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Message to Congress re State of the Union
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STEPHEN EARLY
Secretary to the President

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

In considering the state of the Union, the war, and the peace that is to follow, are naturally uppermost in the minds of all of us.

This war must be waged -- it is being waged -- with the greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men, fighting far from home, have already won victories which the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no question of the cost. Our losses will be heavy.

We and our Allies will go on fighting together to ultimate total victory.

We have seen a year marked, on the whole, by substantial progress toward victory, even though the year ended with a set-back for our arms, when the Germans launched a ferocious counter-attack into Luxembourg and Belgium with the obvious objective of cutting our line in the center.

Our men have fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most difficult conditions, and our German enemies have sustained considerable losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

The high tide of this German effort was reached two days after Christmas. Since then we have resumed the offensive, rescued the isolated garrison at Bastogne, and forced a German withdrawal along the whole line of the salient. The speed with which we recovered from this savage attack was largely possible because we have one Supreme Commander in complete control of all the Allied armies in France. General Eisenhower has faced this period of trial with admirable calm and resolution and with steadily increasing success. He has my complete confidence.

Further desperate attempts may well be made to break our lines, to slow our progress. We must never make the mistake of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has surrendered.

And I would express another most serious warning against the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was less dangerous in actual terms of winning the war than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

(over)
Every little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst—seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are, here and there, evil and baseless rumors against the Russians—rumors against the British—rumors against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely, you will observe that every one of them bears the same trademark—"Made in Germany."

We must resist this divisive propaganda—we must destroy it—with the same strength and the same determination that our fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and—despite temporary setbacks here or there—we shall continue the attack relentlessly until Germany is completely defeated.

It is appropriate at this time to review the basic strategy which has guided us through three years of war, and which will lead, eventually, to total victory.

The tremendous effort of the first years of this war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort—in the language of the military—"Jewel" of deployment of our forces. Many battles—essential battles—were fought; many victories—vital victories—were won. But those battles and those victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy, and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the final, decisive blows.

In the beginning, our most important military task was to prevent our enemies—the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that ever have threatened civilization—from winning decisive victories. But even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative from our enemies and place our superior resources of men and materials into direct competition with them.

It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require the massing of overwhelming forces—ground, sea and air—in positions from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy homelands, and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan, we had to await the completion of extensive preliminary operations—operations designed to establish secure supply lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for overwhelming sea power and air power—supported by ground forces strategically employed against isolated outposts and garrisons.

Always—from the very day we were attacked—it was right militarily as well as morally to reject the arguments of those shortsighted people who would have had us throw Britain and Russia to the Nazi wolves and concentrate against the Japanese. Such people urged that we fight a purely defensive war against Japan while allowing the domination of all the rest of the world by Naziism and Fascism.

In the European theatre, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power against Germany were already available in Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy.
Therefore, our decision was made to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat. That decision was based on all these factors; and it was also based on the realisation that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a war potential.

We had in Europe two active and indomitable Allies -- Britain and the Soviet Union -- and there were also the heroic resistance movements in the occupied countries, constantly engaging and harassing the Germans.

We cannot forget how Britain held the line, alone, in 1940 and 1941; and at the same time, despite ferocious bombardment from the air, built up a tremendous armaments industry which enabled her to take the offensive at El Alamein in 1942.

We cannot forget the heroic defence of Moscow and Leningrad and Stalingrad, or the tremendous Russian offensives of 1943 and 1944 which destroyed formidable German armies.

Nor can we forget how, for more than seven long years, the Chinese people have been sustaining the barbarous attacks of the Japanese and containing large enemy forces on the vast areas of the Asiatic mainland.

In the future we must never forget the lesson that we have learned -- that we must have friends who will work with us in peace as they have fought at our side in war.

As a result of the combined effort of the Allied forces, great military victories were achieved in 1944: the liberation of France; Belgium, Greece and parts of the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia; the surrender of Hungary and Bulgaria; the invasion of Germany itself and Hungary; the steady march through the Pacific Islands to the Philippines, Guam and Saipan; and the beginnings of a mighty air offensive against the Japanese Islands.

Now, as this seventy-ninth Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944, of the German "impenetrable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg -- almost to the Rhine itself.

The cross channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches -- to the sailor and merchant seamen who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied -- and to the military and naval leaders who achieved a real miracle of planning and execution. And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to plan together, and work together, and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this, the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American, French and other Allied forces based in North Africa and Italy.

The success of the two invasions is a tribute also to the ability of many men and women to maintain silence, when a few careless words would have imperilled the lives of hundreds of thousands, and would have jeopardized the whole vast undertakings.
These two great operations were made possible by success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Without this success over German submarines, we could not have built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could we have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had landed in France.

The Nazis, however, may succeed in improving their submarines and their crews. They have recently increased their U-boat activity. The Battle of the Atlantic -- like all campaigns in this war -- demands eternal vigilance. But the British, Canadian and other Allied Navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.

The tremendous operations in Western Europe have overshadowed in the public mind the least spectacular but vitally important Italian front. Be place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been obscured, and -- by some people, unfortunately -- underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected -- now.

What the Allied forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part in our strategy in Europe, now aimed at only one objective -- the total defeat of the Germans. These valiant forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure -- including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops -- all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere.

Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army -- reinforced by units from other United Nations, including a brave and well-equipped unit of the Brazilian Army -- have, in the past year, pushed north through bloody Cassino and the Anzio beachhead, and through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offense, by our troops in Italy will continue.

The American people -- and every soldier now fighting in the Apennines -- should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific.

A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa was a little more than a month old.

A year ago, we were preparing for our invasion of Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Central Pacific to the Philippines.

A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea almost 1,500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.
We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself -- and will continue to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two. There is still hard fighting ahead -- costly fighting. But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been largely cut off from her conquest in the East Indies.

The landing of our troops on Leyte was the largest amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific.

Moreover, these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night engagements around Guadalcanal in November-December, 1942, had our Navy been able to come to grips with major units of the Japanese fleet. We had brushed against their fleet in the first battle of the Philippine Sea in June, 1944, but not until last October were we able really to engage a major portion of the Japanese navy in actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for three days was the heaviest blow ever struck against Japanese sea power.

As the result of that battle, much of what is left of the Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates the Yellow Sea, the China Sea, and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces -- on all fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership which has guided their-sons into battle.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history of teamwork and cooperation, of skill and daring. Let me give you one example out of last year's operations in the Pacific.

Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea, and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, C and E. However, Admiral Halsey reported that a direct attack on Leyte appeared feasible. When General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey's task forces, he also concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese in the Philippines directly -- by-passing islands A, C and E.

Admiral Nimitz thereupon offered to make available to General MacArthur several divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives. These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on the same day.

Thus, within the space of twenty-four hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different theaters of operations -- a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory -- a change which saved lives which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now neutralized far behind our lines.

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Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important
task of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost
insuperable difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944. At
present our aid to China must be accomplished by air transport —
there is no other way. By the end of 1944, the Air Transport
Command was carrying into China a tonnage of supplies three times
as great as that delivered a year ago, and much more, each month,
than the Burma road ever delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China, the tonnage
delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Four-
teenth Air Force, which includes many Chinese flyers, to wage an
effective and aggressive campaign against the Japanese. In 1944,
aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more than 35,000 sorties
against the Japanese and sank enormous tonnage of enemy shipping,
greatly diminishing the usefulness of the China Sea lanes.

British, Dominion and Chinese forces together with our
own have not only held the line in Burma against determined Japanese
attacks but have gained bases of considerable importance to the supply
line into China.

The Burma campaigns have involved incredible hardship,
and have demanded exceptional fortitude and determination. The
officers and men who have served with so much devotion in these
far distant jungles and mountains deserve high honor from their
countrymen.

In all of the far-flung operations of our own armed
forces — on land, and sea and in the air — the final job,
the toughest job, has been performed by the average, easy-
going, hard-fighting young American who carries the weight of
battle on his own shoulders.

It is to him that we and all future generations of
Americans must pay grateful tribute.

But — it is of small satisfaction to him to know that
monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he
needs, and he is entitled to insist upon, our full and active
support — now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made
possible our victories, we shall have to increase our goals even
more in certain items.

Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Depart-
ment in December 1943. Due in part to cut-backs, we have not
produced as much since then. Deliveries of Army supplies were
down by 15 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once
more resumed.

Because of increased demands from overseas, the Army
Service Forces in the month of October, 1944, had to increase
its estimate of required production by 10 percent. But in Novem-
ber, one month later, the requirements for 1945 had to be increased
another 10 percent, sending the production goal well above anything
we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily
increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammuni-
tion. As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions
that we expend will mount day by day.

In October, 1944, while some were saying the war in
Europe was over, the Army was shipping more men to Europe than
in any previous month of the war.
One of the most urgent immediate requirements of the armed forces is more nurses. Last April the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000. Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army.

Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000. That means 18,000 more nurses must be obtained for the Army alone and the Navy now requires 2,000 additional nurses.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalised, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to twenty-six beds, instead of the recommended one to fifteen beds.

It is tragic that the gallant women who have volunteered for service as nurses should be so overworked. It is tragic that our wounded men should ever want for the best possible nursing care.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due to any shortage of nurses. 280,000 registered nurses are now practicing in this country. It has been estimated by the War Manpower Commission that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the armed forces without interfering too seriously with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.

Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required, I urge that the Selective Service Act be amended to provide for the induction of nurses into the armed forces. The need is too pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.

The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers have been the best known to medical science. Those standards must be maintained at all cost. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand desperately in need of it.

In the continuing progress of this war we have constant need for new types of weapons. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need many thousands of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics which must be put into production in order to maintain our technical superiority — and in order to save lives. We have to work every day to keep ahead of the enemy in radar. On D-Day, in France, with our superior new equipment, we located and then put out of operation every warning set which the Germans had along the French coast.

If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development of new weapons, we pay for our backwardness with the life’s blood of our sons.

The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job — for additional American civilians, men and women, not engaged in essential work, to
go out and get a war job. Workers who are released because their production is cut back should get another job where production is being increased. This is no time to quit or change to less essential jobs.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs -- or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And -- again -- that payment must be made with the life’s blood of our sons.

Many critical production programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important army needs are artillery, ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, tires, tanks, heavy trucks and even B-29’s. In each of these vital programs, present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of bombardment ammunition is hampered by manpower shortages; so is production for its huge rocket program. Labor shortages have also delayed its cruiser and carrier programs, and production of certain types of aircraft.

There is critical need for more repair workers and repair parts; this lack delays the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet, and prevents ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.

The pool of young men under 26 classified as I-A is almost depleted. Increased replacements for the armed forces will take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1945 production goals.

Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was not adopted.

I now again call upon the Congress to enact this measure for the total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war. I urge that this be done at the earliest possible moment.

It is not too late in the war. In fact, bitter experience has shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war, the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

There are three basic arguments for a National Service Law.

First -- it would assure that we have the right numbers of workers in the right places at the right times.

Second -- it would provide supreme proof to all our fighting men that we are giving them what they are entitled to, which is nothing less than our total effort.

And -- third -- it would be the final, unequivocal answer to the hope of the Nazis and the Japanese that we may become half-hearted about this war and that they can get from us a negotiated peace.

National Service legislation would make it possible to put ourselves in a position to assure certain and speedy action in meeting our manpower needs.
It would be used only to the extent absolutely required by military necessities. In fact, experience in Great Britain and in other nations at war indicates that use of the compulsory powers of national service is necessary only in rare instances.

This proposed legislation would provide against loss of retirement and seniority rights and benefits. It would not mean reduction in wages.

In adopting such legislation, it is not necessary to discard the voluntary and cooperative processes which have prevailed up to this time. This cooperation has already produced great results. The contribution of our workers to the war effort has been beyond measure. We must build on the foundations that have already been laid and supplement the measures now in operation, in order to guarantee the production that may be necessary in the critical period that lies ahead.

At the present time we are using the inadequate tools at hand to do the best we can by such expedients as manpower ceilings, and the use of priority and other powers, to induce men and women to shift from non-essential to essential war jobs.

I am in receipt of a joint letter from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 3, 1945, which says:

"With the experience of three years of war and after the most thorough consideration, we are convinced that it is now necessary to carry out the statement made by the Congress in the joint resolutions declaring that a state of war existed with Japan and Germany: that to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States."

"In our considered judgment, which is supported by General Marshall and Admiral King, this requires total mobilization of our manpower by the passage of a national war service law. The armed forces need this legislation to hasten the day of final victory, and to keep to a minimum the cost in lives; national war service, the recognition by law of the duty of every citizen to do his or her part in winning the war, will give complete assurance that the need for war equipment will be filled. In the coming year we must increase the output of many weapons and supplies on short notice. Otherwise we shall not keep our production abreast of the swiftly changing needs of war. At the same time it will be necessary to draw progressively many men now engaged in war production to serve with the armed forces, and their places in war production must be filled promptly. These developments will require the addition of hundreds of thousands to those already working in war industry. We do not believe that these needs can be met effectively under present methods.

"The record made by management and labor in war industry has been a notable testimony to the resourcefulness and power of America. The needs are so great, nevertheless, that in many instances we have been forced to recall soldiers and sailors from military duty to do work of a civilian character in war production, because of the urgency of the need for equipment and because of inability to recruit civilian labor."

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Pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects of national service, I recommend that the Congress immediately enact legislation which will be effective in using the services of the 4,000,000 men now classified as 4-F in whatever capacity is best for the war effort.

In the field of foreign policy, we propose to stand together with the United Nations not for the war alone but for the victory for which the war is fought.

It is not only a common danger which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments but of peoples — and the peoples' hope is peace. Here, as in England; in Russia, as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world, wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable and secure.

It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace wars. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step — but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring, and we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight.

The firm foundation can be built — and it will be built. But the continuance and assurance of a living peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an odyssey of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the peoples of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with complex problems of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.

Peace can be made and kept only by the united determination of free and peace-loving peoples who are willing to work together — willing to help one another — willing to respect and tolerate and try to understand one another's opinions and feelings.

The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors.

We must not let those differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in winning the war and building the peace.

International cooperation on which enduring peace must be based is not a one way street.

Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.
In the future world, the misuse of power, as implied in the term "power-politics", must not be a controlling factor in international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed. We cannot deny that power is a factor in world politics any more than we can deny its existence as a factor in national politics. But in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.

Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or imperialism, power politics may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by a direct attack against international cooperation, but against the alleged imperfections of the peace.

In our disillusionment after the last war, we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfil our responsibilities in an admittedly imperfect world.

We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same tragic road again -- the road to a third world war.

We can fulfil our responsibilities for maintaining the security of our own country only by exercising our power and our influence to achieve the principles in which we believe and for which we have fought.

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and I agreed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, these being later incorporated into the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942. At that time certain isolationists protested vigorously against our right to proclaim the principles -- and against the very principles themselves. Today, many of the same people are protesting against the possibility of violation of the same principles.

It is true that the statement of principles in the Atlantic Charter does not provide rules of easy application to each and every one of this war-torn world's tangled situations. But it is a good and a useful thing -- it is an essential thing -- to have principles toward which we can aim.

And we shall not hesitate to use our influence -- and to use it now -- to secure so far as is humanly possible the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We have not shirked from the military responsibilities brought on by this war. We cannot and will not shrink from the political responsibilities which follow in the wake of battle.

I do not wish to give the impression that all mistakes can be avoided and that many disappointments are not inevitable in the making of peace. But we must not this time lose the hope of establishing an international order which will be capable of maintaining peace and realizing through the years a more perfect justice between nations.

To do this we must be on our guard not to exploit and exaggerate the differences between us and our Allies, particularly with reference to the peoples who have been liberated from fascist tyranny. That is not the way to secure a better settlement of these differences or to secure international machinery which can rectify mistakes which may be made.

I should not be frank if I did not admit concern about many situations -- the Greek and Polish for example. But those situations are not as easy or as simple to deal with as some spokesmen, whose sincerity I do not question, would have us believe. We have obligations, not necessarily legal, to the exiled governments, to the underground leaders and to our major Allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did.
We and our Allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. But with internal dissension, with many citizens of liberated countries still prisoners of war or forced to labor in Germany, it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people really want.

During the interim period, until conditions permit a genuine expression of the people’s will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the peoples’ right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as free men, they are to live.

It is only too easy for all of us to rationalize what we want to believe, and to consider those leaders we like responsible and those we dislike irresponsible. And our task is made helped by stubborn partisanship, however understandable, on the part of opposed internal factions.

It is our purpose to help the peace-loving peoples of Europe to live together as good neighbors, to recognize their common interests and not to nurse their traditional grievances against one another.

But we must not permit the many specific and immediate problems of adjustment connected with the liberation of Europe to delay the establishment of permanent machinery for the maintenance of peace. Under the threat of a common danger, the United Nations joined together in war to preserve their independence and their freedom. They must now join together to make secure the independence and freedom of all peace-loving states, so that never again shall tyranny be able to divide and conquer.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, require constant alertness, continuing cooperation, and organized effort.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, can be secured only through institutions capable of life and growth.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding and determination to find a common ground of common understanding, which surrounded the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which those preparatory conversations were directed.

We and the other United Nations are going forward, with vigor and resolution, in our efforts to create such a system by providing for it strong and flexible institutions of joint and cooperative action.

The aroused conscience of humanity will not permit failure in this supreme endeavor.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of inter-communication between peoples over the past generation offer a practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace and the institutions of peace must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to use these great technological achievements for the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.
We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our national life. What we believe in for individuals, we believe in also for nations. We are opposed to restrictions, whether by public act or private arrangement, which distort and impair commerce, transit and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world.

One of the most heartening events of the year in the international field has been the renaissance of the French people and the return of the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations. Far from having been crushed by the terror of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged with stronger faith than ever in the destiny of their country and in the soundness of the democratic ideals to which the French nation has traditionally contributed so greatly.

During her liberation, France has given proof of her unceasing determination to fight the Germans, continuing the heroic efforts of the resistance groups under the occupation and of all those Frenchmen throughout the world who refused to surrender after the disaster of 1940.

Today, French armies are again on the German frontier, and are again fighting shoulder to shoulder with our sons.

Since our landings in Africa, we have placed in French hands all the arms and material of war which our resources and the military situation permitted. And I am glad to say that we are now about to equip large new French forces with the most modern weapons for combat duty.

In addition to the contribution which France can make to our common victory, her liberation likewise means that her great influence will again be available in meeting the problems of peace.

We fully recognize France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the German problem and the contribution which she can make in achieving international security. Her formal adherence to the Declaration by United Nations a few days ago and the proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, whereby France would receive one of the five permanent seats in the proposed Security Council, demonstrate the extent to which France has resumed her proper position of strength and leadership.

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I am clear in my own mind that, as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace in the future, we must have universal military training after this war, and I shall send a special message to the Congress on this subject.

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America — strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

In the State of the Union Message last year, I set forth what I considered to be an American economic Bill of Rights.

I said then, and I say now, that these economic truths represent a second bill of rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all — regardless of station, race or creed.
Of these rights the most fundamental, and one on which the fulfilment of the others in large degree depends, is the "right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation." In turn, others of the economic rights of American citizenship such as the right to a decent home, to a good education, to good medical care, to social security, to reasonable farm income, will, if fulfilled, make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

The Federal Government must see to it that these rights become realities — with the help of States, municipalities, business, labor and agriculture.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce — and this has amounted to approximately half our present productive capacity.

After the war we must maintain full employment with Government performing its peace-time functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand and purchasing power by private consumers — farmers, businessmen, workers, professional men, housewives — which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands; and it means also that we must greatly increase our export trade above the pre-war level.

Our policy is, of course, to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not accept mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work — and that means close to 60 million jobs.

Full employment means not only jobs — but productive jobs. Americans do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive jobs.

We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work — on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition, without the stifling presence of monopolies and cartels.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should also take appropriate measures in peacetime to secure opportunities for new small enterprises and for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.

This necessary expansion of our peacetime productive capacity will require new facilities, new plants and new equipment.

It will require large outlays of money which should be raised through normal investment channels. But while private capital should finance this expansion program, the Government should recognize its responsibility for sharing part of any special or abnormal risk of loss attached to such financing.

Our full-employment program requires the extensive development of our natural resources and other useful public works. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-watershed projects will add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA, which was constructed at a cost of 750 million dollars — the cost of waging this war for less than four days — was a bargain. We have similar opportunities in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these river basins, as we have in the Tennessee Valley, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprises as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of civil aviation, and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce, it will be necessary to construct thousands of airports and to overhaul our entire national highway system.
The provision of a decent home for every family is a
national necessity, if this country is to be worthy of its
greatness -- and that task will itself create great employment
opportunities. Most of our cities need extensive rebuilding.
Much of our farm plant is in a state of disrepair. To make a
frontal attack on the problems of housing and urban reconstruc-
tion will require thoroughgoing cooperation between industry and
labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.

An expanded social security program, and adequate health
and education programs must play essential roles in a program
designed to support individual productivity and mass purchasing
power. I shall communicate further with the Congress on these
subjects at a later date.

The millions of productive jobs that a program of this
nature could bring are jobs in private enterprise. They are
jobs based on the expanded demand for the output of our economy
for consumption and investment. Through a program of this
character we can maintain a national income high enough to pro-
vide for an orderly retirement of the public debt along with
reasonable tax reduction.

Our present tax system geared primarily to war require-
ments must be revised for peacetime so as to encourage private
demand.

While no general revision of the tax structure can be
made until the war ends on all fronts, the Congress should be
prepared to provide tax modifications at the end of the war in
Europe, designed to encourage capital to invest in new enter-
prises and to provide jobs. As an integral part of this pro-
gram to maintain high employment, we must, after the war is
over, reduce or eliminate taxes which bear too heavily on con-
sumption.

The war will leave deep disturbances in the world
economy, in our national economy, in many communities, in many
families, and in many individuals. It will require determined
effort and responsible action of all of us to find our way back
to peacetime, and to help others to find their way back to
peacetime -- a peacetime that holds the values of the past and
the promise of the future.

If we attack our problems with determination we shall
succeed. And we must succeed. For freedom and peace cannot
exist without security.

During the past year the American people, in a national
election, reasserted their democratic faith.

In the course of that campaign, various references were
made to "strife" between this Administration and the Congress,
with the implication, if not the direct assertion, that this Ad-
ministration and the Congress could never work together harmoni-
ously in the service of the Nation.

It cannot be denied that there have been disagreements
between the Legislative and Executive Branches -- as there have
been disagreements during the past century and a half.

I think we all realize too that there are some people
in this Capital City whose task is in large part to stir up dis-
sension, and to magnify normal healthy disagreements so that they
appear to be irreconcilable conflicts.

But -- I think that the overall record in this respect
is eloquent: the Government of the United States of America --
all branches of it -- has a good record of achievement in this
war.

The Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary have
worked together for the common good.

(over)
I myself want to tell you, the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, how happy I am in our relationships and friendships. I have not yet had the pleasure of meeting some of the new members in each House, but I hope that opportunity will offer itself in the near future.

We have a great many problems ahead of us and we must approach them with realism and courage.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.

Most important of all — 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made — of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history — and I hope it will be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE

January 6, 1945
Message of the President to
The Congress on the State of the
Union - January, 1945.

What is uppermost in the minds of our people -- and
should be -- in considering the state of the Union, is an
appraisal of the state of the war. For the task which we all
place first is the winning of total victory in this war.

During the year 1944 we saw tremendous victories for
the United Nations on all fronts in this war -- and very sub-
stantial progress toward the day of total victory which will
enable the achievement of world peace.

On the Western Front in Europe, the year ended with a
set-back for our arms, when the Germans launched a ferocious
counter-attack into Luxembourg and Belgium with the obvious
objective of cutting our line in the center.

This has been a crucial battle on the Western Front, a
battle which will affect the whole course of the war in Europe.
The enemy has made an all-out effort, committing his best troops -
young, fanaticel, desperate Nazis - led by veterans of the
Prussian military caste.

(Note: more to come on this battle as events develop
before delivery of this Message.)

This German counter-offensive has turned out to be far from
the defeat for us which, for a time, some people feared. Our men
fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most
difficult conditions, our German enemies have sustained considerable
losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

However, I would warn the people to be prepared -- as our
Armies in Europe are being prepared -- for further desperate and
costly attempts to break our lines. We must never make the mistake
of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has been

And I would express another most serious warning against
the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western
Europe was immeasurably less dangerous than the wedges which they
are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

Every ugly little rumor which is intended to weaken our
faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst -
seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are evil and baseless
rumors against the Russians -- rumors against the British -- rumors
against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely you will observe
that every one of them bears the same trademark -- "Made in Germany."

We must resist this divisive propaganda -- we must destroy
it -- with the same strength and the same determination that our
fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and - despite temporary set-backs here or there - we shall never stop attacking until Germany is completely defeated and her brutal criminals are given the punishment they so richly deserve.

The essential fact about the war today is this: we have now really come to grips with our enemies. Everything that has gone before was preparation for this moment. The tremendous effort of the first years of the war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort, in the language of the military men, of deployment of our forces. Many battles - essential battles - were fought; many victories - vital victories - were won. But these battles and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy and to put us in positions from which we and our allies could deliver the final, decisive blows.

You know the history, all of you, of the vast manoeuvres of deployment across the greatest oceans of the earth -- and in every climate - and at points as far apart as the Pacific Islands and the continent of Europe - 13,000 miles apart.
You know with what skill this gigantic task was conducted by General Marshall and Admiral King and General Arnold and their associates of the United States and of the other Allied nations. You remember the long months of the training of men, of the building of fleets, of the construction of planes, of the manufacture of munitions and supplies, of the transport of these men and supplies over the oceans east and west. You remember the battles of the Arctic islands, of the tropic archipelagoes, of the African deserts. You recall the names of distant beaches, mountain passes, jungles, towns, - names in tongues as remote and unfamiliar as the places - which are now an unforgettable part of the proud American heritage of battle names.

That period of preparation is now reaching its climax. The deployment of our forces is approximately completed. The battle is being joined.

Now, as this 79th Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

It is appropriate at this time to review the basic strategy which has guided us through three years of war, and which will lead, eventually, to total victory.
In the beginning our most important military task was to prevent our enemies -- the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that ever have threatened civilization -- from winning the war. But even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative from the enemy and use our superior resources of men and materials -- to win.

It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require the massing of overwhelming forces -- ground, sea and air -- in positions from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy homelands and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan we had to await the completion of extensive preliminary operations -- operations designed to establish secure supply lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for overwhelming sea power -- supported by ground forces strategically employed against isolated outpost garrisons. It was necessary therefore to wait for the construction of this overwhelming sea power before major operations could be undertaken.

In the case of Germany, however, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power were already available in
Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy.

Furthermore, we had Allies — active and potential — Allies who could not give us their maximum assistance against the Japs until Germany had been defeated.

Our decision to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat was based on these factors; it was also based on the realization that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a war potential. Japan, on the other hand, lacked the technological skills and the industrial organization to accomplish this kind of rapid increase in war potential.

Our strategy was therefore determined: to apply the maximum ground and air power in Europe until Germany was completely knocked out of the war; to concentrate our power for the final blow against Japan and meanwhile, to apply the maximum Naval strength in the Pacific, supported by sufficient ground and air forces to accomplish the initial operations so as to open the desired routes to the Japanese homeland.
As this new year begins — 1945 — we see the fruition and justification of this strategy. The naval and air developments have been largely completed; and the majority of our ground forces have reached the numerous battlefields of this global war.

Now, as the 74th Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944 of the German so-called "Impregnable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg — almost to the Rhine itself. The cross channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches — to the sailors who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied — and to the military leaders who achieved a real miracle of planning.

And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to work together and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American and French forces.

These two great invasions were made possible by a less spectacular but equally important success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

[Without our success over German submarines, we could not]
Without our success over German submarines, we could not have built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could we have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had landed in France.

The Nazis may succeed in improving their submarines and their crews, and they may once more launch an aggressive submarine attack. The Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the British and Canadian Navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.

The spectacular operations in Western Europe have overshadowed in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian front. Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been obscured, and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected — right now.

What our forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part of our strategy now aimed at only one objective — the total defeat of the Germans. Our forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure — including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops —
all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere. In addition to these German troops who are directly committed to the Italian battle area, the threat of our front in Italy requires the German High command to maintain a large strategic reserve of men and equipment in south-eastern Germany to guard against any sudden push on our part which would produce a major breakthrough. The American people—and every soldier now fighting in the Apennines—should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army—reinforced by units from other United Nations—have been fighting continuously since September 1943. A year ago they were at bloody Cassino. Since that time they have pushed north through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue.
In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific. A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa [November 23, 1943] was a little more than a month old. A year ago, we were just preparing for our invasion of Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Pacific to the Philippines. A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea almost 1500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.

The milestones we have passed in this fast-moving offensive are household words to all of America: Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Guam, Palau, Ladang, Hollandia, Manus, Morotai, and, finally the Philippines.

We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself — and will continue to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two — reducing the enemy to impotence in the Southern half. There is still
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hard fighting ahead in the Philippines — costly fighting. But
the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been
effectively cut off from her conquests in the East Indies. The
landing of our troops in the Philippines was the largest amphibious
operation thus far conducted in the Pacific. Moreover, these land-
ings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle which
Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night engage-
ments around Guadalcanal in November—December, 1942, had our Navy
been able to come to grips with major units of the Japanese
fleet. We had brushed against their fleet in the First Battle of
the Philippine Sea in June 1944, but not until October 23-25, were
we able really to engage the major portion of the Japanese navy in
actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for the next three
days was one of the heaviest blows struck against Japanese sea power.

As the result of that battle, what is left of the Japanese
fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates
the Yellow Sea, the China Sea and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of the Japanese
Navy will give us to fight them again.
Thus far in the war against Japan we have been able to gain great strategic successes with a minimum commitment of ground troops. That will not continue to be the case. It will eventually be necessary to concentrate considerably greater numbers of troops in the Pacific to deliver the decisive blows against Japan's inner defenses.

The waging of effective war calls for continuous revision of plans; strategy must hold to basic concepts but must be kept flexible enough to take advantage of favorable conditions.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces — on all fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership which has guided their sons into battle, a right to be proud of American generalship which shortens campaigns and saves American lives.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history of teamwork and cooperation, skill and daring. Let me give you one example out of last year's operations in the Pacific.

Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, B and C. However, when General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey's task
forces, he concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese
in the Philippines directly — by-passing islands A, B and C.

Admiral Halsey was in agreement with this, and Admiral Nimitz
thereupon offered to make available to General MacArthur several of his
divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives.
These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one
day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of
Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an
attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on
the same day.

Thus, within the space of 24 hours, a major change of plans
was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different
theaters of operations — a change which hastened the liberation of the
Philippines and the final day of victory — a change which saved lives
which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now
far behind our lines and of no danger.

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task
of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost
insuperable difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944.
At present our aid to China must be accomplished by air transport - there is no other way. By the end of 1944, the Air Transport Command was carrying into China a tonnage of supplies three times as great as that delivered at the end of 1943, and more, each month, than the Burma road ever delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China and the complete isolation of our remaining bases in coastal China, the tonnage delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the Japanese. In 1944, aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more than 35,000 sorties against the Japanese and sank over one-half million tons of enemy shipping, greatly diminishing the usefulness of the China Sea lanes.

In all of our military actions - on land, on sea and in the air - the final job, the toughest job, has been performed by that ordinary, every-day, every-time, hard-fighting young American who is universally and affectionately known as "G-I Joe".

It is to him that we and all future generations of Americans must pay grateful tribute.

He - whether he be soldier, sailor or airman - is the one eternally indispensable man.
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But— it is of small satisfaction to him to know that monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he needs, our active support—now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made possible our victories on land and sea and in the air, we shall have to increase our goals even more in certain items.

Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Department in December 1943. We have not produced as much since then.

Delivery of Army supplies fell 15 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once more resumed.

In the one month of October, the Army Service Forces had to increase its estimate of 1945 required production by 10 percent because of increased demands from overseas. That brought 1945 requirements up to the level expected for 1944, our best year so far. But in November, two months ago, the 1945 requirements had to be increased another 10 percent, sending the production coal well above anything we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition. In fact, within five months, it had been more than doubled. And this was all before the Germans launched their counter-Offensive. As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expend will mount
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day by day.

