

SECRET

A16-3 (Philippine
Islands)

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Upon receipt this morning of the radiogram from General MacArthur which is quoted below, I sent a high priority directive to General Wainwright asking him for a frank estimate of the situation. I feel that we should wait for a reply from General Wainwright before deciding what action should be taken:

"To be seen only by decoding clerk and General Marshall.

"You must be prepared for the collapse shortly of the Harbor Defenses in Manila Bay. The generally optimistic tone of reports from there do not repeat not reflect an accurate military estimate of the situation.

"The occupation of Bataan definitely condemned these fortresses and enemy guns of large calibre located there are rapidly destroying our fixed fortifications.

"Personnel losses have not been great, aggregating about 600 since April 9, of which approximately two-thirds are wounded. It is apparent to me, however, that morale is rapidly sinking and the end is clearly in sight.

"Within a short time organized resistance in the Philippines will cease. There will be a few scattered bands of desperate men left whose effectiveness will be practically negligible.

"The numerous secret air fields in Mindanao which I prepared with the hope of using them as a general base for counterdrive will be in the enemy's hands very shortly and this strategic possibility can now definitely be discarded.


"The internal political repercussions in the Philippines which may follow the complete collapse of our military effort cannot be estimated at this time but the potentialities involved may prove to be of the gravest significance.

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"A report just received from Wainwright states that ships can no longer reach Mindanao. I have recalled a blockade runner proceeding from here and have advised Emmons to that effect. I have not yet requested the recall of the converted destroyer en route to Corregidor but depending upon operations reports I anticipate the necessity for doing so very shortly. I believe it is useless to continue to load ships from the United States for this purpose.

MacArthur."


Chief of Staff.

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Philippine Islands

War file

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON


February 12, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation,
I am sending you a suggested reply to Frank Sayre's
message.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.

xx

February 12, 1942

USHIGHCOM,
MANILA (PHILIPPINE ISLANDS)

PERSONAL FOR THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FROM THE PRESIDENT.

Your 43, February 11, 8 p.m.

Of course you should evacuate your staff with you and your family if conditions make it possible and if there are sufficient accommodations. My warmest regards to you all.

ROOSEVELT

U:SW:GES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

War Department

Transmitted by
Gen Marshall
Thru Gen Walden
Jul 10, 1942

For President
Secur Files

COPY
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In White House Files

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that a secret message, as follows, be sent by the most expeditious means possible consistent with secrecy to Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Far East:

IN THE SECOND SECTION OF THIS MESSAGE I AM MAKING COMMA
THROUGH YOU COMMA AN IMMEDIATE REPLY TO PRESIDENT QUEZON'S
PROPOSALS OF FEBRUARY EIGHT STOP MY REPLY MUST EMPHATICALLY
DENY THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS GOVERNMENT'S AGREEMENT TO THE
POLITICAL ASPECTS OF PRESIDENT QUEZON'S PROPOSAL STOP I AUTHORIZE
YOU TO ARRANGE FOR THE CAPITULATION OF THE FILIPINO ELEMENTS OF
THE DEFENDING FORCES COMMA WHEN AND IF IN YOUR OPINION THAT
COURSE APPARS NECESSARY AND ALWAYS HAVING IN MIND THAT THE
FILIPINO TROOPS ARE IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES STOP
FOR THIS PURPOSE THE FILIPINO TROOPS COULD BE PLACED BY YOU UNDER
THE COMMAND OF A FILIPINO OFFICER WHO WOULD CONDUCT ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENEMY STOP SUCH NEGOTIATIONS MUST INVOLVE MILITARY MATTERS EXCLUSIVELY STOP DETAILS OF ALL NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE LEFT IN YOUR HANDS COMMA INCLUDING PLANS FOR SEGREGATION OF FORCES AND THE WITHDRAWAL COMMA IF YOUR JUDGMENT SO DICTATES COMMA OF AMERICAN ELEMENTS TO FORT MILLS STOP THE TIMING ALSO WILL BE LEFT TO YOU STOP PARA AMERICAN FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP OUR FLAG FLYING IN THE PHILIPPINES SO LONG AS THERE REMAINS ANY POSSIBILITY OF RESISTANCE STOP
I HAVE MADE THESE DECISIONS

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IN COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF YOUR MILITARY ESTIMATE THAT ACCOMPANIED PRESIDENT QUEZON'S MESSAGE TO ME STOP THE DUTY AND THE NECESSITY OF RESISTING JAPANESE AGGRESSION TO THE LAST TRANSCENDS IN IMPORTANCE ANY OTHER OBLIGATION NOW FACING US IN THE PHILIPPINES STOP PARA THERE HAS BEEN GRADUALLY WELDED INTO A COMMON FRONT A GLOBE ENCIRCLING OPPOSITION TO THE PREDATORY POWERS THAT ARE SEEKING THE DESTRUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF GOVERNMENT STOP WE CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE THIS LINE BROKEN IN ANY PARTICULAR THEATER STOP AS THE MOST POWERFUL MEMBER OF THIS COALITION WE CANNOT DISPLAY WEAKNESS IN FACT OR IN SPIRIT ANYWHERE STOP IT IS MANDATORY THAT THERE BE ESTABLISHED ONCE AND FOR ALL IN THE MINDS OF ALL PEOPLES COMPLETE EVIDENCE THAT THE AMERICAN DETERMINATION AND INDOMITABLE WILL TO WIN CARRIES ON DOWN TO THE LAST UNIT STOP PARA I THEREFORE GIVE YOU THIS MOST DIFFICULT MISSION IN FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE DESPERATE SITUATION TO WHICH YOU MAY SHORTLY BE REDUCED STOP THE SERVICE THAT YOU AND THE AMERICAN MEMBERS OF YOUR COMMAND CAN RENDER TO YOUR COUNTRY IN THE TITANIC STRUGGLE NOW DEVELOPING IS BEYOND ALL POSSIBILITY OF APPRAISEMENT STOP I PARTICULARLY REQUEST THAT YOU PROCEED RAPIDLY TO THE ORGANIZATION OF YOUR FORCES AND YOUR DEFENSES SO AS TO MAKE YOUR RESISTANCE AS EFFECTIVE AS CIRCUMSTANCES WILL PERMIT AND AS PROLONGED AS HUMANLY POSSIBLE STOP PARA IF THE EVACUATION OF PRESIDENT QUEZON AND HIS

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PARA SECOND SECTION OF MESSAGE PARA PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOW-
ING MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT QUEZON COLON PARA I HAVE JUST RECEIVED
YOUR MESSAGE SENT THROUGH GENERAL MACARTHUR PERIOD FROM MY
MESSAGE TO YOU OF JANUARY THIRTY COMMA YOU MUST REALIZE THAT
I AM NOT LACKING IN UNDERSTANDING OF OR SYMPATHY WITH THE
SITUATION OF YOURSELF AND THE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TODAY
STOP THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS CERTAINLY SEEMS DESPERATE BUT SUCH
CRISES AND THEIR TREATMENT MUST BE JUDGED BY A MORE ACCURATE
MEASURE THAN THE ANXIETIES AND SUFFERINGS OF THE PRESENT
COMMA HOWEVER ACUTE STOP FOR OVER FORTY YEARS THE AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CARRYING OUT TO THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIP-
PINES A PLEDGE TO HELP THEM SUCCESSFULLY COMMA HOWEVER LONG
IT MIGHT TAKE COMMA IN THEIR ASPIRATIONS TO BECOME A SELF
GOVERNING AND INDEPENDENT PEOPLE WITH THE INDIVIDUAL FREE-
DOM AND ECONOMIC STRENGTH WHICH THAT LOFTY AIM MAKES
REQUISITE STOP YOU YOURSELF HAVE PARTICIPATED

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IN AND ARE FAMILIAR WITH THE MANY CAREFULLY PLANNED STEPS BY WHICH THAT PLEDGE OF SELF GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT AND ALSO THE STEPS BY WHICH THE ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE OF YOUR ISLANDS IS TO BE MADE EFFECTIVE PERIOD MAY I REMIND YOU NOW THAT IN THE LOFTINESS OF ITS AIM AND THE FIDELITY WITH WHICH IT HAS BEEN EXECUTED COMMA THIS PROGRAM OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS ANOTHER PEOPLE HAS BEEN UNIQUE IN THE HISTORY OF THE FAMILY OF NATIONS PERIOD IN THE TYDINGS MCDUFFY ACT OF ONE NINE THREE FOUR COMMA TO WHICH YOU REFER COMMA THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES FINALLY FIXED THE YEAR ONE NINE FOUR SIX AS THE DATE IN WHICH THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ESTABLISHED BY THAT ACT SHOULD FINALLY REACH THE GOAL OF ITS HOPES FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE STOP PARA BY A MALIGN CONSPIRACY OF A FEW DEPRAVED BUT POWERFUL GOVERNMENTS THIS HOPE IS NOW BEING FRUSTRATED AND DELAYED PERIOD AN ORGANIZED ATTACK UPON INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL INDEPENDENCE THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMA BEGINNING IN EUROPE COMMA HAS NOW SPREAD AND BEEN CARRIED TO THE SOUTHWESTERN PACIFIC BY JAPAN PERIOD THE BASIC PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE GUIDED THE UNITED STATES IN ITS CONDUCT TOWARDS THE PHILIPPINES HAVE BEEN VIOLATED IN THE RAPE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA COMMA POLAND COMMA HOLLAND COMMA BELGIUM COMMA LUXEMBOURG COMMA DENMARK COMMA NORWAY COMMA ALBANIA COMMA GREECE COMMA YUGOSLAVIA COMMA MANCHUKUO COMMA CHINA COMMA

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THAILAND AND FINALLY THE PHILIPPINES STOP COULD THE PEOPLE OF ANY OF THESE NATIONS HONESTLY LOOK FORWARD TO A TRUE RESTORATION OF THEIR INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE DOMINANCE OF GERMANY COMMA ITALY OR JAPAN QUERY YOU REFER IN YOUR TELEGRAM TO THE ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE JAPANESE PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN'S WILLINGNESS TO GRANT TO THE PHILIPPINES HER INDEPENDENCE STOP I ONLY HAVE TO REFER YOU TO THE PRESENT CONDITION OF KOREA COMMA MANCHUKUO COMMA NORTH CHINA COMMA INDO-CHINA COMMA AND ALL OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE FALLEN UNDER THE BRUTAL SWAY OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT COMMA TO POINT OUT THE HOLLOW DUPLICITY OF SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT STOP THE PRESENT SUFFERINGS OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE COMMA CRUEL AS THEY MAY BE COMMA ARE INFINITELY LESS THAN THE SUFFERINGS AND PERMANENT ENSLAVEMENT WHICH WILL INEVITABLY FOLLOW ACCEPTANCE OF JAPANESE PROMISES STOP IN ANY EVENT IS IT LONGER POSSIBLE FOR ANY REASONABLE PERSON TO RELY UPON JAPANESE OFFER OR PROMISE QUERY PARA THE UNITED STATES TODAY IS ENGAGED WITH ALL ITS RESOURCES AND IN COMPANY WITH THE GOVERNMENTS OF TWENTY-SIX OTHER NATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO DEFEAT THE AGGRESSION OF JAPAN AND ITS AXIS PARTNERS STOP THIS EFFORT WILL NEVER BE ABANDONED UNTIL THE COMPLETE AND THOROUGH OVERTHROW OF THE ENTIRE AXIS SYSTEM AND THE GOVERNMENTS WHICH MAINTAIN IT STOP WE ARE ENGAGED NOW IN LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC OF A DEVELOPMENT IN AIR COMMA NAVAL COMMA AND MILITARY POWER WHICH SHALL BECOME SUFFICIENT TO MEET AND OVERTHROW THE WIDELY EXTENDED AND ARROGANT ATTEMPTS OF THE JAPANESE STOP MILITARY AND NAVAL OPERATIONS CALL FOR RECOGNITION OF REALITIES STOP WHAT WE ARE DOING THERE CONSTITUTES THE BEST

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Regraded Unclassified

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AND SUREST HELP THAT WE CAN RENDER TO THE PHILIPPINES AT THIS TIME STOP PARA BY THE TERMS OF OUR PLEDGE TO THE PHILIPPINES IMPLICIT IN OUR FORTY YEARS OF CONDUCT TOWARDS YOUR PEOPLE AND EXPRESSLY RECOGNIZED IN THE TERMS OF THE TYDINGS MCDUFFY ACT COMMA WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO PROTECT YOU TO THE UTMOST OF OUR POWER UNTIL THE TIME OF YOUR ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE HAD ARRIVED STOP OUR SOLDIERS IN THE PHILIPPINES ARE NOW ENGAGED IN FULFILLING THAT PURPOSE STOP THE HONOR OF THE UNITED STATES IS PLEDGED TO ITS FULFILLMENT STOP WE PROPOSE THAT IT BE CARRIED OUT REGARDLESS OF ITS COST STOP THOSE AMERICANS WHO ARE FIGHTING NOW WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT UNTIL THE BITTER END STOP FILIPINO SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN RENDERING VOLUNTARY AND GALLANT SERVICE IN DEFENSE OF THEIR OWN HOMELAND STOP PARA SO LONG AS THE FLAG OF THE UNITED STATES FLIES ON FILIPINO SOIL AS A PLEDGE OF OUR DUTY TO YOUR PEOPLE COMMA IT WILL BE DEFENDED BY OUR OWN MEN TO THE DEATH STOP WHATEVER HAPPENS TO THE PRESENT AMERICAN GARRISON WE SHALL NOT RELAX OUR EFFORTS UNTIL THE FORCES WHICH WE ARE NOW MARSHALING OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS RETURN TO THE PHILIPPINES AND DRIVE THE LAST REMNANT OF THE INVADERS FROM YOUR SOIL STOP

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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**WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON**

January 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following message from President Quezon to you is reassuring.


"January 31, 1942.

From Ft. Mills

To Chief of Staff.

Your radio nine eight seven, the President's message to Quezon was most effective. Quezon sends following reply for President Roosevelt: Quote Your letter has moved me deeply. I wish to assure you that we shall do our part to the end signed Quezon unquote.

MacArthur."


Chief of Staff.

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Doc

War Department
Office of the Chief of Staff

January 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR The President

List of attached documents:

1. Message from President Quezon to General McArthur (with brief attached).
- * 2. Draft of suggested reply by The President.
3. Message from General McArthur quoting statement of Aguinaldo.
- * 4. Memorandum from the Secretary of War to The President in re Curacao and Aruba.

G.C.M.
G. C. M.

* Did not "come to file."

SECRET

EXACT COPY

RADIOGRAM

JANUARY 28, 1942.
1:45 PM

AG 381 (1-28-42)MSC

FROM FT MILLS

TO THE ADJT GENL

* * * * *

NO. 1445 JANUARY 28

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING COMMUNICATION FROM PRESIDENT QUEZON.

"I HAVE BEEN MORTIFIED BY THE RADIO BROADCAST FROM TOKYO ASSERTING THAT A NEW GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE PHILIPPINES, WHICH GOVERNMENT HAS PLEDGED ITS CONFORMITY WITH JAPAN'S NEW EAST ASIA POLICY.

"I KNOW WHAT THE REAL SENTIMENTS OF MY PEOPLE ARE AND I AM CERTAIN THAT THEIR STAND HAS NOT CHANGED DESPITE THE MILITARY REVERSES OF OUR FORCES. I AM LIKEWISE CONVINCED OF THE LOYALTY OF THE MEN WHO HAVE ACCEPTED POSITIONS IN THE SO CALLED NEW GOVERNMENT.

"I WANT YOU, THEREFORE, TO GIVE PUBLICITY OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: 'THE DETERMINATION OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE TO CONTINUE FIGHTING SIDE BY SIDE WITH THE UNITED STATES UNTIL VICTORY IS WON HAS IN NO WAY BEEN WEAKENED BY THE TEMPORARY REVERSES SUFFERED BY OUR ARMS. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT OUR SACRIFICES WILL BE CROWNED WITH VICTORY IN THE END AND IN THAT CONVICTION WE SHALL CONTINUE TO RESIST THE ENEMY WITH ALL OUR MIGHT.

"JAPANESE MILITARY FORCES ARE OCCUPYING SECTIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES COMPRISING ONLY ONE THIRD OF OUR TERRITORY.

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IN THE REMAINING AREAS CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IS STILL IN OPERATION UNDER MY AUTHORITY.

I HAVE NO DIRECT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE VERACITY OF THE NEWS BROADCAST FROM TOKYO THAT A COMMISSION COMPOSED OF SOME WELL KNOWN FILIPINOS HAVE BEEN RECENTLY ORGANIZED IN MANILA TO TAKE CHARGE OF CERTAIN FUNCTIONS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT. THE ORGANIZATION OF SUCH A COMMISSION, IF TRUE, CAN HAVE NO POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE NOT ONLY BECAUSE IT IS CHARGED MERELY WITH PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS BUT ALSO BECAUSE THE ACQUIESCENCE BY ITS MEMBERS TO SERVE IN THE COMMISSION WAS EVIDENTLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDING THE WELFARE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AND CAN, IN NO WAY, REFLECT THE SENTIMENTS OF THE FILIPINO TOWARD THE ENEMY. SUCH SENTIMENTS ARE STILL THOSE I HAVE REPEATEDLY PRESSED IN THE FIRST: LOYALTY TO AMERICA AND RESOLUTE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE INVASION OF OUR TERRITORY AND LIBERTIES.'

AT THE SAME TIME I AM GOING TO OPEN MY MIND AND MY HEART TO YOU WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO HIDE ANYTHING.

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WE ARE BEFORE THE BAR OF HISTORY AND GOD ONLY KNOWS IF THIS IS THE LAST TIME THAT MY VOICE WILL BE HEARD BEFORE GOING TO MY GRAVE.

MY LOYALTY AND THE LOYALTY OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE TO AMERICA HAVE BEEN PROVEN BEYOND QUESTION. NOW WE ARE FIGHTING BY HER SIDE UNDER YOUR COMMAND, DESPITE OVERWHELMING ODDS. BUT, IT SEEMS TO ME QUESTIONABLE WHETHER ANY GOVERNMENT HAS THE RIGHT TO DEMAND LOYALTY FROM ITS CITIZENS BEYOND ITS WILLINGNESS OR ABILITY TO RENDER ACTUAL PROTECTION.

THIS WAR IS NOT OF OUR MAKING. THOSE THAT HAD DICTATED THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT HAVE FAILED TO SEE THAT THIS IS THE WEAKEST POINT IN AMERICAN TERRITORY. FROM THE BEGINNING, THEY SHOULD HAVE TRIED TO BUILD UP OUR DEFENSES. AS SOON AS THE PROSPECTS LOOKED BAD TO ME, I TELEGRAPHED PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT REQUESTING HIM TO INCLUDE THE PHILIPPINES IN THE AMERICAN DEFENSE PROGRAM. I WAS GIVEN NO SATISFACTORY ANSWER.

WHEN I TRIED TO DO SOMETHING TO ACCELERATE OUR DEFENSE PREPARATIONS, I WAS STOPPED FROM DOING IT.

DESPITE ALL THIS WE NEVER HESITATED FOR A MOMENT IN OUR STAND. WE DECIDED TO FIGHT BY YOUR SIDE AND WE HAVE DONE THE BEST WE COULD AND WE

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ARE STILL DOING AS MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED FROM US
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT HOW LONG ARE WE GOING
TO BE LEFT ALONE? HAS IT ALREADY BEEN DECIDED IN
WASHINGTON THAT THE PHILIPPINE FRONT IS OF NO IMPORT-
ANCE AS FAR AS THE FINAL RESULT OF THE WAR IS CONCERNED
AND THAT, THEREFORE, NO HELP CAN BE EXPECTED HERE
IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, OR AT LEAST BEFORE
OUR POWER OF RESISTANCE IS EXHAUSTED. IF SO, I WANT TO KNOW
IT, BECAUSE I HAVE MY OWN RESPONSIBILITY TO MY COUNTRYMEN
WHOM, AS PRESIDENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, I HAVE LED INTO A
COMPLETE WAR -----
EFFORT. I AM GREATLY CONCERNED AS WELL REGARDING THE
SOLDIERS I HAVE CALLED TO THE COLORS AND WHO ARE
NOW MANNING THE FIRING LINE. I WANT TO DECIDE IN MY
OWN MIND WHETHER THERE IS JUSTIFICATION IN ALLOWING
ALL THESE MEN TO BE KILLED, WHEN FOR THE FINAL
OUTCOME OF THE WAR THE SHEDDING OF THEIR BLOOD MAY
BE WHOLLY UNNECESSARY. IT SEEMS THAT WASHINGTON

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DOES NOT FULLY REALIZE OUR SITUATION NOR THE FEELINGS WHICH THE APPARENT NEGLECT OF OUR SAFETY AND WELFARE HAVE ENGENDERED IN THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE HERE.

SOME (XXXXXXXXXX) CUDLR AVO, I TELEGRAPHED THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.....ABOUT THIS SAME MATTER. I DID NOT RECEIVE EVEN ONE WORD OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT. IS THE SACRIFICE THAT I, MEMBERS OF MY GOVERNMENT, AND MY WHOLE FAMILY ARE MAKING HERE, OF NO VALUE AT ALL?

IN REFERENCE TO THE MEN WHO HAVE ACCEPTED POSITIONS IN THE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED BY THE JAPANESE, EVERYONE OF THEM WANTED TO COME TO CORREGIDOR, BUT YOU TOLD ME THAT THERE WAS NO PLACE FOR THEM HERE. THEY ARE NOT QUISLINGS. THE QUISLINGS ARE THE MEN WHO BETRAY THEIR COUNTRY TO THE ENEMY. THESE MEN DID WHAT THEY HAD BEEN ASKED TO DO, UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THEIR XXXXXXXX GOVERNMENT. TODAY THEY ARE VIRTUALLY PRISONERS OF THE ENEMY. I AM SURE THEY ARE ONLY DOING WHAT THEY THINK IS THEIR DUTY. THEY ARE NOT TRAITORS. THEY XXXXXXX

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ARE THE VICTIMS OF THE ADVERSE FORTUNES OF WAR AND I AM SURE THEY HAD NO CHOICE. BESIDES, IT IS MOST PROBABLE THAT THEY ACCEPTED THEIR POSITIONS IN ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE WELFARE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE OCCUPIED AREAS. I THINK, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AMERICA SHOULD LOOK UPON THEIR SITUATION SYMPATHETICALLY AND UNDERSTANDINGLY.

I AM CONFIDENT THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND MY ANXIETY ABOUT THE LONG AWAITED REINFORCEMENTS AND TRUST YOU WILL AGAIN URGE WASHINGTON TO INSURE THEIR EARLY ARRIVAL.

Sincerely yours,

Manuel Quezon."

HIS PROCLAMATION IS BEING GIVEN THE WIDEST DISTRIBUTION THAT IS POSSIBLE FROM HERE BOTH BY PRINTED CIRCULAR AND RADIO BROADCAST. IT SHOULD BE PUBLICIZED BY YOU THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE LETTER IS OF SUCH A NATURE THAT IT PROPERLY CAN BE ANSWERED ONLY BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I URGE MOST EARNESTLY THAT NO EFFORT BE SPARED ADEQUATELY TO MEET THIS SITUATION. PLEASE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS RADIO AND INFORM ME AS TO WHEN REPLY CAN BE EXPECTED.

MacARTHUR.

SECRET

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COPY

EXACT COPY

RADIOGRAM

SECRET

January 29, 1942

FROM: FT MILLS

TO: ADJUTANT GENERAL:

NO. 148 -- JANUARY 29

THE FOLLOWING PUBLIC STATEMENT IS REPORTED IN THE TRIBUNE
 MANILA JANUARY TWENTY FOUR AS HAVING BEEN MADE BY GENERAL
 AGUINALDO QUOTE SUBQUOTE INDEPENDENCE WITH HONOR EXCLAMATION
 POINT SUBUNQUOTE DASH THIS IS THE REASSURING ANNOUNCEMENT OF PO
 POLICY MADE BY PRIME MINISTER HIDEKI TOJO REGARDING THE PHILIP-
 PINES IN THE COURSE OF HIS SPEECH AT THE OPENING OF THE SEVENTY
 NINTH SESSION OF THE JAPANESE IMPERIAL DIET STOP IT IS A FORMAL
 AND OFFICIAL COMMITMENT WHICH ALL FILIPINOS SHOULD HARK AND
 WELCOME STOP THE ONLY CONDITION IMPOSED IS THAT WE SHOULD
 SUBQUOTE RECOGNIZE AND COOPERATE WITH JAPANS PROGRAM OF ESTAB-
 LISHING A GREATER EAST ASIA COPROSPERITY SPHERE SUBUNQUOTE PARA
 SUBQUOTE THIS IS A LAUDABLE OBJECTIVE FROM VIEWPOINT OF JAPAN
 STOP IT IS AN OBJECTIVE THAT DESERVES THE SUPPORT OF OUR NATION
 COMMA BECAUSE GEOGRAPHICALLY WE ARE LOCATED IN A REGION EMBRACED
 WITH THE SPHERE OF COPROSPERITY PARA SUBQUOTE INSPIRED BY ITS
 LOYALTY TO THE IDEAL OF INDEPENDENCE COMMA OUR COUNTRY COMMA
 ALTHOUGH NOT A BELLIGERENT COMMA HAS SECRIFICED AND IS STILL
 SACRIFICING SIDE BY SIDE WITH AMERICAN TROOPS COMMA THOUSANDS OF
 FILIPINOS SOLDIERS STOP THE JAPANESE COMMAND CANNOT BUT RECOGNIZE
 THE VALOR AND HEROISM DISPLAYED BY OUR SOLDIERS IN THE FIELDS OF

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RADIOGRAM

PAGE TWO NO. 148 FROM FT MILLS

BATTLE. WITHOUT MODERN ARMAMENT, SUBMARINES, AIRPLANES AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS AND RANGE, WITHOUT RECEIVING THE HELP THAT HAS REPEATEDLY BEEN PROMISED, OUR VALIANT COUNTRY MEN HAVE DONE THEIR DUTY. WE SHOULD REALIZE BY NOW THAT FURTHER RESISTANCE WOULD NOT HAVE ANY PRACTICAL ADVANTAGE AND WOULD ONLY MEAN UNNECESSARY SACRIFICE IN LIVES AND PROPERTIES, INASMUCH AS JAPAN 'DOES NOT REGARD US HER ENEMIES' AND THAT JAPAN WOULD 'GLADLY GRANT THE PHILIPPINES ITS INDEPENDENCE' -- THE SAME IDEALS WHICH IMPELLED US REVOLUTIONARIES, TO FIGHT IN THE PAST, AND WHICH OUR SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BELIEVE THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR IN THE PRESENT WAR.

'IN VIEW OF THIS OFFICIAL ASSURANCE GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN, LET US INVITE OUR COUNTRYMEN TO RETURN TO THEIR TOWNS AND HOMES, TO CULTIVATE THEIR FARMS AND TO HARVEST THEIR CROPS IN ORDER TO PREVENT STARVATION AND FURTHER MISERY, AND LET US PLACE OUR CONFIDENCE IN THE PROMISE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES THAT THE LIVES, PROPERTIES

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RADIOGRAM

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PAGE THREE NO. 148 FROM FT MILLS

AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF OUR COUNTRYMEN SHALL BE PROTECTED
STOP PARA SUBQUOTE I BELIEVE COMMA THEREFORE COMMA WE
SHOULD LEND OUR WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION TO JAPAN COMMA
ESPECIALLY IN THE IMMEDIATE TASK CONFRONTING US OF RE-
CONSTRUCTING AND ALEVIATING THE SUFFERINGS OF OUR PEOPLE
FROM THE RAVAGES OF WAR UNQUOTE THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
SITUATION HERE IS BECOMING CRITICAL STOP IF SOMETHING IS
NOT DONE SHORTLY TO BRING REASSURANCE TO THESE PEOPLE THERE
IS GRAVE DANGER OF THE SUCCESS OF THE ENEMYS PROPAGANDA
CAMPAIGN STOP SILENCE WILL DEFEAT US

MACARTHUR

SECRET

*War File
Philippine Folder*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

*file
Confidential*

January 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

After conferring with General Marshall and Admiral King, I suggest, with General Marshall's and Admiral King's concurrence, that you reply to Mr. Sayre's telegram no. 29, January 24, 1 p.m., along the lines of the attached draft telegram.

It is the consensus of opinion among the officers of the three Departments who have been giving this matter special consideration that all concerned should keep in mind the question of the desirability that President Quezon and his family and Mr. Osmeña not fall into the hands of the Japanese; and that, as the military situation develops, consideration be given to the question of possible need for and possible nature of further messages to Mr. Sayre, General MacArthur, and Admiral Hart on that subject. It is my understanding that General Marshall and Admiral King will keep in close touch with each other regarding the situation and this problem.

If you approve the attached draft telegram, I shall have it dispatched at once to Mr. Sayre.

C.H.

x

x

January 26, 1942

UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,

MANILA (FORT MILLS), P.I.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Your 29, January 24, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER.

One. In the light of General MacArthur's recommendations in his message to the Chief of Staff to which you refer, and after consultation with high officers of the several Departments most concerned, I feel that this question should not be raised again with General MacArthur at this time; and I suggest that you withhold reply to the CINCAF and not repeat, pending further word from here, raise the subject with either military or naval authorities unless first approached by them.

Two. It is felt that military considerations are paramount; that no step should be taken which might adversely affect the military situation; and that every possible step should be taken that will favorably affect that situation. The question whether any persons shall at any time be evacuated should be a matter for decision by General MacArthur in the light of his estimate of attendant hazards and effects and with due consideration of the wishes of the individuals concerned.

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Three. Our whole country is proud of all of you and of the heroic way in which the personnel, both American and Filipino, of the armed forces in the Philippines is valiantly contesting every inch of ground against vastly larger enemy forces.

Four. This message is intended for your personal information and guidance. If, however, you should feel, in the light of your knowledge of communications already exchanged of which we here may not have full knowledge, that the contents of this message or any part thereof especially need to be communicated by you to General MacArthur, you are authorized, in your discretion, to make such communication.

PA/H:SKH:HNS
FE:MMH

FE

x

x

January 26, 1942

UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER,

MANILA (FORT MILLS), P.I.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

Your 29, January 24, 1 p.m.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER.

One. In the light of General MacArthur's recommendations in his message to the Chief of Staff to which you refer, and after consultation with high officers of the several Departments most concerned, I feel that this question should not be raised again with General MacArthur at this time; and I suggest that you withhold reply to the CINCAF and not repeat, pending further word from here, raise the subject with either military or naval authorities unless first approached by them.

Two. It is felt that military considerations are paramount; that no step should be taken which might adversely affect the military situation; and that every possible step should be taken that will favorably affect that situation. The question whether any persons shall at any time be evacuated should be a matter for decision by General MacArthur in the light of his estimate of attendant hazards and effects and with due consideration of the wishes of the individuals concerned.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

January 24, 1942.

Mr. Berle:

Mr. Stone brought in this telegram and said he understood you had a draft telegram on this subject.

He said copies of this telegram have gone to A-L, PA/H, FE, and PI.

*I think Dr.
Hornblower is for
drafting*
AD

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HUNNWECK
JAN 26 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AB
PA-H

FROM (Manila)
Port Mills via N.R.

AF
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Dated January 24, 1942

Received 4:34 a.m.

Telegram to Manila
Secretary of State,
Washington.

SECRETARY OF STATE
JAN 24 1942
NOTED
SENT TO THE PRESIDENT

29, January 24, 1 p.m.

VERY SECRET. PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I have received from Cincaf a message citing one from Cine Washington saying "Consideration must be given to evacuation from Corregidor of a certain few key political figures" and asking me after conferring with Admiral Rockwell to send my conclusions "including the number of persons. Presumably this will be done via submarines either now or later".

I am unable to answer message of Cincaf without a clarification of above Washington message. I believe only you should decide what "key political figures" you wish evacuated. So far as concerns Quezon see recent message MacArthur to Chief of Staff Marshall Washington. With Quezon here are his wife and three children, Vice President Osmena and Chief Justice Santos.

Please mark reply triple priority.

SAYRE

811B.001 QUEZON, MANUEL L./158

PS/WHA
Confidential File

511 B.001, Luzon

Box

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON


SECRET

January 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With reference to the possibilities of dropping small arms ammunition to the troops at Del Monte, on the Island of Mindanao, the following information is furnished:

1. If the field at Del Monte remains available or if our planes can service at a Borneo airport, it would be possible to transport approximately 50,000 rounds of small arms ammunition per B-17 plane. One such cargo would furnish about two rounds per gun at Del Monte. (There are 12 rounds of ammunition to the pound).
2. It is exceedingly difficult at this distance to estimate just what might be done in the constantly changing military situation in the Far East. If it becomes impracticable to land B-17's on Borneo or at the Del Monte field in Mindanao, it would be impracticable to service such a project due to the length of the round trip involved between the base on Java to Mindanao and return.
3. At the present time General Wavell has very few heavy bombers and is evidently using them to the limit in opposing the Japanese advance southward. General Brett reported that they were running two crews on each plane. This would mean that the planes would require overhauls at frequent intervals, thus further reducing the limited number available.


Chief of Staff.

SECRET

COPY

Philippe Foldi

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

December 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I suggest that the Secretary of State reply to Mr. Sayre's message substantially as follows:

THE PRESIDENT IS DIRECTLY IN TOUCH WITH THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST stop HE WISHES YOU TO READ THE WAR DEPARTMENT'S MESSAGE SENT TODAY TO MACARTHUR WHICH IS SELF-EXPLANATORY stop FOR EVIDENT MILITARY REASONS NO REPEAT NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE NATURE SUGGESTED BY YOU SHOULD BE MADE AT THIS TIME stop GENERAL MACARTHUR CAN DETERMINE WHAT MIGHT SAFELY BE SAID PUBLICLY end

s/ ROOSEVELT

s/ Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

O.K.

State to
send to Sayre.

F. D. R.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Please let me have a
suggested reply as quickly
as possible.

F. D. R.

WAR DEPARTMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT
1941 DEC 15 PM 1:36

MEV
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Manila

Dated December 15, 1941

Rec'd 7:30 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

628, December 15, 6 p.m.

FROM SAYRE PERSONAL AND IMMEDIATE FOR ROOSEVELT.

Am gravely concerned over rumors circulating here. Filipinos risking lives and country on faith of America's word she will protect them. Under McArthur's leadership they making magnificent defense effort. America cannot afford to let them down. Whispers here United States withholding further aid and does not intend to try break Jap blockade. Existing forces woefully inadequate. Assume whispers untrue but if they become convincing there's critical danger of collapse entire structure and insuing disaster. To avert this may I suggest first, that you forthwith order available resources be sent succor Philippines; second, you publicly announce this fact, giving lie to rumors and preserving morale here. Immediate action necessary.

SAYRE

Repetition of garbled group requested.

*Philippine Is
Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY ICKES:

I think it is extremely un-
advisable to send any message to
Sayre or Quezon in regard to events
of the past. They are fighting with
their backs against the wall!

F.D.R.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

WHITE HOUSE
DEC 9 9 51 AM '41
RECEIVED

DEC - 9 1941

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of December 2 forwarding to this Department for preparation of reply three radiograms, dated November 29, November 30 and December 1, which you have received direct from the United States High Commissioner with reference to certain public statements reported to have been made recently by President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth.

This Department has noted press dispatches sent to the United States reporting President Quezon's remarks and unquestionably the statements attributed to him were unfortunate and ill-timed. I do not believe, however, that anything is to be gained by the issuance either in Manila or in Washington of any public statement in reply to President Quezon. I interpret Mr. Sayre's last message of December 1, referring to President Quezon's public statement asserting his loyalty to you and to the American Government, as modifying to some extent his two previous messages. I believe that a radiogram somewhat along the following lines might be appropriate:

"United States High Commissioner,

"Manila.

"I have received your three radiograms of November 29, November 30 and December 1. I do not believe it advisable to make any public statement either here or in Manila regarding this matter but you might, if you think it advisable to do so, advise President Quezon privately that his statements have received considerable unfavorable publicity in the United States. It must be stated that his remarks were unfortunate not only from the standpoint of their effect upon Philippine-American relations but also from the standpoint of the impression created in foreign countries. If, as he states, steps being taken for civilian defense in the Philippines are inadequate, you might remind him that we have the same problem in the United States but time is so precious that we cannot afford the luxury of argument as to responsibility. I am confident that



President Quezon will not allow something which is past and gone to prevent him now from taking every possible step to cooperate with the United States Government, and I am equally confident that you and other Federal officials in the Islands will do everything possible to cooperate with the Philippine Government in taking appropriate steps for the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines. There are bound to be differences of opinion but public quarrels and misunderstandings merely confuse our own people and give confidence to our opponents. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

"I have received your letter of November 21, 1942, regarding the situation in the Philippines. It is not within my authority to discuss matters of this nature either here or in Manila. My only duty is to you and to the United States Government. I am confident that the Philippine Government will cooperate with the United States Government in the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines. There are bound to be differences of opinion but public quarrels and misunderstandings merely confuse our own people and give confidence to our opponents. Franklin D. Roosevelt."

TELEGRAM

C
O
P
Y

The White House
Washington

MANTLA, 8:23 P.M., Dec. 1, 1941

4WU 45 USG, VIA RCA.

THE PRESIDENT:

REFERENCE MY NOVEMBER THIRTY REGARDING QUEZON SPEECH IT IS
PRESUMED YOU NOW HAVE PRESS REPORTS OF STATEMENT DECEMBER ONE
BY QUEZON ASSERTING HIS LOYALTY AND THAT OF THE PHILIPPINE
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE TO YOU AND TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT.

SAYRE

8:15 A.M.

MAR 23

EMM

NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

NPM 5423

COMM OFFICE
TRAFFIC CHIEF

RECEIVED AT ROOM 2623
RE 7406-EXT. 87-197

RDO MANILA CK 107 GOVT INT TWENTYNINTH 0602

ROUTINE

1941 NOV 29 17 27

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-19008

GOVT INT PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
PRESIDENT QUEZON YESTERDAY IN BROADCAST SPEECH IS REPORTED IN THIS
MORNINGS MANILA BULLETIN COMMA MOST RELIABLE AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS
HERE COMMA TO HAVE CHARGED THAT DELAY IN CIVILIAN DEFENSE MEASURES
IN PHILIPPINES WAS CAUSED BY HIS HANDS BEING TIED BY YOUR MESSAGE
TRANSMITTED (50)

BY RADIO FROM DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR NUMBER FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY
ONE DATED SEPTEMBER SEVEN NINETEEN FORTY CONCERNING HIS EXERCISE
OF POWER UNDER EMERGENCY POWERS ACT STOP PLEASE REFER TO MY PERSONAL
LETTER TO YOU DATED SEPTEMBER TWELVE NINETEEN FORTY STOP AM
PREPARING FULL REPORT SHOWING UNFOUNDED NATURE OF CHARGES COMMA
WHICH I WILL SEND YOU SHORTLY

VIA MSNGR.

1721APMX29NOV.

SAYRE.

TELEGRAM

The White House

NYA44 POKIC 544 CABLE

Washington

F MANILA, NOVEMBER 30, 1941

THE PRESIDENT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CONTINUATION OF MY TELEGRAM OF NOVEMBER TWENTY-NINE:

BE ASSURED PHILIPPINE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY MEASURES BEEN MY CLOSE OBSERVATION FOR MORE THAN YEAR. THROUGH MY EFFORTS, WORKING WITH MILITARY AND NAVAL COMMANDERS, QUEZON WAS INDUCED CREATE CIVILIAN EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION, WHICH THOUGH BADLY HANDICAPPED BY FAILURE TO PROVIDE FUNDS, HAS SLOWLY ADVANCED PHILIPPINE CIVILIAN DEFENSE MEASURES. ALTHOUGH WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION I WAS ABLE TO STIMULATE ITS ACTIVITIES DESPITE DIFFICULTIES DUE TO THE LOCAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMPLEXITIES. THREE MONTHS AGO I SENT MAJOR MARRON, MY LIAISON OFFICER, TO BRITISH MALAYA AND NETHERLANDS INDIES TO REPORT CIVILIAN DEFENSE PREPARATIONS THERE. HIS EXCELLENT CONSTRUCTIVE REPORTS INEVITABLY DISCLOSED GLARING DEFICIENCIES IN PHILIPPINE PREPARATIONS. SOME PROGRESS HAS RESULTED BUT I AM FAR FROM SATISFIED.

THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY QUEZON'S SPEECH WAS PLACEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRESENT INADEQUACY OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE PREPARATIONS. QUEZON CONTENDS THAT EXERCISE OF EMERGENCY POWERS ACT WOULD HAVE ENABLED HIM TO TAKE CIVILIAN PROTECTION

GRAM

The White House
2 - SAYRE - MANILA - NOVEMBER 30, 1941
Washington

MEASURES BUT THAT DUE TO THE AMERICAN OPINION CREATED BY CAMPAIGN OF IGNORANCE AND BAD FAITH YOU STOPPED HIM FROM EXERCISING THOSE POWERS. DURING SEVEN MONTHS FOLLOWING HE CLAIMED HIS HANDS WERE TIED; THAT IT WAS THIS SEVEN MONTHS' PERIOD THAT HE NEEDED IN ORDER TO BE READY TODAY; AND THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THIS NEGLECT OF EMERGENCY MEASURES WAS NOT HIS. HE STATED IF WAR BREAKS OUT SOON AND PEOPLE DIE HERE UNPROTECTED, THOSE WHO HAVE STOPPED HIM FROM DOING WHAT HE SHOULD HAVE DONE OUGHT TO BE HANGED, EVERY ONE OF THEM, ON LAMP-POST; THAT HAD THERE BEEN WAR TWO MONTHS AGO, THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN STARVATION IN THE PHILIPPINES; IF WAR ARRIVED NOW IT WOULD FIND CIVILIAN POPULATION UNPREPARED AND UNPROTECTED; THAT DEATH AND DESTRUCTION MAY COME HERE BUT NOBODY IS GETTING READY FOR IT.

QUEZON'S SPEECH, WITH ITS PATENT ATTEMPT TO EVADE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEFICIENCIES IN EMERGENCY MEASURES, CAME WITHOUT WARNING. IT WAS DELIVERED DAY FOLLOWING CONFERENCE CALLED BY ME WITH HIM AND GENERAL MACARTHUR WHERE IT WAS AGREED THAT EACH SHOULD STATE IN WRITING, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, STATUS OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE AND OUTLINE FUTURE ACTIVITIES.

DURING THE PERIOD SINCE CREATION OF CIVILIAN EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION, QUEZON HAS ADMITTED RESPONSIBILITY OF

GRAM

The White House
3 - SAYRE - MANILA - NOVEMBER 30, 1941
Washington

COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE ON REPEATED OCCASIONS, PARTICULARLY IN ADDRESSING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON MAY FIFTH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE.

SEVEN MONTHS "HANDS TIED" PERIOD OBVIOUSLY REFERS TO TIME BETWEEN RECEIVING YOUR MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER SEVENTH, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY AND DATE OF CREATION OF CEA, APRIL FIRST, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE. FACTS CONTRADICT HIS STATEMENTS CONCERNING THIS PERIOD. OPPORTUNITY WAS NOT OPEN TO HIM TO SECURE LEGISLATION DURING THIS PERIOD, BUT PRESUMABLY HE MIGHT HAVE PROCEEDED UNDER ORDINARY POLICE POWERS OF COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT. DURING THIS PERIOD GENERAL GRUNERT AND I DID EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO STIMULATE HIM TO ACT.

AM FORWARDING TOMORROW, AIR-MAIL, FULL REPORT PROVING CONCLUSIVELY QUEZON'S ALLEGATIONS REGARDING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SHORTCOMINGS CIVILIAN DEFENSE CONTRARY TO FACT. OWING DELICATE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND FACT QUEZON'S ATTACK BASED UPON YOUR CONFIDENTIAL INSTRUCTION TO ME, IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS, I DO NOT FEEL FREE TO MAKE STATEMENT OF MY OWN, UNLESS SO DIRECTED BY YOU. I VENTURE TO SUGGEST HOW TO PROCEED THAT YOU MAY WISH TO STATE TO PRESS:

- (1) THAT FAR FROM IMPEDING CIVILIAN DEFENSE MEASURES

GRAM

The White House
Washington

4 - SAYRE - MANILA - NOVEMBER 30, 1941

AMERICAN AUTHORITIES IN THE PHILIPPINES HAVE LONG URGED AND STIMULATED COMMONWEALTH AUTHORITIES TO MAKE CIVILIAN DEFENSE PREPARATIONS;

(2) THAT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT HAS NEVER PLACED OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF APPROPRIATE LEGISLATION BY COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT OR USE OF EXISTING POLICE POWERS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE MEASURES AND;

(3) THAT IF PREPARATIONS FOR CIVILIAN DEFENSE IN THE PHILIPPINES ARE INADEQUATE, AS PRESIDENT QUEZON ALLEGES, THEY SHOULD BE MADE ADEQUATE FORTHWITH BY THE CONSTITUTED AUTHORITY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH, WHO ENJOYS THE FULL COOPERATION OF AMERICAN AUTHORITIES.

SAYRE.

A76-3 (Philippine)

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON


April 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Disposal of Philippine Monetary
Reserve on Corregidor Island.

The War Department has just received a message from General Wainwright which states that the Philippine monetary reserve composed of silver coins with an aggregate face value of 15,792,000 pesos has been dumped in Manila Bay. The message gives, in detail, the landmarks by which this money may be recovered when conditions permit.

For the present this message is being held in the most secret archives of the War Department. It will be furnished to such office or official of government as you may direct.


Chief of Staff

SECRET

Lt Rigdon:

This came from the Map Room
file of dispatches on the campaign in
the Philippines, 1942. I think you
should have it. Chief Hoying also has
several other papers from the same file
for you.

GME.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

I am informed that the President
asked about this matter.

Very respectfully,

J. L. McCrea
JOHN L. McCREA

COMENCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

March 10, 1942.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL EDWARDS:

Subject: Use of Omaha Class Cruiser as Blockade Runner.

1. (a) Only CONCORD, TRENTON, MEMPHIS and RICHMOND have sufficient radius to make the trip and return.

(b) OMAHA, CINCINNATI, and MILWAUKEE have sufficient radius to go out but not to return.

to destination
(c) DETROIT radius is too short to ensure her getting ~~out~~ if she is compelled to run long at high speed.

2. (a) "As is" with crew, provisions, armament and ammunition, etc., on board, the useful cargo that could be carried by any of these cruisers is less than 60 tons.

(b) By reducing crew to 400, boats to 3, ammunition to about 30 per gun, stores and fresh water to one half, about 530 tons of cargo could be carried.

(c) By further removing planes, catapults, aviation gas, four 6" guns, four 3" guns, torpedoes, torpedo tubes, the total useful cargo could be raised to 780 tons.

3. By way of comparison, the ARGONAUT could carry about 198 tons, and the GRAYLING about 138 tons.

4. The OMAHAS have a distinctive silhouette which cannot be readily modified to resemble any Jap cruiser.

5. The chance of an OMAHA getting in appears very small and the chance of both getting in and getting out appears to be practically nil.

Capt. McCrea

W. A. Lee, Jr.
W. A. LEE, JR.,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

13.

SECRET

A16-3 (Warfare Operations
Philippine Islands) COPY

April 4, 1942.

