dr. Loudon, supported the idea that the world would benefit very much by the organization of a basic food pool. He suggested that it might be tried out with wheat as previous efforts had been nearly successful in pooling the world's wheat supply for the greatest good of those countries most urgently in need of importing food. Such arrangements, he explained, would tend to control national competition for the food markets and work for the benefit of both producer and consumer by stabilizing food prices. Dr. Loudon further suggested that if we should be successful in creating an effective pool for wheat we might then proceed with other food staples, such as coffee and meat; and from that eventually provide pools for some of the metals and for wool and cotton.

The Australian Minister pointed out that the demand for wool and cotton is a very complicated subject that has already received very careful study in Australia and that the entire national economic scheme would be influenced by any agreements involving the sale and exchange of any commodities.

In response to a question from the British Ambassador, President Roosevelt stated that his thought is that the purpose

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of a conference should be two-fold:- First, to demonstrate to the world the present solidarity of the United Nations and their intention to hold together after the war, and, second, to attempt to create a system that would eventually improve living conditions for the people of all countries and all races and thereby reduce the causes for future wars. He continued that the conference should work toward such a goal and that by limiting the first meeting to the subject of wheat pooling, we should be able to avoid controversial subjects and, at the same time, accomplish something constructive. It seems evident to him that without interfering with private enterprise, nations rather than individuals must control the sale of some basic materials. Countries whose production is limited to food supplies should be helped and encouraged to build up factories and become self-supporting. The President cited as an example the fact that Brazil had on his advice built up shoe factories which now make shoes for all of their people, whereas only a few years ago all footwear had to be imported. He asked for an expression of opinion as to whether or not it would be a good thing to call a conference to explore the subject of pooling food resources. The consensus of opinion appeared to be that the whole subject should be considered and studied before any agreement is reached. There was general agreement

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that if a conference is called it is important that it must be a complete success from the standpoint of all participating. The British Ambassador and the Canadian Minister appeared to be rather luke warm. They stated that the subjects of taxes, private enterprise, and finance are involved and that endless and bitter controversy by alleged experts might result.

President Roosevelt stated that he did not visualize a meeting of experts but rather the meeting of a small number of men of common-sense who would explore the general principles that should be adopted to feed the world after the war. President Roosevelt further illustrated his thought by referring again to his committee who are studying the post-war economics of the West Indies. He expressed the belief that similar studies must be made of the smaller islands of the Pacific, as any island people who have to spend ninety cents out of every dollar outside their own island must of necessity soon reach a state of physical discomfort. Civilization must assist them to build up refrigerator plants and to grow their own food supplies. He pointed out that the people of American Samoa are in a much happier state than those of British Samoa because we have invested sufficient money to provide proper sanitation and proper food. A general discussion of Pacific islands led to the statement that all

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of the discussions must be kept "off-the-record" in order to prevent the spreading of harmful rumors.

President Roosevelt noted in passing that the future control of Japanese imperialism will require a redistribution of sovereignty of Pacific Islands to the end that the United Nations may control sufficient strong points to control the Pacific. He stated that we must all recognize now that the growing influence of air power must of necessity have a very great influence on the terms of peace - that the influence of air power will require new strategic studies to preserve peace. The Japanese must be disarmed and kept disarmed.

The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. Loudon, said that he would like to return again to the economic problem of Puerto Rico as an example of the difficulty of avoiding national competition in the distribution of excess food supplies. He stated that the people of Puerto Rico do not care whether their meat comes from the United States or from Argentina and that their only concern would be about the quality and price. Whereas, the merchants of both Argentina and the United States are anxious to find a market for their excess supplies. He repeated that by pooling all export meat the conflicting interests of different nations would not become involved - that by creating a consumers pool the whole subject of distri-

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bution would be greatly simplified.

Lord Halifax stated that he wondered how the conference could be held without becoming involved in some very technical discussions that would be necessary to avoid agreeing to something that might prove very silly. The Minister of Canada supported this thought. Lord Halifax later stated that it might be possible to afford each conferee an opportunity to express an opinion on the feasibility of forming world pools without attempting to adopt any general conclusions or agreements.

President Quezon then launched upon a very earnest plea in support of an early United Nations conference. He stated that all realists must understand that power to control world affairs must, in the last analysis, rest with the most powerful nations; but that, on the other hand, all of the smaller nations set great store by having at least a voice in world affairs and ideas, even though they might not be able to contribute greatly to enforcement. President Quezon pointed out that although the Philippines are usually thought of as one of the smaller nations, yet they have a greater population than any country in either of the Americas except the United States and Brazil. He has, therefore, talked very frankly with the representatives of Central and South America and he has taken them to task for accepting everything that

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the United States is willing to give and giving in return the least possible. He stated that they admitted that this is true and that the reason for it is that they trust President Roosevelt because they know he has their interests at heart, but they also know that there will be a change of administration and a change in the attitude of the people of the United States toward the people of Central and South America. President Quezon stated that he emphatically does not agree with this defeatist belief; that he has confidence that the policies of President Roosevelt for fair dealings will be perpetuated by the people of the United States and that he strongly advocates an early United Nations conference in order that we may convince the doubting elements of all countries that the United Nations do in fact stand for fair dealings with the smaller countries and do have <sup>an</sup> interest in the humanity of the entire world. He urged that a conference be called to discuss the pooling of a single food commodity - possibly wheat (It is of interest to note that rice was never mentioned throughout all of the discussions); and suggested that a United Nations committee could be appointed to study the subject and report to the conferees at some later date the result of their studies.

Dr. Loudon objected that this "smelt too strongly of the past", as it was the formula in common use at Geneva and The Hague and that it would be unfortunate to have the people of

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the world believe that we were returning to a procedure that had proved a complete failure.

President Quezon retorted that the failure of Geneva did not prove anything; that there is, indeed, nothing new under the sun; and that we must not take the defeatist attitude that because a plan has failed once that it can never be made to work.

President Roosevelt suggested that the United Nations must consider now how to perpetuate our solidarity and that perhaps instead of meeting at one fixed spot, as at Geneva, informal meetings should be held from time to time in various countries in the manner that has proved successful in the Pan-American conferences.


Mr. Nash stated that he believed the conferences should be held in various countries, but that all of the conferees should live for a time in some large rural hotel so that they might get to know each other, form personal friendships, and discuss their problems continuously, rather than suffer all of the interruptions that occur when their habitations are scattered throughout any large city.

There was general agreement with Mr. Nash's suggestion and President Roosevelt pointed out that the Casablanca Conference was a fine example of the value of such a meeting place as the conferees devoted all the day and much of the night to pursuing the business in hand, with the result that they were able to accomplish a great deal more than if they had been subjected to the interruptions of traveling to and from their work and

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other distractions of the city. President Roosevelt closed the meeting by stating that he felt benefitted by the discussions and asked that all should think about the subject of a conference. Mr. Nash asked if they could not agree upon some general statement that he might give to the gentlemen of the press as to what business had been transacted this date and all agreed that no statement should be given to the press other than that the members of the Council had held a routine meeting and had no statement to make to the press.


The meeting, then, at 1:45 p.m., adjourned to await the call of the President.

  
Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

Note: Ambassador Wai Tao-ming waited behind the conference to state that he felt that perhaps we had failed to consider Russia's position as one of the United Nations and the embarrassment to her of a conference at this time. He also discussed with the President the arrival of Madame Chiang Kai-shek this afternoon. Before the conference he had talked quite frankly with me about what he considered the weakness of the present Japanese situation. He says that he believes that they will have to take some desperate chance in a final effort to save themselves and that the only thing they can do is support Germany in every possible way. This, he says, may lead to an attack on Siberia or on India. It should be noted that the spring is a bad time

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to initiate either campaign as the monsoon would be a serious interference in India and the spring thaws will lessen the usefulness of air and motorized equipment in Siberia even though Vladivostok will be free of ice and therefore open to attack from the sea.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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February 3, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

The twenty-seventh meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:15 p.m., Wednesday, February 3, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D.C.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)

The President informed the Council that he was glad to be able to report a completely successful conference with the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Combined Joint Staffs during his recent visit to Casablanca. He stated that the conference was successful in winning unanimous opinion for the conduct of the war during 1943. The President elaborated that everyone recognized, of course, that the controlling element in future operations is the all-important problem of transportation - particularly shipping transportation. He pointed out that the requirements of all of the various theatres of war must be considered before a decision can be reached as to how much shipping can be allotted to any particular operation - that the requirements of China, India-Burma, and the South Pacific were all given full consideration before any decision was reached as to what will be undertaken in Europe.

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The President discussed the whole war problem in considerable detail, during which he brought out the following considerations:-

(a) Realizing that China has sufficient manpower and that we can help her most effectively by providing modern war equipment, the decision has been made to send to China as large and effective an air force as can be maintained by aircraft alone, since we are not able to deliver supplies by ship.

(b) That every effort will be made to reopen the Burma Road.

(c) That our transport plane supply is increasing to such an extent that we may hope to send increasing supplies by air to China.

(d) That the Casablanca Conference served to impress upon the British General Staff the magnitude of the campaign the United States has undertaken in the Southwest Pacific. It is hoped that in the future there will be a better general understanding of the entire Pacific problem.

(e) That, as in China, the Russians do not want men or trained technicians of any kind, but continue to stress their needs in munitions of war of all kinds.

(f) The Combined Staffs, after a very thorough analysis, are agreed that when shipping losses approximate 50% of the convoy we are no longer justified in persisting with convoys through highly dangerous waters and that rather than lose so much shipping and valuable cargoes it is better to divert the shipments to other areas until the submarine menace in a particular area is under better control. This may necessitate reducing supplies to Russia during the summer months.

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The President stated that he and the Prime Minister were somewhat impatient with the Combined Staffs for the time schedules they recommended because of logistic difficulties. They succeeded in persuading the military to hasten early and decisive action. As all discussions resulted in unanimous agreement, it should have a far reaching influence on the future conduct of the war.

The President stated, as a very secret confidence, that if Rommel succeeds in joining the Tunisian Axis forces we will be faced with a very serious problem in North Africa, as the Axis can reinforce their troops at a rate of 750 to 800 per day. Our problem, to build up an overwhelming force in the air, tanks and men will present further difficulties in the field of transportation. However, the President continued, the French are doing an awfully fine job and will be of very great help to the Allied cause in Africa. Because their small arms are of different caliber from either the British or American, it will be necessary to re-equip them with American or British small arms as well as with modern tanks and aircraft; but, nevertheless, within six months they should have a very competent and effective fighting force of at least 75,000.

President Quezon asked whether the Moroccans liked the French. President Roosevelt replied that he thinks they do; that French Morocco is as a general rule very well administered; that the inhabitants are allowed to live as they see fit without undue interference and that the French have made important contributions - good roads and other material improvements. He stated that our press has over-emphasized the Jewish problem as the Jews are less than one percent of the total and that almost all political prisoners, except those accused of committing crimes, have

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been released. Mr. Nash asked whether it is true that DeGaulle commands only 20,000 troops. President Roosevelt said he thought that was about the right figure but that they, by marching from the Equatorial Provinces promptly in our support, would be very helpful.

President Roosevelt stated that he had had an interesting talk with General Alexander who was very much impressed by how bitterly the Arabs hate the Italians for their cruelty in driving farmers from their land. The Arabs are, therefore, said to be elated to see the British and Americans moving in, while all Italian influence is evaporating rapidly.

President Quezon asked whether the Sultan of Morocco is cooperating, and was answered in the affirmative. President Roosevelt stated in confidence that he thinks Nogues is an opportunist who likes his palace and position and will play ball with whoever is in power.

President Quezon asked whether the Moors are willing to continue under French control. President Roosevelt replied that he thought not, but he believed that the Moors are glad to learn all they can from the French and to benefit by their administration until they feel strong enough to shift for themselves.

Ambassador Halifax asked what form of government the French have instituted and whether there is a truly representative council in which the Moors have a voice. President Roosevelt stated that he thinks the Moors are represented in council and that their wishes are given consideration.

Mr. Nash asked what had become of the Tunisian Admiral Esteban. The President replied that he did not know, but that continuing effort is being made to get all French ships to join the Allies and that Prime Minister Churchill's meeting with the Turks might have some effect. The conversation

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then shifted to Turkey and it was generally agreed that it is a good sign that Turkey is willing to hold a conference and also that the Finns are losing faith in a German victory.

President Roosevelt explained that the Allies have not asked Turkey to join the war but that we do stand ready to provide her with modern instruments of war, so that with her million able fighting men Turkey may be in a position to defend herself and to have a place at the peace table.

The discussions of Finland's predicament included the possibility of creating a neutral zone between Finland and Russia that might safeguard both countries.

Mr. Nash of New Zealand then launched upon a rather lengthy plea that another meeting of all United Nations might be called in the near future to make all countries - small, as well as large - feel that they are an important and integral part of the Allied war effort and of the readjustment that follows peace. President Roosevelt and Lord Halifax held that such a discussion at this time might open up discussion of certain phases of post-war adjustment that would be very harmful to united effort. President Quezon appeared to share Mr. Nash's opinion that a conference could be prevented from doing harm by agreeing beforehand to have free discussions behind closed doors and to agree beforehand on what announcement should be made to the world as to the United Nations' aims and intentions. A rather lengthy discussion followed - pro and con - during which President Roosevelt expressed his belief that the islands of the Pacific must in the future be considered for the good of the entire world rather than for the

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
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benefit of particular nations and that the economic problem must be studied in great detail in the same manner as is now being done for the West Indies. He pointed out that stability and security will require each nation to maintain certain strong points for self-defense. The Americas will require assurance that the Dakar Area shall not be used as a threat to our security; the United States must hold a strong point in the Hawaiian Islands, etc.

Ambassador Halifax asked President Roosevelt whether he had any news of the rumored naval and air battle in the South Pacific. President Roosevelt replied that we had no details. President Quezon asked, "Have you lost two battleships?". President Roosevelt said, "No". President Quezon rose with a shout and said, "That is all I want to know", and left the meeting.

The Council then, at 2:15 p.m., adjourned to await the call of the President.

  
Lt. J. Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

The twenty-sixth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12 o'clock Noon, Wednesday, January 6, 1943, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D.C.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The British Minister to the Middle East (Hon. R. G. Casey)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins,

The President stated that Sikorski stated that the Russians have been primarily striking Rumanians, etc., and not the best Germans.

The British Minister to the Middle East (Hon. R. G. Casey) told the Council that the attack on 23 October at El Alamein took three months to prepare. This was essential. The command changes were all for the good. 10,000 yards of mines - tough going at first - took ten days and was costly - but since then it has been a chase. Continuing, the British Minister to the Middle East (Hon. R. G. Casey) stated that Malta had been costly to keep alive but was just kept alive. Malta now has petrol and food - is paying dividends with its

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submarine and air bases.

The President remarked about the importance of opening the Mediterranean, both for the Middle East and for China and India. Difficulties at Tunis - much mud - may take more than six weeks. Russia wants no troops but does want supplies. The President explained various opportunities if, and when, we win Africa.

The British Minister to the Middle East (Hon. R. G. Casey) commented that the Italian morale was low - they lost much good equipment - were pretty well armed. The same for the Germans but they are not down and out.

The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon) remarked on the raid on Sumatra. Concentration now going on - Timor - may be directed at Port Darwin.

The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) asked about the air route to Australia. The President said the report was not yet in. The islands concerned are French and we are not sure they should go back to France. The President stated that he believes a route could be worked out.

The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash) stated that we should later have free ports.

The President commented on free air routes. See Navy about Clipperton for air.

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NOTE: The above notes were taken by Mr. Harry Hopkins in the absence of Captain McCrea, who was absent on duty in New York City.

*J. L. McCrea*  
John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

December 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The Twenty-fifth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12 o'clock Noon, Wednesday, December 9, 1942, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D.C.

PRESENT

T h e P r e s i d e n t

The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)

The President announced that he had just received a despatch from Chiang Kai-Shek to the effect that in his judgment the Japanese would continue to "attack and attack" in the Solomon Islands. The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax) asked if the losses which the Japanese had suffered were not "stretching" their transportation system. To this the President replied, "Of this we are very certain. It is apparent that the Japanese have requisitioned from China all the seagoing junks they are able to get to make up for the shipping losses they have sustained."

The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax) remarked that yesterday he had the pleasure of conversing with D'Argenlieu (Free French) and that he had received from him most encouraging news. He stated that D'Argenlieu remarked that he had available to him information from a

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Frenchman who had been engaged in scientific work in Japan just prior to the start of the war and that the Japanese total capacity for production of military planes is about 300 per month. The President remarked that this figure had often been quoted, and that while it was in agreement with the figure supplied by G-2 and O.N.I., nevertheless he, personally, was of the opinion that the Japanese had by now a higher rate of production. "A year has passed and they must have expanded their production rate. We have expanded our production rate considerably and we must give the Japs credit for being able to expand their production rate. On the other hand, they unquestionably could not expand to the same degree we have done. I am convinced that if we keep attrition working on our side that we will be all right."

Addressing the Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming), the President remarked that he was "hopeful" of getting the Burma Road open sometime during the next year; that this could, no doubt, be accomplished with the Indian troops and the splendid Chinese troops which are now undergoing training in India. The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming) thanked the President for his remarks and stated there is now in India some 30,000 of their finest Chinese troops.

The President stated that he had received very confidential information from an excellent source that Indo-China is not anxious to see the return of the French regime. The President stated that the French had been in Indo-China since about 1832 and that little had been done towards improving conditions amongst the natives. The President stated that he had been informed that China had no desire to annex Indo-China, and, with that as a starting point, plans could be made with reference

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to the post-war disposition of this territory. "It is positively refreshing that none of the big powers wants Indo-China."

At this point, the New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash) asked what commitments had been made to the French with reference to its empire. To this the President replied, "No firm commitment has been made." The President continued that the North African situation was entirely a military one and that expediency dictated that we take advantage of all factors that will be helpful to the military campaign.

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon), addressing the President, said, "What is the truth about the situation of the Arabs and the Jews in North Africa?" To this the President replied that the Arabs wanted more self government. About 1882 the voting power, throughout the French North Africa colonies was limited by decree to those of French blood and the Jews, and that as a result the 17,000,000 Arabs in this area were resentful. This situation existed until the Nurmberg decrees, issued by the Vichy Government upon pressure from the Germans, to the effect that the Jews were deprived of their right of franchise. With this, the Arabs were delighted. Since the invasion of North Africa by the Americans, the Jews have raised the point that they want their right of franchise restored. If this were to be done there would be a revision of the old trouble. "Why not cut the Gordian knot by saying that there just won't be any voting during the military occupation?" The President then stated that he had forbidden General Eisenhower to enter into any bilateral agreement with the French North African politicians; that he had advised General Eisenhower to consult

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with the French and give consideration to their recommendations but that in the end he, Eisenhower, was to make an "announcement" only. The President further stated that, as he had remarked at an earlier meeting of the Pacific War Council, "Dakar has fallen into the basket". American ships and planes are now using Dakar and the French are beginning to cooperate in a helpful manner.

The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax) asked for information about Admiral Godfroy's attitude. To this the President replied that nothing definite could be said in this regard; that Godfroy makes up his mind to one thing in the morning and that by evening his position had been changed. "I can readily understand this frame of mind. The French just can't be hurried. The change of position because of recent military developments must have been such as to cause the French a considerable ~~of~~ 'wrench'. I think we all recognize that the change could not be easily done."

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon) then asked whether or not Admiral Darlan knew what was being said about him in this country. To this the President replied that this government was taking pains to see that he, Darlan, was so informed. The President stressed the point that absolutely no agreement had been entered into with Darlan in connection with his contention that he, Darlan, was the legal successor to Petain in French North Africa. At this point the President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon) stated that, in his judgment, whatever had been done in connection with Darlan had served to save lives and time. To this remark there was general agreement.

The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax) remarked that "In fairness

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to DeGaulle we must realize that he is looking beyond the current situation and that he is fearful of and does not trust Darlan, the traitor." To this it was generally agreed that Darlan could be "handled" and that it would be wise for all Frenchmen to bury their differences and to realize that cooperation with the United Nations was the sole hope for the restoration of the French Empire.

The President explained to the Council how he intended that the Food Administrator would function. All available food would be "tossed into the pot". The armed forces of the United States would get first call. The needs of the armed forces of Great Britain and China would then be considered. The needs of the civilian population of this country would then be considered and if rationing was necessary with what was left, that would be up to Mr. Henderson. The President then explained briefly that Governor Lehman, in his official capacity, would look out for the needs of the United Nations.

The President stated that after the fall of Germany the full effort of the United Nations could "turn to" on the Japanese.

The President then stated that incident to the collapse of the German arms undoubtedly that country would need the services of many trained surgeons. He stated that the Abyssinian doctors were famous for a particular brand of surgery and that he thought it would be "a pious idea" to send a sizable number of such surgeons to Germany to practice their specialty. The general merriment that followed this statement of the President seemed to indicate that all members of the Council were aware of the Abyssinian doctors' specialty.

The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash) stated that he had been informed China was in desperate need of more preventative medicine for

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malaria. The President stated that if this were so he thought every plane going to China should carry atabrine. Captain McCrea was directed to follow through on this item and if such action appeared justified to communicate the President's thought to the proper authorities.

At 1:15 p.m., the Council adjourned to await the call of the President.

*John L. McCrea*

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The twenty-fourth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:05 P.M., Wednesday, November 18, 1942, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D.C.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P., (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon).

The President remarked, "We all seem to be more cheerful today than we were the last time we met." The President continued substantially as follows: "A lot of people have gotten quite upset about our dealings with Darlan. Luckily for me the Congress has been interested in the Poll Tax matter, so I have had no repercussions about Darlan from that body. The Prime Minister apparently has not been so fortunate. I noticed in last night's paper that the Parliament is talking about investigating the whole matter. Of course, the 'mopping up' after an invasion of the magnitude just effected in North Africa is most important. Our Staffs thought it might take from one to two months. The whole of North

Africa was strongly fortified and garrisoned. The Staffs were probably making a safe estimate. If we hadn't dealt with Darlan, most probably heavy casualties would have resulted. Then, too, there would have been an equal delay in the offensive against Tunis and Tripoli. Yesterday, at my press conference, I told the newspapers, off the record, of an old Bulgarian proverb, approved by the church, which runs something like this: 'My children, in case of imminent danger it is permitted to walk with the devil until you are safely across the bridge.' Here we are, walking with the devil. We dislike him very much but it is just one of those things. Eisenhower admittedly took many chances, but apparently it has worked. In any event, Eisenhower's action has hastened the hour of our attack on Tunis. Darlan has played fair thus far but if he doesn't continue to do so we will lock him up. I think I can get Winston to agree to that."

The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) remarked, "Do you suppose, Mr. President, that Darlan might think he is walking with the devil?" (laughter).

The President continued that, with reference to the Southwest Pacific, things look somewhat better; that the last time the Council met everybody was worried. While the recent naval engagements can probably not be called decisive victories, nevertheless they are of major importance. Since August the Japanese have been making

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frontal attacks against Guadalcanal and they have never been so decisively defeated as in the engagements just ended. It is altogether possible that the courses of action they now have open to them are: (1) renewed attack in the Solomons, or (2) possibly an attack against some of the other outlying islands in our line of communications, such as Fiji or Samoa.

At this point the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that Fiji is now well garrisoned; that there are many military supplies there, and that foodstuffs are plentiful. These, he explained, were on Vita Levu, but that, in his opinion, Vama Levu could probably be easily taken.

The President stated that in New Guinea we are doing very well and that if we can take Buna, that Lae and Gasmata might also follow. In such case it is thought that we can make Rabaul untenable. Truk would then be the next objective. "Of course, that is looking far in the future. If we can secure Eastern New Guinea, Western New Guinea will undoubtedly follow. Timor deserves our attention too."

Conversation then turned to Nauru and Ocean Islands. The Minister from New Zealand (Mr. Nash) remarked that the phosphates from Nauru are most necessary to Australia and New Zealand and that in ordinary times they received annually 400,000 and 250,000 tons, respectively, of this mineral.

The President remarked (addressing the Minister from New Zealand) that "there is complete unity of command in the Southern Pacific. The public just doesn't look at the map. The Australian command must also

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embrace the New Guinea area and that, of necessity, belongs to MacArthur. Both MacArthur and Halsey have taken fine points of view and cooperate to the utmost. It can, no doubt, be said that unity of command doesn't mean 'one man'."

The President then stated that many of the newspapers in the country were continuing vigorous campaigns about "'Throwing the Japs out of the Aleutian Islands'. This whole Pacific Area is in Nimitz' hands. To continue a vigorous offensive in the Aleutians would, of necessity, mean that we would have to weaken our effort in the Southwest Pacific."

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) then asked the President if he would give to the Council his concept of the relationship of the Caucasus to Egypt. The President replied, "No, nor could I if I had the information. That is essentially a military matter which I don't feel at liberty to discuss here. I may add, in passing, that Stalin 'has been most friendly' since the start of our North African campaign. The tone of his despatches has improved immeasurably."

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) at this point remarked that, in his judgment, the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China should be "looking ahead", stating that he felt that these countries should "get together" while the war is going on, otherwise they would not "get together" during the peace negotiations or after the peace has been won.

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The President remarked that he was addressing a despatch to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek to the effect that the success of our North African campaign and subsequent control of the Mediterranean was bound to mean much to China. Shipping distances, the transport of aircraft, etc., would be greatly improved. The President also stated that control of the southern coast of the Mediterranean would, of consequence, improve the Russian position and would also, no doubt, bolster Turkish neutrality or, if menaced, Turkey might cast its lot with the United Nations. The President continued that he was hopeful that Dakar would "fall into the basket", pointing out that Dakar was of much interest to the Americas since the Dakar - Belem line was the shortest distance between the continents of Africa and the Americas.

