TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

On December 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For the information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate moves leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1853, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1864 there was concluded our first treaty with China.

In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan’s doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "seemingly free concessions." There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China ..., protect all rights guaranteed to foreign powers by treaty and international law and safeguard for the USA the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."
Ever since that day, we have consistently and unflinchingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1908 the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes. In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that they were determined to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire"; that it was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean"; and that "the policy of both Governments was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the first World War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty (see Annex 1). It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

Another was a treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament. (see Annex 1)

The course of events which have led directly to the present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then -- in 1931 -- that Japan undertook on a large scale its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specifically stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties. (see Annex 2)

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. Italy -- then still under the domination of Mussolini -- also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage -- and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". He added that Japan had "no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other Power", (see Annex 3) Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied in kind. (see Annex 4)

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese
Government began to belie these assurances — at least so far as the
rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Our Government thereupon expressed to Japan the view of
the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation
has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests
of other sovereign states. (see Annex 5)

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Wash-
ington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed,
in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its in-
tention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had
limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified
and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself
with Germany by entering the anti-Demintern Pact.

This Fact, as we all know, was nominally directed against
the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism
against the Free world, particularly against Great Britain, France
and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the
stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July
1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened new
large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders,
dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to
acquire and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region
of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

They thus accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty
million Germans were by race, training, ability and might, superior
in every way to any other race in Europe -- superior to about four
hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, following
suit, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people
were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other in-
habitants of the Orient -- nearly all of whom were infinitely older
and more developed in culture and civilization than themselves. Their
concept would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half
the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of
vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly
disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans.
They wounded or abused American men, women, and children. They sank
American vessels -- including a naval vessel, the Panay. They bombed
American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed
American property. They obstructed, and in some cases, drove out,
American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage
upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese people. They were
inflicting wholesale injuries upon other nations -- flouting all the
principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto (see respectively Annexes 6, 7, 8
and 9) lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces
in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to
have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air
bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have
been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of
interferences with American nationals' rights and interests. These lists
are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant
Japanese disregard of American rights and civilized standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and
the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited con-
quest. Since 1935, without provocation or excuse they have attacked,
conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen independent nations. The machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, propaganda and sabotage. This machine -- unprecedented in size -- has world-wide ramifications; and into them the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere -- if it were successful in the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, espionage, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China, and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indochina. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest throughout Thailand, and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma. The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java came next on the Japanese timetable, and it is probable that further down the Japanese page, are the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other Islands of the Pacific -- including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Carolines, Marshall and Mariana Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia", and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia". What they really intended was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment -- not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan -- but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese State. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.
Throughout this course and program of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the Treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937 the Conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes".

Japan scorned the Conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this source of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality -- including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies.

The Japanese Government, it is true, repeatedly offered qualified statements of peaceful intention. But it became clear,
as each proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy alliance with Germany.

In July of this year the Japanese Government concluded with Germany to force from the Vichy Government of France, permission to place Japanese armed forces in Indochina and to begin sending her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which again made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

At that time the Japanese Government made the suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States meet personally to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the two countries. I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic principles. This Government tried hard -- but without success -- to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941 (see Annex 10).

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and discussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese Government presented a new and narrow proposal, (see Annex 11) which called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained however no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The American Government, in order to clarify the issue, presented to the Japanese Government on November 26, a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement. (See Annex 12)

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

In section one there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China. Mutual commitments were suggested along lines
as follows: (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; (c) not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and (i) to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that, under cover of the negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese Government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina. (see Annex 13) I was given an evasive and spurious reply (see Annex 14). Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they had ordered and were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December sixth last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan. (see Annex 15).

To this Government's proposal of November twenty-sixth the Japanese Government made no reply until December seventh. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations, delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions -- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my Message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7, at 7:50 P.M., Washington Time -- 7:50 A.M., Honolulu Time of same day -- Monday, December 8, 3:50 A.M., Tokyo Time.
The following are the countries which have to date declared war against Japan:

Australia
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
The Netherlands
Nicaragua
New Zealand
Panama
El Salvador
South Africa
United Kingdom
Poland

These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting as are we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and man-power to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,

December 15, 1941.
Annex A:

2. Identič notes to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, January 7, 1932.
3. Note from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador, February 21, 1934.
4. Reply thereto, handed to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State on March 3, 1934.
5. Statement by the American Ambassador to Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1934.
7. List of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed, or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning since July 7, 1937.
8. List of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained, subjected to indignities, et cetera, since July 7, 1937, by Japanese authorities or agents.
10. Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941.
11. Document handed to the Secretary of State, by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941.
12. Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.
13. Memorandum addressed by the President to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State, copy of which, under authorization of the President, was read and handed by the Under Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on December 8, 1941.
14. Reply thereto, handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on December 5, 1941.
15. Personal message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, December 6, 1941.
16. Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with your request there is enclosed a memorandum in regard to the number of Japanese forces in Indochina and the recent increase in Japanese military materiel and equipment brought into that colony.

Enclosure:

Memorandum.
Department of State

BUREAU | FE
DIVISION |

ENCLOSURE
TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO

The President
December 6, 1941

Japanese Forces and Recent Increase in Japanese Military Material and Equipment in Indochina.

According to information reported by our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon, received by them from French military sources in Indochina and not confirmed, it is estimated that there are at present in northern Indochina (Tongking) 25,000 Japanese troops and 80,000 in southern Indochina, making a total of 105,000, and that there are at the outside some 450 Japanese planes in Indochina. According to a statement made December 4 by the Governor General of Indochina to our Consul at Hanoi, there are approximately 70,000 Japanese troops in Indochina, a little less than 30,000 being in Tongking and the balance in the south. The estimate of 105,000 is considered to be approximately correct by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

According to the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, 21 transports were sighted in Camranh Bay on December 2 by an air patrol from Manila, 12 submarines were sighted at sea northeast of Saigon proceeding south and nine of these submarines are now in Camranh Bay with other naval units including several destroyers. Our Consul at Hanoi reported on December 5 information from a reportedly
a reportedly reliable source that there were in Camranh Bay 30 transports carrying an estimated division of troops. Our Consul at Tsingtao reported on December 1 that for the preceding ten days an average of about three transports had left Tsingtao daily loaded with troops in summer uniforms.

An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy stated to an officer of our Embassy on December 3 that the Japanese recently had been sending large amounts of military equipment and materiel into Indochina. According to our Consul at Hanoi Japanese military equipment recently landed in Indochina includes, as estimated by French military sources, 3,400 trucks and tractors, 600 automobiles, 500 motorcycles, 260 tanks (categories unspecified), 300 cannon, 2,000 machine guns, 1,300 submachine guns, 2,100 pack horses and a large number of bicycles.

