

Map Room Files.

98

BOX 169. (Continued)

3. A-16/1 PROTECTION OF SEACOASTS: March 2 - July 15, 1942.

Map Room Files.

98

BOX 169. (Continued)

3. A-16/1 PROTECTION OF SEACOASTS: March 2 - July 15, 1942.

4. A-16 QUADRANT (Quebec) CONFERENCE

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

Date July 15, 1942.

From: Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations).

To: The Admiral.

AW

1. All replies to the attached despatch "as of 0000/Z12 July what percentage of vessels assigned frontier forces were operating at sea" have been received.

2. Summary of the replies:

EastSeaFron	70%
GulfSeaFron	71%
CaribSeaFron	77.3%
PaSeaFron	70%
WestSeaFron	30% (4 DD operating with TF8 not included)

*For the President
via Capt. M'Crea*

EJK

M. K.

M. KELLY.

*N.B. - This was a flash check-up with
no warning*

EJK

SECRET

AL MESSAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

DRAFTER	EXTENSION NUMBER	ADDRESSEES	PRECEDENCE
FROM COMINCH	FOR ACTION	COMS ALLSEAFRONSLANT COMWESTSEAFRON	PRIORITY
RELEASED BY ADM KING			ROUTINE
DATE 13 JULY 1942	INFORMATION		DEFERRED
TOR CODEROOM 1951/2123			PRIORITY
DECODED BY EDWARDS/EDWARDS			ROUTINE
PARAPHRASED BY			DEFERRED

INDICATE BY ASTERISK ADDRESSEES FOR WHICH MAIL DELIVERY IS SATISFACTORY.

131913 CCR 4707

UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED THIS DISPATCH WILL BE TRANSMITTED WITH DEFERRED PRECEDENCE.

ORIGINATOR FILL IN DATE AND TIME	DATE	TIME	GCT

TEXT

ACTION

AS OF 0000/Z12 JULY WHAT PERCENTAGE OF VESSELS
ASSIGNED FRONTIER FORCES WERE OPERATING AT SEA.

F-00
F-01
F-016
F-0016
F-05
F-07
F-1
F-11
F-2
F-3
F-30
F-31
F-32
F-33
F-34
F-35
F-37
IG-00
V: NO

Return to F32

C

[Handwritten signature]

SECRET

Make original only. Deliver to communication watch officer in person. (See Art. 76 (4) NAVREGS.)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-22818-1

131913

411

Regraded Unclassified

A16-1
(Protection of Seacoast)
IN REPLY REFER
TO NO.

Navy Folder
2-42
ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDER
EASTERN SEA FRONTIER

full
↓
Headquarters
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

2 July, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

My dear Mr. President:

Many thanks for your letter of June 24th. I greatly appreciate your writing me so frankly and I can assure you that the scuttlebutt rumors have little if any foundation. As I wrote you, I have been on this job seven days a week and many nights since Pearl Harbor and have attended only a few official functions where I thought that my attendance would help the Navy.

Naturally, I have been very much disturbed from the very beginning over our merchant ship losses. We have used every available plane, ship and blimp and everything else in sight to combat submarines and to protect our shipping. I can assure you that all of us here are using our imagination and trying to discover some new scheme by which submarines may be detected and destroyed.

I know that the tendency of our Navy is to seek perfection but several months ago I began obtaining all available fishing and other vessels to act as observation posts and for rescue and patrol. A great many of these boats were hauled up for the winter and had to be recommissioned. At first we experienced great difficulty in obtaining ship to shore telephones or radios for them. In the last few weeks I have been given authority to purchase radio equipment and am now doing this. However, there seems to be a great scarcity of these instruments, especially crystals, which is one of the principal parts of the equipment. I am working daily with the Coast Guard to obtain every available small boat upon which we may mount guns and depth charges.

At the present time we have about 274 fishermen enrolled and at sea as observation ships. For some time we have been receiving reports from them. In addition to these boats we have a number of privately owned boats which are now on patrol and others being equipped with guns and depth charges. I am doing my best to get every available boat to be used as you direct.

Headquarters
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

I have just written King sending him a memorandum, a copy of which is enclosed herewith, showing the number of ships convoyed in my Frontier from 14 May to 30 June. As you know the KN convoys assemble at the mined anchorage off Key West and proceed to Chesapeake Bay. The KS convoys assemble at Chesapeake Bay and proceed to our anchorage off Key West. The BX convoys assemble at Buzards Bay and proceed to Iceland and to the Eastward. For some months I have been using small boats to convoy ships from Chesapeake to the Delaware Bay and from the Delaware Bay to New York.

The mine situation is giving me great concern and I am using every effort to sweep all channels, approaches, and focal points along this coast with every available minesweeper. It is interesting to note that the first mines appearing off our coast were laid in approximately the same positions as those laid during the World War. I am covering all areas where mines were laid during the World War.

I only hope that we can tide over this critical period for the next few months until adequate forces may be obtained not only to escort convoys properly but to protect shipping along the coast. Above all, I hope that we may get more ships with which I can take offensive action against these submarines. No one will be happier than I when this coast is cleared of them and our valuable ships protected.

We have doubled patrols along the coast and are keeping on the alert against the landing of saboteurs. I might tell you that when these men landed on Long Island the entire coast was covered by dense fog. The Naval Intelligence of the Third Naval District under Captain MacFall took immediate steps and covered this situation thoroughly. Without detracting one iota from the splendid performance of FBI I personally feel that our Naval Intelligence did a most efficient job in furnishing the means and information by which these men were finally captured.

ADDRESS REPLY TO
COMMANDER
EASTERN SEA FRONTIER

Headquarters
COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL & PERSONAL

Again, with many thanks, Mr. President, and with renewed assurances of my highest regard,

Very respectfully yours,


ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

July 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM

For information:

Up to and including June 30:

1st KS convoy - May 14, 1942
1st KN convoy - May 15, 1942
1st BX convoy - May 21, 1942

KS convoy 500 - 515 inclusive (16)

Tankers 184
Cargoes 91
Total 275

(1 tanker EMPIRE FREEDOM torpedoed, returned to port)
(1 cargo, SANTORE sunk by mine)

KN convoy 100 - 115 inclusive (16)

Tankers 165
Cargoes 92
Total 257

(2 tankers, ESSO AGUSTA & ROBERT TUTTLE struck mines,
both taken into port)

BX convoy 19 - 26 inclusive (8)

Total 275

(1 vessel, KRON PRINSEN, a straggler - torpedoed and
lost)

Total ships convoyed 807

Total ships lost 2 - the SANTORE sunk by mine and
KRON PRINSEN torpedoed and lost.

Navy Folder

June 24, 1942.

Dear Adolphus:-

You and I are such old friends that I know I can write you frankly about some of the things that have been said in civilian scuttle butt circles and I know you would want me to pass them on to you.

It so happened that within a week or ten days your picture appeared about three times as taking part in social or money-raising functions! Furthermore, even though I know you do not go to them, there was further talk about your being present at luncheons, dinners, weddings, etc., etc.] I realize full well that this is just a combination of circumstances and is not your fault.

Of course, I realize that with the continued sinkings off the coast you are inevitably going to be criticized, as the whole Navy is being criticized, for not ending the sinkings. It is just one of those tough jobs and unfortunately the Navy's publicity for the last four or five months has been none too good, for it has promised that the situation would get better within a few weeks and the promise has not been fulfilled.

You and I are both disturbed over the situation and because I was responsible in 1917 for setting up the naval patrol districts the whole length of the coasts, and because I had to fight many of the older officers in the service to get the thing done, I feel that I can give you some of my thoughts for what they are worth.

1. In 1917 Operations and C. & R. objected to the taking over of smaller patrol vessels. I pointed out that in Summer weather we could use certain vessels as short as forty feet, six days out of seven, in patrolling out to the fifty fathom curve. The objective was to have as many ships, big and little, covering the whole area as we could possibly get. I aimed at this over a year ago but the Department could not see anything else than 100 feet in length, and even after December seventh they moved as slowly as cold molasses in getting additional vessels. I am willing to bet that there are still 1000 vessels on this coast and on the Great Lakes which could be picked up and put to work. That means if two-thirds of them can be kept operating on post that you would have

one for approximately every two and a half miles on the average for the entire coast from Eastport, Maine, to Key West.

