
Franklin D. Roosevelt — “The Great Communicator”
The Master Speech Files, 1898, 1910-1945

Series 3: “The Four Freedoms” and FDR in World War II

File No. 1530

1944 August 23

165th Report on Lend-Lease Operations

THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Pursuant to law, I am submitting herewith the Sixteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations.

Lend-lease supplies and services provided to our Allies in the three months ending June 30, 1944, amounted to \$5,639,000,000 in value, ~~fourteen times the amount in the same period three years ago.~~ In all, lend-lease aid has been provided in the amount of \$28,270,000,000.

Three years ago the Axis aggressors were well along the road to domination of the world. The United States itself was in grave danger. Today the United Nations are moving relentlessly along the roads which lead to Berlin and Tokyo.

In the preparation and execution of the powerful offensives on which we are now jointly engaged with our Allies, lend-lease has fulfilled its promise. Every day that the men of our Army and our Navy go into battle lend-lease is being effectively used in the common cause by the heroic men of the other United Nations. Through lend-lease, the full power of American production is being brought to bear against our common enemies by the millions of fighting men of our Allies. Through lend-lease, American weapons and other war supplies are being used by our Allies to destroy our enemies and hasten their defeat.

We should not permit any weakening of this system of combined war supply to delay final victory a single day or to cost unnecessarily the life of one American boy. Until the unconditional surrender of both Japan and Germany, we should continue the lend-lease program on whatever scale is necessary

to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it.

We know now that by combining our power we can speed the day of certain victory. We know also that only by continuing our unity can we secure a just and durable peace.

THE WHITE HOUSE

AUGUST __, 1944

FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

August 22, 1944

*File
message
to Latta 8/23/44*

Dear Mr. Latta:

A figure contained in the original draft of the President's letter transmitting the Sixteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, which was sent to you on August 18, was inadvertently in error.

The draft of the letter as sent to you contained this statement: "I now report that lend-lease supplies and services provided to our allies in the three months ending June 30, 1944, amounted to \$3,639,000,000 in value, 14 times the amount in the same period three years ago." This figure should have been \$4,045,000,000.

When we received the revised copy of the President's letter of transmittal from you, which contained the figure of \$3,639,000,000, we changed it to the correct figure of \$4,045,000,000.

Very truly yours,

Dean Cox

Mr. Maurice Latta

The White House.

x 5430
x 4193

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached is the proposed letter to accompany the Sixteenth Report on Lend-Lease for the period ending June 30, 1944. *file*

The letter was prepared in FEA, but was shortened and revised by me.

I desire to call your attention to the next to the last paragraph particularly. This was inserted to answer the contention being urged in some quarters that after Germany folds up Lend-Lease should be discontinued.

x198

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Sm
S. I. R. x5439

DK

LMT

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S. I. R.

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JK 7/5/47

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to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

AUGUST ___, 1944

LEND-LEASE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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*Revised
and copies handed
to the House of
F.C.A.
8/21/44*

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THE WHITE HOUSE

AUGUST 23, 1944

1 GP

SIXTEENTH REPORT TO CONGRESS ON LEND-LEASE OPERATIONS

For the Period Ended June 30, 1944

"The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose."

[From Section 5, subsection b of "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States" (Public Law No. 11, 77th Congress, 1st Session).]

2 GP MONO. SECTION

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Chapter 1

LEND-LEASE AND THE UNITED STATES

For the Benefit of the United States

The title of the Lend-Lease Act is "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States". Everything that has been done under the Lend-Lease Act has been for the defense of the United States and for no other purpose. The program of lend-lease aid began on March 11, 1941, at a time when the security of the United States was already gravely threatened by the Axis aggressors who were seeking to dominate the world. We gave aid to Britain and the other nations resisting the aggressors because these nations held positions vital to our own defenses. If they had been defeated, the Western Hemisphere would have been left isolated and surrounded by overwhelmingly powerful forces that made no secret of their hostility to our continued existence as a free and independent people. We gave lend-lease aid in order to aid ourselves.

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When we were ourselves attacked on December 7, 1941, the nations to whom we had sent lend-lease aid were still in the fight and they became our strong fighting partners in the coalition war waged since then by the United Nations. Since December 7th we have given lend-lease aid in order to help our allies help us win complete and final victory over our common enemies at the earliest possible moment and at the lowest cost in lives. We have continued to provide lend-lease aid in order to aid ourselves.

The accounting of lend-lease aid is kept in dollar figures. But no money is either loaned or given away to other nations under lend-lease. The money that is used for the lend-lease program is spent by the United States Government for arms and other war supplies and services needed for the fight against the Germans and the Japanese. Virtually all of these supplies are produced in the United States and virtually all of the money is spent in the United States. This money goes into the pockets of American farmers and American war-workers and American businessmen. Some of it comes back to the United States Treasury in the form of taxes.

It is not money, but tanks, planes, guns and ships, war-production materials, and food, that go abroad under lend-lease. And they go for one purpose only—to be used by our allies either directly or indirectly against our enemies—the Germans and the Japanese. The ultimate recipients of lend-lease supplies are not our allies. The ultimate recipients are the Germans and the Japanese whom our allies are able to kill or capture by using these supplies.

Take, for example, a lend-lease bomb. This particular bomb is turned over to the British and the dollar cost goes into the books as lend-lease aid to the United Kingdom. But the British don't keep the bomb. It is dropped by a British plane square on a German gun emplacement holding up our tanks in northern France. It is the German gun crew that ultimately gets the bomb and is wiped out in the process.

We should not permit any weakening of this system of combined war supply to delay final victory a single day or to cost unnecessarily the life of one American boy. Until the unconditional surrender of both Japan and Germany, we should continue the lend-lease program on whatever scale is necessary to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it.

We know now that by combining our power we can speed the day of certain victory. We know also that only by continuing our unity can we secure a just and durable peace.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,

AUGUST 25, 1944.

4174

TO:

x 4117

883-M

Mr Harry L. Hopkins

Here's a draft of the proposed letter by the President on the 16th land lease report. The report is due to be read in Congress at noon on Tuesday, Aug 22, 1944.

To meet this schedule the President's letter should, if possible and practicable, be cleared and ready by noon on Saturday, Aug 19, 1944.

Do you want to take it on or do you want Judge Rosenman & Steel Early to do it?

Aug 17, 1944 R. COX

DSC

C-1827-79

PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

Present to law,
I am submitting herewith the Sixteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations.

[Nearly three years ago, when I made my Second Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations, the lend-lease program had only been in operation for a short while. In the three months ending June 30, 1941, lend-lease supplies and services provided to the nations now our allies amounted to a value of \$267,000,000. Lend-lease guns, materials and food were then just beginning to make themselves felt upon the battlefields. But lend-lease was already a weapon of tremendous potential power for the security of the United States. As I told the Congress in my Second Report: "Planes, tanks, guns and ships have begun to flow from our factories and yards, and the flow will accelerate from day to day until the stream becomes a river and the river a torrent, engulfing this totalitarian tyranny which seeks to dominate the world."]

[I now report that ³lend-lease supplies and services provided to our allies in the three months ending June 30, 1944, amounted to \$3,639,000,000 in value, 14 times the amount in the same period three years ago. In all, lend-lease aid has been provided in an amount of \$28,270,000,000.

Three years ago the Axis aggressors were well along the road to domination of the world, and ^{itself} the United States ^{was} in grave danger. Today

~~It is~~ the United Nations ~~who~~ ^{moving relentlessly along the roads which lead to} are ~~electing us~~ on Berlin and Tokyo. [It is we who are winning the victories and the Germans and the Japanese who are suffering the defeats. We have come a long, long way in three years.]

~~For~~ the preparation and execution of the ^{formidable} [tremendous] offensives on which we are now jointly engaged with our allies, lend-lease has fulfilled its promise, [in overwhelming measure.] Every day that the men of our Army and our Navy go into battle [on land and sea and in the air, they have helping them what is, in effect, our third fighting arm--] lend-lease, ^{is being} ~~is~~ effectively used in the common cause by the heroic men of the other United Nations. Through lend-lease, the full power of American production is being brought to bear against our common enemies [not only by American fighting men, but] by the millions of fighting men of our allies. Through lend-lease, American weapons and other war supplies are being used by our allies to destroy [tremendous numbers of] our enemies and [to] hasten their defeat.

We ^{should} ~~shall~~ not permit any weakening of this combined system of war supply to delay final victory a single day or to cost unnecessarily the life of one American boy. Until the unconditional surrender of both Japan and Germany, we ^{should} ~~shall~~ continue the lend-lease program on ^{whatever} ~~the~~ scale that is necessary to make the combined striking power of all the United Nations against our enemies as overwhelming and as effective as we can make it.

We know now that ~~only~~ by combining our power ~~can we~~ speed the day of certain victory. We know also that ~~only~~ ^{only} by continuing our unity [^] can we secure a just and durable peace.

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Three years ago the Axis aggressors were well along the road to domination of the world and the United States was in grave danger. Today

it is the United Nations who are closing in on Berlin and Tokyo. It is we who are winning the victories and the Germans and the Japanese who are suffering the defeats. We have come a long, long way in three years.

For the preparation and execution of the tremendous offensives on which we are now jointly engaged with our allies, lend-lease has fulfilled its promise in overwhelming measure. Every day that the men of our Army and our Navy go into battle on land and sea and in the air, they have helping them what is, in effect, our third fighting arm—lend-lease, so effectively used in the common cause by the heroic men of the other United Nations. Through lend-lease the full power of American production is being brought to bear against our common enemies not only by American fighting men, but by the millions of fighting men of our allies. Through lend-lease American weapons and other war supplies are being used by our allies to destroy tremendous numbers of our enemies and to hasten their defeat.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

AUGUST __, 1944

That is true of the bomb is also true of the other supplies that we send under Lend-Lease. American materials were contained within military materials in the British inventory that produced the plane that dropped the bomb. And the British workers who built the plane and the bomb were that plane is against the Germans get enough to not become Lend-Lease food are included in their actions.

3 LIFE MONO. SECTION.

We made that bomb for use against our enemies. The British used it against our enemies. Because the bomb was dropped by a British plane its use was charged up to Lend-Lease. If the bomb had been dropped by an American plane its use would be included in the U. S. Army Air Forces' own procurement costs. In either case the ultimate destination of the bomb and the benefit of its use to the United States and to the other United Nations are the same—the enemy is hurt, the lives of men in our own and allied forces are saved and victory is brought that much nearer.

The statistics of Lend-Lease aid simply measure that part of our total production of war goods and services that is used by the forces of our allies, instead of by our own forces, against our enemies. In the same way, the statistics of their reverse Lend-Lease aid to us simply measure that part of their total production of war goods and services that is used by our forces, instead of theirs. But we benefit equally from that part of our allies' production that goes to their own armed forces, just as they benefit equally from that part of our production that goes to our own armed forces.

The ultimate measurement of the aid that we have given and have received is not to be found in the dollar figures of Lend-Lease and reverse Lend-Lease. Nor can it be found in any dollar figures, since human lives as well as material resources are involved in the accounting. It can be found only in terms of the battles won, the millions of enemy troops killed and captured, and the hundreds of thousands of lives saved, because the United Nations have successfully combined all their resources in men and materials for winning victory and winning it far more than would otherwise have been possible.

Lend-Lease Aid

From March 11, 1941, to June 30, 1944, Lend-Lease supplies and services to the value of \$28,370,150,000 were provided to our allies under the Lend-Lease Act. In addition \$679,241,000 worth of supplies were consigned to U. S. commanding generals in the field for subsequent Lend-Lease transfer to allied forces. The decision as to whether these war supplies and services should be provided to our allies instead of being used by our own forces was made by the United States' own military chiefs of staff and war production high command on the basis of one consideration only—that these supplies and services would do more good toward winning the war and toward aiding the United States if they were provided to our allies than if they were retained for our own use.

Ninety-seven percent of all Lend-Lease aid has been provided to our major fighting allies—the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, and China. The total dollar figure of Lend-Lease aid—over \$28,000,000,000—is about 25 percent of all that the United States has spent for defense and war purposes. One of each dollar 85 cents has been spent for supplies and services used by our own forces in defense of the United States and toward winning the war; and 15 cents has been spent for supplies and services used by our allies toward winning the same war and therefore used equally in the interests of our own defense.

Approximately 54 percent of Lend-Lease aid has consisted of all types of fighting equipment, including ships, and classified as munitions. These are used by our allies directly against our enemies.

Approximately 23 percent of Lend-Lease aid has consisted of industrial materials and products. These are used by our allies indirectly against our enemies. With these supplies the factories of our allies can produce more fighting equipment.

Approximately 11 percent of Lend-Lease aid consists of foods and other agricultural products. These supplies, too, are used by our allies indirectly against our enemies. Lend-Lease food makes it possible for the workers in their factories and the soldiers in their armies to get enough to eat.

The balance of Lend-Lease aid—about 12 percent of the total—consists of services, such as the repair and rental of ships, the ferrying of aircraft, and the building of factories in the United States to produce Lend-Lease supplies. These services enable our allies to use more effectively against our enemies both what they themselves produce and what we send to them.

Lend-Lease Munitions and U. S. Production

Lend-Lease munitions transfers totaled \$21,142,000,000 by June 30, 1944. Yet this great amount was only 15 percent of our total munitions production since the beginning of our defense and war production program in 1940. Our allies purchased another 5 percent for cash. Our own armed forces have received 82 percent—over four-fifths—of all the munitions we have produced.