The marked increase in Japanese troops in Indochina reportedly began November 21 with the arrival of 21 troop and supply ships at Saigon, the landing of 20,000 troops there, the transfer of 10,000 troops from northern Indochina southward and the subsequent landing of additional troops at both Saigon and Haiphong, those landed at the latter place proceeding southward by train.

At nearby
At nearby Hainan Island there are estimated by the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department to be some 30,000 Japanese troops and an unknown number of planes. Pursuit planes as well as bombers can fly from Hainan Island to northern Indochina, either direct or via Waichow Island off Pakhoi, Kwantung Province of China.
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

On December 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For the information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1855, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty proving for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1864 there was concluded our first treaty with China.

In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to
world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions": There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China .... protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Ever since that day, we have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1909 the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan concluded an agreement
by an exchange of notes. In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that they were determined to support
by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and
integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for
commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire; that it
was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free
and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific
Ocean"; and that "the policy of both Governments" was "directed
to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the
principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the first World
War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met
in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United
States were there. One great objective of this conference
was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to
be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of
competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several
treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty (see
Annex 1). It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty
of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the
commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

Another was a treaty between the United States,
the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for
limitation of naval armament. (see Annex 1)

The course of events which have led directly to
the present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then — in
1931 — that Japan undertook on a large scale its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specifically stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties. (see Annex 2)

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. Italy — then still under the domination of Mussolini — also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage — and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". He added that Japan had "no intention whatever
to provoke and make trouble with any other Power". (see Annex 5) Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied in kind. (see Annex 4)

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government began to belie these assurances — at least so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Our Government thereupon expressed to Japan the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states. (see Annex 5)

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Washington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern Pact.

This Pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain, France and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed
forces of Japan opened new large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

They thus accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty million Germans were by race, training, ability and might, superior in every way to any other race in Europe — superior to about four hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, following suit, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other inhabitants of the Orient — nearly all of whom were infinitely older and more developed in culture and civilization than themselves. Their conceit would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women, and children. They sank American vessels — including a naval vessel, the Panay. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed American property. They obstructed, and in some cases, drove out, American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese
people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other nations — flouting all the principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto (see respectively Annexes 6, 7, 8 and 9) lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of interferences with American nationals, rights and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of American rights and civilized standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest. Since 1935, without provocation or excuse they have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen independent nations. The machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, propaganda and sabotage. This machine — unprecedented in size — has world-wide ramifications; and into them the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.
As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere — if it were successful in the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, encirclement, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indochina. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest throughout Thailand — and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma.
The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese time-table; and it is probable that further down the Japanese page, are the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other islands of the Pacific — including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Carolines, Marshall and Mariana Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia"; and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia". That they really intended was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment — not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan — but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese State. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler’s Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.
Throughout this course and progress of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937 the Conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes".
Japan scorned the Conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this source of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality — including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies.
The Japanese Government, it is true, repeatedly offered qualified statements of peaceful intention. But it became clear, as each proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese Government con
dined with Hitler to force from the Vichy Government of France, permission to place Japanese armed forces in southern Indochina; and began sending her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which again made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

At that time the Japanese Government made the suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States meet personally to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the two countries. I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic
principles. This Government tried hard — but without success — to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941 (see Annex 10).

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and discussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese Government presented a new and narrow proposal (see Annex 11) which called for supplying the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained however no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented to the Japanese Government on November 26, a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement. (see Annex 12)

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

In section one there was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area,
and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China. Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as follows: (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; (c) not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the
stabilisation of the dollar-yen rate; (b) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and (1) to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that, under cover of the negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese Government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina. (see Annex 13) I was given an evasive and spurious reply (see Annex 14). Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

I did not know then, as we know now, that they had ordered and were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan. (see Annex 15)
To this Government's proposal of November 26 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations, delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my Message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian
Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7, at 1:20 P.M.,
Washington time = 7:50 A.M. Honolulu Time of same day
= Monday, December 8, 5:20 A.M., Tokyo Time.

To my message of December 6 (9 P.M. Washington
Time = December 7, 11 A.M. Tokyo Time) to the Emperor
of Japan, invoking his cooperation with me in further
effort to preserve peace, there has finally come to me
on December 10 (6:25 A.M. Washington Time, = December
10, 8:25 P.M., Tokyo Time) a reply, conveyed in a tele-
graphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated
December 8, 1 P.M. (December 7, 11 P.M., Washington
Time).

The Ambassador reported that at seven o'clock
on the morning of the 8th (December 7, 5 P.M., Washing-
ton Time) the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs
asked him to call at his official residence; that the
Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum
dated December 8 (December 7, Washington Time) the
text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the Amer-
ican Government (this was the memorandum which was de-
ivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of
State at 2:20 P.M. on Sunday, December 7 (Monday, Decem-
ber 8, 4:20 A.M., Tokyo Time); that the Foreign Minister
had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor
desired that the memorandum be regarded as the Emperor's
reply to my message.
Further, the Ambassador reports, the Foreign Minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President". The message further continued to the effect that, in regard to our inquiries on the subject of increase of Japanese forces in French Indochina, His Majesty had commanded his Government to state its views to the American Government. The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact".

Japan's real reply, however, made by Japan's war lords and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of the attack which had already been made without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

There is the record, for all history to read in amazement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust!

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defense. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to
enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, to — a host of them — have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her by Japan. After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her Allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.

All but three of the governments of nations overrun by German armies have declared war on Japan. The other three are severing relations.

In our own Hemisphere many of our Sister Republics have declared war on Japan and the others have given firm expression of their solidarity with the United States.

The following are the countries which have
to date declared war against Japan:

    Australia  
    Canada     
    China      
    Costa Rica 
    Cuba       
    Dominican Republic  
    Guatemala      
    Haiti        
    Honduras     
    The Netherlands 
    Nicaragua     
    New Zealand   
    Panama       
    El Salvador   
    South Africa  
    United Kingdom 
    Poland

These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting as are we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and man-power to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.
Annexes:

