

A16-3 (1-11-15)
SATS
Confidential

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Op-16

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for Commander-in-Chief.

SUBJECT: Sinking of Argentine Vessel, RIO TORCERO.

1. Captain MacFall, District Intelligence Officer of the Third Naval District, called up by phone to report the following concerning the sinking of the subject vessel, as told by the survivors now landed.

2. These survivors were 36 in number, one Spaniard and the remainder Argentine. Five men were killed.

3. The attack happened at 0645, Monday morning, June 22nd, in broad daylight. The ship was torpedoed on the starboard side. After the crew had taken to the life-boats, the submarine came to the surface and took the Captain on board.

4. The submarine was a German U-27 type (517 tons) with the name, INNSBRUCK, and a porpoise painted on the conning-tower.

5. After a few minutes the Captain was returned to the life-boat, and, while the submarine was still on the surface, four men were seen to appear with two machine-guns. The survivors were convinced that it was the submarine's intention to machine-gun the boats, but providentially an Army bomber appeared, and the submarine crash-dived at about 0700.

6. The survivors stated that 13 flags were painted on the ship, on both sides and on deck, and 9 names. The submarine Captain is said to have informed the ship Captain that he did not have this ship listed as being an Argentine ship (in fact, she had been recently converted from a former Italian ship), and that consequently he had sunk her, not believing her to be a bona fide Argentine ship.

7. All survivors were fighting mad and definitely anti-Axis! When shown the statement made in Argentina that it had not been established whether the ship had been sunk by a mine or a torpedo, they were vehement!

T. S. Wilkinson.

CC: Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
Aide to the President. ✓
Asst. Chief of Staff (G-2).

Op-13.

Confidential

A16-3
(Missions)

A163 | SA + Slamer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN McCREA

Will you bring this up to date and decide whether I should see Foster if he has not already gone back?

F. D. R.

10/7/42
Captain McCrea directed that these papers be filed

Terry.

SECRET

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

SECRET

September 22, 1942.


Memorandum to Captain John L. McCrea:

Admiral Horne has directed me to forward to you through your office the attached copies of communications addressed to him from me during my recent inspection trip to Brazil. He asks that you bring to the President's attention such portions of the correspondence as you deem advisable.

For your information I should like to advise you that I have made a complete verbal report to Admiral King covering the subject matters dealt with in this correspondence. He has some misgivings as to the possibility of embarrassment in the future should he find it necessary to transfer some of Admiral Ingram's larger units to other duty and thus leave Brazil even less protected than at present. However, the South Americans will hold us responsible for whatever happens to their commerce regardless of any promises or implications of commitments or lack of promises on our part.

In compliance with the request of President Vargas I am making a verbal report to Secretary Knox today; he is taking copies of this correspondence with him to read on his trip to Panama and Brazil on which he starts tomorrow.

Admiral Horne directs me to advise you that he wants me to make a report in person to President Roosevelt at the earliest possible opportunity, and to this end he has suggested a couple of times that I arrange an appointment prior to the President's return to Washington if necessary



Paul F. Foster,
Commander, U.S.N.R.

(COPY)

U. S. NAVAL OBSERVER
RECIFE, BRAZIL

S E C R E T

August 31, 1942.

Vice Admiral F. C. Horne, U.S.N.,
Vice Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

My Dear Admiral:

On arriving at Natal day before yesterday (Saturday) I was met by Brigadier General Walsh Commanding the Wing of the Army Transport Service engaged in the ferrying operations between Trinidad and Ascension Island, and he advised me that Admiral Ingram wanted me to come on through to Recife with him for a conference that afternoon. So, instead of stopping at Natal, I came on through and with General Walsh went immediately on board the PATOKA to call on Admiral Ingram and Commander Hodgman, the Naval Observer here.

