

BOX 171.

6. P-1 - P-21 PRESIDENT'S FILE

- a. Memorandum Admiral Leahy to FDR re draft of 650,000 men: September 2, 1942.
- b. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re civilians on General Eisenhower's staff: September 16, 1942.
- c. Letter H. L. Stimson to General Cox: September 17, 1942 and covering memorandum Marshall to FDR.
- d. Lord Halifax to FDR enclosing telegram from the Viceroy of India to Halifax re general conditions in India: September 25, 1942.
- e. Frank Knox to FDR re manpower problems: October 23, 1942.
- f. Frank Knox to FDR re enlisted personnel USN: November 5, 1942.
- g. Recommendations for men and officers of USS Mayrant (including FDR Jr.) for action of November 8, 1942.
- h. Memorandum Frank Knox to FDR and FDR's reply: April 5, 1943 re military government for Samoa.
- i. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re reduction of Army in 1943: June 17, 1943.
- j. Cordell Hull to FDR re Ethiopia: August 10, 1943. (6 pp.)
- k. Yilma Deressa (Vice Finance Minister for Ethiopia) to FDR: July 12, 1943.
- l. Secretary Hull to FDR re Deressa's aide-memoire: August 2, 1943.
- m. Memorandum FDR to Hull: August 4, 1943.

## BOX 171. (Continued)

- n. Secretary Hull to FDR re Ethiopian problems: August 10, 1943.
- o. Division of Naval Intelligence report on the Middle East: August 11, 1943. (8 pp.)
- p. Memorandum (no designations) re Italian political situation: August 16, 1943.
- q. Memorandum ? to FDR enclosing draft of statement by FDR on announcing relations between the U.S., U.K. with the French ~~Commission~~ Committee of National Liberation: August 11, 1943.
- r. Memorandum Stimson to FDR re labor organizational activities at the Berkeley Radiation Laboratory: September 9, 1943.
- s. Memorandum Admiral Brown to Admiral Leahy: December 18, 1943.
- t. Memorandum R. B. Royal to Admiral Leahy re strength of overseas military personnel: December 20, 1943.
- u. Memorandum FDR to General Pat Hurley: January 8, 1944.
- v. Joint Chiefs of Staff report on "Political Conditions on Occupied Europe": January 17, 1944. (4 pp.)
- w. FDR to Governor Walter Bacon: February 10, 1944.
- x. FDR to Frank Curley (Disabled American War Veterans): February 9, 1944.
- y. Memorandum Admiral Brown to Frank Knox: February 11, 1944.
- z. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re strength of U.S. and British armed forces: November 23, 1943.
- aa. Memorandum Captain Wood to FDR re Admiral Byrd: January 19, 1944.
- bb. Memorandum Frank Knox to FDR re Navy enlisted strength: February 14, 1944.
- cc. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re Army strength: February 16, 1944.
- dd. FDR's statement on religious monuments: March 14, 1944.
- ee. FDR to Captain Paul Bastido (USN): March 31, 1944.
- ff. Report on Cuban non-Participation in the War Effort: January 11, 1944.

## BOX 171. (Continued)

- gg. Report on Cuba's Contribution to the War Effort: November , 1943.
- hh. Report Fundamental Conditions in Cuba and their Effect on U.S.-  
Cuban Relations: November 22, 1943.
- ii. Memorandum Secretary Hull to FDR re Italian Political Developments:  
April 20, 1944
- jj. Memorandum G. E. Buxton (OSS) to FDR on Conditions in German Army:  
April 19, 1944.
- kk. FDR to Mrs. Frank Knox: April 30, 1944.
- ll. Group of letters by FDR re death of Frank Knox.
- mm. Memorandum James Forrestal to FDR re strength of enlisted Naval  
personnel: May 8, 1944.
- nn. Memorandum Captain Wood to Chief of Naval Personnel: April 12, 1944.
- oo. Memorandum General Marshall to FDR re Casualties and Prisoners:  
June 6, 1944.
- pp. Frank E. Midkiff to FDR and reply by Admiral Brown: September 19, 1944
- qq. Admiral Beardall to FDR: September 27, 1944.
- rr. Memorandum James Forrestal to FDR re Negro women Reserve: July 28, 1944.
- ss. Group of three reports re complaints: November 17, 1944.
- tt. George H. Earle, Lieutenant Commander, USN, to FDR: September 23, 1944.
- uu. Admiral Brown to Lieutenant Commander Earle: November 25, 1944.
- vv. Request for Orders for Lieutenant Commander Earle: December 18, 1944.
- ww. Report on Terceira, Azores: October 8, 1944.
- xx. Memorandum Forrestal to FDR: December 8, 1944.
- yy. Memorandum Forrestal to FDR re agenda for talk: January 2, 1945.
- zz. Prime Minister Stalin to FDR: February 9, 1945.
- aaa. FDR to L. McCormick-Goodhart: March 19, 1945.
- bbb. Envelope containing top secret data on George Earle case.
- ccc. Group of papers dated March 21-29, 1945, re George Earle case.



TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET---IVI

From: Milattache Amembassy Rio de Janiero, Brazil

To: The President of The United States

Nr: 4410, 19 February 1945

Filed 182045Z

War pass to the President, The White House and info to Acting Secretary of State for Grew and Dunn only from Secretary Stettinius Nbr 4410.

1. Just have successfully completed my special mission for Mr. Stimson with President Vargas about which I will tell you in detail as soon as I see you. We discussed in a very harmonious and friendly way various other matters which I have made the subject of a separate memorandum which I have had repeated to you. In addition to the points covered in that memorandum, Vargas asked me for my opinion as to whether Brazil should promptly recognize the Soviet Union I told him that, speaking quite frankly, it seemed to me it would be in the interest of Brazil and of the United Nations as a whole, for her to do so.

In reply to an inquiry from him as to appropriate procedure, I told him that the simplest procedure would be for his ambassador in Washington to present an Aide Memoire to the Soviet Embassy there on this subject.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Page # 2

He asked me if the United States would sponsor Brazil's approach to the Soviet Union and could assure Brazil that it would see that no harmful results came from this in the future. In reply, I said that the United States would be glad to sponsor Brazil's approach to the Soviet Union on the recognition question, in view of President Vargas' agreement that Brazil would wish to follow our lead in European International Affairs in which he said Brazil is inexperienced.

2. My stop at Dakar was interesting and helpful in promoting cordial relations with Governor Cournarie with whom I had a brief and purely sociable visit at the Governor's Palace. He was pleasant and hospitable and took me for a drive around the city. I also had an opportunity to inspect our Consulate General.

3. My visit to Liberia, which was the first time American Secretary of State has visited that republic, was quite an event. We made the long dusty drive of 52 miles from Roberts Field into Monrovia as the sun was setting and on the way had quite a view of the extensive Firestone plantation. At the Executive Mansion President Tubman had his entire cabinet, the Chief Justice, a number of Senators, the Speaker of the House, and others, present to receive me. This reception at which I made a few brief general remarks was followed by dinner after which we returned to our plane and took off for Natal

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Page # 3

after midnight. President Tubman and his colleagues seemed delighted to have me come. They certainly went to great lengths to put on a show for us. President Tubman asked me to convey to you his warmest personal greetings and best wishes.

EH/ab

End.

Note: Copy has been sent to Acting Secretary of State for Grew and Dunn only.

TOP SECRET

P16/P165 -

March 29, 1945.

Dear George,

Your letter of March 26th has just reached me and your orders to duty in the Pacific have already been issued. As I have already changed instructions once, I think you had better go ahead and carry them out and see what you think of the Pacific war as one of our problems.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely,

Prepared for the President's signature

Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R.,  
The Racquet Club,  
Philadelphia, Pa.

COPY

F16/Pres

The Racquet Club  
Philadelphia

March 26, 1945.

My dear Mr. President:

I have your letter of March 24.  
Your order as my Commander-in-Chief I shall obey to  
the letter.

Further than that, my gratitude for the  
honours you have conferred upon me and made possible  
for me compels me to give you my word of honour that  
I shall issue no public statement of any kind again  
so long as you are the President, except should you  
again decide to be a candidate when I shall certainly  
do all in my power in Pennsylvania to have you reelected.

Your friendship for me has been one of the  
most valued possessions in my life. When I wrote you  
that last letter I realized it might cost me that friendship.  
You may know, therefore, when I deliberately took such a  
risk how intense and sincere were my feelings and convictions.

On March 3, you wrote me that you thought that  
a bigger field of usefulness lay before me in civil life.  
With those words you destroyed my desire to stay in the Navy.

Since nothing has occurred since those words  
of yours, except that I should have had a difference of  
opinion with you, (the first in thirteen years of association),  
I request respectfully that I be transferred to inactive  
duty.

My God give you health and guide you right  
in this Russian mess.

Very respectfully yours,

GEORGE H. EARLE.

UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/20/00 BY SP8/STP/STP

COPY

COPY

THE RACQUET CLUB  
PHILADELPHIA

March 26, 1945.

My dear Mrs. Boettiger:

Will you be kind enough  
to give the enclosed letter to the President?

I assure you it will be  
the last time I shall bother you.

Very sincerely yours,

GEORGE H. EARLE.

March 27, 1945.

Dear Milo,

Thanks ever so much for your letter of 26 March and for your prompt action in the delivery of the White House letter to Commander George Earle.

I am sorry to have caused you so much trouble but it was important that the letter should not go astray and I knew I could rely on you to get it delivered. Thanks ever so much.

Yours as ever,

Wilson Brown,  
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Rear Admiral M. F. Draemel, U.S.N.,  
Commandant Fourth Naval District,  
Navy Yard,  
Philadelphia, Pa.

P16/Pres

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT  
UNITED STATES NAVY YARD  
PHILADELPHIA 12

26 March 1945


Dear Wilson:

Enclosed is the receipt from  
Commander George Earle for the letter delivered  
to me for further delivery to him.

Commander Earle was not at  
his recorded address, nor had he left any in-  
formation as to his movements. Through  
Intelligence he was located at Seaford, Delaware  
about 9:30 p.m. The interval of time between  
9:30 and 1:30 a.m. was required for the delivery  
as Seaford is about one hundred miles from  
Philadelphia.

With very best wishes,

Sincerely,



W. F. Drea  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Commandant

Vice Admiral Wilson Brown, USN  
Naval Aide to the President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

P16/Pres

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

March 24, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
(Chief of Naval Personnel).

Enclosure (A) is a copy of a letter the President has sent to Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R., this date. The President directs that it be made a part of your confidential files; that it be understood that Commander Earle no longer has any special instructions or responsibility to the President; and that he be employed in administrative duties in the war area wherever you consider his services most helpful.

WILSON BROWN,  
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:  
Director of Naval Intelligence.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1945.

Dear George,

I have read your letter of March 21st to my daughter Anna and I have noted with concern your plan to publicize your unfavorable opinion of one of our allies at the very time when such a publication from a former emissary of mine might do irreparable harm to our war effort. As you say, you have held important positions of trust under your Government. To publish information obtained in those positions without proper authority would be all the greater betrayal. You say you will publish unless you are told before March 28th that I do not wish you to do so. I not only do not wish but I specifically forbid you to publish any information or opinion about an ally that you may have acquired while in office or in the service of the United States Navy.

In view of your wish for continued active service, I shall withdraw any previous understanding that you are serving as an emissary of mine and I shall direct the Navy Department to continue your employment wherever they can make use of your services.

I am sorry that pressure of affairs prevented me from seeing you on Monday. I value our old association and I hope that time and circumstance may some day permit a renewal of our good understanding.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R.,  
The Racquet Club,  
Philadelphia, Pa.

March 24, 1945.

Dear Milo,

I am anxious to obtain a receipt from Commander Earle for the enclosed letter together with a record of the time and place of delivery. His latest recorded address is The Racquet Club, Philadelphia. Will you be good enough to have an officer make delivery at the earliest possible time, either at the Racquet Club or wherever he may be at the time this reaches you?

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,  
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Rear Admiral M. F. Draemel, U.S.N.,  
Commandant Fourth Naval District,  
Navy Yard,  
Philadelphia, Pa.

*J.M.*  
*PIC/Pres*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

Following a conversation with Mrs. Boettiger, Admiral Brown called Admiral Denfeld and asked that he hold up the retirement papers, or papers involving transfer to inactive duty, in the case of Commander George H. Earle, U.S.N.R., until further word is received from Admiral Brown.

*W.B.*  
WILSON BROWN.

STANDARD INSIDE MAIL RECEIPT  
 U.S. NAVY OFFICER MESSENGER AND COURIER SERVICE  
 OPNAV-20-559 (1-45)

56

Return signed receipt to originating office. Every time an IN number changes hands a copy of this receipt should be forwarded to CNO (LNC-RPS).

FROM: OMMC BLDG 52 NAVY YARD PHILA PA.

PREPARED BY: KING

TO : OMMC WASH DC RM 1111

DATE: 24 MARCH 1945

Use the following symbols in "CLASSIFICATION" column

- TS - Top Secret
- S - Secret
- C - Confidential
- R - Restricted
- USM - Transmission authorized by Registered Guard Mail or U.S. Registered Mail to or from any point within continental limits of U.S. May be added to any classification except TOP SECRET, when authorized by originator.
- RP - To be handled in accordance with current edition Registered Publication Manual. May be added to any classification.

IDENTIFICATION		FROM	TO
NO.	CLASSIFICATION		
WH-1	TS	WHITEHOUSE	REAR ADMIRAL MILO F. DRAEMEL, USN COMDT. FOURTH MD. PHILA. PA.

*Received from Lieut. F. L. Bugger, Post 4*

RECEIPT is hereby acknowledged of the above described  REGISTERED GUARD  OFFICER MESSENGER mail under item no. WH-732

DATE: 3/25/45 1:30 A.M. SIGNATURE (See INR): S. S. Conrad, Sgt. USNR RANK: NATS

Copy

The Racquet Club  
Philadelphia

March 21, 1945

Dear Mrs. Boettiger:

You may remember I wrote you about the Sultan Mohammed IV hunting knife I had for your father. I told you that I would like to give it to your father personally but if he were too busy I would send it to you to give to him. Then I had a telegram from Mr. Hassett asking me to come to Washington Monday that the President wanted to see me personally.

Sunday I got out of bed with a fever of 105, took a sleeper to Washington to be on time and called Mr. Hassett as to the exact time for the appointment and was informed by him the President was too busy to see me and would I stop by the White House and leave the knife. So I am sending it to you to give to him.

The dates of the Sultan's reign are 1640-1692 and I consider it the finest Turkish antique I have ever seen. On the point end of the scabbard is the Sultan's turban, the stars on the blade are his personal motif, and his name in small Arabic letters are on two places on the scabbard.

As you may know my support of your father began in July 1932, about as early as a Republican could support him. Under him I have been Minister to Austria, Governor of Pennsylvania, Minister to Bulgaria, and three years in the U.S. Navy, the last two years as Asst. Naval Attache' in Turkey, reporting directly to him on Eastern Europe and Near East conditions. I have had several letters from your father congratulating me on my work.

Last autumn I felt my usefulness as an observer in that theatre was finished, so I wrote asking your father to transfer me to occupied Germany for the same sort of work. Imagine my shock when I arrived here to find myself about to be brushed off to the inactive list and not sent to Europe for what Admiral Brown has been frank enough to say on several occasions was because of my anti-Russian attitude. In other words, because I told your father the truth about conditions in Russia and countries occupied by Russia, that near-Bolshevist group of advisers around the President had persuaded him to force me out of the picture.

However, before I am out of the picture, unless your father objects I want to present the following to the members of Congress and to the American people.

First, I shall tell of my opportunities for observation of the Bolsheviks, their methods and results obtained, as Minister to Austria, to Bulgaria and two years as Asst. Naval Attache' in Turkey reporting directly to the President. Then I shall recall my vigorous fight against Nazism from the very beginning in Austria 1933, Bulgaria, etc.

Then I shall point out why Russia today is a far greater menace than Germany ever was, because of its manpower, natural resources, prospects of Bolshevizing Europe, including Germany, and because of its millions of unpaid fifth columnists. I shall show how Russia twenty-five years after its Revolution is exactly the same Red Terror it was then, of its 15 million people in concentration camps, of its treatment of the Jews and of Labor. I shall prove how Stalin deliberately started this war with his pact of friendship with Hitler so that the capitalistic nations would destroy each other. I shall show the history books of 1944 being taught the Russian children, teaching Lenin's doctrines more strongly than ever, among which is stressed that any deceit, lie, treachery or murder is ethical if it helps the proletariat. I shall show how Mr. Davies and other higher government officials were shown and heard of Russia only what the Bolshevik leaders wanted them to hear and see, as contrasted with me who interviewed scores of refugees.

I shall not do this until my papers have been received retiring me from active service, which I understand will be within the next week, and unless I hear from you, your father does not want me to do it. //

I am no Raymond Moley or even Bill Bullitt. No matter how hurt I may be because your father resents the fact I told him the truth and after twelve years wants me to return to civil life, I shall never do anything to hurt or embarrass him as long as we both live. //

I forgot to say that if I send this letter to the Press and members of the Congress, I shall ask a delegation be sent immediately to investigate Russian breaking of promises in the Balkans, where they are sentencing to jail Bulgarian democrats who used to meet me secretly to plan opposition to Nazi influence and power in Bulgaria. I shall also state that the criticism of my article as being untimely or unpatriotic can hardly be considered, so when from the bottom of my heart I believe the ally we are aiding will be a far greater menace to us and to civilization than the enemy we are now fighting.

If I do not hear from you in a week, I shall understand the President has no objection to me sending this letter to members of Congress and the Press. //

Very sincerely yours,

George H. Earle

TOP SECRET DATA RE EARLE CASE.

... have confirmed that the so-called 'Naval Attaché' in Istanbul, and lately United States Minister in Sofia, Earle, who is now in charge of allied political propaganda for Bulgaria, is on friendly terms with many leading Bulgarian military and political personalities, with whom --M-- developments in the Balkans; that in some of his reports he argues in favour of the Bulgarian viewpoint; that he is favoured by ROOSEVELT; and that he is a friend of the United States Consul-General here, who remarked, "Greek circles in Istanbul ought to get together more with EARLE."

Rec'd 5 Feb 44 (h)  
C II c

Greek #109902

**SECRET**

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

SECRET

No. 127054

From: Cairo (Tsouderos)  
To: London (Greek Embassy)  
8 January 1944  
XBT

#213

Following from our Consul in Jerusalem:

"From my conversations with a friendly American colleague I have confirmed that the so-called 'Naval Attaché' in Istanbul, and lately United States Minister in Sofia, Earle, who is now in charge of allied political propaganda for Bulgaria, is on friendly terms with many leading Bulgarian military and political personalities, with whom --M-- developments in the Balkans; that in some of his reports he argues in favour of the Bulgarian viewpoint; that he is favoured by ROOSEVELT; and that he is a friend of the United States Consul-General here, who remarked, "Greek circles in Istanbul ought to get together more with EARLE."

Rec'd 5 Feb 44 (h)  
C II c

Greek #109902

SECRET

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

Regraded Unclassified

WAR DEPARTMENT

**SECRET**

129176

From: Angora (Japanese Ambassador)  
To : Tokyo (Minister for Foreign Affairs)  
6 March 1944  
XBT-JAA

#110

EARLE, formerly American Minister at Sofia (now at Istanbul supervising activities in the Balkans), spoke as follows to a contact:

1. The American Ambassador at Moscow had reported the view that the Red Army would not penetrate far to the west of the former 1939 frontier. This was at one with the wishes of President ROOSEVELT.

(???) It was to be regretted that, in spite of the fact that the establishment of a second front would be for Great Britain the parting of the ways between life and death, the British had but little comprehension of this. Thus it was a fact that even on the Italian front there were, in addition to the American forces, large numbers of Indian, Canadian and French troops and relatively few United Kingdom troops, but it was expected that when it came to setting up the second front the British would endeavour to reduce as far as possible the numbers of their own troops employed, and it was disagreeable that the British in any case depended too much on America.

3. The British were very insistent on Turkey's entering the war, but he did not think that this would have much effect on the war situation, and there was no need to be flurried.

Rec'd 4 Apr 44 (t)

Japanese

#116725

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

Regraded Unclassified

WAR DEPARTMENT

**SECRET**

129138  
B-1764

From: Ankara (Tsou Shang Yu)  
To: Chungking  
6 March 1944  
XBT

#811

Intelligence from Turkish sources. The lack of harshness apparent in the Soviet peace terms to Finland is an artifice to ingratiate the U.S.S.R. with each of the smaller powers. The swing over toward the United Nations is on the point of becoming more pronounced. SEVOFF<sup>a</sup> is still in Turkey. VALEF (?VULEFF?), a previous Bulgarian Minister of Commerce, has also arrived; I hear that he is already in touch with EARLE, former United States Minister to Rumania (?Bulgaria?).

TSOU SHANG YU

a - Cf. No. 128233.

Rec'd 10 Mar 44 (7028-d) Chinese #113281

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

Regraded Unclassified

WAR DEPARTMENT  
**SECRET**

1657

From: Ankara (KURIHARA)  
To: Tokyo (via Berlin)  
6 March 1944  
JAA

#112

Recently in connection with the negotiations concerning an armistice with Finland the enemy authorities have made much ado, for propaganda purposes, about the opening of negotiations with Bulgaria in regard to a separate peace. According to what I have found out through my own private inquiries, the architect SEVOFF, who is at present staying in Ankara, has in fact been in touch with certain enemy officials. According to a government report from an official in the German Embassy here (our "HA" intelligence man), this man has first of all been in contact with the American Minister<sup>a</sup> in Istanbul, EARLE, formerly Minister to Sofia. He has also, it seems, had a secret meeting with the American Ambassador, STEINHARDT. But because the Americans do not make clear what their stipulations were, his plan has fallen to the ground.

On the 3rd the newspaper CUMHURIYET reported

Japanese

#113647  
Page 1

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

Regraded Unclassified

WAR DEPARTMENT  
**SECRET**

a rumor concerning this man's secret schemes. Recently, it would seem, this person has accepted the views of Turkish Government circles. Since the collapse of Anglo-Turkish negotiations the <sup>Turkish</sup> ~~Swedish~~ authorities have looked with disfavor on any such schemes as these on the part of the various Balkan countries.

The newly appointed Rumanian Minister and others have also tried such schemes in Istanbul, we have been informed. MENEMENCIOGLU, the Foreign Minister, has recently heard in regard to these actions that since Turkey desired tranquility and stability in the Balkans she would like to see Rumania at this time, despite the change in the war situation, tighten her relations with Germany and oppose the projects of the Red Army. He was indirectly warning against this sort of activity when he made this pronouncement, I think.

a - As in text

Inter 10 Mar 44 (4)  
Rec'd 11 Mar 44  
Trans 12 Mar 44 (1034-h)

Japanese

#113647  
Page 2

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

TOP SECRET

135927

From: Angora (Japanese Ambassador)  
To: Tokyo (Minister for Foreign Affairs)  
5 September 1944  
XBT-JAA

#415

At the end of last month BERGERY, the former French Ambassador, told me that, according to a statement made to him in confidence by a person in close touch with ROOSEVELT (he said that he was an influential personage who had recently visited Turkey but that he could not disclose his name), the view was strongly held in American political circles that the continuation of the war against Germany was nothing but a transfer of Europe from one gangster<sup>a</sup> to another and that it was folly to shed the precious blood of American youth in a war of this kind, and that this view was gradually having an effect upon public opinion. And according to reliable information Minister EARLE (head of the American organization in the Balkans) takes exactly the same line, and, asking for whose sake it is that America is active in the Balkans, says that the whole thing is senseless and evinces great dissatisfaction with the actions of the U.S.S.R.

a - Word in English

Rec'd 23 Sept 44 (o)  
RIA

Japanese  
TOP SECRET

#141792

TOP SECRET

6873  
B4101  
137651

From: Ankara (KURIHARA)  
To: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)  
21 October 1944  
XBT-(JAA)

488

Reference my telegram No. 415<sup>a</sup>.

A secretary of the Spanish Legation here gave the following information to a member of my staff. The American Minister EARLE, stationed at Constantinople (Head of the American organization in the Balkans), remarked some days ago to the Spanish Minister that the European situation was getting into an uncontrollable mess as "The cat that ate the cheese having been killed they were pursued by an innumerable swarm of rats", and said that he himself was repeatedly advising President ROOSEVELT in strong terms on the question of the Bolshevization of Europe. The Spanish Minister got the impression that EARLE was in favor of establishing touch with the Germans without delay. Repeated to Berlin.

a - SSA #141792.

Rec'd 27 Oct 44 (h) Japanese  
RIA

#147653

TOP SECRET

*see + file*

WAR DEPARTMENT

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

7960

B4462

139197

From: Ankara (Spanish Minister) (ROJAS)  
To: Madrid (Minister for Foreign Affairs)  
5 December 1944  
XBT-(SPA)

315

Mr. EARLE, the personal delegate of the President of the United States, tells me that he has received instructions to be ready to undertake a journey to Germany without details as to the place or method of getting there. It is his wish to go to America first for a thorough exchange of views. He informed me that the anti-Russian party in the United States grows daily, and that the President himself bears in mind the Soviet dangers even if --G-- necessities of the war force him to temporize and not dispense with help that is so valuable for the moment. A French doctor who knows De GAULLE personally said that this progressive --G-- (?was due to him?). The informer who, a month in advance, told him (EARLE) about the V.1 raids, now assures him that V.3 aimed at America will come into operation before the end of this month.

Rec'd 9 Dec 44 (q)

Spanish

H-155739

TOP SECRET  
TOP SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

Regraded Unclassified

JP 78/PMS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1945.

Dear Mr. McCormick-Goodhart,

Thank you very much for your letter of March 5th and for sending me the literature about the Steamship Historical Society of America. I am, of course, greatly interested in that society and I am thoroughly in sympathy with its aims. I, therefore, wish that you would be kind enough to say to Mr. Leland D. Wood, the President, that I shall be very glad to be elected an honorary member of the society.