1. Senate Document No. 124,
   67th Congress, 2nd Session,
   which contains texts of
   Washington Conference
   Treaties and Resolutions,
2. Identiﬁc notes to the Japanese
   and the Chinese Governments,
   January 7, 1932.
3. Note from the Japanese Minister
   for Foreign Affairs, handed to
   the Secretary of State by the
   Japanese Ambassador, February 21, 1934
4. Reply thereto, handed to the
   Japanese Ambassador by the
   Secretary of State on March 8, 1934.
5. Statement by the American Ambassador
   to Japan to the Japanese Minister
   for Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1934.
6. List of American nationals killed or
   wounded by Japanese forces in China
   since July 7, 1937.
7. List of American property in China
   reported to have been damaged, de-
   stroyed, or seriously endangered by
   Japanese air bombing or air machine-
   gunning since July 7, 1937
8. List of American nationals reported
   to have been assaulted, arbitrarily
   detained, subjected to indignities,
   etc. etc., since July 7, 1937, by
   Japanese authorities or agents.
9. List of Japanese interferences with
   American trade and enterprise in China.
10. Document handed by the Secretary of State
    to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941
11. Document handed to the Secretary of State,
    by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941
12. Document handed by the Secretary of State to
    the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.
13. Memorandum addressed by the President to the
    Secretary and the Under Secretary of State, copy
    of which, under authorisation of the President,
    was read and handed by the Under Secretary of State
    to the Japanese Ambassador on
    December 2, 1941.
14. Reply thereto, handed to the Secretary
    of State by the Japanese Ambassador on
    December 5, 1941
15. Personal message from the President to
    the Emperor of Japan, December 6, 1941
16. Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador
    to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

On December 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For the information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing began the negotiation of our first treaty with China. In 1844 that treaty, containing provision for most-favored-nation treatment, was concluded.
Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1844 there was concluded our first treaty with China.
In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan’s doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy
toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions". There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China .... protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Ever since that day, we have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1908 the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan concluded an agreement by an exchange of notes. In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that they were determined to support "by all
pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire"; that it was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean"; and that "the policy of both Governments" was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the first World War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armament and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty (see Annex 1). It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.
Another was a treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armament. (see Annex 1)

The course of events which have led directly to the present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then -- in 1931 -- that Japan undertook on a large scale its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specifically stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties. (see Annex 2)

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe.
Italy -- then still under the domination of Mussolini -- also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage -- and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". He added that Japan had "no intention whatever to provoke or make trouble with any other Power". (see Annex 3) Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied in kind. (see Annex 4)

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government began to belie these assurances -- at least so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.
Our Government thereupon expressed to Japan the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states. (see Annex 5)

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Washington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern Pact.

This Pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain, France and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed forces of Japan opened new large-scale military operations
against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

They thus accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty million Germans were by race, training, ability and might, superior in every way to any other race in Europe -- superior to about four hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, through its regular initiative, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other inhabitants of the Orient -- nearly all of whom were infinitely older and more developed in culture and civilization than themselves. Their conceit would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women, and children. They sank American vessels -- including a
naval vessel, the Panay. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed American property. They obstructed, and in some cases, drove American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other nations -- flouting all the principles of peace and good will among men.

There are attached hereto (see respectively Annexes 6, 7, 8 and 9) lists of American nationals killed or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937; of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to indignities; of interferences with American nationals, rights and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of American rights and civilized standards.
Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of unlimited conquest. Since 1933, without provocation or excuse they have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen independent nations. The machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also huge organizations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimidation, propaganda and sabotage. This machine -- unprecedented in size -- has world-wide ramifications; and into them the Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.

As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere -- if it were successful in the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators
would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, encirclement, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indochina. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest
Throughout the territory of Thailand -- and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma. The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese time-table; and it is probable that further down the Japanese page, are the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other Islands of the Pacific -- in- cluding Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Caroline, Marshall and Mariana Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia"; and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia". What they really intended was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment -- not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan -- but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese State. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.
By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.

IV

Throughout this course and program of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that, whenever they both considered it desirable, we stood ready to exercise our good offices in the cause of peace. During the following years of conflict our attitude remained unchanged.
relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.
In October 1937, thirteen countries which had interests in the Far East, met at Brussels to endeavor to bring about by peaceful means, an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China. Of all the powers invited, only Japan and Germany declined to attend, although Japan was itself an original signatory of the Nine-Power treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937 the Conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes".

Japan scorned the Conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this source of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.
Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, this Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
The principle of equality -- including equality
of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international
cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific
settlement, of controversies.

The Japanese Government, it is true, repeatedly
offered qualified statements of peaceful intention. But it
became clear, as each proposal was explored, that Japan did
not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the
whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that
she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of
East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese
people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce
her unholy alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese Government
connived with Hitler to force the (Vichy) Government
of France, permission to place Japanese armed forces in
southern Indochina; and began sending her troops and equipment
into that area.
The conversations between this Government and
the Japanese Government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent
and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which again
made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations
were resumed.

At that time the Japanese Government made the
suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese Govern-
ment and of the Government of the United States meet personally
to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations
the
between/two countries. I should have been happy to travel
thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that
purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain
some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic
principles. This Government tried hard -- but without success —
to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government
and the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in
a document which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese
Ambassador on October 2, 1941 (see Annex 10).
Thereafter, severalformulae were offered and discussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese Government presented a new and narrow proposal, (see Annex 11) which called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China. It contained however no provision for abandonment by Japan of her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment.

The American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented to the Japanese Government on November 26, a clear-cut plan for a broad but simple settlement. (See Annex 12)

(continue with 17 A)
The outline of the proposed plan for agreement between the United States and Japan was divided into two parts:

there

In section one was outlined a mutual declaration of policy containing affirmations that the national policies of the two countries were directed toward peace throughout the Pacific area, that the two countries had no territorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area, and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based.

There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign
foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China.

Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as follows:

(a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein;

(c) not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or
powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and (1) to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.
- 18 -

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that, under cover of the negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese Government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina. (see Annex 13) I was given an evasive and specious reply (see Annex 14). Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan. (see Annex 15).
To this Government's proposal of November 26 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations, delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterized by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions -- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."
I concur emphatically in every word of that statement.

To my message of December 6th (9 p.m. Washington Time =
December 7th, 11 a.m. Tokyo Time) to the Emperor of Japan,
invoking his cooperation with me in further effort to preserve
peace, there has finally come to me on December 10th (6:25 a.m.
Washington Time = December 10th, 8:25 p.m., Tokyo Time) a reply,
conveyed in a telegraphic report by the American Ambassador
at Tokyo dated December 8th, 1 p.m. (December 7th, 11 p.m.,
Washington Time).

The Ambassador reported that at seven o'clock on the
morning of the 8th (December 7th, 5 p.m., Washington Time) the
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs asked him to call at his
official residence; that the Foreign Minister handed the
Ambassador a memorandum dated December 8th (December 7th, Wash-
ington Time) the text of which had been transmitted to the
Japanese Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the American
Government (this was the memorandum which was delivered by the
Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m. on
Sunday, December 7th (Monday, December 8th, 4:20 a.m., Tokyo Time);
that the Foreign Minister had been in touch with the Emperor;
and that the Emperor desired that the memorandum be regarded as
the Emperor's reply to my message.
For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my Message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7th, at 1:20 P.M., Washington time or 7:50 A.M. Honolulu time of same day or Monday, December 8th, 3:20 A.M., Tokyo time.
Further, the Ambassador reports, the Foreign
Minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral
statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his grateful-
ness and appreciation for the cordial message of the Presi-
dent". The message further continued to the effect that,
in regard to our inquiries on the subject of increase of
Japanese forces in French Indochina, His Majesty had commanded
his Government to state its views to the American Government.
The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific,
and consequently of the world, has been the cherished
desire of His Majesty for the realization of which
he has hitherto made his Government to continue its
earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the
President is fully aware of this fact."