We have sent 30,000 Lend-Lease planes to our allies since March 11, 1941. They have purchased another 5,000 for cash. We retained for the use of our own forces over 175,000 planes. Lend-Lease planes, great as their numbers have been, have accounted for only 15 percent of our total plane production.

4 GF MONO. SEC.

We have sent to our allies 24,900 lend-lease tanks and 657,400 other military motor vehicles, including ordnance vehicles, jeeps, and trucks. Our allies have purchased from us for cash an additional 1,800 tanks and 170,000 trucks. We have retained for our own use 16,500 tanks and 1,500,000 other military motor vehicles. The lend-lease share of our total production of tanks and other military motor vehicles is larger than for any other category of munitions—25 percent.

On the other hand, the \$2,898,529,000 worth of naval and merchant ships and small craft loaned to our allies for the war have amounted to less than 10 percent in value of all ships built in American yards—so great has been our ship-building program. We have loaned 511 cargo ships of 1,000 gross tons or over and 1,284 merchant and auxiliary craft of under 1,000 gross tons. We have loaned over 1,400 naval vessels of all types, the great majority of which are landing craft, PT boats, and other small craft, but including also a few scores of large combat types, such as destroyers, aircraft carriers and cruisers. All ships provided under the Lend-Lease Act are loaned for the duration of the war and remain the property of the United States.

Industrial Materials and Products

Similarly the industrial materials and products sent to our allies have been a comparatively small part of our total production of these war supplies. We have, for example, sent \$2,029,169,000 of petroleum products under lend-lease. This was less than 9 percent of our total production of petroleum products and much of the gasoline and oil we have sent abroad under lend-lease has been used by our own overseas air and naval forces.

Foodstuffs

Between March 11, 1941, and June 30, 1944, we sent over \$4,000,000,000 worth of food, almost entirely to the United Kingdom and Russia. The British cannot raise enough food on their crowded island to feed themselves; they must import some of their food or starve. And the Soviet Union's best food-producing areas were in the hands of the Germans for more than two years. The food we have sent has been vital to winning the war. Yet it has been less than 10 percent of our total food production since the beginning of the lend-lease program. In the first six months of this year we have shipped under lend-lease, for example, 9 percent of all our meat, including only 1 percent of our beef and veal and 15 percent of our pork; less than 2 percent of our butter, slightly over 10 percent of our cheese, less than 4 percent of our canned vegetables and 6 percent of our canned fruits and juices.

Lend-Lease Exports and Cash Exports

Actual shipments of lend-lease supplies reached a cumulative dollar value of \$21,514,870,000 on June 30, 1944. For the past 12 months lend-lease exports have averaged close to \$1,000,000,000 a month. In spite of this tremendous volume of lend-lease exports and the inevitable effects of war requirements and shipping shortages on normal commercial trade, the dollar value of cash exports from the United States has been maintained at pre-war levels and has been increasing for the past 12 months. Our cash exports between March 11, 1941, when the Lend-Lease Act became law, and June 30, 1944, reached \$20,400,000,000, approximately half as much as our lend-lease exports in the same period.

Although the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 was late our normal commercial exports, the total of our cash exports increased sharply in 1940 and 1941 because of large purchases of military equipment and other war supplies made by the nations near our allies, principally before the lend-lease program went into effect. Shipments on these war contracts continued through 1942 and into 1943. From 1939 through 1943 we exported \$2,589,000,000 worth of military equipment for which we were paid cash, principally by the British. In addition, billions of dollars worth of other supplies purchased by the British and others for war purposes were included in our cash exports. As these pre-lend-lease contracts were completed the cash exports tended to decline from the 1941 level. This decline continued through the first six months of 1943. Since July 1, 1943, however, the trend has been reversed, and a gradual increase in our cash exports has continued for a full year.

In the four pre-war years, 1937-1938, total United States exports averaged less than \$2,600,000,000 a year. In the first six months of 1944 our cash exports, exclusive of lend-lease, were at an annual rate in excess of \$2,600,000,000 a year.

5 GF MONO. SEC.

Even after allowance is made for differences in price levels, this is a surprising record. It is in sharp contrast to the experience of the United Kingdom, for example, whose exports have declined more than 50 percent in value since the war began.

Including lend-lease, our total exports in the first six months of 1944 were at an annual rate of over \$14,000,000,000 a year, far in excess of the highest peacetime levels.

While lend-lease is a war program, it is likely to have stimulating effects on the commercial post-war foreign trade of the United States. The war has introduced American products in other countries in a volume and variety never approached before. After the war these countries will want to continue to obtain many of these products by buying them. American industry will have a greatly expanded foreign market, provided that our international economic policies make it possible for these nations to pay for their purchases.

Lend-Lease on the Battlefield

These effective lend-lease on United States foreign trade are, however, incidental.

~~Whether, upon the whole, the material aid in material self-interest that has proved so successful for fighting and winning the war, also gives a useful purpose in the transition period after the war has begun, this is a matter for future decision by the President, the Congress, and the American people as a whole. We already know that, through our experience of working together in the war we have learned much that will be of value in building the peace.~~

In the meantime, however, the lend-lease program is being carried out for one purpose only, to help win the war and win as quickly as possible. The results that have been and are being obtained from the lend-lease program are to be found, therefore, on the battlefronts around the world.

Chapter 3

REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID

The United States has never been bombed, it is far from the fighting front, and it has the greatest industrial capacity among the United Nations. The circumstances of our geographical position and our material strength have therefore called upon us to give more toward winning the war in production and in money, while our major fighting allies have been called upon to give more in lives, in destruction to their homelands and in the suffering of their people. ~~Our American people have suffered, death, exposure, starvation, and millions of civilians who have met death at the hands of the Nazis. The British Commonwealth armed forces have incurred over 1,000,000 casualties, more than 80% of which were suffered by the United Kingdom forces. Over 50,000 British civilians have been killed by enemy bombs and other planes and 125,000 wounded. Almost 40,000 British civilians—men, women, and children—have lost their lives in air raids on the United States Army has lost indeed so far in China. Millions of Chinese soldiers and civilians have been killed by the Japanese. Others of our allies have suffered proportionately heavy losses.~~

We have been able to produce more than our own forces could use effectively against the enemy. Our fighting allies, on the other hand, have generally required more or all of the war supplies that they could produce for their own fighting forces, in addition to all that we could send them. The greatest return we have received for the lend-lease supplies that we have sent is in the extra damage our allies have been able to do to our own war enemies with the help of these supplies from us.

Nevertheless, by June 30, 1944, we had received in addition and without cost to us over \$1,000,000,000 of reverse lend-lease supplies and services from our allies. Most of this aid has been provided to American forces overseas by the British Commonwealth. Expenditures for reverse lend-lease aid by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have been reported up to April 1, 1944. These expenditures for reverse lend-lease supplies and services provided to United States Army and Navy forces overseas and United States merchant shipping overseas in the three months between January 1 and April 1, 1944, amounted to \$485,500,000. Reports on reverse lend-lease aid furnished to American forces in India have not yet been received for the full first quarter of 1944, but partial figures available indicate that more than \$10,000,000 has been expended in India for reverse lend-lease aid for our forces during this period. This would make the total of reverse lend-lease aid received from the British Commonwealth for the first quarter of 1944 well in excess of \$500,000,000, or an annual rate of more than \$2,000,000,000.

The following table shows the expenditures for reverse lend-lease aid by the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand in the first quarter of 1944 and cumulatively since June 1, 1943.

The Japanese have lost 5,300,000 soldiers dead, captured or missing besides millions of civilians who have met death at the hands of the bombs. Millions of Chinese soldiers and civilians have been killed by the Japanese. The great forces of the United Kingdom alone, with a population something of more, had already suffered almost 1,000,000 casualties by September 1943 - a year ago. This figure does not include the casualties of Australia, India or Canadian forces. They too thousands of British soldiers have laid down their lives for our common victory since then. By June 30, 1944, over 50,000 British civilians - men, women and children - had been killed by bomb raids and this was before the recent bombs had done most of their damage. Since then the recent bombs have destroyed or damaged an average of 700 houses every hour of the day and night in England. Others of our allies have suffered proportionately heavy losses in lives and property.

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REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID*

Furnished to U. S. Forces and Merchant Shipping Commands

	Jan. 1-Apr. 1, 1944	Cumulative to Apr. 1, 1944
United Kingdom.....	\$179,360,000	\$1,934,400,000
Australia.....	95,574,000	471,471,000
New Zealand.....	13,461,000	104,344,000
TOTAL.....	488,395,000	2,510,215,000

In addition to the \$2,510,215,000 reverse lend-lease aid received by the United States from the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, reverse lend-lease aid to our forces in India already had totalled more than \$205,000,000 by January 1, 1944.

These figures include only reverse lend-lease aid furnished to our forces and to our shipping commands. They do not include strategic raw materials, commodities, and bookshells furnished

*Excludes India

by the British under reverse lend-lease without cost up to our shipment to the United States.

Under arrangements made in accordance with the agreement announced last November, strategic raw materials and commodities procured in the United Kingdom and the British Colonial Empire are provided to us as reverse lend-lease. We had already received an estimated \$60,000,000 worth of such commodities from these British areas by April 1, 1944, including crude rubber, and tea from Ceylon, cocoa, palm kernels and palm oil, copra fibers, sheema, and asbestos from British Africa, copra from the British Islands of the Pacific and many other commodities needed for the United States war effort. In addition, we are also receiving mica, borlap, jade, and other strategic commodities on reverse lend-lease terms from India.

The volume of reverse lend-lease supplies and services provided to our forces overseas under reverse lend-lease has continued to rise. In the United Kingdom, for example, the figure for the third quarter of 1943 (exclusive of construction and supplies and services provided outside the United Kingdom) was \$114,000,000. In the fourth quarter of 1943 it was \$124,000,000. In the first quarter of 1944 it was \$260,000,000.

In the first quarter of 1944 the expenditures reported by Australia and New Zealand for reverse lend-lease aid to our forces were more than the value of our lend-lease shipments to these two countries in the same period.

United Kingdom

The following table shows the expenditures reported by the United Kingdom for her reverse lend-lease aid to the United States forces and shipping commands cumulatively on the end of 1943 and on April 1, 1944.

REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID BY UNITED KINGDOM

	End of 1943	April 1, 1944
Goods and services transferred to United Kingdom.....	\$179,360,000	\$179,360,000
Shipping services.....	114,040,000	134,461,000
Asbestos, ironore, tungsten and other construction.....	538,140,000	679,650,000
Goods and services transferred outside the United Kingdom.....	181,330,000	204,350,000
TOTAL.....	\$1,062,870,000	\$1,934,400,000

*Revised.

*Figure for Jan. 1-Apr. 1, 1944, are preliminary.

Excludes her goods totaling \$4,000

Reverse lend-lease supplies and services from the British, like our lend-lease aid to the British, played a vital role in preparing for the operations for the liberation of Europe. One of the biggest lend-lease rush jobs done for us by the British was the waterproofing of many hundreds of our landing tanks, as well as trucks and other mechanized equipment as they would reach the invasion beaches in fighting condition after plowing through the surf.

The job was done for allied mechanized equipment, United States and British alike, by British industry. In order to get it done in time the entire output of Britain's sheet steel rolling industry was taken for three months. To meet the frenzied waterproofing job from the factories to the hundreds of vehicles upon in the British Isles a huge fleet of trucks was kept operating day and night. The waterproofing was done assembled and installed by British engineers. General Eisenhower's headquarters has reported that the quantities of sheet steel used for this tremendous job would have been enough for a bridge 150 feet wide across the English Channel from Dover to Calais. The great majority of American landing tanks, as well as British tanks, armored cars, supply trucks, and motor vehicles used so far in Normandy were lined with this waterproofing equipment.

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The wirespreading equipment furnished under reverse lend-lease was only one of many thousands of other categories of supplies and services provided out of British stocks or by British facilities to the American forces taking part in the liberation of Europe. These are a few examples of the scope of this aid.

All rail transportation to the invasion ports, the costs of transporting many U. S. troops on British ships, including the world's two largest liners—the *Queen Elizabeth* and *Queen Mary*, 1,400 Spitfires and other British-made planes, more than 100 aircrafts and other transportation for our forces which cost the British \$634,450,000 up to April 1; fresh vegetables and other British-produced foodstuffs that took care of 30 percent of our soldiers' rations; tens of thousands of newly-invented light-weight gas tanks for our P-47 Thunderbolt fighters on long-range missions to the heart of Germany; more than 21,000 miles of road landing mats; 1,000,000 pairs of steel arches; thousands of parachutes; quantities of bombers, anti-aircraft and anti-tank equipment, all food, light, and water bills at our bases and barracks.

So wide is the scope of the reverse lend-lease aid we receive from the British that a U. S. naval base in Britain has been operated for a full 12 months without making a single cash payment.

We have also benefited greatly from British engineering and research in new weapons. No money valuation is put on this type of aid, but it is freely made available to us. For example, rockets based on a British design are now being used by American forces against the Japanese in the Pacific; a British-developed radio set has been widely used in American tanks built for Britain and Russia; and the jet-propulsion plane uses an engine based on the Whittle design produced in Britain.