An interesting future lies before the American Merchant Marine and I am sure that the Steamship Historical Society can be helpful in giving wise counsel.

With thanks for your message about Pa Watson, and all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

(Prepared for President's signature)

Mr. L. McCormick-Goodhart,  
Langley Park,  
Hyattsville, Route 1,  
Prince George's County,  
Maryland.

716/Pms

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL March 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MRS. ROOSEVELT.

Subject: Lieutenant John Roosevelt,  
(SC), USNR - Present Assignment of.

The Navy Department now inform us that Commander Carrier Division Five and his Staff, including John, are on board the U.S.S. HORNETT instead of the U.S.S. WASP as previously reported. The temporary changes in flagships made by officers on the spot are not always reported promptly.

Therefore, the mail address should be simply:

Staff, Commander Carrier Division 5,  
c/o Fleet Post Office,  
San Francisco, Calif.,

without any reference to the ship, which may changed from time to time without advance notice to us.

WILSON BROWN.

*Pres file Pb*

TRANSLATION

I. V. STALIN

Koreis, 9 February 1945

*File*

Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

Please accept my appreciation for the sentiments expressed by you in the name of the American people and the Government of the USA in connection with the tragic death of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, G. A. Guzansky, his wife and assistants of the Soviet Embassy.

The Soviet Government accepts with thanks your proposal concerning the bringing to Moscow of their remains on an American military airplane.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) I. Stalin

I. Stalin

President Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
"Livadia", Crimea

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*P/Pres file*

Jan. 11, 1945.

REMINDER FOR THE PRESIDENT:

To call up Secretary Forrestal and tell him that you want Stark to stay on in London until further notice.

djb

*File. telephoned to Captain Forster WJ*

like

ations  
argu-  
to the

on this  
stantial  
the  
ific.  
g the  
give us

f  
Ghormley

t of

secretary  
ive Order.  
rel, of

course, is a newcomer. This only has significance, of course, in the event of the absence of both myself and the Under Secretary.

6. Legislation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Carl Vinson proposed this last summer and wanted us to draft a bill. I told him that we could not do so without discussion with you. He proposes giving statutory permanence to the J.C.S.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

2 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is the agenda of Naval matters I would like to talk with you about:

1. Carl Vinson wants us to ask for appropriations to use up the 750,000 tons unused authorization. His argument is that we may suffer drastic losses as we move into the infighting stage against Japan.

Both Admiral King and I have misgivings on this in view of the very large fleet we have now and the substantial building program as yet unfinished, and also in view of the availability of elements of the British Navy in the Pacific. On the other hand, Mike Robinson points out that getting the appropriations and starting the building program would give us insurance which would not be very expensive.

✓ 2. I would like to suggest the termination of Admiral Stark's tour of duty in London as of March 1. Ghormley or Hewitt might be available to succeed him.

✗ 3. I want to discuss with you the replacement of Admiral Young as head of S. & A.

4. Certain promotions in various Staff Corps.

5. The possibility of giving the Assistant Secretary for Air seniority over the Assistant Secretary by Executive Order. The reason: Di Gates has been here three years and Hensel, of course, is a newcomer. This only has significance, of course, in the event of the absence of both myself and the Under Secretary.

6. Legislation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Carl Vinson proposed this last summer and wanted us to draft a bill. I told him that we could not do so without discussion with you. He proposes giving statutory permanence to the J.C.S.

JK  
7. Awards to civilians working for the Navy. This letter I am rather anxious about because it is the only way by which we can give any substantial recognition to civilians who have done exceptional work directly serving the Navy.

8. When Arthur Sulzberger returned from the Pacific he expressed the view very strongly that the interest of the public in the Pacific war would be greatly enhanced by permitting publishers to make the same trip that he did -- he came back very greatly impressed with the scale and scope of our operations. I wonder if you would be willing to review your original decision. I do not believe that we would have an avalanche of applicants.

9. I would like to get your wishes on the Under Secretaryship.

10. Review of Naval history.

11. Revision of Navy Regulations.

Respectfully,

*James Forrestal*

James Forrestal

710/Pires

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

For your information: I turned over to the White House movie operator yesterday prints of amateur movies that I have made on some of the President's trips. These are the President's copies and include shots of:

- Trip to Cairo and Teheran
- Trip to Hobcaw
- Trip to the Pacific (Parts I and II)

I also turned over to the movie operator a copy of the following titles which had been sent to the President from sources indicated:

- Visit to the Amphibious Training Base, Oceanside, Calif. (sent in by Colonel Jimmy).
- Commissioning Ceremonies at the Roosevelt Base, Terminal Island, San Pedro, Calif. (sent in by the Commanding Officer).

Respectfully,

W. M. Rindon.

Pres File  
"T" J

File  
WS

2 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Here is the agenda of Naval matters I would like to talk with you about:

1. Carl Vinson wants us to ask for appropriations to use up the 700,000 tons unused authorization. His argument is that we may suffer drastic losses as we move into the infighting stage against Japan.

Both Admiral King and I have misgivings on this in view of the very large fleet we have now and the substantial building program as yet unfinished, and also in view of the availability of elements of the British Navy in the Pacific. On the other hand, Mike Robinson points out that getting the appropriations and starting the building program would give us insurance which would not be very expensive.

2. I would like to suggest the termination of Admiral Stark's tour of duty in London as of March 1. Ghormley or Hewitt might be available to succeed him.

3. I want to discuss with you the replacement of Admiral Young as head of S. & A.

4. Certain promotions in various Staff Corps.

5. The possibility of giving the Assistant Secretary for Air seniority over the Assistant Secretary by Executive Order. The reason: Di Gates has been here three years and Hensel, of course, is a newcomer. This only has significance, of course, in the event of the absence of both myself and the Under Secretary.

6. Legislation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Carl Vinson proposed this last summer and wanted us to draft a bill. I told him that we could not do so without discussion with you. He proposes giving statutory permanence to the J.C.S.

7. Awards to civilians working for the Navy. This latter I am rather anxious about because it is the only way by which we can give any substantial recognition to civilians who have done exceptional work directly serving the Navy.

8. When Arthur Sulzberger returned from the Pacific he expressed the view very strongly that the interest of the public in the Pacific war would be greatly enhanced by permitting publishers to make the same trip that he did -- he came back very greatly impressed with the scale and scope of our operations. I wonder if you would be willing to review your original decision. I do not believe that we would have an avalanche of applicants.

9. I would like to get your wishes on the Under Secretaryship.

10. Review of Naval history.

11. Revision of Navy Regulations.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

JF:HCO

710/Pres

December 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY FORRESTAL:

The President asked me to thank you for recommending to him the motion picture called "Fighting Lady". He hopes to see it after the first of the year and I shall keep it in mind and arrange for a showing when he wishes it.

Very respectfully,

Wilson Brown,  
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

1947

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

File  
WS

944.

ADMIRAL

THE PRESIDENT  
DESIRES TO SEE THIS  
MOVIE AFTER THE FIRST  
OF THE YEAR.

ry air  
about  
ily.

VERY RESP,  
*J. S. [Signature]*

onestal  
l.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

File  
WS

20 December 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

There has been completed a new Navy air picture called "Fighting Lady." It runs about fifty minutes. I recommend it most highly.

Respectfully,

*James Forrestal*  
James Forrestal.

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

(P)

5 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In order to emphasize the necessity of labor staying on the job, particularly in critical labor areas, we propose to have General Marshall and Admiral King, and possibly Krug, address the Members of Congress in the Hall of the Library of Congress shortly after the beginning of the new session; that is, of course, provided you and the leaders of Congress do not interpose an objection.

You may recall that General Marshall did this some time ago with beneficial results and we believe that it can be equally productive of good now.

Respectfully,

*James Forrestal*

James Forrestal

JF:HCO

*Pres File*  
*P*

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY


13 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL BROWN

I do not believe there is any justification for the criticisms of the Commanding Officer at Terceira, attached. The complaints are petty ones, and the nature of the Commanding Officer's job there is such that he was frequently required to entertain visitors who stopped over between flights. The Secretary and I were among the friends who ate with him at the head table at one time.

Captain W. G. Tomlinson, the officer mentioned, has recently been detached.

Respectfully,

  
J.W. Roper  
Captain, U.S.N.

*[Handwritten initials]*

October 3, 1944

REPORT ON TERCEIRA, AZORES

It is reported that the morale at this Naval Station is bad.

This is because the Commanding Officer does not appear able to handle the Officers and enlisted men under his command.

It is stated that he seizes upon and accentuates petty details and has to some extent lost the confidence of his subordinates.

Among other complaints he is often late for the evening movies, thereby holding up the performance. Recently he was nearly an hour late and when he appeared he was greeted with boos by the enlisted men, all of whom walked out muttering.

It is stated that the Officers are dissatisfied, primarily because of their insular location and their frequent lack of full-time duties.

The fact that the Commanding Officer has special meals for himself and his friends at the head table in the Officers Mess causes some dissatisfaction.

It is recommended that the charges be investigated and, if established, Captain Tomlinson, USN, be removed forthwith.

SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

f  
P/B  
P/W  
H/HF

Cp-16-A-2-a  
GE/EARLE, G. H.  
Serial 3230116

W

18 DEC 1944

From: CNO.  
To: SUPERS.

Subject: Lieut. Commander George H. EARLE, D-V(8), USNR,  
(21192) - Orders, request for.

1. It is requested that despatch orders be issued to the subject officer detaching him from his present duties as an Assistant Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attache for Air, Ankara, Turkey and ordering him to proceed to Washington, D. C. via such transportation including government and commercial air as maybe available. Upon arrival at Washington, D. C., he should be directed to report to the CNO for temporary duty in CP-16.

H.K. Leslie  
By direction

CC:  
Op-16-A-2-b  
Op-16-1-F  
Op-0-2-E  
✓ Aide to President (Adm. Brown)

P/Pres

November 25, 1944.

Dear Commander Earle,

The President has turned over to me your letter of 23 September and I have been in frequent communication with O.N.I. and BUPERS in search of a new billet for you where you may be able to apply your previous experience. There is no vacancy on the very small Naval mission earmarked for Germany and your age makes it difficult to find a good sea billet that you would find satisfactory. I was assured this morning that an answer should be found in the near future and this is only to let you know that your letter did reach the President and that I will send you an answer as soon as I can get one.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, USN.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Lt-Commander George H. Earle, USNR,  
Office of the Naval Attache,  
Istanbul, Turkey,  
Via O.N.I.

Memo for Admiral Brown:

Since Opnav has requested despatch orders for Lt-Comdr. Earle, do you still plan sending him any word - as promised in the attached copy of letter?

Respectfully,

Rigdon

12/20/44  
Adm. Brown  
says file  
Rm

THE WHITE HOUSE OF THE UNITED STATES  
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
ADMIRAL BROWN:

What do you think of this?

F.D.R.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA  
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ  
TURKEY

Istanbul, 23 September 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

Turkey has for the most part lost her value as a listening post and my position here as a personal observer for you is rapidly becoming valueless.

May I take the liberty of making a suggestion to you?

The Germans, because of their dominant characteristic of love of subordination, have brought frightful suffering to the peoples of Europe and to themselves. Their vicious Nazi leaders must be punished as a deterrent to future similar crimes and the German people made to realize in no uncertain way, the enormity of their offenses.

However, I feel very strongly eighty million Germans after their capitulation must not be left entirely without hope. Hopeless people may take desperate and destructive action.

Unlike you who most sincerely I feel has not made a single false step in your conduct of the war, the other leaders particularly Churchill and Smuts, have been guilty of some very bad statements. However, to give Churchill credit, in June 1940 he said this: 'Hitler, that monstrous product of former wrongs and shames' ! Let us not again create these wrongs and shames to produce another Hitler.

Mr. President, I don't want to go back in the diplomatic service and I don't want any high office from you. You have done more than enough for me.

But I do want to remain in the Navy and go to Germany attached ostensibly to some American Mission there, but actually to continue to be a personal observer for you to report to you conditions in Germany as they really are.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA  
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ  
TURKEY

Istanbul, 23 September 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

Turkey has for the most part lost her value as a listening post and my position here as a personal observer for you is rapidly becoming valueless.

May I take the liberty of making a suggestion to you?

The Germans, because of their dominant characteristic of love of subordination, have brought frightful suffering to the peoples of Europe and to themselves. Their vicious Nazi leaders must be punished as a deterrent to future similar crimes and the German people made to realize in no uncertain way, the enormity of their offenses.

However, I feel very strongly eighty million Germans after their capitulation must not be left entirely without hope. Hopeless people may take desperate and destructive action.

Unlike you who most sincerely I feel has not made a single false step in your conduct of the war, the other leaders particularly Churchill and Smuts, have been guilty of some very bad statements. However, to give Churchill credit, in June 1940 he said this: 'Hitler, that monstrous product of former wrongs and shames' ! Let us not again create these wrongs and shames to produce another Hitler.

Mr. President, I don't want to go back in the diplomatic service and I don't want any high office from you. You have done more than enough for me.


But I do want to remain in the Navy and go to Germany attached ostensibly to some American Mission there, but actually to continue to be a personal observer for you to report to you conditions in Germany as they really are.

I speak, read and write German almost as well as English.


Laurence Steinhardt is writing to you about my fitness for such work and Captain Trammell, U.S. Naval Attache, is writing to the Navy Department.

Please do this for me Mr. President. I feel so certain I can do real, constructive work for you and my country in such a position.

Cordially and respectfully yours,

  
George M. Earle.

P.S. I am happy to tell you that most of the Republicans here are splitting their ballots for you because of your conduct of the war.



The President

The White House.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA  
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ  
TURKEY

Istanbul, 23 September 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

Turkey has for the most part lost her value as a listening post and my position here as a personal observer for you is rapidly becoming valueless.

May I take the liberty of making a suggestion to you?

The Germans, because of their dominant characteristic of love of subordination, have brought frightful suffering to the peoples of Europe and to themselves. Their vicious Nazi leaders must be punished as a deterrent to future similar crimes and the German people made to realize in no uncertain way, the enormity of their offenses.

However, I feel very strongly eighty million Germans after their capitulation must not be left entirely without hope. Hopeless people may take desperate and destructive action.

Unlike you who most sincerely I feel has not made a single false step in your conduct of the war, the other leaders particularly Churchill and Smuts, have been guilty of some very bad statements. However, to give Churchill credit, in June 1940 he said this: 'Hitler, that monstrous product of former wrongs and shames' ! Let us not again create these wrongs and shames to produce another Hitler.

Mr. President, I don't want to go back in the diplomatic service and I don't want any high office from you. You have done more than enough for me.


But I do want to remain in the Navy and go to Germany attached ostensibly to some American Mission there, but actually to continue to be a personal observer for you to report to you conditions in Germany as they really are.

I speak, read and write German almost as well as English.

Laurence Steinhardt is writing to you about my fitness for such work and Captain Trammell, U.S. Naval Attache, is writing to the Navy Department.


Please do this for me Mr. President. I feel so certain I can do real, constructive work for you and my country in such a position.

Cordially and respectfully yours,



George M. Earle.

P.S. I am happy to tell you that most of the Republicans here are splitting their ballots for you because of your conduct of the war.



The President

The White House.

716/WH

all read 12-7-44

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

This morning Admiral King asked me to inform you of the changes in senior Flag assignments that he has in mind, as indicated in the attached memorandum. His paragraph two concerning changes in battleship organization has already been reported to you in recommending Oldendorf for Vice Admiral. King asked me to explain that in bringing Hewitt to the General Board he is carrying out your wish to bring in some younger Flag Officers with war experience. In reading action reports for the past two years it seems to me that Hewitt stands out as a very capable leader.

The shift of W. W. Smith and Calhoun should help to speed up the logistic administration in the Pacific, as W. W. Smith through a year's duty here has the picture of both the Atlantic and the Pacific and has worked well with Ingersoll before.

Very respectfully,

*W. Brown*  
WILSON BROWN.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

UNITED STATES FLEET

MEMORANDUM

Date 6 Dec 44

From: Admiral King

To: Naval Aide to the President

1. The following changes in command billets are so far processed as to have received approval of SecNav:

W. W. Smith to relieve Calhoun  
(SewForPac)

Calhoun to relieve Hewitt  
(Mediterranean)

Hewitt to General Board.

2. Formation of 2 Battalions

Battalion 1 - all old BB's - under  
Oldendorf (V. Adm)

Battalion 2 - all new BB's - under  
Lee (V. Adm)

Each Battalion is a "type command"

EJK.

*P10/PMS*

*File  
WB*

OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT  
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

24 November 1944

Dear Wilson:

I am enclosing the invitation  
to luncheon for those occupying the  
President's box.

Please extend it to them when  
you know who is coming and let me know whom  
to expect.

*done by  
Mrs. Bottiger*

Sincerely,

*J. R. Beardall*  
J. R. Beardall

Enclosure

Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U. S. Navy  
Naval Aide to the President  
Room 2078, Navy Department  
Washington-25, D. C.

710/Pres

F-29  
WS

OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT  
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

22 November 1944

My dear Mr. President:

The Superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy and the Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy cordially invite you to be present, as the guest of the two Service Academies, at the Army-Navy football game to be played in the Baltimore Stadium, Baltimore, Maryland, on Saturday, 2 December 1944, at 2:00 p. m.

Very sincerely yours,

  
J. R. Beardall  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Superintendent

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Regretted by adm.  
Brown by phone  
BJ

*10/17/44*

*J*

SECRET

November 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Captain J. W. Roper, USN.,  
Aide to the Secretary of  
the Navy.

Here are three of the reports I spoke to you about. The two anonymous complaints about commanding officers are probably of little value unless you have others on the same individuals to indicate need of investigation. The report about the U.S. Radium Company appears to require investigation.

I will be interested if you develop either negative or positive information about any of the allegations.

WILSON BROWN,  
Rear Admiral, USN.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

Attachments:

1. Report on U.S. Navy Commander at Terceira, Azores, 10-3-44.
2. Report on Commander "Jack" Walsh, USN.
3. Report on Radium Treated Luminous Buttons, 10-13-44.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR  
ADMIRAL BROWN:

Will you look into this?

F.D.R.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER  
(Jay Franklin)  
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 4, D. C.

"We, the People"  
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112  
Metropolitan 4113

CONFIDENTIAL

October 3, 1944.

REPORT ON U.S. NAVY COMMANDER AT TERCEIRA, AZORES.

The attached adverse report on Captain Tomlinson, U.S.N., naval commander at Terceira, Azores, is believed to be correct. It is suggested, however, that the appropriate Navy authorities might wish to check it as to accuracy and as to its significance, if any.

*JFC*  
J.F.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER  
(Jay Franklin)  
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 4, D. C.

"We, the People"  
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112  
Metropolitan 4113

SECRET

October 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORT ON COMMANDER WALSH, U.S.N.

Dear Miss Tully:

Perhaps Admiral Brown will know what to do with the attached report that Commander Walsh, Un.S.N., stationed at Melville, Rhode Island, is abusing his rank and authority in an improper manner.

*JFC*  
J.F.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 25, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

TO DO WHAT IS NECESSARY.

F.D.R.

TER

46

Metropolitan 4112  
Metropolitan 4113

October 13, 1944.

(SERIES NO. 15)

is forced to hold up an  
competitors of the U.S. Radium  
petitive bids.  
ids, even when lower than those  
and Test Section of the Bureau of  
S. Radium plans to set up two dummy  
itors are laying low waiting to  
r of bids.  
s connection. It might be worth  
ve invariably been accepted, even

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING  
WASHINGTON 4, D. C.

"We, the People"  
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112  
Metropolitan 4113

SECRET

October 13, 1944.

REPORT ON RADIUM TREATED LUMINOUS BUTTONS (TECHNICAL SERIES NO. 15)

The attached memorandum indicates that the Navy is forced to hold up an order for 2,000,000 luminous buttons because the two competitors of the U.S.Radium Company refuse to bid and the law requires three competitive bids.

The competitors refuse because all their past bids, even when lower than those of U.S.Radium, have been rejected by the Electrical and Test Section of the Bureau of Ships. To comply with the law, it is stated that U.S.Radium plans to set up two dummy companies for bidding purposes, and the angry competitors are laying low waiting to denounce U.S.Radium for fraud and deceit in the matter of bids.

I don't know what could or should be done in this connection. It might be worth while checking the allegation that U.S.Radium bids have invariably been accepted, even when competitive bids were substantially lower.

J.F.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

*P/Pres File*

28 JUL 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

If and when Negro women are admitted to the Women's Reserve, it is proposed to adopt the following procedure:-

- First: Nominations of Negro women officers will be requested from a selected list of Negro and white men and women. To start the program not more than ten women will be appointed as officer candidates and will be sent for training to the Naval Reserve Midshipmen School (WR) at Northampton. They will assist in the subsequent planning and supervision of the program for Negro women which will be administered as an integral part of the Women's Reserve.
- Second: For Negro enlisted women, recruit training will be conducted at the Recruit Training School (WR) the Bronx. It is planned to form a company of 240 Negro recruits to be housed together at the School but to share all facilities of the station with the other recruits. How many such companies will be trained will be determined by the needs of the service and the number of qualified applicants who are available.
- Third: Specialized training will be conducted in existing facilities. An effort will be made to approximate for Negro women the ratio of rated to unrated women which applied to white recruits admitted at the same time.
- Fourth: Negro women will be detailed wherever needed within the continental limits of the United States, preferably to stations where there are already Negro men.
- Fifth: When government quarters are provided, they will not ordinarily be shared with white women but will be similar to those occupied by white women. Local conditions will determine whether or not the mess is shared by both races. On some stations Negro men and women will eat in their own mess halls. On other stations, they will share the mess with white personnel. In every case equal, if not identical, facilities will be provided for Negro and white personnel.

I propose to proceed with the above plan in the near future. I consider it advisable to start obtaining Negro Waves before we are forced to take them.

Your views would be appreciated.

*James Forrestal*

PIO/Pres

*File*

OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT  
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

27 September 1944

My dear Mr. President:

The Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy, the Regiment of Midshipmen, and the Navy Athletic Association, cordially invite you to be present, as their guest, at the football games to be played in the Baltimore Stadium, Baltimore, Maryland, this fall.

The games and the dates are listed below:

Duke	14 October
Notre Dame	4 November
Cornell	11 November
Purdue	18 November.

Very respectfully,

*J. R. Beardall*  
 J. R. Beardall  
 Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy  
 Superintendent

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt  
The President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

717  
(Pres)

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HONOLULU

26 September 1944

Dear Mr. Midkiff:

The President asked me to thank you for your letter of September 19th. He is glad to have your endorsement of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and his staff. All of us agree fully with your high opinion of them.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

WILSON BROWN,

Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,

Naval Aide to the President.

Mr. Frank E. Midkiff,

Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu,

Honolulu 16, Hawaii, U.S.A.

Yours very truly,

*Frank E. Midkiff*

# CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HONOLULU

ESTABLISHED 1850

HONOLULU 16, HAWAII, U.S.A.

TELEPHONE 6481

F. D. LOWREY  
PRESIDENT  
H. P. FAYE  
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT  
M. B. CARSON  
SECOND VICE PRESIDENT  
JOHN A. HAMILTON  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

RETAIL BOARD  
ALVIN A. SMITH  
PRESIDENT  
ROY C. KESNER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
CLIFFORD L. STARK  
SECRETARY

September 19, 1944

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt  
President of the United States  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Mr. President:

Doubtless through your visit to Hawaii and the Pacific, and through your conferences in Quebec, you have arrived at a decision concerning the conduct of the remaining Pacific war and have decided upon command.


It is hoped, therefore, that this letter will in no way confuse any issues but may serve to confirm convictions you already must have concerning the providential ability and leadership of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.

Admiral Nimitz has surrounded himself with hard-fighting men and with staff officers that are masters in the great problems of strategy and logistics. The record bears this out. Every officer and enlisted man, and every civilian employee in the Pacific adores him and believes in him.

This provides a set-up that needs no improvement. A change in command introduces a gamble that seems unwarranted. The inadvisability of "crossing horses in mid-stream" has been referred to in other connections and with both allusions I am in full accord.

Continued best wishes to you.

Yours very truly,



Frank E. Midkiff

FEM: o

76

**SECRET**

47

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.


6 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Casualties and Prisoners.

You asked me this morning what our latest returns were regarding casualties. I give you the following, which cover the period from May 10 to June 1 (except for prisoners of war which is as of May 31) for U.S. and associated Allied troops of the Fifth Army, and from May 10 to June 2 for British, Canadian, Indian, Polish, and Italian troops of the Eighth Army:

	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Missing</u>	<u>Prisoners</u>
<u>Fifth Army</u>				
U.S.	2,129	9,284	826	7,334
French	1,507	6,950	573	4,328
British	245	1,142	2,354	137
Italian	<u>2</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>365</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	3,883	17,413	4,118	11,799
<u>Eighth Army</u>				
British, Canadian, Indian, Polish, and Italian troops	<u>2,258</u>	<u>9,177</u>	<u>1,194</u>	<u>3,956</u>
Grand totals	6,141	26,590	5,312	15,755



Chief of Staff.

**SECRET**

717 (Pres. file)

April 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Chief of Naval Personnel.

Some time ago Mrs. Roosevelt received a letter from a mother who had recently lost a son killed in action. The mother stated that, although the son died as a Petty Officer, First Class, he had been fully qualified for advancement to Chief Petty Officer and had been performing such duties for some time. The mother put forth the plea that posthumous advancement in rating would seem to be a justified and fitting tribute to the boy's memory.

On the President's direction, I investigated the general situation involved and found that posthumous promotion to warrant and commissioned rank may be effected under certain conditions, but that posthumous advancement in enlisted rank is not possible under the law.