And we shall constantly need more men in the lines of battle.

While some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army in October, 1944, was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.

We shall also need new types of weapons.

We could not now stop war production, even if we had built up a vast reserve of supplies. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need over 5,000 of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics which must be put into
THE URGENT NEED OF THE ARMY FOR NURSES

One of the most urgent requirements for the Army is an urgent need for 18,000 more nurses.

Last April the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000. Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army. A statement of accessions and separations on a monthly basis for 1944 is attached.

Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000. That means that 18,000 more nurses must be obtained.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalized, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to 26 beds, instead of the recommended one to 15 beds.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due to any shortage of nurses in this country. 280,000 registered nurses are practicing. It has been estimated by [Procurement and Assignment Service of the War Manpower Commission] that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the Army without interfering in any way with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.
Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required for the Army, the War Department urges that the Selective Service Act be amended [without delay] to provide for the induction of nurses into the Army. While it is understood that the American Red Cross is starting a recruiting campaign for Army nurses, the need is too pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.

The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers has been of the highest medical standards. Those standards must be maintained at all cost. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand in need of it.
production in order to maintain our technical superiority -- and in order to save lives. We have to work every day to keep ahead of the enemy in radar.

For example: on D-day, in France, with our superior equipment, we located and then put out of operation, every warning set which the Germans had along the French coast.

If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development of new weapons we pay for our backwardness with the life's blood of our sons.

One of our greatest developments -- and one compelled by the extraordinary circumstances of this war -- is that magnificent bomber, the Superfortress, the B-29.

Development of the B-29 was initiated and carried to completion in record time. In less than 12 months from the delivery of the first production model, the Army Air Forces had organized and trained the first B-29 units and had transported them 13,000 miles to bases constructed by the labor of 250,000 Chinese workers.

This coming year will see a steady rise in destructive raids against the nerve centers of Japan -- against Tokyo itself -- by large formations of the most deadly bomber ever built.

And our Air Forces are not content to stop with the B-29. There are even newer and deadlier bombers on the way.
The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job -- for every American civilian -- men and women -- not engaged in essential war work to go out and get a war job.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs -- or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And -- again -- that payment must be made with the life's blood of our sons.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before, increased their already phenomenal production of food of the previous year. However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supplement the production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity, as well as of common humanity, we must furnish the newly-liberated areas of Europe with enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starvation and chaos behind the Allied lines.

At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which to buy food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians. It would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too little.
Even as we see the needs of war production increase in many items, we see the number of men and women working on these items decrease instead of increase. As a result, many critical programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important of these are artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, B-29s, tires, tanks, and trucks. In each of these vital programs present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of high capacity ammunition and for its huge rocket program is being badly hampered by manpower shortages. It is expected that difficulties may be later experienced in the cruiser and carrier programs.

Shortages of labor hamper the Navy program of repair parts for its fleet, airplanes and advance bases as much as the Navy needs for some new types of aircraft, dry cells, radar, wire and wire rope. There is critical need for more repair workers for West Coast shipyards, which delay the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and which prevent ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.
The pool of young men under 26 classified as 1-A is almost depleted. Calls for the armed forces will begin again shortly to take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady and, if necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1945 production goals.
Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was not adopted.

Recently, in order to cope with the problem, we have authorized the use of priority and other powers to induce the flow of manpower from less essential industries to war industries.

If these measures are not successful, I shall again call upon the Congress to enact this total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war. It is not too late in the war. In fact bitter experience has shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.
In this war, with a few notable exceptions, labor and management have submitted disputes which they could not adjust themselves to the National War Labor Board, and have loyally abided by its decision. But there have been some cases where the decisions of the Board have been disregarded. The government cannot expect labor to abide by its no-strike pledge or management to abide by its no-lockout pledge if management and labor do not accept the machinery for peaceful adjustment of disputes which has been set up by the government with the cooperation of both management and labor.

Existing legislation does not provide means for the enforcement of the orders of the War Labor Board except only by seizure to prevent interference with the war effort. In some cases seizure is an awkward and inept means of enforcement. In others, where the fault lies with the labor union, it is an undeserved hardship on the employer. In some cases, like the Patrillo case, the Board after assuming jurisdiction has not been able to find sufficient impediment to the war effort to make a finding necessary to justify seizure.

The avoidance of labor trouble during the war is dependent upon the effective functioning of this machinery for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes. The War Labor Board machinery is working too well in the vast majority of cases to permit it to be weakened by a few unpatriotic recalcitrants among management.
and labor. Responsible leaders of management and labor will find it increasingly difficult to secure compliance by their followers if recalcitrants among management and labor are permitted to ignore the orders of the Board with impunity.

I therefore recommend that the Congress adopt legislation which would make the orders of the War Labor Board legally enforceable whenever it finds that compliance with its orders is necessary to prevent the impairment of peaceful relations between management and labor.
Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty to eat -- and plenty is enough for anyone.

American manpower and industry are decisive factors in this war as they were in the World War which ended in 1918.

But in both wars we were unable to develop our power in men and materiel for a highly critical period after becoming actually engaged in the war.

On both occasions, our Allies were compelled to bear the full brunt of a fully prepared aggressor attack, until we of the United States could gather and organize our resources. We cannot assume that -- should such a tragedy again occur -- the aggressor would not level his first attack on this country. Developments in weapons -- air, ground, and naval -- can make possible such an attack despite the oceans around us.

Our national security and our place in the world, therefore, demand much more of preparation than has been the case in the past. We must always have immediately available trained men and adequate materiel. The only democratic and equitable method of providing adequate security for the United States in terms of manpower is the establishment of a system of Universal Military Training. And by training I mean training, pure and simple, and not liability for military service unless such would be imposed by congressional action in time of emergency. The Army and the Navy would remain purely voluntary forces; but there would be behind them the vast resources and impressive power of a previously trained
In order to fulfill our responsibilities in a system of collective international security, as well as to safeguard our own interests, we must never again destroy our preparedness as we have after every other war.

The democratic system of national defense is not to rely primarily on a professional military. Rather, our democracy calls each citizen, in time of war, by a system of compulsory selective service, to the part he is best equipped to play. It has been wasteful in the past and will be perilous in the future to delay training until war is imminent. We must now accept the principle of peacetime training. This is not a new principle. President Washington recommended a system of universal military training to the first Congress. President Jefferson recommended a system of universal military training to the ninth Congress. Both of them, acutely aware of the necessity of defending this country from foreign aggression and of avoiding military systems that would weaken democracy from within, urged a program of training that would let every citizen play his proper role in military affairs.

Now I recommend to the Congress the same principle of training -- the training of every young man for his part in the national defense, just as we educate every child to accept his other civic responsibilities. The program for this purpose ought to be developed with full appreciation of the unique resources of American society; recognizing that civilian institutions as well as individuals may be called on again to convert the skills of peace to the demands of war. It seems clear to me that the program of training should be universal, including all those who are not so severely handicapped that they can make no contribution whatever to the national defense; that it should be selective, training men for
the most valuable contribution that they can make in the event of war; and that it should be versatile and enterprising, so that, while concentrating on the purpose of national defense, it may increase the health and add to the skills of the young men of the nation.
citizenship.

Such a system should be considered as an integral part of our policy for cooperating in the establishment and maintenance of world security. All the United Nations agree that in the future the peace must be kept by armed force, if necessary; and the present proposals for a future international organization realistically take account of this fact. Our share of the armed forces that would be placed at the disposal of such an international organization obviously cannot be determined exactly until a later date, but they would, of course, be made available from our regular peacetime military and naval establishments consisting of volunteer forces. However, only a Universal Military Training system would provide a body of trained manpower reserve necessary in order to make our peacetime Army and Navy establishments fully adequate to meet any possible needs of providing for our national security.

Such training system would be unmistakable evidence of our power and determination to block the path of any aggressor nation which might again threaten us and the rest of the world.

The subject of Universal Military Training must be considered at this time in order that it may become operative upon the termination of the present emergency. There should not again be the almost fatal lapse in preparation between the close of a successful war and the development of a new emergency.
Proper planning by the War and Navy Departments is also dependent upon the early determination of the details of a Universal Military Training system. The designation of surplus military equipment and supplies, the disposal of that present surplus, and the disposal of training facilities and air and service installations cannot intelligently and efficiently be consummated until this subject has been acted upon by the Congress. If we were to dispose of our present facilities, equipment, and training management now — and, at some time in the vague future, decide to initiate a system of training, it would result in loss of valuable time and property, and would sacrifice other valuable factors which knowledge and familiarity with the problem of war and wartime training give.

Aside from the obvious advantages of military training, it is important that young Americans shall have the opportunity to learn of the development of new methods and new machines. That knowledge will be of incalculable value to them and to the nation as a whole in the future.

I therefore recommend to the Congress, the prompt enactment of legislation requiring all able male citizens to undergo a period of military training. The length of the training period, the extent and content of the training, and the ages within which it shall be given are matters for determination by the Congress in consultation, of course, with our military authorities.
This war must be waged — it is being waged — with the
greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have
is at stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men,
fighting far from home, in cruel and unfamiliar climates, against enemies
whose homes are at their backs — American men have already won victories
which the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no
question either of the cost. Our losses will be heavy. Our hearts will
be wrung. Our determination and our endurance will be tried. But if
we and our comrades in arms of United Nations will go on fighting,
together, nothing our enemies can do by force or treachery or subterfuge
or falsehood can prevent our ultimate, total victory.

And we will go on fighting, together.

Comrades in arms over three years of changing fortunes and of
hope deferred, we will be more than ever comrades in arms now that the
moment of decision is upon us.

We propose to stand together, not for the war alone but for the
victory for which the war is fought. It is not only a common danger which
unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments
but of peoples and the peoples' hope is peace. Here as in England; in
England as in Russia; in Russia as in China; in France, and through the
continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom,
the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable
and secure.
You will see that I am being frank and at the same time, I am being realistic -- realistic as to the conduct of the war abroad and at home, and realistic also in regard to the safety of the nation in the future. What I am recommending in this message is realism. A very large portion of the cost of this war has been made necessary by our lack of realism in the past. I am realistic -- but at the same time I am idealistic. I am against world
war but I want to end this World War as fast as I can. I know that world wars cannot be prevented by passing solemn resolutions in local clubs or societies.

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take every drastic step possible
It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight. There are no magical formulas — no "cure-alls" — that can be concocted by any one group of men sitting around a peace table.

The firm foundation can be built — and it will be built.

But the great structure of a real peoples' peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience, how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an eddy of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There
were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the peoples of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with far greater problems of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.

Aside from the duty to preserve order in military operations, it is not our intention and I do not believe it is the intention of any Allied power, to impose solutions on the peoples that have been liberated from fascist tyranny. On the contrary the Allied powers have declared their purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. We will attempt, in collaboration with our allies, to resolve the external difficulties, economic as well as political, which stand in the way of the exercise of these acknowledged rights by the peoples of the liberated areas and to promote the establishment of the representative governments, truly expressive of the peoples' will, which all nations united in the prosecution of this war for freedom and for peace desire.
Our own policy as regards these questions of the peoples' peace is not in doubt. In the United States, as in any other self-governing nation, it is the national character which constitutes the national policy and the national history which gives that policy book and chapter. It is what the people are that dictates their beliefs and it is what they believe that determines the policies which express their will. We have believed, since the declaration of our independence as a nation, that governments draw their just powers from the consent of the governed. It is, in consequence, our national policy to aid and assist the freedom-loving men and women who have suffered under Nazi and Fascist tyranny to establish governments in the liberated countries which will represent the people.

We have all heard the traditional theory that the internal affairs of other nations are no concern of ours.

That is a very hopeful and high-sounding theory. There is only one thing wrong with it — in the light of modern conditions, it does not make sense.

A good, law-abiding farmer may say, "It is no concern of mine what my neighbor does with his fields. All I have to do is keep my fences
in good repair and mind my own business." But that does not hold
good if the neighbor permits his property to degenerate into a breeding
place of pestilence which no fences can prevent from spreading.

In that case, the good farmer has to call upon the Board
of Health and the local constabulary to go in and clean up the mess.

Similarly, if in one of the countries of the Caribbean area
there should develop a Nazi-Fascist kind of government, that would
definitely be of gravest concern to us. For such a government might
grant bases, for example, to Germany or Japan, thereby providing a
direct threat to our life-line through the Panama Canal.

That is an example close to home — but with the miracles
of modern transportation (and greater miracles to come) the whole
world is now close to home.

We as a nation have the right to be concerned if our neighbors
begin to give indications of criminal tendencies. And other nations,
large and small, have that same right.

We place our faith in democracy. We believe that the warlike
impulse — the evil spirit of aggression — cannot thrive in any nation
where the people really rule.
Therefore we believe — in our own interests and in the
best interests of all mankind — that the guarantees of democracy are
the only sure guarantees of peace.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while
the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friend-
ship and mutual understanding which informed the conversations at Bun-
barton Oaks gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed
in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system
toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of
intercommunication between peoples over the past generation offers a
practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace
must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to turn these great technolog-
ical achievements to the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and com-
merce.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity,
and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of
our national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in
STATEMENT ON THE BRETTON WOODS PROGRAM

The maintenance of peace and prosperity will be much easier in a world in which countries can buy or sell, through mutually profitable trade, the raw materials and the finished goods the world produces and needs. We in the United States can get considerable help toward our goal of sixty million productive jobs if international trade can be expanded above the low levels of the 1930's. I am confident that this can be done if we avoid the exchange disorders and discriminatory practices that characterized the decade of the 1930's, and which will reappear in more acute form after the war unless positive measures are taken to prevent it. The only way to avoid a recurrence of this type of economic aggression is through international cooperation in dealing with international monetary problems.

We must also take positive steps to see that other countries participate in and contribute to a larger volume of international trade. Much of Europe and the Far East have suffered great damage from enemy action. Other areas of the world still have an economy that is undeveloped. While each country can and will do much for its own reconstruction and development, the process can be facilitated if foreign capital for productive investment is available on reasonable terms. The United States, as the largest exporting and importing country in the world, will derive great benefit from the restoration and the development of the producing and consuming power of other countries. Our own trade has always been particularly large with those countries that have high levels of production and consumption.

The Government has been conscious of the need to be prepared to deal with international monetary and financial problems after the war. For more than three years the Treasury and other departments of this Government have been considering means to assure stable and orderly currency arrangements and adequate international investment
after the war. Tentative proposals prepared by the technical staff of the Treasury, in consultation with other Departments, were sent to the Finance Ministers of the United Nations in 1943. After extended informal discussion among the technical representatives of more than thirty countries, it became clear that there was a large measure of agreement on the best means of dealing with international currency and investment problems. For this reason, I invited the United Nations to assemble at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, for an International Monetary and Financial Conference.

This Conference prepared articles of agreement for the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. I think it is a hopeful sign that the forty-four United Nations all agree that international monetary and financial problems are an international responsibility that can be dealt with only through international cooperation. In every country there is a feeling of confidence that this time we are preparing through the Fund and the Bank a sound economic foundation for international peace and for prosperity in all countries. The articles of agreement for the Fund and Bank will be submitted to the Congress for its consideration and I urge your favorable action.
also for nations. We are opposed to every form of restriction whether by public act or private arrangement which limits commerce, transit and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world.

It is as certain as the rising of the sun that an enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America — strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

In the State of the Union Message last year I set forth our economic bill of Rights.
In this Message I want to outline the policies which I believe the Government should pursue to validate the first of these rights -- "The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation." We cannot achieve this right without striving to secure other parts of the Bill of Rights. Measures to provide decent homes, good education, and social security will make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to half our total capacity production.

After the war we must maintain full employment with a Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand by private consumers -- farmers, businessmen, workers, professional men, housewives -- which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands.

Our policy is to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not tolerate mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work -- and that means upwards of 60 million jobs.
Our peacetime tasks will be greater than they ever were. Full employment also means that those employed or those working on their own account should be able to earn incomes sufficient to provide them and their families with adequate food, clothing, and recreation; it means not only jobs, but productive jobs. I do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive.

There are many responsibilities which the Federal Government will inevitably have to bear after the war, including our programs for national defense, aid to veterans, and interest on the national debt incurred during the war.

The Federal Government of the postwar period must gear all its programs to the requirements of full employment in an economy of private enterprise. Some of the measures which were devised to secure our record war production can usefully be applied to promoting peacetime output. During the war we have achieved a high degree of coordination in Government activities and cooperation between Government, business, labor, and agriculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accomplish our peacetime objectives.

I shall submit to Congress detailed legislative programs as soon as the war situation permits. In this message I can only stake out the areas for a comprehensive program.
Measures to encourage private enterprise cover a wide range. We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work -- on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition. Only in that way can we achieve prices which will promote the mass consumption which is necessary for full employment.

Our wartime tax system must be revised so as to encourage private demand. Modifications in the taxes on business should provide incentives to new investment and growing enterprise. We must reduce or eliminate taxes which bear heavily on consumption.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should adopt similar devices in peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.

Private business must contribute most, if not all, of the employment opportunities - and it will, in turn, gain its greatest stimulus from full and stable employment. As that is achieved private enterprise will prosper and initiative will thrive.

Our full-employment program must emphasize the development of our natural resources. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-valley projects will literally add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA was a bargain at 750 million dollars.
We have similar opportunities -- similar bargains -- in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these rivers, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of air transport and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce it will be necessary to construct many more airports and to overhaul our whole national highway system.

The provision of a decent home for every family is a necessity if this country is to be worthy of its greatness -- and that task would itself create great employment opportunities. Many of our cities need extensive rebuilding. Many of our farms are in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal attack on the housing problem will require thoroughgoing cooperation between construction industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.

I cannot now enter into details of our social security programs. I shall only say that an expanded social security program must play an essential role in a program designed to support mass purchasing power.

These policies will provide private and public demands for the products of our industries. But there is another side to the
picture. After the war there will be pressing problems of relocation of both industries and population. During the war there have been large-scale migrations of labor to the centers of war production. We must make sure that after the war there will not be large, dis-organized migrations of people looking for work.

In some cases we shall have to facilitate the orderly movement of people to places of employment -- and in other cases we must find means to encourage industry to develop in the regions to which the people have already moved.

The state must assist in the relocation of its workers. Our education programs, too, must be designed to fit the labor force for the work it is to perform.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to full employment. But if we attack the problem with determination we shall succeed. And we must succeed. As I said last year, freedom and peace cannot exist without security.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.
Most important of all -- 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made -- of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history -- and it may be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
SECOND DRAFT

Message of the President to
The Congress on the State of the
Union - January, 1945.

What is uppermost in the minds of our people — and should
be — in considering the state of the Union, is an appraisal of the
state of the war. For the task which we all place first is the
winning of total victory in this war.

During the year 1944 we saw tremendous victories for the
United Nations on all fronts in this war — and very substantial pro-
gress toward the day of total victory which will enable the achieve-
ment of world peace.

On the Western Front in Europe, the year ended with a set-back
for our arms, when the Germans launched a ferocious counter-attack into
Luxembourg and Belgium with the obvious objective of cutting our line
in the center.

This has been a crucial battle, a battle which will affect
the whole course of the war in Europe. The enemy has made an all-out
effort, committing his best troops — young, fanatical, desperate
Nazis — led by veterans of the Prussian military caste.

(NOTE: more to come on this battle as events develop before
delivery of this Message.)

This German counter-offensive, however, has turned out to be
The task which we all place first is the winning of total victory in this World War, for the simple reason that that kind of victory is the best hope for the achievement of world peace -- a world peace which will last.

We have seen a year marked, on the whole, by substantial progress toward that day, even though ••••.
SECOND DRAFT

far from the defeat for which, for a time, some people feared.
Our men fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most difficult conditions, and our German enemies have sustained considerable losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

However, I would warn the people to be prepared -- as our Armies in Europe are being prepared -- for further desperate and costly attempts to break our lines. We must never make the mistake of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has been eliminated.

And I would express another most serious warning against the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was immensely less dangerous than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

Every ugly little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst -- seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are evil and baseless rumors against the Russians -- rumors against the British -- rumors against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely you will observe that every one of them bears the same trademark -- "Made in Germany."

We must resist this divisive propaganda -- we must destroy it -- with the same strength and the same determination that our
Fortunately most Americans have learned not to believe everything they read in print, for they have discovered that much of the so-called opinion or comment or interpretation may be the honest personal belief of some one individual who has access to a relatively small part of all the information; or it may be the personal belief of some individual who has a personal bias with a political slant -- using the word "political" in the narrow and least attractive sense; or that it may be the personal belief of an individual who would be willing to compromise in this war and has no fundamental objection to the continuance of Nazism, Fascism or Militarism.

We must resist...
fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and -- despite temporary set-backs here or there -- we shall never stop attacking until Germany is completely defeated and her brutal criminals are given the punishment they so richly deserve.

The essential fact about the war today is this: we have now really come to grips with our enemies. Everything that has gone before was preparation for this moment. The tremendous effort of the first years of the war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort, in the language of the military men, of deployment of our forces. Many battles -- essential battles -- were fought; many victories -- vital victories -- were won. But these battles and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the final, decisive blows.

You know the history, all of you, of the vast manoeuvres of deployment across the greatest oceans of the earth, and in every climate and at points as far apart as the Pacific Islands and the continent of Europe -- 18,000 miles apart.
SECOND DRAFT

You remember the long months of the training of men, of the building of fleets, of the construction of planes, of the manufacture of munitions and supplies, of the transport of these men and supplies over the oceans east and west. You remember the battles of the Arctic islands, of the tropic archipelagoes, of the African deserts.

In the beginning our most important military task was to prevent our enemies -- the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that ever have threatened civilization -- from winning the war. But even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative from the enemy and use our superior resources of men and materials -- to win.

It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require the massing of overwhelming forces -- ground, sea and air -- in positions from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy homelands and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan we had to await the completion of extensive preliminary operations -- operations designed to establish secure supply lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for overwhelming sea power -- supported by ground forces.
strategically employed against isolated outpost garrisons. It was necessary therefore to wait for the construction of this overwhelming sea power before major operations could be undertaken.

In the case of Germany, however, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power were already available in Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy. Furthermore, in Europe, we had Allies — active and potential — Allies who could not give us their maximum assistance against the Japs until Germany had been defeated.

Our decision was made therefore to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat. That decision was based on all these factors; and it was also based on the realization that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a war potential. Japan, on the other hand, lacked the technological skills and the industrial organization to accomplish this kind of rapid increase in war potential.

Our strategy was therefore to apply the maximum ground and air power in Europe until Germany was completely knocked out of the war; and meanwhile, to apply the maximum Naval strength in the Pacific, supported by sufficient ground and air forces to accomplish the initial operations so as to open the desired routes to the Japanese homeland.
Always since the day we were attacked, it had seemed not only right morally and correct militarily, but also, respect the arguments of wholly to disagree with those partisans who would have had us throw Britain and Russia to the wolves and concentrate against the Japanese. That these partisans were influenced by hatred of their own Government is beside the point -- for their reasoning meant that they were willing to crush Japan at the cost of the domination of all the rest of the world by Nazism and Fascism.
As this new year begins -- 1945 -- we see the fruition and justification of this strategy. The naval and air developments have been largely completed; and the majority of our ground forces have reached the numerous battlefields of this global war.

Now, as this seventy-ninth Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944 of the German so-called "Impregnable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg -- almost to the Rhine itself.

The cross channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches -- to the sailors who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied -- engineers and and to the military leaders who achieved a real miracle of planning and execution.

And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to work together and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American and
French forces.

These two great invasions were made possible by the less spectacular but equally important success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Without our success over German submarines, we could not have built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could we have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had landed in France.

The Nazis, however, may succeed in improving their submarines and their crews, and they may once more launch an aggressive submarine attack. The Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the British and Canadian Navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.

The spectacular operations in Western Europe have overshadowed in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian front. Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been obscured, and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected — right now.

What our forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part of our strategy now aimed at only one objective — the total defeat of the Germans. Our forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure — including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops —
Finally, the two invasions lead me in fairness to
make tribute to the ability of Americans and Britishers to
maintain silence when a lack of it would imperil the lives of
many hundreds of thousands and ruin them beyond all
retrieval. Understatement is often of value; a lack of statement is
also often desirable.

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all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere.

Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army -- reinforced by units from other United Nations -- have been fighting continuously since Sicily fell. A year ago they were at bloody Cassino. Since that time they have pushed north through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue.

The American people -- and every soldier now fighting in the Apennines -- should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific.

A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa was a little more than a month old.
A year ago, we were just preparing for our invasion of Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Pacific to the Philippines.

A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea almost 1,500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.

We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself -- and will continue to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two. There is still hard fighting ahead in the Philippines -- costly fighting. But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been greatly cut off from her conquests in the East Indies.

The landing of our troops in the Philippines was the largest amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific. Moreover, these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night engagements around Guadalcanal in November-December, 1942, had our Navy
been able to come to grips with major units of the Japanese fleet.

We had brushed against their fleet in the First Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, but not until October 23-24, were we able really to engage a major portion of the Japanese navy in actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for the next three days was one of the heaviest blows struck against Japanese sea power.

As the result of that battle, most of what is left of the Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates the Yellow Sea, the China Sea and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces -- on all fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership which has guided their sons into battle, a right to be proud of American generalship which shortens campaigns and saves American lives.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history of teamwork and cooperation, of skill and daring. Let me give you one example out of last year's operations in the Pacific.
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Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, B, and C. However, when General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey's task forces, he concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese in the Philippines directly — by-passing islands A, B, and C. Admiral Halsey was in agreement with this, and Admiral Nimitz therewith offered to make available to General MacArthur several of his divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives. These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on the same day.

Thus, within the space of 24 hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different theaters of operations — a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory — a change which saved lives
which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are
now far behind our lines and of no danger.

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task
of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost insuperable
difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944. At present our aid
to China must be accomplished by air transport — there is no other
way. By the end of 1944, the Air Transport Command was carrying into
China a tonnage of supplies three times as great as that delivered
at the end of 1943, and more, each month, than the Burma road ever
delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China, the tonnage
delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth
Air Force to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the
Japanese. In 1944, aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more
than 35,000 sorties against the Japanese and sank over one-half million
tons of enemy shipping, greatly diminishing the usefulness of the
China Sea lanes.
In all of our military actions — on land, and sea and in the air — the final job, the toughest job, has been performed by that ordinary, average, every-day, hard-fighting young American who is universally and affectionately known as "G-I Joe".

It is to him that we and all future generations of Americans must pay grateful tribute.

He — whether he be soldier, sailor or airman — is the one 

eternally indispensable man.

But — it is of small satisfaction to him to know that monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he needs, and he is entitled to insist upon, our active support — now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made possible our victories on land and sea and in the air, we shall have to increase our goals even more in certain items.

Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Department in December 1945. We have not produced as much since then. Delivery of Army supplies fell 15 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once more resumed.

In the one month of October, 1944, the Army Service Forces had to increase its estimate of 1945 required production by 10 percent because of increased demands from overseas. That brought 1945
requirements up to the level expected for 1944, our best year so far. But in November, two months ago, the 1945 requirements had to be increased another 10 percent, sending the production goal well above anything we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition. In fact, within five months, it had been more than doubled. And this was all before the Germans launched their counter-offensive.

As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expend will mount day by day.

And we shall constantly need more men in the lines of battle.

While some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army in October, 1944, was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.

One of the most urgent immediate requirements for the men we are sending overseas is nurses. The Army has an urgent need for 18,000 more nurses.
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Last April the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000. Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army.

Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000. That means that 18,000 more nurses must be obtained.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalized, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to 26 beds, instead of the recommended one to 15 beds.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due, however, to any shortage of nurses in this country. 280,000 registered nurses are now practicing. It has been estimated by the War Manpower Commission that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the Army without interfering in any way with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.

Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required
for the Army, I urge that the Selective Service Act be amended to provide for the induction of nurses into the Army. The need is too pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.

The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers has been of the highest medical standards. Those standards must be maintained at all cost. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand in need of it.

We shall also need constantly new types of weapons.

We could not now stop war production, even if we had built up a vast reserve of supplies. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need over 5,000 of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics which must be put into
production in order to maintain our technical superiority — and in order to
save lives. We have to work every day to keep ahead of the enemy in radar.

For example: on D-day, in France, with our superior equipment, we
located and then put out of operation, every warning set which the Germans had
along the French coast.

If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development
of new weapons we pay for our backwardness with the life's blood of our sons.

One of our greatest new developments — and one compelled by the ex-
traordinary circumstances of this war — is that magnificent bomber, the Super-
fortress, the B-29.

Development of the B-29 was initiated and carried to completion in
record time. In less than 12 months from the delivery of the first production
model, the Army Air Forces had organized and trained the first B-29 units and
had transported them 13,000 miles to bases constructed by the labor of 250,000
Chinese workers.

This coming year will see a steady rise in destructive raids against
the nerve centers of Japan — against Tokyo itself — by large formations of the
most deadly bomber ever built.

And our Air Forces are not content to stop with the B-29. There are
even newer and deadlier bombers on the way.
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The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job — for many American civilians — men and women — not engaged in essential war work to go out and get a war job.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs — or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And again — that payment must be made with the life's blood of our sons.

Even as we see the needs of war production increase in many items, we see the number of men and women working on these items decrease instead of increasing. As a result, many critical programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important of these are artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, B-29s, tires, tanks, and trucks. In each of these vital programs present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of high capacity ammunition and for the huge rocket program is being badly hampered by manpower shortages, it is expected that difficulties may be later experienced in the cruiser and carrier programs.

Shortages of labor hamper the Navy program of repair parts for its fleet, airplanes and advance bases as much as the Navy needs for some new types of aircraft, dry cells, radar, wire and wire rope. There is critical need for
more repair workers for West Coast shipyards, which delay the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and which prevent ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.

The pool of young men under 26 classified as 1-A is almost depleted. Calls for the armed forces will begin again shortly to take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady and, if necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1945 production goals.

Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was not adopted.

Recently, in order to cope with the problem, we have authorized the use of priority and other powers to induce the flow of manpower from less essential industries to war industries.

[If these measures are not successful] I would again call upon the Congress to enact this total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war. It is not too late in the war. In fact, bitter experience has shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production.
with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

In this war, labor and management, with a few notable exceptions, have submitted disputes which they could not adjust themselves to the National War Labor Board, and have loyalty abided by its decision. But there have been some cases where the decisions of the Board have been disregarded.

Existing legislation does not provide means for the enforcement of the orders of the War Labor Board except only by seizure to prevent interference with the war effort. In some cases seizure is an awkward and inept means of enforcement. In others, where the fault lies with the labor union, it is an undeserved hardship on the employer. In some cases, the Board after assuming jurisdiction has not been able to find sufficient impediment to the war effort to make a finding necessary to justify seizure.

The avoidance of labor trouble during the war is dependent upon the effective functioning of this machinery for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes. The War Labor Board machinery is working too well in the vast majority of cases to permit it to be weakened by a few unpatriotic recalcitrants among management and labor. Responsible leaders of management and labor will find it increasingly difficult to secure compliance by their followers if recalcitrants among management and labor are permitted to ignore the orders of the Board with impunity.
Professor's note: further calculating, especially in the analysis of our project, which may provide significant information for our research. The emphasis needs to be on theory and facts, further illustrating the development of our project and any contributors. The technical aspect must also be thoroughly explained, such as

Additional comments:
and the use of priority and other powers to encourage men and women to shift from non-essential to essential war jobs. He also continued to encourage...
I therefore recommend that the Congress adopt legislation which would make the orders of the War Labor Board legally enforceable whenever it finds that compliance with its orders is necessary to prevent the impairment of peaceful relations between management and labor by means in addition to seizure.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before, increased their already phenomenal production of food of the previous year. However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supplement the production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity, as well as of common humanity, we must furnish the newly-liberated areas of Europe with enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starvation and to prevent chaos behind the Allied lines.

At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which to buy more food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians. It would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too little.
Many people in this country, who have the opportunity to know the facts, are disillusioned by those with apparently unlimited cash who patronize night clubs, expensive restaurants and winter resorts. Our sons who are in training for overseas service are not ignorant of this display — and their comrades in arms overseas soon get to know all about it.

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Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty to eat — and plenty is enough for anyone.

