

Map Room Files.

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BOX 169.

4. A-16 QUADRANT (Quebec) CONFERENCE: August 8 - September 4, 1943.

September 4, 1943

My dear Mackenzie,

I send you herewith copies of a despatch I have sent to King George and of a note I have written to Princess Alice. To those messages I add to you, my old friend, my thanks for the major part that you have played in accomplishing a most successful war conference at one of the critical periods of the war.

I look forward to the day when we may both fully enjoy our countryside with a feeling that we have helped to make living a satisfaction to people in other parts of the world.

With renewed thanks,

Devotedly yours,

FDR

The Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King,
The Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada

September 4, 1943

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With renewed thanks,

Devotedly yours,

FDR

The Honorable W. L. Mackenzie King,
The Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada

PB

September 4, 1943.

My dear Princess Alice:

I forward herewith a copy of a despatch I have just sent to King George in which I attempted to give some slight evidence of my appreciation for your many kindnesses to us in Canada. I shall always remember the warm welcome, the evident genuine feeling of friendship, and the united effort of everyone to combine against the enemy.

I am very grateful to you for making us all so comfortable at the Citadel. I shall always remember the charm of that inspiring setting. And my day in Ottawa was perfect.

I send my best wishes to your husband and hope that the tour of inspection you are now making will be wholly agreeable and reasonably comfortable.

With all good wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

FDR

H.R.H.
The Princess Alice
Countess of Athlone,
Government House,
Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada.

SECRET

September 4, 1943.

From: Opnav
To : Alusna London

Personal and secret to Winant for the King from the President.

The visit of the Churchill family at the White House not only affords me a great deal of pleasure but gives us an opportunity to evaluate the work of the conference at Quebec. I know that you will be well pleased with the results when you receive a full report from your Prime Minister. Quebec, Ottawa, and all of Canada could not have been more hospitable. You could not have found more helpful and agreeable representatives to receive us than the Governor-General and Princess Alice. I send you my personal thanks for providing such delightful quarters at the Citadel.

ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Grace Tully.

I think the President, having returned to Washington, may wish to send messages or letters to the following in appreciation of his Quebec visits:

- (a) The King.
- (b) The Prime Minister of Canada.
- (c) The Governor-General of Canada.

Will you let me know if the President wishes me to do anything about it?

WILSON BROWN.

THE CITADEL
QUEBEC

1st draft
J. J.
WA

The Anglo-American War Conference which opened at Quebec on the 11th of August, under the hospitable auspices of the Canadian Government, has now concluded its work. The whole field of world operations has been surveyed in the light of the many gratifying events which have taken place since the meeting of the President and the Prime Minister in Washington at the end of May, and the necessary decisions have been taken to provide for the forward action of the Fleets, Armies and Air Forces of the two nations. Considering that these forces are ~~most~~ closely intermingled in continuous action against the enemy in several quarters of the globe, it is indispensable that entire unity of aim and method should be maintained at the summit of the war direction. Further conferences will be needed, probably at shorter intervals than before, as the war effort of the United States and British Commonwealth and Empire against the enemy spreads and deepens. It would not be helpful to the fighting troops to make any announcement of the decisions which have been reached. These can only emerge in action.

It may however be stated that the military discussions of the Chiefs of Staff turned very largely upon the war against Japan and the bringing of effective aid to China. Mr. T.V. Soong, representing the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, was a party to the discussions. In this field, as in the European, the President and the Prime Minister were able to receive and approve the unanimous recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Agreement was also reached upon the political data underlying or arising out of the military operations.

It was resolved to hold another Conference before the end of the year between the British and American authorities, in addition to any tripartite meeting which it may be possible to arrange with Soviet Russia. Full reports of the decisions taken, so far as they affect the war against Germany and Italy, will be furnished to the Soviet Government.

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SUGGESTED STATEMENT TO BE MADE TO MR. SOONG.

1. The building up of the Air route to China has been going on according to plan in spite of difficulties, and deliveries in August are expected to be over 7,000 tons. Expansion will continue.

2. We are intending to carry out the largest operations in Northern Burma during the coming winter, which the physical limitations of the lines of communication, which have been aggravated by the recent floods in Bengal, will allow us to carry out. The start of these operations will be co-ordinated with those of the Chinese by General Stilwell. Their object is to enable us to join hands with the Chinese forces, and thus to pave the way for the eventual opening of the Ledo Road to China.

3. An amphibious operation against the Japanese will be launched from India in 1944. The point of attack will be settled after the completion of further studies which have been set on foot.

(Copy handed to Mr. Hopkins
22.4.43)

✓

SECRET.
IMMEDIATE.

MR. LAWFORD.

Brigadier Jacob has asked me to send you the attached copy of his suggested statement to be made to Mr. Soong.

The Prime Minister has seen this and thinks it good, subject to the views of the Staff. A copy has been given to Mr. Hopkins.

Jmm.

22.8.43

Dup. Red seal'd.
P. 15
2/11/43.

CHATEAU FRONTENAC,
QUEBEC.

MOST SECRET.

PRIME MINISTER.

The Foreign Secretary has told me that you and the President propose to see Mr. Soong tomorrow, and to give him a broad outline of what has been decided about operations in Eastern Asia. Mr. Eden indicated the points you wished to cover, and asked me to make a suggestion as to what exactly should be said.

2. My proposal is that you should say the following:-

- (1) The building up of the air route to China has been going on according to plan in spite of difficulties, and deliveries in August are expected to be over 7,000 tons. Expansion will continue.
- (2) We are intending to carry out the largest operations in Northern Burma during the coming winter, which the physical limitations of the lines of communication, which have been aggravated by the recent floods in Bengal, will allow us to carry out. The start of these operations will be co-ordinated with those of the Chinese by General Stilwell. Their object is to enable us to join hands with the Chinese forces, and thus to pave the way for the eventual opening of the Ledo Road to China.
- (3) An amphibious operation against the Japanese will be launched from India in 1944. The point of attack will be settled after the completion of further studies which have been set on foot.

Good
by
22. viii
R

3. I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be asking for a meeting with the President and yourself at ~~5.30~~ p.m. on Monday, 23rd August, at which they will present their conclusions on the war against

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* Brig. Isitt informed.

Japan. I suggest that it would be best for your meeting with Dr. Soong to take place after your meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The latter could then give you their advice as to whether the statement I have suggested accords with their views.

Stamps

22ND AUGUST, 1943.

3

UNPARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET
CYPHER TELEGRAM IN A ONE TIME PAD

T.O.O. 222208Z August 1943

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

IMPORTANT

From: QUADRANT
To: War Cabinet Offices

WELFARE NO. 327

Personal for Deputy Prime Minister.

Reference WELFARE NO. 326 para. 3., following is what we propose to tell Mr. Soong.

BEGINS. (1) The building up of the air route to China has been going on according to plan in spite of difficulties, and deliveries in August are expected to be over 7,000 tons. Expansion will continue.