Japan's real reply, however, made by Japan's
war lords and evidently formulated many days before, took
the form of the attack without warning upon our territories
at various points in the Pacific.
There is the record, for all history to read
in amazement in horror and in disgust!

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defense. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too -- a host of them -- have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her by Japan. After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her Allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.
All but three of the governments of nations overrun by German armies have declared war on Japan. The other three are severing relations.

In our own Hemisphere many of our Sister Republics have declared war on Japan and the others have given firm expression of their solidarity with the United States.
The following are the countries which have to date declared war against Japan:

Australia
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
The Netherlands
Nicaragua
New Zealand
Panama
El Salvador
South Africa
United Kingdom
Poland

These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting as are we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and man-power to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.

------------------
Annexes:

2. Identical notes to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, January 7, 1932.
3. Note from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador, February 21, 1934.
4. Reply thereto, handed to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State on March 3, 1934.
5. Statement by the American Ambassador to Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1934.
7. List of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed, or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning since July 7, 1937.
8. List of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained, subjected to indignities, etc., etc., since July 7, 1937, by Japanese authorities or agents.
10. Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941.
11. Document handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941.
12. Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941.
13. Memorandum addressed by the President to the Secretary of State, copy of which, under authorization of the President, was read and handed by the Under Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on December 2, 1941.
14. Reply thereto, handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on December 5, 1941.
15. Personal message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, December 6, 1941.
16. Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941.
"Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Under instructions from Tokyo, I wish to inform you as follows:

"As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-China. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the Protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France."
FOR THE PRESS  IMMEDIATE RELEASE  DECEMBER 5, 1941

The President has received the following statement from the Secretary of State to whom it was presented this Forenoon by the Japanese Ambassador:

"Reference is made to your inquiry about the intention of the Japanese Government with regard to the reported movements of Japanese troops in French Indo-China. Under instructions from Tokyo, I wish to inform you as follows:

"As Chinese troops have recently shown frequent signs of movements along the northern frontier of French Indo-China bordering on China, Japanese troops, with the object of mainly taking precautionary measures, have been reinforced to a certain extent in the northern part of French Indo-China. As a natural sequence of this step, certain movements have been made among the troops stationed in the southern part of the said territory. It seems that an exaggerated report has been made of these movements. It should be added that no measure has been taken on the part of the Japanese Government that may transgress the stipulations of the protocol of Joint Defense between Japan and France."

---
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

On December 8, 1941, I presented to the Congress a message in person asking for a declaration of war as an answer to the treacherous attack made by Japan the previous day upon the United States. For the information of the Congress, and as a public record of the facts, I am transmitting this historical summary of the past policy of this country in relation to the Pacific area and of the more immediate events leading up to this Japanese onslaught upon our forces and territory. Attached hereto are the various documents and correspondence implementing this history.

I

A little over a hundred years ago, in 1853, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam. It was a treaty providing for peace and for dependable relationships.

Ten years later Caleb Cushing was sent to negotiate and in 1866 there was concluded our first treaty with China.

In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan's doors. In the next few years those doors began to open; and Japan, which had kept itself aloof from the world, began to adopt what we call Western civilization. During those early years, the United States used every influence it could exert to protect Japan in her transition stage.

With respect to the entire Pacific area, the United States has consistently urged, as it has for all other parts of the globe, the fundamental importance to
world peace of fair and equal treatment among nations. Accordingly whenever there has been a tendency on the part of any other nation to encroach upon the independence and sovereignty of countries of the Far East, the United States has tried to discourage such tendency wherever possible.

There was a period when this American attitude was especially important to Japan. At all times it has been important to China and to other countries of the Far East.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. The United States pledged itself to a policy toward the Philippines designed to equip them to become a free and independent nation. That pledge and that policy we have consistently carried out.

At that time there was going on in China what has been called the "scramble for concessions". There was even talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the principle of the "open door" in China was laid down. In 1900, the American Government declared that its policy was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China .... protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire".

Ever since that day, we have consistently and unfailingly advocated the principles of the open door policy throughout the Far East.

In the year 1908 the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan concluded an agreement
by an exchange of notes. In that agreement, the two Governments jointly declared that they were determined to support "by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire"; that it was "the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean"; and that "the policy of both Governments" was "directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo" in that region.

The United States has consistently practiced the principles enunciated in that agreement.

In 1921, following the close of the First World War, nine powers having interests in the western Pacific met in conference in Washington. China, Japan, and the United States were there. One great objective of this conference was the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This was to be achieved by reduction of armaments and by regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Several treaties and agreements were concluded at that conference.

One of these was the Nine Power Treaty (see Annex 1). It contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

Another was a treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan providing for limitation of naval armaments. (see Annex 1)

The course of events which have led directly to the present crisis began ten years ago. For it was then — in
1931 — that Japan undertook on a large scale its present policy of conquest in China. It began by the invasion of Manchuria, which was part of China. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, at once and during many months of continuous effort thereafter, tried to persuade Japan to stop. The United States supported that effort. For example, the Government of the United States on January 7, 1932, specifically stated in notes sent to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments that it would not recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement brought about by violation of treaties. (see Annex 2)

This barbaric aggression of Japan in Manchuria set the example and the pattern for the course soon to be pursued by Italy and Germany in Africa and in Europe. In 1933 Hitler assumed power in Germany. It was evident that, once re-armed, Germany would embark upon a policy of conquest in Europe. Italy — then still under the domination of Mussolini — also had resolved upon a policy of conquest in Africa and in the Mediterranean.

Through the years which followed, Germany, Italy, and Japan reached an understanding to time their acts of aggression to their common advantage — and to bring about the ultimate enslavement of the rest of the world.

In 1934, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a friendly note to the United States, stating that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two Governments that was "fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". He added that Japan had "no intention whatever
to provoke and make trouble with any other Power*. (see Annex 8) Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied in kind.
(see Annex 4)

But in spite of this exchange of friendly sentiments, and almost immediately thereafter, the acts and utterances of the Japanese Government began to belie these assurances — at least so far as the rights and interests of other nations in China were concerned.

