Includes Narrative of Events Leading to War by Admiral Thomas C. Hart and a narrative of the "Escape of Lieutenant Commander Melvyn H. McCoy, USN, from a Japanese Prison Camp in the Philippines.
MEMORANDUM:

At 1145 - Navy Public Relations (Lt-Comdr. McCarthy (ext. 2291)) called to say that Admiral Edwards had just passed to them a list of our losses in the recent action in Philippine Waters. This list includes, in addition to the PRINCETON,

2 CVEs
2 DDs
1 DE

Navy Public Relations requested White House clearance of an immediate communiqué announcing the above enumerated losses.

At Admiral Brown's direction I called Lt-Comdr. McCarthy at 1200 and requested that this communiqué be held up until further word from Admiral Brown. He (Lt-Comdr. McCarthy) informed me at this time that he had received clearance from Admiral Edwards since first calling us at 1145 but that in view of Admiral Brown's request they would hold up the communiqué until they hear further from Admiral Brown.

Respectfully,

W. M. Aitken.

12:20 - Lt-Comdr McCarthy informed that it was OK to release this communiqué.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN.

Subject: Material for President's Speech - Naval Battle off the Philippines.

Enclosure: (A) Narrative.

1. The enclosed information is considered suitable for inclusion in the President's speech.

2. Throughout the account which follows, East longitude dates and times are used. Since there is a 13 hour difference between Washington time and Philippine time, the use of West longitude dates would cause much confusion in following the narrative.

E. King
Admiral, U.S. Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN.

Subject: Material for President's Speech - Naval Battle off the Philippines.

Enclosure: (A) Narrative.

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If

Admiral, U.S. Navy.
NAVAL BATTLE OFF THE PHILIPPINES

1. The naval background for the sea action that has recently been fought off the Philippines in which we have administered a very severe defeat to the Japanese, started definitely on the 10th of October. On that day carrier aircraft of our Third Fleet struck the Japanese base of Okinawa in the Ryuku Islands. Our same forces made sustained attacks upon Formosa on the 12th and 13th, and on the northern and central areas of the Philippines from the 11th to the 21st.

2. This massive series of air attacks by the Third Fleet covering an area of 1000 miles from north to south and 600 miles from east to west, served as cover to the marshalling and approach of the ground forces of the Southwest Pacific Area to Leyte, our troops being embarked in and escorted by the Seventh Fleet. The attacks of the Third Fleet, assisted by units of the Army Air Forces, were highly successful and resulted in the destruction of about 1230 enemy planes in the air or on the ground, in the sinking of 187 ships and small craft and the probable sinking or damaging of 227 more as well as tremendous damage to Japanese ground installations. The enemy reacted heavily and made many air attacks. In spite of his claims to the contrary he did little damage to our forces. Our losses were less than 100 planes plus two cruisers damaged by aircraft torpedoes. Neither of these vessels has sunk.

3. On the 16th the Seventh Fleet arrived off the entrance to Leyte Gulf and disembarked Army troops which seized two small islands. The main landings on Leyte itself began on the 20th. Meanwhile the Seventh Fleet was pursuing its continuing task of giving gun-fire and air support to the Army, sweeping mines, and disembarking troops and supplies.

4. At about this time groups of Japanese warships were sighted covering on the Philippines from the direction of the Asiatic mainland as well as from the Empire. Air and submarine forces made attacks which damaged or sank a few of these vessels.

5. On the 23rd the situation began to crystallize when a powerful force including battleships, cruisers and destroyers was located in the South China Sea just west of the island of Palawan. Another group was located west of Luzon. These forces were attacked, a cruiser was sunk, and two others and a destroyer were damaged and forced into port.

6. Early in the morning of the 24th we had located two groups of heavy ships forcing their way through the Philippine archipelago.
The southern group, in at least two separate units and variously reported as comprising 2 to 4 battleships, 4 to 8 cruisers and 10 destroyers, was in the Sulu Sea west of Mindanao evidently advancing toward Surigao Strait. This strait lies south of Leyte and separates it from Mindanao. The second group, comprising about four battleships, 8 cruisers and a dozen destroyers was in the Sibuyan Sea just east of Mindoro, evidently bound for San Bernardino Strait which lies between Luzon and Samar. These two straits, Surigao and San Bernardino, are the only passages by which it is practicable for fleets to traverse the Philippines and reach Leyte from the westward. It was notable that there were no carriers with either of these forces.

7. In the mid-afternoon of the 24th, carrier planes of the Third Fleet located the enemy's carrier force, comprising 4 or 5 carriers, 2 to 4 battleships and several cruisers and destroyers about 250 miles NE of Luzon. The 3 main elements of the Jap attack were now located.

8. Throughout the afternoon of the 24th both the Surigao and San Bernardino groups were attacked by planes of the Third and Seventh Fleets. Much damage was done to the San Bernardino force and it was forced to turn westward, though this later proved to be only temporary.

9. The Surigao force continued to advance into the strait. About midnight it was met by the surface forces of the Seventh Fleet ranging from PT boats to battleships, and the enemy summarily disposed of. The next morning eight of the enemy ships, types as yet not definitely established, were seen to sink. It is probable that at least one battleship was also sunk in the night action. This force has evidently ceased to exist as an important factor.

10. Throughout the 25th the Third Fleet was fighting a separate but related action with the enemy carrier force 500 miles to the north, east and northeast of Luzon. At about 11 o'clock our carrier planes exploded and sank one of the enemy's largest carriers and damaged two other carriers and a cruiser so badly that they were dead in the water. This enemy force thereafter began a rapid retreat with the Third Fleet in hot pursuit. At about this time a large force of Jap planes attacked the Third Fleet. 150 of them were shot down but they did manage to break through sufficiently to cause the loss of the light carrier PRINCETON and damage to a cruiser and two destroyers. The Third Fleet continued its pursuit of the enemy ships until evening at which time the Japs were delivered into the hands of waiting submarines. During this phase of the battle some at least of the surface forces got into action, and a light carrier and two cruisers were definitely sunk. In addition a large carrier and two battleships were probably sunk. By the morning of the 26th the scattered remnants of this force had fled north to the latitude of Formosa.

11. A third battle developed on the 25th. The enemy force which had apparently been turned back from the western entrance of
San Bernardino Strait on the afternoon of the 24th, evidently reversed its course and slipped through that strait on the night of the 24th-25th. It appeared about 60 miles northeast of Leyte Gulf at 7:30 A.M. on the 25th. This force was repulsed in a gallant fight by the escort carriers and their attendant destroyers and destroyer escorts of the Seventh Fleet assisted by planes from one of the Groups of the Third Fleet. By noon, at least one of the enemy cruisers had been seen to sink, and a battleship, a cruiser, and a destroyer were dead in the water. Another enemy cruiser was seen in a sinking condition. This enemy group then retired north westward, east of Samar, and retransited San Bernardino Strait during the night. One of its crippled cruisers was sunk by surface forces of the Third Fleet near the strait during the night of 25-26 October. In the course of the day enemy shore based aircraft made several attacks. The escort carriers had to fight them off while simultaneously repulsing the enemy surface forces.

12. This enemy attack on Leyte Gulf caused damage to several of our escort carriers, two of which have been reported sunk. There was also loss and damage among our destroyers and destroyer escort vessels.

13. By the morning of the 26th, the situation was generally as follows: The enemy northern, or carrier, group was defeated with heavy loss and had fled out of range to the northward. The center, or San Bernardino Strait group, had retired westward to the vicinity of Mindoro Island. Its remaining four battleships, six cruisers, and ten destroyers were heavily damaged and were still under attack by planes of the Third Fleet. The southern, or Surigao Strait, group was disintegrated completely and only a few units, which were apparently trying to hide in the passages of the numerous islands, remained in existence.

14. The losses inflicted on the enemy in this series of operations are deemed to be as follows:

In the preparatory Kyuku, Formosa, Philippine strikes -

1230 planes destroyed
414 war and merchant ships sunk or damaged.

In the Sea Battles of the Philippines -

3 to 4 battleships sunk or probably sunk, 6 to 8 damaged.
2 carriers sunk, 1 probably sunk.
4 cruisers sunk, 5 probably sunk, numerous damaged
10 destroyers probably sunk.
At least 200 planes shot down.
15. Based on all available reports, our losses in this series of actions were the PRINCETON, two escort carriers, two destroyers and one destroyer escort sunk.

16. The Third Fleet is commanded by Admiral W.F. HALSEY. The Seventh Fleet, which operates under the operational direction of General MacArthur, is commanded by Vice Admiral T.C. KINKAID. The Seventh Fleet includes ships of the Australian Navy.
The Third Fleet assisted by the Army Air Forces destroyed 1,230 enemy planes.

We lost fewer than 100 planes.

Only two of our ships were damaged and none were sunk.

In the great sea battles which began on the twenty-third of October, the Third Fleet and the Seventh Fleet inflicted the following losses on the Japanese:

3 to 4 battleships sunk or probably sunk
2 carriers sunk, one probably sunk
4 cruisers sunk, 5 probably sunk
10 destroyers probably sunk
6 to 8 battleships damaged
Numerous cruisers damaged

At least 200 enemy planes were shot down.

We lost only one light carrier (the PRINCETON) two escort carriers, two destroyers and one destroyer escort. A few of our ships were damaged, but we do not yet know how severely.
I would like to summarize the results of the great Naval and Air victories we have won in returning to the Philippines.

On the tenth of October the Third Fleet began a massive series of air attacks over an area of 1,000 miles from north to south and 600 miles from east to west.

The Third Fleet assisted by the Army Air Forces destroyed 1,230 enemy planes.

We lost fewer than 100 planes.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MR. ELMER DAVIS.

Admiral Brown authorized me to send you this copy of a statement you are interested in. At the same time the Admiral asked me to tell you that, under no circumstances must this be released until it and the other announcements are given to the Press by the White House. In the meantime it is requested that it be kept TOP SECRET.

Very respectfully,

W. M. Rigdon,
Lieutenant(jg), USN.,
Office of the Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY EARLY:

Subject: Press Releases in Reference to MacArthur Landing in the Philippines This Date.

1. The President has directed that copies of the following messages be delivered to you the moment we receive authentic information that MacArthur has landed in the Philippines:

   (a) A message of congratulations from the President to MacArthur.
   (b) A message of congratulations from the President to Nimitz and Halsey.
   (c) A message to MacArthur for delivery to President Osanna as a message for the Filipine people from President Roosevelt.
   (d) A press release - message from the President to the people of the United States announcing the return of our armed forces to Philippine territory.

2. While the President has stated that he wishes enclosure (d) to be given to the press, it is my understanding that copies of the other messages are given to you to be used or not used at your discretion. I rather think the President would like them all released unless you think we are over-doing it.

WILSON BROWN.
SECRET

7 March 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

Further reference is made to your letter of February 23, 1944, relative to the assistance requested by the governor of Iloilo, Tomas Confesor.

The submarine Nautilus is being ordered to report to General MacArthur for the employment suggested.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

President Manuel L. Quezon,
Nautilus Hospital,
Miami Beach, Florida.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Employment of USS NAUTILUS.

Reference: (a) My memorandum of 3 March 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Draft of letter to President Manuel L. Quezon.

1. Reference (a) advised President Quezon that he would be notified when a decision was reached relative to the employment of USS NAUTILUS.

2. Enclosure (A), informing him of the decision in the premises, is submitted herewith.

E. J. King
Ex. J. King.
3 March 1944.

My dear Mr. President,

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 23, 1944, relative to the appeal for assistance you received from the governor of Iloilo, Tomas Confessor.