2. It is the tendency of the Navy to seek perfection. The Navy is not a good hand at improvising. That is a just criticism with which I know you agree. When a small vessel -- 40, 50 or 60 feet in length is taken over there are two rules that should be observed:

(a) Use the men who are familiar with the individual ship -- the owner and engineer if possible. They may be too old for Navy physicals. They may limp when they walk. They may have to wear glasses. They may even lack a couple of fingers on one hand. But the point is that they know their own vessel and they can be supplemented by a radio man and one man aft to "cut the string" and let a depth charge roll over the stern. That does not require intricate training. Actually, also, they are much better acquainted with local piloting conditions than if we take a fancy ninety day Ensign who has come from Oshkosh.

(b) Incidentally, all that most of these little vessels need is a machine gun forward, a radio telephone and three or four depth charges aft. Actually if the depth charges weigh the boat down too much, it is an exceedingly simple thing to build a wooden rack from the stern to the cabin and keep two of the depth charges nearer amidships. A coat of paint does the rest. Get a carpenter, tell him what you want done and give him no blueprints.

3. The whole purpose is to keep the submarine down both day and night. I want you to aim at the objective not only of increasing the number of ships on patrol but also to keep 75% of the total number on post at all times (including Sundays). Probably you cannot do this but I think you can come pretty close to it.

4. Make all ships stay within the 50 fathom curve. On a very large portion of the coast you can keep all merchant ships inside of the 25 fathom curve. That decreases the area your small craft have to patrol. If

you can greatly increase the number of patrolling vessels, you can use some of them to escort a convoy through the patrol district, adding thereby to the regular Navy escort ships.

5. In case of prospective heavy weather, when the smaller patrol or escorting ships cannot stay at sea, bring the whole convoy into harbor or behind one of the new mine fields.

6. Go personally on unheralded inspection trips as often as you can. I am fully aware of the fact that it is customary in the Navy to give plenty of advance notice of inspection trips. Violate the custom. It will help the service.

7. Use more puddle-jumper or hedgehopper planes. Don't be afraid to put two men into them and give them one bomb or small depth charge which they can toss overboard on to the deck of a submarine, even though they may blow themselves out of existence. Submarines have been got that way in the past.

8. Get that two-man beach patrol working efficiently. Two parties of spies or saboteurs have already landed from German submarines. This operation is merely extending and perfecting one of the regular jobs of the Coast Guard.

Finally, push this thing for all it is worth. Improvise, invent. Do things no one ever did before. And remember that we are under fire on these coastal and West Indies and Gulf sinkings more greatly than in any other respect.

Always sincerely,

Rear Admiral Adolphus Andrews,
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier,
90 Church Street,
New York, N. Y.

P.S. There is an apocryphal story that in 1917 we had two planes which had just arrived at Cape Cod and one of them went off on a reconnaissance flight without any bombs because the bombs had not arrived. She came out of a light fog on top of a German submarine on the surface. The pilot brought her down within 100 feet of the sub and flew over her deck. The mechanic having no other missile at hand threw the monkey wrench and hit the submarine amidships!

Personal and Confidential.

COMMANDER EASTERN SEA FRONTIER
90 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK

June 17, 1942.

My dear Mr President,

I have just received a personal letter from King which, although intended in all kindness which I greatly appreciate, nevertheless has caused me grave concern and distress.

In this note he stated that there have been some rumors and criticisms regarding my "social activities" in New York.

These rumors came probably from pictures of me appearing in the press when I attended the races at Belmont Park Saturday afternoon, a week ago, and when I took part in the parade "New York at war" last Saturday.

I attended the races at Belmont Park with General Drum feeling that it was incumbent upon me to attend officially as the proceeds of the meet were to go in part to Army and Navy Relief and that the Navy should encourage such contributions. This is the first Saturday I have been away from my office except on inspection trips since December 7th.

I felt I should take part officially in the parade last Saturday. However shortly after

the Navy passed the reviewing stand about 2 p.m. I returned to my office leaving here about eight p.m. to return to my home.

Since Pearl Harbor I have been in my office every day including Sunday except when absent on inspections along the coast.

I have declined numerous invitations stating that my strenuous war duties would not permit my attendance. Frequently the papers publish that "Admiral and Mrs. Andrews are expected at such and such a party" but invitations in my case have not meant accepted ones.

Since Pearl Harbor I do not believe I have attended on an average of four private home dinner parties per month and I have attended only official functions where it was incumbent upon me to do so - and these have been very few.

I have hesitated to write ^{you} but, if these rumors exist, I feel that they are so false and unjustified that in fairness to myself you should know the truth.

I realize fully that I am on the spot, that I have a tremendous job and responsibility here close at home and subject to criticism by those who do not know the facts. However I am trying to keep on an even keel and am using every ounce of my energy and every minute of my time to rid this coast of enemy submarines.

We have found about thirteen German mines off Cape Henry and are still sweeping. I expected this mine laying weeks ago and have been using everything available to sweep channels, approaches to harbors and sea lanes along the coast. As you know we have very few mine sweepers but hope to obtain more in the near future.

After the sinking of the two fishermen in Northern waters some weeks ago our fishing observers have become uneasy and are now crying for help. I am going to Boston tonight to investigate this matter and to inspect activities.

I hope, Mr. President, you will not consider me presumptive in writing this long letter but I cannot help feeling very keenly these false rumors and criticisms -

With renewed assurances of my highest regard and with very good wish for you I am, Very respectfully,
Walter S. Andrews.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Also Admiral King

A 16-1
(Protection of
Seacoast)

Navy Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

(SC)QS1/L4
(013600A)/GEM

March 17, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am returning herewith Admiral Andrews' letter to you. I have conferred with Admiral King on the three recommendations and learned that Admiral Robinson has already arranged for Andrews to have complete charge of conversion of small craft which he can pick up for inshore patrol. The routing of merchant vessels is already under way.

With respect to the civil air patrol, Admiral King's information is that this is being undertaken by the Army. I haven't checked with the Army to see what they are doing about it. One difficulty which you mentioned when we talked it over is that if this "Scarecrow Patrol" is put into effect, with the men operating the planes still civilians, it will probably subject them to the peril of being shot in case they are captured. What occurred to me when we were discussing this was that some military organization could be set up after the fashion of the National Guard and these men sworn in to federal service so as to give them proper military status. Their uniform could be the zipper suits which the airmen use in servicing their planes and sometimes in flying. Such a suit would qualify, I think, as a military uniform.

Frank Knox

Enclosure

In reply refer to No.

Headquarters
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

12 March, 1942

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith copy of my letter to Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations regarding the purchasing and fitting out of surface craft. This letter is self explanatory. I do hope that I may be given blanket authority to obtain these ships, and to convert them and fit them out in the earliest possible time for service.

I am also enclosing a copy of my letter regarding "Scarecrow Patrol" which I think can be used effectively along this coast until such time as we can get combatant planes of our own.

I have been directing all merchant shipping to proceed along the coast only in daylight hours, seeking anchorage in harbors at night. Most of the merchant ships have been complying with this directive but others have not.

I have also written a letter to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, copy enclosed, requesting that ships from South America, the West Indies, and from the southeast be directed to join the sea lanes as soon as possible, preferably off the coast of Florida, for the reason that a great number of our sinkings have been well off shore.

A few of the British trawlers have arrived and I have sent them to sea immediately on patrol duty. One of them is on the trail of a submarine now.

In reply refer to No.


Headquarters
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

I greatly appreciate your letter. I can assure you that I am doing and will continue to do everything in my power to meet your wishes and to make our operations effective against the enemy.

Hoping that I may have the pleasure of seeing you soon and with renewed assurances of my highest regard, I am,

Very respectfully yours,


ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 1942.

Secretary Egan has seen,

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please read this and return.
Copies of the recommendations to
King are enclosed. I think all
three should be approved, especially
the authority to Andrews to convert
the ships purchased without having
to go through the old rigamarole
of referring plans, specifications,
etc., to Washington.