(2) We are intending to carry out the largest operations in Northern Burma during the coming winter, which the physical limitations of the lines of communication, which have been aggravated by the recent floods in Bangal, will allow us to carry out. The start of these operations will be co-ordinated with those of the Chinese by General Stilwell. Their object is to enable us to join hands with the Chinese forces, and thus pave the way for the eventual opening of the Lodo Road to China.

(3) An amphibious operation against the Japanese will be launched from India in 1944. The point of attack will be settled after the completion of further studies which have been set on foot.

ENDS.

Circulation
Mr. Martin
Brig. Jacob

T.O.O. 222208Z

Regraded Unclassified

The Citadel,
Quebec,
August 22nd.

Dear Mr. Redfern,

The President would appreciate it very much if the Governor-General would be kind enough to add Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., to the list of those to accompany the President for luncheon.

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

The Honorable A. S. Redfern,
Secretary to the Governor-General,
Government House,
Ottawa, Canada

Quebec,
August 22, 1943.

Dear Mr. Mayor,

President Roosevelt asked me to acknowledge your letter of August 17th and to express his great appreciation of your friendly welcome and your thoughtful invitation to visit the City of Levis. The President asked me to say that he has delayed answering in the hope that an opportunity might offer to accept but that the developments of the conferences and resulting discussions have made such demands on his time that he is unable to accept. In the meantime, he enjoys the wonderful view of historic Levis from the windows of the Citadel.

He sends his best wishes to you.

Very sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

The Honorable J. Adelard Begin,
Mayor of the City of Levis,
Levis, P.Q.

NOTE:

After the above was dictated, the President stated that he might leave Hyde Park on Friday or Saturday rather than on Sunday night.

Quebec,
August 22, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:
Mr. Dewey Long.

The President studied the tentative schedule submitted for the return train trip about 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, August 21st. His comments are as follows:

- (a) Leave Quebec 11 p.m.
- (b) Leave Ottawa for Highland, rather than Washington.
- (c) After delivering the President and the members of the party who will spend the week-end at Poughkeepsie and Hyde Park, the train should take other passengers to Jersey City where they will be free to provide their own transportation to Washington. The train is to remain at Jersey City until Sunday night when the President wishes to leave Hyde Park for Washington, to arrive Monday morning. The President directs that all of the present party are free to return to Washington except those who may be required for communications at Poughkeepsie and possibly Miss Hackmeister to look out for mail.

The program for Ottawa is correct except that times should be inserted to agree with the schedule outlined by the Secretary to the Governor-General. at and from Ottawa

The times for arrival and departure/by train are approved.

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:
Mr. Stephen T. Early
Lt-Col. Chester Hammond, USA.

PROGRAM AT OTTAWA

11:00 a.m. Arrive Deep Cut Station, Ottawa

Leave train and drive to Parliament Hill.

12 Outdoor address to members of the Senate and the House of Commons, and public.

12:30 Receive members of the Diplomatic Corps and Representatives of the Government in the Parliament Buildings.

12:45 Proceed to Government House for luncheon.

2:30 Short ceremony after luncheon (in the Governor-General's room, Government House) for conferring honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from the University of London.

3:45 Enter cars for drive to include stopping at the American Legation and receiving Mr. Atherton's staff (without getting out of car); then to Mr. Mackenzie King's summer residence, "Kingsmere", and returning to the Prime Minister's town house for tea. *5 pm*

6:30 p.m. Leave Ottawa.

Sgt. Cook, U.S.M.C.

Sgt. Coombs, U.S.M.C.

General Service Agents.

(*) Time from Deep Cut to Parliament Hill will vary by schedule.

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

THUESDAY, August 24, 1943

Lv. Quebec City (Canadian National RR)..... 11:00 p.m.

WEDNESDAY, August 25, 1943.

Ar. Deep Cut Station, Ottawa (C.N.RR) 11:00 a.m.(*)

Train level ramp at Deep Cut Station

Lv. Ottawa, Deep Cut Station (C.N.RR)..... 6:30 p.m.

Canadian National diner through to Highland.

THURSDAY, August 26, 1943

Ar. Highland, N.Y. (N.Y.C. RR) 8:30 a.m.

Members of the party

THE PRESIDENT

Stephen Early
Admiral McIntire
Admiral Brown
Harry Hopkins

Miss Tully
George Fox
Wm. Rigdon
Jack Romagna
Miss Hachmeister
Dewey Long
John Cook
Monty Snyder
Valet

Sgt. Hoch, U.S.M.C.
Sgt. Coombs, U.S.A.

Secret Service Agents.

(*) Time from Deep Cut to Parliament Hill only 10 minutes.

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 319/3

22 August 1943

SECRET - SECURITY

COPY NO. 65

(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

DRAFT FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Memorandum by the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Enclosure is the final report on the results of the
Quadrant Conference.

E N C L O S U R E

QUADRANT

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER
OF THE FINAL AGREED SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS REACHED
BY THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

In previous memoranda (C.C.S. 319 and C.C.S. 319/2) the Combined Chiefs of Staff presented certain agreed conclusions reached during the present Conference regarding operations in the main theaters of war. These amended conclusions have been related to resources available, and an agreed summary is submitted herewith.

I. OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE

In conjunction with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS powers.

II. OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR

1. In cooperation with RUSSIA and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date, the unconditional surrender of the AXIS in EUROPE.

2. Simultaneously, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers concerned to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against JAPAN with the purpose of continually reducing her Military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the over-all objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

3. Upon the defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE, in cooperation with other PACIFIC Powers and, if possible, with RUSSIA, to direct the full resources of the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of JAPAN.

III. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS IN SUPPORT OF OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Whatever operations are decided on in support of the over-all strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation.

1. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE and the BRITISH ISLES.
2. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas.
3. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication, with particular emphasis on the defeat of the U-boat menace.
4. Continue the disruption of AXIS sea communications.
5. Intensify the air offensive against the AXIS Powers in EUROPE.
6. Concentrate maximum resources in a selected area as early as practicable for the purpose of conducting a decisive invasion of the AXIS citadel.
7. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of RUSSIA.
8. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of CHINA as an effective Ally and as a base for operations against JAPAN.
9. To prepare the ground for the active or passive participation of TURKEY in the war on the side of the Allies. (See also Section V paragraph 2)
10. To prepare the French Forces in AFRICA to fulfill an active role in the war against the AXIS Powers. (See also Section V paragraph 3)

IV. EXECUTION OF THE OVER-ALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT

The following operations in execution of the over-all strategic concept are agreed upon. No order of priority is necessary since the result of relating resources to operations shows that all are possible of accomplishment If a conflict of interests should arise, it will be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

1. The U-Boat War

a. Facilities in the AZORES Islands

The facilities of the AZORES Islands will be used for intensified sea and air operations against the U-boat.

On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the AZORES we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the AZORES has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

b. Progress report

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.

2. The Defeat of the AXIS in EUROPE

We have approved the following operations for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, 1943-44.

a. The Bomber Offensive

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the

material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

b. Operation OVERLORD

(1) This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in FRANCE, operations designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

(2) There will be a balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the UNITED KINGDOM in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-CHANNEL move into FRANCE.

