Franklin D. Roosevelt — "The Great Communicator"
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Series 1: Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Political Ascension

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Washington, D.C.
REPUBLICAN CLUB

Saturday Discussions, January 30, 1915
2.00 P.M.


Speakers

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. Herbert L. Satterlee,
Former Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Hon. George von L. Meyer,
Former Secretary of the Navy.

(Absent) Hon. I. F. Padgett, M.C.,
Chairman Naval Affairs Committee.

Dr. Frank Crane,
Editor and Author.

Mr. Cragin, Chairman of the Saturday Discussions Committee, addressed the Club as follows:

"In your program menu that you have today, it is mentioned that there are two speakers: the Hon. Rufus Hardy, of the Congressional Committee on Merchant Marine; and also will be present Congressman Humphrey and the Hon. Dudley Field Malone, and also one of our own members, a ship-owner, who has made a great study of the subject, will speak. He has insisted upon it—it is contrary to the idea—Mr. Douglas—next Saturday. The membership present today show that they are very much interested in our topic for today, "The Future of Our Navy."

"Two weeks ago we had with us the distinguished Secretary of War, whom we regarded as the man best posted to speak on the topic of the day; and we are favored today in having one whom we regard by his training and position as being efficiently able to speak on this subject as any man in the country. He needs no introduction to you; he has been at these Saturday discussions before; this State has won him and he has won the State. I take pleasure in presenting the Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt."
MR. ROOSEVELT:

Gentlemen: The last time I was here was, I think, about two years ago, when the topic of the day was "Public Markets." It is somewhat of a far cry from public markets to the navy. At that particular time, there was a good deal of agitation in this state and in this city over improved market conditions; over the elimination of the middleman. Much good was accomplished by public discussion, by a frank exposition of facts. The matter was handled as it should have been—in a non-partisan way—and I take it that in discussing the Navy the same principle applies.

Today we are thinking of national defenses a good deal. Necessarily, it is only human that we should. It is only human that we should take stock and it is not harmful in any way to take stock. We are taking up the subject all over the country. The average citizen is manifesting an interest in the subject in the right way, and we are going ahead with the matter in a way without offending any of the other nations and I hope without injecting into the question of national defense matters of party politics.

Mr. Garrison, I think, took up in a proper way, judging by what I read of it in the papers, the question of the Army. I want to speak very informally on the other branch of the service. Too many people in this country have failed, in thinking about the army or the navy, to go back to the basic question. In other words, to find out what the army and navy are for; to define defense. We are very apt to see a battleship going out through the river and look at her and think, "The country is safe." We are very apt to listen to catch phrases, "Man-for-man," "Gun-for-gun," "Our Navy is better than any other in the world." That is true, but it proves nothing. Let me illustrate: It is quite conceivable that the Republic of Hayti might have two good gunboats—rather better gunboats than any other in the world. It is quite conceivable that the Republic of Hayti might have those gunboats manned with highly skilled officers and men, fully equipped for their gunboat work, and it would be quite reasonable for Hayti to say, also, that she is a ship-for-ship, man-for-man, and gun-for-gun, she had no superior. What have we a navy for? That is the question. Back when I come from on the Hudson River, people think—the average citizen thinks—of defense as meaning protection against invasion by an armed body of men; they think of it as protection from a foreign force coming up the Hudson River, burning their homes, destroying the crops and laying waste the country, generally. Those people are human, but they are beginning to broaden out in their ideas. If you look back far enough in our history, you will find that the navy was created—started—in 1794 by Act of Congress not for the purpose of home defense at all. The preamble of the first appropriation bill passed by congress for the establishment of a navy read somewhat as follows: "Whereas, our commerce has been subjected to insult and depredation; and whereas, our seamen have been imprisoned and thrown into slavery by the Barbary States. Therefore, we hereby appropriate such and such a sum for the building of six frigates to protect that commerce." Gradually, as the years went by, especially after the Civil War, when our flag practically disappeared from the seas, we began to think of the navy as merely an instrument to keep somebody from landing on the Atlantic or Pacific seaboard. I, myself, remember in 1898; in fact, I have heard a gentleman who occupied my chair at that time—at the outbreak of the Spanish War—I have heard him tell me how a delegation from Maine—senators and representatives—came into his office and first threatened and then pleaded for
ships of war to be sent up to Portland on the ground that the good people of Portland were very much worried over the Spanish cruisers that they had heard about, and the delegation reported that the good people had taken their securities, their money and their valuables out of their safe-deposit boxes and carried them back to Augusta. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy promised that he would send them a warship. He found to his great delight that there were some old Civil War monitors lying on a mud-bank near Philadelphia. He had them hauled off the mud-bank and painted, and he had one of them towed up to Portland. The good people of Portland were quite satisfied because she was not a wooden ship, but an iron ship and she carried a 16-inch, smooth-bore gun that would throw a round, solid shot about 1,000 yards, and they brought their securities, money and valuables back from Augusta and were perfectly happy. We have progressed a bit since those days. We on the Atlantic seaboard have learned the lessons of the Spanish war. We have learned today that in case of a war—a fight—the naval battles would be conducted by a fleet; that we would not divide up our battleship fleet along the coast or keep near it, but to meet the enemy with an overpowering force as far away from our coast as possible to prevent him from coming within striking distance. But even now, people do not know the difference between battleships and other vessels of our navy.