F. D. R.

Headquarters
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

SECRET

12 March, 1942

From: Commander Eastern Sea Frontier.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: Scarecrow Patrol.

1. In the routing of merchant shipping along the Atlantic Coast it has been found that most submarines attack at night. For this reason, the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier has been directing shipping to proceed at sea only during daylight hours, seeking anchorage in port overnight. This plan has proved most effective and has no doubt lessened the sinking of merchant ships along designated sea lanes.
2. The more planes that can be used in patrolling during daylight hours, the greater will be the chances of keeping down enemy submarines. It has been found that these submarines upon sighting any plane, dive and submerge immediately.
3. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier has had in mind for some time the use of the Civil Air Patrol for employment as continuous daylight patrols for limited distances off the entire coast. Such planes would be known as "Scarecrow Patrols" and their employment would continue until such time as the Navy has sufficient combat planes for this purpose. The whole object of such a "Scarecrow Patrol" would be to keep down the submarines and to transmit timely information to the Eastern Sea Frontier Command.
4. If this proposed employment be approved, it is requested that the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier be given full authority immediately to make such arrangements as may be necessary with the Civil Air Patrol for the use of their planes for this purpose.
5. Transmission of this letter via registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

In reply refer to No.

Headquarters
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

CONFIDENTIAL

12 March, 1942

From: Commander Eastern Sea Frontier.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: The purchasing and fitting out of surface
craft.

1. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier has given serious study to the problem of obtaining more surface vessels for use as patrols along the Atlantic Coast.
2. There exists an immediate necessity for obtaining and fitting out every available vessel for this purpose in the shortest possible time.
3. It is requested that Commander Eastern Sea Frontier be given blanket authority to purchase all available suitable vessels which are capable of use on the Eastern Sea Frontier. It is further requested that authority be granted him to place these vessels after purchase in different navy yards and private yards for conversion and fitting out.
4. It is realized that this request constitutes a marked change in policy but it is believed necessary at this time in order to obtain adequate patrols for this coast and for approaches to harbors.
5. If this request be approved the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier will make reports at designated times to the different Bureaus concerned as to ships purchased, the expenditure of funds covering cost, and expenditures for conversion.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

COPY

Headquarters
Commander Eastern Sea Frontier
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

SECRET

March 12, 1942.

From: The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To : The Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet.

Subject: Routing of merchant vessels off Atlantic
Coast.

1. Experience up to the present time indicates that merchant vessels proceeding close to coast by daylight from Cape Hatteras to New York are reasonably free from attack.

2. This results from the difficulty of operating submerged in relatively shallow water; from the fact that the area is patrolled by aircraft during daylight; and from the increased efficiency of our surface vessels during hours of daylight.

3. Directives have been sent to all District Commandants of the Eastern Sea Frontier to direct merchant ships proceeding along the approved routes from Hatteras to New York to move between these points during daylight, anchoring during darkness in Chesapeake and Delaware Bays. This information has been repeated to the Commanders of the Gulf, Caribbean, and Panama Sea Frontiers, indicating the approval of the procedure by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. Sinkings occur from time to time farther off the Coast; in general terms, along a line passing through points one hundred twenty to one hundred forty miles off Cape Sable and Cape Fear, or in a lane fifty to sixty miles off the Atlantic Coast of the United States. These sinkings are of vessels of whose movements the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier has no knowledge until they arrive in port or are attacked, and in many cases are of vessels en route north from the East Coast of South America or the West Indies.

SECRET

March 12, 1942.

To: The Commander in Chief, United States
Fleet.

Subject: Routing of merchant vessels off Atlantic
Coast.

5. It is recommended that vessels sailing from South America, the West Indies, and coming up from the southeastward from Africa be directed to so lay their courses as to join the Coastal Sea Lanes (designated by The Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier) at a point between Cape Canaveral and Cape Hatteras, so timing their arrival in the lanes as to make the run from Cape Hatteras to New York by daylight, anchoring during darkness in Chesapeake and Delaware Bays.

6. Transmission of this document via registered mail is authorized within the continental limits of the United States.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

SECRET

March 12, 1942.

To: The Commander in Chief, United States
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6. Transmission of this document via registered mail is authorized within the continental limits of the United States.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

A16-1

Navy Folder
2-42

March 9, 1942.

Dear Adolphus:-

Many thanks for your letter. I am delighted that you are taking over this business. Vincent Astor was here the other day and I gave him a memorandum roughly sketching what I did with the patrol districts during the World War. The two main things were:

(a) To keep as many small craft at sea at all times as possible. We had no planes, no blimps, no radar and very few depth charges at that time, yet we did manage to patrol the coast through sheer weight of numbers of patrol craft, each equipped with a radio. I sympathize with your difficulty in getting planes, blimps, etc., but you have to do the job whether you get them or not!

(b) To decentralize responsibility to a small area command. In other words, for the local Commanding Officer to act and report to you afterwards instead of vice versa.

I hope you will consider routing the coastwise shipping as close to shore as possible. I read this morning of the sinking of a Brazilian ship sixty miles off the Capes of the Chesapeake. No Brazilian ship and no other ship ought to have been there anyway. The location was either too

far offshore or not far enough offshore.

Remember that from mid-April on you will get relatively good weather the whole length of the coast and in such weather smaller craft can operate on the average of 90% of the time. They should have orders that if the barometer drops excessively or the sea starts to run too high, they should make for the nearest harbor.

I think you should not count on using any destroyers on coast patrol. That is a waste of material that is more valuable elsewhere.

I am glad you have Vincent Astor working for you. You and he have got to use Yankee inventiveness to cut down these sinkings, which are wrecking all our plans.

For example, if I were in your place, I would buy (for junk prices) a lot of old ferry boats. I know of at least two dozen which are kept as spares or have been discarded. Cut off their overhangs, build up a wooden bow, put a bulwark around the stern, take off all top hamper, and the silly looking thing will be able to patrol off Sandy Hook or Montauk or Chatham for the six Summer months, at least 90% of the time. All it needs is one radio, one light gun and half a dozen depth charges.

I wish I had your job. Come and see me soon.

Always sincerely,

Rear Admiral Adolphus Andrews,
Commandant Third Naval District,
New York, N. Y.

COMMANDANT THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT
90 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK

6 March, 1942

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

Realizing how keenly interested you are in the defense of the Atlantic Coastline I am taking the liberty of enclosing herewith, for your information, a letter which I wrote on 7 February on the subject of "Readiness" which gives a general picture of the Atlantic Coast and the forces which the Army and Navy had at that time to defend it.

Since taking over this command I have made numerous requests for more planes and more ships. From time to time ships have been assigned to my Command and have been withdrawn later to join the Atlantic Fleet. From time to time there have been a few ships such as destroyers, and certain planes allotted temporarily for Frontier use. At present I have 3 destroyers and 2 patrol planes assigned temporarily from the Atlantic Fleet.

I realize full well that the Department is using every effort at this time to meet serious conditions in other areas which are deemed more important, and rightly so, than the defense of the Atlantic Coast. I have no criticism whatever to make and am only presenting this picture to show how very thin our butter is spread along the entire Atlantic Coast.

We have taken over all of the 75 and 83 foot Coast Guard boats in the harbors along the coast and have been fitting them with 50 caliber guns and depth charges. There are some 18 of them in this immediate area. They are having some trouble with their engine clutches. We have some of them in commission now and expect to have others very shortly which I will assign to different important strategic positions along the coast using them as patrol ships. They are good sea boats but have a cruising radius of only about 500 miles.

COMMANDANT THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT
90 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

As you know we are getting 24 trawlers from England. These are sturdy ships drawing about 21 feet of water with speed of 10 knots. Their deep draft is due to a listening device bulb attached to keel. They carry a good battery and also depth charges. The first of these arrived in New York two days ago and others are expected very shortly.

I am also making a survey of the entire coast to obtain every available fishing vessel to be equipped with radio to form an outside line to give quick information upon sighting enemy submarines or planes. Quite a number of these have already been equipped and are now at sea.