(3) As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

We have approved the following command appointments for
Operation OVERLORD:

Naval Commander - Commander in Chief, PORTSMOUTH
(Admiral Sir Charles Little)

Air Commander - Air Officer Commanding in Chief,
Fighter Command (Air Marshal
Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory)

c. Operations in ITALY

(1) First phase. The elimination of ITALY as a
belligerent and establishment of air bases in the ROME
area, and, if feasible, farther north.

(2) Second phase. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

(3) Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure
on German forces in Northern ITALY, and the creation of the
conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favor-
able for the eventual entry of our forces, including the
bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into
Southern FRANCE.

d. Operations in Southern FRANCE

Offensive operations against Southern FRANCE (to include
the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be
undertaken to establish a lodgment in the TOULON-MARSEILLES
area and to exploit northward in order to create a diversion in
connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished guerrilla operations
in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.

e. Air operations

(1) Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central
MEDITERRANEAN bases, complementing POINTBLANK.

(2) Development of an air ferry route through the AZORES.

(3) Air supply of BALKAN and French guerrillas (see
paragraph f below).

f. Operations in the BALKANS

Operations in the BALKAN area will be limited to supply
of BALKAN guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor Com-
mando forces, and to the bombing of PLOESTI and other strategic
objectives from Italian bases.

g. Garrison requirements and security of lines of communication in the MEDITERRANEAN

Defensive garrison commitments in the MEDITERRANEAN area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of GIBRALTAR will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest AFRICA, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the IBERIAN PENINSULA.

h. Emergency return to the Continent

We have examined the plans that have been prepared by General Morgan's staff for an emergency operation to enter the Continent. We have approved these plans in principle but have directed that they be kept under continuous review with particular reference to the premises regarding the attainment of air superiority and the number of troops necessary for the success of these operations.

3. The War against JAPAN

a. Long-term strategy

(1) We have made a preliminary study of long-term strategy for the defeat of JAPAN and are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:

(a) The dependence of Japan upon air power and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

(b) The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to Japan's air force and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas.

(c) The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.

(2) We consider that great advantage may be obtained, by modern and untried methods, from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. We have in mind:

(a) A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in CHINA as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an "air road" to CHINA.

(b) The employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent largely upon air supply lines.

(c) The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, HABBAKUKS etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.

From every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of JAPAN as soon as possible after the defeat of GERMANY. Planning should be on the basis of accomplishing this within twelve months of that event. Decisions as to specific operations which will insure a rapid course of events must await further examination on the lines indicated above.

(3) The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against JAPAN must be in accord with the overall objective and strategic concept reaffirmed in Sections I and II above.

(4) We are agreed that the reorientation of forces from the European Theater to the PACIFIC and FAR EAST should be started as soon as the German situation, in our opinion, so allows.

The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC, shall be provided by the UNITED STATES, and for operations from the West by GREAT BRITAIN, except for special types not available to GREAT BRITAIN which will be provided by the UNITED STATES. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.

b. Specific operations 1943-44

(1) We have found it impracticable during QUADRANT to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against JAPAN in 1943-44. We therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which we feel able to make at once.

(2) Operations in the Pacific 1943-44

We approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the PACIFIC in 1943-44 as follows:

(a) GILBERTS

The seizure and consolidation of the GILBERTS preparatory to a further advance into the MARSHALLS.

(b) MARSHALLS

The seizure of the MARSHALL ISLANDS (including WAKE and KUSAIE) preparatory to a westward advance through the Central PACIFIC.

(c) PONAPE

The capture of PONAPE preparatory to operations against the TRUK area.

(d) CAROLINES (TRUK area)

The seizure of the eastern CAROLINES as far west as WOLEAI and the establishment of a fleet base at TRUK.

(e) PALAU ISLANDS

The capture of the PALAUS including YAP.

(f) Operations against GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS

The seizure of GUAM and the Japanese MARIANAS.

(g) Operations in the NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY ISLANDS subsequent to current operations

The seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW GUINEA as far west as WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. RABAU is to be neutralized rather than captured.

(h) Operations in NEW GUINEA subsequent to the WEWAK-KAVIENG Operation

An advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as VOGELKOP, by step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances.

(3) Operations in INDIA-BURMA-CHINA Theater, 1943-44

(a) To carry out operations for the capture of UPPER BURMA in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with CHINA. Target date mid-February 1944.

It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.

(b) To continue preparations for an amphibious oper-

Prime Minister's suggested amendment.

(b) should read:

To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the Spring of 1944. Pending a decision on the particular operation, the scale of these preparations should be of the order of those hitherto contemplated for the capture of Akyab and Ramree.

to the building of the air base and
air supplies to CHINA, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

- (i) Keeping CHINA in the war.
- (ii) Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
- (iii) Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in CHINA.
- (iv) Equipping Chinese ground forces.

(g) Operations in the NEW GUINEA-BISMARCKS-ADMIRALTY ISLANDS subsequent to current operations

The seizure or neutralization of eastern NEW GUINEA as far west as WEWAK and including the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS and BISMARCK ARCHIPELAGO. RABAUl is to be neutralized rather than captured.

(h) Operations in NEW GUINEA subsequent to the WEWAK-KAVIENG Operation

An advance along the north coast of NEW GUINEA as far west as VOGELKOP, by step-by-step airborne-waterborne advances.

(3) Operations in INDIA-BURMA-CHINA Theater, 1943-44

(a) To carry out operations for the capture of UPPER BURMA in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with CHINA. Target date mid-February 1944.

It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by recent floods.

~~(b) To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the Spring of 1944 on the scale already contemplated, namely, for the capture of AKYAB and RAMREE.]~~

~~(c) To continue the preparation of INDIA as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.~~

(d) Present plans give first priority of resources available in the CHINA-BURMA-INDIA Theater to the building up and increasing of the air routes and air supplies to CHINA, and the development of air facilities, with a view to:

- (i) Keeping CHINA in the war.
- (ii) Intensifying operations against the Japanese.
- (iii) Maintaining increased U.S. and Chinese Air Forces in CHINA.
- (iv) Equipping Chinese ground forces.

c. Examination of future operations

We have directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:

(1) A study and report on the following operations and their relation one to another:

(a) An operation against NORTHERN SUMATRA; target date Spring 1944.

(b) Operations southwards from NORTHERN BURMA; target date November 1944.

(c) Operations through the MOULMEIN area or KRA ISTHMUS in the direction of BANGKOK; target date to be as early as practicable.

(d) Operations through the MALACCA STRAITS and MALAYA for the direct capture of SINGAPORE; target date to be as early as practicable.

(e) The capture of AKYAB to determine whether it is necessary to the success of operations in (a) to (d) above or the operations in NORTHERN BURMA (paragraph 3 b (3) (a)).

(3) A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to China on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and CHINA in 1944-45, on the assumption that GERMANY is defeated in the Autumn of 1944.

This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraphs 3 b (3) (a) and (b).

d. Southeast Asia Command

(1) We have decided to establish a Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia. It will be set up as follows:

(a) Command and Staff

To be Combined British and American along the lines of the North African Command. The Supreme Allied Commander will be British and he will have an American Deputy.

c. Examination of future operations

We have directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:

Prime Minister's suggested amendment.