Australia

The following table shows the expenditures reported by Australia for her reverse lend-lease aid to United States forces in that area, cumulatively to the end of 1943 and to April 1, 1944.

REVERSE LEND-LEASE AID FROM AUSTRALIA

	Cumulative to Dec. 31, 1943	Cumulative to Apr. 1, 1944
Supplies and services.....	\$95,171,000	\$193,348,000
Technical equipment.....	8,079,000	10,717,000
Motor transport.....	51,479,000	40,895,000
Armory stores and equipment.....	37,440,000	50,545,000
General stores.....	43,271,000	54,170,000
Communications and communication.....	10,588,000	14,178,000
Shipyards.....	51,089,000	51,407,000
Buildings, buildings, and living.....	91,090,000	100,704,000
Miscellaneous.....	1,268,000	7,470,000
TOTAL.....	\$601,364,000	\$953,652,000

Excludes loan Australia paid to U. S. (10)

Australia is providing increasingly increased quantities of food to United States forces in the Pacific as Reverse Lend-Lease. In the first three months of 1944 alone our forces in the Pacific theatres received from Australia more than 380,000,000 pounds of food, an annual rate of a billion and a half pounds. In the entire period up to January 1 of this year the total was 500,000,000 pounds. Our men have received from Australia more than 150,000,000 pounds of food, wool, lamb, mutton, pork and canned meats, 19,500,000 quarts of fresh milk, 38,800,000 dozens of fresh eggs, and more than 15,000,000 pounds of butter. Transfers of food to April 1, 1944, in pounds, included the following:

Beef and veal.....	69,440,000
Lamb and mutton.....	15,440,000
Pork.....	25,840,000
Canned meats.....	36,080,000
Miscellaneous meats.....	4,000,000
Bread, biscuits and cereals (including flour).....	127,880,000
Potatoes.....	75,500,000
Fruits and vegetables, fresh.....	87,540,000
Fruits and vegetables, canned.....	101,900,000
Fruits and vegetables, dehydrated and dried.....	75,744,000
Butter, fresh.....	15,212,000
Butter substitutes.....	9,404,000
Sugar.....	49,738,000
Milk, condensed and evaporated.....	29,448,000
Milk, fresh (19,500,000 quarts).....	41,925,000
Eggs, fresh (38,800,000 doz.).....	58,200,000
TOTAL.....	\$84,571,000

New Zealand

Foodstuffs constituted more than one-third of the Reverse Lend-Lease Aid provided to United States forces by New Zealand. The cumulative totals through March 31, 1944, as

compared with the totals in January 1, 1964, are shown in the following table:

	Committed to Dec. 31, 1963	Committed to Dec. 31, 1964
Fixed assets	\$59,500,000	\$59,704,000
Investment pool supplies	13,267,000	18,317,000
Debtors and accounts	1,793,000	18,377,000
Current	4,737,000	4,737,000
Prepaid	4,604,000	4,604,000
Other	4,800,000	4,800,000
Other	8,727,000	8,727,000
Other	4,292,000	4,292,000
TOTAL	\$91,589,000	\$105,467,000

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United States funds in the South and Southwest Pacific received 454,329,150 pounds of kerosene valued at \$47,361,000 from the Government of New Zealand without cost, at a lower lend-lease up to April 1, 1944.

The transfers, in pounds, included the following:

TOTAL	254,878,140
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Over 90 percent of all the food consumed by the American forces in the South and Southwest Pacific is provided by Australia and New Zealand without cost, under various lend-lease agreements. Because of this, hundreds of thousands of tons of shipping space have been saved for the transport of munitions and other war material from the United States to the Pacific war theaters, and it has been possible to allocate more of our own food supply to American civilians.

Figure 1 consists of two bar charts. The left chart is titled 'All respondents' and the right chart is titled 'Respondents who have been personally affected by the economic crisis'. Both charts show the percentage of respondents for two levels of agreement: 'Strongly agree' and 'Disagree'.

Category	Strongly agree (%)	Disagree (%)
All respondents	65	35
Respondents who have been personally affected by the economic crisis	75	25

The Soviet Union, which boasts until this summer as her own self, has needed virtually all the war-time produce for her own forces. Moreover, until this year the United States Russia were stationed on Soviet territory and the economic for many land-lanes did not arise, except in connection with supplies, repairs, and other services provided as among land-lanes for United States merchant ships in Soviet ports. With the establishment of the double-lane long bases in Russia, the Soviet Union has provided our Air Forces, as reverse land-lanes aid without cost to us, much of the equipment, supplies, and services needed for these bases. This aid has included many of the materials and most of the labor used in building the bases, part of the equipment, much of the food for our Air Force crews and mechanics, and many other operational supplies and services.

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China has been fighting the Japanese on her own soil for seven years. She has needed more aid than we have up to now been able to send her by the single air route that connects her with the outside world. Nevertheless the Chinese people have rendered heroic and effective aid to our forces in China, although technically this help is not classified as overt lend-lease.

The bases in China from which our B-29 Super Fortresses take off to raid Japan were built by 400,000 Chinese laborers, working with their bare hands. There was virtually no equipment in China for building these bases, nor could it be brought in from outside by air. The airfields were built by hand-labor. The Chinese lacked by least 240,000 tons of rock and sand to build the runways needed for the planes, crushed the rock by hand and laid it down by teams, then smoothed the surface by hand-bushed straw rakes. They built so effectively that within three months of the time construction started, the first of the B-29's was able to land in China.

The many bases used by General Chemical's Fourteenth Air Force in China were built in the same fashion. And the success of the operations of one Air Force in China depends in large part on China's progressive air-raid warning system on the approach of Japanese planes. This system extends by underground connections into the Japanese-occupied areas of China. In spite of the lack of modern communication equipment, it is one of the best and most efficient in the world.

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STATUS OF NATIONS Lend-Lease Countries and United Nations

Country	Declared Eligible for Lend-Lease Act	Lend-Lease Agreement Signed	Repealed Lend-Lease Agreement Signed	United Nations Declaration Signed	Earlier Date of Termination of State of War With Any Axis Power	Earlier Date of Termination of Declaration of War With Any Axis Power
Argentina	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942		Jan. 28, 1944
Australia	May 11, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942		
Belgium	June 22, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Bolivia	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Brazil	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	Jan. 28, 1942
Canada	May 22, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	Jan. 28, 1942
Chile	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
China	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942		Jan. 28, 1942
Colombia	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Czechoslovakia	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Denmark	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Ecuador	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
El Salvador	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
France	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Free French Forces	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Greece	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Haiti	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Honduras	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
India	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Iran	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Italy	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Japan	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Latvia	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Lithuania	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Malaya	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Netherlands	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Norway	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Philippines	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Poland	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Portugal	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Romania	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Slovakia	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Spain	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Sweden	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Switzerland	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Taiwan	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Turkey	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
United Kingdom	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
United States	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
U. S. S. R.	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	
Yugoslavia	May 8, 1941			Jan. 1, 1942	Apr. 4, 1942	

¹ The Lend-Lease Agreement has been extended with certain exceptions in New Zealand, but in the European War Agreement entered into with these countries, they accepted the principle of the Lend-Lease Agreement with the United Kingdom as applicable in their Lend-Lease relations with the United States.

² Germany under the provisions of the French National Convention was declared eligible to receive Lend-Lease aid on December 15, 1941, and a protocol of agreement was signed with the Committee on September 1, 1942. French North and West Africa were declared eligible to receive Lend-Lease aid on September 15, 1942. On September 25, 1942, a Lend-Lease-Mexico Lend-Lease Agreement governing Lend-Lease aid and equipment and was entered into with the Mexican Government at Washington. Subsequent to the French National Convention and to the Lend-Lease-Mexico Lend-Lease Agreement in China, Lend-Lease aid was authorized to the Republic of China and to the Republic of China in North China and to the Republic of China in South China.

³ In an exchange of notes between the United States and Mexico, Mexico accepted the underlying principle of Article VII of the Lend-Lease Agreement.

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Chapter 2

LEND-LEASE AND THE WAR FRONTS

Three years ago, on June 30, 1941, the lend-lease program was just getting under way. The Nazis and the Fascists were the masters of all Western Europe. The British Isles were beleaguered by sea and by air, threatened by invasion and still fighting on only by a miracle of courage and united effort. Most of the Mediterranean was an Axis lake and the lifeline of the British Empire at least was in imminent danger of being cut. To the east, Hitler had launched his great offensive against the Soviet Union. The German armies were moving rapidly ahead and the Axis leaders were confident they would be in Moscow by fall. In the Far East Japan was tightening her stronghold upon China and secretly preparing her attack upon us, the British, and the Dutch. The Axis powers had not won the war, but they were winning all the battles and they appeared to possess overwhelming superiority in military equipment and trained manpower over the nations opposing them.

From Trickle to Torrent

The first lend-lease shipments were small. Between March 11, 1941, and December 1, 1941, we shipped only \$620,000,000 worth of supplies to the fighting fronts. But this aid and the promise that lay behind it of much more to come was given at a critical moment. The first lend-lease food shipments arrived in England at a time when the German submarine campaign had come so close to starving Britain out that her warships were almost empty of food stocks. The first American tanks and planes arrived in Iraq in time to strengthen the British Tenth Army sufficiently to launch a counter-attack against Rommel. The first convoy of American and British supplies reached Murmansk at a time when the Nazi armies were at the gates of Moscow. In the Far East, American engineers and material arrived for the development of the Burma Road into a passable, although still dangerous highway, and thousands of American trucks arrived to triple the volume of supplies carried over the road into China.

Lend-lease shipments were a trickle in 1941. But they helped our allies hold the line while we worked (and are now expending our war production and train our armed forces) in defense against the growing menace of the Axis. When we were attacked, Britain, Russia, and China were still fighting strongly and we were far better prepared than we would otherwise have been.

In the three years between June 30, 1941, and June 30, 1944, our lend-lease shipments to our allies, now combined with the tremendous working power of our own forces, have fulfilled the prophecy made in Congress in the Second Lend-Lease Report on September 11, 1941: "Planes, tanks, guns, and ships have begun to flow from our factories and yards, and the flow will accelerate from day to day, until the ocean becomes a river, and the river a torrent, engulfing that totalitarian tyranny which seeks to dominate the world."

Lend-lease shipments from the United States to the war theaters now total \$25,154,870,000. In addition we have loaned for the duration \$1,668,058,000 of naval and merchant shipping and provided \$2,450,150,000 worth of lend-lease services. For the past 12 months lend-lease exports have averaged close to a billion dollars each month, almost as much as in the entire first 12 months of the lend-lease program put together.

The enemy has felt the results of these shipments, just as he has felt the power of our own armed forces. For the United Nations the prospect has changed from the imminent danger of disaster to the certainty of complete victory, sooner than we had hoped, provided we do not allow the enemy to divide us, not weaken the combined program that has brought us where we are today.

Combined Offensive

The forces of the Soviet Union, strengthened by lend-lease supplies, have pushed the Nazis back 1,200 miles from the Caucasus to the gates of Warsaw. The Red Army is over half of the way to Berlin. In the three years from June 22, 1941, to June 22, 1944, the Soviet Government has announced that the Soviet losses, while suffering the terrible number of 5,500,000 dead and missing soldiers themselves, have killed or captured 7,800,000 Germans. Hitler still can't do it: he can't use these men on the Western front.

Combined British, French, and other allied forces, fighting beside Americans and strengthened by lend-lease, have driven the enemy from all of Africa, cleared the Mediterranean and liberated over two-thirds of Italy.

In Western Europe the combined British-American air offensive upon Germany is continuing while the British, American, French, and Canadian forces are liberating France and destroying hundreds of thousands of the enemy. They, too, are headed for Berlin.

In the war against Japan the United States' drive across the Central Pacific has been supported by the decisive participation of Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch forces in General MacArthur's campaign back toward the Philippines by way of New Guinea. In the China-Burma-India theater, Chinese troops are fighting their way across Burma under General Stilwell, the Japanese have been ejected from India; British naval forces in the Bay of Bengal are gaining strength for future moves in the direction of Singapore; and our air power inside China is growing fast as our B-29's hit the Japanese homeland again and again.

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The combined forces of the United Nations are well on the way to Berlin and Tokyo. They are much further along the road than they could possibly have been without lend-lease and material aid. We can shorten the war still further and save the lives of additional tens of thousands of Americans and allied soldiers by continuing the lend-lease program to the full extent necessary to win final victory over Japan—as well as Germany—at the earliest possible moment.

THE OFFENSIVE IN WESTERN EUROPE

When the combined American, British, French, and Canadian forces began the liberation of France on June 6, 1944, they were the best equipped and best supplied armies ever to move against an enemy. United States, British, and Canadian production had been pooled for three years to produce this result. Through lend-lease and material aid United States and Canadian production supplemented British production. Through reverse lend-lease Britain furnished our forces with supplies that could be provided locally. Most of the ships engaged in the landing and supply operations were British-registered. A majority of the ground forces have been Americans. The Air Forces are about equally divided. Regardless of nationality, every man who has participated in these operations has had what he needs to fight successfully against a dangerous and overcautious enemy. General Eisenhower has welded these armies into a single fighting team.