I am attaching hereto a list as of March 1st of the boats, ships and planes assigned to me for this Eastern Sea Frontier. I am also attaching a list of Army planes which are now on this coast. You can see how very meager this list is.

I can assure you that every unit (including surface ships, planes and blimps) has been working since December 7th to maximum capacity. Since that day there have been cleared from New York approximately 1500 ships and out of this number 5 have been torpedoed and sunk while in assigned sea lanes. A number have been sunk well off the coast and others coming up the coast. I think, however, we would have had many more sinkings had we not been able to route merchant shipping close to the coast where ships can be afforded as much protection as possible and where enemy submarines have to operate in comparatively shallow water. We have sunk some enemy submarines. They have a way of remaining below the surface during the day and striking at night. Therefore, ships, planes and blimps equipped with radar are most essential.

As stated in my letter I expect a very active condition on this coast in the Spring and when weather conditions improve. It is not at all improbable that we may have an air attack. What we need are planes and more planes, especially planes which can

COMMANDANT THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT
90 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

scout at distances off the coast and carry bombs and guns. Today I have under Navy Air only 2 patrol planes with radar capable of scouting for 400 or 500 miles to seaward. We are greatly in need of more surface ships and more blimps. These small blimps of which we have only 4 have been used night and day and have been giving excellent results. I wish we had more of them.


Please don't think, Mr. President, that I am trying to paint a sad picture. I am not pessimistic but have hopes that we will be in better condition in the near future. I realize fully, however, what we are up against and am working night and day to meet these conditions.

Vincent Astor told me that you had given him permission to work under me in the Eastern Sea Frontier. I appreciate greatly your letting me have him for this duty, understanding that he is to keep an eye also on his intelligence duties in New York. I have already assigned him as Advisor on Procurement of Ships with the specific duty of getting every possible ship and boat that we can find placed in immediate service. I have been closely associated with Astor here in New York. He has handled his present job splendidly. I have a very high regard for his zeal, initiative and energy. These attributes added to his experience at sea in small ships should make him a very valuable officer on my staff.

Although I realize how very busy you are I hope that you may find it convenient to send for me so that I may go over these matters with you and obtain the benefit of your valuable knowledge of these problems.

With best wishes and with renewed assurances of my highest regard, I am,

Very respectfully yours,


ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

ET-14

*file
Presidential*

Mary Folger

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

February 27, 1942

*X-File
P13*

*X-A16-1
Protection of
Seacoast*

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of 26 February 1942, advising me that you have signed an Executive Order placing upon the Secretary of the Navy the responsibility for security of shipping, piers, and other waterfront property, in ports and harbors of the United States, and suggesting that I use the Coast Guard organization for this work.

I am pleased to inform you that plans for using the Coast Guard in protecting shipping and waterfront property in our harbors have already been prepared, and have been awaiting your approval of the Executive Order. This morning I signed an order to the Chief of Naval Operations, directing that the plans be placed into effect.

Briefly, they propose that the Commandant of the Coast Guard, acting for the Chief of Naval Operations, will have general supervision over security measures, which will be carried out by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, acting through Coast Guard Captains of the Port and local Coast Guard organizations, together with all other facilities available to them within their respective Districts. The Commandant of the Coast Guard proposes to appoint one of his officers to administer the program along the Atlantic Coast and a similar officer for the Pacific Coast area. The Chief of Naval Operations has also signed a letter this morning advising the Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Commandants of the Naval Districts of these instructions, and directing them to proceed accordingly with security measures.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President
The White House

Navy Folder

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I have signed Executive Order directing you to protect vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities -- all in accordance with the recommendation of War, Navy, Maritime Commission and the Office of Civilian Defense.

In carrying this out I do not think that it should just be turned over by the Department to the local naval district Commandant. That may be satisfactory in one district and unsatisfactory in another. As I have told you, I have been greatly disappointed in, what I ~~am~~ frank to call, the inefficiency of the Department in setting up the naval district patrol. For at least a year -- one and a half years, in effect -- I have been pushing for the setting up of a patrol at least as good or possibly on a better basis than 1917.

In that year we started in March and by July had the districts not only set up on paper but large number of small ships -- about twelve to the district -- actually operating on patrol. You will find from the records that where an average of twelve vessels were assigned to a district (each district about seventy-five to one hundred miles incoastal length), an average of ~~nines~~ of the ships were on patrol duty at all times in each district.

For a year and a half I have encouraged the buying of yachts. Some were bought but it has taken an unconscionable time to convert them. I have talked about the larger fishing boats but the Department did nothing about it. There are still several hundred fishing boats big enough to do patrol work except during very serious north Atlantic storms.

When the submarine pack started to work on our own coast, I asked Betty for a report on a given hour on a given evening on how many patrol boats (as distinguished from destroyers) were had at sea at work between Eastport, Maine, and Key West. The answer was a total of seven ships. That is a real disgrace. On the 1917 parallel we would have had over one hundred.

I am reasonably certain that almost any day from now on a German submarine will come in shore and drop shells into some coastal town. They will not do much damage but the public will say that the Germans have the initiative on this coast and that the Japanese have it on the Pacific coast.

Ernie King's arrangement to put Andrews in complete charge of the patrol is good but it has taken a hell of a long while to get it done. I first mentioned it just six weeks ago. Meanwhile, the patrol of the Atlantic seaboard is totally insufficient. We cannot plead that we have not got the means, because we have got the means.

I am saying all this because this new Order puts a very difficult new task up to the Navy. I do not lay down any rule as to how it should be done except that the protection of vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities should be on a uniform basis. The following may be worth considering:

The Coast Guard knows infinitely more about this kind of work than the Navy does. How about getting a Rear Admiral Coast Guard from Woesche and putting him in charge of this work on the whole of the East coast? The same thing could be done on the West coast, with a Coast Guard Captain made responsible on the Gulf coast.

Please let me have a report on how it is to be done and the exact date on which this protection will have gone into effect!

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have taken a look at this because of what I consider to be the laxity in the protection of our merchant ships. It seems to me this Executive Order covers it pretty thoroughly and I would recommend that you sign it.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D. C.


FEB 21 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Attorney General has presented a proposed Executive Order directing the Secretary of the Navy to take action necessary to protect vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities.

The Attorney General has pointed out that as of the date of his letter of February 13, 1942 the Navy Department was opposed to the issuance of the proposed order. Since that time, however, the Navy Department has agreed to accept this responsibility and has agreed to the revised form of such Executive Order which is attached herewith. This revised draft of order has also been approved by representatives of the War Department, the Maritime Commission, the Office of Civilian Defense, and the Department of Justice.

I recommend that the draft of order be approved.


Acting Director.

Enclosures.

February 23, 1942

Dear Frank:

I am going to sign an Executive Order in a day or two giving you the responsibility for protection of all shipping. I think this letter from Admiral Land to me, copy of which I am attaching, is pertinent.

I have a good many misgivings about enemy aliens repairing or constructing our ships - for that matter, working as longshoremen unloading any ships too.

I know some people will say that it will be difficult to get labor. I think you had better make a pretty thorough statistical inquiry if that objection is raised as to how many enemy aliens actually are employed.

It seems to me that unless there is an awfully good reason, of which I am not aware, enemy aliens should be precluded from coming near any of our docks or ships for any purpose whatsoever.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Enclosure.

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy.

HLH/lmb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 20, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

Does this need any further
action?

F. D. R.

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

E. S. LAND
CHAIRMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
FEB 19 9 18 AM '42
RECEIVED
February 18, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

You have asked whether we permit any enemy aliens, or any other aliens to have access to any of our merchant ships, either as longshoremen or workers repairing or building ships.

Longshoremen - Certain areas have been designated by the Attorney General as "prohibited or restricted areas" from which all enemy aliens are barred, and therefore no enemy aliens have access to any merchant vessels or waterfront facilities within those areas. Outside those areas there is no general regulation denying or specially aimed at controlling access of aliens or enemy aliens to merchant vessels or waterfront facilities. Such controls as there may be are purely local and do not exist in the larger ports.