Governor Confessor's refusal to surrender to the Japanese has gained for him the admiration and respect of all who are aware of the distressing situation in which he has been placed. I agree with you that his letter to Mr. Caram, holding that adherence to the high principles involved is dearer than life itself, is a remarkable document, and I am sure that it reflects the views of the Filipino people.

I shall be grateful to you if you will transmit to Governor Confessor our appreciation of his loyalty and of his devotion to the cause for which we are fighting. You may say to him, also, that we are confident that he will be able to continue his successful resistance until the military situation is sufficiently advanced to permit not only his rescue but the liberation of the entire Philippine Commonwealth. Both you and he may rest assured that although it is not possible to predict the exact date, the destruction of the Japanese Empire is certain.

The advisability of employing the submarine Nautilus as suggested in your letter is being taken up with General MacArthur. As soon as a decision is reached you will be notified.

With all good wishes for the success of your efforts, and with highest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

President Manuel L. Quezon,
Nautilus Hospital,
Miami Beach, Florida.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Employment of U.S.S. NAUTILUS.

1. A draft of a reply to President Quezon's letter of February 23, 1944, is submitted herewith.

2. General Marshall concurs in the proposed reply.

E. J. KINLE

3 March 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Philippine bases, subsequent to granting independence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been advised that in the course of discussions regarding the pending Joint Resolutions advancing the date of Philippine Independence, President Quezon has expressed the opinion that the United States should now stipulate what bases will be required in the Philippine Islands after their independence has been granted.

We have given careful consideration to the practicability of specifying at this time the various base facilities that will be required for the full and mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States. We find that while sites for certain installations could now be selected with some assurance, it is quite impracticable to compile at this time any definitive list in final form. Indeed we feel that we must provide for continuing review and adjustment of our military and naval requirements in the Philippines in the light of the changing strategic situation and the development of the means of waging war in the future. We believe the wording of the pending Joint Resolutions vests discretionary authority in the President of the United States to withhold or acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases and the rights incident thereto as he may deem necessary.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
A16-3

UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

Serial 0264

Melbourne, Australia,
June 19, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT TO:
CO QUAIL Conf. Ltr.
A16-3 of June 16, 1942.

From: The Commander U.S. Naval Forces,
Southwest Pacific Area.

To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.

Subject: Surrender of Corregidor — Scuttling of the
U.S.S. QUAIL — Escape of sixteen men and two
officers, account of the trip in a 36 foot
motor launch from Corregidor to Darwin,
Australia, narrative report of.

1. Forwarded.

J. CARY JONES,
Chief of Staff.

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Regraded Unclassified
(y) Coffee was boiled in an ordinary bucket, the bottom of which fit into the improvised stove. In accordance with U. S. Navy custom, coffee was boiled and consumed at all hours of the daylight except in the very roughest weather.

(z) List of officers and crew of boat is as follows:

Lieutenant Commander John H. Morrill, U. S. Navy (2270).
STEELLE, James Howard, 376 61 67, C.M.M. (AA), U.S.N.
WEINMANN, Charles Ernest, 371 67 67, C.M.M. (AA), U.S.N.
CUCINELLO, Nicholas George, 228 28 71, C.W.T. (AA), U.S.N.
HEAD, George William, 278 97 86, C.Ph.M. (AA), U.S.N.
BINKLEY, Philip Martin, 341 98 83, S.M.1c, U.S.N.
RICHARDSON, Bruce Roland, 321 25 68, M.M.1c, U.S.N.
STRINGER, John Samuel, 381 20 15, M.M.1c, U.S.N.
SWISHER, Glenn Arthur, 316 47 47, M.M.1c, U.S.N.
MEKKER, Jack Forest Jr., 381 18 37, W.T.1c, U.S.N.
WOLSLEGEL, Edward Stanley, 234 09 53, W.T.1c, U.S.N.
HALEY, Harold, 310 93 49, B.M.2c, U.S.N.
CLARKE, Ralph William, 393 27 66, G.M.2c, U.S.N.
NEWQUIST, Ralph Waldo, 342 14 59, G.M.2c, U.S.N.
WATKINS, Earl Bevlin, 287 33 90, E.M.2c, U.S.N.
RANKIN, Raid Ormay, 346 76 66 Cox., U.S.N.
BERCIER, Lyle Joseph, 328 71 67, G.M.3c, U.S.N.

J. H. MORRILL

CONFIDENTIAL
(n) A plentiful supply of medical materials were carried in boat and pharmacist's mate frequently treated natives, effecting good-will thereby.

(o) The following arms were carried in the boat: Four automatic rifles, six rifles, eleven pistols - adequate ammunition for each type.

(p) About $600, part U. S. and part Philippine currency, was carried by the party, belonging to individuals but pooled together.

(q) Most beaches were inaccessible for landing at low water. Usual practice was to beach bow of boat on the flood tide with stern anchor out to provide for a quick getaway.

(r) Throughout the Indies and the Philippines, Fortune Island light was the only lighthouse sighted in operation.

(s) Camouflaging boat with green tree branches was effective but boughs had to be carefully tied to side of boat to prevent tide water from washing them away and revealing the lines of the hull. At close distances, however, boat shape could be discerned.

(t) The range of the tide in the Dutch East Indies is great and boats of considerable size - 50 tons - can be landed over the reefs and beached at high water.

(u) So far as is known, the part was not sighted and recognized by the enemy at any time on the journey.

(v) No fishermen were present in the party. Many attempts were made but no fish were caught.

(w) Except for rice, the natives appeared to have sufficient food, both in the Philippines and the Indies. In the Philippines, it was reported that the natives had, on a wide scale, deliberately abstained from planting rice in order to embarrass the enemy.

(x) The men constructed a stove out of a five-gallon lubricating oil can and used this stove on the boat underway to cook rice and boil coffee. Wood from ashore was broken up into short lengths and carried aboard for this stove.

C-0-F-Y
of prevailing winds and 4 to 5 degrees of compass course were allowed for them on the two long legs of the journey. Magnetic compass was checked with Polaris on various headings as long as that star was available.

(a) Eight boxes of emergency rations were loaded in boat at Corregidor - later augmented by purchases of canned goods ashore.

(f) Diet consisted of sardines, corned beef, vienna sausages, rice, tinned tomatoes - fresh fruits, when obtained ashore, consisting of coconuts, papayas, bananas (the favorite of all the food). Large quantities of coffee, some sugar and canned milk were also purchased ashore.

(g) Eight 5-gallon water breakers were carried. Later, as diesel drums were emptied, they were burned out and filled with fresh water. As much as 150 gallons of water was carried in the boat and used for cooking rice, coffee, etc.

(h) Lookouts were constantly posted, one in bow, one in stern, of boat underway. Engineer and coxswain (one officer) also assisted in lookout duty. In the most dangerous parts of the trip, two additional lookouts were posted, providing four quadrant coverage. Ashore, lookouts were posted on hills, points of land, etc. All lookouts were skilled from many months of the same duty and were believed to be superior to enemy lookouts.

(i) No radio was carried in boat.

(j) Cook was MEEKER, J.P., WTlc. U.S.N.

(k) Starter battery was watered with ship's distilled water saved and set aside in one breaker.

(l) Doubtful water was sterilized by pharmacist's mate using iodine drops (no dysentery - no serious sickness of any kind during trip. Men gained weight and strength during trip.)

(m) No bedding was carried. Landing force ponchos were used for bedding and cover, augmented by a few blankets, coats, etc., taken from the tug RANGER. During their first stop ashore of two days, men slept in a rocky gully on sharp jagged rocks in complete relaxation, due to their previous exhaustion at the Corregidor siege.
CONFIDENTIAL

which there was none present at the net, we proceeded around
the western end of the net through a gap, about 100 yards wide,
between the net and a shoal, and which showed sixteen feet of
water by soundings (tide almost low water). Proceeding on
into the harbor, we were not challenged nor our presence
apparently noted until we stopped just off the dock at the
control station in the inner harbor.

34. On arrival, we reported to the U. S. Army
authorities present in the area and were well taken care of
by the commanding officer of the 49th Pursuit Group.

35. The following is submitted as statistical and
possibly human interest information:

(a) Boat: 36 foot Navy motor launch - diesel engine.
Boat survived trip in excellent condition.

(b) Total mileage of route taken: 2000 miles even.
Average speed: 5 knots (estimated)
Total diesel oil consumed: 495 gallons.
Miles per gallon: 4.04.
Total lubricating oil used: 20 gallons.
Mechanical difficulties with engine: None.
(Engine was out of adjustment before start of trip but,
once overhauled, ran perfectly. Starter battery ran
down once.)

(c) Nine drums of diesel oil were carried at start
of trip and two were purchased later. Boat was over-
loaded during early stages of journey but, by time open
sea was reached, was in good trim.

(d) No sextant was carried in boat as none was
available. Good charts of Philippine area were used
but only one "large-scale small-area" chart of East
Indies and Australia was obtained. One large personal
watch, owned by one of the men, was used for navigation.
This watch kept excellent time. Parallel rules and
dividers were carried. One of the men constructed an
improvised sextant. Latitude was obtained at noon.
Longitude was checked with sunrise, sunset, moonrise
and moonset. A nautical almanac was obtained, but no
Bowditch or other navigational books were available.
Celestial navigation provided only the roughest of
checks. Ocean currents were estimated from strength

-12-
30. At Taam, we beached our boat and inserted a new stern bearing on the propeller shaft, which our engineer had whittled out of some hard driftwood which he had found. The natives at Taam were somewhat antagonistic, but caused no real trouble. It is believed, however, that their attitude was not the result of the war but, rather, because of Taam being a center of Mohammedanism. They were vehement in expressing their desire to have us leave at the earliest possible moment, and were obnoxious in many small petty ways. The natives of Taam also indicated the same six weeks period since sighting Japanese ships or planes. At Taam, as elsewhere in the East Indies islands we visited, the Japanese had never landed. They had only seen their ships at a distance or planes overhead.

31. We left Taam on the morning of May 30th and again took refuge from heavy weather behind the island of Molu (also spelled Moloe) on the morning of May 31st. At Molu, the natives appeared to be of a different race, being lighter and more nearly like Filipinos. The natives were more friendly at Molu than in any other Dutch island we visited. While we didn't inform them we were Americans, they seemed to know it and to be well disposed toward the Allied cause. They did not run up a white flag. Again, the natives told us they had never encountered any Japanese and had not seen any Japanese planes or ships for about the same period of six weeks. At Molu, the natives said they thought there had been Japanese on the island of Yamdena (Jamdena) but that they were no longer there. One native said he intended to go to Darwin soon on a native trading vessel, but we suspected this was merely an effort to "draw us out" as to our intentions.

32. As the weather abated somewhat, we left Molu early the morning of June 2nd, proceeded eastward between Mordate and Larat, and thence south, heading for Melville Island, Australia. En route, the weather was very rough and uncomfortable for a small boat. On the evening of June 4th, we made our landfall on the north coast of Melville Island and proceeded through the Straits of Apali, stopping at the two Catholic missions en route, where we were very well received and pleased to receive our first reliable reports of world events.

