   a. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re Irish Air and Naval Bases:
      August 7, 1943.
      (b, c, and d relate to ship repair facilities in the Mediterranean)

Map Room Files.

BOX 171. (Continued)

   e. Memorandum Admiral Leahy to FDR re Philippine bases: January 1, 1944.
   f. Memorandum "for the Secretary" (of Navy?) from E. Greuning, Governor
      of Alaska re Alaskan Highway: December 4, 1943.
   g. Memorandum Admiral Brown to Admiral Morell: October 12, 1944.
   h. Group of papers re Proposed Navy Department Building and Naval
      Museum and Wet Basin.
   i. Group of papers re expansion of the Naval Academy.
I have confirmed that the so-called 'Naval Attaché' in Istanbul, and lately United States Minister in Sofia, Earle, who is now in charge of allied political propaganda for Bulgaria, is on friendly terms with many leading Bulgarian military and political personalities, with whom ---M--- developments in the Balkans; that in some of his reports he argues in favour of the Bulgarian viewpoint; that he is favoured by ROOSEVELT; and that he is a friend of the United States Consul-General here, who remarked, "Greek circles in Istanbul ought to get together more with EARLE."

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.
Following from our Consul in Jerusalem:

"From my conversations with a friendly American colleague I have confirmed that the so-called 'Naval Attaché' in Istanbul, and lately United States Minister in Sofia, Earle, who is now in charge of allied political propaganda for Bulgaria, is on friendly terms with many leading Bulgarian military and political personalities, with whom --M-- developments in the Balkans; that in some of his reports he argues in favour of the Bulgarian viewpoint; that he is favoured by ROOSEVELT; and that he is a friend of the United States Consul-Corneral here, who remarked, "Greek circles in Istanbul ought to get together more with EARLE."

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.
From: Angora (Japanese Ambassador)
To: Tokyo (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
6 March 1944
XBT-JAA

EARLE, formerly American Minister at Sofia (now at Istanbul supervising activities in the Balkans), spoke as follows to a contact:

1. The American Ambassador at Moscow had reported the view that the Red Army would not penetrate far to the west of the former 1939 frontier. This was at one with the wishes of President ROOSEVELT.

(?2?) It was to be regretted that, in spite of the fact that the establishment of a second front would be for Great Britain the parting of the ways between life and death, the British had but little comprehension of this. Thus it was a fact that even on the Italian front there were, in addition to the American forces, large numbers of Indian, Canadian and French troops and relatively few United Kingdom troops, but it was expected that when it came to setting up the second front the British would endeavour to reduce as far as possible the numbers of their own troops employed, and it was disagreeable that the British in any case depended too much on America.

3. The British were very insistent on Turkey's entering the war, but he did not think that this would have much effect on the war situation, and there was no need to be flurried.
Intelligence from Turkish sources. The lack of harshness apparent in the Soviet peace terms to Finland is an artifice to ingratiate the U.S.S.R. with each of the smaller powers. The swing over toward the United Nations is on the point of becoming more pronounced. SEVOFF is still in Turkey. VALEF (?VULEFF?), a previous Bulgarian Minister of Commerce, has also arrived; I hear that he is already in touch with EARLE, former United States Minister to Rumania (?Bulgaria?).

TSOU SHANG YU

a - Cf. No. 128233.
Recently in connection with the negotiations concerning an armistice with Finland the enemy authorities have made much ado, for propaganda purposes, about the opening of negotiations with Bulgaria in regard to a separate peace. According to what I have found out through my own private inquiries, the architect SEVOFF, who is at present staying in Ankara, has in fact been in touch with certain enemy officials. According to a government report from an official in the German Embassy here (our "HA" intelligence man), this man has first of all been in contact with the American Minister in Istanbul, EARLE, formerly Minister to Sofia. He has also, it seems, had a secret meeting with the American Ambassador, STEINHARDT. But because the Americans do not make clear what their stipulations were, his plan has fallen to the ground.

On the 3rd the newspaper CUMHURIYET reported
a rumor concerning this man's secret schemes. Recently, it would seem, this person has accepted the views of Turkish Government circles. Since the collapse of Anglo-Turkish negotiations the Swedish authorities have looked with disfavor on any such schemes as these on the part of the various Balkan countries.

The newly appointed Rumanian Minister and others have also tried such schemes in Istanbul, we have been informed. MEMENEMCIIOGLU, the Foreign Minister, has recently heard in regard to these actions that since Turkey desired tranquility and stability in the Balkans she would like to see Rumania at this time, despite the change in the war situation, tighten her relations with Germany and oppose the projects of the Red Army. He was indirectly warning against this sort of activity when he made this pronouncement, I think.

- As in text

Inter 10 Mar 44 (4) Japanese #113647
Rec'd 11 Mar 44 Page 2
Trans 12 Mar 44 (1034-h)
TOP SECRET

From: Angora (Japanese Ambassador)
To: Tokyo (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
5 September 1944
XBT-JAA

#415

At the end of last month BERGERY, the former French Ambassador, told me that, according to a statement made to him in confidence by a person in close touch with ROOSEVELT (he said that he was an influential personage who had recently visited Turkey but that he could not disclose his name), the view was strongly held in American political circles that the continuation of the war against Germany was nothing but a transfer of Europe from one gangster to another and that it was folly to shed the precious blood of American youth in a war of this kind, and that this view was gradually having an effect upon public opinion. Accordingly to reliable information, Minister BARLE (head of the American organization in the Balkans) takes exactly the same line, and, asking for whose sake it is that America is active in the Balkans, says that the whole thing is senseless and evinces great dissatisfaction with the actions of the U.S.S.R.

a - Word in English

Rec'd 23 Sept 44 (o)  Japanese  #141792
RIa

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified
From: Ankara (KURIHARA)
To: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
21 October 1944
XBT-(JAA)

488

Reference my telegram No. 415.

A secretary of the Spanish Legation here gave the following information to a member of my staff.
The American Minister EARLE, stationed at Constantinople (Head of the American organization in the Balkans), remarked some days ago to the Spanish Minister that the European situation was getting into an uncontrollable mess as "The cat that ate the cheese having been killed they were purused by an innumerable swarm of rats", and said that he himself was repeatedly advising President ROOSEVELT in strong terms on the question of the Bolshevization of Europe. The Spanish Minister got the impression that EARLE was in favor of establishing touch with the Germans without delay. Repeated to Berlin.

a - SSA #141792.

Rec'd 27 Oct 44 (h) Japanese
RIa

TOP SECRET
Mr. EARLE, the personal delegate of the President of the United States, tells me that he has received instructions to be ready to undertake a journey to Germany without details as to the place or method of getting there. It is his wish to go to America first for a thorough exchange of views. He informed me that the anti-Russian party in the United States grows daily, and that the President himself bears in mind the Soviet dangers even if --G-- necessities of the war force him to temporize and not dispense with help that is so valuable for the moment. A French doctor who knows De GAULLE personally said that this progressive --G-- (?was due to him?).

The informer who, a month in advance, told him (EARLE) about the V.1 raids, now assures him that V.3 aimed at America will come into operation before the end of this month.
From: Milattache Amambassy Rio de Janiero, Brazil
To: The President of The United States
Nr: 4410, 19 February 1945

War pass to the President, The White House and info to Acting Secretary of State for Grew and Dumm only from Secretary Stettinus Nbr 4410.

1. Just have successfully completed my special mission for Mr. Stimson with President Vargas about which I will tell you in detail as soon as I see you. We discussed in a very harmonious and friendly way various other matters which I have made the subject of a separate memorandum which I have had repeated to you. In addition to the points covered in that memorandum, Vargas asked me for my opinion as to whether Brazil should promptly recognize the Soviet Union I told him that, speaking quite frankly, it seemed to me it would be in the interest of Brazil and of the United Nations as a whole, for her to do so.

In reply to an inquiry from him as to appropriate procedure, I told him that the simplest procedure would be for his ambassador in Washington to present an Aide Memoire to the Soviet Embassy there on this subject.
He asked me if the United States would sponsor Brazil's approach to the Soviet Union and could assure Brazil that it would see that no harmful results came from this in the future. In reply, I said that the United States would be glad to sponsor Brazil's approach to the Soviet Union on the recognition question, in view of President Vargas' agreement that Brazil would wish to follow our lead in European International Affairs in which he said Brazil is inexperienced.

2. My stop at Dakar was interesting and helpful in promoting cordial relations with Governor Cournarie with whom I had a brief and purely sociable visit at the Governor's Palace. He was pleasant and hospitable and took me for a drive around the city. I also had an opportunity to inspect our Consulate General.

3. My visit to Liberia, which was the first time American Secretary of State has visited that republic, was quite an event. We made the long dusty drive of 52 miles from Roberts Field into Monrovia as the sun was setting and on the way had quite a view of the extensive Firestone plantation. At the Executive Mansion President Tubman had his entire cabinet, the Chief Justice, a number of Senators, the Speaker of the House, and others, present to receive me. This reception at which I made a few brief general remarks was followed by dinner after which we returned to our plane and took off for Natal.
after midnight. President Tubman and his colleagues seemed delighted to have me come. They certainly went to great lengths to put on a show for us. President Tubman asked me to convey to you his warmest personal greetings and best wishes.