To: CGUSAFIA

War Dept. No. 1114

On April 3rd Emmons informed the War Department
in substance as follows:

Ship, manned by a Navy crew, left Honolulu for the
Philippines at 10:00 A.M. today with a total cargo of
4,258 tons. This included one million rations complete,
weighing 3,000 tons, 340 tons of meat, 20 tons of
cigarettes, 150 tons of milk, 200 tons of rice and
548 tons of ammunition. It is estimated that the trip
will require 22 days.

Marshall.

SECRET

FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

By Genl Watson to
Capt McCrea

Return to
John 6-37
Admiral Hart's Narrative

~~105~~
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U. S. FLEET
RECEIVED

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

(*Philippines and S.W. Pacific*)

1942 JUN 11 13 24

Narrative of Events, Asiatic Fleet
Leading up to War and
From 8 December 1941 to 15 February 1942

by

Admiral Thos. C. HART
Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet

Note:- The source of material for this narrative is largely a diary and a file of unofficial letters which were saved. The only official Asiatic Fleet documents available for the preparation of this narrative were a few despatches and the correspondence contained in the file marked "Enclosure (A) to ComSouWesPac Secret Serial SA-24 of March 27, 1942". Since this narrative and the file just referred to are complementary in context, the reading of both will furnish a more complete picture than can be gained from either one alone. All other Asiatic Fleet files (as well as all 16th Naval District files which contained much information on this subject) were lost due to enemy action.

41184

CONFIDENTIAL

A background to any operational narrative for the Asiatic Fleet's preparation for war and of the events during the war's first two or three months needs be supplied by outlining the steps which were taken toward joint operations with the N.E.I. forces and the British forces,- particularly the latter.

It can properly begin about mid-January, 1941, when Commander McCrea came to Manila and acquainted us with the outlines of a new War Plan. At the time of his visit, the Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Purnell, (then Captain), was at Singapore engaged in the second conference with the British. (First one was 8 - 15 November 1940). Incidentally, Admiral Purnell attended all of the conferences, four in all, with the British and the Dutch, directly representing CinCAF, and hence became the officer of that Fleet who was best in touch with what would probably face us in case of a war with Japan while we were allied with the British and the Dutch.

The main lines of the cooperative position which our Asiatic Fleet occupied, vis-a-vis the British and the Dutch, were briefly as follows:-

Under the first plan, which Commander McCrea brought out, the intention was that we would reinforce our Asiatic Fleet with at least a Cruiser Division, one Carrier, and a Squadron of Destroyers, while the British Navy would continue mainly engaged in the Atlantic,- and perhaps the western part of the Indian Ocean. Later, February to April, 1941, the position became reversed in that our Asiatic Fleet was to receive no surface ship reinforcements, whereas the British Fleet would be reinforced heavily, with Battleships and Carriers included. The question of unified command of Naval forces never became at all definite. At first the trend was toward American command, and then later toward British command, corresponding to the relative preponderance of Naval forces available. All through the negotiations and conferences the Dutch Naval command occupied a position quite subordinate to the British; they tended to be in closer touch with the British command than were we, particularly so as time went on and exchange of visits between Java and Singapore increased.

CONFIDENTIAL

A characteristic of the aforesaid negotiations, conferences, etc., was that the British Navy seemed always to primarily feature the control of trade routes over broad areas, (with particular regard to ocean escort of the Empire's troop and supply convoys), whereas we tended to minimize the requirements in that respect to the consequent availability of naval concentrations prepared for direct combat. Consequently, there was a rather basic conflict between British and American views; this not only obtained in the Far East, but is also understood to have existed in Washington, - so there was no disagreement on this major point within our own service. One result was that, all through the period leading up to the war, there never was any agreement with the British, (and Dutch), under which strategic control of the Asiatic Fleet was to pass out of American hands. Therefore, only "cooperative action" was provided for.

The British Naval authorities at Singapore, with the Dutch participating, made considerable progress with joint war plans, (known as "PLENAPS"), based upon the forces available but also useful if naval forces were considerably increased; they always supplied CinCAF with copies, one of which went to OpNav. The British Naval authorities were never able to obtain concrete commitments from either the Australian or New Zealand Navies, both of which held out and retained the idea of concentrating their own ships in their home waters in case of a war with Japan.

As far as the Asiatic Fleet was concerned, the war began with no commitments toward the British or the Dutch except for one minor one: - To supply the British Far Eastern Fleet with Destroyers, up to two Divisions, if and when that Fleet grew to the intended dimensions, comprising Capital Ships, Carriers, etc. We still were in the position of otherwise exercising complete strategic control of the Asiatic Fleet when the war began.

Looking back at this time, the lack of preparation for joint action between the three Navies in that area was really seriously disadvantageous in only two particular factors; - the personnel of the Asiatic Fleet had acquired no familiarity with the N.E.I. and Malayan waters and preparations for joint tactical

CONFIDENTIAL

operations were quite incomplete. There was also the lack of personal acquaintance as among officers of the three Fleets; but the most disadvantageous circumstance was American lack of familiarity with the waters in which they later had to fight. Fortunately, however, considerable preparations had been made in the field of joint communications with the British and Dutch. As a result of two very comprehensive conferences on this subject, and with the benefit derived from a fairly lengthy practice period, in the use of the special cryptographic aids and radio channels, radio procedure, etc., the outbreak of war found us reasonably well prepared in the field of joint communications.

It will be recalled that Admiral Tom Phillips, R.N., arrived in Singapore with REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES about 1 December 1941. The new British Commander in Chief came to Manila almost immediately, (and before conferring with either the Australian or New Zealand Navies, or with the Dutch Commander in Chief); he arrived there on 5 December. Before that time I felt that the situation had become such that there would be no objection in going to Singapore for conference myself, but Admiral Phillips moved first. We conferred through 6 December, with Lieutenant General MacArthur present until the conference became strictly naval and in detail. (Incomplete stenographic record is available). A joint despatch to the respective Governments was agreed upon and sent, late on 6 December. Admiral Phillips then returned to Singapore, (flying both ways), to follow up by conferences with the Dutch, the Australians, and the New Zealanders, but the war came on before such conferences were held.

Note:- Chief Air Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham visited Manila early in April, 1941 and once or twice subsequently. The first visit had no result and I doubt that the later ones did. There was a good deal of attendant publicity which I considered to be quite undesirable inasmuch as all the Allies still had much building-up remaining. It was not timely from the standpoint of International Relations to forewarn enemies by such show of conferences. Those between Navy officials were kept secret, whether held in Singapore, Batavia or Manila.

CONFIDENTIAL

EVENTS UP TO 1 JUNE 1941

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, arrived Manila Bay 21 October 1940, and thenceforth none of the Fleet was north of Philippine waters, with the exception of the China Gunboats and the occasional scheduled visits of the Navy Transports. There had already been discontinuance of forwarding Marine replacements into China for the detachments at Tientsin and Peking. This was later extended to the Fourth Marines at Shanghai, so that all the Marine detachments in China ran down in numbers, to the consequent increase of the Marines in the Philippines. Also, either TULSA or ASHEVILLE were being kept in Philippine waters, leaving only one of those two vessels with the South China Patrol.

Upon arrival in Manila, Commander in Chief soon found that the Commandant of 16th Naval District was in unsatisfactory mental and nervous state and he dropped out from illness on 12 December. This entire period was characterized by personnel difficulties in the 16th Naval District which, indeed, endured to the end. After an interim of five or six weeks, another Rear Admiral arrived to take over the District; but after six months he also was invalided home. After another interim of some weeks, during which the second-in-command of the District carried on, a third Rear Admiral arrived, about four weeks before the outbreak of the war. There were, therefore, in all, five officers who acted as Commandant of the District within one year. This in itself was a source of inefficiency, at a time when the demands upon the District incident to increased work in serving the Fleet, plus the handling of a good many "projects" in preparation for war, placed a heavier load upon the personnel of the District than had ever obtained before.

The Naval establishment in Manila Bay was, of course, most inadequate and difficulties of an industrial nature were very great. Unfortunately, the best personnel obtainable, which in such a situation might have improved matters to a great extent, was not available. The Department had for far too many years sent officers, line officers in particular, to the 16th District who were not of the quality that the conditions called for. Olongapo did run very well; its Commander and the Constructor, (for the DEWEY), were excellent.

CONFIDENTIAL

The situation, which is very briefly sketched above, was always a handicap to the correct functioning of the Asiatic Fleet command as a whole. Nevertheless, in upkeep of material, we were usually able to meet the most important demands and, since the Naval facilities at Cavite and elsewhere in Manila Bay were mostly put out of action very early after the outbreak of the war, these deficiencies did not constitute a serious handicap after hostilities actually began.

During the period, and subsequently, a mass of directives involving alterations to ships was received from the Navy Department. Most of them showed no differentiation over similar ships on other stations, some seemed not to fit Asiatic Fleet's own special requirements and the total involved was so great that available industrial facilities would have been swamped if it had all been taken on. In consequence, Commander in Chief established priorities to control the character and quantity undertaken, - of these alterations which had been ordered by the Navy Department. A number of them were of such low priority on that list that Cavite never even approached undertaking them.

The industrial force at Cavite became expanded to the limit of the plant. In order to better care for immediate needs and to increase potentialities for future Navy Yard work, various small plants in Manila were given contracts for work within their capacity which resulted in some alleviation of the congestion at Cavite. This practice did also set up sufficient organization for utilization of those commercial facilities.

During the period, in addition to various small 16th District "Projects", looking toward better preparedness, there were underway three large ones:- Extension of underground Navy facilities on Corregidor; the Section Base at Mariveles; and the Naval Air Station at Sangley Point, (Cavite).

The underground work, Corregidor, was instituted in the Spring of 1940 and it was a vastly important project:- Invulnerable radio communications, torpedo and ammunition storage and handling and storage for spare parts, general supplies and provisions. The work was done by the Army, proceeded

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rather slowly and was still incomplete in November, 1941. But the installations were of great use, nevertheless; for instance, essential radio communication was never interrupted for long, even under heavy bombardment.

The Section Base was started with very primitive construction facilities and went very slowly at first. It was well conceived and included storage and some maintenance facilities as well as those for operations. The work had gotten far enough along, by December, 1941, for the establishment to be very useful, except for the Net Depot which never got started; such net planting as was accomplished was done with very primitive facilities. The construction of the Ammunition Depot, Mariveles, scarcely got started, - the Contractor had only just finished his usual rather elaborate living and working establishments for his own personnel.

The Naval Air Station, Sangley Point, never even approached completion and, anyhow, it was mostly burned out by the first bombing attack. Of course it was in a location quite vulnerable from the air - and it was likewise so in conception and design. That Base was a \$5,000,000.00 project, as conceived and designed under control of the Navy Department. The CinCAF had proposed a \$2,000,000.00 Air Station, which would have meant fewer eggs in one basket, but his principal argument was that the less elaborate - and semi-permanent - establishment could be completed earlier. However, it may be said here, but for general connection and as applying to all plane and preparations, that CinCAF had insisted upon a policy of concealment and dispersal within his own command, as an essential defensive measure. That policy had obtained from the Winter of 1939-40 and it applied to the entire command.

There was set up, (Autumn of 1940), an auxiliary operating air base at Olongapo; it had been continuously occupied and used for many months before the war began. Preparations had also been made for operating from Los Banos, on Laguna de Bay, where concealment of planes along the foreshores was somewhat practicable; the facilities there were extemporized and at practically no expenditures.

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From the Winter of 1939-40, the words AS-IS came to be applied to Asiatic Fleet war plans. This was because of insistence upon having in readiness operating plans which were based upon going to war with the forces and facilities which were actually in hand. There had been too great tendency to build plans around forces, etc., which had been recommended, requested, or only hoped for. Parenthetically, it may be mentioned that said tendency was fostered somewhat by the Department's basic plans and its instructions for preparing contributing plans. As applying to the 16th District, those instructions complicated matters and the trend was toward too much theory. The time had arrived, (1940), when plans had to be practical and with readiness to use what actually existed, - apart from efforts to build up in forces and facilities. The AS-IS policy increased the labor of planning because changes had to be made as reinforcements were received or as facilities increased. The format and the compliance in detail with the Department's instructions probably was not good. Even with our short-cuts, the plans were usually not strictly correct or up to date but the AS-IS idea did pay when the time came.

During the period, there was close touch by CinCAF and by Commandant, 16th Naval District, with the Commanding General, Philippine Department, Major General Grunert, who was entirely cooperative and willing to come half-way. Despite that fact, little progress was made toward cooperative action between the arms where it was most needed, - the respective air detachments. The main reason was that Army Air was building up rapidly, in fighters particularly, absorbing many partially trained pilots and was, in general, in such a preliminary state that cooperation seemed not yet timely. A Brigadier arrived to take over the Army Air command but he soon went off on mission to China, Malaya, Java, etc., and his arrival did not promote cooperative arrangements.

In conjunction with the Army, the plan for mining the entrance to Manila Bay was extensively revised. For years that plan had been defective in that extremely little attention had been given to navigating the entrance by our own shipping after the mine-fields were laid. (Under the old plan such navigation would have been so difficult and dangerous that egress and ingress would have been impracticable under most weather and visibility conditions). Furthermore,

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Army's fields had previously been planned with no thought of enemy submarines. The plan for the Army's mine fields was extensively changed and Navy's somewhat. Arrangements for moving the DEWEY and for mooring her in operative condition at Mariveles were completed.

CinCAF also entered into a verbal agreement with General Grunert under which the mining of Manila Bay could be done in part: - Army to plant either its inner or outer field - or both - and Navy only to make a bluff at planting its mines; but we were to send out warning notices to the effect that all entrances were dangerous and to put into effect the regular arrangements for patrol and for taking shipping in and out through the gates. It was estimated that some time would elapse before it could be known that the Navy mine fields were a bluff and that we would get the effect of a full closure for a period. Then, if the mining turned out to be unnecessary, there would not be much loss because the Army mine is recoverable; the Navy mine, of course, is not. Furthermore, planting the Army fields was bound to be a long process whereas, when the time came the Navy fields were supposed to be planted very quickly. There was frequent consideration, over many months, as to whether or not the situation called for planting but this arrangement never was effected. Navy and War Departments eventually ordered all the fields planted.

During this period, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, was somewhat too often in a disadvantageous position because of untoward delays in obtaining necessary information from Washington. This was due, in part, to a lack of understanding of Far East conditions by subordinates in the Navy Department. The most prolific source of the difficulties lay in failures to transmit secret documents with necessary despatch.

This period was also marked by the beginning of publicity, including speeches, which were directly threatening against the Japanese. Commander in Chief viewed this tendency with considerable alarm because nothing is ever gained by threatening the Japanese, their psychology being such that threats are likely to wholly prevent their exercise of correct judgment. Furthermore, such threats appearing in the press, etc., (though naturally most of it was from wholly unauthoritative sources), tended to put the Japanese too much on guard against the preparations

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for war which were then being made in the Far East or which shortly followed.

In late 1940, all Naval dependents were sent from the entire station, including the Philippines; there were over 2000 women and children. At Guam there was an additional 100 but, (reason unknown), they were not evacuated until late 1941. The Army's dependents followed the Navy's in a few months. Dependents of other Federal officials in China were evacuated at the same time as the Navy's but the same practice was not extended to such dependents in the Philippines. That was unfortunate.

The Fleet, under the Department's direction, took four Danish freighters into "protective custody". They were Diesel ships; all deck officers and sufficient engineers to run them were found on board. A considerable effort was devoted toward retaining that personnel intact and in a proper mental attitude so that the ships could be readily put into operation when so directed.

There was established, in Manila, an enlisted men's club in a building constructed for the purpose by the Commonwealth and used by us on a rental basis. This filled a long felt need in that it contributed greatly to the men's comfort and health and tended to reduce disciplinary offenses by liberty men.

The "Neutrality Patrols", which were established in the Autumn of 1939, were continued through the period. But the administration of those patrols was such as to feature our own war training. The objective of such flights, moreover, became the Japanese rather than nationals of the participants in the European War.

The Asiatic Fleet based at Manila Bay from its arrival in the Autumn of 1940 through the ensuing Winter and carried on usual schedules of type exercises, etc. Also, there were inserted some periods of exercises which involved all types. There had been a dearth of such work because of the usual peacetime duties which had to be met on the Asiatic Station.

The Asiatic Fleet submarines had been increased in number from 6 to a total of 17, without any increase in tender facilities. This is a condition

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which is not particularly disadvantageous unless extended over long periods. However, the shortage in tender facilities on that station did exist for a long time and was a source of privation for personnel, and of difficulties in maintenance. The Fleet should have received another tender at the same time as the submarines, instead of being required to fit out a merchant ship, as a tender, on the station. There were even great delays in getting the ship, (the OTUS), in hand and no very great progress was ever accomplished toward converting the ship into an adequate tender. One of the Danish freighters would have been fully as suitable as a tender and she lay in Manila from July, 1940. We made an effort to have her purchased for the purpose but the deal fell through, in Washington.

The greater part of the Fleet spent about six weeks, April and May, 1941, in the southern islands, (Tutu Bay, Tawi Tawi, etc.). Scheduled exercises were continued from those southern harbors over the period, and the Fleet returned to Manila Bay at the end of May.

Looking forward to the possible loss of Manila Bay as a base for the Fleet, we took the following measures:- There was loaded into PECOS, TRINITY and the large tenders as much spare ammunition, torpedoes, spare parts, general supplies and provisions as the ships could carry. This meant a considerable quantity, (2500 tons), and though the conditions for storage, particularly as regards explosives, were reasonably safe they were not in accord with usual Naval requirements. These measures still left good supplies of all such material in Manila Bay with the exception of certain machinery spares for the combatant surface ships. Not many Submarine spares were included - only what CANOPUS could stow. It was all planned in detail, extended even to the spare propellers and some shafting and did generally put the Fleet into a much better position to meet serious eventualities than would otherwise have obtained. Additionally, about 150 of the largest aircraft bombs were put in charge of the British Navy at Singapore through a quite unofficial arrangement, intended to conceal the fact. The auxiliaries consequently were loaded rather deeply and the two tankers had to be limited somewhat in their future cargo fuel capacity; this, however, was not great because in the good weather which usually prevailed, they could be safely loaded down below the usual marks.

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FROM 1 JUNE to 15 JUNE 1941

Early in June, the Commander in Chief decided that the time had arrived to set up his Command Post on shore, where strategic command could be readily exercised and to thus place the Fleet in a better condition of readiness for its initial deployment for war. The reasoning was briefly as follows:-

The estimates of the situation as heard from Washington and as seen from our narrower field, but in closer proximity to Japan, had been in general concurrence. In November, 1940, CinCAF had submitted an appreciation which concluded that the Japanese intended further aggression and that such would most likely be to the southward. Later, during early Spring, opinion changed - no signs of building up for a southern advance had become manifest - and the Department was informed that we thought that a Japanese invasion of Siberia had become the more likely. That opinion prevailed for only a few weeks. During the Spring it was seen that the Japanese were becoming more squeezed economically. They were not getting oil out of the N.E.I. at anywhere near the 1,800,000 ton per annum rate and were being more and more restricted in obtaining other raw materials, from the south the southwest, by the measures of our own Government as well as by the British and Dutch. Parenthetically, the people of the United States seemed to have become more anti-Japanese than before and the press was indicating a sentiment against anything in the nature of appeasement. Since an inability to obtain replenishment of oil supplies would alone, and soon, mean a desperate condition for the Japanese the situation bade fair to become menacing.

By May, 1941, it had been settled that Asiatic Fleet would not be reinforced with surface ships but that there was intention to very heavily increase the British Fleet in the Far East. The natural sequence would be that if a joint Naval commander was established he would be British. The little joint planning which was being actually accomplished was between the British and Dutch local fleets - with an informal understanding that any of our Naval forces which went south would expect to fit into their tactical plans. Our war plan for initial deployment placed

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our surface ships toward the south but the various considerations in the picture effectively prescribed that those ships should be under a Task Force Commander; and also, apart from facility of radio communications, that the Asiatic Fleet administration and strategic command should be from on shore, Manila Bay. Authority for moving the Fleet Office ashore was obtained from the Navy Department.

Consideration was given to establishing the Fleet Command Post at Cavite or Sangley Point, but that idea was discarded. Commander in Chief's presence would have tended to interfere with the proper status and functioning of the offices of the 16th Naval District. All space and facilities there were already taxed and an added activity in that space would have been disadvantageous from all standpoints. Moreover, it was seen that it was most desirable for Commander in Chief to be located for easy and convenient conference with U.S. Army authorities, looking toward improved arrangements for cooperation. The same applied as regards the American High Commissioner, but to lesser degree. Since, also, the Fleet anchorage was naturally near to Manila, (for leave, liberty and supply purposes), it was decided to establish the shore Command Post in Manila City. There was no Army office space available to us and provision for a Joint Command Post was still in the planning stage.

The most suitable place was in a building on the waterfront which the State Department was planning to use for the U.S. Consul and the Trade Commissioner. An effort was made to obtain this space, but the State Department was entirely non-cooperative and, though the needs of its officials were of quite minor importance and already fairly adequately looked after, the Foreign Service did not recede from its position.

Accordingly, some space was rented in another building, also on the waterfront. This space was sufficient and was suitable except that it was in a commercial office building where maintenance of secrecy and security of papers, etc., was difficult and required strong guards.

During the period, there was disclosed other instances of important documents being badly de-

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layed on the way to CinCAF from Navy Department. The difficulties seemed to lie in the great slowness and the mistakes in operating the system for transmission of secret mail. In the end, no real damage resulted but the repeated failures caused uneasiness, to say the least.

Received a personal letter from Vice Admiral Layton, R.N., indicating that his command now had authority over the British oil industry in northwest Borneo and would institute preparations for demolition. This was a sequence of considerable "conversation", briefly as follows:-

During the Winter of 1939-40, it became apparent within the Asiatic Fleet command that the Far East petroleum supplies constituted the one strategic raw material that would be absolutely vital to Japan in war. In late 1940, all of the high officials of the "Stanvac" Company, (whose holdings were mostly in Sumatra), were in Manila, - following attendance during the N.E.I. - Japan conference on oil which had recently been completed in Batavia. CinCAF obtained from the Stanvac officials some up-to-date data concerning the industry and certain "inside" information on the general picture surrounding that situation. On all occasions thereafter, - and particularly during Captain Purnell's various conferences, at Singapore or Batavia, - every opportunity was taken to urge upon such authorities as could be reached the necessity for readiness to deny the N.E.I. petroleum to an invading enemy. We represented that common knowledge to the effect that thorough preparation and resolution, to that end, existed would serve as a deterrent to the prospective enemy.

Naturally, the vast importance of the subject was apparent to all who would think about it and our prospective Allies had it in mind all along. It was at the same time clear that commercial and business interests, and rivalries, were very much in the picture, - hence our urging and even insistence about a readiness and a will for destruction. The order of good faith in which the various oil companies met the requests for said preparations seemed to be:- (1) Stanvac. (2) Dutch-Shell. (3) The British company in northwest Borneo. The latter seemed to make little progress toward this "scorched earth" preparation until the British Commander of the Fleet acquired authority.

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16 JUNE to 30 JUNE 1941

The Russo-German war began and it was definitely a surprise for we had received no indication that the Russians would not grant a sufficient number of the "requests" which we had heard the Germans were making on them. This event caused CinCAF to again consider the probability of a Japanese aggression into Siberia rather than to the south. There was indication that the German attack on Russia was also a surprise to the Japanese, which was naturally a factor in the picture. All things considered, it seemed likely that the Japanese would direct any new aggression into the channel that seemed most profitable to them, irrespective of what the rest of the Axis wanted. Therefore, a southern advance still seemed likely and, whichever way things turned, it was seen that our own plans should primarily be on that basis. Consequently, we made no change in either our plans or in our mental attitudes.

During the period, word was received from the Navy Department that Washington had withheld approval to the report of the last Singapore Conference, as not meeting the purposes of the prospective Allies in the Far East theatre. Incidentally, that last Conference had really ended only at about the point at which it should have begun and had not produced a practical, realistic plan which would carry through. There were so many conferees present that difficulties were great, without prior agreements, agenda, etc., and it was too hard a task for the presiding officer to handle.

However, there was not much cloudiness as regards the Asiatic Fleet's situation and what was expected of it. There was agreement and understanding with the Navy Department on the general lines of a war plan involving the Far East. It was clear that the Initial Deployment of surface combat ships and of large Auxiliaries was to be to the southwest, most probably to base on Singapore, - but the Department continued to leave much to the discretion and initiative of CinCAF. In his hands remained the decision as to what ships would deploy to points outside the Philippines and what ships, if any, were to pass to the strategic direction of any other commander.

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At the end of the period, the Fleet Offices were established in the Marsman Building, on the Manila Harbor waterfront. A Task Force was established with the Chief of Staff, (Purnell), commanding, and assisted by an operations staff only. All files, documents and Fleet flag equipment which would not be needed by the Task Force Commander were moved off HOUSTON, - into storage or to the Fleet Office. Henceforth, all fleet administration and all operations of units not included in the Task Force, (which became designated Task Force Five), were from on shore.

No extra officers, other than some V-7 Ensigns for coding boards, were taken in, for fleet or task force staffs. That meant harder work for the staff officers but their working conditions became improved; HOUSTON had been very crowded and hot. The Fleet Office was continuously open, with watches established as on board ship. Radio communications were established in the Fleet Offices; there was also a visual signal watch, with adequate equipment, so that rapid communications were as good as when the Fleet Flag was ship-borne. As soon as these arrangements were completed, the Asiatic Fleet command was stream-lined for war. There would remain, at most, only the transfer to HOUSTON of less than one patrol plane load of administrative staff personnel with equipment. The Fleet Office eventually became quite adequate and satisfactory. Its establishment and its work would have required much less effort if it could have been in the Tourist Bureau Building, in the space which the State Department insisted on having for its Consul.

During the period, the Fleet held a goodly number of those gunnery exercises which require the most in the way of equipment and services. The Fleet's work was somewhat interrupted by typhoons.

1 TO 15 JULY

The ASHEVILLE was totally disabled off Swatow, China, during bad weather. MARBLEHEAD was sent to the rescue and towed this gunboat to Manila; she as well as TULSA was henceforth retained in Philippine waters. The MARBLEHEAD again showed high

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efficiency in that mission; she was an old ship but her personnel always made the best of what they had and this Cruiser could always be depended upon.

The Task Force, (the surface ships, including large Auxiliaries, and also the Submarines), left Manila Bay and operated in the southern waters. The harbors of the Sulu chain were most used but the ships visited other ports as well. Task Force Five Commander's directive was to return ships, in small detachments, to Manila Bay for 2 to 3 day visits, in order to replenish stores as needed and to give liberty. The two Tankers continued their rather frequent voyages to N.E.I. oil ports for cargo. The Fleet had for some time been getting most of its fuel from those fields and it was obtained from at least three ports in order to work up latitude and elasticity in supply. We began administration toward keeping all Navy-owned tankage filled and also began working on the commercial fuel companies to the end that they would keep as heavy reserves as possible, particularly in Manila tanks.

From this time onward, 3 to 6 patrol planes operated continuously along the southern boundary of the Philippines. These operations were in part "neutrality patrols" and in part for general security. Later, an unofficial understanding was entered into with the Dutch Navy under which there was some linking up with the air patrol which they had long maintained along the northeast boundary of the N.E.I. The patrol planes based on their Tenders. Certain minor basing facilities were also extemporized on shore on Balabac Island and in the Gulf of Davao.

A damaged British Battleship passed through bound for Bremerton. This was the second British man-of-war to visit Manila for fuel, etc., while bound to a U.S. port. We made every endeavor toward secrecy and avoidance of publicity but the British personnel showed no great interest to that end.

In an excellent public speech, on 4 July, the American High Commissioner, the Honorable Mr. Sayre, showed a decided change in mental attitude toward the possibilities in the international situation. A few months previously he had thought that the possibility of our becoming involved in a war in the Far East was quite remote. The American High

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Commissioner had by now changed his views and, with his full establishment, had become quite active in promoting, fostering and directing the local measures under the category of "civilian defense".

During the period, rather definite indications were received that the Japanese were about to begin a much more inclusive occupancy of Indo-China. Moreover, that they were projecting a build-up in their military strength as well as an increase in economic control of that country. On 15 July, the Commanding General and CinCAF received directives to proceed with laying the Army and Navy mine fields.

16 TO 31 JULY

There were a considerable number of changes in the Japanese Cabinet during the period which was, however, mainly marked by their military occupation of all of Indo-China. The Naval seizure and prospective use of Tourane, Kamranh Bay and Saigon was of course included and became a matter of great interest to the other Fleets in the Far East. The flying fields which thus came into Japanese use did not bring Japanese aircraft any nearer to Luzon but did constitute a serious advance toward Malaya. The Indo-China French, (Vichy), surrendered their country to the Japanese, after some little demurring, and the latter's powerful amphibious expedition did not come into action. The Jap ships hung fire in the vicinity of Hainan for some days. As a matter of exercise as much as a precaution, Navy patrol planes made some flights in that direction but did not get into contact.

We obtained news of certain financial and economic steps which our Government was instituting against Japan. On the 27th, the induction of the Philippine Army into the Federal service was announced, with Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur to command the mixed forces which were to be known as the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, (USAFFE).

Mine laying by the Army and the Naval District began at once - too hastily in the case of the Navy - and notices of the fact and of the navigational dangers were issued immediately. Steps were at once taken to patrol off the fields with our small vessels

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and to conduct the normal sea traffic through the gates. The warning notices were issued repeatedly but keeping ships out of danger consumed much effort; all small craft available were assigned to the duty and even Destroyers had to be used occasionally. There was loss of one or two small vessels and some lives despite all precautions.

The plan was to defer laying the mine field at Subic Bay and the outer Navy field off the north Manila Bay entrance until the dry-dock DEWEY was moved. The dock arrived at Mariveles on 22 July and was there moored in condition for docking ships; she was made self-operating and self-sustaining. Much material and several tools, as well as personnel sufficient for operations, were brought down from Olongapo. Conditions were difficult and the many obstacles to operations were overcome by efficient and devoted effort of the personnel. Lieutenant C.J. Weschler was in charge and was both untiring and very able. The DEWEY later accomplished a great deal of ship work at Mariveles and continued in operations even after the siege of Bataan was well along. By the end of this period, Olongapo was abandoned except as an auxiliary air base and for occupancy by Marines and some Navy personnel.

Two weeks elapsed after the Department's order before CinCAF was able to report to Washington that Subic and Manila Bays were closed by mines; and the fields were far from complete even then. It was previously known that the Army's planting would be slow but the Navy's was expected to be rapid. One reason for the slowness did lay in adverse weather for it was the season of the year's worst weather along the west coast of Luzon. Moreover, it was somewhat evident that the type of mine supplied the Navy was so delicate in certain features that very highly specialized personnel was required. The Naval District either did not have the requisite personnel available or did not properly administrate it because the mining went badly. In addition to technical errors, there was also deficient seamanship and poor arrangements for handling the planters. The Fleet Gunnery Officer and the personnel of two, (Bird), Sweepers, which had recently arrived on the Station, eventually solved the technical and the planting difficulties. But so many mines were lost that the integrity of the fields was considerably depreciated.

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The Task Force continued exercises in southern Philippine waters. Maintenance and alterations were being carried on by Cavite and the normal number of ships under overhaul was continued. The OTUS's conversion to a Submarine Tender was partly completed and she joined the Task Force. Very little had been accomplished in addition to the "hotel accommodations" and provision for storage. There was nothing available for her shop equipment and the conversion of this ship never got any farther. OTUS did help somewhat with the Submarines but a fully adequate Tender, in addition to CANOPUS, continued to be badly needed.

Authority and final arrangements were completed for putting the four Danish freight ships into the carrying trade under American President Line management. Their total capacity was 33,000 tons and the Far East had long been full of freight awaiting shipment. The delays in utilizing those four ships was exasperating, from the local standpoint. The reason was not really known but there were signs that too much formalism and too many legalistic factors had been in the picture. As heretofore stated, one of these four ships was physically available for conversion into a Submarine Tender for months before OTUS arrived at Manila.

1 TO 15 AUGUST 1941

The mine laying continued and approached the point of fair security against entry into Subic or Manila Bays of anything except small Submarines and shallow draft surface craft. The various difficulties within the Naval District continued - accentuated by sickness of key personnel - and the affairs there consumed much time and effort of the fleet command and staff. The fleet staff was being very hard worked.

The Commanding General, USAFFE, and CinCAF exchanged official calls and held brief conferences. CinCAF set forth his personal position as regards the methods of commanding his own forces and explained any possible relationship with the other two Fleets. He stated that he did not think the time had yet arrived to disturb the cooperate relationship as between the Naval District and Philippine Department of the Army and that such cooperation between District

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and Coast Defense, Manila Bay, should continue to be direct and immediate in any case. However, CinCAF stated that he had established his offices in Manila rather than at Cavite in order to facilitate conference, etc., and that he would always be available for such, on any subject. A little later, on account of the recurrent illnesses of the District Commandant, CinCAF informed Commanding General, USAFFE, that he rather than the Commandant would be the Commanding General's opposite number in all respects. The induction of the Philippine Army and the building up of the USAFFE was being accompanied with much publicity, - which condition continued throughout.

During the period, we heard that current opinion in some quarters was to the effect that the Japanese would attack Siberia but we made no modification in our own preparations or attitude. CinCAF informally called the Department's attention to the vulnerability of the Marines and Gunboats which were in China. He also advised, informally, that another Flay Officer be sent to command the Naval District so that the industrial activities could be separated from the District Command. (This was before the current Commandant was invalidated).

The operations of Task Force Five continued as before. Its commander was in Manila for two days, - in HOUSTON which had returned for supplies. It was entirely apparent that the Task Force and its training were being efficiently handled.

15 TO 31 AUGUST

The period was uneventful as far as the Asiatic Fleet was concerned. It included the completion of understandings on certain points in war plans, - which were not of major importance. CinCAF prepared an "appreciation" concerning the continued retention of his forces in China which set forth his opinion that they should be withdrawn to the Philippines in the near future. An election of Commonwealth officials was pending and was the subject of greatest current interest within the Philippines.

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1 TO 15 SEPTEMBER 1941

This period also was unmarked by events or decisions of any considerable importance. The large projects looking toward larger scale readiness of the Naval District began moving along at a better rate. Cavite continued routine work on ships. The Task Force continued its training in southern waters, with ships returning to Manila every 4 to 5 weeks, in detachments. Because of the very great shortage in Submarine Tenders, the six S-class Submarines were being based at Manila as well as was possible. The first of the Pacific Fleet cruisers which had begun to escort important west-bound ships arrived. Many more American and British officials than usual were stopping off at Manila as they travelled on their various missions.

Little information concerning the Japanese was being received from any source. Such news as did arrive indicated that the financial and economic measures which had been effected against them were resulting in such pressure that the Japanese would have to effect adjustment in the not far distant future.

15 TO 30 SEPTEMBER

The press indicated that there was a rather wide-spread belief in the States that the tension in the Far East was becoming eased. More authoritative advices did not agree and while there seemed hope that there would be a peaceful settlement of the outstanding difficulties with the Japanese, there was no definite ground for optimism. However, the Japanese Fleet was found to be returning to home bases and there was no evidence of increasing occupation of Indo-China.

The HENDERSON made a routine transport voyage, including calls at China ports. No replacements were sent to our Forces in China and there were some withdrawals additional to short-timers, so that the remaining Forces were:- At Pekin and Tientsin, 200 Marines and Navy. At Shanghai, 800 Marines and Navy. Also three Gunboats on the lower Yangtze and one in South China. The Navy Department had rejected

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the recommendation that those Forces be withdrawn concurrently with this voyage of the Transport. CinCAF had, aside from his concern about personnel in the vulnerable locations, hoped to obtain the Commander of the Yangtze Patrol for other duty. Another Flag Office, was badly needed in the Philippines.

Information received indicated that strong Army reinforcements were arriving in the Philippines, or enroute, and that about 80 modern pursuit planes were already on hand. There occurred, (23rd), a protracted interview between the Commanding General, USAFFE and the CinCAF, - at the latter's instance. It was learned that the USAFFE was going far beyond the war plans, by including in the Defense Zone virtually all of the Philippines except Mindanao and Palawan. The plan envisaged a fully equipped ground army of 200,000, (eleven divisions), and a powerful air detachment. The date of complete readiness was to be about six months in the future. CinCAF put forward the necessity for cooperation, - generally, but more specifically as between Army and Navy aircraft. He also made known to the Commanding General the major points in all the conversations with the British and Dutch Fleets and explained our current situation as regards joint action with those forces.

The Rear Admiral commanding 16th Naval District was invalidated home. There were continued instances of failure to receive important information from the Navy Department and CinCAF was constrained to make an official protest. The fuel situation was improving in that increased stocks of boiler and Diesel fuel were being kept on hand. The situation was less satisfactory as regards high-test gasoline. All fuel storage was vulnerable from the air. Much of the Navy's gasoline was in drums which were kept dispersed as much as practicable.

The Fleet received six modern Motor Torpedo Boats which were transported on the deck of the GUADALUPE. Such transport required extensive deck fittings and, while so fitted, it is to be regretted that the ship was not employed to carry out another half squadron of the PT boats. We had expressed the belief that the Philippine waters would be the most favorable location possible for that type of weapon. Was informed that another Submarine reinforcement, for the Asiatic Fleet, was under consideration. The CinCAF

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emphatically urged that an adequate Submarine Tender accompany, or precede, any reinforcing Submarines. He also urged upon the Department that an additional Patrol Plane squadron be despatched to the Philippines. It was also strongly recommended that a full squadron of Navy Dive Bombers be sent out, forthwith, for reconnaissance purposes in the dangerous Formosa sector as well as for their offensive power. We had a tentative promise of availability of Army aerodromes in north Luzon.

1 TO 15 OCTOBER 1941

The numerous visits of high officials during this period continued and included Dutch Army officers. Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brook-Popham also came to Manila, from Singapore, for a second visit - ostensibly for conferences on Army affairs. There was considerable attendant publicity, to which the Air Chief Marshall was not adverse, and CinCAF advised the Navy Department that such was an undesirable feature; that in view of our vast defense preparations, in hand but far from complete, time was in our favor and that nothing unessential should be done to precipitate matters. CinCAF conferred very briefly with Sir Robert, - there seemed to be little to talk over.

CinCAF conferred with the Commanding General, USAFFE, and informed him of the current and prospective dispositions of the Fleet and on the reinforcements which had arrived, or were pending. The subject of aircraft cooperation over the sea was also discussed and CinCAF stated that he would produce an official letter which would set forth his own proposals and hence serve as a concrete basis for further discussion.

Task Force Five returned to Manila and was temporarily inactivated, the command and staff moving to the Fleet Office but leaving all in readiness for re-activation of the Task organization and command. The ships had been away from Base, for the most part, over a period of three months and needed to return for more supplies and various other attention. Such information as was available indicated that although the situation vis-a-vis Japan remained tense, there was not great immediate danger of a rupture and that the time was as favorable for the ships' return as would likely be afforded. Another important matter for port attention concerned the loads of munitions

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and material in the large auxiliaries. The conditions of storage had been unfavorable for four months and some rehandling of it was required. Furthermore, a good deal of Fleet administration was in arrears and required the presence in port of ships, Unit Commanders, and full Fleet Staff. The CinCAF also had in mind discussions of broad scope and the possible reconsideration of the Fleet's Operating Plan.

The departure of the Task Force from Manila was not scheduled during the period:- The southern Philippine harbors were open to Submarine attack, whereas there had been provided at least some mine-field protection in Manila Bay. We were not at the time in position for the use of harbors in the N.E.I. or Malaya. There was no 100% solution which would give security against surprise attack.

16 TO 31 OCTOBER

During the period, the underground work on Corregidor and the building-up of the Section Base at Mariveles made good progress. The Fleet's work in harbor continued and some underway exercises were held. Two Destroyers collided during night exercises and were thereby disabled for several weeks; (PEARY and PILLSBURY). Information was received that HOLLAND and 12 large Submarines were being transferred from the Pacific to the Asiatic Fleet. CinCAF wrote a formal letter to Commanding General, USAFFE, as a basis for more concrete understandings concerning air operations over the water.

The Japanese Cabinet underwent a re-organization. The news of it was reason for concern and new decisions as regards added security precautions. We established an off-shore air patrol over about 100 miles of the west Luzon coast, with particular coverage for exercise areas, and also set an anti-submarine sound patrol by Destroyers. Much consideration was given toward return of the Cruisers, Destroyers and large auxiliaries to more southern waters and CinCAF decided against that step. A far-reaching proposal was under study at the time and:-

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On 27 October, CinCAF proposed to the Navy Department that an Initial Deployment of any ships to the south and west be abandoned as a basic part of the war plan; and that, instead, the Fleet plan to fight the war with all ships based on Manila Bay. The considerations were:-

No real progress had been made toward agreement on joint Naval operations with the British and Dutch and there were no commitments except our promise to supply some Destroyers when the British Fleet acquired capital ships.

There was some question as to the effectiveness of operations, under the circumstances, as based along the Malay Barrier.

Assuming reasonable harbor security, the Fleet could be more effectively employed from Manila Bay, on account of its strategic location; also surface ships, submarines and patrol planes would be, severally, more effective when handled in conjunction with each other.

Lastly, and collaterally, all U.S. Forces would be definitely employed in defending the Philippines, - or in conducting offensive operations from there. (There was little said about this particular consideration, which was largely psychologic).

The Fleet command and staff was by no means unified and in agreement on the correctness of that proposal of 27 October. There was much argument which hinged, of course, on the real situation as regards the probable security and integrity of Manila Bay as a Naval Base. The proponents argued that the situation had already greatly changed by the building up of the USAFFE which would very soon be strong enough to withstand a heavy amphibious expedition; and that although an enemy would probably get his bombers through at times, the U.S. Army pursuit squadrons had become so strong that there would be no sustained bombing attacks on Manila Bay. The opponents argued that USAFFE would not be built up into sufficient strength for some months; and that while pursuit planes were available in considerable numbers, (said to be 100 plus), there would not therein be sufficient opposition to provide anything like the security that we needed. The opponents of the proposal were headed by the Chief of Staff. He was right.

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1 TO 15 NOVEMBER 1941

The period was somewhat marked by uncertainty and indecision. As heretofore recorded, CinCAF had previously felt a lack of timely information from the Navy Department and grave delays had been experienced in the transmission of what was sent. In those earlier instances no disadvantage resulted which was of considerable importance. Although request for decision on the important despatch of 27 October was made on 6 November, no reply had been received by the end of this period and that circumstance was quite disadvantageous. Some despatches, particularly one received about 12 November, contained the Department's instructions on comparatively minor matters and unfortunately the CinC thought there was contained certain indication that his proposal to fight the campaign from Manila Bay with the entire fleet was meeting some favor. No definite steps were thereupon taken toward implementing that proposal but, on the other hand, the detailed preparations for an initial deployment to the southward were not pressed; certain munitions, supplies, etc., were not hurried back into the large Auxiliaries. The combatant ships were maintained in sufficient readiness, (normal maintenance continued), but such was not altogether the case with the Auxiliaries: the extreme congestion of Cavite's waterfront made handling stores a slow matter, which added to the seriousness of losing time.

The War Plans Officer from Singapore, Captain Collins, R.A.N., and our observer there, Captain Creighton, U.S.N., were in Manila 2 to 3 November. The CinCAF informed them concerning the broad lines of his proposal of 27 October. The subject of loaning Destroyers for operations with British capital ships was also discussed as a separate issue. The Department had been informed that under certain circumstances such loan up to two Divisions could be made.

The effort at entering into adequate arrangements for joint operations of Army and Navy aircraft, over the seas, met with a decided rebuff from the USAFFE. Toward the end of the period, some disposition developed toward meeting us but there seemed to be unwillingness to go as far even as the arrangements which for some time had been in effect in the

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Hawaiian Islands; and no great progress was ever made in the Philippines toward unified air operations. During the period, PatWing Ten photographed Spratley and Itu Aba Islands. Little development was found on Spratley but considerable was discovered on the other Island.

A few sets of Radar equipment arrived for the USAFFE and one set was received for the Marines, which was put at the disposal of the Army. It was unfortunate that this highly important equipment did not arrive sooner, and in greater quantity, so that an adequate air-warning system could have been in full being. The CinCAF, with Commanding General, Philippine Department concurring, had urged early in the year that a few Navy sets be sent out and set up at appropriate locations on shore. No defense equipment was more important.

The Section Base, Mariveles, progressed more rapidly and arrived at the point of some utility. We began assembling provisions and general supplies in its storehouses. There was some progress in laying the torpedo baffle nets across Mariveles entrance; the planting methods employed were very primitive. We completed plans for improving the security of that anchorage, as against Submarine entry, with mines. Also began placing permanent moorings - buoys and dolphins - to increase the berthing capacity of the enclosed space.

Eight large Submarines arrived from Pearl Harbor on 8 November and brought word that HOLLAND and the remaining four Submarines were starting later; also that the Squadron Commander, who was slated to take command of all the Asiatic Submarines, would arrive with the last detachment. Heavy Cruisers were calling with greater frequency, - as ocean escorts of transports from Hawaii.

The CinC received the Department's directive to withdraw Marines and Gunboats from China. Since the N.E. monsoon was now at its height, the voyage of the river Gunboats was foreseen to be a feat of seamanship. Decided that, in any case, we would get the Marines out of Shanghai ahead of the Gunboats but they immediately began assembling. Two President Liners were chartered for earliest possible despatch to Shanghai, where the Marines would be able to load at

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short notice. Those at Peking and Tientsin had to proceed to Chinwangtao for embarkation and their movement to that port was likely to be slow. (The withdrawal order was received embarrassingly late).

Mr. Kurusu passed through Manila, en route to Washington, and CinCAF saw him at a reception given in his honor. The conversation was brief; Kurusu remarked that his "mission was to keep our Asiatic Fleet idle" but he evinced no real hopefulness of succeeding in whatever his mission really was.

The Philippine election was completed, permitting some abeyance of politics. Most of the travel by the clipper was being under "prior preference", controlled at Washington. Many writers were travelling in that category. Officer messengers coming straight by plane from that city and bringing the latest information could have been very helpful at this time.

16 TO 30 NOVEMBER

There was definite information during the period that the Japanese Army was engaged in considerable movement along the China and Indo-China coasts. Those movements could be estimated as presaging only increased occupation of southern Indo-China or of an advance into Thailand; a few held opinions to that effect. There was no definite information of Japanese Naval movements that carried much significance. The Fleet Staff was busy during the first few days of the period in revising the Operating Plan on the basis of fighting a campaign from Manila Bay with all the Fleet, - less any forces loaned to the British Fleet. No further information or instructions on that point having been received from the Department, the CinCAF on 18 November informed a full conference of Unit Commanders concerning the proposals which he had submitted and stated that, although approval had not been received, time did not permit further delay in definitely undertaking the corresponding preparations.

The Department's despatch definitely withholding approval was received on 20 November. The Department's estimate and instructions were correct and the proposals of CinCAF, 27 October, were wrong. No harm would have ensued if CinCAF had not been allowed

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to persist in his error over a vital period of three weeks. As things eventuated, the damage was not so very great anyhow and perhaps was offset by the fact that the Fleet did "stand-by" the USAFFE more persistently than a cold-blooded estimate of the real situation called for. (If there is benefit therein it is of course psychologic only).

Upon receipt of the Department's despatch, all plans and preparations were immediately thrown back upon the original basis,- with initial deployment of surface forces to be to the southward. (As before mentioned, the inadequacies of facilities ashore slowed up changes in the loading of Auxiliaries, etc.) The CinCAF did, however, decide to retain all Submarine Tenders in Manila Bay. That turned out to be an incorrect decision. The 29 Submarines themselves constituted most of the potentiality of the Fleet; they could be most effective if they operated with the strategic advantage of Manila's location and they needed all the services which the Tenders could supply if the boats were to retain their effectiveness over any considerable period. Therefore, as seen at the time, that risk had to be taken.