American manpower and industry are decisive factors in this war as they were in the World War which ended in 1918.

But in both wars we were unable to develop our power in men and material for a highly critical period of time after becoming actually engaged in the war.

On both occasions, our Allies were compelled to bear the brunt of a fully prepared aggressor attack, until we of the United States could gather and organise our resources. We cannot assume that should such a tragedy again occur, the aggressor would not level his first attack on this country. Developments in weapons — air, ground, and naval — can make possible such an attack despite the oceans around us.

Our national security and our place in the world, therefore, demand much more of preparation than has been the case in the past. We must always have immediately available trained men and adequate material.

The democratic system of national defense is not to rely primarily on a professional soldier. Rather, our democracy calls each citizen, in time of war, by a system of compulsory selective service, to
the part he is best equipped to play. It has been wasteful in the past
and will be perilous in the future to delay training until war is imminent.
We must now accept the principle of peacetime training. This is not a
new principle. President Washington recommended a system of universal mil-
tary training to the first Congress. President Jefferson recommended a
system of universal military training to the ninth Congress. Both of
them, acutely aware of the necessity of defending this country from
foreign aggression and of avoiding military systems that would weaken
democracy from within, urged a program of training that would let every
citizen play his proper role in military affairs.

I recommend to the Congress the same principle of training —
the training of every young man for his part in the national defense, just
as we educate every child to accept his other civic responsibilities. The
program for this purpose ought to be developed with full appreciation of
the unique resources of American society; recognizing that civilian institu-
tions as well as individuals may be called on again to convert the skills
of peace to the demands of war. It seems clear to me that the program of
training should be universal, including all those who cannot perform
full military service but who are not so severely handicapped that they
can make no contribution whatever to the national defense. The program of training should be selective, training men for the most valuable contribution that they can make in the event of war, and that should be versatile and enterprising, so that, while concentrating on the purpose of national defense, it may increase the health and add to the skills of the young men of the nation.

By training I mean training, pure and simple. It would not include liability for military service unless such liability would be imposed by congressional action in time of emergency. The Army and the Navy would remain purely voluntary forces; but there would be behind them the vast resources and impressive power of a previously trained citizenry.

Such a system should be considered as an integral part of our policy for cooperating in the establishment and maintenance of world security. All the United Nations agree that in the future the peace must be kept by armed force, if necessary; and the present proposals for a future international organization realistically take account of this fact. Our share of the armed forces that would be placed at the disposal of such an international organization obviously cannot be determined exactly until a later date, but they would, of course, be made available from our regular peacetime military and naval establishments consisting
of volunteer forces. However, only a universal military training system would provide a body of trained manpower reserve necessary in order to make our peacetime Army and Navy establishments fully adequate to meet any possible needs of providing for our national security.

Such training system would be unmistakable evidence of our power and determination to block the path of any aggressor nation which might again threaten us and the rest of the world.

The subject of universal military training must be considered at this time in order that it may become operative upon the termination of the present emergency. There should not again be the almost fatal lapse in preparation between the close of a successful war and the development of a new emergency.

Proper planning by the War and Navy Departments is also dependent upon the early determination of the details of a universal military training system. The designation of surplus military equipment and supplies, the disposal of that present surplus, and the disposal of training facilities and air and service installations cannot intelligently and efficiently be consummated until this subject has been acted upon by the Congress. If we were to dispose of our present facilities, equipment, and training management now — and, at some time in the vague future,
decide to initiate a system of training, it would result in loss of valuable time and property, and would sacrifice other valuable factors excising which knowledge and familiarity with the problem of war and wartime training.

Aside from the obvious advantages of military training, it is important that young Americans shall have the opportunity to learn of the development of new methods and new machines. That knowledge will be of incalculable value to them and to the nation as a whole in the future.

I therefore recommend to the Congress, the prompt enactment of legislation requiring all able male citizens to undergo a period of military training. The length of the training period, the extent and content of the training, and the ages within which it shall be given are matters for determination by the Congress in consultation, of course, with our military authorities.

You will see that I am being frank and realistic — realistic as to the conduct of the war abroad and at home, and realistic also in regard to the safety of the nation in the future. What I am recommending in this Message is realism. A very large portion of the cost of this war has been made necessary by our lack of realism in the past.

I am realistic — but at the same time I am idealistic. I am against world war but I want to take every drastic step possible to end
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this World War as fast as I can. I know that world wars cannot be prevented
by passing solemn resolutions in local clubs or societies.

This war must be waged — it is being waged — with the greatest
and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at stake. Every-
thing we are and have will be given. American men, fighting far from home,
in cruel and unfamiliar climates, against enemies whose homes are at their
backs — American men have already won victories which the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no question
either of the cost. Our losses will be heavy. Our hearts will be wrung. Our
determination and our endurance will be tried. But if we and our comrades in
arms of United Nations will go on fighting, together, nothing our enemies can
do by force or treachery or subterfuge or falsehood can prevent our ultimate,
total victory.

And we will go on fighting, together.

Comrades in arms over three years of changing fortunes and of
hope deferred, we will be more than ever comrades in arms now that the
moment of decision is upon us.

We propose to stand together, not for the war alone but for the
victory for which the war is fought. It is not only a common danger which
unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments but
of peoples and the peoples' hope is peace. Here as in England; in England
as in Russia; in Russia as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable and secure.
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It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step — but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight. There are no magical formulas — no "cure-alls" — that can be concocted by any one group of men sitting around a peace table.

The firm foundation can be built — and it will be built. But the great structure of a real peoples' peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience, how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an eddy of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There
were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the people of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with far greater problems of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.

Aside from duty to preserve order in military operations, it is not our intention and I do not believe it is the intention of any Allied power, to impose solutions on the peoples that have been liberated from fascist tyranny. On the contrary the Allied powers have declared their purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. We will attempt, in collaboration with our allies, to resolve the external difficulties, economic as well as political, which stand in the way of the exercise of these acknowledged rights by the peoples of the liberated areas and to promote the establishment of the representative governments, truly expressive of the peoples' will, which all nations united in the prosecution of this war for freedom and for peace desire.
Our own policy as regards these questions of the people's peace is not in doubt. In the United States, as in any other self-governing nation, it is the national character which constitutes the national policy and the national history which gives that policy book and chapter. It is what the people are that dictates their beliefs and it is what they believe that determines the policies which express their will. We have believed, since the declaration of our independence as a nation, that governments draw their just powers from the consent of the governed. It is, in consequence, our national policy to aid and assist the freedom-loving men and women who have suffered under Nazi and Fascist tyranny to establish governments in the liberated countries which will represent the people.

We have all heard the traditional theory that the internal affairs of other nations are no concern of ours.

That is a very hopeful and high-sounding theory. There is only one thing wrong with it — in the light of modern conditions, it does not make sense.

A good, law-abiding farmer may say, "It is no concern of mine what my neighbor does with his fields. All I have to do is keep my fences
in good repair and mind my own business." But that does not hold

good if the neighbor permits his property to degenerate into a breeding

place of pestilence and disease which no fences can prevent from

spreading.

In that case, the good farmer has to call upon the Board

of Health and the local constabulary to go in and clean up the mess.

Similarly, if in one of the countries of the Caribbean area

there should develop a Nazi-Fascist kind of government, that would
definitely be of gravest concern to us. For such a government might

grant bases, for example, to Germany or Japan, thereby providing a
direct threat to our life-line through the Panama Canal.

That is an example close to home — but with the miracles

of modern transportation (and greater miracles to come) the whole

world is now close to home.

We as a nation have the right to be concerned if our neighbors

begin to give indications of criminal tendencies. And other nations,

large and small, have that same right.

We place our faith in democracy. We believe that the warlike

impulse — the evil spirit of aggression — cannot thrive in any nation

where the people really rule.
Therefore we believe — in our own interests and in the best interests of all mankind — that the guarantees of democracy are the only sure guarantees of peace.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding which informed the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of intercommunication between peoples over the past generation offers a practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to turn these great technological achievements to the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.

[The maintenance of peace and prosperity will be much easier in a world in which countries can buy or sell, through mutually profitable trade, the raw materials and the finished goods the world produces and needs. We in the United States can get considerable help toward our goal of sixty]
million productive jobs if international trade can be expanded above the low levels of the 1930's. I am confident that this can be done if we avoid the exchange disorders and discriminatory practices that characterized the decade of the 1930's, and which will reappear in more acute form after the war unless positive measures are taken to prevent it. The only way to avoid a recurrence of this type of economic aggression is through international cooperation in dealing with international monetary problems.

We must also take positive steps to see that other countries participate in and contribute to a larger volume of international trade. Much of Europe and the Far East have suffered great damage from enemy action. Other areas of the world still have an economy that is undeveloped. While each country can and will do much for its own reconstruction and development, the process can be facilitated if foreign capital for productive investment is available on reasonable terms. The United States, as the largest exporting and importing country in the world, will derive great benefit from the restoration and the development of the producing and consuming power of other countries. Our own trade has always been particularly large with those countries that have high levels of production and consumption.

The Government has been conscious of the need to be prepared
to deal with international monetary and financial problems after the war.

For this reason, I invited the United Nations to assemble at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, for an International Monetary and Financial Conference.

This Conference prepared articles of agreement for the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

I think it is a hopeful sign that the forty-four United Nations all agree that international monetary and financial problems are an international responsibility that can be dealt with only through international cooperation.

In every country there is a feeling of confidence that this time we are preparing through the Fund and the Bank a sound economic foundation for international peace and for prosperity in all countries.

The articles of agreement for the Fund and Bank will be submitted to the Congress for its consideration and I urge your favorable action.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in also for nations. We are opposed to every form of restriction whether by public act or private arrangement which limits commerce, transit and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest
of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world.

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America — strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

In the State of the Union Message last year I set forth our economic Bill of Rights.

In this Message I want to outline the policies which I believe the Government should pursue to validate the first of these rights — "The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation." We cannot achieve this right without striving to secure other parts of the Bill of Rights. Measures to provide decent homes, good education, and social security will make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to half our total capacity production.

After the war we must maintain full employment with a Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand by private consumers — farmers, businessmen, workers, professional
Of these rights the most important fundamental and the one on which the fulfillment of the others in large degree depends is the "right to a square foot and remuneration yet in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation." In turn, others of the fundamental economic rights of American citizenship such as the right to a decent home, for good education, to good and medical care, to social security, to normal and farm income, well, if we fulfilled, makes major contributions to attaining adequate levels of employment.
men, housewives — which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands.

Our policy is to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not tolerate mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work — and that means upwards of 60 million jobs.

Our peacetime tasks will be greater than they ever were. Full employment also means that those employed or those working on their own account should be able to earn incomes sufficient to provide them and their families with adequate food, clothing, and recreation; it means not only jobs, but productive jobs. We do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive.

There are many responsibilities which the Federal Government will inevitably have to bear after the war, including our programs for national defense, aid to veterans, and interest on the national debt incurred during the war.

The Federal Government of the postwar period must gear all its programs to the requirements of full employment in an economy of private enterprise. Some of the measures which were devised to secure our record war production can usefully be applied to promoting peacetime output. During the war
we have achieved a high degree of coordination in Government activities and cooperation between Government, business, labor, and agriculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accomplish our peacetime objectives.

[I shall submit to Congress detailed legislative programs as soon as the war situation permits. In this message I can only stake out the areas for a comprehensive program.]

Measures to encourage private enterprise cover a wide range. We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work — on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition. Only in that way can we achieve prices which will promote the mass consumption which is necessary for full employment.

Our wartime tax system must be revised so as to encourage private demand. Modifications in the taxes on business should provide incentives to new investment and growing enterprise. We must reduce or eliminate taxes which bear heavily on consumption.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should adopt similar devices in peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.
Private business must contribute most, if not all, of the employment opportunities — and it will, in turn, gain its greatest stimulus from full and stable employment. As that is achieved private enterprise will prosper and initiative will thrive.

Our full-employment program must emphasize the development of our natural resources. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-valley projects will literally add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA was a bargain at 750 million dollars. We have similar opportunities — similar bargains — in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these rivers, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of air transport and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce it will be necessary to construct many more airports and to overhaul our whole national highway system.

The provision of a decent home for every family is a necessity if this country is to be worthy of its greatness — and that task would itself create great employment opportunities. Many of our cities need extensive rebuilding. Many of our farms are in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal attack on the housing problem will require thoroughgoing cooperation between construction industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.
I cannot now enter into details of our social security programs. I shall only say that an expanded social security program must play an essential role in a program designed to support mass purchasing power.

These policies will provide private and public demands for the products of our industries. But there is another side to the picture. After the war there will be pressing problems of relocation of both industries and population. During the war there have been large-scale migrations of labor to the centers of war production. We must make sure that after the war there will not be large, disorganised migrations of people looking for work.

In some cases we shall have to facilitate the orderly movement of people to places of employment — and in other cases we must find means to encourage industry to develop in the regions to which the people have already moved.

The state must assist in the relocation of its workers. Our education programs, too, must be designed to fit the labor force for the work it is to perform.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to full employment. But if we attack the problem with determination...
Second Draft

we shall succeed. And we must succeed. As I said last year, freedom and peace cannot exist without security.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.

Most important of all — 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made — of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history — and it may be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
What is uppermost in the minds of our people — and should be — in considering the state of the Union, is an appraisal of the war.

The task which we all place first is the winning of total victory in this World War, for the simple reason that that kind of victory is the best hope for the achievement of world peace — a world peace which will last.

We have seen a year marked, on the whole, by substantial progress toward that day, even though the year ended with a set-back for our arms, when the Germans launched a ferocious counter-attack into Luxembourg and Belgium with the obvious objective of cutting our line in the center.

This has been a crucial battle. The enemy has made an all-out effort, committing his best troops — young, fanatical, desperate Nazis — led by veterans of the Prussian military caste.

(Note: more to come on this battle as events develop before delivery of this message.)

This German counter-offensive, however, has turned out to be far from the defeat for us which, for a time, some people feared. Our men fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most
During the past year the American people reasserted their democratic faith in a national election.

In the course of that campaign, various references were made to "strife" between this Administration and the Congress with the implication (if not the direct assertion) that this Administration and the Congress could never work together harmoniously in the service of the Nation.

It cannot be denied that there have been disagreements between the Legislative and Executive Branches -- as there have been disagreements during the past century and a half. That is the way of democracy -- and it is a way that we do not intend to change.

Particularly in war time, when we all bear extraordinarily heavy responsibilities, there is apt to be impatience with the other fellow and occasional displays of cantankerousness.

But -- I think that the overall record in this respect is eloquent: the Government of the United States of America has a good record of achievement in this war. With few exceptions, the legislation needed for the war job has been passed and the required funds have been appropriated.
I think we all realize that there are people in this Capital City whose task is in large part to stir up dissension, especially when such dissension does not in fact exist.
We have a great many more problems ahead of us and we must approach them with realism and courage.

In this Message, I shall indicate some new measures which I believe will help to hasten the day of total victory; and, in the weeks to come, I shall perform my constitutional duty by recommending to the consideration of the Congress such measures as I judge necessary and expedient.
difficult conditions, and our German enemies have sustained considerable
losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

However, I would warn the people to be prepared — as our
Armies in Europe are being prepared — for further desperate and costly
tries to break our lines. We must never make the mistake of assuming
that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has been eliminated.

And I would express another most serious warning against the
poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western
Europe was less dangerous than the wedges which they are continually
attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

Every ugly little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith
in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst — seeking to
sabotage our war effort. There are evil and baseless rumors against
the Russians — rumors against the British — rumors against our own
American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely you will observe that
every one of them bears the same trademark — "Made in Germany."
Fortunately most Americans have learned not to believe everything they read in print, for they have discovered that much of the so-called opinion or comment may be merely the personal belief —
honest in purpose — of some one individual who has access to only a small part of all the information; or that it may be the view of some partisan individual who has a personal bias with a political slant — using the word "political" in the narrow and least attractive sense; or that it may be the belief of an individual who would be willing to compromise with principle in this war and who has no fundamental objection, to the continuance of Nazism, Fascism or Militarism.

We must resist this divisive propaganda — we must destroy it — with the same strength and the same determination that our fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.
In Europe, we shall resume the attack and -- despite
temporary set-backs here or there -- we shall never stop attacking
until Germany is completely defeated and her brutal criminals are given
the punishment they so richly deserve.

It is appropriate at this time to review the basic
strategy which has guided us through three years of war, and
now really come to rest with our enemies. Everything must be done
which will lead, eventually, to total victory.

directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various
theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort -- in the language of the military men -- of
deployment of our forces. Many battles -- essential battles -- were
fought; many victories -- vital victories -- were won. But these battles
and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy
and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the
final, decisive blows.

This involved

You know the history, all of you, of the vast manoeuvres of
deployment across the greatest oceans of the earth, and in every climate,
and at points as far apart as the Pacific Islands and the continent of
Europe -- 13,000 miles apart.
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The essential fact about the war today is this: we have finally come to grips with our enemies. Everything that has gone was preparation for this moment. 

The tremendous effort of the first years of the war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

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You know the history, all of you, of the vast manoeuvres of deployment across the greatest oceans of the earth, and in every climate, and at points as far apart as the Pacific Islands and the continent of Europe -- 13,000 miles apart.
You remember the long months of the training of men, of the building of fleets, of the construction of planes, of the manufacture of munitions and supplies, of the transport of these men and supplies over the oceans east and west. You remember the battles in the Arctic islands, in the tropic archipelagoes, in the African deserts.

In the beginning our most important military task was to prevent our enemies -- the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that ever have threatened civilization -- from winning the war. But even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative from the enemy and use our superior resources of men and materials into quick competition with them.

It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require the massing of overwhelming forces -- ground, sea and air -- in positions from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy homelands, and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan we had to await the completion of extensive preliminary operations -- operations designed to establish secure supply lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for overwhelming sea power -- supported by ground forces.
strategically employed against isolated outpost garrisons. It was necessary therefore to wait for the construction of this overwhelming sea power before major operations could be undertaken.

Always — since the very day we were attacked — it seemed not only as well as morally [but also militarily wholly] to reject the arguments of those past-people who would have had us throw Britain and Russia to the wolves and concentrate against the Japanese. That these partisans might have been influenced by political opposition to their own Government is beside the point — for their reasoning; such people urged that we create a final, decisive argument meant that they were willing to crush Japan at the cost of allowing the domination of all the rest of the world by Nazism and Fascism.

In the case of Germany, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power were already available in Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy.

Furthermore, in Europe, we had Allies — active and potential — Allies who could not give us their maximum assistance against the Japs until Germany had been defeated.

Our decision was made therefore to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat. That decision was based on all these factors; and it was also based on the realization that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a
war potential. Japan, on the other hand, lacked the technological skills and the industrial organization to accomplish this kind of rapid increase in war potential.

Our strategy was, therefore, to apply the maximum ground and air power in Europe until Germany was completely knocked out of the war; and meanwhile, to apply the maximum Naval strength in the Pacific, supported by sufficient ground and air forces to accomplish the initial operations so as to open the desired routes to the Japanese homeland.
As this new year begins -- 1945 -- we see the fruition and justification of this strategy.

Now, as this seventy-ninth Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944, of the German so-called "impenetrable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg -- almost to the Rhine itself.

The cross-channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches -- to the sailors who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied -- and to the engineers and military leaders who achieved a real miracle of planning and execution. And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to work together and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross-channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this, the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American
and French forces based in North Africa and in Italy.

Finally, the two invasions are a tribute to the ability of many
[Americans and Britons alike] to maintain silence when a lack of it
would have imperilled the lives of many hundreds of thousands and would
have jeopardized the whole stupendous undertakings. [Understatement is
often of value; a lack of statement is also often desirable.]

These two great invasions were made possible by the less
spectacular but equally important success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Without our success over German submarines, we could not have
built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could
we have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had
landed in France.

The Nazis, however, may succeed in improving their submarines
and their crews, and they may once more launch an aggressive submarine
attack. The Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the
British and Canadian Navies, together with our own, are constantly on
the alert.

The spectacular operations in Western Europe have overshadowed
in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian
front. Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been
obscured, and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.
It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected — right now.

The Allied forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part of our strategy now aimed at only one objective — the total defeat of the Germans. Our forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure — including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops — all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere.
Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army -- reinforced by units from other United Nations -- have been fighting continuously since Sicily fell. A year ago they were at bloody Cassino. Since that time they have pushed north through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue.

The American people -- and every soldier now fighting in the Apennines -- should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific.

A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa was a little more than a month old.
THIRD DRAFT

- 12 -

A year ago, we were just preparing for our invasion of
Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Pacific to the
Philippines.

A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New
Guinea almost 1500 miles from his present position in the Philippine
Islands.

We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands
from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself — and will continue
to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two.

There is still hard fighting ahead in the Philippines — costly fight-
ing. But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has
been largely cut off from her conquests in the East Indies.

The landing of our troops in the Philippines was the largest
amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific.

Moreover, these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the
first great sea battle which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not
since the night engagements around Guadalcanal in November-December,
1942, had our Navy been able to come to grips with major units of the Japanese fleet. We had brushed against their fleet in the first battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, but not until October [23-25] were we able really to engage a major portion of the Japanese navy in actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for [the next three days was one of the heaviest blows struck against Japanese sea power.]

As the result of that battle, much of what is left of the Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates the Yellow Sea, the China Sea and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces — on all fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership which has guided their sons into battle; a right to be proud of American generalship which shortens campaigns and saves American lives.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history of teamwork and cooperation, of skill and daring. Let me give you one example out of last year's operations in the Pacific.
Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, C and E. However, when General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey's task forces, he concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese in the Philippines directly — by-passing islands A, C and E, and attacking from A to E and from E to B.

Admiral Halsey was in agreement with this, and Admiral Nimitz therewith offered to make available to General MacArthur several of his divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives. These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on the same day.

Thus, within the space of two hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different
theaters of operations — a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory — a change which saved lives which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now far behind our lines and of no danger.

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost insuperable difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944. At present our aid to China must be accomplished by air transport — there is no other way. By the end of 1944, the Air Transport Command was carrying into China a tonnage of supplies three times as great as that delivered at the end of 1945, and more, each month, than the Burma road ever delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China, the tonnage delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the Japanese. In 1944, aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more than 55,000 sorties against the Japanese and sank over one-half million tons of enemy shipping, greatly diminishing the usefulness of the China Sea lanes.

In all of our military actions — on land, and sea and in
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requirements up to the level expected for 1944, our best year so far.

But in November, two months ago, the requirements had to be increased another 10 percent, sending the production goal well above anything we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition.

In fact, within five months, it had been more than doubled. And this was before the Germans launched their counter-offensive. As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expend will mount day by day.

And we shall constantly need more men in the lines of battle.

While some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army in October, 1944, was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.

One of the most urgent immediate requirements for the men we are sending overseas is nurses. The Army has an urgent need for 18,000 more nurses.

Last April, the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000. Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been
carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army.

Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000. That means that 18,000 more nurses must be obtained.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalized, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to 26 beds, instead of the recommended one to 15 beds.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due, however, to any shortage of nurses in this country. 280,000 registered nurses are now practicing. It has been estimated by the War Manpower Commission that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the Army without interfering in any way with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.

Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required for the Army, I urge that the Selective Service Act be amended to provide for the induction of nurses into the Army. The need is too pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.
The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers has been of the highest medical standards. Those standards must be maintained at all cost. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand in need of it.

We shall also need constantly new types of weapons.

We could not now stop production, even if we had built up a vast reserve of supplies. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need many thousands of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics which must be put into production in order to maintain our technical superiority — and in order to save lives. We have to work every day to keep ahead of the enemy in radar.

For example: on D-day, in France, with our superior equipment, we located and then put out of operation every warning set which the Germans had along the French coast.
If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development of new weapons we pay for our backwardness with the life's blood of our sons.

One of our greatest new developments -- and one compelled by the extraordinary circumstances of this war -- is that magnificent bomber, the Superfortress, the B-29.

Development of the B-29 was initiated and carried to completion in record time. In less than 12 months from the delivery of the first production model, the Army Air Forces had organised and trained the first B-29 units and had transported them 13,000 miles to bases constructed by the labor of 250,000 Chinese workers.

This coming year will see a steady rise in destructive raids against the nerve centers of Japan -- against Tokyo itself -- by large formations of the most deadly bomber ever built.

And our Air Forces are not content to stop with the B-29. There are even newer and deadlier bombers on the way.

The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job -- for additional American civilians -- men and women -- not engaged in essential war work, to go out and get a war job.
There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs — or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And — again — that payment must be made with the life’s blood of our sons.

Even as we see the needs of war production increase in many items, we see the number of men and women working on these items decrease instead of increase. (Give some figures.) As a result, many critical programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important of these are artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, tires, tanks, and trucks, and even B-29’s.

In each of these vital programs, present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of high capacity ammunition is being hampered by manpower shortages; so is production for its huge rocket program. It is also expected that difficulties may be later experienced in its cruiser and carrier programs.

Shortages of labor hamper the Navy program of repair parts for its fleet, airplanes, and advance bases, because the Navy needs for some new types of aircraft, dry cells, radar, wire, and wire rope. There is critical need for...
more repair workers for West Coast shipyards, which delays the return of
damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and which prevents ships
now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.

The pool of young men under 26 classified as 1-A is almost depleted.

A future need for the armed forces will begin shortly. It will take men now deferred
who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of
a steady and, if necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements.
Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it pro-
gressively more difficult to attain the 1945 production goals.

Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress
adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of
insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was
not adopted.

I now again call upon the Congress to enact this measure for the
total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war.
It is not too late in the war. In fact, bitter experience has shown that in
this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created
by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war the
more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production with which to
deliver the final blow to the enemy.

A program of national service which would make every able bodied
adult available for war production or other essential needs will be used
only to the extent absolutely required by military necessities. In fact experience in other nations at war indicates that use of the compulsory powers of national service legislation is comparatively seldom necessary.

As I said in my message last year, this proposed legislation does not mean reduction in wages or loss of retirement and seniority rights and benefits. Nor does it mean that any substantial number of war workers will be disturbed in their present jobs.

It is becoming increasingly evident from recent events that the best practical way to insure adequate weapons for our gallant fighting men--and incidentally boost their morale--is by adoption of a national service act.

National Service legislation will make it possible to put ourselves in a position which will assure certain and speedy action in meeting our manpower requirements. In adopting such legislation, it is not necessary to discard the voluntary and cooperative processes which have prevailed up to this time. On the contrary, we must continue to rely on the cooperative action of Labor and Management working with Government. This cooperation has already produced great results. We must build on the foundations that have already been laid and supplement the measures now in operation in order to guarantee the accomplishments of the actions that may be necessary in the critical period that lies ahead.
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In the meantime we are using the inadequate tools at hand to do
the best we can by such expedients as labor ceilings, and the use of
priority and other powers to induce men and women to shift from non-essential
to essential war jobs. Insert B

In this war, labor and management, with a few notable exceptions.

Pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects
of national service, I recommend that the Congress immediately
enact legislation which will be effective in using the services
of the 4,000,000 men now classified as 4-F, in whatever capacity is
best for the war effort.
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the best we can by such expedients as labor ceilings, and the use of
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to essential war jobs.

In this war, labor and management, with a few notable exceptions,
have submitted disputes which they could not adjust themselves to the
National War Labor Board, and have loyally abided by its decision. But
there have been some cases where the decisions of the Board have been dis-
regarded.

Existing legislation does not provide means for the enforcement of
the orders of the War Labor Board except only by seizure to prevent interference with the war effort. In some cases seizure is an awkward and inept means of enforcement. In others, where the fault lies with the labor union, it is an undeserved hardship on the employer. In some cases, the Board after assuming jurisdiction has not been able to find sufficient impediment to the war effort to make a finding necessary to justify seizure.

The avoidance of labor trouble during the war is dependent upon the effective functioning of this machinery for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes. The War Labor Board machinery is working too well in the vast majority of cases to permit it to be weakened by a few unpatriotic recalcitrants among management and labor. Responsible leaders of management and labor will find it increasingly difficult to secure compliance by their followers if recalcitrants among management and labor are permitted to ignore the orders of the Board with impunity.

I therefore recommend that the Congress adopt legislation which would make the orders of the War Labor Board legally enforceable whenever
it finds that compliance with its orders is necessary to prevent the
impairment of peaceful relations between management and labor by means
in addition to seizure.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before,
increased their already phenomenal production of food of the previous
year. However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supple-
ment the production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity,
as well as of common humanity, we must furnish the newly-liberated areas
of Europe with enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starva-
tion and to prevent chaos behind the Allied lines.

At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which
to buy more food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds
the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making
sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Many people in this country, who have the opportunity to know
the facts at first hand, are disillusioned by those who, with apparently
unlimited cash, patronize night clubs, expensive restaurants and winter
resorts. Our sons who are in training for overseas service are also not
ignorant of this display — and their comrades in arms overseas soon get
to know all about it.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians. It
would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too little.
Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty to eat -- and plenty is enough for anyone.

American manpower and industry and agriculture are decisive factors in this war as they were in the World War which ended in 1918.

But in both wars we were unable to develop our power in men and material for a highly critical period of time after becoming actually engaged in the war.

On both occasions, our Allies were compelled to bear the unaided brunt of a fully prepared aggressor attack, until we of the United States could gather and organize our resources. Should such a tragedy again occur, we cannot assume that the aggressor would not level his first attack on this country. Developments in weapons -- air, ground, and naval -- can make possible such an attack despite the oceans around us.

Our national security and our place in the world, therefore, demand much more of preparation than has been the case in the past. We must always have immediately available trained men and adequate material.

The democratic system of national defense is not to rely primarily on a professional soldier. Our democracy, in time of war, calls each citizen by a system of compulsory selective service to the part he is
The people of this country ought not to be confused between two separate problems. The first which I have spoken of is the problem of national service as it affects the conduct of this war. We need it in order to win this war.

The other subject relates to the security of the country for generations to come. I call it Universal Military Training.
best equipped to play. It has been wasteful in the past and will be perilous in the future to delay training until war is imminent.

We should now accept the principle of peacetime training. This is not a new principle. President Washington recommended a system of universal military training to the first Congress. President Jefferson recommended a system of universal military training to the ninth Congress. Both of them, acutely aware of the necessity of defending this country from foreign aggression and of avoiding military systems that would weaken democracy from within, urged a program of training that would let every citizen play his proper role in military affairs.

I now recommend to the Congress the same principle of training — the training of every young man for his part in the national defense, just as we educate every child to accept his other civic responsibilities.

The program for this purpose ought to be developed with full appreciation of the unique resources of American society; recognizing that civilian institutions, as well as individuals, may be called on again to convert their skills of peace to the demands of war.

The program of training should be universal, including all those who may not be able to perform full military service and excluding only those who are so severely handicapped that they can make no contribution whatever
to the national defense.

The program of training should be selective, training men for the most valuable contribution that they can make in the event of war. It should be versatile and enterprising, so that, while concentrating on the purpose of national defense, it may increase the health and add to the skills of the young men of the nation.

By training I mean training, pure and simple. It would not include liability for military service unless, of course, such liability would be imposed by Congressional action in time of emergency. The Army and the Navy would remain purely voluntary forces in peacetime; but there would be behind them these vast resources and impressive power of a previously trained citizenry.

Such a system should be considered as an integral part of our policy for cooperating in the establishment and maintenance of world security. All the United Nations agree that in the future the peace must be kept by armed force, if necessary; and the present proposals for a future international organization realistically take account of this fact. Our share of the armed forces that would be placed at the disposal of such an international organization obviously cannot be determined exactly until a later date, but they would, of course, be made available from our regular peacetime military and naval establishments consisting
of volunteer forces. However, only a universal military training
system would provide a body of trained manpower reserve necessary in
order to make our peacetime Army and Navy establishments capable of
becoming fully adequate to meet any possible needs of providing for
our national security.

The subject of universal military training should be con-
sidered at this time in order that it may become operative upon the
termination of the present emergency. There should not again be the
almost fatal lapse in preparation between the close of a successful
war and the development of a new emergency.