It developed during the course of the ensuing discussion that a few days previously our Ambassador at Rio, Mr. Caffery, had stopped here at Recife and during the meeting with Admiral Ingram it had been agreed between the two that it was essential that all of the military and naval activities in this part of the South Atlantic be unified under the direction of Admiral Ingram. Ambassador Caffery agreed to sponsor this plan in Rio and to cable his strong endorsement to the State Department. Admiral Ingram stated that he had written to Admiral King outlining the plan. The purpose of the conference on the PATOKA Saturday afternoon was to clarify the picture with respect to the Army and both Admiral Ingram and General Walsh wanted me to sit in the conference so that I could give a first-hand accurate report on the situation upon my return to Washington. Naturally I took particular care to explain that I was here in Brazil solely as an observer and that I had no authority whatever from the President or the Navy Department, nor was I authorized to express the opinions of anyone except myself which I would voice only upon request. No conclusions were reached at this conference and it adjourned until the following day, Sunday, to await the arrival of Captain Brady, our Naval Attache at Rio, and Commander Wilson, the British Naval Attache at Rio.

At yesterday's meeting there were present besides Admiral Ingram and General Walsh, Captain Brady, Commander Wilson, Major Hughes the assistant U.S. Military Attache at Rio, Commander Hodgman, and officers of the Staff of Admiral Ingram and General Walsh, and myself. It was agreed by all those present that it was highly desirable to proceed at once with the establishment of a supreme unified command vested in

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Admiral Ingram and located here in Recife with Joint operations offices ashore and sea-going headquarters on board ship. It is planned to represent under this command all activities in this area of the Brazilian Navy, the Brazilian Air Force, and the Brazilian Army, the British Navy, the Army Ferrying Operations, and all the ramifications of U.S. Army and Navy activities in Brazil. Captain Brady stated that President Vargas and the Ministry of Marine had each expressed to him their personal and emphatic approval of the general plan and according preliminary steps are being taken to establish a de facto supreme command pending the formal creation of such command by appropriate orders from Washington. However, and this is a point very important, all steps in this direction are definitely predicated upon the whole hearted approval of President Vargas and the Government of Brazil, and I can assure you that nothing will be done to jeopardize the very happy relationship now existing between the Government of Brazil and our Government as represented by Ambassador Caffery, Admiral Ingram and General Walsh.

In general the organization and set up used by Admiral Ghornley in New Zealand, or by Admiral Stark in England is the pattern that Admiral Ingram has in mind. As I visualize the plan there will be set up at once here in Recife a joint command headquarters on shore at which will be brought together the headquarters (ashore) of Admiral Ingram and General Walsh and from which will be operated a communication system reaching to Washington, San Juan, Panama, Trinidad, Rio, Ascension, Freetown, Capetown and Montevideo, and intermediate airfields and bases. The physical facilities for this communication system are already in existence and enough personnel are available to make it a going concern almost immediately. Both British and American convoy and routing operations for the South Atlantic will be centered at these headquarters and to that end the British Routing Office at Montevideo will probably be moved in its entirety to Recife. The Brazilian Navy and Air Force will cooperate whole-heartedly under the leadership of Admiral Ingram who enjoys the utmost confidence and admiration throughout all branches of the Brazilian Government. Out of respect for the feelings of the Brazilians the U. S. Army activities in Brazil will be confined to the barest essentials and these will comprise largely the ferrying operations to Ascension and the collateral logistics and security.

Admiral Ingram has been very reluctant to set up any offices ashore; by nature he would prefer to stay at sea and he well understands the antipathy in Washington and Rio to the building up of pseudo sea-going staffs on the beach. On the other hand he realizes his impotence as soon as he goes to sea and tries to observe radio silence on his flagship and he, of course, recognizes that he cannot set up a joint control post on a flagship and take care of British and Brazilian forces and activities and the highly important merchant ship control that requires an efficient twenty-four hour, 2-way, communication service. My guess is that Admiral

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Ingram will spend as much time in the air as he will ashore. As you well know Admiral Ingram is not exactly a shrinking violet and he has not hesitated to tell Admiral King of the importance of his position here in Brazil. Having this in mind I think you will be interested to have my verification of his own estimate of the situation. I have listened carefully to him and I have made it my business to make discrete inquiries and to invite the confidences of other responsible officials and I can assure you that Admiral Ingram towers over all other personalities in a most impressive manner. President Vargas calls him "Brazil's Sea Lord" and refers to him affectionately as his "Strong Right Arm". Coupled with this unique prestige is a deep distrust of the British and in the background there are intense rivalries between the several Brazilian services all of which create a firm foundation for Admiral Ingram as Commander in Chief of all of the Armed Forces of the United Nations in the Southwest Atlantic or even in the entire South Atlantic. In my personal opinion Admiral Ingram has the gift of sound judgment and good common sense coupled with an aggressive fighting spirit and a thorough appreciation of the importance of Air Power in this theatre of operations. I think it distinctly to the advantage not only of our Navy but of our entire government that advantage be taken of the present opportunity to make Admiral Ingram a Commander In Chief in this area in order that there may never be a question at any time in the future as to the paramount role of the American Navy in this part of the world. Such an appointment would be very harmful to Pan-American unity if it did not meet with complete approval not only of the Brazilian Government officially, but of the key personalities therein. Happily, in this instance Admiral Ingram's appointment would have an inspiring effect.