The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that it was "too bad that soldiers have to spend so much time with political matters." To this the President agreed but stated that the only involvements permitted the military with political matters were those political matters which affected the immediate military situation, and that current political problems in a military area must be "oriented in the light of military operations". Continuing, the President stated, "By that I mean, London and Washington will tell the military what to do in connection with political matters." At this point the British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) asked if Darlan's effectiveness had been in any way impaired by Petain's repudiation of Darlan. To this the President replied in the negative, stating that, at the moment, the North African situation was quiet everywhere.

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In other words, "We welcome the military assistance of the devil, but when the political considerations are brought up - well, we will handle these in our stride."

At this point the President presented to the Council Dr. Lubin's production statistics for October. It was remarked that the production of heavy bombers was not going forward as rapidly as had been hoped, to which the President replied that the production of these planes will go forward very rapidly when the Willow Run, Fort Worth and Tulsa plants get in operation.

At 1:15 P.M., the Council adjourned to await the call of the President.

*J. L. McCrea*

John L. McCrea,  
Captain, U.S. Navy.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

October 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The twenty-third meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 12:10 P.M., Wednesday, October 28, 1942, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D.C.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmeña)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P., (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon).

The President stated that when it is available, a copy of a pamphlet entitled "After the War - Security" would be placed in the hands of each member of the Pacific War Council for information. He also stated that "now" was the time to begin to think about post-war economic planning and that in general the whole subject could be put in two broad fields, first, coordination of the economy of each country with other countries of the world, and, second, finance and the matter of payment of obligations.

The President continued substantially as follows: "During his visit to this country, Winston Churchill and I had a grand time on evening trying to figure out a world standard economic system. Of course, a world standard

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of currency would be the first thing that would have to be set up. This would be most desirable. Example, say a New York business man enters into a contract with a business man in Hankow. They should be able to refer the monetary side of this contract to a world standard monetary unit rather than towards dollars and yuans. After we had gotten this far, Churchill queried as to an appropriate name for such a currency, stating that, 'As a general proposition no known word should be used'. Between us we decided that in addition to the above requirement, the word should be a short one and have a universal appeal. Winston suggested that since all the United Nations are democratic nations, it might be a fine idea to call this new monetary unit the 'Demo', a contraction of 'democracy'. I think that we should all be giving thought to this subject. In the post-war world the monetary system should not be in the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States nor in the Bank of England, but in a body which would serve the world. I realize that the experts would probably attack this proposition with enthusiasm, however, I have come to realize that nearly all taught me in college about economics by the experts has been proven wrong." At this point the Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) remarked, "You mean that you, yourself, have exploded the theories that were taught you." (Laughter). The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) questioned the President as follows: "How would you visualize practical progress in this matter? Anything you might do here would run into the other parts of the world and not alone in the Pacific." With this the President

agreed. The President stated that one of the annoyances that the United States had to face from other countries of the world was the fact that many of these countries have to borrow money in this country to finance their public works. In consequence, many countries, especially South American countries, become obligated to the United States in large amounts, for which they have to pay high rates of interest. As a usual thing, before the debt has finally been liquidated, the interest has reached enormous proportions. The President stated that every effort should be made to work towards the "reduction of interest rates for public and quasi-public works."

Continuing this line of thought the President remarked that when it was necessary to finance Boulder Dam, which cost this government something in the neighborhood of say, one hundred million dollars, this money was obtained at four percent interest, the principal to be paid in 40 years. The net result was that the project would have cost the government roughly four hundred million dollars. The President stated that he had proposed to the members of the Federal Reserve the revolutionary thought of "just printing bills" to pay for the project. Most of the members of the Board cried "Inflation!" The President countered with the statement that the electricity generated at Boulder Dam could be charged for at a rate which would retire the debt in 25 years, and that as the debt matured, call in and destroy the paper money which paid for the project originally. The President then admitted

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that there was a political danger in the proposal which he had just outlined. In other words, the scheme would fall flat if an unsound project had been originally contracted for. The answer to this, of course, would be that voters should be educated to the point where they could select sound projects. The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that some such scheme in a small way had been undertaken and satisfactorily completed by his government, in the field of re-housing.

The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) then asked the President if he had anything on the war situation that would be of interest to the Council. The President replied, "You know all that I know. I believe that our lines of communication are stronger now than they were three months ago. The attrition of Japanese material is going on apace and if we can keep it up we will make out all right. At the moment, however, geography is working against us. We are operating from few bases and they involve long distances. The Japanese are operating from a large number of bases which are fed by relatively short lines of communication. As for Egypt, I haven't heard anything from the Prime Minister for a couple of days. It seems that the British have control of the air. Everything has to be handled very carefully but considerable casualties are to be expected."

The President then touched on the problem of surplus populations stating that there were enormous reservoirs of United Nations peoples from which it might be possible in the post-war period to draw in connection with populating land which is susceptible of development. The President

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stated that during the recent visit of President Prado of Peru that in conversation with that gentleman it was remarked that Peru would be willing to accept large numbers of surplus peoples who could occupy the farming areas to the eastward of the Andes. President Prado remarked, however, that he would not take one particular ethnological group to the exclusion of others. On the other hand, he would be perfectly willing to take a number of ethnological groups. The President stated that a group of ethnologists were now conducting a world-wide survey and that they have reached, among other things, the general conclusion that human beings, given equal opportunities, mix successfully. At this point the New Zealand Minister remarked, "Do you suggest, Mr. President, intermixture of races?" to which the President replied that racial prejudices, as we know them of the past, will in the post-war period, probably be subordinated and that the countries of the world will more or less become melting pots.

At 1:10 P.M., the meeting adjourned, the President remarked that as far as he was concerned, that Thursday, the 5th of November, would be the best date upon which to hold the next meeting.

J. L. McCrea

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy

\* At the conclusion of the meeting the Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) remarked to me substantially as follows "If we accept the President's thought in this matter it would seem to be of little importance who wins the war." This was communicated by me to the President.

**SECRET**

J. L. McCrea

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

October 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The twenty-second meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 11:50 A. M., Wednesday, October 21, 1942, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P., (Representing the Netherlands  
in the absence of Ambassador Loudon)  
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

The council continued to listen to the broadcast from London (Joint Session of the House of Lords and House of Commons) of an address by Field Marshal Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa. The speech ended at 12:28. The Prime Minister of Great Britain then thanked the speaker on behalf of all Englishmen "for all he has done in the long years of his life," and for his "appearance before us at this time."

The Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-ming, took his seat as a member of the Pacific War Council and was welcomed by the President on behalf of all members of the council.

Discussion started at 12:35. The President remarked with reference to Field Marshal Smuts, "He is a grand old man. I have known him since the last war and think very highly of him."

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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October 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The twenty-second meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 11:50 A. M., Wednesday, October 21, 1942, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Ambassador (Dr. Wei Tao-ming)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P., (Representing the Netherlands  
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The President then remarked that the matter of most concern was the Southwest Pacific. "We are in somewhat of a hole in Guadalcanal." The President pointed out that many problems were involved in naval command and Army participation, and that from what he was able to gather, cooperation between General MacArthur and Vice Admiral Ghormley had been splendid. "The initial effort of Guadalcanal was brilliant in the extreme. It looks now as though we are too far from our point of supply. Japan has apparently decided to crack hard." The President then pointed out that Guadalcanal was a thousand miles from Noumea and six hundred miles from Espiritu Santo, and that with a determined enemy the reinforcement of Guadalcanal was difficult. "Even if we lose Guadalcanal we will have held off the Japanese for at least 2½ months and time has been our ally."

The President stated that in the Port Moresby and New Guinea areas things seem to be going better. "Hindsight is a great thing. It now begins to look as if we did not estimate originally enough aircraft for the Southwest Pacific. On the other hand, the Japanese lines are long and our submarines are doing very good work against these lines. In other words, the process of attrition is working for us. If we had it to do over again, I think we would have probably doubled the aircraft estimates for this area. As I see it, the Japanese have plenty of human beings to expend, but not the materials."

The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) then remarked, "I note, Mr. President, that you state you are 'hanging on' in Guadalcanal. May I ask if there is a back door to that island?" To this the President replied in the negative.

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The President then read to the council the figures on production of important items for the month of September and the estimated production figures for the month of October.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) then asked the President if he would comment on the New Guinea side of the Southwest Pacific operations. To this the President replied that the August operations in this area were badly conducted and that it is estimated that the Japanese never had a larger force than about 3500 men and that the Australians and Americans had six times this number, and even so the Japs were able to put up a determined battle.

The President remarked that he had been informed that Chinese troops were going into India for the purpose of training and rearming. He then remarked that in his judgment it was very necessary to reopen the Burma Road at an early date in order that China can be supplied by that route. The President stated that Mr. Willkie concurred in this thought.

The meeting adjourned at 1:15 P.M., to await the call of the President.

*J. L. McCREA*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

**SECRET**

AWC

MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA


October 14, 1942

Dear Captain McCrea:

I shall be leaving in the next day or so for a short trip to China and wish to take this opportunity of saying goodbye to you. With the agreement of the President, the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wei Tao-ming, will attend meetings of the Pacific War Council during my absence.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,



Captain John L. McCrea  
Room 2078  
Navy Department  
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The twenty-first meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 11:30 A. M., Wednesday, October 7, 1942, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C.

PRESENT

The President  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.B., C.B., E.E. and M.P., (Representing Great Britain in the absence of Viscount Halifax)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P., (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon)

The President remarked that his trip around the country had been entirely successful and that he was much heartened by what he had seen.

The President stated that the British and ourselves are making a re-survey of our combined production programs. "Maybe we are making too much of this and too little of that. Particularly, must we examine the ratio of tank production to that of aircraft." The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) asked as to how the escort ship program was coming along. To this the President replied, "We are just beginning to get them."

The President continued, "The last time we met I was much worried about the whole Pacific situation. At the moment, I am not so worried. Of course, the black spot is Kiska. The Port Moresby situation and, as a

matter of fact, the whole New Guinea situation, seems to be much better. However, in the Guadalcanal area, the Japs seem to be landing small numbers of troops almost nightly. On the whole, I feel that the situation is much better."

The President then discussed the airplane program at length. He stated that he was surprised to learn on his recent trip that the life of trainer planes averaged some two years and that he had imagined that it would be much less than that. The President then remarked that some of our production facilities, with reference to aircraft, had to be smoothed out. Specifically, he stated that planes might get 95 percent complete in two months and then take another two months to finish the remaining five percent. He trusted that improved production methods would correct such things. He stated that Willow Run should be in production in from "two to three weeks." He then stated that the public was pretty liable to get the wrong impression from the headlines, "A Bomber an Hour," "A Ship Built in Ten Days," etc. "These things just aren't so." The President then stated that one of the things on the trip that interested him most was that escort ships are being fabricated in Denver, shipped by freight to the coast, and erected in Mare Island.

The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) "wondered" whether or not everything possible was being done about cutting down turnarounds on shipping, labor and dock facilities in the remote parts of the world. The President replied that these items were receiving our most earnest consideration. The President then related about the Army convoy that arrived in an Australian port and found the longshoremen on a week's holiday. There being no other way of unloading the ships, the Division Commander turned his men to and

and accomplished the unloading of the ships in three days. He received a stubborn protest for this from the Australian Government. To it, the Division Commander replied, "Tell me about it after the war." The President then stated we can't be in a position of depending solely on union labor in all ports, and to that end we are taking steps to provide ourselves with labor battalions.

The President remarked about the employment of women in industry throughout the country, stating that in the plants which he had visited, the employment of women varied from 30 to 50 percent. That it seemed to be the consensus of shop superintendents that on machine work women were "just as efficient as men," and that on inspection work they were "much more efficient than men."

The President remarked that it was his opinion that the age of draftees was too high, and that we could profitably lower our draft ages to include the 18 and 19 year olds. At this point the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash), remarked that experience in his country had been that married men of like age stand up to physical examination better than unmarried men of the same age.

The President noted that he had observed at Camp Shelby an educational unit which interested him greatly - a unit for draftees retarded physically and mentally - and that splendid work is being done in reclaiming such persons.

Addressing himself to the Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) the President then stated that it would be well for the Canadian Military Attache to work closely with the United States as to the problem of epidemics, remarking that "Canada, strange as it may seem, furnishes a very high percentage of nurses

and doctors."

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. Soong) then asked the President if it would be possible for him to bring to the next meeting of the Pacific War Council the new Chinese Ambassador, who will represent the Chinese Government at the Pacific War Council during Dr. Soong's absence from the country.

The meeting adjourned at 12:45 to await the call of the President.

*J. L. McCREA*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The twentieth meeting of the Pacific War Council was held at 11:30 A.M., Tuesday, September 15, 1942, in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C.

PRESENT

The President

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong)

The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)

The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)

The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)

The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)

The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)

The President remarked that stopping Rommel in Libia was a great achievement; that the Prime Minister was very optimistic and trusted that the offensive would be taken soon by the British in this area. The President remarked that he trusted that if and when the offensive was taken, the British would be "sure" of success. The President continued that the news from the Southwest Pacific was "bad," especially in the New Guinea area. "Every estimate seems to point to the fact that the Japanese have only about 3,000 soldiers in this area, whereas the Allies have 45,000. That the Japanese have been able to outflank the Allies on the rough Owen-Stanley terrain is incredible." In our own field of activity, the situation is none too good. The Japanese are concentrating large forces to the north of Guadalcanal, and at the same time they are able to filtrate into the Guadalcanal area at night. "Frankly, I am pessimistic at the moment about the whole situation."

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) remarked about a story that had appeared today in the Washington "Post," having to do with Japanese ferocity as fighters. He stated that every leader of occidental forces should understand that Orientals are fatalists, and that this mental characteristic will be a decided factor in our campaign against the Japanese. "If I have any advice to offer, it is to fight fiercely to the end, killing all the Japanese possible. Where possible to do so, the wounded will strike back."

In substantiation of the foregoing, the President then related stories of Japanese treachery in Tulagi and the Solomons area - the killing of one of our Navy doctors by a wounded Japanese whom he was treating, etc., etc. The President further remarked that both ourselves and the British seem to be "tied to the highways," and not very good at jungle fighting. At this point the President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) interrupted to remark, "You, Mr. President, are telling the story of Bataan."

At this point the President read a memorandum from Admiral Leahy, attached hereto marked "A".

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) asked what the effect would be on the American people and the American positions if the Japanese retook the Solomons. The President replied, "bad." Here some discussion followed about "stepping stones" in the Southwest Pacific. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that island "stepping stones" are too precarious. "The best way of hitting Japan is to hit her hard from the Asiatic continent."

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) addressing the British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) asked if the Ambassador would not give the Pacific War Council his views on the Indian situation. The British Ambassador replied that in the current crisis the Indian Congress was on one side, the Moslems, munitions workers and the untouchables were on the other, and there was a large middle class which didn't know which way to jump. The Ambassador pointed out that it was a distinct error to think that the Indian Congress represented the Indian people as a whole.

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) then stated that at the risk of being out of order and admittedly being ignorant of the Indian situation, he felt constrained to present his views on India to the Pacific War Council. He stated that foreign rule of the Philippine Islands had existed for centuries. During the Spanish rule, Madrid assumed that the masses in the Philippine Islands "didn't care," and had no interest in their homeland. In this belief, the Spaniards executed Rizal, the Filipino patriot, in December, 1896. Before February, 1897, the whole of the Philippine Islands was in an uproar. The Spanish Government, realizing the mistake it had made, bought off Emilio Aguinaldo for 400,000 pesos and sent him to Hong Kong. There Aguinaldo was found by Dewey. After the American conquest of the Philippine Islands, and the Treaty of Paris, the Filipinos then turned against the United States. The Filipinos were conquered by the guns of the American soldiers, but "it was the soldiers themselves who remained in the Philippine Islands who won over the Filipinos." The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) then pointed out that not a single Filipino leader had come from the cities of the Philippine Islands where the Filipinos had little opportunity to come into contact with the American soldiers. The American

soldiers who remained as school teachers and advisors in the Filipino communities rapidly won the respect and confidence of all the Filipino people. Then addressing the British Ambassador, the President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) remarked, "I think the Indian situation could be worked out by the British much as the Philippine problem has been worked out by the United States. The only hope for India lies with the United Nations, and with this I am sure T. V. Soong agrees. Ghandi thinks the Axis will win. Admitting him to be right, his reasoning is absolutely wrong. I think this thought should be gotten across to him. If I were a young man, I would have been in India long ago. It may be out of order to here say it, but in my judgment it is quite impossible for the white man to 'know' the Orientals for what we are. Orientals will say one thing and have an entirely different thought in their hearts." Turning to Dr. Soong, the President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) remarked, "Dr. Soong, do I speak nonsense?" The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. Soong) replied substantially as follows: "The Chinese have long appreciated the British problem in India. They further recognize that the longer the situation remains unsettled, the more trouble Great Britain and India are setting up for themselves." The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) then proceeded to state that the Japanese were doing their utmost to win over the educated Filipinos, but that even if they were successful, they could not win the Philippine Islands because they were abusing the masses of the Filipinos; that the ordinary Filipino hates the Japanese for what they are doing. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that no matter what temporary success Japan might have

in India, it would nevertheless lose in the long run. He admitted, however, that the immediate future insofar as India is concerned, is of great importance to the United Nations.

The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) replied that the British realize the difficulties which face them in India and suggested that it was much easier at a distance to pass on the situation in India than at close hand. The main trouble is that the Indians cannot agree amongst themselves. Sir Stafford Cripps proposed to the Indians two things: (1) To agree amongst themselves as to the form of government they wanted (2) Whatever they agreed to, should not in any way hurt the war effort. "That they didn't accept the proposals caused me no surprise." The Prime Minister has since stated that the Cripps' plan stands, and it will not be added to or subtracted from. The anxiety at the moment is for the present government of India, which keeps the country from civil war. I would emphasize "that the authority of the present government in India must be reestablished." The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) remarked that he had nothing specific to propose, but that he still believed that it is most difficult to get information about the true thoughts of the Indian masses from the Indians themselves. He further remarked that it seemed to him that the Cripps' proposal was very fair and that if he were a younger man he would in time go to India to see what he could do in straightening out the situation.

The President then remarked that no overnight change in government could take place in any backward country without courting trouble. "Certain processes must be accomplished bit by bit. This is the thought that the United States entertained towards the Philippines ever since our occupation

of those islands. The ideal of independence has been fostered for years. In 1934 there was a meeting of the minds of the Philippine leaders and the United States as to the date upon which independence should become an accomplished fact." The President then remarked that he was reminded of a story about Governor Alfred E. Smith who was involved with a labor situation in the state of New York for which there seemed to be no apparent solution. He remarked that Governor Smith had told him that he was bound to settle this problem and that he was going to do it by locking himself and the labor leaders in a room, getting their feet on the table with long drinks of Scotch and good cigars, and "work it out." The President then remarked that he thought it applicable to quote a remark by William Jennings Bryan which went to the effect that "nothing is final between friends."

With much apparent good spirit, the meeting adjourned at 1:30 P.M., to await the call of the President.

*John L. McCrea*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

September 9, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Captain McCrea has informed me that at the September 2d meeting of the Pacific War Council you asked for information with reference to facilities in the Tuamotu Archipelago and also what utilization was being made of trained New Zealand air personnel. The following information has been obtained from the Army Air Forces:

Air depot for Tuamotu Group:

A careful study has been made by General Breene, a member of the staff of Major General M. F. Harmon, Commanding General of the South Pacific Forces, with a view to selecting a site for an air depot on one of the South Pacific Islands of the Society or of the Tuamotu Group. Fakarava Atoll was one of the islands being considered by General Breene in making his survey. A cablegram has just been received from him which definitely fixes Bora Bora as the site for this depot.

In order that no time may be lost in utilizing these new facilities, personnel and equipment required for the construction, establishment, and operation of this air depot are being assembled and will be shipped as soon as possible.

New Zealand air personnel:

With respect to the utilization of trained New Zealand air personnel, the Combined Chiefs of Staff have, in order to meet the strategic requirements of that area, agreed to progressively equip and maintain 10 Royal New Zealand Air Force squadrons prior to April 1, 1943. A study is being conducted to determine the feasibility of accepting the offer




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of New Zealand to employ in units of the United States Army Air Forces those New Zealand pilots, technicians and ground crews in excess of those required for their own Air Forces and for meeting their commitments to the United Kingdom. It is believed that the implementation of these plans will make possible the utilization of the surplus of qualified New Zealand air personnel.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:



WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

**SECRET**

A(2)

Washington DC Evening Star - September 3, 1942.



**DIPLOMAT ADDRESSES STUDENTS**—Walter Nash, Minister to the United States from New Zealand (right), who spoke this morning before the International Student Assembly, is shown chatting with Miss Jane Mack, from University of Miami, and Dr. David Jenkins, chief of the New Zealand delegates. (Story on page A-1.) —Star Staff Photo.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM

The nineteenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 A.M., Wednesday, September 2, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The Prime Minister of New Zealand (The Right Honorable Peter Fraser)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong)  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Baron W. van Boetselaer, E.E. and M.P. (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon)  
Hon. L. B. Pearson, O.B.E., Minister Counselor, (Representing Canada in the absence of Hon. Leighton McCarthy).

The President remarked that he had recently received a despatch from the Prime Minister of Australia in which it was suggested that both the Prime Minister and General MacArthur felt that it was time to make a resurvey of the general strategy of the conduct of the war, the intimation being that the Southwest Pacific was not being given the consideration which the importance of that area warrants. The President stated that he and the Chiefs of Staff were not insensible to the problems that faced the Southwest Pacific and that but yesterday he had held a long conference with Admirals Leahy and King, and General Marshall. The nub of the whole problem of the war is ocean transportation. If the Allied Nations possessed sufficient transportation facilities, more aggressive offensive activities could be carried on in many theaters. As it is, the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are confronted with the

following problems:--

(1) Aide to Russia. ("We must help Russia all we can.")

(2) The Near East. ("If Germany and Japan join hands, as they are planning, and build up a Naval force in the central Indian Ocean, the problem of supplying the Near East and China will be an almost impossible one.")

(3) The whole of the Pacific. ("That is essentially a United States problem.")

(4) The establishment of a Second Front. ("We must exert every effort to accomplish this.")

The President continued, "If we change the present effort, i.e., Items (1) to (3), inclusive, in favor of (4), we should have to neglect something in Items (1) to (3). Item (4), of course, would give aid to the whole picture. In my judgment, we can't abandon any of the above. We have troops on the West Coast and planes ready to go to the Southwest Pacific, but as I remarked above, the problem is one entirely of ocean transportation, and I must ask, 'How the hell do we get the stuff there?' We have just about half enough troop transports. If anyone has a substitute for any of the items listed above, please come and tell me about it. We just simply can't abandon any of the four items." It is significant to note that no one present had an alternative to propose.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand (Mr. Fraser) remarked that he had had the pleasure of talking to the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (M. Litvinov). "He was most pessimistic, but entirely without bitterness." The President said he wished to remark, entirely off the record, that Ambassador Litvinov had told the Brazilian and Peruvian Ambassadors that "Russia was entirely through." "A completely defeatist attitude. If I hadn't been

reasonably certain that it would have been equivalent to sentencing him to death, I would have reported the incident to his home government." At this point the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that no doubt the Prime Minister (Mr. Fraser) was much affected by M. Litvinov's pessimism. "On the other hand, having talked with M. Litvinov on many previous occasions, for myself I was impressed yesterday with his 'very restrained pessimism.' He did not appear on this occasion nearly so pessimistic as he has been in the past." The Prime Minister of New Zealand (Mr. Fraser) continued, "After listening to M. Litvinov I did not have the heart to open up the Pacific problem. I was much affected by his presentation of the tragedy through which his own country is now passing. Since listening to the remarks of Mr. Nash, I am just wondering of M. Litvinov is not a very astute diplomat. Specifically, M. Litvinov minimized the German forces in the West. He stated that there was little use of trying to make a stand in the Urals."

The Prime Minister of New Zealand (Mr. Fraser), turning to the President, remarked, "In your judgment, Mr. President, is there any significance in Togo's resignation from the Japanese cabinet?" The President shook his head in the negative.

Mr. Fraser continued that, "as far as Australia and New Zealand are concerned, I think I can safely say that we realize the difficulties and the impossibilities that face the United States. The United States need have no fear as to our attitude."

The President remarked that the Southwest Pacific was only one-third of the Pacific problem, and while admitting that it was a most important theater,

suggested that we should not lose sight of the Central and North Pacific. "There are dozens of editorials written daily enjoining the President to throw the Japs out of the Aleutians. To do that, is easier said than done. In the present state of our forces in the Pacific, it would be necessary for us to abandon the Southwest Pacific to accomplish the foregoing. No sane person could agree to that."

The President informed the Council that he had received a personal report from Brigadier General Ira C. Eaker, U.S.A., on the daylight bombing which is now proceeding apace against the cities of western Germany. General Eaker remarked that when he had left the United Kingdom Air Marshal Portal told him that when the B-17's arrived and undertook their bombing of western Germany he, Portal, was very skeptical that it would be successful, and that he had been most pleasantly surprised at the effectiveness of this type of aircraft, and that he felt that if the United States heavy bombers were able to continue effectively to bomb Germany during daylight, and the R.A.F. during the night, that Germany was in for "a hot time for the rest of the war."

The President remarked that he had just said goodbye to Dr. Hu Shih, the distinguished Chinese Ambassador. "I wish you would inform the Generalissimo for me (addressing the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Soong) that in my judgment Dr. Hu Shih has done a perfectly splendid job in the United States. He has put the problem of the Chinese before the country in a thorough and unobtrusive way and I am indeed sorry to see him go."