On being informed of this, the President directed me as follows: "Will you run this down further because I do want to put it through if we can?"

In view of the President's expressed interest and desire, it is requested that such action as may be practicable be instituted toward the general end of providing posthumous advancement for enlisted men under conditions similar to those which now exist for posthumous advancement in the commissioned and warrant ranks.

It is further requested that the Naval Aide to the President be kept advised on pertinent developments.

Respectfully,

Chester C. Wood  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Assistant Naval Aide  
To the President

7 (Pres),

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON

MAY 8 - 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 30 April 1944 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the revised estimated number in active service on 31 March 1944 is also included:

	<u>30 April 1944</u>	<u>31 March 1944</u>	<u>Net Gain for Month</u>
Regular Navy (Obligated Enlistments)	321,792	320,765	1,027
Inductees	117,534	108,000	9,534
Retired Active	6,950	6,890	60
Fleet Reserve	5,550	5,660	- 110
Women's Reserve	50,483	47,676	2,807
Other Reserve	1,896,600	1,802,000	94,600
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,398,909</b>	<b>2,290,991</b>	<b>107,918</b>

2. To date 1,080,307 men have been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very respectfully,

*James Forrestal*

The President  
The White House

Pre  
"B"

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1944.

Dear Mackenzie,

The death of Frank Knox was really a blow as he was a great fellow and fitted into the scheme of things. That is a rare combination.

I do hope to see you when you get back and trust you will have a very successful conference.

As ever,

Yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Honorable W. Mackenzie King,  
Care of Canadian Embassy,  
Washington, D.C.

Pres. 'F'

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1944.

Dear Betty,

The death of Frank Knox was really a blow as he was a great fellow and fitted into the scheme of things. That is a rare combination. We<sup>all</sup>/shall miss him.

With every good wish to you as always,

Sincerely,

Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N.,  
Headquarters, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe,  
London, England.

P9

May 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY OF STATE.

Referring to the letter addressed to you by our Ambassador to Spain, dated April 17, copy returned herewith, I am in full accord with your proposed message in reply to Ambassador Hayes transmitted to me in your memorandum of April 28, 1944. Please tell this to the Ambassador.

F. D. R.

*Pres. file*  
*76*

ALNAV NO. \_\_\_\_\_

I have the distressing duty of announcing to the Naval Service the death on Friday, April 28th 1944, of the Honorable Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy.

The personnel of the Navy, officers, men and women share in a deep sorrow at the loss of this distinguished, courageous, and highly successful leader of our naval effort in this war.

His efforts in his high office have been outstandingly successful in ensuring our eventual victory and I join with you all and with the nation in mourning the loss of his splendid services and his lovable personality.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,  
COMMANDER IN CHIEF.

*Proposed but  
not sent  
Rn*

Brew  
R

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
WASHINGTON,

April 30, 1944.

Dear Mrs. Knox,

I am privileged to send you the following message from the Prime Minister of Great Britain expressing his sympathy and the appreciation of the British Government of the service performed by your husband. I quote:

"I have learned with great sorrow of the sudden death of Colonel Knox. If you will allow me to say so, His Majesty's Government and especially the Admiralty feel his loss acutely, for no one could have been more forthcoming and helpful in all our difficult times than was this distinguished American statesman and war administrator.

"The War Cabinet have desired me to express their sympathy with you in losing so invaluable a colleague, to which I add my own expressions of sincere sorrow."

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Mrs. Frank Knox,  
Washington, D.C.

*Pres File*  
*P*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
April 21, 1944

*File*  
*JS*

MEMORANDUM FOR      The President  
FROM                    Jonathan Daniels *JD*

At the request of Colonel  
G. Edward Buxton, Office of Strategic  
Services, I pass on to you the attached  
material.

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

19 April 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT**

In connection with the message from [redacted]  
land (transmitted to you on 15 April 1944) giving  
Mr. Jonathan Daniels,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Daniels:

I transmit herewith a memorandum  
which supplements a previous message sub-  
mitted to the President on 15 April 1944.

It would be appreciated if you  
would see that this memorandum reaches the  
President.

Sincerely yours,

*G. Edward Buxton*  
G. Edward Buxton,  
Acting Director.

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

19 April 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In connection with the message from Switzerland (transmitted to you on 15 April 1944) giving an appreciation of the German political and diplomatic situation rendered by the principal OSS intelligence officer, Switzerland, he was immediately queried as to whether he wished to modify or add to that message, in view of its import. He has now replied.

He states:

- (1) That he sees no reason to change or qualify his earlier message as a description of the current Nazi diplomatic and political scene.
- (2) That though his evaluation is derived most immediately from the material recently received by him, and from conversations with one

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-2-

tried informant, he has received other similar reports recently from other well-proven informants in the same strain, and background data to him in Bern supports his view.

He adds:

That his message should not be read as indicating that the morale of the Nazi army is nearing collapse (excepting probably the so-called Gross Deutscher, Slav and other non-German elements). Nor does he think that any important Nazi military officials are ready and willing to let us come in through the West unopposed. He believes, rather, that fierce opposition may be given to any invasion attempt. A collapse of Germany might follow, however, a few months after the establishment of a firm toe-hold in the West.

He concludes:

The timing of the invasion attempt may be all important. The German people are war-weary

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-3-

and apathetic, and even in Nazi circles the same kind of psychological depression can be seen as appeared last August and September.

Yet if they could stabilize the Russian front once more, they might catch a second wind, and put up an even stronger defense against invasion.

William J. Donovan

*G. Edward Buxton*  
By: G. Edward Buxton  
Acting Director.

TOP SECRET

Regraded Unclassified

Pres File  
P

File  
W

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT, April 20, 1944

Subject: Recent Italian Political Developments

On April 12, King Victor Emmanuel announced his "final and irrevocable" decision to withdraw from public affairs, by appointing his son Lieutenant General of the Realm, the appointment to become effective by formal transfer of power on the day Allied troops enter Rome. The decision was precipitated by pressure brought to bear upon the King himself by the British and American representatives of the Advisory Council on April 10, the lead in this having been taken by Robert Murphy. The Junta, meeting on April 16, decided to accept the King's plan--although previously it had demanded immediate retirement of the Sovereign--and enter a new government consisting principally of its representatives. Apparently, only the Action Party has refused to participate in any government under the King, although there have also been rumors of Socialist opposition to what it terms the "Fascist-Communist bloc". The action of the Junta in agreeing to participate in the government under the King and Badoglio is generally ascribed to the volte-face of the Communist Party, which was the first to indicate its willingness to serve under those leaders.

On April 17, the Cabinet resigned, and Badoglio was asked by the King to form a new cabinet "with a broad foundation, taking account of the wishes expressed by all the parties". During the two following days, consultations were held between Badoglio and the parties, and press reports received this afternoon announce that Badoglio has now formed a new government including all the opposition parties except the Action Party. Its composition will be announced after the King has approved it tomorrow.

C H

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Recent Italian Political Developments

On April 12, King Victor Emmanuel announced his "final and irrevocable" decision to withdraw from public affairs, by appointing his son Lieutenant General of the Realm, the appointment to become effective by formal transfer of power on the day Allied troops enter Rome. The decision was precipitated by pressure brought to bear upon the King himself by the British and American representatives of the Advisory Council on April 10, the lead in this having been taken by Robert Murphy. The Junta, meeting on April 16, decided to accept the King's plan--although previously it had demanded immediate retirement of the Sovereign--and enter a new government consisting principally of its representatives. Apparently, only the Action Party has refused to participate in any government under the King, although there have also been rumors of Socialist opposition to what it terms the "Fascist-Communist bloc". The action of the Junta in agreeing to participate in the government under the King and Badoglio is generally ascribed to the volte-face of the Communist Party, which was the first to indicate its willingness to serve under those leaders.

On April 17, the Cabinet resigned, and Badoglio was asked by the King to form a new cabinet "with a broad foundation, taking account of the wishes expressed by all the parties". During the two following days, consultations were held between Badoglio and the parties, and press reports received this afternoon announce that Badoglio has now formed a new government including all the opposition parties except the Action Party. Its composition will be announced after the King has approved it tomorrow.

CA

Pres File

7

- I. Fundamental Conditions in Cuba and Their Effect on our Relations
- II. Discussion of Cuba's Contribution to the War Effort
- III. Transmitting Summary of Cases of Cuban Non-Participation in the War Effort

Fundamental Conditions in Cuba and their Effect on our Relations

800 - Cuban Officials (Batista, Fulgencio)

AIRMAIL

Habana, November 22, 1943.

No. 5206

Subject: Fundamental Conditions in Cuba and their Effect on our Relations.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

1/

I have the honor to attach hereto (for ready reference) copy of memorandum I left with the Secretary of State and certain other officers of the Department when I was in Washington last June and which is entitled "Conditions in Cuba and Their Effect on our Relations". It now seems opportune to report that corruption in Cuba has still further increased in all quarters, excepting only in respect to American nationals and companies who, pursuant to my request, have I believe for the most part desisted from making illicit payment and political contributions. Although the real sufferers from corruption are the Cuban people, it also must be kept in mind that the unparalleled dishonesty of the Batista Administration is not only destructive of democracy in this country but inevitably must prejudice Cuban-American relations. The procedure proposed in my aforementioned memorandum has been followed in all particulars excepting for the recommendation outlined in paragraph 4, page 12, wherein I urged a restriction on the largesse distributed by us to Cuba unless the present Administration makes a genuine effort to eradicate the widespread corruption and we receive an adequate quid pro quo for each favor we grant.

The volume of corruption and the cynicism of the grafters has augmented this year, as the latter have been emboldened by the easy success of their operations. Likewise improving economic conditions have given both greater incentive and a larger fund on which to draw. Thus, bribery and graft have continuously increased both as respects the number of cases and the size of the "take" from the Cubans and non-American enterprises. In fact, the only encouraging aspect of the picture is that my policy of preventing American nationals and companies from contributing to either corruption or political campaigns has already met with very considerable success and therefore, as the Minister of Labor recently admitted to a leading Cuban attorney, it has been of great benefit to Cuba and the only brake on corruption, which is at an all time high, and were it not for my position corruption would have been much greater (sic).

Self evidently the Cuban people eventually will be the greatest sufferers from these conditions. As a result of the limitless "rackets", living standards inevitably have been lowered, social problems have

been

Regraded Unclassified

been created and morality in all walks of life destroyed. Such democratic principles as still prevail will be destroyed, since democracy never can endure under dishonest government. Incidentally, many Cubans charge us with being co-responsible for this tragic state of affairs because they allege that under the Magoon intervention corruption got a foothold in the Cuban Government, that subsequently under the powers of the Platt Amendment we did nothing to erase the evil, and that big American business, as typified by the Steinhardts, Rubens and Catlins, by payments of graft and bribery have been just as guilty as the receivers thereof. Finally, all these developments may gravely injure Cuban-American relations because of this country's geographical proximity to the United States, the large American investments and other important economic ties which we have with Cuba and, in general, our vital concern for this Island's Well being. Moreover, since Cuban-American relations are watched as a sort of barometer by the other American Republics, it may be that on the skill we display with respect to this Island will depend the well being of our relations throughout the hemisphere.

As commented upon in my memorandum under reference, President Batista and his close associates do not relish having the flow of illicit profits from American entities blocked. They consider me responsible for this loss of "easy income" and needless to say, therefore would be glad to be rid of what they regard as my unfortunate influence.

Collateral to this fundamental consideration of increasing corruption on all sides, are the following:

- (a) A strong trend by Batista and his advisers toward demagogic action in close cooperation with the Communists;
- (b) An ominous political situation which results from the President's determination to continue in control of Cuba.

With respect to (a) the Department has already been fully informed of the invasion by the Cuban Government of property rights, including those of American companies. There are for instance the Tinguaro and Bacardi seizure cases, the disregard for the rights established by the concessions held by three American dock companies, the order to the Hershey Company to reinstate one Aisenstein as manager of its oil processing plant, the seizure of Cuban Electric Light and Power Company funds by the Municipality of Marianao, et cetera. In this sphere of demagogic action there should also be included recent developments of a communistic trend on which the Embassy has reported. The latest of these is a poorly disguised attempt to turn over the normal schools to the direction of Minister-Without-Portfolio Marinello, President of the Communist Party, and his wife. Also Batista increasingly has become more irresponsible in his promulgation of social and economic decrees and orders, which frequently appear to have been inspired by the Communist Party.

With regard to paragraph (b) above, the Department will realize from my despatches nos. 4972 of November 1 and 5042 of November 5 the enormity of corruption which has entered into the taking of the census and party affiliations. Based on this record, it would seem that Batista has practically assured the election to the presidency

next June of his candidate, Dr. Carlos Saladrigas. However, it is interesting to note that in the event the frauds perpetrated to date prove insufficient Senator Casanova, a leading Liberal who on Batista's orders is supporting Saladrigas, ingenuously described to me last week how easy it would be still further to rig the elections in the rural districts. Many predict that, despite the encouraging outlook for prosperous economic industries, violence will result from the shameless electoral frauds. Whether or not there will be trouble also depends, in my opinion, on the degree to which Batista maintains control of the Army, which is itself up to its ears in graft. Presently he would appear to be secure on this score, but of course among such volatile people a change could come with surprising rapidity.

Of one thing we may be certain, that in Batista we are dealing with a shrewd though largely uneducated, utterly unscrupulous man who is determined to continue in control of this country. By reason of birth, blood and upbringing, he has a profound hatred of the United States and is irritated because I have "interfered" with his rackets in so far as the American companies are concerned. Since his coup d'état of September 1933 he has never been successfully crossed. He is entirely capable of seizing the bit in his teeth at any time and taking action which may have serious consequences for both Cuba and the United States.

In passing it is appropriate to note that the Cuban Government, presumably by reason of the political situation and because of the dedication of so many of its members to the business of filching ill-gotten gains, is increasingly delinquent in matters having to do with its relations with us. And what is perhaps more serious, it today barely renders lip service to the war effort.

As hereinbefore stated, the policy recommended in my memorandum under reference has met with a greater measure of success than I expected would be possible within such a brief period. The forthright action taken in the Conroy and other cases has convinced many people of our sincerity and determination, and so we have gained greatly in public confidence. I have received thoroughly loyal cooperation from the leading Americans resident in Cuba, who in general heartily approve of my policy. For these reasons we have advanced so rapidly that it is now generally accepted that no American of any importance will consent to becoming involved in any illicit transaction or to participating in the internal political affairs of this country. This is decidedly encouraging and should serve henceforth to protect both our Government and our nationals against charges that either we continue to be co-responsible for corruption or that we meddle in the internal affairs of this country. The enactment of this policy according to several reliable Cuban informants has been the one ray of light for many of their people, who otherwise are discouraged and dispirited. At long last sensible Cubans are beginning to realize that we mean what we say when we indicate that it is their responsibility--and not ours--to get themselves out of the maelstrom of corruption. Lastly, this policy and the manner in which it has been executed is inducing a sentiment of genuine respect for our Government and our citizens.

The continuance of existing corruption is accumulating explosive power which eventually will burst its bounds; under these circumstances the explosion is likely to cause less damage the sooner it comes. However, I still am sanguine enough to believe that we may greatly assist

in the avoidance of violence if we firmly pursue the policies and programs I have recommended. Also there is a remote possibility that Saladrigas, who I consider to be genuinely friendly to the United States and this Embassy, if elected President might, with such support as we could give him, be able to eliminate Batista, Benitez, Mariné, et al, end the rackets and establish a clean and efficient Government. But I repeat that in my opinion the chances of his being able to do this appear extremely remote.

For us to condone a continuance of existing conditions and to permit Batista to establish himself as the Trujillo of Cuba would be a negation of everything for which we are fighting this war and would constitute an appeasement for which we would pay dearly in the future.

In view of all the foregoing, I am convinced that for the good of the Cuban people and of our relations with this country, the policies we have inaugurated must be continued, and in particular, unless there is a complete change in ethics and attitude shown by the Cuban Government, I feel we should with increasing firmness and, in accordance with my recommendation no. 4 on page 12 of the memorandum under reference, bring home to our Cuban friends that the Good Neighbor Policy is a two-way street, and that we shall be compelled to desist from granting favors to the Cuban Government until they have demonstrated a spirit of complete reciprocity and, above all, of honesty.

Respectfully yours,

Spruille Braden

SB/mmy  
file 800.

Enclosure:

Memorandum.

Enclosure to despatch no. 5206 from the Embassy  
at Habana, dated November 22, 1943.

CONDITIONS IN CUBA AND THEIR EFFECT ON  
OUR RELATIONS

I.

Unrest in Cuba, due to increasing discontent with the Batista regime, developed rapidly during 1942 until in July and August it became so marked that a serious situation was only averted by my issuing a public statement expressing confidence in the Cuban Government's war effort and cooperation with us, and denying the many alarming rumors which were then current.

The Cabinet was reorganized on August 17 under a new Prime Minister, Dr. Ramon Zaydin, but the hoped-for improvement did not occur. The political situation after a brief pause continued to disintegrate and governmental business increasingly suffered from a species of creeping paralysis, until even in matters of evident benefit to Cuba it now scarcely functions except with respect to the political or financial advantage of individuals in or connected with the Administration. Excepting for his interest in politics and the enhancement of his personal fortunes, President Batista now pays scant attention to the affairs of State.

The developments in the latter half of 1942 were summarized in the second paragraph of my airgram no. 532 of November 14, 1942:

"....I feel that most serious thought must be given to a fundamental problem (which is economic as well as moral, political and social), namely the amount of assistance which we would be justified in extending unless the present administration makes a genuine effort to eradicate widespread corruption with resulting extravagance, inefficiency and adverse effect on cooperation with us in war effort. Not only is the present economic situation more serious than it need be, but some of our present cooperative activities are handicapped if not thwarted because of conditions within the Cuban Government; moreover public morale is becoming so weakened and distrust in the authorities so augmented that sooner or later the issue will have to be faced in any event. I refer to graft and corruption and to

the maintenance of useless and idle bureaucrats on the public payroll, and to the general disintegration since last July of the Government as a functioning administration. While these conditions cannot, of course, be cured from one day to the next and while I thoroughly appreciate its extreme delicacy and the imperativeness of avoiding any action which could even remotely be interpreted as intervention, in my opinion this situation cannot longer be ignored and unless steps are taken by the Cuban Government to regain the confidence of its own people, our efforts to assist Cuba economically, however sincerely well-intentioned, would be severely handicapped and we might be accused in some measure of being accessory to the continuance of corruption. Moreover, these conditions are now so well known everywhere that I question whether as a matter of principle we can afford to utilize public funds for purposes which may later be misinterpreted with consequent embarrassment."

Shortly after this airgram was sent to Washington, President Batista, by official invitation, visited the United States. As a result of his personal contact with President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles, his first-hand view of our war effort and the many courtesies paid him, I was encouraged to hope that he might measurably abandon his previous practices and himself pursue more honest policies, simultaneously forcing others to do likewise. In fact, after his return to Cuba, he stated to me that it was his intention to do so, and there were evidences during the course of the 1943 zafta negotiations of his desire to follow a better and more informed policy than before.

It is impossible to say whether Batista, undoubtedly bearing in mind President Roosevelt's advice regarding Civil Service, simply made his promises of reform pending a satisfactory sale of the zafta and other financial assistance from the United States, or whether his intentions were genuinely good but that he could not perform because he was so enmeshed in corruption and his associates had such a hold on him that he could not safely withdraw therefrom.

Unfortunately, however, the beneficial effects of the trip have disappeared, the promises of reform have been forgotten and the

volums of organized corruption in governmental circles has increased until it is now well nigh unanimously acknowledged to be worse than ever before in this country's history.

The principal beneficiary of organized corruption is unquestionably President Batista, whose "take" is handled largely by Colonel Mariné. Practically all the higher officials of the Cuban Government, including members of the Cabinet, and members of the Congress, as well as the ranking officials of the Cuban Armed forces, likewise share in this graft. Mrs. Batista is also understood to profit very substantially.

Corruption takes the form of graft, affecting practically every citizen of the Republic through dishonest tax and administrative officials, extra-legal gambling, prostitution, the visa racket, the sale of jobs and other political favors, and innumerable shake-downs to which nearly everyone is exposed, from the humblest placer of a five-cent bet on the numbers racket to the industrialist who finds it cheaper to settle his taxes personally with the inspector. Discontent with these conditions has grown into such a state of widespread disgust and anger amongst the usually easy-going Cuban people that inevitably a crisis will occur unless Batista is able to retain complete control of the government, either by remaining in office himself or perhaps by getting in as his successor some puppet whom he would dominate. Either situation would require the support of the army, which Batista seems to have now in spite of some reports to the contrary. Such a development as either of these two alternatives might merely defer the crisis and in any case would open the way for a Trujillo type of personal administration, which from every aspect would be far more harmful in Cuba than it is in the Dominican Republic. The effect on our relations of Batista's establishing himself as a dictator would be most serious and can only be viewed with the greatest concern.

III.

It is unnecessary presently to review the long history of corruption in Cuba as it has reflected on our economic relations. It suffices to say that, directly and indirectly, it affects every phase of our relations. In the economic field many American business enterprises, in keeping with the customs of the country, have taken the easiest way by paying graft and resorting to other illicit practices. Aside from the immorality and the fact that it is fundamentally counter to the Good Neighbor policy, this conduct by our citizens cannot fail in the long run seriously to injure these American enterprises, and therefore our friendly relations with Cuba.

For these reasons, I have, since my arrival in Cuba, clearly declared as a basic policy that all American interests and citizens must rigidly obey the laws of Cuba, both in the letter and the spirit. I have stated that if they do so the Embassy will always assist to the fullest extent possible in the protection of their just rights, but that the excuse that they are compelled to pursue illicit methods because others do so or because it is common practice, is absolutely unacceptable. I have further made it abundantly clear that any American entity adopting illegal or unethical procedures would be viewed unfavorably by the Embassy and could not expect our support in any particular.

This policy has already prevented the consummation of certain deals involving graft, and in at least one case it has made possible the successful conclusion of an important transaction, without the illicit payments which had been demanded. Also certain American organizations, some of them in the past notorious for their unethical procedures, have promised henceforth rigidly to abide by my afore-stated injunctions. Thus, predatory officials of the Cuban Govern- ment and others have been deprived of graft which they otherwise

would have received. Naturally this has aroused the animosity of the leading grafters in the Cuban Government, as for example Colonel Mariné, who is generally known to be the President's "pay off" man and whose headquarters are on the fourth floor of the Presidential Palace. (Lately he is reported also as occupying an office at the home of Dr. Saladrigas, Batista's alleged choice as a successor.) Self-evidently these circumstances weigh upon our relations generally.

My aforedescribed policy is sound and is the only one which in the long run will protect American interests and preserve friendship with Cuba. Any other policy might not even maintain satisfactory conditions for the short pull, and certainly in the end would result disastrously.

#### IV.

Corruption is intimately connected with every political development in Cuba. However, due to the Embassy's staying strictly apart from all matters of internal politics, otherwise than to keep ourselves informed thereon, this aspect of the situation has not yet directly affected our relations.

The chaotic state of the Cuban political picture is detailed in my despatch no. 3270 of May 29, 1943. In this connection the most important consideration to be kept in mind is the possibility of Batista's remaining in power beyond the normal end of his term in October 1944. Based on our experience to date, it would be folly to hope that were Batista to retain the reins of government he would change his habits and at that late date pursue a constructive and patriotic course.

In the matter of internal Cuban politics, we can be most helpful by continuing to emphasize our fundamental policy of non-intervention,

but

but this should not blind us to the existence of present day conditions, or to the fact that the Good Neighbor Policy, to be effective, must be practiced by Cuba as well as by the United States.

V.

In respect to the effect of Cuban corruption on the war effort, it is only fair to say that there have been relatively few officials, mostly military, who have endeavored to profit financially from our direct cooperation with Cuba in these particulars. Also our blocking of the few efforts they have attempted in this direction has for the most part been accepted in reasonably good part, although this is not true of the Minister of Communications in his repeated attempts to disorganize, and even to abolish, censorship and radio control.

The disturbing factor in this phase of the problem is that a few incidents of corruption in connection with the war effort have been flagrant. Among the most serious of these have been:

a) The Govea incident, fully reported in my despatches nos. 1492, November 11, and 1706, December 12, 1942, and my airmgram A-503, November 9, 1942.

There is no doubt whatever that Govea's activities as Director of Radio provided information relating to ship movements, convoys, cargoes, etc., which was of value to the enemy and which might very well have been the direct reason for several sinkings of our merchant vessels in this area. Whether or not he was and still is acting as an enemy agent I am unable to say, but so long as the control of radio broadcasting was in his hands there was no need for the enemy to have agents in Cuba charged with supplying information on shipping. Govea's radio stations provided daily broadcasts in the simplest code of precisely the information a commander of an enemy submarine needed. Nevertheless, it was most difficult to obtain his removal and, through his personal friendship with Batista and his close association with Mariné, he still exercises a sinister influence in the field of radio broadcasting and his stooges and spies, several of whom are known to be pro-Axis in sympathy, still retain their jobs in the Radio Office.

b) An investigation by our Intelligence Section of Magat Blanck and Company, an alleged merchandizing firm, disclosed that in reality it was a passport and visa concern facilitating the passage through Cuba of alleged refugees on passports and

visas

visas which had been forged or purchased. It is closely aligned with the office of Oscar Caiñas Milanes, a Cuban politician active in the visa racket and a known Mariné man. According to the Legal Attaché of this Embassy, both the Magat Blanck and Caiñas offices are run by Mariné through stooges and act as collection agencies in the visa racket on his behalf and that of Batista. The Legal Attaché further reports:

"The office of Magat, Blanck & Co. was visited repeatedly by the following Nazi operatives:

Fritz Nater  
Elsa Erb alias Elsa Brandorff  
Eugenio Hoppe  
Rolf Hoppe  
Horst Schindler  
John Pedro Tomas Lindner  
Alejandro Weseri Szabo  
Fritz Appel

"Of these persons, Fritz Nater was identified as the coordinator and contact man for Nazi operatives in Cuba and the Western Hemisphere, and is now interned; Elsa Erb was the mistress of Carlos Brandorff, an internee, and she endeavored to communicate with Colonel Mariné at the time of the apprehension of Eric Kohl, a hunchback watchmaker, interned since Pearl Harbor; Eugenio Hoppe, now interned, was the principal member of the German Nazi Party in Cuba; Rolf Hoppe, his son, was a leader of the Hitler Youth, had keys to the office of Magat, Blanck & Co., and has been interned since February 1943; Horst Schindler has been interrogated and released; and Fritz Appel has also been interned since February 1943. This office was used by these persons for repeated contacts in October, November, and December 1941, many times after business hours; on one occasion, Fritz Nater held a meeting with two Japanese in the office; and on several occasions, Rolf Hoppe opened the door with his own keys after closing time. Both of the offices mentioned as located in the Manzana de Gomez are deeply implicated in the general visa racket recently exposed by the investigation of censorship intercepts.