(1) A study and report on the following operations and their relation to one another:

(a) CULVERIN; target date spring 1944.

(b) Operations southwards from Northern Burma; target date November 1944; and whether the capture of Akyab is necessary to their success.

(2) To continue the general study of longer-term objectives such as:

(a) Operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Isthmus in the direction of Bangkok; target date to be as early as practicable.

(b) Operations through the Malacca Straits and Malaya for the direct capture of Singapore; target date to be as early as practicable.

necessary to the success of operations in (a) to (d) above or the operations in NORTHERN BURMA (paragraph 3 b (3) (a)).

(3) A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to China on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia Theater and CHINA in 1944-45, on the assumption that GERMANY is defeated in the Autumn of 1944.

This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraphs 3 b (3) (a) and (b).

d. Southeast Asia Command

(1) We have decided to establish a Supreme Allied Command in Southeast Asia. It will be set up as follows:

(a) Command and Staff

To be Combined British and American along the lines of the North African Command. The Supreme Allied Commander will be British and he will have an American Deputy.

(b) Area included

The boundaries are set out in detail in C.C.S. 308/3, but, generally, they include BURMA, FRENCH INDO CHINA, THAILAND, the MALAY PENINSULA and SUMATRA.

(c) Command relationship

The command relationships are as set forth in C.C.S. 308/3 but briefly they are as follows:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Theater, and over the allocation of resources. The British Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations.

The Viceroy of INDIA, acting on behalf of the British War Cabinet, will resolve on the spot any day to day differences that may occur concerning the division of responsibility between INDIA and Southeast Asia relating to priorities on administrative matters.

General Stilwell will be the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander of the Southeast Asia Theater and, in this capacity, will command all Chinese troops and U.S. air and ground forces committed to the Theater in conformity with the over-all plan of the British Army Commander. In him also will be vested the operational control of the 10th Air Force. He will continue to have the same direct responsibility to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as heretofore.

(d) Combined Liaison Committee

A Combined Liaison Committee will be set up for the coordination of U.S. and British quasi-military activities in INDIA and the Southeast Asia Command.

V. CONCLUSIONS ON MISCELLANEOUS SUBJECTS

1. Military considerations in relation to SPAIN

We suggest that our general policy should be to deny the enemy his present privileged position in SPAIN, and to supplant him there to as great an extent as possible, thus transferring to the Germans the anxiety that has hitherto been ours. In pursuance of this policy, we suggest that we should now intensify pressure by economic and political means in order to obtain the following objectives:

a. Discontinuance of supplies of raw materials to GERMANY. The most important material which GERMANY obtains from SPAIN is wolfram, of which commodity SPAIN and PORTUGAL supply the largest proportion of German requirements.

b. Withdrawal of the Blue Division from the ranks of the enemy.

c. A modification of the present distribution of Spanish forces in MOROCCO so as to remove any suggestion of distrust of the United Nations.

d. Cessation of the use of Spanish shipping for the benefit of our enemies.

e. Denial to the enemy of secret intelligence facilities.

f. Facilities for civil aircraft of United Nations.

g. A more benevolent attitude towards escaped Allied prisoners of war.

h. The strictest interpretation of international law towards enemy personnel and naval and air units.

i. Elimination of objectionable anti-Allied propaganda and increase in pro-Allied propaganda.

2. Military considerations in relation to TURKEY

We are of the opinion that from the military point of view the time is not ripe for TURKEY to enter the war on our side. Our policy should be as follows:

a. We should ask TURKEY to interpret the Montreux Convention strictly, so as to exclude the passage of all German shipping of military value through the Straits.

b. We should ask that supplies of chrome to Germany should be stopped.

c. We should ask TURKEY to continue:

(1) To improve her internal communications.

(2) To complete the airfields required for HARDIHOOD.

(3) To allow us to install the full R.D.F. and Sector Control facilities which we require.

(4) To complete the construction of storage facilities required for the full HARDIHOOD Plan.

(5) To raise the effectiveness of their fighting forces.

d. Our policy on equipment to TURKEY should be that we should continue to supply such equipment as we can spare and as the Turks, in the opinion of C in C Middle East, can absorb.

3. Reequipping French forces

We have approved the rearmament of French units up to and including eleven divisions by 31 December 1943 as recommended by the Commander, North African Theater.

4. PLOUGH force

General Morgan and General Eisenhower have been given the details of PLOUGH force and have been asked to report as to possible uses for it in their respective theaters.

5. Special operations in SARDINIA and CORSICA

We have asked General Eisenhower to examine the possibilities of intensifying subversive activities in SARDINIA and CORSICA with a view to facilitating entry into those islands.

6. HABBAKUK

We have examined the possibilities of constructing "floating airfields" and have given our approval to the active pursuit of further experiments.

7. Supply routes in N.E. INDIA

We have approved in principle intensified development of the supply routes into ASSAM and have issued directives to theater commanders concerned with a view to a target of 220,000 tons per month being reached by 1 January 1946.

8. Pipeline, INDIA-CHINA

We have approved the construction of a 4-inch pipeline from ASSAM to KUNMING and of a 6-inch pipeline from CALCUTTA to ASSAM. These will facilitate air operations in CHINA and ease congestion on the existing lines of supply.

British

SECRET - SECURITY

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U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 319/1

21 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Memorandum from the British Chiefs of Staff

We have prepared the enclosed draft report with reference to War against Japan. It is presented for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

E N C L O S U R E

1. At Trident we directed the Combined Staff Planners to initiate a study and prepare for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff an appreciation leading up to an outline plan for the defeat of Japan, including an estimate of the forces required for its implementation.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff, having made a preliminary examination of this study (summary attached as Annex I) are of the opinion that the following factors require particular emphasis:-

a. The dependence of Japan upon air power and shipping for maintaining her position in the Pacific and Southeast Asia;

b. The consequent need for applying the maximum attrition to Japan's air force and shipping by all possible means in all possible areas in order to assist the main American advance across the Pacific;

c. The advantage to be gained and the time to be saved by a more extensive use of the superior air resources at the disposal of the United Nations, both in the strategic field and in conjunction with operations on land.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider that great advantage can be obtained by modern and untried methods from the vast resources which, with the defeat of Germany, will become available to the United Nations. They have in mind:

a. A project rapidly to expand and extend the striking power of the United Nations air forces in China as well as of the ground troops for their defense by employing the large numbers of load carrying aircraft available to open an "air road" to China without waiting for the opening of the Burma Road proper.

b. The reconquest of areas in Southeast Asia by the employment of lightly equipped jungle forces, dependent entirely upon air supply lines.

c. The use of special equipment, such as artificial harbors, Habbakuks etc., to enable the superior power of the United Nations to be deployed in unexpected and undeveloped areas.

Although from every point of view operations should be framed to force the defeat of Japan as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany - even within twelve months of that event - decisions which will insure a much more rapid course of events than that envisaged in the plan laid before us must await further examination on the lines indicated above.