EH/ab

End.

Note: Copy has been sent to Acting Secretary of State for Grew and Dunn only.
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Captain R. H. Hillenkoetter, U.S.N.,
Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Subject: Naval Academy - expansion of.


1. Thank you very much for the information contained in your memorandum. I think Admiral Moreell's memorandum of 9 April 1945 is an excellent statement of our conclusions and I am completely in accord with it. I have had several conversations in the last two days with Admiral Jacobs and I gather that after we have got some advice from the board of Visitors we will be able to go ahead with more enquiries.

2. I think I should not play any part in further discussions, but I will be obliged if you will keep me informed of progress.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, USN,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to: Vice Admiral Moreell.
MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL BROWN:

Subject: Naval Academy - expansion of

Attached hereto are copies of a number of memoranda relating to the expansion of the Naval Academy, having as a basis Captain Strauss' memorandum to the Secretary.

I am sure you will find this of interest, but I agree completely with your comments of last Friday, in that there are now too many people getting engaged on this topic. I think some one activity should look into this instead of having about a dozen.

I am preparing a statement on this question for Admiral Jacobs to use before the executive council of the Navy Department next week and as soon as he approves it I shall send you a copy, which I think you may find of interest.

I shall keep you informed of any new developments that may arise in this connection.

R. H. Hillenkoetter,
Captain, USN.
9 April 1945

MEMORANDUM

For: The Secretary of the Navy.

I do agree with Major Correa that the questions raised by Captain Strauss in his memorandum to you, which I am returning, should be deferred at least until you have been able to study a report currently being made on this subject.

Admiral Wilson Brown, Admiral Moreell and Captain Hillenkoetter have been looking into this situation and have been down at Annapolis studying the problem on the scene. Their report will be shortly forthcoming, and I will see that you have it as soon as possible. I do not feel we should take the matter up with the President until we have the benefit of the results of their study.

[Signature]

CC: Admiral Brown
Admiral Moreell
6 April 1945

FROM: JAMES FORRESTAL

TO: ADMIRAL JACOBS

I have talked with Major Correa about this before he wrote the ansured draft. I have also talked with Admiral Jacobs on the subject. There is very little I can add to the information contained in this memorandum.

Do you agree with Major Correa -- that there is nothing to be gained by talking with the President until after we have decided what our requirements at Annapolis are to be in terms of post-war education?

/s/ J. F.

Respectfully,

/s/ James F. Correa
Memo, for Mr. Forrestal

I have talked with Lewis Strauss about this before he wrote the annexed memo. I have also talked with Admiral Jacobs on the subject. There is very little I can add to the information contained in this memorandum.

Adm. Moreell is considering the details of an acquisition of this property and also is exploring an alternative possibility for expansion of the Naval Academy's grounds. As yet he has not submitted any recommendation.

I gather from Admiral Jacobs that no conclusion has been reached as yet, on what appears to me to be the essential point involved in this, i.e., the postwar educational needs of the Navy and the extent to which they will be provided for by the Naval Academy and Naval ROTC's.

Respectfully,

/s/ Mathias F. Correa
March 28, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

You asked me to round up the facts in the situation relative to the proposal to acquire St. John's College at Annapolis for the Naval Academy. The following appear to be the pertinent items, and some observations thereon:

It is reasonably clear from the record that real estate interests in Annapolis are keeping the project alive. Senator Tydings has been quoted on both sides of the question but his position appears to be defined in a telephone message to you on January 30 after being visited by certain people in Annapolis "with no publicity attached" and whom he described as wanting "To help the Naval Academy get St. John's College". The College is represented to be operating at a deficit and its acquisition by the Naval Academy as relieving the state of Maryland of an annual subvention. College officials, however, have figures to show that they are out of the woods financially. On the other hand, the tentative plan prepared for its acquisition and improvement by the Navy would involve the expenditure of $22,000,000 by the Federal Government.

The President of the College and members of the Board -- I have not checked to see whether they constitute the whole Board -- are averse to selling. The College is the third oldest in the country and even its critics among educators concede that it is a significant educational departure. There will be much opposition in academic circles beyond the College itself if the property is acquired other than by negotiation; that is to say, with the consent of the College authorities.

If the property is acquired for the Naval Academy it is proposed to demolish most of the existing structures and erect new buildings to increase the capacity of the Naval Academy to 7500 students. President Roosevelt, on the other hand, is quoted by his Naval Aide, Admiral Wilson Brown, as desiring to preserve the buildings on the ground that they are landmarks (one of them was constructed in 1795).

The critical question, to my mind, however, is not whether the St. John's College property should be bought, but whether the optimum size of the Naval Academy can be agreed upon. The size of the post-war Navy has some bearing on the answer and that has not yet been determined.
To increase the size of the student body to 7500 men is furthermore in conflict with our existing arguments for an expanded NROTC, in support of which we have urged that the NROTC can best supply the flexibility of our quantitative demand and the diversification of our qualitative demand for officer personnel in the future.

The wisdom of increasing the size of the student body at Annapolis struck me as open to grave question from yet another aspect. Much of the argument presented for continuing Annapolis as an under-graduate institution is based upon the thesis that the Naval Academy has always given a distinctive stamp to its graduates and has produced an unique esprit de corps. It can be questioned whether these advantages are currently being preserved even in an institution of its present size -- the enrollment is now over 3000 -- not to mention the situation which would result from more than doubling it. In the current issue of "Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute", a writer who has been connected with the Academy for 20 years passily mentions that Reserve Midshipmen now at the Academy "have few contacts with the Regulars". This is probably less attributable to the Navy's "Jim-Crow" policy for Reserves than to the present size of the student body. In other words, enrollment at the Academy has already reached a point where diminishing returns can be expected from the sacrifice of intangibles which have always been represented as no less valuable than the curriculum itself.

In conclusion, I would recommend that no steps whatever be taken for the present beyond exploratory ones and that they be so conducted as not to arouse the resentment and antagonism of the friends of the College nor give to any individuals a position upon which they may some day present a claim for a real estate commission or brokerage.

I have in my office the plans and other details in connection with the proposal, if you are interested in seeing them.

Resp'y
/s/ Lewis Strauss
Lewis L. Strauss

LLS:ivw
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Via: Chief of Naval Personnel.

Subj: Naval Academy, Annapolis - Post War Expansion.

Refs: (a) Memo for President from SecNav, Serial 801 of 9 February 1945.
(b) Memo for Secretary of the Navy from the President, dtd March 10, 1945.
(c) Memo for President from Secretary of the Navy, dtd 11 March 1945.
(d) Memo for Secretary of the Navy from the President, dtd 14 March 1945.

1. The postwar development of the Naval Academy was discussed in conference at Annapolis on April 6 by the Naval Aide to the President, the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Captain Hillenboller, representing the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and other representatives of the Naval Academy and the Bureau of Yards and Docks. The following conclusions are believed to represent the consensus of those who participated.

2. The Fye report estimated that it would be necessary to expand the Naval Academy to a capacity of 7500 if all vacancies in the line of the Navy and recommended proportions of certain staff corps were filled with Naval Academy graduates, but stated that since expansion of the Naval Academy to this capacity was impracticable and uneconomical, a minimum of 33 to 40% (preferably 40%) of vacancies should be filled by Naval Academy graduates and that the balance should come from R.O.T.C. It was the consensus that expansion of the Naval Academy to a capacity of 7500 is feasible, that in view of the great importance to the nation of an efficient and integrated Navy the cost of this expansion would not represent an uneconomical expenditure, that the Navy should, in the main, draw its line officer material from the Naval Academy and that only a small portion should come from R.O.T.C.

3. In the light of past experience, it should be expected that further expansion of the Naval Academy beyond 7500 may be required in the distant future. This contingency is, however, too remote to warrant planning now for an expansion beyond 7500 as an ultimate goal.

-1-

CONFIDENTIAL
4. The Bureau of Personnel estimates replacement requirements somewhat lower than the Eye Board and advises that the maximum probable number of vacancies will be about 1500 annually. Assuming that 20% of these vacancies could be filled from R.O.T.C., it would be necessary to graduate 1200 from the Academy each year. This would require a capacity of 5500 to 6000.

5. Consideration was given to various possible alternative solutions which would avoid removal of the St. Johns College buildings, including (a) the development of a new annex on the eastern bank of the Severn, (b) relocation of the proposed annex on Sandy Point adjacent to the proposed Naval Academy Air Station and (c) expansion of the present Academy by increments, first to about 5600 without disturbing the college buildings, and ultimately to 7500, requiring construction of additional dormitories on the site of the college buildings or elsewhere.