33. Leaving Melville on the night of June 5th, we arrived off Darwin about 0900, June 6th. There, we perceived an anti-submarine net across the harbor. After waiting some minutes for a challenge or instructions from harbor craft, of
Leaving the Jeff Family group the night of May 24th, we headed southwestward for Pisang Island, and thence south to a small uninhabited island just north of Ticor. Here, we had difficulty with our starter battery due to a ground in the lighting system to the magnetic compass. Numerous unsuccessful attempts were made to start the diesel engine by cranking. We then laid overnight in a rather exposed anchorage, with a heavy sea running, and made preparations to use the sails in the morning. This was a discouraging prospect, as the prevailing wind of south-southeast would probably permit no better destination than Portuguese Timor and our heavy boat was without center board and was, at the best, a poor sailboat. However, in the morning, one of the crew members devised a "tackle-leverage" system whereby we were able to crank the engine with its propeller shaft and to start the engine. We then moved over to Ticor and landed at that place on May 27th.

At Ticor, there was one native who could speak English, and we obtained more fresh water and provisions by means of barter (natives of Dutch East Indies would not accept American or Philippine currency). At Ticor, the natives reported that they had not seen any Japanese ships or aircraft for about six weeks. Leaving Ticor, the night of May 27th, we proceeded southward in heavy weather and took refuge behind the island of Kur (Keor on some charts) on the morning of May 28th.

At Kur, the natives hoisted white flags on our approach, as they had also at Sajafi and Ticor. There was, also, one native "lugger" of about fifty foot length in the harbor, which first hoisted a white flag and then hoisted a Japanese flag, and finally hauled down their Japanese flag when they saw we were white men. With the arms we had, we felt capable of coping with the "lugger" but did not actually find any Japanese aboard, the crew being natives. At Kur, we encountered a school teacher who could speak good English and who told us that the entire island of New Guinea, the islands of New Zealand and Tasmania, were all occupied by the Japanese, and that he had heard it over his radio about two weeks previously.

Leaving Kur the afternoon of May 28th, we proceeded southward, still encountering heavy weather, and took refuge that night behind the island of Fado (also spelled Fadol). There, the natives were slightly more friendly than in the previous East Indies islands, and gave us quantities of water and coconuts. They also indicated the same six weeks period since sighting Japanese ships or planes. As our stern tube bearing needed renewal, and as there was no beach available for repairs at Fado, we proceeded on the morning of May 29th to the island of Tasm, a short distance away.
not starving but they were definitely short of food. The natives were, however, planting extensively and, in a short time, would have food. In spite of their lack of food and fresh water, they gave us some of each of what little they had. They also gave us lumber which we used for decking over the forward part of the boat to make it more seaworthy in heavy weather. No Japanese had ever been in Port Lamon but were reported to be in the city of Surigao in considerable numbers. We had intended to stay over at Port Lamon for another day to complete our decking work, but about 2200, the night of May 18th, a native came running down to the boat, informing us that the "Japs" were entering the harbor in power boats and that their families had taken to the hills. We listened, and observed that approximately six of the same type patrol boats we had seen near Fortune Island passed close by, but departed to the southward along the coast.

23. About 2300, we left Port Lamon. As we were leaving the harbor, some natives came swimming out to the boat with another drum of diesel oil, which they had promised previously. They did this in spite of their obvious great fear of the Japanese. We then headed eastward, proceeding 100 miles, to clear any possible air or sea patrol lanes. On May 19th, we set a southerly course for the island of Morotai in the Halmabera group, where we arrived on the morning of May 22nd, off the northeast tip. En route, we had arranged to cross the possible air lane route between Palew and Mindanao at night. No planes or ships were sighted during this passage.

24. On May 22nd, we attempted to land at the small village of Bari Beri on Morotai but, as we approached the beach, we observed a small launch flying the Japanese merchant flag, so we changed our course and proceeded southward, arriving at the small island of Sajafi the morning of the 23rd. At Sajafi, we obtained quantities of fresh provisions and fresh water from the natives, bartering articles of clothing and using the sign language. The natives there, as elsewhere in the East Indies islands where we stopped, were indifferent, favoring neither one side nor the other. They didn't refuse to trade, but in every case, in some way, they would make it evident they wished we would depart as soon as possible. They knew where there was a war going on, and our presence embarrassed the, but in no case did they cause any trouble. They also made it understood that no Japanese vessels or aircraft had been sighted for some time.

25. Leaving Sajafi, the night of May 23rd, we headed southeastward, passing northward of Gag Island and then south to a small uninhabited island of the Jeff Family group. Between Gag Island and the Jeff group, we sighted to the eastward two power-driven launches flying no flag, which we consequently did not identify.
days of May 14th, we passed around the southwestward end of Masbate Island, and arrived off the northern end of Cebu the morning of the 15th. No enemy planes or ships had been sighted since the Verde Island passage. As we left Cebu, continuing eastward, we passed one Japanese tanker, flying their merchant flag and heading southward between Cebu and Leyte. We passed the tanker about 3000 yards in broad daylight, but we kept our personnel below the gunwales of the boat and the encounter passed without incident. About 1300, May 15th, we landed at Tabango on the northwest coast of Leyte. There, we encountered more friendly natives and purchased some canned goods from a Chinese store. We also purchased a drum of diesel oil and ten gallons of lubricating oil. At Tabango, the natives reported that small detachments of Japanese soldiers were billeted on the north shore of Cebu Island. They also said there were small enemy garrisons at Tacloban, Leyte, and at Catbalogan, Samar, in both which places Fil-American troops were then in the process of turning themselves in, in accordance with the surrender terms. They also reported that Governor Vinzon still continued to lead guerilla troops in the Camarines provinces and had not surrendered with the other forces. We were also informed that the San Bernardino Straits were closely guarded by ships and patrol vessels. No Japanese had ever been in Tabango.

21. The word of our arrival in Leyte spread quickly and we left hurriedly the night of May 15th, just as a small fast unidentified power boat entered Tabango Bay. We proceeded southward through the Camotes Sea and continued on, the day of the 16th. Rounding the southern tip of Leyte, we continued on eastward through the Surigao Strait, using the south passage, south of Binecat Island. No ships or planes were sighted in this area. No mines were sighted in the straits, but our shallow draft would undoubtedly allow us to pass over them and we assumed the straits to be mined due to the absence of patrol vessels. Continuing on south, along the east coast of Mindanao, we arrived at a small un-named cove in the vicinity of Tandag on the morning of May 17th. We landed our boat inside the cove in a very concealed spot as the cove bends around in such a way as to cut off visibility from the sea. There, we obtained fresh water and a few more fresh provisions from the natives. No Japanese were reported in this area.

22. Leaving the cove the night of May 17th, we ran into heavy weather and rain squalls and landed the next morning at Port Lamon. There, we found that the docks and the lumber camp at that place had been demolished by a severe typhoon on the 16th of April. Their radio transmitting and receiving station was intact, but not in operation. The natives at that place were
Confidential

we made some headway and passed the line, only to have the boat engine break down, and we drifted back through the line again. The engine was soon repaired, however, by working under a canvas hood with a flashlight, and we re-passed the line. In the meantime, we had sighted and identified the following craft, anchored or moored at the southwest end of Malacakan, one enemy tanker and one large auxiliary vessel. A little to the eastward, there were two enemy destroyers, and at the eastern end of the island there were two very large submarines. Proceeding on, we passed to the westward and then the northward of Verde Island. Anchored at the southwest end of Verde Island, there was another vessel, not clearly made out, about the size of a destroyer. Looking astern and to north of Malacaban, there appeared to be other vessels. As we passed between Verde Island and the Luzon mainland, two lights on the shores, one on Verde Island and one on Luzon, followed our progress, keeping us exactly between them, as though there were a sound detection device in that passage. We passed beyond them without further incident, however, and rounded the point, and reached the small barrio of Digas by daylight, the 10th of May.

At Digas, the friendly natives gave us some (and sold us some) very valuable supplies such as rice and fresh fruit. They also cut and fashioned bamboo mess gear for us, as we had none. No Japanese had ever been in Digas, but small garrisons of six men or so were reported to be stationed at nearby inland towns. Leaving Digas the night of May 10th, we arrived near the barrio of Bondoc in the Bondoc Peninsula, the morning of May 11th. At that place, the natives were also very friendly although that province (Tayabas) was formerly the center of the Sakdalista area. According to the natives, few, if any, of the Sakdalista members are now pro-Japanese, and all the known pro-Japanese Filipinos have been killed by patriotic natives. No Japanese had ever been in Bondoc although it was reported there were small groups in the towns north of Bondoc and particularly at Lucena.

We remained two days at Bondoc and thoroughly overhauled our boat engine. On May 12th, a Filipino trading banca came in with a copy of a Japanese controlled Manila newspaper, which informed us that by the terms of General Wainwright’s surrender, all the forces in the Philippines, including Mindanao, had been ordered to surrender. We accordingly, at that time, started preparing ourselves for continuing our journey on to Australia. The natives made a bamboo mast and boom for us, gave us cordage, etc.

The night of May 13th, we left Bondoc, heading southward through the Sibuyan Sea. Continuing on, during the

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marker buoy in Hamilo Cove. The morning of the 8th, five more patrol boats made the trip to Corregidor and returned southward about 1300. Japanese ships made no effort to use Manila Bay as far as we could see from our hiding place in Hamilo Cove. About 1900, one destroyer entered Looc Cove and anchored, but none entered our cove and, at 2000, we departed on a southerly course along the coast. As we passed Looc Cove, we sighted the outlines of three enemy destroyers in formation abeam on a southerly course to seaward of us. These destroyers might have been running a sound screen as there was much signalling with blinker guns between them. Shortly afterwards, we sighted another destroyer entering a cove south of Looc Cove and also sighted numerous patrol boats, possibly nine, to the southward. Three of the patrol boats appeared to be patrolling between Fortune Island and Nasugbu. We then changed course to the westward to pass outside of Fortune Island, the three sound screen destroyers having in the meantime passed on to the southward. On reaching a position north of Fortune Island, we headed south and approached Fortune Island cautiously. Three more patrol boats were sighted between Fortune Island and the Lubang group, but were somewhat wider spaced. Watching for the opportunity we slipped between Fortune Island and the inner patrol boat just after it had turned away from the island on its patrol.

16. Continuing southeastward from Fortune Island without further contacts, we arrived off the southwest coast of Luzon at daybreak and anchored just outside the reef as we were unable to approach the shore at that point because of the reef. During the day, we re-painted the boat black, took off the taffrail, and otherwise tried to disguise it as best we could. Ships' masts near the Lubang group of islands were sighted during the day, but none approached our area. Six enemy medium bombers were sighted leaving Manila, heading southwestward, about 1300.

17. At 2000, the night of the 9th of May, we proceeded southward, and then eastward, through the Verde Island passage. As we approached Malacaban Island, there appeared to be suspicious objects to the north of it, so we passed to the southward about midway between Malacaban and Mindoro. There, we also encountered difficulty as there were two lines of patrol boats—one line between the southwest end of Malacaban and Mindoro, the other between the southeast end of Malacaban and Mindoro. The night was very dark and we passed between the patrol boats of the first line without difficulty, but when we reached a position midway between the boats of the second line, we experienced a strong current, and remained in that relative position for nearly three and one-half hours. Finally,
CONFIDENTIAL

we sighted two Japanese destroyers to seaward about one mile, patrolling on north-south courses between Fortune Island and Olongapo, and another destroyer and a patrol boat blocking our path to the southward. We accordingly turned in at Hamilo Cove, intending to take refuge until such time as the patrol was relaxed. We landed our boat on a beach in the cove with a stern anchor out, and proceeded to camouflage it with green tree branches.