Lend-lease shipments to the United Kingdom between March 11, 1941, and June 30, 1944, had a dollar value of \$9,121,740,000. About half of these supplies consisted of fighting equipment. Guns, shells, and bombs amounted to almost \$1,500,000,000. Many of these guns are now firing against the same enemy our men are fighting in France and many of the bombs are now being dropped by British planes on our enemy's defense points, communications lines, and war-production centers.

The British produce themselves three-quarters of the planes used by the R. A. F., including all their heavy bombers and most of their fighters, but we have supplied under lend-lease over 4,500 medium and light bombers and fighters to the R. A. F. and the Royal Air Force. We have also sent to the United Kingdom over 9,500 tanks. Many of these planes and tanks, manned by British crews, are fighting in the French campaign today.

We have also loaned to the British for the duration \$1,410,000,000 worth of combat ships and small naval craft. Many of the planes lend-leased to the British have been carrier planes which are now flying from British aircraft carriers. With this assistance to their own naval production, the British have been able to carry the major part of the burden of conveying men and supplies across the Atlantic and of covering our landing operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France, while the United States fleet has concentrated on the Pacific phase of the war.

The British have themselves produced by far the larger share of the equipment needed for their forces. We have assisted them to maintain their war production record by supplying \$1,285,173,000 worth of industrial materials and products. Our shipments have included over 6,000,000 tons of steel and 550,000 tons of other metals for the production in British factories of more guns and planes and tanks and bombs to use against the enemy.

Before the war Britain imported about two-thirds of her food. By strict rationing and greatly increased home production the British have reduced their food imports by two-thirds and thus saved ships for fighting equipment. Part of their reduced food imports comes from the United States under lend-lease. We have sent Britain \$2,145,590,000 of food. This has been about 10 percent of Britain's total food supply. With this additional food from us, the British have been able to maintain the rations of their war workers, at a level considerably lower than ours, but still sufficient for working efficiency.

Lend-lease shipments to the Mediterranean theatre reached \$1,070,829,000 up to June 30, 1944. Almost all of these shipments have consisted of military supplies for the British, Indian, Polish, French, New Zealand, Australian, Greek, and other allied armies that have made up a majority of the United Nations fighting forces in this theatre. Until our landings in North Africa these supplies all had to be shipped around Africa and up the Red Sea or down across Africa. We have sent in all 4,600 lend-lease planes, 3,100 tanks, and 71,000 trucks and other motor vehicles to this theatre. This equipment has played a major role in the campaigns that began at El Alamein and Algiers in the fall of 1942 and have now reached Florence in northern Italy. It has strengthened the striking power of the allied forces fighting beside Americans in the invasion of southern France. In these campaigns, the Axis armies have lost hundreds of thousands of men and tremendous quantities of equipment.

With the fall of France, the French Army was virtually destroyed. Now there is an army of France again. It is equipped with lend-lease arms. In addition to equipment lend-leased directly to the French, we have sent \$452,598,000 worth of lend-lease equipment to the U. S. Commanding General in the field for subsequent transfer to the French. Some divisions of the reborn French Army have been playing a gallant and important role for months in the Italian campaign. Others are now engaged in southern France. In northern France a French armored division is now striking toward Paris as a powerful unit of Lieutenant General Patton's Third Army. Its commander is General Jacques LeClerc, who led the French in their 1,200 mile drive across the Sahara from Lahe Chad to Tripoli in January 1943. Then his men rode in a few old and broken British and American tanks and cars.

The Germans thought that the men in this army would not be able to fight again in this war, because they had lost their arms and their homeland. They are back in the fight because we have sent them the Sherman tanks, the American half-tracks and artillery and the other equipment to replace what they had lost.

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There are over half a million men in the armed forces of Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Belgium who are also back in the fight, though their homelands are occupied, because of the equipment that we and the British have been able to supply. Now does this figure include the millions of partisans and underground forces fighting behind the German lines. All of them are doing their full share toward wounding battles and killing Germans and Japanese.

THE EASTERN FRONT

In one of the most rapid and overwhelming military campaigns in history, the Red Army had advanced to the borders of East Prussia and the gates of Warsaw. Fighting on an 800-mile front from the Gulf of Finland to the foothills of the Carpathian mountains, the Soviet forces have broken through the German Baltic defense, spanned the Vistula River in Poland, and covered more than half the distance to Berlin. The Soviet summer campaign began on June 22d. In the first 30 days the Red Army has driven the enemy out of 180,000 square miles of territory, an area larger than New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland combined.

Behind the advance of the Red Army and supplying its vital needs are Soviet production—now largely relocated and rebuilt in Siberia—and American lend-lease, supplemented by large amounts of British and Canadian material and goods.

With the assistance of more than \$1,500,000,000 worth of industrial supplies and equipment that the United States has shipped to the U. S. S. R. from October 1941 through June 30, 1944, the Soviet Union has strengthened its own industrial ability and capacity to meet the growing needs of its armies. Vice President Wallace and other U. S. Government officials who have visited the Soviet Union have seen American steel, American machine tools, and other industrial products in the Soviet war factories, shipyards, and repair shops that are providing the Soviet forces with the greater part of their equipment.

The rapid advance of the Red Army has meant increasingly long lines of transportation and communication to the front, much of the way over lands that have been watched by the retreating enemy. Land-lease shipments of mobile equipment and large quantities of supplies for her transportation and communication systems have aided the Red Army materially as it advances further and further from its home bases. ■

We have sent 300,000 trucks and other military motor vehicles to the Soviet Union. Half of all the supplies for the advancing Red Army that are sent by road are now being carried in American lend-lease trucks. According to estimates of U. S. Army observers, almost 34,000 military motor vehicles were shipped to Russia in the first six months of 1944 alone.

Last year we began a program for shipments of railroad rolling stock to the Soviet Union. By June 30, 1944, we had sent to the Soviet 189 locomotives and 1,640 flat cars. We also increased our shipments of railroad rails and accessories. By June 30, we had shipped more than 275,000 tons of railroad rails and accessories, car and locomotive wheels and axles up and in the rebuilding and expansion of the Soviet railroads. For the Soviet Army's communications system, we have shipped \$14,000 miles of field telephone wire and 175,000 field telephones. American supply officers attached to the U. S. military mission have reported from the Soviet front that American transport and communications equipment has contributed immeasurably to success on the eastern front.

In the first six months of this year we sent more than 3,000 planes to the Soviet Union. From October 1, 1943, through June 30, 1944, more than 11,000 planes have been flown or shipped from the United States. Almost half of these have been ferried by Soviet pilots over the Alaska-Siberia Air-Ferry route. Most of the planes sent to the Soviet Union have been Bell Aircraft P-51 and Curtiss P-40 fighters, Douglas A-20 attack bombers, and North American B-25's. The ace of all allied fighter pilots, Lt. Col. Alexander Pokryshkin of the Soviet Air Force, shot down 46 of his 39 Nazi planes in 2 Bell Aircraft. Nine other Soviet aces have shot down between 20 and 40 German planes each in lend-lease Aircraft. All have been honored as "Heroes of the U. S. S. R." The German planes shot down by Russian airmen flying lend-lease planes cannot be used by Hitler against our men in France.

American fighter pilots are now also giving direct support to the Soviet offensive on the eastern front. From forward-bombing fields behind the Soviet front, American long-range pursuit ships have participated in operations in the Lublin area in Poland. American air forces stationed in these bases in Soviet territory are being provided with living quarters and other services and supplies by the U. S. S. R. under revised lend-lease.

Food shipments to the Soviet Union have totaled 1,779,000 short tons since October 1, 1943, and are valued at approximately \$4,000,000,000. These shipments include 388,000 tons of wheat and flour, 140,000 tons of canned meat, 156,000 tons of vegetable oils, and 62,000 tons of canned and dried milk. These food shipments have made it possible for the Soviet Union to maintain the rations of the Red Army. To assist the Soviet people in the production of their own foods, particularly in the recently liberated Ukraine, and to relieve their dependence on outside sources, we have also shipped 17,000 tons of seeds since lend-lease aid to Russia began.

From the beginning of the Soviet lend-lease program in October 1941 through June 30, 1944, total United States lend-lease exports to the U. S. S. R. have amounted to \$1,900,000,000. Of that amount, more than \$1,490,000,000 has been shipped in the first six months of this year.

Because of the increased and pressing needs of the Soviet armies for the final drives against Germany as American and British forces attack from the west, shipments from the United States in the period between July 1, 1943, and June 30,

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1944, exceeded the schedule called for under the Third Protocol by 30 percent. The schedules of the Third Protocol have been extended with necessary modifications to meet special circumstances, until the Fourth Protocol negotiations, now under way, are completed.

THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

Southwest Pacific

Over \$1,441,115,000 worth of lend-lease supplies have been sent to Australia, New Zealand, and the China-Burma-India theater for the war against Japan. These supplies have included almost 1,000 lend-lease planes and almost 1,000 lend-lease tanks which are being used against the Japanese by Australian, New Zealand, British, Chinese, Indian, and Dutch forces. With this help from us, they are inflicting heavy damage on the same enemy our men are fighting.

Almost a billion dollars' worth of these supplies have been sent to Australia and New Zealand in order that their participation in the Allied war rings under General MacArthur may be as effective as possible. Australian and New Zealand troops, naval units, and air forces have continued to play an important part in the fighting in New Guinea and the Solomons alongside United States forces. Dutch cinema and troops in increasing numbers are also seeing action in this theater. These Allied forces have taken a heavy toll of the Japanese, and are now heading, along with our own forces, in the direction of the Philippines and the East Indies.

This war theater offers a vivid example of lend-lease and reverse lend-lease as a means of uniting the efforts of the Allies for fighting the war. In the 105,000 square miles embraced by the Solomons, New Britain, and New Ireland to the Carolines in the north and the entire Netherlands Indies on the west, troops are widely scattered and supply lines are difficult to maintain. To help meet this supply problem, engines built in the United States and sent us as lend-lease are fitted into Australian-built boats, and the resulting motorships move among the scattered islands carrying food and supplies to the combined Allied forces under MacArthur.

Industrial materials sent by the United States are also making possible a vastly increased production of munitions in the factories of Australia and New Zealand, while munitions shipped from this country and from the United Kingdom supplement the domestic output.

Australia and New Zealand are supplying over 80 percent of the food needs of our troops in the South and Southwest Pacific. In New Zealand only 25 percent of the total food production is retained for civilian consumption. Fifty percent is sent to the United Kingdom and 25 percent assigned to the American troops. In Australia, too, where agriculture is the principal industry, 20 percent of the total war budget is devoted to reverse lend-lease, and hundreds of thousands of tons of food are made available to the American troops.

China-Burma-India

China has been cut off by land and sea since the Burma Road was lost in April 1942, more than two years ago. Even when the Burma Road was open, the amount of supplies that could be carried over its hairpin turns and dizzy precipices never much exceeded 11,000 tons a month. Since April 1942 the only communication with China has been by air. The air route from Assam in upper India, to Yunnan province in China, crosses some of the worst country in the world through weather that is equally bad a large part of the year. Until recently the route has also been constantly subject to attack by Japanese fighter planes using bases in upper Burma.

Nevertheless, the planes that fly this route now carry into China a considerably greater tonnage than was ever carried over the Burma Road. It is still only a trickle, and most of the supplies consist of gasoline, bombs, and ammunition for the United States and Chinese Air Forces operating inside China. All the gasoline that is used by the increasing numbers of our war planes flying from bases inside China, from our giant B-29's to P-40 fighters, has to be flown into China over the Hump.

We have been able to get only a small amount of lend-lease supplies to the Chinese forces inside China. We have therefore brought Chinese fighting men over from China to the supplies. Hundreds of Chinese student pilots have been flown out of China, brought to the United States, trained under lend-lease, and then sent back to China to fly lend-lease planes against the Japanese. Many of these Chinese men are now members of the Chinese-American wing of General Chennault's Fourteenth U. S. Army Air Force.

The survivors of the Chinese forces whom General Stilwell led into India after the loss of Burma in the spring of 1942 have been joined by many other Chinese soldiers flown out from China. Trained and equipped under lend-lease in India, they have formed new divisions and a tank corps and are now fighting their way back to China ahead of the new road that is being cut across upper Burma. With the aid of small numbers of veteran American and British troops, this campaign has resulted in the capture of the main Japanese base in upper Burma - Meiktila. The air route into China has already been made safer by this campaign and eventually a land route into China will be reestablished.

Among the lend-lease supplies that we have sent into China have been spare parts for the few thousand American tanks that reached China over the Burma road before April 1942. Many of these tanks have been converted to charcoal-burners and are being kept in operation by shipments of spare parts and tires. Some of them are being used to maintain the supply lines inside China to General Chennault's air base.

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It is because it has been impossible to get supplies in any volume into China that lend-lease shipments to China up to June 30, 1944, totaled only \$179,544,000, and that lend-lease consignments to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for subsequent transfer to China totaled only \$217,000,000 additional.

Much the greater part of our lend-lease shipments to this theater—over \$1,348,000,000—have gone to India, which is the major base for operations against the Japanese from the east that will eventually free China, just as our naval operations from the west in the Pacific are directed to the same end. Once land and sea communications with China are restored, lend-lease supplies can be sent to China in the volume needed to back up quickly the war against Japan.

Western Hemisphere

Lend-lease aid to the other American Republics has been exclusively military in character and given for the purpose of strengthening the southern defenses of the Western Hemisphere and the development and protection of vital military supply routes by air and water.