Since the availability of ComYangPat, (Glassford), could by then be foreseen, it was decided to put him in command of Task Force Five, upon his arrival. The CinCAF adhered to his decision of June 1941, to maintain his own command post in Manila and also decided to directly command the Coastal Frontier,- which had far outgrown its original dimensions and by then comprised the greater part of the Philippine waters. Only the original sea defensive zones, in and off Manila and Subic Bays, were kept under Commandant 16's jurisdiction and only enough surface craft for that coverage was permanently assigned to the District; however, the small ships were switched back and forth between Fleet and District as the day-to-day demands called for. In consequence of these arrangements, the CinC retained personal command of Submarines, the Patrol Wing, the Motor Torpedo Boats and some of the small surface craft which were to operate within the Sea Frontier. A larger staff was therefore required than had been contemplated in June. Rear Admirals Glassford and Rockwell were both "new" in the duties which were to confront them. Rear Admiral Purnell was fully experienced and was variously in demand; the CinCAF decided that he must be retained

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for the duties of Chief of Staff. Preparations for a Joint Army and Navy, (including Air), Command Post had been underway for months. It was being constructed by the Army, underground at Camp McKinley, which was not an advantageous location for the Navy but the Army considered the underground spaces at Corregidor unsuitable on account of the location. However, the preparations at McKinley were months from completion and that installation never got into the picture.

During the period, we began moving explosives out of the casemates of the Naval magazine, Cavite, and placing them in a large ammunition dump established in the open along a beach a few miles from Cavite. The greater part of such inflammables as paints, dryers, etc., also was moved out of Cavite. The large quantity of filled gasoline drums was further dispersed; by this time we had gasoline widely scattered about in the Manila and Subic Bay areas as well as small caches at various outlying points. The CinCAF directed that certain projects for elaborate bomb-proof structures be discontinued and that available effort be directed toward extensive provision of bomb shelters giving reasonable security against fragments and blast but not against direct bomb hits.

On 24 November, CinCAF sent BLACK HAWK and four Destroyers to Balikpapan; MARBLEHEAD and four Destroyers to Tarakan. Those were the two east Borneo oil ports; the detachment commanders' instructions were to go to them for fuel but to "have difficulty" in obtaining full loads - with a view to occupying the ports, or vicinity, for a protracted period if necessary. HOUSTON was directed to further hasten the completion of mounting four 1.1 inch quadruple machine guns, then to proceed to Iloilo or vicinity and await the arrival of Commander, Task Force Five.

The CinCAF received, on 26 November, a Navy Department despatch which indicated very serious developments in the American-Japanese relations. The American High Commissioner received a similar despatch on the following day and, in consequence, called into conference the Commanding General, USAFFE, and the CinCAF. All three conferees set forth the current situation, as concerned the activities and responsibilities in their own fields, and discussed any additional measures which seemed possible. One of the

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three expressed greater optimism than did the other two; all were fully aware of the necessity for promoting an optimistic spirit in the lower echelons.

The HOLLAND and four Submarines arrived. The two Squadron organizations were inactivated, washing out that command and administrative echelon so that the chain of command was direct from Commander Submarines to the Division Commanders. The latter, five in number, assumed staff duties in addition to their nominal command functions,- which latter were not to be exercised at sea except under circumstances calling for special orders to that effect. The Division Commanders were specialized in their staff capacities,- two for operations, etc. One Squadron Commander took over duties as Chief of Staff to Commander Submarines and was especially charged with operations and training. The other Squadron Commander had the Department's orders as Commander Submarines and the date for turn-over was set as of 1 December. (When the turn-over actually occurred, the outgoing officer - Captain Wilkes - was held at Manila,- for eventualities). The Commander of Destroyers was informed that a war would be a Division Commanders' war and that it was unlikely that he would command Destroyer formations at sea.

The two President liners loaded the Fourth Marines, and attached Naval personnel, at Shanghai, with the greater portion of their movable equipment and supplies and sailed, separately. Four large Submarines had been sent to escort them from a point to the northward of Formosa. Of the three Yangtze Gunboats, the smallest was laid up at Shanghai, pretty well stripped down and equipped for demolition; (when the time came, the personnel failed to destroy her). The other two then sailed for Manila; PIGEON and FINCH were sent north to escort the Gunboats down because there was no experience to show the effect of rough water on them; the "Bird-Boats" themselves got into trouble on account of the bad weather on the way north. The South China Gunboat, MINDANAO, was held at Hong Kong until the developments with the other two were known. Inasmuch as it had previously been represented that she could be useful in defending Hong Kong it was unwise to subject her to too much weather risk.

Toward the end of the period, a valuable Army convoy was nearing Manila, under escort of BOISE. The LANGLEY was just arriving to replenish stores and

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revise cargo, having been held in the southern islands for a long period,- tending the air patrols and establishing two extemporized air bases. TRINITY and PECOS were arriving with full loads of fuel which they had taken on in the N.E.I.

On 29 November, received a definite War Warning from the Navy Department. Additional to the disposition of ships previously listed, in the foregoing, the forces of the Fleet were occupying the following stations 29-30 November:-

Three Destroyers were on listening and general patrol off the Manila-Subic Bay entrances. The remaining two of the Squadron were still at Navy Yard, repairing collision damages.

Three Submarines were in Navy Yard hands. The remainder were in Manila Bay or were training in the vicinity. The three Submarine Tenders were scattered from Mariveles to Manila Harbor. The practice of berthing Submarines alongside Tenders in large numbers, or in large "trots", had been discontinued. Not more than two were being alongside or together and all berthing was considerably dispersed.

There was one aircraft detachment based on Balabac and one in Davao Gulf. Each comprised one small Tender with patrol planes in the eastern detachment and utility planes at Balabac. The planes were patrolling off-shore and linking up in an informal arrangement with the Dutch planes. One full squadron of PBV's was basing on Sangley Point, the remainder of the large planes at Olongapo; in each case a certain degree of localized dispersal and concealment was being practiced. An auxiliary and extemporized base at Los Banos, (in Laguna de Bai), was ready for use.

The remaining small craft were in Manila Bay or vicinity. The inshore patrol and guarding of the mine fields continued to absorb much effort of small craft; and more of them than was usual were in Navy Yard hands.

1 TO 7 DECEMBER 1941

The Marines arrived from Shanghai and were disembarked into Olongapo, via tugs and lighters, with

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weapons, munitions, field equipment and all supplies. The Fourth Marines immediately set about reorganizing as a 3-battalion Regiment, equalizing the strength from the 600 to 700 Marines of the battalion that was already in the Philippines, etc. The Regiment was told to occupy the Bataan Peninsula for the present, - from Mariveles to Olongapo and somewhat to the northward of the latter. Having mostly long service men and a full complement of regular officers, the Marines were the strongest infantry regiment in the Philippines; it was not equipped for rapid movement.

One of the President Line ships was turned around as quickly as possible and sailed for Ching-wangtao to embark the remaining Marines. She never arrived there. The Army convoy arrived on the 4th; its escort, BOISE, was fueled and supplied and sailed for Cebu to await further orders. The MINDANAO sailed from Hong Kong about 3 December and arrived at Manila on the 9th, having encountered considerable difficulty with the N.E. monsoon seas.

The two Gunboats from Shanghai had less difficulty and, with the two "Bird Boats", arrived at Manila on the 4th; all three river Gunboats joined the inshore patrol. Rear Admiral Glassford set about getting in touch with the situation and at constituting a staff preparatory to assuming command of Task Force Five. It was regrettable that he could not have started such preparation some time before. Actually he reached Manila at virtually the last minute and at a time when all activity was particularly intense.

LANGLEY, TRINITY and PECOS arrived and prepared for departure. Tankage on shore was nearly full and there was difficulty in disposing of the cargoes of the two Tankers. None of those three large Auxiliaries had left Manila by the end of the period. ISABEL was despatched to an outpost patrol station off the Indo-China coast. A small sailing yacht with auxiliary power was taken over and fitted out for a similar mission but the preparations were only just completed by 7 December. (This vessel was eventually sailed to Java and then to Australia by Fleet personnel, - including the Flag Lieutenant, - who were evacuating to the southward).

The CinCAF, the Commanding General of USAFFE and certain of their subordinates held a conference, on 1 December, on joint operations of aircraft

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over the seas. Preparatory conferences had been held by the Air Commanders and progress resulted on this date. It was agreed that Army heavy bombers would take over the patrol of the two northern sectors which touched Formosa. Their speed and ceiling better fitted them for coping with any enemy fighters that might come out from the Formosan landing fields. We obtained no enemy information from those planes during the period.

The Navy Patrol Planes made a considerable number of long reconnaissance flights during the period. Those which went to the Indo-China coast were not routine flights but were at the personal, day-to-day, direction of CinCAF. The instructions were to avoid being sighted from the coast, or by Japanese ships, if practicable. The PBY's were sighted and at times by Japanese planes but they were not attacked. The patrol planes did sight a large number of transport and cargo ships in harbor or at sea. In Kamranh Bay alone there were over 20 large or medium sized ships, - with an air patrol over them, - and numerous small craft. Not much enemy information was received, during the period, from other than the Fleet's own sources. But it became very clear that strong Japanese amphibious expeditions were prepared to move.

Admiral Tom Phillips, R.N., the new CinC of the British Far Eastern Fleet, visited Manila, for conference, on 5 and 6 December. This was at his own initiative and he had arranged to make the journey by air, prior to his arrival at Singapore. Inasmuch as the conditions and circumstances which had previously prevented a visit by CinCAF to Singapore no longer existed, Admiral Hart would have proceeded to that port for the conference if the British authorities had given the necessary information. Admiral Phillips left Singapore prior to any meeting with Dutch or Australian Naval authorities. The CinCAF proposed to him that Admiral Helfrich be included in the conference at Manila but the despatch got lost somewhere at the British end.

Admiral Phillips arrived at noon, 5 December, and departed during the evening of the following day; his presence in Manila was a carefully guarded secret. The afternoon and evening of the fifth was taken up with informal conversations which were followed by a somewhat formal conference that lasted well through the following day. The Commanding General of USAFFE

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and his Chief of Staff were present during all the periods that involved other than Naval subjects. During the conversations, CinCAF learned for the first time that the British had been assured of American armed support in any of four contingencies having to do with Japanese aggression against Thailand, the N.E.I., etc. It should be said that Admiral Phillips showed himself to be a remarkably able officer, - possessing very broad knowledge, with keen intuition and judgment. Even though our association with him was brief we sensed that he was the best man that we had encountered.

Admiral Phillips was made acquainted with the general Naval and Military situation as for the Philippines, and he set forth the British situation and prospects. He had brought out PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE and had just sailed the latter to Port Darwin - largely for political considerations. Additional British Battleships were promised at a rate which would have built up the capital ship force in the Far East quite rapidly. Admiral Phillips however did not have in sight a commensurate force of Destroyers or of Carriers.

During the discussions it appeared that, as yet, there had been no decided change in the British Naval attitude in that protection of their sea supply routes as well as of the troop convoys was still primary. There was still the trend toward dispersal of forces. However, the new high command was obviously seeking combat and a coming offensive attitude was clearly seen. The immediate British Naval concern was lack of Destroyers; four had accompanied their heavy ships to the Far East but more were wanted at once. Consequently, Admiral Phillips requested the immediate loan of the two Destroyer Divisions which had been eventually promised. There was considerable argument between the two CinC's, on various subjects, but the main point of differences hinged upon that disposition of Destroyers:-

The CinCAF declined to send his Destroyers to Singapore immediately. He represented that the British had only two capital ships in hand and had four Destroyers with them; that there were two or three other British Destroyers assigned to the local defense of Hong Kong which were the approximate equal of the

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American Destroyers and which were currently not assigned to very good advantage; that the American Cruisers needed Destroyers for their full effectiveness and that the results from our large force of Submarines could be promoted by the association of a few Destroyers with them; finally, that though the promise for loan of American Destroyers would be kept - and we had disposed them somewhat to that end - the time had not arrived to give up two-thirds of them.

Toward the end of 6 December, joint despatches were drawn up in the conference and sent to London and Washington. While the smooth copies were being made, word came from Singapore that a Jap amphibious expedition had been sighted in the Gulf of Siam, heading westward; there was a suggestion that its objective was an anchorage in Thailand. Admiral Phillips immediately recalled REPULSE and said that if he were in Singapore he would go to sea with such ships as he could collect. Arrangements were made to send him in an American PEY if his own plane should, for any reason, be unable to make a night flight; he started for Singapore during the evening.

PatWing Ten's patrol flights did not go close in on the Indo-China coast on 6 December and did not see any expeditions on the move. As soon as the British information of the enemy in the Gulf of Siam was received, BLACK HAWK and one Destroyer Division was directed to sail from Balikpapan to Batavia "for supplies and liberty". That order started them to the westward and while en route the Destroyers were directed to proceed toward Singapore and placed under the orders of the British CinC. Admiral Phillips was so informed as he was departing, by the CinCAF, with a remark to the effect that the differences as disclosed by the day's arguments were rapidly disappearing if still existent.

8 TO 10 DECEMBER

Received notification of the attack on Pearl Harbor slightly after 3:00 a.m., (L.M.T.), 8 December. Informed the GHQ of the USAFFE and the Asiatic Fleet, - with a directive to the latter to "govern yourselves accordingly". Recalled ISABEL. The first landing on the Malay Peninsula occurred at

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about the same hour but we did not hear of it for some hours. The first attack on the Philippines was at day-break, by air, upon two PBY planes on the water at Malalag in Davao Gulf; those two planes were destroyed - the other two had taken off for patrol. The PRESTON, anchored at Malalag, saw four enemy Destroyers pass, steaming toward Davao, slipped out astern of them and escaped. At about 10:30 a.m., we received word that enemy planes were in the vicinity of Baguio. Later in the day we learned that enemy planes had made powerful and well-executed attacks on U.S. Army landing fields in north-central Luzon, at midday, and had destroyed numerous planes as well as severely damaging the ground installations.

The respects in which the Asiatic Fleet was caught unprepared,- additional to incomplete shore and harbor installations,- has been set forth in the foregoing. The Fleet made a good recovery. Rear Admiral Glassford and staff left for Iloilo by plane, during forenoon of 8 December, to hoist his flag in HOUSTON as Commander Task Force Five. His orders were to rendezvous HOUSTON and BOISE with LANGLEY, TRINITY and PECOS which latter ships left the Bay soon after dark that evening, screened by two Destroyers; the Destroyers eventually returned. While crossing the Sulu Sea, bound for Makassar Strait, the detachment encountered one enemy Light Cruiser, probably carrying a Flag and screened by Destroyers. Our ships drove them off and they were lost in the darkness. It is probable that this was a fortunate encounter in that the enemy estimated that our forces were likely to be encountered in that general locality in strength too great for the forces which he had available for fighting them. Anyhow, no enemy forces were met by the long string of merchant and other ships which were running south toward and through the Makassar Strait for several days afterward. Commander Task Force Five proceeded into Makassar Strait, assembling his forces and obtaining full loads of fuel at the Dutch oil ports.

The Submarines sailed for patrol stations as per plan:- One-third off enemy harbors; one-third stationed for intercepting enemy expeditions advancing on Luzon; one-third in reserve stations which were somewhat scattered and concealed. The Submarines which were sent on directly offensive missions arrived after

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the enemy shipping had, for the most part, moved out and found only poor hunting for some time. They probably would have been more effective if they had been partly armed with ground mines instead of torpedoes only. The mines had only recently arrived and BuOrd had informed us that a defect had to be corrected before they were to be used. The Submarines in reserve stations soon began to be fed into the defensive-intercept patrol lines,- as the Japanese amphibious offensive developed against Luzon.

On 9 December, CinCAF decided to restore the relieved Commander of Submarines, (Captain Wilkes), to that command on account of his experience and familiarity with the conditions obtaining - and his excellent ability, including health. It was also decided to send the thus displaced Submarine Commander south in OTUS to have ready an alternative command post for Submarines. On the following day, it was decided to also send HOLLAND south with OTUS,- which meant the realization of the mistake of attempting to use all the Tenders for servicing Submarines in Manila Bay for a protracted period.

The air patrol obtained no information on enemy ship movements during the 8th and 9th. From this time onward an extraordinary crop of incorrect enemy information flowed in over the Warning Net. Too many reports came in of enemy sightings when nothing actually was sighted and when a vessel really was seen she was usually reported in one of two categories;- irrespective of size, she was either a Transport or a Battleship! We received word of the capture of the WAKE at Shanghai and of the surrender of the 200 Marines in North China.

The Naval Station, Cavite, was destroyed at noon, 10 December, by Japanese bombers which bombed with deliberation, from above the range of the nine 3-inch 50 guns that we had installed for its protection. The enemy attack was not interfered with by our Army pursuit planes and the bombing was very accurate. The damage was mostly from fire which effectively burned out the entire establishment, less the aircraft shops. Also, the fire was kept away from the Naval Magazine which still contained propellants and a small quantity of high explosive.

The OTUS was alongside a Cavite wharf loading torpedoes, spare parts and some equipment which had

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recently arrived for her own conversion. The ship got away, during the attack, with only slight damage but most of the material to be loaded was lost; it was only a small portion of the total available. PEARY was completing repair of collision damages; she got away with minor damage but several personnel casualties. One Sweeper was disabled, mainly through loss of machinery parts which were in the shops. The most serious loss was one of the large Submarines which received two direct hits which entirely disabled her; she was later stripped of considerable gear and then fully wrecked with explosives. The other of the two Submarines, at Cavite, received minor damages which were later made good by the Tenders. The two Submarines were just completing some of the numerous alterations which were on order.

The attack of 10 December made it entirely clear that, as far as security of ships and installations in Manila Bay was concerned, the enemy had control of the air. The HOLLAND, OTUS, ISABEL and two Destroyers were sailed that evening, for the south. Another, (9-knot), detachment consisting of TULSA, ASHEVILLE and two Sweepers also sailed; all to join Task Force Five. It is unfortunate that two or three additional small ships were not sent south at this time. Those two detachments also encountered no enemy on their voyages to the Borneo oil ports.

11 TO 15 DECEMBER

During the attack of 10 December, a few bombs were dropped among the merchant ships just outside Manila Harbor. One medium sized ship was burned and sunk thereby. An extraordinary number of ships had fled for refuge in harbors and collected in Manila Bay:- Most of the small inter-Island ships had come into the Bay which also contained about 40 deep-sea ships, of various ownerships; there were no very large ships but there were many medium sized ships that were valuable, some with valuable cargoes.

On 11 December, CinCAF called a conference of Masters, Owners and Agents and advised as follows:-

- a) That the inter-Island ships were likely to be as safe while in ports or on voyages in the central portion of the Islands and might

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as well work there; that they could thus in some measure assist the USAFFE's effort.

- b) That the deep-sea ships would eventually be destroyed if they remained in Manila Bay and that there was a fair chance of escape if they sailed to the southward. The Fleet could not at once undertake direct convoy or escort, but was in position to cover, that some of its own ships had sailed the preceding night and that no enemy ships were being found to the southward.

The CinC's advice was accepted and ships began departing that evening. The movement continued for several days, with ships going out singly just after nightfall. All are believed to have escaped except one which was burned by a minor air attack. We were lucky.

It had been apparent for some days that our Pacific Fleet could make no westward movement in force. The loss of PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE and indications that the British defense of Malaya was not going too well gave little ground for hope in that direction also, - as far as any diversionary effect on the enemy was concerned. Clearly the U.S. Forces in the Far Eastern theatre were on their own and the chance of getting reinforcements into the Philippines via the Torres Strait was not favorable. The mission of our Naval forces remaining in or near the Philippines remained as before, - to support the USAFFE's defense while damaging the enemy as much as possible. He was already meeting success in landing forces in southeast and north Luzon. On 13 December advised the Navy Department that the situation of Luzon was very serious.

The air patrol discovered enemy men-of-war off north and northwest Luzon on 11 December and a half squadron of PBV's attacked a ship of the HARUNA class, which was accompanied by Cruisers and Destroyers. It was a good attack, coming in from astern, made through thick anti-aircraft fire, but unfortunately, the salvo was dropped a fraction of a second too soon and the hits made were on the extreme stern. The attack at least disabled the enemy's steering gear and the damage may have been quite extensive. This was the last body of enemy combat ships that was found at sea by our air patrols.

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On the following day PatWing Ten's luck was bad:- A half squadron took off from Olongapo, on unjustifiably bad information, to attack "a Battleship" nearby. The planes found nothing, were seen by enemy fighters which were not themselves seen and which attacked after ours had landed; seven PBV's were burned by incendiary bullets, two enemy planes being shot down in their attack.

By 13 December, our Army planes were no longer keeping the air except for one or two fighters, at a time, flying for reconnaissance purposes. We then had a little less than one squadron of patrol planes operable and with little prospect of gaining further results commensurate with losses. The CinCAF therefore directed, (14 December), that ComPatWing Ten proceed to N.E.I. waters with remaining planes, all three small Tenders and such extra personnel and remaining spares as could be carried. The voyage was made successfully and the Tenders were ready to service a reinforcing squadron of PBV's when it arrived, in January, via a southern route to Darwin. After this movement south, there remained in the vicinity of Manila some damaged planes from which four were eventually made operable.

By the end of the period, we had withdrawn our four Destroyers from Singapore and so much of the entire Fleet had gone into Task Force Five that more staff assistance was there required. Therefore the Chief of Staff, and six key officers in operations, communications and maintenance, were transferred to ComTaskFor Five. Admiral Hart decided to remain at Manila as long as the Submarines could be operated and serviced from there. The Chief of Staff and one communication officer, carrying a letter of introduction, proceeded by plane, the others in one Destroyer and the Submarine which was damaged when Cavite was destroyed. There then remained in or based on Manila Bay:-

Two Destroyers,- one still repairing.
Six Motor Torpedo Boats.
Twenty-seven Submarines.
CANOPUS and PIGEON.
Three River Gunboats.
Three Sweepers and one Fleet Tug.
Various District small craft.

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Nearly all the Submarines were patrolling or in advanced stand-by stations and when they were in Manila it was only for short periods. With the destruction of Cavite, we were thrown back on CANOPUS for all services to Submarines. In the interest of facilitating her work and of reducing damages from future bombing, CANOPUS was moored at the Manila Harbor front, in shoal water, and covered with camouflage nets. The torpedoes, spare parts, supplies and stores were moved into dumps - dispersed among the freight sheds in the vicinity. The Submarine Command Post was established in the nearby Men's Club which also took on a large task of berthing and subsistence; some provision for bomb shelter was accomplished. This was the best that could be done for the Submarines under the conditions of menacing air attack and it was hoped that the set-up could last for some time.

A few hide-outs were arranged - against the Breakwater, among junks, lighters, etc. - which it was hoped the Submarines could occupy without discovery while resting. The efforts at concealment were probably ineffective in view of the activity of enemy photographic planes - which seemed to hover about at will - and quite possibly our dispositions were being radioed from on shore anyhow.

The Motor Torpedo Boats had arrived with experienced and trained personnel but the news of their addition to the Fleet and information about their requirements had not been received in time to arrange for their basing or to lay down the outlying fuel caches which their short radius called for. Arrangements for basing them at Cavite had gotten fairly well along but it was all ruined on 10 December. Consequently, the employment of the PT's for combat had been thrown back, even if the enemy had come within their reach. They continued preparations for combat; (actually some use had to be made of them for messenger service between Manila and Mariveles, over several days). At the end of the period, the PT's - backed by one of the two available Destroyers - were stationed to cover against a night advance of the enemy toward the Batangas-Tabayas wharves and beaches.

The three Philippine Motor Torpedo Boats, which according to plan were to operate with ours, did not join up with them or report to Com 16. Those

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three boats never accomplished anything in operations involving combat. The American boats were highly successful during the later stages of the campaign.

16 TO 20 DECEMBER

The enemy's invading expeditions in north-west and southeast Luzon continued to advance and became well established. The Submarines operated against them thickly, particularly in the vicinity of their landing points, and did damage but evidently not enough to disrupt the enemy's effort.

The Naval District was doing its best at recovery from the bombing of Cavite:- As many of the industrial personnel as could be used were shifted to the various small plants in Manila and progress was made toward carrying on supplying and repair work. The District Commandant established a Command Post on Sangley Point and controlled operations from there. On 19 December, that area in turn received an accurate, high-altitude bombing attack which burned much of the gasoline that remained there in drums and ruined the radio installations,- the latter by direct hits of large bombs. The Naval Hospital, which directly adjoined, was not touched; it had been abandoned because of its location in the midst of military objectives. Com 16 then moved his Command Post to the prepared underground position on Corregidor. Cavite and Sangley Point were thereupon virtually abandoned except for handling salvaged supplies and making the preparations for complete demolition.

Two French merchant ships had been taken into "protective custody", somewhat earlier. During this period, one of them, an old-type freighter, loaded with a considerable quantity of flour and other provisions was sent to Mariveles to unload. She was bombed and burned, somewhat later, before the provisions were fully discharged. The other one, the MARECHAL JOFFRE, was a modern and valuable ship and, since she could not be "protected" in Manila Bay it was decided to try to get her away. About 100 Navy personnel were thrown aboard and she sailed for Makassar Strait the same evening, being one of the last merchant ships to escape; she eventually proceeded to an east Australian port. The Commander was a young Lieutenant

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who must have done extremely well to surmount the difficulties encountered.

21 TO 25 DECEMBER

The Japanese expeditions had been getting on very well with their invasion of Luzon. The enemy force in southeastern Luzon seemed to have a subsidiary mission but it had been making steady progress to the northward. The expedition on the north-west coast seemed the more dangerous one and it was coming down the coast fairly rapidly. It was clear that the enemy was doing a good job, that he understood amphibious war, could employ its natural advantages and could overcome its difficulties, - including the coordinated use of all the varieties of forces and weapons needed. It is to be noted that in the entire campaign in the northern half of Luzon the Japanese landings were on open beaches and their transports were never dependant on wharves. The enemy's ground equipment could not have been heavy and it probably was not elaborate.

Early in the period it became likely that the enemy would soon attempt landings in or near the Lingayen Gulf. That would be most dangerous to our defense and Submarines were concentrated in that area - and its approaches - without regard to individual patrol stations. The instructions were to get at the enemy without thought of neighboring Submarines which also might be attacking. Nevertheless the Submarines again did not succeed in disrupting the enemy at sea. The best chance was in one incident off Cape Bolinao where one large Submarine found herself in front of a convoy of large ships, with strong anti-submarine screen, in the late afternoon. She got off a contact report but did not succeed in attacking as the enemy passed - or by running in from astern that night. Next morning a considerable number of medium or large ships were at anchor in shoal water on the south side of Lingayen Gulf, and with a mine field to the seaward. They were attacked and probably damaged. In that difficult task, one S-boat touched off a mine or two and was hunted and depth-charged for over 24 hours. She barely escaped but had no serious injuries.

There had been conversations with the USAFFE concerning the employment of the Marine Regiment but

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resulting in no definite arrangements or understanding. On 20 December, the CinCAF made mention of the subject in a formal letter and subsequent staff conferences resulted in the following arrangement:-

That the Marines, plus a Naval Battalion which was forming, would be brigaded with a regiment of Constabulary, under a Marine Brigade Commander. The Constabulary regiment was composed of fairly well experienced men but lacked good officers and non-coms which the Fourth Marines would supply from its wealth of experienced personnel. There was never time to carry out the project; the Marine Regiment, as such, passed under the direct control of USAFFE and was mainly employed on Corregidor.

On 23 December, the CinCAF saw a copy of a USAFFE despatch which predicted an early retirement of all Army forces to the Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor. On the following morning he received definite information that such movement was in progress, that the Government and the GHQ of USAFFE would move to Corregidor that day and that Manila was to be proclaimed an open city, containing no combat elements. This eventuality had been foreseen but its coming so soon was a surprise - as was the fact that no mention of such a step had previously been made, formally or otherwise, since the war began. We immediately proceeded to uproot CANOPUS and the other Submarine installations from the Manila Harbor front and to shift all such activities to Mariveles and Corregidor.

It was decided, in a full conference, that the Submarines would continue to operate from Manila Bay and keep it up as long as possible. It was hard to decide whether CinCAF should also shift his Command Post to Corregidor or accept the probability that even the Submarines would have to shift base to the southward in the near future,- and make one jump of it to the N.E.I. The latter alternative was chosen. We had three patrol planes, hidden in the mangrove off Los Banos, available for transport; also one Submarine which had by then "worked up" after a main battery renewal. It was planned to send out one plane on the evening of the 24th, with the acting Chief of Staff and seven other commissioned and enlisted staff. (At the last minute we gave up half the places to the top-ranking Army Air Officers). We planned to sail the

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remaining two planes the following evening and also the Submarine, carrying a load of personnel and the heavy communication equipment, files, etc.

During the forenoon of 25 December, the CinCAF turned over to Com 16 full command of all Naval activities remaining in the Philippines, with a formal letter of instructions. This became effective at noon that day whereupon CinCAF's Command Post and radio station in Manila discontinued to function. The CinCAF had intended to take off after sunset, on 25 December, with 15 others in two PBV's and to make a night flight to Soerabaya; thereby being out of action for less than 24 hours. Unfortunately, the enemy discovered the two planes and burned them up in their hide-outs in the late afternoon. Consequently, only the Submarine, (SHARK), was available for transport; she left the Bay at 2:00 a.m. on 26 December.

26 TO 31 DECEMBER

The SHARK's voyage to Soerabaya occupied the period and was uneventful. Com 16 directed the two Destroyers which had been left in Manila Bay to proceed south, - on the night of 27 December. A little later he also directed Commander Submarines to shift his Command Post south and to discontinue attempting to carry out normal service to Submarines from Manila Bay. It had become too late to get CANOPUS and PIGEON south. The ships were old and not of great value but the personnel was highly valuable. They did serve usefully in contributing to the defense of Bataan, etc., during the remaining months.

As indicated in the foregoing, the Submarines did not succeed in disrupting the enemy's invasion of Luzon, even though two-thirds of them were employed on the task. Those results were disappointing to all concerned including the Submarine personnel themselves. The personnel was long-service and experienced in peace-time training but - like everyone else - were not experienced in the kind of war that they faced; only war proves what is correct and what is wrong, - who is effective and who is not. It can also be said:-

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That our peacetime training was not realistic in certain respects.

That we also had not been realistic as regards the material which was too complex in installations that did not contribute directly to offense, or defense, and was lacking somewhat in the absolute essentials.

That the enemy's mastery of amphibious war, by virtue of which he could land most anywhere, made interception of his expeditions very difficult.

That the enemy employed large numbers of small ships, difficult to hit and that there was scant return when they were hit.

That the enemy employed large numbers of anti-submarine craft; they seemed to be good at detection but not at attack, though it required time to learn that the hundreds of depth charges which they dropped were not very dangerous.

That the last stage of the voyage of their invading expeditions was always at night, - and during the dark of the moon at the critical periods. The enemy being in full control of the air, the Submarines could be given no information of his ship movements approaching Luzon.

During the period, Task Force Five completed its assembly, fueling, etc., and moved the Auxiliaries for occupation of Port Darwin as a main base. Its command completed organization, set up a Command Post at Soerabaya and held preliminary conferences with appropriate Dutch authorities. The merchant shipping by this time had all escaped, mostly via Makassar Strait.

PEARY sailed for the south via Molucca Strait and there experienced considerable air attack; she was undamaged by the enemy attack but had some casualties from an attack by Australian dive-bombers, from Ambon. HERON went north to assist PEARY and was herself severely attacked; she held the advantage in the engagement, however.

By the end of the period the enemy was establishing at Jolo and at Davao for a further advance. Our Submarines were tending toward a more southern theatre, for their patrols, and opposing the enemy at those points. The damaged Submarine, SEADRAGON, had been repaired and sent on patrol.

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31 DECEMBER 1941 to 6 JANUARY 1942

Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, arrived at Soerabaya, Java, during the evening of 1 January and found the Command Post of Task Force Five established in the outskirts of the city in buildings which had been commandeered and supplied by the Dutch Navy. The accommodations were sufficient and the Post satisfactory except that radio facilities were inadequate. The Fleet personnel did splendidly in extemporizing a main radio, from apparatus obtained locally and some taken out of ships, but the difficulties in handling the radio load were very great.

By this date Navy Department and War Department had fixed upon Port Darwin as a potential base of considerable magnitude and the trend was toward demands upon the place which its very poor facilities could not meet. Following the movement - and also because security from enemy attack was at the time better there than at Soerabaya - ComTaskFor Five had sent all Naval Auxiliaries to Darwin. These voyages and also the escort of Army and other shipping using the Torres Strait route employed Cruiser and Destroyers to such an extent that their center of gravity was, at the time, well to the eastward. The Department was informed of the deficiencies of Darwin as a port and was also advised that the Torres Strait route might become too dangerous for our convoys at an early date.

There were ample fuel supplies at Soerabaya and at Darwin and all of our ships, including Tankers, had filled to capacity at Balikpapan on the way south. The Dutch had made their base facilities at Soerabaya available and were accommodating in all respects. Those facilities were considerable but the Base was congested and quite vulnerable from the air. All spares, munitions and special supplies were at Darwin, - a long distance away.

It was found that all ships of the Fleet which were sent south had reached the waters of N.E.I. without much damage. PEARY and HERON were air-bombed, during the period, in the Molucca Strait and both had some personnel casualties. In the case of the HERON, the action was protracted; the ship did splendidly, - destroying one large enemy seaplane.

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All but one of the numerous merchant ships which went south from Manila Bay had reached N.E.I. waters and were being managed by their own agents as regards disposing of and receiving cargoes. It was fortunate that the enemy had not been able to intercept this shipping, - the aggregate value was great.

The Japanese had established themselves at Davao and at Jolo, from which points they later invaded the N.E.I. Patwing Ten sent six PBV patrol planes to make a daybreak bombing attack on shipping while the enemy was still in the building-up phase at Jolo. The section found the enemy off the north side of the Island but were intercepted by fighters and lost four planes; luckily, about 65% of the personnel were saved. Japanese Submarines had appeared as far south as the Java Sea, - and were thereafter present most of the time for the remainder of the campaign.

We were informed that the enemy had completed his occupancy of Manila City. From the end of December onward, very little further information and practically no reports were received from Com 16 and the subsequent history of that area is not included herein. A considerable force of small craft had been left in Manila Bay under Com 16's command; by this time it became clear to CinCAF that he should have sent three or four more of them south before, say, 18 December - including two of the Sweepers. Similarly, too many officers and men of the Navy were left in Manila Bay; 400 to 500 others might well have been brought out while it was still possible, even if risky; they were experienced and could have been more profitably employed in theatres other than Manila Bay. This error of judgment probably came from the idea of not going too far in withdrawing the Navy from the defense of the Philippines. From Java things looked different!

On 2 January, received a despatch from Opnav which indicated some disappointment in the amount of damage which Asiatic Fleet had inflicted on the enemy. Also a despatch from Cominch, the last of which stated that the Fleets would soon be placed under a Joint Command. CinCAF proceeded to Batavia on evening of 3 January and returned the following night. Purpose was to call on the Governor-General and to confer with Vice Admiral Helfrich, Commanding the N.E.I. Navy.

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The Honorable Mr. Van Mook and Vice Admiral Helfrich were present at the interview with the Governor-General. His Excellency stated that if the Japanese proposed that the N.E.I. withdraw from the war, and resume commercial relations, their proposal would be denied. The Governor-General then proceeded to read a press report announcing the agreement to set up General Wavell as a Supreme Commander, with GHQ on Java, Admiral Hart to command the three Fleets, etc. He pressed Admiral Hart to set forth his basic ideas on the forthcoming campaign; he was told that the news came as a surprise, that considerable thought and interview with General Wavell would be required first, etc. His Excellency then presented his own views, - clearly, concisely and showing excellent knowledge and understanding of broad strategy and of the character of war which confronted us. His most cogent idea was that the campaign would be one in which the importance of ships and of aircraft would transcend everything else.

There was considerable time for interviews with Admiral Helfrich, the American Consul General and others. It appeared to be the sentiment among the Dutch that the American reputation was badly damaged as a result of the events of the war in the Philippines. The Dutch Navy was particularly cocky, principally because two of its Submarines had each sunk four enemy ships in the South China Sea. Their attitude modified when SEAWOLF arrived at Soerabaya, (7 January), and likewise brought in a bag of four enemy ships which she had sunk off Hainan.

The Dutch Navy had lost three Submarines and the remainder was mostly in port, resting and overhauling. The Dutch Cruisers and Destroyers were being employed as Covering Forces for Singapore convoys, and in A/S escort of their own shipping. Vice Admiral Helfrich had already provided space for a U.S. Command Post at Batavia, next door to his own, and strongly urged that we move into it - and away from Soerabaya. He informed us that Admiral Layton was also preparing space at Batavia for a similar shift of the British Fleet's Command Post from Singapore. Admiral Helfrich was told that we were not likely to move because our Fleet's operations would probably continue to be in the central and eastern part of the theatre, - hence Soerabaya would be the better location; anyhow it now appeared that the new Supreme Command GHQ would be in or near Batavia - and it would control.

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Upon return to Soerabaya, CinCAF requested information from Navy Department concerning any prospective reinforcement of his Fleet and any likely offensive movement by Pacific Fleet. This information was to be in preparation for the forthcoming conference with the Supreme Commander; it was not received.

Admiral Hart, lacking any instructions on the point, assumed that he would continue to command his own forces and proceeded to set up the Soerabaya Command Post to that end. It seemed necessary to have one of the two Rear Admirals at sea, to command a Striking Force, and arrangements were immediately made to re-embark Rear Admiral Glassford in HOUSTON, with an adequate staff. The Fleet Command was to be exercised through, (and somewhat by), the Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Purnell who was fully informed and indoctrinated and who, also, was the American officer who by experience was best informed concerning the N.E.I. area and all matters pertaining to the Allied Fleets.

It may well be said at this point that the Asiatic Fleet Staff was a highly efficient and very adequate organization. It was mainly composed of officers who had enjoyed no previous staff experience. They had been together for a long time, had encountered many unusual conditions, had shown that they could rise to occasions and could always function efficiently despite poor working conditions.

At the end of the period, we definitely learned that the British Far East Fleet Command Post had vacated Singapore; that a Post was being occupied at Batavia by a junior Admiral who would command the three D-class Cruisers, few Destroyers and lesser craft which now composed that Fleet; and that Admiral Layton would soon proceed to Colombo with most of the Fleet Staff and there await heavy reinforcements, including capital ships. A Rear Admiral, R.N., (Spooner), was remaining in command of H.M. Dockyard at Singapore and would command Sweepers and small local craft.

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TO 12 JANUARY

The Commander Submarines arrived from Manila, with Staff, and set up his Command Post within the Fleet Offices. Captain Wilkes reported that the Japanese aircraft had become so active over Manila Bay and over such of the basing facilities as remained at Corregidor and Mariveles that it had been impossible to service Submarines there any longer. Therefore he had been obliged to shift his base to the southward. It was not possible to bring out CANOPUS or PIGEON, of the Submarine Command. Also, a considerable amount of spare parts and torpedoes had consequently been left behind. Most of the torpedoes and some of the spare parts were brought out later, in Submarines, but it was a mistake not to have brought out the two ships when it could have been accomplished.

Patrol Wing Ten also set up its Command Post at Soerabaya where it functioned for the remainder of the campaign under one of the Squadron Commanders,- the two senior officers of the Wing were taken into the Supreme Commander's H.Q. during the period. The Wing's duties henceforth were altogether reconnaissance, which was mainly over the central and eastern part of N.E.I. waters. The patrol planes were basing over wide areas, making full use of the three small Tenders, and hence were difficult for the enemy to locate and destroy on the water. By this time, what remained of the Wing had become highly experienced and efficient; the pilots contrived to maintain reconnaissance in the face of strong enemy air forces - by virtue of their skill in using cloud cover and ability in air combat, even against fighters. We had extra crews for which we began overtures toward obtaining some new PBV's which the Dutch Navy had bought but for which they had no trained personnel. After considerable controversy, five of them were obtained.

During the period, we completed new Operating Plans, re-constituted the Cruisers and Destroyers as a Task Force, (Rear Admiral Glassford), and organized a Base Command at Port Darwin, (Captain Doyle). The Cruisers and Destroyers continued some escort and convoy work but were also assembling for covering the Makassar and Molucca Straits. The Submarines were continuing to shift their patrol areas to the southward, to work against the advancing enemy,

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but were also on his communication lines and off as many of his Indo-China ports as their numbers would permit. The Submarines' results were improving but still there were occurring too many failures from torpedo defects and other causes. CinCAF was continuing to receive despatches over various routes, about getting ammunition, etc., into Corregidor. Army authorities were trying to collect enough to load a submarine, - 20 tons.

On 9 January, Admiral Hart arrived at Batavia and thenceforth was able to visit the Fleet Offices at Soerabaya, or his ships, only for brief periods. He interviewed Mr. Elliot, of the Stanvac Co., and obtained late information concerning the oil industry and its situation, - generally, as applying to the entire area, and particularly to the Palembang area. Mr. Elliot possessed an entirely correct war psychology and is very able. Through him we began fostering a commission to handle all the oil situation. Also, Admiral Hart conferred with Lieutenant General Brett and Major General Brereton, and stated his views as regards ship-and-aircraft cooperation to which they expressed no disagreement. General Brett was not optimistic about holding the Malay Barrier and pointed out that Burma and Australia were the vital points - in his estimation - and that perhaps Burma could be held.

Admiral Layton had arrived from Singapore and there was a long conference between him, Admiral Helfrich and Admiral Hart. It was found that the British Naval interests and activities were entirely centered on guarding troop convoys into Singapore; they were using the few small ships of their local command as well as the Cruisers of adjacent commands which came into the area as ocean escorts. The British had a well-organized system for handling those movements and Admiral Layton proposed that it continue to operate independently and outside of the Joint Naval Command which was about to be initiated. Admiral Hart stated that such a method would mean responsibility without commensurate authority and hence would be unacceptable to him; that, of course, for any measure taken toward guarding anything as important as troop convoys he would be most unlikely to disturb a going concern; but that he must have cognizance and full authority. There was considerable argument but Admiral Layton eventually conceded that Admiral Hart was correct.

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With this meeting there began the personal conferences and cooperation which carried through during the interim up to the time that General Wavell assumed the full command of what became known as the "ABDA" area. Admiral Helfrich advised against setting up the Joint Naval Command Post elsewhere than at Batavia and Admiral Layton was disposed to agree with him.

On 10 January, General Wavell arrived by plane with several Army and R.A.F. staff officers. A general conference was held that afternoon at which General Wavell expressed some general views, quite simply and directly, and set forth the situation in Burma and Malaya, - rather optimistically. The various conferees were called upon to state their views. Admiral Layton had little to say except as regards escort and convoy of reinforcing troops and materials through the Soemba Strait to Singapore. Admiral Helfrich expressed considerable optimism over the prospects of combined Cruiser and Destroyer operations, with all available ships, against the enemy's expeditions. Admiral Hart pointed out, on that subject, that IF the enemy controlled the air over the sea areas his surface forces would have the advantage of better information about our forces than ours would have of his; that, in addition, our surface forces would have to cope with air attack - which they would do but that we should be realistic in measuring those disadvantages. Admiral Hart expressed his belief that the cooperation of ships and planes, including land-based planes, was of even more importance than the cooperation between troops and planes - to which view no exception was expressed. Admiral Hart also stated that thus far the Submarines, though inflicting damage on the enemy's amphibious expeditions, had not succeeded in breaking any of them up; and he finally pointed out that it remained to be decided how much of the effort of the Allied Cruisers and Destroyers was to be devoted to Striking Forces and how much to protecting convoys. General Wavell, - at this or perhaps a later conference, - said that the two missions were of about equal importance, - that at least the convoy-escort task was not secondary.

The Supreme Commander then said that his short title would be "ABDACOM" and announced similar titles for his subordinates, - including "ABDAFLOAT". He then stated that the GHQ would be at LEMBANG, 10 miles from Bandoeng which was the secondary seat of the N.E.I. Government. When asked his views about the location, Admiral Hart stated that there were objections

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to placing a Naval Command Post up in the hills where the officers of ships could not reach it, etc. But, that since a combined Headquarters was wanted, the only proper course was to try it,- which ABDAFLOAT would be prepared to do as soon as rapid communications could be assured.

ABDACOM then presented the outline of his command and staff organization, all of which, including assignments of individuals, had been decided upon before his arrival in Java. There were to be five sections:-

Intendant General	-- Lt.Gen. Brett, U.S.A.
Intelligence	-- Col. Field, R.A.
Navy (Operational Command)	-- Adm. Hart, U.S.N.
Air (Operational Command)	-- Air Marshall Pearce, R.A.F.
Army (Operational Command)	-- Lt.Gen. Ter Poorten, N.E.I.A.

The Air Marshall was still in Britain. General Brett was to take over this command in the interim, as additional duty; he was also the Deputy ABDACOM and was, in consequence, bound to be seriously over-loaded. The Chief of Staff was Major General Pownall, R.A., recently CinC, Malaya, vice Brook-Popham. His Chief of Staff in that latter billet, Major General Playfair, R.A., was assigned as Chief of Staff to General Ter Poorten; the latter continued to actively command his own Army and was at GHQ for only a brief period each day,- at the most.

After the conference, Admiral Hart gave Admiral Helfrich an opportunity to assign his own Chief of Staff, Captain Van Stavaren, as Chief of Staff to ABDAFLOAT. Admiral Helfrich replied that he could not spare Van Stavaren, whereupon Admiral Hart announced that he would take Rear Admiral Palliser, R.N. The latter had come out as Chief of Staff to Admiral Tom Phillips but had just taken over the British Navy command at Batavia; he was immediately relieved as such by Captain Collins, R.A.N.,- Admiral Layton's War Plans and Operations Officer.

Admirals Hart and Layton received despatches from their respective Governments asking their opinions on the qualifications of Admiral Helfrich for the command of the Joint Naval Forces and both replied favorably - on the 11th. Admiral Helfrich expressed his dissatisfaction with his own prospective position,-

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as a relatively subordinate commander, in an echelon below that of his own Army vis-a-vis, General Ter Poorten: Admiral Hart immediately communicated the above facts, and everything else which he knew about this subject, to General Wavell.

A second full conference was held at Batavia, by ABDACOM, during the afternoon of the 11th at which the principal business was on details and arrangements for setting up the Command Post. ABDAFLOAT reported the formation of his operating staff, - one Captain and one Commander from each of the three Fleets, - and that he would be prepared to shift to Lembang as soon as the considerable arranging of communications was completed. He reiterated his views about ship-plane cooperation, (in view of the inclusion of all aircraft under one, (R.A.F.), command). Incidentally, Captains Wagner and Stump had been called to Batavia in order to have them on the spot and available for the Reconnaissance Command.

Up to this point, the major point of discussion and consideration within the ABDACOM Staff had been the Malaya campaign and the arrival of reinforcements, looking forward as far as two months. Little thought was expressed about the eastern half of the ABDA area and the speed at which amphibious warfare progresses seemed not well realized. The Japanese jumped off from Jolo and Davao and landed at Tarakan and Menado on 11 January. This was the first blow against the N.E.I. The event did direct more attention toward the eastern part of the theatre.

Working conditions at Batavia were being very difficult for the British and Americans and getting things done took undue time and effort.