13. About 0700, May 7th, while we were still at work camouflaging the boat, two enemy seaplanes flew over the coast line, one passing directly over us at about 500 foot altitude. These planes apparently did not sight us as they did not circle or inspect the area. During the day, the enemy continued the patrol between Fortune Island and Olongapo, using two destroyers (modern type) and a minesweeper (new type with general appearance of destroyer except the after deck was flat and cleared except for a reel which looked to be a magnetic cable reel. Vessel had two antiaircraft guns, one forward, one aft, with splinter shields, and apparently splinter shields on bridge - one stack - typical Japanese foremast and stern.) During the day, this minesweeper led a column of sixteen patrol boats of about 150 tons each, diesel powered (very loud exhaust heard even at three miles), and with general appearance of small inter-island cargo ships. This group proceeded north in the morning and returned in the afternoon, heavily laden with personnel, seen from a distance as standing up and closely packed together. It is probable these were prisoners from Corregidor bound for Fortune Island. Estimated at 150 men per ship, the total would be about 2400 men.

14. At about 1900, in the evening twilight as we were preparing to leave the cove, a Japanese destroyer entered Hamilo Cover and anchored a few hundred yards from our boat. I entering the cove, the destroyer's guns were trained in (during day, guns were continuously trained to the sky) and rangefinder secured, crew were at muster quarters on deck, and lookouts were apparently very poor as we had ascertained for ourselves that from similar short distances the outline of our boat was clearly visible. Throughout the night, we stood ready with rifles and automatic rifles, but the destroyer did not sight us and left the cove shortly after dawn.

15. During daylight on the 8th of May, the enemy continued their patrol, and we were able to estimate that their destroyers remain underway during daylight hours and that every other night each destroyer has a night off and anchors in one of the coves along the coast - Hamilo, Looc, etc. The Japanese had erected a system of range markers ashore and an anchorage
charts, etc. from this tug (the RANGER). Diesel oil in drums was obtained from several other ship's boats in the vicinity to a total of 450 gallons. (It had been practice for each ship's boat to carry several drums of diesel oil in case the ships were sunk and there were a number of ship's boats anchored singly and spread out over the harbor.) Our plan at that time was to proceed to Mindanao to contact our U. S. Army forces at that place. We did not scuttle the tug RANGER as we thought its commanding officer and crew intended to return from Fort Hughes to it and effect an escape themselves. Later events prevented this, however, and it is probable that this tug is in enemy hands.

10. At nightfall, we proceeded to Fort Hughes to pick up the remainder of our crew at that place. It appeared hopeless to attempt to rescue those on Corregidor. There was some delay in locating and collecting the members of the crew at Fort Hughes, and it was carefully explained to each man that if caught they would undoubtedly be shot by the enemy and that the enemy had a very close picket line cordon of patrol boats and destroyers around the bay. Six men and two officers, while they did not refuse to come with us, appeared so shaken mentally and exhausted physically that it was considered unwise to take them and were left at Fort Hughes. The remaining sixteen and the same officer previously mentioned (Gunner Taylor) were enthusiastically desirous of making the attempt and, at 2215, May 6th, we departed on the journey, intending if possible to proceed to Mindanao to join our U. S. Army forces at that place.

11. At 2230, while we were leaving the bay, the enemy laid down a full barrage on Caballo Island (Fort Hughes) similar to the one laid down on Corregidor the previous night. At 2330, they fired a green rocket and the barrage ceased. It is believed that enemy troops landed on Caballo at that time and completed the investment of that place. It is known that many casualties resulted from enemy fire during the day while the white flags were flying, and it is believed that many more resulted when the enemy armed ground troops attacked our own disarmed forces. Throughout the night, the next day, May 7th, and until noon, May 8th, the enemy continued artillery fire and bombing attacks on the forts, as we were able to discern from our hiding place in Hamilo Cove only five miles away. In the enemy controlled newspaper account which we obtained about a week later, they mention the 8th of May as the official date of surrender, but the fact is that fire was continued for a full forty-eight hours after the actual surrender.

12. On leaving Manila Bay, we continued on down the coast at a very slow speed (about three knots) due to our heavily laden boat. About 0100, May 7th, the moon came up, and
Only one gun at Fort Hughes remained in action, and this gun (mortar) was being used to fire on the ridge at Monkey Point (Corregidor) until about 0900 when orders from Corregidor were received for it to cease fire. At daylight, heavy and dive bombers also attacked Fort Hughes but could not add much to the heavy artillery fire. About 1030, May 6th, orders were received by landwire from headquarters (Corregidor) to destroy the contents of all safes. About 1100, May 6th, orders were received from the Commandant to scuttle all ships. This order applied to the U.S.S. QUAIL and possibly to the U.S.S. LUZON and U.S.S. OAHU, the latter two vessels having been previously completely wrecked by shell fire and were then in a slowly sinking condition with their crews ashore at Fort Hughes. Immediately after receipt of this message from the Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, all further communication with those officers was lost. At this time, it was also reported to the Colonel commanding Fort Hughes that white flags had been hoisted on Melinta Hill (Corregidor), followed shortly thereafter by white flags on Fort Frank (Carabou) and Fort Drum (Fraile). Fort Hughes, however, did not immediately follow suit.

7. About 1115, May 6th, the scuttling party, consisting of the commanding officer, gunnery officer and four enlisted men of the engineer force, left Fort Hughes to embark in their boat at the Fort Hughes dock. The ship's boat had, however, been sunk in the meantime by a shell so the party was forced to swim out to another boat anchored about 200 yards off shore. Reaching the boat safely, they proceeded to the U.S.S. QUAIL under dive bomber strafing and machine gun fire from the Corregidor shore. Fortunately, they were not hit and succeeded in scuttling the ship. On their return, they noted that Fort Hughes had also hoisted the white flag and that enemy troops surrounded Melinta Hill on Corregidor. They accordingly took refuge on a small deserted tug boat near the Caballo shore and remained there in hiding for the rest of the daylight hours.

8. Throughout the afternoon of May 6th, the enemy continued his artillery fire, heavy bombing and dive bombing attacks on the forts, and time and again the white flags were shot or bombed down and were replaced. The enemy appeared to have withdrawn his ground troops to the Monkey Point (Corregidor) area, which allowed his artillery to continue to pound the spots where our own remaining troops were taking refuge. By this time, our soldiers and sailors at Fort Hughes (and it is presumed elsewhere) had spiked their heavy guns and had been ordered to throw their small arms over the cliff into the water, and hence were without means of resisting. Even the men's pocket knives had been taken from them.

9. While in refuge on the rug, we made our plans for departure and obtained fire arms, ammunition, food, clothing,
3. About 2030, the night of May 5th, the enemy opened up their full barrage with all guns, estimated to be between 150-300 artillery pieces, possibly more. As seen from the U.S.S. QUAIL in South Harbor, this barrage completely covered the island of Corregidor proper and the entire island appeared as one vast sheet of flame. Landslides were caused on the slopes of the hills, and it is believed the beach defense forces were obliterated. Dust clouds arose which reached the proportions of heavy fog and island defense search-lights were rendered useless, appearing only as yellow spots in the dust fog. Two small patrol boats, the U.S.S. PERRY and U.S.S. MARY ANN, were stationed in Manila Bay offshore but reported by radio that they were unable to estimate the situation due to low visibility and confusion of fire. The U.S.S. QUAIL was standing by on voice radio orders but no orders were received as it is probable that, at the time, the place of the enemy landing was not known at Army headquarters. It is known, however, that the landing was on the north side of the island as no enemy forces came through South Harbor were the U.S.S. QUAIL was stationed.

4. About 2330, May 5th, the enemy fired a green rocket and the artillery fire ceased, followed by comparative quiet broken by only sporadic machine gun fire in the vicinity of "Melinta Hill", beneath which were located the Army and Navy tunnels which contained the respective headquarters. This machine gun fire increased somewhat and about 0200, May 6th, the enemy fired a white rocket and their artillery concentrated heavy fire on Melinta Hill for about one-half hour, at the end of which they fired two green rockets and that artillery fire ceased, and there remained only light machine gun and rifle fire at scattered places throughout the island area.

5. About 0430, May 6th, a message was received from the Commandant to move the personnel aboard the U.S.S. QUAIL (one-third the crew) ashore. These men and four officers accordingly proceeded to Fort Hughes (Caballo Island) and manned the final defense line of that fort and also were put to work repairing shelter barricades.

6. On arrival at Fort Hughes, it was apparent that the fort was in the final stages before collapse. Mortar pit walls, tunnel and other shelter barricades were crumbling and the enemy artillery shells were landing in the mortar pits and killing men even in the shelter spots. Casualties were heavy and their sick bay was overflowing and, even in their sick bay, shell fragments entered and injured the doctors and attendants.
From: The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. QUAIL.
To: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
Via: The Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.

Subject: Surrender of Corregidor - Scuttling of the U.S.S. QUAIL - Escape of sixteen men and two officers, account of the trip in a 36 foot motor launch from Corregidor to Darwin, Australia, narrative report of.

1. By the 5th of May, 1942, eight of the nine auxiliary vessels in the Corregidor area, namely, the U.S.S. CANOPUS, U.S.S. BITTERN, U.S.S. FINCH, U.S.S. TANAGER, U.S.S. MINDANAO, U.S.S. LUZON, U.S.S. OAHU, U.S.S. PIGEON, had been sunk by enemy gunfire, bombs, scuttled or otherwise rendered unserviceable. The U.S.S. QUAIL had been hit by three six-inch shells, her bridge was wrecked, and the stem area torn away by one of the shells. She was, however, able to perform some services and had just completed sweeping a 600 foot channel through the Navy south channel mine field, providing access from seaward to South Harbor, Corregidor.

2. By order of the Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, most of the Title "B" equipment, especially navigational equipment, had previously been removed from the ships and stored ashore in Queen Tunnel, Corregidor. All records, logs, pay accounts, etc. were also stored ashore in Queen Tunnel. About one-half of the ordnance, including the fifty caliber machine guns, had been taken ashore and were in use by beach defense forces. Approximately two-thirds of the crew were retained in Queen Tunnel in the status of reserve beach defense forces, and the other one-third were used to operate the ship, boat sweep the channel, or other duties as required. This latter one-third of the crew included only men whose morale, nerve, and physical condition had survived unshaken the long siege.

2. Throughout the month of May, the enemy had been spotting in their batteries by ranging on selected targets until they had every mortar pit, gun emplacement and beach defense position covered and the exact gun range known. During this period, their artillery fire was sporadic and included only selected targets. Their heavy and dive bombing was likewise sporadic.
A16-3 (Philippines)

June 19, 1942.

CROSS-INDEX SHEET

See File A8-2 for confidential report concerning loyalty of

Manuel Roxas (Secretary of Finance)
Jose Abad Santos (Chief Justice)
Andres Sorriano (Treasurer of the Philippine Commonwealth and present Secretary to

Information contained in letter of June 19, 1942 from Francis P. Sayre to the President, returning and commenting on J. Edgar Hoover's letter of June 15, 1942, to Major General Edwin M. Watson
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY

From: GHQ SWPA, Australia
To: Chief of Staff

No. AG 877, May 9th, 1943.

I have just received word from General Sharp that General Wainwright in 2 broadcasts on the nights of the 7th and 8th announced he was reassuming the command of all forces in the Philippines and directed their surrender giving in detail the method of accomplishment. Sharp asked for instructions. I have informed him that General Wainwright's orders since his surrender have no validity; that if overcome by superior forces he will attempt to divide into small irregular bands and continue such resistance as may be possible. I believe General Wainwright has temporarily become unbalanced and his condition renders him susceptible on enemy use.