6. Construction of an annex on the eastern bank will not be satisfactory. The student body cannot be divided without more or less prejudice to the quality of graduates. If a division were imperative, this division should be made on an organizational basis with the student body organized as a brigade, either of two regiments, one of which would be on the eastern bank, or three regiments, of which two would be on the eastern bank. Each regiment would contain portions of all four classes. It would be necessary to provide dormitories, mess halls, academic buildings, and auxiliary facilities practically duplicating those of the present Academy, except for a few facilities which could be used jointly. This solution is preferable to a division by classes and would involve less loss of the effectiveness of a single Naval Academy. Development of this annex on the eastern bank of the Severn would be difficult and unsatisfactory in many respects because of the rough topography of the terrain. This tract contains a number of knolls rising 50 to 100 feet above the river and is traversed by deep irregular gullies. Heavy cuts and fills would be required to secure a compact arrangement. The Experiment Station, Radio Station, rifle ranges, and other developments on the eastern bank would be adversely affected. The operation of the divided academy would be less efficient and uneconomical. Development of the annex on the eastern bank is not recommended.

7. Development of an annex adjacent to the proposed Naval Academy Air Station would result in still greater separation and would tend toward division of the student body between general service and aviation. It is considered essential that the entire student body of the Naval Academy be given the same indoctrinational and technical training without regard to future specialized service. This solution would,
in effect, set up an independent Air Academy. Location of the
annex at Sandy Point is not considered a feasible or desirable
solution. It would stimulate political pressure to locate a
New Naval Academy on the West Coast.

8. The Superintendent of the Naval Academy will request an opinion
of the Board of Visitors on:

   (a) the present value to the Nation and the State of
   Maryland of St. Johns College as an educational
   institution.
   (b) can 7500 students be taught at the Naval Academy
   in time of peace without a serious lowering in the
   quality of graduates?

9. The present buildings of St. Johns College cannot be rehabilitated
and utilised effectively for Academy purposes except to a limited ex-
tent. These buildings are small, obsolescent and many are in poor
condition and cannot be efficiently adapted to Naval Academy purposes
without extensive remodeling and reconstruction.

10. The State Legislature of Maryland has unanimously adopted a joint
resolution to the effect that "any increase in the Nation's facilities
for the training and education of additional Naval Officers can, and
should, be provided by expansion of the Naval Academy at Annapolis,
where adequate areas contiguous to the reservation are available, and
where the Academy has grown and expanded for a century."

11. The Bureau of Personnel will confer with the St. Johns College
authorities to present the tentative plans of the Navy, subject to
approval, to proceed with the acquisition of this property, to deter-
mine the present attitude of the college authorities with reference to
such acquisition and to secure information from the college authorities
as to the probable status of the college in the postwar period both from
a financial and an educational standpoint.

12. In the light of the foregoing, the following recommendations are
made:

   (A) That plans be prepared for an immediate expansion of
   the Naval Academy to accommodate a postwar student
   body of 5500.

   (B) That these plans envisage an ultimate expansion to
   7500.

   (C) That the plan provide for the acquisition of St. Johns
   College and other tracts immediately contiguous to the
   Academy grounds to provide space for construction of
   additional dormitory, academic, recreational and service
   facilities to accommodate the total student body of 5500
without removal of the St. Johns College buildings.

(D) That this initial expansion provide also for such filling of Dorsey Creek as may be necessary to make available the required parade grounds, athletic fields, and other recreational spaces.

(E) That the plan for the ultimate expansion to 7500 be made, insofar as is practicable, in such manner as to avoid removal of the older buildings of St. Johns College.

(F) That immediate negotiations be undertaken with the authorities of St. Johns College with a view to arriving at a mutually agreeable arrangement in order that criticism of the prospective action of the Navy in acquiring St. Johns may be avoided.

cc: Naval Aide to the President.
    BuPers.
    Supt., Naval Academy.

B. Moreell
Chief of Bureau
MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF:

Subj: Naval Academy Expansion - Progress Report on Studies.

Refs: (a) Your memo for Chief Planning Officer 12 March 1945.
     (b) Your memo for Chief Planning Officer 25 March 1945.
     (c) Memo from Capt. Wirth to Superintendent, Naval Academy
         file NO2, Serial 239792-M-C of 10 March 1945.
     (d) Memo from Capt. Wirth to Capt. Smith, file NC2, Serial
         232212-M-C of 20 March.

1. Studies for the expansion of the Naval Academy to accommodate a student
   body of 7500 have been initiated on several alternative bases, as follows:

   (a) Expansion of the Naval Academy, by the acquisition of
       St. John's College and other tracts contiguous to the Academy grounds,
       demolition of the college buildings and the construction of a new
       5,000 man dormitory on the college grounds, together with additional
       academic, recreational and service facilities on the enlarged
       reservation.

   (b) Acquisition of St. John's College, rehabilitation of the
       college buildings for academic purposes of the Academy, development
       of a new annex, to accommodate one half of the student body, on the
       eastern bank of the Severn River and expansion of the present
       facilities to accommodate the other half comfortably.

   (c) Same as (b) except for development of the new annex to
       accommodate two thirds of the student body, with little or no
       expansion of the present facilities.

   (d) Same as (b) except for relocation of the proposed annex
       on Sandy Point adjacent to the proposed Naval Academy Air Station.

   (e) Removal across the Severn of all activities now at the
       Academy but not directly necessary for academic functions and
       maximum use of present grounds for dormitory, academic and essential
       associated facilities, possibly involving filling part or all of
       Dorseay Creek.

2. Scheme A, submitted by my memorandum of 16 January, has been reviewed
   by the Naval Academy and comments submitted in reference (c). Revision
   of the plan to meet the comments of the Academy appears generally feasible
   and can be worked out in further refinement of the layout if it is
   decided to adopt this original scheme. Further development of this
   scheme is being held in abeyance pending completion of the alternative
   schemes proposed by the President.

3. Scheme B is being developed in accordance with the President's request

Regraded Unclassified
and is based on the Academy's view as expressed in reference (c) that the benefits of a single Naval Academy would suffer the least loss if the division between the present Academy and the new annex were made on a brigade organizational basis placing half of the requirements of the brigade in each campus and including parts of all four classes in each half. This scheme involves the expansion of the present academy from its present normal peace time capacity of 2500 to a capacity of 3750 and the provision at the annex of dormitory and messing facilities for 3750 with complete academic and auxiliary training facilities, drill fields, recreation facilities, service facilities and quarters. In effect it requires almost a complete duplication of the present Naval Academy as enlarged.

4. Development of this annex on the tract directly across the Severn River from the present Academy lying between the Ritchie Highway and the Experiment Station will be difficult and unsatisfactory in many respects because of the rough topography of the terrain. This tract contains a number of knolls rising 80 to 100 feet above the river and is traversed by deep irregular gullies. It is not well adapted to any regular or formal layout. Heavy cuts and fills will be required if a compact arrangement is to be secured. Economical adaptation to the terrain, on the other hand, will force a comparatively wide dispersion of facilities. The Experiment Station will be adversely affected. Future expansion will be precluded, and operations restricted and enveloped so that it would be desirable to consider relocation of the station in some other locality as an integral part of this scheme. No separate sketch has been prepared for this scheme, since it would be essentially the same as Scheme "C", with all facilities reduced in size from a 5000-man scale to a 3750-man scale.

5. Scheme "C" is the same as Scheme B except that it is proposed that the new annex be developed to accommodate two-thirds of the student body. This scheme is being considered primarily because of the difficulties which will be encountered in expanding the present Naval Academy to 3750 as required under Scheme B in view of the limitation that the St. John's College site cannot be utilized for dormitory purposes. This scheme contemplates the organization of the student body on a brigade basis comprised of three regiments, two of which would be located in the new annex. This scheme is the same as Scheme B, with facilities enlarged, and is subject to the same criticisms as advanced above for Scheme B. It does not conform to the Academy's present views on organization of the student body. Sketch Plan "Scheme C" is a preliminary schematic layout of this development. The plan contains many obvious deficiencies and considerable further study will be necessary to arrive at a satisfactory solution.
6. Scheme D contemplates the relocation of the annex on Sandy Point adjacent to the proposed Naval Academy Air Station. This scheme would involve division of the student body between general service and aviation. Such a division has been proposed previously but is not acceptable to the Naval Academy authorities. The basic conception of the Naval Academy is that the entire student body should be given the same indoctrinational and technical training without regard to future specialized service. It would be contrary to the policy as now conceived to set up what amounts to an independent air academy which would be the ultimate result of this scheme. The terrain adjacent to the Sandy Point Air Station is the most easily adapted to a major development of any site in the vicinity of Annapolis. It would, however, be so far from the present academy that it would be practically an independent and separate establishment. Sketch plan "Scheme D" is a preliminary schematic layout of this development.

7. Scheme E. The advantages of an integrated and unified student body appear to justify consideration of an alternative whereby dormitory, academic and associated facilities for 7500 would be provided on the present academy grounds, without replacement of the St. John's College buildings, by utilizing space which could be made available by removing the hospital, quarters, post graduate school and some service facilities east of the Severn or elsewhere and possibly by providing additional land by filling all or part of Dorney Creek as suggested by the Naval Academy. This alternative has many drawbacks including the necessity for excessive demolition and replacement of existing structures, divorce of the student body from direct association with the families of commissioned officers and decreased efficiency incident to the separation from the academy of some of its service facilities. The cost of this alternative would be extremely high. Sketch plan, Scheme E, is a preliminary schematic layout of this development.