Our Government thereupon expressed to Japan the view of the American people, and of the American Government, that no nation has the right thus to override the rights and legitimate interests of other sovereign states. (see Annex 5)

The structure of peace which had been founded upon the Washington Conference treaties began to be discarded by Japan. Indeed, in December of 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, which had limited competition in naval armament. She thereafter intensified and multiplied her rearmament program.

In 1936 the Government of Japan openly associated itself with Germany by entering the anti-Comintern Pact.

This Pact, as we all know, was nominally directed against the Soviet Union; but its real purpose was to form a league of fascism against the free world, particularly against Great Britain, France and the United States.

Following this association of Germany, Italy and Japan, the stage was now set for an unlimited campaign of conquest. In July 1937, feeling themselves ready, the armed
forces of Japan opened new large-scale military operations against China. Presently, her leaders, dropping the mask of hypocrisy, publicly declared their intention to seize and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific, and the southern Pacific.

They thus accepted the German thesis that seventy or eighty million Germans were by race, training, ability and might, superior in every way to any other race in Europe — superior to about four hundred million other human beings in that area. And Japan, following suit, announced that the seventy or eighty million Japanese people were also superior to the seven or eight hundred million other inhabitants of the Orient — nearly all of whom were infinitely older and more developed in culture and civilization than themselves. Their conquest would make them masters of a region containing almost one-half the population of the earth. It would give them complete control of vast sea lanes and trade routes of importance to the entire world.

The military operations which followed in China flagrantly disregarded American rights. Japanese armed forces killed Americans. They wounded or abused American men, women, and children. They sank American vessels — including a naval vessel, the Panay. They bombed American hospitals, churches, schools, and missions. They destroyed American property. They obstructed, and in some cases, drove out, American commerce.

In the meantime, they were inflicting incalculable damage upon China, and ghastly suffering upon the Chinese
people. They were inflicting wholesale injuries upon other
nations — flouting all the principles of peace and good
will among men.

There are attached hereto (see respectively
Annexes 6, 7, 8 and 9) lists of American nationals killed
or wounded by Japanese forces in China since July 7, 1937;
of American property in China reported to have been damaged,
destroyed or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing
or air machine-gunning; of American nationals reported to
have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained or subjected to
indulgences; of interferences with American nationals, rights
and interests. These lists are not complete. However, they
are ample evidence of the flagrant Japanese disregard of
American rights and civilized standards.

II

Meanwhile, brute conquest was on the rampage in
Europe and the Mediterranean.

Hitler and Mussolini embarked upon a scheme of
unlimited conquest. Since 1935, without provocation or
excuse they have attacked, conquered, and reduced to economic
and political slavery some sixteen independent nations. The
machinery set up for their unlimited conquest included, and
still includes, not only enormous armed forces, but also
huge organisations for carrying on plots, intrigue, intimida-
tion, propaganda and sabotage. This machine — unprecedented
in size — has world-wide ramifications; and into them the
Japanese plans and operations have been steadily interlocked.
As the forces of Germany, Italy and Japan increasingly combined their efforts over these years, I was convinced that this combination would ultimately attack the United States and the Western Hemisphere — if it were successful in the other continents. The very existence of the United States as a great free people, and the free existence of the American family of nations in the New World, would be a standing challenge to the Axis. The Axis dictators would choose their own time to make it clear that the United States and the New World were included in their scheme of destruction.

This they did last year, in 1940, when Hitler and Mussolini concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan deliberately aimed at the United States.

The strategy of Japan in the Pacific area was a faithful counterpart of that used by Hitler in Europe. Through infiltration, encroachment, intimidation, and finally armed attack, control was extended over neighboring peoples. Each such acquisition was a new starting point for new aggression.

III

Pursuing this policy of conquest, Japan had first worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria. Next she had invaded China; and has sought for the past four and one-half years to subjugate her.

Passing through the China Sea close to the Philippine Islands, she then invaded and took possession of Indochina. Today the Japanese are extending this conquest throughout Thailand — and seeking the occupation of Malaya and Burma.
The Philippines, Borneo, Sumatra, Java come next on the Japanese time-table; and it is probable that further down the Japanese page, are the names of Australia, New Zealand and all the other islands of the Pacific — including Hawaii and the great chain of the Aleutian Islands.

To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan violated the mandate under which she had received the custody of the Caroline, Marshall and Marianas Islands after the World War, by fortifying them, and not only closing them to all commerce but her own, but forbidding any foreigner even to visit them.

Japanese spokesmen, after their custom, cloaked these conquests with innocent-sounding names. They talked of the "New Order in Eastern Asia"; and then of the "co-prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia". What they really intended was the enslavement of every nation which they could bring within their power, and the enrichment — not of all Asia, not even of the common people of Japan — but of the war lords who had seized control of the Japanese State. Here too they were following the Nazi pattern.

By this course of aggression, Japan made it necessary for various countries, including our own, to keep in the Pacific in self-defense large armed forces and a vast amount of material which might otherwise have been used against Hitler. That, of course, is exactly what Hitler wanted them to do. The diversion thus created by Hitler's Japanese ally forced the peace-loving nations to establish and maintain a huge front in the Pacific.
Throughout this course and progress of Japanese aggression, the Government of the United States consistently endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan's best interests would lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes. Following the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937, this Government made known to the Japanese Government and to the Chinese Government that whenever both those Governments considered it desirable we stood ready to exercise our good offices. During the following years of conflict that attitude on our part remained unchanged.

In October 1937, upon invitation by which the Belgian Government made itself the host, nineteen countries which have interests in the Far East, including the United States, sent representatives to Brussels to consider the situation in the Far East in conformity with the Nine Power Treaty and to endeavor to bring about an adjustment of the difficulties between Japan and China by peaceful means. Japan and Germany only of all the powers invited declined to attend. Japan was itself an original signatory of the treaty. China, one of the signatories, and the Soviet Union, not a signatory, attended. After the Conference opened, the countries in attendance made further attempts to persuade Japan to participate in the Conference. Japan again declined.

On November 24, 1937 the Conference adopted a declaration, urging that "hostilities be suspended and resort be had to peaceful processes".
Japan scorned the Conference and ignored the recommendation.

It became clear that, unless this source of affairs in the Far East was halted, the Pacific area was doomed to experience the same horrors which have devastated Europe.

Therefore, in this year of 1941, in an endeavor to end this process by peaceful means while there seemed still to be a chance, the United States entered into discussions with Japan.

For nine months, these conversations were carried on, for the purpose of arriving at some understanding acceptable to both countries.

Throughout all of these conversations, the Government took into account not only the legitimate interests of the United States but also those of Japan and other countries. When questions relating to the legitimate rights and interests of other countries came up, this Government kept in appropriate contact with the representatives of those countries.

In the course of these negotiations, the United States steadfastly advocated certain basic principles which should govern international relations. These were:

The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of all nations.

