
Franklin D. Roosevelt — “The Great Communicator”
The Master Speech Files, 1898, 1910-1945

Series 3: “The Four Freedoms” and FDR in World War II

File No. 1403-A

1941 December 15

**Message to Congress Reviewing History of
American-Japanese Relations**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This is the original
Dept of State memo.

DRAFT

December 10, 1941.

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Supplementing the message which I presented to the Congress on December 8, in regard to the treacherous attack made by Japan upon the United States, I wish to make for the information of the Congress a statement in further reference to the attitude and policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and to the events leading up to the attack by Japan upon the United States.

I

Present developments in the Pacific can best be understood against the historical background of our relations in that area.

In the closing decades of the eighteenth century, American traders began the development of our direct contacts with eastern Asia. A little over a hundred years ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam -- in which treaty there was made provision for perpetual peace and for dependable relationships. By that time American missionaries were beginning

to

to work in eastern Asia. Ten years later Caleb Cushing began the negotiation of our first treaty with China, and in 1844 that treaty, containing provision for most-favored-nation treatment, was concluded. In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors, and in the next years those doors began to open.

From the earliest days of our relations with countries of the Pacific area the United States has consistently urged in regard to that area, as it has done in its relations with all other parts of the world, the fundamental importance of fair and equal treatment among nations. Our people and our officials have felt that policies shaped along those lines express the traditional liberal concepts of the people of this country and thus best serve the legitimate interests of the United States. Our Government has consistently espoused the principle of equal treatment of commerce. Whenever there have been indications that one or more of various nations were inclined to encroach on the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has used its influence against such tendencies,

tendencies, no matter what were the nations that manifested them. There was a period when this was especially important to Japan. It has at all times been important to China. In these fundamental respects, our concepts and our action in regard to all countries of the Far East have been consistently the same.

A new chapter in our history began with occurrences at the end of the nineteenth century.

Sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country; and this country pledged itself to pursue a policy toward the Philippines calculated to equip them to become a free and independent nation.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions". There was talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" came into prominence and that, in 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China ... protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and

international

international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Since 1898, the American Government has been conducting in the Philippines the unprecedented experiment of acquainting an Asiatic people with the methods of personal freedom and national self-government that are practiced by our own Republic. Our constant aim has been to develop the Filipino people into a self-governing and independent commonwealth. At the same time, this farsighted experiment has been and is of far-reaching importance to us and to other peoples. It is important to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in the western Pacific a nation friendly to us by virtue of close association and profitable relations with us. Our presence in the Philippines has helped make known to the peoples of the Orient the name, the culture, the commerce, and the good repute of the United States. It has helped to establish and to stabilize our relations in general with those regions of the Pacific from which there come materials which are indispensable to our economy not only in time of peace

but

but even more in time of war and to which we sell in increasing amounts our manufactured products and some of our raw materials.

We have made good our pledge to the Philippine Islands. We have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy.

In the year 1900 the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes. The two Governments jointly declared that not only were they determined to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire" but also that it was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean", and that "the policy of both Governments" was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has constantly practised and supported these principles.

Following the close of the first World War nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in

conference in Washington in 1921. China, Japan, and the United States were among them. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Treaties and agreements which interlocked and were dependent one upon another were concluded at that conference. One of these was the

(see Annex 1)
Nine Power Treaty/which contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China. There was likewise a treaty/between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament.

The course of events which have led directly to the present crisis may be taken as having begun ten years ago.

In 1931 Japan undertook on a large scale the policy of conquest in China by commencing its seizure of Manchuria. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations endeavored at once and during many months of continuous effort to induce Japan to revert to peaceful procedures.

The United States supported that effort. While the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese armed forces was going forward, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, sent identical notes (see Annex 2) to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments declaring that the United States did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by means contrary to the provisions of the Pact of Paris -- on which we have firmly stood.

The "Manchuria incident" set the example and in no small measure the pattern for courses soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe.

In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It promptly became evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. She had, as it presently developed, the support and concurrence of Italy whose Government had resolved on a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean. If the various steps taken by Germany, Italy, and Japan were timed together,

together, they would gain effectiveness. It gradually became apparent through the following years that Germany, Italy, and Japan had reached an understanding for the synchronizing of their moves of aggression to their common advantage.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note (see Annex 3) to the United States stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was fundamentally incapable of friendly solution and that Japan had "no intention whatever to provoke or make trouble with any other power". Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied (see Annex 4) that he appreciated and reciprocated these cordial sentiments.

But almost immediately the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government gave indications of intentions utterly inconsistent with these assurances so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Through our Ambassador in Tokyo our Government stated (see Annex 5) that in the opinion of the American people,

and

and of the American Government, no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully override the rights, obligations, and legitimate interests of other sovereign states.

The structure of peace set up by the Washington Conference treaties was, in fact, being discarded by Japan. In December of 1934 the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament.

Japan thereafter intensified her rearmament program. Increasingly she took measures obviously directed toward extending her domination over neighboring areas and destroying the lawful rights and interests in those areas of other countries including the United States.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern Pact.

The stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened large-scale military operations against China. Soon Japan's leaders were publicly declaring

their

their intention to achieve and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific. This, if achieved, would make them masters of a region containing almost one half the population of the earth. It would likewise give them complete control of sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans and wounded or otherwise physically abused American men, women, and children. They sank American vessels -- including a naval vessel -- and they imperiled others. They bombed American hospitals, churches, and schools. They destroyed American property, ruined American business, crippled American trade, and in general showed utter disregard of our rights both in law and under treaties. This was over and above the incalculable damage done to China, the ghastly suffering inflicted upon the Chinese people, the wholesale injuries done to other nations, to civilization, and to the cause of peace and good will among men.