"Mariné's connection with this office is well concealed, but once it became known to reliable sources which were instrumental in securing information as to the activities there conducted, we were advised that further investigation would be impossible because of the power and influence of Mariné."

c) My despatch no. 2918 of April 28, 1943 reports in detail an investigation of an office known as the Prensa Indo-Americana. This investigation was conducted by the Cuban police at our request as a result of information that it was in contact with a pro-Nazi Bolivian editor who was in communication with German agents in Spain. The investigation was summarily halted by a telephone call from Captain Torre, President Batista's private secretary, because this office was an "internal propaganda

office" of the President and should not under any circumstances be investigated by the Cuban police or anyone else. Colonel Mariné berated Comandante Faget for his action in ordering this investigation, the President himself was enraged and threatened to dismiss Faget and roundly lashed Benitez for the "blunder". In fact, the Chief of National Police has recently admitted that by reason of this affair, he and Faget are still in danger of losing their jobs.

(Under the best of circumstances Batista and Mariné both know that we are aware of their connection with this office, and its possible involvement in subversive activities. This must be recalled in connection with their attitude toward the United States and our relations with Cuba.)

Our experience with the office of the Prensa Indo-Americana brought matters, at least temporarily, to a head. The investigation of this office occurred on April 9. Shortly thereafter, I was surprised to find stories being spread that I was "unduly active", as witnessed by my trips to the interior; that I pried into matters too much; that I was "fiscalizing" government affairs, and for these reasons I was becoming unpopular in various circles, including governmental. It is known that one of Mariné's methods of propagandizing (he is chief of publicity for the government) is by putting out so-called "bolas" or street rumors. It is significant that these rumors later formed the substance of editorials in the newspapers owned and operated by Mariné, and that they ceased at the same time and as suddenly as did the editorials. (Immediately thereafter some of Mariné's known agents approached members of my staff suggesting that their chief and the Embassy get together and that he could supply us with valuable information on Axis activities.)

#### VI.

Apparently Batista, already annoyed by my impeding the payment of graft by American companies (as, for instance, in the Cuban Electric Company-Mariano case), was especially aroused by the Prensa Indo-Americana incident, and as a result he chose to make

an issue with me over the charges of Nazi sympathy brought by Opposition Representative Chibás against the Peruvian Minister, Cúneo Harrison, notwithstanding the fact that in two letters (one written at his request to General Benitez, Chief of the National Police) I had defended the Police--and incidentally other Government organizations--against Chibás' insinuations of ineptitude in dealing with Fifth Column activities in Cuba. Subsequently both the President and the Minister of State agreed with me that these communications were not only entirely proper, but had supported the Government.

Nevertheless Batista, although fully informed on the Peruvian Minister, took the position that by my cutting relations with Cúneo, while maintaining at the same time close friendship with the ex-Counselor of the Peruvian Legation (who is an old friend and a true believer in democracy and the cause of the United Nations), I was somehow "criticizing Batista's position", and "interfering with the conduct of Cuban foreign affairs". While I fully realized that Batista's extraordinary attitude resulted from the Prensa Indio-Americana investigation, it became apparent during the Cúneo Harrison affair that any show of weakness on my part would have seriously impaired both my position and the prestige of this mission.

Any other course on my part would have shown weakness and like all appeasement might well have encouraged Batista to further irrational and violent action. Instead, my firmness induced respect and praise from most quarters, including the responsible press and even those government officials not directly connected with Batista and Mariné. What is more important, as a result of my stand (see my telegram no. 313 of May 11, 11 p.m.) the Cuneo affair was quickly hushed by the government, the Peruvian Minister was not whitewashed by either Congress or the Minister of State, and Batista suddenly

began sending me messages of esteem and affection. A few days later, he received me most cordially, and immediately thereafter we received more constructive action from the authorities on pending matters than at any time since Saladrigas left the Cabinet.

In short, this entire incident has terminated felicitously. But it is a warning of what we may expect from Batista in the future. On this occasion he chose the wrong issue, but it is clear that irrationally and without prior notice, he is at any time capable of precipitating a violent situation.

#### VII.

In view of the aforedescribed circumstances it is obvious that we may be entering a difficult, if not critical, phase of our relations with Cuba and that we must proceed uprightly, firmly, but with caution, and we must constantly be on the alert.

Batista is shrewd, ruthless and probably determined to continue in control after the expiration of his present term of office. If he succeeds in doing so, he and his group may become so entrenched as to continue their abuse of the Cuban people more or less indefinitely. In such an eventuality, Batista's profound dislike of the United States and all we represent will be seriously detrimental to our relations and a source of unending trouble.

On the other hand, many competent observers are convinced that any attempt by Batista to continue in power will bring on a crisis, the violence of which will depend on the manner of its occurrence, economic and political influences and other factors prevailing at the time. The longer that crisis is deferred the more severe is it likely to be. The reaction of the Cuban people against the President is mounting on all sides. He is facing possible political defeat and being forced into a disagreeable corner. For these reasons and  
because

because he is a fighter, he may resort to strong-arm measures. If he does, revolution and bloodshed may ensue.

Irrespective of our wishes (or of the facts of the case), the Cuban people hold us in a measure responsible for Batista's rise to power and therefore for the existing decomposition in Government. Conversely the Cuban people have come to depend on us for informal guidance in their troubles, and I believe we should adopt a dignified position of self respect and integrity which will inspire their respect and perhaps thus lead them to sounder action than otherwise would be the case. Inevitably our prestige and influence in Cuba will be in inverse ratio to Batista's.

#### VIII.

It is my considered opinion that we must now establish the policy we desire to follow. To do nothing would be tantamount to appeasement and counter to our fundamental policies; it might even in effect amount to an intervention on behalf of Batista, and it would in any case be against the best interests of Cuba, our relations with this country, and democracy in this hemisphere. It would lay us open to strong and justifiable criticism at home and in every way would be a negation of the high principles for which the Roosevelt Administration stands.

On the other hand, there exists in Cuba a latent although, I believe, potentially puissant public opinion, which if we will supply the moral support may inspire the better elements here to concerted and effective action, deprive the grafters of their financial sinews and so perhaps save the situation or at least greatly ameliorate the dangers involved in the present conditions of unrest.

Therefore, I most earnestly recommend the adoption of the following program which is entirely in keeping with our broad policies,

cannot be subject to criticism, and is the one procedure which may avert trouble:

1) We should scrupulously adhere to our policies and commitments of non-intervention, underscoring for the Cuban public that we will under no circumstances deviate in the slightest from this course. In the event of trouble occurring, I strongly believe that both in Washington and Havana we should follow the wise procedure of 1933 of consulting with the representatives of the other American republics.

2) We should make clear in every way possible and on all occasions that we stand for honesty and morality and will be disposed to extend our whole-hearted and most generous cooperation only to those who uphold and practice the same principles.

3) A continuance of and reiteration of my aforescribed policy of insisting upon complete honesty by all American enterprises and individuals in Cuba.

4) As recommended in my airgram no. 532 of November 14, we should quite properly state that opposition groups in the United States might be severely critical of us were we to continue assistance to the Batista Administration unless in each instance we received a satisfactory quid pro quo. The only exception to this rule might be in those cases where we believe our aid is essential for the well being of the Cuban people. Leak-proof safeguards should surround the extension of any future credit or financial assistance to the Cuban Government--viz. the safeguards surrounding the disbursement of funds under the \$25,000,000 line of credit of 1942.

5) At an early opportunity, I should make a public statement asserting our absolute abstention from any direct or indirect influence or preference in internal Cuban politics, and declaring further that pursuant to this policy no American corporation or citizen resident in Cuba should in any way, shape or manner participate in Cuban politics, and as an integral part of this policy we will view with disfavor any financial contribution by any one of our nationals or companies to a Cuban political party or politician. (The only argument which could perhaps be advanced against such a course is that it might favor Batista, since he has both Government funds and power wherewith to support his own candidate. I do not regard this as a valid argument.) Certainly such a public statement would be sensational. However, I favor it because it is entirely in keeping with our fundamental policy, and because our influence for good in Cuba, if it is to endure, must be premised on the highest principles of Good Neighborliness and non-intervention. Sooner or later the Cubans must be brought to realize that theirs is the responsibility for whether they have good or bad government, and such a declaration might bring them to this realization.

In order for me successfully to carry out this program, it is imperative that the Cuban people and Government be informed that these policies will be adhered to strictly and that in their enactment I enjoy the complete confidence of my Government.

Discussion of Cuba's Contribution to the War Effort

AIR MAIL

Habana, Cuba, January 10, 1944

No. 5648

Subject: Discussion of Cuba's contribution to  
the war effort.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my confidential airgram No. A-32 of January 6, 1944, 12:20 p.m. concerning the general situation in Cuba and to my telegram No. 9 of January 5, 7:00 p.m. reporting inter alia on the publication of an offensive editorial in the newspaper Mañana (controlled by the notorious Colonel Jaime MARINE) and to call the attention of the Department to the following excerpt from that editorial having to do with Cuba's alleged contributions to the war effort. It will be recalled that this editorial was a result of the campaign fomented by Prime Minister ZAYDIN (who last May urged that I prevent Mañana receiving any newsprint because it was "so scurrilous a sheet and only existed by blackmail and its illicit sales of paper") in an effort to obtain a larger newsprint quota, but the quotation hereafter is so representative of the sort of assertions emanating from the so-called "Palace group" referred to in Airgram No. A-32 as well as public statements by the Prime Minister himself, that its significance in my opinion is not limited merely to the newsprint question. Mañana declared:

"They asked us for airports and we gave them. They asked us for naval bases and we offered them. They asked us for roads and we are building them. They asked us for manganese and chrome and we are shipping them. They asked us for sugar at a low price and we are sending it to them. They asked for meat and vegetables and Cuba is supplying them. They asked us for collaboration of all kinds, and we are giving them enthusiastic and decided collaboration."

While these declarations could easily be dismissed with the observation, especially in respect to our defense projects, that in protecting the security of the United States we were simultaneously defending Cuba, it is, I

believe.

Regraded Unclassified

believe pertinent, by reason of Marine's ownership of this sheet, to consider these assertions seriatim and in some detail:

"They asked us for airports and we gave them."

The fact is that in constructing Batista Airport alone our Government invested sixteen million dollars, more than half of which was probably disbursed for personnel and other services in Cuba, with an employment of Cuban personnel which reached a maximum of over ten thousand at the peak of the construction period. Smaller but nevertheless very substantial airport investments were made at San Julián (approximately four million dollars), and at Camaguey. These construction activities contributed to the maintenance of the Cuban economy, and in particular the employment provided was a notable factor in the maintenance of that economy. Moreover under the Batista and San Julián Airport agreements we are committed to turn them over to the Cuban Government without charge six months after the end of the war. In other words, the airports have cost Cuba nothing and will revert to Cuba after the war without charge. In addition they represent continuing income for the Cuban people on two counts, first money spent by Service personnel, and second purchases, principally food, for consumption at these bases. In the latter connection I am informed that upwards of sixty percent of all food purchases for American forces at Camaguey, Batista Airport, and San Julián are made in Cuba.

While it is true that when the use of the land was requested in 1942, Prime Minister SALADRIGAS acted promptly and collaborated with us sincerely, I have heard from several sources--including his own admission--that in so doing he virtually over-rode President BATISTA and then Minister of State CORTINA. It may also be recalled that within a few weeks of the replacement of Saladrigas by Zaydín as Prime Minister (August 1942), the latter and the new Minister of State (Martínez), endeavored to torpedo the Batista Airport agreement by a series of so-called "interpretations" which would certainly have interfered with its construction and probably have impaired the success of subsequent operations. It was only by taking a firm stand against this attempted violation of our signed and sealed agreement that I was able to induce the Ministers to withdraw and cancel the note which had been addressed to me in the premises. In net balance, the airport construction has unquestionably been a contribution by the United States to Cuba, rather than vice versa.

"They asked us for naval bases, and we offered them."

It is a fact that the Cuban Government, under the Premiership of Saladrigas, acted promptly in response to our requests for permission to utilize such points as La Fé, Cayo Francés, and Santa Fé (Isle of Pines), which concessions cost Cuba nothing and added materially to our

ability to protect Cuban and other shipping. While the cost of such installations was much less than for the airports mentioned above, nevertheless the investment certainly was of assistance to Cuba, as are the maintenance expenses continuing at the present time.

Turning to the Guantánamo Naval Base, it may be mentioned that our investment there during the past three or four years has been in excess of thirty-five million dollars, and from three thousand to seven thousand Cuban workmen have been continuously employed. As in the case of the airports, the Naval Base likewise makes important local purchases of foodstuffs, and considerable money is spent by naval personnel in the Guantánamo area and at Santiago de Cuba. The employment given at Guantánamo has been highly important in maintaining the economy of the whole Guantánamo area. Quite aside from the protection to Cuba represented by the Naval Base, the net balance from a contribution viewpoint is again greatly in favor of the United States as the contributor. Incidentally, the Cuban Government has not been exactly an enthusiastic cooperator in the matter of the water supply but instead has endeavored to have us assume all the expense while it acquired title.

"They asked us for roads and we are building them."

The inclusion of highways as an item of "Cuban collaboration" with the United States is patently absurd. Until our invasion of North Africa, the Central Highway doubtless had a certain strategic value, but the Cubans long before Pearl Harbor had requested a line of credit for the purpose of repairing this artery, which is essential to the economic life of Cuba. The feeder roads to be constructed under the same credit are of no interest whatever to the United States, with the possible exception of the proposed road to connect the town of Pinar del Río with the San Julián airport. It may also be recalled that in order to get out manganese production the Metals Reserve Company has itself had to build roads. As the Department well knows, the \$25,000,000 line of credit was sought by Cuba for projects important to the Cuban economy, and "acceptance" of that line by Cuba hardly falls within the category of a "Cuban contribution."

"They asked us for manganese and chrome and we are supplying them."

With respect to manganese the facts are that a year and a half ago when this product was not in short supply, we nevertheless offered to create a stockpile and furthermore, through the Metals Reserve Company, and at a price above the previously-existing market, we permitted a number of marginal mines to function, thereby maintaining to an important degree the economy of Oriente Province. In this connection the difficulties of establishing the stockpile near Santiago de Cuba, and the suspiciousness with which the Cuban Government viewed the project, will not be for-

gotten. While chrome at that period was more urgently needed, our purchases permitted a higher rate of production than had ever hitherto existed in Cuba, notwithstanding which protracted difficulties occurred with regard to shipping this metal, and the Cuban Government was on the whole thoroughly uncooperative in solving these problems, which required considerable ingenuity on the part of the Embassy and protracted discussion with the Prime Minister and other high officials of the Cuban Government. Violent criticism arose when our chrome contracts were terminated and the reasons therefor were deliberately misrepresented by the local press.

Similar misrepresentation is now arising in connection with the termination of the copper operations at Matahambre, and the Cuban Government is being urged by local labor and other interests to intervene for the purpose of "saving thousands of (non-existent) families from starvation." The fact that Matahambre copper was costing us nineteen cents per pound as against copper obtainable for twelve cents per pound and under elsewhere, is being ignored in discussion of the matter by the Cuban Government and press.

"They asked us for sugar at a low price, and we are sending it to them."

The argument is presented almost daily that by not demanding a higher price for its sugar, the Cuban Government has shown a notable spirit of self-sacrifice, patriotism and self-denial. That point of view even appears to have obtained some support in Washington. The facts are that the average price for sugar during the five years ending in 1941 was approximately 1.55 cents, whereas it has subsequently been 2.65 cents, plus a fantastically high (by pre-war standards) price for molasses. The year 1942 was a boom year for Cuba because of our sugar purchases, and the country likewise fared extremely well in 1943. In 1944 it is confidently expected by everyone having to do with sugar production that larger profits will be made than at any time during the past fifteen years. In fact, the principal economic problem facing Cuba today is not profits, but control of inflation. It is believed that, without detracting in any way from such credit as Cuba may legitimately claim for not insisting on a higher raw sugar price for 1944, the assertions of ranking Cuban officials concerning the contribution represented by its sale of sugar, are subject to considerable discount. In fact during the negotiations for the 1943 crop all members of the Cuban Mission, the Prime Minister, and other officials repeatedly emphasized to me that they did not want a higher price as it would be bad for the industry (sic). López Castro, only a couple of hours before his recent departure reiterated this sentiment to the Counselor of the Embassy and me, although simultaneously regretting that sugar wages could not be raised. In this latter connection the hacendados would like to receive a higher price but fear it would immediately be passed on to

labor and the industry thus be placed in a still less provable competitive position. I may also remark that no agreement has yet been reached with Cuba concerning blackstrap molasses and/or alcohol, but that all indications are that the Cuban "contribution" to this subject will be to hold out for the best possible terms and to endeavor to extract the final centavo of profit that it is able to squeeze, in the knowledge of our extreme need for these products for the prosecution of the war.

"They asked for meat and vegetables and Cuba is supplying them."

The Embassy would be interested to see presented any argument, no matter how tenuous, tending to prove that the efforts of the American Government to maintain the market for Cuban vegetables represented a "contribution" by Cuba. Regarding meat, it may be recalled that nearly a year of negotiations was required to induce Cuba to make meat regularly available; in fact, the Cuban Government delayed so long over these negotiations that our acute need for beef had had to be satisfied elsewhere, and by the time the agreement was finally made, our interest in Cuban beef had largely evaporated. Also it is perhaps not amiss to recall that in connection with the shipment of pickled beef, the American Manager of Swift & Company was arrested and even an attempt made to make it appear that certain officers of the Embassy were obtaining illicit profits from this transaction. Needless to say, this stupid attempt to frame members of the Embassy staff was promptly and vigorously squashed.

"They asked us for collaboration of all kinds, and we are giving them enthusiastic and decided collaboration."

I am not aware what examples could be cited in proof of this assertion. Examples of the reverse--that is of lack of cooperation by Cuba--have been on the other hand numerous. The list would include Cuban censorship, which has degenerated into a racket operated by the Prime Minister's cousin; radio communications; failure to maintain prices of certain basic commodities, promises to our Government to the contrary notwithstanding; failure to restrict the use of articles and materials in short supply (together with blackmarket operations engaged in on an ever-increasing scale by high officials of the Cuban Government); and the failure of the Cuban Government to take any effective action to intern enemy aliens until our Government had agreed to underwrite a substantial part of the cost, and subsequent thereto the release through political pressure of certain dangerous Germans previously apprehended at our request. During the past year and a half there have been a whole series of incidents and cases in which the "collaboration" of the Cuban Government has been obtainable only after extreme effort, including on occasion direct approach to the President of the Republic; in others, the action taken by the Cuban Government has been so delayed as materially to

reduce

reduce the value of the action finally taken.

On the other hand, the great mass of the Cuban people definitely sympathize with the cause of the United Nations, and there are many individuals who have demonstrated willingness to do something about it, as for instance through contributions to the Fondo Cubano-Americano. Also I believe a number of the young aviators would welcome an opportunity to see active service and the men on the subchasers loaned by us to the Cuban Navy have worked earnestly and sincerely. However, these examples are the exception as evidenced by the fact that the recruiting law only could be passed in 1942 on the specific condition that no one would have to leave Cuban territory.

In summary, it is my belief that the assertions relative to wartime collaboration made by high officials of the Cuban Government and constantly appearing in the Habana press are subject to a discount of approximately ninety percent, whereas the collaboration of our Government with Cuba has thus far been exceedingly if not excessively generous.

Respectfully yours,

Spruille Braden

EOB/len

File No. 820

A true copy of  
the signed original

*len*

Transmitting Summary of Cases of Cuban Non-Participation in the War Effort

No. 5663 UNITED STATES AIR MAIL Habana, January 11, 1944

AIR MAIL

Subject: (Transmitting Summary of Cases of Cuban  
(non-Participation in the War Effort

References: Embassy's Dispatch No. 4799 of  
March 27, 1943 and No. 485 of  
September 6, 1943.

**STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**

Prior to the inauguration of the Joint United-States  
The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Sir: surveilling and interfering by immigration inspectors  
German and Japanese alien consuls. This unsatisfactory

1/ I have the honor to refer to paragraph 3 of my  
airgram A-13 of January 4, 1 p.m. and to enclose here-  
with a list of cases, in summary form, in which Cuban  
officials have either aided the enemy or have failed  
to cooperate in the war effort. I should also like to  
refer to my A-32 of January 6, 12:20 p.m. in which I  
drew certain conclusions regarding the possible results  
which might be expected from these occurrences.

Respectfully yours,

Juan GONZA, in his capacity as Director of Radio,  
was responsible for sending messages in clear and in  
cipher codes giving detailed information on the move-  
ment of ships which might well have been the direct  
cause for several seizures in the vicinity  
of the Cuban coast. His close friendship with Pres-  
ident Batista and Juan Mariné was such that it was possi-  
ble to secure the true facts only with the greatest  
difficulty and it is not inconceivable that he is still  
conspiring to aid our enemies.

**Spruille Braden**

(3) Case of Fernando PABRE SCHWAB

Reference: Dispatch No. 1312 of October 20, 1943.

Fernando PABRE y Schwab was a Havana port pilot  
against whom serious suspicions of pro-Axis sympathies  
and even activities, in the wake of obtaining shipping  
information, existed. Although strong representations

Enclosure: to the Cuban Government and we were informed  
that he had been permanently suspended, he was actually  
List of cases: to his position after a very short

File No. 620  
HCA/hmf

Later when he was brought before the Spanish  
charges of pro-Nazi activities, he was re-  
only after months of intensive efforts were  
made to have him removed as a pilot and despite the  
fact that the war entered on the Nazi charges, he  
continued to work until the time of his suicide.

Enclosure to despatch No. 5663  
of January 11, 1944, from the Embassy at Habana

I. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH CUBA

(1) Difficulties with regard to surveillance  
and internment of enemy aliens prior to  
inauguration of joint internment program

References: Embassy's despatches No. 3739 of  
March 27, 1942 and No. 945 of  
September 8, 1942.

Prior to the inauguration of the joint Cuban-United States internment program which gave the United States a certain measure of control over the surveillance and internment of enemy aliens in Cuba, great difficulty was experienced in protecting the security of Cuba by properly surveilling and interning by incarceration dangerous German and Japanese alien enemies. This unsatisfactory state of affairs was due to a lack of the sense of responsibility and appreciation of the serious dangers involved by the Cuban officials concerned.

(2) Juan GOVEA, ex-Director of Radio

References: Despatch No. 1706 of December 12,  
1942 and No. 5206 of November 22,  
1943.

Juan GOVEA, in his capacity as Director of Radio, was responsible for sending messages in clear and in simple codes giving detailed information on the movement of ships which might well have been the direct reason for several merchant ship sinkings in the vicinity of the Cuban coast. His close friendship with President Batista and Jaime Mariné was such that it was possible to remove him from office only with the greatest difficulty and it is not inconceivable that he is still conspiring to aid our enemies.

(3) Case of Fernando PANNE Schmidt

Reference: Despatch No. 1312 of October 20, 1942.

Fernando PANNE y Schmidt was a Habana port pilot against whom serious suspicions of pro-Axis sympathies and even activities, in the sense of obtaining shipping information, existed. Although strong representations were made to the Cuban Government and we were informed that he had been permanently suspended, he was actually permitted to return to his position after a very short suspension. Later when he was brought before the Urgency Tribunal on charges of pro-Nazi activities, he was acquitted. Only after months of intensive efforts were we able to have him removed as a pilot and despite the fact that he was never cleared on the Nazi charges, he remained unincarcerated until the time of his suicide a couple of weeks ago.

(4) Discharge of Adolfo NOVO, manager of G.N.C.A. airport at Cienfuegos, for pro-Nazi activity

Reference: Not previously reported.

NOVO had a definite pro-Nazi record and was outstandingly derelict in his duty by failing to report for over five hours the sighting of a submarine which had been reported to him by a Pan American pilot. However, in spite of the strong evidence against him, the Minister of State at that time, Dr. Cortina, informed me that President Batista was exercised at his dismissal and would demand the reinstatement of Novo. I was forced in this instance to speak to the President personally to obtain the permanent removal of a dangerous pro-Nazi occupying a key position. In view of President Batista's stand, it was deemed inexpedient to request this man's internment.

(5) Camagüey Incident

Reference: Not previously reported.

On June 27, 1943 members of the Cuban National Police attacked and brutally beat with their clubs some 20 officers and men of the United States military unit assigned to the Camagüey Airport. A careful investigation of this incident by United States and Cuban military officials tended to indicate that there was no provocation on the part of the United States soldiers and that the Cuban police were acting according to a prearranged plan. While the Embassy was inclined to attribute this incident to friction between our troops and the Cuban police, Colonel Wade tells me he has always felt there might have been some pro-Nazi influences at work in this instance.