The President stated that the Russians have now accepted the Nome-Siberia route for the delivery of aircraft and that this route should be open soon. The Russians will not permit delivery of the planes to be made to Russia by our Ferry Command pilots, but insist that Russian pilots come to Nome to get the

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planes. In response to a query the President stated that he felt that the reason the Russians would not permit the United States Ferry Command pilots to deliver aircraft to Siberia was that in some way the Japanese might use that fact as a "casus belli" and that the Russians were most anxious under the circumstances to keep their record absolutely clear.

General discussion then followed as to the attitude of the Russians towards the remainder of the United Nations. Reference was made to the flight of Hess to Great Britain. The President remarked that no doubt the Russians thought that all the United Nations were perfidious enough to make peace with Germany at the expense of the Russians and that they were really amazed when Mr. Churchill declined to do this. Continuing, the President stated that both Mr. Churchill and Mr. Harriman had remarked to him that it would be well if all of us could go to Russia, that the government is not a Communistic one, but it is a different form of government than anything the world has previously known, and that they are really working out "something new" as compared to forms of government as we now know them.

In response to a question as to the significance of the Solomon Islands engagement, the President remarked that no doubt Japan would make a desperate effort to cut our lines of communication to the Southwest Pacific. "History will recall the importance of the Coral Sea, Midway and Solomon Islands engagements as having thwarted the Japanese attempt to cut our communications to the Southwest Pacific. The battles were most opportune. If, say New Zealand were occupied, our lines would surely be cut."

Addressing his remarks to the Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) the President stated, "I think something should be done about the Australian



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

August 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The eighteenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 A. M., Thursday, August 27, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The Prime Minister of New Zealand (The Right Honorable Peter Fraser)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong)  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, E.E. and M.P., (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon)  
Hon. L. B. Pearson, O.B.E., Minister Counselor (Representing Canada in the absence of Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
Mr. Alan S. Watt, Counselor, (Representing Australia in the absence of Sir Owen Dixon)  
Hon. Harry L. Hopkins

The President stated that it was evident the Japanese were planning extensive operations in the Southwest Pacific, but that we had no evidence as to where they were going to strike; that it might be Fiji or an all-out attack on the Solomons.

As a result of his recent visit to Australia, the Prime Minister of New Zealand (Mr. Fraser) stated that the Australian Army was improving and that Australia was all-out for the war. He stated that Prime Minister Curtin and General MacArthur were getting on well.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand (Mr. Fraser) stated that the Australians were building two planes - a good pursuit plane and a dive bomber. The latter they have hopes of being very successful. He said

he believed that any attack which Japan could make on Australia now would be thrown back.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand (Mr. Fraser) said the public in Australia and New Zealand could not understand why there is no second front in Europe. They feel, however, that if a second front cannot be launched at once that we need a victory somewhere and should review the strategy and determine whether we should not attempt a knockout blow against the Japanese. He stated that the defense of Australia and New Zealand did not occupy their thoughts, but that the people of these two countries think of them as bases for an offensive on the way to the Philippines. Mr. Fraser stated that Japan is holding Java with light forces and feels there is no necessity to attack Java in the first instance. He said that while he had no information as to what Japan intended to do about Russia, that for his part he hoped the Japs attacked her because this would give us landing fields from which to attack Japan.

The President stated that the ferry route to Russia via Alaska was well under way, but the Russians wanted to fly the planes with their own pilots because they feared Japan would seriously object to the use of American flyers, although the Russians have agreed that American observers can accompany the planes. The President said he believed that Germany wants Japan to attack Russia but that Japan seems unwilling. The President believes there will be only six weeks of good weather in that part of the world from September 15th to November 1st, and if Japan delays much beyond the 15th she will never accomplish her objective. The President stated that he had had a long talk with Ambassador Grew, who told him he thought Japan would


resist to the last and the only way we would ever overcome them would be to kill them and fight them in the streets of Tokyo. Ambassador Grew had stated that the tortures in Hong Kong and other places were not overstated. That there are still about 1,000 Americans in Japan and as many British.

The President, in summarizing, indicated that our main over-all problem was shipping.

The Prime Minister of New Zealand (Mr. Fraser) said that the New Zealanders were quite ready to turn their air force over to the United States and work under United States direction. Mr. Fraser said his pilots and ground crews could be used anywhere in the Southwest Pacific; that he has no desire to hold them in New Zealand proper. He stated that the ground personnel and some pilots will go to England if they cannot be used in the Southwest Pacific, but they would prefer the latter. Mr. Fraser believes they have a good many competent men with nothing to do because of the lack of airplanes.

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NOTE: Captain McCrea did not attend this meeting of the Pacific War Council due to his absence on duty in Brooklyn, N. Y., at the direction of the President, to witness the launching of the U. S. S. IOWA. The above notes were taken by Mr. Harry Hopkins.

  
JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

August 27, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

After the last meeting of the Pacific War Council, Captain McCrea informed the Chiefs of Staff that you had inquired as to whether or not in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the time is now appropriate for the United Nations to conduct a land offensive against the enemy on the north shores of New Guinea. This operation against New Guinea is planned as the second phase of the operation which began with the attack on the Solomons. Land operations against Japanese installations on New Guinea will be undertaken as soon as the naval situation in the Solomons is clarified sufficiently to permit such an expedition.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that this information be not divulged to the Pacific War Council because of the danger of a leak and the disastrous consequences which would result from such information getting into enemy hands.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

*William D. Leahy*

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,  
Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Chief of Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

August 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM

The seventeenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:40 A. M., Wednesday, August 12th, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. T. V. Soong)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.B., C.B., E.E. and M.P., (Representing Great Britain in the absence of Viscount Halifax)  
Hon. L. B. Pearson, O.B.E., Minister Counselor, (Representing Canada in the absence of Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary of the New Zealand Legation, (Representing New Zealand in the absence of Mr. Nash)

The President informed the Council that he had just received a call from Governor Kielstra, the Governor of Dutch Guiana. The President stated that he told the Governor that the Tennessee Valley Authority had been able to produce aluminum from red clay, that, while the process at the moment is expensive, nevertheless Dutch Guiana should not feel that their bauxite would always be indispensable to the United States or other large aluminum consuming countries. The President remarked generally that no country could safely look ahead for very many years because of the unexpected developments which science is sure to make.

The President stated that our operations in the Tulagi area had, in his judgment, made Australia relatively safe for the time being, and that these operations were going ahead satisfactorily. The President continued

that he thought the press stories emanating from Australia were too "scary."  
"We are in the Solomons, I hope, to stay, and in getting in there we have gained a couple of months on our enemy."

The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) remarked that the training program for pilots and the militia was proceeding satisfactorily in Australia. He remarked that as a matter of fact Australia has an excess of combat pilots.

The Indian question was raised. The President remarked that he felt that the Pacific War Council was no place in which to discuss India, but "we will, anyway." The President stated that he and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek had been in correspondence with each other about India, and while there was some disagreement as to the method by which China and the United States should engage in this matter, nevertheless there was unity of thought as to the end desired. "In my judgment, India is not yet ready for home government. That takes time. The training of thousands of persons over a number of years is necessary for good government." The President then pointed out the experience of the United States, namely that at the end of our revolution we found thirteen separate states which were very loosely bound together by the Confederation. We have the same thing now, but the Confederation is now a Constitution which was worked out after a number of years of trial and error under the Confederation. "If the Generalissimo and I could sit down together we could work this thing out. The British Empire should know that we would approach this subject as 'amici curiae,' but they should further understand that we would not interfere in something that is essentially their business unless we were asked to do so by both sides. One thing is certain, open hostilities in India will slow up the United Nations war effort."


At this point the President read a memorandum attached hereto marked (A).

The President directed that Captain McCrea address a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff making inquiry as to whether or not a land offensive could now be carried out against the enemy on the north shores of New Guinea.

The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) remarked at length about radio propaganda. He stated that he felt that the Office of War Information was not approaching the matter in a realistic manner; that a knowledge of the mentality of the persons towards whom the propaganda was being directed is essential. The President directed that Captain McCrea get in touch with Mr. Elmer Davis and inform Mr. Davis of the President's very keen interest in this matter. Continuing, the President remarked that of course it is well known that types of propaganda effective in the Philippines would produce an entirely different result in say Borneo and the Sulu Islands. The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) continued that when the new radio station is built in Australia, spare parts in quantity should be sent. The Australian Minister (Sir Owen Dixon) remarked that he thought that the Netherlands Ambassador and the British Charge and himself could very profitably get together on the subject of radio propaganda.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Dr. Soong) stated that radio propaganda was most effective in China, but that the Chinese were particularly appreciative of what the American planes were now doing there. The best propaganda for China is "to send more bombers to operate against the enemy."

The conference closed at 12:40 P.M. No decision was made as to the time of the next meeting.

  
JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

August 12, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Referring to your memorandum of July 29, 1942, requesting information for the Pacific War Council, the following is furnished:

1. The total number of United Nations troops in New Guinea, as of August 10, 1942, was about 16,200.

2. Radio propaganda being directed to the Netherlands East Indies and Philippines.

a. The Office of War Information is broadcasting by short wave from Pacific Coast stations. By picking up and analyzing the short wave propaganda broadcasts from Australia directed to the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines, the O.W.I. gears its own efforts to supplement and reinforce the propaganda from Australia. In addition, the O.W.I. listening post in San Francisco analyzes broadcasts from radio Tokyo and radio Berlin, and sends directives based thereon to the Australian broadcasting system.

b. Arrangements are now in process to establish in Australia a broadcasting station of sufficient strength to blanket the Pacific Southwest area with standard-wave broadcasts, to be used if short wave sets must be altered to standard wave lengths. This will be in operation in about 45 days.

3. Reports from General MacArthur indicate that agents have been sent into the Netherlands East Indies




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and the Philippine Islands for the purpose of encouraging guerrilla activities. These operations are being directed by an Allied Intelligence Bureau at General MacArthur's headquarters.



W. B. SMITH,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Secretary.

**SECRET**

- 2 -

A(2)

Regraded Unclassified

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The sixteenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:50 a.m., Wednesday, July 29, 1942.

PRESENT

**The President**

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)

The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)

The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)

The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Robert</sup> Dixon)

The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)

Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.B., C.B., E. F. and M. P. (Representing Great Britain in the absence of Viscount Halifax)

Mr. G. S. Cox, First Secretary of the New Zealand Legation (Representing New Zealand in the absence of Mr. Nash)

The President remarked that it was a delicate subject to discuss, but he felt that something must be done to get India to help win the war. He stated that he recognized this was Mr. Churchill's problem, but nevertheless he was making bold enough to make certain suggestions to Mr. Churchill.

The President stated that an amusing incident had just occurred. Negotiations had been undertaken by the President with Mr. Stalin to permit an air corps mission to proceed to Russia via Siberia. Yesterday, the State Department refused to issue passports for that purpose and this morning it was found that the Russian Embassy would not visa the passports for American officers to enter Russia via Siberia. "Whether they get passports or not, or visas or not, the mission is going as scheduled," the President remarked with emphasis.

The President remarked that he didn't think the Russian situation was as bad as the papers set forth. Certainly last March everyone thought that the Germans would start their offensive no later than the first of May and that they would probably be in the Caucasus by the first of August, and that probably by the first of August Moscow and Leningrad would be invested. This has not happened. We know that the Germans must be a good six weeks behind their schedule. "Before we know it, snow will be covering two-thirds of the German-Russian front, and mud the remaining one-third. There is a tremendous amount of pessimism about Russia. I don't think it is warranted."

The President stated that he was receiving a good deal of twitting about the Aleutian Islands situation. "Thus far I am content to let the military council prevail in this matter. We can't be strong in all places at the same time, and I feel that the military have given the Aleutians the proper weight to which their importance entitles them. Don't mistake me. I would rather have the Japanese out than in."

Turning to the southwest Pacific, the President stated that the Japanese seem to be building up their forces in the Rabaul area and that this he didn't like. The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Owen</sup> Irwin Dixon) stated that he was under the impression that Australia had a division in New Guinea, but wasn't sure. He stated that he was generally concerned about the air situation in Australia and that we should undertake to have a higher percentage of operative aircraft in that area. The landing of the Japanese troops at Buna is a direct threat to Port Moresby, and this port must be held. The President directed that Captain McCrea make inquiry as to the

number of troops now in New Guinea.

The President stated that the United States is sending troops out of this country in quantity, daily. Once the troops are out of the country, that doesn't end the story. "Every time we send a division out of the United States, we increase the supply problem. The shipping situation being as it is, this makes a real problem for us to face."

The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) stated that the Japanese were putting out much misinformation about the Dutch East Indies. They are principally claiming to be doing things which they can't do. As an example, the Ambassador cited a recent newspaper story, emanating from Tokio, that in the harbor of Surabaya alone, the Japanese had raised thirty ocean-going ships. The Ambassador remarked that this was impossible because only eight ocean-going ships were sunk in Surabaya. He stated that further extravagant claims about the resuming of production of rubber, oil, etc., were also being made. In one place alone, it is known that oil is now being produced, and this in very small quantities. The Japanese are facing a great deal of difficulty in their inter-island transport problem, and information has been received to the effect that they are doing their utmost to build wooden vessels to fill this need.

The President remarked that it would be a happy day for the Allied Nations when they recover Timor. The President further remarked that there is a great shortage of copper in Japan and that the Japs were doing their utmost to induce Chile to run the risk of seizure and send copper ore to Japan.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that

he had been advised that three Japanese ships had recently arrived in Bordeaux with tin and rubber for Germany. The President remarked that the problem of French neutrality was rapidly approaching reductio ad absurdum. "Germany is undoubtedly getting much material of war from France."

The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Osmena) stated that he thought it was very possible that small boat communication could be put into operation between Australia and the Philippines, with the idea of sending aid and comfort to the natives of the Philippines to encourage them to keep the guerrilla warfare going.

General discussion was had about the character of the United Nations propaganda now going to the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippine Islands. The President directed that Captain McCrea inquire as to what is being done in this regard, and further, if anything is being done towards sending United Nations agents into the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines from Australia.

The President stated that we would soon face a real problem with many of our troops in tropical areas. He stated that he was under the impression that we would shortly have to rotate these troops with the idea of getting those who had served some time in the tropics into a more temperate climate for purposes of recuperation.

The President stated that in view of the fact that the Queen of the Netherlands was expected to arrive in Washington on Wednesday, 5 August, that no meeting of the Pacific War Council would be held during that week.

*John L. McCrea*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The fifteenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 12:00 o'clock noon, Wednesday, July 22, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>CWEP</sup>~~Isaac~~ Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.B., C.B., E. E. and M. P. (Representing Great Britain in the absence of Viscount Halifax)  
Baron W. van Boetselaer, E. E. and M. P. (Representing the Netherlands in the absence of Ambassador Loudon)

The President remarked that he had just received a call from Mr. Litvinov, the Ambassador of the U. S. S. R. "He's a grand person but he is a persistent pessimist. He always sees the hole in the doughnut. His principal complaint this morning had to do with the stopping of the Russian convoys." The President stated that he had explained to Mr. Litvinov that of the 35 ships of PQ-17, at least 70% had been lost; this despite the fact that the escort was a most heavy one. The damage inflicted on the convoy was accomplished for the most part by shore based air, for which no remedy at the moment was apparent. The alternative in this matter is to send the ships via the Cape of Good Hope to Basra. "Litvinov was insistent. I said to him, 'In view of the terrific losses of material and shipping which we experienced in the last convoy, does Russia still want another

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convoy sent in via the north of Iceland. If so, I am sport enough to send one, and I think Mr. Churchill would agree.'" The President added that Mr. Litvinov stated he would take the matter under advisement. Mr. Litvinov also asked about a second front. The President remarked in response to a question by a member of the Council as to the possibility of Norway being used as a second front, that Mr. Molotov had stated that "Norway as a second front is a toy pistol."

The Minister from New Zealand (Mr. Nash) remarked that the objective as he saw it was to help Russia. The question that must be asked is, "Does the loss of ships at such a high rate as experienced in PQ-17 help anyone? The answer is obviously that it doesn't."

The President remarked that he had asked Mr. Litvinov whether or not the Russians had any information about the Japanese going into Siberia. To this Mr. Litvinov replied in the negative. The President continued, "I may be wrong, but my hunch is that they will go in between August 1-10."

The President remarked about public opinion in the United States, stating that public opinion is made largely by the commentators and the columnists who had little understanding of strategic matters and are for the most part rather shallow thinkers. "Forget Egypt, forget China, forget everything, and get the little so-and-so's out of the Aleutian Islands. Of course we want the Japanese gotten out of the Aleutians. We must remember that at the moment there are bigger things which face us."

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that the Russians should right now be making all necessary arrangements for hostilities if and when they broke. To this the President agreed, remarking as he did so that the Russians still hope Japan won't invade Siberia.

The President announced that word had been received that the Japanese had denounced the Seal Protection Treaty. This treaty, which has been in effect for some 40 years, had saved the fur seal from extinction.

At this point the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) gave a map talk about conditions in China. He touched particularly on the relationship of the Eighth Route (Communist) Army with the Generalissimo, remarking that ever since Russia had been invaded by Germany, the relationship between this Army and the Generalissimo had been much more cordial. It was also pointed out that of all the airplane routes to Chungking, it appears that the Sadiya-Chungking line is by far the most practicable. This route had never been properly explored until recently when a representative of the Douglas Aircraft Company flew over it and found that the highest a plane need fly was about 16,000 feet, instead of 22,000 feet as had previously been supposed. This permits the transport planes to be loaded with  $3\frac{1}{2}$  tons of stores rather than 2 tons. The principal difficulties in the China situation are as follows: (1) To get small arms ammunition to China in quantity; this is possible of solution since the routes can be flown. (2) The economic problem; Japan has now overrun the Chinese granary. (3) The currency situation; prior to Pearl Harbor a currency war existed; the Japanese have now issued fiat money throughout the occupied areas and have forbidden the use of Chungking money, and consequently there is no incentive for smugglers to bring in articles needed by the Chungking government. Most of the dishonest currency tricks were taught the world by the Germans. Rice and salt have risen in value to about 30 times what they were before the war. Quinine is almost non-existent.

No longer will a doctor's prescription alone assure one of getting quinine. The user must appear in the drug store and take the quinine in the presence of the dispenser. The bombers have done good work in the Hankow-Canton areas. "Many are depressed about the Chinese situation, but I am not. I feel that all the problems which face China are capable of solution."

The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Owen</sup> ~~Erwin~~ Dixon) stated that consideration should be given to the reopening of Torres Strait. The President remarked that this depends on many expert considerations.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that a good base should be had in the Solomons-New Hebrides area. That if such were the case, Rabaul could be made untenable. "Get across New Guinea and we can upset the Celebes situation for the Japanese."

The meeting came to a close at 1:10 p.m., and it was determined that the next meeting would be held on Wednesday, July 29, 1942.

*John L. McCrea*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The fourteenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:50 a. m., Thursday, July 16, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. Eelco van Kleffens)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Owen</sup> Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.B., C.B., E. E. and M. P. (Representing Great Britain in the absence of Viscount Halifax)

The President announced to the Pacific War Council that he wished to thank the Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Osmena) for bringing to his attention the copy of his (Mr. Osmena's) radio address delivered over the Columbia Broadcasting System at 4:30 p. m., July 13, 1942, on the program "Spotlight on Asia," the address itself being entitled "American-Filipino Partnership in Bataan." The President remarked that he was very glad to note that this partnership was still on a going basis.

The President then read to the Council the production figures of munitions of war as submitted by Mr. Isador Lubin, Chief, Statistical Analysis Branch, Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The President remarked that in one way, at least, the week just

passed had been rather good. Rommel had been stopped and pushed back a little. Either side, however, might win. The South African divisions suffered heavy losses. A British armored division has been landed and the British tank strength in Libya is higher than it has ever been. Very little additional air can be taken care of in the Libian theater at the moment. The victory in Libya should go to the side which can build up its forces the quickest. The Germans are flying many troops into the battle area. As usual, the Germans are on the short end of the supply line while the British are on the long end. On the other side of the ledger, one matter of serious import must be recorded. The current Russian convoy (PQ17) was well beaten up. Over fifty percent of the ships were lost, and it may be that the losses will run as high as 75 percent. This represents not alone a loss of huge quantities of materials of war, but a tremendous loss of tonnage. This convoy was given a particularly heavy escort, but in the high latitudes through which it had to travel, daylight is almost continuous, this making an attractive target for both air and surface ship operations. The question now seems to be whether or not to continue this convoy route or to send the material into Russia through the Persian Gulf. "I hope that Russia will agree that it is better to get ninety percent in, than a mere thirty percent, even though the route be longer."

Land operations in Russia are not going too badly. The Germans are afraid that Russia will not break up this winter. "If the Russians hold out this summer, I think the United Nations will be over the hump."

From everything that can be learned, the Japanese are suffering from

lack of tonnage. We get good reports from our submarines returning from their patrols. Japanese ship production is not high. The Office of Naval Intelligence estimates that the Japanese replacement capacity is about 25,000 tons per month. "I cannot agree that it is as low as that. I think it more probable that they can produce about 50,000 tons per month." Information is reaching the United States from many sources that the Japanese have set up trading companies all over the occupied Orient. It is evidently their intention to exploit economically the countries they have overrun, to the utmost.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) asked if anything further had been heard from Laval with reference to the ultimate disposition of the French ships now at Alexandria. To this, the President replied that Mr. Laval had sent him "an insulting despatch," the general tenor of which seemed to be that he could not accept the President's proposal because of the honor of France." The President further stated that since Godfroy had made an intimation in his despatch that French ports would be acceptable to him, that he, the President, had then sent a later despatch to both Laval and Godfroy, suggesting that Martinique be the safe haven for the French ships. Godfroy replied that Martinique wasn't "the kind" of a French port to which he wished to repair, but rather the port of Bizerte. The President remarked that the record in these proceedings is entirely in the open, has been given much publicity, and that in his judgment the British would be "wholly justified" in destroying the French ships were the British themselves forced to evacuate Alexandria.

The President remarked in response to a question from the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) that more and more within the country the French are opposing the German occupation. Laval's position is somewhat peculiar. "He is trying to occupy a central position." The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) then asked if the United States Charge d' Affaires in Vichy was still looking out for the affairs of the occupied countries. The President directed Captain McCrea to consult with Mr. Welles, the Under Secretary of State, in this regard. Mr. Welles informed Captain McCrea that five days ago, Vichy notified this government that they regarded our services in behalf of the occupied countries as having terminated. Further, that Vichy itself would now undertake to look after the interests of the occupied countries.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that yesterday he had received information from three different sources that food packages were not getting through to the prisoners of war. To this, the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. van Kleffens) remarked that Spain makes it difficult to get food packages through the country in view of brigandage. He stated that it was virtually impossible to get cigarettes through Spain. In addition, there is a bottleneck in Portugal with reference to the transportation of these packages. The President remarked that he had been informed that German prison guards high-jacked prisoners of their food parcels by demanding a portion of the food within the package in return for signing a receipt for it.

The President discussed at some length the danger of a German-controlled Dakar, to the western hemisphere, especially Brazil.

The meeting came to a close at 12:55 p.m., and it was determined that the next meeting would be on Wednesday, July 22, 1942.

*John McCrea*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

July 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The thirteenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:40 a. m., Wednesday, July 8, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. Eelco van Kleffens)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Walter</sup> ~~James~~ Dixon)  
The Vice President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Sergio Osmena)  
Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B., E. E. and M. P. (Representing Great Britain in the absence of Viscount Halifax)  
The Director-General of British Information Services in the United States (Hon. Harold B. Butler, E. E. and M. P.)

The President remarked that the United Nations had passed through difficult days since the Council last met. When Mr. Churchill arrived in the United States on 18 June, the Lybian battle was well underway, but no apprehension was felt. The fall of Tobruk was a decided shock to the Prime Minister, as it was to the rest of the United Nations. At the moment, the Middle East appears to be holding, and it is trusted that as time passes and reinforcements arrive, the British will be in a definitely better position.

The President continued his remarks by stating that he had recently been in correspondence with Chiang Kai-Shek and that the Generalissimo appeared to be greatly depressed. This downheartedness was no doubt due to the fact that when the Lybian situation became acute and something had

to be done in a hurry to save Egypt, "I ordered the Tenth Air Force to proceed to the Middle East and help Egypt. Time for consultation with the Generalissimo simply did not exist, and something had to be done very quickly. I am sure if the Generalissimo had been here and had all the facts before him, he would have not only heartily approved, but would have urged that I take the action I did. If the Middle East falls, the problem of the supply of China will be made immeasurably harder. The stand that the British are now making on the El Alamein line is a last ditch stand. If successful, we can (1) reinforce the British, and, (2) seize the initiative."

Continuing his remarks, the President stated that Mr. Stalin had a keen appreciation of the value of the Middle East to the United Nations' cause when he (Stalin) agreed to relinquish to the British some forty medium bombers already at Basra and in condition to operate. The President further remarked that he judged from this fact that the Russian situation may not be as serious as it now seems. "At any rate," the President remarked, "as soon as the situation stabilizes we will repay both China and Russia, with interest, for the materials that had to be diverted."

The President stated that the submarine losses in the western Atlantic continued to be bad. "The Navy told me in March that the situation would get better and they have told me repeatedly since then that it would get better, but to date it hasn't. We are extending ourselves to the utmost to meet this situation. More aircraft and more patrol vessels are being assigned to the sea frontiers as they become available."

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At this point the President read a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attached hereto marked (A).