8. Detailed survey has not yet been made of the St. John's College buildings, with a view to determining their arrangement and condition, the feasibility of adapting them to the academic needs of the Academy, and the scope and cost of rehabilitation and alterations necessary. It is understood from discussions with Admiral Beardsall, Capt. Wirth and Cmrd. Ernest that the facilities are extremely limited and in bad condition.

9. My tentative conclusion is that none of the alternative solutions will be as satisfactory as the Scheme A originally proposed, with such modifications and refinements as may be subsequently agreed upon. Nevertheless, detailed development plans for Schemes B, C, D and E will be completed as rapidly as possible to permit full evaluation of the relative merits and disadvantages of the various schemes.

W. H. Smith
April 2, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FILE.

Mr. Stringfellow Barr called me this morning and asked whether I had informed the Secretary of the Navy of his wish for a conference on the question of possible transfer of St. Johns. I told him that I had informed the Secretary and could not say what the Secretary would do about it. He asked for my advice. I said that if he wished to precipitate a conference I thought a letter from him to Admiral Beardsell or the Secretary would probably lead to one, or he could wait developments as it seemed to me there were certain questions involved that could not be answered by anyone at this time.

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR VICE ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

The Secretary of the Navy has referred your memorandum of 19 March 1945, regarding St. Johns College, to me for reply.

The Navy Department has made no official steps looking toward any idea of taking over St. Johns College at Annapolis. This Bureau too has heard many rumors concerning this, but insofar as any action of this Bureau or the Navy Department is concerned they remain simply rumors.

I shall be very happy to have Mr. Cleveland meet with my representative, Captain R. H. Hillenkoetter, USN, at any time that may be agreeable to him. Captain Hillenkoetter is located in Room 2064, Arlington Annex, Navy Dept.
15 March 1945

Vice-Admiral Randall Jacobs
Chief of Naval Personnel
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Randall:

I have had the local land records checked for the ages of the older buildings of St. John's College and find the following:

- McDowell Hall (Bladen's Folly) started 1740
  Completed 1784
- Humphrey Hall 1825
- Pinkney Hall 1825
- Randall Hall about 1900
- Woodward Hall about 1900

McDowell Hall, which is probably the only one of historical moment, was started by Governor Bladen with the expectation of its being the Governor's Mansion. It was called "Bladen's Folly." The legislative body of the Colony withheld funds and it was ultimately completed in 1780. A Governor's Mansion had been built on the grounds that are now within the Naval Academy limits.

St. John's College claims greater age than McDowell Hall possesses. I am told that the school or college was originally set up in another part of Annapolis (Francis Street) and moved to its present site sometime around 1800.

Hoping the above provides you with informative data,

I am,

Sincerely,

M. D. Gilmore
RESTRICTED

March 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY FORRESTAL:

Dear Mr. Secretary,

President Stringfellow Barr came to see me on Saturday to seek advice about what he should do about the many rumors, mostly among real estate agents, concerning the intention of the Government to take over St. Johns as a part of the Naval Academy.

He asked me to say to you that he knows that the Trustees of St. Johns would welcome a discussion with you, or your duly appointed representative, as to the Naval Academy’s needs. He suggested that the continuance of rumors among real estate agents is harmful to both institutions and that as patriotic citizens he, Stringfellow Barr, and the Trustees of St. Johns are just as anxious to find a satisfactory solution for the needs of the Naval Academy as are other patriotic citizens. He points out that Mr. Richard L. Cleveland (son of Grover Cleveland) was an associate of yours at Princeton and has been the legal adviser for the Trustees of St. Johns for many years. He, therefore, suggests that perhaps if you would have a talk with Mr. Cleveland it might be a helpful move to reach a friendly understanding among all concerned.

I told Mr. Barr that I would convey this message to you. I, of course, made no comment whatever about the President’s attitude but I did suggest that perhaps the future of the Naval Academy and of St. Johns are among the subjects that will have to be worked out when the future of world conditions appear somewhat clearer.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.
RESTRICTED

March 19, 1945.

Dear Jack,

I send you a copy of a memorandum I have just sent to Secretary Forrestal which is self-explanatory. As you know, we saw a good deal of the Brrs when I was Superintendent and somehow he had gotten the rumor that the President had been asked for a decision.

I may be mistaken but I have the impression that perhaps the trustees may be found less opposed to the transfer of St. Johns than they were four years ago, notwithstanding an improvement in their financial prospects.

As the subject seems doomed to be put on the White House steps, I fear that I cannot keep clear of your business much as I would like to do so. I hope we may have a talk on this and other subjects in the not too distant future.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Rear Admiral John R. Beardall, U.S.N.,
Superintendent, U.S. Naval Academy,
Annapolis, Maryland.
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF PLANNING OFFICER.

In compliance with the attached memorandum from Vice Admiral Jacobs, will you please proceed with studies based on the following assumptions:

(a) That we will acquire the St. Johns College buildings but will not destroy them. They will probably have to be rehabilitated to some extent and utilized for such purposes as are applicable to the needs of the Naval Academy.

(b) The additional expansion of the Naval Academy would be across the Severn River.

In making the studies we will, of course, have to get in touch with the Superintendent of the Naval Academy to see what division can be made in the classroom and dormitory facilities so that facilities on both sides of the River can be operated with maximum efficiency.

We will also have to consider the possibility of a bridge across the Severn so as to provide ready access between the two parts.

Please proceed with this study at your earliest convenience.

B. Moreell

cc: Secretary of the Navy.
Admiral F. J. Horns, USN
Vice Adm. Randall Jacobs, USN
Superintendent, Naval Academy.

BC: Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, USN.
Handed to Lt. Rigdon 5/14/45.
elb

March 13, 1945.

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Subject: St. Johns College.


As indicated in my memorandum of 10 March, I do not think we should take steps to acquire St. Johns College grounds and buildings or additional property across the river until we have worked up the additional information indicated in my memorandum of the 10th.

I think it would be all right to go ahead now to find out whether St. Johns wants to sell to the Government or whether there is still opposition to such a transfer. It would also help to know how much they expect to get for the sale and whether their price is considered reasonable.

F. D. R.
11 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: St. Johns College.

1. I don't want to move too fast on this without being sure that I have your approval on principles; Senator Tydings is being importuned by a group of his people who believe the time is ripe to acquire the St. Johns property and he in turn is asking me for expression of our desires.

2. As I recall it you agreed in principle to this procedure:

   (a) Acquire St. Johns College, grounds and buildings, and keep the buildings intact, adapting them so far as may be to uses of the Naval Academy, although this use will be somewhat limited.

   (b) Proceed with the acquisition of property across the river to provide for expansion of the Academy. In conjunction with this we may want to give consideration to the acquisition of adjacent property for construction of an airfield. There is general agreement that air instruction in some form should be embodied in the general course at the Academy.

3. Ben Moreell is going ahead with the preparation of plans looking to the acquisition of the property involved -- both St. Johns and across the river -- together with plans for such restoration as might seem desirable on the St. Johns buildings, plus an estimate of annual maintenance costs.

4. Any definitive action will, of course, be subject to your subsequent approval but I do not want to initiate these steps unless you are in accord in principle.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

JF:HC0
Memorandum to
The Superintendant.

Subj: Naval Academy; Expansion and Development.

Ref:
(a) Naval Academy report NC2 of 31 August 1944.
(b) Plan accompanying reference (a).
(c) Captain H. H. Smith's "Memorandum to Chief" of 16 January 1945.
(d) Appendix A to reference (c).
(e) White print and photograph accompanying reference (c).
(f) Naval Academy Plan.

1. References (c), (d) and (e) are excellent developments of the Naval Academy Preliminary Plan. References (a) and (b). In general, they are strongly recommended.

2. Specific comment on points of references (c) and (d) are made:

A. Reference (c) (MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF) par. 2. Metropolitan Annapolis census is 25,000. This will expand to 35,000, at least, when the Academy is expanded, if size of community is important. It is considered the tract of the reservation will be adequate for the expansion when 14.5 acres set forth in reference (a) are acquired, and 40 more acres are re-claimed by filling Dorsey Creek, as herein recommended. Such an expanded reservation would total 417 acres west (south) of the river, and 121 acres east (north) of the Severn. The pre-war inaccessibility of Annapolis is to be corrected by a direct 4 lane highway to Washington which is to be linked to Ritchie Highway by a new road and bridge removed from the reservation. It is doubted that greater accessibility than that to be thus afforded, is desirable.

par. 3. Re-location of the Postgraduate School in California is concurred in.

par. 4. The Federal and the State Roads Commissions are collabor-ating in a survey to determine the best routing of the proposed bridge and road to link the proposed new Washington Highway to Ritchie Highway. The routing indicated in references (b) and (e) is understood to be favorably considered by these commissions.

par. 5. The ultimate capacity of the stadium, as previously proposed, is confirmed as 90,000 with both ends closed. Inadequacy of the stadium tract for the adequate parking of cars
and buses is recognized. The available area should be so prepared as to permit other use than parking during the relatively large periods between the occasional need for parking space. In addition, there can be no doubt as to the great benefit to the government of the possession of the land between the present N.A.A. stadium tract and the new highway. Should the new highway be located as has been recommended by the Naval Academy the area between such location and the stadium tract might suffice for the needs of parking. It can not be too strongly urged that every bit of undeveloped property in this area be acquired by the government at the earliest practicable date.

par. 7 and 8. It is fully agreed that the additional costs entailed in Captain Smith's plans are more than justified.

par. 9 and 10. Concurrence is given to the recommendation that all officers quarters be relocated west of Dorsey Creek, except the Superintendent's quarters and those of three of his aides, including the Commandant of Midshipmen. These quarters should be the two buildings directly in the rear of the Superintendent's quarters, at the northwest end of Porter Road. The removal of the rest of Porter Road will permit retention of Captain Smith's arrangement for spreading and opening out academic buildings to the marked benefit of campus proportion and Chapel focus. Cost estimates anticipate construction values of materials and labor when available, on the premise that considerations of the architectural standards and the permanence of the Naval Academy will influence relaxation of the war-time limits.