MacArthur

Action: OPD
Info Copies: 0-2
SGS
TAG
LOG
FILE

Upon further (Pur. Relations) studies after the 2 broadcasts refused to whom were quite evidently from a second of the original text and except for one sentence where the maps were enclosed or with clipped up in the original, the people are convinced that the entire affair has been faked by the Japanese authorities of getting General Sharp in isolated to surrender and to discredit Wainwright as a wanted nation captive.

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General MacArthur has sent me the following paraphrase of a message which he received from General Sharp, commanding the forces now on Mindanao, which he states was written a few hours after General Sharp had reported his contemplated surrender and the fact that he had released from his command those commanders operating outside of Mindanao. The message from General Sharp was dated May 10th and was delayed in transmission.

"After a conference with an officer on Wainwright's staff I countermanded my instructions releasing officers commanding on other islands in the Philippines and directed the surrender of all forces still operating in the Philippines. Only the most urgent necessity forced this action."

Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Supplies for the Philippines.

The following is a brief of a radiogram received from General MacArthur this afternoon:

Submarines.

Four submarines assigned to transfer supplies from Cebu to Corregidor. One has arrived and two are now due in Cebu. Two more have departed from Fremantle for Cebu on the 1st and 2d of April respectively. Arrangements made to continue four submarines on this duty as long as operating supplies are available in Cebu.

Medical Supplies.

One-third of immediate requirements of quinine, one-tenth immediate requirements of vitamins, together with partial supply of other priority medical items were sent to Del Monte by air March 26. These being transferred to Bataan by Balanca and pursuit planes as rapidly as possible. Transport plane loaded with medical supplies will depart from Australia within 48 hours. It will remain in Philippines. This should enable Wainwright to obtain urgently needed medical supplies. Additional medical supplies being accumulated in Australia and will be sent to the Philippines by air this week.

Subsistence.

Radio states Somervell has reported six small vessels loaded with supplies, principally subsistence, to arrive in Philippines via Hawaii between April 30 and May 13. Radio also cites our message of April 5 telling of an additional ship manned by the Navy which departed from Honolulu April 3, due in Corregidor April 25. General MacArthur states cargo ship now ready to load at Brisbane to continue dispatch of supplies to Mindanao and Cebu, and that others are being reconditioned to continue this service.

[Signature]
Acting Chief of Staff.
The month of December, 1941, under normal conditions would have meant for me the completion of a regular two and a half year tour of duty on the Asiatic Station, the first year of which was spent in China and the remaining time as Naval Aide to the U.S. High Commissioner, The Honorable Francis B. Sayres in Manila P. I. I had looked forward with keen anticipation to the time, which was close at hand, when I could return to the U.S.A. and again be with my wife and children whom I had not seen since November, 1940, when, along with other Navy dependents, they were evacuated from Manila. My hopes, however, were shattered when on December eighth, 1941, at three a. m. I received a telephone call which informed me of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor - the long thought of hostilities had finally begun!

The events which took place in various parts of Luzon, and especially in the Manila Bay area, during the month of December are too well known for comment. However, mention must be made of the fact that on the first day of hostilities, after due notice had been given, the Japs bombed Camp John Hay, Baguio, about eight-fifteen a. m., then at noon they struck a vicious blow at Clark Field, sixty miles north of Manila, where most of the Army bombers were caught on the ground and destroyed. A few did manage to escape to the southern islands. Again shortly after midnight under a cloudless sky and full moon, Nichols
Field, on the outskirts of Manila, was attacked by unopposed heavy bombers - they were plainly visible in the moonlight. Again during the forenoon of this same day, December ninth, our Army pursuit and fighter planes were caught and destroyed on the ground at Iba Field on the west coast of Luzon. Loss of this latter group was most serious, as it gave the enemy almost complete superiority in the air, thus allowing him a free hand to bomb other military objectives which he proceeded to do methodically and without delay. The Navy Yard, Cavite, was utterly destroyed with a terrific loss of life on the afternoon of December tenth, and on the nineteenth the fuel depot and Naval air base, Sangley Point, met the same disastrous fate. The only difference between these attacks and the one at Pearl Harbor was that here our forces did have adequate warning. Why practically all of our air power was caught and destroyed on the ground during the first two days of war is not known by me. There are several reasons given, but the true facts will have to be determined at a later date. At any rate, it gave the Japs what they wanted - unchallenged air superiority - and thus made landing operations a relatively simple matter. During the first ten days landings were made at Aparri and Lingayen to the north, Legaspi and Antimonin to south and east, and at Nasigbu to the southwest. Manila was the hub of this wheel, the objective of the plan, toward which the main drives centered. The rice crop had been harvested, the fields were dry and had hardened, there would be no rain for six months, and all would be in the hands of the enemy only for the taking.

About December twentieth, when it became evident that
the American and Filipino forces could not hold back the invader, withdrawals from the north, east and south commenced at once with the peninsula of Bataan as the ultimate destination - the last stand defensive position.

Manila would not be defended or fought over. The High Commissioner was then confronted with the tremendous problem of what to do. Since some three thousand American civilians resided in or near Manila he felt that it was his duty to remain there to be of whatever service he could and to share their common fate. At a conference with General MacArthur, at which I was present, this subject was discussed at great length. The General's plan in the event Manila had to be abandoned was for the High Commissioner, his family and part of his staff to go to Corregidor. The same applied to President Quezon. The High Commissioner could not readily agree. I believe he referred the matter to President Roosevelt before he was finally convinced that such a move was the proper step to take.

Manila was under almost constant air alarm during the month of December - the Japs were pressing hard from all directions - and toward the latter part of the month events came to a climax very rapidly.

On Christmas eve morning the Commissioner called me in and told me that he had received word to be ready to leave with Quezon for Corregidor at two p. m. as previously planned. As this move would terminate my duty with him, he expressed his appreciation for my services and we said an official "good-bye."
His parting remark in the office was that: "There is an armored truck down below which contains two million dollars in United States currency, the property of the Commonwealth Government; in addition there are about seventy-five bags of diplomatic mail, and the baggage belonging to myself and members of the staff who are designated to go to Corregidor this afternoon. As I cannot take it with me, I hope you will see that it gets over there." An air alarm occurred at that moment, but as soon as "All clear" was sounded I reported to my immediate superior, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Asiatic Fleet, explained to him the Commissioner's intentions, and requested instructions as to my duty assignment. Admiral Rockwell, Commandant Sixteenth Naval District, had established headquarters at Corregidor after the Navy Yard and Sengley Point installations had been destroyed, and, as there were no naval vessels in the Manila Bay area to which I was eligible for assignment, Admiral Hart verbally instructed me to comply with the Commissioner's request and then to report to Admiral Rockwell for duty.

The official party left on an inter-island steamer at two p. m. for Corregidor, the island fortress at the entrance to Manila Bay twenty-seven miles distant. On their way out to the steamer in a launch, the Japs bombed the port area nearby and I know that must have given them the thrill of their lives.

It was arranged that I should take the Presidential yacht "Casiana" with all the "loot" and leave from the port area about six p. m. All the personal effects I could take with me were what I had on plus what I could get in a small suitcase.
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and brief case. Everything else that I owned had to be left in my quarters at the Army-Navy Club.

At five p.m., after another bombing of the port area and Nichols Field, I said good-bye to those remaining in the Manila office (Dr. Claude Buss, Executive Assistant, in charge) and went to the docks. To my amazement, the "Cesiana" was not there, and upon inquiring I learned that during the bombing attack earlier in the afternoon she had gotten underway and followed the vessel on which the officials were embarked to Corregidor. Two million dollars in my hands, a place to go, but not the means!

After considerable worry and delay I located a ship at the Army pier which was to leave at seven p.m. for Corregidor carrying General MacArthur, his family, members of his staff, and other officers. I took passage on this vessel.

It was dark when we shoved off; Manila was blacked out as usual, but a moon shone sufficiently to accentuate the sad and deserted harbor and piers where under normal conditions there was activity throughout the twenty-four hours of the day. As we drew further out into the bay, tremendous fires along the Cavite shore, at Fort McKinley, Nichols Field, and the oil storages at Pandakan, Manila, illuminated the heavens. I knew that this was my last time in Manila, and as I watched the grim spectacle, fully realizing its import, and thought of my friends there, a sinking feeling came over my heart. And this was Christmas Eve, 1941!
I had hoped we would arrive before moonset so that there would be light for unloading, but unfortunately such was not the case. We did not get alongside until midnight and then, as I had anticipated, there was a general mixup in the baggage and gear on the dock as everyone tried to claim his own in the dark. One box of money (there were fifteen in all) did get adrift, but I found it later on that night.

On Christmas morning I reported to Admiral Rockwell for duty. He had arrived two days previously and had established his headquarters, such as they were, in one of the Navy tunnels. The Admiral was very much concerned about the location of Naval personnel in this grand re-shuffle and, as his regular District Personnel Officer was in a Manila hospital wounded, he assigned me that hectic job on his staff. I served in that capacity until my transfer on May third, 1942.

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lippine Commonwealth), and a generous number of barges, motor boats, motor launches, and other small craft of assorted varieties; Based on Corregidor - The District Headquarters, part of the Navy Yard personnel, communication personnel of the District, the Fleet Radio units, and the torpedo repair and upkeep gang. There were still personnel in the Navy Yard salvaging what they could and destroying the remainder. In Manila were part of the censorship unit, part of the Yard supply section salvaging material, the former Naval Hospital, Canacao, staff and patients, and small details who had lost their way or who had become separated from their commands. Submarines also operated from Corregidor-Mariveles area until about the first of the year, at which time it became untenable as an operations base. At this time the submarines with their staff moved to southern waters. With the exception of the submarines, the Commandant took over this entire force of approximately 2,500 officers and men to administer to the best possible advantage for prosecution of the war. The actual ship operations came under the immediate direction of Captain K. M. Hoeffel, who was then Commander Inshore Patrol.

From the standpoint of my job, the picture presented tremendous difficulties - officers and men scattered hither and yon, many of whose accounts and records had either been lost or destroyed. The question was: how could I ever get an accurate count? In addition to the accountability came the added problem of administration - advancements, assignments to duty, deaths, injuries, changes in pay, allotments, transfers, and many other details too numerous to mention. Our mail service with the outside world was cut off. I immediately collected a few yeomen,
some typewriters, etc., and went to work.

On Christmas Day and for a few days thereafter, boats were headed for Corregidor from every direction bearing remnants of Army units, our own personnel and civilians. The latter in most cases were made to return from whence they came, or else were sent over to Bataan. I endeavored to meet all boats arriving to identify and direct any Naval personnel who might be aboard, and this did help some. But the general picture on the "Rock" for the first few days so far as we were concerned was one of confusion.

The Fourth Regiment of U. S. Marines (Shanghai) had originally been landed in Olongapo, Subic Bay, thirty miles north of Corregidor just prior to the outbreak of war. They were withdrawn from Olongapo about December twenty-fifth and arrived on Corregidor with all their equipment about December twenty-seventh. Their task was to defend the beaches of the fortress against attempts by hostile forces to land.