I plan to proceed to Bahia tomorrow and to Rio a day or two later. The duration of the stop in Rio and the extent of my activities there will be dependent completely upon the wishes of Admiral Ingram and Ambassador Caffery. I shall not intrude into the discussions on this subject in Rio, but if requested by proper authority to listen in or to participate as an observer, I shall do so in order that I may carry back to Washington as accurate a picture as possible. Both Admiral Ingram and General Walsh suggested the advisability of my including a trip to Ascension during this tour, yet both say that it would be very helpful to them if I could return to Washington as quickly as possible to convey a first hand report of existing conditions here, particularly with respect to the need for the immediate creation of the post of Commander in Chief, South Atlantic (or South-west Atlantic). As you know I still have Curacao and Aruba on my itinerary and I should like to stop over one day at Trinidad, San Juan and Guantanamo enroute home. It now appears to me that I cannot reach Washington before the

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middle of September and I could possibly spend another month on this trip if it were not for the desirability of talking personally with you about some matters that I do not feel at liberty to write about.

Sincerely,

PAUL FOSTER

Copy to: Capt. A.B. Anderson

SECRET

OFFICE OF U. S. NAVAL ATTACHE

Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
September 10, 1942.

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

VIA: THE DIRECTOR, PLANS DIVISION.

SUBJECT: Report of Conference with President Vargas on
Coordination of Brazilian - American Naval and
Air Operations under Vice Admiral Jonas H. Ingram,
USN.

REFERENCE: (a) My letter dated 31 August 1942 to VCNO.
(b) Alusna Rio Secret Dispatch 101905 of Sept. 1942.
(c) Capt. Brady's (U.S. Naval Attache) memorandum to
the Ambassador - Secret serial No. 0422032 dated
10 September 1942.

ENCLOSURE: (A) Copy of reference (c).

1. Confirming and in amplification of reference (b), I have to report that I arrived in Rio de Janeiro on September 4 and reported to the U. S. Naval Attache, the Chief of the U. S. Naval Mission and to the U. S. Ambassador, to all of whom I presented my orders and explained fully the purpose of my visit. I further explained to Ambassador Caffery that I had no authority or instructions to negotiate with the Brazilian Government in any matter and that I had no desire to take any steps that were not specifically outlined and approved by him and by Captain E. E. Brady, Jr., USN, the Naval Attache. I gave Ambassador Caffery and Captain Brady a copy of reference (a) and they approved its contents.

2. Ambassador Caffery and Captain Brady decided that I should call upon the Minister of Marine, the Chief of Naval General Staff and upon the Foreign Minister. These calls were made on Saturday, September 5, and I was accompanied by Captain Brady. In these meetings the subject of convoys and anti-submarine warfare off the Brazilian Coast was discussed, and each of these three Brazilian officials stated unequivocally that he would like to see all of the Brazilian Naval and Air Forces, together with any British Forces that might be operating in this part of the world, placed under the sole command of Vice Admiral Ingram, in whom the utmost confidence was evidenced. Again, in each of these meetings I made it clear that I was present only as an observer and that I was not conveying any requests or suggestions from the Navy Department or President Roosevelt.

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3. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Oswaldo Aranha, Captain Brady and I spent nearly an hour in discussion of this matter and of Brazil's attitude toward the war and her readiness to engage in overseas operations with us whenever occasion might require it in the future. Dr. Aranha stated that he would like to call a meeting of the Minister of War, the Minister of Marine, and the Minister of Air and himself for a round table discussion with Ambassador Caffery, Captain Brady and myself, but I firmly expressed my disinclination to participate in such a meeting unless Ambassador Caffery ordered me to attend.