(6) Irregularities committed by certain members of the Cuban Foreign Service

References: Embassy's despatches Nos. 1610 of November 28, 1942 and 4701 of October 6, 1943.

The Embassy has accumulated much evidence regarding the serious illegal actions committed by many members of the Cuban diplomatic and consular corps in Europe and elsewhere. These include the illegal transfer of funds, the sale of visas and passports to refugees who might be spies and other acts calculated to endanger the security of Cuba and the United States and hence interfering with the war effort. One of the more outstanding cases is that of Eugenio TAQUICHEL y Villasana, Secretary of the Cuban Legation at Rio de Janeiro. In this instance the Minister of State was

informed by the Embassy on July 4, 1942 of the suspicious nature of a United States currency transaction involving \$8,000 engaged in by Taquechel. So far as can be ascertained, no attempt was made to investigate this Secretary's activities and he is presumed to be still at his post in Rio de Janeiro, even though a follow-up note was sent to the Ministry of State on January 19, 1943.

(7) Sale of visas and passports by Cuban politicians

Reference: Embassy's A-1769 of August 25, 1 p.m., 1943

The Embassy has strong evidence that Nestor CARBONELL y Rivero, Cuban Minister to Colombia, his nephew, Nestor CARBONELL y Andricain, Speaker of the House of Representatives of Cuba, and the former's brother, José Manuel CARBONELL y Rivero, the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, are involved in a well-organized racket to sell visas to European refugees of unknown reliability and also Cuban passports to those not legally entitled to them. This is but one of a number of cases of visa and passport racket organizations in which prominent Cuban politicians are involved.

(8) The CUNEO Harrison incident

Reference: Despatch No. 3959 of July 29, 1943.

Sr. CUNEO Harrison, the former Peruvian Minister in Habana, was a Nazi sympathizer; if not actually abetting the Nazi cause in Cuba, he at least was intimately in touch with known agents and on one occasion offered to get a Dutch officer out of a German prison camp. Ample evidence of his opinions and activities was in the hands of the Cuban Government and the National Police, and it was generally known that he formed the center of a coterie of pro-Nazi café society persons. In spite of this he was protected, white-washed, decorated and feted by the Cuban authorities and only the Embassy's very strong and unyielding stand that his continued presence in Habana constituted a danger to the security of the Island made it possible for his removal eventually to take place.

(9) The CAMPBELL-JOHNSTON case

Reference: Despatch No. 3587 of June 25, 1943.

Diarmid Alexandre CAMPBELL-JOHNSTON was a British subject resident in Habana who was strongly suspected, on the basis of considerable evidence, of pro-Nazi opinions and even activities. He was associated with

suspected

suspected pro-Axis agents and was considered generally a dangerous person to enjoy freedom in Cuba. There was a flurry of resistance to the incarceration of Campbell-Johnston and attempts were made by his attorneys to bribe high Cuban officials to release him. Fortunately it was possible to arrange for his return to England under surveillance as it is considered likely it would not have been possible to keep him in confinement longer.

(10) Lack of cooperation in the war effort

Reference: Despatch No. 5648 of January 10, 1944

In 1942 the Cuban Government agreed to the construction of United States military airports to be utilized by United States military forces during the war and thereafter turned over to Cuba. In 1943 cooperation in the war effort was almost entirely lacking and repeated requests for action by the Cuban Government in connection with the airports, the Nicaro Nickel plant and other war projects have not been acted upon.

(11) MAGAT, BLANCK incident

Reference: Despatch No. 5206 of November 22, 1943.

The firm of MAGAT, BLANCK and Company, Habana, Cuba proved by a confidential investigation to be in reality a passport and visa facilitation office, closely associated with the office of Oscar CAÑAS Milanés, a Cuban politician who has been active in the procuring of visas for refugees of doubtful loyalty and who is known to be associated with Jaime Mainé. As a result of confidential surveillance, several known Nazi and Japanese operatives were seen visiting the office of Magat, Blanck and Company regularly (some of them possessing keys to the office). According to the investigation report, Marine's connection with the firm of Magat, Blanck was well concealed but there is no doubt that it existed, in fact, further investigation had to stop for this reason.

(12) Resistance of President Batista to LUNING's execution

In spite of the clear-cut evidence proving that August LUNING was a German spy, on several occasions General BENITEZ declared that he had to force President Batista to approve Luning's execution.

(13) PRENSA

(13) PRENSA INDO-AMERICANA case

References: Despatches Nos. 2918 of April 28, 1943 and 5206 of November 22, 1943.

As a result of information which came into the possession of the Embassy that an office in Havana, known as the PRENSA INDO-AMERICANA, was maintaining contact with a pro-Nazi Bolivian editor who, in turn, was communicating with German agents in Spain, the enemy activities section of the Cuban police raided the office. The investigation was summarily halted by a telephone call from Captain Torra, President Batista's private secretary, because this office was "an internal propaganda office" (i.e., a graft collection office) of President Batista. In fact, the President was so angry that his police investigated this office that for a time both the Chief of Police and his subordinate, the Chief of the Anti-Enemy Section of the Police, were in danger of being cashiered.

(14) Enmity of Batista advisers to the American Ambassador

Reference: Despatch No. 5487 of December 21, 1943.

It has been learned on excellent authority (Dr. SOSA DE QUEBADA, Minister of National Defense, who requested his name be kept secret) that there is a small group surrounding President Batista which for some time has been endeavoring to poison Batista's mind against the American Ambassador by magnifying complaints against him and attempting to convince the President that he is interfering with the administration of the Cuban Government.

(15) Failure to intern six Germans recommended for inclusion in the Joint United States-Cuban internment program

In October the Embassy was visited by Mr. James BELL, Office of the Alien Enemy Control Unit of the Department of Justice, who reviewed a list of persons being considered for internment. As a result of this visit a formal letter was sent to General Manuel Benítez, Chief of Police, on October 22, 1943 recommending the internment of various aliens. Some of these were already incarcerated and our recommendation merely had the effect of transferring the expenses of their internment from the Cuban Government to the joint internment program. Six of the persons recommended, however, were at liberty and up to the present time are understood not yet to have been apprehended and incarcerated, a flagrant exhibition of the lack of responsibility towards the war effort on the part of the Cuban officials concerned.

(17) Three

(16) Three dangerous interned Nazis at liberty on parole

References: Department's instruction No. 1909 of July 6, 1943 and Embassy's despatch No. 5626 of January 7.

Under a provision of the Cuban internment law, three Nazis whom the Embassy definitely considers dangerous, Ignacio and Jorge ADRIAN and Kurt HANNEBECK, although interned, are at liberty on parole. As two of these three internees are considered among the most dangerous Nazis in Cuba, their freedom under nominal supervision, which would be unlikely in any case to hamper their activities, is definitely harmful to the security of Cuba and the United States. Since January 1, 1944 the Embassy again has urgently requested their imprisonment and hopes it may now succeed.

(17) The Elias SMATT (U.S.P.L.) case

Reference: Despatch No. 5469 of December 20, 1943.

Manuel PEREZ Benitoa, the Cuban Alien Property Custodian, acted to nullify the effectiveness of the United States Proclaimed List in the case of Elias SMATT (U.S.P.L.) by promising to appoint an intervener in Smatt's affairs who would actually carry on under Smatt's direction.

(18) General censorship situation

Reference: Despatch No. 5438 of December 17, 1943.

The United States has maintained in Cuba a postal censorship liaison officer and staff for more than 18 months in an endeavor to create an effective postal censorship program. The Embassy has finally been forced to recommend the withdrawal of this liaison mission. The immediate cause for this is that postal censorship has developed into such a "racket" that the Cuban Government has refused to accept the offer of the United States Government to contribute approximately \$20,000 a month to the censorship program apparently because it fears the resulting cooperation would stop a rapidly growing and increasingly lucrative enterprise. A cable censorship liaison officer was assigned here for nearly six months and was unable, in spite of his best efforts, to accomplish anything in the way of having an effective cable and radio censorship established and the Embassy, as a result, was forced to recommend that it no longer considers it advisable to contemplate financial participation in such a censorship.

(19) Rumors

(19) Rumors regarding the sinking of the Cuban steamship LIBERTAD

Reference: A-32, January 6, 12:20 p.m.

Rumors indicative of the willingness of certain people, some of whom it is believed may be in official positions, to harm the war effort have been spread with regard to the recent sinking of the Cuban steamship LIBERTAD. The story was that the sinking was caused by the convoy's abandonment of the LIBERTAD. In addition, news of its sinking was published prematurely, thus constituting a flagrant violation of basic security rules.

(20) Search of the Legal Attaché's personal effects in his room at the Hotel Nacional

Reference: A-32 of January 6, 12:20 p.m.

Definite proof, long suspected, of the search of personal effects of United States officials staying at Cuba's best hotel, the Hotel Nacional, came to light recently when the newly arrived Legal Attaché found harmless torn up bits of private correspondence removed from his waste basket and partially pieced together on his suitcase. At about the same time and in the same hotel the effects of Mr. Ray Leddy, former Legal Attaché at Habana, were searched. Mr. Leddy was temporarily in Habana in a private capacity. The Ambassador has also become aware that there is maintained a close vigilance of himself, ranking members of his staff and Chancery visitors.

(21) Attempt to force Major Keller's file-safe.

Reference: A-80, January 13, 9:15 a.m.

Major Fred B. Keller, U. S. Postal Censorship Liaison Officer, maintains a strong file-safe at the Cuban Censorship Headquarters for his own correspondence. A few days ago he found that the combination disk had been tampered with in an effort to open the cabinet. There was no suspicion of this attempt having been made by persons not connected with the Cuban Office of Censorship, as the building is under guard.

(22) Stigmas now being attached to anyone labeled "Americano"

Reference: Despatch No. 5557 of December 30, and A-32 of January 6, 12:20 p.m.

Increasing evidence has recently come to the Embassy's attention that the group surrounding President Batista, who are hostile to the United States

Government

Regraded Unclassified

Government, is now using the label "Americano" as a stigma against any Cuban Government officials or others who show any friendliness to the United States or perform their functions with exceptional honesty and efficiency. This labeling of Comodoro ARGUELLES, recently relieved as Chief of Staff of the Cuban Navy, is believed to have been a factor contributing to his dismissal.

(23) Release from internment of Italian subjects without consulting the Embassy

Reference: Embassy's telegram No. 695 of November 1, 12 noon, 1943

Although the internment program in Cuba is a joint United States - Cuban effort, including annual financial assistance from the United States Government amounting to \$143,000, the Cuban Government, without in any way consulting the Embassy, ordered the release of all interned Italian subjects shortly after the capitulation of Italy. Three of the interned Italians are considered dangerous and the Embassy would not in any case have agreed to their release had it been given an opportunity to express its opinion.

(24) General

When the submarine menace became serious, the Embassy encountered the greatest difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of the Civil Authorities in controlling the movements of small craft so as to eliminate the possibility of any contact between such crews and the German submarines. More recently, protests were made within the Government against the use of United States troops to guard the Nicastro mine properties after an agreement had been reached with the proper authorities on this subject. In addition, criticisms (mentioned in my despatch No. 5487 of December 21, 1943) of legal jurisdiction by the United States over its troops stationed in Cuba continue to be spread although there is no occasion to do so. These three examples are instances of the grudging spirit of cooperation in direct war matters and are particularly serious because, even while cooperation on lower levels may be frequently satisfactory, the President and his clique are the chief source of dissatisfaction.

## II. UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

- (1) Attempt to influence sugar negotiations by threatening to appeal to the other American republics against "unfairness" of the United States

On the return of the Cuban sugar delegation from Washington in early January 1943, following six weeks of inconclusive negotiations in Washington, President Batista and his advisers considered attempting to mobilize hemisphere opinion against the United States by alleging that the American Government, through the inadequacy of its sugar offers, was making an improper use of economic pressure and endeavoring to reduce Cuba to serfdom. Simultaneously spokesmen of the sugar industry made hostile declarations, as did certain Government officials. This was clearly an attempt by "threat of bad behavior" to obtain more favorable sugar terms. A tendency to employ the same technique has been discernible in connection with other economic matters during the past year.

- (2) Joint Cuban-Mexican anti-Americanism

Reference: A-32, January 6, 12:20 p.m.

The Mexican Ambassador to Cuba, Rubén Romero, included a strongly anti-American passage in a speech last April and was abetted in this by Emeterio Santovenia, the Cuban Minister of State.

### III. RELATIONS AMONG THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS

#### (1) Cuba's wooing of Mexico

Reference: A-32, January 6, 12:20 p.m.

Last summer President Batista sent General Benítez as a special Ambassador to Mexico with the reported object of his arranging an interview between the Presidents of Mexico and Cuba, either in Yucatan, Mexico or at Varadero, Cuba. Decorations were freely exchanged.

#### (2) Cuban-Dominican Relations

Reference: A-32, January 6, 12:20 p.m.

Rumors that President Batista is ambitious to extend his dictatorship to other countries of the Caribbean gained credence in the light of visits to the Dominican Republic made by his most intimate associate, Jaime Maríné, in November 1942 and again within the last few months. It is also worthy of note that one of the associates of Colonel BOSCH Pearson, reputedly President Trujillo's confidential representative in Cuba, was Jaime Maríné.

#### (3) Cuban-Haitian Relations

Reference: A-32, January 6, 12:20 p.m.

Friendly activity between Cuba and Haiti appears to be on the increase. The strongest reflection of a growing friendship between the two countries is the extreme courtesy which was shown to President LESCOOT on his recent brief official visit here; this courtesy exceeded that shown any other official visitors and is in marked contrast to the unfriendly treatment accorded the Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs and the relatively reserved treatment accorded other visitors of State. In addition, the Cuban Minister of State made an incognito two-day trip to Haiti within the last month; Haiti was also visited by Jaime Maríné on his recent trip which included the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.

#### (4) Uncivil treatment of Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs

The Chilean Minister came to Cuba in October 1943 by invitation and was thereupon informed that President Batista "because he would be out of town" could not receive him. It was not until the Chilean Minister had threatened to depart on the first south-bound plane with his suite that an interview with President Batista was arranged. The motive of this boorish behavior was apparently furnished by a report reaching Batista that the Chilean Foreign Minister is anti-Communist.

#### (5) Uncivil

(5) Uncivil treatment of the departing  
Uruguayan Minister

President Batista declined in December 1943 to receive the farewell visit of the Uruguayan Minister, Dr. MacEachen. No definite reason has ever become apparent, although it is surmised that the President's refusal may have been because of the Minister's personal intimacy with the Vice President of Cuba, a political opponent of Batista.

(6) Reprimand to Brazilian Minister

When the former Brazilian Minister called on the Minister of State to request his successor's agrément, he was caustically criticised for meddling in Cuba's internal affairs. His only "sin" was his remarks, made at a dinner a few weeks previously in reply to a tiresome tirade against Cuban politics by his hostess, the Marquessa de Tiedra, that ruling was difficult, many problems had to be met, etc. He spoke only in general terms and did not discuss political affairs, as charged by the Minister of State.

Pres. File  
P

March 31, 1944.

My dear Paul,

I was extremely sorry to learn of your forthcoming retirement. It must be a great disappointment to you.

On the other hand, I am glad that the medics found the trouble at an early stage. Under such circumstances it should cause you no concern.

As you know, it was a great pleasure to have had you as my Naval Aide in '36 and '37. We had many grand times which I shall always remember with appreciation of your services and friendship.

Please accept my congratulations on your long and distinguished career and my very best wishes for continued happiness and success.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Franklin D. Roosevelt

Captain Paul H. Bastedo, U.S.N.,  
4926 Glenbrook Road, N.W.,  
Washington, D.C.

P12 (Pres. file)

W

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MARCH 14, 1944

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Everyone knows the Nazi record on religion. Both at home and abroad, Hitler and his followers have waged a ruthless war against the churches of all faiths.

Now the German army has used the Holy City of Rome as a military center. No one could have been surprised by this -- it is only the latest of Hitler's many affronts to religion. It is a logical step in the Nazi policy of total war -- a policy which treats nothing as sacred.

We on our side have made freedom of religion one of the principles for which we are fighting this war. We have tried scrupulously -- often at considerable sacrifice -- to spare religious and cultural monuments, and we shall continue to do so.

- - - -

716  
**SECRET**

FEB 16 1944

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:**

You asked the other day the number of divisions that would be in continental U.S. on the date of the launching of OVERLORD. I find the following to be the present schedule:

June 1st

Divisions in U.S.	41
Divisions in U.K.	21
Divisions in Mediterranean	8
Divisions in Pacific	19

September 30th\*

Divisions in U.S.	29
Divisions in OVERLORD (U.K. and N.W. France)	31
Divisions in Mediterranean	8
Divisions in Pacific	21

\* During June and July, only one division a month can be sent to U.K. as the ports will be too burdened with cross-channel business.

It is expected that on June 1st there will be a total of 1,514,700 U.S. soldiers in the United Kingdom, 2,804 four-engine bombers, 711 medium bombers and 4,346 fighter bombers or fighters.

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL

Chief of Staff.

PLEASE INDICATE ACTION TAKEN AND RETURN TO THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT.

**SECRET**

716

26-1944  
has been  
A. H. E.  
W. F. B.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

FEB 14 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 31 January 1944 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the estimated number in active service on 31 December 1943 is also included:

	<u>31 January 1944</u>	<u>31 December 1943</u>	<u>Net Gain for Month</u>
Regular Navy	407,649	399,739	7,910
Retired Active	6,700	6,700	-
Fleet Reserve	5,940	6,000	- 60
Women's Reserve	41,275	38,450	2,825
Other Reserve	1,660,319	1,581,161	79,158
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	2,121,883	2,032,050	89,833

2. To date 860,833 men have been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very respectfully

*Frank Knox*

The President  
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File  
Pres. has seen.*

**SECRET**


19 January 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President.

1. Admiral Byrd arrived in Dallas, Texas from Panama about 1 December. He underwent a minor operation which he thought would keep him there about a week, but which in reality kept him about six weeks. He went from Dallas to Boston last week and is at present at his home there. He is expected in Washington momentarily.
2. The report is now completed and will be submitted shortly after Admiral Byrd's arrival here.
3. In talking with Admiral Byrd's Aide, I gained the following impressions:
  - (a) The mission was successful despite the unfortunate gasoline explosion which threatened to disrupt the plans.
  - (b) Several promising routes have been outlined and are recommended in the report.
4. I have further information should it be desired prior to submission of the report.

Very respectfully,

  
Chester C. Wood  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Assistant Naval Aide  
To the President

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
ADMIRAL BROWN

Will you ask Admiral King  
how Dick Byrd is? The last we  
heard he was in a hospital in  
Dallas, Texas.

F. D. R.

P

*Admiral Brown to*

SECRET-SECURITY

*file 1*  
*Fido*  
*US*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

23 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

At our last meeting on the IOWA you asked for the figures on deployment of U. S. forces (Army, Navy, Marines) and of British forces. These figures follow. The U. S. figures are accurate; the British figures are an estimate made by us. If more accurate figures on the British become available, they will be furnished to you.

<u>U. S.</u>	<u>At present</u>	<u>Jan. 1, 1944</u>	<u>May 1, 1944</u>	<u>July 1, 1944</u>
Overseas	3,631,000	3,961,000	4,936,000	5,523,000
At home	6,497,000	6,567,000	5,791,000	5,399,000
Total personnel	10,128,000	10,529,000	10,727,000	10,823,000
Combat air-planes overseas	11,500	12,500	16,200	18,100

<u>British</u> (includes Dominions)	4,412,000	4,412,000	4,490,000	4,510,000
--	-----------	-----------	-----------	-----------

Approximately 2,200,000 of above are in U. K. Total does not include 480,000 Dominion and Colonial forces estimated as in Home Areas for defense.

Combat airplanes	8,500	9,000	9,300	9,600
------------------	-------	-------	-------	-------

A breakdown of these forces into U. S. Army, Navy and Marines and British Army, Navy and Air Forces is available.

*[Signature]*

Chief of Staff.

SECRET-SECURITY

P15

11 February, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of the Navy.

At the request of the President, Mrs. Roosevelt took up the following matter with the Assistant Military and Naval Aides to the President with the suggestion that it be referred to the respective Departments.

Mrs. Roosevelt has had reports to the effect that many returning soldiers and sailors have been greatly disappointed at the lack of warmth and hospitality shown them by the general public. Led to believe that they are looked upon as the gallant saviors of the country, they find that if this be so, it is merely theoretical. Mrs. Roosevelt feels that this state of affairs is due to two elements:

- (a) The natural apathy of the general public toward the war and Service personnel.
- (b) Inability on the part of the public to recognize soldiers and sailors who have recently returned from active zones outside the country.

Mrs. Roosevelt recognizes the purpose of the service ribbons but feels that they are inadequate for the purpose in question.

She has been informed that Service personnel returning to Australia from service overseas are compelled to wear a distinctive arm-band. The general public has come to recognize this distinctive insignia with very beneficial results.

It is suggested that consideration be given toward making such an arm-band available to returning personnel for certain specific length of time after arrival. Due to well known self-pride and naturally modest disposition of many of our people, it is not believed that wearing the arm-band should be obligatory. It is felt that any action taken should be done jointly by the Army and the Navy.

It is requested that I be informed as to any action taken along the lines indicated. In the meantime Mrs. Roosevelt proposes to take what measures she can toward interesting the general public in our returning personnel.

Respectfully,

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

*WCB*

// 78

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. W. D. HASSETT.

I think the President would be glad to sign a letter something like the one enclosed.

WILSON BROWN.

*Bill*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

REAR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN

Dear Admiral Brown:

What do you think we should do about this request?

If you think the President should send a message will you prepare something suitable or will you suggest a good reason for turning it down if in your judgment it should be turned down.

*Pille*

WILLIAM D. HASSETT.

attachments-2

February 9, 1944.

Dear Mr. Curley,

I am very much interested and pleased to learn from your letter of January 30th that plans are in hand to organize a new post of the American Legion to be named for the late Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan, my former friend and Naval Aide. Admiral Callaghan's heroic record is too well known to require any further elaboration by me but on the eve of the organization of your post I am glad to join with you in doing honor to the memory of a gallant Naval officer. I wish you all a great deal of satisfaction in your post.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Frank Curley,  
Post Commander of The Disabled American  
Veterans of World War #1,  
San Francisco Chapter #3,  
2330 Larkin Street,  
San Francisco 9, California.

Ab

ccw

February 10, 1944.

Dear Governor Bacon,

I thank you very much for your letter of February 5th by which you have been kind enough to inform me of the plans of the Joint Service Clubs and Veterans Organizations of the State of Delaware to tender a testimonial dinner to General Thomas Holcomb at the Hotel Dupont in Wilmington on February 17th and to invite me to attend that dinner.

I regret exceedingly that I shall not be able to attend, but I send to you my very best wishes and congratulations to the State of Delaware in having sent to the Nation so distinguished a leader as General Holcomb has proved to be throughout his service in the United States Marine Corps. All of us who have served with him hold him in high esteem. We recognize that as Commandant of the Marine Corps during two years of war he has played a highly important part in the march to victory.

Sincerely yours,

FDR

The Honorable Walter W. Bacon,  
Governor of Delaware,  
Honorary Chairman,  
Committee for Testimonial Dinner  
to General Thomas Holcomb,  
Wilmington, Delaware.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN

The attached correspondence  
is respectfully referred for preparation  
of appropriate reply for the President's  
signature.

*William D. Hassett*

WILLIAM D. HASSETT

attachment

*message returned  
to White House  
filed By*

Pb  
NPM 2109

WB  
FROM: CINCPAC 112121 NCR 31441 12 FEB 44 GMP  
ACTION: COMINCH ROUTINE

REQUEST DESPATCH AUTHORIZATION RELEASE STORIES DEATH LIEUTENANT COLONEL A J DYESS AND PRIVATE FIRST CLASS STEPHEN HOPKINS, SON HARRY HOPKINS, BOTH OF FOURTH MARDIV X IF AFFIRMATIVE WILL ASSUME NEXT KIN NOTIFIED

COMINCH...ACT

WR...FILE

RK

ACTION: F-25

**RESTRICTED**

OPNAV-NCR-4

For information about this dispatch call Branch 5295 (Room 3628)

STANDARD FORM NO. 14A  
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT  
MARCH 10, 1925

# TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

FROM

The White House  
Washington

February 12, 1944.

Seaboard Railroad Station Agent,  
Ocala, Florida

Please deliver the following urgent message to Miss Adda Johnson passenger  
Seaboard Silver Meteor East Coast Train 43, car SA25, compartment G, for delivery to  
the Honorable Harry L. Hopkins

*delivered to miss Johnson  
at Jacksonville, Fla.  
1:25 pm, 2/12/44*

STANDARD FORM NO. 14A  
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT  
MARCH 10, 1926

# TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

FROM

The White House  
Washington

February 12, 1944.

~~The Honorable Harry H. Hopkins,~~

*I am terribly*

~~am~~ distressed to have to tell you that your son Stephen Hopkins private first class was killed in action at Kwajalein. We have no

details as yet other than that he was buried at sea. His mother has been notified. I am confident that when we get details we will

all be even prouder of him than ever. *I am thinking of you much.*

F.D.R.

*tel. to Mrs. Harry H. at 10:35 giving her the wording of the Pres. message and telling her now she can send a message to Mr. Hopkins*

79  
RESTRICTED

17 January 1944

*Admiral Brown*  
*File*  
*WFB*  
*WFB*  
White House

COPY NO. 22

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR INFORMATION NO. 180

REPORT ON POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN OCCUPIED EUROPE

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report from an O.S.S. representative in Switzerland, on political conditions and opinion in occupied Europe, is circulated for the information of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

F. B. ROYAL,

A. J. McFARLAND,

Joint Secretariat.