B. Reference (d) (APPENDIX to Reference (c)

par. 2. Under the topic "land" it is desired to set out the need for filling Dorsey Creek. Captain Smith has suggested the inadequacy of the proposed tract of 14.5 acres. The inadequacy is aggravated by poor distribution. The campus south of Dorsey Creek, as developed in previous plans of the references, has living concentrations at both ends, Bancroft Hall and the new dormitory. Bancroft Hall is to have 2500 occupants, and the new dormitory twice as many, 5000. Yet the plans provide the largest field, the old gymnasium and the large new field house for the small dormitory, and nothing adequate within the proximity of the dormitory which will quarter two-thirds of the student body. The American School standard of play area is .02 acre per student. Currently, the Naval Academy has 80 acres available for recreation west (south) of the river for 3300 midshipmen, or .024 acre per student. This is little enough "velvet" for a military boarding school employing such areas for recreation in an enforced physical training program, and for
drill. The plan proposes the addition of only 60 additional acres for recreation, the stadium site. 140 acres for 7500 students averages .0185 acres per student. Distribution of these areas in the plan places 32.5 acres at the Bancroft Hall end of the campus, which will average .013 acres per student for the 2500 quartered there. The remaining 107.5 acres are at the new dormitory end of the campus, averaging .022 acres per student for 5000 students in the dormitory. But, these 107.5 acres are divided among four parcels, from three of which the dormitory is separated by a creek. In the whole campus there is not a single field provided that can accommodate a brigade formation. Certainly the provision of such a field is part of the fundamental concept underlying all thought and effort for the retention of the one Naval Academy, rather than suffering separate and independent institutions — unit of the military corps. A sense of a cramped and makeshift environment could hardly be escaped in a Naval Academy so chopped up as to preclude the formation of the brigade of midshipmen. It is submitted that these land shortcomings admit of ready accommodation and balanced orientation and distribution by the inclusion of a project for the filling of Dorsey Creek to the Bowyer Road bridge. Such a fill will provide 70 acres, 40 of which will fall within the reservation the plans thus far envision. All 70 acres might properly, and very well, be government appropriated, and most favorably consigned to utility areas, but, conservatively, for the time being, this paper will be limited to the 40 acres. Tabulated, the gain of these 40 acres bordering upon the large dormitory site, would offer these features:

(a) The joining of Worden and Lawrence Fields in an open field of 45 acres, roughly, stretching from the academic area across the front of the dormitory and to the Museum (Postgraduate School) and residential area.

(b) The provision of a site for the location of the new 150,000 square foot field house neighboring the new dormitory, opening the currently planned field house site for tennis courts.

(c) An arrangement whereby the Chapel vista may be opened to the river by the relocation of tennis courts in an area which will not interrupt the full sweep of Farragut Field across the Bay. (Courts to be placed where Field House has been planned, along Randall Street).

(d) The location of the baseball diamond in the fill between King George Street and the railroad bridge, next to the new dormitory and Field House.

(e) The enlargement of the area available for utility elements in the vicinity of rail and road service, and on the town side instead of the otherwise attractive river front.

(f) Development in the enlarged utility area of one large central power plant.

(g) Removal of the unsightly power plant and stack from the river front, thus providing needed, sheltered water frontage for cutter sheds, and other floating equipment facilities.
(h) Removal from the campus and residential area of all shop, laundry, labor and utility traffic, serving the convenience of such traffic, at the same time, by placing its destination on the city boundary.

This recommendation, obviously, involves moving the Boat House across Bowyer Road into the lagoon to be retained. The shores of this lagoon will provide additional boating facilities needed at the new dormitory end of the campus. The 20 acre gain in field area will provide the Academy with 160 acres, restoring a .02 acreage per student for 7500 students, and, more importantly, distributing these areas and permitting distribution of other recreation facilities, in balance with the distribution of quarters. Little, if anything, is lost in the proposed fill of Dorsey Creek except storm drainage, for which a culvert can be substituted. In the upper reaches of the creek involved, water stagnates. Above the railroad bridge the creek is bounded by a cemetery, a dump, and a slum area.

par. 3(a). Traffic routing and paving in Captain Smith's plan is a big improvement over reference (b), and is accepted in all details except that projecting across Farragut Field to the Bay seawall. With relocation of the Field House, this road can follow the Randall and Prince George Street boundaries to the belt highway along the seawall.

par. 3(e). Plans being considered by the State Roads Commission include a dual purpose bridge to accommodate both vehicles and trains. The B. & A. plans comprehensive improvements following the war. It is of considerable service to the Naval Academy, and no objection is felt to the continuation of its right-of-way within the reservation as currently arranged.

par. 4. Dormitory arrangements and comments are concurred in fully.

par. 5. The academic considerations presented are much superior to those set forth in references (a) and (b), and are heartily concurred in.

par. 6 recreational. Unless Dorsey Creek is filled, Farragut Field can not afford any sacrifice of length to tennis courts, as desirable as their removal from the Chapel vista may be considered. With the Field House located on the fill, its heretofore proposed site may advantageously be given to courts. Farragut Field might then even accommodate some of these courts at the Santee Basin end, too.

par. 6 auditorium. The present auditorium seats 1100, or one-third the current student body. A 3200 capacity auditorium could accommodate 43 percent of a 7500 student body; a 5000 capacity space, 75 percent. I can't help being for the larger dimension.

par. 6 Field House. The question of justification of both an open stadium and a limited seating capacity, closed field house can not be fully answered until consideration is given to the need of a field

Regraded Unclassified
house would answer for indoor drills, mass-meetings and graduation exercises. It is apparent that such non-
athletic uses, as well as many athletic, demand a closer proximity to the campus and dormitories than a football stadium could properly be given.

Par. 7. Objection is made to the location of any building in the expanse of field that may be gained by filling Dorsey Creek. With its auditorium and corridor arrangement the Postgraduate School building is ideally adaptable to the purposes of a Museum. With this the Curator is in decided agreement.

Par. 8. All features of the residential arrangements of Captain Smith are liked. However, his areas appear somewhat crowded. His plan, like reference (b), neglected to "rub out" the World War I "temporary" bungalows along Bowyer Road. Future illustrations should omit them.

Par. 9. Public utilities. It is felt deeply that in the utility area heretofore described there should be erected a central power plant for the entire institution.
CONFIDENTIAL

March 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Acquisition of St. Johns College at Annapolis.

I am glad to have your memorandum of 9 February concerning your telephone conversation with Senator Tydings in reference to the possible acquisition by the Government of the St. Johns College property.

I think now, as I did in 1941, that the St. Johns buildings and grounds should be preserved unless very strong reasons of national interest make it necessary to destroy them. If the owners of the property are anxious to sell, either to the Government or to any other purchaser, I think the Government should buy in order that the property may be safeguarded as long as the public interests may permit.

If the owners of St. Johns property do not seek a purchaser, I think we should have further information before deciding whether or not the Government should endeavor to secure ownership at this time. Some of the questions that I think should be answered before a decision is reached are:

(a) The present value to the nation and the state of Maryland of St. Johns College as an educational institution;
(b) The probable financial status of the college in the postwar period;
(c) Whether the Navy will draw all of its officer material from the Naval Academy after the war, or whether a considerable proportion will come from other sources;
(d) The probable future size of the Naval Academy student body;
(e) Assuming that the Naval Academy should soon have a plant capable of housing and instructing a student body of 7,000 or more, is it possible that in time we may have to double even that figure? Is there a limit to the number of students that can be taught at the Naval Academy in time of peace without a serious lowering in the quality of graduates?
(f) Will the acquisition of St. Johns property allow for all the expansion that the future may demand or would it be better now to bridge the Severn and start a new development that will have ample room for all future expansion needs?
(g) Could dormitories and some instruction buildings be established on the eastern bank for the Third and Fourth Classes without prejudice to the quality of graduates?

I suggest that the opinion of the Board of Visitors on some of the above questions might be helpful.

Copy to:
Chief of Naval Personnel
Supt., U.S. Naval Academy
Mr. Leonard Draper, Bureau of Naval Personnel.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Acquisition of St. Johns College at Annapolis.

I have recently had a telephone conversation with Senator Tydings in which he informed me that a group of citizens of Annapolis were interested in promoting the acquisition of St. Johns College by the Navy for use in the postwar expansion of the Naval Academy.