There has, however, been instituted by the Coast Guard a system of identification cards (not permits) "for persons who are employed on board vessels or who are employed ashore in connection with the operation of ships in such occupations as longshoremen, checkers, watchmen, shipping company employers, etc." Temporary green cards are issued by the Captain of the Port upon completion of application and fingerprint forms. The regulations provide that permanent cards will be issued only to reputable persons (citizens or aliens) whose identification has been established to the satisfaction of the issuing officer, whose

fingerprint forms have been forwarded, and who have been sponsored by a reputable person, corporation or organization, except that unemployed or unsponsored seamen presenting bona fide credentials are also entitled to cards. The Federal Bureau of Investigation checks the fingerprints, and the Office of Naval Intelligence checks the application, and the Captain of the Port may on the information thus obtained revoke the card. A special pink card is issued to alien seamen and enemy aliens but non-enemy aliens who are not seamen receive the same temporary green and permanent white cards that are issued to citizens. Except as indicated above there are no regulations providing for the denial of cards under certain circumstances, but we are advised that the Captain of the Port exercises a wide discretion in this matter. The regulations require that a full report be submitted to Coast Guard Headquarters in the case of any seaman who may be denied an identification card, but there is no such requirement as to applicants who are not seamen.

It is understood that a special red card is required by the Captains of the Ports to be carried by all persons having access to vessels carrying explosives and that in the principal ports the Captains of the Ports in the exercise of their discretion have limited the issuance of these cards to citizens.

Under date of November 25, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the Commission that the Navy had become the responsible agency for safeguarding shipping in the territorial waters of the United States, noting that "the internal security of the ports and harbors including their waterfront facilities and activities is a prerequisite to the safeguarding of shipping" and bespeaking "the active assistance of the Maritime Commission in the execution of the task of safeguarding shipping and in developing internal security measures for ports and harbors." Pursuant to this request the Commission appointed a Coordinator of Marine Protection who, after consultation with the officer in charge of sabotage precautions under the Chief of the Naval Districts Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and after a survey of the Port of New York, prepared suitable directives which were issued to all District Managers of the Commission, with detailed recommendations for "Precautions for the Protection of Piers, Terminals

and Steamships against Subversive Activities", to be placed in the hands of all pier, waterfront, terminal and ship operators. These recommendations do not deal with the subject of aliens or enemy aliens. The Coordinator of Marine Protection will shortly complete a survey of conditions at all major ports.

Enclosed with the letter of November 25, 1941, from the Secretary of the Navy was a copy of instructions dated September 8, 1941, from the Commandant of the Coast Guard to District Commanders and Captains of the Port in which it was pointed out that "the primary responsibility for furnishing protection against sabotage of moored ships and shore structures from the land side rests with State and Municipal forces and private interests." This situation created an anomaly which was recognized by all the parties concerned and which was the subject of conferences between representatives of the Commission and of the Navy Department, and of correspondence between the Commission and the Office of Civilian Defense, in which the Commission stated under date of January 9, 1942, that "the Maritime Commission considers itself an essential factor in coordinating the security program for the landside of the waterfront facilities, but it regards the Navy as having assumed primary responsibility in this matter" and under date of January 30, 1942, that "it is felt that the Navy Department and the Maritime Commission have arrived at a full and satisfactory understanding on this matter and the Commission does not consider itself equipped to take over the function of leadership." Subsequently, and at your request, the Attorney General called a conference on this matter as a result of which and by agreement of the War and Navy Departments, the Department of Justice, the Maritime Commission and the Office of Civilian Defense, a proposed directive has been prepared and it is understood has been submitted to you by the Attorney

General, in effect fixing the responsibility for the protection of waterfront facilities in the Navy Department.

The concern of the Office of Civilian Defense in the matter was based not only on its duty to "take necessary steps to secure the cooperation of appropriate Federal departments and agencies," but on the belief expressed by General Gasser, War Department Member of the Board for Civilian Protection in the Office of Civilian Defense, in which the Commission concurs, that the problem of internal security of waterfront facilities is as much civilian as it is military. It was for that reason that the Commission stated that it "considers itself an essential factor in coordinating the security program for the landside of the waterfront facilities." It is recognized, however, that the control and direction of the security program for shipping and waterfront facilities is properly centered in the Navy Department, that granting the coordinate importance of the civilian and military aspects of the problem, it is nevertheless indivisible, and that the necessary attention to both aspects can only be given at the point where the control and direction is exercised.

Workers repairing or building merchant ships - There are no restrictions whatever on the access of aliens or enemy aliens to merchant ships under repair or construction. In the majority of cases there are collective bargaining agreements between the unions and the shipyards which in effect put the control of this question in the hands of the unions. It is not believed that any of the unions have adopted any restrictions on the employment of aliens or enemy aliens in the shipyards.

In general, it is felt that the outright prohibition of employment of enemy aliens for marine work might have serious and immediate effects through the removal of a large

- 5 -

number of qualified and undoubtedly honest men. In Philadelphia and Boston particularly, many Italians are employed as stevedores and dock warehousemen, and their removal from the ranks of eligibles would deplete an already diminished number of stevedores at those ports. It is felt that a system of careful checking by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Office of Naval Intelligence, although a tremendous task, might be the most effective method of approaching the problem.

Sincerely,

E. S. Land

E. S. Land
Chairman

The President
The White House



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

February 13, 1942

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith presenting for your consideration a proposed Executive order entitled "Directing the Secretary of the Navy to Take Action Necessary to Protect Vessels, Harbors, Ports, and Waterfront Facilities in the United States".

The proposed order was drafted after a conference with representatives of the Navy Department, the War Department, the Maritime Commission, and the Office of Civilian Defense. The representatives of all the agencies named, except the Navy Department, approve the proposed order. The representatives of the Navy Department feel that the present plans are adequate and that the proposed order is therefore unnecessary.

However, if you consider the order necessary or desirable, they are unopposed to it in its present form except in one respect. They object to the provision in section 1 that the Secretary of the Navy shall be "primarily responsible for the protection of vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities", as required by the order. For the reasons stated in the next paragraph, however, I feel that the provision in question should be included in the order.



- 2 -

Executive Order No. 8972 of December 12, 1941, authorizes both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to protect from injury or destruction national-defense material, premises, and utilities, which include the things to be protected by the proposed order. It is felt by the agencies recommending issuance of the proposed order that because of the divided responsibility imposed upon the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy by the order of December 12, 1941, that order is unsatisfactory with respect to the protection of vessels, harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities; that the primary responsibility for such protection should be in a single agency; that the responsibility for the protection of waterfront facilities, which is a prerequisite to the safeguarding of vessels and shipping, is not clearly placed; and that the Navy, from the standpoint of equipment, personnel, experience, and contacts, is best equipped to furnish the necessary protection.

Copies of letters relative to this matter from the Secretary of War, the Maritime Commission, and the Office of Civilian Defense are enclosed.

I respectfully recommend that you issue the proposed order.

Respectfully,

Attorney General.

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

The Honorable,

The Attorney General.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Reference the conference held in your office February 3, 1942, at which you desired information and recommendations as to the fixing of definite responsibility for the protection of ports and harbors against sabotage, the War Department submits herewith its views in this matter.

Definite delineation of responsibility for the protection against sabotage of waterfront facilities is not fixed by any formal joint plan between the Army and Navy. However, by mutual agreement between the Army commander and the Naval District Commandants concerned and with assistance provided by the state or local government and the owner or operator, protection against sabotage is afforded to port and harbor installations vital to the war effort.

In a letter dated November 18, 1941, to the Commandants of all Naval Districts, the Chief of Naval Operations states, "It is of immediate importance to the national defense that all measures for the safeguarding of shipping in harbors and ports be fully developed. With the transfer of the United States Coast Guard to the jurisdiction of the Navy the safeguarding of shipping in territorial waters and the internal security of ports and harbors becomes a naval responsibility. The Chief of Naval Operations desires that measures for further improving the existing situation and conditions be instituted with the minimum delay".