*Capt. Freeman's*

*Rather interesting.*  
*Highlights are*  
*marked in pencil*  
*Receipt*  
*etc*

ENCLOSURE

REPORT ON POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN OCCUPIED EUROPE  
(8 January 1944)

1. Viewing the situation from here, it is fair to say that the developments in the military and political field during the past few months have created the impression that Russia will be the dominating force in determining the future of Europe. This impression is widespread in the area which we might call Central and Western Europe -- an area which roughly extends westward of a line drawn from the mouth of the Danube to the mouth of the Vistula. I do not say that such an impression is correct: I merely state that it exists, that it is widespread in this large area, and that at the moment it must be reckoned with in judging the immediate course of events and the reactions of governments and peoples in this area.

2. The results of the Moscow and Teheran Conferences have rather strengthened than lessened this impression. These conferences have, it is true, dispelled the idea of a possible arrangement between Germany and Russia. That is recognized, as now Germany's last hope of even a compromise peace has vanished. Few in Germany, and practically no one outside Germany, believes that there is any possible way out for Germany. Some believe that the end may come within a few months and possibly even before Allied invasion of the continent or of the Balkans. Unless the Germans can stabilize their lines in Russia, almost anything might happen this winter, and there seems no immediate prospect of this stabilization.

3. Many factors, in addition to Russian military successes, have strengthened the conviction here that Russia will play the dominating role in Europe, and that the end of the war will not see a clean slate on which the victorious United Nations can construct a new Europe and a new world. There is a feeling that Russia already has laid her plans for the kind of Europe she wants, and that there is no force immediately at hand which can stop her in realizing her program. Among the factors which have led to this conclusion are the following:

a. The agreement with Benes which starts a system of alliances in Central Europe and which may affect any future settlement in the Danube Basin.

b. The believed connection between Tito and Moscow and also between Russia and important circles in Bulgaria, which together, they believe, will go far towards determining the future arrangements in the Balkans.

c. The belief that Russia is unwilling to reach an agreement with Finland, even on the basis of the 1941 treaty.

d. The belief that Russia has already laid plans for the kind of government it proposes to have in France and has laid the groundwork for assuring that this government be established.

e. The apparent intention of Russia alone to determine the size and shape of the future Poland. These impressions seem to have found confirmation in the partial excerpts from Smuts' speech, which is all that is available to the man in the street here. I do not state that these assumptions are correct. I merely state that they are fairly generally believed in this part of the world, and hence are influencing policy. And this is something which we must take into account.

RESTRICTED

4. Further, we must take into account that the dynamic, purposeful policy which Russia is following finds no direct answering counterpart on the side of the other United Nations insofar as Europe is concerned. In general it is believed that we desire a tabula rasa after the collapse of Germany on which to build a peace after a considerable period of trial during a prolonged armistice; that in general we desire non-militaristic and democratic government in the various European countries, and that we have plans -- information about which unfortunately has not yet reached here in any great detail -- for assuring the food supply and the economic rehabilitation of countries which fit into the framework of a new peaceful democratic Europe.

5. So far, however, the Western powers have not given dynamic, spiritual form to the statements of their aims and objectives as regards Europe, certainly nothing that has moved the great masses of the people as they were twenty-five years ago by the idealism of President Wilson. Rather England and America, in the minds of the man in the street, have sometimes been associated with forces which outwardly appear to be reactionary, such as the Darlans in France and Victor Emmanuel and Badoglio in Italy. A great social revolution is going on in Europe.

This is inevitable after the earthquake which has passed over it in the past four years. The Russians rather than the Western powers have caught the imagination of the peoples who have suffered from this earthquake more than the Western powers.

Added to this, the hardships and sufferings from the bombings, which naturally tend to create radicalism and throw the people toward Russia rather than toward the West, have been largely attributed to the Anglo-Saxon powers. It is often overlooked that these bombings and the air supremacy of the Western powers is in no small measure responsible for the Russian victories and Germany's decline.

6. Despite what I have just said, fundamentally Western Europe does not desire Russian domination. There are well over 200,000,000 people living west of the line from the mouth of the Danube to the mouth of the Vistula, among whom only a small percentage are Slavs, and even the terrors of the last four years have not destroyed entirely their traditions or the desire to rebuild them free from domination by the great Slav power on the East. If there are periods of Communism following the war in this western part of the world, they will probably be of a local national character and not based on the particular desire to join with Russia if there is any alternative.

7. The situation I have described is leading to a sort of fatalism which is pervading Germany, her satellites, and some of the occupied territories, particularly northern Italy and to some extent France. It also accounts for the fact that even in countries like Rumania and Hungary the opposition to the German alliance has somewhat lessened, rather than increased, during the past few months; and that in Germany there are few signs of even such clandestine opposition organization as under the Gestapo terror might be possible.

8. This all may change if Anglo-Saxon forces are in Europe or in the Balkans, or if there is some evidence from Russia to indicate whether she will agree to fix a limit to her claims of territorial or political domination.

9. After the fall of Napoleon, Western Europe had a fear of Russia somewhat comparable to that of today. It proved groundless. In the same way the present-day apprehension of Russia may turn out to be mistaken. Some evidence on which such hopes could be grounded would hasten the end of the war and would give more hope on which to start the work of reconstruction.

79

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

WB.  
CW

January 8, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

I have blocked out the attached proposed letter to General Hurley as a reminder for the President.

When he sends a letter to General Hurley I suggest that it would be well to send a copy to the State Department, if the President wishes it done.

WILSON BROWN.

PROPOSED DRAFT

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Dear Pat,

I am given to understand by the State Department that the Foreign Minister of Iran is very much perturbed about the stories the American press and radio have carried about a reported plot to assassinate the various Heads of State during the conferences at Teheran in December. I wish you would explain to the Foreign Minister that there was never any question of suspicion about any Iranian, but that the report of threatened violence involved German agents who were believed to have entered Iran without authority. As you know, my move from the American Legation was made primarily in order not to expose any of the conferees to the risk of attack by Axis agents while coming to visit me. I hope that you can put at rest any misunderstanding about the incident. I do not wish to make any further statement to the American press about it as such action would only increase general attention to the matter.

I hope that you may be making fine progress in your work.

With all good wishes,

Cordially yours,

Major General Patrick J. Hurley, U.S.N.

(Via State Department)

R3

December 28, 1943.

Dear William,

The President directs me to thank you for your letter to him of November 11th which has been slow in reaching him because of his recent expedition to the Mediterranean. He is much interested to learn of your active career in the Navy and regrets to learn of your hospitalization. The President directs me to say that he saw your father at Hyde Park during the holidays and that everything is going well at the cottage. He wishes you all success in your new assignment.

Very truly yours,

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

William Bie, MM2c, U.S.N.,  
U.S. Receiving Station,  
Navy Yard R, General Detail,  
South Carolina.

P16

**CONFIDENTIAL**

(Excerpt from Admiral Leahy's Memorandum to the President.)

1. On Friday, 24 December 1943, it is estimated that there will be, ashore and afloat, a total of 3,784,800 members of the armed forces (officers and enlisted personnel) of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marines and the Coast Guard serving in overseas areas or beyond the continental limits of the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL *716*

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

20 December 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR - Admiral William D. Leahy.

Reference: a. Memorandum request from Naval Aide to the President (copy attached).

1. There is submitted for your information and possible use certain details in substantiation of the statement prepared for your presentation to the President on this subject.

2. A breakdown of personnel by services, that it is estimated will be overseas as of 24 December 1943, is as follows:

Army	-	2,528,000
Navy	-	1,066,800
Marines	-	166,000
Coast Guard	-	<u>24,000</u>
Total		3,784,800 *

\*Includes officers and enlisted personnel (male and female).

Memorandum for the President from General Marshall dated 23 November 1943, estimated at 3,961,000 the service personnel overseas by 1 January 1944 with 3,631,000 as of November 23rd.

3. The effect of recent orders on priorities for landing craft is indicated in terms of aggregate increased completion by shipyards as follows:

Type	<u>1 May 1944</u>	<u>1 January 1945</u>	<u>1 March 1945</u>
LST's	21	175	199
LCI(L)'s	37	178	183
LCT	88	225	-

*James H. Royal*

Secretary,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Regraded Unclassified

P16

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Admiral Leahy.

The President requests that the Joint Staff inform him as early as possible next week and in time to be used in his Friday talk, the total number of men of the armed forces overseas in all areas outside of the continental United States -- Army, Navy, Marines and Coast Guard. He does not care about having it broken down into areas or into particular services, but does wish a fairly accurate total.

He also wishes the Joint Staff, in consultation with the Maritime Commission, to inform him how many more landing craft we will be able to deliver in the Mediterranean and United Kingdom by April 1944 than had been planned two months ago -- in other words how much have recent orders about priorities for landing craft affected expected deliveries overseas in April?

Wilson Brown,  
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,  
Naval Aide to the President.

P

Admiral Glassford's letter to the President, dated  
9-28-43, re report on activities of the American Mission  
to Dakar, F.W.A.

See President's File L - Logistics, General.

19  
**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

File  
WS  
September 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: FAECT Organizational Activities  
in the Radiation Laboratory.

1. There has been a marked increase recently in union organizing activity in the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California in Berkeley which is engaged upon one of the most important phases of the work on uranium fission. This organizational activity is being carried on by the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (CIO) Local No. 25. In the furtherance of their organizational activity this union is assembling lists of the scientific and technical personnel of the laboratory, and necessarily acquiring considerable information with respect to the work being carried on there.

2. The mid organizer of Local No. 25, Rose Segure, and the local FAECT International Vice-President, David E. Adelson, are definitely Communists. They are close associates of and receive the constant counsel of one Steve Nelson, who is a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and the head of the Communist Party in Alameda County, California. Nelson induced Joseph Weinberg, a member of the staff of the Radiation Laboratory, to furnish him secret information concerning the work with the announced intention of transmitting it to the U.S.S.R. and it is believed he has done so.

3. Lists of the persons employed upon this Project are classified as secret because information as to the nature and extent of the work could be deduced therefrom. The security of the work has already been compromised by the activities of the union. Continued union activities will be extremely dangerous not only to security but to the speedy completion of the work and it is unquestionable that the union organization will be used to further espionage activity of agents of a foreign power.

4. It is urgently recommended that at the earliest opportunity you have a personal conference with Mr. Philip Murray, the head of the CIO, and request him in the strongest terms to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the FAECT immediately cease, for the duration of the war, all union activity whatsoever with respect to the Radiation Laboratory, University of California, at Berkeley. This should include disbanding the laboratory organization of Local No. 25.

- 1 -

**SECRET**

Regraded Unclassified

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (continued)

There is no objection, however, to employees of the laboratory retaining membership in the union, provided it is in an <sup>inert</sup> inactive status during the war.

Respectfully yours,

*Henry W. Stevenson*

Secretary of War.

*Unless this can be at once stopped, I think  
the situation very alarming*

*HTS*

- 2 -

**SECRET**

8-11  
P9  
August 11, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a draft of statement, about which I spoke to you over the telephone this morning, for you to give out in connection with the announcement as to relations with the French Committee of National Liberation.

If you reach agreement in your talks with the Prime Minister with regard to the relations with the French Committee, I do hope you will have publicity withheld long enough for us to inform the Soviet Government before announcement in order to fill out our commitments to that Government.

PA/D:JCD:ACK

**Statement by the President on the Occasion  
of Announcing Establishment of Relations  
between the Governments of Great Britain  
and the United States with the French  
Committee of National Liberation.**

The Governments of Great Britain and the United States have today made an announcement setting forth their relations with the French Committee of National Liberation subject to certain understandings. It is my firm hope that this Committee will demonstrate a single-minded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the French people. Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves.

From the outset this Government has given military equipment and assistance to the French forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been intensified since the landing of our forces in North Africa. In recent weeks arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the defeat of the Axis and the liberation of France.

This

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation for all other matters is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of the French people and the United Nations and will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent in promoting the entire French and United Nations cause, I am agreeing to conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unify itself and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political objections.

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND  
THE PRIME MINISTER

The President and the Prime Minister have felt that the time has come to announce that Great Britain and the United States accept relations with the French Committee of National Liberation in the continuation of the mutual war effort against the Axis powers.

From the outset military equipment and assistance has been given to the French armed forces wherever they might be engaged in resistance to the Axis. This assistance has been constantly growing since the landing of British and American forces in North Africa. In recent weeks, arrangements have been concluded which will insure that French forces have adequate modern military equipment effectively to participate in the liberation of France.

It is our firm hope that the French Committee of National Liberation will demonstrate a singleminded purpose to represent and further the broad interests of the overseas French. Our arrangements for dealing with the Committee are made with the full knowledge that over 90 percent of the French people as a whole are still under the domination of the enemy and are unable freely to express themselves. Only the people of France itself can determine the form of their future government and make the choice of their future leaders. In making this decision, they must be wholly untrammled.

This limited relationship with the French Committee of National Liberation is based on both the hope and the assumption that the Committee will achieve unity in support of the cause of liberating France from the German and Italian yokes. We trust that it will keep out of its activities any factional or personal political considerations.

In an earnest effort to go to the utmost practicable extent, at this time, in promoting this great cause we are agreeing to the conditional acceptance of the Committee, as already stated, for trial in any efforts to further unity itself, and to free itself completely from any still existing factional and personal political problems.

-----



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM

1. Clearing up of manner of dealing with political situation in Italy.

It is necessary to set up some machinery for clearing information and questions arising from the development of the Italian situation, whether this is to be done through the Civil Affairs Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, by correspondence between the State Department and the Foreign Office, or whether it is to be dealt with by direct communication between the President and Mr. Churchill.

2. Question of whether "Conditions of Surrender" in the case of Italy are going to be divided into

- (a) Military terms, and
- (b) Political and economic terms,

or whether all the terms, military and other, are to be combined in one comprehensive document as desired by the British.

3. Clearing up of manner of relationship with French Committee of National Liberation.

Decision on this question should also include, if the decision is in the affirmative, the character and designation of the representation of the two Governments near the French Committee at Algiers.

4. Decision as to whether a joint statement by the President and Mr. Churchill should be made with respect to the German situation similar to the joint statement made by them with regard to the Italian situation a few weeks ago.

Op-16-FA-2

Division of Naval Intelligence  
August 11, 1943MIDDLE EAST

## I - POLITICAL

The Middle East comprises the countries of Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and numerous minor principalities on and adjacent to the Arabian peninsula (Turkey is not included in this memorandum). All of these countries are British spheres of influence or protectorates with the exception of Syria and Lebanon (French mandate). Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran were independent until the outbreak of war.

EGYPT is ruled by a king and a constitutional parliamentary government. At the outbreak of war in 1939 British forces garrisoned the country and took over communications and certain other essential services in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of 1936. The King has been sympathetic to the Axis and was almost forced to abdicate early in 1942 when strong British action forced in the pro-Allied Wafd government, still in power. The British Ambassador has maintained his strong position and there is no indication that Egypt will become a serious problem for the duration of the war.

PALESTINE is a British mandate and under the British High Commissioner, Sir H. A. Mac Michael. Arab and Jewish communities have some semi-legislative and administrative functions. Civil strife shook the country from 1936 to 1939, when both sides recognized the futility of straining the patience of a Britain-at-war. Hebrews and Moslems have meanwhile been building up arsenals, training men and planning campaigns for the end of the World War. Both sides are broken by factional disputes but it is certain that at the end of the present war they will renew their struggle with redoubled energy unless strong British garrisons are maintained. There is little hope for a compromise settlement of grievances.

SYRIA and LEBANON are two separate countries formed from the Turkish Empire at the end of the last war and assigned French mandate. (Lebanon comprises the coastal area from Palestine to a point slightly north of Tripoli). Both countries were to be granted independence as soon as possible. After British and Free French forces drove out the Vichy

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

government in 1941 these countries were virtually ruled by Free French decree. British pressure, backed by the U. S., has forced the promise of independence to both countries, but this grant has yet to be implemented. Elections are about to take place. The present situation is confused by wholesale political chicanery. It is evident that the French will not release their hold completely unless actually driven out. The French High Commissioner is Jean Helleu. The principal British representative is General Spears, while the Consul General at Beirut, Mr. George Wadsworth, is the American spokesman.

TRANSJORDAN is a poor, barren country lying east of Palestine and assigned to Amir Abdullah in 1921. He still rules under a mandate assigned to Great Britain. Abdullah has consistently seen his interests as tied to those of Great Britain. The Transjordan Frontier Force is British officered and controlled.

SAUDI ARABIA is an independent kingdom formed and ruled by Ibn Saud, an absolute monarch. He has accepted British subsidy at times, but is independent of any, even indirect, control. He has been consistently pro-British for he has believed in ultimate British victory throughout the war, and has never toyed with Axis overtures. However he has never allowed England to get economic footholds in the country, and has welcomed U. S. companies instead. Relations with this country are extremely cordial. There are no dissident or rebellious factions in the country.

IRAQ was assigned to Great Britain as a mandate after the last war but soon won its independence and became a constitutional monarchy. Great Britain retained control of the port of Basra, its air base at Habbaniyah, and held a few other concessions. The country was occupied in 1941 and has recently joined the United Nations by declaring war on the Axis. The present king is a minor (8 years old) and his power exercised by a Regency. In principal matters of foreign policy, internal security, communications, etc., the British Ambassador, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, exercised a lenient but definite control.

IRAN is a constitutional monarchy. The present Shah was placed on the throne by the British and Russians who occupied the country and deposed Shah Reza Pahlevi in 1941. The Russians occupy and control the country north of Teheran and the British garrison the south-western section, where the principal supply-to-Russia routes lie. The American Army operates all Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf and roads and railroad north to

Teheran. The central government has been wracked by internal troubles since 1941 and its control of the country varies from weak to non-existent. Whole provinces have been in open revolt for many months at a time. Iran is made up of a number of large, explosive tribal elements. It is bitter against British and Russian imperialism and there is much pro-Axis sympathy. The country may be the scene of wholesale strife requiring large bodies of United Nations troops to control.

The Minor States of the Middle East lie principally along the coast of the Arabian peninsula. Of these, Aden, Oman, Muscat, Bahrein, Kuwait, Qatar and the Yemen are the most important. Aside from the Yemen, all are under British control, ruled by local sheikhs, and insignificant economically. Cyprus is a British colony largely administered by the crown-appointed governor. Once openly rebellious for union with Greece, it has cooperated loyally since Greece entered the war.

## II - ECONOMIC

PORTS - The principal ports of Egypt are Alexandria, Port Said and the numerous facilities in the neighborhood of Suez. Alexandria is large and deep but handicapped by antiquated facilities. Suez was the principal supply point for the Western Desert campaign and the many docks recently built near the southern end of the canal can handle enormous quantities of goods.

Haifa and Beirut are the only deep water ports along the eastern coast. Both are small harbors but have modern equipment. Latakia, Tripoli and Jaffa-Tel Aviv are subsidiary, lighter and coastal shipping points.

All the ports at the head of the Persian Gulf have expanded enormously to handle British Army and Russian supplies. Basra has been used principally by the British while Khorram Shahr and Bandar Shapur are almost exclusively for Russian transit.

The only other ports of any importance are Aden (bunkers and routing), Bahrein (oil), Bushire (trucks for Russia), Famagusta (Cyprus supply) and Abadan (oil).

RAILWAYS - Egyptian communications all run north and south along the Nile. The railroad in standard gauge and largely double tracked in the Delta area. It crosses the canal by a new, swing bridge and runs north along the coast to connect with the old standard gauge Turkish railway. This, in turn, follows the Turkish-Syrian boundary then runs along the Euphrates to Baghdad. There are minor narrow gauge lines of small capacity in Palestine, Syria and Transjordan which feed the major important towns. In addition to the standard gauge Baghdad railway, Iraq has meter gauge from Basra to Baghdad and points north-east. The principal Iranian line of communication is the standard gauge line from Bandar Shapur and Khorram Shahr north to Teheran, most of the way to the Russian supply center of Tabriz and to the Caspian.

ROADS - Palestine and Syria have, in general, excellent modern roads. There are several trans-desert routes to Baghdad, and one is completely paved. Roads in Iran are principally NE-SW and must cross tremendous mountain barriers. They are very poor in spite of excessive labors to keep them in shape for Lend-Lease supplies. The only real motor route in the Arabian peninsula is that from the Red Sea to the Gulf via Jeddah and Riyadh.

INLAND WATERWAYS - The Nile and the Tigris (to Baghdad) handle immense barge traffic.

OIL - Three million tons of oil are refined at Haifa and another million at Suez. In the Persian Gulf Abadan produces ten million tons and Bahrein about one and one-half million, making a Middle East total of about 15,000,000 tons annually. There are minor refineries, with insignificant output, at Tripoli, Kermanshah and Ras Tanura. Suez is supplied with crude by tanker from Ras Gharib and Hurghada on the Red Sea. The Haifa refinery is fed by pipeline from Kirkuk and by pipeline to Tripoli, thence by tanker. Abadan crude comes from three major fields in south-western Iran. Bahrein is fed from wells on the island and the adjacent mainland. No lubricating oil is produced. Aviation gasoline is refined only at Abadan (recently increased to about 800,000 tons, annual capacity).

MINERALS - Principal minerals (excluding oil) are phosphates in Egypt, cupreous iron pyrites on Cyprus, Dead Sea deposits in Palestine, and gold in Saudi Arabia, which is worked on a small scale.

MANUFACTURES - The only country in the Middle East with industries of any importance is Palestine. Here there has been considerable development of hydroelectric power. Principal products are cement, pharmaceuticals, processed foods, chemicals, and building materials.

Egypt has a growing textile industry but little else other than the usual soap, cigarette, food processing and minor chemical production for local needs.

Syria and the Lebanon have a silk culture of increasing war-time importance. There is some textile industry. Its power resources are being slowly developed.

Neither Iraq or Iran have important manufactures although both countries have been slowly developing small plants to meet local, essential needs.

Food - With the exception of the Arabian Peninsula states, the countries of the Middle East are barely self-sufficient in essential food products. Whenever war or other disaster strikes, experience has taught the natives to hoard, and an acute situation immediately arises, bringing starvation to whole areas. During the past three years the most acute food shortages have occurred in Syria and Iran, with some starvation in upper Iraq. The blame of this has undoubtedly been poor governmental control of hoarders and disrupted communications. The Middle East Supply Council has, when possible, shipped wheat to the have-nots and prevented wholesale starvation. Rice has been regularly imported to Arabia.

COST-OF-LIVING - Throughout the Middle East scarcity has brought the inevitable increases in prices and staples have gone up several hundred to a thousand percent since 1939. Luxury goods like cars have occasionally sold for astronomical sums. Under British guidance excessive inflation has been averted.

### III - NAVAL

The Levant Command of the Royal Navy has its main base and headquarters at Alexandria. Commanding Officer is Acting Admiral Sir John Henry Dacnes Cunningham, K.C.B., M.V.O. Under him are the subsidiary commands of

Op-16-FA-2  
(MIDDLE EAST - cont'd.)

Division of Naval Intelligence  
August 11, 1943

Red Sea (Vice-Admiral R. H. C. Hallifax, C. B.), Palestinian ports, Cyrenaican ports etc.

The present strength of the Levant Command is 21 destroyers, 13 submarines, 5 sloops, 8 corvettes and a considerable number of minor and auxiliary craft.

The Persian Gulf is not under the Levant Command but is somewhat loosely affiliated with the Eastern Fleet (H.Q. Kilindini). The Senior Naval Officer of the Persian Gulf is Commodore C. F. Hammill (ret.). The Persian Gulf has only minor craft attached.

#### IV - MILITARY

The Middle East has been defined by the United Nations High Command as a British operational area.

Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East is General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., with Headquarters at Cairo. Under him are a large number of commands including units of the 8th Army stationed in Libya and Egypt, the 9th Army located in Syria and Cyprus, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Command, Aden Command, Palestine Command, Cyrenaican Command. The total number of troops stationed in the Middle East Command is around 775,000. The latter figure includes, in addition to British and Dominion troops, various Allied forces such as Greeks, Fighting French, Belgians, Yugoslavs, etc.

The headquarters of the 9th Army, one of the largest forces in the Middle East Command, is located near Beirut. Commanding officer is Lt.-Gen. William George Holmes, C.B., D.S.O.

Separate from the Middle East Command is the Persia-Iraq Command with Headquarters at Baghdad, Iraq, and commanded by Gen. Sir Henry Royds Pownall, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C. Approximately 240,000 troops are in this command including well-armed Polish Divisions. Two more Polish divisions are to form. The most important unit under the Persia-Iraq Command is the 10th Army whose commanding officer is Lt.-Gen. E. P. Quinan, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

V - AIR

All Allied Air Forces in the Mediterranean area are under the command of Air Chief Marshal, Sir Arthur Tedder, K.C.B., with headquarters at Algiers. One of the commands under him is that of the Middle East with headquarters at Cairo. The Air Officer-in-Charge, Middle East Command of the Royal Air Force, is Air Chief Marshal, Sir Sholto Douglas, K.C.B., M.C., D.F.C. Subsidiary commands under Air Chief Marshal Douglas are those of Iraq, Levant, Egypt, Aden, and Western Desert Air Forces.

The present strength of the Royal Air Force in the Middle East Command is 3,265 planes of which 1,350 are immediately serviceable.

VI - UNITED STATES FORCES AND REPRESENTATIVES

ARMY

The ranking U. S. Army officer in the Middle East is Major-General Brereton who commands, in particular, the 9th U. S. Air Force. At last report approximately 17,000 men and 700 planes (350 serviceable) constituted the 9th Air Force.

The other important U. S. Army project in the Middle East is in the Persian Gulf where there are around 30,000 engineer and service troops concerned with developing and maintaining the Persian supply route to Russia. These troops are commanded by Major-General Connolly.

U.S. NAVAL AND ARMY INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATIVES

1. Joint Intelligence Collection Agency, Cairo.

Army Head: Col. Osmun

Navy Head: Capt. T. A. Thornton, U.S.N. R .