There is a story that they told me down in Washington when I got there about a secretary of state in the dim and distant past, who came running into the office of the Secretary of the Navy one day, very much excited, and he said, "I've got to have a battleship—there is a revolution broken out in Hayti—American property is in danger—I've got have a battleship there inside of twenty-four hours!" The Secretary of State replied, "I am awfully sorry; all our battleships are up in Narragansett Bay and it will take them six days to get down there." The Secretary of State went right up in the air. The Secretary of the Navy continued, "I can't do the impossible, but I have got a gunboat just across the passage at Guantanamo and it will take her twelve hours to get to Hayti." The Secretary of State almost wilted and said, "Why didn't you say that before? My dear fellow, when I say 'battleship,' don't think I mean anything technical. All I meant was that I wanted something that would float and had guns on it!"

In the same way, there is a tendency in Congress—I notice one of my friends from Brooklyn who is in Congress and will bear me out in what I say—a tendency in Congress to do what is pleasant—to become amateur strategists on their own hook—a tendency to draw conclusions; a tendency to say offhand "The day of the battleship is gone. All we need is submarines." They do not take the point of view of the expert. When you or I in our business affairs want to build a house, a factory or put in a machine, we go to a man who knows about building houses, factories or to a man who knows about putting in machines. I used to be an amateur strategist myself, before I went to the Navy Department; but since I went there, there is one thing I have learned once and for all: it is that the experts whom you and I as taxpayers employ are the men best qualified to tell us what kind of a navy we should have.

Now, the question of national defense is at the base of it all. What do we want in the way of defense? We have progressed beyond the idea that defense consists merely of measures to prevent somebody from landing on the Atlantic or Pacific seaboard. That is, of
course, a possible attitude to take. Let us see what it would entail in case of war. Probably the navy would not need much more than submarines in that case. Probably it would be extremely difficult, if we had a submarine stationed at every small point on the coast, for an enemy to land an army. It would mean that in case of war, we on the continent would be secure, but we should have to see our coast cities given up without a struggle in the event that the enemy was able to land his forces in sufficient number to make a series of concerted attacks. As the political entity of the United States includes a direct interest beyond our own shores, there would consequently result an entire closing up of our foreign commerce. If the United States want to adopt that as their policy, then they had better do it with their eyes open. It would mean, of course, the loss of Porto Rico, the Canal Zone; it would mean the loss of our present relationship with Cuba. It would mean on the other side, the loss of the Hawaiian Islands, of American Samoa, of Guam, of the Philippines and of Alaska. If the American people--I can not repeat it too strongly--want that policy of defense, they should do it with their eyes open. What other policy of defense can they adopt? If they want to be in a position at any time to defend successfully their possessions and their interests that lie beyond the limits of the continental United States, they can only do so by obtaining and maintaining what has been well called--there is no other phrase that better describes it--"The control of the seas." The Panama Canal, unless we were able at any time in the war to send down troops there to prevent, if possible, the landing of an enemy's army on either side of the Canal or either ocean, would undoubtedly be the object of an organized attack by an enemy in large force and would undoubtedly suffer from the effects of a bombardment and thereby prevent the passage of ships and troops to the Pacific. If we want to prevent such a calamity, we have got to protect those troops on the way down and that means a sea-going fleet.