The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. van Kleffens) remarked that his government was intensifying the propaganda broadcasts to the Netherlands East Indies. Oddly enough, it has been discovered that San Francisco is by far the best place from which to beam these broadcasts, the enemy being able to "jam" effectively Melbourne and Sydney broadcasts. Dr. van Kleffens further remarked that his government was most anxious to improve this service. The President replied that Dr. van Kleffens should see Mr. Elmer Davis and Mr. Robert Sherwood, in this connection. The President further pointed out that it was most important to see that propaganda material is used rightly, remarking that the British Broadcasting Corporation at the outset of the war made very bad errors of judgment, in that they failed to make a proper appreciation of the sort of material which could best be used for propaganda purposes. Dr. van Kleffens stated that his government has in this country a great many people who can speak Javanese, and what is more important, have made a study of the Javanese peoples and know the proper approach to be taken. "Evidently our propaganda broadcasts are very successful, because the Japanese are condemning to death those who listen to our propaganda broadcasts." Dr. van Kleffens continued that his government was in receipt of information from New Guinea and the Celebes that resistance was continuing. He cited as an example that a lieutenant in the field had recently sent a despatch to the effect that he heard the San Francisco broadcasts nightly, but had been unable to acknowledge

same until he had fortunately been able to seize an enemy radio station over which he was sending this information.

The discussion turned generally towards the Aleutians. The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) stated that he was somewhat concerned with the presence of the Japanese in these waters. The President remarked that since the French-Canadians object to being sent overseas, one solution might be that they could be employed in Alaska.

The President ventured the remark that all the United Nations should "give particular attention to the spy situation." He cited the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation evidently had very good reasons to suspect that some of the alleged Jewish refugees coming into our country are spies in the pay of the German government, and that a careful search was being made on the S. S. DROTTNINGHOLM, recently arrived in this country, because of this. "The Germans are anxious to get saboteurs into this country in any way whatsoever, and it is difficult to pass judgment as to which is the more despicable, the attempt to plant saboteurs in this country by using the Jews, or the willingness of the Jews themselves to do this. In any event, all refugees should be carefully watched." Continuing in the same vein, the Director-General of British Information Services in the United States (Mr. Butler) stated that it was a known fact that the Germans were putting pressure, through the Gestapo, on Jews resident in Germany to join the spy organizations, by promising ameliorated conditions for their families in Germany.

At this point there was general discussion about German police

methods. The President, by way of personal reference, remarked that when a young boy of about 10 years of age, he was arrested four times in Germany in one day, for (1) Killing a goose with his bicycle; (2) Picking cherries from a tree, the branches of which were hanging over a wall; (3) Wheeling his bicycle through a railroad station, and (4) Wheeling his bicycle around a barrier in the road. The President elaborated on the last named incident to the effect that he and his tutor while cycling through Germany and enroute to Strassburg, found themselves suddenly confronted with a barrier in the road. Since Strassburg was about three miles distant, the President and his tutor dismounted and wheeled their bicycles around the barrier. Upon mounting them to ride off in the direction of Strassburg, they were promptly arrested by a German sentry who suddenly appeared from nowhere. They were taken before the man's Colonel who informed the President that he was under arrest for "trying to enter a fortified city of the Rhine, on, with or by a wheeled vehicle, after sundown." On being asked as to how one could get to Strassburg the Colonel informed the President that he should go back down the road a couple of miles to a railroad station and there take a train for Strassburg. The Colonel did not seem to have any answer to the statement made by the President that the railroad carriage in which he would enter Strassburg was "a wheeled vehicle arriving after sundown."

The President remarked that reports from inside Germany continued to be bad. "It is my conviction that if Russia can hold out, and if the Middle East can hold out, Germany cannot successfully pass another winter. I am well aware that this is a very 'iffy' matter."

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that China is "getting weaker." "The loss of the Burma Road was a distinct blow to China. The thing that is hurting the Chinese most at the moment is that the Japanese have outlawed all Chinese currency in occupied territory and have substituted for it Japanese occupational currency. The whole practice, therefore, of the Chinese buying much needed goods in occupied China has had to go out the window. The greatest danger which now faces China is economic exhaustion. Inflation of the worst order is rife throughout the country." One encouraging thing is that the Russians are now meeting the Chinese and cooperating in every particular.

The President then remarked that the Russians are cooperating with the United States in that a survey of air routes from Alaska to Siberia is now underway and that much progress is being made. It is intended that one of the air routes between Nome and Moscow will break off at a suitable point for Chungking.

In response to a question from the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) as to whether or not there was any news from France, the President told the Council of his offer to both Laval and Godfroy to furnish asylum to the French men-of-war now at Alexandria, should the British find it necessary to abandon that port. "Laval bluntly turned down the offer, remarking as he did so that it was an insult to France. Godfroy further turned down the proposition, but I expected nothing different from him. Our record in this matter is very clear. We have made a definite offer to the French and unless something should develop, I feel that in event Alexandria is abandoned, I should recommend to the British that they sink the French ships before leaving."

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The meeting came to a close at 1:00 p. m., and it was determined that the next meeting would be on Wednesday, July 15, 1942.

John L. McCREA

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

The Operations Division, War Department General Staff, has investigated the report received by Mr. T. V. Soong that airplanes are being used indiscriminately to carry material across India when available rail transportation would serve the same purpose. It is not believed that the statement is justified.

Air freight operations in India are divided into two distinct classifications as follows:

a. The Trans-India Ferry Route operated by the 10th Air Force for the purpose of extending from Karachi to Dinjan the air ferrying service from the United States and the transport of critical equipment for its own use.

b. The air ferry route from Dinjan, India, to Kunming, China - established to transport war materials to China - also is used at present to supply the two squadrons of the 10th Air Force at Kunming.

On the Dinjan-Kunming route we are operating 30 planes and this is the maximum number that can be employed efficiently with existing airdrome facilities. Tonnage delivered to China by air is not limited to the planes assigned the task but by the ground facilities available at the terminals. When airdromes now under construction near Dinjan are completed, 17 more planes can be added to this fleet but this construction has been delayed by record-breaking floods. The fleet can be further expanded when additional airdrome facilities at Kunming are provided, but this is being held up by the Chinese pending military developments in Yunnan.



**SECRET**


A (1)

**SECRET**

During May and June the China Ferrying Command moved a total weight of 1,527,939 pounds eastward and 1,792,186 pounds westward, and dropped 161,160 pounds of food and medicine to the Chinese Army in North Burma although flying conditions were very bad during part of this period. For instance the fleet was able to operate only one day between June 22d and June 27th.

When weather conditions prohibit the China run, idle planes at the Dinjan terminal are used to supplement transport operations within India, where the transport problem is most critical as the railroads are badly congested, water transportation in the Bay of Bengal has practically ceased, and the port of Calcutta is closed. The British Indian Army, consisting of almost 1,000,000 men, have to be supplied by rail routes and all reports of our observers confirm the seriousness of transportation difficulties. We must also supply our own air force in India which is operating from widely dispersed airdromes without a transport squadron of its own.

General Stilwell was directed by the War Department to expedite the flow of materials into China using to the maximum all the means at his disposal, and the War Department is confident that this is being done.



W. B. SMITH,  
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,  
Secretary.

**SECRET**

- 2 -

A(2)

Regraded Unclassified

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The twelfth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p. m., Thursday, June 25, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The Prime Minister of Great Britain (The Right Honorable Winston S. Churchill)  
The Prime Minister of Canada (The Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King)  
The Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. Eelco van Kleffens)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir ~~Erwin~~ Dixon)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins *Owen*

The President stated that, on behalf of the regular members of the Pacific War Council, he wished to extend cordial greetings to the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill), the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. King), and the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. van Kleffens), remarking as he did so that the Council would be pleased to receive the observations and comments of these distinguished visitors.

In general, the President remarked that there was "no particular news." It now appears that the Japanese carrier strength has been reduced from twelve to seven. Three or four of the original twelve were no doubt converted merchant types, and not having been built as carriers they no doubt lacked certain desirable features, but nevertheless up until now they

have been able to carry on pretty successfully in their appointed roles. The attrition that has gone on against the Japanese carrier strength has been very gratifying. In addition, with the loss of each of the aircraft carriers concerned there must have been a correspondingly heavy loss of embarked aircraft.

With reference to the Aleutian situation, the President stated that he was "somewhat disturbed." Continual fog, rain and wind make aircraft operations against the enemy in this area very difficult. So far as can now be determined, the enemy forces in this area are "small, even somewhat infinitesimal as regards ships and men." Looking at the Pacific problem as a whole and without attempting to evaluate the relative importance of the south and central Pacific, it would appear nevertheless that the north Pacific is definitely in third place insofar as priority of attention on our part is concerned. With the remark that Canada appeared to be "somewhat excited," the President asked the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. King) for his comments. To this, the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. King) replied, "We are not much excited; we feel that we are in good company."

The President then requested that the Prime Minister of Great Britain present his views on the general situation. The Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) replied substantially as follows: "I have, of course, been concerned about Lybia. We think that with reinforcements which are now enroute to that theater, the situation will be gotten in hand. I wish to here state with what inexpressible relief we learned of the results of the fighting in the Pacific, both in the Coral Sea and Midway areas. The change in the list of Japanese ships as a result of those two engagements is, to say the least, refreshing. I can now disclose that in the latter part of March and in early April we were much alarmed for the safety of Bengal and Ceylon. Very different

is that position now. Into India we have put three divisions, with more on the way. There are more British troops in India now than have ever been there before. The Eastern Fleet will be built up to full strength by August. This will not alone improve our position in the Far East, but we will be in a position to do something of positive help to China, and I wish to say here and now that we will extend ourselves to the utmost to aid our Oriental ally. It is our very definite hope that we will be able to take the offensive in the Bay of Bengal area not later than November, 1942. What has happened in Lybia will not set back this date. The Japanese are making their first important and decided move to wipe out Chinese resistance. Everything points to early action on the part of the Japanese against Siberia. With a war on his western front, Mr. Stalin no doubt views the possible attack on Siberia by the Japanese without enthusiasm. The United Nations can rest assured that Britain will spare no means or methods to bring the aggressor nations to their early and ultimate downfall."

At this point the President remarked that the Japanese are in such a position that heavy withdrawals of troops from the southwest cannot be made since there is much resistance by guerrillas going on in the East Indies and the Philippine Islands. To this, both the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands (Dr. van Kleffens) and the President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) added vigorous agreement. The President further remarked that the Japanese were encountering much resistance in Timor on the part of the Portuguese and that the Australian troops and New Guinea natives in the Australian Mandates were helping "harass the invader." The President further stated that authority had been given General MacArthur to purchase at a good price all rubber which could be smuggled into Australia; this will unquestionably

help to keep alive the resistance against the Japanese.

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) remarked that he had recently received information that Colonel Roxas, the one whom the President had designated as his successor in case he were killed or fell into the hands of the enemy, was still fighting bravely against the Japanese in central Mindanao.

At this point the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) stated that he would "like to remark in conclusion" that he thought it wise for the Council to adopt an offensive policy embodying (1) Operations against the enemy to the northward from Australia; (2) Counterstrokes against the enemy from India; (3) Maintenance of guerrillas wherever they were located.

The President remarked that he felt it most essential that the guerrillas be assisted in every possible way. "Every Japanese killed by the guerrillas hastens the end of the war." Plans for the offensive to the north from Australia are now in a most confidential and advanced state of completion. Cooperation from British seaborne forces in Trincomalee, the Prime Minister informs me, can confidently be counted upon.

The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Owen</sup> ~~Erwin~~ Dixon) suggested that early consideration be given to opening up a channel through Torres Strait. To this remark the President replied that the matter was being "attended to."

The Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) told the Council that he had a very gratifying conversation with Rear Admiral Sherman, lately in command of the U. S. S. LEXINGTON, and that Rear Admiral Sherman had particularly impressed him with the capabilities of dive bombers and torpedo planes.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that he had just received a despatch from his government in which it was stated that aircraft were being used for transportation purposes in the Indian area in an injudicious manner, in that this type of transportation was being employed where other and slower transportation would do. The President directed that Captain McCrea take up this matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President then informed the Council that information had been received that the Germans, Italians, and Japanese were planning a commercial air route between their countries via Rangoon and the Middle East. Consideration was also being given to flying a northern route across Siberia and Russia, but that that route was looked upon with little favor because of the usually adverse weather conditions. The President remarked that everything possible should be done "to make their venture a failure."

At this point the President read a memorandum attached hereto marked (A).

The Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) at this point read a letter which he had received from General Smuts recommending that every effort be made to recover Rangoon and the Burma route. The import of General Smuts' letter was that it was most important to support China and that the quickest and best way to do so would be to reestablish the Burma route as a supply line to the heart of China. In conclusion, the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Mr. Churchill) remarked that General Smuts' proposal had his entire approval and hearty endorsement. "I have great confidence in General Smuts' judgment."

The President remarked that the immediate goal of the allied nations was

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WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCE

WASHINGTON

to construct "more and more planes and arms per month." In that manner we shall bring the full force of our resources to bear at the earliest possible moment, on the aggressor nations.

The President then announced to the Council that invitations had been extended by him to General Smuts and Messrs. Fraser (Prime Minister of New Zealand) and Curtin (Prime Minister of Australia) to visit the United States at their earliest convenience. General Smuts and Mr. Fraser have already accepted, but the dates for their visits have not been fixed.

The next meeting of the Pacific War Council is scheduled for Wednesday, July 1, 1942, at 11:30 a. m.

The Pacific War Council then (1:15 p.m.) adjourned to lunch in the State Dining Room, there being joined by the Secretary of State (Mr. Hull) and the Under Secretary of State (Mr. Welles).

*John McCrea*

\*\*\*\*\*

*DA Arnold*

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:


1. Investigation of the India-China air cargo situation reveals that as of May 8 approximately 3,500,000 pounds had been transported into China from Dijan (Sadiya). The returning aircraft are reported to have evacuated several thousand people from Burma.

2. No definite statements have been received as to the amount of freight carried within the last thirty days. General Stilwell has indicated, however, that the following number of tons will be transported during the next few months:

128 tons	June
264 "	July
400 "	August
400 "	September
400 "	October

3. In a telegram just received from General Wheeler he makes the statement that the most favorable estimate of the capacity of the air transport link from Assam to Kunming will be 200 tons per week commencing July 10th. This appears to me to be an optimistic estimate of the air transportation capacity during the monsoon season. It is approximately double that indicated by General Stilwell.

4. It is the opinion of those who have looked into this situation, both on the spot and in Washington, that the largest single factor which will restrict a considerable increase in tonnage during the months mentioned is the unsuitable weather occurring during the monsoon season. It is reported that flying conditions in this area will show no improvement for the next three months. General Stilwell, reported that the maximum planes he could handle in India and China would be 75. This number of airplanes will be furnished.



H. H. ARNOLD,  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.



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Regraded Unclassified

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES  
WASHINGTON

June 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Subject: Conversion of Military Type Planes to  
Transport Use in India and China.

As far as I know, there is only one airplane (B-24) that has been converted to transport use for the purpose of supplying China from India.

So far, only one pilot model has been produced, and even if it is accepted as a military type airplane, it will be many months before they come out in quantity.

We are studying this matter now and trying to determine what effect such production will have on existing orders for bombers, critical equipment, raw materials, engines, or any other items of a critical nature. As soon as this study is completed, we will know what to do next.



H. H. ARNOLD,  
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.

Incl:  
Memo. for Gen. Arnold, 6/22/42,  
fr. Capt. McCrea, re above  
subj.

*This was shown to, but was NOT read aloud  
by the President at the June 25<sup>th</sup> meeting  
File P.W.C.*



**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

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
June 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARNOLD

At the last meeting of the Pacific War Council Mr. T. V. Soong asked the President if it was contemplated converting any 4-engined military type planes to transport uses for the purpose of supplying China from India. The President asked to be advised in this connection.

Would it be possible for me to have this information in time for the next meeting of the Pacific War Council on Wednesday, 24 June, at 11:30 A.M.?

Very respectfully,



JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy  
Naval Aide to the President

Room 2078  
Navy Department

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

June 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The eleventh meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, June 17, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Hon. Manuel Quezon)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir ~~James~~ Owen Dixon)

The President remarked to the Council that he was glad to introduce the President of the Philippine Commonwealth, the Hon. Manuel Quezon, as a member of the Council, stating that the Philippine point of view would be most helpful in the Council's deliberations and that Philippine representation would make an additional point of view available from the Orient. The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) remarked that it was his earnest hope that he would be able to contribute something of value to the Council.

The President remarked that a despatch had been received recently from General Stilwell to the effect that the ferry plane situation in China was satisfactory. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) questioned this despatch and stated that he would like further information on the matter. The President directed Captain McCrea to make inquiry of General Arnold in this regard.

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The President stated that Mr. Stalin now approves of flying planes from Alaska to Siberia. This was one item of benefit that grew out of the Molotov talks. The President continued that information was being requested of Russia as to airfield facilities in Siberia.

The President remarked that the Pacific area, generally, was getting on well, save for the Aleutians. He remarked that conversations were going on here with reference to the opening of new fronts in Africa or Europe, or both. Nothing new is available on the situation in Timor. The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) remarked that he had positive information that fighting was still going on in Timor and in Java and the Philippines.

The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) advised that he had but recently been informed that some 44 Filipinos had been executed by the Japanese for "helping the United Nations."

The President stated that Midway survivors were reporting that while they were in parachutes and rubber boats, they had been machine gunned by the Japanese. The President of the Philippine Commonwealth (Mr. Quezon) reported that the Japanese consistently strafed aviators while the latter were descending in their parachutes. The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that he was under the impression that all this was provided for by treaty, the gist of the treaty being that a parachutist is fair game if he is seen to be descending into his own territory, but it is not proper to machine gun him if he is descending into his enemy's territory.

The President remarked that he had noticed considerable in the press about the use of poison gas by the Axis nations and that he deprecated

such remarks. "I do not think we should talk about it. The proper way to handle this matter is to get all the necessary proof and then retaliate effectively."

The President stated that Germany would be very strong if Russia collapsed. An increasing number of despatches are being received from Europe telling of discontent in Germany and Italy. The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) remarked that his home government advised him that conditions in Germany were not good and that there was considerable discontent, but nevertheless a strong will on the part of the German people to stick it out in any event. The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that there were reasons to believe that Hitler's time table was out of sorts in many respects. To this, the President replied, "I am not certain of that. Sevastopol, of course, should have fallen, and Germany no doubt is working against time. However, no one can be sure how rapidly the situation on the eastern front might deteriorate. The Russian supplies might give out and we might have great difficulty in getting manufactured articles to them."

The President then remarked generally about Japanese aircraft losses. He stated that in his judgment the Japanese must have lost close to 300 planes in the battle of Midway and that our despatches rarely show less than 5 planes of the enemy daily destroyed in the Southwest Pacific. In other words, the process of attrition is working and that this process will in the long run win the war. The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) remarked that he was amazed to find that the Russians had been able to salvage so many of their first-line military factories and move them to the vicinity of the Urals. Production from these factories is now coming to a full capacity. The President stated that Mr. Molotov remarked to him that if fighting

continued every day in the week, Russian supplies would no doubt be used up more rapidly than they could be replenished. "This," remarked the President, "behooves us to do everything we can to get manufactured articles to Russia as rapidly as possible."

The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) then made reference to a news story which had appeared under a London dateline, in which it was stated that the Japanese aircraft production was many times that which it was supposed to be. The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that London could not trace the story and that he had asked his home government to give him its best estimate as to Japanese production. The President remarked that Brigadier General Doolittle stated that three planes had been told off to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Factory and that they had done a good job of it.

The President remarked that at the last meeting it had been suggested that General Arnold go to Australia on an inspection trip. This proposal cannot be carried out in view of the fact that General Arnold's services are required in this country. On the other hand, General Richardson has been sent to Australia for the purpose of acquainting General MacArthur with conditions in this country and in presenting the War Department's point of view to General MacArthur. In connection with this subject, the President read a memorandum from General Marshall, affixed hereto marked (A).

The President further remarked that at the last meeting the Chinese Foreign Minister (Mr. Soong) had stated that consideration should be given to bombing the power plants at Shanghai. In this connection the President read a memorandum from General Arnold, affixed hereto marked (B). In

conclusion, the President suggested that Mr. Soong tell the Generalissimo to get in touch with General Stilwell in connection with this matter, and that it might be an excellent thing to bomb the plants as suggested, if for no other than economic reasons.

The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) queried as to where the Japanese had retired to after the defeat at Midway. To this question the President replied that the best guess seemed to be that those ships that were uninjured had retired to the Mandates, while those that were injured had gone to the homeland for repairs.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) inquired as to the shipping situation off the Atlantic Coast. To this, the President replied that it was "bad." The President further remarked that he had issued instructions that convoys were to be instituted from Eastport, Maine to Trinidad. Meanwhile, every effort was being made to increase the number of patrol craft to operate against the submarines.

The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Owen</sup>~~Irwin~~ Dixon) remarked that four of the Japanese midget submarines had been destroyed in Sydney harbor. When queried as to the situation with reference to oil and gas stocks in Australia, he remarked that, "Conditions are good so far as stowage is concerned, but the amounts in stowage are insufficient for long time operations because of the limited stowage capacity." He further stated that the arrival of so many ships in Australian waters necessitated a great deal of repair work being done on them and that the ship repair facilities were being taxed to the utmost.

The President remarked that delivery of aircraft to Australia was now proceeding apace and that our staffs were working out an offensive in

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

the Australian area. The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that as he understood, it had been the President's original conception to have an officer from New Zealand help out in connection with the combined staff plans, remarking as he did so, that in his judgment General Smart should participate in the discussions with reference to Australia. The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Owen</sup>~~John~~ Dixon) remarked that Australia was eager and anxious to open an offensive.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) remarked that on reflection, he was certain Pan-American Airways had much information on the Siberian airfield facilities.

The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that he was in receipt of many telegrams in the past few days stating that the Germans were loading ships and landing-craft, evidently with a northerly destination. The President remarked that the destination might be Murmansk, Spitzbergen or Iceland.

The meeting was brought to a close by the President remarking that in general, shipping and the Russian front are the two most critical items at the moment.

The next meeting of the Pacific War Council was scheduled for Wednesday, June 24, 1942, at 11:30 a.m.

*J. L. McCreas*  
JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA:

Will you give this to me at  
the next Pacific War Council meeting?

F.D.R.

Regraded Unclassified

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

June 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Subject: Proposed visit of General Arnold  
To Australia.

I think it is important that General Arnold be available in Washington for the next two or three months in connection with the development of Bolero. Therefore it would appear inadvisable for him to undertake this visit to Australia.

Up to the present time, the use of the Army Air Forces has been dictated by expediency. We are reaching a stage in airplane production that calls for the most careful planning and execution in connection with organization, training, operation and maintenance.

In regard to allocation of aerial strength to Australia, I am convinced that decisions can best be reached by the Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff in Washington, subject to confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and approval by you. The perspective from Washington is better and the needs of the Southwest Pacific Area can be more accurately weighed against those of other theaters.

If personal visits to particular localities appear to be necessary or desirable, qualified officers are available. Major General Richardson, for instance, is now in the Southwest Pacific Area as my personal representative for the purpose of both ascertaining needs and acquainting General MacArthur and other officials with the general situation and plans, as well as the problems involved in other theaters, all of which affect the allocation of available means.

  
Chief of Staff.



(A)

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

The President wants you to  
take this up at the Pacific War  
Council tomorrow.

G.G.T.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
Headquarters Army Air Forces  
~~OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS~~

WASHINGTON


June 15, 1942

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Dr. Soong's Proposal re Shanghai.

1. Reference is made to Dr. Soong's proposal that the Shanghai power plant be bombed, by airplanes operating from India, for the purpose of slowing up Japan's war industrial production.
2. A completed study of this project made in my office, coordinated with Operations Division, General Staff, indicates that while Shanghai is a city of relatively great industrial importance in China, particularly because of its textile mills, our sources of information do not indicate that Japan has concentrated there industries vital to its war effort.
3. Shanghai does appear to be important to Japan as a trans-shipment and storage center. Japan is known to have there ship repairing docks and small metal works. Areas in Southern Japan (Kyushu) and Taiwan may afford war industries targets of a higher priority than Shanghai.
4. Dr. Soong's proposal, with a study of the project, have been referred to General Stillwell for his decision, in the light of such additional information as may be available to him.

  
H. H. ARNOLD  
Lieut. General, U. S. A.  
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.



**SECRET**

(B)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

President Quezon of the Philippines came to see me yesterday morning to express the hope that he could become a member of the Pacific War Council.

He stated that the fact that he was a member would be known to every Filipino at an early date and would greatly hearten his people. He thinks that the Philippines have as much at stake as any of the Commonwealths and, furthermore, guerrilla fighting is still going on in many parts of the Philippine Islands and will continue.

He told me that, while he had been advised by members of his Cabinet and by General MacArthur to come to the United States, he felt he was making no contribution here and told me that he was somewhat inclined to return to Australia at an early date.

He thought, however, that his membership on the Pacific War Council, together with some visits which he has in mind to American communities that have a substantial number of Filipinos and to South American countries, which he wants to visit on his own, would give him adequate reasons for remaining indefinitely;

  
H.L.H.

6-17-42

Done for Quezon.  
J. L. McQuinn

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA:

Will you speak to me about  
this?

F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The tenth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, June 10, 1942. No meeting was held on Wednesday, June 3rd.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Australian Attorney General and Minister of State for  
External Affairs (Hon. H. V. Evatt)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Australian Minister (Sir ~~Lewis~~ Dixon)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins *Owen*

The President stated that the consequences of the naval action off Midway had changed our strategic plans in the Southwest Pacific and gave us the opportunity of taking the offensive. It seemed likely that it would be possible to take the Andaman Islands, Christmas Island and, possibly, Rabaul if our naval victory can be followed up vigorously.

The President said the situation with China was little better.

The President reviewed briefly the assignments that had been made to the Pacific area and indicated to the Council that American production was improving very rapidly.

The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) reported upon his visit to London, indicating that he felt there was better understanding there of the situation in the Southwest Pacific. He said that

they had air squadrons in Australia that were not equipped and indicated that that was a matter of great concern to the Australian Government.