Proper planning by the War and Navy Departments is also
dependant upon the early determination of the details of a universal
military training system. The designation of surplus military equip-
ment and supplies, the disposal of that present surplus, and the dis-
posal of training facilities and air and service installations cannot
intelligently and efficiently be consummated until this subject has
been acted upon by the Congress. For example, if we were to dispose
of our present facilities and equipment now — and, at some time in
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the vague future, decide to initiate a system of training, it would
result in loss of valuable time and property, and would sacrifice
other valuable factors provided by existing knowledge and familiarity
with the problem of war and wartime training.

I therefore recommend to the Congress, the prompt enactment
of legislation requiring all able male citizens to undergo a period of
military training. The length of the training period, the extent and
content of the training, and the ages within which it shall be given
are matters for determination by the Congress in consultation, of course,
with our military authorities.

You will see that I am being frank and realistic — realistic
as to the conduct of the war abroad and at home, and realistic also in
regard to the safety of the nation in the future. What I am recommending
in this Message is realism. [A very large portion of the cost of this
war has been made necessary by our lack of realism in the past.
I believe that we should be realistic and at the same time ideol
calism, but at the same time I am realistic. I am
against the war, I want to take every drastic step possible to end
this World War as fast as I can. I know that world wars cannot be pre-
vented by passing solemn resolutions in local clubs or societies.

Realism and idealism have gone together in our American
experience. Things are not. — Christopher Columbus.
This war must be waged — it is being waged — with the
greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at
stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men, fighting
far from home, in cruel and unfamiliar climates, against enemies whose
homes are at their backs — American men have already won victories which
the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no
question either of the cost. Our losses will be heavy. Our hearts
will be wrung. Our determination and our endurance will be tried.
But if we and our comrades in arms of United Nations will go on fighting,
together, nothing our enemies can do by force or treachery or subterfuge
or falsehood can prevent our ultimate, total victory.

And we will go on fighting, together.

Comrades in arms over three years of changing fortunes and
of hope deferred, we will be more than ever comrades in arms now that
the moment of decision is upon us.

We propose to stand together, not for the war alone but for
the victory for which the war is fought. It is not only a common danger
which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of govern-
ments but of peoples and the peoples' hope is peace. Here as in England;
in England as in Russia; in Russia as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable and secure.

It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step — but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight. There are no magical formulas — no "cure-alls" — that can be concocted by any one group of men sitting around a peace table.

The firm foundation can be built — and it will be built. But the great structure of a real [peoples?] peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.
THIRD DRAFT

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the
difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own
experience, how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are
not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own
Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian,
"an eddy of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There were
separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections,
open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These diffi-
culties we worked out for ourselves as the peoples of the liberated
areas of Europe, faced with far greater problems of adjustment, will
work out their difficulties for themselves.

Aside from duty to preserve order in military operations,
it is not our intention and I do not believe it is the intention of
any Allied power, to impose solutions on the peoples that have been
liberated from fascist tyranny. On the contrary the Allied powers
have declared their purpose to respect the right of all peoples to
choose the form of government under which they will live, and to see
sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been
We propose to stand together, not for the war alone, but for a living, growing peace. It is not only a common danger which unites us, but a common interest in a peaceful, working world of free peoples.

Wars can be fought by governments, but peace can be made and kept only by the united will of free and peace-loving peoples who are not only willing to work together, but willing to respect and tolerate and try to understand one another's opinions and feelings, when they differ with one another.

The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies, the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors. When our enemies are vanquished, all important differences will be differences among allies. We must not let these differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in the peace. International cooperation on which enduring peace must be based is not a one way street. Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.

We cannot hope to eliminate power as a factor in world politics any more than we can hope to eliminate power as a factor in national politics. But in a democratic world as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.

In our disillusionment we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfil our responsibilities in an imperfect world. We must not let that happen again or we shall follow the same road again - The road to a Third World War.

Do not misunderstand me. We cannot fulfill our responsibilities in an imperfect world by not exercising our power and our influence to achieve the principles in which we believe and for which we have fought. When in August, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and I committed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which were later incorporated into the Declaration for maintaining the security of our own country.
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operation and progress are not helped by any nation assuming that it has a
monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.

Perfectionism no less than isolationism, imperialism and power
politics may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget
that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not
by a direct attack against international cooperation, but against the alleged
imperfections of the peace. In our disillusionment we preferred international
anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think
exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace
because we had not the courage to fulfill our responsibilities in an imperfect
world. We must not let that happen again. It is our business now, as in the past,
to follow the peace road again — the road to a Third World War.

Do not misunderstand me. We cannot fulfill our responsibilities in an
imperfect world by exercising our power and our influence to achieve
the principles in which we believe and for which we have fought. When, in
August, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill and I committed to the principles
of the Atlantic Charter, which were later incorporated into the Declaration

for maintaining the security of our own country.
of the United Nations, there were many who are now protesting the alleged violation of those principles who then denied our right and duty to proclaim them. While I did not then and do not now believe that those principles provide rules of easy application to all the many tangled situations in this war-torn world, I was and am convinced that those principles will help us to reach more satisfactory solutions than would otherwise be obtainable.

And we shall not hesitate to use our power and influence to secure so far as humanly practical the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

I do not wish to give the impression that all mistakes can be avoided and that many disappointments are not inevitable in the making of peace. But we must not this time lose the hope of establishing an international order which will be capable of maintaining peace and realizing through the years more perfect justice between nations than could possibly be secured by continuing ordeals of battle.

To do this we must be on our guard not to exploit and exaggerate the differences between us and our allies, particularly with reference to the peoples they have liberated from fascist tyranny. That is not the way to secure a better settlement of those differences or to secure international machinery which in time may rectify mistakes which may be made.

I should not be frank if I did not admit concern about many situations, the Greek and Polish for example. But these situations are as easy or as simple to deal with as partisans whose sincerity I do not question would have us believe. We have obligations, not necessarily legally, to the exiled governments, to the underground leaders and to our major allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did. We cannot forget that some of the conservative exiled governments were the first to resist Nazi tyranny, nor that some of the most vigorous underground leaders had to be convinced that this was not an imperialistic, capitalistic war. We and our allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and
In August, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and I agreed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, these being later incorporated into the Declaration of the United Nations. At that time certain isolationists protested vigorously our right and against the principles themselves. Today, many of the same people are protesting against the alleged violation of the same principles.

It is true that the statement of principles does not provide rules of easy application to each and every one of this war-torn world’s tangled situations. But it is a good and a useful thing to have principles toward which we can aim. The Ten Commandments, every one of which is violated every day in the year by various human beings, is no reason why we should repeal the Book of Exodus.
self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.
But with internal dissension, with many men prisoners of war or forced to labor
in other countries, it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the
people really want. It is only too easy for all of us to rationalize what
we want to believe and to consider those leaders we like responsible and
those we dislike irresponsible. And our task is not helped by the intercessions
however understandable of opposed internal groups.

We have used and will continue to use our influence in our conversations with our allies to resolve the external difficulties, economic as well as political which stand in the way of the exercise of the democratic rights of the peoples of the liberated areas. It is our purpose to help the peace-loving peoples of Europe to live together as good neighbors, to recognize their common interests and not to nurse their traditional grievances against one another.

We must not permit the many specific problems of adjustment connected with the liberation of Europe to delay the establishment of permanent machinery for the maintenance of peace. Under the threat of a common danger, the United Nations joined together in war to preserve their independence and their freedom. They must now join together to preserve the independence and freedom of all peace-loving states so that never again shall tyranny be able to divide and conquer. The peace-loving nations of the world must learn to work together as well as to fight together for their common welfare. We have made a good start at the Dumbarton Oaks and at Bretton Woods. We must continue the job we have started and establish international institutions which will make the peace-loving nations of the world conscious of their common interests in time of peace as they are in time of war. International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, require continuing cooperation and organized effort. International peace and well-being can be secured only through institutions capable of life and growth.
We must recognize that these were preliminary conferences and that they will be followed up by further conferences on international problems. We cannot make a perfect world over-night but we can at least improve the treatment of international problems. This is the real objective of the United Nations -- peace-loving nations of the world who are conscious of their common interests in time of peace as they are in time of war.
forcibly deprived of them. We will attempt, in collaboration with
our allies, to resolve the external difficulties, economic as well
as political, which stand in the way of the exercise of these acknowledged
rights by the peoples of the liberated areas and to promote the establish-
ment of the representative governments, truly expressive of the peoples'
will, which all nations united in the prosecution of this war for freedom
and for peace desire.
Our own policy as regards these questions of the peoples' peace is not in doubt. In the United States, as in any other self-governing nation, it is the national character which constitutes the national policy and the national history which gives that policy book and chapter. It is what the people are that dictates their beliefs and it is what they believe that determines the policies which express their will. We have believed, since the declaration of our independence as a nation, that governments draw their just powers from the consent of the governed. It is, in consequence, our national policy to aid and assist the freedom-loving men and women who have suffered under Nazi and Fascist tyranny to establish governments in the liberated countries which will represent the people.

We have all heard the traditional theory that the internal affairs of other nations are no concern of ours.

That is a very hopeful and high-sounding theory. There is only one thing wrong with it — in the light of modern conditions, it does not make sense.

A good, law-abiding farmer may say, "It is no concern of mine what my neighbor does with his fields. All I have to do is keep my fences in good repair and mind my own business." But that does not hold good if
the neighbor permits his property to degenerate into a breeding place of pestilence and disease which no fences can prevent from spreading.

In that case, the good farmer has to call upon the Board of Health and the local constabulary to go in and clean up the mess.

Similarly, if in one of the countries of the Caribbean area there should develop a Nazi-Fascist kind of government, that would definitely be of gravest concern to us. For such a government might grant bases, for example, to Germany or Japan, thereby providing a direct threat to our life-line through the Panama Canal.

That is an example close to home — but with the miracles of modern transportation (and greater miracles to come) the whole world is now close to home.

We as a nation have the right to be concerned if our neighbors begin to give indications of criminal tendencies. And other nations, large and small, have that same right.

We place our faith in democracy. We believe that the warlike impulse — the evil spirit of aggression — cannot thrive in any nation where the people really rule.

Therefore we believe — in our own interests and in the best interests of all mankind — that the guarantees of democracy are the only sure
Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding which informed the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of intercommunication between peoples over the past generation offers a practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to turn these great technological achievements to the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in also for nations. We are opposed to every form of restriction whether by public act or private arrangement which limits commerce, transit and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials
and markets may be free after this war than ever before in the history of the world.

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America — strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.
One of the most encouraging events of the year in the international field—although one which occasions no surprise to the friends of that country—has been the renaissance of the French people and the return of the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations. Far from having been crushed by the yoke of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged with stronger faith than ever in the soundness of the democratic ideals to which the French nation has traditionally contributed so greatly.

Since her liberation, France has given many evidences of her unceasing desire and determination to resume an ever-increasing part in the United Nations war effort, in continuation of the heroic efforts of the resistance groups under the occupation and of those Frenchmen who abroad continued the fight by our side after the disaster of 1940. It has been our policy from the outset to place in French hands all the arms and material of war which our resources and the military situation permitted. It is through no lack of desire on our part that the quantities of material so made available have been less than the French, in their eagerness to square accounts with their old enemy, would have wished. I am glad to say, however, that
plans are now under way to equip eight new French divisions for combat duty, and it is to be hoped that the future will see an ever-growing volume of help of this nature.

In addition to the contribution which France can make to our common victory, her liberation likewise means that her great influence will again be available in meeting the problems of peace. France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the German problem and the contribution which she can make in achieving international security are fully recognized. Her formal adherence to the Declaration by United Nations three days ago and the proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, whereby France would receive one of the five permanent seats in the proposed Security Council, are indications of the extent to which France has resumed that position of strength and leadership in which she has always been associated in our minds.
In the State of the Union Message last year I set forth what I considered to be an American economic Bill of Rights.

Of these rights the most fundamental and the one on which the fulfillment of the others in large degree depends is the "right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation." In turn, others of the economic rights of American citizenship such as the right to a decent home, to a good education, to good medical care, to social security, to reasonable farm income, will, if fulfilled, make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to half our total capacity production.

After the war we must maintain full employment with a Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand and purchasing power by private consumers — farmers, businessmen, workers, professional men, housewives — which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands.

Our policy is to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not tolerate mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work — and that means upwards of 50 million jobs.
Our peacetime tasks will be greater than they ever were. Full employment also means that those employed or those working on their own account should be able to earn incomes sufficient to provide them and their families with adequate food, clothing, and recreation; it means not only jobs, but productive jobs. Americans do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive jobs.

The Federal Government of the postwar period must gear all its programs to the requirements of full employment in an economy of private enterprise. Some of the measures which were devised to secure our record war production can usefully be applied to promoting peacetime output. During the war we have achieved a high degree of coordination in Government activities and cooperation between Government, business, labor, and agriculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accomplish our peacetime objectives.

Measures to encourage private enterprise cover a wide range. We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work — on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition — without the stifling presence of monopolies and cartels. Only in that way can we achieve prices which will promote the mass consumption which is necessary for full employment.

Our present tax system geared primarily to war requirements must be revised for peacetime so as to encourage private demand. Modifications in the
While no general revision of the tax structure can be made until the war ends on all fronts, I urge the Congress to consider granting tax relief at the end of the war in order to encourage capital to invest in new enterprises and provide jobs. I have in mind such things as increased depreciation allowances on new plants and equipment, providing capital by making available a limited percentage of postwar refunds of excess profits taxes, and a limited increase in the excess profits tax exemption.
taxes on business should provide incentives to new investment and growing enterprise. We must reduce or eliminate taxes which bear heavily on consumption. We must expand our foreign trade.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should adopt similar devices in peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.

Private business must contribute most, if not all, of the employment opportunities — and it will, in turn, gain its greatest stimulus from full and stable employment. As that is achieved, private enterprise will prosper and initiative will thrive.

Our full-employment program must emphasize the development of our natural resources and other useful public works. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-valley projects will literally add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA was a bargain at $700 million dollars. We have similar opportunities in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these rivers we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of air transport and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce it will be necessary to construct many more airports and to overhaul our [whole] national highway system.
At the same time I want to go on record as warning the Congress against the grave mistake which was made a few years after the end of the first World War. We ended that war with a total national debt of thirty-two billion dollars. This was reduced by the sale of equipment and plants to thirty billion dollars. By retaining a high tax rate we cut this down to a total national debt of twenty-three billion dollars in 1927. History will show that this great reduction was made primarily for political purposes. It was unsound from the point of view of economics. It encouraged the speculation which culminated in the crash of 1929.

Immediately thereafter we stopped reducing the national debt and encouraged the wildest orgy of speculation we have ever known.

The result was that for three years we were faced by the conditions that most of us remember -- unemployment, poverty, loss of property and all the evils which culminated in the failure of the banks.

I hope that the recognition of this national disaster will be remembered by this and future Congresses. We will end this
war with a very much larger debt because the war is on a vastly greater scale. Of course we ought to reduce taxes but each year that follows the end of the fighting we should make it the national policy to reduce the debt year after year so that the interest on the national debt can automatically decrease year by year.

It will be a great temptation to political parties in the years to come to angle for votes by promises to reduce taxes. It is essential that we continue taxes sufficiently high to continue the substantial reduction of the debt. The attitude toward this subject will be a good line of demarcation between politicians and statesmen -- between temporizing and patriotism.

We might as well think of the future of the country and the burdens on the coming generation.
The provision of a decent home for every family is a necessity if this
country is to be worthy of its greatness — and that task would itself create
great employment opportunities. Many of our cities need extensive rebuilding.

Many of our farms are in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal attack on the
housing and urban reconstruction
problems will require thoroughgoing cooperation between construction
industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.

An expanded social security program and an adequate health program must
play a substantial role in a program designed to support increased purchasing power.

These policies will provide private and public demands for the products
of our industries. But there is another side to the picture. After the war there
will be pressing problems of relocation of both industries and population. Dur-
ing the war there have been large-scale migrations of labor to the centers of war
production. We must make sure that after the war there will not be large, dis-
organized migrations of people looking for work.

In some cases we shall have to facilitate the orderly movement of
people to places of employment — and in other cases we must find means to en-
courage industry to develop in the regions to which the people have already moved.

The state must assist in the relocation of its workers. Our education
programs, too, must be designed to fit the labor force for the work it is to per-
form.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to
I recommend that the Congress continue in effect the renegotiation and stabilization acts.
We have already taken extensive measures to enable the men and women now in the armed forces to complete their education after the war. We must also raise our sights for oncoming children and young people. They should be enabled to remain in or return to school for as long as necessary for an adequate education—and the schools should gear their programs to employment opportunities as well as citizenship training in meeting the needs of all American youth.
All of these objectives for the post-war period are in a very true sense at loose ends. I hope that the Congress will realize that the Executive has today no machinery for tying these ends together. The National Resources Board may not have been perfect in all of its planning work and it may have studied or planned for some non-vital projects, but at least they studied and reported on many of them. This Board was abolished by the Congress two years ago. The Congress provided no alternative or substitute.

I should like authority to set up some other body to which these problems can be referred for report. It is impossible to parcel them out at this time among existing departments or agencies for practically every problem relates to two or more departments or agencies. In other words, we are approaching a period when, whether we like the term or not, we should plan for all kinds of needs in not solely to give employment but to improve the life of the American people. I hope that at this session the Congress can take some forward steps to provide for this need.
full employment, I shall take the opportunity to communicate again with the Congress in greater detail on some of the aspects of this program, including Social Security and health and education. If we attack the problem with determination we shall succeed. And we must succeed. For freedom and peace cannot exist without security.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.

Most important of all — 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made — of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history — and we may be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
The war will leave deep disturbances in the world economy, in our national economy, in many communities, in many families, and in many individuals. It will require determined effort and responsible action of all of us to find our way back to peacetime and to help others to find their way back to peace time—a peace time that holds the values of the past and the promise of the future.
FOURTH DRAFT

Message of the President to
The Congress on the State of the
Union - January 1, 1945.

In this Message, I shall indicate some new measures which I believe will help to hasten the day of total victory; and, in the weeks and months to come, I shall perform my constitutional duty by recommending to the consideration of the Congress such measures as I judge necessary and expedient.

This war must be waged — it is being waged — with the greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men, fighting far from home, in cruel and unfamiliar climates, against enemies whose homes are at their backs — Americans have already won victories which the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no question either of the cost. Our losses will be heavy. Our hearts will be woun. Our determination and our endurance will be tried.

But if we and our comrades in arms of United Nations will go on fighting, together, nothing our enemies can do by force or treachery or subterfuge or falsehood can prevent our ultimate, total victory.

And we will go on fighting, together.

Comrades in arms over three years of changing fortunes and of hope deferred, we will be more than ever comrades in arms now that the moment of decision is upon us.
We have seen a year marked, on the whole, by substantial progress toward [next day] even though the year ended with a set-back for our arms, when the Germans launched a ferocious counter-attack into Luxembourg and Belgium with the obvious objective of cutting our line in the center.
FOURTH DRAFT

This has been a crucial battle. The enemy has made an all-out effort, committing his best troops — young, fanatical, desperate Nazis — led by veterans of the Prussian military caste.

(NOTE: more to come on this battle as events develop before delivery of this message.)

This German counter-offensive, however, has turned out to be far from the defeat for us which, for a time, some people feared. Our men fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most difficult conditions, and our German enemies have sustained considerable losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

Further desperate attempts will be made to break our lines, to slow our progress. We must be prepared — for further desperate and losing attempts to break our lines. We must never make the mistake of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has surrendered.

And I would express another most serious warning against the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was less dangerous than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.
FOURTH DRAFT

Every weak little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst — seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are here and there, evil and baseless rumors against the Russians — rumors against the British — rumors against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely you will observe that every one of them bears the same trademark — "Made in Germany."

We must resist this divisive propaganda — we must destroy it — with the same strength and the same determination that our fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and — despite temporary setbacks here or there — we shall continue the attack until Germany is completely defeated, and her brutal criminals are given the punishment they so richly deserve.

It is appropriate at this time to review the basic strategy which has guided us through three years of war, and which will lead, eventually, to total victory.

The tremendous effort of the first years of this war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.
It was an effort — in the language of the military men — of deployment of our forces. Many battles — essential battles — were fought; many victories — vital victories — were won. But these battles and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the final, decisive blows.

This involved vast manoeuvres of deployment across the greatest oceans of the earth, and in every climate, and at points as far apart as the Pacific Islands and the continent of Europe — 13,000 miles apart.

It involved long months of training of men, building of fleets, construction of planes, manufacture of munitions and supplies, transport of these men and supplies over the oceans east and west. It involved battles in the Arctic islands, in the tropic archipelagoes, in the African deserts.

In the beginning our most important military task was to prevent our enemies — the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that ever have threatened civilization — from winning decisive victories. But even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative from our enemies and place our superior resources of men and materials into direct competition with them.
It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require the massing of overwhelming forces — ground, sea and air — in positions from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy homelands, and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan we had to await the completion of extensive preliminary operations — operations designed to establish secure supply lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for overwhelming sea power — supported by ground forces strategically employed against isolated outpost garrisons. [It was necessary therefore to wait for the construction of this overwhelming sea power before major operations could be undertaken.]

Always — from the very day we were attacked — it was right militarily as well as morally to reject the arguments of those short-sighted people who would have had us throw Britain and Russia to the Nazi wolves and concentrate against the Japanese. Such people urged that we fight a purely defensive war against Japan while allowing the domination of all the rest of the world by Nazism and Fascism. (2)

In the case of Germany, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power were already available in Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy.
Paragraph——
And we had to reject the arguments of many others who wanted to disperse our forces all over the world.
instead of retaining a reasonable concentration of them. Our controversies were with those who failed to think in world terms those who were thinking in the selfish terms of
their own country, or their own neighboring country, or their own economic good. This world point of view which we have striven for was and is something relatively new in our history.
Because to us it is something relatively novel, I believe that this country stands in a position of greater leadership possibilities than in the case of other nations or empires.
Furthermore, in Europe, we had Allies — active and potential — Allies who could not give us their maximum assistance against the Japs until Germany had been defeated.

Our decision was made therefore to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat. That decision was based on all these factors; and it was also based on the realization that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a war potential.

Our strategy was, therefore, to apply the maximum ground and air power in Europe until Germany was completely knocked out of the war; and meanwhile, to apply the maximum Naval strength in the Pacific, supported by sufficient ground and air forces to accomplish the initial operations so as to open the desired routes to the Japanese homeland.

Now, as this seventy-ninth Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944, of the German "impregnable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg — almost to the Rhine itself.
The cross channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches — to the sailors who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied — and to the military leaders who achieved a real miracle of planning and execution. And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to plan together, 

and work together and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this, the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American and French forces based in North Africa and Italy.

Finally, the two invasions were a tribute to the ability of many men and women to maintain silence when a few careless words would have imperilled the lives of hundreds of thousands and would have jeopardized the whole stupendous undertakings.

These two great operations were made possible by success in the Battle of the Atlantic.
Without some success over German submarines, we could not have
built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could we
have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had landed
in France.

The Nazis, however, may succeed in improving their submarines and
their crews (and they may once more launch an aggressive submarine attack.)
The Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the British and
Canadian Navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.

The tremendous operations in Western Europe have overshadowed in
the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian front.
Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been obscured,
and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected —
eeight now.

What the Allied forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part
of our strategy now aimed at only one objective — the total defeat of the
Germans. These valiant forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial
portion of the German Army under constant pressure — including some twenty
first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and re-
placement troops — all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere.
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This afternoon, United Nations in first paragraph.

(including a brave and well equipped unit of the Brazilian Army)
Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army — reinforced by units from other United Nations — have been fighting continuously since early February. A year ago they were at the bloody Cassino, since that time they have pushed north through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue.

The American people — and every soldier now fighting in the Apennines — should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific.

A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa was a little more than a month old.
A year ago, we were just preparing for our invasion of Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Pacific to the Philippines.

A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea almost 1500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.

We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself — and will continue to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two. There is still hard fighting ahead in the Philippines — costly fighting. But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been largely cut off from her conquests in the East Indies.

The landing of our troops in the Philippines was the largest amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific.

Moreover, these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night engagements around Guadalcanal in November–December,
1942, had our Navy been able to come to grips with major units of the
Japanese fleet. We had brushed against their fleet in the first battle
of the Philippine Sea in June, 1944, but not until last October were we
able really to engage a major portion of the Japanese navy in actual
combat. The naval engagement which raged for three days was the heaviest
blow ever struck against Japanese sea power.

As the result of that battle, much of what is left of the
Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates
the Yellow Sea, the China Sea and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of
the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the
courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces — on all
fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership
which has guided their sons into battle.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history
of teamwork and cooperation, of skill and daring. Let me give you one
example out of last year's operations in the Pacific.
Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, C and E. However, when General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey's task forces, he concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese in the Philippines directly — by-passing islands A, C and E.

Admiral Halsey was in agreement with this, and Admiral Nimitz thereupon offered to make available to General MacArthur several of his divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives. These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on the same day.

Thus, within the space of twenty-four hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different
theaters of operations — a change which hastened the liberation of the
Philippines and the final day of victory — a change which saved lives
which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now
far behind our lines and of no danger.

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task of
rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost insuperable diffi-
culties, we increased this aid during 1944. At present our aid to China
must be accomplished by air transport — there is no other way. By the
end of 1944, the Air Transport Command was carrying into China a tonnage
of supplies three times as great as that delivered [at the end of 1943] and
more, each month, than the Burma road ever delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China, the tonnage de-
ivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth Air
Force to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the Japanese.
In 1944, aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more than 35,000 sorties
against the Japanese and sank over one-half million tons of enemy shipping,
greatly diminishing the usefulness of the China Sea lanes.

In all of our military actions — on land, and sea and in
the air — the final job, the toughest job, has been performed by that average, easy-going, every-day, hard-fighting young American who is universally and affectionately known as "G-I Joe".

He — whether he be soldier, sailor or airman — is the one indispensable man in this war.

It is to him that we and all future generations of Americans must pay grateful tribute.

But — it is of small satisfaction to him to know that monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he needs, and he is entitled to insist upon, our active support — now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made possible our victories on land and sea and in the air, we shall have to increase our goals even more in certain items.

Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Department in December 1943. We have not produced as much since then. Delivery of Army supplies fell 15 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once more resumed.

In the one month of October, 1944, the Army Service Forces had to increase its estimate of required production by 10 percent because of increased demands from overseas. But in November, two months ago,
the requirements for 1945 had to be increased another 10 percent, sending the production goal well above anything we have yet attained.

Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition. [In fact, within five months, it had been more than doubled. And all this was before the Germans launched their counter-offensive.] As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expend will mount day by day.

In October, 1944, while some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.

One of the most urgent immediate requirements for the men we are sending overseas is nurses. Last April the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000. Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army.
Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000.

That means that 18,000 more nurses must be obtained.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalized, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to 26 beds, instead of the recommended one to 35 beds.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due, however, to any shortage of nurses. 280,000 registered nurses are now practicing in this country. It has been estimated by the War Manpower Commission that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the Army without interfering with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.

Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required for the Army, I urge that the Selective Service Act be amended to provide for the induction of nurses into the Army. The need is too pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.
FOURTH DRAFT

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The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers has been of the highest medical standards. Those standards must be maintained at all cost. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand in need of it.

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We could not now stop production of war weapons, even if we had built up a vast reserve of supplies. We shall also need constantly new types of weapons. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need many thousands of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics which must be put into production in order to maintain our technical superiority — and in order to save lives. We have to work every day to keep ahead of the enemy in radar.

For example: on D-day, in France, with our superior new equipment, we located and then put out of operation every warning set which the Germans had along the French coast.
If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development of new weapons we pay for our backwardness with the life's blood of our sons.

One of our greatest new developments — and one compelled by the extraordinary circumstances of this war — is that magnificent bomber, the Superfortress, the B-29.

Development of the B-29 was initiated and carried to completion in record time. In less than 12 months from the delivery of the first production model, the Army Air Forces had organized and trained the first B-29 units and had transported them 13,000 miles to bases constructed by the labor of 250,000 Chinese workers.

This coming year will see a steady rise in destructive raids against the nerve centers of Japan — against Tokyo itself — by large formations of the most deadly bomber ever built.

And our Air Forces are not content to stop with the B-29. There are even newer and deadlier bombers on the way.

The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job — for additional American civilians — men and women — not engaged in essential war work, to go out and get a war job. Workers cut who are released because their production is slack back should get another
job where production is being increased. This is no time to quit or change to less essential jobs.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And — again — that payment must be made with the life's blood of our sons.

Many critical production programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important of these are artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, tires, tanks, heavy trucks and even B-29's. In each of these vital programs present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of high capacity ammunition is being hampered by manpower shortages; so is production for its huge rocket program. It is also expected that difficulties may be later experienced in its cruiser and carrier programs.

Shortages of labor hamper the Navy production of new types of aircraft, dry cells, radar, and other essentials. There is critical need for more repair workers and repair parts; this lack delays the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and prevents ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.
The pool of young men under 26 classified as 1-A is almost depleted. Increased replacements for the armed forces will take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady and, to the extent necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1945 production goals.

Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was not adopted.

I now again call upon the Congress to enact this measure for the total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war. It is not too late in the war. In fact, bitter experience has shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war, the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

A program of national service which would make every able-bodied adult available for war production or other essential needs will be used
There are three basic arguments for a National Service Law.

First -- it would assure that we have the right numbers of workers in the right places at the right times.

Second -- it would provide supreme proof to all our fighting men that their country is really going all-out in their support.

And -- third -- it would be the final, unequivocal answer to the hopes of the Nazis and the Japanese that they can get from us a negotiated peace.
only to the extent absolutely required by military necessities. In fact experience in other nations at war indicates that use of the compulsory powers of national service legislation is [comparatively] seldom necessary.

This proposed legislation should provide against loss of retirement and seniority rights and benefits. It does not mean reduction in wages. [Does it mean that any substantial number of war workers will be disturbed in their present jobs?]

It is becoming increasingly evident from recent events that the best practical way to insure adequate weapons for our gallant fighting men—and incidentally boost their morale—is by adoption of a national service act.

National Service legislation will make it possible to put ourselves in a position which will assure certain and speedy action in meeting our manpower requirements. In adopting such legislation, it is not necessary to discard the voluntary and cooperative processes which have prevailed up to this time. On the contrary, we must continue to rely on the cooperative action of labor and management working with government. This cooperation has already produced great results. We must build on the foundations that have already been laid and supplement the measures now in operation in order to guarantee the accomplishments of the actions that may be necessary in the critical period that lies ahead.
In the meantime we are using the inadequate tools at hand to do the best we can by such expedients as manpower ceilings, and the use of priority and other powers to induce men and women to shift from non-essential to essential war jobs.

Pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects of national service, I recommend that the Congress immediately enact legislation which will be effective in using the services of the 4,000,000 men now classified as 4-F [the majority of whom are already in essential war work] in whatever capacity is best for the war effort.

In this war, labor and management, with a few notable exceptions, have submitted disputes which they could not adjust themselves to the National War Labor Board, and have loyally abided by its decision. But there have been some cases where the decisions of the Board have been disregarded.

Existing legislation does not provide means for the enforcement of the orders of the War Labor Board except only by seizure to prevent interference with the war effort. In some cases seizure is an awkward and inept means of enforcement. In others, where the fault lies with the labor union, it is an undeserved hardship on the employer. In some cases, the Board after assuming jurisdiction has not been able to find sufficient impediment to the war effort to make a finding necessary to justify seizure.
Insert C—Page 23
Paragraph.
Under electing law the Executive Branch of the Government has done and is doing everything possible to scrape the barrel for the funding of war needs of manpower.
Only the Congress can complete the effort. Trust that the Congress will remember these words and that necessary legislation will soon be forthcoming.
The avoidance of labor trouble during the war is dependent upon the effective functioning of this machinery for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes. The War Labor Board machinery is working too well in the vast majority of cases to permit it to be weakened by a few unpatriotic recalcitrants among management and labor. Responsible leaders of management and labor will find it increasingly difficult to secure compliance by their followers if recalcitrants among management and labor are permitted to ignore the orders of the Board with impunity.