As noted above, the Navy has assumed primary interest and responsibility in this matter. The War Department has no objection to this action. It will, as in the past, cooperate

Regraded Unclassified

-2-

to the fullest extent. However, in order to insure the co-operation of all other agencies concerned it is suggested that the President issue a directive calling upon these agencies to cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy in the fulfillment of this responsibility.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War

COPY

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION

WASHINGTON

Office of The Chairman

February 12, 1942

The Honorable
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Attorney General:

Mr. O'Brien of your office dictated over the telephone the proposed Presidential Directive ordering and directing the Secretary of the Navy to take the necessary steps "for the safeguarding against hostile undercover action and against sabotage of vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities in the United States". For the purpose of confirmation a copy of this Directive, as we understand it to read, is attached hereto.

This will confirm the telephone message to Mr. O'Brien advising you of the Commission's approval of this Directive.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) E. S. Land
Chairman

Enclosure

OFFICE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 13, 1942

The Honorable
The Attorney General
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

The Office of Civilian Defense approves and recommends the issuance of the proposed executive order entitled "Directing the Secretary of the Navy to Take Action Necessary to Protect Vessels, Harbors, Ports and Waterfront Facilities in the United States", in which the Secretary of the Navy is directed to take such steps as may be necessary to protect vessels, harbors, ports and waterfront facilities in the United States against hostile undercover action and sabotage, and in which the other agencies of the government are directed to assist the Secretary of the Navy in providing this protection to the extent of other valuable facilities and personnel.

The issuance of this order will accomplish the objective of the Waterfront Facility Committee of the Facility Security Program of the Office of Civilian Defense.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) L. D. GASSER

L. D. GASSER
Major General, U. S. Army
War Department Member of the Board
For Civilian Protection

(C O P Y)

SECRET
Al6-1(ESF)
Serial 868

Headquarters of the
Commandant Third Naval District
Federal Office Building, 90 Church Street
New York, N. Y.

Secret

7 February, 1942

From: Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier.
To : Chief of Naval Operations.
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Readiness.

Reference: (a) Opnav Conf. Ltr. Op-10 Hu 1/30/42 (SC)
Al6-1(4) Serial 0510 of 31 Jan. 1942.
(b) Opnav Conf. Ltr. Op-22-A2 (SC) Al6-3(9)
Serial 0115422 of 23 Oct. 1941.

Enclosure: (A) Com.3, Conf. Ltr. Al6-3, Serial 785 of
29 Jan. 1942 to C.O. Naval Vessels.
(B) Com.3, Res. Ltr. QW20 (Al6-3(4) QS-1 of
29 Jan. 1942 to Masters Merchant Vessels
at Shipyards.
(C) Com.3, Res. Ltr. QW20 (Al6-3(4) S74 of 30
Jan. 1942 to Masters Armed Merchant Vessels.
(D) Com.3, Res. Ltr. QW20 (Al6-3(4)/QC-No/ND3/S74
of 31 Jan. 1942 to Capt. Arthur Marsden, R.N.
British Ministry of War Transport.
(E) Com.3, Res. Ltr. QW20 (Al6-3(4)/QC-No/ND3/S74
of 7 Feb. 1942 to Mr. Orvind Lorentzen,
Norwegian Shipping and Trade Mission.
(F) List of available Army and Navy aircraft.
(G) List of available patrol vessels.

1. As directed, copies of reference (a) have been sent to the Commanding General Eastern Theatre of Operations and to the Commanding General First Air Force.

2. In the matter of joint Army and Navy training outlined in reference (b), such exercises were held frequently up to the time that war was declared. These exercises were planned for closer cooperation and coordination of air and surface vessels, communications, etc., between the Army and Navy. Since that time all efforts have been concentrated in meeting by joint action the enemy submarine activities in coastal waters. This joint action has served to a marked degree in training and in taking the place of joint exercises. In the future, when opportunity offers and when forces are not engaged in actual activities against enemy submarines or air attacks, joint Army and Navy training will be continued.

SECRET

AI6-1(ESEF)
Serial 868

(C O P Y)

7 February 1942

Subject: Readiness.

3. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier is fully in accord with statements made in reference (a). Every activity under his command has been kept on the alert constantly since 7 December last. In the opinion of Commander Eastern Sea Frontier there is not only a possibility but a distinct probability that our Eastern Coast will receive an air attack when weather conditions are favorable. This air attack may come direct from the shores of Europe or from mobile bases in the way of vessels capable of carrying and catapulting large sea planes. With this in mind, the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier has conferred frequently with the Army in order to bring into being and have available every defensive and offensive unit to repel an air attack. In New York the Army is woefully lacking in sufficient anti-aircraft guns. It has been roughly estimated that in order to protect this vital industrial New York area, a rectangle of about 10 by 9 miles, it is necessary to have about 500 anti-aircraft guns of 3" to 5" in caliber. At present it is understood that there are about 50 such guns placed in this area. In order to augment this fire, the Commandant Third Naval District has given orders that guns' crews of all naval vessels in this port and all merchant ships undergoing repair at the different navy yards and private shipyards and alongside piers must remain on the alert ready to fire in the event the particular ship is attacked from air or an attack is made in the immediate vicinity. In addition to this, the British officer controlling British merchant shipping in this port, as well as the Norwegian officer in control of Norwegian ships have been requested to give similar orders to their ships lying in this port. There are attached hereto enclosures (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) which have been issued not only in this District but sent to other Districts of the Eastern Sea Frontier command, all with the object of bringing to bear the greatest volume of anti-aircraft fire in case of attack. In addition to this, security measures have been taken and instructions issued to all shipbuilding plants outlining plans for security. Copies of these instructions have been sent to other Districts.

4. It is needless to note that there are vital areas along the Eastern Frontier which are today without protection and which should be protected from an air attack. It is understood that the Army has not sufficient guns for this purpose. Navy guns are being placed for the protection of the Narragansett area. Twelve 20 MM guns are being placed at Floyd Bennett Field. There are numerous other plants, however, such as the Federal Shipbuilding Plant, without local protection or with insufficient protection from Army or Navy guns.

SECRET
A16-1(ESF)
Serial 868

(COPY)

7 February 1942

Subject: Readiness.

5. In order that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet may be thoroughly informed as to the means for information and security and the means to meet submarine and air attacks, the following information is given showing the status of air conditions on the Eastern Frontier as of 1 February.

Except for the patrol bombers of the Fleet Air Detachment now at Norfolk, there are no long range naval patrol planes in the Eastern Sea Frontier capable of maintaining a constant patrol offshore and giving adequate protection to merchant shipping. The only naval planes attached to the districts are single-engined planes which, when carrying depth bombs, have a range of very little more than three hours. There is one squadron at Squantum for the First Naval District, which is inadequate to maintain a patrol of the Gulf of Maine as well as to maintain protection for shipping in and out of Portland, Portsmouth, Boston and the Cape Cod Canal.

Newport has one single-engined plane at Quonset carrying one depth bomb.

New York has one squadron of single-engined planes and three single-engined amphibians carrying depth bombs. These are not sufficient to maintain patrols as well as give air coverage to all the convoys and vessels requesting air coverage in and out of New York.

The four lighter-than-air ships of Squadron 12 at Lakehurst are being utilized to the limit, and additional ZNP's are urgently needed, as these airships can maintain, weather permitting, useful sea patrols. They are most valuable for patrol and escort duty.

The Fourth Naval District has no planes capable of attacking submarines. For the protection of the Delaware Capes a squadron should be based at Cape May.

The Fifth Naval District is dependent upon the fleet air detachment at Norfolk for patrol and escort duty. There should be planes permanently assigned for this.

The Coast Guard Air Station at Elizabeth City has recently been assigned three single-engined amphibians carrying two depth bombs each. Larger planes, when available, should be assigned.

SECRET
A16-1(ESF)
Serial 868

(COPY)

7 February 1942

Subject: Readiness.

The First Bomber Command of the Army has been maintaining patrols from Westover, Mitchell and Langley Fields, with flights in the morning and in the afternoon. Insufficient equipment, transfer of crews and units, and inexperienced personnel have contributed to the handicaps under which the Bomber Command has been operating, resulting in an average of not more than three planes from each field per flight.

The First Air Support Command has a number of small planes with short range, which have been used for observation patrols, but, lacking armament, they are ineffective against submarines.