4. The deployment of forces and the operations to be undertaken in the war against Japan must be in accord with the overall objective and strategic concept defined at Trident.*

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed that the re-orientation of forces from the European theater to the Pacific and Far East should be started as soon as the German situation, in the opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, so allows, without necessarily waiting for an armistice.

The principle has been accepted that the forces to carry out operations from the East, including the Southwest Pacific, shall be provided by the United States, and for operations from the West by Great Britain, except for special types not available to Great Britain which will be provided by the United States. The employment of Dominion forces will be a matter of discussion between all Governments concerned.

* C.C.S. 242/6, Sections 1 and 2.

6. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are convinced that the issues raised in the plan that has been submitted are so large and complicated that it would be impracticable to arrive at all the necessary decisions for operations in the war against Japan in 1943-44 during the few days of Quadrant which remain. They therefore propose that, as soon as the necessary further examinations have been made, a Combined Chiefs of Staff Conference should be held wherever may be most convenient, unless agreement is reached through the ordinary channels.

7. There are, nevertheless, certain decisions which the Combined Chiefs of Staff feel able to make at once. These are:

a. To approve the proposals of the United States Chiefs of Staff for operations in the Pacific in 1943-44* (see Annex II) it being understood that the operations in New Guinea will be kept constantly under review to ensure that the results likely to be obtained are commensurate with the effort involved.

b. To carry out operations for the capture of Upper Burma in order to improve the air route and establish overland communications with China. Target date mid-February 1944. It is recognized that the extent of these operations is dependent upon logistic considerations as affected by the recent floods.

c. To continue preparations for an amphibious operation in the spring of 1944 on the scale already contemplated.

d. To continue the preparation of India as a base for the operations eventually contemplated in the Southeast Asia Command.

8. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have also directed that the following studies shall be made forthwith:

* As decided in C.C.S. 301 para. 8 a - h.

a. A study and report on the following operations:

- (1) CULVERIN; target date spring 1944.
- (2) Operations southwards from Northern Burma;
target date November 1944.

This study is to determine how far resources will be available for both the above operations and whether the previous capture of Akyab is necessary for the success of (2).

b. In the light of a above, a study and report on the following as alternatives, with target date November 1944.

- (1) The feasibility and desirability of operations through the Moulmein area or Kra Isthmus in the direction of Bangkok with the object of assaulting Rangoon and facilitating the capture of Singapore, or
- (2) Operations through the Malacca Straits and Malaya for the direct capture of Singapore.

c. A study of the potentialities and limitations of developing the air route to China on a scale sufficient to employ all the heavy bomber and transport aircraft likely to be available for the Southeast Asia theater in 1944-45, on the assumption that Germany is defeated in the autumn of 1944.

This study to specify the action required to implement the best possible plan resulting from the above without prejudice to the operations in paragraph 7 b.

Congress Report

SECRET - SECURITY

COPY NO. 71

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 319

19 August 1943

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

Note by the Secretaries

The Enclosure is the report to the President and the Prime Minister which was made to them at the meeting at the Citadel on 19 August. It includes all of the amendments which they directed be made.

H. REDMAN,
J. R. DEANE,
Combined Secretariat.

ENCLOSURE

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

PROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff submit the following report on the progress made so far in the QUADRANT Conference.

2. We have agreed to accept tentatively Sections I, II and III of the final report made to you at the TRIDENT Conference as a basis for use in this Conference. These sections, covering the Over-all Objective, the Over-all Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War, and the Basic Undertakings in Support of the Over-all Strategic Concept, to be reaffirmed at the conclusion of the present Conference.

STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR THE DEFEAT OF THE AXIS IN EUROPE

3. We have approved the following strategic concept of operations for the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, 1943-44.

4. Operation POINTBLANK

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

5. Operation OVERLORD

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in FRANCE, operations designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

b. Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the UNITED KINGDOM in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-CHANNEL move into FRANCE.

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

6. Operations in ITALY

a. First phase. The elimination of ITALY as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the ROME area, and, if feasible, farther north.

b. Second phase. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

c. Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern ITALY, and the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern FRANCE.

7. Operations in Southern FRANCE

Offensive operations against Southern FRANCE (to include the use of trained and equipped French forces), should be undertaken to establish a lodgment in the TOULON-MARSEILLES area and exploit northward in order to create a diversion in connection with OVERLORD. Air nourished guerilla operations in the Southern Alps will, if possible, be initiated.

8. Air operations

a. Strategic bombing operations from Italian and Central MEDITERRANEAN bases, complementing POINTBLANK.

b. Support for ground operations with land and carrier-based air forces.

c. Development of an air ferry route through the AZORES.

d. Air supply of BALKAN and French guerillas (see paragraph 10 below).

9. Operations at sea

a. Intensified anti-submarine warfare, including operations from the AZORES.

b. Security of our sea communications.

c. Continued disruption of AXIS sea communications.

d. Support of amphibious operations.

10. Operations in the BALKANS

Operations in the BALKAN area will be limited to supply of BALKAN guerillas by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces, and to the bombing of PLOESTI and other strategic objectives from Italian bases.

11. Garrison requirements and security of lines of communication in the MEDITERRANEAN

Defensive garrison commitments in the MEDITERRANEAN area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of GIBRALTAR will be assured by appropriate

U. S. SECRET

BRITISH MOST SECRET

dispositions of our forces in Northwest AFRICA, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the IBERIAN PENINSULA.

THE U-BOAT WAR

12. Progress report

We have had encouraging reports from the Chiefs of the two Naval Staffs regarding the U-boat war. We have approved recommendations made by the Allied Submarine Board which should result in further strengthening our anti-U-boat operations. The Board has been directed to continue and expand its studies in search of further improvements.

PORTUGUESE ISLANDS

13. Facilities in the AZORES Islands

On the successful conclusion of the negotiations for the use of the AZORES we have taken note of the assurance given by the British Chiefs of Staff that everything will be done by the British as soon as possible after actual entry into the AZORES has been gained to make arrangements for their operational and transit use by U.S. aircraft.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

14. Southeast Asia Command

We have considered the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff for the set-up of the Southeast Asia Command.

On the question of Command relationship, we have agreed:

a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia Theater and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China Theater and the Southeast Asia Command.

b. That the British Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and will be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

We are giving further consideration to:

c. The precise duties of General Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander; and

d. Arrangements for the coordination of American agencies such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., with comparable British organizations.

15. Operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST

a. We have given preliminary consideration to a memorandum by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff on specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST 1943-44.

b. We have had an account from Brigadier Wingate of the experiences of the Long-Range Penetration Groups which were employed in Northern BURMA in the early part of this year. We think that there is much to be said for further developing this method of conducting operations on a larger scale against the Japanese, and are working out plans to give effect to this policy.

c. We have not yet considered specific operations in Northern BURMA or the Arakan Coast for 1943-44, pending the receipt of further information about the logistic situation which has been created by the disastrous floods in India.

d. Meanwhile the Combined Staff Planners have completed in outline a long-term plan for the defeat of JAPAN. This has not yet been considered. We propose to review specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST for 1943-44 (See a, b and c above) in the light of the conclusions reached on this larger question.