You will recall that the matter has been previously discussed with you. On January 16, 1941, Admiral Wilson Brown sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation after conference with you a memorandum in which he indicated your desire to preserve the buildings and grounds of St. Johns. It appeared, at that time, that the College was in poor financial condition and might be forced to sell. It is my understanding that the College was able to weather the financial storm and is now in a fairly secure position.

We have been making some studies for the possible postwar expansion of the Naval Academy to take care of a large increase in the student body, it being contemplated that a total capacity of 7500 midshipmen might have to be accommodated to serve the postwar Navy.

These studies indicate that in addition to the acquisition of three blocks on the north side of King George Street which are now occupied by private residences and which project into the Academy grounds, it will be essential for an orderly plan that we acquire the St. Johns College grounds for the erection thereon of a midshipmen's dormitory and mess hall. There is no other land available for this purpose unless we should acquire a large area of heavily built-up residential property in the City of Annapolis. Any other area which might be utilized for the dormitory would be too far removed from the academic group (recitation halls, laboratories, armory, chapel, etcetera). The prospective utilization of the St. Johns College grounds would require that the present buildings be demolished. These buildings would be of little value for Naval Academy purposes and the erection of other buildings on the St. Johns grounds would not only spoil the appearance of the existing buildings but would also provide inadequate housing facilities for the Academy.

The remainder of the expansion of the Naval Academy would take place on the north and west sides of Severn Creek. This expansion would consist of a hospital, bachelor officers quarters, married officers' quarters, shop buildings, storehouses, laundry, a stadium and athletic field, and miscellaneous industrial buildings.
Serial 801
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

While I recognize the great desirability of preserving the buildings of this historic college, I believe that the need for this land for the orderly expansion of the Naval Academy would warrant the removal of these buildings.

It has been suggested that in order to preserve the historic value of the institution, if the buildings are removed, a scale model in detail should be made and placed on exhibition in a specially prepared room which would be provided on the college grounds for this purpose.

Before taking any further steps in regard to this matter, I would appreciate your views with respect to the acquisition of St. Johns College by the Navy and the removal of the college buildings.

James Forrestal
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Captain Dudley W. Knox, USN (Ret),
Office of Naval Records and Library,
Navy Department.

The President has read your memorandum of 5 March with interest. He asked me to say that he will be glad to see you, with your two assistants, in about two weeks.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:
Secretary Hassenet.
MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN, AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT:

Re your letter of 25 February enclosing the President's memo concerning the Naval Museum project.

I hasten to disclaim any thought of "capturing" the naval collection at Hyde Park. In this provision the "prospectus" is too broad, since other exceptions are obviously called for—such as Library of Congress, the National Gallery, etc. What we had in mind principally were many scattered relics in naval custody.

I like the President's "ten cent admission" suggestion very much. Receipts would largely cover salaries of civil employees.

Of course I will be delighted to discuss the whole matter with the President whenever convenient to him. I will be better prepared after about two weeks. May I bring with me two officers from my office: Lieutenant Whitehill (who in civil life is the Director of the Peabody Museum at Salem) and Lieutenant Brewington, a leading naval antiquarian.

[Signature]

DUDLEY W. KNOX,
Captain, U.S.N. (Ret.).
February 25, 1945.

Dear Dudley,

The President found time on the cruise to read with interest your general plan for the United States National Naval Museum. I send you, herewith, a copy of a memorandum which he has sent to me outlining his reaction to your plan.

I suppose that the President's naval collection at Hyde Park might technically be included in the material you expect to have brought to Washington and perhaps you should therefore specifically exclude it just as you have done in the case of the Naval Academy Museum. Will you let me know what you think about this?

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.
February 23, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN.

Two suggestions about this:

The first is that while the general idea is good, the cost of maintenance is too high and I am sure that Congress would not appropriate it in time of peace.

Navy people are notorious for not knowing what appeals to civilians. Frankly I doubt the wisdom of compelling the selection of an Annapolis graduate to run this public exhibition building, nor do I think it wise to put the Chiefs of Bureaus of the Navy Department on the Board of Trustees. There are always people like old Colonel Thompson who would be much more valuable. Very little need be done about collecting and exhibiting contemporary navy exhibits.

The basin will be the major point of attraction and I think that by charging ten cents entrance fee to all ships in the basin it would be very nearly possible to make the whole thing sustain itself. I wish that Captain Knox would carefully examine the proposed plan for this as a part of the new navy building.

Having had a good deal of experience with several types of museums, I would in the beginning at least cut the roll of employees in half.

Secondly: The problem to see what is to be done with my collection at Hyde Park which now belongs or is in process of transfer to the Government.

Under this memorandum it seems the clear purpose to transfer that entire collection to this navy museum at Washington. It is, of course, one of the main attractions of a Government owned museum and should be kept as such because it has been one of my principal avocations for four years.

Dudley Knox had better come to see me as I have worked on this matter personally for the last ten years.

F. D. R.

Attachment:
Memo from Captain Dudley Knox, USN(Ret.) (undated) on subject "General Plan for a United States National Naval Museum".

Regraded Unclassified
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

1 March 1945

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bert:

I am forwarding to you, herewith, a copy of a letter dated February 26th from Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, Naval Aide to the President. This has to do with the new Navy Building, Museum and Wet Basin.

Admiral Brown refers to my letter of December 26th which in turn refers to Admiral Brown's letter of December 21st.

In order that you may have the background of this correspondence I am forwarding copies of Admiral Brown's letter of February 26th, my letter of December 26, 1944, and Admiral Brown's letter of December 21, 1944.

You will note in Admiral Brown's letter of February 26th that the President desires that the Public Buildings Administration, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, and the Fine Arts Commission, be informed of his wishes.

If there is any additional information that you desire I will be pleased to furnish it.

Sincerely yours,

B.

B. Moreell,
Vice Admiral, (CGC) USN.

Mr. W. E. Reynolds,
Commissioner of Public Buildings,
Public Buildings Administration,
Washington, D.C.

CC: Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.,
  Naval Aide to the President.

Adm. Brown: I have also written to
  Fine Arts Com. and National Capital Park
  & Planning Com. B
February 26, 1945.

Dear Ben,

On our return passage I have had an opportunity to discuss your letter of 26 December with the President. He agrees with you that the Public Buildings Administration should prepare drawings and models for the President's approval, the preparation to be in consultation and agreement with the three other interested agencies, to wit, the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, the Fine Arts Commission and the Navy Department. When the Public Buildings Administration are prepared to make presentation of their plans and models to the President he will arrange to see them with representatives of the other three interested groups.

The President asks if you will be kind enough to convey his wishes to the interested agencies.

Sincerely,

Wilson Brown,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Vice Admiral Ben Moreell, (C&C), USN.,
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Admiral:

Thanks for yours of December 21 re New Navy Building, Museum, etc.

I note your statement re the ships that the President listed for berthing in the Wet Basin.

I note also, the President's views relative to the removal of the buildings on Observatory Hill.

Immediately on receipt of your letter I got in touch with Mr. Gilbert Underwood of the Public Buildings Administration to find out whether they had made any further progress on the plans or models. Mr. Underwood stated that they had made only the roughest kinds of sketches and what are known as "block plans" to determine general features of the mass layouts. He has no detailed plans or layouts, apparently. From their block plans they have made an estimate of $50,000,000 for the cost of the project. I understand that this includes the Museum and Wet Basin.

I believe it pertinent to state that the entire project is under the cognizance of the Public Buildings Administration of the Federal Works Agency. Whatever plans are developed are subject to the approval of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission for general features, locations and traffic control, the Fine Arts Commission for Architectural features, and the Navy Department as the using agency.

Under the circumstances, it seems to me that the Public Buildings Administration should be called upon to prepare drawings and models for presentation to the President, the preparation to be in consultation and agreement with the three other interested agencies mentioned above. When these have been prepared I believe they should be presented to the President by the Public Buildings Administration and that if a conference on the subject is held it should be attended by representatives of the other interested agencies.

If the foregoing is in accord with the President's desires and if you wish, I will inform the interested agencies to this effect.

With best wishes for the New Year, I am

Sincerely,

Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President
The White House

B. Moreell
December 21, 1944.

Dear Ben,

I have delayed thanking you for your letter of 30 October, about the new Navy Building, Museum and Wet Basin, until an opportunity offered to inform the President of all you have done. Last night he read the copies of the transcript from the records in the office of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission and briefly viewed the plans. I told Mr. Delano about the President's recent inquiry several weeks ago at Hyde Park and he said he would do all he could to bring things to a head. Dudley Knox told me the other day that he understands that decisions are being reached and difficulties ironed out.

For the ships to go in the Wet Basin the President mentioned the NICHIGAN (later called the WOLVERINE), the HARTFORD, the CONSTELLATION, a four-stack destroyer with outstanding record in both wars and a submarine. I give you this now so that we may get it in the records.

The President also said that he thinks the buildings on Observatory Hill should eventually be pulled down and the whole hilltop made a public park where government employees could have their lunch in good weather. In the center of the park he thinks a peace monument should be placed.