About a month before war was declared it had been my pleasure to spend a week-end on Corregidor. This island fortress stands guard at the entrance of Manila Bay. Two and one half miles to the northward across the main ship channel is the thick jungle peninsula of Bataan; to the westward the China Sea; about six miles to the southward is the mainland of Cavite; and to the eastward Manila Bay proper. On an arc to the south from Corregidor on smaller islands are situated the lesser forts of Hughes, Drum and Frank. All are natural defensive positions, and from
the standpoint of seacoast defense they are ideal in location. Corregidor is a rocky, precipitous island with few beaches, shaped like a crooked tadpole, five square miles in area, the average dimensions being approximately five miles long and one mile wide. There are two principal hills about three hundred feet high, which slope steeply downward to a low flat area in the middle of the island known as "bottomside". The axis of "bottomside" runs in a north-south direction with docks at each end. Corregidor is normally covered for the most part with a luxuriant variety of thick tropical growth, and many of the military roads are covered by overlapping branches. It is a natural commanding position.

While there, General Moore, in command, made a car available to me, and with his aide I spent a half day looking over the island in general and its defensive armament in particular. I believe I am correct in saying that all the anti-aircraft protection they had was twelve three-inch guns - no pompons. One Navy pompon was later mounted on Molinta peak. There were dispersed, however, numerous 30-caliber machine guns which are of no use whatever in modern air attacks. There were good 155-millimeter guns located at strategic points, but the coast defense batteries of large caliber guns, limited in train and with 1899 stamped in the muzzles of some, gave me a feeling of deep concern. Their fire-control system was of the elementary basic triangulation arrangement and protection to their magazines from a rear end explosion that would result from a bombing attack was nil indeed. Aside from barbed wire, which had been laid over exposed beaches and possible landing points, and pill boxes located deep
in the ravines covering such points, little else had been done in the way of beach defense. Actually, there were not then on the island enough men to man the batteries and beaches at the same time. It was purely a coast defense post and no adequate provision had been made for attack from either flank or the rear. In the end that is precisely what did happen, for the Japs knew the weaknesses and exploited them to the full.

There were a few wells on the island, but the principal water supply came from Bataan, being brought over in barges and stored for the most part in above-ground unprotected storages. Water for the other but smaller fortified islands was supplied in the same manner, with the exception of Fort Frank which was only about one-half mile from the Cavite shore. This fort received its supply by direct line from an impounding basin on the beach.

In the rocky hills of the island an elaborate tunnel system, particularly in Molinta hill, of main and tributary concrete laterals had been constructed. In these tunnels, several of which belonged to the Navy, were located the hospital, repair shops, magazines, food supplies, and other stores, headquarters offices, the Navy’s main radio transmitting and receiving stations, submarine spare parts, torpedo overhaul and upkeep shops, fuel reserves, etc. The main tunnels were supplied with auxiliary diesel-driven power and lighting units.

This tour of inspection, so to speak, was impressive indeed, but many questions which worried me could not be answered.
It was summed up by the remark, "Well, that may be so, but we've
done the best we can with what we have", and in the main I had
to agree. But, notwithstanding, their general feeling was one
of confidence.

And so when I again saw these people toward the end
of the first month of war they were still confident, with a
feeling of complete security - the "Rock" had become a symbol
of strength in their imagination; they had not yet been attacked!
I was unable to share in such optimism, for the questions I had
asked on the previous visit still remained unanswered and I had
in the meantime seen Nichols Field go under, the port area of
Manila bombed and on fire, and had helped unload in Manila
boatloads of burned and butchered human flesh with bellies torn
open, arms and legs dangling by threads, fresh from the massacre
and raging inferno that was Cavite Navy Yard.

Toward the end of December the Fil-American troops had
about completed their withdrawal into the defensive position in
the jungles of Bataan. A considerable number of merchant ships
had assembled in the waters between Corregidor and Bataan, hug-
ging the lee of the former like a child clinging to its mother's
breast, waiting and wondering what to do. All was serene and
quiet until eleven forty-five a. m. on December twenty-ninth
when suddenly fifty-four Jap heavy and dive bombers appeared on
the scene, and for the next three hours Corregidor took a pound-
ing that words cannot describe. Although the personnel casualties
were not so high and fortunately the gun positions not seriously
damaged, there was, nevertheless, tremendous damage to other
installations, services, stores, equipment, buildings, and two
large loaded merchant vessels struck and on fire in the harbor.
The President's yacht "Casiana" was also sunk at a later date.
It appeared to be a general bombing in which anything hit would
do, and after it fires were everywhere on the island. This was
also an unopposed bombing, and as we knew there would be plenty
more in store as the days went on, all hands immediately licked
their wounds and went to work instantly to make repairs and re-
store vital services.

Heavy bombing attacks occurred daily except from the
seventh to the eleventh of January, but with not the same fury
as the initial baptism, until about February first. While this
was going on on Corregidor, the other fortified islands, and
our installations at Mariveles, the Japs launched an offensive
in Bataan. There was bitter fighting in that jungle country, but
we had the advantage of position and their main attack was
bloodily repulsed. Our field artillery and the Filipino Scout
infantry regiments (old Filipino U.S. Army regulars) did heroic
and splendid work. From all accounts not so much can be said
for the newly-inducted Filipino Army units in this battle, but
what they lacked was made up by others. I think the only American
infantry regiment we had, the Thirty-First, was held in reserve
during this engagement. It was about this time that General
MacArthur made his brief visit to Bataan and the below-quoted
order was published to all hands - General J. M. Wainwright was
commander in the field:
"Fort Mills, F.I.
January 15, 1942.

Subject: Message from General MacArthur
To: All Unit Commanders

"The following message from Gen MacArthur will be read and explained to all troops. Every company commander is charged with personal responsibility for the delivery of this message. Each headquarters will follow up to insure reception by every company or similar unit.

"Help is on the way from the United States. Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched. The exact time of arrival of reinforcements is unknown as they will have to fight their way thru Japanese attempts against them. It is imperative that our troops hold until these reinforcements arrive.

"No further retreat is possible. We have more troops in Bataan than the Japanese have thrown against us; our supplies are ample; a determined defense will defeat the enemy's attack.

"It is a question now of courage and determination. Men who run will merely be destroyed but men who fight will save themselves and their country.

"I call upon every soldier in Bataan to fight in his assigned position, resisting every attack. This is the only road to salvation. If we fight we will win; if we retreat we will be destroyed.'

"MacArthur

"By Command of General MacArthur"

The supply lines for the Japs on the front came from the eastward by land, and by sea into Subic Bay, which was immediately behind their lines, to the north and west. Having complete control of the land, sea and air, the problem of supply for their forces presented no difficulty whatever, but for us it was perilous and most urgent. Corregidor at all times was amply supplied with everything except anti-aircraft ammunition, but for the army of Bataan their principal needs as early as mid-January were medical supplies, especially quinine to combat the jungle malaria, and food.

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With the terrific setback we took at Pearl Harbor and being surrounded by numerous Jap fortified islands and land air bases in the Pacific, I could never from the beginning see how any outside help could possibly reach us in any quantity. It was impossible for surface transport, but the Army in general could not understand why. To them it was simply a question of driving through. But how they would get through, sustain themselves against repeated aerial and surface attack, find a peaceful place in which to unload their cargo, and obtain fuel for the return trip was not their worry. We were all vitally concerned with this problem, for it meant the difference between victory and defeat. I discussed the matter with numerous army officers of high rank, staff members, etc., and was amazed to learn that they had not the slightest conception of the problem of logistics.

Under constant bombing it was necessary for all those who did not have to be exposed to seek shelter in the tunnels, dugouts, or fox holes. Our headquarters were in the main Navy tunnel and here we worked, ate and slept in a most crowded and over-packed style. Ventilation was poor indeed. Some auxiliary fans were rigged, but their capacity was far from adequate. Outside, the earth was parched and dusty (the effects of a wicked tropical sun) and this, mixed with smoke from fires and the pungent fumes of high explosive bombs, penetrated our tunnels causing extreme discomfort. Added to this already bad situation were the smells of hundreds of hot sweating human bodies long without baths. We washed our own clothes in buckets and hung them out to dry at night. Water was precious, so baths were infrequent. Our ration was simple, and limited in amount - two
meals daily with breakfast at eight a. m. and supper at four p. m. I usually carried a piece of bread in my shirt pocket to munch on during the middle of the day. Our diet was basically one of corned beef, salmon, rice and bread. Added to this were canned vegetables and some canned fruits — nothing was fresh. We all lost weight on the diet, in my case about twenty-five pounds, and very soon I began to notice the effects in my gums and teeth caused by the vitamin deficiency. As proper exercise and fresh air were out of the question, I believe the reduced diet was a saving factor in the end. Throughout the entire period on Corregidor there was little if any real sickness in our command. Living packed together as we did, it is almost a miracle that some contagious disease did not break out. But luck was with us and thus tragedy averted.

On the island was located one of the Commonwealth Treasury vaults loaded with gold and silver bullion, currency, and securities of various nature. The High Commissioner and President Quezon were much concerned about this valuable deposit — how could it be shipped to a place for safe keeping? Two million dollars in U. S. currency were destroyed by burning, and it was my unpleasant duty to assist in that operation. The money had been cancelled so that the only actual loss was the cost of the paper and printing. But they were all crisp new beautiful bills. It occurred to me that I had never lit a cigarette with a hundred dollar bill before, and I did not miss this unique opportunity. Money had lost its value — there was nothing to spend it for; our requirements were very few and we much preferred cigarettes and soap to money. This experience readily proved, through

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necessity, how quickly the standard which we had known all our lives could change. After all, we found the veneer covering to be very thin.

As for the gold and silver, there was only one reasonably safe means of getting part of it out - by submarine. Accordingly, in late January the TROUT (Lieut. Comdr. Fenno) arrived from Pearl Harbor. He negotiated our minefields, circled the island and secured to the south docks about eight p.m. It was a beautiful moonlight night. With him he brought about three thousand rounds of much-needed anti-aircraft ammunition. While this was being unloaded from aft, we were giving him fuel oil from the port side and loading torpedoes down his forward hatch. I thought of all the usual safety precautions that were being violated, but then this was war; speed was of the essence for night bombing attacks were not out of the question. The original plan was to unload ammunition and to fuel ship the first night, dive before dawn and surface after dark the second night, at which time he would receive the gold, silver and securities. It developed about midnight that he would need more ballast. So, I woke up the Vice President and other Commonwealth officials, members of the High Commissioner's staff, and before four a.m. had loaded twenty tons of gold and silver in his ship. The other securities were taken out the next night in a small boat, loaded on board quickly, and in a very short time he was off for Pearl via way stations.

A brief respite from bombing came during the latter part of January. The Marines had been busy all along as much as they could bolstering up beach defense positions, but now they
were enabled to work almost all day long. Roll after roll of
barbed wire was strung, land mines placed along the beaches,
deep tank-trap trenches were dug, concrete tank barriers were
erected on the principal roads, and numerous additional machine
gun positions established at strategic points. They did a mag-
nificent job.

As long as the supply of oil and gas would permit,
our vessels were out on patrol duty every night and shooting at
dive bombers by day. Patrols were established as follows:
(a) on a line with the main channel axis toward Manila well into
the bay, and return; (b) from a point about two miles east of
Corregidor on a southerly course to the vicinity of the Cavite
shore, and return; (c) from the same point of origin as (b) but
on a northerly course for about eight miles up the east coast
(bay side) of Bataan peninsula, and return; (d) a vessel in the
vicinity of the seaward entrance buoy to the mine field; and
(e) a motor torpedo boat patrol up the west coast of Bataan as
far as Subic Bay.