The Australian Minister (Sir <sup>Owen</sup>~~Erwin~~ Dixon) said the morale of the American troops in Australia was excellent and that they had made a fine impression in Australia.

The President stated that there was the serious political problem in America of having a vast army here in this country trained and ready to fight and that our government was insisting upon our taking an appropriate part in the war, not only by sea and air but by our ground forces as well. He said the problem in the last analysis was one of shipping but that the American Government had to consider, in the future use of ships, the urgent problem of getting our own ground forces on fighting fronts.

The President discussed briefly the difficulties of a second front in Europe and told the conference that he had invited Fraser, Smuts and Curtin to visit him at separate times some time during the summer.

The meeting adjourned at 12:30 p.m.

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NOTE: Captain McCrea did not attend this meeting of the Pacific War Council due to his absence on duty in Baltimore, at the direction of the President, to meet King George of Greece. The above notes were taken by Mr. Harry Hopkins.

*J. L. McCrea*

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U. S. Navy

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

May 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The ninth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:45 a. m., Wednesday, May 27, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins (after 12:30 p.m.)  
Mr. A. V. Smith (In the absence of the Australian Minister)

The President opened the meeting by remarking that he had received a letter from General Smuts which rather disturbed him. The letter, written from Cairo, set forth three principal items with which the General was concerned: (1) The safety of Egypt, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf, (2) the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, and, (3) South Africa. The President continued that he had gathered the impression that General Smuts might quite profitably visit the United States in order that the General might be the better apprised of the general plan of conducting the war. The President further remarked that he had "an idea" that Mr. John Curtin (The Prime Minister of Australia) could very profitably visit the United States for the same purpose, this since it is always helpful for people to learn about one another. The President asked the British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) and the Australian representative (Mr. Smith) what they thought of the proposal. The substance

of the replies of both was that it would indeed be most profitable if the proposed visits could be made. The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) stated in particular that it would be most useful if General Smuts could come to the United States, that the General possessed a sound mind and that he had performed invaluable service for the Empire in Africa. "Somehow or other, I feel that General Smuts might decline to come, as he usually begs off about visiting London because he states he cannot spare the time." The President then remarked that of course he would not invite General Smuts and Prime Minister Curtin to the United States without first getting the reaction of Prime Minister Churchill to the proposition.

The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) remarked that the Japanese are working hard at the Surabaya naval base endeavoring to put it in operation. He further remarked that information was at hand to the effect that captured crude rubber was being sold to Russia by the Japanese for gold, with which the latter hoped to purchase war materials.

The President "wondered" as to food conditions in Siberia. The Chinese Foreign Minister (Mr. Soong) remarked that there was no food shortage in Siberia, in fact that there was "a great plenty of it." The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that New Zealand experienced its greatest competition from Siberia with reference to dairy products - "And good dairy products they were; they have modern machines and have imported New Zealand dairy technicians to show them the art of dairy manufacture."

The President remarked that he had recently been informed that there was a shortage of scrap iron in Japan, remarking that he didn't believe such to be the case. He stated further that he was of a mind that there was a

great deal of scrap in the Orient which would now fall into the hands of the Japanese, and that they, with their well known efficiency, would proceed to make use of it.

At this point the President read a memorandum, attached hereto marked (A). The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) stated that all quoted in the memorandum was correct, but that the point that he was trying to make was that the Radio Corporation of America was unable to get for its station in New Zealand a ten kilowatt set which would permit trans-Pacific telephone conversation. The President directed that Captain McCrea communicate with the proper people in regard thereto and see what information about the matter could be obtained.

The President read a memorandum attached hereto marked (B). It was remarked by the Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) that too much comfort could not be had from the Russian shipping situation, despite the fact that Lease-Lend material is being transported in these ships. He stated that he had been reliably informed that the Japanese were permitting the Russians to import only what they, the Japanese, sanctioned, and that he thought it altogether possible that the Russians were selling some of the material that they were importing, to the Japanese.

The President remarked that a few days ago, a rather despondent despatch had been received by Mr. Lauchlin Currie from Madame Chang Kai-Shek. The President stated that he had to make a quick decision in the matter, so directed that the Tenth Air Force, now in India, be placed under General Stilwell's command, to be operated as General Stilwell saw fit, in either China, Burma or India. At this point Captain McCrea obtained from the

White House Map Room a composition of the Tenth Air Force, which was read by the President to the council. (at 12:30) and took his seat with

The President then referred to a London newspaper story of recent date that stated that since the beginning of the war the Japanese had lost in the neighborhood of 5400 planes, and that they had on hand at the outset of hostilities something in the neighborhood of 15,000 planes. Further, that replacements were coming along at the rate of about 700 a month. General discussion about this newspaper item ensued, it being the consensus of opinion that the figures stated in the newspaper article were too high. The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) offered to have his government check this story and make a report at the council's next meeting. The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) further stated that if he were not mistaken, the British Air Intelligence was of the opinion that the Japanese replacements could not be made in excess of 400 planes of all types a month. The President remarked that with reference to the general subject, information was being received from our fliers that the quality of the Japanese fliers now being met in combat was steadily deteriorating.

The President remarked that the State Department is in receipt of many despatches from the neutral capitals of Europe telling of the steadily deteriorating position of the Axis. Discussion on this statement ensued, the President finally remarking that, while the indications were hopeful, nevertheless "We can't, as Mr. Churchill has remarked, win this war by hoping that Germany will lose it."

The President remarked that the Martinique situation was well in hand and that our information tended to show that Hitler was very much annoyed with

Mr. Laval for not immediately breaking relations with the United States.

Mr. Hopkins entered at this point (12:30) and took his seat with the council.

At this point the President read a memorandum, attached hereto marked (C).

The President queried Mr. Hopkins as to Lease-Lend material now being carried in the Russian ships leaving our west coast ports. Mr. Hopkins stated that he had "a suspicion" that the Russian ships are sailing largely by permission of the Japanese.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) stated that the New Zealand troops were now going to remain in Fiji, and that while the defenses of New Zealand were desperately weak, nevertheless his government felt it better that they go along with the recommendation of Admiral Ghoramley in this regard.

The President remarked that the patrol torpedo boats had evidently proven themselves in the Philippines and that consideration was being given to largely increasing our program in this respect, with the idea of using them in the Southwest Pacific and in the N. E. I. when the offense starts.

The next meeting of the Pacific War Council is scheduled for 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, June 3rd.

*J. L. McCarroll*

\* \* \* \* \*

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.  
Op-20-T/gk

*Capt. MacCre*

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, MAY 25, 1942

**CONFIDENTIAL**

May 25, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. In the event of interruption of cable facilities to the New Zealand area, the following radio circuits are in operation as of today:

- (a) Navy circuit Honolulu-Canberra-Wellington
- (b) Mackay Radio and Telegraph Company circuits San Francisco to Wellington, San Francisco to Sydney, Australia.
- (c) RCA circuits San Francisco to Melbourne, San Francisco to Wellington, San Francisco to Sydney, and San Francisco to Noumea.

2. The above are the principal commercial circuits at present in operation from the continental United States to East Australia area. There is also a British naval circuit between Colombo, Port Darwin and Canberra.

Generally, vessels stop first at Petropavlovsk and discharge the greater part of their cargoes, and then make additional calls at one or more of the other three ports.

*J. M. Fernald*  
James M. Fernald  
Op-20-T

(A)

May 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR NEXT MEETING OF PACIFIC WAR COUNCIL, MAY 27, 1942:

The Maritime Commission advises that the following number of sailings of Russian ships from West Coast ports, with Lease-Lend material, have either been completed or set up for the future:

March	6
April	10
May	11
June	9
July (thus far)	4

Ships cleared for the following named ports:

Petropavlosk  
Okhotsk  
Nikolaevsk  
Vladivostok

Generally, vessels stop first at Petropavlosk and discharge the greater part of their cargoes, and then make additional calls at one or more of the other three ports.

(B)

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN JOHN L. McCREA,  
NAVAL AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Survey of South Pacific Ferry  
Route via West Coast of South  
America and Islands in the  
South Pacific.

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans, Headquarters  
Army Air Forces, reports that two routes were under con-  
sideration:

1. Panama, Galapagos Islands, Easter  
Island, Society Islands, Tonga Islands.
2. From the West Coast of South  
America to San Felix Islands on Juan Fernandez,  
Easter Island, thence as indicated above.

The key to the whole route rested with Easter  
Island. Information at hand indicated that landing facili-  
ties could be constructed on Easter Island but after going  
into the matter the Air Force Ferry Command considered the  
navigational hazards, even with radio aids, were too great  
and that the aircraft losses would be far beyond the number  
we could afford. The Commanding General of the Ferry Com-  
mand recommended against the establishment of either route  
at this time, and in view of the vast amount of experience  
which the Ferry Command has acquired in the movement of  
aircraft over great distances at sea, the Army Air Forces  
Headquarters approved the Ferry Command recommendation.  
Admiral R. E. Byrd has been requested to make a further  
investigation of these islands for air route purposes with  
the idea of finding an alternate site to Easter Island.  
Pending receipt of his report, no further action is con-  
templated.




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From a construction viewpoint only, no exceptional difficulty would be encountered in preparing an airfield on Easter Island or on other islands to the west thereof. There is a high disease rate among the natives on Easter Island which would present something of a problem in connection with any installation there. The possibility of an alternate field on the Sala-y-Gomez Islands to the east of Easter Island was considered but it was found that landing field construction there was absolutely impossible.



W. B. SMITH,  
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,  
Secretary.

**SECRET**

C (2)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

May 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The eighth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, May 20, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy).  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash).  
Baron W. van Boetzelaer, Minister Plenipotentiary, Counselor  
of Embassy (Representing The Netherlands in the absence  
of Ambassador Loudon).  
Mr. A. V. Smith (In the absence of the Australian Minister).

The President opened the meeting by announcing that he had just had a conference with Mr. William Green, President of the American Federation of Labor. Mr. Green informed the President that Sir Walter M. Citrine was in this country to meet the representatives of American labor. Mr. Green, Mr. Murray and Sir Walter Citrine wished to have the President's approval on the proposition of sending a delegation of working men all over the world with the idea of (1) learning to know each other, (2) observing labor conditions in foreign countries with the idea of increasing and improving war production methods and morale, etc., and (3) gaining background for post-war relations with labor throughout the world. The President informed Mr. Green that he had no objection to such a proposition, provided that the committee confined itself to studies and made no recommendations at this time. The President continued that it was well

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known that Russia and the United States are very similar in that they are nearly "self-contained economically." The reverse is true of China and Britain, since China raises her food but has no manufactures, and Britain has many manufactures but a very limited amount of food. The President remarked that, for the time being, he would propose that only Russia, China, the United States and Great Britain collaborate with this committee. The President made it clear that the committee would not be an official body but merely have official sanction.

The President remarked that there was nothing new in the Martinique situation, nor in the Southwest Pacific. He disclosed that there was a considerable concentration of ships in the waters of the Japanese homeland and that while the locale of future operations was at this time not evident, nevertheless Japan could move decisively in one of many directions, i.e., the Aleutians, the Hawaiian Islands, the Southwest Pacific, or the Indian Ocean. The President, in response to a question by the British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) as to when the naval situation might be expected to clear, remarked, "Oh, I suppose anytime after the first of June."

The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) inquired as to whether or not there was any change in the Russian situation. The President remarked that Russia did not wish us to deliver planes to her via Nome, but suggested that she send her own pilots to Nome to pick up the aircraft. The discussions in regard to this proposal are still in the preliminary phase. The President further remarked that the difficulties of getting convoys through to northern Russia had been thoroughly explained to Mr. Stalin, who in turn complained vigorously to Mr. Churchill.

The Chinese Foreign Minister (Mr. Soong) announced that his country was anxiously exploring a new route to China, via Persia, Turkestan, Russia, etc., and to this the President remarked that while he was heartily in favor of the exploration of a new route, we would continue to furnish aid to China via Sadiya as long as possible.

The President mentioned that he wanted instructions issued to Admiral Standley to get all the information he could on the route to China via Persia, Turkestan, etc.

The President remarked that this government had recently been informed that there were 104 airports in French West Africa, the great majority of which are of recent construction, such construction having been supervised by German engineers, and that obviously the presence of these airports presents a potential threat to our plane ferry route to the Far East.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) stated that should anything happen to the cable at Fanning Island, communications to the southwest Pacific would be in a bad way. It was suggested that steps be taken to see that the cable was paralleled with radio.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) then inquired as to whether or not the occupation of Wallis Island had been accomplished. In answer to this question the President stated that while the occupation had not yet been accomplished, it no doubt would be accomplished about 28-29 May. The President then remarked that he was not sure that we should go as far in the case of Wallis Island as had been done in the case of Madagascar and Martinique, i.e., in guaranteeing to return to the French their territory upon the conclusion of the war. The President remarked that he felt

that the United States should make very certain at the end of this war that the islands of the Pacific would not in the years to come be used against us. It was remarked, and generally agreed to, that the French did not seem to be very good colonizers. Indo-China was specifically cited in this regard. The Chinese Foreign Minister (Mr. Soong) remarked that the French had exploited Indo-China to the limit, but had never done anything about educating the natives or encouraging them to aspire to self-government. In this respect it was stated that the French conduct with reference to their colonies was at considerable variance with the general practice of Great Britain and the United States to encourage natives to participate in self-government to the limit of their capabilities.

The Chinese Foreign Minister (Mr. Soong) stated that the Japanese force attacking Chungking via Indo-China was more likely to succeed than was the attack via Burma. The Japanese seem very anxious to break up all air routes.

The President remarked that any small island in the Pacific was completely vulnerable to an attack in force.

The President announced that Admiral Ghormley had arrived in Auckland.

The President further stated that it would be a great help if there were an effective censorship from South America to Germany and Japan. It was also remarked that it might generally be expected that there would be a slowing down of air mail across the Atlantic. A survey of the mail situation shows that a great deal of this mail can be put in the "chit-chat" class. Mail has always been given priority over passengers. During the emergency, the reverse of this will prevail.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) stated that articles from

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TIME and NEWSWEEK were appearing in the German broadcasts as propaganda against the United States, and queried as to how this could happen. He was informed that TIME publishes a special air mail edition for South American subscribers and that no doubt this was the outlet by which the articles were obtained in Germany. The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) then recounted to the Council listening to station D-E-B-U-N-K, obviously a German propaganda station which is broadcasting destructive propaganda against the United States.

The President told the council of his conversation with Brigadier General Doolittle with reference to the air raid on Japan. General Doolittle stated that he specifically instructed that the Imperial palace in Tokio not be bombed. To this the Chinese Foreign Minister (Mr. Soong) remarked that it should have been bombed, as "the madder we get them (the Japanese) the less they will think. I think it's about time to remove the sacred halo with which the Japanese have almost surrounded their emperor; in other words, blow up Heaven! In my judgment the Japanese are now at the maximum of their output, and anything we do to them couldn't spur them to greater effort."

The President directed Captain McCrea to find out if any Russian ships had recently called at any British Columbia or northwest U. S. ports.

The President directed that inquiry be made as to what progress was being made in connection with the survey of a south Pacific ferry route, via the west coast of South America and the islands in the south Pacific.

The President then remarked that he thought the council could very well at this time, without getting into post-war problems, adopt the slogan of "Japan for the Japanese."

The next meeting of the Pacific War Council is scheduled for Wednesday,  
May 27th, 1942.

*John L. McCrea*

\* \* \* \* \*

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

The seventh meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 a. m., Wednesday, May 13, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
Mr. A. V. Smith (In the absence of the Australian Minister)

The President opened the meeting by giving the Council a brief summary of the trouble in New Caledonia. It appears that the Free French High Commissioner, shortly after his arrival in New Caledonia, arrested Governor Sautot and four members of his staff, and deported them to Walpole Island. This was an exceedingly unpopular move, and the populace responded by declaring a general strike and the militia making High Commissioner D'Argenlieu a virtual prisoner. The High Commissioner demanded of General Patch that he use American troops to suppress this rebellion against constituted authority. General Patch declined to do this and kept aloof from the entire proceedings. In due time a despatch was sent to General DeGaulle by General Patch setting forth the situation and containing the statement that unless the situation clarified, he, General Patch, would declare martial law, reserving however, to D'Argenlieu, the right to communicate with General DeGaulle via cipher. It happily turned out, however, that a very few hours before martial law was due to be declared,

D'Argenlieu capitulated to the extent that he ordered the return of the four members of Governor Sautot's staff to New Caledonia. This action appeased the populace and order was quickly restored. D'Argenlieu himself stated that he would shortly leave New Caledonia. Governor Sautot has been ordered by General DeGaulle to report to him in person in London, with a view to his assignment to duty elsewhere.

The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that he felt it would be a wise move for the Free French Committee in London to announce to the world that General DeGaulle is only the military member of the Committee. The President remarked that the statement from General DeGaulle, at the same time, that he had no desire for power and that he believed in a democratic form of government, would have a wholesome effect on the relations of the Free French people everywhere.

The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that it would no doubt interest the Council to know that the bombers which have been used against Britain in the recent bombings by the Germans have without exception come from training units. Lord Halifax remarked that this was indicative of one of two things - either the Germans are getting short on bombers or they were conserving their supply of first line bombers for duty elsewhere. In any event, the employment of this type is indicative of the fact that they did not have sufficient modern bombers to employ them everywhere.

The Canadian Minister (Mr. McCarthy) announced that the Ottawa conference was to start on 18 May.

In response to an inquiry by the President as to whether or not aviation training operations were going on in Australia, Mr. Smith stated

that the Australian airmen are being trained in this country and Canada for the reason that all Australian training centers have now become operational centers.

In response to a question by the President as to whether or not Commandos are being trained in Australia and New Zealand, Messrs. Nash and Smith replied in the negative.

The President remarked that a despatch had recently been received from General MacArthur in which it was stated that in the General's opinion "the best way to help Russia is to start an offensive against the NEI." "This," said the President, "is in my judgment circuitous thinking. I am of the opinion that the Japanese are as anxious to avoid war with Russia as possible, and that the Russians are equally anxious to avoid war with the Japanese." To this observation there was general agreement.

The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) then read to the Council a despatch from his home government in exile in which it was remarked that during the recent conversations at Salzburg between Hitler and Mussolini, consideration had been given to the proposition of Germany starting a peace offensive against Russia. The quid pro quo would be that (1) Germany would agree to take all agricultural export production from Russia for the next 25 years, and (2), the Russian boundaries would be restored as of June, 1941. It was further stated in the despatch that if Russia did not accept this offer of the Germans, Japan would attack Russia in the Far East. The Netherlands Ambassador (Dr. Loudon) remarked that this seemed at first blush to be a fantastic proposal, "but on the other hand," he remarked, "this information has been received from a German anti-Hitler source that in the

past has always served us well."

The President stated that he had been informed that Mussolini had demanded of Hitler something substantial which he could show to his people. Mussolini demanded a free hand in dealing with the French, and again renewed his demands for Tunisia and Corsica. Hitler's reaction to Mussolini's demands is not known.

The President stated that he had recently received information from at least two sources that the Russian Ambassador (M. Litvinov) was in a gloomy frame of mind about Russia's prospects. The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) remarked that it is altogether possible that the Russian Ambassador had taken this stand in order to hasten the opening of a second front. At this point the President read two memoranda, attached hereto marked (A) and (B).

The President further discussed April production figures as furnished by the Chief, Statistical Analysis Branch.

At this point the President inquired as to the food situation in New Zealand and Australia, and both the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) and Mr. Smith stated that there was no shortage of food in either Dominion. The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that in his judgment, much shipping could be saved by buying locally much of the food necessary for our armed forces in Australia and New Zealand. The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) remarked that over and above current requirements, New Zealand has in storage as a reserve, in excess of 100,000 tons of beef, 38,000 tons of cheese, and 40,000 tons of butter. He did admit, however, to not as wide a variety of fresh vegetables as are found in the United States.



**SECRET**

THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

May 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General W. B. Smith

In addition to the materials included in the attached binder on allocations and assignments, the following data which show actual exports of munitions of war from April 1 through May 2, inclusive, may be of interest to you.

	<u>Number of Units</u>
<b>BOMBERS, ALL TYPES</b>	
Australia	16
New Zealand	10
Egypt	22
Sudan	3
<b>PURSUIT, INTERCEPTOR &amp; FIGHTER PLANES</b>	
India	7
China	22
Australia	60
New Zealand	33
Egypt	3
<b>TRAINERS</b>	
China	66
<b>LIGHT TANKS</b>	
India	12
<b>MEDIUM TANKS</b>	
India	127
Australia	44
Egypt	2
<b>SMOKELESS POWDER (Pounds)</b>	
India	110,000
China	1,953,000
Australia	143,000
New Zealand	19,000

**SECRET**

A(1)

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BRIGADIER GENERAL SMITH

- 2 -

5/12/42

	<u>Number of Units</u>
REVOLVERS AND PISTOLS (.32, .38 and .45 cal.)	
New Zealand	500
RIFLES (.22, 30M1, and 30M1903)	
India	14,000
New Zealand	8,000
MACHINE GUNS	
China	7,280
Australia	4,000
New Zealand	1,000
Egypt	392
FIELD ARTILLERY (Unspecified)	
Australia	13
ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY	
Australia	11
SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION (Rounds)	
India	53,000,000
Burma	5,000,000
China	16,000,000
Australia	5,000,000
New Zealand	10,000,000
Egypt	27,000,000

Isador Lubin  
Chief  
Statistical Analysis Branch

SECRET

A(2)

RECORDING CENTER

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

May 8, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

The following is the information which the President desired after the last meeting of the Pacific War Council:


1. United Nations submarine activity in the Bay of Bengal:

The present arrangement is to have British and Dutch submarines guard the northwest exit of the Malacca Strait and operate offensively against enemy ships in the Bay of Bengal as the occasion warrants. U. S. submarines will guard Sunda Strait for the First Mission (Malacca Strait). There are at present 6 Dutch and 2 British submarines and, in addition, a British submarine flotilla in the Mediterranean, now under orders to Ceylon. When these arrive the normal disposition will be to have 6 constantly on patrol with 6 on passage to and from station, and the remaining 8 in various stages of overhaul at Ceylon.

With respect to the Second Mission, in addition to guarding Sunda Strait, the attention of General MacArthur has been invited to the possibility of the profitable use of U. S. submarines at the eastern entrance of Malacca Strait from the China Sea.

2. Fighter Ferry Route from the Marquesas to Australia:

General Arnold discussed this with the President subsequent to your memorandum of May 6th. He told the President the matter was being worked out and he would submit a detailed report as soon as possible.



W. B. SMITH,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,  
Secretary.



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*McCrea:—*

For your personal information I have ascertained the following:

The proposed route will be:- Christmas-Tongareva-Atiutaki-Tongatabu-Norfolk. The Marquesas are being investigated as an assembly site in accordance with the President's suggestion. Three million dollars have been allotted to the Commanding General, Hawaii, and he estimates that construction can be completed within 2 months after equipment is placed. This is rather indefinite but much of the equipment is already in Hawaii, Tongatabu is being worked on now, and if Emmons proceeds as rapidly as Short did for the bomber route, the fighter ferry route ought to be in operation in a maximum of from 3 to 4 months. This is my personal estimate and is not official.

W. B. SMITH,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.,  
Secretary.

SECRET

B(2)

Regraded Unclassified

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

May 1, 1942


Memorandum for Captain J. L. McCrea

Pursuant to your telephone call this morning I am sending you herewith copies of some of the exchanges of messages between the War Department and General MacArthur. They are:

- 1) General MacArthur's No. AG 286 of April 16 regarding signal equipment.
- 2) General Marshall's reply No. 1410 of April 20.
- 3) General MacArthur's No. AG 453 of April 24 and No. AG 470 of April 25 with regard to an aircraft carrier.
- 4) General Marshall's reply No. 1499 of April 26.
- 5) General MacArthur's No. AG 490 of April 27 with regard to additional military police units.
- 6) General Marshall's reply No. 1543 of April 28.
- 7) General Marshall's No. 1282 of April 14 requesting an estimate of minimum forces required for which munitions must be allocated.
- 8) General MacArthur's reply No. AG 441 of April 24.
- 9) General Marshall's No. WD 8 of April 30 stating that General MacArthur's estimates are under thorough study.

*These are the only messages re additional means or personnel since MGA received his directive - W.B.S.*

9 Encls.

  
W. B. SMITH

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING MESSAGE

35 WTJ  
FILED 0630 GMT/16  
BVC

CSWD  
April 16, 1942  
3:30 P. M.

From: HQ USAFFE  
To: AGWAR

No. AG 286, April 16, 1942

Since my arrival in Australia I have instituted studies which are still under way to determine minimum augmentation required to complete a balanced force for southwest Pacific area in order to perform mission described in your radio 1065 April 3rd. Irrespective of final allocation of troops to this area, paucity of signal communications and aircraft warning systems require immediate augmentation of signal personnel and means. Several organizations listed herein as urgently needed have previously been requested by the CT USAFIA in his radio nr 143. In order to meet these urgent needs request immediate approval of addition of following signal units in following order of priority and despatch of same at the first available transportation. Two AWS repeat AWS signal reporting companies-4 were requested our radio 143 items 111, only 2 arrived: 2 AWS repeat AWS signal battalions: 2 air depot signal sections-1 previously requested our radio 143 items 127 but not received: 2 air wing signal companies-2 previously requested our radio 143 item S 116 but none received: 1 signal construction battalion: 2 air wing signal companies previously requested for air force our radio 143 item S 114 but none received: 1 signal construction battalion: 2 signal battalions: 1 aviation signal company: 1 aviations signal maintenance company previously requested our radio 143 item S 115 but not received: 1 signal battalion: 1 signal operations company: 1 aviation signal maintenance company: 2 air depot signal sections.