There are attached lists (see Annexes 6, 7, 8, 9) of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of interferences with American nationals, rights and interests. These lists are not absolutely complete. They afford, however, indisputable and ample evidence of the flagrant disregard of American rights and of civilized standards which Japan and its agents have shown during recent years.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini, embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest, have, since 1935, without provocation or excuse attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen other countries. Their conquests

conquests have been carried out in utter ruthlessness and with the most revolting brutality. The machinery set up for unlimited conquest included and still includes not only enormous armed forces but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, and propaganda. This machine -- unprecedented in size -- has world-wide ramifications, and with it the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

In 1940, Germany, Italy and Japan concluded a treaty of alliance avowedly aimed at the United States.

We are confronted today in the Pacific with a repetition of the strategy pursued by Hitler in Europe. Methods used by one or another of the allied aggressors with temporary success are speedily and faithfully imitated by the others. They consist of progressively seizing power and control over neighboring peoples by infiltration, encirclement, and finally armed attack -- all carefully planned and treacherously executed.

III

After this fashion, and pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan worked her way into and finally seized

Manchuria.

Manchuria. She invaded and she has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate China. Japanese armed forces, passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, have step by step invaded and taken possession of Indochina. They have extended their procedure of conquest into Thailand. These aggressions have borne and continue to bear hideous fruits of rapine, torture, massacre, and destruction.

To the eastward of the Philippines Japan extended her threatening activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands in violation of the mandate under which she received twenty years ago the custody of those islands.

Japan's spokesmen have cloaked these conquests and movements of aggression with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia" and of the "Co-Prosperity Sphere in Greater East Asia". What that meant was the enslavement of every nation and group which they could bring within their power.

Many of Japan's spokesmen have long threatened to extend their conquest to the Philippine Islands, the

Dutch East Indies, the British outpost of Singapore, and even Australia.

By these moves of aggression, Japan compelled various countries, including our own, to place and maintain in the Pacific, for self-defense, large armed forces and a vast amount of matériel -- as the alternative to abandoning their lifelines of commerce, their peaceful civilization, and their capacity of self-defense in that area. But for the threat created by Japan, the powers engaged in resistance to Hitler's and Mussolini's efforts at conquest might long since have been using most of this huge aggregate of defensive weapons in the European and Atlantic theaters of operations and toward destruction of Hitler.

IV

Throughout the period in which Japan was proceeding step by step with a course and program of aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations

relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, thirteen countries which have interests in the Far East, twelve of which were signatories or adherents to the Nine Power Treaty, met at Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened,

opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate but Japan again declined.

On November 24 the Conference adopted a declaration in the course of which it said:

"The Conference believes that a prompt suspension of hostilities in the Far East would be in the best interests not only of China and Japan but of all nations. With each day's continuance of the conflict the loss in lives and property increases and the ultimate solution of the conflict becomes more difficult.

"The Conference therefore strongly urges that hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes."

Japan scorned the Conference and paid no attention to the recommendation.

It became abundantly clear that, unless the course of affairs in the Far East was halted, and unless considerations of justice, humanity, and fair dealing once more became dominant, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which walk throughout the continental limits of Europe. These horrors are now in full swing in the Pacific. But in an endeavor to halt and end this process by peaceful means while there seemed

still

still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months conversations have been carried on between and among the highest officials of this country and of Japan for the purpose of arriving if possible at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

In entering into and throughout these conversations this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also the legitimate interests of Japan -- and those of other countries. When the conversations touched upon questions relating to the rights and interests of other countries, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

Throughout the conversations this Government steadfastly supported certain basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we especially stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows:- The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and

conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. Basically these are the essential principles of peace, law, order, and fair dealing among nations.

During the course of the conversations, the Japanese Government offered in succession various formulas for its basic terms, in all of which every statement of pacific intent was qualified and restricted. It became clear as each proposal was explored that Japan did not intend to budge one iota from the fundamental tenets of its military leaders.

Japan manifested no disposition to renounce its association with Hitlerism. It insisted that its obligations under the Tripartite Alliance -- a direct threat to this country -- would be fulfilled by Japan.

Japan was willing to affirm its adherence to the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, but refused to relinquish in practice the preferential position which it had arrogated to itself in all areas under Japanese occupation.

Japan insisted upon obtaining in its hostilities with China a victor's peace and on having our assent thereto.

Japan refused to make practical application of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. It insisted upon continuing to maintain its armed forces in large areas of China for an indefinite period -- a clear indication of intention to effectuate a permanent control over that country.

Japan, while declaring it her intention to pursue peaceful courses, took action directly belying that profession.

In July the Japanese Government forced from the Vichy Government of France an agreement permitting the placing of Japanese armed forces in Southern Indochina, and began sending troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government were thereupon suspended -- naturally.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations

were

were resumed. At that time the Japanese Government made a suggestion that there be held a meeting of the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan. I should have been happy to have traveled thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for the purpose described, but I felt it desirable, in order to assure that that meeting would accomplish the objectives in view, to attempt before so doing to make sure of a meeting of minds regarding the interpretation of certain principles and the practical application thereof to concrete problems in the Pacific area. This Government tried hard -- but without success -- to obtain such clarification from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941 (see Annex 10).