The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

The principle of equality — including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention, and pacific settlement, of controversies.
The Japanese Government, it is true, repeatedly offered qualified statements of peaceful intention, but it became clear, as each proposal was explored, that Japan did not intend to modify in any way her greedy designs upon the whole Pacific world. Although she continually maintained that she was promoting only the peace and greater prosperity of East Asia, she continued her brutal assault upon the Chinese people.

Nor did Japan show any inclination to renounce her unholy alliance with Hitlerism.

In July of this year the Japanese Government conpired with Hitler to force from the Vichy Government of France, permission to place Japanese armed forces in southern Indochina; and began sending her troops and equipment into that area.

The conversations between this Government and the Japanese Government were thereupon suspended.

But during the following month, at the urgent and insistent request of the Japanese Government, which again made emphatic profession of peaceful intent, the conversations were resumed.

At that time the Japanese Government made the suggestion that the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States meet personally to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the two countries. I should have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan for that purpose. But I felt it desirable, before so doing, to obtain some assurance that there could be some agreement on basic
principles. This Government tried hard — but without success —
to obtain such assurance from the Japanese Government.

The various proposals of the Japanese Government and
the attitude taken by this Government are set forth in a docu-
ment which the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese Ambas-
sador on October 8, 1941 (see Annex 10).

Thereafter, several formulas were offered and dis-
cussed. But the Japanese Government continued upon its course
of war and conquest.

Finally, on November 20, 1941, the Japanese Govern-
ment presented a new and narrow proposal (see Annex 11) which
called for supplying by the United States to Japan of as much
oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures,
and for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China.
It contained however no provision for abandonment by Japan of
her warlike operations or aims.

Such a proposal obviously offered no basis for a
peaceful settlement or even for a temporary adjustment. The
American Government, in order to clarify the issues, presented
to the Japanese Government on November 26, a clear-cut plan
for a broad but simple settlement. (see Annex 12)

The outline of the proposed plan for agreement be-
tween the United States and Japan was divided into two parts;

In section one there was outlined a mutual decla-
rations of policy containing affirmations that the national poli-
cies of the two countries were directed toward peace through-
out the Pacific area, that the two countries had no ter-
ritorial designs or aggressive intentions in that area,
and that they would give active support to certain fundamental principles of peace upon which their relations with each other and all other nations would be based. There was provision for mutual pledges to support and apply in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples liberal economic principles, which were enumerated, based upon the general principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

In section two there were outlined proposed steps to be taken by the two Governments. These steps envisaged a situation in which there would be no Japanese or other foreign armed forces in French Indochina or in China. Mutual commitments were suggested along lines as follows: (a) to endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the governments principally concerned in the Pacific area; (b) to endeavor to conclude among the principally interested governments an agreement to respect the territorial integrity of Indochina and not to seek or accept preferential economic treatment therein; (c) not to support any government in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking; (d) to relinquish extraterritorial and related rights in China and to endeavor to obtain the agreement of other governments now possessing such rights to give up those rights; (e) to negotiate a trade agreement based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; (f) to remove freezing restrictions imposed by each country on the funds of the other; (g) to agree upon a plan for the
stabilisation of the dollar-yen rate; (h) to agree that no agreement which either had concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in a way to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement; and (i) to use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to the basic political and economic principles provided for in this suggested agreement.

In the midst of these conversations, we learned that new contingents of Japanese armed forces and new masses of equipment were moving into Indochina. Toward the end of November these movements were intensified. During the first week of December new movements of Japanese forces made it clear that, under cover of the negotiations, attacks on unspecified objectives were being prepared.

I promptly asked the Japanese Government for a frank statement of the reasons for increasing its forces in Indochina. (see Annex 13) I was given an evasive and specious reply (see Annex 14). Simultaneously, the Japanese operations went forward with increased tempo.

We did not know then, as we know now, that they had ordered and were even then carrying out their plan for a treacherous attack upon us.

I was determined, however, to exhaust every conceivable effort for peace. With this in mind, on the evening of December 6 last, I addressed a personal message to the Emperor of Japan. (see Annex 15)
To this Government's proposal of November 25 the Japanese Government made no reply until December 7. On that day the Japanese Ambassador here and the Special Representative whom the Japanese Government had sent to the United States to assist in peaceful negotiations, delivered a lengthy document to our Secretary of State, one hour after the Japanese had launched a vicious attack upon American territory and American citizens in the Pacific.

That document (see Annex 16) was a few minutes after its receipt aptly characterised by the Secretary of State as follows:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese Ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions — infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them."

I solemnly emphatically in every word of that statement.

For the record of history, it is essential in reading this part of my Message always to bear in mind that the actual air and submarine attack in the Hawaiian
Islands commenced on Sunday, December 7, at 1:20 P.M.,
Washington time = 7:30 A.M. Honolulu Time of same day

To my message of December 6 (9 P.M. Washington
Time = December 7, 11 A.M. Tokyo Time) to the Emperor
of Japan, invoking his cooperation with me in further
effort to preserve peace, there has finally come to me
on December 10 (6:25 A.M. Washington Time, = December
10, 8:25 P.M., Tokyo Time) a reply, conveyed in a tele-
graphic report by the American Ambassador at Tokyo dated
December 9, 1 P.M. (December 7, 11 P.M., Washington
Time).

The Ambassador reported that at seven o'clock
on the morning of the 8th (December 7, 6 P.M., Wash-
ington Time) the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs
asked him to call at his official residence; that the
Foreign Minister handed the Ambassador a memorandum
dated December 8 (December 7, Washington Time) the
text of which had been transmitted to the Japanese
Ambassador in Washington to be presented to the Amer-
ican Government (this was the memorandum which was de-
ivered by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of
State at 2:20 P.M. on Sunday, December 7 (Monday, Decem-
ber 8, 4:20 A.M., Tokyo Time); that the Foreign Minister
had been in touch with the Emperor; and that the Emperor
desired that the memorandum be regarded as the Emperor's
reply to my message.
Further, the Ambassador reports, the Foreign Minister made an oral statement. Textually, the oral statement began, "His Majesty has expressed his gratefulness and appreciation for the cordial message of the President". The message further continued to the effect that, in regard to our inquiries on the subject of increase of Japanese forces in French Indo-China, His Majesty had commanded his Government to state its views to the American Government. The message concluded, textually, with the statement:

"Establishment of peace in the Pacific and consequently of the world, has been the cherished desire of His Majesty for the realization of which he has hitherto made his Government to continue its earnest endeavors. His Majesty trusts that the President is fully aware of this fact".

Japan's real reply, however, made by Japan's war lords and evidently formulated many days before, took the form of the attack which had already been made without warning upon our territories at various points in the Pacific.

There is the record, for all history to read in amusement, in sorrow, in horror and in disgust!