I therefore recommend that the Congress adopt legislation which would make the orders of the War Labor Board legally enforceable whenever it finds that compliance with its orders is necessary to prevent the impairment of peaceful relations between management and labor by means in addition to seizure.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before, increased their already phenomenal production of food of the previous year. However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supplement the production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity, as well as of common humanity, we must furnish the newly-liberated areas of Europe with enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starvation and to prevent chaos behind the Allied lines.
At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which

to buy more food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds

the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making

sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Many people in this country, who have the opportunity to know

the facts at first hand, are disillusioned by those who, with apparently

unlimited cash, patronize night clubs, expensive restaurants and winter

resorts. Our sons who are in training for overseas service are also not

ignorant of this display — and their comrades in arms overseas soon get

to know all about it.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians.

It would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too

little.

Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty

to eat — and plenty is enough for anyone.

American manpower and industry and agriculture are decisive factors

in this war as they were in the World War which ended in 1918.

But in both wars we were unable to develop our power in men and

material for a highly critical period of time after becoming actually en-

gaged in war.
On both occasions, our Allies were compelled to bear the unaided brunt of a fully prepared aggressor attack, until we of the United States could gather and organize our resources. Should such a tragedy again occur, we cannot assume that the aggressor would not level his first attack on this country. Developments in weapons — air, ground, and naval — can make possible such an attack despite the oceans around us.

Our national security and our place in the world, therefore, demand much more of preparation than has been the case in the past. We must always have immediately available trained men and adequate material.

The people of this country ought not to be confused between two separate problems. The first which I have spoken of is the problem of national service as it affects the conduct of this war. We need it in order to win this war.

The other subject relates to the security of the country for generations to come — Universal Military Training.

The democratic system of national defense is not to rely primarily on a professional soldierly. Our democracy, in time of war, calls each citizen by a system of compulsory selective service to the part he is best equipped to play. It has been wasteful in the past and will be perilous in the future to delay training until war is imminent.
We should now accept the principle of peacetime training. This is not a new principle. President Washington recommended a system of universal military training to the first Congress. President Jefferson recommended a system of universal military training to the ninth Congress. Both of them, acutely aware of the necessity of defending this country from foreign aggression and of avoiding military systems that would weaken democracy from within, urged a program of training that would let every citizen play his proper role in military affairs.

I now recommend to the Congress the same principle of training—the training of every young man for his part in the national defense, just as we educate every child to accept his other civic responsibilities.

The program for this purpose ought to be developed with full appreciation of the unique resources of American society; recognizing that civilian institutions, as well as individuals, may be called on again to convert their skills of peace to the demands of war.

The program of training should be universal, including all those who may not be able to perform full military service and excluding only those who are so severely handicapped that they can make no contribution whatever to the national defense.
The program of training should be selective, training men for the most valuable contribution that they can make in the event of war. It should be versatile and enterprising, so that, while concentrating on the purpose of national defense, it may increase the health and add to the skills of the young men of the nation.

By training I mean training, pure and simple. It would not include liability for military service unless, of course, such liability would be imposed by Congressional action in time of emergency. The Army and the Navy would remain purely voluntary forces in peacetime; but there would be behind them these vast resources and impressive power of a previously trained citizenry.

Such a system should be considered as an integral part of our policy for cooperating in the establishment and maintenance of world security. All the United Nations agree that in the future the peace must be kept by armed force, if necessary; and the present proposals for a future international organization realistically take account of this fact. Our share of the armed forces that would be placed at the disposal of such an international organization obviously cannot be determined exactly until a later date, but they would, of course, be made available from our regular peacetime military and naval establishments consisting of volunteer forces. However, only a universal military training system would provide
a body of trained manpower reserve necessary in order to make our peace-
time Army and Navy establishments capable of becoming fully adequate
to meet any possible needs of providing for our national security.

The subject of universal military training should be consid-
ered at this time in order that it may become operative upon the termina-
tion of the present emergency. There should not again be the almost
fatal lapse in preparation between the close of a successful war and the
development of a new emergency.

Proper planning by the War and Navy Departments is also de-
pendent upon the early determination of the details of a universal
military training system. The designation of surplus military equipment
and supplies, the disposal of that present surplus, and the disposal of
training facilities and air and service installations cannot intelli-
gently and efficiently be consummated until this subject has been acted
upon by the Congress. For example, if we were to dispose of our present
facilities and equipment now — and, at some time in the vague future,
decide to initiate a system of training, it would result in loss of
valuable time and property, and would sacrifice other valuable factors
provided by existing knowledge and familiarity with the problem of war
and wartime training.
I therefore recommend to the Congress, the prompt enactment of legislation requiring all able-bodied citizens to undergo a period of military training. The length of the training period, the extent and content of the training, and the ages within which it shall be given are matters for determination by the Congress in consultation, of course, with our military authorities.

You will see that I am being frank and realistic — realistic as to the conduct of the war abroad and at home, and realistic also in regard to the safety of the nation in the future. What I am recommending in this Message is realism.

I believe that we should be realistic and at the same time idealistic. Realism and idealism have gone together in our American scheme of things ever since Christopher Columbus.

I am against war and I want to take every drastic step possible to end this World War as fast as we can. But I know that world wars cannot be prevented by passing solemn resolutions in local clubs or debating societies.
In the field of foreign policy,

we propose to stand together, not for the war alone but for
the victory for which the war is fought. It is not only a common danger
which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of govern-
ments but of peoples and the peoples' hope is peace. Here as in England;

with the United Nations
in England as in Russia; in Russia as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable and secure.

It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step — but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight. [There are no magical formulas — no ‘sure cures’ — that can be concocted by any one group of men sitting around a peace table.]

The firm foundation can be built — and it will be built.

But the great structure of a real peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.
We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience, how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an eddy of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the peoples of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with far greater problems of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.

Wars can be fought by governments, but peace can be made and kept only by the united will of free and peace-loving peoples who are willing to work together — willing to respect and tolerate and try to understand one another's opinions and feelings.

The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors.

We must not let those differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in the peace.
International cooperation on which enduring peace must be
based is not a one way street.

Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think
alike and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any
nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.

We cannot hope to eliminate power as a factor in world politics
any more than we can hope to eliminate power as a factor in national
politics. But in a democratic world as in a democratic nation, power
must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify
itself within the framework of the general good.

Perfectionism no less than isolationism, imperialism and power
politics may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget
that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started
not by a direct attack against international cooperation, but against the
allaged imperfections of the peace.

In our disillusionment after the last war, we preferred inter-
national anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not
see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving
a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfill our responsibilities
in an imperfect world.

We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same
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road again — the road to a third world war.

Do not misunderstand me. We can fulfill our responsibilities for maintaining the security of our own country, only by exercising our power and our influence to achieve the principles in which we believe and for which we have fought.

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and I agreed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, these being later incorporated into the Declaration of the United Nations. At that time certain isolationists protested vigorously against our right to proclaim the principles — and against the very principles themselves. Today, many of the same people are protesting against the alleged violation of the same principles.

It is true that the statement of principles does not provide rules of easy application to each and every one of this war-torn world's tangled situations. But it is a good and a useful thing to have principles toward which we can aim. [The fact that the Ten Commandments are violated every day in the year by various human beings, is no reason why we should repeal the Book of Exodus.]

And we shall not hesitate to use our influence to secure so far as humanly possible the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
I do not wish to give the impression that all mistakes can be avoided and that many disappointments are not inevitable in the making of peace. But we must not this time lose the hope of establishing an international order which will be capable of maintaining peace and realizing through the years more perfect justice between nations than could possibly be secured by continuing ordeals of battle.

To do this we must be on our guard not to exploit and exaggerate the differences between us and our allies, particularly with reference to the peoples they have liberated from fascist tyranny. That is not the way to secure a better settlement of those differences or to secure international machinery which may be made.

I should not be frank if I did not admit concern about many situations, the Greek and Polish for example. But these situations are not as easy or as simple to deal with as partisans whose sincerity I do not question would have us believe. We have obligations, not necessarily legally, to the exiled governments, to the underground leaders and to our major allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did. We cannot forget that some of the exiled governments were the first to resist Nazi tyranny, nor that some of the most vigorous and valiant underground leaders had to be convinced that this was not an imperialistic war. We and our allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the
right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they
will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to
those who have been forcibly deprived of them. But with internal dissension,
with many new prisoners of war or forced to labor in other countries, it
is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people really want.
It is only too easy for all of us to rationalize what we want to believe
and to consider those leaders we like responsible and those we dislike
irresponsible. And our task is not helped by the stubborn partisanship,
however understandable, of opposed internal groups.

It is our purpose to help the peace-loving peoples of Europe
to live together as good neighbors, to recognize their common interests
and not to nurse their traditional grievances against one another.

We must not permit the many specific problems of adjustment
connected with the liberation of Europe to delay the establishment of
permanent machinery for the maintenance of peace. Under the threat of a
common danger, the United Nations joined together in war to preserve their
independence and their freedom. They must now join together to preserve
the independence and freedom of all peace-loving states so that never
again shall tyranny be able to divide and conquer.
The peace-loving nations of the world must learn to work together as well as to fight together for their common welfare. We have already made a good start at various conferences.

We must recognize that these were preliminary conferences and that they will be followed up by further conferences on international problems. We cannot make a perfect world today or tomorrow but we can at least improve the treatment of international problems. This is the real objective of the United Nations — peace-loving nations of the world who are conscious of their common interests in time of peace as they are in time of war.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, require continuing cooperation and organized effort.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, can be secured only through institutions capable of life and growth.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding which informed the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.
This atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding at the International Conferences during the past year is not aided by those Americans who by voice or writing deliberately try to magnify division and...
create trouble. 
Here again they come very close to being labeled "made in Germany." 
They hope that Germany hopes that disunity can be sown in our ranks — disunity within each Allied nation.
and disunity in their selective efforts to make a better world.
We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of inter-
communication between peoples over the past generation offer a practical
method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace must rest,
and it is our policy and purpose to utilize these great technological achieve-
ments for the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and
equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our
national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in also for
nations. We are opposed to all restrictions whether by public act
or private arrangement which limit commerce, transit and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is
our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest
of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials
and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history
of the world.

One of the most encouraging events of the year in the international
field — although one which occasions no surprise to the friends of that
country — has been the renaissance of the French people and the return of
the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations. Far from having been
crushed by the yoke of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged
with stronger faith than ever in the soundness of the democratic ideals
to which the French nation has traditionally contributed so greatly.

Since her liberation, France has given many evidences of her
unceasing desire and determination to resume an ever-increasing part in
the United Nations war effort, in continuation of the heroic efforts of
the resistance groups under the occupation and of those Frenchmen who
abroad continued the fight by our side after the disaster of 1940. It
has been our policy from the outset to place in French hands all the arms
and material of war which our resources and the military situation per-
mitted. It is through a lack of desire on our part that the quantities
of material as made available have been less than the French, in their
eagerness to square accounts with their old enemy, would have wished. I
am glad to say [hesitated] that [hesitated] are now about to equip large new
French forces for combat duty, and it is to be hoped that the future
will see an ever-growing volume of help of this nature.

In addition to the contribution which France can make to
our common victory, her liberation likewise means that her great
influence will again be available in meeting the problems of peace.
France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the German problem
and the contribution which she can make in achieving international
security are fully recognized. Her formal adherence to the Declaration
by United Nations a few days ago and the proposal at the Dumbarton
Oaks discussions, whereby France would receive one of the five permanent
seats in the proposed Security Council, are indications of the extent
to which France has resumed that position of strength and leadership,
[which she has always been associated in our minds.]

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong
America — strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the
military sense.
I have determined in my own mind that, as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace in the future, we must have Universal Military Training after this war, and I shall send a special message to the Congress on this subject.
In the State of the Union Message last year I set forth what I considered to be an American economic Bill of Rights.

Of these rights the most fundamental, and the one on which the fulfillment of the others in large degree depends, is the "right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation." In turn, others of the economic rights of American citizenship such as the right to a decent home, to a good education, to good medical care, to social security, to reasonable farm income, will, if fulfilled, make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to half our total capacity production.

After the war we must maintain full employment with Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand and purchasing power by private consumers — farmers, businessmen, workers, professional men, housewives — which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands; and it means also that we must greatly increase our export trade above the pre-war level.

Our policy is to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not tolerate mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone
willing and able to work — and that means approximately 60 million jobs.

[Our peacetime tasks will be greater than they ever were.] Full employment also means that those employed or those working on their own account should be able to earn incomes sufficient to provide them and their families with adequate food, clothing, and recreation; it means not only jobs, but productive jobs. Americans do not regard jobs that pay sub-
standard wages as productive jobs.

[The Federal Government of the postwar period must gear all its programs to the requirements of full employment in an economy of private enterprise. Some of the measures which were devised to secure our record war production can usefully be applied to promoting peacetime output.] During the war we have achieved a high degree of coordination in Government activities and cooperation between Government, business, labor, and agri-
iculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accom-
plish our peacetime objectives.

[Measures to encourage private enterprise cover a wide range.] We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work — on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition — without the stifling presence of monopolies and cartels. [Only in that way can we achieve prices which will promote the mass consumption which is necessary for full employ-
ment.]
Our present tax system geared primarily to war requirements must be revised for peacetime so as to encourage private demand.

While no general revision of the tax structure can be made until the war ends on all fronts, I urge the Congress to consider granting tax relief at the end of the war in order to encourage capital to invest in new enterprises and provide jobs. I have in mind such things as increased depreciation allowances on new plants and equipment, providing capital by making available a limited percentage of postwar refunds of excess profits taxes, and a limited increase in the excess profits tax exemption. Modifications in the taxes on business should provide incentives to new investment and growing enterprise. We must reduce or eliminate taxes which bear too heavily on consumption. [We must expand our foreign trade.]

At the same time I want to go on record as warning the Congress against the grave mistake which was made a few years after the end of the first World War. We ended that war with a total national debt of thirty-two billion dollars. This was reduced by the sale of equipment and plants to thirty billion dollars. By retaining a high tax rate we cut this down to a total national debt of twenty-three billion dollars in 1927. History will show that this great reduction was made primarily for political purposes. It was unsound from the point of view of economics. It encouraged the speculation which culminated in the crash of 1929.
Immediately thereafter we stopped reducing the national debt and encouraged the wildest cry of speculation we have ever known.

The result was that for three years we were faced by the conditions that most of us remember — unemployment, poverty, loss of property and all the evils which culminated in the failure of the banks.

I hope that the recognition of this national disaster will be remembered by this and future Congresses. We will end this war with a very much larger debt because this war is on a vastly greater scale. Of course we ought to reduce taxes, but each year that follows the end of the fighting we should make it the national policy to reduce the debt year after year so that the interest on the national debt can automatically decrease year by year.

It will be a great temptation to political parties in the years to come to angle for votes by promises to reduce taxes. It is essential that we continue taxes sufficiently high to offset the substantial reduction of the debt. The attitude toward this subject will be a good line of demarcation between politicians and statesmen — between temporizing and patriotism.

[We might as well think of the future of the country and the burdens on the coming generation.]
During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should adopt similar devices in peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.

Our full-employment program requires the extensive development of our natural resources and other useful public works. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-valley projects will irreversibly add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA was a bargain at 700 million dollars. We have similar opportunities in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these river basins, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of civil aviation and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce it will be necessary to construct many more airports and to overhaul our national highway system. The provision of a decent home for every family is a necessity if this country is to be worthy of its greatness — and that task would itself create great employment opportunities. Most of our cities need extensive rebuilding. Many of our farms are in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal
attack on the problems of housing and urban reconstruction will require thoroughgoing cooperation between [construction] industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.

An expanded social security program and adequate health and education programs must play essential roles in a program designed to support individual productivity and mass purchasing power. I shall communicate further with the Congress on these subjects on a later date.

I recommend that the Congress continue in effect the renegotiation and stabilization acts.

We have already taken extensive measures to enable the men and women now in the armed forces to complete their education after the war. We must also raise our sights for oncoming children and young people. They should be enabled to remain in or return to school for as long as necessary for an adequate education — and the schools should gear their programs to employment opportunities as well as citizenship training in meeting the needs of all American youth.

These policies will provide private and public demands for the products of our industries. But there is another side to the picture. After the war there will be pressing problems of relocation of both industries and population. During the war there have been large-scale migrations of labor to the centers of war production. We must make sure that after the war there will not be large, disorganized migrations of people looking for work.
In some cases we shall have to facilitate the orderly movement of people to places of employment — and in other cases we must find means to encourage industry to develop in the regions where the people already are.

All of these objectives for the post-war period are in a very true sense at loose ends. I hope that the Congress will realize that the Executive has today no machinery for tying these ends together. The National Resources Board may not have been perfect in all of its planning work and it may have studied or planned for some non-vital projects, but at least they studied and reported on many of them. This Board was abolished by the Congress two years ago. The Congress provided no alternative or substitute.

I should like authority to set up some other body to which these problems can be referred for report. It is impossible to parcel them out at this time among existing departments or agencies for practically every problem relates to two or more departments or agencies. In other words, we are approaching a period when, whether we like the term or not, we should plan for all kinds of needs not solely to give employment but to improve the life of the American people. I hope that at this session the Congress can take some forward steps to provide for this need.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to full employment.
The war will leave deep disturbances in the world economy, in our national economy, in many communities, in many families, and in many individuals. It will require determined effort and responsible action of all of us to find our way back to peacetime and to help others to find their way back to peace time—a peace time that holds the values of the past and the promise of the future.

I shall take the opportunity to communicate again with the Congress in greater detail on some of the aspects of this program, including Social Security and health and education. If we attack the problem with determination we shall succeed. And we must succeed. For freedom and peace cannot exist without security.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.

Most important of all—1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made—of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.
During the past year the American people reasserted their democratic faith in a National election.

In the course of that campaign, various references were made to "strife" between this Administration and the Congress with the implication (if not the direct assertion) that this Administration and the Congress could never work together harmoniously in the service of the Nation.

It cannot be denied that there have been disagreements between the Legislative and Executive Branches — as there have been disagreements during the past century and a half. That is the way of democracy — and it is a way that we do not intend to change.

Particularly in war time, when we all bear extraordinarily heavy responsibilities, there is apt to be impatience with the other fellow and occasional displays of cantankerousness.

I think we all realize too that there are some people in this Capital City whose task is in large part to stir up dissension, especially when such dissension does not in fact exist.

But — I think that the overall record in this respect is eloquent: the Government of the United States of America — all branches
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of it — has a good record of achievement in this war. [With few exceptions,] the legislation needed for the war job has been passed and the required funds have been appropriated, and I am not worried about future relations between Capitol Hill and the White House.

We have a great many more problems ahead of us and we must approach them with realism and courage.
We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history—and I hope it will be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
FIFTH DRAFT

Message of the President to
The Congress on the State of
the Union - January, 1942.

In this Message on the state of the Union, I shall indicate
some new measures which I believe will help to hasten the day of total
victory; and, in the weeks and months to come, I shall perform my con-
stitutional duty by recommending to the consideration of the Congress
such measures as I judge necessary and expedient.

This war must be waged -- it is being waged -- with the great-
est and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at
stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men, fighting
far from home, have already won victories which the world will never
forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no question
either of the cost. Our losses will be heavy.

We and our allies will go on fighting together to ultimate total
victory.

We have seen a year marked, on the whole, by substantial progress
toward victory, even though the year ended with a set-back for our arms,
when the Germans launched a ferocious counter-attack into Luxembourg and
Belgium with the obvious objective of cutting our line in the center.

(NOTE: more to come on this battle as events develop before
delivery of this Message.)
This German counter-offensive, however, has turned out to be far from the defeat for us which, for a time, some people feared. Our men fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most difficult conditions, and our German enemies have sustained considerable losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

Further desperate attempts will be made to break our lines, to slow our progress. We must never make the mistake of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has surrendered.

And I would express another most serious warning against the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was less dangerous than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

Every little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst -- seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are here and there, evil and baseless rumors against the Russians -- rumors against the British -- rumors against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely you will observe that every one of them bears the same trademark -- "Made in Germany."

We must resist this divisive propaganda -- we must destroy it --
with the same strength and the same determination that our fighting men
are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and -- despite temporary
setbacks here or there -- we shall continue the attack until Germany is
completely defeated.

It is appropriate at this time to review the basic strategy which
has guided us through three years of war, and which will lead, eventually,
to total victory.

The tremendous effort of the first years of this war was directed
toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of
action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort -- in the language of the military men -- of
deployment of our forces. Many battles -- essential battles -- were
fought; many victories -- vital victories -- were won. But these battles
and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy
and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the
final, decisive blows.

In the beginning our most important military task was to prevent
our enemies -- the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that ever
have threatened civilization -- from winning decisive victories. But even
while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking forward
to the time when we could wrest the initiative from our enemies and place
our superior resources of men and materials into direct competition with them.
It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require
the massing of overwhelming forces — ground, sea and air — in positions
from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy
homelands, and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan we had to await the completion of extensive
preliminary operations — operations designed to establish secure supply
lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for over-
whelming sea power, supported by ground forces strategically employed
against isolated outpost garrisons.

Always — from the very day we were attacked — it was right
militarily as well as morally to reject the arguments of those short-
sighted people who would have had us throw Britain and Russia to the
Nazi wolves and concentrate against the Japanese. Such people urged
that we fight a purely defensive war against Japan while allowing the
domination of all the rest of the world by Nazism and Fascism.

[And we had to reject the arguments of many others who wanted
to disperse our forces all over the world instead of retaining a reason-
able concentration of them. Our controversies were with those who
failed to think in world terms, those who were thinking in the selfish
terms of their own country, or their own neighboring countries, or their]
own economic good. This world point of view which we have striven for was and is something relatively new in our history. Because to us it is something relatively novel, I believe that this country stands in a position of greater leadership possibilities than in the case of other nations or empires.

In the case of Germany, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power were already available in Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy.

Our decision was made therefore to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat. That decision was based on all these factors; and it was also based on the realization that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a war potential.

Now, as this seventy-ninth Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944, of the German "impregnable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium.
We had in Europe two active and indomitable Allies — Britain and the Soviet Union — and there were the heroic resistance movements in the occupied countries, constantly engaging and harassing the Germans.

We cannot forget how Britain held the line, alone, in 1940 and 1941, and at the same time, despite ferocious bombardment from the air, built up a tremendous armaments industry which enabled her to take the offensive at El Alamein in 1942.

We cannot forget the heroic defense of Moscow in 1941, Stalingrad in 1942, or the tremendous Russian offensives of 1943 and 1944 which destroyed formidable German armies.

Nor can we forget how, for seven years, the Chinese people have been sustaining the barbarous attacks of the Japanese and containing large enemy forces on the vast areas of the Asiatic mainland.

In the future we must never forget the lesson that we have learned — that we must have Allies — friends, who will work with us in peace as they have fought at our side in war.
and Luxembourg — almost to the Rhine itself.

The cross channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches — and merchant seamen — to the sailors who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied — and to the military leaders and engineers who achieved a real miracle of planning and execution. And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to plan together, and work together, and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this, the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American and French forces based in North Africa and Italy.

Finally, the success of the two invasions is a tribute to the ability of many men and women to maintain silence, when a few careless words would have imperilled the lives of hundreds of thousands, and would have jeopardized the whole stupendous undertakings.

These two great operations were made possible by success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Without this success over German submarines, we could not have built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could we
have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had landed in France.

The Nazis, however, may succeed in improving their submarines and their crews, and they may once more launch an aggressive submarine attack.

The Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the British and Canadian Navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.

The tremendous operations in Western Europe have overshadowed in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian front. Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been obscured, and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected — now.

What the Allied forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part of our strategy now aimed at only one objective — the total defeat of the Germans. These valiant forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure — including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops — all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere.

Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army — reinforced by units from other United Nations including a brave and well-equipped unit of the Brazilian Army — have, in the past year, pushed north through bloody Cassino and the Anzio beachhead, through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.
The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue.

The American people — and every soldier now fighting in the Appennines — should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific.

A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa was a little more than a month old.

A year ago, we were preparing for our invasion of Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Pacific to the Philippines.

A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea almost 1500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.
We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself — and will continue to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two. There is still hard fighting ahead in the Philippines — costly fighting. But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been largely cut off from her conquests in the East Indies.

The landing of our troops in the Philippines was the largest amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific.

Moreover, these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night engagements around Guadalcanal in November-December, 1942, had our Navy been able to come to grips with major units of the Japanese fleet. We had brushed against their fleet in the first battle of the Philippine Sea in June, 1944, but not until last October were we able really to engage a major portion of the Japanese navy in actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for three days was the heaviest blow ever struck against Japanese sea power.

As the result of that battle, much of what is left of the Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates the Yellow Sea, the China Sea and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.
Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of
the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the
courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces — on all
fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership
which has guided their sons into battle.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history
of teamwork and cooperation, of skill and daring. Let me give you one
example out of last year’s operations in the Pacific.

Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces
into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy
blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by
further stages, taking islands which we may call A, C and E. However,
Admiral Halsey reported that a direct attack on Leyte appeared feasible.
When General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey’s task
forces, he concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese
in the Philippines directly — by-passing islands A, C and E.

[Admiral Halsey was in agreement with this, and Admiral Halsey
thereupon offered to make available to General MacArthur several of his
divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives.}
These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on the same day.

Thus, within the space of twenty-four hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different theaters of operations -- a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory -- a change which saved lives which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now far behind our lines. [End of no danger.]

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost insuperable difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944. At present our aid to China must be accomplished by air transport -- there is no other way. By the end of 1944, the Air Transport Command was carrying into China a tonnage of supplies three times as great as that delivered a year ago, and more, each month, than the Burma road ever delivered at its peak.
Despite the loss of important bases in China, the tonnage delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the Japanese.

In 1944, aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more than 35,000 sorties against the Japanese and sank 645,000 tonnage tons of enemy shipping, greatly diminishing the usefulness of the China Sea lanes.

In all of our military actions -- on land, and sea and in the air -- the final job, the toughest job, has been performed by those average, easy-going, [every-day] hard-fighting young American who carries the weight of battle on his own shoulders. Painlessly and affectlessly known as "G.I. Joe."

He -- whether he be soldier, sailor or airman -- is the one indispensable man in this war.

It is to him that we and all future generations of Americans must pay grateful tribute.

But -- it is of small satisfaction to him to know that monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he needs, and he is entitled to insist upon, our active support -- now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made possible our victories on land and sea and in the air, we shall have to increase our goals even more in certain items.
In Burma, and Chinese
Together with British and Dominion forces and the
Together with our own, against determined Japanese attacks
have not only held the line demanding but have gained bases
of considerable importance to the supply line into China.

The Burma campaigns have involved incredible hardship and
have demanded exceptional fortitude and determination. The officers
and men who have served with so much devotion in these far distant
jungles and mountains deserve the highest honor from their countrymen.
Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Department in December 1943. We have not produced as much since then. Delivery of Army supplies fell 15 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once more resumed.

In the early months of October, 1944, the Army Service Forces had to increase its estimate of required production by 10 percent because of increased demands from overseas. But in November, two months ago, the requirements for 1945 had to be increased another 10 per cent, sending the production goal well above anything we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition. As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expend will mount day by day.

In October, 1944, while some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.

One of the most urgent immediate requirements for the men we are sending overseas is nurses. Last April the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000.
Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army.

Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000. That means that 18,000 more nurses must be obtained for the Army alone.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalized, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to 26 beds, instead of the recommended one to 15 beds.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due, however, to any shortage of nurses. 280,000 registered nurses are now practicing in this country. It has been estimated by the War Manpower Commission that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the Army without interfering at all with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.

Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required for the Army, I urge that the Selective Service Act be amended to provide
for the induction of nurses into the army. The need is too pressing to 
await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.

The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers 
have been to the best known to medical science. Those standards must be 
maintained at all cost. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by 
failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand in 
need of it.

We could not now stop production of war weapons, even if we 
had built up a vast reserve of supplies. We shall also need constantly 
new types of weapons. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or 
tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army 
now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet 
mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need many thousands 
of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics 
which must be put into production in order to maintain our technical 
superiority — and in order to save lives. We have to work every day 
to keep ahead of the enemy in radar.
FIFTH DRAFT

For example: on D-Day, in France, with our superior new equipment, we located and then put out of operation every warning set which the Germans had along the French coast.

If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development of new weapons we pay for our backwardness with the life's blood of our sons.

The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job — for additional American civilians — men and women — not engaged in essential work, to go out and get a war job. Workers who are released because their production is cut back should get another job where production is being increased. This is no time to quit or change to less essential jobs.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs — or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And — again — that payment must be made with the life's blood of our sons.

Many critical production programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important of these
are artillery ammunition, [small arms ammunition] cotton duck, bombs, tires, tanks, heavy trucks and even B-29's. In each of these vital programs present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of high-capacity ammunition is [being] hampered by manpower shortages; so is production for its huge rocket program. [It is also expected that difficulties may be later experienced in its cruiser and carrier programs, and production of certain types of aircraft.] Shortages of labor hamper the Navy production of new types of aircraft, dry cells, radar, and other essentials. There is critical need for more repair workers and repair parts; this lack delays the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and prevents ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.

The pool of young men under 26 classified as 1-A is almost depleted. Increased replacements for the armed forces will take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady and, to the extent necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1945 production goals.
Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the
Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic
way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommend-
dation was not adopted.

I now again call upon the Congress to enact this measure for the
total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the
war. It is not too late in the war. In fact, bitter experience has
shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are con-
stantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come
to the end of the war, the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war
production with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

There are three basic arguments for a National Service Law.

First -- it would assure that we have the right numbers of workers
in the right places at the right times.

Second -- it would provide supreme proof to all our fighting men
that their country is really going all-out in their support.

And -- third -- it would be the final, unequivocal answer to the
hopes of the Nazis and the Japanese that they can get from us a negotiated
peace.
A program of national service which would make every able-bodied adult available for war production or other essential needs will be used only to the extent absolutely required by military necessities. In fact experience in other nations at war indicates that use of the compulsory powers of national service legislation is seldom necessary.

This proposed legislation should provide against loss of retirement and seniority rights and benefits. It does not mean reduction in wages.

National Service legislation will make it possible to put ourselves in a position which will assure certain and speedy action in meeting our manpower requirements. In adopting such legislation, it is not necessary to discard the voluntary and cooperative processes which have prevailed up to this time. On the contrary, we must continue to rely on the cooperative action of labor and management working with Government. This cooperation has already produced great results. We must build on the foundations that have already been laid and supplement the measures now in operation, in order to guarantee the accomplishments of the actions that may be necessary in the critical period that lies ahead.
The White House
Washington

June 19

I am

in receipt of a joint
letter from the Secretary of
the Navy and the
Secretary of the Army which
I quote in full:

[Handwritten text not legible]
At the present time,

In the meantime we are using the inadequate tools at hand to
do the best we can by such expedients as manpower ceilings, and the use
of priority and other powers to induce men and women to shift from non-
essential to essential war jobs.

Pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects of national
service, I recommend that the Congress immediately enact legislation which
will be effective in using the services of the 4,000,000 men now classified
as 4-F in whatever capacity is best for the war effort.

Under existing law the Executive Branch of the Government has done,
and is doing, everything possible to scrape the barrel for the filling of our
war needs of manpower — military and equipment.

Only the Congress can complete the effort. I trust that the
Congress will remember these words and that necessary legislation will
soon be forthcoming.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before,
increased their already phenomenal production of food of the previous year.
However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supplement the
production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity, as well as of
common humanity, we must furnish the newly-liberated areas of Europe with
enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starvation and to prevent
chaos behind the Allied lines.
At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which to buy more food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians. It would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too little.

Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty to eat -- and plenty is enough for anyone.

In the field of foreign policy, we propose to stand together with the United Nations not for the war alone but for the victory for which the war is fought. It is not only a common danger which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments but of peoples and the peoples’ hope is peace. Here as in England; in England as in Russia; in Russia as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace -- a peace that is durable and secure.

It will not be easy to create this peoples’ peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies
will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step -- but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight.

The firm foundation can be built -- and it will be built. But the continuance and assurance of a living peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience, how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an eddy of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the peoples of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with far greater problems of adjustment, will
work out their difficulties for themselves.

Wars can be fought by governments, but peace can be made and kept only by the united will of free and peace-loving peoples who are willing to work together -- willing to respect and tolerate and try to understand one another's opinions and feelings.

The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors.

We must not let those differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in the peace.