Lend-lease aid to the other American Republics from March 11, 1941, to June 30, 1944, had a dollar value of \$600,000,000. The value of all lend-lease supplies actually shipped to the other American Republics in this period of three years and three months was \$471,970,000. This was less than one percent of all lend-lease exports and considerably less than what the United States Government spends in a single day toward fighting and winning the war.

The security of the Panama Canal and of the southern half of our hemisphere against aggression has been made infinitely stronger than ever before through the full cooperation of all our neighbor republics except Argentina and as a result in necessary assistance from us that is infinitesimal by comparison with the strategic value of this combined program to ourselves and to all the nations of this hemisphere.

All the lend-lease supplies that we have shipped have consisted of military and naval equipment or materials for manufacturing war equipment. More than half of all lend-lease shipments to Central and South American countries have gone to Brazil. Natal in Brazil is the nearest point in the Western Hemisphere to Africa. It commands the South Atlantic approach to the Caribbean and the Panama Canal. It is the jumping off point for the South Atlantic Trans-African Air Route over which most of our own Army and Navy planes, as well as lend-lease planes, have been ferried for the African and Mediterranean campaigns. It continues to be heavily used today, along with an additional heavy route that Portugal made possible by granting landing rights on the Azores.

Brazilian naval and air forces, as well as the naval and air forces of other American Republics, have participated fully in antiaircraft patrols and convoy duty in the Caribbean and South Atlantic. On both the Atlantic and Pacific, bases vital to the defense of the Panama Canal have been made available to us. Brazil is also participating in the war overseas. Her first expeditionary force landed at Naples July 14th to take part in the Italian campaign.

The cooperative war program of the American Republics has also resulted in a great expansion of trade between the United States and our neighbors to the south. We have imported from Latin America tremendously increased quantities of strategic materials vital to the production of the planes, guns, tanks, and ships United Nations forces are using to win the war—copper, manganese, quartz crystals, tin, rubber, soap fibers, and other materials. Since the Philippines and the Indies fell, virtually all the new supply of quinine which our soldiers need to fight off malaria has come from Latin America.

At the same time, our commercial exports to Latin America, for which we are paid in cash, have risen to 50 percent above pre-war levels, except in Argentina.

All the other American Republics receive lend-lease aid with the exception of Argentina and Panama. The defense needs of Panama are met by our own Panama Canal defenses.

Shipments to Other Areas

Lend-lease supplies valued at \$654,207,000 had been shipped as of June 30, 1944, to countries other than those discussed previously in this report. About two-thirds of the total went to Canada for transshipment to the United Kingdom or other United Nations, for further fabrication, or for use of United Nations forces training in Canada. No lend-lease aid is furnished to the Canadian Government by the United States. Canada has, however, purchased for cash in this country supplies needed for her war effort, using lend-lease procurement machinery for some of these purchases.

The balance of lend-lease exports, amounting to approximately \$200,000,000, has gone to widely scattered areas. Sorely needed munitions were rushed to Greece in the spring of 1941 when she was valiantly resisting the overwhelming Nazi forces. Subsequently we have sent limited quantities of foodstuffs to the starving people of Greece. Lend-lease has financed Red Cross food packages for Poland, Yugoslavia, and other allied prisoners of war. Needed industrial equipment and materials have been shipped under lend-lease, although paid for in cash, to Greece and Siam, sources of bauxite ore for making aluminum, and of petroleum. Various outposts of the Fighting French and of the British Empire have been strengthened by lend-lease.

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The values of most lead lines are outside the values of lead lines regions, since the figures are not included, and the regions themselves are not included, the following cases:

1. Goods transferred and existing regions. 2. Goods transferred but not in this country, such as foreign goods used in the making of United States goods. 3. Lead lines outside. 4. Goods based on the direction of the flow. 5. Supplies produced outside the United States and transferred under lead lines.

Chart 1

Chart 2

Chart 3

Chart 4

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APPENDICES

Appendix I

LEND-LEASE ACT

Purpose is promote the defense of the United States, and for other purposes.

As it enacted by the House and Senate of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, "That this Act may be cited as "The Act to Promote the Defense of the United States."

Section 1

As used in this Act—

(1) The term "defense article" means—

- (A) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or tank;
- (B) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;
- (C) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;
- (D) Any agricultural, industrial, or other commodity or article for defense.

Such term "defense article" includes any article described in this subsection manufactured or produced pursuant to section 3, or in which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.

(2) The term "defense information" means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article.

Section 2

(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it to be in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(1) To manufacture in armories, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States;

(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government, any defense article, but no defense article can be manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph except after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed \$1,500,000,000. The value of such defense articles shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency, or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds heretofore appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except in the manner heretofore authorized by the Congress in the laws appropriating such funds or otherwise;

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract;

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (1) of this subsection;

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be present or apparent in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

(c) After June 30, 1945, to after the passage of a concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1945, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a), except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1945, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the collection of money to be used in aid of the United States.

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the collection of the money of any American used into a similar use in violation of section 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917.

Section 3

All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 2 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will use, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit it to be by export or in other, employee, or agent of such foreign government.

Section 4

(a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is required, immediately inform the department or agency designated by the President in subsection section 2 of the Act of July 1, 1945 (54 Stat. 1045), of the quantity, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so required.

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(3) The President, from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems inconspicuously with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.

Section 6

(4) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.

(5) All money and all property which is received from money received under section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the appropriate appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated for law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year, but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1946.

Section 7

The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall, in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information, fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or information which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the patents collected for royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owner and holders of such patents.

Section 8

The Secretary of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition, and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country in which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interest of the defense of the United States.

Section 9

The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act, and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

Section 10

Nothing in this Act shall be construed as charge raising law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as such law relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other communication purposes mentioned in this Act.

Section 11

If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

• • •

On March 11, 1945, after extensive review of H.R. 1 in the House of Representatives and H.R. 1 in the Senate the President signed the Act entitled the Lend-Lease Act until July 1, 1946.

On April 26, 1944, by vote of 344-21, the House of Representatives voted to extend the Lend-Lease Act until July 1, 1945, with the following amendment to section 4 (3) of the Act as follows: "not money in public."

"The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any and authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefits to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other form or value benefit which the President deems satisfactory. Provided, however, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to authorize the President to any final settlement in respect of any obligation on the part of the United States and respect to post-war economic policy, post-war military policy, or any post-war policy involving international relations except in accordance with established international practice."

On May 8, 1944, by vote of 371-1, the Senate also voted to extend the Act, with the same amendment as that adopted by the House except for deletion of the words "in any final settlement." On May 12 the House concurred in the change made by the Senate. On May 17 the President signed the Act.

Appendix B

BRITISH MASTER AGREEMENT

Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America and of the United Kingdom on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War Against Aggression, Authorised and Provided for by the Act of March 11, 1941.

Whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of having the basis of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations;

And whereas the President of the United States of America has determined, pursuant to the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, that the delivery of the United Kingdom against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America;

And whereas the United States of America has extended and is continuing to extend to the United Kingdom aid in mounting aggression;

And whereas it is expedient that the final determination of the terms and conditions upon which the Government of the United Kingdom receives such aid and of the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return thereof should be deferred until the progress of the defense aid is known and until the progress of events makes clear the final terms and conditions and benefits which will be to the mutual interests of the United States of America and the United Kingdom and will promote the establishments and maintenance of world peace;

And whereas the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom are mutually desirous of concluding some preliminary agreement in regard to the provision of defense aid and in regard to certain considerations which shall be taken into account in determining such terms and conditions and the making of such an agreement has been in all respects fully authorized, and all acts, conditions and formalities which in any have been necessary to perform, fulfill, or execute prior to the making of such an agreement in conformity with the laws of either of the United States of America or of the United Kingdom have been performed, fulfilled, or executed as required;

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The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

Article II

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities of information as it may be in a position to supply.

Article III

The Government of the United Kingdom will not, without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information transferred to it under the Act or permit the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.

Article V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost, or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

Article VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full agreement shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 11, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

Article VII

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for all furnished under the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to hinder commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the movement of world-wide economic activities. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of this world, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and consumption of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples in the domination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, and, in general, to the promotion of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 11, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

As an early concrete step, conversations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of prevailing economic conditions, the best means of executing the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of making the agreed action of what like-minded Governments.

Article VIII

This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall only terminate until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington in duplicate this 1st day of February, 1941.

For the Government of the United States of America:

[Initialed]

ROBERT H. HENRICH,
Acting Secretary of State of the
United States of America.

For the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

[Initialed]

ROBERT
The Major's Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary at Washington.

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Similar Mutual Lend-Lease Agreements have been signed with the following countries: Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Liberia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia. Australia and New Zealand have accepted the principles of the Mutual Agreements.

Appendix B

RECIPROCAL AID AGREEMENTS

Reciprocal aid agreements with United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Fighting France were concluded September 1, 1941, by the following exchange of notes. The last three agreements were signed at Washington and the agreement with Fighting France was signed in London.

Agreement With United Kingdom

The Honorable Clarence M. Wilson,
Secretary of State, United States Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Text: In the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1941, the contracting governments pledged themselves to supply their full resources, military or economic, against those nations with which they are at war and in the Agreement of February 25, 1941, each contracting government undertook to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities, or information useful in the prosecution of their common war undertaking as each may be in a position to supply. It is further the understanding of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the general principle to be followed in providing mutual aid as set forth in the said Agreement of February 25, 1941, is that the war production and the war resources of both Nations should be used by the armed forces of each and of the other United Nations in ways which more effectively utilize the available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space.

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With a view, therefore, to supplementing Article 1 and Article 2 of the Agreement of February 15, 1942, between our two Governments for the provision of reciprocal aid, I have the honour to set forth below the understanding of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be completed with the maintenance of close liaison by the United States Government.

1. While each Government reserves the right of final decision, in the light of its own particularities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.

2. As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the general principle to be applied, to the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services which such Government may authorize to be provided to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of such Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum.

It is accordingly the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1940, the share of its war production made available to the United Kingdom. The Government of the United Kingdom will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid as much of its war production made available to the United States as is authorized in accordance with the Agreement of February 15, 1942.

3. The Government of the United Kingdom will provide the United States as its armed forces with the following types of assistance as such reciprocal aid, when it is found that they can most effectively be provided in the United Kingdom or in the British Colonial Empire:

(a) Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.

(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administrative expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Government of the United Kingdom as specified in paragraph 4.

(c) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of military facilities, tanks, and similar capital works required for the common war effort in the United Kingdom or in the British Colonial Empire, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.

(d) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tanks, and capital works in territories other than the United Kingdom or the British Colonial Empire or territory of the United States to the extent that the United Kingdom or the British Colonial Empire is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations.

4. The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting when possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities. Requests by the United States Government for such aid will be presented by duly authorized authorities of the United States as official agencies of the United Kingdom which will be designated or established in London and in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.

5. It is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that all such aid, as well as other aid, including information, received under Article 2 of the Agreement of February 15, 1942, accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of the United Kingdom will be received as a loan to the United States under the Act of March 15, 1940, insofar as its conditions will permit, appropriate reward of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.

If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Sir, your most obedient, faithful servant,

BRITAIN.

Agenda 1, 1942

His Excellency the Right Honourable The Viscount Halifax, K. G.,
British Ambassador.

Enclosure: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of today's date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the armed forces of the United States of America.

In reply I wish to inform you that the Government of the United States agrees with the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as expressed in that note. In accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your own and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.

This further interpretation and strengthening of our common war effort gives me great satisfaction.

Accept, Sir, the warmest assurances of my highest consideration.

UNITED STATES.

Secretary of State of the United States of America.

Agenda 1, 1942

Agreement With Australia

The Honourable Conway Black,

Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Sir: An exchange of notes to the United Nations Declaration of January 5, 1942, the Government of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against those nations with which they are at war.

With regard to the arrangements for mutual aid between our two governments, I refer to the agreement signed at Washington on February 15, 1942, between the Governments of the United States of America and the United Kingdom on principles applying to mutual aid in the present war authorized and provided for by the Act of Congress of March 11, 1940, and have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia accepts the principles therein contained as governing the provision of mutual aid between itself and the Government of the United States of America.

It is the understanding of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia that the general principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of both nations should be

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The undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments for that purpose, have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Government of the United States of America will continue to supply the Government of the United Kingdom with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be transferred or provided.

Article II

The Government of the United Kingdom will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities or information as it may be in a position to supply.

Article III

The Government of the United Kingdom will not without the consent of the President of the United States of America transfer title to, or possession of, any defense article or defense information considered to be under the Act in power the use thereof by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of the Government of the United Kingdom.

Article IV

If, as a result of the transfer to the Government of the United Kingdom of any defense article or defense information, it becomes necessary for that Government to take any action or make any payment in order fully to protect any of the rights of a citizen of the United States of America who has patent rights in and to any such defense article or information, the Government of the United Kingdom will take such action or make such payment when requested to do so by the President of the United States of America.

Article V

The Government of the United Kingdom will return to the United States of America at the end of the present emergency, as determined by the President, such defense articles transferred under this Agreement as shall not have been destroyed, lost, or consumed and as shall be determined by the President to be useful in the defense of the United States of America or of the Western Hemisphere or to be otherwise of use to the United States of America.