Macarthur

ACTION: OPD

INFO COPIES: AG  
FILE  
SGS  
CG AAF  
SOS

CONFIDENTIAL

CM-IN-4318 (4/16/42) PM 8:55

**SECRET**

OUTGOING MESSAGE

April 20, 1942

TO: USAFIA,  
MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA

WDWPD

War Dept No 1410

The following general information is furnished reference your Ag 286: Air Depot Signal Sections have been replaced by Signal Companies Depot Aviation, composed of a Depot Headquarters, Company Headquarters, Communication Platoon, Repair Platoon (Fixed), Repair Platoon (Mobile), and a storage and issue platoon, totalling 6 officers and 199 men (Special T/O); Air Wing Signal Companies have been replaced by Signal Companies Aviation (T/O 11-217) composed of headquarters platoon, Message Center Section, Radio Section and Telephone and Teletype Section, totalling 6 officers and 136 men; Aviation Signal maintenance companies have been replaced by Signal Construction Battalions (Aviation) composed of a Headquarters Company and 2 Construction Companies (Heavy), totalling 20 officers and 544 men (Including attached Medical).

For MacArthur. Based on the above organization, orders have been issued to furnish you additional Signal Units as follows: 415th Signal Company Aviation and 436th Signal Construction Battalion (Aviation) to sail about May 20; 404th, 405th and 419th Signal Companies Aviation and 440th Signal Construction Battalion (Aviation) to prepare for movement to you without delay; 2 Signal Companies, Depot, Aviation to be activated and prepared for duty in Australia without delay; 255th and 256th Signal Construction Companies to sail about May 20. Remainder of Signal Units requested will be furnished you at such time as they become available.

MARSHALL

ORIG: OPD

INFO COPIES: TAG  
FILE  
CSO  
SOS (MC)

CM-OUT-4129 (4/21/42)

**SECRET**

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INCOMING MESSAGE

P1 WVY  
24/0910  
dj

CSWD  
April 24, 1942  
1011A

From: HQ SWPA  
To: Gen George C Marshall

No. AG 453 April 24, 1942

The surface element of the naval force of this area is unbalanced because of the lack of integral air force and in consequence its value as a striking unit is practically nullified reducing it to the execution of subsidiary and minor missions. There are present all of the units required to protect the air carrier which would transform the force from a weak ineffective element into a powerful offensive weapon. There are important targets constantly within striking distance of such a force operating in this area for the enemy's lines are partially uncovered and carelessly defended as a result of the fact that he has been practically unchallenged. This condition will not repeat not last indefinitely. When the hostile position has been consolidated the situation will be rendered immeasurably more difficult. It is a waste of our potentialities to operate such an unbalanced force at the point of immediate contact. I therefore urge that every effort be made to provide an air carrier even of the smallest type in order to make possible a more offensive attitude in the South West Pacific area.

MacArthur

Action Copy: OPD  
Info. Copies: TAG  
File  
SGS  
CGAAF  
G-2  
A-2

CM-IN-6430 (4-24-42) PM 1:25

SECRET

SECRET

INCOMING MESSAGE

16 WTJ  
filed 0905/25  
md

CSWD  
April 25, 1942  
7:27 A. M.

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA  
To: General George C. Marshall

No. AG 470, April 25th, 1942

I have just learned that the subject matter of my 45\* was previously discussed by Admiral Leary with Admiral King. I understand that Admiral Leary feels that there should be 2 carriers so that 1 attacking enjoys protection of the other. In this connection I may add that the Australian Government in endeavouring to obtain a British carrier in addition so that there might be 2 available here.

MacArthur

\* Came (four five thrje)  
Service will be made on request

Note: No. 453 was CM-IN-6430 (OPD)

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: TAG  
File  
SGS  
CG AAF  
G-2

CM-IN-6643 (4/25/42) AM 8:22

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

April 26, 1942

To: USAFIA  
Melbourne Australia                      WDWPD

War Dept. No. 1499

Navy Department states that all available carriers are now being employed on indispensable tasks. For MacArthur refer your AG453 and AG470. Your request cannot be granted at this time.

MARSHALL

ORIG: OPD

INFO. COPY: TAG FILE CG AAF

CM-OUT-5249 (4/27/42)

SECRET

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INCOMING MESSAGE

From: GHQ SWPA  
To: AGO

No AG 490 April 27, 1942

Additional military police units urgently required for guard duties at Base Ports, on lines of communication and at advance Depots and to preserve order in nearby large cities. Now necessary to use personnel from service units needed for normal duties. Request 5 military police Battalions organized as per T stroke 07-235 s with the following modifications for each: increase attached medical by 1 lieutenant medical, 1 Sergeant medical, 1 Corporal medical, 4 Privates basic; increase motor transportation by 40 trucks quarter ton reconnaissance 4 by 4: officers and enlisted men armed with pistol to be issued carbine in addition to pistol. Modifications necessary to permit wide separation of elements, to provide for needed motor patrols, and to increase emergency combat value of units. Request radio advice of War Department code shipment number assigned for directed troop movements these units.

MacArthur

Action Copy: OPD

Info. Copies: TAG  
File  
SOS (Personnel)  
SOS (PMG)

CM-IN-7300 (4/27/42) PM 9:36

SECRET

SECRET

OUTGOING MESSAGE

April 28, 1942

USAFIA  
Melbourne Australia

WDWPD

War Dept. No. 1543

5 military police battalions (L of C) have been ordered constituted and activated for Australia RE your AG 490 April 27th. For MacArthur. Due to shipping conditions and the fact that those units have to be activated and trained the date of departure cannot be determined at this time. However, sailing date will not be prior to October.

Marshall

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: TAG  
File

CM-OUT-5809 (4/29/42)

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OUTGOING MESSAGE

April 14, 1942

Commanding General  
United States Army Forces in Australia WDWPD

War Dept. No. 1282

For purposes of formulating munitions allocation programs it is necessary that we promptly receive definite information as to the planned combat strength of Australian and Dutch forces in the southwest Pacific area. For MacArthur. The Australian Chiefs of Staff forwarded by telegram 14th March an appreciation of defense of Australia and, by telegrams of 26th March, statement of Australian land and air forces and equipment available and proposed. The munitions required for the forces contemplated in those reports are far in excess of what can be allocated. Request you review those reports and submit at early date your considered estimate of minimum forces required for which munitions must be allocated. Your report should show major units of Australian and Dutch ground and air forces to be in active service on June 30th 42, December 31st 42 and June 13th 43, and the major units in training as of those dates. In listing latter indicate contemplated date on which each will be sufficiently trained for combat service. Your report should show the number of operating aircraft required for the air units recommended.

Marshall

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: AG  
FILE  
SOS  
CGAAF

CM-OUT-2601 (4/15/42)

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INCOMING MESSAGE

15 WTJ  
filed 1600gmt/24  
nd

CSWD  
April 25, 1942  
6:38 A. M.

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA  
To: AGWAR

No. AG 441, April 24th, 1942

For Marshall. Radiograms indicated your 1282 have been reviewed and further conferences have been held. The following represents my views as to the minimum Australian and Dutch Forces required for which munitions must be allocated. I am assured that man power is available to meet this program. The army expansion is moderate and embraces necessary organic units to fill out existing framework. The air force expansion is not exception based on the great extent of land area and coast line. Dates troops will be sufficiently trained for combat service are difficult of determination because of inability to predict availability of equipment. Basic assumption must be made that equipment will be available when troops are trained. Equipment and aircraft required is exclusive of that now available, enroute, or which can be procured locally. Major units of Australian army in service and training below. Notes refer as follows. (A) readiness depends on supplying deficiencies by motor transport (B) readiness depends on supplying deficiencies in equipment and P T (C) MT, equipment and heavy mechanical engineering equipment required (D) MF and signal equipment required. In service 30th June 1942. Item (1) 1 division. Item (2) 2 Army HQ Signal Units. Item (3) 2 Corps Signal units. Item (4) 31 New Guinea Force. Item (5) 1 Fusileer CC NEI Forces. In training 30th June 1942. Item (6) 5 Divisions (A) ready 30th June 1942. Items (7) 2 Divisions (B) 30th June 1942. Item (8) 1 Armoured Divisions (B) 30th July 1942. Item (9) 1 Armoured Divisions (B) 1st September 1942. Item (10) 1 Army Tank Brigade (B) 1st November 1942. Item (11) 1 Armoured Brigade (B) 1st November 42. Item (12) 1 Armoured Brigade (B) 1st November

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 2 from GHQ SWPA No. AG 441

42. Item (11) 5 light AA Regiments with Sig Section and Regimental workshop (A) 1st September 1942. Item (14) 4 Field Artillery Regiments with Signal Section and workshop (A) 30th October 1942. Item (15) 4 Field Artillery Regiments with Signal Section and Workshop (A) 31st December 1942. Item (16) 2 Medium Artillery Regiments (with Signal Section and Workshop) (B) 30th October 42. Item (17) 2 Medium Artillery Regiments (with Signal Section and Workshop) (B) 30th October 1942. Item (18) 3 Army Field Co (Engineer) (C) 30th October 1942. Item (19) 2 Army Field Park Co (Engineers) (C) 30th October 1942. Item (20) 3 Army Field Co (C) 31st December 1942. Item (21) 2 Army Field Park Co (C) 31st December 1942. Item (26) 2 Army Air Support Control Signal units (D) 30th August 1942. Major Units in service 31st December 1942. Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 11 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 26 31 and 32. Major units in training 31st December 1942. Item (9) 3 mobile Heavy AA Regiments (with Signal Section and Workshop) (B) 30th June 1943. Item (10) 2 Mobile Heavy AA Regiments (Signal Section and Workshop) (B) 30th June 1943. Item (12) 3 additional Light AA Regiments (with Signal Section and Workshop) (B) 30th June 1943. Item (13) 5 (additional) light AA Regiments with Signal Section and Workshop (B) 30th June 1943. Item (24) 1 Armoured Corps Signal unit (D) 30th March 1943. Item (25) 4 AA Brigades HQ Signal Sections (D) 30th June 1943. Item (27) 7 infantry Battalions (B) 30th March 1943. Item (28) 3 Reconnaissance Battalions (B) 30th June 1943. Item (29) 1 Armoured Car Regiment (B) 30th March 1943. Item (30) 1 Armoured Car Regiment (B) 30th March 1943. Major units in service June 30th 1943 all items 1 to 32 inclusive. In training that date NIL. if unable supply our ship all requirement, recommend following order of priorities. 1st priority items 2 3 4 6 7 9 11 12 14 15 16 18 19 22 23 27. 2nd priority items 5 10 13 17 20 21 26 and 29. 3rd priority items 8 24 25 28 and 30. Major units of Australian and Dutch Air Forces. Notes (A) number of Planes required expressed by numerals in parenthesis after types of Squadrons. (B) Basis of computative initial equipment plus 50 per cent. In service 30th June 1942. Item (1) 6 Recco Bomber (9). Item (2) 1 General Recco Tomekdo (Nil). Item (3) 2 General Recco Flying boat (7).

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Page 3 from GHQ SWPA

No. AG 441

Item (4) 5 dive bomber (99). Item (5) 3 fighter interceptor (22). Item (6) 2 arm cooperation (72) Item (7) 1 fleet cooperation (12). Item (8) 2 transport (land) (10). Item (9) 1 fighter long range (6). Item (33) 1 (Dutch) medium bomber (9). In training 30th June 1942. Item (10) 2 transport (land) 30th September 1942 (24). Item (11) 3 fighter interceptor 30th September 1942 (108). Item (12) 2 fighter long range 30th September 1942 (48). In service 31st December 1942. Items 1 to 12 inclusive and 33 above. Item (13) 1 General Recco Bomber (27). Item (14) 1 General Recco Torpedo (Mil). Item (16) flying boat General Recco (9). Item (18) 2 dive bomber (72). Item (20) 1 fighter interceptor (36). Item (22) 1 fighter interceptor (36). Item (22) 1 fighter long range (36). Item (24) 1 transport (land) (9). Item (26) 1 transport flying boat (12). In training 31st December 1942. Item (15) 2 General Recco Torpedo 30th March 1943 (nil). Item (17) 2 General Recco flying boat 30th March 1943 (30). Item (19) 2 dive bomber 31st January 1943 (72). Item (21) 5 fighter interceptor 30th March 1943 (180). Item (23) 3 fighter long range 30th March 1943 (108). Item (25) 3 transport (land) 30th March 1943 (36). In service 30th June 1943. Items 1 to 26 inclusive and 33 above. Item (27) 4 heavy bomber (99). Item (29) 2 army cooperation (72). Item (31) 1 transport (land) (11). In training 30th June 1943. Item (28) 4 heavy bomber 30th September 1943 (144). Item (30) 2 army cooperation 30th September 1943 (72). Item (32) ore transport (land) 30th September 1943 (12). Item (34) 6 (Dutch) medium bomber 30th September 1943. (216). (35) 9 (Dutch fighter interceptor 30th September 1943 (324). Priority 1 Items 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 11 12 and 33. Priority 2 Items 10 14 16 18 19 20 22 24 26 27 Priority 3 Items 13 15 21 23 \* 28 29 and 31. Priority 4 Items, 17 30 32 34 and 35. Dutch Air Forces Items (34) and (35) are planned to be formed from

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INCOMING MESSAGE

Page 4 from GHQ SWPA

No. AG 441

pilots being trained in United States. Location of eventual employment unknown here. There is insufficient personnel locally to form Dutch Ground Echelons for support of this effort.

MacArthur.

\*Came (twentyfive) Service will be made on request.

#1282 is CM-OUT-2601 (OPD)

Action Copy: OPD

Info Copies: TAG  
File  
CGAAF  
SOS

CM-IN-6810 (4/25/42) PM 10:15

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SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

OUTGOING MESSAGE

April 30, 1942

To: CINC, SWPA  
MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA

W. D. No. 8

WDWPD

\* \* \* \* \*

Statement of requirements recently submitted by  
you is under thorough study.

MARSHALL

Originator: OPD

Info. Copies: File  
TAG

CM-OUT-6034 (4/30/42)

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

May 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The sixth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 a.m., Tuesday, May 5, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Netherlands Minister (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins  
Mr. A. V. Smith (In the absence of the Australian Minister)

The President remarked that "At last the United Nations are on the offensive." This remark was made with particular reference to the British occupation of Madagascar Island. The President told the Council the substance of his message to Vichy, the important item being that the action of the British had the hearty approval and support of the United States Government. The President further told the Council that a Naval task force had been in action in the southwest Pacific, with gratifying results, but that this information was given to the Council members in strictest confidence. The point was raised as to the attitude of the United States Government towards Martinique. The President replied that he regarded that situation as "an easy one," and that with the passing of time the required action would become apparent.

The President remarked that a despatch had been sent to General MacArthur to obtain the latter's personal views as to the next objective of the Japanese.

The Netherlands Minister (Dr. Loudon) stated that some program for the arming of Hollanders should be undertaken. He thought the best idea would be for the British to drop arms and ammunition from aircraft flying over Holland. "A great deal of this would no doubt be lost, but I am convinced that enough arms and ammunition would reach the proper people to make the project well worthwhile." The British Ambassador (Lord Halifax) stated that General DeGaulle was very willing to have the opposition to Germany centered around an idea rather than himself. The President remarked that he thought it would be a fine thing to have released in London something along the foregoing line, i.e., that a statement be issued with the full authority and approval of General DeGaulle that the movement he represented be known as the "Liberation" or "Free French Movement," and not by his (DeGaulle's) name.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong) made a statement with reference to the restricted number of air routes now available to China as the result of the collapse of the defense of Burma. The burden of Mr. Soong's remarks was that a modicum of supplies must be kept moving to China; that this is necessary in order to keep the morale of the Chinese bolstered. He remarked that China would, of course, like to get as many supplies as possible, but if this was not feasible, any small trickle would help. Mr. Soong stated that the Chinese troops could be depended upon to

give a good account of themselves. He stated that he was disturbed to learn that the Japanese are now attacking China through Indo-China. In connection with this subject Mr. Hopkins remarked that consideration was being given by the War Department to converting a certain number of 4-engined bombers to transports. At first blush it would seem that this would not be an economical employment of 4-engined bombers, as that type of plane is not readily adaptable for use as a freight carrier. Mr. Hopkins stated, however, that the decision in this matter had not been made, but would be made at an early date.

At this point the President directed a question to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) as to whether or not his government had any idea that Japan would attack Russia this summer. To this, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that he regarded such an action on the part of Japan as highly improbable unless it was seen that Russia was in great difficulties on her (Russia's) western front. The President then remarked to Mr. Soong that he was at liberty to tell the Generalissimo that we were making every possible effort to assist the Chinese in their splendid stand against the Japanese, and that the matter of air transport is receiving serious consideration. At the same time the President remarked that he would be pleased if Mr. Soong would get the Generalissimo's reaction to the proposition that coolie trains be established across the mountains. "I have a shrewd guess that it would be quite feasible to carry a lot of war material across the mountains by coolie train. It might not be an economical thing to do, but it would unquestionably get some material through." To this, Mr. Soong replied that the country which the coolie trains would have to

traverse is very rough and inhospitable. A good deal of manpower would have to be expended to carry their rations through this wasteland. "It can safely be said," remarked Mr. Soong, "that all possible supply routes now open to us are teeming with difficulties." At this point the President directed that Captain McCrea inquire of the Chiefs of Staff if anything is contemplated in the way of submarine action on the part of the United Nations in the Bay of Bengal.

The President then explained to the Council that Great Britain and the United States have a vast quantity of material which can be supplied Russia, but that this quantity of material is greatly in excess of the shipping facilities. The term, "shipping facilities," in this instance, must include the conditions under which ships can go to sea. The supply of material to Russia is no longer a mere convoy job, but is a naval operation - this because of the ice and the opposition from German air, surface and subsurface craft. It was remarked that all "heavy and needed stuff" can be gotten through, and that Mr. Stalin and Mr. Litvinov have been so advised.

At this point the President directed that Captain McCrea inquire as to (1) the progress being made by the Chiefs of Staff in the study of the Marquesas to Australia ferry line for pursuit planes, and (2) production figures of war materials for April. It is desired that these two items be ready for the next meeting of the Council.

The Council then decided to meet next at 11:30 a.m., Wednesday, May 13, 1942.

J. L. McC

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

May 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The fifth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:45 a.m., Wednesday, April 29, 1942.

PRESENT

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Australian Attorney General and Minister of State for  
External Affairs (Hon. H. V. Evatt)  
The Netherlands Minister (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins (Entered at 12:30)

The President remarked on a variety of subjects, substantially as follows:

(a) The French were notified in the President's speech of 28 April 1942, that the United Nations would prevent, by force if necessary, Germany's use of French territory.

(b) The Free French situation is causing concern to both the President and the Prime Minister. Briefly, there is a tendency amongst the Free French to divide into two groups, i.e., the DeGaullists and those opposed to DeGaulle. DeGaulle, himself, seems to be very difficult to handle.

(c) The President has directed the Chiefs of Staff to make a study of the proposal of flying pursuit planes from the Marquesas to Australia via the Tuamotu Archipelago and other islands to the westward. To this end it would be necessary to establish an assembly plant in the Marquesas and servicing

points along the ferry route. If such a plan were possible, it would greatly relieve the shipping situation.

(d) The shipping situation, with reference to Russian convoys, is disturbing. Ships are banking up in Iceland to such an extent that the facilities of the ports of that island are no longer able to accommodate shipping in such quantity. The Admiralty has come to the conclusion that the movement of a convoy to Murmansk is no longer a mere escort job, but a naval operation. This situation results from the presence on the Norwegian coast of the heavy German units and the basing of German sub-surface and aircraft in northern Norway. This situation will be aggravated with the coming of the long daylight hours. Further, ice conditions cannot be regarded as good until about 15 July. The President remarked that in the early stages of our "Aid to Russia," we were unable to meet our commitments. Now, however, we are fully able to meet these commitments and it is a distinct disappointment not to be able to keep our promises to the Russians. Generalizing, the President remarked that he "supposed" that the contribution which had been made by this country to Russia in the way of military material was about five percent of Russia's total equipment. In response to an inquiry from Lord Halifax as to what Admiral Standley thought of the general situation, the President replied that Admiral Standley quoted Stalin as saying that "The general situation is as good as can be expected."

(e) The situation in Argentina and Chile remains for the most part, unchanged. Lord Halifax remarked that within the week he had been in touch with one of the British diplomatic officials who had spent some 20-odd years

in Argentina, and that that official expressed himself as certain that Argentina would ultimately get into the war "on the side of the winner."

The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) asked if there was any news of Japanese intentions with reference to the Far East. The President remarked that in view of the sizeable concentration of combatant units now underway in the Truk area, that it was quite possible for the Japanese (1) to strike to the eastward at our lines of communication, or (2) to the southeast on the Samoa-Fiji-New Caledonia line, or (3) to the southward in the New Britain-New Guinea area.

The President asked the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) what headway had been made in connection with "censorship at the source," so far as his country was concerned. To this Dr. Evatt replied that he had forwarded a suggestion to his Prime Minister in regard thereto, but as yet no reply had been received. The Minister from New Zealand (Mr. Nash) remarked that all the United States had to do was to name the censor and his government would see that he was appointed. To this remark the President stated that the United States Minister to New Zealand (Mr. Hurley) would be acceptable and directed that Captain McCrea undertake to see that Mr. Hurley was so appointed. (Note: This matter was referred to the Secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for accomplishment).

The Netherlands Minister (Dr. Loudon) remarked that many statements were attributed to Dutch officials supporting the press items that General MacArthur was in doubt as to the precise nature of his directive. The Netherlands Minister stated that he had been advised by his government that

no such remarks were made by any Dutch officials.

At this point the Burma situation was discussed generally. The President told the council that General Stilwell had recently reported having difficulty in getting the Chinese division commanders to carry out his orders. He further stated that the Generalissimo had sent to General Stilwell's support one of his best Chinese generals to act as a Chief of Staff. When queried by the President as to the meaning of the Burma break-through, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) replied that for nearly 5 years the Japanese had been "breaking through our lines," and that the Chinese are in no way discouraged when this happens. "Only when panic occurs, and this has occurred an exceedingly small number of times, are we at all fearful of a Japanese break-through. As a matter of fact, it often works out to our advantage." Mr. Soong continued that the road building was proceeding very rapidly and that he was confident that even though Lashio falls, supplies can be flown into China very efficiently. Mr. Soong suggested that the President give consideration to utilizing an Alaska-Siberia air route to China. The President remarked that this had been under consideration for some time but as yet the Russians had done nothing to encourage the project. Mr. Soong then invited attention to the fact that when his government first started receiving aid from Russia, the Russians would not permit the Chinese flyers to enter Russian territory. This situation was met by permitting the Russian flyers to enter Chinese territory at the last Chinese stop. Mr. Soong suggested that some such arrangement as this might be worked out. To this the President stated that he would have no objection.

The conversation again turned to the discussion of France. The President remarked that he hoped that diplomatic relations could be maintained with Vichy. He further stated that he trusted Canada would not close her avenues of information to that country. "Laval can't be trusted around the corner, and while he insists that he hopes to keep our friendship, no one can be sure that he is not brewing bad medicine at the same time." The Netherlands Minister (Dr. Loudon) remarked that Germany forced Vichy to break diplomatic relations with the Netherlands government, but at the same time would not permit deposed Netherlands officials to leave the country. Mr. Soong remarked that his country only had nominal relations with Vichy at the moment, and that it was not expected that this situation would improve. Lord Halifax expressed himself very positively that avenues to France should be kept open. At this juncture the President remarked in confidence to the meeting that M. Herriott was in full accord with what the United Nations are now doing and can be counted upon to step in should the moment be propitious, or the Laval government falls. The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) remarked that the situation in Madagascar and Martinique were of much worry to his government and to him. The President stated that while the Madagascar situation might be of some moment, the Martinique situation was of an entirely different order and one which would cause us very little trouble. (Note: Mr. Hopkins entered and joined the Council).

The President remarked that much progress was being made in this country in connection with the manufacture of aluminum from ordinary clay. The Tennessee Valley Authority has been experimenting with this, and while the process is expensive and is not completely perfect, nevertheless aluminum has been man-

ufactured. The Minister from New Zealand (Mr. Nash) asked that the information available thus far, in connection with this matter, be made available to him in view of the fact that the New Zealand government is conducting experiments with its clays. The President directed Captain McCrea to contact Mr. Donald Nelson with the end in view that the report which the President is expecting from Mr. Nelson on this subject, be expedited, and when it is received, a copy should be furnished Mr. Nash.

At this point the President read a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: "Air Forces for Australia," marked (A) and attached hereto. The President directed that Captain McCrea inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he desired the number of planes allotted by our Army forces to Australia be raised to one thousand, total all types.

The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) remarked substantially as follows: "I am in receipt of a number of despatches from my government in which it is stated that General MacArthur has made certain recommendations to the War Department and that to these recommendations General MacArthur had been unable to get a satisfactory reply." Dr. Evatt stated further that he was well aware that the political level could not properly make the decisions in military matters and that they would have to be made by the military level. All that he was concerned about was that "the decisions be made." The President remarked that one thing was very evident with reference to the Southwest Pacific - defensive strategy was the order of the moment and not offensive strategy.

At this point the President read a memorandum, Subject: "Aliens in the Army of the United States," marked (B) and attached hereto. It is to be noted that the laws in question are being changed. The President then asked whether or not it would be possible to raise a Chinese division in this country. To this Mr. Soong replied that at the outside there were not over one hundred thousand Chinese in the United States and accordingly a division would be out of the question.