We are now at war. We are fighting in self-defense. We are fighting in defense of our national existence, of our right to be secure, of our right to
enjoy the blessings of peace. We are fighting in defense of principles of law and order and justice, against an effort of unprecedented ferocity to overthrow those principles and to impose upon humanity a regime of ruthless domination by unrestricted and arbitrary force.

Other countries, too — a host of these — have declared war on Japan. Some of them were first attacked by Japan, as we have been. China has already been valiantly resisting Japan in an undeclared war forced upon her by Japan. After four and one-half years of stubborn resistance, the Chinese now and henceforth will fight with renewed confidence and confirmed assurance of victory.

All members of the Great British Commonwealth, themselves fighting heroically on many fronts against Germany and her Allies, have joined with us in the Battle of the Pacific as we have joined with them in the Battle of the Atlantic.

All but three of the governments of nations overrun by German armies have declared war on Japan. The other three are severing relations.

In our own Hemisphere many of our Sister Republics have declared war on Japan and the others have given firm expression of their solidarity with the United States.

The following are the countries which have
to date declared war against Japan:

Australia
Canada
China
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominican Republic
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
The Netherlands
Nicaragua
New Zealand
Panama
El Salvador
South Africa
United Kingdom
Poland

These and other peace-loving countries will be fighting as are we, first, to put an end to Japan's program of aggression and, second, to make good the right of nations and of mankind to live in peace under conditions of security and justice.

The people of this country are totally united in their determination to consecrate our national strength and man-power to bring conclusively to an end the pestilence of aggression and force which has long menaced the world and which now has struck deliberately and directly at the safety of the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

December, 1941.
Annexes:

2. Identical notes to the Japanese and the Chinese Governments, January 7, 1942.
3. Note from the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador, February 21, 1934.
4. Reply thereto, handed to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State on March 5, 1934.
5. Statement by the American Ambassador to Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1934.
7. List of American property in China reported to have been damaged, destroyed, or seriously endangered by Japanese air bombing or air machine-gunning since July 7, 1937.
8. List of American nationals reported to have been assaulted, arbitrarily detained, subjected to indignities, or others, since July 7, 1937, by Japanese authorities or agents.
10. Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2, 1941.
11. Document handed to the Secretary of State, by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941.
12. Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941.
13. Memorandum addressed by the President to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State, copy of which, under authorization of the President, was read and handed by the Under Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on December 5, 1941.
14. Reply thereto, handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on December 3, 1941.
15. Personal message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, December 6, 1941.
16. Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

December 6, 1941.

Pursuant to your request, there is sent you herewith a draft of a message from you to the Emperor of Japan.

I understand that, prior to sending the message to the Emperor, you have in mind sending a message to Chiang Kai-shek in which you would, without quoting the text of the message to the Emperor, outline to him the substance of the "stand-still" arrangement which you contemplate proposing to Japan.

From point of view of ensuring the confidential nature of your message to Chiang Kai-shek, it is suggested that you might care to call in the Chinese Ambassador and Dr. Soong, to impress upon both of them the urgency and secrecy of the matter, and to ask the Ambassador to communicate to Chiang Kai-shek, by his most secret code, your message.

Enclosure:
Draft message to the Emperor of Japan.
MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

December 6, 1941.

I feel I should address Your Majesty because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in
formation in relations between our two countries. Conversations have been in progress between representatives
of our two Governments for many months for the purpose
of preventing any extension of armed conflict in the
Pacific area. It has been my sincere hope that this
would be achieved and I am sure that it has equally been
the sincere hope of Your Majesty.

Developments are now occurring in the Pacific area
which threaten to deprive each of our nations and humanity of the beneficial influence of the long and unbroken
peace which has been maintained between our two coun-
tries for almost a century. Those developments are
suggestive of tragic possibilities.

In these circumstances, where continuance of present
trends imperil the now tenuous threads which still hold our two countries in amicable relationship, I feel
that no possibility should be overlooked which might serve
serve to relieve the immediate situation and thus enable our two Governments to work out in a calmer atmosphere a more permanent solution. I am sure Your Majesty will share my feelings in this regard.

The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by wise decisions and enlightened acts, arrested harmful trends and directed national policies along new and farsighted courses -- thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other nations.

With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose now the conclusion of a temporary arrangement which would envisage cessation of hostilities for a period of ninety days between Japan and China and an undertaking by each of the Governments most concerned in the Pacific area to refrain from any movement or use of armed force against any of the other parties during the period of the temporary arrangement. If the Japanese Government is favorably disposed toward conclusion of such an arrangement I would be glad promptly to approach the other Governments concerned with a view to obtaining their assent and commitment.

In
In order to give those Governments an incentive to enter into this arrangement, I further propose that, toward relieving existing apprehensions, Japan reduce her armed forces in French Indochina to the number which Japan had there on July 26, 1941, and that Japan agree not to send new contingents of armed forces or materiel to that area during the ninety-day period of the temporary arrangement.

If the commitments above envisaged can be obtained, I would undertake as a further part of the general arrangement to suggest to the Government of Japan and to the Government of China that those Governments enter into direct negotiations looking to a peaceful settlement of the difficulties which exist between them. Such negotiations might take place in the Philippine Islands should the Japanese and the Chinese Governments so desire.

In as much as the Chinese Government has been cut off from its principal industrial areas, I believe it equitable that during the temporary period of the proposed arrangement the United States should continue sending material aid to China. I may add that the amount of material which China is able under present conditions to obtain is small in comparison with the
amount of material that Japan would save through discontinuance of operations for a period of three months.

It is my thought that while this temporary arrangement would be in effect our two Governments could continue their conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The kind of solution I have had and continue to have in mind is one in which Japan, on the basis of application of the principle of equality, would be provided through constructive and peaceful methods opportunity for the freer access to raw materials and markets and general exchange of goods, for the interchange of ideas, and for the development of the talents of her people, and would thus be enabled to achieve those national aspirations which Japan's leaders have often proclaimed.

In making this proposal, I express to Your Majesty the fervent hope that our two Governments may find ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional condition of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.
1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the South-eastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo-China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present.

2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area.

   In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement.

3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies.

4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets.

   The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
December 6, 1941.

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE
EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Almost a century ago the President of the United States
addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending the
offer of friendship of the people of the United States to
the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the
long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has
followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of
their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers, have prospered
and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our
two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on
matters of state. I feel I should now so address your
because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears
to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which
threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity
of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our
two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.
The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States would agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six
thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted further Japanese military forces avowedly for the same reason -- protection against Chinese attack on Indo-China from the north. I think I am correct in saying that no Chinese attack has been made upon Indo-China, nor that any is contemplated by the Chinese Government.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that very large numbers of Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to southern Indo-China, to places so far removed from the defense area of northern Indo-China as to constitute a reasonable doubt on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration in southern Indo-China is neither defensive in its character nor directed against China at all.
Because these continuing concentrations in southern Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending to make attack in one or more of these many directions.