2. U.S. Naval Liaison Office with Levant Fleet:  
Capt. James H. Foskett, U.S.N.
3. U.S. Naval Attache, Cairo:  
Lt.-Com. John T. Harding, U.S.N.R.
4. U.S. Naval Liaison Officers:  
Suez: Lt. R. R. Johnston, U.S.N.R.  
Aden: Lt.-Com. Ralph B. Curren, U.S.N.R.  
Port Said: Lt. E. F. Skinner, U.S.N.R.  
Basra: Lt.-Com. Wilfred MacDonald, U.S.N.R.

STATE DEPARTMENT REPRESENTATIVES

1. U.S. Minister to Egypt:  
Alexander C. Kirk
2. U.S. Consul-General, Beirut:  
George Wadsworth
3. U.S. Minister to Iran:  
Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr.
4. U.S. Minister to Iraq:  
Thomas M. Wilson
5. U.S. Consul-General, Palestine:  
Lowell C. Pinkerton

1  
F/Pres

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 10, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

The position of Ethiopia with respect to an outlet to the sea, to which you refer in your memorandum of August 4, is one which commands much sympathy and demands a solution, but there is serious doubt in our minds as to the practicability of solving the problem by turning French Somaliland and its port of Djibouti over to the Ethiopians. I feel certain that the French would not be at all disposed to relinquish their hold on this territory even if offered sizeable compensation.

It is true that French Somaliland has never been a source of revenue to the French Government, but on the other hand, the colony possesses some significance in the French Empire as a counter-weight to Aden and as a French port of call for French ships en route to and from Madagascar and the French Far Eastern possessions. As the colony has been in the possession of the French for eighty years it seems probable that this time element will

also

The President,

The White House.

also be taken into account by the French in weighing their interest in and title to the territory. Taken all in all, therefore, and considering particularly the jealous pride of the French in their possessions, including even this desolate and torrid bit of land, I cannot avoid the conviction that French Somaliland would not be relinquished by the French except under the heaviest of pressure and then only with the most violent reactions.

I do feel, however, that the French should be obliged to grant Ethiopia ready access to the sea through the colony and the port of Djibouti. While Djibouti is nominally a free port for Ethiopian trade, it has not been so in fact, for the French have insisted on collecting various duties and taxes on products in transit to and from Ethiopia and on such a scale as to place a serious burden on Ethiopian imports and exports. Proposals made by French and other commercial organizations that Djibouti be made a genuine free port have always been rejected by the colonial authorities in Paris on the grounds that without such revenue a subsidy to the colony from the French Government would be necessary to compensate for the loss of half the annual budget of the colony. In effect, therefore, a considerable part of the cost of administering French Somaliland has been borne by the Ethiopians. Any protests to the contrary notwithstanding, the French should be required to grant a genuinely free port status to Djibouti  
for

also be taken into account by the French in weighing their interest in and title to the territory. Taken all in all, therefore, and considering particularly the jealous pride of the French in their possessions, including even this desolate and torrid bit of land, I cannot avoid the conviction that French Somaliland would not be relinquished by the French except under the heaviest of pressure and then only with the most violent reactions.

I do feel, however, that the French should be obliged to grant Ethiopia ready access to the sea through the colony and the port of Djibouti. While Djibouti is nominally a free port for Ethiopian trade, it has not been so in fact, for the French have insisted on collecting various duties and taxes on products in transit to and from Ethiopia and on such a scale as to place a serious burden on Ethiopian imports and exports. Proposals made by French and other commercial organizations that Djibouti be made a genuine free port have always been rejected by the colonial authorities in Paris on the grounds that without such revenue a subsidy to the colony from the French Government would be necessary to compensate for the loss of half the annual budget of the colony. In effect, therefore, a considerable part of the cost of administering French Somaliland has been borne by the Ethiopians. Any protests to the contrary notwithstanding, the French should be required to grant a genuinely free port status to Djibouti  
for

for Ethiopian trade and free transit privileges through the colony.

An accompanying move should be the establishment of an equitable rate structure on the Franco-Ethiopian Railroad between Djibouti and Addis Ababa. This railway, a strictly commercial enterprise, is owned and operated (under normal conditions) by a French company. The French Government has held none of the shares and has derived no direct revenue from the railway, although the railway has undoubtedly been of considerable political interest to the French Government. The Government of Ethiopia, on the other hand, owned at the time of the Italian invasion 25 percent of the share capital and the Emperor was reported to have held, in addition, 13.6 percent of the shares, or between them a total of 38.6 percent, and these shares are understood to be still owned by the Government and the Emperor. In the past the immediate financial interest of the Ethiopian Government and of the Emperor in a high rate structure seems to have been more compelling, considering the large dividends paid by the company, than any interest they may have had in facilitating the trade and development of the country through lower rates.

As you have pointed out in your memorandum, the interior of Ethiopia can never be developed until cheap transportation is provided, and therefore future action with respect to the railway must be postulated on the willingness of the

Ethiopian

Ethiopian Government and the Emperor to subordinate their positions as stockholders in the railway to their role as agents responsible for the development of Ethiopian economy as a whole. By being a party to the charging of excessive freight rates the Government of Ethiopia and the Emperor have, of course, though perhaps unwittingly, lent their hand to the most uneconomical means, in the long run, of raising revenues for the State. It is believed, however, that the Emperor now recognizes this truth, and if this is the case then the problem of the railway might be solved either through the acquisition by the Ethiopian Government of all the company's shares, which would doubtless have to be financed from abroad, or by securing control over the rates and finances of the company by public utility legislation similar to that which exists in almost every other country and thereby limit the profit of the railway to a reasonable return.

While the suggestions outlined above, if carried into effect, might be expected to alleviate greatly the economic isolation of Ethiopia, it seems certain that such action would not suffice to meet completely Ethiopian aspirations. Ethiopia wishes an outlet to the sea under its own sovereignty and has repeatedly stated its hopes in this regard. The surrounding ring of territories has constituted a  
potential

potential menace to Ethiopia, and the Ethiopians are particularly anxious to break this ring by the acquisition of Eritrea. We believe that Ethiopia could present a sound case for the restoration of that territory, or at least a part of it, since it is closely linked to Ethiopia by historic, ethnic, religious and linguistic ties, although in eastern Eritrea there are some small minority elements.

Eritrea has two sizeable ports in Massawa and Assab. From Massawa to Asmara there is a narrow gauge railway, and from Asmara to Addis Ababa, a distance of 758 miles, there is a good highway. The road from Assab to Addis Ababa, a distance of 591 miles, is reported to have also been excellently constructed, but it will require considerable repair. Economically, considering the absence of railways to the interior, these two ports are not as satisfactory outlets to the sea as is Djibouti with its railway to Addis Ababa. But under the sovereignty of Ethiopia they would, in the estimation of the Ethiopians, eliminate in large measure the existing political and economic threat against Ethiopia by powers whose colonial possessions now entirely surround it.

It is extremely doubtful that Ethiopia would accept any form of trusteeship, as suggested in your memorandum, except under duress. The Ethiopians are a proud people and will insist upon complete sovereignty. They are  
fretting

fretting now under the terms of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of January 31, 1942, which is construed by the Ethiopians as circumscribing their sovereignty, and they have expressed their determination not to renew the agreement, which will expire on January 31, 1944, on the present terms.

The Ethiopian Government does, however, wish to obtain the service of foreign advisers, particularly American advisers, to guide and advise the Government along enlightened and progressive channels. It has requested the Department's assistance in obtaining the services of such advisers. It is our desire to comply with this request, and we are now endeavoring to arrange to send an agricultural mission, a highway engineering mission and a minerals mission to Ethiopia, at the expense of this Government, to assist the Government of Ethiopia in the rehabilitation of the country and to enable it to make a greater contribution to the winning of the war, in line with the hope expressed on behalf of the Emperor by the Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance, Mr. Yilma Deressa, in various communications to the Department.

Under the present Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement the Emperor is under the obligation of consulting with the British Government before appointing foreign advisers, but it is understood that, when interpellated on this point, Mr. Eden stated that no objections would be raised to the  
appointment


appointment of American advisers.

The requests of the Ethiopian Government for the services of American missions and advisers and for material and financial assistance have undoubtedly been directed to us because of the belief of the Ethiopians in the disinterestedness of the United States in gaining any material or political advantage in Ethiopia and also in response to the generally accepted belief that the United States has indicated its willingness to help foreign peoples who have been released, or will be released, from Axis domination. Any advisers sponsored or sent by the Department will be competent and experienced in their profession and of personal characteristics which will reflect respect and credit on the United States. With adequate and enlightened assistance, given conditions of internal security, the Ethiopian Government should be able to place Ethiopia on a sound, progressive footing without resorting to the necessity of handing out disadvantageous concessions to the citizens of any nation, and without the need of foreign trustees, which, as previously pointed out, Ethiopia is unlikely to accept except under compulsion, even though the purpose of the trustees would be to protect and aid the country.

It may be of interest to note in the latter connection that the question has been raised by the British  
whether

whether a trustee could function fully as a disinterested guardian without withdrawing completely from trade and investments in the country over which it exercises its trusteeship. (Oliver Stanley in the House of Commons, July 13, 1943). If such is the case the possibility of any nation being willing to accept a trusteeship over another nation or a colony would seem to be rather remote. The lending of advisers, on the other hand, would impose no such limitations. An additional advantage is that the advisers, who would be bound by honor to work for the just interests of the local Government alone, would have the confidence of that Government because they would not have been imposed upon it.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

F/P/MS  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

In regard to the situation in Ethiopia, I will have an opportunity to talk this over with the Prime Minister of Great Britain when I next see him. If there is anything else you want me to take up with him, let me know before August twelfth.

I am very much of the opinion that the Ethiopian Government should own the railroad from Addis Ababa to Djibouti. I am credibly informed that this railroad, before the war, earned 40 to 50% a year on its cost, and that the interior of Ethiopia can never be developed until it gets cheap transportation.

Also, I am inclined to the thought that Djibouti has never been a source of income or pride to the French. In this war the French and the French armed forces in Djibouti held out for a long time against the British. I do not think they have earned the right to keep that little colony — but, on the other hand, the United Nations might afford to pay something to the French in the form of relief and rehabilitation of

WASHINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

France itself as the quid pro quo for France turning it over to Ethiopia.

What Ethiopia needs is three trustees to see that she is not robbed and that no one nation gets special advantages. Such a trusteeship could hire good management of various enterprises without handing out concessions.

F. D. R.

E/PMS

Ph  
falan

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to the attached Aide Memoire which Mr. Yilma Deressa, the Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance and delegate to the recent Food Conference, handed to you during the course of his interview with you on July 13, it is true, as stated by Mr. Deressa, that following the occupation of Addis Ababa by British forces in April 1941, Ethiopia was administered by the British as enemy occupied territory. While the Emperor was permitted to return to Addis Ababa in May of that year his field of action was closely restricted by the British during the prolonged period of negotiations leading up to the signing of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement and Military Convention on January 31, 1942, and on the face of available evidence the British during this period administered the affairs of the country with a heavy hand.

However,

The President,  
The White House.

However, in extenuation of the British action, it is well to point out that Ethiopia was at that time in a state of anarchy, with large bands of tribesmen roaming the country bent on robbery and destruction, while military operations against the Italians were not concluded until the following November. The authority of the Emperor was in doubt, or completely repudiated, over wide areas. Military security, as well as protection for the large numbers of Italian civilians and other white residents of the country, doubtless demanded, in the face of the prevailing troubled conditions, a firm hold on the situation.

Nevertheless, the Emperor and his immediate followers were impatient with the refusal of the British to turn over the policing and administration of the country to the Ethiopians. This impatience seems to have been brusquely brushed aside by the British authorities. Perhaps the Emperor was, as the British contended, overestimating his strength and his capacity to restore order and reestablish effective government, but less high-handedness and more tact on the part of the British would probably have avoided the strained relations which soon rose between the Ethiopians and the British, a condition which

which has become, it seems, more poisoned as time has passed. It appears, however, that this trend has been due more to the reportedly low quality of the officials which the British appointed to fill the posts provided for in the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement than to any harsh policy of the British Government itself toward Ethiopia. The fact that the fiscal position of the country was in a state of collapse when the British took over and that under the terms of the Agreement the British have made substantial grants of money to enable the Emperor to re-establish his administration seems not to have made the Ethiopians any more tolerant of the presence of these British officials. In general, it does not appear that the terms of the Agreement were onerous, having regard to the special circumstances existing in Ethiopia. It is thus not so much in the actual terms of the Agreement as in the distorted and vexatious application by local officials of those terms which is so distasteful to the Ethiopians.

The Ethiopians are therefore determined, as the Emperor and the several cabinet officials made abundantly clear to our Consul at Asmara prior to the closing on

June 1

June 1 of our office there, to rid the country as soon as possible of British personnel. This explains why the Emperor is so anxious to prepare for the replacement of the present Agreement, as provided for in Article XII, which reads, in part:

"The present Agreement shall enter in force as from this day's date. (January 31, 1942.) It shall remain in force until replaced by a Treaty for which His Majesty the Emperor may wish to make proposals. If it is not so replaced within two years from this date, it may thereafter be terminated at any time by either Party giving three months' notice to the other to this effect."

As pointed out in the Aide Memoire by Mr. Deressa, the Emperor desires the assistance of an American jurist to assist him in drafting a new treaty, and in line with a previously expressed request by Mr. Deressa an effort is being made by the Department to find a suitable candidate for the position of legal adviser to the Ethiopian Government. Consideration has already been given to two persons and a third is under consideration now. The appeal of the Emperor, as expressed by Mr. Deressa, for the "diplomatic cooperation" of this Government in connection with the drafting and negotiation of a new Anglo-Ethiopian treaty would seem to imply a desire on the part of Ethiopia that we use our good office with the British

in


in gaining terms more satisfactory to the Ethiopians in any future treaty which might be signed. Possibly an expression of our interest in the matter to the British Ambassador at the appropriate time might be desirable.

As regards the desire of the Ethiopians to obtain a direct outlet to the sea, to which Mr. Deressa also refers in his Aide Memoire, this aspiration is understandable, since under existing conditions Ethiopia is entirely dependent upon the mercy of the British and the French for the conduct of the nation's foreign trade. This, of course, places serious obstacles in the way of Ethiopia's economic independence and prosperity. It is our opinion that a fairly strong case could be made in support of the Ethiopian contention that Eritrea, or a part of it, should be incorporated into Ethiopia. Such action would yield the Ethiopians an outlet to the sea, and thus meet their aspirations in this direction, while avoiding the complicated and contentious question of securing an outlet through Djibouti, although because of the railway from that port to Addis Ababa it seems probable that this route would continue to be used to a considerable degree.

With

With respect to the desire of the Ethiopian Government to obtain a loan from the United States, a matter to which Mr. Deressa alludes in the latter part of his Aide Memoire, Mr. Deressa addressed a communication to the Department on this subject on July 12, requesting financial assistance in the sum of \$50,000,000, ten million dollars of which would be used for currency stabilization purposes and forty million dollars for the development of Ethiopian resources and the purchase of essential goods. In principle, the Department is disposed to support the extension of financial aid to Ethiopia, in order to assist the country in restoring its economy and thereby contribute in a greater degree to the war effort, although it may be impracticable to make a loan in the amount requested. In any case, the matter, having received favorable tentative consideration in the Department, is now being taken up with the Treasury Department and the Export-Import Bank.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name.

Enclosure:

Aide Memoire,  
July 12, 1943.

P/RMS

From Hon. Yilma Jeressa - Ethiopian Delegate  
to the Int. Food Conference, given me  
July 13 1943.

AIDE MEMOIRE

Ethiopia, as you know, was one of the first victims of the wave of aggression which started thirteen years ago in China and which has now swept with a fury, engulfing the entire world and bringing sorrow and desolation to a great majority of the world's population and destruction and waste to their lands. Ethiopia, singularly, has been the first among the nations overrun by the aggressor to be returned to her own people.

When the time came to free our country from the yoke of the enemy, the Emperor and the nation gave full cooperation to our British allies. Ethiopian refugees, formerly dispersed to nations all over the world, returned to their homeland and joined the Emperor's army of liberation. The patriotic armies, spurred onward by a fierce determination and a deep and abiding love for their country, made a concentrated attack on the rear of the enemy. Civilians joined with the liberating armies in the most effective manner - that of guerilla warfare - just as the civilian populations of dominated Europe are doing today. Every Ethiopian was anxious to do whatever he could to hasten the day of complete liberation. Every Ethiopian believed that our country, freed from the yoke of axis domination, would serve as a beacon of encouragement to other countries temporarily overrun. The brave Chinese, the Czechs, the Poles, the Norwegians, the Dutch, the peoples of the East Indies

could all take heart upon seeing Ethiopia freed and her people aided in the restoration of their land. As a matter of fact, all the peoples composing the United Nations would be reassured by this example of the Atlantic Charter "in action".

But when victory was won, and our country was free from the enemy, our ally told the Emperor that Ethiopia was an Occupied Enemy Territory and would be administered as such until a special treaty was signed between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Emperor. The draft of the treaty was not presented to His Imperial Majesty for months, and in the meanwhile, every possible pressure was exercised to make the Emperor and the people of Ethiopia wish for the signature of a treaty in order to end the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. During this time, industrial and mechanical equipment, means of transportation, telephone and electric lines, much needed and vital to the program of rehabilitation, were either removed from Ethiopia or wrecked.

The first draft of the agreement proposed amounted to the imposition of the status of a protectorate on Ethiopia. It was rejected by the Emperor. The actual agreement which is in force until January 1944 is regarded in Ethiopia as an agreement which imposes upon her Government conditions which are incompatible with either liberty or the exercise of her sovereign rights as a free nation. Its spirit is not in accordance with that of the Atlantic Charter. It was imposed upon her by pressure and is, therefore, regarded as having been signed under duress.

This agreement is due for revision next January. His Imperial Majesty has requested Your Excellency to use your good offices in affording him a competent American jurist to help him in this task and is appealing to the Government of the United States to give him diplomatic cooperation in the matter so that a settlement, consistent with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter might be reached.

Outlet to the Sea

It is recognized that in the world of tomorrow, the world which all freedom-loving peoples are striving to build, there must be a free interchange of the world's resources. A nation to grow, must be able to export freely her native commodities and to secure in exchange needed supplies and equipment from other countries. Ethiopia, with an area of 350 thousand square miles, a population of 14 million inhabitants and with vast natural resources, has been in the recent past without territory bordering on the sea. The development of our country has been hindered by this fact. Not having had a seaport resulted, unfortunately, in the inability of Ethiopia to import necessary arms and ammunition to defend herself before and during the time of the Italian invasion; this, in addition to the fact that as far back as 1884, certain nations through treaty, agreed between themselves not to allow such materials destined for Ethiopia to pass through territories dominated by themselves.

The people in what is now called Eritrea are ethnically

and culturally akin to the Ethiopian people, and in times past, that territory was a province of Ethiopia called Hamassen. In 1940, during the attack on Eritrea from the Sudanese border, our British allies, by pamphlets dropped from airplanes, promised the people of Hamassen (the Eritreans) union with Ethiopia as a reward for deserting from their Italian conquerors.

His Imperial Majesty hopes that Your Excellency will use your good offices to help us effect this union and to secure a seaport for our country.

His Imperial Majesty has instructed me to convey to Your Excellency Ethiopia's gratitude for the generous unilateral gesture on the part of Your Excellency to declare his country eligible to the benefit of Lend-Lease Aid. Ethiopia is a country which has been devastated by seven years of war, and, therefore, needs financial and material assistance to be rehabilitated. Financial difficulty is acute, and the primary equipment to run a government is lacking. His Imperial Majesty hopes that Your Excellency will recommend his country's case to the Administration to secure a loan and to acquire the materials which are urgently needed.

His Imperial Majesty will be glad to have American citizens to advise him in financial, military, judicial, and other technical affairs. His Imperial Majesty will welcome the cooperation of American capital and technical skill to help him develop the natural resources of his country. It is further the feeling of His Imperial

Majesty that Ethiopia can be of aid in supplying foodstuffs to needy European and Eastern nations during the post-war period of reconstruction. If help could now be given her in the form of technical aid and equipment, the temperate climate and fertile soil in the highlands of our country would lend themselves favorably to the production of important crops and cattle for food. Ethiopia would have the advantage of being much nearer to the needy territories than America, thereby effecting a saving in transportation and time. The people of Ethiopia are anxious to join with the people of the United States in their magnificent effort to rebuild a war-torn world.

Ethiopia is not unmindful of the asylum offered by the people of England to their Emperor during his stay there; the Ethiopian people are simply striving toward self-determination, the right of every free people, and look to America, the arsenal of democracy, for aid in the complete realization of this desire.

At a date convenient to Your Excellency, His Imperial Majesty will be pleased to pay a visit to Your Excellency to discuss matters affecting the future of his country.

*Yilma Deressa*

YILMA DERESSA  
Vice Minister of Finance  
of the Imperial Ethiopian  
Government

July 12, 1943.

AUG 10 1943

My dear Mr. President:

The position of Ethiopia with respect to an outlet to the sea, to which you refer in your memorandum of August 4, is one which commands much sympathy and demands a solution, but there is serious doubt in our minds as to the practicability of solving the problem by turning French Somaliland and its port of Djibouti over to the Ethiopians. I feel certain that the French would not be at all disposed to relinquish their hold on this territory even if offered sizeable compensation.

It is true that French Somaliland has never been a source of revenue to the French Government, but on the other hand, the colony possesses some significance in the French Empire as a counter-weight to Aden and as a French port of call for French ships en route to and from Madagascar and the French Far Eastern possessions. As the colony has been in the possession of the French for eighty years it seems probable that this time element will

also

The President,

The White House.

also be taken into account by the French in weighing their interest in and title to the territory. Taken all in all, therefore, and considering particularly the jealous pride of the French in their possessions, including even this desolate and torrid bit of land, I cannot avoid the conviction that French Somaliland would not be relinquished by the French except under the heaviest of pressure and then only with the most violent reactions.

I do feel, however, that the French should be obliged to grant Ethiopia ready access to the sea through the colony and the port of Djibouti. While Djibouti is nominally a free port for Ethiopian trade, it has not been so in fact, for the French have insisted on collecting various duties and taxes on products in transit to and from Ethiopia and on such a scale as to place a serious burden on Ethiopian imports and exports. Proposals made by French and other commercial organizations that Djibouti be made a genuine free port have always been rejected by the colonial authorities in Paris on the grounds that without such revenue a subsidy to the colony from the French Government would be necessary to compensate for the loss of half the annual budget of the colony. In effect, therefore, a considerable part of the cost of administering French Somaliland has been borne by the Ethiopians. Any protests to the contrary notwithstanding, the French should be required to grant a genuinely free port status to Djibouti

for

for Ethiopian trade and free transit privileges through the colony.

An accompanying move should be the establishment of an equitable rate structure on the Franco-Ethiopian Railroad between Djibouti and Addis Ababa. This railway, a strictly commercial enterprise, is owned and operated (under normal conditions) by a French company. The French Government has held none of the shares and has derived no direct revenue from the railway, although the railway has undoubtedly been of considerable political interest to the French Government. The Government of Ethiopia, on the other hand, owned at the time of the Italian invasion 25 percent of the share capital and the Emperor was reported to have held, in addition, 13.6 percent of the shares, or between them a total of 38.6 percent, and these shares are understood to be still owned by the Government and the Emperor. In the past the immediate financial interest of the Ethiopian Government and of the Emperor in a high rate structure seems to have been more compelling, considering the large dividends paid by the company, than any interest they may have had in facilitating the trade and development of the country through lower rates.

As you have pointed out in your memorandum, the interior of Ethiopia can never be developed until cheap transportation is provided, and therefore future action with respect to the railway must be postulated on the willingness of the

Ethiopian

Ethiopian Government and the Emperor to subordinate their positions as stockholders in the railway to their role as agents responsible for the development of Ethiopian economy as a whole. By being a party to the charging of excessive freight rates the Government of Ethiopia and the Emperor have, of course, though perhaps unwittingly, lent their hand to the most uneconomical means, in the long run, of raising revenues for the State. It is believed, however, that the Emperor now recognizes this truth, and if this is the case then the problem of the railway might be solved either through the acquisition by the Ethiopian Government of all the company's shares, which would doubtless have to be financed from abroad, or by securing control over the rates and finances of the company by public utility legislation similar to that which exists in almost every other country and thereby limit the profit of the railway to a reasonable return.

While the suggestions outlined above, if carried into effect, might be expected to alleviate greatly the economic isolation of Ethiopia, it seems certain that such action would not suffice to meet completely Ethiopian aspirations. Ethiopia wishes an outlet to the sea under its own sovereignty and has repeatedly stated its hopes in this regard. The surrounding ring of territories has constituted a  
potential

potential menace to Ethiopia, and the Ethiopians are particularly anxious to break this ring by the acquisition of Eritrea. We believe that Ethiopia could present a sound case for the restoration of that territory, or at least a part of it, since it is closely linked to Ethiopia by historic, ethnic, religious and linguistic ties, although in eastern Eritrea there are some small minority elements.

Eritrea has two sizeable ports in Massawa and Assab. From Massawa to Asmara there is a narrow gauge railway, and from Asmara to Addis Ababa, a distance of 758 miles, there is a good highway. The road from Assab to Addis Ababa, a distance of 591 miles, is reported to have also been excellently constructed, but it will require considerable repair. Economically, considering the absence of railways to the interior, these two ports are not as satisfactory outlets to the sea as is Djibouti with its railway to Addis Ababa. But under the sovereignty of Ethiopia they would, in the estimation of the Ethiopians, eliminate in large measure the existing political and economic threat against Ethiopia by powers whose colonial possessions now entirely surround it.