The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Dr. Evatt) remarked that the possibility of a statement to be entitled the "Pacific Charter," similar to the one issued last summer under the name of the "Atlantic Charter," would be a good idea. He stated that he was aware that this had been proposed at a recent meeting, and that no final action had been taken. He further stated that the longer he thought about the matter, the more it appealed to him. The President remarked that this matter must be approached with caution. That it appeared to him that the best thing that could be done at the moment was to try to impress the overrun countries of what would happen to them under Japanese domination. One of the factors that makes the problem a difficult one is the inherent differences in the races found in the southeast Asia, Dutch East Indies, and Philippine areas. The Netherlands Minister (Dr. Loudon) stated that the text of such a statement might well be, "The Japanese are not a civilized people."

It was decided that the next meeting of the Pacific War Council would be held on Tuesday, May 5, 1942, at 11:30 a.m.

J. L. McC

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 22, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Subject: Air Forces for Australia.

The following is the information desired by the President after yesterday's Pacific War Council:

General MacArthur received his directive as Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area on April 4th. He operated informally under this directive by agreement with the Australian and Dutch Governments until the approval of the New Zealand Government was obtained on April 18th on which date General MacArthur's directive was given formal governmental approval. There should be no question in General MacArthur's mind as to the terms and scope of his directive since he has been in constant communication with the War Department on this subject and has already submitted a statement of his complete command and staff setup.

Attached is a copy of a message regarding U. S. aircraft strength allocated to the Southwest Pacific Area, which was sent to General MacArthur on April 9th. The reference in paragraph 1 of this message to "T/O Strength" refers to existing Tables of Organization and consequently describes accurately to General MacArthur the exact U. S. strength in planes allocated to his command. This strength corresponds to the data previously sent you for the President's information and is as follows:

**SECRET**


A(1)  
Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

	<u>Operating</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Total</u>
Heavy bombers .....	80	40	120
Medium bombers .....	159	57	216
Light bombers .....	57	30	87
Pursuit .....	320	160	<u>480</u>
		Grand Total	903

Additional to the above, the planned strength of the R.A.A.F. is 401 combat planes of which 152 are now in Australia and about 348 have been allocated by the Munitions Assignments Board for the period ending June 30, 1942, with deliveries in progress.

Dr. Evatt has been given all the above figures in detail.



W. B. SMITH,  
Secretary.

Incl.  
Copy of W.D. Classified  
Message No. 1188, 4-9-42.

SECRET

SECRET  
WAR DEPARTMENT  
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

SECRET

April 9, 1942

To CG USFIA

W.D. No. 1188

Summary of tactical air units authorized for Australia follows (for MacArthur): Heavy bombardment, 2 groups; medium bombardment, 2 groups (less 2 squadrons which are earmarked for Fiji and New Caledonia); light bombardment, 1 group; pursuit, three American groups and 1 Australian group. Airplanes for these units will be supplied and maintained on a basis of 100 percent T/O strength with units and 50 per cent in reserve. In addition to the above there are a total of 45 B-25 airplanes allocated to Australia, 18 of which are for the Dutch.

The 2 medium bombardment squadrons earmarked for subsequent orders to Fiji and New Caledonia are to be considered as supporting elements for Australia in case of emergency when so ordered by the War Department. Allocation of airplanes for these 2 squadrons has been made to Australia.

The three separate pursuit squadrons now in Australia are earmarked as follows: 68th Squadron, now under orders to Tongatabu; 21st and 34th Squadrons, tentatively set up for other island bases. Decision will be made as to whether allocation of airplanes for the 21st and 34th Squadrons will be made through you or directly from the United States. You will be informed.

Other commitments of United States airplane production will not permit any additions to the force authorized herein for Australia.

The following for your information: The pursuit squadron now in Fiji is to be augmented by an additional squadron to be provided by furnishing airplanes to New Zealand pilots from British allotments; A Marine Fighter Squadron is under orders to Efate.

MARSHALL

Orig: OPD  
Info. Copies: AG, File, SGS, CGAAF  
CM-OUT-1619 (4-9-42) 8:05

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101  
CITY  
AVS DE  
SERUEL

ALIENS IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

In response to the request of Captain McCrea,  
the following information is submitted:

Under existing laws:

a. Aliens may be inducted into the military service by the Selective Service System, and if so inducted, they may be paid under the provisions of current Appropriation Acts.

b. Aliens may be enlisted or commissioned in the Army of the United States, but may be paid only when serving outside the continental limits of the United States. Under existing provisions in Appropriation Acts this category of personnel, except for Filipinos, may not be paid if serving within the continental limits of the United States.

The matter of removing the restrictive language regarding the payment of aliens in military service is being considered by the conferees of the Senate and the House in connection with HR 6868 (6th Supplemental Pay Act). The War Department has been advised informally that the conferees have agreed to authorize the payment of military personnel who are not citizens of the United States.

Aliens who are now serving in the Army of the United States are not segregated into units according to nationality except in the case of one battalion of Filipinos.

B

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

RETURNED FOR YOUR FILES.

H.L.H.

Mr Jerry -  
File, please, with  
notes on P. W. C. -  
J. C. McC

**SECRET**

April 30, 1942

Memorandum for Mr. Ray Atherton,  
Chief, Division of European Affairs  
Department of State

During the last meeting of the Pacific War Council held at the White House, Mr. Nash, the Minister of New Zealand, raised the question of the control of official press releases in New Zealand, particularly those of military character. He said that the New Zealand Government would like to have a representative of the United States approve such official releases before their issuance.

The President stated that General Hurley would be a good person to have this responsibility, and instructed his Naval Aide, Captain McCrea, to direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make the necessary arrangements. As General Hurley is not on active military duty, and is the United States diplomatic representative in New Zealand, it is believed that this matter falls within the province of the Department of State. The President's desires, as communicated by Captain McCrea, are, therefore, being transmitted to the Department of State for such action as may be considered appropriate.

W. B. SMITH,  
Brigadier General, U.S.A.  
Secretary

J  
c Capt. J.L. McCrea

**SECRET**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The fourth meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:55 a. m., Tuesday, April 21, 1942.

PRESENT:

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Australian Attorney General and Minister of State for  
External Affairs (Hon. H. V. Evatt)  
The Netherlands Minister (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins

The President announced that he had little to take up with the Council. The one item of interest was that he had been informed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army (Major General McNarney) that headway was being made with reference to censorship "at the source" with regard to press despatches coming out of Australia.

The President remarked that he had been queried about the alleged bombing attack on the Japanese mainland. His reply had been that we were now basing our planes on Shangri-la, a Utopian valley in the Himalayas!

The President announced that the Bay of Bengal situation appeared to be getting easier and that there was every indication that the Japanese heavier forces had withdrawn to the eastward.

The President asked Mr. Hopkins to tell the Council briefly of the impressions gathered as a result of his trip to England. Mr. Hopkins stated that the British Military Intelligence were of the opinion that Germany's main push will be in the direction of the Caucasus. There is some thought that they might strike through Turkey for the Middle East. The Royal Air Force bombings are having a decided effect on occupied France and on Germany, and the British intend to intensify these bombings. Further, the Commando raids have met with much success, and in this connection, the problem of supplying persons in the overrun countries with weapons and ammunition is being given attention. Mr. Hopkins further remarked that the safe conduct of the Russian convoys was giving the British much concern. The President remarked that the presence of German air, surface, and underwater craft on the Norwegian coast committed sizeable task forces of our own and of the British to those areas, and that this was an "unhappy" situation.

The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Mr. Evatt) stated that General MacArthur had requested of the United States government on 4 April that he be informed as to plane distribution for the Southwest Pacific Area, and that to date no answer had been received. The President directed Captain McCrea to make inquiry of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Evatt further remarked that he had just received a despatch from his government to the effect that General MacArthur "had not yet received his directive from his own (the U. S. ) government." Dr. Evatt stated that the Australian government was very much worried about the matter. The President instructed Captain McCrea to refer this matter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the request that a memorandum on the subject be given to the President.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that he thought it was appropriate to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for certain information on the Tenth Pursuit Force. (Note: This information was requested of Lieutenant General Arnold by Captain McCrea on April 22, 1942).

The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Mr. Evatt) suggested that the President give consideration to making an announcement to the world of a "Pacific Charter," similar to the "Atlantic Charter." The President replied at length to this suggestion, stating in substance that while he was in agreement in principle with the suggestion, he thought it best to do nothing about it at this time, and that in any event, such a charter would have to be stated most broadly. The Australian Minister of State further suggested that it might be appropriate for the President to refer vaguely to such a charter at an appropriate time in one of his speeches to the country, and that it might be made in the form of an attack on Japan. The President stated that consideration would be given to this suggestion.

The New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) suggested that it would be appropriate to have members of the Chiefs of Staff appear from time to time before the Pacific War Council, for the purpose of presenting a broad picture of the strategic problems facing the United Nations. The President "thought" that this might be arranged.

The Australian Minister of State wished to know whether or not the Munitions Assignments Board had thusfar made definite allocations of munitions of war. To this, Mr. Hopkins replied that until the strategy of the war had definitely "jelled," no allocations could be made. He further remarked that we must remember that no hard and fast distribution

can be made at this time, i.e., that our plans must remain fluid.

The President directed that Mr. Hopkins get in touch with the Chairman of the Maritime Commission to the end that bottoms returning from Australia carry as much cargo as possible. This to be accomplished however without delaying departure of the ships in any way whatsoever.

It was decided that the next meeting of the Pacific War Council would be held on Tuesday, April 28th, 1942, at 11:30 a.m.

V. L. McC

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The third meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 3:00 p. m., Wednesday, April 15, 1942.

PRESENT:

The President  
The Prime Minister of Canada (The Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Australian Attorney General and Minister of State for External Affairs (Hon. H. V. Evatt)  
The Netherlands Minister (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
Sir R. I. Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B., E. E. and M. P. (Representing Great Britain in the absence of Lord Halifax)

The President remarked that the Council was honored to have with it the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King.

The President stated that the information from France was disconcerting, it appearing from press despatches that Pierre Laval was about to be taken into the cabinet. While these despatches lacked official confirmation from Admiral Leahy, nevertheless such a turn of events would not be at all surprising. The President "trusted" that there would be no change in the status of the French Fleet.

The President stated that he regretted Sir Stafford Cripps' mission to India had not been more successful. Further, that the tenor of the despatches from Burma gave the impression that things were "not pleasant" in that area.

2822

The President continued that Burma was important in the supply route to China and that every effort should be made to hold it.

At this point the President read a despatch from the American Consul in Noumea, copy of which is attached marked "A". General discussion ensued. The Australian Minister of State and the Minister from New Zealand both agreed that d'Argenlieu was "a very able official but a bit difficult." They thought the proposal to remove him to Tahiti was not in order.

The Australian Minister of State remarked that he was disturbed about the news despatches coming out of Australia, stating that General MacArthur's command status was not clearly understood by the General. The Minister stated that there was no doubt in his government's mind as to this matter and he was sure that to this, his colleague the Minister from New Zealand, would agree. There was general agreement that such was the case.

The Australian Minister of State then entered an excuse for the news despatches originating in his country stating that no doubt many things were passed out by the censor in the thought that the censorship within this country would handle any objectional matter. It was then suggested that the most practicable way of handling the matter would be for censorship to be effective at the source.

The Australian Minister of State remarked that he suggested the President make a press release about the MacArthur command situation.

The President read a memorandum submitted by the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of Korea, and comments thereon by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, copies of which are attached marked "B" and "C" respectively.

SECRET

General discussion was then had with reference to the allocation of munitions of war. The Australian Minister of State presented rather vigorously the thought that Canada as the senior Dominion should have representation on the Munitions Assignments Board. It is significant that while Canadian representation was urged by Dr. Evatt, the Canadian Prime Minister did not contribute to the argument. The Minister from New Zealand remarked that the only sound way of assigning the munitions production was to let the Combined Chiefs of Staff determine the relative importance of the various theaters of effort and that the munitions assignments be made accordingly.

The Canadian Prime Minister remarked that Canada was raising two mobile divisions, one armoured, for duty as necessary in Canada. It was also remarked that Prince Rupert was an important port and that its defenses were not adequate. To this, there was general agreement.

The President remarked that he wished to bring into the picture again, the matter of a second front against Germany - that such a front would help the United Nations militarily and politically. He remarked that such a front should not be opened up rashly but it should be done if it offered a "reasonable chance of success."

The Australian Minister of State stated that he thought diplomatic steps should be taken, looking toward getting Russia to permit us to use Siberia for operations against Japan. The Chinese Foreign Minister remarked that Russia had given much aid to China without herself attacking Japan.

The Minister from the Netherlands stated that he represented one of the smaller of the United Nations whose homeland and colonies had been

SECRET

generally overrun. He made a vigorous plea that those Dutch citizens who have taken out their first citizenship papers be required to render military service to the United States. He stated that there were many such persons in this country and Canada who were not subject to the laws of the Netherlands, and that "We want to help you but you won't let us."

The President directed that Captain McCrea inform the Secretary of War that the President desired a study be made along the lines indicated by the Minister for the Netherlands, and a memorandum on such study be prepared.

It was decided that the Pacific War Council would next meet at 11:30 a. m., on Tuesday, April 21, 1942.

J. L. McC

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SECRET

JW  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Noumea

Dated April 15, 1942

Rec'd 5:18 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

43, April 15, 10 a.m.

The High Commissioner has telegraphed, through the Australian representative here, to the Australian Naval Board, Admiral Leary, General de Gaulle and the Free French Delegation at Washington a strong protest over the new change in Pacific naval command, especially stressing his resentment that he was not consulted before a change was made. The full text of this protest probably can be obtained by the Department from the Free French Delegation at Washington. In this connection it is deemed advisable to inform the Department that d'Argenlieu has consistently shown that he desires to impress all and sundry with his importance and that this attitude seems of more paramount importance to him than the present dangerous situation in this part of the Pacific. Both he and his staff have constantly held themselves aloof from the population, which fact has caused deep resentment and may create a situation that would hinder the proper defence of the country.

"A" (1)  
D (1)

-2- #43, April 15, 10 a.m. from Noumea

the country. Major General Patch concurs in the above and believes it advisable in the interest of defence that the High Commissioner's office be removed to Tahiti.

MACVITTY

KLP

"A" (2)

MEMORANDUM:

Held down by a large Japanese army of occupation, the mood of the Korean people is that of sullen submission, with memories of historic injustice rankling, and having been dispossessed of the rich South Korean rice-growing areas by Japanese landlords and oppressed by the present civil and economic disabilities.

Except for sporadic assassinations in Korea itself, Korean discontent is manifest only among their nationals living in China and Russia, while ideologically existent among Koreans in the United States.

The principal leaders of the Korean revolutionaries are living in Chungking, on the one hand the members of the Korean Provisional Government Party, which is the historic party of Korean disaffection, and on the other the Korean Revolutionary Party which is made up of younger and supposedly left-wing elements. Korean revolutionaries in the United States are adherents of one of these two parties. With the limited aid of the Chinese Government, there is in existence a small Korean Peoples Army, which is operating with Chinese guerrillas in North China and numbers a few thousand.

In Siberia the Russians have incorporated for many years two or three regiments of Koreans in the Russian Far East army, but until hostilities commence between Russia and Japan, no step-up in this activity can be expected.

If the United Nations, particularly the members of the Pacific Council, desire to foster Korean independence, two measures are indicated:

1. After promoting a fusion of the two rival revolutionary parties by promising help to a united Korean revolutionary organization, which appears easily feasible, undertake to raise, arm and support a Korean irregular army of, say, 50,000 men, which will be located in the guerrilla areas of North China,

and which will be the rallying center for all Korean revolutionary activities both within and outside Korea. The purpose of such an army would be:

- (a) to operate in Korea at some opportune moment to be selected by the United Nations;
- (b) to be headquarters for sabotage activities by Korean workers in munition works and vital communications centers in Korea and Japan;
- (c) to constitute an intelligence service through Koreans working in the lower ranks of civil servants and police in Korea, North China and Japan.

The prospect for irregular activities will be particularly promising because, owing to the shortage of labor in Japan similar to that in Germany, large numbers of Koreans have been recruited for munition works in Korea, Manchuria and Japan. In addition, large numbers of Koreans are working as agents in North China in such instruments of Japanese policy as monopolies in opium, morphine and heroin, prostitution and gambling, to demoralize the Chinese population. With a well-organized system, these Japanese activities could prove a boomerang.

2. As a political measure, in order to encourage Korean aspirations at some opportune moment the Pacific Council could announce its determination to effect the independence of Korea after the war. Recognition of a Korean Provisional Government might be effected either simultaneously or at some time later.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In your memorandum to me of April 8, enclosing a memorandum handed to you by Dr. Soong, you asked me to speak with you about Dr. Soong's memorandum before Tuesday the 14th.

I am returning herewith the original of Dr. Soong's memorandum regarding which I should like to offer the following comment.

I fully concur in the suggestion that the United Nations, particularly the members of the Pacific War Council, should assist in organizing and equipping a Korean irregular army. Geographical factors would seem to make China the logical place from which such activity could best be carried on, with the suggestions and assistance of the United States and other military missions at Chungking. Should you wish me to do so, after the Pacific War Council has approved this suggestion, I shall be glad to take the matter up with my Liaison Committee in order that recommendations may be formulated by the General Staff and by

The President,

The White House.

"C" (1)

Naval Operations for your consideration covering the practical steps involved.

With regard to the suggestion that a fusion of rival Korean revolutionary parties be promoted and that recognition of a Korean Provisional Government be granted at an appropriate time, I am informed that the principal Korean revolutionary organizations are the one existing in Chungking (apparently supported by most of the Koreans in the United States) and the Korean bands in Manchuria and other parts of China. The latter have apparently no close connection with the organization at Chungking.

I have sent a telegram to our Embassy in Chungking asking for further information on this point and also asking for information from the Government of China with regard to its views concerning the possibility of a fusion of these groups.

With regard to an announcement by the Pacific War Council of its determination to effect the independence of Korea, in principle I am heartily in accord with such a step, but I question the wisdom of making an announcement of that character at this moment. If such an announcement were made today, it seems to me that the announcement would lack reality.

Temporarily the tide of war continues to be in Japan's favor. No armed revolt in Korea against Japan

"C" (2)

can be expected at this time. Furthermore, the question of the independence of India has recently held and still holds the center of attention among the peoples of the Pacific area and the failure of the Cripps negotiations makes it unfortunately impossible for us to utilize the announcement of an agreement between the British Government and the peoples of India, providing for the freedom of India, as a platform upon which to base an announcement of broader policy.


If the Cripps negotiations had been successful, I would have recommended to you an announcement by the Pacific War Council affirming the determination of the countries represented to recognize the independence of the Philippine Islands and to bring about the independence of Korea and the expulsion of the Japanese invaders from all territories which they had temporarily overrun in order that the liberty of the peoples of those regions might be reestablished. In brief what I had in mind was to recommend the announcement of a broad policy of general liberation, insofar as the peculiar circumstances covering the Netherlands East Indies and Burma might make such an announcement possible, but, unfortunately, the breakdown of the Indian negotiations eliminates, at least temporarily, that possibility.

"C" (3)

My suggestions for the moment with regard to Dr. Soong's memorandum would consequently be to do everything possible to further the organization and equipment of a Korean army and to further in every way possible, in consultation with the Chinese and the British, the fusion of the Korean revolutionary parties and to postpone until a more propitious time any recognition of a Korean provisional government and any announcement with regard to the future independence of Korea.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'H. H. Hsiao', written in a cursive style. The signature is positioned to the right of the typed phrase 'Faithfully yours,'.

Enc.

"C" (4)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

April 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (PWC)

This forenoon, Dr. H. V. Evatt (The Australian Minister of State for External Affairs) called to say that he wished I would communicate to the President that he (Evatt) suggested that the President issue a statement about the command situation in the Southwest Pacific, i.e., that MacArthur's directive had been issued and that there was no misunderstanding on the part of the United Nations governments about MacArthur's authority.

I suggested to Dr. Evatt that, since the Pacific War Council would meet at 3:00 p. m., this date, and further since the matter was one which was appropriate for the Council to consider, it would be quite in order to present the subject to the President at that time.

During the meeting of the Pacific War Council, Dr. Evatt argued at length that a statement should be made and suggested to the President that he (The President) make such a statement. To this suggestion, the President made no reply.

Some minutes after the meeting ended, Dr. Evatt came to me in the Waiting Room of the Executive Offices and stated in effect, "I have told the press that the President would issue a statement tonight with reference to the command situation in the Southwest Pacific Area." This, I told the President while in the Doctor's office sometime later.

April 16, 1942.

About 0930 this date, Dr. Evatt called me on the phone and remarked substantially as follows: "You don't think, do you Captain, that I did anything wrong yesterday in making the statement I did to the Press?" I replied that I didn't know what statement he had made. Dr. Evatt then said, "Well, it's in all the papers this morning." To this I replied that I had not read the papers and consequently could not pass judgment on what he had said.

Dr. Evatt then "trusted" that the President would understand that he (Evatt) had meant no harm. With that the conversation ended.

*J. L. McCrea*  
JOHN L. MCCREA,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF  
OPERATIONS DIVISION  
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON, THE WHITE HOUSE:

Attached hereto is a copy of a cablegram sent to General MacArthur last evening. It is possible that the President would like to see this copy before he has his next meeting of the Pacific War Council.

*Dwight D. Eisenhower*

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER,  
Major General,  
Assistant Chief of Staff.

1 Incl.  
Copy of cable to  
Gen. MacArthur



SECRET

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Message to Commanding General, USAFIA.

April 13, 1942.

In addition to formal acceptance by the Netherlands Government of your directive as Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, we assume that the Australian Government has concurred through an exchange of messages as below described. This message for General MacArthur refers to our No. 1256.

The Prime Minister of Australia in radio of April 7 raised certain questions concerning movement of Australian troops out of the continent, the functions of local government in the direction of operations and the right of Australian field commanders to communicate directly with their local government. His message indicated that if satisfactory answers were received to these questions the directive would be acceptable to Australia. The Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff have answered these questions to the satisfaction of Dr. Evatts.

It is therefore assumed that through this action the Australian Government has formally accepted the directive although no definite statement to that effect has since been received here. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore consider that you should show this dispatch to appropriate officials of the Australian Government and, provided our assumption as above stated is correct, agree with them upon the date and hour on which you should formally assume command. This date should be promptly reported to the War

SECRET

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Department. The date agreed upon should be as soon as practicable but sufficiently far in the future to permit the governments concerned to carry out the procedure prescribed in Par. 8 of the directive previously communciated to you.

Marshall

McNarney,  
Acting Chief of Staff.

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA:

Subject: Aircraft Allocations in  
Australia.

In response to the President's inquiry transmitted in your memorandum of April 7, 1942, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the table below shows the planes scheduled to be sent to Australia under current plans:


Type	Number of Planes		Total
	Operational	Reserve	
Bombers (Heavy)	80	40	120
Bombers (Medium)	141	75*	216
Bombers (Light)	57	30	87
Pursuit	320	160	480**
Patrol Planes (Navy)	<u>12</u>	<u>    </u>	<u>12</u>
Totals	610	305	915

\* 18 from Dutch account.

\*\* 120 pursuit planes have been used to equip Australian units.

Of the above planes it is intended to send 20 bombers (medium) to New Caledonia and 20 bombers (medium) to Fiji, reinforcing the garrison at each of these places by a medium bombardment squadron with 50% reserve planes. These two squadrons are to be considered as supporting elements for Australia in case of emergency when ordered by the War Department.

With exception of the planes mentioned in the preceding paragraph, all planes shown in the table above will be available for service in the Australian Area.



W. B. SMITH,  
Secretary.

**SECRET**

April 16, 1942.

My dear Mr. Nash:

My dear Dr. Evatt:

In accordance with your request, there is forwarded herewith a copy of the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated April 10, 1942, having to do with Aircraft Allocations in Australia.

Sincerely yours,  
Sincerely yours,

JOHN L. McCREA,  
JOHN L. McCREA,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

The Hon. Walter Nash,  
Hon. H. V. Evatt,  
The Australian Minister of State  
for External Affairs,  
3117 Woodland Drive,  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure (2)

Enclosure (1)

Registry 24614

April 16, 1942.

April 16, 1942.

My dear Mr. Nash:

In accordance with your request, there  
is forwarded herewith a copy of the memorandum  
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated April 10,  
1942, having to do with Aircraft Allocations  
in Australia.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN L. McCREA,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

The Hon. Walter Nash,  
The New Zealand Minister,  
27 Observatory Circle,  
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure (1)

Registry 24614

April 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

Received one sealed envelope bearing registry No.  
24614 for delivery to The Australian Minister of State for  
External Affairs.

*W.S. Smith*


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Secretary

April 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM RECEIPT

Received one sealed envelope bearing registry No.  
24614 for delivery to The New Zealand Minister.

  
Secretary



NEW ZEALAND LEGATION  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

18th April, 1942.

Dear Captain McCrea,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 16th April and wish to thank you for your courtesy in supplying me with a copy of the Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff dated April 10th, 1942, with reference to Aircraft Allocations in Australia.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. Mash", with a long horizontal flourish underneath.

Captain John L. McCrea,  
United States Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President,  
The White House,  
WASHINGTON. D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 14, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (PWC)

The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy) called me this date to ask whether or not he was expected to attend the meeting of the Pacific War Council scheduled for 3:00 p.m., April 15, 1942. The Canadian Minister stated that he made this request in view of the fact that Prime Minister Mackenzie King was due to attend this same meeting. He asked that I put the matter before the President for a decision. Upon presenting the subject to the President, he remarked that he did not desire the Canadian Minister to attend the meeting in question. The President stated that he wished to set the precedent that only one representative of a foreign country would attend any meeting of the Pacific War Council - this to avoid the body becoming too unwieldy.

I communicated the President's wishes in this matter to Mr. McCarthy, who stated that he not alone understood, but heartily concurred in the President's decision.