This West Coast Bataan Patrol made successful torpedo
attacks on Jap vessels in the Subic Bay area, and on one patrol
in late January encountered a Japanese landing boat returning
empty from a position well behind our lines on the Bataan coast.
The boat was sunk and its crew killed. When daylight came it
was discovered that the Japs had made a landing on Longoskawayan
Point with five hundred men, deep in our territory and not so
far from our Naval installation at Mariveles. Comdr. F. J.
Bridget hastily organized a mixed battalion of Navy personnel
from the CANOPUS, the section base, other units present, part of
his VP101 Squadron, and a few marines who were manning anti-air-
craft batteries there. This battalion, untrained but courageous
and eager for action, hastily went into the jungle and for three
days and nights fought at close quarters with the Japs who had
secreted themselves in caves along the beach and in the thick
underbrush near the main road. Apparently, the Japs were hoping
for a force to augment them, but it never came and none of them
ever got back alive. After the third day a Filipino Scout batt-
alion relieved Bridget’s tired detail and cleaned up the situa-
tion. The Navy and Marines lost about fifteen killed in this
action, with about forty wounded.

There were other encounters close in along the beach
in which our personnel participated. One in particular, led by
Lieut. Comdr. Goodall, executive officer of the CANOPUS, is
worthy of mention. In command of two motor launches and two
motor whaleboats, with a force of Philippine scouts and blue-
jacket volunteers, they landed on the west coast of Bataan to
clear out some caves where Japs were known to be. The mission
was successfully completed, but on the return trip shortly after
daybreak, Jap dive bombers attacked this small force killing and
wounding several men. Goodall sustained serious wounds in both
feet.

Around the first of February bombing attacks on Correg-
idor ceased, but they continued on the front lines in Bataan and
on our installations in Mariveles. About this time several inter-
island vessels ran the gauntlet by night (anchoring close to
shore by day) to Cebu and Panay, and returned with much-needed food and supplies for the Army of Bataan. This was a hazardous undertaking. Soon the Japs learned of this activity, and it ended abruptly with the loss of several ships and cargoes in late February.

About the fifth of February the Japs surprised us by opening up on all the forts from concealed batteries behind the ridges of Cavite shore with what appeared to be four- or five-inch guns. Later they added to their number eight- or nine-inch guns. This fire was destructive and extremely harassing, and continued until the end of the campaign. It was almost a daily occurrence, and then did Corregidor become a "no-man's-land" and "bull's eye." They would strike at odd times, without warning. The whines and detonations of those shells were sickening. Although we fired many rounds of counter battery there were no accurate means of determining the results. We had no planes from which to observe the fall of shot, and firing in this manner was only guess work. In the early stages of this enemy artillery action, Fort Franks, near the Cavite shore, suffered the heaviest casualties, although all the rest came in for their share. Heavy artillery duelling continued in Bataan. With numerous ships entering Subic Bay, it became evident that the enemy was strengthening his position for a heavy attack. Thus the noose was gradually being drawn tighter and tighter around the neck of the last stronghold in the Philippines and the possibility of help was getting more remote each day.

It was decided to evacuate the High Commissioner, his
family and members of his staff, President Quezon, his family, Vice President Osmena, and other Commonwealth officials. Again the submarine was the only feasible means, but even this was extremely hazardous as the Jap destroyers and patrol vessels were now carefully guarding the entrances to Manila Bay. Nevertheless, the SWORDFISH (Lieut. Comdr. Smith) arrived in the mine field channel on the night of February twentieth, and shortly after nine p. m. I placed the President and his party on board. Prior to his departure from Corregidor, however, he presented me with a present which I later found to be an excellent bottle of Scotch whiskey. I remember it still - the brand was "Emperor" and that struck me somehow as being characteristic of the fiery little man.

The SWORDFISH carried the President's party to Panay and returned on the night of February twenty-third for the High Commissioner. I had learned only that morning that authority had been granted by my commander-in-chief for me to accompany the Commissioner to Washington, but General MacArthur, on finding out about it, would not permit me to leave - for what reason I shall probably never know. At any rate, it was a great disappointment to me, and our parting that night after nearly two years of close relationship was one of the saddest moments of my life. I felt then that I would never see them again. Four days previously General MacArthur had ordered fifty-six of our Naval officers to Cebu to work for the Army. These officers, of whom Captain Deasoo was the senior, departed in the S.S. Legaspi. None of us ever expected them to reach their destination, but fortunately they did. It was the Legaspi's last trip, for on the
return voyage she was lost.

Shelling continued intermittently almost daily.

On the evening of March eleventh, after a very carefully planned itinerary, General MacArthur, his family and staff, Admiral Rockwell and Captain Ray, our Chief of Staff, departed in motor torpedo boats for Mindanao, from where they later flew to Australia. General Wainwright relieved MacArthur on Corregidor and General King took over the field command in Bataan. Captain Hoeffel relieved Admiral Rockwell, Commander Deswall replaced Captain Ray. The PERMIT stopped in on the evening of the fourteenth and took aboard thirty-odd Naval officers and men for transportation to Australia.

I spent the week-end of March seventeenth in Bataan, staying with friends at field hospital No. Two. This hospital was an open air one in the strictest sense of the word. It contained about three thousand patients at that time, consisting of shrapnel, malaria, dysentery, and amputation cases. Except for the crudely constructed operating room there were no other buildings in the installation; the beds were arranged in "wards" scattered hither and yon in the dense tropical jungle, and except for an occasional piece of canvas canopy there was no overhead covering. This was the dry season, and red dust from the much over-used military roads which wound in and out of the area, literally covered everything. Bathing and sanitation facilities presented a tremendous problem. Fortunately, however, a few mountain streams did pass through the sector.

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I don't think I ever saw a more depressing sight than on that trip to Number Two hospital. Food and vital medicines were almost exhausted. Long ere this all horses, mules and carabao had been slaughtered and eaten. The patients were thin, emaciated and listless, and the pathetic expressions of hopelessness on the faces of these men was a picture I shall never forget. They had expected and longed for help which had not come and was not to come; their position was rapidly becoming desperate. However, in spite of it all, they tried so hard to keep their spirits up, often making fun of their own tragic circumstances: "We are the battling bastards of Bataan - no mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam", etc.

On March twenty-fourth all hell broke loose when the enemy renewed his bombing attacks on the fortified islands, opening up at the same time with savage artillery fire from the Cavite shore. From this day forward there was to be no respite day or night until the final fall of Corregidor on May sixth. He employed a new type twin-engined high altitude heavy bomber. At the same time our installations in Mariveles and the front lines in Bataan were receiving almost continuous dive bombing and strafing attacks. During the first week of this renewed attack, our anti-aircraft guns on Corregidor knocked down about fifteen planes. But soon the enemy advantage proved too great and one by one the anti-aircraft batteries with their crews were destroyed either from bombing or shelling or both. The same applied to the heavier batteries, magazines, ammunition dumps, and stores scattered over the "Rock". Casualties were high. The place was under almost constant air or shell alarm.
From the beginning the Japs used every means of propaganda they could think of to produce disloyalty amongst the Filipino soldiers. Usually it came in the form of illustrated pamphlets, written in Tagalog and dropped from planes behind the lines and on the fortified islands. The Filipinos were urged to kill their American officers, throw down their arms, and cross the lines to "Freedom and Safety." Detailed instructions of how to do this were given in the pamphlets. They further played up the sex angle, and many of the hideous leaflets contained photographs of nude white women in inviting poses. They did everything they could to discredit the American in the eyes of the Filipino, but I am happy to say their efforts were not productive of the desired results. Incidentally, when the Jap came to the Phils he brought with him bogus Philippine currency printed in Japan and labelled as such. This was one of the ways he professed true friendship for the Filipino — and he made him accept the worthless paper at the point of a bayonet!

At the end of March the situation in Bataan became critical indeed. The Japs, with fresh troops, launched what was to be their last offensive in the peninsula campaign. A vigorous push broke through the center of the line, which extended from east to west, and then by enveloping movements to the right and left the battle was won. April seventh was the date, and thus did the sorely tried Fil-American army meet its fate. This army was sick, starved, and worn; it had fought under unbearable conditions for over four months without help or support until it could resist no longer.
Broken communications, combined with general confusion and disorder in the midst jungle, delayed the actual surrender until April eighth, at which time General King with a veteran army of about 35,000 officers and men fell to enemy hands.

The moonless night of eight-nine April was one of tragedy, horror, and strange beauty. Detached units of our troops and demolition squads had retired to the southern tip of Bataan, and there they were firing and destroying all our military installations. The whole world seemed to be on fire that night — actually, the southern part of Bataan was a huge conflagration which resembled more than anything else a volcano in violent eruption, with the exception that the earth trembled and one was deafened by the gigantic explosions of main ammunition dumps, oil storages etc. White hot pieces of metal from exploded shells and bombs shot skyward by the thousands in every conceivable direction. Various colored flares exploded in great numbers and charged off on crazy courses much the same as a skyrocket which has run wild on the ground. The spectacle was awe-inspiring and breath-taking, but at the same time the experience was most depressing, for all that had been ours, and now that the end had come we were destroying it by our own hands.

While all this was going on, our own Naval forces were destroying everything at Mariveles — the Navy tunnels, equipment, the Dewey drydock, the CANOPUS and other small craft that we could not use. The order was given to destroy everything that night except serviceable water-craft which was to be brought to Corregidor before daybreak with only American naval personnel.
The Army directed that order to be issued — very little notice was given, but by working like mad the order was successfully carried out under the able leadership of Commander Sackett, who was Commanding Officer CANOPUS and Naval Forces Mariveles area. In accordance with the order, about two hundred old-time Filipino Naval Reservists, who had been courageous, loyal and efficient men, were given money and food and told in the early hours of the morning of the ninth that their services could no longer be used. It simply meant turning them out in the jungles of Bataan on this night of wild confusion to the mercy of the Japs who were close at hand. To me, this was one of the most heartless and distressing episodes of the whole campaign. At the time I felt sure the Japs would play this up to the full on their propaganda machine, and I was not mistaken.

All of the Army nurses, about one hundred in number, and one Navy nurse, Miss Ann Bernatitus, were evacuated through shot and shell to Corregidor during the early hours of April ninth, and up to the forenoon of the same day. Miss Bernatitus had served in the field hospitals in Bataan throughout the entire campaign. All other Navy nurses with the former Canaeso hospital staff were taken in Manila when the Japs occupied the city.

Two of our submarines had been previously detailed to transport food and supplies from Cebu through the blockade to Corregidor. The SEADRAGON (Lieut. Comdr. Farrell) arrived during the exciting hours of the evening of April eighth. When he departed shortly thereafter, he took out twenty-seven Naval
officers and men for Australia.

About midnight of the eighth we experienced a violent earthquake. Our tunnel weaved like a snake and I thought it was going to collapse. Some confused it with the explosions going on in Bataan. We had had lots of shaking up in the past from bombings and shellings, but never a motion with that characteristic. Fordham University confirmed the fact two days later.

Before daybreak on the ninth our already crowded living condition was further complicated by the arrival from Mariveles of about six hundred and fifty officers and men, and seventy civilians, employees of the Pacific Air Base contractors. This placed our strength now at about two hundred officers, one nurse, and over twenty-three hundred enlisted men.

Bombing and shelling had been so violent during the past few days that we had moved to places of reasonable safety ashore the crews of our vessels during daylight hours. The ships were anchored off the south side of Corregidor. They were low in fuel oil, and practically all anti-aircraft mounts had been taken off and placed in defensive positions along the beaches. Each night the crews returned to their ships to salvage and remove to the forts all usable material. When this had been accomplished, the crews of the gunboats OAHU, MINDANAO, and LUZON were transferred to Fort Hughes and became a part of the beach defenses under Commander Bridget. One battery of sea coast defense mortars on Fort Hughes was manned by Naval personnel. Altogether at this fort were approximately five hundred Naval officers and men.
About two hundred and fifty of the overflow which came over from Mariveles were assigned to beach defenses with the Marines on Corregidor. At that time there were already about four hundred and fifty bluejackets serving with the Marines.