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The Japanese rapidly completed their occupation of Tarakan and of Menado and the vicinities of both. At Menado they made their first use of paratroops, which seemed to work but there was little opposition. The Dutch reported that they did a good job of destruction of the petroleum installations at Tarakan. These two enemy operations well illustrated

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the methods which all their amphibious expeditions followed:-

The expeditions formed at Jolo and Davao, at both of which points landing fields were seized and prepared. From those fields, the first step was to use their Navy planes to knock out the Allied aircraft,- over the country and the landing fields in the general vicinity of the next objective. That accomplished, the troops followed, guarded by numerous anti-submarine craft and strong forces of surface ships. The troops usually constituted a divisional organization and they were equipped for beach landings; apparently the Jap expeditions generally did not have to depend upon wharves and alongside unloading even for the heaviest equipment which they used. After seizure of a port, the next step of the enemy was to repair its air fields and move his own aircraft in on them,- in preparation for the next advance.

The Allied Fleets continued the operations of the preceding period and two important convoys were passed into Singapore. General Wavell, who was at Singapore 13-14 January, finally took over formal command of the ABDA area on the evening of 15 January. Up to that time, the three Fleet Commanders continued to work at Batavia, on the cooperative principle. There was always agreement in the end but frequently preceded by efforts to "get the others to do it". It was plainly difficult for the British Flag Officers to relinquish control but their attitude was correct. Admiral Layton departed, (16th). No information came from Washington about prospective reinforcements. The Commanding General USAFFE sent ABDACOM additional despatches about supplying him at Corregidor. The installation of a communication system from Lembang was proving very slow and the move to the new GHQ was being delayed in consequence. In the meantime, it was difficult to carry on the work from Batavia.

On 14 January, CinCAF ordered his Forces to make a Cruiser-Destroyer night attack on Kenia which, it was learned, was being used by the enemy ships of the expedition which took Menado. The Striking Force, (Destroyer torpedoes were to be the primary weapon), formed up quickly and made two-thirds of the long run, through unfamiliar and narrow waters, when it received word from a U.S. Submarine that the

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enemy had moved out of Kemà and the vicinity. This was the first one of several attempts of the sort. H.M.S. JUPITER sank a large enemy Submarine southwest of Java on the 16th; recovered two prisoners.

Although by the end of this period ABDAFLOAT was in full operational command, the cooperative principle had carried over and to some extent that condition obtained throughout. This fact was fully realized, - and it was believed the correct way. Rear Admiral Palliser was Chief of Staff, - and he was also the best informed concerning the state of the British Naval forces, and of its shore installations. It was therefore natural that his advice should carry great weight and to permit him to make all minor decisions concerning the British, including the actual arrangement of convoys. It is considered that Admiral Palliser was fully loyal. For instance, some time after arriving at Colombo, Admiral Layton attempted to withdraw the four best British Destroyers from the ABDA area; he had certain valid grounds upon which to make that attempt. It would have been a serious error - at the time - as Admiral Palliser saw at once and he valiantly fought out the question on which, in the end, he won. Admiral Hart similarly handled the U.S. Naval Forces - quite directly.

It was, at least from the political and psychological angle, advisable to, similarly, give Admiral Helfrich as much latitude as possible as regards his own forces and it was done as far as minor operations were concerned. The Dutch surface ships continued in use in covering the Singapore convoys for the remainder of January. As will appear later, there was one occasion when Admiral Helfrich permitted a misunderstanding that had a serious aspect. At the time it looked as if the basis for it lay in language difficulties. However, there is one circumstance which requires recording:-

Admiral Helfrich had long worked in a dual capacity for he was, in effect, the Minister of Marine to the Governor-General, N.E.I. As such he was really a cabinet officer with much to do concerning N.E.I. merchant shipping and commerce and there was a political tinge to those duties. Admiral Helfrich was also the Commander of the Fleet which, incidentally, had a different status from the Army of the N.E.I., in that

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the Fleet was "Royal", and the Army "Territorial". It was rather natural for Admiral Helfrich to be somewhat dual in his attitude toward the Allies because of these circumstances. He was always under the Governor-General's authority and was required to inform him on everything he knew, including secret ship movements, in consequence of which there was danger of compromise

In his relations as a subordinate commander under ABDAFLOAT, Admiral Helfrich at times seemed to be motivated somewhat from the political angle and at other times altogether from the standpoint of a Naval commander in war. At times he would be entirely frank and open in any matters which were under discussion, while at other times he acted more as in a civil capacity. The difficulty was that in the latter role, he seemed to wish to get Naval forces other than his own to take on an undue proportion of escort duty and anti-submarine work in connection with the relatively unimportant movements of Dutch merchant shipping. The last conference with Admiral Helfrich prior to ABDAFLOAT's departure for Lembang, from Batavia, was entirely satisfactory and in a spirit of full frankness. Upon the whole that condition continued.

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On this date, ABDACOM moved from Batavia to Lembang into a mountain-resort hotel which is ten miles north of Bandoeng. The choice of location there, rather than in or near Bandoeng, lay in the idea of spreading out and, consequently, the better concealment of the GHQ from the air. Facilities were far from adequate, but upon the whole were good enough, with the exception of radio and land wire communications; (they improved as time went on, in consequence of much work, including addition of temporary buildings).

ABDACOM had a very complicated command involving four Army, four Navy, and six Air organizations. Consequently, there was a great deal to do in organizing and equipping a GHQ, which naturally required time. In the face of an advancing enemy there of course was not time. The command function had to be exercised; but we never reach a condition under which it could be so exercised that there would be certainty that information and clear directives would be transmitted with despatch.

Despite the period over which the move from Batevia was delayed in the interest of establishing communications, those facilities were still quite unsatisfactory. In the first place, the equipment and the methods for rapid communications within the N.E.I. had always been rather limited;- sufficient for their own purposes but very difficult of expansion.

ABDACOM's GHQ was set up with the idea that the codes and ciphers would be mainly British, but using Dutch equipment and channels as much as was necessary. Inasmuch as CinCAF still commanded his own forces at this time, (through his Chief of Staff at Soerabaya), a Navy radio unit and coding board was set up at Lembang. However, these units had to be retained throughout and were an important part of ABDACOM's communication system. Without their services, communications with ships would have been very slow and hopelessly glugged. The Navy communication system was called upon to do much for the U.S. Army forces, which in the beginning had none of their own. The mass of Army communications became so great that we were obliged to restrict and force them into N.E.I. commercial channels in order that Navy personnel could keep their own heads above water. Also, there was much danger of incurring compromise by handling Army traffic.

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By this time it had become apparent that ABDACOM and his immediate advisors, who were mostly of the British Army, was still thinking mainly of Malaya (Singapore),- and somewhat of Burma. ABDACOM had not shown much interest when I discussed our eastern areas and the dangers of enemy penetration to the Malay Barrier on that side. As for the Naval side of things, ABDACOM's interest was primarily the safety of the reinforcing convoys going into Singapore. His trend was to promote employment of cruisers and destroyers on that mission without great thought to the consequent weakening of any possible Striking Force. At the same time, he was amiably critical of deficient Naval opposition to the direct advance of the enemy's amphibious expeditions.

ABDACOM's set-up for air operational command called for an Air Marshal, (Perce), to head the unified air command which had to control the six air organizations. The officer chosen had to come out from England; in the interim, General Brett, with General Brereton assisting, exercised such command as existed. General Brett being also the Intendent General, as well as Deputy ABDACOM, was over-loaded,- particularly since he had to pay considerable attention to U.S. Army affairs in Australia, with which he had been charged prior to the inception of ABDACOM. However, his actual air command duties during the period, (additional to work in connection with U.S. Army air reinforcements coming through Australia), was mainly confined to handling his own small detachment of heavy bombers. The R.A.F. air was all in Malaya and being directly commanded from Singapore. The immediate concern of CinCAF, as regards air, was the efficient operation of reconnaissance over water, for which his own remaining planes, with tenders, were available in addition to an approximately equal force of Dutch seaplanes. That particular air function was concrete, somewhat separated from the rest, and in the interest of best use for naval purposes, it was so maintained. General Brett at first chose Captain Wagner, U.S.N., to command the American and Dutch seaplanes; but eventually, and incident to Dutch opposition, he had to change that and put the head of the Dutch Naval air service in command. However, Captain Wagner was kept in the Reconnaissance Command post, (at Bandoeng), as Deputy, and the joint operation of seaplanes was carried on quite efficiently throughout. Captain Wagner had his three small seaplane tenders which were invaluable in providing flexibility of basing and, consequently, was in a strong position in his associations with the Dutch Naval air.

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The Air Reconnaissance Command was established well ahead of anything else, had its own communication system, and, in general, its performance was better than that of the other air units seemed to be.

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During the period the British Army and R.A.F. were being defeated and pressed southward in Malaya at a discouraging rate. ABDACOM visited Singapore and also Rangoon, (two separate journeys). His absence on journeys of that sort seemed to create the impression that he was not taking enough interest in the affairs of the N.E.I. This was unfortunate and was probably due only to suspicion among the Dutch, as Malaya was the principal fighting front at the time. While in British circles there was talk of their Army being shoved all the way down to Singapore Island and of an evacuation of Malaya by the R.A.F., the opinion was repeatedly expressed that Singapore itself would hold out indefinitely, even if the dockyard and port could not be used at all by our shipping.

We completed assembly of the ABDAFLOAT staff with Rear Admiral Palliser, R.N., as Chief of Staff, and with two British, two American, and two Dutch assistants, - all of command rank. Additional to them was Lieut. Commander Mason, U.S.N., who, next to Colonel Field, had come to be the most important member of the Intelligence Section. It had already become apparent that, other than by direct observation by reconnaissance planes, we would be getting very little information about the enemy from sources other than Corregidor. The Naval unit there continued to be of the utmost value, and without its services ABDAFLOAT would have had to carry on very much in the dark. The American Naval communication unit at Lembang increased in importance and grew to a total of something over twenty officers and men.

During the period, the Japanese continued some activity in the Molucca Strait but its character was not clear. There were signs of a build-up and of activity toward Ambon and Kendari but there was insufficient information for proper estimate of enemy

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intentions. I advised ABDACOM that the Fleets could not be depended upon to break up an expedition against Ambon. I said that it would be well covered by Submarines but that previous experience showed that they could not be relied upon to do enough damage to break up an expedition embarked in many ships, according to the usual Jap practice; and that only under an unusual combination of favorable circumstances could we hope to get the few American surface ships available into action against the transports before they discharged. I also stated that if ABDACOM intended to withdraw the troops from Ambon he should act in the near future. The impression was gathered that the forces at Ambon should remain there and "fight it out".

The enemy completed his capture and occupancy of Tarakan and advanced south through Macassar Strait to Balikpapan, which he occupied without much opposition on the land. The Dutch reports were to the effect that all of the oil industry installations at both those places which were above ground were totally destroyed; moreover, that some or all of the wells were so plugged that the enemy would have to start drilling operations from the beginning in order to get fuel out of the fields. The demolition job at Tarakan was a smaller task than at Balikpapan but more time was available at the latter port, where the demolition began sometime before the Japanese appeared. While there is no doubt that the Dutch did accomplish a great deal of destruction at those places, we can by no means be certain that Dutch wells of considerable capacity did not fall into the hands of the Japanese. In any case, at Tarakan, which field gives a very high grade of petroleum, the oil is not at great depth. (Incidentally, the British field at Seria is said to be a very extensive one and the oil is very near the surface. In that field also, the oil is of a very high quality, - good enough for boiler fuel as it comes from the ground).

CinCAF had long believed that as far as natural resources were concerned, the oil fields were by far the most important strategic factor in the entire Far East area. On the possibility that the Japanese might capture some of the oil-bearing territory, CinCAF had urged the fullest possible preparations for destruction and had continued to press in that way insofar as befitted his position. Soon after the outbreak of war, he suggested that a certain amount of plugging of wells be started at once. There had seemed to be more reluctance on the part of the British owners of the Miri-Seria area than by the others. It was evident that very little preparatory work was done at Miri and Seria until the matter was finally put into the control

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of the British Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Fleet, in the Autumn of 1941.

The Striking Force, (American cruisers and destroyers), jumped off on 21 January to attack into Macassar Strait. The movement was based upon a Dutch Army report which was incorrect for the Jap advance was not made until later. This false move threw the Striking Force badly out of gear;- burned up a lot of fuel, MARBLEHEAD developed defects on one shaft, and BOISE was lost to the Asiatic Fleet for the remainder of the campaign by striking an uncharted pinnacle rock which ripped a long gash in her bottom near the keel. There was incomplete recovery of readiness to strike when the Jap expedition did proceed to Balikpapan.

However, four destroyers did attack off Balikpapan during the night of 23-24 January, with no loss, and succeeded in doing much damage. The results cannot be known but the destruction of four large valuable ships is certain and that of four others is most probable. The destroyers made either five or six known torpedo hits and between thirty and forty 4-inch hits at close range, generally along the waterline, with the projectiles exploding inside, and known to have started some fires. As far as the Division Commander knew, he was in the presence of superior enemy forces. He ran past four powerful Jap destroyers, and our destroyers held full speed during the 1½ hours that they were weaving in and out of the Japanese transport formation. In consequence, there were many misses by torpedoes which were launched at close range, while passing the targets at high speed. The staff work which set up the attack, (from Soerabaya), was excellent; weather conditions fitted; the destroyers were efficient, and they were also lucky in that they suffered practically no damage. The Japanese expedition down the Macassar Strait also suffered from submarines and from the attack of Dutch and American Army planes. The sum total of the damage inflicted proved to be such that the enemy stalled at Balikpapan and did not come farther by itself.

The S-36 was lost about thirty miles west of the city of Macassar, through grounding on an open sea reef, during thick weather. It should be said here that much of the waters of the N.E.I. are difficult from the navigational standpoint and since all aids to navigation had been discontinued as a war measure, the condition constituted a handicap at best. There was the

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still greater handicap of almost total lack of familiarity with the operating areas on the part of our personnel. The Dutch charts and sailing directions are much better than the English publications but our officers could not read them. Effort was made to supply the deficiency by obtaining pilots but the required Dutch personnel was said to be unavailable.

Our surface ships had been nearly continuously at sea since the war began and the adverse effects as regards material efficiency of those old vessels were becoming apparent. Even when they were in port usually only a little could be obtained in the way of services. The tenders were at Darwin and their availability was reduced for that reason. The same circumstances existed for the Submarines. Several of them were already several weeks out and, in fact, to find more than three or four in port at any one time was a rare occasion. It was well understood in our own Fleet Command that we were over-working our submarines, particularly for their first patrols, but so many emergencies kept developing on account of the necessity for resisting the enemy's southern advance to the utmost that there was nothing else to do.

Our submarines were continuing to shift their patrol areas to the southward in order to stay in front of the enemy advance. They continued, however, insofar as numbers available would permit, to patrol exits from the enemy ports and bases and to work on the enemy's lines of communications when information disclosed same.

It developed to be a mistake to have sent practically all our large auxiliaries all the way to Darwin, because that removed them so far from the center of gravity of operations of our ships which they existed to serve. A westward movement was consequently projected. During the period, American destroyers sank a submarine off Darwin. Examined the wreck by divers, 165 feet of water, no opportunity to get detailed information.

HOUSTON and two destroyers were being continually used in the Darwin-Torres Strait area for escorting American troop ships and auxiliaries. Also, we were having to meet some of the many demands for anti-submarine escorts in Java waters by using American destroyers.

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Two more British convoys were sent to Singapore during the period and British and Dutch surface ships still were mainly engaged in that task. The Dutch surface ships remained fresh, - not in overworked condition. The same condition applied to the Dutch submarines. They had been very active during December and two of them had sunk four ships each; three had been lost. But for some time the remaining Dutch submarines had operated most leisurely, usually with not more than two at sea at once.

During the period, ABDAFLOAT visited Soerbaya in order to generally regain touch and also to arrange to bring Admiral Glassford on shore so that command could be turned over to him, as ComSouthWestPac, under conditions such that he could properly exercise that command. This was a difficult change to carry out in the face of an advancing enemy and was a subject of considerable embarrassment at the time.

Since about 8 January, there had been received several communications about getting supplies into the Philippines. At first it was a direct call, from USAFFE upon ABDACOM, in meeting which we sent anti-aircraft ammunition into Corregidor. Somewhat later, but as soon as a cargo could be collected, a submarine carried small arms ammunition into Mindanao. This ammunition was sent in as soon as commensurate loads of the required components could be collected from Australia by our Army authorities. A third submarine for which an ammunition load was not primary, also went to Corregidor from Java - somewhat later. These supply voyages of course took the submarines away from their primary war missions for considerable periods. However, this was not all loss from the strictly Naval standpoint because upon their return the submarines brought out of Corregidor torpedoes, spares, and a certain number of key personnel, all of which was badly needed in the southern areas.

The project of getting food into Corregidor and Bataan was placed with the Army by the President, who made available a considerable sum to be employed for chartering merchant vessels and paying high wages to their personnel for attempts to run the supplies in from Australia or points along the Barrier. The Naval authorities of all three Nations in Java gave what assistance was possible but the full results are not known. CinCAF detailed a Commander to assist our Army authorities in Java.

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The CinCAF also turned over to the Army a 2000-ton freighter, (Philipino flag), which it had under charter from November, 1941, and sparked up the ship's personnel into full willingness to undertake the venture. This ship was the most promising of those which were heard of as employed on the project from within the ABDA area; but it is understood that the food components for her cargo were collected too late for the ship to get loaded and well started before the Japanese advance was pretty well on top of Soerabaya. She is understood to have been caught while still well south.

The most promising venture of the lot was another Philipino ship, DON ISIDRO, a fast Diesel-engine inter-island ship which was sent south from Manila Bay during the early days of the war. This ship was loaded by the Army, in Australia in time to get through to the Philippines before the enemy had gotten very far into the N.E.I. waters. The CinCAF, after careful study, gave the ship a routing which seemed most promising and involved going through the Torres and Dampier Straits. Something miscarried, however, because the ship went south about Australia, to Fremantle, and was next heard of while approaching Batavia! DON ISIDRO was caught on the way north from there. Had she been properly directed from Australia, there was a very good chance that she would have reached Corregidor.

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The returning Submarines were by now reporting larger results than before but still were also reporting too many failures;- warheads not exploding on hits, torpedoes missing on account of bad runs, and too many attacks failing for various other reasons. A considerable number of the failures was still the fault of personnel. As could have been expected, first war patrols of Submarines are relatively inefficient and time is required to get into stride. The official reports of the Asiatic Submarines will, for the most part, be available and should cover this subject thoroughly.

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By this date, the Submarines generally had been keeping the sea for unduly long periods; that is, upwards of 50 days for the large boats and 30 to 40 for the small boats, all in tropical waters at that. Many of the patrols were much longer than was intended because, in so many cases, Submarines which were on the way to base had to be turned back to increase opposition to the enemy's advance. It was being found, however, that, in spite of the very great hardships and strain over long periods, the personnel was standing it surprisingly well. Many were in rather bad shape upon return but appeared to recover in a very short period of rest.

CinCAF visited Soerabaya during the period and set up the new command arrangement under which he remained nominally CinCAF but with that office practically inactivated. Vice Admiral Glassford, with Rear Admiral Purnell as Chief of Staff, became Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Southwest Pacific. The Command Post remained at Soerabaya but was tending to shift out of that city on account of the threat of the pending enemy advance. By now, the forces under Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, had officially come under USAFFE operational command; in practice, this arrangement had been in effect for some time. The Asiatic Fleet Intelligence work did remain altogether under CinCAF and there was certain cognizance as regards communications but, in most all other respects, the Naval and Marine forces, Manila Bay, were assisting the Army. In this role their services are known to have been of great value.

During this visit at Soerabaya, it was seen that some days would elapse before an American Striking Force of much potentiality could take the sea; the Destroyers had many empty tubes and no Cruiser was available, except MARBLEHEAD, which was completing temporary repairs to main power plant. ABDAFLOAT visited Batavia upon return and conferred with Vice Admiral Helfrich and Commodore Collins, R.A.N. (He usually saw eye-to-eye with the latter officer and had come to rely very greatly upon his judgment and general attitude). Vice Admiral Helfrich was still found disposed not to be entirely frank as regards the state and readiness of his forces. At this conference he did not disclose that he could get a considerable force of his own Cruisers and Destroyers to sea, - which would have strengthened our current weakness to the eastward of Java. (Without informing the ABDAFLOAT office, he had

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ordered these forces into the Karimata Strait. It was a proper action, as instituted, but at the time of the conference the information upon which it was based had been found to be incorrect and the order had been cancelled. This latter was not disclosed for a little time afterward).

Started moving American auxiliaries westward from Darwin. (Directed it 29 January but first sailing was not until 3 February). This was necessitated by the requirements for servicing the Destroyers and Submarines in Java harbors. However, by now Darwin, as might have been expected, had been found most inadequate and unsuitable as a harbor and base. Moreover, being located in a bight of the ocean and free for approach from the north or west, it was becoming too easy for the enemy to cover Darwin and lock up anything inside. This decision amounted to our Navy's moving toward discontinuance of the use of Darwin as a base and did not conform to the general attitude which the United States administration had adopted a month or more previously. ABDACOM did not personally approve of moving American auxiliaries away from Darwin but he accepted the idea since British and Dutch Naval thought also agreed upon it.

At one of ABDACOM's conferences during this period ABDAFLOAT stated that the Allied Naval forces could have accomplished much more in the way of direct opposition to the enemy advance if no Cruisers and Destroyers had been used for escort duty; that the past history showed that we would have lost nothing at sea if convoys had gone "bare", with the possible exception of one fuel ship, TRINITY, which might have been lost in the vicinity of Darwin had she been unescorted. Those statements were unwelcome but were true.

During the period, (29th), the decision was made by ABDACOM to concentrate the British Army, which had been opposing the Japanese on the Peninsula, on Singapore itself. Included in that decision was the virtual withdrawal of the R.A.F. from British territory and projecting its future operations from the air fields of Sumatra. Formal orders were issued closing the naval dockyard at Singapore, - a step which was a very hard thing for the British to have to take in view of the Empire's policy over many years. It was understood that Rear Admiral Spooner, R.N., in command at Singapore, was himself considerably surprised at the suddenness of the British Army's retreat. In consequence of the decision, all ship movements involving

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Singapore now became a matter of bringing personnel and material out, rather than in, with general destination Java. Evacuation of women and children from Singapore had been in progress for some time but more or less on a go-as-you-please basis.

During the period, the Japanese were building up east of Celebes Island but their other expedition was still stalled off Balikpapan, - where it continued to present some attractive targets. Preparations of American Destroyers and MARBLEHEAD were pressed as rapidly as possible and MARBLEHEAD got out with four Destroyers, (with some empty tubes, however), and made another jump-off into the Makassar Strait. However, they were shadowed by Japanese air during the afternoon and since it was a bright moonlight night the Commander, very properly, decided not to drive home the attack in the face of the superior Japanese Naval forces which air reconnaissance reported.

Chief Air Marshall Pearce finally arrived. ARDAFLOAT did his best to get on good personal terms with him, looking toward promoting cooperation between planes and ships, but never made much progress. The new Air Commander had not been trained for such co-operation. One of his assistants was Group Captain Darvall, R.A.F., who had been long in Malaya; he was one officer of that service who seemed able to understand the problems over the water and, fortunately, he was available at the GHQ nearly all the time.

General Wavell again visited Singapore and upon his return stated in conference that he expected the Island to hold out indefinitely though, of course, its port would not be usable. A Jap expedition attacked Ambon on the 31st and took the entire place within two or three days. The Allied air force still remaining there at the time was meagre. The Dutch and Australian planes which had been stationed at the place had been well used up during preceding enemy air attacks. Our PatWing Ten lost two planes on account of inexperience - belonged to the squadron which had recently arrived. The Allies lost a strong battalion of Australians and some of the best units of the N.E.I. Army.

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TO 5 FEBRUARY

During the period, the Japanese remained inactive in the Macassar Strait. They continued to build-up in Molucca Strait and on the east side of Celebes Island;- at Ambon probably but particularly at Kendari. There were very good Dutch landing fields at that point which had also been used by U.S. Army heavy bombers. They had hoped to continue such use and called for transportation of fuel supplies to that front. In compliance, 30,000 gallons of 100 octane gasoline were sent in by a destroyer plane tender which barely got clear just as a Japanese expeditionary force arrived to occupy Kendari. The Navy did considerable running in order to lay down gasoline along the Malav Barrier for use of Army planes which were to be ferried from Darwin to Java.

Sent LANGLEY to Freemantle to load Army P-40 pursuit planes, assembled, under an agreement to transport them north if conditions were propitious when the ship was loaded and ready. In the interest of secrecy of the movement, requested Army authorities to send no despatches whatever concerning this movement other than to direct that their planes be sent to Freemantle to be there loaded on a ship.

On 2 February called all three Naval Commanders, (Admirals Helfrich, Glassford, and Commodore Collins), to Lembang for conference with the objective of setting up a stronger Striking Force; most of the Cruisers and Destroyers were by then being relieved from escort duty into Singapore. Moreover, the enemy's next advance would be bound to bring his forces into easier reach of our forces, acting from the points from which they had to jump off. All the Dutch Cruisers and Destroyers had become available and there was prospect of soon using the British Destroyers, of which two were very strong, modern ships; also there was possibility of using one, or even two, very good British Cruisers, which were temporarily in the ABDA area.

During the conference, it was decided to set up the Striking Force with Rear Admiral Doormann, (Dutch), in command,- with Rear Admiral Purnell as second in command if found advisable to have two Flag Officers in the Force. It was also decided to first assemble the Force at sea, east of Java, as soon as possible and to strike at first opportunity. The

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tactical handling of the mixed forces was discussed. Since there would be little or no chance for training, there were bound to be difficulties but it was held that they would not be great because the force would be small and the tactics simple. The ship-to-ship communications were to be by short-range, high-frequency voice radio. General Wavell looked over the agreements and approved. The Striking Force got assembled on the 3rd and was sighted that P.M. by enemy air units which attacked Soerabaya.

Soerabaya experienced its first bombing attacks on February 3rd and, according to the usual Japanese procedure, it was directed at the air installations. The Dutch fighters in the vicinity were beaten and mostly lost in the air. The Japanese caught and destroyed a considerable number of planes on the ground, but all U.S. Navy planes got away. By then they had fully learned about dangers on the water, if they were where the enemy might expect them to be. The small Airplane Tenders permitted frequent changes of base, - which was their salvation and permitted them to continue their invaluable reconnaissance work for so long in the presence of strong enemy forces.

On the 4th of February, the Striking Force was caught by a powerful Jap bombing attack while on the way out to a jump-off point for another attack. Two Dutch and two American Cruisers, with a mixed force of ten Destroyers, were in the formation. MARBLEHEAD was knocked out of the campaign by three bombs, and would have sunk at sea but for an unusually courageous and efficient personnel. HOUSTON lost her after turret and her main radio and had heavy personnel casualties; - sixty killed. Both cruisers went to Tjilapjap. Admiral Doormann still had a considerable force intact, even after providing escorts for the damaged American Cruisers, but he immediately withdrew all his ships to the south and west. That movement was not known at Lembang for over half a day on account of the very defective Dutch ship-to-shore communications. The Striking Force was, therefore, thrown out or taken out of action for the time being. Henceforth, the only American Cruiser available in the area was the damaged HOUSTON. The BOISE sailed for Colombo 1-2 February. On 10 February, sent HOUSTON on a troop escort mission, Darwin to Koepang. Although with after turret disabled, HOUSTON was still the most powerful cruiser available in the area and quite capable of escort duty, at least. It was tentatively decided that when PHOENIX arrived in the area, HOUSTON would return to a home port.

CONFIDENTIAL

This last jump-off of the Striking Force was about three days later than it would have been if the Dutch Navy had acted with entire frankness in disclosing its state of readiness. The reason for such misunderstanding is still not known, but a natural tendency to hold back and expect American surface forces not to hold back had been more or less present for some time. I doubt that any individual is particularly to blame for that situation. Rather, it was a matter of failure to begin personal associations of American, British, and Dutch Naval officials soon enough.

The westward movement of the Striking Force after receiving the bombing attack was, probably, quite unfortunate. It later developed that an enemy expedition had milled around in waters south of Celebes for nearly a day, - 7-8 February, probably awaiting something. We had information of it - from patrol planes - but no surface ships were in position to strike it.

TO 10 FEBRUARY

During the period, General Wavell visited Burma and later Singapore. By the date of the latter visit, the Japs had already invaded Singapore Island and occupied considerable ground on its western end. ABDACOM directed four fast ships sent up to evacuate 3000 R.A.F. personnel to Java.

The period was marked by an increasing number of Allied planes lost in the air. Most of the losses were British and it was said that nearly all of the 100 new Hurricanes which were gotten into action around 30 January, through risky and expensive movements of ships, had been "used up". U.S. Army and Dutch Army air had also suffered and Allied power in the air was diminishing at an alarming rate. The Reconnaissance Command was also losing planes but was still keeping up a fairly good flow of information of enemy movements at sea.

During the period, ABDAIR disappeared from Lembang and was found to have established his Command Post at Bandoeng. This move was made without notice to

CONFIDENTIAL

ABDAFLOAT and when facts were made known to ABDACOM he indicated that he himself had not previously known of the move. There was continuing indication that the comparative weakness of the Allies in the air had been more a matter of unseasoned personnel than in an inadequacy of planes, in numbers or in types. This seemed to particularly apply to all squadrons of the R.A.F., and to the pursuit squadrons of the U.S. Army.

As soon as Admiral Doormann's withdrawal movement after receiving the bombing attack on 4 February was known, he was directed to reverse his movement and reform the Striking Force for use in the quadrant northeast of Java. He thereupon issued a directive setting up two rendezvous about 300 miles south of the Malay Barrier from which to fuel, assemble and jump off. This was a quite impracticable project in that the rendezvous were too far away and the sea there too rough for dependence on fueling at sea. Consequently, Admiral Doormann was directed to proceed to Tjilapjap for conference.

ABDAFLOAT visited Tjilapjap on the 8th, finding a considerable portion of the Striking Force in port, and conferred with Admiral Doormann. The latter was found to be rather over-apprehensive of enemy bombing attacks. Shortly after the meeting began information came in indicating a Jap expeditionary movement to be coming around the southeast end of Celebes and the Island of Bouton. From previous information, there was belief that the enemy's next move would be directed at Banjarmassin, (southeast Borneo), or on eastern Java. (Actually, the enemy's next step was to take Makassar, - 9-10 February). ABDAFLOAT represented in the conference that if such developed, at least a night attack must be made. He directed Admiral Doormann to draw up plans for it and to take up position in readiness as soon as it could be done. The plan was issued very quickly and ships of the Striking Force began leaving port; the plan was to assemble just south of the Barrier and west of Bali. (By this time, it had become apparent that Admiral Doormann was naturally a very cautious sea commander and not inclined to take commensurate risks. Thought was given to relieving him but ABDAFLOAT decided against the step at that time. There was no Cruiser available upon which to embark an American Admiral and there was no British commander available; additional to which was the prevalence of feeling among the Dutch that their officers were not being given enough of the command positions, over the ABDA theatre - in all areas).

CONFIDENTIAL

At about the end of this period, there were indications of another Jap expedition forming at a group of Islands about 300 miles south of Saigon. It was not ABDACOM's practice to keep up running Estimates of the Situation, or "appreciations",- as the British call such documents. ABDAFLOAT kept up only very rough running estimates which usually were not preserved. On or about 9 February, the general strategic picture, as it appeared to him, was about as follows:-

The British in Singapore had already been rendered innocuous and there was question of the destination of the new enemy expedition referred to just above. The indications were that it was being directed at Banda Island or its vicinity, with ultimate destination either western Java or central Sumatra,- probably the latter.

There was at the same time to be considered the Jap movement through Molucca Strait; (and perhaps the remains of the detachment which came through Macassar Strait). It was known that the Japs had built-up strongly around Kendari and to the south of it, particularly as regards air fields and air power, so that it was a considerable base. That area having been relatively quiescent for some time, the assumption had to be made that there would be a push from those eastern Jap forces in the near future. While it later developed that they first made a short step only to Macassar, and generally occupying all of southwest Celebes, it was at this time estimated that a straight jump to Madura Island or Bali was quite likely. Also that if such jump were made, the Striking Force would have a fair opportunity for breaking it up. Unfortunately, for about 48 hours at this time, either bad weather or heavy enemy air opposition prevented our reconnaissance planes from getting any information. This fact caused ABDAFLOAT to hold to his estimate about 24 hours longer than would otherwise have been the case, during which time the Striking Force was retained to the eastward, whereas it should have moved west for use against the other invading expedition.

ABDAFLOAT also visited HOUSTON and MARBLEHEAD at Tjilapjap on 8 February and saw at first hand the damage to HOUSTON and MARBLEHEAD. Both ships had been severely punished, but the morale and courage of the officers and men seemed in no way impaired. It was finally decided that HOUSTON would remain in the area

CONFIDENTIAL

for the present and that her next employment would be in covering a troop movement, which ABDACOM was forming up, from Darwin to Koepang or Timor, for the better protection of the landing field there.

MARBLEHEAD was seen to be badly wrecked. By virtue of a high degree of technical ability on the part of a Dutch Naval architect, the ship's bow had been lifted out of water so that the hole in the bottom could be roughly patched. There was total lack of steering power but it was considered less risky to send the ship to sea steering with her engines than to attempt to get the stern out of water with the limited lifting power available in the Tjilapjap dock. It was decided that MARBLEHEAD must be gotten out of the ABDA area as early as possible, and she sailed for Ceylon, OTUS accompanying, within a very few days. Only unusually efficient and tenacious officers and men could have saved this ship in the first instance, or have continued to keep the sea with her over such long periods.

The Tankers and Tenders arrived at Tjilapjap and began giving long-deferred service, (including torpedoes), to Destroyers and Submarines which had long needed it. Thenceforth, Tjilapjap was the principal base for American ships; it was a most inadequate harbor but the only one with much of any security; said security lay entirely in the location.

The Submarines continued to be active, - Dutch boats in the western part of the theatre, American boats in the central and eastern parts. Since their splendid performances during December, the Dutch Submarines had not been effective. The American boats were by now bringing back larger "bags" than before and the total had become considerable. But there were still occurring too many lost opportunities to inflict severe damage on the enemy. It was still the case that the enemy could advance his amphibious expeditions in the face of Submarines without suffering enough loss to stop or break him up. However, the Submarines are thought to have caused the enemy greater losses than did everything else in the ABDA area.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO 15 FEBRUARY

During the period, the Japanese invasion of Singapore Island made ground very rapidly, against what was the equivalent of three full British divisions, and the surrender occurred on 15 February. During the last days of Singapore, evacuation of material and personnel - including women and children - was carried on as well as it could be done in the immediate presence of an invading enemy. Conditions were very chaotic. Ships of all types were subjected to considerable bombing attack, while loading and while at sea for quite a distance south of Singapore. The R.A.F. was operating from Java and the south-central fields of Sumatra and offering opposition to the Japanese aircraft in their operations which began to extend well south of Singapore.

The Japanese invasion of the Palembang section of Sumatra got underway, - a paratroop attack at first followed by landings on the east coast and movements up the rivers. The success or failure of this invasion was not clearly known in Java as the period closed. Neither was it known what steps, if any, had been taken toward denying the enemy petroleum from this, the most valuable oil property of the N.E.I.

There was a large influx of shipping into Java ports - particularly into Priok, the port of Batavia. Conditions had become badly disrupted at all the ports; their facilities would have been over-taxed at best, additional to which was the desertion of much of the Malay laborers as soon as they heard the first bombs explode.

The Japanese forces in Celebes and the surrounding territory made no move during the period. By the evening of 11 February, ABDALFLOAT decided that the menace to the west of Borneo was the greater and the Striking Force was directed to shift to the westward to oppose. As previously stated, about 24 hours were lost by the belatedness of this decision. However, the loss was more apparent than real, because when the Striking Force did jump off for the waters north of Banka Island, (13th), Admiral Doormann had just been strongly reinforced by the addition of EXETER, HOBART, and most of the British Destroyers. That made a force of four very good light cruisers adequately supplied with destroyers, and Admiral Doormann

CONFIDENTIAL

was in consequence told that:- "He should consider the advisability of an attack upon enemy expeditions by day as well as by night in view of the considerably increased power of his force".

The Striking Force got into the waters northeast of Banka Island during the night of 13-14 February, leaving one Dutch Destroyer aground on the way. The Force passed through several bombing attacks the next day without injury and then it returned to Batavia in the early morning of the 15th, having accomplished nothing. The Japanese expedition was already into Banka Strait, and the Sumatra rivers, with the advance elements of their expedition, - with Palembang as their objective. The Striking Force arrived too late to defeat at sea the landing of the enemy's first waves, but it probably could have inflicted considerable damage had Admiral Doormann pressed into Banka Strait from the north or swept to the northward. There were several Jap detachments in the vicinity and there were some signs that just the appearance of the Striking Force in those waters considerably disrupted the Jap movements.

It became too dangerous to continue to send Tankers into Palembang for cargo. The producing capacity on Java, which was all that remained available to the Allies, was only 22,000 tons per month, which could be handled by a small number of Tankers. Accordingly, ABDAFLOAT ordered all Tankers sent to the Persian Gulf as soon as they were ready for cargoes. He directed that the two American Tankers be sent out as soon as practicable.

On 14 February, ABDAFLOAT directed that a large Submarine be sent to Corregidor to evacuate the American High Commissioner, the Honorable Mr. Sayre, - and four other civilians who were with him, - and to fill the rest of the passenger capacity of the boat with Naval personnel selected for their potentiality for carrying on the war.

On 12 February, ABDACOM received a directive under which Admiral Hart was to turn over operational command as ABDAFLOAT to Vice Admiral Helfrich. The turn-over was made on the 14th at Lembang. Admiral Hart represented to ABDACOM that with a Dutch Admiral as ABDAFLOAT and a British Admiral as a Chief of Staff, the American Navy did not have at Lembang a representation commensurate with its power, - which still

CONFIDENTIAL

was about half the total strength of the three Allied Navies. Making no progress toward any remedial action in this line, he reported the facts to Washington but at the same time urged ABDACOM that Vice Admiral Glassford be placed either in or near ABDAFLOAT's H.Q. This seemed very necessary in order that the Asiatic Fleet would have proper representation and have its interest and welfare looked after to the best advantage which seemed possible under the circumstances. Efforts of this sort, completing the turning over of Asiatic Fleet's affairs to Vice Admiral Glassford, etc., consumed the time up to late afternoon of 15 February, when Admiral Hart departed from Lembang bound for Washington.

File: HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH WEST PACIFIC COMMAND (Bz)
Al6-1
Serial: (CINC-0006) JAVA

February 12, 1942

SECRET

From: Commander Combined Naval Forces, A.B.D.A. Area.

To: Commandant der Zeemacht.
Commander U.S. Naval Forces in South West Pacific.
Commodore Commanding China Forces.

Subject: Estimate of situation as it relates to submarine dispositions.

Reference: (a) ABDAFLOAT secret letter Al6-1 serial (CINC-0005) dated February 3, 1942.

1. The principles outlined in the basic letter, reference (a), are, in my opinion, still applicable, but it is desired at this time in view of the strong protection given by the enemy to his military convoys during actual operations and the consequent difficulties in obtaining results by submarines, to recommend a change in the number of submarines assigned to the various tasks. Also, the enemy movement toward the eastern end and center of the Barrier appears to have slowed up and in consequence some of the submarines now in a position to oppose such a move may be more usefully employed in other localities.

2. Intelligence information indicates that the Takao-Bako area is extremely important as an intermediate stopping point for commercial vessels and men-of-war, both north and south bound, and also for vessels to and from the Japanese mainland and South China Sea ports. In connection with this latter shipping, our information indicates that it is increasing in importance and vitally necessary to the enemy's continuing war effort. Principal ports being used in the South China Sea are Haiphong, Saigon and Bangkok.

3. In view of the information outlined in the above paragraph, it is felt that, in general, the number of submarines employed in work against convoys consolidating positions already gained as outlined in paragraph 4 (b) of reference (a), should be reduced, as should those being held in position to act against a movement from Ambon to the southward. This would release, say, four additional submarines for employment as outlined in the preceding paragraph although, due to the distances involved, it can not be expected that more than three of these additional vessels could be on station at any one time.

C O P Y

-1-

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File:
A16-1
Serial:

HEADQUARTERS, SOUTH WEST PACIFIC COMMAND

(Bz)

(CINC-0006)

JAVA

February 12, 1942.

SECRET

Subject: Estimate of situation as it relates to submarine dispositions.

4. In order of priority, the Commander Combined Naval Forces considers that the following distant locations should be covered:

- (1) Takao-Bako area
- (2) Saigon
- (3) Hainan Strait
- (4) Indo-China coast-Hainan line
- (5) Keelung-Japanese mainland line

5. Previous considerations outlined for use of Dutch and British submarines are still applicable. In this connection, due to indications of a possible enemy move in force from locations in the South China Sea to the southward in the near future, it is my opinion that additional Dutch submarines should be hastened to patrol stations in the Karimata-Gaspar Straits vicinity as quickly as possible.

/s/ Thos. C. Hart

THOS. C. HART,
ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY.

C O P Y

-2-

(S-188)

December 25, 1941.

SECRETS-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
 To: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

Subject: Turns Over All Command Within Philippine
 Coastal Frontier.

1. Following our general war plan, which incidentally has been fairly closely adhered to thus far, I am transferring my command post to some point to the southward, exact location not yet decided, but concerning which you will be informed as soon as known.

2. You will therefore assume command of all units remaining in this area, which, in addition to forces already under you, are the following:

- (a) Submarines, ASIATIC FLEET, Commander Wilkes.
- (b) Destroyer Division "P", comprising PILLSBURY and PEARY, Lieutenant Commander Pound.
- (c) Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Three, Lieutenant Bulkeley.
- (d) The commissioned and enlisted personnel of my Staff that I do not take with me. Lieutenant Commander Dennison, who has been Assistant Chief of Staff and Assistant Operations Officer for some days, will be the senior member in charge of all personnel, documents, files, equipment, and so forth.

3. Referring to our general war plan:- its basic feature as concerns the forces which I am leaving under your command is that the submarines should operate from here as long as such is practicable and profitable. As soon as such practicability is over, the large submarines, at the very least, are to be transferred to TASK FORCE FIVE for further operations. It is essential that Commander Wilkes and certain selected personnel of his Command and Operations group be passed to the south at such time as best judgment dictates. I recommend that you be guided generally by Commander Wilkes' advice. He is thoroughly in touch with the general situation, the efficiency of the submarine command is high and can generally be counted upon. Because of the personal characteristics in the case,

C O P Y

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(S-188)

SECRET
S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Turns Over All Command Within Philippine
Coastal Frontier.

it is more likely that submarines will try to hang on from Manila Bay too long rather than that they will cease operating from here too soon. At this date, it looks as if the movement south should begin soon and in the absence of further orders, submarines should join HOLLAND.

4. Viewing the situation as a whole, I would in general advise that transfer of remaining surface forces south be not now attempted. At the time of writing, it looks as if the time has passed when it can be done within commensurate risk to personnel as measured against future usefulness of ships.

5. Following precedent and the apparent necessities of the situation, I have placed the Fourth Marines under Army direction, details of which will be given you by Lieutenant Colonel Clement. The first preliminary to that step was a telephone request from the Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, for the use of a certain number of marines; the conversation included General MacArthur's statement to the effect that I could regain jurisdiction of that force. I have thus far no intention of and see no need of putting strings on the use of the Fourth Marines as long as they are under the Army. It has been my further intention to reinforce the Fourth Marines with excess naval personnel acting as infantry units. I would suggest that any such co-operative step which you take be in that manner rather than turning Navy personnel directly over to Army immediate command.

6. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

Copy to:
Comsubsaf.

THOS. C. HART.

C O P Y

-2-

B(2)

December 17, 1941.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT.

1. About 13 December, Mr. Colley, the head of our firm of constructors, told me, after hearing of the discontinuance of work on the Sangley Point Air Base and on the Ammunition Depot and hearing also of our intentions as regards the employment of his company on certain extemporized work at Mariveles and on Sangley Point, (the latter is understood to have been practically completed);-

That he will have left over after caring for any of the needs which have been expressed to him, a considerable quantity of excess equipment and the skilled personnel for its operations which could be otherwise employed. Mr. Colley suggested that since we seem to have no further need of his heavy equipment, such as bulldozers, powerful tractors, etc., perhaps it would be best employed by the Army. I informed Mr. Colley that I agreed in principle and that as a first step would get him in touch with Colonel Casey, the Engineer Office of General Mac Arthur's staff, to ascertain the Army's thoughts in the matter. I have just heard that the Army is in an entirely receptive frame of mind and will probably wish to fully avail themselves of anything which Mr. Casey's organization can accomplish.

2. It is definitely the case that the 16th District still has first call on all of Mr. Casey's facilities. While proceeding on the assumption that work on the Air Base and the Ammunition Depot, (with a possible exception of the dock at Mariveles), is indefinitely postponed, please authorize Mr. Colley to use such of his equipment and personnel as it is quite evident will not be required for the additional undertakings under the Naval District.

THOS. C. HART.

Copy to:
Colonel Casey, U.S.A.
Mr. Colley.

SECRET

C-O-P-Y

B(3)

(00254)

December 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commandant, 16th Naval District.

1. Many regrets indeed over yesterday's disaster from enemy air attack which he can evidently repeat with impunity at any time. In consequence, I find myself entirely thrown back on the operations of submarines and Wagner's splendid force.

2. We will carry on with such basing facilities as we can retain in operation. I have not at this moment arrived at much consideration of the basing factor as regards our planes. As for the submarines, however, I have recast the situation as well as I am able and the salient factor, insofar as you are concerned, is the integrity of the diesel oil at Sangley Point. The submarines will not need any of it until they return from patrols, so there is no hurry about the piping, pumping, etc. The tanks themselves, however, are vitally important and I hope that you can get Colley on the job to get in his people and do the best possible in the way of earth protection.

3. The integrity of the boiler fuel is of greatly reduced importance now; so, as far as it is concerned, the question is one of relationship to the diesel fuel, if the boiler fuel takes fire.

4. Much sympathy to you and to all your people, with all my regrets concerning the losses, particularly of personnel,

THOS. C. HART.

C-C-P-Y

SECRET

B(4)

SECRET.

By auth. of: CG., USAFFE.

Date: Dec. 24, 1941.

Initials: A.J.D.

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office of the Commanding General.
Manila, P. I.

December 24, 1941.

Subject: Evacuation of Metropolitan District.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

1. Reference is made to your letter of this date, subject as above, file FF6/Al6-1 (S-187). The decision as to the time that Manila is to be declared an open city must necessarily be based upon the military situation. You were informed of that decision immediately upon its being taken. There is inclosed herewith a copy of the Proclamation that will be issued. It will be noted that the withdrawal of military installations is to be progressive although as rapid as possible.

2. The plan contemplating the evacuation of the High Commissioner and of the Government and the declaration of Manila as an open city was presented in a radio to the War Department. You were informed immediately upon receipt of approval by the War Department.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur

Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in the Far East.

(Pencilled notes: Attached copy of proclamation given to Adm. Rockwell.

R.W.C.

See two pages down Marked "A")

COPY

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

(S-187)

December 24, 1941.

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
To: The Commanding General, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN
THE FAR EAST.

Subject: Evacuation of Metropolitan District.

1. My Liaison Officer, (Commander Dennison), just brings me word that your Chief of Staff has notified him (9 a.m.), of your decision to declare Manila an open city tomorrow. Incidentally, I should record that I have received only twenty-four hours notice of any possibility of such action.