It is impossible to guard the Frontier waters properly with the aviation equipment now available.

6. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier cannot too strongly emphasize the lack of sufficient air force on this Frontier to defend it properly and to patrol sea-borne trade along the coast, escort convoys, etc., in a proper manner. It is urgently and strongly recommended that steps be taken immediately to supply this coast with sufficient heavy long distance planes equipped with bombs and radio, in order that daily flights may be made to seaward and that a constant day and night patrol be maintained along this coast. In order to maintain an effective patrol along this Frontier the following is the minimum which should be assigned for this duty:

- 1 Squadron of patrol planes at Charleston or at Jacksonville.
- 1 Squadron of patrol planes at Elizabeth City, N.C.
- 1 Squadron of patrol planes at Norfolk, Va.
- 1 Squadron of patrol planes at Cape May, N.J.
- 1 Squadron of patrol planes at Naval Air Station, New York.
- 1 Squadron of patrol planes at Quonset.
- 1 Squadron of patrol planes at Squantum.

1 Squadron = 12 planes -

This estimate is made having in mind the additional planes in the way of bombers and support planes to be furnished by the Army.

7. There is attached hereto as enclosure (F) a list of available Naval aircraft and available Army aircraft as of 1 February, which force, Army and Navy included, has been used to the limit to search for and attack enemy submarines which have been operating off this coast for the last few weeks.

SECRET
A16-1(ESF)
Serial 868

(C O P Y)

7 February 1942

Subject: Readiness.

8. As to surface vessels, there is attached hereto as enclosure (G) a list of all surface vessels attached to the Eastern Sea Frontier and Naval Districts as of 1 February. It will be noted that the large proportion of these vessels are incapable of going to sea and maintaining a patrol which in the opinion of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, is urgently needed at this time.

9. It is absolutely essential that a number of vessels be used to guard efficiently the approaches to important harbors such as Norfolk, New York, Philadelphia, Narragansett Bay, Boston and Portland. It has not been considered sound policy to withdraw these vessels, which are constantly on duty night and day, and have them proceed to sea on patrol, even if they are capable of doing so, by reason of the fact that it is absolutely essential that these approaches be guarded.

10. Every effort has been made to expedite the laying of booms, submarine nets, sound loops, mine fields, in the approaches to the important harbors. Vessels, however, are absolutely necessary to guard these approaches in conjunction with other defensive measures.

11. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier, during the submarine activity off this coast, has used every possible available vessel for patrol along the coast but at no time has there been available over 10 such vessels for coastal sealane patrol. In some instances these vessels, small as they are, had to be used in rescuing survivors from sunken merchant ships in heavy weather at considerable distance offshore.

12. It is considered absolutely essential for the proper protection of merchant shipping along this coast to have a surface, as well as an air patrol, and at least 15 destroyers should be assigned to the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier for such duty.

13. The Commander Eastern Sea Frontier is well aware that all of this information is well known to higher authority, but he feels that it is his duty to call attention to this condition at the present time.

Recently there have been numerous letters received from the masters of merchant ships plying along this coast complaining of insufficient air and surface protection.

SECRET
A16-1(ESF)
Serial 868

(C O P Y)

7 February 1942

Subject: Readiness.

In the opinion of the Commander Eastern Sea Frontier there will be increased submarine activity on this coast in the coming Spring. Planes and ships should be made available NOW in order to meet this condition.

14. The transmission of this document via registered mail within the continental limits of the United States is authorized.

ADOLPHUS ANDREWS

Secret

LIST OF PATROL COMBAT VESSELS

FIRST NAVAL DISTRICT

5 March 1942

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Speed in Knots</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Number of Depth Charges</u>	<u>Sonic</u>
PC-455	Sub-Chaser 93 feet	12	2-50 Cal. Mche. Guns	7	Yes
PC-471	Sub-chaser 173 feet	20	2-3" 50 Cal.	32	Yes
PC-472	Sub-Chaser 173 feet	20	2-3" 50 Cal.	32	Yes
PC-473	Sub-Chaser 173 feet	20	2-3" 50 Cal.	32	Yes
St. Augustine	Converted Yacht 272 feet	14	3-3" 23 Cal.	14	Yes
Siren	PY	12	1-3" 23 Cal.	8	Yes
C.G.C.Dix	125 feet	12	1-3" 23 Cal.	14	Yes
Harriet Lane C. G. Cutter	125 feet	12	Unarmed	Unarmed	No
Cartigan C. G. Cutter	125 feet	12	1-3" 23 Cal.	14	Yes

LIST OF PATROL COMBAT VESSELS

NAVAL OPERATING BASE, NEWPORT, R.I.

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Speed in Knots</u>	<u>5 March 1942 Armament</u>	<u>Number of Depth Charges</u>	<u>Sonic</u>
Argo	Eagle	12	1-4"	9	Yes
C. G. Cutter	165 feet	16	1-3"-23 Cal.	16	Yes
PE-55	Eagle	15	1-4"	9	Yes
General Green C. G. Cutter	125 feet 110 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal. Cal.	14	Yes
Sylph	PT-216 feet	11	1-3"-50 Cal.	10	Yes
Icarus C.G.C.	165 feet	18	1-3"-23 Cal.	16	Yes
Antietam C.G.C.	125 feet	12	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
Alabaster	PT 110 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	6	Yes
PE-56	Eagle	15	1-4"	9	Yes
C.G.C.-464	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
C.G.C.-471	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
*Four C.G.C.	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
* Available 7 March.					
#Four C.G.C.	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
# Available 14 March.					

LIST OF PATROL COMBAT VESSELS

LIST OF PATROL COMBAT VESSELS

THIRD NAVAL DISTRICT

5 March 1942

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Speed in Knots</u>	<u>5 March 1942 Armament</u>	<u>No. of Depth Charges</u>	<u>Sonic</u>
PE-48	Eagle	12	1-4"	9	Yes
Zircon 451	PY 83 feet	15	3-3"-23 Cal.	28	Yes
PC-507 471	Sub-Chaser 110 feet	9	3-3"-23 Cal.	18	Yes
Sylph 553	PY-216 feet 79 feet	11	1-3"-50 Cal.	10	Yes
Icarus C.G.C. Fax	165 feet	16	1-3"-23 Cal.	16	Yes
Antietam C.G.C.	125 feet	10	1-1-pdr.	10	Yes
Alabaster	PY 110 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	6	Yes
PE-56	Eagle	15	1-4"	9	Yes
C.G.C.-464	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
C.G.C.-471	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
*Four C.G.C.	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
* Available 7 March.					
#Four C.G.C.	83 feet	16	1-1-pdr.	6	Yes
# Available 14 March.					

LIST OF PATROL COMBAT VESSELS

FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT

5 March 1942

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Speed in Knots</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>No. of Depth Charges</u>	<u>Sonic</u>
Alabaster	PY 110 feet	14	1-3" 23 Cal	8	No
PE-56	Eagle	15	1-4"	9	Yes
C.G. Cutter 464	83 Feet	16	1-1 pdr.	8	Yes
C.G. Cutter 471	83 Feet	16	1-1 pdr.	8	Yes
C.G. Cutter 653	79 Feet	14	1-1 pdr.	4	Yes
C.G. Cutter Colfax	125 Feet	12	1-1 pdr.	8	Yes
C.G.C. Calypso	125 Feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Curlew	125 Feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Blane	125 Feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Calypso	125 Feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Carrabassett	125 Feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes

LIST OF PATROL COMBAT VESSELS

FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

5 March 1942

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Speed in Knots</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Number of Depth Charges</u>	<u>Sonic</u>
PC-437	110 feet	14	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
PC-330	110 feet	14	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
PC-412	110 feet	14	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
Tournaline	PY-190 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	8	Yes
PE-19	Eagle	15	1-4"	9	Yes
C.G.C. Rush	125 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Jackson	125 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Cuyahoga	125 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Dione	165 feet	16	1-3"-23 Cal.	12	Yes
C.G.C. Calypso	165 feet	16	1-3"-23 Cal.	12	Yes
C.G.C. Carrabassett	155 feet	13	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes

LIST OF PATROL COMBAT VESSELS

SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT

5 March 1942

<u>Name of Ship</u>	<u>Type of Ship</u>	<u>Speed in Knots</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Number of Depth Charges</u>	<u>Sonic</u>
Ruby	PY	13	2-3"-23 Cal.	8	Yes
C.G.C. Agassiz	125 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	10	Yes
C.G.C. Tallapossa	165 feet	12	1-3"-23 Cal.	8	No
C.G.C.-131	75 feet	12	1-1-pdr.	4	No
C.G.C.-186	75 feet	12	1-1-pdr.	4	No

Secret

STATUS OF AIRCRAFT E.S.F.