4. Later, the Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Caffery and Captain Brady that he desired me to meet President Vargas, and accordingly he introduced me to President Vargas on September 7 at a function celebrating Brazil's Independence Day. Afterwards Dr. Aranha told Ambassador Caffery that the President desired to talk privately with me at a later date at his official residence, Gunabara Palace. When Ambassador Caffery told me that he wanted me to remain in Rio to see President Vargas a second time I asked for his advice as to the propriety and advisability of my engaging in any discussion with the President on matters pertaining to American-Brazilian collaboration under Vice Admiral Ingram's leadership. I pointed out that this seemed to me to be a task for him to handle alone and that I had no desire to intrude into the diplomatic field. The Ambassador said that I should discuss this matter if an opportunity to do so occurred and he explained that he could not express his own views on the subject without their appearing to be those of President Roosevelt, whereas I could speak freely without endangering the Embassy's position. He expressed his opinion that it would be helpful if I directly or indirectly aided in a prompt clarification of the problem which otherwise he feared might drag on indefinitely.

5. Reference (c) is a detailed report of the conference which was held with the President yesterday, September 9. Since I do not speak Portuguese and President Vargas does not speak English, I was forced by necessity as well as by choice to keep strictly within the scope of my role as "observer." Nevertheless, I could follow the trend of the conversation and thus I can substantiate Captain Brady's report on what was said.

6. At no time during the conference with President Vargas did Captain Brady or I make direct specific requests nor did we make any promises or commitments. I should also like to add that I explicitly told the President that further enemy raids on the Brazilian Coast were inevitable and that we could not expect to avoid losses from time to time. The President agreed with this point of view and then remarked that he felt this would be a long war and a hard war.

7. President Vargas particularly inquired as to when I planned to return to Washington, and he stated that he was very anxious for me to give a complete report of the meeting to the Secretary of the

TO: CPTT & M...
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EN...
M...
PAUL F. FOSTER
2.
M...

Navy prior to that official's departure from Washington for Panama and Rio. Based upon information that the Secretary of the Navy is to leave Washington on September 22, I am planning my return trip so as to reach Washington by September 19 in order to comply, if possible, with this request of President Vargas.

Paul F. Foster,
Commander, U.S.N.

ORIGINAL FILED IN THE FILE OF THE BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL

COPY

EN3-11 (B)

A2-14

Serial No. 0422032

September 10, 1942.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMBASSADOR

Pursuant to your instructions I arranged an appointment and presented Commander Paul Foster to President Vargas at the Guanabara Palace at 7:00 p.m., yesterday, September 9th. I explained the reason for his presence in Rio de Janeiro and described briefly his background and naval career, including his recent assignments from President Roosevelt to inspect U.S. defenses in the Panama Canal Area, Alaska, the Aleutians, and the Carribean. President Vargas stated that there could be no better credentials than the orders held by Commander Foster.

A discussion began as to the shipping problem in Brazil and the President explained the grave situation confronting some sections of Brazil, arising from the paralysis of ocean commerce since the recent enemy attacks on ships off the coast of Brazil. He mentioned particularly the probable shortage of food-stuffs, in Northeastern Brazil and the shortage of coal in this part of Brazil.

Reference was made to the convoy of Tankers now en route to Brazilian ports and to the need for similar convoys for the Brazilian coastal traffic and from Montevideo to Trinidad. The presently existing difficulties confronting Vice Admiral Ingram were explained to the President, and it was pointed out that experiences in other theaters of the war had clearly shown that the best possible results were obtained only when the control of the operations of the sea and air forces was placed in the hands of one man. Commander Foster and I further pointed out that this was particularly true in cases involving the air and sea forces of more than one nation engaged in joint operations regardless of whether these operations were convoying merchant ships or campaigning against the enemy.