It is extremely doubtful that Ethiopia would accept any form of trusteeship, as suggested in your memorandum, except under duress. The Ethiopians are a proud people and will insist upon complete sovereignty. They are

fretting

fretting now under the terms of the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of January 31, 1942, which is construed by the Ethiopians as circumscribing their sovereignty, and they have expressed their determination not to renew the agreement, which will expire on January 31, 1944, on the present terms.

The Ethiopian Government does, however, wish to obtain the service of foreign advisers, particularly American advisers, to guide and advise the Government along sound and progressive channels. It has requested the Department's assistance in obtaining the services of such advisers. It is our desire to comply with this request, and we are now endeavoring to arrange to send an agricultural mission, a highway engineering mission and a minerals mission to Ethiopia, at the expense of this Government, to assist the Government of Ethiopia in the rehabilitation of the country and to enable it to make a greater contribution to the winning of the war, in line with the hope expressed on behalf of the Emperor by the Ethiopian Vice Minister of Finance, Mr. Yilma Deressa, in various communications to the Department.

Under the present Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement the Emperor is under the obligation of consulting with the British Government before appointing foreign advisers, but it is understood that, when interpellated on this point, Mr. Eden stated that no objections would be raised to the appointment

appointment of American advisers.

The requests of the Ethiopian Government for the services of American missions and advisers and for material and financial assistance have undoubtedly been directed to us because of the belief of the Ethiopians in the disinterestedness of the United States in gaining any material or political advantage in Ethiopia and also in response to the generally accepted belief that the United States has indicated its willingness to help foreign peoples who have been released, or will be released, from Axis domination. Any advisers sponsored or sent by the Department will be competent and experienced in their profession and of personal characteristics which will reflect respect and credit on the United States. With adequate and enlightened assistance given conditions of internal security, the Ethiopian Government should be able to place Ethiopia on a sound, progressive footing without resorting to the necessity of handing out disadvantageous concessions to the citizens of any nation, and without the need of foreign trustees, which, as previously pointed out, Ethiopia is unlikely to accept except under compulsion, even though the purpose of the trustees would be to protect and aid the country.

It may be of interest to note in the latter connection that the question has been raised by the British

whether

whether a trustee could function fully as a disinterested guardian without withdrawing completely from trade and investments in the country over which it exercises its trusteeship. (Oliver Stanley in the House of Commons, July 13, 1943). If such is the case the possibility of any nation being willing to accept a trusteeship over another nation or a colony would seem to be rather remote. The lending of advisers, on the other hand, would impose no such limitations. An additional advantage is that the advisers, who would be bound by honor to work for the just interests of the local Government alone, would have the confidence of that Government because they would not have been imposed upon it.

Faithfully yours,

Cardell Holl

# SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Reduction in Army strength in 1943.

In the light of the strategical situation, the apparent strength of the Russian Army, and the quality of the French divisions in North Africa, it has been thought permissible to delay the organization of 12 Armored or Infantry Divisions scheduled for the latter part of 1943. The primary purpose of passing these divisions into the 1944 program is to relieve the existing divisions of the necessity of furnishing further cadres and therefore to permit a more intensive effort to improve their quality.

Since last fall we have had an exhaustive examination made throughout the country to see what economies could be developed in the employment of soldiers engaged in the Supply services, the maintenance personnel of posts, headquarters staffs, etc. A "yardstick" has been developed which is susceptible of rather accurate application to any garrison, which should result in considerable economies. Already we have determined on a reduction of approximately 125,000 men, civilians and soldiers, in the Army Service Forces.

As the Army program approaches completion we are finding it possible to cut down on training establishments, and in due time can eliminate completely a number of these set-ups. At the present moment formal decision has been taken which reduces the training schools for specialists (such as mechanics, drivers, gunners, communications men, etc., etc.) by 50% in the Air Forces, 25% in the Ground Forces, and 33% in the Army Service Forces. The exact numbers involved I have not available at this moment.

A cut has been determined upon of approximately 100,000 men heretofore scheduled in the program for combat troop units other than divisional, such as Antiaircraft, Field Artillery, Tank Destroyer units, etc.

The Air Forces are now studying the possibility of delaying somewhat in the activation of squadrons in the latter part of 1943, carrying these units over into the 1944 program. Whether or not this will prove advisable cannot be stated at this time. The point is, we are considering two factors, the more rapid development of highly trained surplus combat crews and at the same time the better training of the new units created.

It appears at this time that the minimum reduction in Army strength in the 1943 program will be between 500,000 and 600,000 and there is a possibility that a maximum of 750,000 will be reached.




# SECRET

**SECRET**

The Selective Service has been notified of the reduction requirements for August, from 215,000 to 175,000. Notification will probably be given the Selective Service in about two weeks of the reduction in the September Army quota from 215,000 probably to 130,000. It is our intention not to take final decision as to the elimination from the 1943 program of the October to December divisions until the situation of the Russian Army can be estimated in the latter part of August. Incidentally, this reduction in divisions makes it conveniently practicable to provide the agreed upon equipment for the French divisions without embarrassment to our own units.

It is my opinion that no publicity whatever should be given to these reductions, that as a matter of fact the matter should be treated with great secrecy. Any announcement could be seized upon by the Axis propaganda agencies as an indication of our failure to make good on our program. Furthermore, it would probably give rise to a wave of unfortunate optimism in this country which would result in a relaxation of effort particularly in the production field. Probably the most important factor which permits us to make the reductions in combat strength is the status of the Russian Army and it would seem highly inadvisable to discuss the possibility of its destruction or defeat which would have a very definite bearing on our decision in August as to further increments in the 1943 program. Mr. McNutt and Mr. Donald Nelson have been informally advised of these prospective reductions and of the secrecy believed necessary in the matter.

  
Chief of Staff.

**SECRET**

- 2 -

NAV. PERS.

115366

ORD.

AERO.

BUSHIPS AIR MAIL

Y & D.

S & A.

M & S.

**SECRET**

March 6, 1943  
Op13-E-1/hjm  
Serial No. 022113  
(SC) ~~16-1/1943~~

April 9, 1943 <sup>P17-1/TK</sup>

*Wds* J. A. G. **From:**

*TK* M. G. C. **To:**

BUDGET **Via:**

**Subject:**

The Commander in Chief.  
Brigadier General Henry L. Larsen, U.S.M.C., Military  
Governor of American Samoa.  
The Secretary of the Navy.

Military Governor of American Samoa - Discontinuance  
of position.

COMINCH

**Reference:**

Op. 10.

Op. 11.

Op. 12.

Op. 13.

Op. 15.

Op. 16.

Op. 17.

Op. 19.

Op. 20.

Op. 21.

Op. 23.

Op. 28.

Op. 29.

Op. 30.

Op. 38.

Op. 39.

Op. 40.

INSP. GEN.

U.S.M.C.

(a) Letter from Commander in Chief of January 16,  
1942, to Brigadier General Henry L. Larsen,  
United States Marine Corps, Commanding Second  
Brigade, U.S.M.C., Tutuila, American Samoa.

1. Under the unity of command now in operation, the  
position of Military Governor of American Samoa is no longer deemed  
essential.

2. Upon your detachment from American Samoa, your  
appointment as Military Governor is terminated and the position  
of Military Governor is discontinued.

cc: Cominch  
Marine Corps  
Bupers  
Op 16

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

*Copy retained for SecNav File*

*File*  
*TK*

118445

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND No.

Serial No. 030313  
(SC)P17-1/KK

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

W.F.S.


SECRET

APR 5 - 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President.

1. There are now in American Samoa, a Military Governor, a Naval Governor (civil), and a Commanding General (Marine Corps) of the defense forces.
2. It is desired to eliminate the Military Governor and to leave the Naval Governor (civil) in charge of the government of the island, thus reverting to the situation which existed prior to your appointment of the Military Governor on January 15, 1942.
3. It is requested that you sign the attached letter to accomplish the above.

Respectfully,



Frank Knox



115366

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1943

116109

(SC)P17-1/KK  
(09600A)

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR: ADMIRAL ERNEST J. KING, U.S.N.

Please note the attached.

*28 Mch/43*

*CS  
VCNO*

*Comment*

*JK*

RECEIVED SC FILES  
Room 2155

MAR 29 1943

ROUTE 10-10411

(SC) P17-1/KK

77829

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR


THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I have not approved this because, considering the fact that there will be an end to this war, and the further fact that even during the continuation of the war, Samoa will continue to <sup>paper-</sup>  
*- vice* ~~use~~ many thousands of natives who are in no way concerned with the conduct of the war.

I want the natives to receive the same good care we have given them in the past and if the civil government of Samoa is abolished, a purely military government will, without doubt, pay less attention to the natives than a civil government would.

I greatly doubt the advisability of this proposed order. It seems to me that the civil Governor, who is under the Navy Department, will have no difficulty in coordinating the civil end of things with the officer in command of troops or naval operations.

F. D. R.



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MISS TULLY.

The enclosed letter has been initialed  
by Admiral King and General Holcomb.

Its purpose is to simplify the civil  
government of Samoa by returning it to naval  
command, as it was prior to December 7, 1941,  
and separate the civil function from the  
military.

W. T. P.  
WILSON BROWN.

8

**THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON**

March 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MISS TULLY.

The enclosed letter has been initialed  
by Admiral King and General Holcomb.

Its purpose is to simplify the civil  
government of Samoa by returning it to naval  
command, as it was prior to December 7, 1941,  
and separate the civil function from the  
military.

*W. T. P.*  
NELSON BROWN.

P15

Secret

Extracts from report of Commanding Officer, U.S.S. MAYRANT to Commander Task Group 34.1, on Activities on November 8, 1942.

The conduct of all officers and men was highly creditable and in accordance with the best traditions of the service.

While no individual acts of heroism were noted, the following named officers and men played an outstanding part in the action and thereby contributed considerably to its successful outcome:

The Gunnery Officer, Lt. F. D. ROOSEVELT, Jr., U.S.N.R., for opening fire on his own initiative on an enemy plane which is believed have been shot down by this ship; and for controlling and spotting main battery with skill and good judgment under highly adverse spotting conditions, resulting in hits on an enemy destroyer and possible hits on an enemy cruiser.

Torpedo Officer, Lt. R. E. WATSON, U.S.N.R., for his coolness, good judgment and skill, in keeping station and maneuvering ship to avoid straddles from enemy salvos. Although under supervision of the Captain he was frequently permitted to exercise his own initiative and did so in a creditable manner.

HADLEY, J.C., FC3c; WHITE, R. A., FC2c; STEEVES, H.M., CMM(AA); NICHOLAS, L. A., Sealc, for their ingenuity and skill in renewing the hydraulic drain filter line to the auxiliary pump of gun #1 during which time the gun fired thirty-nine rounds.

SMALLWOOD, D., CGM(PA), for coolness and efficiency in assisting repairs to gun #1; specifically for replacing firing pin and immediately overhauling removed pin while firing was at its heaviest.

LOPP, A. A., CEM(AA), the gun captain of #1 gun, for keeping his gun in action while repairs were carried out; for his fine example of leadership and a demonstration of his complete familiarity with his weapon.

PIERCE, G.F., CPhM(AA), for his energetic and continuous work in preparing battle rations.

It is recommended that the above named men below the rank of Chief Petty Officer, Permanent Appointment, be advanced to the next higher rating.

P16

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

66378

*file*

(SC) P16-1/MM

NOV 5 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted men in active service on October 31, 1942, is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the estimated number in active service on September 30, 1942, is also included:

	<u>Oct. 31, 1942</u>	<u>Sept. 30, 1942</u>	<u>Net Gain for Month</u>
Regular Navy	291,053	286,753	4,300
Retired	7,150	7,200	(-) 50
Fleet Reserve	8,290	8,490	(-) 200
Other Reserve	<u>624,242</u>	<u>507,378</u>	<u>116,864</u>
	930,735	809,821	120,914

Very respectfully,

*Frank Knox*

The President  
The White House

CONFIDENTIAL

44

P8-~~2000~~

*Handwritten file*

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.  
WASHINGTON.

October 23, 1942

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

(SC)P8-1  
(O47100A)

My dear Mr. President:

Your suggestion at this morning's conference that some of the men needed by Don Nelson for work in the woods be supplied by the Engineering Corps of the Army and the Construction battalions of the Navy is my warrant for this letter. I have talked with you enough about this subject to know that you feel as I do that we ought to avoid, if possible, any compulsory industrial service act ~~unless~~. It seems to me there are several things we should do before we seriously contemplate a labor draft act.

First of all, I entirely agree with you that we should have a registration of all women between the ages of eighteen and sixty. This will supply information that will be invaluable in any event in handling the manpower question.

Second, we should determine just what the real bottleneck is in production. I am thoroughly convinced that it is materials far more than it is manpower and all of the members of the War Production Board with whom I have talked, agree with me. If this is true, that a material shortage will show itself long before a manpower shortage, then what is actually needed at the moment is some method to take care of special situations like those which have developed in copper mining and in lumbering. I believe such situations can be met by the creation of a volunteer industrial army made up chiefly, if not exclusively, of men in higher age brackets and men with minor physical deficiencies, but all of them men who, in private life, have the skills and the crafts that are needed to meet special situations, the men who enlist in this industrial section of the Army to be paid exactly the same pay and allowances and their families receive the same care that men do who enlist in the Army itself.

I know this can be done because I have done it in the Navy. The sole question to be tested is how large a reservoir of manpower we could secure in this way and whether that would be big enough eventually to take care of the special situations that arise where there is an acute shortage of skilled manpower. If this plan should be tried, I most earnestly

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The President

- 2 -

October 23, 1942


recommend that all of these men be given three or four months indoctrination and infantry drill, be uniformed and armed as a part of our armed forces, and give them in every way the prestige and standing of enlisted men in the armed services. As far as possible, I would classify them in regiments by their crafts or skills. For instance, certain regiments of men competent to work in the woods, other regiments of miners, battalions of machine tool makers, and so forth. Then from such organizations, we could fill the needs for workers in certain situations where wage attraction alone is not sufficient to provide the requisite number from civil life.

I feel very strongly on this subject because of the amazing experience we have had in the Navy with the Seabees, which is our name for the construction battalions. Prior to their organization, we had, as you know, the greatest possible difficulty in getting civilian workers to build our bases in many of the remote places overseas where we had to build them. We went to the length of actually doubling the wages paid here at home and still we got nowhere. Now we have no embarrassment of this sort whatever. These construction battalions of the Navy feel themselves part of the Navy and they go willingly and enthusiastically to the most remote and difficult places, endure all the hardships of the enlisted man cheerfully and regard themselves as an important part of the military forces of these outposts which they are engaged in building.

It is this latter phase that ought to be emphasized if we are to attempt this. Men will volunteer for this sort of thing only from patriotic reasons and because they want to be a part of the armed forces in this war. I firmly believe that this appeal is sufficient to provide us with the necessary reservoir to take care of bottlenecks in manpower and certainly postpone, if it does not entirely avoid, resort to the draft for labor.

I trust you will pardon this rather lengthy discussion of this subject. The seriousness of the decision which confronts you must be my excuse for its length.

Yours sincerely,



The President

The White House

W

P9

2 October 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

This will acknowledge, on behalf of the President, the receipt of your letter of 25 September 1942 together with its enclosure, a paraphrase of a telegram from the Viceroy of India, addressed to yourself, dated 22 September 1942.

The President has directed that I thank you for bringing to his attention this most interesting summary of the Indian problem.

Very truly yours,

JOHN L. McCREA  
Captain, U.S. Navy  
Naval Aide to the President

The Right Honorable the Viscount Halifax, K. G.,  
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador  
The British Embassy  
3100 Massachusetts Avenue  
Washington, D. C.

jlmccrea:jh

122  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA:

Will you thank him and file?

F.D.R.

*Capt McCrea  
Will you thank  
him & file.*

Ref: 1539/-/42

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

25th September, 1942.

Dear Mr. President,

I send you herewith a copy  
of a telegram from the Viceroy of India  
which you may possibly like to glance at.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

*Halifax*

The Honourable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C.

Regraded Unclassified

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM FROM THE  
VICEROY OF INDIA TO LORD  
HALIFAX DATED SEPT.  
22nd, 1942.

---

There have been great changes in the situation in India since the time when you were Viceroy. No margin now remains for bargaining; His Majesty's Government have already made all the concessions that have any practical importance. The major political parties have in consequence immensely hardened their attitude to each other. Any evidence of reasonableness or preparedness to reach a practical compromise will, they now consider, be regarded by their political opponents as a sign of weakness. At the same time they all hope that an uncompromising attitude and the advertisement of their views in the United Kingdom and the United States will induce public opinion in those countries to press His Majesty's Government to accept their case. None of the Parties will compromise with the others, and all of them in their publicity deliberately ignore the existence of the claims of the other Parties and the difficulty which the existence of these claims presents to the British Government.

2. Furthermore, the proportion of seats allotted to each Party in any interim Government seems likely to the principal Parties to be the determining factor in a final settlement, and therefore they are all determined to exert every effort to secure the best possible position at the present stage of developments.

3. The Government of India maintains its previous attitude. It is obliged to hold the balance even and to live up to its responsibilities to the minorities, the

Princes and the people of India. With this proviso the policy stands that India should achieve Dominion status as soon as the Indians themselves can reach agreement. His Majesty's Government have recently re-affirmed the principle behind the Cripps negotiations, and these negotiations prove that a settlement which should be fair to all the parties is what His Majesty's Government desire. The British initiative which these negotiations represent failed because they brought the Indian Parties face to face with one another and with responsibility and because of the jealousies between communities and parties which have always hampered progress in India. The leader of no Party succeeded either in improving on the Cripps proposal or in producing any more constructive demand than a free hand for his Party coupled with the backing of His Majesty's Government. Whatever they may say I do not believe that the Moslems want any change. No compromise will be agreeable to them which does not include the acceptance of Pakistan and the abandonment of the ideal of Indian unity; these are terms which no self-respecting leader of the Hindus can accept, but as the Moslems represent 90 million they are strong enough to block a settlement on any other terms. What the Hindus want is a Hindu Raj backed by British bayonets. What the Princes want is no change at all. The so-called "Moderates", who are principally Hindus, are unimportant apart from their excellent publicity. None of the Indian Parties had the political courage to accept the Cripps' proposals, and none has been able to suggest a practicable alternative to them. The Congress impasse has the

substantial support of Hindu opinion, and Jinnah has that of Moslem opinion; the two communities are presenting irreconcilable claims, and we can only impose a solution on either if we are prepared to support the other in the civil war which will inevitably follow. There is no need to emphasize the consequences which this would have for the war effort, for assistance to China and for the use of India as an operational base in 1943.

4. I am continuing to use all channels, formal or informal, in my search for a possible settlement that will have some chance of working. But at the moment I see little hope of success. I am keeping the door open. But the facts must be faced. Congress is to blame for the present violent uprising and is consequently out of court, if only because to open negotiations with it would shatter the confidence of the police, the army and the numerous fence-sitters in this country to an extent that would be dangerous to law and order in India.

5. Congress being temporarily ruled out, the Moslem league and the Mahasabha are the only important Parties remaining in British India. Moslem insistence on Pakistan and the communal problem generally keeps these two Parties apart. No prospect of either abating its claims is in view. Thus I can see no hope of being able to form a Government in which important parties could be represented. If the Mahasabha and Moslem league cannot agree there is no possible nucleus for a Government which will receive more support than my present Executive Council, which is as representative and experienced a body as India can produce. Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, Untouchables, Parsis, and Mahasabha and non-official

Europeans are all represented on it. Out of a total of 15 Members there are only two officials in addition to the Commander-in-Chief and myself.

6. Taking interference with the war effort as a criterion, the merits of the present position should be compared with the situation which would be presented by the inevitable nation-wide communal troubles such as would inevitably arise from an attempt to form a Government on the basis of either the Mahasabha or the Moslem League alone. Practical politics exclude the consideration of such a basis. A coalition between the two, which is at the moment unrealisable, would itself be highly insecure, and its effect on the war effort would be unlikely to be a favourable one. Whatever the critics may say the fact must be accepted that without some readiness among Indians to accept responsibility and to collaborate with other Parties no progress can be made. There is at the moment no sign of such readiness. The difficulty lies not in British reluctance to transfer power but in the impossibility of finding Indians ready to accept the transfer and capable of discharging the responsibilities which power would lay upon them.

7. The military aspect must not be overlooked. The recent troubles have not affected the loyalty of the army, which has given the Government of India its support in restoring order. At the present time it remains of paramount importance to the war effort that the army should continue to be contented. It will not remain

contented /

contented if there is an artificial constitutional settlement resulting in an inevitable communal clash and the fighting value of the army would be immediately and disastrously diminished if it ceases to be contented. The war effort of the United Nations would be seriously damaged if well meant but ill-informed political pressure imposed on the Government of India a settlement of that kind. I am sure that the President fully realizes this danger and the importance of the army. I am less sure that the general public, at home or in the United States, realizes these facts. The ignorance of public opinion outside India, and outside expert circles in England, of this factor is only one of the causes of the widespread idea that the Indian political problem is easier to solve than is in fact the case.

8. No one is less likely than I am to underestimate the importance of the principal Indian Parties, Congress, the Moslem League and to a lesser extent the Mahasabha. I have been at this business for seven years. During that time I have done everything I could to bring the Parties together and to make progress. Much against their will, and without any result, I managed to get Gandhi and Jinnah into the same room. But all of this was useless while Indians refused to agree among themselves and while they still entertained claims and ambitions which were mutually destructive, and while Congress still hoped that skilful publicity, ingenious arguments and a fallacious air of reasonableness would result in jockeying His Majesty's Government into throwing over the Moslems, the Princes and the Military classes and staking all on Congress. The lack of progress

is due to the bitter jealousies between the Parties and their manoeuvring for position against the time of the transfer of control. It is not caused by any unwillingness of His Majesty's Government to see, or to facilitate, constitutional progress in India.

P16

*Capt McCrae  
for approval  
file*


WAR DEPARTMENT  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Captain McCrae has brought to my attention your suggestion that Brigadier General Albert L. Cox should be commended for the excellent manner in which he performed his duties as Provost Marshal during the recent trial of the saboteurs.

The commendation you suggested has been sent General Cox by the Secretary of War. A copy is inclosed.

  
Chief of Staff.

Incl.

C  
O  
P  
Y

September 17, 1942.

My dear General Cox:

I wish to express to you my deep sense of gratitude and appreciation of the manner in which you have performed your difficult duties as Provost Marshal during the recent trial of the eight saboteurs by a Military Commission. The manner in which you carried out your duties set a high standard of dignity and efficiency under most difficult and unusual circumstances.

A precedent has been set which, I am sure, will have a great influence and value in the protection of the national interests against dangerous and subversive attacks. I send you my hearty thanks.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON

Brigadier General Albert L. Cox,  
Headquarters, Military District of Washington.

P16

**SECRET**  
**WAR DEPARTMENT**  
**OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF**  
**WASHINGTON**

September 16, 1942.


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Civilian Administrative Section of General Eisenhower's Staff.

Everything appears to be working out satisfactorily with respect to furnishing General Eisenhower qualified personnel for his Civil Affairs Section.

I have informed General Eisenhower that both Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Murphy believe Mr. Mathews, the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in London, to be well qualified for the position as deputy head of the Section, acting for Mr. Murphy under General Eisenhower. I understand this arrangement meets with your approval.

In the uniform of a Lieutenant Colonel General Staff, and under the name of Herbert Macgowan, Mr. Murphy left yesterday morning by air for Scotland for a conference with General Eisenhower. At this conference will be discussed the position Mr. Mathews would fill in the organization. It appears that as soon as General Eisenhower and Mr. Murphy have arrived at a definite agreement, appropriate instructions should be issued to Mr. Mathews. I will take this matter up later with Mr. Hopkins.

  
Chief of Staff.

**SECRET**

C  
O  
P  
Y

SECRET

P16

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON

September 2, 1942

*Capt  
McLain  
To file*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff, at their meeting on September 1, 1942, considered and approved a recommendation of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to increase the U. S. Army by drafting an additional 650,000 men at once in order that the total strength may be 5,000,000 men by December 31, 1942.

This increase is considered essential in order to provide for new task forces, to bring present units to organization strength, to provide cadres for units to be organized in 1943, and to provide a cushion of replacements for estimated battle losses in 1942. Actually, U. S. forces authorized for 1942 have already been overdrawn, since it has been necessary to reduce the strength of U. S. units -- sometimes with untrained or partially trained troops -- to bring up to strength units sent overseas.

The Director of the Budget has indicated his approval of this increase, which will not affect the proposed augmentation for 1943, since the 650,000 additional troops for 1942 may be considered as an advance against next year's troop basis.

Your approval of this proposed increase during 1942 is earnestly requested.

For the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff:

(Signed) WILLIAM D. LEAHY

WILLIAM D. LEAHY  
Admiral, U. S. Navy  
Chief of the Staff to the  
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

"Sept. 2 1942  
Approved  
Franklin D. Roosevelt"

SECRET

P9 (Great Britain)

COPY NO. 1

To: Joint Staff Mission

From: War Cabinet Offices

Dated: 25th June, 1942.

MOST SECRET

MOST IMMEDIATE

STALKY 99 (NOCOP)

Following personal for Prime Minister from  
Minister of Information.

I gave our own press a very straight talk  
yesterday and as a result most of their political  
news to-day might have been written by the  
Government. They ridicule the notion that there  
is any sort of political crisis and so most of the  
absurd political speculations made by American  
correspondents will now embarrass their authors.  
I have been a lot in the House this week and can  
assure you that most of the Members remain your  
unswerving supporters. The dreary caterwauling  
of the Opposition of none of the talents annoy  
the sensible Members of the House of Commons who  
feel that a great disservice has been done by  
attacks on the Prime Minister whilst he is  
engaged on work of the highest national importance  
in the U.S.A.

Regraded Unclassified

T.O.O. 1819Z/25