I asked that this map should be put up here to give you an idea of distances. Roughly speaking, if we take into consideration the Monroe Doctrine—if we believe in the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine—America has very direct interests inside of a line which I will draw very roughly. Starting up here at the North Pole, for I take it (glancing at Admiral Robert E. Peary, who was one of the invited guests present) that we have got the North Pole now, once and for all—starting up there at the North Pole and coming on down through the North Atlantic Ocean and the South Atlantic Ocean, and around Cape Horn, and up this way around American Samoa, and then up here and around Guam, which is there (indicating locality of Guam), then around the Philippines, then up here past the Aleutian Islands and back to the Pole—that is SOME territory. The only way you can reach that territory is in seagoing ships and, incidentally, I may add that submarines are not seagoing or sea-keeping. They are valuable in narrow shores, but you can not operate a submarine against an enemy 3,000 miles away. The Canal undoubtedly has helped the naval defense because it has cut off a large distance; but we are not absolutely sure that in case of war we would be able to use that canal for our fleet at any time that we wanted to. Things sometimes will happen. A seagoing fleet at the present time means battleships, battle cruisers, scout cruisers, destroyers and aeroplanes. It is perfectly true that ship-for-ship and man-for-man our men are the equal of any men in the world. They have got to have organization; they have got to know what they are going to go up against; and therefore in taking stock it is necessary that we should know what is the strength
of our navy or what we want it to be in comparison with the armed forces of other powers. We might as well say so perfectly frankly and it is not un-neutral to say so. In 1815, just a hundred years ago, England had in her navy over six hundred ships. If we compare our navy today with the navy of England a hundred years ago, she would have three, four or five times as many units as we have. It is also true that almost any one of our ships, down even to the gunboat class, could obtain and maintain control of the seas against England's six hundred ships of 1815; therefore, the basis of comparison must be the basis of today.

Probably some of you who have followed the discussion, have read in the past few months that there is in the navy an organization called the General Board. The General Board has for the past ten or twelve years sent recommendations as to what we should build to secure the position of the navy. For many years the reports of the General Board were not made public by the Secretary of the Navy. They were held as confidential documents and the Secretary of the Navy in almost every case made recommendations for ships much less in number than the recommendations of the General Board. In some cases, also, the recommendations were given confidentially to Congress, and in every year the ships voted by Congress were vastly fewer than those recommended by the General Board. It is fair to state that the General Board has represented in this period practically what the experts whom we employ should be the naval force of the United States. They recommended, way back in 1903, that we should have built by 1910 or by 1920 forty-eight battleships, each battleship to be attended by four destroyers. At the present time, and at the present rate of building, we shall have ready in 1920 only thirty-eight or possibly thirty-nine battleships. Battleships are costly things; at the present time their cost has reached a figure of $15,000,000.00. The General Board, however, has been perfectly consistent in its policy. It has varied it in minor details each year. When it found that its earlier recommendation for two battleships was not carried out by Congress, it recommended four that had not been authorized, and at the present time we are far behind that program.

There is a frame of mind in this country, a frame of mind in which even some of my best friends persist—I will not say my best friends, because we are all in favor of peace—I do not know quite what to call them; I have always felt that they did not understand—that they could not understand if they could be told—they would not keep on with the views that they have always expressed. I had a long talk with an eminent gentleman, Dr. David Starr Jordan. He has some excellent ideas; he believes in the Brotherhood of Man—so do I. He believes that this country should be the Big Brother to Mankind; that we will never have war. Now, there is a saying which he referred to during our conversation: that it takes two men to make a quarrel. Unfortunately, the events of the past three months have proved that this is not so. These gentlemen are secure in their theories; this Brotherhood of Man idea is fine—but if any of these gentlemen will guarantee that we will never have a war, and if we could take their guarantee—if we could take out the kind of insurance that would protect us without building a navy, I would not want to build a navy; but unfortunately in the present state of civilization, nobody is able to give that guarantee. In the matter of building a navy, there are lots of things to consider besides considering what we would like to have. A very distinguished secretary of the navy worked hard for four years for
battleships for an adequate navy and he was turned down very largely by Congress. Cost enters into it. We pay today for our navy $140,000,000 per year; we pay about $100,000,000 per year for our army, and some people will tell you that we spend $300,000,000 per year for pensions that should be charged to the military end of the Government. As a matter of fact, pensions should be charged up to the David Starr Jordans of this country. They are the result of a lack of common-sense preparation. About three months ago, some of the newspaper men came into my office in Washington and asked me to figure out for them—give them—a statement as to how many men would be necessary to man the ships now in the navy in the event of war. It was a simple mathematical calculation; they are facts and figures. So I sat down and in the course of a couple of hours, with the help of experts in the Department, we had added up our figures which showed that to man all the ships in our navy in time of war (not including those additional ships which act as auxiliaries to the principal fighting units) we had to get—we would have to have eighteen thousand men. That statement was printed in the newspapers as a fact, merely a fact, which it is. Next afternoon, my friend Mr. Villard of The Evening Post, came out with an article savagely attacking that as a jingo saying—merely because I had given out a simple statement of facts—and conveying the impression that I, necessarily, was a believer of war and that I could be put in the category of those people who are dangerous to the safety of the country. The Evening Post representatives do very well in New York—despite their failings. They are perfectly willing that we should have a navy—frankly willing that we should keep what we have, but do not want the country to build any more battleships; want the money used for education, etc. They forget that a battleship becomes antiquated; they forget that the Civil War monitors in 1868 were not a match for the Spanish cruisers, and they forget that the wooden Cumberland in 1861 was not a match for the iron-clad Merrimac. They forget, also, that the Oregon of the Spanish War—that fifteen Oregon of the Spanish War—could be beaten by one of our modern dreadnaughts. If we are going to have a navy, we should have an adequate one. We ought, first, to define what we want. We ought to consider what we are going to defend: just that strip of coast on the Atlantic and that strip of coast on the Pacific? Or are we going to provide for the defense of all of the territory in which America is interested?