REMAINDER OF CONFERENCE

16. Before we separate, we propose to discuss the following matters:

- a. Immediate operations in the MEDITERRANEAN;
- b. Emergency return to the CONTINENT;
- c. Military considerations in relation to SPAIN;
- d. Military considerations in relation to TURKEY;
- e. Military considerations in relation to RUSSIA;
- f. Equipment of Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals;
- g. A number of miscellaneous matters.

The Citadel,
Quebec,
August 21st.

Dear Mr. Redfern,

Thank you very much for your letter of August 20th by which you have been good enough to inform me of the minor change in the President's program, by which members of the Diplomatic Corps and Representatives of the Government will be presented to the President in the Parliament Buildings rather than at Government House.

I understand that Secretary Early has already acknowledged your previous letter and informed you of the President's agreement.

Looking forward to meeting you on
Wednesday,

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

The Honorable A. H. Redfern,
Secretary to the Governor-General,
Government House,
Ottawa, Canada

GOVERNMENT HOUSE,
OTTAWA.

Office of the Secretary
to the Governor-General

20th August, 1943.

Dear Admiral Wilson Brown

The Governor General and Mr. Mackenzie King discussed on the telephone yesterday evening the proposed arrangements for the President's visit to Ottawa on Wednesday. I Understand that the suggestions contained in my letter to you of yesterday were agreeable, with the exception that the Prime Minister will arrange for the Corps Diplomatique and the Representatives of the Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations to be presented to the President in the Parliament Buildings, before the President goes to Government House for luncheon. Would you, therefore, be good enough to make this amendment on the provisional programme which was enclosed in my letter.

Admiral Wilson Brown,
Governor General's Quarters,
The Citadel,
Quebec, P.Q.

Yours sincerely
A. G. D. H. R. J.

RESTRICTED

19 August 1943

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

QUADRANT INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 12

Note by the Secretaries

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff have invited the United States and United Kingdom Delegations for a cruise down the St. Lawrence and up the Saguenay Rivers, through some of the finest scenery in Canada.

The Canadian Steamship Line's TADOUSSAC, which has been specially requisitioned, will leave Quebec at 1800 on Saturday 21 August and return by 1800 on Sunday, 22 August. The cruise will be treated as a military operation, and will be given no publicity.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff, accompanied by some Canadian staff officers, will be on board.

The U.S. share of the accommodation will be for approximately 125 people, which means that invitations can be accepted by about half the U.S. delegation. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff have expressed the hope that the U.S. party will include, in addition to the Chiefs of Staff and Senior Officers, a representation of all ranks, including civilian secretaries.

The names of those accepting the Canadian Chiefs of Staff invitation must reach Room 3309 by 2200 tonight (Thursday).

Wireless communication with Quebec will be available during the cruise.

Because of the possibility of cool weather it is advisable to take an overcoat, or suitable warm clothing.

J. R. DEANE,
F. B. ROYAL,
Joint Secretariat.

A16/Outstanding

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

Date August 19-43

To:

Subject:

Memorandum to the President

Herewith is an advance
copy of the report which
the Chiefs of Staff are to
submit to you this afternoon

John C. Stoen

Fido

SECRET - SECURITY

COPY NO. 100

AFF

AND PRIME MINISTER

mit the following report
DRANT Conference.

vely Sections I, II and
the TRIDENT Conference

These sections, covering
strategic Concept for the
Undertakings in Support
be reaffirmed at the

THE AXIS IN EUROPE

strategic concept of
Powers in Europe, 1943-44.

4. OPERATION POINTBLANK

The progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital elements of lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive is a prerequisite to OVERLORD (barring an independent and complete Russian victory before OVERLORD can be mounted). This operation must therefore continue to have highest strategic priority.

5. Operation OVERLORD

a. This operation will be the primary U.S.-British ground and air effort against the AXIS in EUROPE. (Target date 1 May 1944). After securing adequate CHANNEL ports, exploitation will be directed toward securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

Regarded Unclassified

U. S. SECRET
BRITISH MOST SECRET

COPY NO. 10018 August 1943COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFFPROGRESS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

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Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in FRANCE, operations designed to strike at the heart of GERMANY and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

b. Balanced ground and air force build-up for OVERLORD, and continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the UNITED KINGDOM in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-CHANNEL move into FRANCE.

c. As between Operation OVERLORD and operations in the MEDITERRANEAN, where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring the success of OVERLORD. Operations in the MEDITERRANEAN Theater will be carried out with the forces allotted at TRIDENT except insofar as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation OVERLORD and have authorized him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

6. Operations in ITALY

a. First phase. The elimination of ITALY as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the ROME area, and, if feasible, farther north.

b. Second phase. Seizure of SARDINIA and CORSICA.

c. Third phase. The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern ITALY, and the creation of the conditions required for OVERLORD and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the reequipped French Army and Air Force into Southern FRANCE.

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- c. Development of an air ferry route through the AZORES.
- d. Air supply of BALKAN guerrillas (see paragraph 10 below).

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Defensive garrison commitments in the MEDITERRANEAN area will be reviewed from time to time, with a view to effecting economy of force. The security of our lines of communication through the Strait of GIBRALTAR will be assured by appropriate dispositions of our forces in Northwest AFRICA, so long as there remains even a remote possibility of the Germans invading the IBERIAN PENINSULA.

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THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

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b. That the British Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and will be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

We are giving further consideration to:

c. The precise duties of General Stilwell as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander; and

d. Arrangements for the coordination of American agencies such as O.S.S., O.W.I., F.C.B., etc., with comparable British organizations.

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a. We have given preliminary consideration to a memorandum by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff on specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST 1943-44.

b. We have had an account from Brigadier Wingate of the experiences of the Long-Range Penetration Groups which were employed in BURMA in the early part of this year. We think that there is much to be said for further developing this method of conducting operations against the Japanese, and are working out plans to give effect to this policy.

c. We have not yet considered operations in Northern BURMA or the Arakan coast for 1943-44, pending the receipt of further information about the logistic situation which has been created by the disastrous floods in India.

d. Meanwhile the Combined Staff Planners have completed in outline a long-term plan for the defeat of JAPAN. We propose to review specific operations in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST for 1943-44 (see a, b and c above) in the light of the conclusions reached on this larger question.

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d. Military considerations in relation to TURKEY;

e. Military considerations in relation to RUSSIA;

f. Equipment of Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals;

g. A number of miscellaneous matters.

File
WS

UNPARAPHRASED VERSION OF A MOST SECRET
CYPHER TELEGRAM IN A ONE TIME PAD.

T.O.O. 182356Z August 1943

MOST SECRET CYPHER TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE

From: QUADRANT

To : War Cabinet Offices

WELFARE No. 209

Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister.

Personal and Most Secret.

1. The President and I have agreed together that he should send the following from both of us to Stalin. If he accepts it will be good. If he does not accept we at any rate cannot be reproached with not having done everything in human power.

2. In this connection you should see the message which Stalin sent to the President at the same time as he sent his last message to me.