On the night of April ninth, the SNAPPER (Lieut.Comdr. Stone) arrived with food and supplies for Corregidor, but was unable to unload all her cargo owing to enemy activity in the immediate vicinity. She did take out with her twenty-five Naval officers and men for transfer to Australia. The ship had a very narrow escape in departing.

The tempo of bombing and shelling increased - the casualties mounted, big guns, magazines and ammunition dumps went up daily. Fires were general over the island. The dried grass and underbrush burnt even with the ground and in these general fires beach defense small arms ammunition invariably went off all around - popping and cracking with a noise no Chinese New Year nor a hundred Fourth of July's could approximate. I conservatively estimate that during this period no less than four thousand bombs and shells landed on us daily; it was a constant pounding, a terrific beating.

About April twelfth the Japs moved all their artillery batteries down the Bataan peninsula much nearer to Corregidor. They were effectively concealed in the heavy jungle ravines in that area. Thus, with a much shorter range, and with heavier guns brought to bear on us and directed by observation balloons, their fire was deadly accurate and of the severest nature. The largest
gun they used was a two hundred and forty millimeter - in addi-
tion 155's and seventy-fives in great number. Our batteries never
refused to fire back, but we were shooting at a hidden target
while theirs was plain as day. A few rounds from our guns would
draw a salvo from the enemy right into the gun pit, which usually
resulted in the loss of the gun, its crew, and frequently a
general magazine explosion.

On April twelfth, thirteen flying fortresses flew up
from Australia and operated for two days from our air base in
Del Monte, Mindanao. They bombed Davao and Cebu and inflicted
serious damage on the enemy at these points. One plane was dis-
patched to the Manila area and successfully bombed Nichols Field
at high noon. We did not see the plane, but we saw the smoke
rising from the direction of Manila and it cheered our hearts
tremendously. It was the first and only outside help we ever
saw, but it was a joy. We were much the same as a drowning man
grabbing for a straw. The war had been so one-sided, the odds so
heavily against us, and never before one sign of aid. We knew
this action could not be repeated, for the Japs in time would
take our last field at Del Monte - it was unprotected.

And so there we were, twelve thousand persons trapped
like rats, living much the same, and waiting for the end. Every-
one tried to be happy and cheerful and to take it as philosoph-
ically as possible. But it was a false face - we were to be
sacrificed, and the question was: how soon? Constant bombing,
shelling, death, and destruction was steadily on the increase -
would the enemy ever run out of bombs and shells? We hoped so,
but it was not to be. It seemed that my nightly casualty dis-
patch to the Secretary of the Navy grew longer each day. Our services were torn up daily, our radio serials knocked to pieces a dozen times, but always they were mended and frequently while under fire. The courage of the men was magnificent - somehow they didn't seem to care. Numbers of times I saw radiomen up the poles, patching the lines while bombers were overhead. This was done without orders and on their own initiative - the only protection they had was a tin hat. Until our radio station finally signed off on May fifth I do not believe we were ever off the air for more than twenty minutes at a time. They performed an amazing job in maintaining that valuable service.

Every day was like the one that preceded it and if anything, worse. How could we stand this strain and terrible shock much longer? That was the question we asked ourselves. There is a limit to what a human being can endure, but that limit had not been reached.

April twenty-ninth, Emperor Hirohito's birthday, is a memorable date. We expected the worst that day and we got it - I think the kitchen sink came over too. About ten thousand explosives was the enemy's allowable for that day. The earth trembled and shock under those violent detonations which lasted continuously from seven-thirty a. m. until three-thirty p. m. When "all clear" sounded we found the "Rock" to be on fire all over - again ammunition dumps, magazines, grass, brush, and anything else that would burn was on fire. All wooden structures had burned long before this. One could not stop without seeing fragments from bombs and shells or the ugly pock-marks and
craters from explosions. Several of our ships were struck this
date, and one mine-sweeper was sunk. Instantly we went to work
making repairs and patching up here and there, only to have it
knocked out on the morrow. This same routine occurred daily, but
the men never gave up hope. They went about their work willingly
and cheerfully.

The night of April twenty-ninth was clear and with a
full moon. Two Navy patrol planes (PBY's) had arrived the night
before in Lake Lanao, Mindanao, from Australia, bearing medicines
and fuses for anti-aircraft shells for Corregidor. They hid out
during the day, but after dark took off for the besieged fortress.
Fires were burning brightly on the "Rock". The planes were due
at eleven p. m. Forty-six passengers, including Army and Naval
officers, Army nurses, and a few civilian women were to take
passage back to Australia in these planes. We waited tensely and
expectantly - why not another bombing or shelling attack tonight
in the full moonlight? The trip was logically planned, for no
doubt after a hard day's work, and on such an important date,
the enemy would probably be celebrating. Shortly after eleven
we heard the sound of motors - it was from the right direction
and with a different pitch from that to which we had been accus-
tomed. I cannot say how thrilling it was to hear the sound of a
friendly plane after all those long hard months. The planes
landed right under the Jap's nose, in full view and close to the
Cavite shore. In thirty minutes they completed their exchange of
stores for passengers, and with a wide open gun they took off in
a blaze of glory, with a roar that could be heard for miles
around. Not a shot, not even a rocket, was fired by the enemy.
That feat required real courage and accurate timing - it was eminently successful in both.

Unfortunately, one of the planes punctured its hull the next day in Lake Lanao, and a bad leak developed. The Army authorities radioed to Australia for a flying fortress to complete the journey, and most of the passengers left the PBY for what they thought was a safer risk. Working against almost insurmountable odds, the PBY was patched to the extent that the pilot was willing to chance a take-off. He had to, for the Japs were rapidly closing in on that area. The attempt was successful and he reached his destination without further mishap. A flying fortress was dispatched to Mindanao for the remaining passengers, but it crashed on route. Those people never got out. General Seals and his wife, Colonel Stuart Wood, and Commander Bridget were among the passengers who were left in Mindanao.

In the Philippine Treasury vault on Corregidor there remained about seventy tons of silver in the form of one peso pieces. The job of disposing of it was assigned to the Navy. Working for ten nights during the latter part of April, all of this treasure was finally removed and dumped in deep water between Corregidor and the Cavite shore.

As usual, the shelling and bombing continued. The Japs had knocked out all the anti-aircraft, a large number of 155's and big guns by early May. Ko was so brazen now that, after dropping his load of bombs he came so low to strafe that you could even see him thumb his ugly little nose - such spite and arrogance!
On the afternoon of May third came the surprise and thrill of my life. After another day of horrible pounding, the Commandant called me in during the late afternoon and told me that he had received instructions from Commander Naval Forces Southwest Pacific to transfer certain officers by name to Australia via the submarine SPEARFISH (Lieut. J. C. Dempsey) which was due to arrive off Corregidor that evening, and that my name was on the list. We had all suffered somewhat from shock as a result of the enemy's continuous action, but this news almost overwhelmed me and I could hardly keep back the tears - I had already resigned myself to Fate. The passenger list included five other Naval officers, six Army colonels, one Navy nurse, eleven Army nurses, and the wife of a naval officer. Packing was no problem, for I had lived out of a small suitcase and brief case for the past four and one-half months, and these contained all I possessed in the world. I immediately went over to tell General Wainwright and friends on his staff good-bye. I shall never forget that worn and tragic figure. He wished me well, and then said: "They will have to come take us. They will never get this place any other way." He was a great man and a fine field soldier who had one of the most difficult jobs passed on to him of any man I ever knew.

I could hardly say good-bye to my friends, for we had thought the same thoughts, lived the same life, and planned the same end, but they seemed happy for me - they knew the end was very near. I took watches, class rings and messages from them for their wives and loved ones at home. This, indeed, was real tragedy - and the tired, worn, hopeless expressions they had
was something I shall never forget.

The enemy started shelling again about seven-fifteen, but he seemed to be concentrating on the eastern end of the island. At seven forty-five we left from the south dock and later transferred to another boat in south harbor. It was just about dark, but the outline of Corregidor stood out in bold relief. It was ghost-like to me. In former days it had been a lovely spot, with thick rich tropical growth and beauty and splendor everywhere. Now it was beaten and burnt to a crisp; nothing was standing. It resembled a sponge more than anything else I can describe.

During previous nights we had swept a channel through the south mine field for just such contingencies as this. Our small boat PENNY (named after a relative of mine who was the first quarantine officer of Manila years ago) made the trip through the field safely, and soon we were in the China Sea heading for our rendezvous point four miles southwest of Corregidor. It was pitch dark, and any shapes we encountered could be enemy as well as friend, for the Japs closed in at night on their patrol of the entrance to Manila Bay. Furthermore, we had no definite assurance that the submarine would be there. He had been ordered by radio to be at that point, but could not acknowledge receipt of the despatch since he was in enemy waters. Suddenly about nine-thirty a black shape loomed up ahead. We had to challenge, and to our great relief he came back promptly with the proper reply and soon the old familiar hail, "come alongside!" It was the thrill of a lifetime. We had to work fast, for
Jap destroyers were close at hand. The Captain told us he had passed under two lines of them in the afternoon on his way in. I took one last look in the direction of old Corregidor just in time to see flashes from Bataan, a hit on one of our big batteries, followed by a series of explosions - another magazine gone up! The sight of it made me sick - I could stand no more. It was then ten p.m.

We lay to and charged batteries until the moon rose at ten-thirty. We then headed out, but after a few minutes were forced to make a quick dive to avoid Jap destroyers nearby. We went down to about two hundred feet. They were racing around overhead pinging and searching for us desperately, but by skillful handling of his ship the Captain managed to shake them off and we were not depth-charged. This is what we were doing when midnight came on May third. This vessel was the last to call at Corregidor. The Japs landed about twenty-four hours later, and on the morning of May sixth the fortress surrendered. It was the last vestige of United States power in the Philippines.

The last we heard of our Navy on Corregidor as our radio went off the air on May fifth was the now historic and beautiful expression of an heroic Commandant, Captain K. M. Heoffel, when he said - "One hundred and seventy three officers and twenty three hundred and seventeen men of the Navy reaffirm their loyalty and devotion to country, families, and friends."

Throughout the entire period of this campaign our services worked, fought and died unflinchingly before an over-
whelming enemy force of land, sea and air power. Every day was a twenty-four hour work day - we lost track of days of the week and dates. There was no recreation and nothing to break the monotony of the incessant shelling, bombing, and unbearable heat. Money soon lost its value. We lived and were sustained only by the strength of comradeship - we learned to appreciate thoroughly the basic factors of life and soon realized that, after all, the human factors were more valuable than riches. We never received mail or glad tidings from home. We purchased half a million dollars worth of War Bonds. We wished a thousand times that the people of America could fully understand the many ordeals which daily confronted us, with the hope that by that knowledge more drive, more power, and unstinted and unselfish application could be thrown into the practical business of making war.

Those less fortunate than I, who remained behind, are, in my opinion, all real heroes. They are the victims of a cruel Fate far, far from home, and their tribulations at the hands of their little arrogant Japanese masters must be terrible. Our Government owes to them and to their families every possible consideration. They are deserving of the blessings of all, and it should be the solemn duty of every American to remember that heroic struggle and sacrifice and to see to it, and promptly, that it was not made in vain.

They fought a good fight, they finished their course, they kept the faith!