Much has been said— I am sorry to say, unfairly—about the navy today. The navy, of course, is stronger than it was two years ago. Last year we got the biggest appropriation we have ever had in times of peace; we added three battleships; we got a good building program; this year we got a good building program. There are many things to be done— lots of them; but we have accomplished much. We have tried out certain experiments; we do not know whether they are going to work permanently or not. Much has been said about education in the navy—about making the navy a Chautauqua. Of course, every sailing-man does not want to be driven to school. The Secretary of the Navy provided that they should all be given some kind of training, for an hour, for a day. When the fleet was down in Mexico, they did not have it. It is a question of whether it is going to work on that basis. We do not know yet; but we do want to do this: it is only right, it is only American, that we should provide in the navy means for the average enlisted man and they are boys,
most of them twenty-one years—and opportunity to serve out their
enlistments of one, two, three or four years, or whatever it may be;
and if they want to go back to private life, give them an opportunity
to go back better educated and better trained citizens. But we are
trying to keep, and we want to keep, in the back of our heads the
idea that we should only do that without hurting the efficiency of
the fighting force. I might add that so far as these experiments
have gone, they have accomplished this: that where, not long ago—
a year ago—the enlistments were about keeping even with the vacan-
cies, today we have five men applying for every place we have to
fill.

I think that the responsibility for the navy, like most
things, goes right back to the average citizen; it goes back to the
average educated man, who can and who does exert some kind of influ-
ence over other men. We all of us, no matter what our station in
life may be, help to form the opinions of our neighbors in life.
I, personally, and I think everybody else welcomes free discussion
about the defenses of the Government—the army and naval defenses
are peculiarly a non-political part of the Government. It is a
mighty good thing to find out what we lack; in other words, to find
out how far our navy would go at the present time. There is no harm
in stating that our navy today stands third in the navies of the
world. There is no harm in stating that the French navy and the
Japanese navy are increasing more rapidly in strength than our own.
They are facts to keep in sight; they are facts to know; and if we
want to keep on at the present rate, we should exert our influence
along those lines. If we want to progress a little faster, we
should exert our influence in that direction also. In other words,
the navy is in your hands as citizens; it is in the hands of your
Congressmen. Last night, I attended a dinner of about six hundred
guests at the Harvard Club; they were all Harvard men there with the
exception of one Eli, and I made this point: I stated frankly that
I did not believe that more than half of the men in the room knew
who their Congressman was, and there was a guilty look on the faces
of over half of the men in the room. It does not apply to this
room, but it applies to the average gathering throughout the length
and breadth of this country. It shows a lack of appreciation of the
necessity of taking a part in public affairs and voicing their opin-
ions. I have been in the Legislature—up in Albany—and I know how
sensitive I was to epistles from home. I know that the average Con-
gressman believes that the people in his district want him to take a
certain course where it is in conformity with his duty to do so, and
where he may properly take a position not fixed by party caucus or
some other rule, such as national defenses—they believe that he will
take that course. If we can bring home that problem of what we are
going to defend, we will get the adequate means, and until that has
been done we will not get a fair expression of opinion from the Am-
erican people. The navy today is efficient; you know where it
stands; you know what it could do; you have read about the figures;
you have read the statistics; you know more about strategy than you
did; BUT you do not know enough about strategy to tell the country
whether to build battleships or submarines. That is up to our paid
experts. I trust them and I think that, on the whole, the people
of the country trust their American naval officers. I think if we
will keep in mind the map, the distances involved and the interests
involved, we will all come to a fairly definite opinion, one way or
the other—it can not be half way. We need either only the means to protect the Atlantic and the Pacific seabords against invasion or we want the adequate means to protect American interests where American interests lie.
NOTED MEN ASSAIL FOES OF ARMAMENT

$300,000,000 Pension List Due to David Starr Jordan, Says F. D. Roosevelt.