Thereafter,

Thereafter, although several formulas were offered and discussed, the Japanese Government gave no indication of desire or intention to desist from courses of conquest and pursue courses of peace. In consequence, no progress was made toward achievement of an agreement. Finally, on November 20 (see Annex II) the Japanese Government presented a narrow proposal containing suggested provisions of a modus vivendi. The plan thus offered called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, suspension of freezing measures, and discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern French Indochina to northern French Indochina, but placing no limit on the number of the armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina and no provision for withdrawal of the said forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area. The plan contained no provision for reversion by Japan to peaceful courses. Such a proposal offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. At that point the American Government in order to clarify the issues felt called upon to offer -- and it presented to the Japanese Government on November 26 (see Annex III) -- a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement. In presenting that plan, it stated that what it was offering was a practical example of a program such as this Government felt susceptible of being made the basis

Thereafter, although several formulae were offered and discussed, the Japanese Government gave no indication of desire or intention to desist from courses of conquest and pursue courses of peace. In consequence, no progress was made toward achievement of an agreement. Finally, on November 20 (see Annex //) the Japanese Government presented a narrow proposal containing suggested provisions of a modus vivendi. The plan thus offered called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, suspension of freezing measures, and discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained no provision for reversion by Japan to peaceful courses. Such a proposal offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. At that point the American Government in order to clarify the issues felt called upon to offer -- and it presented to the Japanese Government on November 26 (see Annex /2) -- a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement, / In presenting that plan, it stated that what it was offering was a practical example of a program such as this Government felt susceptible of being made the basis

for further discussion.

During the final phases of these conversations, the Government of the United States learned beyond possibility of doubt that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and additional equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that under cover of the negotiations such forces were being disposed for some attack on unspecified objectives. These disposals included moving into strategic positions in the Gulf of Thailand. That disposal was apparently designed not merely to intimidate or assault Thailand but also to set up bases for attacks southward against Singapore and northward against the Burma road.

I promptly asked (see Annex/3) of the Japanese Government a frank statement as to its intent in augmenting its forces in Indochina, and I promptly was given an utterly evasive and specious reply (see Annex/4). Simultaneously, the Japanese disposals went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that disposals were being made for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind I addressed, on the evening of December 6, a personal message (see Annex 15) to the Emperor of Japan, of which you already have full knowledge. You are aware of the fact that Japanese armed forces were at that very moment moving for attack upon Hawaii and upon the Philippines, and that on the morning of Sunday, December 7, they struck -- at both points.

To this Government's proposal of November 26 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7, when the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent here to assist in peaceful negotiations delivered to the Secretary of State one hour after the Japanese attack upon us in the Pacific a lengthy document. That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes later aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

We did not know then, as we know now, that disposals were being made for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind I addressed, on the evening of December 6, a personal message (see Annex 15) to the Emperor of Japan, of which you already have full knowledge. You are aware of the fact that Japanese armed forces were at that very moment moving for attack upon Hawaii and upon the Philippines, and that on the morning of Sunday, December 7, they struck -- at both points.

To this Government's proposal of November 26 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7, when the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent here to assist in peaceful negotiations delivered to the Secretary of State one hour after the Japanese attack upon us in the Pacific a lengthy document. That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes later aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions -- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

To my message of December 6 to the Emperor of Japan invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve peace, the Emperor probably was afforded by his entourage no opportunity to give consideration.

Japan's reply, made by Japan's militant leaders and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of an attack without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

The Congress, in reply to Japan's action and utterance, has declared that a state of war, thrust upon the United States by Japan, prevails, and has authorized and directed me to employ all the forces and all the resources of the Government to carry on this conflict and bring it to a successful termination.

*Substantive
Attack*

Substitute for second and third paragraphs on page 24
(just above the middle of the page):

To my message of December 6 to the Emperor of Japan invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve peace, there has come to me on December 10 a reply, conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated December 8, 1 p.m. The Ambassador, Mr. Grew, reports that at seven o'clock on the morning of the 8th the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked him to call at his official residence; that the Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum dated December 8 the text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the American Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m. on Sunday, December 7); that the Foreign Minister had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum under reference be regarded as the Emperor's reply to my message. Further, the Ambassador reports, the Foreign Minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his

gratefulness

gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President". The message further continued to the effect that, in regard to our inquiries on the subject of augmentation of Japanese forces in French Indochina, His Majesty had commanded his Government to state its views to the American Government. The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact."

Japan's real reply, made by Japan's militant leaders and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of an attack without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

We are at war. We are fighting in self-defense.

We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice against an effort unprecedented as regards the ferocity of those who make it to overthrow those principles and impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too, a host of them, have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her, through the wholesale invasion of her territory, by Japan. After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with complete confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

At this point name all the other countries that have declared war.] These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting as are we, first to put an end to

Japan's

Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good
the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace
under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are today and "for the
duration" united--totally united--in determination to
devote the whole of our national capacity to whatever
effort may be required to bring conclusively to an end
the movement of aggression and conquest by force which
has long menaced us and which now has struck deliberately
and directly at us.

Sir
Draft

DRAFT

December 10, 1941.

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

On December 8, 1941, I presented ~~impassion~~ to the Congress
~~in person~~ a message, ^{as a answer} asking for a declaration of war in response to the treacherous
~~by Japan~~ attack ~~made~~ the previous day ~~upon~~ upon the United States. For
the information of the Congress and as a public record of the facts, I
am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this
country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events

^{this}
leading up to the Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached
hereto are the various documents and correspondence
implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1853, the United States
entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was
a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing began the negotiation of our
first treaty with China. In 1844 that treaty, containing provision for
most-favored-nation treatment, was concluded.