International cooperation on which enduring peace must be based is not a one way street.

Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.

We cannot hope to eliminate power as a factor in world politics any more than we can hope to eliminate power as a factor in national politics. But in a democratic world as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.

Perfectionism no less than isolationism, imperialism and power politics may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget
that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started
not by a direct attack against international cooperation, but against the
alleged imperfections of the peace.

In our disillusionment after the last war, we preferred inter-
national anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not
see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving
a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfil our responsibilities in
an imperfect world.

We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same
tragic road again -- the road to a third world war.

Do not misunderstand me. We can fulfil our responsibilities
for maintaining the security of our own country, only by exercising our
power and our influence to achieve the principles in which we believe
and for which we have fought.

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and I agreed to
the principles of the Atlantic Charter, these being later incorporated
into the Declaration of the United Nations. At that time certain
isolationists protested vigorously against our right to proclaim the
principles -- and against the very principles themselves. Today, many
of the same people are protesting against the alleged violation of the
same principles.
It is true that the statement of principles does not provide rules of easy application to each and every one of this war-torn world’s tangled situations. But it is a good and a useful thing to have principles toward which we can aim.

And we shall not hesitate to use our influence to secure so far as is humanly possible the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

I do not wish to give the impression that all mistakes can be avoided and that many disappointments are not inevitable in the making of peace. But we must not this time lose the hope of establishing an international order which will be capable of maintaining peace and realizing through the years more perfect justice between nations than could possibly be secured by continuing ordeals of battle.

To do this we must be on our guard not to exploit and exaggerate the differences between us and our allies, particularly with reference to the peoples they have liberated from fascist tyranny. That is not the way to secure a better settlement of those differences or to secure international machinery which can rectify mistakes which may be made.

I should not be frank if I did not admit concern about many situations, the Greek and Polish for example. But these situations are not as easy or as simple to deal with as partisans whose sincerity I do
not question would have us believe. We have obligations, not necessarily legally, to the exiled governments, to the underground leaders and to our major allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did. We cannot forget that some of the members of exiled governments were the first to resist Nazi tyranny, nor that some of the most vigorous and valiant underground leaders had to be convinced that this was not an imperialistic war.

We and our allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. But with internal dissension, with many citizens of liberated countries still prisoners of war or forced to labor in Germany, it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people really want. It is only too easy for all of us to rationalize what we want to believe and to consider those leaders we like responsible and those we dislike irresponsible. And our task is not helped by the stubborn partisanship, however understandable, of opposed internal groups.

It is our purpose to help the peace-loving peoples of Europe to live together as good neighbors, to recognize their common interests and not to nurse their traditional grievances against one another.
We must not permit the many specific problems of adjustment connected with the liberation of Europe to delay the establishment of permanent machinery for the maintenance of peace. Under the threat of a common danger, the United Nations joined together in war to preserve their independence and their freedom. They must now join together to preserve the independence and freedom of all peace-loving states so that never again shall tyranny be able to divide and conquer.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, require continuing cooperation and organized effort.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, can be secured only through institutions capable of life and growth.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding which surrounded the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.
This atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding at the International Conferences during the past year is not aided by those Americans who, by voice or writing, deliberately try to magnify dissension and create trouble. Here again, they come very close to being labeled "made in Germany".

They hope, as Germany hopes, that disunity can be sown in our ranks — disunity within each Allied Nation and disunity in their collective efforts to make a better world.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of intercommunication between peoples over the past generation offer a practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to use these great technological achievements for the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in also for nations. We are opposed to restrictions whether by public act or private arrangement which limit commerce, transit and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest
of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to
materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the
history of the world.

One of the most encouraging events of the year in the international
field — although one which occasions no surprise to the friends of that
country — has been the renaissance of the French people and the return of
the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations. Far from having
been crushed by the yoke of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged
with stronger faith than ever in the destiny of their country and in the
soundness of the democratic ideals to which the French nation has tradi-
tionally contributed so greatly.

During her liberation, France has given many evidences of her un-
ceasing desire and determination to resume an ever-increasing part in
the United Nations war effort, in continuation of the heroic efforts of
the resistance groups under the occupation and of those Frenchmen who
abroad continued the fight by our side after the disaster of 1940. Since
our landings in Africa, we have placed in French hands all the arms and
material of war which our resources and the military situation permitted.
And I am glad to say that we are now about to equip large new French
forces for combat duty.

In addition to the contribution which France can make to
our common victory, her liberation likewise means that her great
influence will again be available in meeting the problems of peace.
France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the German problem and the
contribution which she can make in achieving international security are
fully recognized. Her formal adherence to the Declaration by United Nations
a few days ago and the proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, whereby
France would receive one of the five permanent seats in the proposed
Security Council, are indications of the extent to which France has resumed
her proper position of strength and leadership.

I have determined in my own mind that, as an essential factor in
the maintenance of peace in the future, we must have Universal Military
Training after this war, and I shall send a special message to the Congress
on this subject.

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America —
strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

In the State of the Union Message last year I set forth what I
considered to be an American economic Bill of Rights. \[\text{Insert A}\]

Of these rights the most fundamental, and one on which the ful-
fillment of the others in large degree depends, is the "right to a useful
and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the
I said then and I say now that these economic truths represent a second bill of rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all - regardless of station, race or creed.
nation." In turn, others of the economic rights of American citizenship such as the right to a decent home, to a good education, to good medical care, to social security, to reasonable farm income, will, if fulfilled, make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to half our total capacity production.

After the war we must maintain full employment with Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand and purchasing power by private consumers — farmers, businessmen, workers, professional men, housewives — which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands; and it means also that we must greatly increase our export trade above the pre-war level.

Our policy is, of course, to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not accept mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work — and that means approximately 60 million jobs.
The Federal Government must assume the responsibility for seeing to it that these rights become realities.
Full employment also means not only jobs, but productive jobs. Americans do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive jobs.

During the war we have achieved a high degree of coordination in Government activities and cooperation between Government, business, labor, and agriculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accomplish our peacetime objectives.

We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work — on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition — without the stifling presence of monopolies and cartels.

Our present tax system geared primarily to war requirements must be revised for peacetime so as to encourage private demand. While no general revision of the tax structure can be made until the war ends on all fronts, I urge the Congress to consider modifications in the taxes on business which will provide incentives to new investment and growing enterprise. We must reduce or eliminate taxes which bear too heavily on consumption.

We will end this war with a very much larger debt than at the end of the last war because this war is on a vastly greater scale. Of course we ought to reduce taxes; but we should make it the national policy to reduce the debt year after year so that the interest on the national debt can automatically decrease year by year.
It will be a great temptation to political parties in the years to come to angle for votes by promises to reduce taxes. It is essential that we continue taxes sufficiently high to make possible the substantial reduction of the debt. The attitude on this subject will be a good line of demarcation between politicians and statesmen — between temporizing and patriotism.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should adopt similar devices in peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.

Our full-employment program requires the extensive development of our natural resources and other useful public works. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-valley projects will add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA was a bargain at $500 million dollars. We have similar opportunities in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these river basins, as we have in the Tennessee Valley, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of civil
This necessary expansion of our peace time productive capacity will require new facilities, new plants and new equipment.

It will require large outlays of money which should be raised through normal investment channels. But while private capital should finance this expansion program, the Government should recognize its responsibility for sharing part of any special or abnormal risk of loss attached to such financing.

We must expand our foreign trade. Important progress to this end was achieved at the Bretton Woods Conference last year. The adoption by Congress of the Bretton Woods Agreements will be proposed by me at an early date.
aviation and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce, it will be necessary to construct thousands of more airports and to overhaul our entire national highway system.

The provision of a decent home for every family is a national necessity if this country is to be worthy of its greatness — and that task will itself create great employment opportunities. Most of our cities need extensive rebuilding. Much of our farm plant is in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal attack on the problems of housing and urban reconstruction will require thoroughgoing cooperation between industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.

An expanded social security program and adequate health and education programs must play essential roles in a program designed to support individual productivity and mass purchasing power. I shall communicate further with the Congress on these subjects at a later date.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to full employment.

The war will leave deep disturbances in the world economy, in our national economy, in many communities, in many families, and in many individuals. It will require determined effort and responsible action of all of us to find our way back to peace time and to help others to find their way back to peace time — a peace time that holds
The millions of productive jobs that a program of this nature could bring are jobs in private enterprise. They are jobs based on the expanded demand for the output of our economy for consumption and investment. A program of this character can provide America with a national income high enough to provide for an orderly retirement of the public debt along with reasonable tax reduction.

Our present tax system geared primarily to war requirements must be revised for peacetime so as to encourage private demand.

While no general revision of the tax structure can be made until the war ends on all fronts, I urge the Congress to grant tax relief at the end of the war in order to encourage capital to invest in new enterprises and to provide jobs. As an integral part of this program to maintain high employment, we must, after the war is over, reduce or eliminate taxes which bear too heavily on consumption. Broad markets are needed to sustain high production and employment and so long as consumption is taxed heavily we cannot attain our fullest employment and business opportunities.
the values of the past and the promise of the future.

If we attack the problems with determination we shall succeed. And we must succeed. For freedom and peace cannot exist without security.

During the past year the American people reassured their democratic faith in a national election.

In the course of that campaign, various references were made to "strife" between this Administration and the Congress with the implication (if not the direct assertion) that this Administration and the Congress could not work together harmoniously in the service of the Nation.

It cannot be denied that there have been disagreements between the Legislative and Executive Branches — as there have been disagreements during the past century and a half. That is the way of democracy — and it is a way that we do not intend to change.

Particularly in war time, when we all bear extraordinarily heavy responsibilities, there is apt to be impatience with the other fellow and occasional displays of cantankerousness.

I think we all realize too that there are some people in this Capital City whose task is in large part to stir up dissension, and to
magnify normal healthy disagreements so that they appear to be irreconcilable conflicts.

But — I think that the overall record in this respect is eloquent: the Government of the United States of America — all branches of it — has a good record of achievement in this war. The legislation needed for the war job has been passed and the required funds have been appropriated, and I am not worried about future relations between Capitol Hill and the White House.

We have a great many more problems ahead of us and we must approach them with realism and courage.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.

Most important of all — 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died.
in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made — of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history — and I hope it will be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
FIFTH DRAFT - A

Message of the President to
The Congress on the State of
the Union - January , 1945.

In this Message on the state of the Union, I shall indicate
some new measures which I believe will help to hasten the day of total
victory; and, in the weeks and months to come, I shall perform my con-
stitutional duty by recommending to the consideration of the Congress
such measures as I judge necessary and expedient.

This war must be waged -- it is being waged -- with the great-
est and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at
stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men, fighting
far from home, have already won victories which the world will never
forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no question
whether of the cost. Our losses will be heavy.

We and our allies will go on fighting together to ultimate total
victory.

We have seen a year marked, on the whole, by substantial progress
toward victory, even though the year ended with a set-back for our arms,
when the Germans launched a ferocious counter-attack into Luxembourg and
Belgium with the obvious objective of cutting our line in the center.

(Note: more to come on this battle as events develop before
delivery of this Message.)
In considering the state of the Union, the war, and the peace that is to follow, are naturally uppermost in the minds of all of us.
This German counter-offensive, however, has turned out to be far from the defeat for us which, for a time, some people feared. Our men fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most difficult conditions, and our German enemies have sustained considerable losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

Further desperate attempts may well be made to break our lines, to slow our progress. We must never make the mistake of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has surrendered.

And I would express another most serious warning against the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was less dangerous in actual terms of winning the war than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

Every little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst -- seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are here and there, evil and baseless rumors against the Russians -- rumors against the British -- rumors against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely, you will observe that every one of them bears the same trademark -- "Made in Germany."
The high tide of this German effort was reached two
days after Christmas. Since then we have reasserted the
offensive, rescued the isolated garrison at Bastogne, and
forced a German withdrawal along the whole line of the salient.
The speed with which we recovered from this savage attack was
largely possible because we have one Supreme Commander in
complete control of all the Allied armies in France. He has
faced this period of trial with admirable calm and resolution
and with steadily increasing success. He has my complete
confidence.
We must resist this divisive propaganda -- we must destroy it -- with the same strength and the same determination that our fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and -- despite temporary setbacks here or there -- we shall continue the attack until Germany is completely defeated.

It is appropriate at this time to review the basic strategy which has guided us through three years of war, and which will lead, eventually, to total victory.

The tremendous effort of the first years of this war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort -- in the language of the military men -- of deployment of our forces. Many battles -- essential battles -- were fought; many victories -- vital victories -- were won. But these battles and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy, and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the final, decisive blows.

In the beginning our most important military task was to prevent our enemies -- the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that
ever have threatened civilization -- from winning decisive victories. But

even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking

forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative from our enemies

and place our superior resources of men and materials into direct com-

petition with them.

It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require

the massing of overwhelming forces -- ground, sea and air -- in positions

from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy

homelands, and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan, we had to await the completion of extensive

preliminary operations -- operations designed to establish secure supply

lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for over-

whelming sea power and air power -- supported by ground forces strategically

employed against isolated outpost garrisons.

Always -- from the very day we were attacked -- it was right

militarily as well as morally to reject the arguments of those short-
sighted people who would have had us throw Britain and Russia to the

Nazi wolves and concentrate against the Japanese. Such people urged

that we fight a purely defensive war against Japan while allowing the

domination of all the rest of the world by Nazism and Fascism.
In the European theatre, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power against Germany were already available in Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy.

Therefore, our decision was made therefore to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat. That decision was based on all these factors; and it was also based on the realisation that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a war potential.

We had in Europe two active and indomitable Allies — Britain and the Soviet Union — and there were also the heroic resistance movements in the occupied countries, constantly engaging and harassing the Germans.

We cannot forget how Britain held the line, alone, in 1940 and 1941; and at the same time, despite ferocious bombardment from the air, built up a tremendous arms industry which enabled her to take the offensive at El Alamein in 1942.

We cannot forget the heroic defenses of Moscow and Leningrad and Stalingrad, or the tremendous Russian offensives of 1943 and 1944 which destroyed formidable German armies.
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Nor can we forget how, for more than seven long years, the Chinese people have been sustaining the barbarous attacks of the Japanese and containing large enemy forces on the vast areas of the Asiatic mainland.

In the future we must never forget the lesson that we have learned — that we must have [Allies] — we must have friends who will work with us in peace as they have fought at our side in war.

Now, as this seventy-ninth Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944, of the German "impregnable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg — almost to the Rhine itself.

The cross channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches — to the sailors and merchant seamen who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied — and to the military and naval leaders [and engineers] who achieved a real miracle of planning and execution. And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to plan together, and work
As a result of the combined effort of the Allied forces, great military victories were achieved in 1944, including the liberation of France, Belgium, Greece, and parts of the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia; the surrender of Rumania and Bulgaria; the invasion of Germany itself and Hungary; the steady march through the Pacific Islands to the Philippines, Guam, and Saipan; clearing of most of the Burma Road; and the beginnings of a mighty air offensive against the Japanese Islands.
together, and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross channel invasion was followed in August by a second
great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this,
the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American and the Allied
French forces based in North Africa and Italy.

[Finally] the success of the two invasions is a tribute to the
ability of many men and women to maintain silence, when a few careless words
would have imperilled the lives of hundreds of thousands, and would have
jeopardised the whole undertakings.

These two great operations were made possible by success in the
Battle of the Atlantic.

Without this success over German submarines, we could not have
built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could we
have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had landed
in France.

The Nazis, however, may succeed in improving their submarines and
their crews. They have recently increased their U-boat activity. The
Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the British, Canadian
and other Allied Navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.
The tremendous operations in Western Europe have overshadowed in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian front. Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been obscured, and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected now.

What the Allied forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part of our strategy, now aimed at only one objective — the total defeat of the Germans. These valiant forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure — including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops — all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere.

Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army — reinforced by units from other United Nations, including a brave and well-equipped unit of the Brazilian Army — have, in the past year, pushed north through bloody Cassino and the Anzio beachhead, through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.
That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue.

The American people — and every soldier now fighting in the Appenines — should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific.

A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa was a little more than a month old.

A year ago, we were preparing for our invasion of Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Central Pacific to the Philippines.

A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea almost 1,500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.

We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself — and will continue to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.
Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two.

There is still hard fighting ahead—in the Philippines—costly fighting.

But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been largely cut off from her conquests in the East Indies.

The landing of our troops—in the Philippines—was the largest amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific.

Moreover, these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night engagements around Guadalcanal in November-December, 1942, had our Navy been able to come to grips with major units of the Japanese fleet. We had brushed against their fleet in the first battle of the Philippine Sea in June, 1944, but not until last October were we able really to engage a major portion of the Japanese navy in actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for three days was the heaviest blow ever struck against Japanese sea power.

As the result of that battle, much of what is left of the Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates the Yellow Sea, the China Sea, and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.
The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces — on all fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership which has guided their sons into battle.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history of teamwork and cooperation, of skill and daring. Let me give you one example out of last year’s operations in the Pacific.

Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, C and E. However, Admiral Halsey reported that a direct attack on Leyte appeared feasible. When General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey’s task forces, he also concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese in the Philippines directly — by-passing islands A, C and E.

Admiral Nimitz thereupon offered to make available to General MacArthur several divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives. These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one day.
General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on the same day.

Thus, within the space of twenty-four hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different theaters of operations — a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory — a change which saved lives which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now neutralized far behind our lines.

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost insuperable difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944. At present our aid to China must be accomplished by air transport — there is no other way.

By the end of 1944, the Air Transport Command was carrying into China a tonnage of supplies three times as great as that delivered a year ago, and more, each month, than the Burma road ever delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China, the tonnage delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force, which includes many Chinese flyers, to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the Japanese. In 1944, aircraft of the
Fourteenth Air Force flew more than 35,000 sorties against the Japanese and sank enormous tonnage of enemy shipping, greatly diminishing the usefulness of the China Sea lanes.

In Burma, British, Dominion and Chinese forces together with our own have not only held the line against determined Japanese attacks but have gained bases of considerable importance to the supply line into China.

The Burma campaigns have involved incredible hardship and have demanded exceptional fortitude and determination. The officers and men who have served with so much devotion in these far distant jungles and mountains deserve high honor from their countrymen.

In all of our military operations — on land, and sea and in the air — the final job, the toughest job, has been performed by the average, easy-going, hard-fighting young American who carries the weight of battle on his own shoulders.

He — whether he be soldier, sailor or airman — is the one indispensable man in this war.

It is to him that we and all future generations of Americans must pay grateful tribute.
But -- it is of small satisfaction to him to know that monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he needs, and he is entitled to insist upon, our active support -- now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made possible our victories on land and sea and in the air, we shall have to increase our goals even more in certain items.

Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Department in December 1943. Due in part to cut-backs, we have not produced as much since then. Deliveries of Army supplies were down by 25 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once more resumed.

Because of increased demands from overseas, the Army Service Forces in the month of October, 1944 had to increase its estimate of required production by 10 percent. But in November, two months ago, the requirements for 1945 had to be increased another 10 percent, sending the production goal well above anything we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition. As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expend will mount day by day.

In October, 1944, while some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.
It is tragic that the gallant women who have volunteered for service as nurses should be so over-worked. It is tragic that our wounded men should ever want for the best possible care.
One of the most urgent immediate requirements of the armed forces is more nurses. Last April the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000. Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army.

Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000. That means that 18,000 more nurses must be obtained for the Army alone. The Navy requires 2,000 additional nurses.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalized, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to fifteen beds, instead of the recommended one to ten beds.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due to any shortage of nurses. 280,000 registered nurses are now practicing in this country. It has been estimated by the War
Manpower Commission that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the Army without interfering too seriously with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.

Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required for the Army, I urge that the Selective Service Act be amended to provide for the induction of nurses into the armed forces. The need is too pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.

The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers have been the best known to medical science. Those standards must be maintained at all costs. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand in need of it.

We could not now stop production of war weapons, even if we had built up a vast reserve of supplies. We shall also need constantly new types of weapons. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need many thousands of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics which must be put into production in order to maintain our technical
superiority -- and in order to save lives. We have to work every day to keep ahead of the enemy in radar.

For examples, on D-Day, in France, with our superior new equipment, we located and then put out of operation every warning set which the Germans had along the French coast.

If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development of new weapons, we pay for our backwardness with the life's blood of our sons.

The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job -- for additional American civilians, men and women, not engaged in essential work, to go out and get a war job. Workers who are released because their production is cut back should get another job where production is being increased. This is no time to quit or change to less essential jobs.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter.
And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs -- or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And -- again -- that payment must be made with the life's blood of our sons.
Many critical production programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important army needs are artillery ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, tires, tanks, heavy trucks and even B-29's. In each of these vital programs present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of bombardment ammunition is hampered by manpower shortages; so is production for its huge rocket program. Labor shortages have also delayed its cruiser and carrier programs, and production of certain types of aircraft.

There is critical need for more repair workers and repair parts; this lack delays the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and prevents ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.

The pool of young men under 26 classified as I-A is almost depleted. Increased replacements for the armed forces will take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady and, to the extent necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1945 production goals.
Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was not adopted.

I now again call upon the Congress to enact this measure for the total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war. I urge that this be done at the earliest possible moment.

It is not too late in the war. In fact, bitter experience has shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war, the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

There are three basic arguments for a National Service Law.

First — it would assure that we have the right numbers of workers in the right places at the right times.

Second — it would provide supreme proof to all our fighting men that we are going there what they are entitled to which is that their country is really going all-out in their support.

And — third — it would be the final, unequivocal answer to the hopes of the Nazis and the Japanese that they can get from us a negotiated peace.

nothing less than our total efforts
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A program of national service which would make every able-bodied adult available for war production or other essential needs, would be used only to the extent absolutely required by military necessities. In fact, experience in other nations at war indicates that use of the compulsory powers of national service legislation is seldom necessary, only in rare instances.

This proposed legislation would provide against loss of retirement and seniority rights and benefits. It does not mean reduction in wages.

National Service legislation would make it possible to put ourselves in a position which will assure certain and speedy action in meeting our manpower requirements. In adopting such legislation, it is not necessary to discard the voluntary and cooperative processes which have prevailed up to this time. [On the contrary, we must continue to rely on the cooperative action of labor and management working with Government.] This cooperation has already produced great results. The

contributing your workers to the war effort has been beyond measure. We must build on the foundations that have already been laid and supplement the measures now in operation, in order to guarantee the production that may be necessary in the critical period that lies ahead.
At the present time we are using the inadequate tools at hand to do the best we can by such expedients as manpower ceilings, and the use of priority and other powers, to induce men and women to shift from nonessential to essential war jobs.

Under existing law the Executive Branch of the Government has done, and is doing, everything possible to scrape the manpower barrel for the filling of our war needs for fighting men and for workers. I am in receipt of a joint letter from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, dated January 3, 1945, which says:

quote in full

"...With the experience of three years of war and after the most thorough consideration, we are convinced that it is now necessary to carry out the statement made by the Congress in the joint resolutions declaring that a state of war existed with Japan and Germany: that 'to bring the conflict to a successful conclusion, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.'

In our considered judgment, which is supported by General Marshall and Admiral King, of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, this requires total mobilization of our manpower by the passage of a national war service law. The armed forces need this legislation to hasten the day of final victory, and to keep to a minimum the cost in lives."
National war service, the recognition by law of the duty of every citizen to do his or her part in winning the war, will give complete assurance that the need for war equipment will be filled. In the coming year we must increase the output of many weapons and supplies on short notice. Otherwise we shall not keep our production abreast of the swiftly changing needs of war. At the same time it will be necessary to draw progressively many men now engaged in war production to serve with the armed forces, and their places in war production must be filled promptly. These developments will require the addition of hundreds of thousands to those already working in war industry. We do not believe that these needs can be met effectively under present methods.

The record made by management and labor in war industry has been a notable testimony to the resourcefulness and power of America. The needs are so great, nevertheless, that in many instances we have been forced to recall soldiers and sailors from military duty to do work of a civilian character in war production, because of the urgency of the need for equipment and because of inability to recruit civilian labor.

We know that the men in the armed forces will be heartened by the knowledge that the entire resources of the nation have in fact been fully committed to their support. Our fighting men are entitled to nothing less than our total effort.
"Finally, the passage of national war service legislation at this time will serve as unmistakable proof to our enemies of our determination to go through to complete victory."

Pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects of national service, I recommend that the Congress immediately enact legislation which will be effective in using the services of the 4,000,000 men now classified as 4-F in whatever capacity is best for the war effort.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before, increased their already phenomenal production of food of the previous year. However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supplement the production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity, as well as of common humanity, we must furnish the newly-liberated areas of Europe with enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starvation and to prevent chaos behind the Allied lines.
At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which to buy more food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians. It would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too little.

Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty to eat — and plenty is enough for anyone.

In the field of foreign policy, we propose to stand together with the United Nations not for the war alone but for the victory for which the war is fought.

It is not only a common danger which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments but of peoples, and the peoples' hope is peace. Here, as in England; in England, as in Russia; in Russia, as in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable and secure.

It will not be easy to create this peoples' peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies
will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the
armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step — but the first
step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the
Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude our-
selves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can
be solved overnight.

The firm foundation can be built — and it will be built. But
the continuance and assurance of a living peace must, in the long run,
be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult
processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience; how
great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties
peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left
behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an eddy of lawlessness
and disregard of human life." There were separatist movements of one
kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky
and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts
and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the
peoples of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with sem-greater problems
of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.
Peace can be made and kept only by the united will of free and peace-loving peoples who are willing to work together — willing to help one another — willing to respect and tolerate and try to understand one another's opinions and feelings.

The nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become conscious of differences among the victors.

We must not let these differences divide us and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in the peace.

International cooperation on which enduring peace must be based is not a one way street.

Nations like individuals do not always see alike or think alike, and international cooperation and progress are not helped by any nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdom or of virtue.

In the future world, the misuse of power, as implied in the term "power-politics", must not be a controlling factor in international relations. That is the heart of the principles to which we have subscribed. We cannot deny that power is a factor in world politics any more than we can deny its existence as a factor in national politics. But in a democratic world, as in a democratic nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.
Perfectionism, no less than isolationism, imperialism and power politics may obstruct the paths to international peace. Let us not forget that the retreat to isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by a direct attack against international cooperation, but against the alleged imperfections of the peace.

In our disillusionment after the last war, we preferred international anarchy to international cooperation with nations which did not see and think exactly as we did. We gave up the hope of gradually achieving a better peace because we had not the courage to fulfil our admittedly responsibilities in an imperfect world.

We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow the same tragic road again — the road to a third world war.

[Do not misunderstand me.] We can fulfil our responsibilities for maintaining the security of our own country only by exercising our power and our influence to achieve the principles in which we believe and for which we have fought.
In August, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill and I agreed to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, these being later incorporated into the Declaration of the United Nations of January 1, 1942. At that time certain isolationists protested vigorously against our right to proclaim the principles — and against the very principles themselves. Today, many of the same people are protesting against the violation of the same principles.

It is true that the statement of principles does not provide rules of easy application to each and every one of this war-torn world's tangled situations. But it is a good and a useful thing — it is an essential thing — to have principles toward which we can aim.

And we shall not hesitate to use our influence and to use it now to secure so far as is humanly possible the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We have not shirked from the military responsibilities will brought on by this war. We cannot and will not shrink from the political responsibilities which follow in the wake of battle.

I do not wish to give the impression that all mistakes can be avoided and that many disappointments are not inevitable in the making of peace. But we must not this time lose the hope of establishing an international order which will be capable of maintaining peace and realizing through the years more perfect justice between nations.
To do this we must be on our guard not to exploit and exaggerate the differences between us and our Allies, particularly with reference to the peoples they have liberated from fascist tyranny. That is not the way to secure a better settlement of those differences or to secure international machinery which can rectify mistakes which may be made.

I should not be frank if I did not admit concern about many situations, the Greek and Polish for example. But those situations are not as easy or as simple to deal with as pretended whose sincerity I do not question would have us believe. We have obligations, not necessarily legal, to the exiled governments, to the underground leaders and to our major Allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did.

We and our Allies have declared that it is our purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. But with internal dissension, with many citizens of liberated countries still prisoners of war or forced to labor in Germany, it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people really want.

During the interim period, until conditions permit a genuine expression of the people's will, we and our Allies have a duty, which we cannot ignore, to use our influence to the end that no temporary or provisional authorities in the liberated countries block the eventual exercise of the peoples' right freely to choose the government and institutions under which, as freedom, they are to live.
It is only too easy for all of us to rationalize what we want to believe and to consider those leaders we like responsible and those we dislike irresponsible. And our task is not helped by stubborn partisanship, however understandable, on the part of opposed internal factions.

It is our purpose to help the peace-loving peoples of Europe to live together as good neighbors, to recognize their common interests and not to nurse their traditional grievances against one another.

But we must not permit the many specific problems of adjustment connected with the liberation of Europe to delay the establishment of permanent machinery for the maintenance of peace. Under the threat of a common danger, the United Nations joined together in war to preserve their independence and their freedom. They must now join together to make secure the independence and freedom of all peace-loving states so that never again shall tyranny be able to divide and conquer.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, require constant alertness, continuing cooperation, and organized effort.

International peace and well-being, like national peace and well-being, can be secured only through institutions capable of life and growth.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding and determination to find a common ground of common
understanding, which surrounded the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks, gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.

We and the other United Nations are going forward, with vigor and resolution, in our efforts to create such a system by providing for it strong and flexible institutions of joint and cooperative action.

The aroused conscience of humanity will not permit failure in this supreme endeavor.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of intercommunication between peoples over the past generation offer a practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace and the institutions of peace must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to use these great technological achievements for the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in also for nations. We are opposed to restrictions, whether by public act or private arrangement, which distort and impair commerce, transit and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials
and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world.

One of the most encouraging events of the year in the international field[—although one which occasions no surprise to the friends of that country—] has been the renaissance of the French people and the return of the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations. Far from having been crushed by the yoke of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged with stronger faith than ever in the destiny of their country and in the soundness of the democratic ideals to which the French nation has traditionally contributed so greatly.

During her liberation, France has given much evidence of her unceasing desire and determination to resume an ever-increasing part in the United Nations war effort, in continuation of the heroic efforts of the resistance groups under the occupation and of those Frenchmen who abroad continued the fight by our side after the disaster of 1940. French armies are again on the German frontier, and once again are fighting shoulder to shoulder with our sons.

Since our landings in Africa, we have placed in French hands all the arms and material of war which our resources and the military situation permitted. And I am glad to say that we are now about to equip large new French forces with the most modern weapons for combat duty.

In addition to the contribution which France can make to our common victory, her liberation likewise means that her great influence will again be available in meeting the problems of peace.
We fully recognize France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the German problem and the contribution which she can make in achieving international security. Her formal adherence to the Declaration by United Nations a few days ago and the proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, whereby France would receive one of the five permanent seats in the proposed Security Council, are indications of the extent to which France has resumed her proper position of strength and leadership.

I have determined in my own mind that, as an essential factor in the maintenance of peace in the future, we must have universal military training after this war, and I shall send a special message to the Congress on this subject.

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America -- strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

In the State of the Union Message last year, I set forth what I considered to be an American economic Bill of Rights.

I said then, and I say now, that these economic truths represent a second bill of rights under which a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all -- regardless of station, race or creed.
Of these rights the most fundamental, and one on which the fulfillment of the others in large degree depends, is the "right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the nation." In turn, others of the economic rights of American citizenship such as the right to a decent home, to a good education, to good medical care, to social security, to reasonable farm income, will, if fulfilled, make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

The Federal Government must assume the responsibility for seeing to it that these rights become realities.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to only one-tenth of our total capacity.

After the war we must maintain full employment with Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand and purchasing power by private consumers -- farmers, businessmen, workers, professional men, housewives -- which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands; and it means also that we must greatly increase our export trade above the pre-war level.
FIFTH DRAFT - A

Our policy is, of course, to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not accept mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work — and that means close to 60 million jobs.

Full employment means not only jobs, but productive jobs. Americans do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive jobs.

During the war we have achieved a high degree of coordination in government activities and cooperation between government, business, labor, and agriculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accomplish our peacetime objectives.

We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work — on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition, without the stifling presence of monopolies and cartels.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should also take appropriate measures in

new small enterprises and for

peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.