MEYER CITES BRITISH CASE

Says 50% of Blame for Our Policy on Congress at the Republican Club Luncheon.

The condition of the navy was the theme of an address delivered yesterday at the luncheon of the Republican Club. It seemed that the condition of the navy has not been neglected by the nation and that it is not being neglected by the military authorities. The secretary of the navy, Mr. B. D. Roosevelt, said that he was well aware of the need of the navy and was doing all that he could to meet it. He added that the condition of the navy was not being neglected by the military authorities.

TORN MCKINMILL WILL VOID

Court Awards $750,000 Estate to Widow and Daughters.

After the death of the famous inventor, Mr. T. McKinnon M. Smith, two of his daughters, Mrs. Frances Smith and Mrs. Anna Smith, were given a portion of the estate. The estate was valued at $750,000. The daughters were not aware of the death of their father and were not informed of the estate.

REVENUE CUTTERS NOW COAST GUARDS

Our Famous Force of Little Ships Merges with the Life-Saving Service.

In the matter of the merger of the revenue cutters with the life-saving service, there was a demonstration for the revenue cutters. The revenue cutters were a force of little ships, and the life-saving service was a force of little ships. The merger of the two forces was a demonstration of the power of the revenue cutters.

WINNING UP OF A COAL MINE

More Than 2,000,000 Words of Testimony Taken in Summary Proceedings of the Action.

A suit was brought in the court of the United States for the recovery of a coal mine. The suit was brought by the coal mine company against the coal company. The suit was based on the claim that the coal company had taken the coal mine.

CHARLESTOWN, $473.176

T. T. Sherman, in Charge of His Estate, Reports to the Superior Court.

Mr. T. T. Sherman, in charge of his estate, reported to the superior court. The estate is valued at $473,176. The report was made to the court by Mr. Sherman.

WAR LECTURES FOR N.Y.U.

Series of Six Will Be Given Weekly Beginning Feb. 2.

New York University has arranged for a series of six lectures on the war. The lectures will be given weekly, beginning Feb. 2.

NEW JEWISH MAGAZINE.

It Will Be Devoted to Advancement of American Jewry.

The first number of the new Jewish magazine, which will be devoted to the advancement of American Jewry, will be published shortly.

WIFE SUES SHERRY LEADER.

Wants a Separation and Allowance from Leo Wald, Musician.

Mrs. Leo Wald, musician, has filed a bill for a separation and allowance from her husband, Leo Wald. The bill was filed in the court of the city of New York.

SURROGATE ROW APPEALED.

Higher Court To Pass on Jury Trial of Holmes Will Case.

The case of the will of the late Albert Holmes, who left a property worth $500,000, has been appealed to the higher court. The case was heard in the county court and the decision was reversed.

TO AID ST. JOHN'S HOSPITAL

Concert at the Waldorf-Astoria for Long Island Institution.

An announced concert at the Waldorf-Astoria will be held to aid St. John's Hospital. The concert will be held on Thursday, May 10, in connection with the benefit for the hospital.

STORE'S FIFTIETH YEAR.

Abraham & Straus Begin Month's Celebration of Jubilee.

Abraham & Straus will celebrate their fiftieth year of business with a month's celebration of jubilee. The celebration will extend from May 15 to June 15.
Mayer Criticised Changes.

Mr. Mayer criticised recent changes in the U.S. government and said that a national council of defense and a navy general staff should be created by statute, so that they could not be abolished by the executive order of a new secretary who did not want to approve them.

Surrogate Row Appealed.

Higher Court to Pass on Jury Trial of Holme Will Case.

Surrogate Fowler yesterday refused to vacate the order he signed last week disallowing the will of Linda Pasteur O'Connor, who is the instrumentality of her determination that no part of her $50,000 estate should be disposed of by her husband, Leonard Holmes, since he has been found guilty of bigamy.

General L. S. Mooney, of Mandy, Mooney & Amentino, one of Mr. Fowler's associates, went to court for a jury trial, which was denied by Surrogate Fowler. During the trial, Mr. Mooney worked on drafting a defense, with the help of the late Walter, and the lawyer was able to get the case to a jury trial.

New Jewish Magazine.

It Will Be Devoted to Advancement of American Jewry.

The first number of The Menehna Journal has just been published by the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Inc.

New Company, Headed by Copleand Townson, Takes It Over.

The Majestic Hotel, it is announced, has been leased for a long term to a new hotel company, of which Copleand Townson, for many years manager of the Hotel Imperial, and George C. P. Copleand, the manager of the Martha Washington Hotel, are the active representatives. The lease covers the hotel, the Tenement House, the Majestic Hotel, and the theatre.

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