In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors. In the
next few years those doors began to open; and Japan which had kept itself

aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call modern civilisation. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions". There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American

Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China ... protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Ever since that day, we have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1908 the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes.

In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that ~~not-only~~
~~and~~
~~were~~ they determined to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire"; ~~and~~ also that it was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean"; and and that "the policy of both Governments" was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has constantly practiced ~~and-supported~~ the

principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the first World War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty (see Annex /). It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

Another
There was ~~also~~ a treaty (see Annex /) between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament.

The course of events which have led directly to the present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then — in 1931 — that Japan undertook on a large scale its ^{present} policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The

Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. *For example,* ~~while the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese armed forces was going forward, the~~ ~~Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, declared in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments (see Annex 2) that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties.~~

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. *Indeed the entire world was doomed to experience the poisoning fangs of aggression.*

In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe.

Italy — then still under the domination of Mussolini — also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the ~~following~~ years, *which followed,* Germany, Italy and Japan reached

an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage -- and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note (see Annex) to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was fundamentally incapable of ^{amicable} ~~friendly~~ solution. He added that Japan had "no intention whatever to provoke or make trouble with any other power". Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied (see Annex) ^{friendly} in kind,

But in spite of this exchange of ^{friendly} sentiments and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government belied these assurances -- at least so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Through our Ambassador in Tokyo our Government thereupon expressed ^{t. Japan} the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states (See Annex 5.)

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the
began to be
Washington Conference treaties ~~was~~ ^{had} ~~ever~~ discarded by
Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave
notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6,
1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. *It*,

Japan thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament
program. [She took measure after measure obviously directed toward
domination over neighboring areas and destruction of the lawful rights
and interests in those areas of all other countries -- including
the United States.]

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself
with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern Pact.

This Pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against
the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of
fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain,
France and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the
stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July
1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened new

large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

^{THAT}
They accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty million Germans were by race, training, ability and might, superior in every way to any other race in Europe -- superior to about four hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, through its rapidly ~~and~~ imitative process, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other inhabitants of the Orient -- nearly all of whom in culture and civilization were infinitely older and more developed than themselves. Their conceit would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women, and children. They sank

American vessels — including a naval vessel, the Panay. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed American property, they obstructed, and in some cases, crippled American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other nations — flouting all the principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto (see ^{reflected} Annexes 6, 7, 8 and 9) lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of interferences with American nationals, rights and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of American rights and civilized standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest, since 1935, without provocation or excuse have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen independent nations. The machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, propaganda and sabotage. This machine -- unprecedented in size -- has world-wide ramifications; and ~~and~~ the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly ^{Combined} joined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere -- if it were successful in ~~and~~ the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World would-be a stemming challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their schemes of destruction.

This they did last year, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan ~~secretly~~ aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, encirclement, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III.

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her. Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indochina. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest into the territory of Thailand -- and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma. The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese time-table; and it is probable that further down the Japanese page ~~will~~ ^{are} the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other Islands of the Pacific, including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Caroline,

Marshall and Mariana Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia"; and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in ^{by intended} Greater East Asia". What they ~~want~~ was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment — not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan -- but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese State. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.

IV

Throughout this course and program of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade

the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever they both considered it desirable, we stood ready to exercise our good offices in the cause of peace. During the following years of conflict our attitude remained unchanged.

In October 1937, thirteen countries which ~~had~~ ^{had} interests in the Far East, met at Brussels to endeavor to bring about by peaceful means, an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China. Of all the powers invited, only Japan and Germany declined to attend, although Japan was itself an original signatory of the Nine-Power treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937 the Conference adopted a declaration, urging

[in the course of which it said:

"The Conference believes that a prompt suspension of hostilities in the Far East would be in the best interests not only of China and Japan but of all nations. With each day's continuance of the conflict the loss in lives and property increases and the ultimate solution of the conflict becomes more difficult.

"The Conference therefore strongly urges [that] hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes."

Japan scorned the Conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this course of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

P. J. Neff, In this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

There
For nine months [conversations have been] carried on,
[between the United States and Japan] for the purpose of arriving
at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

all of
Throughout these conversations, this Government took into
account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but
also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating
to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up,
this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives
of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States
Throughout the conversations this Government steadfastly
advocated certain basic principles which should govern international
relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity
and sovereignty of ~~such~~ and all nations.

The principle of non-interference (?) in the internal
affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international cooperation
and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of contro-
versies.

Asia first,

The Japanese Government repeatedly offered qualified
statements of peaceful intention. But it became clear, as each
proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any
way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world.

Japan

Although she continually maintained ^{that} she was promoting only
the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal
assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy
alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese Government connived with
Hitler to force from the vassal (?) Government of France permission
to place Japanese armed forces in southern Indochina; and began sending
her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese
Government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent
request of the Japanese Government, which again made emphatic profes-
sion of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

Japan


At that time the Japanese Government made ^a suggestion
that ~~Japanese held a meeting of~~ the responsible heads of the Japanese
Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means
^{meet personally}

for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the ~~United States and Japan~~ ^{two countries}. I should have been happy to ~~have traveled~~ travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic principles. This Government tried hard — but without success — to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941 (see Annex /D).

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and discussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941 (see Annex //), the Japanese Government presented a new and narrow proposal, which called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal offered ^{obviously} no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented to the Japanese Government on November 26 (see Annex 12) a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement. 