This necessary expansion of our peacetime productive capacity will require new facilities, new plants and new equipment.
It will require large outlays of money which should be raised through normal investment channels. But while private capital should finance this expansion program, the Government should recognize its responsibility for bearing part of any special or abnormal risk of loss attached to such financing.

We must expand our foreign trade. Important progress to this end was achieved at the Bretton Woods Conference last year, adoption by the Congress of the Bretton Woods Agreements will be proposed by me at an early date.

Our full-employment program requires the extensive development of our natural resources and other useful public works. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-works projects will add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA construction of 750 million dollars -- the cost of waging this war for less than four days -- was a bargain. We have similar opportunities in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these river basins, as we have in the Tennessee Valley, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of civil
aviation and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce, it will be necessary to construct thousands of [more] airports and to overhaul our entire national highway system.

The provision of a decent home for every family is a national necessity if this country is to be worthy of its greatness — and that task will itself create great employment opportunities. Most of our cities need extensive rebuilding. Much of our farm plant is in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal attack on the problems of housing and urban reconstruction will require thoroughgoing cooperation between industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.

An expanded social security program and adequate health and education programs must play essential roles in a program designed to support individual productivity and mass purchasing power. I shall communicate further with the Congress on these subjects at a later date.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to full employment.

The millions of productive jobs that a program of this nature could bring are jobs in private enterprise. They are jobs based on the expanded demand for the output of our economy for consumption and investment. A program of this character can provide America with a
a national income high enough to provide for an orderly retirement of the public debt along with reasonable tax reduction.

Our present tax system geared primarily to war requirements must be revised for peacetime so as to encourage private demand.

While no general revision of the tax structure can be made until the war ends on all fronts, I urge the Congress to enact tax legislation at the end of the war, to encourage capital to invest in new enterprises and to provide jobs. As an integral part of this program to maintain high employment, we must, after the war is over, reduce or eliminate taxes which bear too heavily on consumption.

The war will leave deep disturbances in the world economy, in our national economy, in many communities, in many families, and in many individuals. It will require determined effort and responsible action of all of us to find our way back to peacetime and to help others to find their way back to peacetime — a peacetime that holds the values of the past and the promise of the future.

If we attack our problems with determination we shall succeed. And we must succeed. For freedom and peace cannot exist without security.
During the past year the American people, in a national election, reasserted their democratic faith.

In the course of that campaign, various references were made to "strife" between this Administration and the Congress, with the implication, if not the direct assertion, that this Administration and the Congress could never work together harmoniously in the service of the Nation.

It cannot be denied that there have been disagreements between the Legislative and Executive Branches — as there have been disagreements during the past century and a half. [That is the way of democracy — and it is a way that we do not intend to change.]

[Particularly in war time, when we all bear extraordinarily heavy responsibilities, there is apt to be impatience with the other fellow and occasional displays of cantankerousness.]

I think we all realise too that there are some people in this Capital City whose task is in large part to stir up dissension, and to magnify normal healthy disagreements so that they appear to be irreconcilable conflicts.

But -- I think that the overall record in this respect is eloquent — the Government of the United States of America — all branches
of it — has a good record of achievement in this war. The legislation needed for the war job has been passed and the required funds have been appropriated, those of us who are interested in the welfare of our nation are not worried about future relations between Capitol Hill and the White House.

We have a great many more problems ahead of us and we must approach them with realism and courage.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.

Most important of all — 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made — of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

war, so far as the Government of the United States of America is concerned, has been extraordinarily good.

The Congress, the Executive, and the Judiciary have worked together for the common good. I myself want to tell you, the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, how happy I am in our relationships and friendships. Some of the new Members of both Houses, I have not yet had the pleasure of meeting, but I hope that opportunity will offer itself in the near future.

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history -- and I hope it will be better history than ever has been
made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities
that God has given us.
MEMORANDUM

To: Judge E. I. Rosenman

From: William Haber

Harry Hopkins mentioned a possible reference to National Service legislation in the President's message to the Congress. I suggested that if this subject is to be treated in the message and an all out proposal for legislation is endorsed, it would be highly desirable that some reference be made to the contribution of the voluntary programs which have been operated thus far. This might soften Labor reaction to the proposal somewhat.

He suggested that I might send you several lines on that subject. These are attached.
National Service legislation will make it possible to put ourselves in a position which will assure certain and speedy action in meeting our manpower requirements. In adopting such legislation, it is not necessary to discard the voluntary and cooperative processes which have prevailed up to this time. On the contrary, we must continue to rely on the cooperative action of Labor and Management working with Government. We must build on the foundations that have already been laid and supplement the measures now in operation in order to guarantee the accomplishments of the actions that may be necessary in the critical period that lies ahead.
Dear Mr. Moneet,

here are the reasons for suggested change:

1. French people's state of complacency is important. That they show that they are confident in their own confidence and to improve from here.

2. Attention must be made to French effort during liberation.

3. The reality of which French people are proud and wish to justify that the USA will not give up to save France at price. The impression of the reality of such partnership that has grown up and also makes public the fact that French armed forces have been equipped etc. required

4. To second thought I should maintain this sentence. The candid will be good and will answer a situation which exists in the mind of the French people.
The suggested last change is important. First, the acceptance of France as a partner, base justifies general help. Second, the French are largely waiting to see what imports will be added. To omit the ships would greatly weaken the effect on French people. Instead, recall the French people want to hear that France as a whole is joining against the enemy and her enemies unchallenged. And not that only armies are armed.

This is what is said of the chase. This is a great advantage in saying it now, as the President takes the initiative.

Yours ever,

[Signature]
One of the most encouraging events of the year in the international field, although one which occasions no surprise to the friends of that country, has been the renunciation of the French people over the return of the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations. Far from having been crushed by the yoke of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged with stronger faith in themselves in the destiny of their country, in the democratic ideals to which the French Nation has traditionally contributed so greatly.

During her liberation and secession, France has given many evidences of her resolute determination to resume her place among the United Nations. Her efforts, in cooperation of the heroic efforts of the resistance groups and the companionship of those volunteers who adorned the fight by their side after the desertion of 1940.

We have from the outset placed in French hands all the arms and munitions which our resources and the voluntary sacrifices furnished. French troops arrived with the front
and must succeed measures that our industry could produce have greatly contributed to the victories of Tunisia, Italy and France.

French resources are now exposed to the German front and shoulder to shoulder with our boys. It is through us that of course on our part will the possibilities of industry made available have been less than the French in their experience to square accounts with their old enemy, would have wished.

France is an essential war base for the Allied troops. Already have been made to equip large new French forces for combat duty and to support new France. The essential commodities that will enable her to contribute with all her resources to the defeat of the enemy.

The addition to the contributions which France can make to our common victory, her future influence means that her great influence will again be available.
in meeting the problems of peace. France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the French problem and the contribution which the case made in achieving international security are fully recognized. Her formal adherence to the Declaration by the United Nations three days ago and the proposal at the New York Security Council, whereby France will receive one of the five permanent seats on the proposed Security Council, are indications of the extent to which France has sustained that portion of strength and leadership in which she has always been associated in our councils.
FIRST DRAFT  Message of the President to
The Congress on the State of the
Union - January 1, 1945.

What is uppermost in the minds of our people -- and
should be -- in considering the state of the Union, is an
appraisal of the state of the war. For the task which we all
place first is the winning of total victory in this war.

During the year 1944 we saw tremendous victories for
the United Nations on all fronts in this war -- and very sub-
stantial progress toward the day of total victory which will
enable the achievement of world peace.

On the Western Front in Europe, the year ended with a
set-back for our arms, when the Germans launched a ferocious
counter-attack into Luxembourg and Belgium with the obvious
objective of cutting our line in the center.

This has been a crucial battle on the Western Front, a
battle which will affect the whole course of the war in Europe.
The enemy has made an all-out effort, committing his best troops --
young, fanatical, desperate Nazis - led by veterans of the
Prussian military caste.

(NOTE: more to come on this battle as events develop
before delivery of this Message.)

This German counter-offensive has turned out to be far from
the defeat for us which, for a time, some people feared. Our men
1st DRAFT

fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most
difficult conditions, our German enemies have sustained considerable
losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

However, I would warn the people to be prepared — as our
Armies in Europe are being prepared — for further desperate and
costly attempts to break our lines. We must never make the mistake
of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has been
destroyed.

And I would express another most serious warning against
the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western
Europe was immeasurably less dangerous than the wedges which they
are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

Every ugly little rumor which is intended to weaken our
faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst —
seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are evil and baseless
rumors against the Russians — rumors against the British — rumors
against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely you will observe
that every one of them bears the same trademark — “Made in Germany.”

We must resist this divisive propaganda — we must destroy
it — with the same strength and the same determination that our
fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and — despite temporary set-backs here or there — we shall never stop attacking until Germany is completely defeated and her brutal criminals are given the punishment they so richly deserve.

The essential fact about the war today is this: we have now really come to grips with our enemies. Everything that has gone before was preparation for this moment. The tremendous effort of the first years of the war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort, in the language of the military men, of deployment of our forces. Many battles — essential battles — were fought; many victories — vital victories — were won. But these battles and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the final, decisive blows.

You know the history, all of you, of that vast manoeuvres of deployment across the greatest oceans of the earth — and in every climate — and at points as far apart as the Pacific Islands and the continent of Europe — 15,000 miles apart.
You know with what skill this gigantic task was conducted by General Marshall and Admiral King and General Arnold and their associates of the United States and of the other Allied nations. You remember the long months of the training of men, of the building of fleets, of the construction of planes, of the manufacture of munitions and supplies, of the transport of these men and supplies over the oceans east and west. You remember the battles of the Arctic islands, of the tropic archipelagoes, of the African deserts. You recall the names of distant beaches, mountain passes, jungles, towns, - names in tongues as remote and unfamiliar as the places - which are now an unforgettable part of the proud American heritage of battle names.

That period of preparation is now reaching its climax. The deployment of our forces is approximately completed. The battle is being joined.

And now as this 79th Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

It is appropriate at this time to review the basic strategy which has guided us through three years of war, and which will lead, eventually, to total victory.
In the beginning our most important military task was to prevent our enemies — the strongest and most violently aggressive powers that ever have threatened civilization — from winning the war. But even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we were looking forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative from the enemy and use our superior resources of men and materials — to win.

It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would require the massing of overwhelming forces — ground, sea and air — in positions from which we and our Allies could strike directly against the enemy homelands and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war machines.

In the case of Japan we had to wait the completion of extensive preliminary operations — operations designed to establish secure supply lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This called for overwhelming sea power — supported by ground forces strategically employed against isolated outpost garrisons. It was necessary therefore to wait for the construction of this overwhelming sea power before major operations could be undertaken.

In the case of Germany, however, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power were already available in
Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground opera-
tions against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could
put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy.

Furthermore, we had Allies — active and potential — Allies who could
not give us their maximum assistance against the Japs until Germany
had been defeated.

Our decision to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air
forces against Germany until her utter defeat was based on these fac-
tors. It was also based on the realization that of our two enemies,
Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more
able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered
territory into a war potential. Japan, on the other hand, lacked the
technological skills and the industrial organization to accomplish this
kind of rapid increase in war potential.

Our strategy was therefore determined to apply the maximum
ground and air power in Europe until Germany was completely knocked
out of the way, then to concentrate our power for the final blows against
Japan, and meanwhile, to apply the maximum Naval strength in the Pacific,
supported by sufficient ground and air forces to accomplish the initial
operations so as to open the desired routes to the Japanese homeland.
As this new year begins — 1945 — we see the fruition and justification of this strategy. The naval and air developments have been largely completed; and the majority of our ground forces have reached the numerous battlefields of this global war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944 of the German so-called "Impregnable" sea wall of Europe and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg — almost to the Rhine itself. The cross-channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world; it overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its intensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches — to the sailors who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied — and to the military leaders who achieved a real miracle of planning.

And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to work together and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross-channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American and French forces.

These two great invasions were made possible by a less spectacular but equally important success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Without our success over German submarines, we could not
Without our success over German submarines, we could not have
built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could
we have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had
landed in France.

The Nazis may succeed in improving their submarines and their
cries and they may once more launch an aggressive submarine attack. The
Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the British and
Canadian Navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.

The spectacular operations in Eastern Europe have overshadowed
in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian
front. Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has
been obscured, and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be
corrected — right now.

What our forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered
part of our strategy now aimed at only one objective — the total
defeat of the Germans. Our forces in Italy are continuing to keep
a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pres-
sure — including some twenty first-line German divisions
and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops —
all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere. In addition to
these German troops who are directly committed to the Italian battle area,
the threat of our front in Italy requires the German high command to
maintain a large strategic reserve of men and equipment in south-eastern
Germany to guard against any sudden push on our part which would produce
a major breakthrough. The American people — and every soldier now
fighting in the Apennines — should remember that the Italian front has
not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the
only Allied front in Europe.

Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather condi-
tions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army — reinforced by units
from other United Nations — have been fighting continuously since
September 1943. A year ago they were at bloody Cassino. Since that
time they have pushed north through Rome until now they occupy heights
overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fight-
ing ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that
although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose,
the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will
continue.
In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 3,000 miles across the Central Pacific. A year ago our conquest of Tarawa (November 23, 1943) was a little more than a month old. A year ago we were just preparing for our invasion of Kwajalein, the second of our great strides across the Pacific to the Philippines. A year ago General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea almost 1,500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.

The milestones we have passed in this fast-moving offensive are household words to all of America: Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Saipan, Guam, Palau, Naden, Hollandia, Manus, Morotai, and finally the Philippines.

We now have firmly established bases in the Marianas Islands from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself — and will continue to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two, reducing the enemy to impotence in the southern half. There is still
hard fighting ahead in the Philippines — costly fighting. But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been effectively cut off from her conquests in the East Indies. The landing of our troops in the Philippines was the largest amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific. Moreover, these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night engagements around Guadalcanal in November-December, 1942, had our Navy been able to come to grips with the major units of the Japanese fleet. We had brushed against their fleet in the First Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, but not until October 23-25, were we able really to engage the major portion of the Japanese navy in actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for the next three days was one of the heaviest blows struck against Japanese sea power. As the result of that battle, what is left of the Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates the Yellow Sea, the China Sea and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific. Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the leaders of the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.
Thus far in the war against Japan we have been able to gain great strategic successes with a minimum commitment of ground troops. That will not continue to be the case. It will eventually be necessary to concentrate considerably greater numbers of troops in the Pacific to deliver the decisive blows against Japan's inner defenses.

The waging of effective war calls for continuous revision of plans; strategy must hold to basic concepts but must be kept flexible enough to take advantage of favorable conditions.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces — on all fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership which has guided their sons into battle, a right to be proud of American generalship which shortens campaigns and saves American lives.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history of teamwork and cooperation, skill and daring. Let me give you one example out of last year's operations in the Pacific.

Last September Admiral Halsey led American Naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, B and C. However, when General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey's task
forces, he concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese
in the Philippines directly — by passing islands A, B and C.

Admiral Nimitz was in agreement with this and Admiral Halsey
thereupon offered to make available to General MacArthur several of his
divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives.
These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one
day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of
Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an
attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on
the same day.

Thus, within the space of 24 hours, a major change of plans
was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different
theaters of operations — a change which hastened the liberation of the
Philippines and the final day of victory — a change which saved lives
which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are now
far behind our lines and of no danger.

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task
of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost
insuperable difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944.

At present our aid to China must be accomplished by air transport - there is no other way. By the end of 1944 the Air Transport Command was carrying into China a tonnage of supplies three times as great as that delivered at the end of 1943, and more, each month, than the Burma road ever delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China and the complete isolation of our remaining bases in South China, the tonnage delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth Air Force to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the Japanese. In 1944, aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more than 35,000 sorties against the Japanese and sank over one-half million tons of enemy shipping, greatly diminishing the usefulness of the China Sea lanes.

In all of our military actions - on land, and sea and in the air - the final job, the toughest job, has been performed by that ordinary, every-day, easy-going, hard-fighting young American who is universally and affectionately known as "C-J Joe".

It is to him that we and all future generations of Americans must pay grateful tributes.

He - whether he be soldier, sailor or airman - is the one eternally indispensable man.
FIRST DRAFT

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But - it is of small satisfaction to him to know that monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he needs, our active support - now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made possible our victories on land and sea and in the air, we shall have to increase our goals even more in certain items.

Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Department in December 1943. We have not produced as much since then. Delivery of Army supplies fell 15 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once more resumed.

In the one month of October, the Army Service Forces had to increase its estimate of 1945 required production by 10 percent because of increased demands from overseas. That brought 1945 requirements up to the level expected for 1944, our best year so far. But in November, two months ago, the 1945 requirements had to be increased another 10 percent, sending the production goal well above anything we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition. In fact, within five months, it had been more than doubled. And this was all before the Germans launched their counter-offensive. As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expend will mount
day by day.

And we shall constantly need more men in the lines of battle.

While some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army in October, 1944, was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.

We shall also need more men and newer types of weapons.

We could not now stop war production, even if we had built up a vast reserve of supplies. For we cannot afford to fight the war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example, the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more powerful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will need over 5,000 of these new tanks in 1945.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics which must be put into
production in order to maintain our technical superiority — and 
in order to save lives, we have to work every day to keep ahead 
of the enemy in radar.

For example, on D-Day, in France, with our superior 
equipment, we located and then put out of operation, every warning 
set which the Germans had along the French coast.

If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the 
development of new weapons we pay for our backwardness with the 
life's blood of our sons.

One of our greatest developments — and one compelled 
by the extraordinary circumstances of this war — is that magnificent 
bomber, the Superfortress, the B-29.

Development of the B-29 was initiated and carried to 
completion in record time. In less than 18 months from the delivery 
of the first production model, the Army Air Forces had organized 
and trained the first B-29 units and had transported them 13,000 
miles to bases constructed by the labor of 250,000 Chinese workers.

This coming year will see a steady rise in destructive 
raids against the nerve centers of Japan — against Tokyo itself — 
by large formations of the most deadly bomber ever built.

And our Air Forces are not content to stop with the B-29. 

There are even newer and deadlier bombers on the way.
The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job — for every American civilian — man and woman not engaged in essential war work to go out and get a war job.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this nation must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs — or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And — again — that payment must be made with the life's blood of our sons.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before, increased their already phenomenal production of food. However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supplement the production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity, as well as of common humanity, we must furnish the newly-occupied areas of Europe with enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starvation and chaos.

At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which to buy food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians. It would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too little.
1st DRAFT

Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty to eat — and plenty is enough for anyone.

American manpower and industry are decisive factors in this war as they were in the World War which ended in 1918.

But in both wars we were unable to develop our power in men and materiel for a highly critical period after becoming actually engaged in the war.

On both occasions our Allies were compelled to bear the full brunt of a fully prepared aggressor attack, until we of the United States could gather and organize our resources. We cannot assume that—should such a tragedy again occur—the aggressor would not level his first attack on this country. Developments in weapons — air, ground, and naval — can make possible such an attack despite the oceans around us.

Our national security and our place in the world, therefore, demand much more of preparation than has been the case in the past. We must always have immediately available trained men and adequate materiel. The only democratic and equitable method of providing adequate security for the United States in terms of manpower is the establishment of a system of Universal Military Training. And by training I mean training, pure and simple — and not a liability for military service except such as would be imposed by congressional action in time of emergency. The Army and the Navy would remain purely voluntary forces; but there would be behind them the vast resources and impressive power of a previously trained
citizenship.

Such a system should be considered as an integral part of our policy for cooperating in the establishment and maintenance of world security. All the United Nations agree that in the future the peace must be kept by armed force, if necessary; and the present proposals for a future international organization realistically take account of this fact. Our share of the armed forces that would be placed at the disposal of such an international organization obviously cannot be determined exactly until a later date, but they would, of course, be made available from our regular peacetime military and naval establishments consisting of volunteer forces. However, only a Universal Military Training system would provide a body of trained manpower reserve necessary in order to make our peacetime Army and Navy establishments fully adequate to meet any possible needs of providing for our national security.

Such training system would be unmistakable evidence of our power and determination to block the path of any aggressor nation which might again threaten us and the rest of the world.

The subject of Universal Military Training must be considered at this time in order that it may become operative upon the termination of the present emergency. There should not again be the almost fatal lapse in preparation between the close of a successful war and the development of a new emergency.
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The subject of Universal Military Training must be considered at this time in order that it may become operative upon the termination of the present emergency. There should not again be the almost fatal lapse in preparation between the close of a successful war and the development of a new emergency.
Proper planning by the War and Navy Departments is also dependent upon the early determination of the details of a Universal Military Training system. The designation of surplus military equipment and supplies, the disposal of that present surplus, and the disposal of training facilities and air and service installations cannot intelligently and efficiently be consummated until this subject has been acted upon by the Congress. If we were to dispose of our present facilities, equipment, and training management now— and, at some time in the future, decide to initiate a system of training, it would result in loss of valuable time and property, and would sacrifice other valuable factors which knowledge and familiarity with the problem of war and wartime training give.

Aside from the obvious advantages of military training, it is important that young Americans shall have the opportunity to learn of the development of new methods and new machines. That knowledge will be of incalculable value to them and to the nation as a whole in the future.

I therefore recommend to the Congress, the prompt enactment of legislation requiring all able male citizens to undergo a period of military training. The length of the training period, the extent and content of the training, and the ages within which it shall be given are matters for determination by the Congress in consultation, of course, with our military authorities.
This war must be waged — it is being waged — with the
greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have
is at stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men,
fighting far from home, in cruel and unfamiliar climates, against enemies
whose homes are at their backs — American men have already won victories
which the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no
question either of the cost. Our losses will be heavy. Our hearts will
be wrung. Our determination and our endurance will be tried. But if
we and our comrades in arms of United Nations will go on fighting,
together, nothing our enemies can do by force or treachery or subterfuge
or falsehood can prevent our ultimate, total victory.

And we will go on fighting, together.

Comrades in arms over three years of changing fortunes and of
hope deferred, we will be more than ever comrades in arms now that the
moment of decision is upon us.

We propose to stand together, not for the war alone but for the
victor, for which the war is fought. It is not only a common danger which
unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments
but of peoples and the peoples' hope is peace. Here as in England, in
England as in Russia; in Russia as in China; in France, and through the
continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom,
the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable
and secure.
It will not be easy to create this people's peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe wishfully that all these problems can be solved overnight. There are no magical formulas — no "cure-alls" — that can be concocted by any one group of men sitting around a peace table.

The firm foundation can be built — and it will be built. But the great structure of a real people's peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience, how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an odyssey of harshness and disregard of human life." There
were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the peoples of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with far greater problems of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.

Aside from the duty to preserve order in military operations, it is not our intention and I do not believe it is the intention of any Allied power, to impose solutions on the peoples that have been liberated from fascist tyranny. On the contrary the Allied powers have declared their purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. We will attempt, in collaboration with our allies, to resolve the external difficulties, economic as well as political, which stand in the way of the exercise of these acknowledged rights by the peoples of the liberated areas and to promote the establishment of the representative governments, truly expressive of the peoples' will, which all nations united in the prosecution of this war for freedom and for peace desire.
Our own policy as regards these questions of the people is not in doubt. In the United States, as in any other self-governing nation, it is the national character which constitutes the national policy and the national history which gives that policy book and chapter. It is what the people are that dictates their beliefs and it is what they believe that determines the policies which express their will. We have believed, since the declaration of our independence as a nation, that governments draw their just powers from the consent of the governed. It is, in consequence, our national policy to aid and assist the freedom-loving men and women who have suffered under Nazi and Fascist tyranny to establish governments in the liberated countries which will represent the people.

We have all heard the traditional theory that the internal affairs of other nations are no concern of ours.

That is a very hopeful and high-sounding theory. There is only one thing wrong with it — in the light of modern conditions, it does not make sense.

A good, law-abiding farmer may say, "It is no concern of mine what my neighbor does with his fields. All I have to do is keep my fences
in good repair and mind my own business." But that does not hold
good if the neighbor permits his property to degenerate into a breeding
place of pestilence, producing germs which no fences can prevent
from spreading.

In that case, the good farmer has to call upon the Board
of Health and the local constabulary to go in and clean up the mess.

Similarly, if in one of the countries of the Caribbean area
there should develop a Nazi-Fascist kind of government, that would
definitely be of gravest concern to us. For such a government might
grant bases, for example, to Germany or Japan, thereby providing a
direct threat to our life-line through the Panama Canal.

That is an example close to home — but with the miracles
of modern transportation (and greater miracles to come) the whole
world is now close to home.

We as a nation have the right to be concerned if our neighbors
begin to give indications of criminal tendencies. And other nations,
large and small, have that same right.

We place our faith in democracy. We believe that the warlike
impulse — the evil spirit of aggression — cannot thrive in any nation
where the people really rule.
Therefore we believe — in our own interests and in the
best interests of all mankind — that the guarantees of democracy are
the only sure guarantees of peace.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while
the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friend-
ship and mutual understanding which informed the conversations at
Bromton calls gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed
in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system
toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of
intercommunication between peoples over the past generation offers a
practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace
must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to turn these great technological
achievements to the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and com-
merce.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity,
and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of
our national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in
also for nations. We are opposed to every form of restriction whether
by public act or private arrangement which limits commerce, transit
and trade.

We have house-cleaning of our own to do in this regard. But
it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in
the interest of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce
and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than
ever before in the history of the world.

It is as certain as the rising of the sun that an enduring
peace cannot be achieved without a strong America — strong in the
social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

In the State of the Union Message last year I set forth
our economic Bill of Rights.
In this Message I want to outline the policies which I believe the Government should pursue to validate the first of these rights — "The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines of the Nation." We cannot achieve this right without striving to secure other parts of the Bill of Rights. Measures to provide decent homes, good education, and social security will make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to half our total capacity production.

After the war we must maintain full employment with a Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand by private consumers — farmers, businessmen, workers, professional men, housewives — which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands.

Our policy is to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not tolerate mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work — and that means upwards of 60 million jobs.
FIRST DRAFT

Our peacetime tasks will be greater than they ever were. Full employment also means that those employed or those working on their own account should be able to earn incomes sufficient to provide them and their families with adequate food, clothing, and recreation; it means not only jobs, but productive jobs. I do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive.

There are many responsibilities which the Federal Government will inevitably have to bear after the war, including our programs for national defense, aid to veterans, and interest on the national debt incurred during the war.

The Federal Government of the postwar period must gear all its programs to the requirements of full employment in an economy of private enterprise. Some of the measures which were devised to secure our record war production can usefully be applied to promoting peacetime output. During the war we have achieved a high degree of coordination in Government activities and cooperation between Government, business, labor, and agriculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accomplish our peacetime objectives.

I shall submit to Congress detailed legislative programs as soon as the war situation permits. In this message I can only stake out the areas for a comprehensive program.
Measures to encourage private enterprise cover a wide range. We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work -- on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition. Only in that way can we achieve prices which will promote the mass consumption which is necessary for full employment.

Our wartime tax system must be revised so as to encourage private demand. Modifications in the taxes on business should provide incentives to new investment and growing enterprise. We must reduce or eliminate taxes which bear heavily on consumption.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should adopt similar devices in peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.

Private business must contribute most, if not all, of the employment opportunities -- and it will, in turn, gain its greatest stimulus from full and stable employment. As that is achieved private enterprise will prosper and initiative will thrive.

Our full-employment program must emphasize the development of our natural resources. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-valley projects will literally add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA was a bargain at 750 million dollars.
We have similar opportunities -- similar bargains -- in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of these rivers, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of air transport and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce it will be necessary to construct many more airports and to overhaul our whole national highway system.

The provision of a decent home for every family is a necessity if this country is to be worthy of its greatness -- and that task would itself create great employment opportunities. Many of our cities need extensive rebuilding. Many of our farms are in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal attack on the housing problem will require thoroughgoing cooperation between construction industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.

I cannot now enter into details of our social security programs. I shall only say that an expanded social security program must play an essential role in a program designed to support mass purchasing power.

These policies will provide private and public demands for the products of our industries. But there is another side to the
picture. After the war there will be pressing problems of relocation of both industries and population. During the war there have been large-scale migrations of labor to the centers of war production. We must make sure that after the war there will not be large, disorganized migrations of people looking for work.

In some cases we shall have to facilitate the orderly movement of people to places of employment — and in other cases we must find means to encourage industry to develop in the regions to which the people have already moved.

The state must assist in the relocation of its workers.

Our education programs, too, must be designed to fit the labor force for the work it is to perform.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to full employment. But if we attack the problem with determination we shall succeed. And we must succeed. As I said last year, freedom and peace cannot exist without security.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.
Most important of all -- 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made -- of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history -- and it may be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
Even as we see the needs of war production increase in many items, we see the number of men and women working on these items decrease instead of increase. As a result, many critical programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important of these are artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, B-29s, tires, tanks, and trucks. In each of these vital programs present production is behind requirements.

Navy production of high capacity ammunition and for its huge rocket program is being badly hampered by manpower shortages. It is expected that difficulties may be later experienced in the cruiser and carrier programs.

Shortages of labor hamper the Navy program of repair parts for its fleet, airplanes and advance bases as much as the Navy needs for some new types of aircraft, dry cells, radar, wire and wire rope. There is critical need for more repair workers for West Coast shipyards, which delay the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and which prevent ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.
The pool of young men under 26 classified as I-A is almost depleted. Calls for the armed forces will begin again shortly to take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady and, if necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1935 production goals.
Nat. Service

-3-

Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was not adopted.

Recently, in order to cope with the problem, we have authorized the use of priority and other powers to induce the flow of manpower from less essential industries to war industries.

If these measures are not successful, I shall again call upon the Congress to enact this total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war. It is not too late in the war. In fact bitter experience has shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.
INCREASE - War Labor Board

With a few notable exceptions labor and management have submitted disputes which they could not adjust themselves to the National War Labor Board for decision and have loyally abided by its decision.

The government cannot expect labor to abide by its no-strike pledge or management to abide by its no-lockout pledge if management and labor do not accept the machinery for peaceful adjustment of disputes which has been set up by the government with the cooperation of both management and labor.

Existing legislation does not provide means for the enforcement of the orders of the War Labor Board except only by seizure to prevent interference with the war effort. In some cases seizure is an awkward and inept means of enforcement. In others, where the fault lies with the labor union, it is an undeserved hardship on the employer. In some cases, like the Petrillo case the Board after assuming jurisdiction has not been able to find sufficient impediment to the war effort to make a finding necessary to justify seizure.

The avoidance of labor trouble during the war is dependent upon the effective functioning of this machinery for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes. The War Labor Board machinery is working too well in the vast majority of cases to permit it to be weakened by a few unpatriotic recalcitrants among management
and labor. Responsible leaders of management and labor will find it increasingly difficult to secure compliance by their followers if recalcitrants among management and labor are permitted to ignore the orders of the Board with impunity.

I therefore recommend that the Congress adopt legislation which would make the orders of the War Labor Board legally enforceable whenever it finds that compliance with its orders is necessary to prevent the impairment of peaceful relations between management and labor.
SECOND DRAFT

Message of the President to
The Congress on the State of the
Union — January 6, 1945

"That is uppermost in the minds of our people — and should
be — in considering the state of the Union, is an appraisal of the
state of the war. For the task which we all place first is the
winning of total victory in this war.

During the year 1944 we saw tremendous victories for the
United Nations on all fronts in this war — and very substantial pro-
gress toward the day of total victory which will enable the achieve-
ment of world peace.

On the Western Front in Europe, the year ended with a set-back
for our arms, when the Germans launched a ferocious counter-attack into
Luxembourg and Belgium with the obvious objective of cutting our line
in the center.

This has been a crucial battle — a battle which will affect
the whole course of the war in Europe. The enemy has made an all-out
effort, committing his best troops — young, fanatical, desperate
Nazi — led by veterans of the German military caste.

(Note: More to come on this battle as events develop before
delivery of this message.)

This German counter-offensive, however, has turned out to be
far from the defeat for us which, for a time, some people feared.

Our men fought with indescribable and unforgettable gallantry under most difficult conditions, and our German enemies have sustained considerable losses while failing to obtain their objectives.