3. Message from President and Prime Minister to Stalin:

Begins:

1. We have both arrived here with our Staffs and will probably remain in conference for about ten days. We fully understand the strong reasons which lead you to remain on the battlefronts, where your presence has been so fruitful to victory. Nevertheless, we wish to emphasize once more the importance of a meeting between all three of us. We do not feel that either Archangel or Astrakhan are suitable but we are prepared ourselves, accompanied by suitable officers, to proceed to Fairbanks in order to survey the whole scene in common with you. The present seems to be a unique opportunity for making a rendezvous and also a crucial point in the war. We earnestly hope that you will give this matter once more your consideration. Prime Minister will remain on this side of the Atlantic for as long as may be necessary.

2. Should it prove impossible to arrange the much-needed meeting of the three Heads of Governments, we agree with you that a meeting on the Foreign Office level should take place in the near future. This meeting would be exploratory in character as, of course, final decisions must be reserved to our respective Governments.

3. Generals Eisenhower and Alexander have now completed the conquest of Sicily in thirty-eight days. It was defended by 315,000 Italians and 90,000 Germans, total 405,000 soldiers. These were attacked by 13 British and United States Divisions and with a loss to us of about 18,000 killed and wounded, 23,000 German and 7,000 Italian dead and wounded were collected and 130,000 prisoners, besides those Italians who have dispersed in the countryside in plain clothes. It can be assumed that all Italian forces in Sicily have been destroyed. Masses of guns and munitions are lying scattered about all over the island. Over 1,000 enemy aircraft have been taken on the airfields. We are, as you know, soon to attack the Italian mainland in heavy strength.

(Message to Stalin ends).

4. Message from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt:

Begins:

1. Only now, having come back from the front, I can answer your message of July 16th. I have no doubt that you take into account our military position and will understand the delay of the answer.

Contrary to our expectations, the Germans launched their offensive not in June, but in July, and now the battles are in full swing. As it is known, the Soviet Armies repelled the July offensive, recaptured Orel and Byelgorod and now are putting the further pressure upon the enemy.

It is easy to understand that under the present acute situation at the Soviet-German front, a great strain and utmost vigilance against the enemy actions are required from the Command of the Soviet troops. In connection with the above, I have at the present time to put aside other questions and my other duties, but the primary duty - the direction of action at the front. I have frequently to go to the different parts of the front and to submit all the rest to the interests of the front.

I hope that under such circumstances you will fully understand that at the present time I cannot go on a long journey and shall not be able, unfortunately, during this summer and autumn to keep my promise given to you through Mr. Davis.

I regret it very much, but, as you know, circumstances are sometimes more powerful than people who are compelled to submit to them.

I consider that a meeting of the responsible representatives of the two countries would positively be expedient. Under the present military situation, it could be arranged either in Astrakhan or in Archangel. Should this proposal be inconvenient for you personally, in that case you may send to one of the above-mentioned points your responsible and fully trusted person. If this proposal is accepted by you, then we shall have to determine a number of questions which are to be discussed and the drafts of proposals which are to be accepted at the meeting. As I have already told Mr. Davis I do not have any objections to the presence of Mr. Churchill at this meeting, in order that the meeting of the representatives of the two countries would become the meeting of the representatives of the three countries. I still follow this point of view on the condition that you will not have any objections to this.

2. I use this opportunity to congratulate you and the Anglo-American troops on the occasion of the outstanding successes in Sicily which are resulted in collapse of Mussolini and his gang.

3. Thank you for your congratulation sent to the Red Army and the Soviet people on the occasion of successes at Orel.

August 8th, 1943. (Message Ends).

T.O.O. 182336Z

Circulation

Mr. Martin
Brig. Jacob.

MAM

Room and Telephone Numbers

		<u>Telephone #</u>
The President	Frontenac Room, The Citadel	AMCO 1
Admiral Leahy	Mdm. de Vercheres Room, The Citadel	AMCO 3
Mr. Harry Hopkins	Wolfe Room, The Citadel	AMCO 4
Admiral Brown	Mance Room, The Citadel	AMCO 13
President's Map Room	The Citadel	AMCO 2
Prime Minister's Map Room	The Citadel	AMCO 5
Mr. Stephen T. Early	Chateau Frontenac	Room 3201-3203
Lt.Colonel Hammond	" "	" 214
Captain Kniffin	" "	" 619
Lt(jg) Elsey	" "	" 619
WO(jg) Cornelius	" "	" 619
Ch.Ship's Clerk Rigdon	" "	"4119
Miss Tully	" "	"4019
Jack Romagne	" "	"3205
Miss Hackmeister	" "	"4019
Dewey Long	" "	"3205
John Cook	" "	"1603
Lt. Hawks	" "	"1603
Guy H. Spanan	" "	" 212
Jim Rowley	" "	" 212
H. S. Anderson	" "	" 212
Dan Moorman	" "	"1619
Harry Lee	" "	"1619
George Fox	" "	"4119
Major Dewitt Greer	" "	"4104
M. F. Reilly	" "	"5220



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

For your files. I think
it best not to make the statement
at this time.

F.D.R.

File
MS



WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

Not done

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

The following statement is authorized by
the President and the Prime Minister:

When it was known that it was impossible
for Marshal Stalin to leave the battle-front for any
length of time in present circumstances, the British
and United States Governments decided that it was
necessary anyhow for them and their Staffs to meet in
order to discuss the war against Japan in respect of
which Russia is not a belligerent and also the problems
arising out of the rapid progress of the Anglo-American
Armies in the Mediterranean theatre. Every effort is
however being made to bring about a Tripartite Conference
with Marshal Stalin at the earliest opportunity.

his
13. 8. 43

See Jackson after night

Handwritten notes on left margin:
H. ...
12 Aug 1160

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

August 11, 1943.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

PR - Mr. Summerlin

Mr. Atherton called me on the telephone this morning and said that the ranking A.D.C. of the Governor General had just come in to see him and had informed him that the Governor General had been advised that the President is definitely going to Ottawa after his conference in Quebec with Mr. Churchill. The A.D.C. expressed gratification that the Governor General was to give a luncheon for the President at Government House on August 22 or 23. I told Mr. Atherton that I had not seen the program.

Mr. Atherton said that the following questions had come up in connection with the President's visit to Ottawa:

1. They are anxious to know at Government House as soon as possible whether the luncheon is to take place on August 22 or August 23.

24 -

2. They are equally anxious at Government House to know the number and names of those members of the President's staff who will attend the luncheon.

*Leahy, Brown
Hoptons
3 or 4*

3. In Government House there are six steep steps leading down to the dining room. Should a ramp be constructed?

yes

4. Does the President wish to have Mr. Atherton's official car (which is a Cadillac very much like the Secretary's car) made available for the President's use while he is in Ottawa? It is Mr. Atherton's understanding that the President will motor to Kingsmere, Mr. Mackenzie King's country place, and it occurred to Mr. Atherton that the President might wish to have the Legation's official car.

no

*?
?*

5. Is any member of the President's staff coming to Ottawa in advance to check arrangements for the luncheon and other matters incidental to the visit?

Mike

?