I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.
None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit permanently on a case of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of duty to humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred tu
restore traditional amity and prevent further death and
destruction in the world.
December 6, 1941.

PROPOSED MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN

Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have prospered and have substantially helped humanity.

Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.

Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.
The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the conversations between our two Governments during these past months. We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all; and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination against or in favor of any nation.

I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat. This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.

More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government permitted
further Japanese military forces avowedly for the same reason --
protection against Chinese attack on Indo-China from the north.
I think I am correct in saying that no Chinese attack has
been made upon Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated
by the Chinese Government.

During the past few weeks it has become clear to the
world that very large numbers of Japanese military, naval
and air forces have been sent to Southern Indo-China, to
places so far removed from the defense area of Northern
Indo-China as to constitute a reasonable doubt on the part
of other nations that this continuing concentration in
Southern Indo-China is neither defensive in its character
nor directed against China at all.

Because these continuing concentrations in Southern
Indo-China have reached such large proportions and because
they extend now to the southeast and the southwest corners
of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable that the people of
the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands of the East
Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking them-
selves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or
intending to make attack in one or more of these many
directions.
I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all these peoples is a legitimate fear in as much as it involves their peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty will understand why the people of the United States in such large numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed forces capable of measures of offense.

It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.

None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.

There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were to be withdrawn therefrom.

I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese
forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.

I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this definite emergency to ways of dispelling the dark clouds. I am confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and prevent further death and destruction in the world.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with your request there is enclosed a memorandum in regard to agreements which have been concluded between France and Japan concerning the stationing of Japanese troops in French Indochina.

Enclosure:
Memorandum.
French-Japanese Agreements with Regard to the Stationing of Japanese Troops in French Indochina

On August 30, 1940 an exchange of notes was signed by France and Japan under which France recognized Japan's predominant interests in the Far East and Japan in turn gave assurances of an intention to respect French rights and interests in the Far East, particularly the territorial integrity of Indochina and French sovereign rights there. The French Government agreed further that discussions might be initiated between French and Japanese authorities with a view to assuring Japan exceptional military facilities in French Indochina with the understanding that such facilities were designed solely to permit a settlement of the Sino-Japanese hostilities; that they should cease to be enjoyed when hostilities should have been concluded; that they related only to that province of French Indochina which borders upon China; and that they should not have the character of a military occupation. Pursuant to this agreement discussions were held between French and
and Japanese authorities and an agreement was reached on September 22, 1940 under which it was provided that the Japanese might have the use of three airdromes in northern Indochina and might station at these airdromes a total of not more than 6,000 effectives. Provision was also made for a right of transit through northern French Indochina for Japanese troops in case operations should be undertaken against China, with the understanding that the total number of Japanese effectives present at any one time on Indochinese territory should not exceed 25,000 men. It is not entirely clear from the information available to the Department whether this total of 25,000 was to be in addition to or to include the 6,000 troops at the airdromes. According to reports the Japanese subsequently acquired the use of other airports in northern French Indochina than those mentioned in the September 22, 1940 agreement. (The texts of the exchange of notes of August 30, 1940 and of the agreement of September 22, 1940 were communicated to this Government in confidence.)

In a French-Japanese protocol of May 9, 1941 which was concluded in connection with the settlement of the Indochinese-Thai boundary dispute, the French Government
Government agreed not to enter into any agreement concerning French Indochina with any third power which would envisage political, economic or military cooperation in opposition directly or indirectly to Japan.

On July 29, 1941 a French-Japanese protocol for military cooperation for the common defense of French Indochina was signed, providing that measures to be taken with this end in view were to be the object of special arrangements. According to reports from French official sources, previous to the signature of this protocol an agreement had been reached between the Governor General of French Indochina and the chief of the Japanese military mission in French Indochina, General Sumita, with a view to ensuring the maintenance of order during the landing of Japanese forces and to providing facilities for their quartering. This agreement is understood to have envisaged the use by Japan of eight airfields in southern Annam, Cochinchina, and Cambodia, the stationing of Japanese warships at Camranh Bay and Saigon in southern Indochina and the landing of 40,000 Japanese troops in southern Indochina. Information available to the Department does not indicate however that the figure of 40,000 was regarded as a final or maximum limit upon the number of Japanese troops to be landed in southern Indochina.
An official of the French Foreign Office at Vichy indicated to an officer of our Embassy there on December 3 that a definite maximum had been agreed upon. He stated that after constant pressure from the Japanese for permission to increase their forces substantially beyond the number provided for, the French Embassy at Tokyo had finally been instructed to inform the Japanese Government that any attempt to increase Japanese garrisons beyond the agreement would be resisted by the French with such force as they had and that upon receipt of this notification the Japanese had agreed that they would make no such increases at the moment but did not give assurances that they would not make increases in the future.
Annexes:

1. Senate Document No. 124
   67th Congress, 2nd Session,
   which contains texts of
   Washington Conference
   Treaties and Resolutions.
2. Identio notes to the Japanese
   and the Chinese Governments,
   January 7, 1932.
3. Note from the Japanese Minister
   for Foreign Affairs, handed to
   the Secretary of State by the
   Japanese Ambassador, February 21, 1934.
4. Reply thereto, handed to the
   Japanese Ambassador by the
   Secretary of State on March 5, 1934.
5. Statement by the American Ambassador
   to Japan to the Japanese Minister
   for Foreign Affairs, April 29, 1934.
6. List of American nationals killed or
   wounded by Japanese forces in China
   since July 7, 1937.
7. List of American property in China
   reported to have been damaged, de-
   stroyed, or seriously endangered by
   Japanese air bombing or air machine-
   gunning since July 7, 1937.
8. List of American nationals reported
   to have been assaulted, arbitrarily
   detained, subjected to indignities,
   et cetera, since July 7, 1937, by
   Japanese authorities or agents.
9. List of Japanese interferences with
   American trade and enterprise in China.
10. Document handed by the Secretary of
    State to the Japanese Ambassador on
    October 2, 1941.
11. Document handed to the Secretary of State,
    by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20, 1941.
12. Document handed by the Secretary of State to
    the Japanese Ambassador on November 28, 1941.
13. Memorandum addressed by the President to the
    Secretary and the Under Secretary of State,
    copy of which, under authorization of the
    President, was read and handed by the Under
    Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador
    on December 2, 1941.
14. Reply thereto, handed to the Secretary
    of State by the Japanese Ambassador on
    December 5, 1941.
15. Personal message from the President to
    the Emperor of Japan, December 8, 1941.
16. Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador
to the Secretary of State, December 7, 1941.