Can Attack Subs

NAVY AND COAST GUARD AIRCRAFT

<u>Location</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Guns</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Endur.</u>	<u>Bombs</u>	<u>Depth Bombs</u>	<u>Out</u>	<u>Standby</u>	<u>Ready</u>
Salem	10	Light	175 K	6 hrs.	1	2	0			
MANCHESTER	0	Light	200 K	2 1/2 hrs.	0	3	47			
Squantum	12	Observ. Scout	10	85 K	4 hrs.	0	9	2	6	4
Total	12	Light	175 K	6 hrs.	0	7	0			
Quonset	4	Observ. Scout	4	85 K	4 hrs.	1	4	0	2	2
	5	Patrol Bomber	5	100 K	12 hrs.	0	5	1	4	1
LANGLAY	2	Patrol Bomber	2	175 K	6 hrs.	0	2	0	2	
	3	Torpedo Bomber	3	190 K	3 1/2 hrs.	0	3	0	2	1
Total	14	Bomber	3	190 K	3 1/2 hrs.	0	0	0	0	0
New York	4	Utility Amphib.	4	110 K	4 hrs.	0	4	2	1	3
MIAMI	12	Observ. Scout	11	85 K	4 hrs.	1	11	1	7	4
WEST PALM BEACH	4	Blimp	3	40 K	24 hrs.	0	3	1	1	2
Cape May	2	Torpedo Bomber	2	190 K	3 1/2 hrs.	0	2	0	7	2
	3	Utility Amphib.	3	110 K	4 hrs.	0	3	0	0	3
	1	Fighter	1	280 K	3 hrs.	1	0	0	1	1
Norfolk	2	*Patrol Bomber	2	100 K	12 hrs.	0	1	0	1	1
	6	Scout Observ.	6	90 K	3 1/2 hrs.	0	3	0	6	0
* Equipped with Radar.										
Eliz. City	5	Utility Amphib.	5	110 K	4 hrs.	0	5	0	1	4
TOTAL	65							4	34	28

Total planes standing by 34.
Total planes ready for immediate flight 28.

Patrol bombers carry 50 and 30-caliber machine guns.

ARMY BOMBER COMMAND

Can Attack Subs.

ARMY BOMBERS

<u>Location</u>	<u>Total No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Endur.</u>	<u>Out Comm.</u>	<u>In Comm.</u>	<u>Can Bomb</u>
BANGOR	10	Light	175 K	6 hrs.	1	9	0
MANCHESTER	55	Light	220 K	2½ hrs.	8	49	47
		Medium			0	3	2
WESTOVER	12	Medium	160 K	4 hrs.	5	7	6
		Light	175 K	6 hrs.	0	7	0
MITCHEL	7	Medium	160 K	4 hrs.	1	6	6
LANGLEY	12	Light	220 K	2½ hrs.	0	1	1
		Medium	160 K	4 hrs.	3	2	2
		Heavy	165 K	10 hrs.	4	8	8
CHARLESTON	0	- Bomb	180 K	8 hrs.	0	0	0
SAVANNAH	2	Light	160 K	4 hrs.	0	2	2
MIAMI	3	Medium	160 K	4 hrs.	1	2	2
WEST PALM BEACH	2	Medium	140 K	8 hrs.	0	2	2
Totals	119				23	98	78

Total planes in commission 98.
Total planes that can bomb 78.

Light bombers carry 30-caliber machine guns.
Heavy and medium bombers carry 30 and 50-caliber machine guns.

Total planes in commission 12.
Total planes out of commission 12.
Total planes that can bomb 12.

All observation planes that can bomb carry 30-caliber machine guns.

ARMY - AIR SUPPORT COMMAND

March 5, 1942.

<u>Location</u>	<u>Total No.</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Endur.</u>	<u>Out Comm.</u>	<u>In Comm.</u>	<u>Can Bomb 100 lb.</u>	<u>Demolition</u>
Devens, Mass.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Otis, Mass.	4	OBS	114 K	4½ hrs.	2	2		2
Hillsgrove, R.I.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mitchel, N.Y.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Newark	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dix, N.J.	16	OBS	114 K	4½ hrs.	7	9		9
	1	Med. Bomb.	123 K	8 hrs.		1		1
Atlantic City	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dover, Del.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Langley, Va.	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Charleston	4	OBS	114 K	4½ hrs.	2	2		2
Miami	2	OBS	114 K	4½ hrs.	1	1		1
Totals	27				12	15		15

Total planes in commission 15.
Total planes out of commission 12.
Total planes that can bomb 15.

All observation planes that can bomb carry 30-caliber machine guns.

A16-1 - Protection of Seacoasts.

Correspondence from and to the Secretary of the Navy regarding plans for using the Coast Guard in protecting shipping and waterfront property in our harbors.

Filed File ET-14 (Coast Guard.

Original to
Vincent A. Lator

A16-1
Protection of aircraft

Navy Folder

ROUGH DESCRIPTION SECTION BASES, EAST COAST,
WORLD WAR NO. 1

Set up about April 1 on paper. Began to be manned
May 15th. Fully manned July 1st.

From recollection, about 60% of the vessels were
yachts. From the time of conversion of said yacht ^{from} ~~in~~ time
they were turned over to government, to time they went on
sea duty, six weeks. Principal alterations to yachts:
one gun, one radio, four depth charges. Practically nothing
else.

The coast from Eastport to Key West was divided
into about 12 patrol sections. To each section was allocated about 12 vessels.
The other 40% of the vessels were made up of motor fishing
boats, a few seagoing tugs in the beginning, and a small
number of small local coasting steamers -- about 75 to 100
tons each.

As an example, patrol section No. 1 ran from
Eastport, Maine to Deer Island -- distance 80 miles.
Section base No. 1 was at Bar Harbor -- headquarters in
top of ferry house. If 12 vessels were assigned, 9 of
them were supposed to be kept at sea at any given time.

The 9 vessels at sea patrolled from Eastport to Deer Island day and night, and the usual custom was to run 3 vessels up and down on patrol about 10 miles out -- 3 more vessels about 25 or 30 miles out, and 3 other vessels about 50 or 75 miles out.

The next district was the Rockland patrol section and was supposed to cover the coast from about Deer Island to Bath.

Patrol section No. 3 -- headquarters Portland -- covered from there down to part way Portsmouth.

Patrol section No. 4 was based on Portsmouth and covered the area outside the Isle of Shoals, and down to Cape Ann.

Patrol section No. 5, based on Boston, covered the whole Mass. Bay and, as I remember it, had a sub-section base in Provincetown.

Patrol section No. 6 was based on Newport. But its actual operations base was Block Island, and covered the territory from Chatham to Southhampton.

Patrol section No. 7 was based on Staten Island and covered the Sea from Southhampton to Atlantic City.

Patrol section No. 8 was the mouth of the Delaware

from Atlantic City to half way down the Eastern Shore.

Patrol Section No. 9 based on Hampton Roads, ran from Ocean City, Md. to south of Hatteras.

The next 3 patrol sections covered the territory from about Wilmington, N.Car. to Key West, Fla.

As I remember it, there was real decentralization. Reports were made by observers at sea to the section base C.O. who acted immediately without any further authority, but also immediately notified the office^f of the Commandant of the District. In practice the Commandant of the District did little to interfere with operations of the section base people. The section base commander had full authority to ask for help from the adjacent section base which, of course, was given unless something else was keeping him busy.