Article VI

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom full recognition shall be taken of all property, services, information, facilities, or other benefits or considerations provided by the Government of the United Kingdom subsequent to March 13, 1941, and accepted or acknowledged by the President on behalf of the United States of America.

Article VII

In the final determination of the benefits to be provided to the United States of America by the Government of the United Kingdom in return for all furnished under the Act of Congress of March 13, 1941, the terms and conditions thereof shall be such as not to hinder commerce between the two countries, but to promote mutually advantageous economic relations between them and the harmonious of world-wide economic relations. To that end, they shall include provision for agreed action by the United States of America and the United Kingdom, open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and conservation of goods, which are the material foundations of the liberty and welfare of all peoples; to the elimination of all forms of discriminatory practices in international commerce; and to the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers; and, in general, to the attainment of all the economic objectives set forth in the Joint Declaration made on August 12, 1941, by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.

As an early concrete step, consultations shall be begun between the two Governments with a view to determining, in the light of governing economic conditions, the best means of attaining the above-stated objectives by their own agreed action and of seeking the agreed action of other interested Governments.

Article VIII

This Agreement shall take effect as from this day's date. It shall remain in force until a date to be agreed upon by the two Governments.

Signed and sealed at Washington to duplicate this 23d day of February, 1942.

For the Government of the United States of America:

(Sigs)

ROBERT WELLES,
Acting Secretary of State of the
United States of America.

For the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

(Sigs)

WELLES
His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary at Washington.

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Identical Minor Kind-Less Agreements have been signed with the following countries: Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Liberia, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia. Australia and New Zealand have accepted the principles of the Minor Agreements.

Appendix II

RECIPROCAL AID AGREEMENTS

Reciprocal aid agreements with United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and Fighting France were concluded September 1, 1940, by the following exchanges of notes. The first three agreements were signed in Washington and the agreement with Fighting France was signed in London.

Agreement With United Kingdom

The Honorable Cordell Hull,

Secretary of State, United States Department of State,

Washington, D. C.

Inc. In the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the contracting governments pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military or economic, against those nations with which they are at war and in the Agreement of February 23, 1942, each contracting government undertook to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities, or information useful in the prosecution of their common war undertaking as each may be in a position to supply. It is further the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the general principle to be followed in providing mutual aid as set forth in the said Agreement of February 23, 1942, is that the war production and the war resources of both Nations should be used by the armed forces of each and of the other United Nations in ways which most effectively utilize the available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space.

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With a view, therefore, to supplementing Article 2 and Article 3 of the Agreement of February 25, 1942, between our two Governments for the provision of reciprocal aid, I have the honour to set forth below the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be coordinated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.

1. While each Government retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own possibilities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, previous to common plans for winning the war.

2. As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the general principle to be applied, in the parts to which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services which each Government may authorize to be provided to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the total of such Government for the currency of the other may be reduced to a minimum.

It is accordingly the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its war production made available to the United Kingdom. The Government of the United Kingdom will provide on the same terms and in reciprocal aid as much of its war production made available to the United States as is authorized in accordance with the Agreement of February 25, 1942.

3. The Government of the United Kingdom will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance in such reciprocal aid, when it is found that they can most effectively be provided in the United Kingdom or in the British Colonial Empire:

(a) Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.

(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administration expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Government of the United Kingdom as specified in paragraph 4.

(c) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of military projects, tanks, and similar capital works required for the common war effort in the United Kingdom or in the British Colonial Empire, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.

(d) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tanks, and capital works in territory other than the United Kingdom or the British Colonial Empire or territory of the United States to the extent that the United Kingdom or the British Colonial Empire is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations.

4. The practical application of the principles hereinafter in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting when possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities. Requests by the United States Government for such aid will be processed by duly authorized authorities of the United States to official agencies of the United Kingdom which will be designated or established in London and in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.

5. It is the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland that all such aid, as well as other aid, including information, received under Article 3 of the Agreement of February 25, 1942, accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of the United Kingdom will be received as a benefit to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit, appropriate receipt of aid received under this arrangement, except for administration facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.

If the Government of the United States concurs in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration, Sir, your most obedient, faithful servant,

Harvest.

April 3, 1942

His Excellency the Right Honourable The Viscount Harcourt, K. G.,
British Ambassador.

Excuse me: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of today's date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the armed forces of the United States of America.

It is my wish to inform you that the Government of the United States agrees with the understanding of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as expressed in that note. In accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.

This further recognition and strengthening of our common war effort gives me great satisfaction.

Accepts, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.

April 3, 1942

Agreement With Australia

The Honourable Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Sir: In continuing action to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Government of the United States of America and the Commonwealth of Australia pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against those nations with which they are at war.

With regard to the arrangements for mutual aid between our two governments, I refer to the agreement signed at Washington on February 25, 1942, between the Government of the United States of America and the United Kingdom on principles applying to mutual aid in the present war authorized and provided for by the Act of Congress of March 11, 1941, and have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia accepts the principles therein contained as governing the provision of mutual aid between itself and the Government of the United States of America.

It is the understanding of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia that the general principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of both nations should be

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used by the armed forces of each, in the ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space.

I now set forth the understanding of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia of the principles and procedure applicable to the provision of oil by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be coordinated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.

1. While each Government retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own particularities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.

2. As to financing the provision of such aid, within the fields mentioned below, it is my understanding that the general principles to be applied in the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services which each Government may authorize to be provided to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the cost of such Government for the custody of the effort may be reduced to a minimum.

It is accordingly my understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and to the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its war production made available to Australia. The Government of Australia will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid so much of its war production made available to the United States as it authorizes in accordance with the principles mentioned in this note.

3. The Government of Australia will provide as reciprocal aid the following types of assistance to the armed forces of the United States in Australia or in territories and in such other cases as may be determined by common agreement in the light of the developments of the war.

(A) Military equipment, transportation, and military and naval stores.

(B) Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administrative expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Australian Government as specified in paragraph 4.

(C) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of military projects, tanks, and similar capital works required for the common war effort in Australia and in such other places as may be determined, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.

4. The practical application of the principles hereof in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting where possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities. Requests by the United States Government for such aid will be presented by duly authorized authorities of the United States to official agencies of the Commonwealth of Australia which will be designated or established in Canberra and in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of reciprocal aid.

5. It is my understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from the Government of Australia will be received as a loan to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit appropriate record of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.

If the Government of the United States desires in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

I have the honor to be with the highest consideration, Sir, your obedient servant,

CHURCHILL

September 1, 1941.

The Honorable Sir CHURCHILL,
Minister of Australia.

Sir, I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date concerning the principles and procedure applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia to the armed forces of the United States of America.

In reply I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America likewise accepts the principles mentioned in the agreement of February 15, 1941, between it and the Government of the United Kingdom as governing the provision of mutual aid between the Governments of the United States and of the Commonwealth of Australia. My Government agrees with the understanding of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as expressed in your note of today's date, and, in accordance with the suggestion contained therein, your note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.

This further integration and simplifying of our common war effort gives us great satisfaction.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

CORCORAN

Secretary of State of the United States of America.

September 1, 1941.

Agreement With New Zealand

The Honorable CHURCHILL, Prime Minister,
Secretary of State,
United States Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Sir: As contracting parties to the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Governments of the United States of America and New Zealand pledged themselves to employ their full resources, military and economic, against those various tasks which they are at war.

In the Agreement of February 15, 1941, between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the United States of America, the provisions and principles of which the Government of New Zealand considers applicable to its relations with the Government of the United States, each contracting Government undertakes to provide the other with such articles, services, facilities, or information needed in the prosecution of their common war undertaking as each may be in a position to supply.

It is the understanding of the Government of New Zealand that the general principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of both nations should be used by each, in the ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space.

I now set forth the understanding of the Government of New Zealand of the principles and procedure applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of New Zealand to the armed forces of the United States and the manner in which such aid will be coordinated with the maintenance of those forces by the United States Government.

1. While each Government retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own particularities and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.

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3. As to financing the provision of such aid, within the limits mentioned below, it is my understanding that the general principle to be applied, in the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services to be provided by each Government to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid so that the need of each Government for the contrary of the other may be reduced to a minimum.

It is accordingly my understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and in the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its production made available to New Zealand. The Government of New Zealand will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid as much of its production made available to the United States as it authorizes in accordance with the principles mentioned in this note.

4. The Government of New Zealand will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance, as such reciprocal aid, where it is found that they can most effectively be provided in New Zealand:

(a) Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.

(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, administrative expenses, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of the Government of New Zealand as specified in Paragraph 4.

(c) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of military projects, tanks, and similar capital works required for the common war effort in New Zealand, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens.

(d) Supplies, materials, and services needed in the construction of such military projects, tanks, and capital works in countries other than New Zealand or territory of the United States within areas that New Zealand is a more practicable source of supply than the United States or another of the United Nations.

5. The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid by either Government are made and acted upon, shall be worked out as occasion may require by agreement between the two Governments, acting where possible through their appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities.

6. It is my understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representative from the Government of New Zealand will be regarded as a loan to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit, appropriate record of aid received under this agreement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each Government.

If the Government of the United States consents in the foregoing, I would suggest that the present note and your reply to that effect be regarded as placing on record the understanding of our two Governments in this matter.

I have the honor to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,

Warren Mason,
Minister of New Zealand.

September 1, 1942

The Honorable Warren Mason,

Minister of New Zealand.

Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by the Government of New Zealand to the armed forces of the United States of America.

In reply I have the honor to inform you that the Government of the United States of America likewise considers the provisions and principles contained in the agreement of February 25, 1942, between it and the Government of the United Kingdom as applicable to its relations with the Government of New Zealand. My Government agrees with the understanding of the Government of New Zealand as expressed in your note of today's date, and, in accordance with the suggestions contained therein, we may and our reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding between our two Governments in this matter.

The British suggestion and understanding of our common war effort gives me great satisfaction.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States of America.

September 1, 1942

Agreement With French National Committee

Terrace House, Grosvenor, Doughty Square, France: Warrenton, Connecticut.

The French National Committee has kindly begun its understanding of the principles governing the provision of reciprocal aid by the United States of America to Fighting France and by Fighting France to the United States.

1. The United States of America will continue to supply Fighting France with such defense articles, defense services, and defense information as the President shall authorize to be furnished as provided.

2. Fighting France will continue to contribute to the defense of the United States of America and the strengthening thereof and will provide such articles, services, facilities, or information as it may be in a position to supply.

3. The fundamental principle to be followed in providing such aid is that the war production and war resources of Fighting France and of the United States of America should be used by the armed forces of each in the ways which most effectively utilize available materials, manpower, production facilities, and shipping space. While each retains the right of final decision, in the light of its own permissions and responsibilities, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans for winning the war.

4. As to financing the provision of such aid, within the limits mentioned below, it is the Committee's understanding that the general principle to be applied, in the point at which the common war effort is most effective, is that as large a portion as possible of the articles and services to be provided by each to the other shall be in the form of reciprocal aid.

It is accordingly the Committee's understanding that the United States Government will provide, in accordance with the provisions of, and in the extent authorized under, the Act of March 11, 1941, the share of its war production made available to Fighting France. Fighting France will provide on the same terms and as reciprocal aid as much of its war production made available to the United States as it authorizes in accordance with the principles mentioned in this note.

5. Within the limitations under the control of Fighting France, or within the same share of operations, the National Committee will provide the United States or its armed forces with the following types of assistance, as such reciprocal aid, where it is found that they can most effectively be provided in territory under the control of Fighting France:

(a) Military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores.

(b) Other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for the United States forces, except for the pay and allowances of such forces, admin-

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native resources, and such local purchases as its official establishments may make other than through the official establishments of Fighting France as specified in paragraph 6.

- (c) Supplies, materials, and services, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens, needed in the construction of military projects, tanks, and similar capital works required for the continuous war effort in territory under the control of Fighting France, or in the zone thereof of operations, to the extent that such territory is the most practicable source of supply.

4. The practical application of the principles formulated in this note, including the procedure by which requests for aid are made and acted upon, shall be worked out by agreement as necessary may require through the appropriate military or civilian administrative authorities. Requests by the United States forces for such aid will be processed by their duly authorized authorities to official agencies of Fighting France which will be designated or established in the areas where United States forces are located for the purpose of facilitating the provision of requested aid.

5. It is the Government's understanding that all such aid accepted by the President of the United States or his authorized representatives from Fighting France will be received as a loan to the United States under the Act of March 11, 1941. Insofar as circumstances will permit, appropriate record of aid received under this arrangement, except for miscellaneous facilities and services, will be kept by each.

If the Government of the United States desires to the foregoing, the present note and a reply to that effect will be regarded as placing on record the understanding in this matter.

Text on Note to French National Committee Paris Geneva, Champagne

The Government of the United States of America agrees with the understanding of the National Committee, as expressed in the English text of the Committee's note of today's date, concerning the principles and procedures applicable to the provision of aid by Fighting France to the armed forces of the United States of America and, in accordance with the suggestion contained therein, that note and this reply will be regarded as placing on record the understanding in this matter.