2. While, as you have been repeatedly informed, it has been our intention to carry on the war from here with submarines as long as possible, this denial of the use of the facilities within the metropolitan area very much shortens the period during which those operations can be carried out from here. It has now become likely that we shall be unable to bring any more submarines into the harbor for replenishment, fuel, etc. Nearly all of them are at sea at present and will continue their operations until they have to leave their stations because of exhaustion of fuel, supplies and of personnel.

3. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

THOS. C. HART.

Copy to:

Comdt., 16th Naval District.
Comdr. Submarines, Asiatic Fleet.

(Penciled notes: See next sheet Marked "A")

C O P Y

SECRET

In reply refer to:

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office of the Commanding General
MANILA, P. I.

In order to spare the Metropolitan area from the possible ravages of attack, either by air or ground, Manila is hereby declared an open city without the characteristics of a military objective. In order that no excuse may be given for possible mistake, the American High Commissioner, the Commonwealth Government and all combatant military installations will be withdrawn from its environs as rapidly as possible. The Municipal Government will continue to function with its police powers, reinforced by constabulary troops, so that normal protection for life and property may be preserved. Citizens are requested to maintain obedience to the constituted authorities and to continue the normal process of business.

C O P Y

(Penciled notes: "A")

SECRET

December 23, 1941.

His Excellency,
Manuel L. Quezon,
President of the Philippine Commonwealth,
Malacanan Palace,
M a n i l a.

My dear Mr. President:

I regret very much that circumstances have made it necessary to discontinue the operation of our Enlisted Men's Club as such. The building, however, is now serving a most useful purpose as an official Navy headquarters. I have directed that the rent on this building for the next quarter be paid from U.S. Government funds.

Sincerely,

THOS. C. HART,
ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.

C O P Y

FF6/A16-1

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

OO/Bz

(S-186)

U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,

December 21, 1941.

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
To: The Commanding General, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN
THE FAR EAST.

Subject: Enemy Penetrative Move.

Reference: (a) Your secret letter O45.9 of December 21,
1941.

1. Reference received, - a brief time after I had seen you at your Headquarters and departed without mention of the subject. I am taking it under consideration immediately.

2. Since I should, of course, base Submarine dispositions after evaluation of all available information, I am sending to your G-2 section to learn the recent information concerning enemy.

3. The Submarine is not a type which operates in heavy concentrations. I can, however, thicken the present coverage of the two possible landing points which you mention.

4. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

THOS. C. HART

SECRET

C-O-P-Y

In reply refer to:

045.9

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office of the Commanding General
MANILA, P. I.

December 21, 1941

SECRET

Subject: Naval Assistance.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, Manila, P. I.

The Japanese order of battle shows four divisions unaccounted for. Information leads me to believe that they contemplate a major penetrative move with these units in the Lingayen and Batangas areas. If it were possible to concentrate submarine strength to break these formations, it would be of infinite assistance. I anticipate the action within the next three or four days.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur

Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in
the Far East.

COPY

SECRET

In reply refer to:
AG 370

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office of the Commanding General
MANILA, P. I.

December 20, 1941.

Subject: Employment of Naval Personnel in Land Defense.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, Manila, P. I.

1. Following several conferences between us and between members of our staffs, it is understood that the Fourth Marines will eventually become available for general employment in land defense. It is a powerful, veteran organization and will be of the utmost value if integrated into the defense forces. It is requested that the regiment, or successive elements thereof, be placed at my disposal as developments of the Navy plan can make it available.

2. It is also requested that such sailors as may become surplus be made available. They would be used immediately for guard purposes on the southern part of Bataan, thus releasing elements of my field forces.

Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in
the Far East.

SECRET

C-O-P-Y

(S- 185)

U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,

December 20, 1941.

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
To: The Commanding General, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN
THE FAR EAST.

Subject: Movement of Convoy.

Reference: (a) your letter 370.092 of December 19, 1941.

1. As regards the convoy now in the vicinity of Darwin, my orders to pass it through Torres Strait were issued immediately after a conference with General Sutherland yesterday forenoon, several hours before the receipt of referenced letter. I intend to so bring it through if available forces make it possible. In the interests of secrecy and security, I request that the Army make no references in its own administrative and operative orders concerning the routing of that convoy. If possible, the same precaution should apply to its destination.

2. Your paragraph 3 indicates that we are now entirely in accord, in principle, concerning movements of convoys into Philippine waters. I am fully aware of the importance of getting the Army's convoys to their destinations. As the time approaches for decision in each instance, I expect to keep you informed as to the situation on the sea and in the air in its bearing upon the possibilities in the various cases.

3. Your letter opens with a quotation from an estimate. That paper appears to have been prepared by Admiral Purnell at the direct request of General Brereton and supposedly to be for his aid in handling Army Air Forces in the immediate future. It contained the employment of our submarines and aircraft at the time. Any formal Navy estimate of the situation would naturally be signed by me or indicate that it was by my direction, if my own signature should not be obtainable. The only formal estimate thus far has been the one made out jointly with you for the Singapore Conference. Naturally, the most important despatches between the Navy Department and me contain information and opinions which may amount to a brief formal estimate. I believe I have kept you informed concerning the content of those despatches. It hardly seems necessary to say that I fully appreciate the strategic importance of Luzon, because it has been a primary subject in Naval circles for a great many years.

-1-

C-O-P-Y

SECRET

FF6/A16-1
(S-185)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

OO/Bz

U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,

December 20, 1941.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Movement of Convoy.

4. There remains to be made a matter of official record the disposition of the Fourth Marine Regiment, concerning which much cooperative effort has been going on between our respective Staffs. As between you and me, there has been only your telephone request for a certain number of Marines to be employed in the vicinity of your Headquarters. At that time, I replied that I agreed in principle to the Marines' coming into the Army's picture and took the matter up immediately. During General Grant's and General Grunert's incumbencies, I informed both that in case we succeeded in transferring the Marines here from China, I should have available for service in the field a veteran regiment of considerable strength which I expected to put at their service. Since the Fourth Marines will constitute a force of considerable potentiality, I think that something more formal should be passed between us. At your convenience, I request something on paper.

5. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

THOS. C. HART

-2-

C-O-P-Y

SECRET

In reply refer to:
AG 370.092

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office of the Commanding General
MANILA, P. I.

December 19, 1941.

Subject: Movement of Convoy.

To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet, Manila, P. I.

1. On December 10, 1941, I received the Navy's estimate of the situation as of that date: "With the initiative in the hands of the enemy, consideration of his early successes, and the preponderance of forces available to him is the contemplation of a long war, facing the loss of, and ultimate recapture of the Philippines." On December 13, I received information from the War Department that a convoy would shortly arrive at Brisbane, and await orders there; that in the absence of orders to proceed to this Theatre of Operations it would unload at that port. On that date I dispatched a radio to the War Department presenting my views regarding the Far Eastern Theatre of War and emphasizing the strategic importance of the Philippines. I recommended that an immediate effort, conceived on the broadest lines, be initiated through the concentrated action of all resources of the Democratic Allies on the sea, on land, and in the air, with a view to pushing reinforcements and supplies to the Philippines. I gave first priority to air reinforcements and made specific recommendations regarding the reinforcement of that arm in a supplemental radio on December 14. On December 16, I received a radio from the War Department stating that my messages of December 13 and 14 had been studied by President Roosevelt and were generally concurred in by him; that the strategic importance of the Philippines was fully recognized. The War Department recognized the importance of reestablishing limited sea travel from Australia to the Philippines to supplement air transportation, stating further in a radio on December 17 that every possible action was being taken to forward assistance. In furtherance of this plan the War Department is establishing in Australia a Service of Supply from where support will be given to the troops in the Philippines. Major General George H. Brett, Air Corps, has been detailed to command all troops and installations there and to act pursuant to my instructions. He will select suitable bases in accordance with my directives and with due consideration to recommendations from the U. S. Navy authorities with whom it is necessary to cooperate for security of the routes that will be used by supply vessels.

2. You have informed me today that the control of the convoy at Brisbane has been turned over to you with orders to conduct it by Torres Strait to Darwin. I deem this to be concrete evidence of the determination of the Administration to carry out the policy expressed in the War Department radios.

-1-

8-O-P-Y

SECRET

3. The convoy carries 70 airplanes which will be unloaded at Brisbane, assembled and flown to the Philippines. I have issued instructions for the debarkation and disposition in Australia of Air Corps ground elements. It is my urgent desire, in accordance with the policy of President Roosevelt, that reinforcements and supplies be pushed forward to the Philippines. It is not possible nor necessary at this time to make the decision regarding movements from Darwin. That decision can be taken when the convoy arrives at or in the vicinity of Darwin and in the light of the information that will be available at that time. The basic decision, however, is clear that this and future convoys should be pushed north from Australia, leaving to the last the ultimate decision as to the routes and methods to be employed in the last stages of the voyage to the Philippines. I shall continue to keep you fully informed of the situation as I see it.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur

Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in the
Far East.

-2-

C-O-P-Y

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

In reply refer to:

600.1

HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Forces in the Far East
Office of the Commanding General
MANILA, P. I.

December 18, 1941.

SECRET

Subject: Employment of Navy contractor on Army work.
To : Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Commander-in-Chief,
United States Asiatic Fleet.

1. With reference to your memorandum dated Dec. 17 to the Commandant, 16th Naval District, with respect to making available for U.S. Army operations a portion of the contracting force, plant, materials, etc., utilized by the Pacific Naval Base Contractors on Navy construction work in the Philippines, I appreciate your action in releasing these facilities and personnel for U.S. Army construction.

2. This Headquarters thru the Department Engineer, is entering into a separate contract with Mr. Colley and his group for an extensive program of airfield and national defense construction. It is our understanding that such of Mr. Colley's force and such of the plant and materials which have been procured for Navy account, as are required for the completion of the Navy construction work still remaining to be done, will be retained by the U.S. Navy but that the personnel, plant, and materials no longer required will be made available to the U.S. Army. This Headquarters is proceeding on that assumption.

3. It will be appreciated if this division of force and equipment can be consummated promptly as the personnel in Mr. Colley's organization and such surplus plant and materials as can be spared are urgently needed for the execution immediately of a greatly enlarged airport construction program now being undertaken.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in the Far East.

(Penciled notes:

23 Dec.

Have talked to the USAFFE Engineer.
— Everything necessary on our part
has been done. —No further action needed.

/s/ Dennison)

-1-

C-O-P-Y

SECRET

December 17, 1941

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: Public Works Officer, 16th Naval District.**Subject:** Dolphins, Manila Harbor, as shown on PW Drawing No. P-8510.

1. The very strong seven pile dolphins are not needed and single piles, say, sixty feet as long as good size, should answer the purpose. I have accordingly verbally instructed the contractor to use single piles for Numbers D-13 to D-16, both inclusive.

2. I have further instructed the contractor to drive an additional four dolphins, also single piles, near the inboard face of the breakwater north of its entrance; two to be on the north-south portion and two around the angle at what is known as the west breakwater.

THOS. C. HART.

Copy to:
Comsixteen.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company.

C-O-P-Y**SECRET**

U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,
December 2, 1941.

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
To : The Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in
the Far East.

Subject: PLENAPS dated November 12, 1941.

1. Forwarded herewith are copies numbers 8 and 9
of PLENAPS dated November 12, 1941.

2. Insofar as naval forces are concerned pages 31
and 32, Plenap A, Appendix I, are not up to date in that the
United States Asiatic Fleet is now composed of three groups
as follows:

- (a) Task Force One, under my direct command:
Submarines, including tenders.
Aircraft, including tenders.
Motor Torpedo Boats.
Five Destroyers.
Oilers. Base Manila Bay.
- (b) Task Force Five, direct command Task Force Commander: *
HOUSTON, MARBLEHEAD. 8?? ← - - - (Penciled notes: → Also BOISE,
Two destroyer divisions (12/ DD's). but it had not been offi-
BLACK HAWK. cially ordered).
Base British or Dutch port. This force is at
present in the Borneo-Celebes area.
- (c) Local Naval Defense Forces, direct command Commandant,
SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT:
ASHEVILLE, TULSA.
Mine vessels.
District craft.
ISABEL.
River gunboats upon arrival.
Operations of this force are confined o the
Naval Defensive Sea Areas.

3. My formal approval of the PLENAPS is being withheld
pending receipt of further directives, now enroute by air from
the Chief of Naval Operations. Undoubtedly there will be further
changes recommended after Admiral Phillips, Commander in Chief,

-1-

C-O-P-Y

*By Admiral Hart

SECRET

FF6/A7-3/(S-163)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

gwt

U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,
December 2, 1941.

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: PLENAPS dated November 12, 1941.

Eastern Fleet, has had opportunity to study the situation.

4. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impractical to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

THOS. C. HART.

C-O-P-Y

SECRET

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

December 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Last Two Interviews with General MacArthur To Date.

1. On about 18 December, MacArthur called and talked at length concerning the PENSACOLA'S convoy, then bound for Brisbane. As usual, he talked very well, bringing in many theoretical considerations; but I managed to set forth the little that could then be said about the situation of that convoy.

2. I knew the General was coming and had ready in my office the location chart showing where all Submarines were, with the exception of the eight which were off enemy ports. With the exception of the very few in harbors, all were (for some time) disposed for direct support of the Army; that is, placed for catching enemy landing expeditions, with particular concentrations along the northwest coast of Luzon. I was prepared to fully explain just what the Submarines, (virtually the Navy's only weapon), were trying to do and expected that I would bring him into discussion on the subject. He barely glanced at the chart and, after I had gotten off one or two sentences, again launched forth into one of his characteristic "speeches" about his own side of the war. It was only by using some sharpness and repeatedly interrupting him in turn that I was able to tell him anything of the Navy situation at all. He asked no questions whatever, evinced no curiosity and, as has too often been the case, the interview was quite futile as far as furthering any meeting of minds between us.

3. On 22 December, a.m., I called on MacArthur, incidentally to congratulate him on his promotion, but with plenty of time for as much discussion of our situation here as might come forth. The General also seemed to have plenty of time, but the conversation for ten minutes was entirely inconsequential and the two leads which I took to turn the interview into useful channels were altogether without results.

4. At this date, looking back over the short period since hostilities began, it is clear that as far as MacArthur and I are personally concerned there has been very little get-together. I have succeeded in keeping touch with what goes on with the Army by means of one liaison officer, (Commander Dannison), who, in spite of a heavy press of work incident to sending seven of my best Staff officers south, has visited USAFFE Headquarters daily at least once, and averaging two or three times. He also makes known to anyone he finds there, with time and inclination to listen, the situation of my own forces, the content of important despatches between here and Washington and our Allies to the southwest. Occasionally, MacArthur sends his Chief of Staff or his personal Aide to my Headquarters, who shows me a part of their important despatches to and from Washington.

END

(Pencilled notes: /s/ Thos. C. Hart

There were no subsequent interviews,
See official memo in Secret File.)

COPY

D
A-1
Staff
Refer
acts

Regraded Unclassified

Bz

December 23, 1941

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

My dear MacArthur:

The stenographers partially completed their notes on the conferences which you and I had with Admiral Philips and here is the result.

In general, they seem to have gotten what you said fairly well, but if you should like to make corrections we will try to find time to recopy.

The men failed to get all of Admiral Philips' remarks and I have only filled in a little here and there where I felt that I remembered what he had said. There were several places in my own remarks where the men missed it and that much I filled in.

Very sincerely yours,

THOS. C. HART.

General Douglas MacArthur, U.S.A.,
Commanding General,
U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

(Penciled notes:
For enclosure see
beginning of this
file under
date of 6 December)
(Attached hereto)

P. S.: The copy I'm retaining I regard mainly as in remembrance of a very gallant Englishman.

T.C.H.

C O P Y

Regraded Unclassified

Manila, P. I.
December 6, 1941.

SECRET

REPORT OF CONFERENCE

Present: Admiral Thos. C. Hart, U.S. Navy.
Vice Admiral Sir Tom Philips, Royal Navy.
Lieutenant General Douglas MacArthur, U.S. Army.
Rear Admiral William G. Glassford, U.S. Navy.
Rear Admiral William R. Purnell, U. S. Navy.
Major General Richard K. Sutherland, U.S. Army.
Paymaster Captain S. T. Beardsworth, Royal Navy.
Commander Michael G. Goodenough, Royal Navy.
Commander William G. Lalor, U.S. Navy.

Admiral Hart: Gentlemen, Admiral Philips has come up from Singapore and General MacArthur and I have read what he has given us in the way of his own instructions. It checks up with what we know, or have to read between the lines of our own instructions and it seems to boil down to this:- That the object of the Admiral's visit is a preliminary conference with us, which has started today, from which it is hoped that he and I can agree upon everything that is basic for Joint Plans; after which he will bring into consultation the New Zealand, Australian and other British Empire forces and those of the N.E.I. General MacArthur has consented to sit in with us. He is very busy building up an Army and if the General is willing I will ask him to set forth the situation as regards his own end, insofar as it touches the Naval end. General, I think there are two points on which Admiral Philips needs information. The first one is preliminary and has to do with the security aspects of Manila Bay as a base for Naval operations. That is, security while in harbor as regards attack from air or ground forces. We know the situation insofar as concerns attack from surface ships, submarines or with mines.

General MacArthur: We are in the process here, Admiral Philips, of organizing from a complete peace-time basis to a potential theatre of operations. In its final form, it will present Army forces which are completely adequate for the mission of defense of this archipelago. It will comprise, roughly, an Army of about 200,000 men, consisting of 12 to 15 divisions of troops with the balance of components of auxiliary forces. At the present time, we are in midway of organization. We have now about 11 divisions, comprising a force of about 125,000 men, who are in a fair state of training, a fair state of equipment, and a fair state of balance. By that, I mean the auxiliaries. The rate of our approaching maximum possibilities of fighting efficiency will depend somewhat upon the rate of equipment furnished from the United States. The next 4 months

are very valuable months to us. There is a great mass of equipment, probably in rough terms 500,000 tons. Perhaps the most critical of all those months is the next one. At the end of that time, we would be able to accomplish our mission with adequacy. Until that time, our effort must be regarded as in the nature of an improvisation (X). Even under those conditions, I have every confidence we can defend the Archipelago, but it is impossible during that period to say with complete security that we can defend this place, that place, or the other place (in order) to be the basis of strategic concentrations. The greatest acceleration that is going to take place in our Force will be that element in which you are most interested - the air. Our program is in constant consolidation and it will depend probably upon the rapidity with which ships can be ferried from the United States. We have a number of estimates. Of the estimates I have made already, I believe that the ultimate strength that might be expected out here will be largely determined upon the possibility of its utilization and also upon the possibility, as I say, of the ferriage across. In other words, with the ferriage potentialities accomplished, there is practically no limit to the ultimate results of American air support that might be brought out here in this area in case of necessity. What we have now would vitally interest you without going into too much detail. Let me tell you that we have in the air today about 35 B-17 bombers. We have leaving the United States immediately (interruption by Admiral Philips). They are in first class condition in every way - personnel and material - not only in the air, but in everything else. They are the best in the world. They are my ace unit. They are splendid. They have only recently arrived. They had their training, equipment and everything in the United States. They are the finished product for operations in case of necessity. In addition, we have a squadron of B-18's. They are in excellent shape too. That squadron (?) 18 - 19 strength. We have in addition 52 so-called dive bombers that have just arrived. It would probably take them 10 days before they are ready for operations. Their personnel is excellent. I know their equipment is excellent. It is not the most modern; it is the A-24. That type has been replaced by later models, but still is in excellent condition. In the pursuit, we have prepared for operational procedure in the neighborhood of 80 planes. The equipment, material, etc., is superior. The piloting is also perhaps superior. The operational group training is excellent, not superior yet. It needs further polishing. We feel they can be ready (.....). The units have been thrown together recently - we haven't had a chance to mold them. As far as our fields are concerned, they are improvised. We have one thoroughly good field at Clark Field. We have other fields that are rated from good down to indifferent. We are engaged in the most energetic effort to expand the base potentialities of our air - not only actual housing and operating fields but dispersion fields for

diversifying operating set-ups, etc. We are presented with certain bottle-neck difficulties in connection with that program. This is an agricultural country, but it is hand agriculture - by turning of earth by implements wielded by individuals. We have not gotten the great potentialities for building fields which we have in the most industrialized bases. We are endeavoring to correct that by shipment from the United States. It takes time to get them in. The bottleneck of our air fields can only be for the next few months. This program can only be regarded as fair. There will come a time when we can get the equipment from the United States that it will go by leaps and bounds. But for any immediate emergency, the field capacities are limited and improvised. As regards the Warning Service, we have in the Islands 6 Army radio position detectors. The Navy has one. They are in the process of installation. We have operating now three which are installed and going well. One is to the west, near Iba. One is to the north near the top of the peninsula. One is at Tagaytay. Three of those are operative.

General Sutherland: It will probably take from 6 weeks to (?) complete the remainder, two months before they are going. Now the organization of the Warning System itself is complete, but it is crude. The personnel is excellent. It is largely composed of Government people and Constabulary men and in due course of time they will be very good and efficient but the organization has just started. There will be great gaps and slips that will undoubtedly hurt.

General MacArthur: As regards the anti-aircraft defense potentialities, they are low. We have one spot of superior defense - anti-aircraft defense - that is the island of Corregidor. Any Fleet that might anchor off there would be within the zone of excellent anti-aircraft defense. We also have fair anti-aircraft defense at Clark Field. The anti-aircraft defense of other localities is largely improvised, and is largely the elements which ground troops would supply. As far as Manila Bay as a whole is concerned, it is practically non-existent at present. We will have, in February, a balloon barrage which will protect the immediate area of the harbor here and we are endeavoring to get anti-aircraft units from the United States in the next 3 months which will give a very fair degree of anti-aircraft support to the harbor. At the present time, as I say, if war broke out immediately, the anti-aircraft units of this harbor as far as ground shooting is concerned would be practically negligible.

As far as concerns the fitting in of the co-ordinated activities of the Army air with Navy operations, let me say that Navy operations of a more or less independent character - by that I mean Navy operations which are not directly involved in a determined effort by the enemy - bears the (?)

of the Philippine Islands. Navy operations of an aggressive character occur but the Navy operations have as their basis the destruction of Axis forces and the raiding of Axis communications. I intend to support with what Army air and forces I have at my disposal. In the performing of my operations, I shall use as my guide and mentor, Admiral Hart. He will be the connecting link between all Navy operations and the Army or any other forces operating independently with each other and he will co-ordinate with me. In our actual activities, the Army air will be under Army control and Army tactical command, but for your purpose I intend to be guided entirely by the Naval advice of Admiral Hart as to the necessity for going in as to time and place and as to the mission that we will accomplish. We will hope to get the most results by co-ordination of mission and Admiral Hart will be the agency. In this general Pacific area, it is most difficult. They are numerous and countless and they are not organized the same way. It is a problem that seems most difficult, but we will be able to simplify it, insofar as the Army land and air service is concerned, by having all outside Naval movements co-ordinated through Admiral Hart. He and I operate in the closest co-ordination. We are the oldest and dearest of friends. There will be nothing that will not instantly respond by the combined co-ordinated effort of we two.

On the other phase of attack by an enemy for the purpose of penetration,- land penetration - the penetration of our frontier zones,- such an effort would require the entire use of my air as a part of my mobile forces. I would, at that time, hope that when the enemy was attacking our shores - and I may add that my aim is to defend the shore line - (.....). I am reminded of that occasion when your great Prime Minister was being heckled in the House of Commons and answered the query as to defense of the British Isles, "I have three great defensive lines, the first is on the shore, the second is on the shore, the third is on the shore." And that is exactly the strategic planning that I have. We intend to fight to destruction on the shore lines. Insofar as the Navy is concerned, it means that the Army will represent an obstacle which will hold up the enemy for a certain period which will give the friendly Navies an opportunity to launch a combative effort either in flank attacks, in such ways and means as the Navies may know, but to get the maximum of the ways and means would be entirely determined by the Navy; but my hopes would be communicated to all other Navies through Admiral Hart. He, again, would be the agent who would operate with me, so that as far as the co-ordinated effort is concerned, Admiral Hart is the locus of effort of everything that concerns the combined Navy forces. That is my suggestion. Is that generally agreeable with you, Tommie?

Admiral Hart: Yes, I think my Staff has any number of details and plans to work out with you as we will have with the British Navy and the N.E.I. Navy. The general lines of the situation as you set it forth are in accord with what we see of it and, if I may say so, it is a very excellent exposition. Will that suit you, Admiral?

Admiral Philips: I may say that it would suit us admirably. Might I clear my mind by asking one or two questions? The first thing I was wondering about is the fighter aircraft and fields for their use.

General MacArthur: We can give you a complete line-up before you go.

Admiral Philips: We have had an invasion problem at home in the last year, and probably, I hope, more difficult than you may face. I hope, and as far as I can see here, the enemy can bring nothing but bombers to fight over this vicinity. That is one of the great assets that we have and it makes it possible for us to

General MacArthur: We are subject to a fighter landborne attack. We couldn't improve these fields sufficiently (.....) and we would have to bring in a protectional element before we could do it. Now all we have to do is to strip ground and make landing fields and build up, but the minute we get them we can operate.

Admiral Philips: As we have seen it at home, the possibilities of operating fighters is the most important of all. It is more so than yours. Although the enemy could bring fighters to the Battle of Britain, we could not get the fighters because before France fell we had been looking to the east and toward the North Sea. We hadn't thought much of fighters on the south and on the west until the fall of France; so those three months were really all we had to work together to give us time to develop our fighters in the south and if we had not been able to do that we could not have produced fighters and made them go. That is why I felt the defense of this place so much depends on the ability to operate fighters in any area.

General MacArthur: We practically have that now. The inability of an enemy to launch his air attack on these islands is our greatest security. Most fighters are short ranged. I repeat what I said. Even with the improvised forces that I have now, because of the inability of the enemy to bring not only air but mechanized and motorized elements, leaves me with a sense of complete security. However, as I explained.

that does not mean that a Fleet anchored in Manila Bay might not be subjected to a heavy bomber attack that would get through but which would be punished severely.

Admiral Philips: That is exactly the way that we see it.

General MacArthur: Nothing would please me better than if they would give me three months and then attack here. That would deliver the enemy into our hands, in that we would bring him down to give you an opportunity to deliver a knockout blow on his communication system. Well, if he delivers an attack with an expeditionary force designed to penetrate this shore line, he would certainly have to have a large element (.....), so three months from now would please me more than to have him attack here now.

Admiral Philips: There is one point I might raise in the event of attack and that is fighter pursuit planes, as escorts for those which are operating to break up the enemy forces. We had to clear our minds as to what was the object of the Air Force. When invasion really looked likely, we had to face up to to and after a great deal of thought we finally all agreed that it was vital that the best way of breaking up the invaders was by shooting them up at sea by Naval forces. If you can get a few cruisers and destroyers into an invading expeditionary force, they would sink it down in no time. But in the conditions that prevail in the English Channel you were unlikely to get the cruisers and destroyers. Unless they have fighter help (.....). The thing that worries us is the dive bombers, rather the high level bombers, and the torpedo planes. So that the first task of a fighter force is to provide fighter defense over the vessels and to be there right on the spot.

General MacArthur: You may rest assured that when the Fleet comes to the rescue, we will make it the first business of our interceptor groups to give you all the protection we can. And I would say that under those conditions of penetration that the air force would punish them very much. I do not wish to rule out the Navy punishment.

Admiral Philips: The next thing that came out of it was the need for organizing the show so that the parties would work together and for getting a means of communication to the ships and the aircraft so that they could talk to each other. You are likely to have a party of fighters up there (pointing) and a bombing group there which the fighters can't see. It so often happens that you want to be able to tell the fighters where the bombers are. Of course, that is all a matter of detail and cooperation.

General MacArthur: The details of cooperation that would be necessary between the British Fleet and the American land based aircraft - those details - the scheme of that planning should be worked out between you and Admiral Hart. The Admiral has it for the Navy in general, not only for the American Navy but for your Navy, and we would work out with him the details as to how to do it. In other words, our air will have a general plan of communications, inner communications systems, and all other details, with the Navy. Not with the American Navy, the British Navy, the Dutch Navy - but when you have perfected all those things among the Navy elements and you have one coordinating (.....). Is that it?

Admiral Philips: Yes. There is a need for working out such a plan. In touching on the same problem, there is the range of the fighters. There again I hope you don't mind my repeating but the thing that came up so often was the range of fighters. At the beginning of hostilities, our Hurricanes and Spitfires were very good for the job for which they were designed - that was to work within about a thirty mile area controlled entirely from the ground. But when it came time for going over the sea, the need rose for tanking up the Hurricanes and also for developing the long range fighters. We used the long range fighters to find the Hun coming with his ships - and it was a very awkward proposition - and we developed the Beaufort fighter which is a long range fighter and better than the Me-110. Someone from the Naval point of view (.....). Also when this night bombing had to be dealt with, the Beaufort and the Spitfire were put in to defend against night bombing. I wonder how you stand in long range fighters, because we have found that a very important need. With the Navy, what it really comes to when you are within range, if you have the fighters, you can do your job. And if you haven't it is, as at Crete - none too good. I, of course, am sorry that we have no good long range fighters out here.

General MacArthur: We are limited entirely by the range of what we have. We have the P-40, with an operating range of in excess of 600 miles. I would say he could deliver his maximum possibilities at 150 miles and with a decreasing range of efficiency for each 100 miles further.

Admiral Philips: That is much better than we have out here. The Beaufort, while it is a two-seater and is a long range machine - a much larger machine than the Hurricane - is effective for 700 to 800 miles. One other point, General, how do you stand in tanks and armored units?

General MacArthur: In tanks, we have 2 battalions, which means about 112 tanks. They are from 12 to 15 tons - 13½ - I think. Perhaps ultimately that might be increased to one armored division, but I have that instrument in a low order of priority because of shipment difficulties from the States, as it takes much space and the terrain does not lend itself to tank action. The whole system of communications in the Islands is a doubtful one. The bridges won't hold them up and even to operate our own tanks off the road is a problem. But we have 112, excellent material condition, very good personnel, out from the United States with a year's training under (.....) officers. I would look for them to be the lead in a powerful counter attack which would smash any quick move.

Admiral Philips: Do we know much about Japanese tanks?

General MacArthur: We have all the information in a portfolio on them. They have had no outstanding successes in their four years in China and they have been miserably weak in their handling of them. They have used them to eliminate strong points but as for the conception of using them for enveloping movements, the Chinese have held (.....) and have a local success. But they tell me they utterly failed in their broad (.....). We constantly have reports of the failure of local Japanese penetration to follow through because they could not get the stuff. That is one of the weaknesses of the Japanese Staff. I don't believe that, considering the difficulties of getting them down here as an expeditionary force, we would have very much worry about it. But with our 112 tanks here, I have nothing to fear at all. (....) But it's a difficult thing when you get something to balance. My own estimates of Army strengths and weaknesses are academic estimates. It is a real estimate with my potential enemy. I have to revise that estimate but, considering relativity, the Army is very much like a poker game.

Admiral Hart: Admiral, suppose I attempt a summary as the understanding between Navy men, as affecting General MacArthur's forces. I think you will agree that we are primarily interested in security of this harbor, in particular, against air attacks, but that we do not expect that it would be altogether prevented. A determined bombing attack may get through but it is our hope that such an attack, if made, would be so severely punished that a second one might not be made at all. In other words, we expect to have to take some bombs and it is all right if the fellows who dropped them don't get away. That means, of course, what Admiral Philips has brought out; that we are intensely interested in the landbased interceptors more so than in your other types. And the other point of security provided by the Army is only that in the immediate vicinity of bases:- that is anti-aircraft artillery

in certain localities. I vision, Admiral Philips, that my anchorage of greatest security is to be Mariveles Bay. That is on account of its hydrographic and also topographic features, the presence of Corregidor and, as we hope, additional anti-aircraft artillery around Mariveles Harbor. The only other place in the Philippine Islands where it is possible to obtain a high degree of security against under water attack is in this harbor itself. And in that, of course, we realize anti-aircraft ground defense is much farther from realization than it will be at Mariveles. That is in a reasonable length of time.

The other point I believe, General MacArthur, in addition to security, is in the method of handling co-operative operations as effecting Army aircraft over the water, on which I think there rests still a great deal to do between all units, and even between U.S. forces. Well, General, we are going to proceed with various things the Admiral wants to get settled. We will be delighted to have you stay with us but if at any time you want to leave us, please feel free.

Admiral Philips: We will give you something of a report. I feel that I might give you a little review as regards our Fleet and the time factor in respect to our defenses. There has been a lot of talk in the press about arrivals of the Eastern Fleet, but it is not very strong yet. The situation at the moment is that at the moment we have the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, the only two capital ships. And secondly (.....) to give a certain amount of comfort to the Australians. I hope about the 20th of the month or perhaps by Christmas we will have two more battleships, which are on their way now. They are not modern, but are as good or better than the Jap's. But they are better than our still older ships. They have been modernized as much as we can. They are fitted with all this new stuff. That is two more by Christmas, - a total of four. Another two have left England about today or yesterday or tomorrow and they should be here in six weeks. So that will make it up to six, and I hope for a seventh later. Clearly, until you have a Fleet you can't hope to do much except to act on the defensive and it is quite clear that to stick your head out where the enemy is with a very inferior Fleet would be foolish. I think you read those telegrams which said to send a Battle Fleet up. I think there is some misunderstanding. I was looking further ahead. On the other hand, when one considers our Naval problem in the Far East area, it is quite clear that while Singapore is in an admirable position for defensive measures, really it is not much of a base when you think of offensive measures. One thing, it is too far away and it is placed behind all those shoals and shallow waters and you would never get out of there in time. Even in our own War Plans, when we could not look forward to carrying a war home toward the

Japs we have got to get nearer than Singapore, and used to scratch our heads and wonder where we could go. Hongkong don't look good as it has a little Strait and the Jap is already in Indo-China. He stops there now - and there he is. Hongkong has a narrow channel and, for use as a fighting base, it is out. But, of course, these Islands are sufficiently far off to make it possible for the enemy to come and the Island is big enough to have a whole strategic plan for dispersion. Therefore, as I see it, when one looks toward anything for a base with other than a defensive outlook, here (Manila) is the place. Before this war, it was not expected that air attack on Manila was going to amount to much. The air men always said it would. We doubted it. Well, we do know that now and we used a land-plane base much closer (...) Scapa Flow (...) is the most practical base. So we feel that in the light of our experiences there, this place is more adequately defended. So we feel that if we are agreed, we should say that if we are thinking of carrying on this war to the end we should look to the time when the main Fleet comes in these waters. Before you do that, you can put on a certain amount of pressure but there is nothing between here and Singapore. Well, I don't know whether we can accept that in principle. Then there are many things to look to before it is practicable. First you couldn't base the whole Fleet here. If we could -----

Admiral Hart: If this Bay is made fully secure, there is plenty of room for all the Fleets in the world. The deep water comes close in but the entrance is six miles wide and the mine fields alone are not too dependable against the entry of submarines. Before going on, I would like to make one observation. General MacArthur has said that he is building up. So are we. We both can effect this only if we have something in the line of communications that will come across the Pacific or the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. Eventually, the latter line has to come from the Malay Barrier up here. So during this time while we are building up, we shall have to keep one line of communications open or we will never get built up.

(General MacArthur arose and took position before a chart of the Philippines and gave a review of the location of Army air fields in the Islands).

(General Sutherland relieved General MacArthur before the chart and proceeded to give a more detailed explanation on the same subject).

Admiral Philips: I was wondering; in the event of a Japanese attack, where do you think they would develop it?

General MacArthur: I believe that he will exercise the element of surprise by feinting at the various possible points of attack. Hold his main transport units to attempt to penetrate where he discovers weaknesses. But, wherever he may attack, he is bound to try for the port of Manila. Here is the network of communications. Everything points to an attack along this area. Undoubtedly any attack he is to make will be supplemented by an attack to the south. Now in these other areas (points to chart) he can be blocked by small forces. Along here (points to chart) he can be blocked at the bottom. I look for his main attack to be delivered through this plain land. I believe that he is primarily going to attempt the element of surprise. He might deliver his main attack here. (Points to central Luzon). Now he has no idea of what we are doing here. We have managed to confuse him with the cooperation of the press. We have allowed stories to go out regarding morale of personnel, etc., which has misled him. I don't believe he knows that we have built up so completely. (Note: Statement was made regarding sudden reverse of a 20-year policy regarding the arming of the Philippines). In an invasion, he might underestimate and come with inferior forces. We figure that at maximum he could not send a force down here of more than 125,000 - no - 75,000; 12 tons to the man and equipment for a month beyond ordnance and food stuffs. It would not include such elements as heavy tanks and all the motorized gadgets.

Admiral Philips: We should look upon this as a base. It is now a question of timing. When could we expect to be in a position to get (.....). I would not say that we are going to have (.....). As far as I can say from my point of view it would be about March. The defense situation will strengthen (.....).

Admiral Hart: May I ask if you base that upon the building up period of your forces? I would then guess that we would run about neck and neck.

General MacArthur: The question that the Admiral advances is a basic strategic one, and if that is going to change the Navy conception of this base, the sooner the Army knows it the better. Protection should be a major mission for us. (...) if the Grand Fleet would base here. I would have to increase the defensive potentialities and have to let the War Department know it at once.

Admiral Hart: I don't quite understand, General. Do you base that on necessities of increase in anti-aircraft batteries, pursuit planes?

General MacArthur: Perhaps under that type conditions the balloon barrage would increase them.

Admiral Philips: That is a most important form of defense.

General MacArthur: If a Fleet is here, I know no place where a balloon barrage would be more important than here, if they will develop them in the United States. In other words, if it is the Navy's decision to use this as a base, the sooner I know it, the better.

Admiral Philips: That is the major point of this discussion. That is, Manila is available, I think (.....). (.....) Singapore will remain a (.....).

Admiral Hart: I think it is necessary to see our problem as possibly needing solution much sooner than that. It is all very well for us to be aiming to meet a condition on the 1st of April, next, but -----

Admiral Philips: I wonder if we could not look ahead and take some sort of decision now. When the 1st of April comes (....). It takes an awful long time (....).

General MacArthur: These two suggestions largely depend upon the non-outbreak of immediate hostilities. But if hostilities do not break out (....) as I understand Admiral Philips' idea is to (....). So if war should come (....).

Admiral Hart: I agree, but suggest that we not see it too remotely (....). With small modifications the whole thing, in the way of providing security for this base, is going to depend upon how much material we can be getting into these Islands. After that, the matter of communications to the south and west (....). If we do not have time for that, then our war will be strictly on an "as is" basis; that immediate problem is the one I think must be held in front.

Admiral Philips: It won't be there (....).

Admiral Hart: I think that we are increasing security as rapidly as can be done and it is dependent upon communications, rather than the time involved and the availability of material in the States.

Admiral Philips: I feel that I might look into that problem, but of course (....) by berthing a Fleet (....) too exposed here. (....) chance of getting berths is a difficult problem but of course there will be alternatives. (....) stringing buoys in Manila. We could not bring our Fleet up and (....).

Admiral Hart: Dredging may become a big problem but buoyage is not. We can now berth everything we have - you and me - using Manila Harbor under conditions quite secure from all but air attack.

General MacArthur: Are they going to send you an aircraft carrier?

Admiral Philips: I hope so. I was going to get the ARK ROYAL. Will have six capital ships - no carrier.

General MacArthur: (....) Will that include carrier aircraft?

Admiral Hart: Suppose, Admiral Philips, you and I put out our current War Plans for the moment and proceed toward a solution of our joint problems.

NOTE: The remainder of the conversation in the forenoon was more or less informal. Admiral Philips asked about the latitude at which the B-24 was able to photograph. General MacArthur replied, "As high as 30,000". General MacArthur mentioned that Admiral Hart knew the answers. Admiral Hart stated that the Pelews were soon to be photographed, which would complete photography of all the bases on small islands. General MacArthur then departed in company with General Sutherland.

CONFERENCE -- with AF staff.

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December 13, 1941.

First thing:- the Army has virtually abandoned the air except for observation purposes; pretty much did yesterday. Their large planes are all down south ... for observation and possibly to make attacks, but what they have left is not very powerful. I decided last night, and finally this morning, to virtually do the same thing, even before I had heard of the Army's action, simply because these changes are becoming evident just from observing the situation. They have been finding no attack targets since their attack on the KONGO and I don't gather that they should expect to find any right now. They (the Japs) know that we have a lot of submarines, that they will be out and I don't think there will be any attack targets. They are more building up and building in a few every day and night. Moreover, the chances of our planes accomplishing anything is much reduced on account of the damage of the enemy pursuit. We lost 7 of our planes yesterday and are likely to lose them most anytime they take the air. I also have arrived at the point of conservation of planes. I am conserving what we have left as a nucleus from which to build up. What we have left are 4 tenders, a dozen planes and a highly efficient Wing Commander with some very fine officers with him who have now been on the firing line (front) and would expect to be better than anybody, even those back home. Therefore, I have instructed Wagner that he is to get CHILDS ready, fueled with everything, a reasonable amount of supplies, take the ship, get in her himself with the most valuable of his aviation personnel even displacing a portion of the ship's regular personnel; that is, filling her with skilled people. These can be placed on TULSA and ASHEVILLE. The time for him to go is immediately after dark tomorrow night, and to go south over a different route than the rest of our ships. He is going there to be near the B-17's, and the situation will have to develop from there on. The HERON and PRESTON are working their way south through Makassar Strait with the four small planes they have with them. Wagner is going to leave here the amphibians and 3 of the PBV's. After that we will have room for air transportation only .. to small and hope you can completely .. and big planes. All we shall say about the movement to anybody whatever is, -I told Wagner to adopt the same course (as Army), on account of our losses and the prevalence of enemy pursuit is such that we also cannot operate around Central Luzon. (Shift our heavy air). Nothing will be said about this movement. Now I would like to have Lindner told about this, just what it is in the way of an air nucleus, and if he stays here we will go. It is a part of our general build-up along the eastern end of the Barrier. Make sure Wagner has anything we have in the way of intelligence, etc. It may be some time before he gets in touch with Glassford. Can we give

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him, and expect him to use, the Anglo-Dutch code?

Lieutenant Roeder: Yes, I think so.

Make sure he (Wagner has everything in the way of intelligence, etc.

. . . .

Check up on the situation and see if Glassford knows about TASK FORCES SIX and SEVEN.

Commander Slocum volunteered the information that such information was known to Admiral Glassford.

Send him (Glassford) authority to merge TASK FORCES SIX and SEVEN.

(Penciled notes by Admiral Hart:

The above is a poor record of this conference. Stenog. missed a lot.)

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Conversation between Admiral Hart and General MacArthur

On 22 September, I sent General MacArthur word that there had been recent developments on my side of the fence about which I should inform him and said that I could meet him at most any time, that perhaps some evening would be a good occasion. (I had had virtually no interviews with him in all the time that had elapsed since he was recalled to active duty) He replied at once, and that same evening we talked in my apartment for about 2½ hours).

I began by recounting the inside history of the over-all planning since last January, with particular regard to our conversations, etc., with potential allies. In this, I set forth the entire picture as I knew it and also set forth my own status and probable participation in any eventualities which may occur.

General MacArthur listened very attentively, seeming to pay no greater heed to what I said concerning our plans for support of the Army's operations than he did to the rest of the tale. As soon as I finished, he began a long statement with about these words, "The Army is glad to know of the Navy's plans but it's own plans are virtually independent thereof and there seems no possibility of conflict between them". I replied that the local Navy's job is, naturally, to support the Army's efforts and that there must be cooperation between the respective air services. Otherwise, a great deal would be lost. Also stated that our Submarine operations were dependent upon information expected to be largely obtained from air operations and that there, again,

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operations involving Army air service must be particularly close. Upon that, and two or three times afterward, General MacArthur repeated that we need have no concern about getting full cooperation from all parts of his command which are involved thereby. He then held forth at length concerning his own plans for defense of the Philippines:-

His primary idea visualizes land warfare and are clearly with the idea that the land forces, (he did mention the Motor Torpedo Boat arm), are to defeat any enemy that gets landed. He very clearly is motivated by the idea under which he has been working as an employee of the Philippine Commonwealth. That is, of course, to build up a land, (and air), defense which will hold the most valuable portions of the group against any enemy who definitely has command of the sea. In other words, the General's whole project, which was being for him a losing battle-or one nearly lost-while he was in his retired status, now shows prospects of realization incident to the U.S. effort; particularly the U.S. Army's effort. Incidentally, it is seen that this new development comes just in the nick of time to save the thesis upon which the General has been working for years and which had about reached the end of its rope.

He went on to say that the plans in effect when he took over command were hopeless; that they meant "citadel defense" which, was perhaps the best that could be done by his predecessor, Grunert, who had only a "token Army". He said that such a defense is hopeless from the start, bound to lose, and

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that a much larger theater of operations had to be held. He ridiculed the idea that we could simply rest on holding central Luzon; that an enemy could absolutely defeat such defense by establishing himself in the central or southern islands of the group, etc. He conceded that Corregidor and its immediate vicinity is a strong point, but said that it would be bombed to death, etc.; that the ultimate defense area was something of a myth because total defeat would follow soon after our theater of operations was reduced there to. He then set forth the elements of his own current plans as follows:-

That his effort would be to hold the entire group with the exception of the Calamians, Palawan, Mindanao and the Sulu chain. That he was forming three three-division Army corps with two other division, (one U.S. Army), as G.H.Q. reserve. That one corps would defend to the northward of central Luzon, a second one to the southward and the third the Visayan group. He said that at his present rate of progress he expected to be all ready with forces to that extent, comprising altogether about 200,000, by next April. He admitted that in the meantime, particularly the next few weeks, his defense capabilities were not great and outlined the planned rate of growth thereof.

Among other things, MacArthur stated that his air service was rapidly growing and that he soon expected to have 600 planes. He said that the state of efficiency of his present air force is not good, in fact, said that the 90 to 100 Filipino pilots are superior to the average of the U.S. pilots ! Along that same line, he off and on made other surprising comparisons:- That the straight

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Filipino Army soldiers are superior to those in the U.S. scout regiments, etc. He gave high praise to all the ground Filipino components of his projected Filipino Army except as for officers. Therein, he said that the Philippine divisions, (12 or 13), would be very weak and that he is putting a large number of white officers with them to improve this matter.

MacArthur said that he intended to proclaim such large cities as Manila, Iloilo and Cebu to be open cities and to have everything that is military and governmental, other than the pure municipal agencies, moved out of those cities. Thereby, he hoped to avert any wholesale bombing of the large cities. He having mentioned his newly-arrived reenforcement of B-17's, I asked him the purpose for which they were sent out. He replied that it was primarily for bombing an enemy expeditionary force at sea; that after Philippine cities were bombed, therein lay his weapon for retaliation.

The conversation indicated that his main interest in any sea weapon lay in the Motor Torpedo Boats, to which he had confined the Commonwealth's strength on the water. He talked considerably about the rate at which they expected to build up the Philippine unit of such craft, but always said that, of course, "Bemis will operate them".

I brought the conversation back to Naval participation in the defense and said that the portion of his own defenses which were of most vital interest to us lay in his pursuit strength and in the Army's development of radar,- explaining what the latter was, for it developed that MacArthur was not cognizant. I said

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that the Navy's estimate is that the first attack upon us is likely to come through the air or under the water, or both. That insofar as an air attack is concerned, it is our hope that though one may be made successfully, the results will be so expensive to the attacker that there is not so much likelihood of a second attack. Also said that with the proper radar service, even a first attack in the vicinity of Manila Bay should be defeated if three or four pursuit squadrons were brought to bear upon it in time.