*John L. McCre*

JOHN L. MCCREA,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The second meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 a.m., April 7, 1942.

PRESENT:

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Minister (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The Canadian Minister (Hon. Leighton McCarthy)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Australian Attorney General and Minister of State  
for External Affairs (Hon. H. V. Evatt)

The President announced that he had received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum in connection with the Pacific subdivision. He stated that that body was in complete agreement that Australia proper and the New Zealand line of communications are two strategic entities; that the defense of Australia is primarily a land-air problem for which the best possible naval support is a fleet free to maneuver without restrictions imposed by the local situation; that New Zealand on the other hand, is the key point for the support of the Pacific line of communications, the security of which is a naval responsibility.

The President then read two memoranda from the Joint Chiefs of Staff attached hereto marked (A) and (B). General discussion of these two papers was had. The President remarked that in addition to the numbers mentioned in (A), the arrival of the convoys in Australia on April 6, 1942, raised the

total of U. S. Army forces on that continent to some 64,000 troops.

The point was made by the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash) that he trusted there would be cooperation between the commanders in the various theaters of action. The President remarked that it was his idea that the commanders would be not in daily but rather hourly touch with each other.

The President remarked that it was "a rather blunt and not a pleasant remark" to make, but all would no doubt agree that Russia was the only country which at the moment was conducting full scale offensive operations against the enemy. The President remarked that if Germany were defeated, the defeat of Japan would most surely follow, whereas on the other hand the defeat of Japan would not necessarily insure Germany's defeat. The President remarked that accordingly, the United Nations might very soon have to make a decision as to whether or not a second front should be opened on Germany. It was stated that the current protocol with Russia expired on June 30, 1942, and that consideration would have to be given to renewing it. The President remarked that the two major production countries, i.e., the United States and the United Kingdom, would no doubt find it to their advantage to renew these agreements and even "sweeten" them to make them more attractive to the Russians.

At this point the Australian Minister of State for External Affairs (Mr. Evatt), seconded by the New Zealand Minister (Mr. Nash), remarked that in the distribution of war material it was trusted the Pacific Areas would receive "their full share" of such production. The discussion on this point was carried on for some time. The President finally directed Captain McCrea to ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff to prepare a memorandum setting forth the

overall of materials of war "which will be available in the next few months," together with the intended distribution of same. The President further asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare for him a memorandum showing the numbers of aircraft by types that it is now intended will be despatched to Australia for service in that area. In connection with the discussion of the distribution of war materials, it was agreed generally - (1) that the strategic situation would have to govern, and (2) that the plans for distribution would no doubt have to be kept fluid.

The President remarked that the persistent and devastating air attacks on the island of Malta were causing concern and that the liquidation of the defenses of Malta would no doubt mean much to the Germans.

The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Soong) inquired as to the progress that had been made in using gliders. He stated that he had recently been furnished considerable authoritative detailed information and that he had been amazed at their possibilities. The President remarked that our aeronautical services were pushing the development of gliders but that it must be remembered we were all amateurs in regard to them. It was then stated that the Poles had accomplished much in this field and that their services might be helpful.

The Netherlands Minister (Dr. Loudon) stated that his home government had informed him (1) that much resistance was continuing in Java and Sumatra; (2) that the Governor General and his family were now quartered in a cottage at Bandoeng; (3) that Dr. van Mook and a small party were now in Australia but would shortly come to the United States.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942

It was decided that the Pacific War Council would next meet on  
April 14, 1942, at 11:30 A. M.

Subject: Adequacy of the Defenses of the Fiji Islands and  
New Caledonia

*J.L.H.C*

Your inquiry on this subject has generated a review of  
the entire question of the defense of the island bases between  
Hawaii and Australia. This review has been undertaken in a matter  
of urgency, to determine whether additional assets can or should be  
made available, and a PERTNEY report will be made as soon as it is  
completed.

The present defenses of New Caledonia are as follows:

NEW CALEDONIA

- On hand - 2 Infantry Regiments
- 1 Tank Battalion
- 1 Coast Artillery Regiment
- 1 Submarine, plus 1 battery 100 mm. Guns
- 1 100 mm. Howitzer Regiment
- 1 Transport Squadron (25 Planes)
- 8 T.P.S. Mines
- Medical, Quartermaster, signal, etc.

- On route - 1 Infantry Regiment
- 1 100 mm. Howitzer Regiment
- 1 75 mm. Tank Destroyer Battalion

Total Personnel - 14,000

FIJI ISLANDS

- On hand - 2 Infantry Regiments
- 1 Tank Battalion
- 1 Coast Artillery Regiment
- 1 Submarine, plus 1 battery 100 mm. Guns
- 1 100 mm. Howitzer Regiment
- 1 Transport Squadron (25 Planes)
- 8 T.P.S. Mines
- Medical, Quartermaster, signal, etc.

Total Personnel - 14,000

SECRET

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(A)

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Adequacy of the Defenses of the Fiji Islands and  
New Caledonia

Your inquiry on this subject has generated a review of the entire question of the defense of all the island bases between Hawaii and Australia. This review has been undertaken as a matter of urgency, to determine whether additional means can or should be made available, and a further report will be made as soon as it is completed.

The present defenses of New Caledonia and Fiji are as follows:

NEW CALEDONIA

On hand - 2 Infantry Regiments  
1 Tank Battalion  
1 Coast Artillery Regiment  
1 Battalion, plus 1 battery 155 mm. Guns  
1 155 mm. Howitzer Regiment  
1 Pursuit Squadron (25 Planes)  
6 V.P.B. Planes  
Medical, Quartermaster, Signal, etc.

En route - 1 Infantry Regiment  
1 105 mm. Howitzer Regiment  
1 75 mm. Pack Howitzer Battalion  
~~2 Pursuit Squadrons (53 Planes)~~  
~~4 Medium Bombardment Planes~~

Total Personnel - 23,000

FIJI ISLANDS

On hand - a. U. S. Forces

1 Pursuit Squadron (25 Planes)  
Air Warning Service  
Medical, Quartermaster, Signal, etc.

Total Personnel - 608

SECRET

(A)

SECRET

(Memorandum for the President)

April 7, 1942

SECRET

b. New Zealand Forces

8 Infantry Battalions  
2 Field Batteries  
1 Reconnaissance Squadron (12 Planes)  
1 Flying Boat Squadron (12 Obsolescent Patrol  
Bomber Seaplanes)  
6 Coast Defense, 8 Antiaircraft, and 6 Anti-  
tank guns.

Total Personnel - 10,220

En route from U. S.

24 60 mm. Mortars  
4 155 mm. Guns  
2 6" Naval Guns  
12 60" Searchlights

*E. J. King*  
E. J. KING

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

April 9, 1942.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Attached hereto is the copy of  
memorandum for which you asked.

Sincerely yours,

JOHN L. McCREA,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.

*Walter*  
The Hon. ~~Edward W.~~ Nash,  
The New Zealand Minister,  
27 Observatory Circle,  
Washington, D. C.

*B. J. King*  
2/15/42

SECRET

Washington, D. C.  
April 9, 1942.

Received from bearer, one sealed envelope  
showing No. 2494, for delivery to the Hon. ~~Edmund~~ W.  
Nash, the New Zealand Minister.

G. A. Messersmith

Secretary

9. 4. 42

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General arrangements for obtaining intelligence  
from N.E.I.:


The scattered situation of Dutch forces still operating in the Netherlands Indies has made it impossible for the N.E.I. Government to maintain an organized system of intelligence agents. The Dutch lost their last permanent short-wave sending station with the fall of Medan, but radio communication has since been established for short periods between Australia and Netherlands troops in North Sumatra.

We are obtaining information from the N.E.I. Area by interception of enemy radio communications, by piecing together the scraps of combat information which reach Australia, and by intensive naval and long-range aerial reconnaissance which has so far been quite effective. General MacArthur can be expected to take all necessary action to build up an efficient intelligence service, and the War Department has been in communication with him on this subject.

The British are preparing an intelligence organization in India with Dutch cooperation, for service in N.E.I., and agents are being trained in Delhi. Colonel Donovan has also completed plans for subversive activity and espionage work in the Far East including the Netherlands East Indies and has agents training for the purpose, but his organization can not be in effective operation for about three months. Until then we must depend on our present sources of information as indicated in the preceding paragraph.

Dutch representatives in staff setup in Australia:

General MacArthur will have Dutch representatives on his staff. This is provided for in the directive just issued, and it was previously covered by specific instructions from the Chief of Staff.

  
E. J. KING

**SECRET**

(B)

*Pac War Council  
file*

77

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECRET**

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In connection with today's meeting of the Pacific War Council, the following is thought to be of interest:

- (a) The directives to the commanders Southwest Pacific Area and Central Pacific Area are in the process of being implemented.
- (b) General MacArthur will report when ready.
- (c) Vice Admiral Leary has been directed to report to General MacArthur.
- (d) Rear Admiral Ghormley has been ordered to the United States to take command of the South Pacific Force.
- (e) It is recognized that some delay will take place until Rear Admiral Ghormley can report to his new station. Admiral King states, however, that he will continue to handle that area until Rear Admiral Ghormley reports.

Very respectfully,

*John L. McCREA*

JOHN L. McCREA

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE (PWC):

The Canadian Minister telephoned me this date and asked that I inform the President that Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King was due to arrive in Washington about 1:00 p.m., 15 April 1942. The Minister also asked that if agreeable to the President, he would appreciate very much if Mr. Mackenzie King might be permitted to attend a meeting of the Pacific War Council at the suggested time of 3:00 p.m., that date.

I acquainted the President with the Canadian Minister's wishes and he was agreeable to the suggestion. The President directed that I make the necessary arrangements, which has been done.

*J. L. McCREA*

JOHN L. McCREA,  
Captain, U. S. Navy,  
Naval Aide to the President.



AUSTRALIAN LEGATION,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

**SECRET**

5th April 1942.

Dear General Watson:


Following on Dr. Evatt's telephone conversation with you this evening, he has asked me in his absence to forward to you a letter addressed to the President and accompanied by two memoranda. These are accordingly forwarded and Dr. Evatt would be grateful if you could arrange for them to be brought to the notice of the President. As you will observe, the matters raised are of great importance.

Dr. Evatt referred also to the next meeting of the Pacific Council. At the initial meeting of the Council the question of the next meeting was discussed generally and fixed for next Tuesday. As a result, Dr. Evatt has made arrangements to leave Washington on Tuesday afternoon to proceed to Canada to confer with Mr. MacKenzie King and the Canadian War Cabinet. Mr. MacKenzie King is anxious to see Dr. Evatt and a very full and definite programme has been fixed.

Mr. Nash, the New Zealand representative at the Council, informs me that he has made arrangements to leave Washington for New York on Tuesday evening. I take it, therefore, that the meeting will be held on Tuesday.

Dr. Evatt looks forward to receiving advice as early as possible as to the President's wishes regarding consultation on the memoranda forwarded herewith for his consideration.

Faithfully yours,

  
A. W. Smith.

General Edwin Watson,  
Secretary to the President,  
White House,  
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

April 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

The first meeting of the Pacific War Council took place in the Cabinet Room of the Executive Offices, The White House, Washington, D. C., at 11:30 A. M., April 1, 1942.

PRESENT:

The President  
The British Ambassador (Viscount Halifax)  
The Netherlands Minister (Dr. A. Loudon)  
The New Zealand Minister (Hon. Walter Nash)  
The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr. T. V. Soong)  
The Australian Attorney General and Minister of State  
for External Affairs (Hon. H. V. Evatt)  
The Canadian Minister Counselor (Mr. Hume Wrong)  
Mr. Harry Hopkins

After photographs had been taken by representatives of the Press, the President welcomed the members of the council and addressed them substantially as follows:

I suggest that no formal minutes be made of our meetings. I think it better that we keep the meetings as informal as possible. From time to time questions will no doubt arise in your minds as to problems affecting all of our governments generally. You may feel that you want to get certain information in your possession, to me, or request that special meetings of the council be held. In such event, please communicate directly with Captain McCrea, my Naval Aide, and he will take the necessary action.

I think it would be well to discuss the various general theaters of operations made necessary by our war with the Axis powers. When Mr. Churchill was here, we talked much about "areas of command." That term does not tell the whole story. I feel that the term "theaters of responsibility" is a much better way of putting the thought. I have suggested to the Prime Minister, and he has agreed, that the following general division of responsibility will obtain for the various world theaters. Briefly put, the United States assumes responsibility for the Pacific Theater, the limits of which are roughly China and all east of Singapore to the American continents, with the exception of Sumatra. The British assume responsibility for the Middle East and the Indian Ocean Theater. Both the British and the United States assume joint responsibility for the Atlantic Theater.

We have been greatly heartened by the splendid resistance that the Russians have been making to the Germans, and likewise by the resistance that the Chinese have made for  $4\frac{1}{2}$  years to the Japanese. Our thought must be how and where can all of our countries be of assistance. China would be an ideal base of operations for us against Japan. No doubt it will be some time before we can establish ourselves in that area to such an extent as will permit us to undertake an air offensive against Japan. It would be of much help to us, too, if Russia declared war on Japan and then permitted the United States to use Russian territory as a base of operations against the Japanese homeland. If this were to come about we could use the Aleutian Islands as a bridge to Siberia. In any event, I feel that while our efforts are being so largely used in reinforcing the central and southwest

Pacific areas, we will have to look to Canada for assistance in securing Alaska and the Aleutians. I have an idea that Canada can do this without interference with her commitments to the United Kingdom.

At this point Mr. H. Wrong (Canada) remarked that Canada had extensive commitments with the United Kingdom, but that Canada was now raising two mobile divisions for duty on the North American continent, one to be stationed on the west coast and the other on the east coast.

Mr. Soong (China) then remarked that Canada had made commitments to his country to furnish certain supplies of war. Mr. Soong "hoped" that nothing would interfere with these arrangements.

The President at this point remarked that the delivery of materials of war to China was a matter of much concern to all. The President further remarked that Mr. Soong had stated that a fleet of one hundred (100) transport planes could deliver per month from the Indian Ocean ports to China, as much material as was supplied per month over the Burma Road; that we had taken over from our commercial air lines and from the builders about seventy-five (75) such planes. Lord Halifax remarked that he trusted Canada would not undertake any commitments which would interfere with giving assistance to the United Kingdom.

Mr. Evatt remarked that the security of the Australian continent was of first importance to Australians, and that he "hoped" the United States would expeditiously reinforce it at the earliest possible date to such an extent that it can resist any attack by the Japanese.

Mr. Nash remarked that he recognized that New Zealand was somewhat removed from the direct line of communications from the United States to

Australia, but nevertheless the protection of New Zealand was of utmost importance since that Dominion supplied the United Kingdom with 25% of its food.

Both Mr. Evatt and Mr. Nash questioned the adequacy of the Fiji Islands - New Caledonia defenses. The President directed Captain McCrea to ask the Chiefs of Staff for an appreciation of this subject, to be available at the next meeting of the council.

Mr. Loudon (Netherlands) remarked that he trusted the N. E. I., now that they had been lost to the enemy, would not be forgotten.

The President directed that inquiry be made of the Chiefs of Staff if the staff set-up in Australia of General MacArthur made provision for Dutch representation. Mr. Loudon remarked that the Netherlands government would shortly have a balance in this country of \$140,000,000 with which it was desired to purchase destroyers and/or patrol craft which this country could spare.

It was decided that the Pacific War Council would next meet on April 8, 1942, at 11:30 o'clock.

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*April 4, 1942*

*Screen to and approved  
by The President this date*

*J. L. McCrea*

SECRET



FIRST MEMORANDUM

SUBMITTING SUGGESTIONS REGARDING ESTABLISHMENT  
OF MACHINERY FOR THE ALLOCATION OF MUNITIONS.



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
FROM DR. H. V. EVATT, MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, COMMONWEALTH  
OF AUSTRALIA.

In a war which the United Nations are prosecuting over a number of theatres, it is essential that munitions and supplies and the shipping wherewith to transport them should be allocated objectively and impartially, in order to carry out a general strategical plan of defence and offence. Otherwise allocations may be decided according to the strongest pressure of the moment.

2. This can be achieved by pursuing three guiding considerations:

(a) The supreme strategic authority should make objective determinations of the relative importance of the various theatres, i.e. determinations on a tough military basis, and no other consideration should apply.

(b) Munitions should be allocated, according to the strategical determinations, on a theatre basis rather than a governmental basis (Russia, of course, stands in a special position).

(c) The supreme strategic authority should be situated in one place, a war capital of the United Nations. A strong case can be made for Washington in this regard.

3. At present, in the main, munitions allocations are made by assignments to various governments. This is not the most effective method because each government tends to regard its own claims as paramount.

4. Again where allocations have already been made to governments, there is a tendency to regard such arrangements as

final "commitments". There is no room for final commitments (except Russia).

SECRET

5. The general principle which should be applied is plain. Military strategy must be the supreme factor. Such strategy should take account of (a) the relative importance of the various theatres of war throughout the world and also (b) the time factor. In short, even after the relative importance of all the theatres of war has been assessed, those findings must be subject to review.

6. It should be possible to determine from time to time the relative importance of the theatres and allot a munitions percentage quota for each theatre. Despite the difficulties of thus quantifying the relative strategic position of the various theatres, it is essential that the supreme strategic authority determine the matter. If it is left to subordinate munitions or other authorities, there is the danger that they may fix upon figures or percentages which fail to give effect to the supreme strategic authority's determination of the relative importance of the theatres.

7. I apply the foregoing principle to the Pacific theatre of war. That theatre is admittedly important but its relative importance at the present moment has never been assessed. Whatever the Pacific theatre's relative importance, it can and should be assessed in terms which will control the allocations of munitions from the hypothetical common pool of the United Nations. The essential question is what is needed for the theatre as a whole and what percentage of the pool should be allocated to the theatre.

8. What I suggest is -

(1) An immediate assessment of the strategic importance of the various theatres of war. This should be done by the supreme

strategic authority such as the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the assessment should be expressed in terms of percentages.

SECRET

(2) This assessment should control subordinate munitions, shipping and raw materials bodies in allocating the total production in all theatres.

(3) The extent to which munitions and supplies are held in stock or in reserve in any theatre must be taken into account so as to adjust actual and available resources to relative strategic importance.

(4) The importance of the procedure would lie in the making of allocations to theatres, not governments. For instance, under the new directives Admiral King and General Marshall are the executive agencies of the United States Chiefs of Staff for the Pacific theatre of war. They would state their requirements with a full knowledge of the world position and a special knowledge of the Pacific theatre. The result would be an assessment or finding as to relative strategic importance, e.g. 15 per cent.

(5) At the same time, theatres are composed of governments and representatives of the governments within a theatre could provide knowledge on the special needs of the theatre. Thus, General Marshall and Admiral King could be assisted by such representatives as they desired from Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch East Indies or American forces in Australia.

(6) These representatives will give strong help in knitting together the common effort of the United Nations:

(a) They will assure the interested governments that their special needs - e.g. the pressing danger to the South Pacific in the next two months - are communicated to the strategic authority for objective evaluation.

(b) This will prevent irregular pressures which may cause unsound diversions of material and will also prevent disastrous sectional misunderstandings among the Allies.

SECOND MEMORANDUM

COVERING JOINT OPINION OF GENERALS MACARTHUR AND  
BRETT AND THE AUSTRALIAN CHIEFS OF STAFF REGARD-  
ING THE DANGER WHICH THREATENS AUSTRALIA.



COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

TELEGRAM

SECRET

FROM: THE HON. JOHN CURTIN, PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA  
TO: THE HON. DR. H. V. EVATT, MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

No.P.M.21.  
Dated 4th April 1942.

MOST IMMEDIATE: MOST SECRET:

Reference your P.M.S.23, the following appreciation has been furnished by the Australian Chiefs of Staff with General Brett co-opted as representative of General MacArthur:-

BEGINS:

The Japanese having completed the conquest of the Netherlands East Indies and possessing decisive air superiority and effective control of the seas in areas in which they are operating, are in a position to launch attacks in the South West Pacific. Attacks in force against Australia and Australian lines of communication are likely at an early date.

2. The area in Australia vital to continuance of the war effort lies on the East and South East Coast generally between Brisbane and Melbourne. Port Moresby is the key to this area. An attack in force on Port Moresby could develop at any time. (? To any ?) accumulated evidence of the movement of enemy forces in the direction of Rabaul where there is already a formidable concentration. This threat is most serious not only because indications are that an attack is impending, but also because any success would imperil both the lines of communication between Australia and the U.S.A., and the security of the vital area of Australia. Were it not for successful attacks on Japanese in this area, an attack on Port Moresby would have been made before now.

Regraded Unclassified

SECRET

3. Early attacks are also likely on both the following areas:- (a) Darwin: (b) Fremantle.

4. If Darwin were properly defended and bomber aircraft and naval forces based there, attacks could be launched against the enemy in the Netherlands East Indies which might contain the enemy in that area and prevent reinforcements elsewhere and which would prepare the way for an eventual offensive.

5. Fremantle is also open to attack and the risk of sporadic raids by carrier-borne aircraft is a very real.

6. In all the foregoing front line area there are not sufficient forces available to secure their defence, much less to take the offensive which is all important. The requirements of the greatest urgency is for increased naval and air forces to protect these areas.

7. The minimum naval forces required for operations to the North East of Australia is the Anzac squadron reinforced by two task forces which should include two or three aircraft carriers and should be based in the area. A squadron of submarines is also necessary.

8. The first priority requirement of aircraft is for aircraft to equip with modern planes the existing operationally trained R.A.A.F. and United States air Corps units. Taking into account the aircraft already here and known to be en route, the aircraft necessary for this purpose are as follows:-

106	B26	)	
70	B17	)	
99	Hudson	)	676
19	Catalina	)	
187	Vengeance	)	
195	P.40	)	

These figures provide for 25% wastage.

9. Of these ? aircraft ? the most urgently needed are heavy bombers and importance of the immediate supply of these cannot be over-emphasised.

10. With foregoing forces, it should be possible to undertake

initial offensive operations against the enemy bases, particularly Rabaul.

SECRET

11. The foregoing relate merely to immediate requirements but it is necessary to keep constantly in mind the need for combined offensive operation on such a scale as will draw off the Japanese forces that are now available for further attacks.

12. In this connection it is desirable to stress the need for combining the initial offensive operations with the building up of forces that are required to undertake a major offensive and in particular to emphasize the importance of keeping in the forefront of our policy the need for building up an Allied naval force of sufficient strength to challenge the Japanese Fleet at any moment. Such a project should be constantly in our minds whilst the tactical group of which this force will be composed should be continually employed in offensive operations until such time as the moment for concentration arrives.

ENDS.

2. I have discussed it with General MacArthur who is repeating it directly to General Marshall. He is in entire agreement with the appreciation and urges that provision of naval forces as proposed and aircraft indicated are minimum essential for the purposes indicated. You are requested to seek acceptance of these views and early provision of forces and equipment specified.

3. This cable is being repeated to Bruce in London so that he can also support it there.

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON


SECRET

April 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The directives to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz, approved by you on March 31, 1942, have been read and approved by Dr. Evatt for Australia and Mr. Nash for New Zealand. Dr. Evatt undertook to obtain the formal concurrence of his government. Instructions from New Zealand, subsequent to March 25th, while reiterating the opposition of the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff to our subdivision of the Pacific Theater, authorize Mr. Nash to accept the final decision of the U. S. Chiefs of Staff because of the urgent need to prevent further delays. With this understanding, the directives have been transmitted to the two commanders concerned.

Marshall and I are in complete agreement on subdividing the Pacific. We believe that Australia proper and the New Zealand-line of communications area are two strategic entities. The defense of Australia is primarily a land-air problem for which the best possible naval support is a fleet free to maneuver without restrictions imposed by the local situation. New Zealand, on the other hand, is the key point for the support of the Pacific line of communications, the security of which is a naval responsibility. New Zealand has no relation to the defense of Australia in current circumstances.



E. J. KING,  
Admiral, U. S. Navy,  
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
Washington

April 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

ADMIRAL KING

GENERAL ARNOLD

TO NOTE AND LET ME HAVE A

MEMORANDUM

F.D.R.

Y IMMEDIATE

MOST SECRET

Your telegram Number PM5 of March 25th.

New Zealand have repeated to us extensive comments to Nash on the proposal of combined Chiefs of Staff committee for the division of Pacific theatre into a South West Pacific area under General MacArthur and a Southern Pacific area directly under Washington. Chiefs of Staff have considered this proposal and the New Zealand Government's observations and have submitted the following reports:

Begins: Chiefs of Staff are strongly opposed to the proposed subdivision of the Pacific area. We agree with the comments of the Prime Minister of New Zealand and urge the following additional considerations against the proposal. It is essential to Australia that Fiji and New Caledonia should be in the same area as Australia because they are all inter-dependent and from every point of view must be considered together. Australian line of communications with the United States in through New Zealand Fiji and New Caledonia and the most effective and economic use of forces available to defend the whole area depends upon there being united command so that speedy reinforcement of any new points threatened can be effected as necessary: Ends

2. For reasons set out in the above report we are opposed to the proposed division of the Pacific theatre involving the separation of Australia from New Zealand Fiji and New Caledonia. It is desired that you cooperate with Nash on this question.

3. Chiefs of Staff have also furnished the following additional observations which are communicated for your information and for discussion with the combined Chiefs of Staff or Admiral King as appropriate: Begins:

While adhering to the proposals already made by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand for the creating of an Anzac area rather than what is now proposed from Washington, we would prefer that all naval forces in the Pacific should be put directly under the command of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with a view to ensuring the greatest concentration of naval forces at the right place and time. This of course would involve Admiral Glassford's force (comprising U.S. units from ABDA area now based on Fremantle) being placed under the command of Admiral Lowry. Ends.

This message has been repeated to the Prime Minister of New Zealand.