As regards the luncheon Mr. Atherton stated that they plan to have 38 people, all men except for Her Excellency and one Lady in Waiting. This number includes

the

OK
the Cabinet and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff (18 in all) and 16 other guests. After the luncheon they proposed at Government House to invite the Diplomatic Corps in Ottawa (who will not be at the luncheon) to come in to be introduced to the President. This is in line with the arrangements which they made when the Queen of the Netherlands and other Chiefs of State visited Ottawa. Mr. Atherton wishes to know whether these arrangements are satisfactory.

Mike
I told Mr. Atherton that I would bring this to your attention in order that you could take up these questions at the White House and give him the answers direct. I assume of course that someone from the President's staff will go up to Ottawa in advance to handle all detailed questions of this sort or that you yourself will do so. ?

JWA

Eu:Hickerson:EJD

SECRET

August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MAP ROOM WATCH OFFICERS:

1. A map room will be set up in the Citadel at Quebec for the use of the President during his visit to that city. The following Map Room personnel will proceed to Quebec in order to set up the Quadrant Map Room:

Lt. Colonel Chester Hammond
Captain Ogden Kniffin
Lt. (j.g.) G. M. Elsey
Warrant Officer (j.g.) Albert M. Cornelius

2. Colonel Hammond will leave Washington by plane Thursday, August 12th at noon from the Municipal Airport, hangar #6 (contact man Captain Knight, telephone War Department extension 74401). He is due to arrive in Quebec at 4:00 P.M. that same afternoon.

3. Captain Kniffin, Lt. Elsey and Mr. Cornelius will leave Washington by train at 4:30 P.M. Saturday, August 14th and are due to arrive in Quebec Sunday afternoon at 5:00 P.M. They will take with them the necessary maps, files, and miscellaneous equipment in order to set up the Map Room in the Citadel.

4. All of the above-mentioned personnel will be quartered in the Chateau Frontenac during their stay in Quebec.

5. There is direct telephone communications between Quebec and the White House switchboard. Watch Officers should not hesitate to avail themselves of this facility in the event problems arise which they cannot solve.

6. There will be a code room under the supervision of Major Greer immediately next to the Quadrant Map Room where the coded messages from the White House Map Room will be received, decoded, and passed to the Quadrant Map Room.

7. A daily pouch will be flown from Washington to

SECRET

SECRET² -

Quebec. Material to go in this pouch should be sent to the office of Colonel Peck (W.D. telephone, Extension 71469) Combined Chiefs of Staff, Public Health Building to arrive there not later than 10:30 A.M.

8. The following papers will be sent in the above-mentioned pouch every day:

ARMY

1. War Department Operational Summary.
2. Daily Situation map of Sicily and Bombings on Europe and Mediterranean.
3. War Department Communiques.
4. Important War Department despatches which are not important enough to be sent in code.
5. Air Corps Status Slips.

NAVY

- (U.S. and foreign)
- Fleet location
- Convoy data.
- Judd summary.
- F3714 Casualty report.
- FCC summary (important)
- State Dept. brief.
- O.N.I. statistical reports, weekly, etc.

SECRET

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August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR MAP ROOM WATCH OFFICERS:

1. Effective August 12, 1943 Captain Price will be the officer in charge of the map room until further notice except at such times when Admiral Brown is in the city.
2. Lt. Myers will be in charge of the Navy side of the room. Also in the absence of Admiral Brown he will take care of the Admiral's affairs in the Navy Department.
3. Effective August 13th Lt. Schall U.S.N.R. will be available for temporary duty in the Map Room if he is needed.
4. The Map Room will send encoded despatches to the President's party in exactly the same manner as heretofore both during the President's visits to Hyde Park from August 11th to August 16th and during the President's trip to Quebec commencing August 17th.
5. However from now on, when important news items are received during the day, they should be transmitted immediately to the President in code. The morning and evening summary should contain only a resume of routine items. It is very important that these "hot items" be sent to the President promptly throughout the day as comment has been made in the past on certain delays which have been evident in passing the news to the President when he is out of the city.
6. Admiral Brown and Mr. Rigdon will accompany the President on his visit to Hyde Park leaving on the night of August 11th and returning the morning of August 16th.
7. For the convenience of the Watch Officers, the following "contacts" are listed:

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SECRET² -

SUBJECT	CONTACT
(a) General Marshall and all War Department activities.	Colonel Sexton on direct White House wire.
(b) Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff.	Colonel Peck 71469.
(c) War Department Classified Despatches.	Major Hurnelsine Extension 72660.
(d) Special Messages, i.e., P.M.'s etc.	Colonel Jones Extension 2292
(e) Intelligence on enemy armies	Direct G-2 wire.
(f) Army operations in Sovespac.	Colonel Wm. Ritchie Extension 72968.
(g) Army operations, Aleutians.	Colonel Russ Extension 5387.
(h) Army operations, Mediterranean Area.	Colonel Ferrenbaugh Extension 5800.
(i) State Department.	Mr. Gray and Mr. Renchard. Direct Sec. of State wire.
(j) All matters pertaining to Quadrant.	Colonel Peck Extension 71469

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

August 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Senior Officer, White House Map Room.

During the past month the President has sent word to the Prime Minister that he will have final discussions with him on various subjects at their next conference. Among the subjects I remember are:

- (a) Recognition of the French Committee;
- (b) Making Rome an open city, etc.;
- (c) Conditions for an armistice to be demanded from Italy.

The President will discuss these subjects and any others that may have developed with the Prime Minister at Hyde Park on 12 August. Before that time he wishes the Map Room to assemble all pertinent despatches, making a separate folder for each subject with complete references.

Please start the above assembly at once.

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER ANNOUNCE THAT GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES ACCEPT RELATIONS WITH THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION IN THE CONTINUATION OF THE MUTUAL WAR EFFORT AGAINST THE AXIS POWERS.

THIS CONSTITUTES IN NO SENSE RECOGNITION OF THAT COMMITTEE IN SPEAKING FOR THE PEOPLE IN FRANCE OR FOR A FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF FRANCE.

IT DOES CONSTITUTE RECOGNITION OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF FUNCTIONING WITHIN SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON BEHALF OF FRENCH TERRITORY OUTSIDE OF FRANCE.

IN VIEW OF THE PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE ^{of} ~~the~~ THE COMMON WAR EFFORT, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS AND THE FRENCH COMMITTEE CONTINUES TO BE SUBJECT TO THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS OF THE ALLIED COMMANDERS.

THE SIMPLE PURPOSE IS COOPERATION WITH ALL PATRIOTIC FRENCHMEN WORKING FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE FRENCH PEOPLE AND TERRITORIES FROM THE OPPRESSION OF THE ENEMY.

ACCORDINGLY WE WELCOME THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FRENCH COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LIBERATION. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN CONCEIVED AND WILL FUNCTION ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL ITS MEMBERS TO THE PROSECUTION OF THE WAR.

OBVIOUSLY, IT WILL BE FOR THE FRENCH PEOPLE THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT AFTER THEY HAVE HAD UNTRAMMELED OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS THEMSELVES WITH THE UTMOST FREEDOM.

MAY THE RESTORATION OF FRANCE COME WITH ALL SPEED.