Passing then to Army's air operations over the water, I emphasized that the Navy absolutely must know all about them; that the closest association of planning operations which involve such speed was necessary and required face to face and minute to minute association and cooperation between and among the officers who were authorized to give operative orders. I stated that the Navy had gone under-ground at Corregidor, incident to my own initiative of nearly two years ago, and that we are now virtually established therein, including all the elements for information and command. I said that I had hoped that such would be the location chosen for commanding the operations of all the local Navy and for all air, both Army and Navy, with the exception of such Army planes as were bound to operate only in conjunction with ground forces. I stated that the ground establishments which the Army is preparing at another location could be made to serve the Navy's purpose, despite its disadvantageous location from our standpoint. Said that I realized that provision had been made there for our command elements and that all no doubt would go

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well if there was a full desire on both sides to make them do so. While making no demands concerning same, I did set forth my opinion that any operations of Army air forces over waters in which my forces, particularly my Submarines, are operating, must be worked out in full collaboration and coordination between their operating command and ours.

There was some discussion about the under-ground command posts and I asked MacArthur where he himself intended to be. He replied that he would not be at that place; that he would be in an advanced headquarters just behind whatever front is bearing the brunt of the enemy's attack. I noted that at no time did he ever ask where I intended to be myself.

The conversation concluded with discussion of some more minor matters. One of them was Bemis' illness, concerning which I stated that I would probably have to take certain District matters in my own hands and that I, rather than Bemis, would be doing business with the Army on most of the important matters which were of interest to both services. MacArthur expressed delight at that.

I carried away from this conversation, in addition to various thoughts concerning the lack of AS-IS realism of the Army's plans, one thing which most directly effects naval participation in the defense of the Philippines:- That is that there is going to be trouble with the overseas operations of the Army aviation unless we can arrive at a better understanding than now exists. There is likely to be great difference in reaching such an understanding

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in which I fear that MacArthur will tend too strongly to always take the say-so of the Army air service. He mentioned that they are all insubordinate, but his own ideas and real interests are confined to ground forces and we are likely to have difficulty in keeping Army air operations within bounds and so directed that they will do most good in maritime warfare.

If MacArthur succeeds in developing forces adequate to hold his greatly magnified theater of operations, the defense of Subig Bay will assume a quite different aspect than has been the case for 30 years. We need to be alive to such development, keeping in view the possibility of, say, six months from now being able to return to and utilize Olongapo as before.

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Conversation between Admiral Hart and General Sutherland

On 26 September, General Sutherland, Chief of Staff to General MacArthur, came over for an interview. When he telephoned for it, I understood that he was coming to inform me of the prospects of having some Army radar in operation at an early date. It developed that he only knew that three outfits with personnel are coming out ahead of other sets and that the Army has completed plans for location and operation. He did not know when results will obtain.

On General MacArthur's behalf, Sutherland invited me to come up to Clark Field, look over their B-17's, take a ride, etc., and said that Army would arrange that I be so transported and demonstrated to on any day of suitable weather that I designated. Said that they had nine of those planes here and twenty-six more are coming.

Another circumstance which probably touched off Sutherland's visit was a note, subsequent to my interview with MacArthur on the 22nd, informing him that Bemis is definitely invalidated and that I will be his, (MacArthur's), vis-a-vis until some one else takes over. Sutherland said that MacA had directed that I be told that he was delighted that there is such a resumption of cooperative relations which we two had had in the past, which were so eminently successful, and all that.

One purpose of the visit was to show the Army's lay-out of coast artillery projects outside of the defenses of Subig and Manila Bays. They have drawn up plans for defending, with

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heavy coastal artillery, all passages to all portions of this group of islands, excepting Mindanao, the Sulu chain and the Palawan-Calamain areas. The plans are somewhat grandiose and, to my mind, far less necessary than would be similar expenditures in other directions. I did not tell Sutherland that but did say that large caliber guns seem rather too much for such a job inasmuch as an enemy would be most unlikely to attempt penetration of that area with ships of any value. I said that as against the present force of Submarines, the prospective forces of Motor Torpedo Boats, etc., penetration of those waters is likely only by small cheap vessels carrying land forces for surprise attacks.

Sutherland made no attempt to meet that argument and, as soon as I finished, passed to discussion of the advisability of also using mines to defend all of those passages. I said that because of the linear distances involved, the depths of water and the currents there that no effective enclosure by mines could be expected from any effort that I regard to be practical.

Sutherland also showed me a chart which illustrated all of the Army's "warning services", which depends upon observers around the entire periphery of the group. It is most complete and comprises a very large number of observers. I expressed much satisfaction in the existence of this system which we find really is considerable of a going concern right now. I also said that a comparatively few people with radar equipment would

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get much better results and that their observations would not be confined to high visibility conditions.

Our consignment of Motor Torpedo Boats had just arrived and we discussed the subject. I told Sutherland that the unit just received is a fully manned and fully trained unit which will be ready for service just as soon as they can be unloaded, get their stuff stowed and are given something in the way of basing facilities. Their, (MacArthur and Sutherland), idea has been that an important task for this new unit of ours is to assist in building up the force of Philippine Motor Torpedo Boats, particularly as regards training and indoctrination of their personnel. They hoped that our unit would not have a complete personnel so that they could feed in their own as a part of it. They wish the most intimate association and, at the present moment, their interest in that angle has precedence over the immediate potentialities of our own unit. I was aware of this circumstance before and Sutherland and I discussed the matter at length. MacArthur had already made his own Motor Torpedo Boat base available to us and said that it had much greater capabilities than their own three boats now require. Therefore, Sutherland was genuinely disappointed when I said we are going to extemporize a base for our Motor Torpedo Boat unit at Cavite. I said that all of his own facilities would be ultimately required; that we expect another six boats ourselves in the near future; that the Torpedo Shop, Cavite, is now in tune for handling that particular torpedo, which point almost dictated

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basing at Cavite apart from other considerations.

I stated that our first job is to have these six boats ready for war and that we expect to arrive at that point in a very short time. I repeatedly assured Sutherland that we are in full sympathy with him in fostering the Philippine unit and that we shall do something effective in that direction just as soon as we solve our own particular problems for that particular weapon.

Lieutenant Huff's status was brought into the picture. It seems that they desire him recalled to active duty under the Navy but to remain employed by the Commonwealth with the primary job of building up their Motor Torpedo Boat unit, superintending the construction, the elementary training, etc. (Not commanding or operating what they already have). It seems that there has been discussion with Bemis about it; that a radiogram was framed for BuNav but has never been sent. I said that I am not sufficiently informed to talk on the subject and that I could only guess that Bemis may have difficulties in arranging any such status for Huff, because he himself has many retired officers under him and might be embarrassed by giving Huff a more advantageous status, financially in particular, than the other retired officers could enjoy.

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December 12, 1941

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

My dear Mr. High Commissioner:

Referring to our recent conversation in which I informed you that difficulties are likely to arise in getting imports into these Islands, etc.

I think it would be a wise measure to take certain steps toward the conservation of the supplies of imported food, which is now actually in the Philippines. I am not suggesting that we are, or even may be, at the point of rationing, although it may well come to that and perhaps that step should be given a fairly high priority in the measures other than military and naval which are being taken.

In illustration would point out that I live at a hotel which still continues to operate its commissariat on the usual lines;- a very long menu with a choice of dishes unreasonable under the conditions obtaining. We all know that American habits in hotel and restaurant operations are very wasteful and right today it may be that imported food stuffs will be wasted to such an extent that we shall all be very regretful at some later date.

I have the honor to be,

Very truly yours,

THOS. C. HART,
ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.

His Excellency,
The United States High Commissioner
to the Philippines,
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OO/Bz

December 11, 1941.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Captain Wagner.

Dear Wagner:

In the first place, I am giving thanks that I still have you and, as far as I can learn, most of your people. In the second place, my congratulations for the splendid work that you are doing under great difficulties.

When I last talked with you, I left with the understanding that you were to take charge of the war in the air and go ahead and run it without paying much attention to me, unless you figured it was something which only I should decide.

I am sending this by my boat and putting said boat at your service for as long as you need her through the rest of the day. (Incidentally, if you put all the cushions down on the deck, you can get a fair nap while you are in transit !)

It strikes me that your aviation personnel must be getting pretty well worn and we must look out that we do not have loss on account of over flying them. I would not be at all surprised to hear you say that you think they should pretty much have a days rest.

Now I propose that you come over to see me and have a talk as soon as today's results are in and you know how you are set. There are certain things in the situation which you probably should take into account before you make tomorrow's decisions. I will so arrange that I will be at your service whenever you come. It would help if you could let me know ahead, but such is not necessary.

Good luck in the meantime.

THOS. C. HART.

C-O-P-Y

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F
Personal
Memo-
randa

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BRITISH CONSULATE GENERAL,
MANILA.

8th December, 1941.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith for your information copy of a letter which I have addressed to the United States High Commissioner.

I would repeat to you the assurance made therein that all members of the British community are prepared to offer their services to the American authorities for any duty that may be required. I trust that you will therefore call upon them as necessary.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

/s/ S. Wyatt-Smith

Consul-General.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart,

Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet.

G-O-P-Y

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British

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8th December, 1941.

Sir,

Some months ago, when preparations were being made for a possible future emergency, I informed your Excellency that the British community were willing and anxious to assist in any way that their services might be useful. Now that Japan has declared war on the United States and the British Empire and has attacked the Philippines, I wish on behalf of all members of the British community individually and collectively to renew this pledge and to assure your Excellency and all American civil, military and naval authorities that the British residents of the Philippines unrestrictedly offer their services to the American authorities for whatsoever duty they may be required or fitted.

I am sending copy of this letter to Admiral Hart and General MacArthur.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your Excellency's

obedient Servant,

/s/ S. Wyatt Smith

Consul-General.

His Excellency
Francis B. Sayre
United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands.

C O P Y

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(S-141)

S-E-C-R-E-TU.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,
November 12, 1941.VIA P.A.A. LOCK BOX

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
To : The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Control of Air Operations Over Water.

Reference: (a) Cincaf conf. ltr. FF6-Al6-3/Al6-1
(CF-0977) of October 23, 1941.
(b) Comdg. Gen., U.S. Army Forces in the Far
East secret ltr. AG 381 of November 7, 1941.
(c) Cincaf secret ltr. FF6/Al6-1 (S-140)
of November 12, 1941.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of reference (a).
(B) Copy of Reference (b).
(C) Copy of reference (c).

1. The enclosures are forwarded to the Department for information purposes only, at the present time. There is the further objective of making a situation known to the Department to the end that better understanding can result in case the Commander in Chief finds it necessary to send despatches on this subject.

2. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time via the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by P.A.A. lock box from Cavite, P.I., to San Francisco, California, and by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

3. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

/s/ THOS. C. HART.

C-O-P-Y

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Enclosure (A) was written after a conference between Admiral Hart and General MacArthur in which it was mutually agreed that Admiral Hart should write a letter on this subject which would serve as a basis of further conferences.

/s/ R. MASON,
Lt. Comdr., U.S.N.

FF6/Al6-3/Al6-1
(CF-0977)

OO/Bz

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

October 23, 1941

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
To : The Commanding General, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN
THE FAR EAST.

Subject: Control of Air Operations Over Water.

1. Some months ago, (May 24, 1941), certain agreements were reached between the Philippine Department, U.S. Army, and the SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT as regards the war operations of aircraft. There were included therein agreements for,-

- (a) Assistance, if practicable, by Army reconnaissance planes in the Navy's scouting over the sea areas.
- (b) Attack by Army bombardment planes on enemy expeditions at sea which may threaten Luzon.
- (c) Support of bombardment units - Army and Navy - by Army pursuit planes, within their effective range, if other imposed tasks permit.

2. In the light of later developments, particularly as regards increased Army and Navy forces now available or in prospect, it is held that the agreements should go farther in order that there may be full readiness for the most effective employment of available forces against an enemy on the seas.

3. A major task of the Navy's forces in this entire area is the defense of these Islands,- operating from a base or bases held by the Army. Such defense will primarily apply against enemy forces prior to effecting landings, at which time they are most vulnerable. The Navy has a considerable power of attack in submarines, and some in surface ships, which tends to increase. The best information possible is required to develop the full effectiveness of the Navy's power in ships - most particularly that of the submarines - and such information is best obtained through air scouting. Furthermore, there will also be comprised in the air forces of the two services an attack potentiality sufficient to be decidedly dangerous to an expeditionary force at sea if it is properly applied.

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ENCLOSURE (A) (1)

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C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

October 23, 1941

Subject: Control of Air Operations Over Water.

4. In order that the forces mentioned above, as employed against enemy forces at sea, may be fully effective, there must be exceedingly close cooperation between the Army's aircraft which operate over the water, those of the Navy, the submarines, and even the Navy's surface ships. Unless so operated, their efforts may be abortive and, what would be even worse, the efforts of Navy's sub-surface and surface forces may be handicapped and the ships be even unnecessarily endangered. The close cooperation and coordination required will be effective only under adequate operational control, by officers in instant communication with each other, and who also have instant access to all information which is obtainable. Furthermore, there needs be full understanding among those officers who are charged with operational controls, as regards authority and cognizance, if there is to be full utilization of opportunity to damage an enemy expeditionary force while it is most vulnerable.

5. The assignment of aircraft of either service to such operational control must naturally rest with the highest echelon of command of the Army and Navy, in this area. The Navy is prepared to place under Army's full tactical command such of its aircraft as may be assigned for attack on land objectives in the Philippines.

6. It is proposed that, upon general lines, the following be agreed upon to cover control of Army and Navy forces assigned to operate against an enemy who is on or over the water.

- (a) The Navy to control all scouting, patrol and reconnaissance operations over the water.
- (b) The Navy to control all aircraft attacks upon vessels. If made in areas where its own ships are operating, tactical command by the Navy will be necessary.
- (c) The Navy to control pursuit units assigned to support air attacks upon vessels. (Units normally alerted for defense mission might be assigned to participate on short notice if prior arrangements and understandings existed).

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

October 23, 1941

Subject: Control of Air Operations Over Water.

7. The following arrangements are considered vital to the success of the operations outlined:-

- (a) An information central on shore for receipt of all pertinent information acquired from our ships, air scouting, Army Air Warning system, etc.
- (b) Location of Army and Navy operational control officers close to the information center.
- (c) Provision in the above location of ample communication facilities for effecting complete control of assigned forces.

8. Air attack, by either service, upon land objectives situated over-seas need not be subject to the operational control principles, (as per paragraph 6). However, before initiating such attacks each service should consult the other and obtain its opinion as to the advisability, from the general strategic standpoint, of the projected operation. Also, the Navy should be informed of details of such attacks in order that it may coordinate the activities of any of its own units in the location affected.

THOS. C. HART

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ENCLOSURE (A) (3)

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST
Office of the Commanding General
Manila, P. I.

S-E-C-R-E-T

November 7, 1941

Subject: Control of Air Operations Over Water.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet,
Manila, P. I.

1. I have carefully considered your letter of October 23, embodying the suggestion of Naval control of Army Air Forces operating against an enemy who is on or over the water. I find the proposal entirely objectionable.

2. The basic principle upon which your letter is based, that the medium over which planes operate should determine their control, has been thoroughly considered by the Joint Board on many occasions and has been held untenable. The following policies are among those recommended by this authoritative body, approved by the Secretaries of War and Navy and published for the Joint guidance of the two services.

"The air component of the Army conducts air operations over the land and such air operations over the sea as are incidental to the accomplishment of Army functions.

"The air component of the Navy conducts air operations over the sea and such air operations over the land as are incidental to the accomplishment of Navy functions.

"Aircraft, by their nature, are capable to a degree, dependent upon their design and upon the skill and training of their personnel, of performing either Army or Navy air functions. Available air strength should therefore be used whenever possible by either service in support of the other. Army aircraft may temporarily execute Navy functions in support of or in lieu of Navy forces. Conversely, Navy aircraft may execute Army functions under like conditions.

"The air component of each service has a primary function to which its principal efforts are to be directed, both in peace and in war.

"These primary functions are:

The Army air component to operate as an arm of the mobile army, both in the conduct of air operations over

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ENCLOSURE (B) (1)

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the land in support of land operations and in the conduct of air operations over the sea in direct defense of the coast.

The Navy air component to operate as an arm of the Fleet.

"Secondary functions of the air component of the Army are:

Reconnaissance and observation of fire for harbor defenses.

Air operations in connection with the defense of important industrial centers and military and naval installations.

Air operations in support of or in lieu of Naval forces.

"Secondary functions of the air component of the Navy are:

Air operations, by aircraft forming part of naval local defense forces, for the patrol of the coastal zones and for the protection of shipping therein.

Air operations in support of or in lieu of Army forces.

"In operations against enemy attacks along our coasts and in the waters adjacent thereto, the operations of Army and Navy aviation will overlap to a certain extent. That is, Army aircraft will necessarily have to operate over the sea and Navy aircraft may at times have to operate over the land. In any case no restrictions will be placed upon the complete freedom of either service to utilize against the enemy the full powers of all aircraft available and any and all facilities that may be necessary to make that power effective. Army air forces are a part of the mobile army forces engaged in direct defense of the coast.

"In order that the most effective cooperation may be attained, the following general principles will govern:

Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the means and weapons used by the other service in carrying out its functions. Neither service will attempt to restrict in any way the area of operations of the other service in carrying out its functions. Each service will lend the utmost assistance possible to the other service in carrying out its functions."

I intend to comply fully with, and without deviation from, these sound principles and policies.

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ENCLOSURE (B) (2)

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3. Excellent coordination between the local commands has existed in the past. The Commandant of the 16th Naval District upon his recent relief addressed a letter of appreciation for the complete cooperation which has been extended to him by this Command. It is the Army's policy to continue this mutual close relationship. It is essential, however, in order that coordinating arrangements can be completely maintained to know with what command the Army henceforth will coordinate. Heretofore the Army has done so with the Commandant, 16th Naval District, who apparently was charged with normal missions pertaining to coastal frontier defense. His War Plan, which was furnished this Headquarters, was based on that conception. With his departure you advised me informally that insofar as the Army was concerned you would assume the functions of the Commandant, 16th Naval District. With the recent arrival of the new Commandant, I am confused as to the exact situation. Am I to deal with the Commandant, 16th Naval District, in accordance with previous practice, or is it contemplated that you will continue to perform the functions prescribed for that officer with regard to coastal frontier defense? If the latter situation prevails, will your Headquarters be on shore or afloat? It is essential in the consideration of this matter that I be informed of your basic organization.

4. The mission of the Army is:
- a. Defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier in cooperation with the Navy.
 - b. Conduct air raids against enemy forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases.
 - c. Support the Navy in raiding enemy sea communications and destroying axis forces.
 - d. Cooperate with Associated Powers in accordance with approved policies and agreements.

The mission of the 16th Naval District, as understood by this Headquarters, is:

- a. Support the Army in the defense of the Philippine Coastal Frontier.
- b. Protect shipping of the United States and Associated Powers in that area.

Forces: a. Offshore Patrol:
Submarine Squadron Twenty, less CANOPUS.
Patrol Wing Ten, less LANGLEY.

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ENCLOSURE (B) (3)

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- b. Inshore Patrol.
- c. Combatant Units Ashore.

The mission of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet at the present time insofar as its probable strategic employment is not known to me nor have I been informed as to what you may have in contemplation.

5. The basic concept of the Army's plan of defense is to strike at any enemy force committed to attack against the Philippines or in position to execute such an attack. The Army Air Force, the most powerful offensive striking element available, will necessarily have to operate over water. It is essential under such circumstances that the control of the Commanding General over this component should be complete. Not only for strategic conception but for tactical execution he must have integral command of all elements of his force.

6. It is possible that under extraordinary conditions elements of an Army Air Force in support of a Fleet might advantageously operate under temporary naval direction, but in this sense, the term "Fleet" cannot be applied to the two cruisers and the division of destroyers that comprise the combat surface elements of your command. This is especially striking when judged in comparison either with the potential enemy naval forces in the Western Pacific or with the Air Force of this Command which is rapidly being built up to an initial strength of 170 heavy bombers and 86 light bombers, with pursuit in proportion. It would be manifestly illogical to assign for control or tactical command such a powerful Army air striking force to an element of such combat inferiority as your Command or that of the 16th Naval District. That portion of my mission involving support of the Navy will be carried out with all possible energy, but I believe that the cooperative efforts of the two Services can better be obtained by leaving their elements under their own commands, operating with complete coordination as to mission assignments.

7. The operational features outlined in your paragraph 7 have already been arranged.

8. If bombing operations should be undertaken by the Army against objectives situated over-seas, you would of course be informed and consulted if available, but if your paragraph 8 intends to convey the thought that such a mission could not be undertaken without your concurrence, the point is untenable.

/s/ DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
Commanding General,
United States Army Forces in
the Far East.

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ENCLOSURE (B) (4)

Regraded Unclassified

FF6/A16-1
(S-140)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET

OO/Bz

U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,
November 12, 1941.

S-E-C-R-E-T

From: The Commander in Chief, U.S. ASIATIC FLEET.
To : The Commanding General, U.S. ARMY FORCES IN
THE FAR EAST.

Subject: Control of Air Operations Over Water.

Enclosure: (A) Extract from Chief of Naval Operations'
secret letter Op-30B2-BP over (SC) A7-2(2)/
FF1 serial 059230 of June 20, 1941.

1. In reference to your letter of 7 November, replying to mine of 23 October;- would say first off that I am delighted that Rear Admiral Bemis was able to express his appreciation for complete Army cooperation. Upon my own relief from present station, I hope to likewise express thanks and appreciation.

2. My letter of 23 October expresses no basic principle about mediums over which planes operate. Rather than that, it is a matter of the objectives against which they operate. They may be the same objectives attacked by the ships of this Fleet. You state that my proposals are entirely objectionable. Wholly apart from the question of most effective employment of forces which Army and Navy send against an enemy upon the sea, there remains interference and possible danger to my own units if Army aircraft should take action wholly independent of the Navy, in the same areas.

3. Such unnecessary risk is altogether unacceptable to me and, if taken, must be at the instances of the Navy Department itself. However, it seems unnecessary that such problems should be added to the load which Washington is carrying that I am making a further attempt at a local solution.

4. Your letter of 7 November quotes at length from the Confidential Publication on Joint Action, 1935. The quotations might have included the following:-

"When any section of a frontier is threatened.....
The Army Air Corps operates along the coast under the same conditions as in other operations except that occasions may arise when the G.H.Q. air force or units thereof may act in conjunction with Naval air forces under temporary direction of Naval Commanders; or

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ENCLOSURE (C) (1)

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S-E-C-R-E-T

U.S.S. HOUSTON, Flagship,
November 12, 1941.

Subject: Control of Air Operations Over Water.

similarly when Naval air forces may operate in conjunction with and under temporary direction of Army Commanders "

5. There is precedent for my proposals in an agreement as set forth in the enclosure. The conditions and circumstances surrounding that agreement are more nearly parallel to our local situation than to those of our continental coasts which was in the foreground during the preparation of Chapter V of the Joint Action pamphlet. Furthermore, the date is 1941.

6. It is therefore requested that you reconsider the position taken in your letter of 7 November. That letter goes beyond the subject of aircraft operations in such manner that an answer is necessary, for purposes of record.

7. On about 22 September, in an interview which I sought, you were given a history of the developments during the current year concerning Naval plans and projects for the entire Far Eastern Area. There was included the high lights of our relationships with potential Allies and you were also informed as regards the history of my own command status and its locals, a subject of particular reference in your letter. You then proceeded to give me a general outline of the plans and projects for your own forces; that was followed up and added to during a very courteous visit by your Chief of Staff, shortly afterward. It should be mentioned that those interviews showed the Army's plans to have been greatly changed and expanded over what they had previously been but we have as yet received no official information on the subject. However, I hold no dissatisfaction therein as long as I am kept generally informed; Navy's plans have been changing frequently to meet changed conditions and it is to be assumed that Army's plans also change as its expansion comes to fruit.

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ENCLOSURE (C) (2)

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CHART OF ESCAPE
OF
LT. COMDR. MELVYN H. McCOY, USN

ESCAPE OF
LT. COMDR. MELVIN H. MCCOY, USN
FROM A JAPANESE PRISON CAMP
IN THE PHILIPPINES

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Lt. Comdr. Malvyn H. McCoy, Radio Material Officer of the 16th Naval District, was stationed at Cavite during the first stages of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. On 25 December 1942, a week before the Japanese entered Manila, he was evacuated to Corregidor, where he remained during the siege. Although that fortress surrendered on 6 May 1942, it was not till the 22nd that he was moved from the island to Old Bilibid Prison, Manila, where he was kept for the following six weeks.

On 6 July he was transferred to the main American Prisoner of War Camp at Cabanatuan, Luzon. There he remained until 26 October, when he left for the American Prisoner of War Camp, Davao Penal Colony, about 30 miles north of Davao City. En route he again passed through the Old Bilibid Prison before arriving at the Davao camp on 7 November.

He made his escape from this camp on 4 April 1943, leading a group of 10 officers and men. A month later the party succeeded in reaching our guerrilla forces. On 13 May Lt. Comdr. McCoy met Lt. Comdr. Parsons, U.S.N.R., and on the 23rd Lt. Col. W.W. Fertig, leader of the guerrillas in Mindanao. He had remained at Misamis, the scene of this meeting, for about a month when the Japanese occupation of the place on 26 June forced a hurried departure. On 3 July he started for a rendezvous with the submarine which was to take him to Australia, which he made as scheduled on 9 July 1943.

The following pages contain Lieut. Comdr. McCoy's account of his experiences, his observations and recommendations.

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About two weeks before Corregidor surrendered the Japanese commenced a very heavy bombardment of the island. At no time during this period did fewer than 5,000 shells daily strike the island, the largest number up until the last day being 16,000. Most shells were about 155 caliber, although some 240's and 105 caliber were used. By May 5th, all of the large gun batteries on Corregidor had been destroyed by enemy gunfire as well as all searchlights, so that it is probable that the first Japanese landing barge landed without being seen about 2300, May 5. However, in spite of the fact that there was no illumination and only smaller caliber semi-portable guns could be used, we probably sank about two-thirds of the Japanese barges, according to their own admission.

The landing was preceded by a terrific bombardment of the area in which they landed. After the first landing, they were pushed back by our forces perhaps 200 yards and rapidly fell back about 500 yards more and requested by radio a renewed barrage which was forthcoming and drove our forces back towards the center of the island. The Japanese also sent for reinforcements which arrived and could have repeated this process indefinitely if necessary. It was informed about 0400, May 6th, that it was the intention to surrender at 1200 that date.

All Naval radio equipment with the exception of one transmitter and receiver was destroyed before 1100 and the rest of the equipment was destroyed at 1155. All codes and ciphers were destroyed by burning and all coding machines completely demolished and distorted by burning also. The Army did not destroy all of its radio equipment, but I personally saw to it that the coding machine which they had borrowed from us was destroyed. All in-shore patrol vessels which included the

Yangtze River gunboats and minesweepers were sunk, except the Luzon, whose engineering plant had been completely damaged by enemy shells. The Luzon was later towed by the Japanese to the Cavite Navy Yard.

After the surrender I was able to view the area in which the Japanese landed. Prior to the landing this ~~area~~ was heavily wooded. At the time I examined it, there was not a blade of grass or remains of a tree, 8 inches high in it. The Japanese were bombarding us with many guns from Bataan; one of the reasons that they were able to install somany artillery units on Bataan is that they put them adjacent to and within our No. 2 hospital area in which we knew were located at least 3000 American and Filipino wounded.

After the surrender, no Japanese officers appeared for sometime in the Navy tunnel, but many enlisted were passing through the tunnel at all times, looting and robbing, but not molesting the prisoners. It seems to be a practice of Japanese officers to permit their troops to have a chance to loot unobserved; because if an officer actually sees a Japanese soldier robbing, he forces him to return the loot and slaps the soldier around. The Japanese soldier is very fond of wrist watches and I saw one with one arm covered with watches from his wrist to his elbow and the other arm half covered, with his bayonet in the stomach of another man striving to obtain more watches. These soldiers were awed by the electric refrigerators, in fact I have elsewhere seen them put ice within perfectly operatable electric refrigerators.

These first Japanese soldiers who entered were a healthy, rugged and tough lot, mostly Marines who had already seen action at Hongkong, Singapore, and Bataan, in other words - the shock troops. In general they were of the lower classes - uneducated and uninformed. They seemed

to harbor no resentment toward us. On the contrary, many of them patted us on the back and said we were much braver than the British, and that had the British fought at Singapore as we had on Corregidor they could never have captured Singapore.

The officers in general were of a much higher type but of low rank. A sergeant in the Japanese Army corresponds in general in experience, ability, and authority to the present day United States Army 1st Lieut. Discipline in the Japanese Army appeared to be very rigid, and the men seemed to consider the officers as the direct representatives of the Emperor. Japanese officers stated that they lost about 5,000 men killed in taking the island. I do not know our exact losses but they were estimated at well under 1,000.

One amusing incident which occurred in the Navy tunnel was that the rifles and pistols which we surrendered were left lying upon the desk in the center of the tunnel, all loaded. We were allowed to remain in the tunnel that night, the night of the 6th, and these arms were never removed. No Japanese remained in the tunnel. About midnight they realized, apparently, that there were approximately 100 loaded weapons in the tunnel and routed us out, with much anger on their part, to dispose of these arms and also search thoroughly the rest of the tunnel for arms.

Another amusing sight is to watch the average Japanese soldier use a modern toilet. I have seen them walk straight forward, over the bowl, drop their pants, defecate - missing the bowl and landing in front of it on the floor - wiping the rectum with a rag withdrawn from a pocket and return said rag to the pocket. Toilet paper was within reach of his hand. Unfortunately, American soldiers had to clean up

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after them when they moved up the deck.

On the day following the surrender the Japanese bombed and shelled the island - the planes coming over at extremely low levels. One interpretation of this could be that the Japs were trying to demonstrate to General Falmwright that they would, if necessary, fulfill their threat to massacre all persons on Corregidor unless all American forces in the Philippines surrendered. Of all the fortified islands, only Port Drum, the concrete battleship, was undamaged by Japanese shells and bombs. Drum's armament suffered no damage whatsoever. The officers and men on board Drum were subjected to 48 hours of hearing after their surrender, during which time they were not allowed to sit down or to sleep or to have water or food. This was due to the fact that Port Drum had dropped a 14" shell amidst a large group of Japanese on Betanc, killing a high ranking Japanese officer whose brother was still in Manila and who ordered this special hearing of the Port Drum occupants.

Practically all prisoners were placed in the 92nd Garage area, which is a concrete square about 100 yards on the side. There were ten thousand prisoners placed here without cover. There was one water spigot for the 10,000. There were no latrines. The heat during the day was terrific and several nights it rained. During the day the only relief was to go out into the bay up to the neck, which was permitted by the Japanese. The fact that this bay was used as the common latrine was an unfortunate, but not a deterring, factor. The Japanese furnished these prisoners with no food for seven days, but some food trickled in from working parties who were able to obtain it during the work. These prisoners remained there until May 22, which is just after the date on

which the last General in the Visayan Islands surrendered. They may have been kept there in keeping with the Japanese threat mentioned elsewhere. On the afternoon of the 22nd, we prisoners were loaded on to three merchant vessels of about 7,000 tons displacement. These vessels were designed to accommodate twelve passengers. There were about 3500 of us on each vessel. We remained aboard all night, without sleep naturally, and the following day proceeded to Manila. Instead of going to a pier in the city itself, we were taken beyond the city, off Passay, placed into landing barges and put ashore. This operation took place during the hottest part of the day, as has always been usual with any Japanese dealing with prisoners. In the landing barges we hung around for about an hour packed like sardines. We were then dumped in the water up to our armpits; this last action was unnecessary as the boats could have been run right up on to the beach but the Japanese wanted to be sure we made the march through Manila in wet clothes and with wet equipment. We marched through the entire city of Manila, about five miles, ending up at Old Bilibid Prison. The Japanese were undoubtedly attempting to impress the Filipinos, but throughout the march I saw no smiles on the faces of any inhabitant, many tears, and many surreptitious victory signs.

Although many prisoners fell out and were unable to make the march only one died - a Lt. Col. Short, U.S.A. Due to having to walk on the cement with wet shoes the condition of many feet was deplorable, especially among the more aged officers. I left Bilibid that same afternoon in company with Capt. K. H. Hoeffel, U.S.N., the Naval Commandant, and several other officers, for the Passay Elementary School, at which the Naval Hospital Unit from Canacao, Cavite, Philippine Islands, was

located. Generals Moore and Drake were also with me with this party, as were members of their staffs.

While there, a group of 300 American prisoners who had been captured on Batasan and had been ^{at} Camp O'Donnell passed through on their way to a work detail in Batangus. All were in a deplorable condition and 18 were unable to walk the following morning. These 18 remained at the hospital and were replaced by 18 men already there. Later at Cabanatuan the remainder of this working party were returned. About 270 of the 300 died on the job to which detailed. While at this camp I learned that all officers of the rank of full Colonel and above, with corresponding ranks in the Navy, would be sent to Tarlac, Luzon. Each General was allowed one enlisted orderly and each two Colonels was allowed an orderly. Of the Navy, this group taken to Japan included Capt. Koeffel, U.S.N., Capt. W.H. Wilterdink, Supply Corps, U.S.N., Capt. K.E. Lowman, Medical Corps, U.S.N., Capt. R.G. Davis, Medical Corps, U.S.N., Capt. L.J. Roberts, Medical Corps, U.S.N., and Col. S. L. Howard, U.S. Marine Corps.

On May 27th, I was returned to Old Bilibid, Manila, where I remained until July 6th. At this time most of the Corregidor prisoners had been sent to Cabanatuan and the remainder were going at the rate of about 1,000

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per day. About 30 officers remained at Bilibid, in addition to the hospital unit, to supervise working parties engaged in clearing up, repairing the prison, and to do odd jobs about Manila. I was one of these 30, and there were about 300 enlisted men. After the work was finished most of these were sent to Cabanatuan. A few permanent working details were formed and remain until this day, I believe, in Manila, for the most part working in the port area. Naval officers were in charge of all of these groups.

While at Bilibid, I went on one volunteer working party to load canned milk for prison camps. I later ascertained that only about 10% of what we loaded was ever sent. This milk was located at Rizal Stadium and in this stadium was also a huge amount of supplies, almost all of which were U. S. A. Quartermaster supplies.

On July 7th, I was taken with 250 other American prisoners to Cabanatuan, Luzon, about 75 miles north of Manila. We were placed in metal box cars, 75-80 in a car, and the trip took about six hours. There was no sitting room in the cars.

At Cabanatuan we were thoroughly searched and then installed in Nipa quarters. These were quarters used for the Philippine Army. We were very crowded and located in small bays with just room enough to lie down side by side in each bay. At this time it was not an unusual sight to see dead prisoners lying around the barracks and each morning there was a new group of dead carried outside and laid on the ground awaiting disposal. These bodies at times lay around for several days, which did not enhance either the odor or the sanitary conditions. Water was rationed but adequate. Bathing facilities were inadequate, consisting of a few wells

for the 6000 men in the camp. Latrines were open and a decided menace. The question of food will be gone into elsewhere. At this time and throughout the month of July the average death rate was 30 per day. The maximum being 43. All prisoners were Americans.

This camp had been established about June 1st with prisoners from Corregidor and Camp O'Donnell arriving at about the same time. Camp O'Donnell was the prison to which the Bataan prisoners were first taken and is located in the province of Tarlac, Luzon. The Cabanatuan camps consist of Camp # 1, and the hospital adjacent to it, about six miles north of Cabanatuan City; and Camp #2, which is about twelve miles north of the city. All of the Bataan prisoners were taken to Camp # 1. Camp # 2 is composed largely of enlisted men from Corregidor, with a few officers, also from Corregidor, and the health there is considerably better than that at Camp # 1.

The death rate for June and July of 1942 was thirty per day - in August 21 per day - September 14 per day - and in October about 19 per day. That means from the time Cabanatuan was established until I left there were approximately 3400 deaths, mainly of people who had been captured on Bataan. Deaths were due to malaria, dysentery, diphtheria, and malnutrition. At the time I left Cabanatuan, responsible doctors told me that of the 2500 patients then in the hospital they did not expect any of them to live. One almost had to be dead to get into the hospital. At Camp O'Donnell during April and May the number of deaths is estimated to have been about 2200 Americans, but the confusion was so great there that this estimate could be slightly inaccurate, but not by more than two or three hundred.

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This means that a total of over 5,000 Americans died in captivity prior to November 1942. The reason for the confusion in accurately determining the number of dead at O'Donnell was that there were originally 45,000 Filipinos at the camp who were dying at the rate of about 500 a day and the problem of burial became acute, the Japs being unwilling to help and there being too few Americans or Filipinos strong enough to take care of the bodies. Of those 45,000 Filipinos, at least 27,000 are now dead.

About the middle of July the prison camp was divided into three groups and all the Navy and Marines were placed in group one. Officers were not required to work but could volunteer to be in charge of working parties. Almost the only work enlisted men were required to do was to secure and deliver firewood for the galleys. The camp is surrounded by barbed wire and sentries, but as a rule there are no Japanese within the fence and the prisoners can live unmolested by the Japs. We were allowed to hold classes in various subjects to pass the time, but not in foreign languages. Card playing is frowned upon by the Japanese, but not strictly prohibited. To help the morale of the camp, we put on little skits of entertainment, two or three times weekly, and now and then the Japanese would permit an exchange of shows between prison camps. The Japanese have furnished a very small amount of soft ball gear, but this is ample as only about 5% are physically able to use the gear. A man able to play will get about one opportunity a week.

Throughout the time I was at this camp there were no medicines available in the hospital, nor did the Japanese permit the Philippine Red Cross to furnish any until shortly before my departure. When this

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one group of supplies from Manila arrived, including quinine, the Japanese would not permit it to be unpacked and used for sometime, during which time many died of malaria whose lives could have been saved by the quinine. When I arrived in camp there was some sulfathiazole and quinine in the hands of private individuals, mostly Army hospital corps men, who had appropriated these supplies from the hospitals in Bataan or Corregidor and had not returned them when the hospitals were reestablished at Cabanatuan. These men were selling the medicine for four dollars a pill. Obviously they should be treated no better than the Japanese, as in effect they have caused loss of the lives of many of their countrymen by hoarding stolen medicine.

The most common diseases are malaria and dysentery. The malaria was generally incurred in Bataan and due to lack of quinine, keeps repeating in most of the cases. There have been a large number of cases of cerebral malaria, almost always fatal as the cure consists of intra-venous injections of quinine, none of which was available. Whether the cerebral malaria was caused by frequent recurrence of the ordinary malaria or whether it is a distinct type many doctors were in doubt. The dysentery was acquired from drinking polluted water from carabao wallows on the march out of Bataan and polluted water at Camp O'Donnell, and is transmitted in the camp by the general unsanitary conditions.

There were several efforts to escape made - all by enlisted men except for the original effort made by three Naval Reserve officers; Ensigns Barry, Tirk, and Sanborn. These three left, rather than escaped, the night that Cabanatuan was first formed. There were no lights, no fences, no muster and very little guarding done; and escape was simply a matter

of walking off. After three months these three officers turned themselves in, in southern Luzon, because they realized that if they did not do so, the Filipinos would have turned them over to the Japanese and the punishment been much harsher. All other incidents of escape have been of individuals, and these men have all turned back in within a space of two weeks. None of these above-mentioned has been executed. The enlisted men were beaten up and put to hard labor in chains. The officers were confined only, and required to read statements of their experiences on the outside, and to make speeches on the futility of escape, to all hands in the prison camp.

About September 30, Lieutenant Colonels Lloyd Biggs and Howard Breitung, with Lieutenant R. D. Gilbert (C.E.C.) U.S.N.R., attempted to escape. Through an unfortunate accident and the loud mouth of Colonel Biggs these men were apprehended by the Japanese, tortured and executed. The details of the treatment by the Japanese will be related along with the atrocities committed. While these three were crawling in single file, each armed with a club, along a ditch which lead under the camp's barbed wire fences, an enlisted man named Tonelli (ex All-American football player from Notre Dame) commenced to urinate in this ditch instead of the regular latrine. Lt. Col. Biggs, upon being urinated upon, rose in a rage and turned to on Tonelli with his club, loudly cursing at the time. Tonelli resisted and called for help. The American perimeter guards came to his assistance but were unable to subdue the three officers and some other Americans from the living barracks took a hand. The three officers were finally subdued and lead away and during this time the Japanese guard outside the fence had come up abreast of the scene of action, but I doubt if a suspicion that an escape was in

progress was aroused. Upon arrival at American Headquarters which is in shouting distance of Japanese Headquarters, Lt. Col. Biggs was raving and ranting about being stopped and saying that it was the duty of the other Americans to help him escape. The Japanese Camp Commander, Lt. Col. Mori, was giving some instructions to the American Camp Commander Major H. J. Say (posing as Lt. Col.) and when hearing the rumpus told Say to go out and take care of the affair. At about the time Say arrived Lt. Col. Biggs eluded his captors and dashed off into the darkness. When a guard caught up with him, he wrested a club from the guard and turned on him again, but was finally subdued with additional aid. Upon being returned to the presence of Major Say he reminded Say that he, Biggs, was senior to Say, that he was required to escape if possible, and that it was Say's duty to assist him. Biggs used such loud language that the Japanese, who were no alertly listening, were able to pick up the word "escape" several times and accordingly stepped into the affair. Lt. Col. Mori told Say to send one of these three officers into him for questioning and the other two were turned over to Japanese guards. Unfortunately, Lt. Col. Biggs was the man chosen to be sent in for questioning. Had he had the beating up by the Japanese which the other two received, perhaps he would have not been so chesty when he faced Col. Mori. He "read off" Col. Mori and told him that he was not supposed to take any action against him, Biggs, for attempting to carry out his duty of escaping and that if Col. Mori did so, after the war he would see to it that Col. Mori got demoted. The sequel of all this was torture and execution. There is but little doubt that had it not been for Biggs' loud voice and arrogant attitude, the affair would never have come to the attention of the Japanese authorities.

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In addition, all officers who lived in the barracks in which these three officers had been quartered were confined for a period of thirty days, were not allowed to purchase additional food, receive any from friends or leave the building to bathe. They could go to the head under guard. No other retaliatory measures were taken.

In October, 1942 the Japanese inaugurated a policy to reduce the number of prisoners in camp by means other than starvation and sickness. There was a small group of about 80 men sent to Japan from Camp #1 to work in factories. About 100 enlisted men from Camp #2 were sent to Davao Penal Colony. At Camp #1 they called for two groups of personnel - one of 1000 and one of 400. These were to be officers and men alike. The requirements for the first group were that they could stand a sea voyage; and for the second group, in addition to the sea voyage, they also had to be technicians. They stated that the 400 would go to Japan and the 1000 to Davao. I do not know the exact number that were called for from Camp #2 but they all went to Japan from Camp #2. At this time there were approximately 12,000 in Cabanatuan Camps, including 2500 in the hospital. The Japanese indicated that Camp #2 would be abolished and there would be altogether only about 6000 left at Camp #1, including the hospital, when transfers were effected. I have no information as to what happened after the thousand men group left Camp #1, October 26, 1942 but inasmuch as no other prisoners arrived at Davao between that time and April 4, 1943 and no large working parties have been reported elsewhere in the Philippines by our guerrilla spies, I assume that either the Japanese abandoned the plan, or sent approximately 5000 men prisoners to Japan.

The trip from Manila to Davao required eleven days and was made on

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about a 7000 ton British built vessel. There were 989 prisoners, of whom two died on the way. We were placed in two holds. There was not room for all hands to lie down even though side by side, with the result that many remained top-side, in spite of the fact that it rained every night. The Japanese made no effort to identify this vessel as having prisoners-of-war on board. The food was the best any of us had had since being captured consisting mainly of canned corned beef from our Cavite Navy Yard pre-war supplies. We disembarked at the Lasang Lumber Dock near Davao City about 0800, November 6th. We were kept in the sun without food until one o'clock, given rice, then marched 17 miles to Davao Penal Colony. We were stopped twice. We arrived at the penal colony at 0100, November 7.

The Davao Penal Colony was operated by the Bureau of Prisons and contained about two thousand convicts. All but 150 of these convicts were transferred to the Filipino Prison near Puerto Princessa, Palawan. The 150 convicts who were left to aid in the management of the farm were the hardened criminals, all of them homicides. Prior to the war this colony was not only self-sufficient for two thousand convicts, but sold considerable produce to the surrounding inhabitants.

After arrival we found that the Japanese expected this to be a work camp and there were now approximately 2,000 prisoners in all, as all American prisoners captured in the Visayan Islands and Mindanao were in the Davao Camp. Lt. Col. Moriat Cabanatuan, if he knew prisoners were wanted for work, did not tell the American Camp Commander, with the result that the party which left Cabanatuan was composed largely of sick and undesirable personnel. There were a few volunteers; and in the case of the Navy and Marine personnel, almost all were volunteers including

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myself. The Davao Camp Commander, Major Maida, was very angry because of our physical condition, however he insisted on all hands working unless actually hospitalized. At the time I escaped, of the 2000 prisoners about 1100 were working and the other 900 were in the hospital. The Japanese made no effort to distinguish between officers and men in types of work, and all along had made every effort to break down the internal discipline between American officers and men. They have succeeded in this to a great extent. Enlisted men of the Navy were head and shoulders above those of the Army in this respect as well as in many others. I have seen Lt. Colonels and Commanders up to the age of forty-five years old working in rice paddies in mud knee high, planting and harvesting rice. I have personally cleaned out Japanese latrines and sewage disposals. No kind of work is too low for the Japanese to assign to Americans. Although there was much useful work which could have been done in the way of planting the colony farms, we were not allowed to do this but were assigned unnecessary tasks. Had we been able to work usefully, we could have produced enough food on the colony adequately to feed ourselves, but the Japs did not want us to do so. At the time of my departure we had sixty officers logging to furnish 1000 logs over a three-month period to a Japanese firm in Davao City. The agricultural facilities of the camp were so reduced that they supplied almost no food for our own use, as much of what we grew was turned over to the Japanese themselves. There were on April 4, 1943, approximately 250 Japanese in the camp.

Most of the Japanese are clerks and the guards are mainly young recruits from Formosa with very little training. There are some Filipino administrators who administered the convict colony before the war. The

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Superintendent is a Mr. Robin, not to be trusted. The Assistant Superintendent was Mr. Juan Acenas, a capable and trustworthy man who has befriended the Americans at every opportunity. There were also civilian evacuees from Davao to the number of about 20 as well as 150 Filipino convicts present. I understand from information obtained about a week after I escaped that all Filipinos were moved out of the colony on account of the escape and 200 Japanese soldiers moved in, but that no retaliation was taken upon Americans. Whether the Filipinos removed included the convicts or not, I do not know.

A Japanese sentry had murdered in cold blood an Army hospital corps man named McFee four days before I escaped. Through guerilla spies we learned the Japanese have indicated that they believed we escaped for the purpose of getting guerillas and attacking the prison camp in retaliation for the murder of McFee, and that was the reason for the additional 200 guards.

At Davao the working prisoners lived in 8 large barracks. These barracks are wooden with galvanized tin roofs, while those at Cabanatuan were all bamboo with nipa roofs. At Davao our living quarters were more cramped even than at Cabanatuan. There were no recreational facilities at all during the week, but on Sunday afternoons we could play two softball games, which meant that very few people could ever take part in any athletic endeavor.

On Sunday, April 4, our escape was made and details of it will be the subject of a special enclosure.