I hope that perhaps sometime after the first of the year the President may be able to find time to have you tell him just what the present situation is. If you can have models or drawings ready, I will see what I can do about finding an opportunity for you to present and explain them if you will be so kind. Will you let me know if you would like to do this yourself or if it would be better to get someone from the Capital Park and Planning Commission?

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Vice Admiral Ben Moreell, (CC)USN*,
Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Admiral:

My reply to your letter of October 12 has been delayed while we were making an investigation to see if we could find what action the President had taken on Paul Cret's recommendations relative to the new Navy Building, Museum and Wet Basin.

We have made a very thorough search in our own files and have consulted with the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, the Public Buildings Administration, and Paul Cret's office. None of us can find any record of action by the President on Paul Cret's recommendations.

However, our search did reveal the fact that the National Capital Park and Planning Commission presented certain models and plans to the President and that the President expressed his preference at that time. This was in August, 1939. I am forwarding to you herewith copies of transcripts which we made from the records in the office of the National Capital Park and Planning Commission, together with copies of the plans to which these transcripts refer.

I believe our correspondence on this matter has served a useful purpose because both the National Capital Park and Planning Commission and the Public Buildings Administration have dug out plans and records which serve to refresh their memories in regard to this matter.

Will you please let me know if there is anything further that you want us to do on this?

Sincerely yours,

B. Moreell
Vice Admiral, (CEC) USN

Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.
Naval Aide to the President
The White House.
MEMO FROM JOHN NOLEN, NCP&P TO MR. DELANO

August 3, 1939

Partridge, Barton, Foster, and Nolen presented models and plans of three schemes. The President prefers Scheme C by the Supervising Architect's Office, including the interior ship basin, with the following modifications:

1. The entire group of buildings be moved east about 60' so as to incorporate in the headhouse building the west pavilion of the Public Health Building.

2. That we try if we can to work out a plan for extending E St. mall west from 23 St. to the main Navy Building, carrying the roadway down through the arches in the building to the grade of 26 St. To do this he suggested changing the grade of E St. from 23 St. west, shaving off the hill on the south to a steep grassy slope without any wall.

3. That the Joint Board Building at the south end of the Naval Hospital hill be eliminated, and space be found for the Board in the Main War and Navy Buildings, probably the former.

The idea of mooring ships along the river is definitely abandoned. The President and Admiral McIntire agreed with the Chief of Engineers report.

The President was equally emphatic in his desire to retain the Naval Hospital hill and to develop a plan for the Navy Department Buildings that would take advantage of topography, the view of the river, and other unusual features of the site.

Mr. Delano appended following ms.: I have read the above with interest and satisfaction—it is a good result of a difficult situation. 8/16/39

This is a slight reduction of memo in office of Mr. Nolen, NCP&P, New Interior Bldg., Room 7013. By Lt. D. R. Houck 10/27/44.
This is a slight reduction of memo in office of Mr. Nolen, NCP&P, New Interior Bldg., Room 7013. By Lt. D. R. Houck 10/27/44

August 5, 1939

MEMO BY WILLIAM D. FOSTER, CONSULTING ARCHITECT, WITH PRESIDENT, AUG. 3, 1939

Models showing the three schemes A, B, and C were presented to the President by Messrs. Partridge and Nolen, of National Capitol Parks and Planning Commission, and by Messrs. Barton and Foster of PBA.

The following schemes were discussed:

Scheme A - Based on what the President had previously indicated, this scheme was disliked as being too much of a mass facing Constitution Avenue, and does not use the River frontage to advantage.

Scheme B - Explained and passed over quickly.

Scheme C - Liked as a parti along the lines desired.

The President thought the building should be moved to the East some 60' or the width of the wing of the Public Health Building—in order to keep the total mass further away from the river.

The President felt very strongly that the mall, including both E St. N. and E St. S. should be carried through to the building, and that an effort should be made to design the building so that the mall could carry through it under arches or some such similar treatment. He thought that it would be good if the mall could be lowered in elevation, so that it meet 25 St. rather than carry over it and also that it would be preferable to carry it through the building at the lower level rather than remaining on a deck as was shown in Scheme A. However, he seemed to realize that this would depend on further study as to the feasibility of lowering the mall to that extent.

It was pointed out to the President that in lowering the mall the two blocks to the north of E St. N. and between 23 St. and 25 St. would have to be acquired, and he expressed the opinion that these two blocks should be acquired in any event.

The President felt that the Museum was preferable in the location to the east of 26 St. and nearer the main building, rather than the alternate scheme of placing it on the border of the basin.

After looking at the models the President felt that the historic ships should not be berthed along the River, not only because of the difficulty of protecting them, but because the great length of ships which would form a line along the river bank. He thought placing the ships in a basin as shown on Scheme C was a satisfactory solution.
11 October 1944

Dear Admiral:

I am writing you with reference to your letter of 29 September relative to the proposed Naval Museum and the various sketches which we submitted for the new development of the Navy Building, Naval Museum and Basin for Historic Vessels.

We have made a search for the sketch by Paul Cret to which the President referred. We did not have these sketches in our files, and I had no recollection of ever having seen them. The Public Buildings Administration could not find them, nor did any one there remember them. We, therefore, got in touch with Paul Cret's office and obtained copies of the sketches, which I am forwarding herewith.

The President's suggestion for a Basin separated from the waterfront only by the highway is met fairly well, but not exactly, by Paul Cret's sketches. We will, therefore, develop another sketch showing only a highway between the Basin and the waterfront.

Paul Cret has, in our opinion, developed a very attractive layout for the proposed structures.

With kindest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

B. Moreell,  
Vice Admiral, (CEC) U.S.N.

Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President,  
The White House.
October 12, 1944.

Dear Ben,

Thank you very much for your letter of 11 October and for the Paul Cret sketches which I will show to the President as soon as an opportunity offers. In my last conversation on the subject I understood that the President had taken action on Cret's recommendations. As neither you nor the Public Buildings Administration have any record of the sketches or his comments, can you suggest any other place we might look for them? The White House has no record, so they must have been brought in by hand -- possibly by my predecessor. Could any of your people enquire of Mr. Delano?

I am sorry to give you so much trouble but I think we should try to find out what action the President has already taken if we can.

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Vice Admiral Ben Moreell, (CEC), USN,
Chief of Bureau of Yards and Docks,
Navy Department,
Washington 25, D.C.
Memorandum for the Secretary:

December 4, 1943

It is evident that the Alaska Highway will have little or no value after the war. All the evidence that I have been able to gather, which appears to me conclusive, is that the Canadians will not maintain it—certainly not as a whole—and that as far as its being a traffic artery for tourists and others to Alaska, it will cease to be.

Even assuming that the Highway should be maintained, its value for tourists will be virtually nil for the following reasons:

The route leaves the United States in the area of least population (Eastern Montana) approximately 1,000 miles from the nearest great centers of population—Denver, Kansas City, St. Louis, Detroit, Chicago—from which many tourists might be drawn. They would have to travel approximately 1,000 miles through uninteresting prairie country to reach the Canadian border. Then there are 500 miles of flat country to Edmonton. Then, from Edmonton to Dawson Creek where the actual Alaska Highway begins, is a sort of hiatus. A dirt road maintained more or less by the Province of Alberta extends from Edmonton to Dawson Creek, but this is not an all-weather road and its defects are revealed in the fact that everything that has gone over the Alaska Highway has not used this stretch of road but has been shipped by freight cars from Edmonton to Dawson Creek, which is likewise the terminus of the railroad.

From Dawson Creek to Watson Lake is another 639 miles of uninteresting country. In fact, the scenery does not really become interesting and attractive until you pass Whitehorse—a total of 902 miles from Dawson Creek. This is far too long a journey for the average tourist, in view of the uninteresting nature of the countryside. He would be infinitely better off taking the boat from Seattle and travelling on it up the beautiful Inside Passage. If he wishes to take a car with him, the branch of the Alaska Highway which has been extended to the port of Haines at the upper end of the Inside Passage will furnish him the opportunity. However, after 42 miles on American soil, this branch of the Highway also extends some 250 miles through Canadian territory. The problem, therefore, is how are we going to provide that this section which would be really useful to Alaska may be maintained. Clearly it is the section of Alaska Highway in which the Canadians will have the least interest, since there is nothing in this territory but scenery; it is without population and leads only into Alaska. And certainly the United States Congress will have no interest, after the military need has passed, in maintaining a highway on another nation's soil. It would be quite right in taking that position.

I would like to propose negotiations which will make it possible for that portion of the Highway to be transferred to American sovereignty, and therefore subject to maintenance with United States funds. The objective of these negotiations is to transfer an area of approximately 16,000 square miles extending from the Canada-Alaska boundary up to and including the stretch of Highway in question to the United States.

The alienation to another nation of even a foot of worthless land is a ticklish matter in which such elements as national pride and prestige are involved. If mere purchase were proposed, these elements would be insuperable.
It is probable that the United States could not purchase the tract of land in question for any sum of money, no matter how relatively worthless the terrain involved. If, however, a deal could be consummated by which land were exchanged, the requirements of national pride and prestige might be taken care of. On the appended map I have indicated roughly the land that could be traded in such an exchange. One highly desirable result would be the linking of southeastern Alaska with the rest of Alaska by land. (Although there is at present a thin connection along the coast, this consists of glaciers and is impassable; for all intents and practical purposes, the two parts of Alaska are not connected.)