April 1, 1942

Appendix IV

MODUS VIVENDI ON RECIPROCAL AID IN FRENCH NORTH AND WEST AFRICA

The Government of the United States and the French Committee of National Liberation, desiring to lend each other the reciprocal aid necessary to the prosecution of the present war effort, are agreed upon the following provisional *Modus Vivendi* which will, following signature, be applicable in French North and West Africa:

I. With reference to supplies and services urgently needed to maintain the French war effort, which the United States has furnished to the French authorities and will continue to furnish, within limitations of need and supply, it is understood that:

(a) Military aid, including supplies for railroads, docks, public utilities, and other facilities in the extent that such supplies are determined to be military aid is made available on a straight *Lend-Lease* basis, in the light of the commitments set forth in Paragraph V. Such aid does not include the pay and allowances of French forces. The United States reserves the right to require the return of any articles furnished under this paragraph and not lost, destroyed, or consumed.

(b) If at any time it is decided that such facilities would be so valuable to the conduct of the war, as:

(c) If at the end of the present emergency as determined by the President of the United States, the facilities shall determine that such articles are useful in the defense of the United States or of the Western Hemisphere, or to be otherwise of use to the United States.

(d) For all civilian supplies imported from the United States, the French authorities will pay upon the basis of prices to be agreed. Payment will be made, currently or at convenient intervals, in dollars, or in appropriately designated account to the United States.

(e) The distinction between civilian and military aid, supplies and services, where such distinction may be necessary, will be made by agreement.

(f) All aid furnished under Paragraph I (a) and I (b) will be made available by the United States under the authority and subject to the terms and conditions provided for in the Act of Congress of 11 March, 1941, as amended (P. L. 11, 724 Congress, 76 Session).

II. With reference to supplies and services urgently needed to maintain the United States war effort, which the French authorities have furnished to the United States and will continue to furnish, within limitations of need and supply, it is understood that:

(a) The French authorities undertake to make available to or for the use of the armed forces and other governmental agencies of the United States, as *Lend-Lease* aid to the United States, on a straight *Lend-Lease* basis, when it is found that such aid can more effectively be procured in territory under their control.

(b) military equipment, munitions, and military and naval stores;

(c) other supplies, materials, facilities, and services for United States forces, including the use of railway and port facilities, but not including the pay and allowances of such forces nor the administrative expenses of American missions;

(d) supplies, materials, facilities, and services, except for the wages and salaries of United States citizens, needed in the construction of military projects, tanks, and similar capital works required in the continuous war effort, to the extent that French North or West Africa is the most practicable source of such supplies, materials, facilities, or services;

(e) such other supplies, materials, services, or facilities as may be agreed upon as necessary in the prosecution of the war, but not including exports of civilian supplies to the United States from North and West Africa.

While the French authorities retain, of course, the right of final decision, subject to the obligations and arrangements they have entered into for the prosecution of the war, decisions as to the most effective use of resources shall, so far as possible, be made in common, pursuant to common plans by winning the war.

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(b) All civilian supplies required from French North and West Africa to the United States will be paid for on the basis of prices to be agreed. Payments will be made currently, at convenient intervals, in dollars, in an appropriation designated accounts in the United States.

(c) The distinction between civilian and military aid, supplies and services, where such distinction may be necessary, will be made by agreement.

(d) In order to obtain the supplies and services included within the scope of Paragraph B (a), duly authorized United States officials or other officials will submit their requests to the official services duly designated by the French authorities. These services will be established in Algiers, Constantine, Oran, Tunis, Dakar, and other places where it may be found practicable and appropriate to establish organizations for facilitating the transfer of supplies and services.

(e) For use in those exceptional cases, and particularly in cases of local procurement of supplies, in which it is agreed to be more practicable to secure such supplies (land-lease supplies, facilities, and services by direct purchase, rather than by the method of procurement set forth in Paragraph B (a)), it is agreed that the French authorities establish a franc account in currency banking institutions and in the name of a designated officer of the United States to facilitate the provision of certain land-lease aid as contemplated by Paragraph B (a). The French contribution to this account will be mutually agreed upon from time to time in the light of the changing needs of the American forces, and other appropriate factors. Such an account will not be used for the payment of wages and salaries of American military or civilian personnel, nor for administrative expenses of American missions. Estimates of the franc requirements of the United States will be submitted to designated French authorities from time to time, as may be found convenient. The French authorities will be kept fully and currently informed of all transactions in this account.

(f) In exceptional cases, and when they deem it probable, the American military forces, or other agencies of the United States Government, may continue to use their present practice of acquiring francs against dollars from the French authorities.

(g) Adequate statistical records will be kept of all goods and services exchanged in current aid under paragraphs 1 and B above.

V. The provisions of this statute intended correspond to a desire to reduce to an appropriate minimum the need of either party for currency of the other party. Provisions which call for payments in dollars have been decided upon in view of the special situation arising from accumulated dollar balances and establishments of dollar funds due to the presence of United States troops in French North and West Africa. Revision of the payment provisions of this statute viewed will be made should the situation require.

Signed at Algiers this 25th day of September, A. D. 1943.
For the Government of the United States of America:

J. B. M. M. M.

For the French Committee of National Liberation:

J. M. M. M.
J. J. M. M.

September 25, 1943.

Appendix V

EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

Be it enacted by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to unify and coordinate governmental activities relating to foreign economic affairs, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the Foreign Economic Administration (hereinafter referred to as the Administration), at the head of which shall be an Administrator.

2. The Office of Land-lease Administration, the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, the Office of Economic Warfare (consistent with the cooperation, agencies, and functions transferred thereto by Executive Order No. 9861 of July 15, 1943), the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (except such functions and personnel shared as the Director of the Budget shall determine are not concerned with foreign economic operations) and their respective functions, powers, and duties are transferred to and consolidated in the Administration.

3. The Administrator may establish such offices, bureaus, or divisions in the Administration as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this order, and may assign to them such of the functions and duties of the offices, agencies, and corporations consolidated by this order as he may deem desirable in the interest of efficient administration.

4. The powers and functions of the Administration shall be exercised in conformity with the foreign policy of the United States as defined by the Secretary of State. As soon as military operations permit, the Administration shall assume responsibility for and control of all activities of the United States Government in liberated areas with respect to supplying the requirements of and procuring materials in such areas.

5. All the personnel, property, records, funds (including all unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds now available), contracts, assets, liabilities, and capital stock (including shares of stock) of the offices, agencies, and corporations consolidated by paragraph 1 of this order are transferred to the Administration for use in connection with the exercise and performance of its functions, powers, and duties. In the case of capital stock (including shares of stock), the transfer shall be to such agency, corporation, office, officer, or person in the Administration shall designate. The Administrator is authorized to employ such personnel as may be necessary in the performance of the functions of the Administration and in order to carry out the purposes of this order.

6. No part of any funds appropriated or made available under Public Law 195, approved July 25, 1943, shall hereafter be used directly or indirectly by the Administration for the procurement of services, supplies, or equipment outside the United States except for the purpose of executing general economic programs or policies, heretofore approved by a majority of the War Relocation Commission in writing and with the Secretary of State prior to any such expenditure.

7. All prior Executive Orders transfer as they are in conflict herewith are repealed accordingly. This order shall take effect upon the taking of office by the Administrator, except that the agencies and officers consolidated by paragraph 1 hereof shall continue to exercise their respective functions pending any contrary determination by the Administrator.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The White House, September 25, 1943.

Appendix VI

EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING
OFFICE OF LEND-LEASE ADMINISTRATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and particularly by the Act of March 18, 1941, entitled "An Act further to promote the defense of the United States and for other purposes" (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and by the Defense and Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941, approved March 27, 1941, and with supplementary or supplemental thereto, in order to define further the functions and duties of the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President in respect to the national emergency as declared by the President on May 27, 1941, and in order to provide for the more efficient administration of these Acts in the interest of national defense, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There shall be in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President an Office of Lend-Lease Administration, at the head of which shall be an Administrator, appointed by the President, who shall receive compensation at such rate as the President shall approve and, in addition, shall be entitled to actual and necessary transportation allowances, and other expenses incident to the performance of his duties.

2. Subject to such policies as the President may from time to time prescribe, the Administrator is hereby authorized and directed, pursuant to Section 4 of the Act, to exercise any power or authority conferred upon the President by the Act and by the Defense and Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1941, and any acts supplementary or supplemental thereto, with respect to any matter which the President shall have found to be vital to the defense of the United States: *Provided*, That the master agreement with each nation receiving lend-lease aid, setting forth the general terms and conditions under which such nation is to receive such aid, shall be approved by the Board of Economic Warfare, with the advice of the Economic Defense Board and the Office of Lend-Lease Administration.

3. The Administrator shall make appropriate arrangements with the Economic Defense Board for the review and clearance of lend-lease transactions which affect the economic defense of the United States as defined in Executive Order No. 8823 of July 26, 1941.

4. Within the limitation of such funds as may be made available for that purpose, the Administrator may appoint one or more Deputy or Assistant Administrators and other personnel, delegate to such Deputy or Assistant Administrators any power or authority conferred by these orders, and make provision for such supplies, facilities, and services as shall be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Order. Insofar as practicable, the Office of Lend-Lease Administration shall use such general business services and facilities as may be made available to it through the Office for Emergency Management.

5. Executive Order No. 9575 of May 2, 1941, establishing the Division of Defense Aid Reports and defining its functions and duties, is hereby revoked.

Eugene D. Rowland.

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, D. C.

LEND-LEASE EXPORTS—MONTHLY

Millions of Dollars

	United Kingdom	U. S. S. R.	Other Allies and Associated States	Other Countries	Total
1941					
Jan.	1			1	2
Feb.	9		5	1	15
Mar.	36		9	1	46
Apr.	49		19	1	69
May	46		14	3	63
Jun.	54		7	3	64
Jul.	142		19	17	178
Aug.	137		18	18	173
Sep.	119	1	25	12	157
1942					
Jan.	125	13	24	12	174
Feb.	78	25	26	12	141
Mar.	148	47	25	11	231
Apr.	144	144	45	17	470
May	144	70	37	8	359
Jun.	212	119	35	14	480
Jul.	171	183	64	29	457
Aug.	156	152	38	19	405
Sep.	214	108	71	17	410
Oct.	223	128	96	21	468
Nov.	223	128	95	14	460
Dec.	267	126	112	21	607
1943					
Jan.	176	167	94	22	559
Feb.	202	187	45	27	761
Mar.	212	211	123	47	793
Apr.	357	212	117	67	1,053
May	406	173	121	21	821
Jun.	454	186	106	21	967
Jul.	467	218	121	21	1,027
Aug.	771	213	184	173	1,341
Sep.	1,046	225	182	81	1,534
Oct.	1,244	243	145	122	1,754
Nov.	1,271	244	121	21	1,657
Dec.	285	229	127	116	1,057
1944					
Jan.	345	213	113	22	693
Feb.	411	212	127	27	777
Mar.	436	261	20	22	739
Apr.	447	249	122	22	840
May	542	214	124	22	1,002
Jun.	474	221	21	24	1,020
TOTAL EXPORTS	9,321	3,912	1,421	246	15,900

LEAD-LEASE FOOD SHIPMENTS IN RELATION TO SUPPLY AND TO U. S. CIVILIAN POPULATION

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Wahlstrom and O'Connell

2,627

AMOUNTS OF LONG-LEASE AIR AUTHORIZED

1. Local-Level Aggregations in the Past

H. Bentley, *Authorised Free Copy Agreement*[illegible]

Notes: 1. In addition to the foregoing, correspondence with various international authorities on the timing of State of the River and estuary physical assessment work has been requested by the National Commission on the Environment, Commission on the State of the River, and the number of such reports which may be required. (See, for example, *State of the River*, report, prepared February 10, 1992, and Public Law 102-587, signed October 3, 1992.)