Details of Escape

I was the officer in charge of a working detail which harvested coffee on the plantation. Major Mellnik and two Army sergeants, Spielman and Marshall, assisted me upon this detail, which included approximately 35 officers of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, all over 40 years of age. The reason for so many assistants was that my primary aim was to see that enough extra food was stolen so that we could build up the health of these older officers. At first we had a Japanese guard on the detail, but when the Japanese later reduced the number of guards in the Colony this coffee detail was one from which they removed the guard. It was obvious that without a guard we could probably make an escape and get about eight hours head start before the Japanese found out about it. Early in January the three assistants and I commenced making plans to escape. We decided to wait until we could all build up our health and also to feel that if we got near New Guinea and were picked up, that there was a fifty-fifty chance that it would be by one of our own forces.

I was able to receive radio news from San Francisco approximately every other day due to the fact that there was a Filipino, one Mr. Candido Abrina, formerly cashier of the Phillippine National Bank in Davao City, assigned to advise me in the harvesting of coffee. Mr. Abrina was a close friend of the assistant superintendant, Mr. Juan Acenas. Acenas had a radio in his home and a hidden antenna and so was able to receive San Francisco news and pass it on to me via Abrina.

To build up our health, Major Mellnik, Sergeant Spielman and I found that with the exercise of considerable caution we would be able to enter the Japanese chicken farm and relieve them of some of their charges. During the months of January, February and March, we stole 133 chickens. These we used not only to feed ourselves but also to supplement the diet of the officers working for me and to obtain supplies for the escape.

In early March I was approached by Captain A. C. Shofner, U.S. Marine Corps, who told me that there were six officers who had been preparing plans for an escape and would like for me to take charge of the party if I so desired. Both escaping groups felt that we would have to make our escape from the Island itself by sailboat, as we had no information available regarding the extensive guerilla activity and radio or submarine contact between Mindanao and Australia. We had heard rumors that there were some guerillas to the north of the camp and fairly close by, and we hoped that after our escape we might receive help from them.

The group intending to escape now consisted of the following men: Lieut. Commander M. H. McCoy, U.S. Navy; Major (CAC) S. M. Mellnik, U.S.A.; Major (AC) W. E. Dyess; Captain A. C. Shofner, U.S.M.C.; First Lieutenant Jack Hawkins, U.S.M.C.; First Lieutenant Michael Dobervich, U.S.M.C.; Second Lieutenant (AC, Eng.) L. A. Boelens, U.S.A.; Second Lieutenant (AC) Samuel Grashio, U.S.A.; Sergeant R. B. Spielman, U.S.A.; and Sergeant Paul Marshall, U.S.A. Through Mr. Abrina we made arrangements to obtain native guides and contacted Benigno de la Cruz and

Victorio Jumarung for this purpose. Victor had been three times to the barrio where we thought we might find guerillas; but his last trip had been made a year previously. Victor spoke very little English; Ben and his companion spoke excellent English as well as many native dialects. Ben is an example of one of the higher-type, intelligent Filipinos and was a doctor's apprentice, having had considerable experience in taking care of the Filipino convicts. Both of these Filipinos were convicted of homicide. Neither wanted any financial reward for aiding us, but only the opportunity of accompanying us to Australia and the assurance that, if successful in reaching American forces, we would intercede to obtain a pardon for them.

Lieutenant Boelens constructed a home-made sextant for me, and from a book on science and astronomy I was able to obtain the right ascension and declination of all principle stars and also the equation of time. From a book of Army survey tables I was able to obtain the altitude corrections. I could compute the right ascension and the declination of the sun and so felt prepared to navigate with reasonable limits. I also had a good Hamilton pocket watch which had a fairly constant rate and whose error I determined by comparing the watch with the time of local apparent noon. I found, when I finally was able to get a time tick by radio, that I was fifteen seconds off.

Captain Shofner and three other members of the party were working on a plowing detail of which Captain Shofner was temporarily in charge. This detail worked in various parts of the Colony and used Indian steers for plowing. Their basic area was very close to that section of the jungle

from which we intended to make our escape, while my coffee area was on the opposite side of the Colony.

The problem of taking out ahead of time what equipment and supplies we could obtain was not too difficult. One of our main difficulties throughout the whole plan was to prevent other Americans from finding out that we intended to escape because, unfortunately, the morale of some was so low that they would have reported us, feeling that our escape might bring restrictions upon them. For this reason, for example, I was unable to bring out of the camp a complete roster of all prisoners there. If we set out articles of clothing, blankets, shelter halves, etc., it was quite possible that our next-door neighbors would notice these things. Undoubtedly there were some suspicions aroused, but there was nothing definite enough to go on, and outside of a few comments nothing was done.

We decided to escape on a Sunday, as on Sunday we could go out as a depleted working party taking only those who intended to escape and thereby reducing to a minimum the possibility of any retaliation on the Americans. Captain Shofner's plowing detail always went out as a working party of four on Sunday to change the grazing location of the steers and to water them, so that their going out would excite no suspicion. My detail did not generally work on Sunday, but without obtaining permission of the Japs on the previous day, I decided to take the other six out, and if we were questioned state that we were going out to build a rain shelter in the coffee plantation. We selected March 28 as the day for the escape, and on March 26 we commenced sending what equipment and supplies that could be spared out to the jungle. On March 14 we rehearsed the route

of escape by going through the entire procedure without any equipment whatsoever and proceeding to our rendezvous point in the jungle in order to find out if the Japanese guards at their various posts, or the Japanese tower sentries, who are equipped with binoculars, would make any effort to stop us. We were successful in reaching the rendezvous and then returned to the camp.

Captain Shefner's group, less Major Dyess, took their equipment out to the plowing "shack" on March 26 and 27. It was there put into five gallon cans and sneaked into the jungle near the rendezvous point. My party, plus Major Dyess, took our gear into the coffee plantation and assembled it there. Saturday morning all of this latter gear was placed in a bull cart and covered over with small tree trunks which were ostensibly for the purpose of erecting a fence, in case the Japanese should inquire. Major Dyess, who was the regular bull cart driver, accompanied by Major Mellnik, drove this bull cart near to the jungle and at an appointed spot was met by a couple of the plowers who carried the gear into the jungle. This bull cart had to pass one of the main Japanese sentry houses which almost invariably stopped it to obtain fruit as the bull cart usually carried fruit from the colony orchard to the Japanese quartermaster. A burlap bag of star apples was placed on the rear of the bull cart to appease the Japanese sentries. The plan worked without a hitch.

About 1100, March 27, Lieutenant Hosume, known as the "Crown Prince of Swat," due to his proclivity to slap Americans, made an inspection of working parties for the purpose of seeing if they were using forbidden

foods in the preparation of the noon meal. At 1100 he inspected the plowing detail and searched the musette bags of all members of the detail. In Captain Shofner's bag was a large bottle containing 1,000 tablets of quinine and some other bottles of medicine, but no food. Fortunately, Lieutenant Hosume has a single-track mind and did not have his suspicions aroused by the presence of medicine. After slapping around all members of the plowing detail, Lieutenant Hosume left and almost ran into Captain Carberry, an Army Chaplain, who was carrying two five-gallon cans containing blankets, and other suspicious supplies. Father Carberry saw Hosume first and ducked off into the banana groves.

We had added Father Carberry to our party as we felt that we would obtain much more cooperation from the Filipinos if we had a Catholic priest with us. Unfortunately, Father Carberry was unable to accompany us as on March 31 he became ill with amoebic dysentery.

On Saturday night, March 27, we discovered that all hands would have to work the following day in the rice fields, somewhat in the nature of a punishment for the fact that Lieutenant Hosume had found working details cooking unauthorized food for lunch. This completely upset our plans for leaving on March 28 and we postponed the date of departure until April 4. However, much of our equipment was now stowed into the jungle and it was considered too risky to try to bring it back in as the Japanese frequently make thorough inspections of officers coming back from work, to make sure that they are not smuggling in fruit. There was considerable risk in this equipment being found as naturally it was not very far into the jungle and people do roam as far as we had our equipment hidden.

On Sunday, April 4, we carried out our original plan without incident. We all presented a somewhat bulky appearance in passing the main gate where the Japanese sentry had to check us off as working parties and we had to make excuses to our American companions who noted that we had taken out our mosquito nets. My excuse was that I had found bed bugs in it and was taking it out to wash it during the noon hour. In going out I had to take my group of six in the direction of the coffee plantation which was opposite to that in which I desired to go, and I took a short cut on the way which had been expressly forbidden the previous day by a special order from the Japanese. We then ducked into coconut groves and worked our way back to the point where we could cross the main road, less than 50 yards from where I originally started. There was no earthly reason for an American group to be using the road at that spot on Sunday but although we passed within 20 yards of the Jap sentry who saw us, he said nothing. This crossing and getting out of the main gate with our equipment was probably the biggest hazard encountered.

At this point I will insert an exact copy of day-to-day notes which I jotted down from April 4 until May 13, inclusive.

L O G
of Expedition Commanded by
M. H. McCoy, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

MEMBERS:

Lieutenant Commander M. H. McCoy, U.S. Navy
Major (CAC) S. M. Mellnik, U.S.A.
Major (AC) W. E. Dyess
Captain A. C. Shofner, U.S.M.C.
First Lieutenant Jack Hawkins, U.S.M.C.
First Lieutenant Michael Dobervich, U.S.M.C.
Second Lieutenant (AC, Eng.) L. A. Boelens, U.S.A.
Second Lieutenant (AC) Samuel Grashio, U.S.A.
Sergeant R. B. Spielman, U.S.A.

Sergeant Paul Marshall, U.S.A.
Benigno de la Cruz
Victorio Jumarung

April 4 - at 0800 I left in charge of 5 others as a "Coffee Detail," ostensibly to build a rain shelter. We all carried a little more than usual, such as mosquito nets hidden in shelter halves, but cleared the gate without comment. Capt. Shofner followed shortly thereafter with remaining three Americans as a plowing detail to shift steers. This is a regular Sunday detail and excited no comment. 0830 - My group met Shofner's at plower's shack and proceeded into jungle where we assembled our gear. Some of this gear had to be moved across the road where Jap sentry could spot us. Our equipment was in deplorable condition. 0900 - Victor Jumarung appeared but was without Ben de la Cruz. Apparently they wanted to make certain we really meant to escape. Victor returned to get Ben. The two of them arrived about 1030, during which time some of us had a few uneasy moments for fear the Filipinos had let us down. 1030 - Started for Lugnaog. After about 200 yards, Victor, the guide, apparently lost the trail but continued to travel at random for about 1/2 hour. He then admitted he was lost. I decided to travel North by compass, when possible, and otherwise to lean towards the East. The purpose of going North was to get well away from the Penal Colony. 1800 - Stopped for night. Travel had been difficult and getting swampier all the time. There were many streams to cross by wading or cutting down trees along the bank to make a walk below the surface. Needless to mention, we were all wet, as it also rained most of the afternoon. Made camp for the night near a stream. Water was ankle deep. Made structures of boughs to

keep us off the ground. Although we and the bedding were wet, most of us slept during the night as we were so tired. The water rose during the night so that some of us had our tails in it by morning. We each ate 1/2 can of devilled ham with cold rice before retiring, our only food since breakfast.

April 5 - Monday. Up at dawn and ate 1/2 can of corned beef each. Started on an Easterly course favoring the North. Reason: going directly North we would have to pick up a trail to Maniki in order to locate ourselves, and after Victor's initial display of ignorance, I was afraid he might miss the trail to Maniki. While if we went East, we were certain to cross the railroad, which anyone could recognize, and then travel up the railroad. After about two hours travel we got into a swamp.

Water over the knees and "Coogon" or sword grass higher than our heads. At times we could scarcely travel 50 yards in an hour. Ben and Victor led the way by cutting a path, while some of us carried their packs. By 1400 I was completely exhausted, and most of the others within 10 minutes of the same state. I had been feeling ill from the time I awoke. At 1400 we backtracked about 10 minutes walk to a place where a log, large enough to have its top above water, lay. Here we made camp. Surrounded by water and jungle we were still able to build a fire on top of the log and had rice with 1/2^{can} of corned beef each. Also hot tea. We built a rude structure for sleeping above the water and turned in. 1800- Heard unmistakable sounds of rifle and machine gun fire to the northward and not too distant, perhaps 5 or 6 kilometers.

April 6 - Tuesday. All had slept well as we were so tired, and I felt O.K., much to surprise, as whatever had been bothering me had completely vanished. I decided to move to the northward, hoping to clear the swamp, which drained to the eastward, before turning East again. Ate a hot breakfast of oatmeal and started out feeling much better than the previous day's start on cold corned beef. Instead of all moving together slowly, all but three sat, while those three cut their way through without packs. This method was far less tiring and about 1300 the way became much less swamp, and we travelled faster in a generally NE direction. At about 1400 we picked up a trail. About 100 yards down this trail we came onto the railroad tracks and great was our joy. Investigation showed signs of recent travel, including what appeared to be prints of a Jap shoe. Accordingly, the two Filipinos and Sgt. Spielman went ahead to reconnoitre while the rest made camp for the night. Spielman reported that no one had been seen, but three nipa huts were found, one recently occupied. We had hot tea and cold corned beef for supper. Built the usual structure for sleeping. Major. Mellnik suffered a bad cut on the left hand, while using a bolo.

April 7 - Wednesday. Up at dawn and under way at once, without breakfast. Went straight down the R. R. tracks. Found definite evidence of Japanese presence at some time, such as broken sack holding Jap cookies. Found two clips of .303 cal. ammunition and surmised we were near the scene of the firing heard, Monday night. Stopped nearby, about five kilometers from starting point, at a P.A. barracks, empty now, but

recently occupied. Had breakfast here, at Kinamayon. While Capt. Dyess was on guard he and two armed Filipinos espied each other simultaneously. The two natives disappeared quickly, although Dyess called to them. After breakfast went up R.R. track about 1 km. and met a native who took us to the house of a soldier of the guerillas. While runners were sent ahead for the "headman" we were given eggs, rice and casavas. Here I ate my first baloot (2 of them) and they weren't bad at all. We bathed and shaved here. After a couple of hours Sgt. Casiano de Juan appeared, with pistol drawn. He seemed almost alone, but after he satisfied himself that we were Americans and not aids of the Japs, about 50 of his soldiers sprang from the woods, now that the fear of an ambush was over. All were armed with either rifles or revolvers, and two BARS were included. Sgt. Casiano, in the future to be referred to as "Big Boy," is a living picture of the motion picture ideal of the big-hearted Latin-American bandit, who protects the peon, and is generally played by Leo Carrillo. Big Boy is much younger than Carrillo and has a very engaging smile. He seemed overjoyed to see us. He led us to Lagnaog and we occupied a building in the center of the barrio, amply large enough for us. The entire barrio population gathered there to watch us unroll our gear, etc. Big Boy made all arrangements for our food which was carried to us three times daily. Many people made gifts of chickens and eggs to us. We were beginning to get the benefits of the justly famed Filipino hospitality. These people did not have plenty for themselves, our presence might mean retaliation upon them by the Japs, but they were most eager to share their food with us. We stayed here until about 0900 April 10, less than 10 miles from

the nearest Jap outpost at Anibogan and about 12 miles airline from the Prison Camp. Yet we had no fears for our security. While here we learned that the previous Monday a number of Jap soldiers from the colony encountered a Filipino patrol at Kinamayan. The Japs were looking for us. The Filipinos reported that they had 16 men against 83 Japs; suffered no losses and killed 10 Japs. One of the two Filipinos who saw Capt. Dyess April 7, said he attempted to fire on him, but that his rifle misfired. He thought Dyess was a Jap, and the two of them reported to their leader that 100 Japs were coming.

April 10 - Saturday. 0900 left Lungnaog for Luna, 4 kms., arriving at 1015. We were guided by Sgt. Aquilino Baguiled. Luna was formerly known as Abaca. It is a plantation owned by Mr. Onofre Beldua. There is a sugar mill here. Mr. Beldua was very hospitable. For lunch we had a drink made from sugar cans which looked and tasted like wine but much more powerful. The food here was excellent; and we had pork from a pig given to us by Big Boy. Fried eggs for breakfast and plenty of chicken.

April 11 - Sunday. 1000. Left to Sampao, 5 kms. away, arriving at 1140. We stayed here with Mr. Jacinto Royo, brother of the mayor of Lungnaog. Again amply feasted.

April 12 - Monday. 1000. We went about halfway back towards Luna to a small market place where all hands nearby had gathered. There was cockfighting, etc., and we ate lunch there. After lunch we returned to Sampao, picked up our baggage and went on to Kapungagan, where we stayed with Mr. Eligio David, a former resident of Davao. He is the leader in this area, and although a civilian, also is in charge of the military.

Here we remained until we could make arrangements with Capt. Claro Laureta for moving on.

GENERAL SITUATION: There is an organization in Davao Province under the command of Capt. Claro O. Laureta. During the war he commanded the Constabulary Battalion, Davao, and never surrendered. His present command contains a great majority of volunteers. Lts. Rivera and Tuvilla and two others are his assistants, all PC officers. Capt. Laureta is a dictator in the district, which he administers under military law. A certain portion of his command tills the soil, while the others patrol. In addition, the civilians are each requested to contribute a certain amount of food per week for the soldiers. They are very willing to do this as the Japs are kept out. In order to attain our objective, it was almost essential to contact Capt. Laureta and obtain his cooperation. On April 8, runners were sent to Capt. Laureta with a request that he arrange a meeting. As it turned out, he was very suspicious, as the Japs had been using all types of tricks to ensnare him. We moved eventually to Kapungagan where we met Lts. Rivera and Tuvilla on Tuesday, April 13. They requested permission to examine our effects, as Capt. Laureta wanted to be certain of our bonafides. I permitted this, although deemed the greater part of it unnecessary. Having satisfied himself as to our identities, Rivera dispatched a runner to Capt. Laureta who arrived at noon, Saturday, April 17. He is very pleasant and willing to cooperate with us in every way. I had two courses of action to choose from. First was a 7-day hike to Cateel on the East Coast where I would try to secure a sailing vessel, and have it

provisioned for a trip to New Guinea. Second course was an 8 or 9-day trip by walking and bancas to Ampara, just short of Butuan, provincial capital of Agusan, at the mouth of the Agusan river. At Ampara, we expected to be able to contact the main guerilla G.P., which is in radio contact with GHQ, Australia, according to a letter written March 21, by Lt. Col. McClish, U.S.A. If so, we would ask that a submarine pick us up, just before commencing her return trip to her base. If no success from this quarter, we could still make an East Coast port and try the original scheme. There is no need to enumerate the pros and cons of each course. I decided on the second one, and Capt. Laureta is now busily engaged arranging for our supplies and cargadores.

April 16 - Friday. Lt. Dobervich became ill in the afternoon. Had a fever. Was chilly the night before. I gave him 30 grs. quinine in two doses.

April 17 - Saturday. 30 grs. quinine to Mike (Lt. Dobervich) in forenoon. He vomited all day. Had fever still but not so high.

April 18 - Sunday. No quinine for Mike. His symptoms not those of malaria, particularly which he has had several times before. Ben says he has the "flue" although if so, it is different type from ours in the States. Gave him nothing but aspirin, he has no appetite. Today is market day; witnessed several cockfights in PM; bet on one, and won. Had a dance in the open from 1700 to 1900. After dinner, dancing continued by the light of an almost full moon, a beautiful night.

April 19 - Monday. Mike was heaving his cookies about 0630, but ate a good breakfast at 0800. A fat bull carabao was killed. The meat

will be heavily salted and sun-dried, and will then keep about 3 months. This is further proof of the abounding generosity of the Filipinos. Carabaos are few and far between in this area, and this one was brought from several kilometers away. Enough of the dried meat will be retained for a possible trip by sailing vessel. Present indications are that we will not depart until Wednesday, the 21st.

April 20 - Tuesday. Mike's health is much better. The cargadores arrived with supplies. We will carry with us about 20 live chickens, 110 lbs. dried carabao, 5 dozen eggs and plenty of rice. Acquired a Golt, .45 cal. revolver today. Spent last evening singing songs by moonlight.

April 21 - Wednesday. 0800. Under way for Asparo, Agusan. The Davids were very sorry to have us go and Mrs. David shed many tears. We, too, felt badly about it, as they had been our very good friends. Mr. David hiked with us. At Camp Victor, Capt. Laureta's post before surrender, we stopped for tuba and to wait for the bancas. We used 5 bancas in all. They were pulled, pushed, or poled up the Libugenan River, depending upon the depth of water. The current is quite strong, about 3 or 4 knots. Stopped at noon for lunch at a Chinaman's place. Our chow had been prepared at David's so had only to be heated. The Chinaman had a kind of rice wine which smelled terribly and tasted like kerosene. We just couldn't take more than a sip, although the Chinaman got quite drunk. 1400 - Under way again and stopped at 1730 at Florida, a former small camp of Laureta's. Here we were given an example of how Filipinos can throw things together. In no time at all they had built a serviceable table, served coffee, and then rice and meat. All times in this log so far are Zone - 9. Darkness is

Darkness is about 1900 and dawn at 0600. We did not go very far today. It is very hard work moving these bancas upstream. Our party consists of 36 in all.

April 22 - Thursday. Breakfast, at 0630, of rice, soft boiled eggs, meat, vegetables and coffee. Under way at 0745. We are making better progress today, but we have a long haul before we arrive at Lt. Rivera's camp. The river bottom is very rocky. I don't see how the cargadores manage to walk all day on them, pushing or pulling as they go. Passed a hut inhabited by a character called locally "Mahatma Ghandi" because of the decided resemblance. He really does, is very emaciated, practically no teeth, etc. Spent 20 years in the States, but for the past 8 years living here in the jungle with a crazy mountain woman. The mountain people, called Atas, are non-Christians, ignorant, live in tree houses. At 1130 stopped for lunch. Had rice, vegetables, chicken, fresh tomatoes and coffee. Under way at 1415. Passed several tree houses. I sure would like to take a movie of this trip. Stopped at dark at Cupitan, the post of Lt. Rivera. We expected to find less civilization as we went further along, but here we find a large native house, had omelet and chickens with our rice. Mrs. Rivera is here and two or three other women. They moved here into a complete wilderness last August, but now have corn, camotes and about 150 chickens. The Rivera's child is two years old now; they are expecting another in about 3 months. Hope she can get to Davao. Rained most of the night.

April 23 - Friday. A shorter haul for today, so slept until 0715. Had rice, cottage cheese, omelet, carabao meat and coffee with carabao milk for breakfast. Also tomatoes. 0830 - Under way.

Having a very difficult time due to the current and high water. Made exactly nothing after one hour of straining at one stage, but managed to get across the river where the going was better. 1400 - Stopped for lunch by Ata's house. Visited it; occupant not at home. We have several Atas with us. They use spears, and bows and arrows, the latter being poisoned. 1530 - Under way again. Rained sporadically. 1830 - Stopped for night at ex-settlement of Atas, consisting of 4 houses. The first two days of this trip we covered a distance normally made by a Filipino runner in half a day. However, he would travel light and must swim occasionally. There is no point in our travelling faster than our equipment.

April 24 - Saturday. 0700. Under way after another excellent breakfast. 0730 - met about 3 families of Atas floating downstream on bamboo rafts. They probably live where we had lunch yesterday. The women's breasts are no larger than the men's. (P.S. Just passed another raft. I was wrong about the breasts.) Passing a small group of Atas on the shore. They are ever ready to move. To make these temporary homes they move their raft upon the beach, raised a few inches above the ground by stones, and construct a rude grass roof over them. We stopped tonight at Kapitalong, a small outpost of Laureta's of about 6 men. Here we secured a different group of cargadores. All but 2 of those who brought us up the river returned to their houses. We got the head man of the Atas and requisitioned Cargadores from him.

April 25 - Sunday. Under way about 0900. The late start was due to getting the new cargadores ready. Our party now consists of 46 men.

The travelling was really rugged today. Climbing hills, slippery from recent rains, crossing streams many times, wading in them and in swamps. The streams in general were rocky and very hard on shoes. When we stopped for lunch I was very fatigued, but as the afternoon went on I felt stronger and stronger and was far less tired than the majority of my group when we arrived at a jungle camp about dark (1900). Almost at once it rained cats and dogs. The roof leaked badly. All our clothes were soaked and no way to dry them; so we passed a most uncomfortable night. Those who really needed sympathy were the Atas. Each of them carried an enormous load on his back, generally about 100 lbs. How they managed to walk, climb, or stumble all day long is beyond me, and I would never have believed it if I had not seen it. Then, at the day's end, they had to build themselves a rude shelter in the rain. (Walked 25 kms.)

April 26 - Monday. Up at dawn (0600). The Gargadores were up earlier, ate before us and left about 0700, while we left at 0800. It was misery to put on all wet clothes. Today was similar to yesterday in the type of trail, but there was more walking on sharp stones. Shoes were definitely going bad. In the late afternoon it rained hard, although it was not possible to get much wetter as the wading gets us wet up to our hips and I could wring perspiration from my shirt. Arrived at a deserted barrio, Binakayon, about 1800. It is the southernmost barrio in Agusan Province. The inhabitants went to the hills, scared of the Japs. No Jap would ever get near the place, it is so far into the hinterland. Most of the huts were in bad shape, rotten flooring and leaky roofs. However, we had fresh coconut juice and built fires for drying our clothes and passed a very comfortable night (by comparison with others).

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April 27 - Tuesday. A shorter trip today so left about 0900. The trail was more slippery and much more swampy. Very little of the rocky creek beds to travel. Made a leisurely 2 1/2 hour stop for lunch by a river, and arrived at Johnson about 1700. There is a very small outpost of the Agusan forces here. We were very comfortable here, tuba and coconut milk available. The inhabitants are very poor and have no rice or corn. Eat mainly camotes and sago, a product of the palm tree. Here Lt. Abunda (In Ch) had a young pig killed for us. The rain held off till after dark and we were again able to dry our clothes. Six of the ten of us now have no shoes fit to walk in. Accordingly, I decided to send those 6 to Loreto in 2 bancas or barotes the following day, while the other 4, including myself, walked. By trail, which goes direct, it is a half-day trip, but by boat, an all-day affair.

April 28 - Wednesday. The 6 shoeless men left about 0745. My group left at 0315 and made by far the most rapid hike yet. We fairly ran at times to keep up with our guide. Stopped only 15 minutes for rest the entire trip and arrived Loreto at 1250. The train was very difficult, being a swamp 3/4 of the way. We were filthy on arrival but had ample time to wash and dry our clothes. Lt. Antonio, CO Comdr. and Lt. Casal, comdr. of the Loreto detachment, were here. The post is quite military, and clean and we were pleased to find several American flags, the first seen since the surrender. Compared to Davao Province food is scarce. But we had lots of dried fish and a fried egg a piece. We expected the other 6 about 1700. At 1800 Dobervich arrived with one guide, walking barefooted. Said he had gone on ahead because the others

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were so slow and seemed to be worried lest Maj. Mellnik be upset about it, as he hadn't asked to leave the nest. Just after dark the remainder arrived. We had been very worried about them. Their feet were in bad shape and so were they; and madder than hornets. Dobervich had gone off with the only competent guide; the other got lost. Fortunately, a third native in their party thought he knew the way and was able to get on the right trail after the party had gone 40 minutes out of the way. Walking through the swamp in the dark was brutal, there are many thorns and boughs to stub one's toes on. It was inexcusable on the part of Dobervich and will probably keep Shofner quiet about how wonderful Marines are, for at least 24 hours. The 6 shoeless were "taken in." They travelled by banca from Johnson to Novigracias in about 2 hours and were then given an excellent lunch. During this time the guerilla Lieutenant and the mayor gave the boys a pep talk about the foot trail direct from there to Loreto. By banca it is round-about and upstream, through swamps and is hard work. The escorts didn't want to work, so the Americans were told the trail was level, dry and easy walking and could be traversed in 2 hours. Then as Exhibit "A" they brought in a young girl in a clean white dress who said that she had just arrived from Loreto, had worn that dress on the walk, and although it took her 3 hours, a man could make it in two. The men bit hook, line and sinker, and excusably so; especially after such a fine meal. Actually the trail was neither level nor dry, but just like the one we traversed. I felt very sorry for them as it was bad enough to have to hike barefooted, let alone get lost. This is our last day of foot travel on the way to Amparo. I

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will mention a couple of additional items which are applicable to all four days travel on foot. The jungle is full of leeches. They are very thin and travel with a jack knife motion and can worm their way anywhere. Although we pull our socks over our trouser legs, they wear leggings, they can still get on our feet. They blow up like a balloon with blood and can't be safely pulled off. They will drop off by applying fire or tobacco leaf to them. We got enough on us, but the Filipinos, being barefooted, get many, many more, and their feet are bloody messes by the end of a day. For two days of our trip, we went ahead of the cargadores and used a child Ata about 12 years old as a guide. We named him "betel nut". He carried a 2 1/2 gal. can of rice on his back. They use straps passed over the shoulders, and another strap over the head. They have great endurance and are said to be able to hike 3 days without food so long as they can chew betel nuts. We carried our own rice with us and all other provisions. It is remarkable what good food the Filipinos are able to produce under adverse circumstances.

We received very good news from Lt. Antonio, which indicated that there is a radio transmitter and receiver near Amparo, and that subs have already been landing supplies in Mindanao. Will get more info at Amparo.

April 29 - Thursday. At 0300 a carabao was killed and prepared for us. We had fish, rice and carabao for breakfast and took some of the latter with us. At 0930 under way in five bancas going down the Umayan River. Our party consisted of 14 Filipinos plus our original 12.

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1115 - Entered the Agusan River. I noticed many floating houses. These houses are not generally used for mobile purposes but to adjust themselves to the rise and fall of the river. Generally several families get together and land is planted, etc. Had a very short trip today. Stopped at a floating house about 1130 and cooked lunch. Only travelled for one hour after lunch until we arrived at Teogum, a group of about 5 floating houses. One was vacated for us and here we spent the night. Played some bridge in the afternoon. The night was disturbed many times by some half-grown kittens yowling and trying to get to where their mama had been located before we moved her out. Apparently mama deserted her kittens without feeding them. Lt. Antonio said he was leaving for Amparo tomorrow with 14 men. We are taking four days this trip, the reason being availability of suitable stopping places.

April 30 - Friday. Under way early at 0750 as the day's trip will be considerably longer than yesterday's. 1235 - Stopped for lunch. 1425 - Under way. 1630 - Arrived Talacagan. The Japs have never been here. There are 2 Dutch priests here. No soldiers are stationed here. People not so cooperative. 2200 - Listened to radio at priest's home. Not loud enough to catch much news.

May 1 - Saturday. Most of us went to church, although only one of us is a Catholic. 0820 - Under way. 1300 - Stopped for lunch. 1550 - Under way. The long time consumed at lunch was due to the fact that the rice cooked for us this morning at Talacagan was undercooked and spoiled and had to be thrown out. The cooking was done by Talacaganites. 2000 - Arrived Esperanza. A long, hard day, the last hour travelling

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after dark. Due to difficulties in getting food, etc., had supper at 2400.

May 2 - Sunday. 0930. Under way. Lateness due to preparation of rice from palay and changing bancas. We secured a large, light one in exchange for our heavy, slow one. Met the wife of the Mayor of Davao City at the beginning of the war. He is badly wanted by the Japs. Her son is very ill with malaria so gave her quinine. Today's trip should require not over 6 hours of paddling. Stopped for lunch at Las Nieves where a fiesta was going on. 1740. Arrived Amparo. There is an American ex-civilian, now 2nd Lt. in the Army, here, named Mester. We were quartered here for the night. Food supply is very limited. Learned that Japs have reinforced Butuan and have complete control in the immediate sector only.

May 3 - Monday. 0930 - Departed with Capt. Shofner, Lt. Tuvilla and escort under guidance of Lt. Viajar for Medina, HQ of Lt. Col. McClish. First hour by banca took us very close to Japs' river outpost. At 1200 ate lunch at home of an Attorney, Mr. Banag, where there was a fiesta going on. We were 1 1/2 miles from Butuan. 1330 - Departed. Left trail and took National Road 6 kilometers from Butuan. Hiked 10 kms. along the road to Buena-vista, arriving 1700. A Capt. Baxter is in charge there. After eating we left by sailing banca for Medina at 2300. Supposed to be a 12 hour trip.

May 4 - Tuesday. What little wind exists is unfavorable. Under these conditions the banca is propelled by one or two of the crew using a sculling motion. 0730 - Put in to Cayagan, a small, dirty barrio to

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secure something for breakfast. We had only rice on board. The Mayor was very old and spoke Spanish. The people were kind, giving us bananas, camotes, 3 eggs, 2 chickens and a kid. They killed and skinned the latter. I left the Mayor some quinine. It is the first time I've ever eaten goat or kid, and it was excellent; no odor whatsoever. The sun poured down on us all day long. About 30 we stopped at Linugos and got some coconuts, 2 ripe pineapples, fish and a little sugar and coffee. Had a real feast tonight. The wind sprang up but was exactly dead ahead, so our progress is still slow. Lt. Tuvilla has been seasick the entire time. I neglected to mention that Mr. Kriekenbeek is with us. He is a 40-year old Britisher, born in Ceylon, whose claim to fame is that he has never slept with a white woman.

May 5 - Wednesday. At last Medina is in sight!! I was beginning to think it did not exist. 0930 - Arrived at Medina. Lt.-Col. McClish is a very pleasant man and has done excellent work in organizing the area. Shofner and I had lunch with him at the home of ex-Governor Pelaez, a wealthy landowner. Lunch was excellent. McClish had an 11-piece orchestra play for us during the meal. We are staying at the home of Mr. Tomas Reyes. The people are very willing to help Americans here. Lt. Tuvilla and Mr. Kriekenbeek left at midnight via a motor sailboat which was to pick up the remainder of my party whom I had instructed to be in Buenavista not later than May 6. I hated to leave Tuvilla and gave him \$100.00 to buy salt for the soldiers. Sent 2 slips to Teresita (age 5 years).

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May 7 - Thursday. A little before noon Shofner and I left with McClish for Gingoog, on horseback. I've not been on a horse for 15 years. We stopped for lunch about 5 miles along the road at the house of another Reyes. And wonder of wonders, had some real Canadian Club Whiskey. Also piano music with the delightful meal. Stopped only momentarily at Gingoog and rode 5 miles further to Anacan on business, where a Mr. Walters, manager of the lumber mill, resides. Returned to Gingoog and spent the night at the house of still another Reyes. We rode 20 miles today and I'm a bit sore but Shofner is much worse off with four running sores of good size on his rear.

May 7 - Friday. Called on Mr. Peters, an American, employed at Cavite by Pacific Air Base Contractors. He was shot by Leyte guerillas and suffered a bad hip wound. Now gets around on crutches but one leg is shorter than the other. In the afternoon, drove back in an alcohol-using Chevrolet, about 1931 vintage, to Medina or Kabug.

May 8 - Saturday. Met Maj. Childress. Learn that communications to GHQ are slow and none too satisfactory. Went to a local dance at Gingoog this evening. The dance is a benefit for the army which gets 50% of the intake and they also have a quaint custom of selling flowers from various ladies in the audience. If you buy a flower you must dance the next dance all by yourself with the lady from whom you bought the flower. After much discussion as to whether to return to Gingoog or to Medina for the night, we finally decided to return to Medina in a motor banca. We were late getting started and in going from the beach to the banca, a small gondola in which Col. McClish and Maj. Childress were

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riding, sank about half way out. Each was carrying a small bag and his pistol belt and by the time they had reached the larger banca, they were both almost exhausted. A man in the banca threw Maj. Childress a line but as fast as Childress tried to heave himself aboard by the line, the boat-man kept paying out the line, much to Childress' annoyance. We finally arrived in Medina about 0500.

May 9 - Sunday. Have practically no sleep as about 20 minutes after my return from the dance the preceding night, the remainder of the group with Maj. Mellnik arrived from Buenavista and I was busy all morning getting them settled.

Today, ex-Governor Palaez is 74 years old and had all Americans in the vicinity to his home for lunch. This evening we went to the fiesta at Daan Lunsod. It was very lovely. I wonder how the Filipinos have managed to preserve their beautiful customs during the war.

May 10 - Monday. All of us had lunch with Capt. Sapanta at his home at Daan Lunsod. In the afternoon we returned to Medina and Childress, Mellnik and myself left on Sapanta's motor-banca, our ultimate destination being Talakag. My intention was to see a Lt.-Commander Parsons, USNR, who had been left here by submarine in March, on a special intelligence mission.

May 11 - Tuesday. Arrived Baligasag about 0900 and went to the home of Capt. Formashon. A birthday party for his sister-in-law was in progress. It seems that everywhere we go in the Philippines this month, we stumble into parties or fiestas of one type or another which makes travelling a great pleasure. Here there was a piano and many

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young ladies who knew how to play, so we enjoyed hearing many of our old favorites again. We left Balingasag in the afternoon in order to arrive at El Salvador by dawn. Capt. Sapanta had never been to El Salvador and could not be certain that he could lay a course direct to that barrio. It was necessary to arrive at dawn because the Japs have a patrol boat which leaves Cagayan at about dawn. During the night the wind blew up and it became quite rough and also made it more difficult to arrive at the exact spot we desired to reach.

May 12 - Wednesday. We lay to about an hour before daylight and when daylight broke we were able to see 3 small supply vessels between us and Cagayan, the nearest of which was only about 2500 yards distant and mounted a 3-inch gun in the bow. We were fortunate in that, had we left Balingasag an hour later we would probably have ended up in the middle of these 3 Japanese ships. We were naturally quite nervous about their reaction to seeing a large two-masted banca nearby but nothing happened and when they turned to go into the dock we followed discreetly behind them until we were opposite our port of debarkation. Had breakfast and lunch at El Salvador before proceeding, both afoot and by horseback, to Pagatpat, where we spent the night. Here I met Capt. Grinstead, an ex-civilian.

May 13- Thursday. Departed for Talakag about 0800 on horseback. The trail passes over a fairly high ridge and the country in general reminds me of farming country in innumerable places in the Middle West if it were not for coconut trees visible in almost any direction. The natives have planted corn in place of rice, which gives the countryside

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this familiar appearance. After about 11 kms. we picked up a car in which we drove to the river. After ferrying the river we rode on a bus to Talakag arriving about 1300. Here I met Lt.-Col. Bowler and Lt.-Commander Parsons. I was very lucky to contact them as they had intended to depart this morning for Malaybalay. After talking to Parsons, I decided that there was no great hurry in my getting back to Medina and as I badly needed a rest, - I have been on the road almost continuously since April 4 - we decided to remain here until Bowler and Parsons return from the journey on which they started on the following day.

When Lieutenant Commander Parsons returned I met him near the coast and on May 23 left for the town of Misamis in the province of Misamis, Occidental in which the headquarters of the Tenth Military District were located. When I first arrived at a radio station, about May 6, I had the following two dispatches sent to the radio station which communicates with Australia:

"FOR COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES SOUTHWEST PACIFIC
INFO COMMANDER MARINE FORCES
FROM LIEUTENANT COMMANDER MELVYN H. MC COY
ARRIVED AFTER ESCAPE FROM AMERICAN PRISONER OF WAR CAMP DAVAO WITH
THREE MARINE OFFICERS CAPTAIN SHOFNER, THREE AIR CORPS, CAPTAIN
DYESS, ONE CAC, MAJOR MELLNIK AND TWO SERGEANTS X ALL CAPTURED
BATAAN AND CORREGIDOR HAVE EXTENSIVE INFO REGARDING CORREGIDOR X
BRUTALITIES AND ATROCITIES WITH EXTREMELY HEAVY DEATH TOLL TO WAR
PRISONERS DUE SAME X HAVE SOME INFO RE DAVAO PROVINCE X IF PRACTICABLE
REQUEST ENTIRE PARTY PLUS TWO FILIPINOS WHO AIDED ESCAPE
DEPART HERE VIA NEXT TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE X"

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"FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD K. SUTHERLAND, GENERAL HEADQUART
U.S. ARMY FORCES IN AUSTRALIA
FROM MAJOR STEPHEN M. MELLNIK.

HAVE ESCAPED WITH SEVEN OFFICERS AND TWO ENLISTED MEN FROM JAPANESE
WAR PRISONERS' CAMP IN DAVAO PENAL COLONY X LIEUTENANT COMMANDER
MC COY U S NAVY HAS REQUESTED SENIOR NAVAL OFFICER IN AUSTRALIA
FOR SUBMARINE TRANSPORTATION TO AUSTRALIA X WILL YOUR OFFICE AS-
SURE A FAVORABLE ANSWER X JAPS VIOLATING ALL RULES OF WARFARE AND
DECENCY X FIFTY PERCENT USAFFE FORCES SURRENDERED IN BATAAN NOW DEAD
FROM MALNUTRITION AND DISEASES X REMAINDER IN VARIOUS STAGES OF
BERI BERI, DYSENTERY, MALARIA AND BLINDNESS DUE TO VITAMIN DEFI-
CIENCY X WAINWRIGHT, MOORE, BEEBE, DRAKE GOOD HEALTH AT SURRENDER X
REGARDS COLONEL DILLER, GENERALS MARQUAT AND WILLOUGHBY X HOPE
TO SEE YOU SOON.X"

Lieutenant Colonel Fertig, head of the guerilla forces, had not
only not sent either message but had not informed me that he would re-
fuse to forward them. While waiting in Talakag for the return of Lieu-
tenant Commander Parsons I sent a radio to Colonel Fertig asking whether
my messages had been forwarded. He did not answer, although communica-
tion between the two points was easy. I understand that Colonel Fertig
finally sent a message stating, in effect, "LIEUTENANT COMMANDER MC COY
AND MAJOR MELNIK HAVE ARRIVED HAVING ESCAPED FROM AMERICAN PRISON CAMP
AT DAVAO." His handling of this matter, in my opinion, was unfortunate,
as each of the other seven ex-prisoners who did not get to come with me
know of incidents related to Japanese conduct towards Americans different
from those known to the three of us.

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I remained in Misamis with Major Mellnik until June 26, at which time I left by a four-knot unprotected motor launch and proceeded to Boni Pacio. From there we hiked to Colonel Fertig's main radio station. Lieutenant Commander Parsons arrived there on July 1 and Major Dyess on July 2. On July 3 we departed to make our rendezvous with the submarines. This particular trip turned out to be very difficult but the incidents would be mainly of interest in story telling and not as an official document. We had considerable trouble at all times although this fact once turned out very favorably for us. At one point of the journey the Japanese were following us and they were looking for us; and our guide lost us. When we got back on the main trail we found that we were behind the Japanese, and eventually when they turned to the left we turned to the right and proceeded to our destination in a roundabout manner. At one point we had to cross a crocodile-infested stream through a five-knot current, both ends of the bridge being burned out, but the center remained. Lieutenant Commander Parsons used great ingenuity in devising a way so that we could get across without getting wet. At another time we had to cross a stream, with a current of about eight knots, and that was accomplished by the construction of a bamboo raft, but we almost were washed all the way down to the coast before being able to get secured on the other side; and had the river not had a fortuitous bend in it, the results might have been disastrous. On the day on which we had the most guide trouble, we hiked from 0600 to 1900 without stopping for food, and had had no breakfast. The contact scheduled with the submarine came off perfectly without any delay.

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Food Received and General Health Conditions in Prison Camps

The food supply at Camp O'Donnell was generally the same as that at Cabanatuan, so only the latter will be described.

For breakfast we were rationed one mess kit of lugao which is a rice and water concoction. At noon and night we received one mess kit of steamed rice with not over a half canteen cupful of watery, greenish-colored soup, sometimes with no substance in it. When there was substance it consisted of camote tops. In the five months that I was there the only piece of meat I ever received was about one-quarter of an inch cube. This great event happened once. At one time the Japanese gave us three chickens and nine eggs for each mess of 500 men; no doubt so that they could claim in their propaganda that we were fed on chicken and eggs. As polished rice contains no vitamins whatsoever and its caloric value is about one-third that of the next lowest cereal, this diet would not sustain life.

Many prisoners had some money and finally machinery was set up whereby those with money could purchase through a prison store various items--all ordered in advance. The main items were canned sardines and canned milk. It was very difficult to get any fresh fruit although the surrounding country abounded in it. Sugar and salt were obtainable at very low prices and, in general, were purchased by the small amount of profit made by the ship's store so that sugar and salt could be furnished to all hands in prison regardless of their financial condition. It was therefore possible, if a prisoner had about 25 pesos a month, to barely exist by supplementing the Japanese diet with supplies from

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the store. Those who had no money became victims of beri beri and scurvy. Death occurred quite regularly by the end of the fifth month of captivity. It is worthwhile noting that the death rate at Cabanatuan decreased steadily from July to September, but was on the increase again in October. At the time I left Cabanatuan, October 27, 1942, many men were going blind from lack of Vitamin A.

Old Bilibid prison in Manila is the location of the Naval Hospital unit from Canacao, Cavite. The food there is a little better than at Cabanatuan and a ship's store is also operated there. At Davao prison camp when I arrived November 7, the food there was so much better than I had been accustomed to that I thought it was excellent. The diet was still rice, but with each meal we received some vegetables such as camotes, green papayas, casavas, or cooking bananas. Also, at least once a day we generally had mongol beans which are very nourishing.

However, a great many of those prisoners who had just arrived from Cabanatuan had already had symptoms of beri beri and now became seriously ill with it. The diet at the Camp was not sufficient to keep them from sliding backwards, although if you did not have beri beri you could hold your own. Advanced cases of beri beri were sent to the hospital. It was a pathetic sight to visit the hospital and watch the people sitting all day long massaging their toes and their fingers. They lose appetite and generally need a narcotic in order that they may be able to sleep. However, due to the better diet at Davao prison the decline of these patients was very slow and only a few died. Now and then we received a meat gravy due to the fact that a carabao or steer died of old age.

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There are 600 head of cattle and carabao on the penal farm of which only 200 are needed for working the farm, and there are many cattle accessible outside of the colony. The Japanese would not let us have meat regularly no matter how much was available. When a carabao does die the Japanese (250 in the camp) always take the choicest parts and leave the remainder for the 2,000 prisoners.

In early January the Red Cross supplies, brought over in one of the Japanese diplomatic vessels, arrived. Each man received two individual packages and fifteen cans of corned beef or meat and vegetable stew, and these were issued to him at the rate of two cans per week. This food was a life saver and was the best Christmas present that any of us ever had received. In addition to the food there was an ample supply of quinine and sulfa drugs. There was an inadequate supply of vitamin B₁ solution. However, there was sufficient medicine for beri beri that even the most severe cases in the hospital improved beyond description to the point where men who had been given less than a week to live were able to totter around. Unfortunately, unless such supplies can continue to arrive these men will slip backwards again and will be joined by many others. Undoubtedly a portion of the Red Cross supplies must have gone to the Camp at Cabanatuan and must have saved even more lives there than at Davao. As mentioned in the article on atrocities, the Japanese, in effect, confiscated the Red Cross food, and by the middle of March the Red Cross supplies had vanished but the Japanese did not restore our former rations. The ration which I received at Davao for the last three weeks before my escape was the same but in

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smaller quantity than that given me at Cabanatuan at the time I left. Our supply of vegetables was completely cut off but sometimes in the evening we had one tablespoonful of mongol beans.

This last diet will not support life and this camp is unfortunate in that even though you have money there is nothing to buy. A small store has been set up in which one can purchase tobacco and perhaps once a week a small amount of fried bananas. The colony abounds in fresh fruit which the Japanese would not let us bring in. They punished us severely if they caught us stealing it. However, those on working details managed to augment their daily ration with fruits they found in their area. This is a wasteful method and the supply of fruit was being rapidly depleted.