The proposed trade would rectify this long standing deficiency. Moreover, it should be mutually beneficial. It would relieve the Canadians of the obligation to maintain some 250 miles of difficult terrain. There are a few small settlements in the Territory to be ceded by the United States, but I am sure there would be no opposition on the part of Alaskans there.

One further complication exists, however. That is, that the lower part of the area which we wish to acquire (shaded in violet) belongs to British Columbia and not to the Dominion. British Columbia, therefore, which undoubtedly has all the psychology of an American sovereign state, would not be interested or benefited by the transfer of land to Yukon Territory, i.e., the Dominion. It may therefore be necessary to find something else to offer in addition to the transfer of land above indicated. One obvious possibility that suggests itself is the port of Skagway, possibly with some territory adjacent (which is of little value). Skagway is the ocean terminus of the Canadian White Pass and Yukon Railroad. The first twenty miles of this road from the sea are on American soil. These twenty miles with a strip of suitable width would, I feel, be attractive to the Province of British Columbia and the Dominion Government.

The permanent population of Skagway is about 600. The railroad is the only industry in the town, and the townsfolk derive their livelihood from it directly or indirectly. I doubt whether there would be any strong objection on the part of the people of Skagway to the transfer; they would of course retain their citizenship, and the phenomenon of Americans working in Canada and Canadians working in the United States is not uncommon. Furthermore, their rights, to continued employment and other rights, would be provided for by treaty. A less radical alternative might satisfy Canada and British Columbia: to make Skagway a free port and to internationalize the 20-mile railroad belt now on United States soil. There are probably other alternatives.

The port of Haines on the other hand will be developed as a result of the Highway coming down to it. Haines will become the Alaska entrance to the Highway. If the maintenance of the stretch of the Highway which we are discussing is assured, Haines will probably exceed other Alaska ports in importance since it will give access to the interior of Alaska without crossing the Gulf of Alaska. It will be available to many smaller vessels which will be able to navigate the protected waters of the Inside Passage. The future tourist route into Alaska would in my judgment be from Seattle up the Inside Passage to Haines and then over the Highway either by automobile or bus to the interior. The return trip could be from Seward or Valdez.

To sum up, it is my belief that a mutually advantageous exchange of terrain between Canada and the United States can be worked out. One great value of such a result, if it can be achieved, would be its splendid example for other parts of the world where alteration of boundaries is inevitable and where a re-drawn boundary peacefully negotiated would point the way to other nations.

Ernest Grunenig, Governor of Alaska
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Ernest Gruening, Governor of Alaska

Regraded Unclassified
For the President to take up with Secy. Jakes after he gets to Washington
file from Quebec file

Regraded Unclassified
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

1 January 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Philippine bases, subsequent to granting independence.

For complete memo see File A16/Philippines.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Philippine bases, subsequent to granting independence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been advised that in the course of discussions regarding the pending Joint Resolutions advancing the date of Philippine Independence, President Quezon has expressed the opinion that the United States should now stipulate what basis will be required in the Philippine Islands after their independence has been granted.

We have given careful consideration to the practicability of specifying at this time the various base facilities that will be required for the full and mutual protection of the Philippine Islands and of the United States. We find that while sites for certain installations could now be selected with some assurance, it is quite impracticable to compile at this time any definitive list in final form. Indeed we feel that we must provide for continuing review and adjustment of our military and naval requirements in the Philippines in the light of the changing strategic situation and the development of the means of waging war in the future. We believe the wording of the pending Joint Resolutions vests discretionary authority in the President of the United States to withhold or acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases and the rights incident thereto as he may deem necessary.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY,
Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.
In reply to the President's inquiry in your memorandum of 18 December, you are advised the Allies are using to the full the repair facilities at Dakar, Casablanca, Oran and Alexandria. In general, the facilities at Dakar and Casablanca are mostly being operated by the French, and the U.S. and U.K. are furnishing material. Facilities at Oran are largely being operated by U.S. with some British operation, and the majority of the material is being furnished by U.S. Alexandria operates entirely under British control, with small amounts of material being obtained from time to time from our Naval Supply Depot at Oran for repairs to U.S. types of ships under British operation.

In general, these repair facilities are adjusted from time to time to conform to demand.

F. J. HORNE
Vice Chief of Naval Operations
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Horne.

The President has directed me to ask you whether the Allies are using to the full the repair facilities at small outlying stations, such as Dakar, Casablanca, Oran and Alexandria.

Wilson Brown,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR REAR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN USN
Naval Aide to the President

Reference: (a) Your memo of 25 October 1943 in re my tour of observation.
(Copy attached).

1. My party covered very completely logistic arrangements in England, Scotland, Londonderry, thence to Casablanca, Oran, Algiers, Bizerte, Palermo, Port Lyautéy, Dakar, Natal and up through the Caribbean Bases.

2. Port, storage and transportation facilities in the various Mediterranean Harbors:

Adequate for current requirements.
Room for amplification and development of facilities.
Expansion ready as may be required.
Increasing effective use being made of our own repair bases.
In some places excess stock, and too, excess personnel - steps already taken to adjust.
Necessity for more comprehensive operational directives will be met.
No failure of supply or inconsistent duplication.
Spot action taken on controversial matters with concurrence of Area Commanders.

3. Repair facilities in the Mediterranean:

Increasing development for effective use.
Palermo dockyard in operation.
Units in Africa equipped, ready and in effective use.

4. Duplication of logistic effort between Army, Navy, & Air Forces:

Nothing inconsistent.
Isolated examples of duplication readily explained and adjusted.
Strong type of cooperation and coordination.

5. My contact with the British Admiralty especially strong. Conferences arranged with all responsible Chiefs and agreements reached without difficulty. Production of Reverse Lend Lease figures entirely satisfactory.
Memorandum for Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, USN  
Naval Aide to the President  
16 December 1943

There is so much that cannot be evaluated. The British will move 3,000 families out of the area needed to train our invasion forces. There is no dollar value that one can place on this dislocation and discomfort. President's speech on this subject comforting to all hands. Developed excellent financial relations with Barclays Bank.

6. The entire trip productive. On my return, there has been continuous contact with COMINCH, NAVOPR and Bureau Chiefs in developing notes in my black memo book. Action taken throughout the trip to consolidate activities and facilities, reduce stock to satisfactory limits, dispose of surplus stock, move excess personnel.

W. B. YOUNG
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Admiral Young.

I have shown your memorandum of 23 October to the President and he is very much obliged to you for your offer to carry out any special mission. He has no special instructions other than what I know you already have in mind, but he authorized me to say that his particular interest in the result of your inspection will be concerning the port facilities, storage facilities and transportation facilities, of the various Mediterranean harbors, and whether or not we are shipping too much of any one article to any of the ports or failing to meet re-requirements at any port. He is also interested to know what plans are in hand to increase repair facilities in the Mediterranean so that our forces will be largely self-supporting without need of sending ships back to the home yards for repairs other than major casualties. He will also be interested in whether you find duplication of logistic effort between Army, Navy and Air Forces.

/s/ W. Brown

Wilson Brown
Rear Admiral, USN
Naval Aide to the President
Lt Rigdon
Capt Wood Moore
Pols 21st

[Signature]

Regraded Unclassified
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Irish Air and Naval Bases

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the military aspects of the acquisition of air and naval bases in Ireland.

2. Air transport and air ferry operations will not be materially improved by acquiring such bases. Air operations by very long range aircraft for the protection of shipping would not be appreciable extended in range. In both instances, however, an additional degree of safety and flexibility would be had through the availability of additional fields.

3. Air operations against the European Continent would not be appreciable facilitated by use of bases in Eire except that bases for fighter planes in southwest Eire would be of advantage to the theater commander as bases to which he might move his fighter planes to oppose German air attacks on Allied convoys if they should be routed south of Ireland.

4. This air threat together with that of the German submarines operating from bases in western France are now deterrent factors in the routing of seaborne traffic to England through lanes south of Ireland. Air bases will reduce the air threat but naval bases will not materially reduce the existent submarine threat because present bases in southwest England are closer to the Bay of Biscay. However, naval bases will be useful when it is considered safe enough to route convoys south of Ireland and when invasion operations start in western Europe. They can be quickly established with floating equipment.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that fighter air bases and naval bases in southern Eire will be strategically valuable to the United Nations when shipping is routed past southern Ireland or when an invasion of western Europe is undertaken.
6. A saving of American lives and the lives of nationals of those countries associated with us in the war, might result from availability of suitable emergency landing fields in Eire, and would result from availability of air and naval bases when it becomes feasible to route convoys south of Ireland.

7. It is recommended that negotiations be conducted without committing the U.S. at this time to a definite program for the establishment of air or naval bases in southern Ireland.

8. A copy of this memorandum is being sent to the Secretary of State, and officers representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been designated to consult with him in this matter.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

Copy to:

The Honorable,  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

Copy for General Marshall