	July 1949	July 1950	July 1951	Total
Manufactures (Excluding Chemicals)	Percent	Percent	Percent	Percent
Industrial Machinery & Equipment	11.2	14.3	14.4	11.3
Agricultural Products	10.7	11.7	10.9	11.3
Chemicals	15.0	11.1	11.2	11.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Measurement of Distance

	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	July 1944- June 1945	Total
United Kingdom	1,404,941	1,016,795	4,218,513	6,640,249
U. S. S. R.	501,115	1,791,017	3,697,372	5,989,504
Belgium, Middle East & Afghanistan Area	108,544	1,110,180	1,697,084	3,075,808
China and India	114,131	4,85,589	747,613	1,407,333
Australia and New Zealand	109,562	438,454	691,656	1,239,672
Latin America	9,777	54,646	87,666	174,089
Other Countries	86,086	350,416	107,460	543,962
Total	2,239,661	7,812,697	11,666,264	21,718,622

Keywords: *Disability, Employment, Social Security, Social Insurance, Social Security Act*

	July 1961- June 1962	July 1962- June 1963	July 1963- June 1964	Total
United Kingdom	54.5	49.8	41.7	146.0
U. S. S. R.	19.0	26.4	20.0	65.4
Japan, Middle East & Mediterranean Area	11.0	16.0	14.1	41.1
China and India	6.0	3.9	4.0	13.9
Argentina & Peru	3.0	3.0	4.1	10.1
Latin America	0.4	1.0	0.0	1.4
Other Countries	1.0	3.4	1.1	5.5
Total	105.0	100.0	100.0	305.0

12 BP MONO. SEC.

LIND-LEASE EXPORTS

March 1941 through June 30, 1944

(Millions of Dollars)

	United Kingdom	U. S. S. R.	Other Middle East and Mediterranean Areas	China, India, Australasia, and the Pacific	Other Countries	Total
MINERALS						
Crude Oil	411	379				1,790
Asphaltum	917	425	173	154	77	1,844
Asphalt and Pave.	3,319	1,911	1,217	1,111	77	4,214
Trunk and Pave.	264	918	1,217	140	41	1,844
Motor Vehicles and Parts	481	218	41	140	86	1,113
Waxes	171	147	41	35	37	461
Total Minerals	5,493	3,177	2,385	1,290	422	12,864
INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS AND PRODUCTS						
Metals	478	673	131	990	77	1,489
Aluminum	564	546	171	250	77	1,644
Plastic Products	112	40	48	140	3	1,009
Other	409	418	113	170	23	1,349
Total Industrial	1,163	1,139	362	1,350	103	3,124
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS						
Foodstuffs	1,142	915	985	985	13	3,060
Other Agric. Products	485	111	11	21	4	647
Total Agric. Products	1,627	1,026	1,006	1,007	17	4,713
TOTAL EXPORTS	8,283	5,342	3,353	2,647	542	19,182

LIND-LEASE EXPORTS TO ALL COUNTRIES

Thousands of Dollars

	Mar. 1941-June 1943	July 1943-June 1944	July 1944-June 1945	Total
Crude Oil and Asphaltum	378,764	1,377,336	1,694,146	3,450,246
Asphalt and Pave.	375,614	1,987,099	2,711,460	4,374,213
Trunk and Pave.	187,350	754,077	884,000	1,825,427
Motor Vehicles and Parts	394,080	417,376	1,045,254	1,856,710
Waxes	174,460	176,115	154,911	405,486
Total Minerals	1,510,268	4,651,923	6,489,771	12,651,962
Industrial Materials and Products	607,097	1,661,036	1,003,458	3,271,591
Agricultural Products	784,441	1,200,054	1,009,085	3,003,580
Total	2,901,806	7,512,993	8,502,314	18,917,113

LIND-LEASE EXPORTS TO UNITED KINGDOM

Thousands of Dollars

	Mar. 1941-June 1943	July 1943-June 1944	July 1944-June 1945	Total
Crude Oil and Asphaltum	300,894	861,704	878,944	1,941,542
Asphalt and Pave.	136,412	770,288	1,030,770	1,937,470
Trunk and Pave.	70,811	317,438	388,441	776,690
Motor Vehicles and Parts	40,133	101,179	247,113	388,425
Waxes	16,305	106,671	85,444	308,420
Total Minerals	564,555	2,057,200	2,630,712	5,252,467
Industrial Materials and Products	424,347	790,100	1,060,776	2,275,223
Agricultural Products	660,013	867,123	1,100,013	2,627,149
Total	1,648,915	3,714,423	4,791,501	10,154,839

LIND-LEASE EXPORTS TO U. S. S. R.

Thousands of Dollars

	Mar. 1941-June 1943	July 1943-June 1944	July 1944-June 1945	Total
Crude Oil and Asphaltum	49,176	264,664	398,597	712,437
Asphalt and Pave.	170,884	401,345	614,172	1,186,399
Trunk and Pave.	91,870	101,179	134,713	327,762
Motor Vehicles and Parts	34,870	174,130	268,667	477,667
Waxes	1,614	10,081	91,314	103,009
Total Minerals	248,414	851,399	1,403,463	2,503,276
Industrial Materials and Products	110,014	794,995	1,096,427	1,999,436
Agricultural Products	91,468	130,700	419,714	641,882
Total	449,896	1,777,094	2,919,604	5,146,594

13 BP MONC. SEC.

LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO INDIA AND CHINA

Thousands of Dollars

	Mar. 1941- June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Oilseeds and Accessories, Alcohol and Fats.....	51,836	193,971	71,856	317,663
Textiles and Fats.....	20,717	60,899	267,270	348,906
Trucks and Parts.....	18,087	63,330	35,830	117,247
Motor Vehicles and Parts.....	28,518	47,334	608,185	784,037
Wares and.....	460	8,064	70,014	78,538
Total Machinery, Industrial Materials and Fuel.....	127,648	385,742	305,750	819,140
with Agricultural Products.....	28,693	130,665	615,795	875,153
Total.....	156,341	516,407	921,545	1,594,293

LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Thousands of Dollars

	Mar. 1941- June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Oilseeds and Accessories, Alcohol and Fats.....	51,867	60,899	70,571	183,337
Textiles and Fats.....	24,250	70,967	149,241	244,458
Trucks and Parts.....	1,776	48,727	4,343	53,846
Motor Vehicles and Parts.....	1,960	29,586	64,014	95,560
Wares and.....	4	7,394	3,645	11,043
Total Machinery, Industrial Materials and Fuel.....	81,757	167,773	188,814	438,344
with Agricultural Products.....	24,636	130,785	187,415	342,836
Total.....	106,393	298,558	376,229	781,180

LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST, AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA

Thousands of Dollars

	Mar. 1941- June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Oilseeds and Accessories, Alcohol and Fats.....	65,465	194,880	76,510	436,855
Textiles and Fats.....	51,147	139,558	430,642	621,347
Trucks and Parts.....	44,508	177,575	308,224	530,307
Motor Vehicles and Parts.....	65,214	191,538	271,886	528,638
Wares and.....	6,476	9,275	36,973	52,724
Total Machinery, Industrial Materials and Fuel.....	232,810	613,846	1,394,235	2,240,891
with Agricultural Products.....	71,673	136,507	275,671	483,851
Total.....	304,483	750,353	1,669,906	2,724,742

LEND-LEASE EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA *

Thousands of Dollars

	Mar. 1941- June 1942	July 1942- June 1943	July 1943- June 1944	Total
Oilseeds and Accessories, Alcohol and Fats.....	1,540	11,547	13,949	26,036
Textiles and Fats.....	4,003	66,364	34,871	105,248
Trucks and Parts.....	1,783	17,183	12,148	31,114
Motor Vehicles and Parts.....	1,738	6,756	8,275	16,769
Wares and.....	450	450	677	1,577
Total Machinery, Industrial Materials and Fuel.....	8,514	102,400	69,944	180,858
with Agricultural Products.....	453	8,205	12,981	21,639
Total.....	8,967	110,605	82,925	202,497

*By 20 other American Republics.

UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE

Value in Millions of Dollars

	Exports			Imports
	Lend-Lease	Cash	Total	
1945.....		9,283	9,283	9,647
1946.....		9,496	9,496	9,495
1947.....		9,545	9,545	9,594
1948.....		9,696	9,696	9,668
1949.....		9,777	9,777	9,718
1950.....		9,901	9,901	9,852
1951.....	129	4,408	4,537	4,545
1952.....	4,895	3,144	8,039	8,740
1953.....	18,104	5,467	23,571	8,384
1954*.....	11,586	5,877	17,463	4,794

*First 6 months of present year.

14 BP MONO SECTION

TOTAL LEND-LEASE AID

March 1941 Through June 30, 1944

	Amount	% of Total
Goods Transferred		
Aircraft	121,142,379.000	21.6
Industrial Materials and Products	4,276,084.000	81.3
Agricultural Products	1,430,385.000	12.5
Total Goods	126,848,848.000	81.5
Services Rendered		
Towing and Repair of Ships, etc.	101,850.000	1.9
Rental of Ships, Towing of Aircraft, etc.	5,915,755.000	1.0
Production Facilities in U. S.	437,700.000	0.8
Miscellaneous Expenses	98,646.000	0.2
Total Services	6,553,951.000	10.0
Total Lend Lease Aid	133,402,799.000	100.0
Committed to Commanding Generals*	678,547.000	

*Goods committed to United States commanding generals for expenditure transfer to the field to lend lease countries. The value of goods actually transferred is not included in the total goods and value of 133,402,799.000. *Goods allocated for expenditure to lend lease countries is given in Table 16, page 102.

GOODS COMMITTED TO U. S. COMMANDING GENERALS, IN THE FIELD, FOR SUBSEQUENT TRANSFER UNDER LEND-LEASE TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AS OF JUNE 30, 1944

Thousands of Dollars

Category	Expenses Incurred in Field and War Reliefs	Goods	Other Countries	Total
Ordinance and Ammunition	74,359	143,946	8,314	226,619
Aircraft and Parts	36,389		191	36,580
Trucks and Other Vehicles	156,137	43,485	2,319	202,941
Miscellaneous Supplies	95,587	32,254	16,917	144,758
Total	459,589	219,690	20,631	699,910

TRANSFERS OF MERCHANT SHIPS UNDER LEND-LEASE

As of June 30, 1944

	Number	Total weight (tons)	Percentage of Total
LARGE VESSELS (1,000 gross tons or over)			
United Kingdom	290	3,341,714	67.488
U. S. S. R.	84	841,817	17.031
Other Countries	17	225,656	4.580
Total	311	4,409,187	89.100
SMALL VESSELS			
United Kingdom	1,085	11,649	17.715
U. S. S. R.	1	513	8.00
Other Countries			
Total	1,086	12,162	18.715
TOTAL ALL VESSELS			
United Kingdom	1,475	3,353,363	66.203
U. S. S. R.	85	842,330	17.031
Other Countries	34	226,171	4.580
Total	1,594	4,421,864	89.114

*Weights for some small vessels is not available.

** Not demonstrated. Not all have agreed upon the size of certain vessels transferred.

TRANSFERS OF WATERCRAFT UNDER LEND-LEASE

As of June 30, 1944

Thousands of Dollars

Type of Ship	United Kingdom	U. S. S. R.	Other Countries	Total
Destroyers	51,080	4,954	11,916	67,950
Motor Auxiliary and Small Craft	1,375,960	49,967	84,895	1,510,822
Merchant	445,899	513,436	75,676	935,011
Total	2,372,939	568,357	172,487	3,013,783

15 BP MONO. SECTION

Appendix (VI)

EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING THE SURPLUS WAR PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, particularly the First War Powers Act, 1941, as President of the United States and ex-Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is hereby established in the Office of War Mobilization, the Surplus War Property Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "Administration"), the persons and functions of which, subject to the general supervision of the Director of War Mobilization, shall be exercised by a Surplus War Property Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "Administration"), to be approved by the Director of War Mobilization.

2. With the concurrence of a Surplus War Property Policy Board, composed of a representative from each of the following: Army Department, Treasury Department, War Department, Navy Department, Justice Department, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Smaller War Plants Corporation, United States Maritime Commission, War Production Board, Bureau of the Budget, War Relocation Administration, Federal Works Agency, Civil Administration Board, and the Foreign Economic Administration, it shall be the function of the Administration, in the following cases, to take such action as may be provided for or permitted by law:

(a) To have general supervision and direction of the handling and disposition of surplus war property.

(b) To have general supervision and direction of the transfer of any surplus war property in the possession of any Government agency to any other Government agency whenever in the judgment of the Administration such transfer is appropriate.

(c) Unless otherwise directed by the Director of War Mobilization, to assign, so far as it is deemed feasible by the Administration, surplus war property for disposition, as follows: consumer goods to the Procurement Division of the Department of the Treasury; capital and producers' goods, including planes, engines, materials, scrap and other industrial property, to a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, created pursuant to Section 41 (2) of the Reconstruction Finance Act, as amended; ships and maritime property to the United States Maritime Commission; and land in the War Relocation Administration. Provided, That surplus war property to be disposed of outside the United States, unless otherwise directed by the Director of War Mobilization, shall be assigned, so far as it is deemed feasible by the Administration, to the Foreign Economic Administration.

3. All inventories, papers, and data relating to the transfer or disposition of surplus war property, heretofore collected by law or any Government agency may, to the extent necessary to carry out the provisions of this order, be retained also by the Administration.

4. The Administration may prescribe regulations and issue directions necessary to effectuate the purposes of this order, and no Government agency shall transfer or dispose of surplus war property in contravention thereof. Each Government agency shall submit such information and reports with respect to surplus war property and to such form and at such times as the Administration shall direct. When requested by the Administration, a Government agency shall transmit such documents for the transfer of title or for any other purpose or take such steps as the Administration shall determine to be necessary or proper to transfer or dispose of surplus war property as authorized to carry out the provisions of this order.

5. The Administration may perform the functions and exercise the powers, authority, and discretion conferred on the Administration by this order by such officials and such agencies and in such manner as the Administration, subject to the provisions of this order, may determine. In carrying out the purposes of this order, the Administration may utilize the services of any other Government agency. The Administration, within the limits of funds which may be made available, may employ necessary personnel and make provision for supplies, facilities, and services necessary to discharge the responsibilities of the Administration.

6. As used in this order:

(a) "Government agency" means any executive department, independent establishment, agency, commission, board, bureau, division, administration, office, service, independent regulatory commission or board, and any government-owned or government-controlled corporation.

(b) "Surplus War Property" means any property, real or personal, including but not limited to planes, facilities, equipment, machines, instruments, parts, assemblies, products, commodities, materials, and supplies in the possession of or controlled by any Government agency, whether new or used, in use or in storage, which are in excess of the needs of such agency or are not required for the performance of the duties and functions of such agency and which are determined, subject to the authority of the Office of War Mobilization, to be surplus by such agency.

7. All prior Executive Orders, in so far as they are in conflict herewith, are amended accordingly.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, February 14, 1945