In the midst of these conversations, ^{the Government of} ~~the United States~~ learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and masses of equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that under cover of the negotiations attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked (see Annex 13) ~~the Japanese Govern-~~ ^{for} a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina. I was given an evasive and specious reply (see Annex 14). Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined ^{however,} to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan (see Annex /S/).

To this Government's proposal of November 26 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese ^{to the United States} Government had sent ~~here~~ to assist in peaceful negotiations, delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory ^{America} and citizens in the Pacific.

That document (see Annex /b/) was a few minutes ^{after its receipt} aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

To my message of December 6 to the Emperor of Japan in-

voking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve peace,

there had ^{further} come to me on December 10 a reply, conveyed in a telegraphic

report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated December 8, 1 p. m. (Tokyo-

time?). P The Ambassador, Mr. Brew, reports that at seven o'clock on the morn-
ing of the 8th the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs ~~arrived~~ ^{came} to
call at his official residence; that the Foreign Minister handed the
Ambassador a memorandum dated December 3 the text of which had been
transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented
to the American Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered
by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:30 p. m. on
Sunday, December 7); that the Foreign Minister had been in touch with
the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum under
~~reference~~ be regarded as the Emperor's reply to my message. P Further,
the Ambassador reports, the Foreign Minister made an oral statement.
Textually, the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his
gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the Presi-
dent". The message further continued to the effect that, in regard
to our inquiries on the subject of ~~migration~~ ^{increased} of Japanese forces in
French Indochina, His Majesty had commanded his Government to state

its views to the American Government. The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact."

However, war lords Japan's real reply, made by Japan's militant leaders and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of the attack without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

There is the record, for all history to read in amazement and in horror and in disgust:

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defense. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too, a host of them, have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her ~~through the whole-scale-invasion~~ of her territory by Japan. After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her Allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.

At this point name all the other countries that have declared war. These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting as are we, first to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and man-power to

bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force
which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately
and directly at the safety of the United States.

- - - - -

Annexes:

1. Senate Document No. 124,
67th Congress, 2nd Session,
which contains texts of
Washington Conference
Treaties and Resolutions.
2. Identical notes to the Japanese
and the Chinese Governments,
January 7, 1932.
3. Note from the Japanese Minister
for Foreign Affairs, handed to
the Secretary of State by the
Japanese Ambassador, February 21,
1934.
4. Reply thereto, handed to the
Japanese Ambassador by the
Secretary of State on March 3,
1934.
5. Statement by the American Ambassador
to Japan to the Japanese Minister
for Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1934.
6. List of American nationals killed or
wounded by Japanese forces in China
since July 7, 1937.
7. List of American property in China
reported to have been damaged, de-
stroyed, or seriously endangered by
Japanese air bombing or air machine-
gunning since July 7, 1937.
8. List of American nationals reported
to have been assaulted, arbitrarily
detained, subjected to indignities,
et cetera, since July 7, 1937, by
Japanese authorities or agents.
9. List of Japanese interferences with
American trade and enterprise in China.
10. [redacted] document handed by the Secre-
tary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
on October 2, 1941.
11. [redacted] document handed to the Secre-
tary of State by the Japanese Ambassador
on November 20, 1941.
12. [redacted] document handed by the Secre-
tary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
on November 26, 1941.
13. [redacted] memorandum addressed by the
President to the Secretary and the Under
Secretary of State, copy of which, under
authorization of the President, was read
and handed by the Under Secretary of
State to the Japanese Ambassador on
December 2, 1941.
14. Reply thereto, handed to the Secretary
of State by the Japanese Ambassador on
December 5, 1941.
15. Personal message from the President to
the Emperor of Japan, December 6, 1941.
16. [redacted] document handed by the Japanese
Ambassador to the Secretary of State,
December 7, 1941.

P.P.E.

1F

file

1/16/41

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

On December 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For the information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1853, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1864 there was concluded our first treaty with China.

In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilisation. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United

States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions". There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Ever since that day, we have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1898 the Government of the United States and

the Government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes. In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that they were determined to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire"; that it was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean"; and that "the policy of both Governments" was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the First World War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty (see Annex 1). It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

Another was a treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament. (see Annex 1)

The course of events which have led directly to the

present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then — in 1931 — that Japan undertook on a large scale its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specifically stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that it would not recognise any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties. (see Annex 2)

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. Italy — then still under the domination of Mussolini — also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage — and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution".

He added that Japan had "no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other Power". (see Annex 3) Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied in kind. (see Annex 4)

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government began to belie these assurances — at least so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Our Government thereupon expressed to Japan the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states. (see Annex 5)

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Washington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern Pact.

This Pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain, France and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In

July 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened new large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

They thus accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty million Germans were by race, training, ability and might, superior in every way to any other race in Europe — superior to about four hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, following suit, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other inhabitants of the Orient — nearly all of whom were infinitely older and more developed in culture and civilization than themselves. Their conceit would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women, and children. They sank American vessels — including a naval vessel, the Panay. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed American property. They obstructed, and in some cases, drove out, American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other nations —

flouting all the principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto (see respectively Annexes 6, 7, 8 and 9) lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of interference with American nationals, rights and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of American rights and civilized standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest. Since 1935, without provocation or excuse they have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen independent nations. The machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, propaganda and sabotage. This machine — unprecedented in size — has world-wide ramifications; and into them the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly

combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere — if it were successful in the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, encirclement, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippines Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indochina. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest throughout Thailand — and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma.