The thousand prisoners at Davao who had been captured in the Visayan Islands at Mindanao had suffered no food shortage during the war and were in excellent physical condition at the time they arrived at Davao. As a result of this and the medicines received from the Red Cross on June 1943, the death rate at Davao prison has been quite low--approximately three per month.

Cabanatuan and Davao are the only two American prison camps in the Philippines, although there are isolated working parties of Americans elsewhere in the Philippines such as in the Manila port area and in Palawan. The situation regarding diet at each camp at the time I was last there will cause many deaths unless it is rectified. I understand that the Japanese claim to be giving the prisoners the same diet that a Japanese soldier gets. For breakfast he generally has a vitaminized

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mash together with his rice. At noon he has fish and vegetables with his rice. At night he has his biggest meal and meat is almost always served with it.

I feel that if we could arrange to provide the prisoners with a vitamin pill which contains vitamins A, B, C, and N in such a way that one pill per day would be sufficient so that they could get by even on the present insufficient diet. I understand that the Japanese will not permit us to supply prisoners with anything like that. It is perfectly feasible to supply the prisoners at the Davao Penal Colony with vitamins without the Japanese knowing anything about it. Detailed plans concerning that have been taken up with interested parties at Australian Headquarters.

Brutalities and Atrocities
Miscellaneous Violations of International Law by the Japanese

In detailing the brutalities and atrocities I am mentioning only those which I know from personal experience or which were the personal experience of a responsible officer who himself told them to me.

After the fall of Bataan on April 8, approximately 10,000 Americans and 45,000 Filipinos were marched to San Fernando, Pampangas, a distance of about 120 miles. These prisoners were marched in different groups, naturally, and some groups were treated much more terribly than others. In most cases they were given no food and no water. One officer stated that in seven days of marching he received only one mess kit of rice and nothing to drink. If a Filipino was unable to keep upon the march and fell out he was summarily disposed of and left by the side of the road. He was generally killed by bayonetting or shooting. In the case of Americans they were generally removed from the immediate vicinity of the road and shot just out of sight of the prisoners.

Due to the fact that there was no water allowed or given, many prisoners were forced to drink from carabao wallows and probably contracted dysentery therefrom. There were instances of Filipinos being buried while still alive and the Japanese made it a point to use American officers to do the burying.

Major Neiger, U.S.A., a West Point graduate, stated to me in Cabanatuan that he had buried Filipinos alive several times and would never forget to his dying day the picture of their hands reaching up

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through the soil trying to claw their way out; nor the time he was forced by the Japanese guard to club one of them down again into the grave with the shovel.

During the march almost all groups passed through a town called Lubao and were kept there overnight. They were quartered in a large building of galvanized tin with no windows but with small grid openings near the floor of the building. The prisoners were crowded into the building in such a way that there was scarcely room to sit. First, the Japanese herded as many into the building as possible, requiring them all to stand; then when the building seemed to be completely full, more prisoners were placed just outside the door and a line was attached to one corner of the building with guards on the other end. This was used to squeeze those outside into the building, and the place was then closed up for the night. The prisoners were not allowed to leave for any reason whatsoever and had to use the place naturally as a latrine right where they sat or stood. After several groups had passed through Lubao it can easily be imagined that the building became quite filthy, especially as many of the prisoners were already feeling the effects of dysentery. There were quite a few dead when the march started the following day.

At San Fernando they were placed in iron box cars, 100 to the car. This left no room whatsoever in which to sit, there being just enough room to stand, and then the sliding doors were closed. They were taken to Capiz, Luzon, a two or three hour trip. This was always done in the heat of the day so that the conditions within the cars were such that had

the trip not been so short suffocation of many would almost certainly have ensued. At Capiz they were marched to the prison camp at Camp O'Donnell. The Japanese had made no preparations for receiving the prisoners and the camp commander stated to the prisoners that he didn't like Americans and that he didn't care how many of the prisoners died. There was only a single water spigot and the water in the nearby stream was polluted with dysentery.

The death rate there was so alarming that the Japs moved the Americans to Cabanatuan and discharged many Filipinos whom they realized would undoubtedly die shortly, but preferred to have them die in the bosom of their families rather than in the camp. However, approximately 27,000 Filipino prisoners died in the camp itself. At Cabanatuan the death rate for the first two months was 30 Americans per day; but the dead were left lying around the camp instead of being taken over to the hospital. This camp at that time was in charge of a Japanese corporal, but after some degree of organization was obtained a Japanese lieutenant colonel named Mori arrived and took command. Lieutenant Colonel Mori formerly operated a bicycle shop in the city of Manila.

It was almost impossible to get a sick man into the hospital unless he was practically dead—the Japanese did not want to have their roll calls disturbed by these transfers. Lieutenant Commander A. E. Harris, USN, died after being unconscious for four days in my living quarters. During this time we made every effort to have him transferred to the hospital. Permission was finally obtained but he died as he was being carried through the hospital gate. Such incidents are not unusual; but, in fact, are common.

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Medicines are almost non-existent in the hospital. There were some medicines available in Manila and the Philippine Red Cross was more than anxious to let our hospital at Cabanatuan have it; but at first the Japanese refused. They later apparently became alarmed at conditions in the camp and had their own doctors make a survey of these conditions, as a result of which we were finally permitted to receive some medicine, mainly quinine, from the Philippine Red Cross. However, after these medicines arrived the Japanese kept them and would not release them to our doctors for some time, during which time many died of malaria. They told the doctors that they would release the medicine after they had taken an inventory of it, which they were in no hurry to do. The amount of medicine received was inadequate to last for but a short period of time.

Occasionally the Japanese, particularly the interpreters, would brutally beat or slap Americans without cause. We were required to move some Nipa shacks from one portion of the camp to another. This was very heavy work and taxed the men's strength. Although they were doing the best they could, the Japanese non-com in charge of the moving belabored them vigorously with a large heavy riding crop and serious damage was suffered by several Americans.

Lieutenant Colonel Cain of the 200th National Guard, while acting as Executive Officer of the camp, was struck behind the ear with a riding crop by a Jap interpreter. He now suffers periodically from very severe headaches, with growing paralysis. This condition has been aggravated by another slapping at the hand of the Japanese interpreter in the Davao Penal Colony.

The Japanese after one march from Cabanatuan and into the surrounding neighborhood returned singing with a Filipino head dangling from a pole. This head was put on a fence picket on the main road and left there about a week for passerbys to take warning.

About September 30, Lieutenant Colonels Biggs and Breitung, U.S.A., and Lieutenant R. D. Gilbert (CEC), USNR, attempted to escape. They were apprehended and beaten severely by the Japanese immediately. The Japanese system of beating is to use clubs and feet mainly in the vicinity below the knees until the victim falls down and he is kicked and stomped upon then. After these preliminary beatings, the men were taken to a house just outside the camp at one corner, located on the main road. They were stripped and tied up with their hands behind them and beaten more or less continuously throughout the day. They were nude during this time and were not allowed to have food or water. Every Filipino who passed along the road was stopped and required to beat all three men in the face with a two-by-four board. If the Filipino did not strike them hard enough the Japanese beat the Filipino. After three days of this it was impossible to recognize any of the officers. They were also left naked in the open during a typhoon for one day. At the end of this time all three were dragged off for execution. One officer's (probably Colonel Biggs) ear was lying upon his shoulder. The Japanese reported that they shot two and beheaded Biggs. These officers were not given any kind of trial whatsoever as required by International Law.

About July 1, 1942, six American prisoners, all enlisted men, were apprehended by the Japanese for dealing with Filipinos to get food, which

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they were selling at high prices through a "black market." These men were tied out in the hot sun to a fence post for 48 hours without food or water. Finally one of them, crazed with thirst, got loose from his bonds and ran back into the prison camp, having been tied up outside. He went straight to his barracks and got a drink of water and remained in his barracks after that. The Japanese found him there, took him out and summarily shot him, and also shot the other five Americans who were still tied up. This also was done without any trial and on the excuse that this particular man was trying to escape.

A working party of 50 Americans--enlisted men--repairing the Calumpit Bridge under guard was attacked one night by Filipino guerillas. The guerillas killed several Japanese guards and wounded others and got away. The Japanese selected five Americans at random from the working party and shot them on account of this attack.

At the Davao Penal Colony, about April 1, 1943, the Japanese guard in a sentry tour by the hospital shot and killed an Army hospital corpsman by the name of McFee. McFee was digging camotes underneath the tower and just outside of the hospital compound fence. He became thirsty and called to one of his buddies on the other side of the fence and asked him to throw over a canteen of water. When this was done and as McFee was stooping to pick up the canteen, the guard above him shouted at him. McFee, after picking up the canteen, opened the cap and let some of the water trickle out to show the guard that it was an innocent act. While pouring the water, the guard shot McFee, the bullet entering

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his shoulder and coming out the lower abdomen which shows that the firing took place from almost directly above. The Japanese again tried to blame the shooting on an attempted escape on the part of McFee. McFee had no clothing or equipment of any kind with him.

Many prisoners are becoming afflicted with scurvy due to a lack of Vitamin C. There are many lemons, a rich source of Vitamin C, in the Davao Penal Colony. The Japanese themselves do not like lemons and will not permit us to have any, and during rains I have seen over a thousand lemons at one time floating down stream and out of the Colony.

One American white woman was raped on Bataan by two Japanese two weeks after she had had a baby. An Army officer was a witness to this. One of the outstanding violations of International Law was the fact that after the capture of Bataan they installed artillery within and closely adjacent to our field hospitals which were still crowded with sick and wounded with the result that instructions were given on Corregidor not to fire on these batteries.

The Japanese did not permit us to send any notice home until on January 1, 1943. We were then permitted to make out cards and again a month later. Whether or not these cards ever arrived I do not know but I believe that International Law requires that the opportunity to make out such notifications shall be afforded to all prisoners immediately after their capture.

In my eleven months of imprisonment I was paid once, receiving the sum of 25 Japanese printed pesos, to get which I had to sign up for about

\$400. We were assured that the remainder was on deposit to our credit in the Japanese bank at Davao City, and the Japanese even went so far as to charge us one peso for manufacturing our "chop"—our signature. They did not furnish us with our "chop." However, the Japanese were preparing to pay us again at the time that I escaped and they had already paid warrant officers and second lieutenants. On this second payment the amount was increased so that I would have drawn 50 pesos had I remained to be paid. The payment was made on a sliding scale downward according to rank and enlisted men were not paid at all. The Navy and Marine Corps officers had already set up a board which divided some of the money received by the officers among the Navy and Marine Corps enlisted personnel. The Army was attempting to put the same idea into effect.

At the Davao prison camp there arrived early in January 1943, Red Cross supplies, which I understand were brought by the Japanese vessel which had been used in the exchange of diplomats. Each man received two individual boxes and fifteen cans of either corned beef or meat and vegetable stew. These cans were distributed to us at the rate of two cans a week. Immediately upon receipt of these supplies the Japanese discontinued giving us any of our regular ration except for plain, simple rice; whereas, before we had been getting some vegetables and now and then meat if a carabao should die of old age. Their stopping of the regular ration to us, in effect, constituted a confiscation of the Red Cross supplies as the Japanese quartermaster could then put into his own pocket the money which he was supposed to use to feed us. Unfortunately, after these Red Cross supplies gave out in about eight weeks, the

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Japanese did not go back to the previous ration. This will be covered elsewhere under the subject of "Food."

The Japanese require every one at the Davao prison camp to work and they make no distinction between officers and men in the type of work. The American camp officials have succeeded in differentiating between the work done by enlisted men and officers. However, officers of all ranks and up to the age of 45 are required to work under very adverse circumstances in rice paddies, harvesting and planting rice. I, personally, had to clean out Japanese latrines, sewage disposals, garbage pits, and do other labor which no American should be required to perform for anyone. The Japanese would not permit us to do useful farming to maintain ourselves, but used us to work for civilian Japanese firms, such as logging companies.

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American prisoners captured on Cebu were, for the most part, kept in a school house. Lieutenant J. E. Bullock, Supply Corps, U.S.N., apparently decided to escape and with a pack went beneath the school house about dusk in May 1942, and was waiting there until it became dark, so that he could attempt to go through the outer fence. While waiting he changed his mind according to his statement made to friends and returned to his quarters. A Filipino reported to the Japanese that an American had tried to escape. The Japanese questioned Americans and no one admitted to the act. The Japs then took all Americans to the jail in Cebu and questioned them individually with no success. They then called them all together and stated that each American would be individually tortured until these asserted the name of the man who had been under the school house. Lieutenant Bullock then stated that if the Japanese would agree not to reap any retaliation on the other prisoners he would admit to being the prisoner in question. The Japanese agreed and kept the bargain. The other Americans were returned to the school house at once and Bullock a few days later. He received no punishment and, in effect, was only warned not to be a bad boy and try it again. The Japanese warned that, in the future, if anyone attempted to escape and was caught, he would be executed, and that if they escaped successfully Colonel Cornell, the American Commander, would be executed.

Sometime later two Filipinos were apprehended tinkering with the light switch at the Japanese prison headquarters. The Japanese construed this as an effort on the part of the Filipinos to escape. About two o'clock one afternoon the Japanese sent for Colonel Cornell and told him that they

were going to execute the two Filipinos and Lieutenant Bullock, and desired to know if he wished to witness the execution. Colonel Cornell refused. The Japanese took Lieutenant Bullock out then and he had no inkling that he was about to be executed. As he went through the gate one Japanese said to him, "You had better tell your friends goodbye," and Bullock turned and waved and said, "See you later, boys." The Japanese reported that they beheaded Bullock. At no time did he receive any trial nor was it, in effect, ever shown that he made a definite attempt to escape, as he returned to his quarters of his own volition.

Radio Electrician J. S. Leroy, U.S.N., was picked up by the Japanese on Cebu before surrender and with three Filipinos was in a cell in the Cebu city jail. When American officer prisoners were taken to the jail after the surrender some were assigned to his cell. His clothes and those of the Filipinos, with other items such as toilet gear, were still in the cell and none of the four were ever seen again. Filipino occupants of the jail stated that Leroy and the three Filipinos from the same cell were executed by the Japanese.

The incidents related in the preceding two paragraphs were recited to me by Lieutenant Charles Slain, U.S. Naval Reserve, who acted as a kind of liaison officer between the Americans and the Japanese.

Shortly after the surrender of Mindanao some American prisoners were concentrated at Dansalan, Lanao, and Mindanao. They were later marched to the seaport of Iligan, a distance of about twenty miles. Although these prisoners had shoes they were required to carry them and walk bare-footed, and throughout the journey all prisoners were linked with each

other by wire. On this trip the Japanese executed three American prisoners whose names I cannot now recall for certain, but the fact of the executions is certain.

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DISPOSITION OF REMAINDER OF ESCAPED PRISONERS

Captain A. C. Shefner, U.S.M.C., 1st Lt. Jack Hawkins, U.S.M.C., 1st Lt. Michael Dobervich, U.S.M.C., 2nd Lt. (AC, Eng.) L. A. Boelens, U.S.A., 2nd Lt. (AC) Samuel Grashie, U.S.A., Sgt. R. B. Spielman, U.S.A., and Sgt. Paul Marshall, U.S.A., are still on the island of Mindanao with the guerilla forces. Each one has had his own individual experiences as to Japanese treatment and atrocities practiced upon Americans. These men escaped from the prison camp, not to join the guerillas, and not just to effect their own personal freedom, but for the purpose of re-joining their own fighting forces, where they would have a chance to get back at the Japanese without being behind the eight-ball all the time. While I realize it would not be feasible to divert any naval vessel for the purpose, I earnestly request that if a submarine should touch any where in that area in the performance of other assigned duties, that these seven officers and men be picked up. I also suggest that this pick up be made even though it means keeping the seven on board throughout a war patrol as it could easily happen that at the end of a patrol these escaped prisoners could not be available due to the rapidly changing situation between the guerillas and the Japanese. These men had been perfectly willing to risk their lives to try and make a reasonably dangerous voyage by sailboat and I cannot too strongly request consideration of this plea.

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The two Filipinos who guided the party, Benigno de la Cruz, and Victorio Jumarung, only asked that they be allowed to accompany us on the sailboat and that if we reached safety I intercede to obtain a pardon for them. Jumarung has served eleven years of a life term for homicide and de la Cruz - nine years of a seventeen year sentence. Both of these men were helpful, willing, and courageous and neither was of the hardened criminal type. I request that President Quezon be asked to issue them a pardon to be affected when practicable.

In case any publicity is even given to this escape it might be possible that the presence of these two Filipinos would be desired here or in the United States for propaganda purposes in promoting Fil-American harmony and cooperation.

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MISCELLANEOUS

American and British civilians, including Army and Navy female nurses, were interned at the Santo Tomas University in Manila. I understand that in June, Manila radio announced that the internees were being transferred to Los Banos. I also understand that their treatment has been satisfactory as they are allowed to supplement the diet furnished them with money obtained from friends in Manila and from the Philippine Red Cross. Lt. Comdr. Parsons has considerably more detailed information than I on this subject.

The staff of the U. S. Naval Hospital at Canacao, Cavite, were interned first at Santa Scholastica on Pennsylvania Street in Manila, then moved to the Pasay Elementary School and finally about July 1, 1942 moved to Old Bilibid Prison, Manila, where they are still located. According to most recent reports by guerilla spies they were not permitted to retain their surgical equipment and have very little medicine.

The field hospitals in Bataan were eventually removed to Camp #1, at Cabanatuan. This hospital had practically no medicines whatsoever and very little equipment. The Corregidor hospital was moved first to the old top-side hospital and later evacuated, the patients going to Old Bilibid in Manila and the nurses to Santo Tomas University. The majority of the doctors were sent to Old Bilibid. The Davao Hospital was allowed to retain much of its Army medical and surgical equipment and in addition has the use of what equipment was in the convict hospital in the penal colony. However, there was very little medicine

available in Davao Penal Colony except that which arrived in January 1943 in the Red Cross supplies.

At the time I left Cabanatuan, the Japanese were sending out American doctors to accompany all departing prisoner details including those going to Japan.

The Japanese were using American divers to try and bring up the silver which was dumped over the side near Corregidor. The Japs used Filipino divers to locate the silver and Americans to bring it up.

The morale of American prisoners is generally fair and exceptionally good considering the circumstances under which they are living. The majority of them keep their morale up by believing that help is just around the corner. As far as I know there has only been one actual suicide due to mental depression. At Davao a couple have tried to kill themselves due to the intense pain they are constantly suffering from beri-beri. Their attempt failed.

Lt. Comdr. Fritz Worcester, U.S.N.R.; Lt. Sam Wilson (I.V.S.), U.S.N.R.; and Ens. I. D. Richardson, U.S.N.R., are free on the island of Mindanao. The former two have lived in the Philippines a considerable length of time and might possibly have information of considerable value. Lt. Comdr. Worcester and Lt. Wilson are now deep in the jungle in hiding from the Japanese. Lt. Comdr. Worcester has already withstood one seige of hiding out and it is my personal opinion upon close observation that he may break down mentally if he undergoes another such period. I know of only five Navy enlisted men in the guerilla forces on Mindanao. I do not know their initials or rates but will try estimating their rates:

C.M.M. Offerts, R.M. 2/c Konko; S.C. 1/c Napolina; M.M. 1/c Lewis,
and Tuggle, rate unknown. I believe that all of these men were
attached to the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron #3.

COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS

(a) It is perfectly feasible to contact responsible American officers in the Davao Penal Colony from the northern side of the colony without the Japs finding it out. This is due to the fact that they have Americans gathering firewood or logging in the jungle itself. These working details are guarded by about two Japanese who in general are afraid of getting near the jungle and do not maintain a close watch on the prisoners. It seemed to be a general sentiment among the Japanese guards that the jungle was infested by Moros ready to lop off their heads. Accordingly, it would not be impossible to deliver to a responsible American prisoner Multiple Vitamin Pills and intra-venous vitamin B₁ solutions. I left in Mindanao detailed sketches and information regarding the prison camp itself.

Lt. Comdr. Parsons assures me that he could get similar medicines smuggled into the prison at Cabanatuan. If these medicines could be sent in I believe that deaths could be reduced 80%.

(b) In case we should contemplate sudden attack on Mindanao I suggest that the prisoners there be delivered by the guerillas forces adjacent to the camp about four days before the attack. Because of the Japanese attitude towards death it is quite possible that in case of a general attack on Mindanao the prison authorities might attempt to exterminate the prisoners. Since they are often confined in a very small area consisting of eight closely spaced barracks surrounded by barbed wire, the Japs would be able to carry out this plan before many Americans could get over the fence.

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(c) If it is ever intended that useful information be received from Mindanao and the Philippines in general, I recommend that our people be furnished with standard portable communication equipment, and Navy type strip ciphers of limited disposition, with trained personnel to observe and operate. If possible, there should be some means of direct communication between the master station in the Philippines and the Navy station VIX~~g~~ at Perth. Because of the exceeding difficulty of communicating by any means other than radio between points within the Philippines, an internal communication system there is very important. Otherwise in the time of need an entire plan will break down due to lack of speedy internal communication. I will discuss details with the Senior Army Signal Corps officer here.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Sealed into Feb 5, 44
Then Filed
WB

5 September 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Subject: Major Dyess' Report on Japanese Atrocities.

I understand that you requested a copy of a report made by Major William E. Dyess concerning his experiences and observations as a prisoner of war in the Philippines. The report is attached.

In submitting this document, I wish to point out that a considerable disadvantage might result from making public reference at this time either to Major Dyess' escape and presence in this country or to the Japanese atrocities which he describes.

The GRIPSHOLM has sailed for Goa, Portuguese India, on its mission of exchanging American and Japanese nationals, and I understand that the British have arranged for a similar exchange when the Japanese exchange ship has completed its present mission. In addition, the GRIPSHOLM is carrying drugs and supplies to our nationals imprisoned or interned by the Japanese. It is possible that this will be the last occasion upon which we shall be able to get such supplies to them by means of an exchange ship.

I believe the success of the exchange may be jeopardized if we bring up the question of Japanese atrocities before the exchange has been completed, probably about the middle of November, and the supplies have been delivered, somewhat later.




Chief of Staff.

Encl.

"A notarized paper (only substantiation possible) - as no other prisoner has testified to these incidents described herein"

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COPY

*STATEMENT OF MAJOR WILLIAM E. DYESS,
AIR CORPS, CONCERNING EXPERIENCES AND OBSERVATIONS AS
PRISONER OF WAR IN THE PHILIPPINES - 9 APRIL 1942
TO 4 APRIL 1943.

* The sentences which are underlined in this statement are incidents which were reported to Major Dyess by others and not personally experienced or witnessed.

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Bataan had surrendered but we were still under constant bombardment by the Japanese, the American and Filipino prisoners were assembled at various points on Bataan. My squadron, the 21st Pursuit Squadron was concentrated on Mariveles cut-off approximately 4 KM from Mariveles Harbor. At day light, 10 April, 1942, without permitting the prisoners to eat any food, which some had, they were assembled and driven to Mariveles Airport in trucks. There the Japanese searched all the prisoners, officers and enlisted men, and took practically all of their personal belongings. Many of the men had Japanese tokens and money in their possession, and had been previously searched, those found with any Japanese items in their possession were killed. One of these individuals was Captain Springer of the Air Corps who was in charge of observation post near N.W. Post 160 on Bataan. He was beheaded. (A number of officers and men saw this. I checked to see if Capt. Springer ever reported to any Jap Camp. He did not.) As soon as the inspection was over, we started marching on the national road off Bataan toward San Fernando, Pampanga. This march is referred to by American prisoners of war as the "Death March of Bataan." Had the Americans and Filipinos of Bataan known the fate in store for them, though beaten, hungry and tired from months of hardships in the last hectic days of combat, never would they have surrendered to our dishonorable foe. Further resistance and blood-shed was obviously useless, but little did anyone dream that the majority of those who marched down that dusty road were to die. Not on the field of battle as a soldier should die, but in a "land of plenty," in filthy Japanese prisons, from starvation, disease, or brutality.

As we marched along the road, the occupying Japanese troops constantly searched and slapped the prisoners of war, regardless of age or rank. I marched only a short distance before the Japanese stripped me of my personal belongings. One Japanese soldier took my canteen, gave the water to a horse and threw the canteen away. Another beat several of us with a stick because we were wearing "tin helmets," the only cover we had. It was a terrifically hot day as we marched along the road without food, cover, or water. We were marched out in groups of 500 to 1,000 men; I was approximately in the middle group. In the afternoon, I saw a Filipino soldier who had evidently been bayoneted. Shortly after that, we frequently passed men lying alongside and on the road. Many had been run over by Japanese trucks and flattened. These men had been recently killed. Number One Hospital was severely bombed by the Japanese. Many patients left the hospital and wandered around in their hospital pajamas and robes. Some were thrown into the marching columns of prisoners. What their fate was, I do not know; however, the Japanese took no consideration of this. Many Americans were forced to act as cargadors, carrying very heavy loads of military equipment. Such treatment was directly responsible for the death of Sgt. Batson, an outstanding man of my organization. Some of these men were forced to stay and work for the Japanese under the shell fire from Corregidor. At ten o'clock that night we were made to march back for two hours for no apparent reason. Several hundred of us were placed in a rice patty without room to lie down. An officer asked permission to get water and a Jap sentry beat him with his fist and rifle butt. Finally a Japanese officer permitted us to drink water from a near-by carabou wallow.

Eleventh April. We were awakened before daylight and started marching down the road. During this time, thousands of Japanese soldiers and artillery units were setting up positions to fire on Corregidor. Hundreds of Japanese trucks loaded with soldiers were constantly passing us. One Japanese stuck his rifle out of a fast-moving truck and hit an American on the head, knocking him senseless. The constant dust clouds raised by the trucks and blistering heat increased the torture of the march. We were told that we would be given food sometime that

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morning, so we marched till 12 o'clock and were permitted to get water out of a dirty stream, but no food. Three officers were removed from the prisoners, thrown roughly into an automobile by the Japanese. Why, or what their fate was, we never were able to find out, as they never arrived at any of the prison camps. The march was continued until it was nearly dark and they promised to spend the night and eat. Instead, we were again searched, placed on the road and forced to march until 3 o'clock in the morning, over 21 hours of continuous marching. As we marched along the road at night, men started falling out frequently. He may lay in silence or moan in agony, but the Japs did not permit a stronger man (of which there were few at this time) to stop and aid the weaker. We could hear occasional shots behind us. The Japanese had clean-up squads marching behind the columns and if men fell out too tired and hungry to go on, they were killed. Many of the missing men of Bataan met this fate. At 3 o'clock (a.m.) we were placed in a barb-wire "bull pen" which would have ordinarily accommodated 200 prisoners. In this pen there were at least 2,000 men, Filipino and American. They were made to sit up, not given room to lie down. Human filth and magots were everywhere. The strain was telling even on the strongest men, or rather we ceased to be men--more like filthy, starving rabble. The oriental plan of breaking and subduing mankind to meet their wishes was becoming a reality.

The following day instead of receiving food the Japanese promised us, we were made to sit in the boiling sun with very little water. Many of the men went crazy and several died. It was at this point that the Japs were dragging out sick and delirious men. Three Filipinos and three Americans were buried alive. This incident was observed by an American officer (1st Lt.) who told me and swore it was true, before I escaped from a prison camp. The Japanese even went so far as to make one of our own American sergeants (a Sgt. Hunt) hit one of the men on the head with a shovel when he tried to get out of the grave. We remained in the "bull pen" all that night.

The following day, the Japanese gave each prisoner a mess kit of rice and forced us to sit in the sun without shelter for another day. This "sun treatment" was used on all groups of prisoners. Many sat as long as four days. This ^{the} mess kit of rice was the first food we had had since the beginning of ~~the~~ march. At dark, we were forced to march without water until daylight, at which time they permitted us to sit in the road for about two hours before resuming the march. Sometimes the Japanese paced us on bicycles and we had to walk very fast, or else they paced us so slowly that the muscles in my legs began to draw and each step was an agony. The Filipinos along the road endeavored to help the American and Filipino soldiers, by tossing bits of food and cigarettes from windows and from behind houses. Those who were caught were severely beaten. The Japs had food stores along the roadside. One full colonel of the U. S. Army pointed to one of the cans lying on the ground and asked for food for the prisoners. The Japanese officer picked up this can of salmon and hit the colonel full force on the side of the head, cutting his cheek wide open. Another colonel and a brave Filipino picked up three American soldiers who had just fallen out, before the Japs had gotten to them, put them on a cart and started down the road to San Fernando. However, they were immediately caught. The colonel and Filipino, together with the American soldiers in a state of coma, were severely horse whipped. The colonel was beaten in the face a number of times with the whip. Along the road in the Province of Pampanga there are many artesian wells. At any time the prisoners tried to break the columns to get water, they took a chance on being shot or bayoneted by the Japanese. After marching so far and so hard all night

everyone was nearly crazy with fatigue, starvation and thirst. Six Filipinos made a dash for one of the wells. All six were killed in cold blood. At Lubac, one Filipino had been run through and gutted by the Japs, and hung over a barb-wire fence in full view of the marching prisoners.

Late that afternoon we arrived at San Fernando and were placed in another barb-wire "bull pen" under identical conditions as previously mentioned. Filipino and American officers and enlisted men were crowded into one small area with no room to lie down to rest their weary and dirty bodies. Some of the men were fortunate enough to get a little rice from the Japanese, but there was not enough to go around. That night the Japanese sentries charged into the compound with their bayonets fixed, terrorizing the prisoners.

Before daylight the next morning, we were marched out, and the Japanese put 115 men in a small narrow-gauge box car. Men who were by this time sick of diarrhoea and dysentery, were crowded into the filthy cars and movement was impossible. The box car doors were then closed and locked. The heat, closeness and stench made it almost unbearable. All of us by this time were beginning to wonder how much longer we could "take it." We rode in the box car from San Fernando to Capiz Tarlac where we were taken out and forced to sit in the sun for about three hours. The Filipinos again wanted to feed us, but got only abuses from the Japs. We were then forced to march down to the prison camp, a dilapidated Filipino camp on which construction was never completed. It was surrounded by barb-wire and high towers. The inside was also equipped with barb-wire to make separate compounds. On this last leg of the journey, the Japs permitted the stronger men to carry the weaker.

This march I completed in six days with one mess kit of rice, a distance of approximately 135 KM. Some of the Americans made the same march without any food from the Japanese and many spent as long as twelve days marching. Most of this time, of course, being tortured in the sun.

As soon as we arrived, we were again searched and the Japanese captain in command of the camp made a speech. He told us we were not prisoners of war. We were captives and we should expect to be treated as captives and we would not receive the privileges of prisoners of war. We were enemies of Japan and always would be considered enemies of Japan --for us to expect treatment in prison camps as enemies. We were too tired to be impressed. No one cared what happened. Hunger, thirst and fatigue, and one thousand pains of the tortured body made death seem a pleasant means of escape rather than something to fear. As soon as the captain finished his speech, we were marched into dilapidated buildings. There were practically no water facilities in O'Donnell. It was not unusual to stand in line six to ten hours for water to drink. I wore the same clothes without washing or changing for over a month and a half, nor did I get a bath for over 35 days after living in such filth. The water I used for my first bath was one gallon. After the dry season was over in the islands, mother nature provided water for our bathing and washing clothes, without soap of course. As there were no razors, everyone had a beard. Twenty-three officers were assigned to one dilapidated shack 14 feet by 20 feet long.

During the two months I stayed at O'Donnell, the principal diet was rice. The Japs gave us meat two times in two months, but not enough to flavor the watery soup, much less give even a fourth of the men a piece one inch square. A few times they gave us comoties, a very inferior

type of native sweet potato. Many of these were rotten and had to be thrown away, but it was necessary to post guards in the Filipino and American garbage pits to keep many of the starving men from eating rotten potatoes. The usual ration per man received of this potato delicacy was one tablespoon. The utensils the Japs gave the American to cook with were two cauldrons for each kitchen, a shovel for shoveling rice, and a 55-gallon drum. The kitchens were dilapidated shacks with dirt floors and dirty, but we had no cleaning facilities. There was no water to wash the rice or knives to peel the potatoes with. After the potatoes were boiled, they were thrown into a 55-gallon drum and mashed with a two-by-four so each man could get his spoonful. They gave us a few mango beans, which is a type of cow pea. We considered it a great delicacy. A tablespoon of these beans and a small cup of juice, together on the rice was a grand meal. Once or twice we were issued a little flour for making paste gravy to ^{to} cover our rice. We were given a few issues of coconut lard. The ration never exceeded one spoon per man. My diet for the total 361 days that I was a prisoner of war, with the exception of the American and British Red Cross ^{food} that I received, was constantly some type of watery juice with little base and rice. The Japs would absolutely not permit those Americans who were fortunate enough to have hidden some of their money, to make any out-side purchases. The Jap soldiers themselves saw that things got into the camp. If one were fortunate enough to be in a position to buy anything, he might be able to buy a small can of fish for five dollars.

Many of the men at O'Donnell did not have shelter. They lived in the open. When it rained, they had to scramble under buildings or any other shelter they could find. After we had been at O'Donnell for approximately one week, the death rate among Americans was about 20 a day and among Filipinos, 150 a day. After we had been there slightly over two weeks, the death rate got to be up to 50 a day among Americans and 300 a day for Filipinos. After the Americans left the camp, the death rate of Filipinos went up to 500 a day. (After I was with the guerrillas on Mindanao I talked to a Filipino officer who escaped from the Japs after they made him serve in their army.) It was a problem to find men strong enough to dig graves and bury the dead. It ended by digging shallow trenches, dumping ten men in each trench and covering them with earth; many with no records as to who they were. The actual conditions I find impossible to describe. No matter how bad these conditions could be recorded on paper, they can't be visualized.

One large, dilapidated building at O'Donnell was set aside and very facetiously called a hospital. Hundreds of men were laid on the bare floor as close as they could possibly be, without blankets or shelter halves, and many of them naked. Men were under the building and all over the area. Many at one time had weighed 200 pounds, but now they were lucky if they would tip the scales at 90 pounds. The stench and odor of the place was unbearable. The Japs gave the Americans no medicine at all. The American doctors in the camp had nothing at all to work with; not even water to wash the human waste from the bodies of the patients. Many of the men, sick with dysentery, stayed out in the weather near the latrines until they died. It was difficult throughout the entire concentration camp to look at a man lying still and tell whether he was dead or alive. Hundreds were like skeletons. You could count every rib. They had no buttocks. Plain and simple starvation. There was very little sanitation in the camp. The Japs finally issued shovels to dig latrines, but even then, men were so weak with malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery that it was impossible to keep the place clean. There were literally millions and millions of flies. Containers of rice, untouched, lay around the building; rice the Japanese had issued to these dying men. Even to

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find enough water to wash our food containers was a problem. I found one of my own sergeants lying naked on the floor, covered with defecation and flies. He had large sores all over his body as evidence of his violence when out of his head. There was not even enough medicine available to doctor a skin bruise. Unable to eat rice, drink water, or recognize his closest friends, he very quickly died. At the fall of Bataan, this man weighed nearly 185 pounds. When he died, he was no more than a shadow. When the Japanese inspected the area, they sometimes promised such things as medicine which they never gave, but one time they permitted the Red Cross at Manila to bring in Quinine. How much, we were never able to find out. The Japs did not issue the Americans enough to cure ten cases of Malaria, and we had thousands suffering from Malaria. O'Donnell was infested with mosquitoes and scarcely anyone had a mosquito bar or blanket to cover himself with. Later the Japs issued most of the officers blankets.

The most common cause of death in the camp was malaria, dysentery and Beri Beri. Many had all of these diseases. Hundreds had wet Beri Beri and their feet, ankles and legs were swollen nearly double their size, and their faces would be puffed up like balloons. When this condition affected the heart, they died. The Japs constantly insisted on work details and made us form work companies under American officers. However, the officers did not have to supervise the actual labor. Time after time the Japs forced men to go on detail that could hardly stand or walk. Many times these men did not return. By the first of May, about 20 out of every company of 200 were able to go out on detail, but even these were not in condition to perform hard labor. Many men died in barracks over night. Men who the Japs maintained were physically able to work. The Japanese would line up American prisoners of war inside the camp in the hot sun, regardless of whether they were sick or well, to count them or for any other assinine reason they could think of and make them stand in the sun for hours.

All full colonels and generals were moved to Capiz Tarlac about 1st May, 1942, and were later either sent to Formosa or Japan.

Over 2,200 Americans and over 27,000 Filipinos died at O'Donnell prison camp.

About 1 June, 1942, the American prisoners of war were moved from O'Donnell Prison Camp to Cabanatuan Concentration Camp where we met the prisoners from Corregidor. There were no Filipinos interned at Cabanatuan. Conditions at Cabanatuan were improved slightly - muddy seepage wells provided water for bathing and washing clothes and there was adequate drinking water. Although living conditions were filthy and close, they were better than at O'Donnell.

I had been at Cabanatuan one day when a Jap came looting through the barracks. He found a watch hidden in some of the equipment of one of the men not present at the time. As I was sitting nearby, he became very perturbed at the idea of an American having a watch and showed his anger by boxing me severely.

The Japs continued to feed the Americans principally on rice, although at intervals they would give us mango beans, juice and sometimes dried small, stinking fish. In one instance they gave the Americans three chickens for 500 men and in another instance 50 eggs for 500 men. They later listed in their propaganda they were feeding the prisoners of war chickens and eggs. The officers were not forced to work at Cabanatuan, although some volunteered to take out work details. I was one of those. The Japs frequently mistreated the Americans

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who were working for them. In one instance a small and frail private in the U.S. Army was not digging a ditch to suit the Japs. A Jap grabbed the shovel away from him, hit him across the back and once across the thigh. The boy had to be sent to the hospital. Another instance a Jap threw a rock at an American and hit him on the ankle. The boy was crippled for months. One Jap carried a golf club shaft and was in charge of a house moving project. While the Americans were working, he beat on them like horses. There were numerous instances of brutality. When two Americans were caught getting food from Filipinos they were beaten unmercifully on the face and over the body. They then called for a doctor and as soon as the doctor had completed dressing the wounds, the Japs took sticks and beat them again. In another instance three American officers, two Army and one Navy, were attempting to escape. Cabanatuan was lined with barbed-wire and had many high towers and machine gun emplacements on the outside of the wire. In addition to the guards in the tower, there was also a patrol guard that walked the outside of the compound. The Japs also forced the Americans to maintain an interior guard in an effort to keep anyone from escaping. However, Lieut. Col. Biggs, Lieut. Col. Breitung, and Lieut. Gilbert, U.S.N., were moving down a drain ditch in an effort to get under the barbed-wire entanglement when the Japanese heard the noise and investigated. When they found out what the three men's plans were, they beat them severely. They stripped them naked and tied them to a post in front of the gate of the concentration camp and forced every Filipino who came by to beat them in the face with a two-by-four board. They were tied with their hands behind them and a rope above so that they were forced to stand on their feet until they lost consciousness. They kept them in the blazing sun for two days without food or water and continued beating them. On the third day they were forced to stand in the cold driven rain of a tropical typhoon. Later that afternoon they were dragged in a practically semi-conscious condition to a point near the concentration camp. Colonel Biggs was beheaded. The other two were shot. Colonel Biggs had one ear still attached, but lying on his shoulder, and all of them were just a bloody, unrecognizable mass. Colonel Cain (New Mex.) the Commanding Officer, 200 and 515 Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft Batteries on Bataan was working at Cabanatuan Concentration Camp. The Japanese called for a report which he delivered to Japanese Headquarters. There was some item in the report that did not please the Japanese. The Japanese interpreter was very perturbed, perturbed to the extent that he looked at Colonel Cain and called all Americans sons-of-bitches. When the Jap made this remark, Colonel Cain turned to leave the room. The interpreter thereupon struck Colonel Cain on the head with a black jack, knocking him senseless. (Col. Cain is a very close friend of mine, and this incident was described by him. He still suffers from the blow.)

In the filthy Japanese kitchens I saw them use the American Flag as a wrapper for meat and covering for other foods, as well as other common, disgraceful uses.

The death rate at Cabanatuan for June and July was 30 Americans a day--for August over 20 a day, September around 15 and for the month of October between 15 and 19 and increasing steadily. By this time all forms of disease were breaking out in the camp. The principal ones were malaria, wet beri beri, scurvy, blindness, and dry beri beri, diarrhoea and dysentery, yellow jaundice, dengue fever. Still the Japs would not give us any medical supplies. They eventually let the Red Cross in Manila give the Americans some medical supplies, but they left the medicines packed and would not let them be used for some time. During this period many died for lack of medical care. When I left

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Cabanatuan on 26 October, there were 2,500 Americans in hospitals, and it is doubtful out of that number that any will live, according to the American medical officers. The principal reason for the death of the Americans is mal-nutrition, as definitely proven by autopsies performed. Both American and Japanese doctors performed these autopsies. The Japanese answer, after it was definitely determined that the men were starving to death, was that they were very sorry but the food was not available.

The Philippine Islands at this time had an abundance of food on every island as I later discovered after my escape. At Cabanatuan I had dengue fever and yellow jaundice at the same time. It was impossible to eat the diet of rice. The Japanese gave me absolutely no medicine--not even an aspirin tablet and after approximately three weeks I weighed around 130 pounds. My normal weight is 175 pounds. However, even at 130 pounds at Cabanatuan I might have been considered a fat man. Prior to my departure from Luzon over 5,000 Americans had died. In my organization, counting only those who were captured and not casualties during the war, 45 per cent were already dead and another 10 or 15 per cent probably died within the next month. These men I have by name. During the time I was at Cabanatuan and O'Donnell the Japs constantly took Americans on outside work details to build bridges, to salvage equipment, to work on docks or any other type of hard labor. It was not uncommon that over 20 per cent of the entire detail would be worked to death, and in one instance 75 per cent of the men were worked to death. These men, when on these working details, as a general rule were treated like dogs. Conditions at Cabanatuan in many respects were similar to those at O'Donnell. When I left Cabanatuan, several men had gone completely blind. One pilot had to have an eye removed. The Japanese high officials were frequently inspecting the prison camp at Cabanatuan. Japanese authorities of all grades know the conditions that were existing here. When we had the inspections the Japs forced us to put on our best clothing. Our clothes at the very best were only rags--some men did not have shirts, some did not have trousers and many lacked shoes. It was here that the Jap blackmarket was going full swing. The Japs made purchases from the Filipinos and gave the food to Americans who worked in Jap kitchens and forced them to sell it in the camp.

The Japs took 400 Americans who were technical men, gave them a physical examination, issued clothes and sent them to Japan to work in the factories. When I left Cabanatuan the Japs were arranging a detail of 1000 technical men to be sent to Japan for work in factories. On October 26, 969 American officers and enlisted men were crowded into the holds of a 7,000-ton British built ship. The conditions on the ship were filthy. Twelve men were assigned to an area--it was impossible for more than six men to sleep. There were many lice and bedbugs as the ship had been used as a Jap troop ship. We had to sleep in the stifling hold or try to find a place to lie on the junk-heaped deck, regardless of the fact that it rained almost continually every night. We spent eleven days going from Manila to Davao, stopping at Cebu and Iloilo. The ship was not marked as a prison ship and the holds beneath the Americans were loaded with gasoline, the fumes from which one was conscious of all the time. However, it was the best food we had received since becoming prisoners--for breakfast we usually got rice and squash soup--for lunch a small dried fish and rice--and in the evening a small piece of corned beef. Two men died on this trip. One was buried in a shallow grave at the dock at Iloilo and the other was buried at sea.

On 7 November, 1942, the Americans unloaded at Lensang Lumber Company near Davao Penal Colony. We were given the customary "sun treatment" for two hours and then started march 26 KM to the penal

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colony. Being in a weakened condition, it was impossible for many of the Americans to make this. However, those that fell out were picked up in a truck by the Japs and taken to the colony.

The Japanese captain, named Hosume, was in command of the guards that escorted the prisoners from Luzon. He was famous for boxing the Americans and making life as unbearable as he possibly could. When we arrived at the penal colony, there were many Filipino prisoners there (prisoners against the state -- many of them in for murder). However, the majority of these were moved to Paulau to do work on the Japanese fortifications. Major Mida, a Jap in command of the penal colony at Davao, when he saw the condition of the Americans arriving, was very much perturbed, because what he had asked for had been laborers. Regardless of the condition of the Americans, he got his laborers. Every man not in the hospital, regardless of age or rank, was forced to work. Chaplains, officers and enlisted men - no exceptions - were forced to plant rice, harvest rice in murky rice paddies, build and clean Jap latrines, work in fields and all types of manual labor and degrading work. During the 361 days that I was a prisoner of war, I received \$10 pay. To get this \$10 I had to sign a statement stating that I had received over \$250 and that the Japanese had given me clothes, food, housing, etc.

It does not cost the Japs one cent a day to feed a war prisoner. Food given to the prisoners was planted by the prisoners themselves, (and the Japs take the greater majority of this or confiscate from the Filipinos).

Not until the arrival of the American Red Cross did the Japs ever give the Americans any clothes. The majority at the camp had no shoes. I was without shoes and forced to clear jungle, plow, etc. barefooted for over a month and a half.

There was an abundance of citrus fruits and vegetables at the camp, however, scurvy was prevalent. I had scurvy and had a sore on my lower lip for over two months--nevertheless the Japs would not give the Americans any citrus fruit, although there was an abundance available. Oranges and lemons were allowed to rot on the ground. There was an abundance of bananas in the area, yet it was seldom that the Japs ever gave the Americans a banana. However, the living conditions at Davao were much better than those at any other place we had been.

The death rate was cut down considerably, bathing facilities were added and living conditions in general were better. However, the salvation of the American prisoners of war was the arrival of the American and British Red Cross supplies. Actually, these supplies were confiscated by the Japs. After the arrival of these supplies they did not go even as far as to give us our usual soup for our meal. However, after the Red Cross supplies were exhausted the Japs made no effort to re-instate the original diet. When I escaped, it looked as if things were becoming very very serious. Practically all the American Red Cross cigarettes were confiscated. This I know for a fact, for while working with guerrillas after my escape I could purchase through guerrillas who entered Japanese areas, American cigarettes that were war wrapped and made after the beginning of the war at \$4 a pack (if I had the \$4).

While we were prisoners at Cabanatuan we heard that a Jap guard

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had been killed. Two days later we heard artillery and machine gun fire at a small baric about four miles from the camp, and the baric was burned. The Japs returned with a Filipino's head tied to a pole and paraded it through the American camp. They then tied it outside the gate in full view of all passing Filipinos with a sign under it in Japanese and English, "Bad Man." We later heard that they had killed everybody in the baric that they had caught--men, women, and children.

Shortly before I escaped, the Japs killed an American in cold blood. The American was an Army hospital corps man and had a pass to be outside the barbed-wire compound while working. He had previously shown his pass to the Jap guard in the tower along side the compound. One of his friends threw the corps man a canteen over the barbed-wire entanglement. The Jap hearing it disapproved, so the American took the top off and started showing the Jap that it was merely water. The Jap shot him three times and killed him in cold blood and then riddled a nearby hospital with bullets in an effort to kill the enlisted man who had thrown the canteen over the fence. The American that threw the canteen broke no existing Jap regulation.

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I have tried to put into words some of the things that I have experienced and observed during all these past months, but I fail to find words adequate to an accurate portrayal. If any American could sit down and conjure before his mind the most diabolical of nightmares, he might perhaps come close to it, but none who have not gone it could possibly have any idea of the tortures and the horror that these men are going through.

/s/ WILLIAM E. DYESS,
Major, Air Corps.

The foregoing statement, consisting of fourteen (15) pages was sworn and subscribed to before me this _____ day of August 1943.

/s/ _____
DONALD C. SANDISON,
Major, A.C.D.
Asst. Adjutant General.