I explained to the President the situation existing today in Recife under which Brigadeiro Gomes is operating the Brazilian Air Force in cooperation with Admiral Ingram and Rear Admiral Neiva and Captain Dutra are cooperating with the Brazilian Naval Units under their commands. I advised the President of the talks Commander Foster and I had had with the Minister of the Marine, the Chief of Naval Staff, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. I told the President categorically that Admiral Ingram has no desire to exercise any command over the Brazilian Army, nor has he any wish to interfere in the administrative affairs of the Air Force and Navy. However, I did say that Admiral Ingram felt that there was need for a more definite understanding as to his authority and responsibility with respect to the operations of the Brazilian Navy and Air Force in the defense of the Brazilian coast and shipping and in the war at sea against our common enemy. Parenthetically, I explained that Admiral Ingram maintained very cordial relations with the Brazilian Army Commanders in

SECRET

COPY

Serial No. 0422032

September 10, 1942

Northeast Brazil, has asked and received their collaboration in providing for security of the air fields used by our Army and Navy planes. In this connection I stated that there was no present desire upon the part of Admiral Ingram to bring in U.S.A. troops to guard these air fields or other defense installations on Brazilian soil.

Thereupon the President after careful deliberation made the following statements to me and Commander Foster:

- (1) That he desired that Vice Admiral Ingram be given full authority over the Brazilian Navy and Air Forces and full responsibility for the defense of the coast of Brazil.
- (2) That he desired our Government give Vice Admiral Ingram full authority and adequate reinforcements so that he could undertake the defense of the entire coast of Brazil with complete freedom of action. He repeated this statement three times: "That he desired and would consider that Admiral Ingram be responsible for the defense of the entire coast line of Brazil."
- (3) He stated that he would direct today the Minister of Marine and the Minister of Air to place their respective forces under the orders of Vice Admiral Ingram for operations at sea and in the Air.
- (4) He stated that he would instruct the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Aranha, to notify you today of the above decisions and wishes in order that you might transmit Brazil's wishes in this matter to our government.
- (5) Finally, he specifically requested that Commander Foster make a report in person concerning this meeting and his decisions and wishes expressed therein to the Secretary of the Navy prior to the departure of Colonel Knox from Washington on his trip to Rio (about September 21st), and he also requested that Commander Foster make a similar report in person to President Roosevelt coupled with renewed assurances of his personal esteem and Brazil's whole hearted determination to cooperate in every way possible in our joint war effort.

Respectfully,

/s/ E. E. BRADY, JR.
Captain, USN
Naval Attache.

PAGE

NAVY DEPARTMENT

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THIS FROM COMDR PAUL FOSTER. FOR VCNO AND COMSOLANTFOR

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VCNO

"REF MY LTR FROM RECIFE AUG 31ST TO VCNO. AT REQUEST OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND AT SPECIFIC DIRECTION OF AMBASSADOR CAFFERY, I CALLED UPON PRESIDENT VARGAS YESTERDAY ACCOMPANIED BY NAVAL ATTACHE AND DISCUSSED FOR 45 MINUTES SUBJECT COORDINATION AND COOPERATION OF BRAZILIAN AND AMERICAN FORCES. PRES. VARGAS STATED HE DESIRED THAT FULL AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY BE GIVEN ADMIRAL INGRAM FOR THE DEFENSE OF BRAZILIAN COAST AND THAT HE WOULD DIRECT TODAY THE MINISTER OF MARINE AND MINISTER OF AIR TO PLACE THEIR RESPECTIVE FORCES UNDER THE ORDERS OF ADMIRAL INGRAM FOR OPERATIONS AT SEA AND IN THE AIR, AND THAT HE WOULD INSTRUCT FOREIGN MINISTER TODAY TO NOTIFY AMBASSADOR CAFFERY OF THIS DECISION AND TO REQUEST HIM TO CONVEY BRAZIL'S WISHES TO OUR GOVERNMENT THAT ADMIRAL INGRAM BE GIVEN FULL AUTHORITY, ADEQUATE REINFORCEMENTS AND COMPLETE FREEDOM OF ACTION SO THAT ALL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE ENEMY OFF THE BRAZILIAN COAST BE UNIFIED AND EXECUTED MOST SUCCESSFULLY. PRES. VARGAS REQUESTED THAT I INFORM SECRETARY OF NAVY AND PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IN PERSON OF THIS MEETING AND

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PAGE 2 OF 101905 NCR 4409

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OF THE ABOVE DECISIONS. AM PROCEEDING RECIFE SEPT 11 TO MAKE REPORT TO ADMIRAL INGRAM THEN PROCEEDING NORTH TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON BY SEPTEMBER 19."

DISTRIBUTION

ACT: 16....

COMINCH...12...13...17...20G...OPDO...

FILES: CNO...NAVAID...20-0P...

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