The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese time-table; and it is probable that further down the Japanese page, are the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other Islands of the Pacific — including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia"; and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia". What they really intended was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment — not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan — but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese State. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.

IV

Throughout this course and program of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937 the Conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes".

Japan scorned the Conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this source of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality — including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies.

The Japanese Government, it is true, repeatedly offered qualified statements of peaceful intention. But it became clear, as each proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese Government connived with Hitler to force from the Vichy Government of France, permission to place Japanese armed forces in southern Indochina; and began sending her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government were therupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which again made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

At that time the Japanese Government made the suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States meet personally to dis-

cess means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the two countries. I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic principles. This Government tried hard — but without success — to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 8, 1941 (see Annex 10).

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and discussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese Government presented a new and narrow proposal, (see Annex 11) which called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained however no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented to the Japanese Government on November 26, a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement. (see Annex 12)

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

In section one there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China. Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as follows: (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; (c) not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocity.

most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and (i) to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that, under cover of the negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese Government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina. (see Annex 15) I was given an evasive and specious reply (see Annex 14). Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they had ordered and were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan. (see Annex 16).

To this Government's proposal of November 28 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations, delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my Message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7, at 1:40 P.M., Washington Time, 7:40 A.M. Honolulu Time of same day — Monday, December 8, 8:20 A.M.

Tokyo Time.

To my message of December 6 (9 P.M. Washington Time — December 7, 11 A.M. Tokyo Time) to the Emperor of Japan, invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve peace, there has finally come to me on December 10 (6.25 A.M. Washington Time — December 10, 8.25 P.M., Tokyo Time) a reply, conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated December 8, 1 P.M. (December 7, 11 P.M., Washington Time).

The Ambassador reported that at seven o'clock on the morning of the 8th (December 7, 5 P.M., Washington Time) the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked him to call at his official residence; that the Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum dated December 6 (December 7, Washington Time) the text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the American Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2.20 P.M. on Sunday, December 7 (Monday, December 8, 4.20 A.M., Tokyo Time); that the Foreign Minister had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum be regarded as the Emperor's reply to my message.

Further, the Ambassador reports, the Foreign Minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President". The message further continued to the effect that, in regard to our inquiries on the subject of increase of Japanese forces in French Indochina,

His Majesty had commanded his Government to state its views to the American Government. The message concluded, tentatively, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact."

Japan's real reply, however, made by Japan's war lords and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of the attack which had already been made without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

There is the record, for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust!

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defense. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too — a host of them — have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her by Japan.

After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her Allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.

All but three of the governments of nations overrun by German armies have declared war on Japan. The other three are severing relations.

In our own Hemisphere many of our Sister Republics have declared war on Japan and the others have given firm expression of their solidarity with the United States.

The following are the countries which have to date declared war against Japan:

Australia
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
The Netherlands
Nicaragua
New Zealand
Panama
El Salvador
South Africa
United Kingdom
Poland

These and other peace-loving countries will be

- 20 -

fighting as are we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and man-power to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force which has long harassed the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

December , 1941.

Annexes:

1. Senate Document No. 184
67th Congress, 2nd Session,
which contains texts of
Washington Conference
Treaties and Resolutions.
2. Identical notes to the Japanese
and the Chinese Governments,
January 7, 1932.
3. Note from the Japanese Minister
for Foreign Affairs, handed to
the Secretary of State by the
Japanese Ambassador, February 21, 1934.
4. Reply thereto, handed to the
Japanese Ambassador by the
Secretary of State on March 5, 1934.
5. Statement by the American Ambassador
to Japan to the Japanese Minister
for Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1934.
6. List of American nationals killed or
wounded by Japanese forces in China
since July 7, 1937.
7. List of American property in China
reported to have been damaged, de-
stroyed, or seriously endangered by
Japanese air bombing or air machine-
gunning since July 7, 1937.
8. List of American nationals reported
to have been assaulted, arbitrarily
detained, subjected to indignities,
et cetera, since July 7, 1937, by
Japanese authorities or agents.
9. List of Japanese interferences with
American trade and enterprise in China.
10. Document handed by the Secretary of
State to the Japanese Ambassador on
October 2, 1941.
11. Document handed to the Secretary of State,
by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941.
12. Document handed by the Secretary of State to
the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941.
13. Memorandum addressed by the President to the
Secretary and the Under Secretary of State,
copy of which, under authorization of the
President, was read and handed by the Under
Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
on December 2, 1941.
14. Reply thereto, handed to the Secretary
of State by the Japanese Ambassador on
December 5, 1941.
15. Personal message from the President to
the Emperor of Japan, December 6, 1941.
16. Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador
to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941.

P.P.E.

1F

file

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

On December 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For the information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1853, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1844 there was concluded our first treaty with China.

In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could assert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United

States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions". There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Ever since that day, we have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1908 the Government of the United States and

the Government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes. In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that they were determined to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire"; that it was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean"; and that "the policy of both Governments" was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the first World War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty (see Annex 1). It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

Another was a treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament. (see Annex 1)

The course of events which have led directly to the

present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then -- in 1931 -- that Japan undertook on a large scale its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specifically stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties. (see Annex 2)

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. Italy -- then still under the domination of Mussolini -- also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage -- and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution".

He added that Japan had "no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other Power". (see Annex 5) Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied in kind. (see Annex 4)

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government began to belie these assurances — at least so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Our Government therupon expressed to Japan the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states. (see Annex 5)

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Washington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern Pact.

This Pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain, France and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In

July 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened new large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

They thus accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty million Germans were by race, training, ability and might, superior in every way to any other race in Europe — superior to about four hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, following suit, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other inhabitants of the Orient — nearly all of whom were infinitely older and more developed in culture and civilisation than themselves. Their conceit would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women, and children. They sank American vessels — including a naval vessel, the Panay. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed American property. They obstructed, and in some cases, drove out, American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other nations —

flouting all the principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto (see respectively Annexes 8, 7, 8 and 9) lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of interference with American nationals, rights and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of American rights and civilised standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest. Since 1935, without provocation or excuse they have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen independent nations. The machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organisations for carrying on plots, intrigues, intimidation, propaganda and sabotage. This machine — unprecedented in size — has world-wide ramifications; and into them the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly

combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere — if it were successful in the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, encirclement, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indochina. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest throughout Thailand — and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma.

The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese time-table; and it is probable that further down the Japanese page, are the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other Islands of the Pacific — including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia"; and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia". What they really intended was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment — not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan — but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese State. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.

IV

Throughout this course and program of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937 the Conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes".

Japan scorned the Conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this source of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality -- including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies.

The Japanese Government, it is true, repeatedly offered qualified statements of peaceful intention. But it became clear, as each proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese Government connived with Hitler to force from the Vichy Government of France, permission to place Japanese armed forces in southern Indochina; and began sending her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which again made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

At that time the Japanese Government made the suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States meet personally to dis-

other means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the two countries. I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic principles. This Government tried hard -- but without success -- to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941 (see Annex 10).

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and discussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese Government presented a new and narrow proposal, (see Annex 11) which called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained however no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented to the Japanese Government on November 28, a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement. (see Annex 12)

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

In section one there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China. Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as follows: (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; (c) not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocity.

most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the stabilisation of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purposes of this agreement; and (i) to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that, under cover of the negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese Government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina. (see Annex 15) I was given an evasive and specious reply (see Annex 14). Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they had ordered and were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan. (see Annex 15).

To this Government's proposal of November 26 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations, delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my Message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7, at 1:20 P.M., Washington Time, 7:50 A.M. Honolulu Time of same day — Monday, December 8, 8:20 A.M.

Tokyo Time.

To my message of December 6 (9 P.M. Washington Time -- December 7, 11 A.M. Tokyo Time) to the Emperor of Japan, invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve peace, there has finally come to me on December 10 (6.25 A.M. Washington Time -- December 10, 8.25 P.M., Tokyo Time) a reply, conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated December 8, 1 P.M. (December 7, 11 P.M., Washington Time).

The Ambassador reported that at seven o'clock on the morning of the 8th (December 7, 5 P.M., Washington Time) the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked him to call at his official residence; that the Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum dated December 8 (December 7, Washington Time) the text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the American Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2.20 P.M. on Sunday, December 7 (Monday, December 8, 4.20 A.M., Tokyo Time); that the Foreign Minister had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum be regarded as the Emperor's reply to my message.

Further, the Ambassador reports, the Foreign Minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President". The message further continued to the effect that, in regard to our inquiries on the subject of increase of Japanese forces in French Indochina,

His Majesty had commanded his Government to state its views to the American Government. The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific, and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realisation of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact."

Japan's real reply, however, made by Japan's war lords and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of the attack which had already been made without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

There is the record, for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust!

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defence. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too — a host of them — have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her by Japan.

After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her Allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.

All but three of the governments of nations overrun by German armies have declared war on Japan. The other three are severing relations.

In our own Hemisphere many of our Sister Republics have declared war on Japan and the others have given firm expression of their solidarity with the United States.

The following are the countries which have to date declared war against Japan:

Australia
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
The Netherlands
Nicaragua
New Zealand
Panama
El Salvador
South Africa
United Kingdom
Poland

These and other peace-loving countries will be

- 20 -

fighting as are we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and man-power to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

December , 1941.



*Corrections
made*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

There is attached a corrected page 15.

There is attached also a list of corrections on
pages 2, 8, 11, 16, 21, and 27 (list of Annexes).

On the bottom of page 25, the names of all the
countries which have to date declared war against Japan
need to be inserted.

We are also working on a statement, to be inserted
at the top of page 22, containing a summary of the plan
presented to the Japanese Government by this Government
on November 26.

Enclosures:

1. Corrected page 15.
2. List of corrections.

ctt

RA
December 9, 1941.

LIST OF STATES WHICH HAVE DECLARED
WAR ON JAPAN

December 8

Australia✓
Canada✓
Costa Rica✓
Dominican Republic✓
? Free French✓
Guatemala✓
Haiti✓
Honduras✓
The Netherlands✓
New Zealand✓
Panama✓
El Salvador✓
South Africa✓
United Kingdom✓

17 states

Greek Government in exile instructs its Minister at Tokyo to demand his passport. Belgian Government in exile expected to sever relations with Japan.
Polish Minister of Information makes declaration of solidarity. The Polish Ambassador indicated to Eu on December 9 that he desired that Poland not be overlooked in any list of belligerents.

December 9

China✓ (also on Germany and Italy)
Cuba✓
Nicaragua✓ ("de hecho")

Egypt decided to sever diplomatic relations with Japan. Norwegian Government in exile severing diplomatic relations with Japan.
Colombia severs relations with Japan.
Mexico severs relations with Japan

Davies

*Corrected
or copy*

relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened,

CORRECTIONS

- Page 8, line 1: Change the sentence beginning "Ten years later" to read "Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1844 there was concluded our first treaty with China". ✓
- Page 8, line 11: Change "to provoke or make trouble" to "to provoke and make trouble". ✓
- Page 8, line 12: Capitalize "P" in "Power".
- Page 11, line 17: Change "1936" to "1935" (the date of the beginning of the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy). ✓
- Page 16, line 5: Capitalize the initial "C" in "Conference". ✓ cut
- Page 21, line 22: Change "or" to "of". cut ✓
- Page 27 (list of Annexes): Delete the words "Copy of a" at the beginning of items numbered 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

There is attached a statement for insertion at the top of page 22 after the words "for further discussion". This additional statement consists of a summary of the plan presented to the Japanese Government by this Government on November 26.

Enclosure:
Statement to be
inserted at top
of page 22.

CH

Insert on page 22 after the words "for further discussion"

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

In section one^{there} was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other

foreign

foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China.

Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as follows:

- (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein;
- (c) not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or

powers

powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict
with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and
(i) to use their influence to cause other governments
to adhere to the basic political and economic principles
provided for in this suggested agreement.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE: F.Y.I.

The President is going to send his Message to Congress up on Monday. He said the mimeographing, etc. could be done today.

On Page 20 - end of line 7 is to be checked with State Dept. to find out whether that is Toyko time and if so to take out the question mark and parenthesis and to put in Washington time and December A.M. or P.M.

On Page 20 - line 8 check to see if that is Toyko time and to put into parenthesis the Washington date and the Washington time.

// (this is being done)

// Also to telephone the State Dept. and ask whether Norway, Belgium & Greece have actually declared War on Monday before message goes up.

Also tell State Dept. today I have not mentioned Luxembourg and Egypt and should I do it."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE:

Mr. Stone of the State Dept.
called to say that word had been
received from Ambassador Biddle as
of Dec. 11th that Poland is in a state
of war with Japan.

This should be added to the
list of countries at war with Japan
in the President's message to Congress.

dj

S -> ? -> -
Norway
Belgium & Greece) are now b/w
1932 -> Luxembourg & Egypt) /
OPI

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

The State Department reports
that no action has been taken by
Luxembourg. Egypt has broken off
diplomatic relations with Japan but
did not declare war, as she did not
declare war on Germany.

G. G. T.

Substitute for second and third paragraphs on page 24
(just above the middle of the page):

(From Washington, D.C., December 7, 11 a.m., Tokyo Time)
To my message of December 6 to the Emperor of Japan

invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to

(6:22 a.m. Washington Time, ^{from} December 10, 2:22 p.m.
preserve peace, there has come to me on December 10 a ^{Tokyo}
^{Time})

reply, conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American

(December 7, 11 p.m. Washington Time)
Ambassador at Tokyo dated December 8, 1 p.m. The Ambas-

sador, Mr. Grew, reports that at seven o'clock on the

(December 7, 5 p.m. Washington Time)
morning of the 8th the Japanese Minister for Foreign
Affairs asked him to call at his official residence;

that the Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memo-

(December 7 Washington Time)
randum dated December 8 the text of which had been
transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to

be presented to the American Government (this was the

memorandum which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassa-

dor to the Secretary of State at 2:30 p.m. on Sunday,

(Monday December 5, 4:10 a.m. Tokyo Time)
December 7); that the Foreign Minister had been in touch
with the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the

memorandum under reference be regarded as the Emperor's

reply to my message. Further, the Ambassador reports,

the Foreign Minister made an oral statement. Textually,

the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his

gratefulness

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement. To my message of December 6th (8 p.m., Washington Time, December 7th, 11 a.m., Tokyo Time) to the Emperor of Japan, invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve peace, there has finally come to me on December 10th (6:23 a.m., Washington Time, December 10th, 8:23 p.m., Tokyo Time) a reply, conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated December 8th, 1 p.m. (December 7th, 11 p.m., Washington Time).

The Ambassador reported that at seven o'clock on the morning of the 8th (December 7th, 5 p.m., Washington Time) the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked him to call at his official residence; that the Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum dated December 8th (December 7th, Washington Time) the text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the American Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m. on Sunday, December 7th (Monday, December 8th, 4:20 a.m., Tokyo Time); that the Foreign Minister had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum be regarded as the Emperor's reply to my message.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Copy of document handed to
the Secretary by the Japanese
Ambassador on November 20.

1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States
undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the
regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific
area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the
Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its
troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the
restoration of peace between Japan and China or the estab-
lishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that
it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the
southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of
the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrange-
ment which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall
cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those
goods and commodities which the two countries need in
Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutu-
ally undertake to restore their commercial relations to
those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply
Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to
refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial
to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between
Japan and China.

Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,
volume 4, p. 72.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

December 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the substance of the "stand-still" arrangement which you contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your message.

Inclosure:
Draft message to
the Emperor of Japan.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED

December 6, 1941.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our two countries for almost a century. Those developments are suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be overlooked which might

serve

serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.

In

In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or materiel to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the

amount

amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan's leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

~~DECLASSIFIED~~

December 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the substance of the "stand-still" arrangement which you contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your message.

Enclosure:
Draft message to
the Emperor of Japan.

Printed in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,
volume 4, pp. 722-723.

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

December 6, 1941.

DECLASSIFIED

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives of our two Governments for many months for the purpose of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken peace which has been maintained between our two countries for almost a century. These developments are suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel that no possibility should be overlooked which might

serve

serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.

In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or material to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

As much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the

amount

amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan's leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.

Master Speech File # 1403

FDRL Copy