However, I would warn the people to be prepared -- as our armies in Europe are being prepared -- for further desperate and costly attempts to break our lines. We must never make the mistake of assuming that the Germans are beaten until the last Nazi has been eliminated.

And I would express another most serious warning against the poisonous effects of enemy propaganda.

The wedge that the Germans attempted to drive in Western Europe was immeasurably less dangerous than the wedges which they are continually attempting to drive between ourselves and our Allies.

Every ugly little rumor which is intended to weaken our faith in our Allies is like an actual enemy agent in our midst -- seeking to sabotage our war effort. There are evil and baseless rumors against the Russians -- rumors against the British -- rumors against our own American commanders in the field.

When you examine these rumors closely you will observe that every one of them bears the same trademark -- "Made in Germany."

We must resist this divisive propaganda -- we must destroy it -- with the same strength and the same determination that our
fighting men are displaying as they resist and destroy the panzer divisions.

In Europe, we shall resume the attack and -- despite temporary set-backs here or there -- we shall never stop attacking until Germany is completely defeated and her brutal criminals are given the punishment they so richly deserve.

The essential fact about the war today is this: we have now really come to grips with our enemies. Everything that has gone before was preparation for this moment. The tremendous effort of the first years of the war was directed toward the concentration of men and supplies in the various theatres of action at the points where they could hurt our enemies most.

It was an effort, in the language of the military men, of deployment of our forces. Many battles -- essential battles -- were fought; many victories -- vital victories -- were won. But those battles and these victories were fought and won to hold back the attacking enemy and to put us in positions from which we and our Allies could deliver the final, decisive blows.

You know the history, all of you, of the vast manoeuvres of deployment across the greatest oceans of the earth -- and in every climate -- and at points as far apart as the Pacific Islands and the continent of Europe -- 15,000 miles apart.
You remember the long months of the training of men, of the
building of fleets, of the construction of planes, of the manufac-
ture of munitions and supplies, of the transport of these men
and supplies over the oceans east and west. You remember the battles
of the Arctic islands, of the tropic archipelagoes, of the African
deserts.

In the beginning our most important military task was to
prevent our enemies -- the strongest and most violently aggressive
powers that ever have threatened civilization -- from winning the war.

But even while we were conducting defensive, delaying actions, we
were looking forward to the time when we could wrest the initiative
from the enemy and use our superior resources of men and materials --
to win.

It was plain then that the defeat of either enemy would
require the massing of overwhelming forces -- ground, sea and air --
in positions from which we and our Allies could strike directly
against the enemy homelands and destroy the Nazi and Japanese war
machines.

In the case of Japan we had to await the completion of
extensive preliminary operations -- operations designed to establish
secure supply lines through the Japanese outer-zone defenses. This
called for overwhelming sea power -- supported by ground forces
strategically employed against isolated outpost garrisons. It was necessary therefore to wait for the construction of this overwhelming sea power before major operations could be undertaken.

In the case of Germany, however, the necessary bases for the massing of ground and air power were already available in Great Britain. In the Mediterranean area we could begin ground operations against major elements of the German Army as rapidly as we could put troops in the field, first in North Africa and then in Italy. Furthermore, in Europe, we had three active and potential — allies who could not give us their maximum assistance against the Japs until Germany had been defeated.

Our decision was made therefore to concentrate the bulk of our ground and air forces against Germany until her utter defeat. This decision was based on all these factors; and it was also based on the realization that, of our two enemies, Germany would be more able to digest quickly her conquests, the more able quickly to convert the manpower and resources of her conquered territory into a war potential. Japan, on the other hand, lacked the technological skills and the industrial organization to accomplish this kind of rapid increase in war potential.

Our strategy was therefore determined to apply the maximum ground and air power in Europe until Germany was completely knocked out of the war; and meanwhile, to apply the maximum naval strength in the Pacific, supported by sufficient ground and air forces to accomplish the initial operations so as to open the desired routes to the Japanese homeland.
As this new year begins — 1945 — we see the fruition and justification of this strategy. The naval and air developments have been largely completed, and the majority of our ground forces have reached the numerous battlefields of this global war.

Now, as this seventy-ninth Congress meets, we have reached the most critical phase of the war.

The greatest victory of the last year was, of course, the successful breach on June 6, 1944, of the German so-called "Impregnable" sea wall of troops and the victorious sweep of the Allied forces through France and Belgium and Luxembourg — almost to the Rhine itself.

The cross channel invasion of the Allied armies was the greatest amphibious operation in the history of the world. It overshadowed all other operations in this or any other war in its immensity. Its success is a tribute to the fighting courage of the soldiers who stormed the beaches — to the sailors who put the soldiers ashore and kept them supplied — and to the military leaders who achieved a real miracle of planning. And it is also a tribute to the ability of two nations, Britain and America, to work together and fight together in perfect cooperation and perfect harmony.

This cross channel invasion was followed in August by a second great amphibious operation, landing troops in Southern France. In this the same cooperation and the same harmony existed between the American and
French forces.

These two great invasions were made possible by the less spectacular but equally important success in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Without our success over German submarines, we could not have built up our invasion forces or air forces in Great Britain, nor could we have kept a steady stream of supplies flowing to them after they had landed in France.

The Nazis, however, may succeed in improving their submarines and their crews, and they may once more launch an aggressive submarine attack. The Battle of the Atlantic demands eternal vigilance. But the British and Canadian navies, together with our own, are constantly on the alert.

The spectacular operations in Western Europe have overshadowed in the public mind the less spectacular but vitally important Italian front. Its place in the strategic conduct of the war in Europe has been obscured, and — by some people, unfortunately — underrated.

It is important that any misconception on that score be corrected — right now.

That our forces in Italy are doing is a well-considered part of our strategy now aimed at only one objective — the total defeat of the Germans. Our forces in Italy are continuing to keep a substantial portion of the German Army under constant pressure — including some twenty first-line German divisions and the necessary supply and transport and replacement troops —
all of which our enemies need so badly elsewhere.

Over very difficult terrain and through adverse weather conditions, our Fifth Army and the British Eighth Army — reinforced by units from other United Nations — have been fighting continuously since Sicily fell. A year ago they were at bloody Cassino. Since that time they have pushed north through Rome until now they occupy heights overlooking the valley of the Po.

The greatest tribute which can be paid to the courage and fighting ability of these splendid soldiers in Italy is to point out that although their strength is about equal to that of the Germans they oppose, the Allies have been continuously on the offensive.

That pressure, that offensive, by our troops in Italy will continue.

The American people — and every soldier now fighting in the Apennines — should remember that the Italian front has not lost any of the importance which it had in the days when it was the only Allied front in Europe.

In the Pacific during the past year, we have conducted the fastest-moving offensive in the history of modern warfare. We have driven the enemy back more than 5,000 miles across the Central Pacific.

A year ago, our conquest of Tarawa was a little more than a month old.
A year ago, we were just preparing for our invasion of
Iwo Jima, the second of our great strides across the Pacific to the
Philippines.

A year ago, General MacArthur was still fighting in New Guinea
almost 1500 miles from his present position in the Philippine Islands.

We now have firmly established bases in the Mariana Islands
from which our Superfortresses bomb Tokyo itself -- and will continue
to blast Japan in ever-increasing numbers.

Japanese forces in the Philippines have been cut in two. There
is still hard fighting ahead in the Philippines -- costly fighting.

But the liberation of the Philippines will mean that Japan has been
greatly cut off from her conquests in the East Indies.

The landing of our troops in the Philippines was the largest
amphibious operation thus far conducted in the Pacific. Moreover,
these landings drew the Japanese fleet into the first great sea battle
which Japan has risked in almost two years. Not since the night en-
gagements around Guadalcanal in November-December, 1942, had our Navy
been able to come to grips with major units of the Japanese fleet.

We had brushed against their fleet in the First Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, but not until October 23-25, were we able really to engage a major portion of the Japanese navy in actual combat. The naval engagement which raged for the next three days was one of the heaviest blows struck against Japanese sea power.

As the result of that battle, most of what is left of the Japanese fleet has been driven behind the screen of islands that separates the Yellow Sea, the China Sea and the Sea of Japan from the Pacific.

Our Navy looks forward to any opportunity which the lords of the Japanese Navy will give us to fight them again.

The people of this nation have a right to be proud of the courage and fighting ability of the men in the armed forces -- on all fronts. They also have a right to be proud of American leadership which has guided their sons into battle, a right to be proud of American generalship which shortens campaigns and saves American lives.

The history of the generalship of this war has been a history of teamwork and cooperation of skill and daring. Let me give you one example out of last year's operations in the Pacific.
Last September Admiral Halsey led American naval task forces into Philippine waters and north to the East China Sea and struck heavy blows at Japanese air and sea power.

At that time, it was our plan to approach the Philippines by further stages, taking islands which we may call A, B and C. However, when General MacArthur received the reports from Admiral Halsey’s task forces, he concluded that it might be possible to attack the Japanese in the Philippines directly — by-passing islands A, B and C.

Admiral Halsey was in agreement with this, and Admiral Nimitz thereafter offered to make available to General MacArthur several of his divisions which had been scheduled to take the intermediate objectives.

These discussions, conducted at great distances, all took place in one day.

General MacArthur immediately informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff here in Washington that he was prepared to initiate plans for an attack on Leyte in October. Approval of the change in plan was given on the same day.

Thus, within the space of 24 hours, a major change of plans was accomplished which involved Army and Navy forces from two different theaters of operations — a change which hastened the liberation of the Philippines and the final day of victory — a change which saved lives
which would have been expended in the capture of islands which are
now far behind our lines and of no danger.

Our over-all strategy has not neglected the important task
of rendering all possible aid to China. Despite almost insurmountable
difficulties, we increased this aid during 1944. At present our aid
to China must be accomplished by air transport — there is no other
way. By the end of 1944, the Air Transport Command was carrying into
China a tonnage of supplies three times as great as that delivered
at the end of 1943, and more, each month, than the Burma road ever
delivered at its peak.

Despite the loss of important bases in China, the tonnage
delivered by air transport has enabled General Chennault's Fourteenth
Air Force to wage an effective and aggressive campaign against the
Japanese. In 1944, aircraft of the Fourteenth Air Force flew more
than 55,000 sorties against the Japanese and sank over one-half million
tons of enemy shipping, greatly diminishing the usefulness of the
China Sea lanes.
In all of our military actions — on land, and sea and in the air — the final job, the toughest job, has been performed by that ordinary, average, every-day, hard-fighting young American who is universally and affectionately known as "O-I Joe".

It is to him that we and all future generations of Americans must pay grateful tribute.

He — whether he be soldier, sailor or airman — is the one eternally indispensable man.

But — it is of small satisfaction to him to know that monuments will be raised to him in the future. He wants, he needs, and he is entitled to insist upon, our active support — now.

Although unprecedented production figures have made possible our victories on land and sea and in the air, we shall have to increase our goals even more in certain items.

Peak deliveries of supplies were made to the War Department in December 1943. We have not produced as much since then. Delivery of Army supplies fell 15 percent by July 1944, before the upward trend was once more resumed.

In the one month of October, 1944, the Army Service Forces had to increase its estimate of 1945 required production by 10 percent because of increased demands from overseas. That brought 1945
requirements up to the level expected for 1944, our best year so far. But in November, two months ago, the 1945 requirements had to be increased another 10 percent, sending the production goal well above anything we have yet attained. Our armed forces in combat have steadily increased their expenditure of medium and heavy artillery ammunition. In fact, within five months, it had been more than doubled. And this was all before the Germans launched their counter-offensive.

As we continue the decisive phases of this war, the munitions that we expand will mount day by day.

And we shall constantly need more men in the lines of battle.

While some were saying the war in Europe was over, the Army in October, 1944, was shipping more men to Europe than in any previous month of the war.

One of the most urgent immediate requirements for the men we are sending overseas is nurses. The Army has an urgent need for 18,000 more nurses.
Last April the Army requirement for nurses was set at 50,000. Actual strength in nurses was then 40,000. Since that time the Army has tried to raise the additional 10,000. Active recruiting has been carried on, but the net gain in eight months has been only 2,000. There are now 42,000 nurses in the Army.

Recent estimates have increased the total number needed to 60,000. That means that 18,000 more nurses must be obtained.

The present shortage of Army nurses is reflected in undue strain on the existing force. More than a thousand nurses are now hospitalized, and part of this is due to overwork. The shortage is also indicated by the fact that eleven Army hospital units have been sent overseas without their complement of nurses. At Army hospitals in the United States there is only one nurse to 26 beds, instead of the recommended one to 15 beds.

The inability to get the needed nurses for the Army is not due, however, to any shortage of nurses in this country. 280,000 registered nurses are now practicing. It has been estimated by the War Manpower Commission that 27,000 additional nurses could be made available to the Army without interfering in any way with the needs of the civilian population for nurses.

Since volunteering has not produced the number of nurses required
for the Army, I urge that the Selective Service Act be amended to
provide for the induction of nurses into the Army. The need is too
pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.

The care and treatment given to our wounded and sick soldiers
has been of the highest medical standards. Those standards must be
maintained at all cost. We cannot tolerate a lowering of them by
failure to provide adequate nursing for the brave men who stand in
need of it.

We shall also need constantly new types of weapons.

We could not now stop war production, even if we had built
up a vast reserve of supplies. For we cannot afford to fight the
war of today or tomorrow with the weapons of yesterday. For example,
the American Army now has developed a new tank with a gun more power-
ful than any yet mounted on a fast-moving vehicle. The Army will
need over 3,000 of these new tanks in 1943.

Almost every month finds some new development in electronics

which must be put into
production in order to maintain our technical superiority — and in order to
save lives. We have to work every day to keep ahead of the enemy in radar.

For example: on D-day, in France, with our superior equipment, we
located and then put out of operation, every warning set which the Germans had
along the French coast.

If we do not keep constantly ahead of our enemies in the development
of new weapons we pay for our backwardness with the life's blood of our sons.

One of our greatest new developments — and one compelled by the ex-
tremely circumstances of this war — is that magnificent bomber, the Super-
fortress, the B-29.

Development of the B-29 was initiated and carried to completion in
record time. In less than 13 months from the delivery of the first production
model, the Army Air Forces had organized and trained the first B-29 units and
had transported than 13,000 miles to bases constructed by the labor of 250,000
Chinese workers.

This coming year will see a steady rise in destructive raids against
the nerve centers of Japan — against Tokyo itself — by large formations of the
most deadly bomber ever built.

And our Air Forces are not content to stop with the B-29. There are
even newer and deadlier bombers on the way.
The only way to meet these increased needs for new weapons and more of them is for every American engaged in war work to stay on his war job — for every American civilian — men and women — not engaged in essential war work to go out and get a war job.

There is an old and true saying that the Lord hates a quitter. And this notion must pay for all those who leave their essential jobs — or all those who lay down on their essential jobs for non-essential reasons. And — again — that payment must be made with the life’s blood of our sons.

Even as we see the needs of war production increase in many items, we see the number of men and women working on these items decrease instead of increase. As a result, many critical programs with sharply rising needs are now seriously hampered by manpower shortages. The most important of these are artillery ammunition, small arms, ammunition, cotton duck, bombs, N-29s, tires, tanks, and trucks. In each of these vital programs present production is behind requirements.

Every production of high capacity ammunition and for its huge rocket program is being badly hampered by manpower shortages. It is expected that difficulties may be later experienced in the cruiser and carrier programs.

Shortages of labor hamper the Navy program of repair parts for its fleet, airplanes and advance bases as much as the Navy needs for some new types of aircraft, dry cells, radar, wire and wire rope. There is critical need for
more repair workers for West Coast shipyards, which delay the return of damaged fighting ships to their places in the fleet and which prevent ships now in the fighting line from getting needed overhauling.

The pool of young men under 26 classified as I-A is almost depleted. Calls for the armed forces will begin again shortly to take men now deferred who are at work in war industry. The armed forces must have an assurance of a steady and, if necessary, an even greater flow of young men for replacements. Meeting this paramount need will be difficult, and will also make it progressively more difficult to attain the 1943 production goals.

Last year, after much consideration, I recommended that the Congress adopt a national service act as the most efficient and democratic way of insuring full production for our war requirements. This recommendation was not adopted.

Recently, in order to cope with the problem, we have authorized the use of priority and other powers to induce the flow of manpower from less essential industries to war industries.

If these measures are not successful, I shall again call upon the Congress to enact this total mobilization of all our human resources for the prosecution of the war. It is not too late in the war. In fact, bitter experience has shown that in this kind of mechanized warfare where new weapons are constantly being created by our enemies and by ourselves, the closer we come to the end of the war the more pressing becomes the need for sustained war production.
with which to deliver the final blow to the enemy.

In this war, labor and management, with a few notable exceptions, have submitted disputes which they could not adjudge themselves to the National War Labor Board, and have loyally abided by its decision. But there have been some cases where the decisions of the Board have been disregarded.

Existing legislation does not provide means for the enforcement of the orders of the War Labor Board except only by seizure to prevent interference with the war effort. In some cases seizure is an awkward and inept means of enforcement. In others, where the fault lies with the labor union, it is an undeserved hardship on the employer. In some cases, the Board after assuming jurisdiction has not been able to find sufficient impediment to the war effort to make a finding necessary to justify seizure.

The avoidance of labor trouble during the war is dependent upon the effective functioning of this machinery for the peaceful adjustment of labor disputes. The War Labor Board machinery is working too well in the vast majority of cases to permit it to be weakened by a few unpatriotic recalcitrants among management and labor. Responsible leaders of management and labor will find it increasingly difficult to secure compliance by their followers if recalcitrants among management and labor are permitted to ignore the orders of the Board with impunity.
I therefore recommend that the Congress adopt legislation which would make the orders of the War Labor Board legally enforceable whenever it finds that compliance with its orders is necessary to prevent the impairment of peaceful relations between management and labor by means in addition to seizure.

The farmers of America, working harder in 1944 than ever before, increased their already phenomenal production of food of the previous year. However, we must continue to feed our armed forces and to supplement the production of our Allies. As a matter of military necessity, as well as of common humanity, we must furnish the newly-liberated areas of Europe with enough critical foodstuffs to preserve them from starvation and to prevent chaos behind the Allied lines.

At the same time, our own civilians have more money with which to buy more food than ever before. Whenever the demand for food exceeds the supply, we must ration ourselves. That is the American way of making sure that each family obtains its fair share.

Our failure to ration would not create more food for civilians. It would only give the greedy family too much and the patriotic family too little.
Of one thing we can be sure: we in this Nation will have plenty to eat — and plenty is enough for anyone.

American manpower and industry are decisive factors in this war as they were in the World War which ended in 1918.

But in both wars we were unable to develop our power in men and material for a highly critical period of time after becoming actually engaged in the war.

On both occasions, our Allies were compelled to bear the full brunt of a fully prepared aggressor attack, until we of the United States could gather and organize our resources. We cannot assume that should such a tragedy again occur — the aggressor would not level his first attack on this country. Developments in weapons — air, ground, and naval — can make possible such an attack despite the oceans around us.

Our national security and our place in the world, therefore, demand much more of preparation than has been the case in the past. We must always have immediately available trained men and adequate material.

The democratic system of national defense is not to rely primarily on a professional soldier. Rather, our democracy calls each citizen, in time of war, by a system of compulsory selective service, to
the part he is best equipped to play. It has been wasteful in the past
and will be perilous in the future to delay training until war is imminent.

We must now accept the principle of peacetime training. This is not a
new principle. President Washington recommended a system of universal mil-
itary training to the first Congress. President Jefferson recommended a
system of universal military training to the ninth Congress. Both of
them, acutely aware of the necessity of defending this country from
foreign aggression and of avoiding military systems that would weaken
democracy from within, urged a program of training that would let every
citizen play his proper role in military affairs.

Now I recommend to the Congress the same principle of training —
the training of every young man for his part in the national defense, just
as we educate every child to accept his other civic responsibilities. The
program for this purpose ought to be developed with full appreciation of
the unique resources of American society; recognizing that civilian institu-
tions as well as individuals may be called on again to convert the skills
of peace to the demands of war. It seems clear to me that the program of
training should be universal, including all those who cannot perform
full military service but who are not so severely handicapped that they
can make no contribution whatever to the national defense; that it
should be selective, training men for the most valuable contribution
that they can make in the event of war and that it should be versatile
and enterprising, so that, while concentrating on the purpose of national
defense, it may increase the health and add to the skills of the young
men of the nation.

By training I mean training, pure and simple. It would not
include liability for military service unless such liability would be
imposed by congressional action in time of emergency. The Army and the
Navy would remain purely voluntary forces; but there would be behind them
the vast resources and impressive power of a previously trained citizenry.

Such a system should be considered as an integral part of
our policy for cooperating in the establishment and maintenance of
world security. All the United Nations agree that in the future the
peace must be kept by armed force, if necessary; and the present proposals
for a future international organization realistically take account of this
fact. Our share of the armed forces that would be placed at the disposal
of such an international organization obviously cannot be determined
exactly until a later date, but they would, of course, be made available
from our regular peacetime military and naval establishments consisting
this world war as fast as I can. I know that world wars cannot be prevented by passing solemn resolutions in local clubs or societies.

This war must be waged — it is being waged — with the greatest and most persistent intensity. Everything we are and have is at stake. Everything we are and have will be given. American men, fighting far from home, in cruel and unfamiliar climates, against enemies whose homes are at their backs — American men have already won victories which the world will never forget.

We have no question of the ultimate victory. We have no question either of the cost. Our losses will be heavy. Our hearts will be wrung. Our determination and our endurance will be tried. But if we and our comrades in arms of United Nations will go on fighting, together, nothing our enemies can do by force or treachery or subterfuge or falsehood can prevent our ultimate, total victory.

And we will go on fighting, together.

Comrades in arms over three years of changing fortunes and of hope deferred, we will be more than ever comrades in arms now that the moment of decision is upon us.

We propose to stand together, not for the war alone but for the victory for which the war is fought. It is not only a common danger which unites us but a common hope. Ours is an association not of governments but of peoples and the peoples' hope is peace. Here as in England in England
as in Russia; in Russia; in China; in France, and through the continent of Europe, and throughout the world; wherever men love freedom, the hope and purpose of the people are for peace — a peace that is durable and secure.
It will not be easy to create this people's peace. We delude ourselves if we believe that the surrender of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we long for. The unconditional surrender of the armies of our enemies is the first and necessary step—but the first step only.

We have seen already, in areas liberated from the Nazi and the Fascist tyranny, what problems peace will bring. And we delude ourselves if we attempt to believe mistakenly that all these problems can be solved overnight. There are no magical formulas—no "cure-alls"—that can be concocted by any one group of men sitting around a peace table.

The firm foundation can be built—and it will be built. But the great structure of a real people's peace must, in the long run, be the work of the people themselves.

We ourselves, like all peoples who have gone through the difficult processes of liberation and adjustment, know of our own experience, how great the difficulties can be. We know that they are not difficulties peculiar to any continent or any nation. Our own Revolutionary War left behind it, in the words of one American historian, "an eddy of lawlessness and disregard of human life." There
were separatist movements of one kind or another in Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Tennessee, Kentucky and Maine. There were insurrections, open or threatened, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. These difficulties we worked out for ourselves as the people of the liberated areas of Europe, faced with the greater problem of adjustment, will work out their difficulties for themselves.

Aside from duty to preserve order in military operations, it is not our intention and I do not believe it is the intention of any Allied power to impose solutions on the peoples that have been liberated from fascist tyranny. On the contrary the Allied powers have declared their purpose to respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. We will assist, in collaboration with our allies, to resolve the external difficulties, economic as well as political, which stand in the way of the exercise of these acknowledged rights by the peoples of the liberated areas and to promote the establishment of the representative governments, truly expressive of the peoples' will, which all nations united in the prosecution of this war for freedom and for peace desires.
in good repair and mind my own business." But that does not hold.

good if the neighbor permits his property to degenerate into a breeding
place of pestilence and disease which no fences can prevent from
spreading.

In that case, the good neighbor has to call upon the Board
of Health and the local constabulary to go in and clean up the sick.

Similarly, if in one of the countries of the Caribbean area
there should develop a Nazi-Fascist kind of government, that would
definitely be of gravest concern to us. For such a government might
grant bases, for example, to Germany or Japan, thereby providing a
direct threat to our life-line through the Panama Canal.

That is an example close to home — but with the miracles
of modern transportation (and greater miracles to come) the whole
world is now close to home.

So as a nation have the right to be concerned if our neighbors
begin to give indications of criminal tendencies. And other nations,
large and small, have that same right.

We place our faith in democracy. We believe that the unwise
impulse — the evil spirit of aggression — cannot thrive in any nation
where the people really rule.
Therefore we believe — in our own interests and in the best interests of all mankind — that the guarantees of democracy are the only sure guarantees of peace.

Many of the problems of the peace are upon us even now while the conclusion of the war is still before us. The atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding which informed the conversations at Dumbarton Oaks gives us reason to hope that future discussions will succeed in developing the democratic and fully integrated world security system toward which these preparatory conversations were directed.

We believe that the extraordinary advances in the means of intercommunication between peoples over the past generation offers a practical method of advancing the mutual understanding upon which peace must rest, and it is our policy and purpose to turn these great technological achievements to the common advantage of the world.

We support the greatest possible freedom of trade and commerce.

The maintenance of peace and prosperity will be much easier in a world in which countries can buy or sell, through mutually profitable trade, the raw materials and the finished goods the world produces and needs. We in the United States can get considerable help toward our goal of sixty
to deal with international monetary and financial problems after the war.

For this reason, I invited the United Nations to assemble at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, for an International Monetary and Financial Conference.

This Conference prepared articles of agreement for the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

I think it is a hopeful sign that the forty-four United Nations all agree that international monetary and financial problems are an international responsibility that can be dealt with only through international cooperation.

In every country there is a feeling of confidence that this time we are preparing through the Fund and the Bank a sound economic foundation for international peace and for prosperity in all countries.

The articles of agreement for the Fund and Bank will be submitted to the Congress for its consideration and I urge your favorable action.

We Americans have always believed in freedom of opportunity, and equality of opportunity remains one of the principal objectives of our national life. What we believe in for individuals we believe in also for nations. We are opposed to every form of restriction whether by public act or private arrangement which limits commerce, transit and trade.

To have housecleaning of our own to do in this regard. But it is our hope, not only in the interest of our own prosperity but in the interest
of the prosperity of the world, that trade and commerce and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world.

An enduring peace cannot be achieved without a strong America — strong in the social and economic sense as well as in the military sense.

In the State of the Union Message last year I set forth our economic Bill of Rights.

In this Message I want to outline the policies which I believe the Government should pursue to validate the first of those rights — "The right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shore or farms or mines of the Nation." We cannot achieve this right without striving to secure other parts of the Bill of Rights. Measures to provide decent homes, good education, and social security will make major contributions to achieving adequate levels of employment.

We have had full employment during the war. We have had it because the Government has been ready to buy all the materials of war which the country could produce, and this has amounted to half our total capacity production.

After the war we must maintain full employment with a Government performing its peacetime functions. This means that we must achieve a level of demand by private consumers — farmers, businessmen, workers, professional
mon, housewives — which is sufficiently high to replace wartime Government demands.

Our policy is to rely as much as possible on private enterprise to provide jobs. But the American people will not tolerate mass unemployment or mere makeshift work. There will be need for the work of everyone willing and able to work — and that means upwards of 60 million jobs.

Our peacetime tasks will be greater than they ever were. Full employment also means that those employed or those working on their own account should be able to earn incomes sufficient to provide them and their families with adequate food, clothing, and recreation; it means not only jobs, but productive jobs. I do not regard jobs that pay substandard wages as productive.

There are many responsibilities which the Federal Government will inevitably have to bear after the war, including our programs for national defense, aid to veterans, and interest on the national debt incurred during the war.

The Federal Government of the postwar period must gear all its programs to the requirements of full employment in an economy of private enterprise. Some of the measures which were devised to secure our record war production can usefully be applied to promoting peacetime output. During the war
we have achieved a high degree of coordination in Government activities and cooperation between Government, business, labor, and agriculture. Similar coordination and cooperation will be needed to accomplish our peacetime objectives.

I shall submit to Congress detailed legislative programs as soon as the war situation permits. In this message I can only state out the areas for a comprehensive program.

Measures to encourage private enterprise cover a wide range. We must make sure that private enterprise works as it is supposed to work — on the basis of initiative and vigorous competition. Only in that way can we achieve prices which will promote the mass consumption which is necessary for full employment.

Our wartime tax system must be revised so as to encourage private demand. Modifications in the taxes on business should provide incentives to new investment and growing enterprise. We must reduce or eliminate taxes which bear heavily on consumption.

During the war we have guaranteed investment in enterprise essential to the war effort. We should adopt similar devices in peacetime to secure opportunities for productive business expansion for which finance would otherwise be unavailable.
PRIVATE BUSINESS must contribute most, if not all, of the employment opportunities — and it will, in turn, gain its greatest stimulus from full and stable employment. As that is achieved private enterprise will prosper and initiative will thrive.

Our full-employment program must emphasize the development of our natural resources. The undeveloped resources of this continent are still vast. Our river-valley projects will literally add new and fertile territories to the United States. The TVA was a bargain at 750 million dollars. To have similar opportunities — similar bargains — in our other great river basins. By harnessing the resources of those rivers, we shall provide the same kind of stimulus to enterprise as was provided by the Louisiana Purchase and the new discoveries in the West during the 19th century.

If we are to avail ourselves fully of the benefits of air transport and if we are to use the automobiles we can produce it will be necessary to construct many more airports and to overhaul our whole national highway system.

The provision of a decent home for every family is a necessity if this country is to be worthy of its greatness — and that task would itself create great employment opportunities. Many of our cities need extensive rebuilding. Many of our farms are in a state of disrepair. To make a frontal attack on the housing problem will require thoroughgoing cooperation between construction industry and labor, and the Federal, State and local governments.
I cannot now enter into details of our social security programs.

I shall only say that an expanded social security program must play an essential role in a program designed to support mass purchasing power.

These policies will provide private and public demands for the products of our industries. But there is another side to the picture. After the war there will be pressing problems of relocation of both industries and population. During the war there have been large-scale migrations of labor to the centers of war production. We must make sure that after the war there will not be large, disorganized migrations of people looking for work.

In some cases we shall have to facilitate the orderly movement of people to places of employment — and in other cases we must find means to encourage industry to develop in the regions to which the people have already moved.

The state must assist in the relocation of its workers. Our education programs, too, must be designed to fit the labor force for the work it is to perform.

The program I have briefly sketched does not provide an easy road to full employment. But if we attack the problem with determination
we shall succeed. And we must succeed. As I said last year, freedom and peace cannot exist without security.

This new year of 1945 can be the greatest year of achievement in human history.

1945 can see the final ending of the Nazi-Fascist reign of terror in Europe.

1945 can see the closing in of the forces of retribution about the center of the malignant power of imperialistic Japan.

Most important of all — 1945 can and must see the substantial beginning of the organization of world peace. This organization must be the fulfillment of the promise for which men have fought and died in this war. It must be the justification of all the sacrifices that have been made — of all the dreadful misery that this world has endured.

We Americans of today, together with our Allies, are making history — and it may be better history than ever has been made before.

We pray that we may be worthy of the unlimited opportunities that God has given us.
DRAFT

One of the most encouraging events of the year in the international field—although one which occasions no surprise to the friends of that country—has been the renaissance of the French people and the return of the French nation to the ranks of the United Nations.

Far from having been crushed by the yoke of Nazi domination, the French people have emerged with stronger faith than ever in the soundness of the democratic ideals to which the French nation has traditionally contributed so greatly.

Since her liberation, France has given many evidences of her unceasing desire and determination to resume an ever-increasing part in the United Nations war effort, in continuation of the heroic efforts of the resistance groups under the occupation and of those Frenchmen who abroad continued the fight by our side after the disaster of 1940. It has been our policy from the outset to place in French hands all the arms and material of war which our resources and the military situation permitted. It is through no lack of desire on our part that the quantities of material so made available have been less than the French, in their eagerness to square accounts with their old enemy, would have wished. I am glad to say, however, that
plans are now to equip new French for combat duty, and it is to be hoped that the future will see an ever-growing volume of help of this nature.

In addition to the contribution which France can make to our common victory, her liberation likewise means that her great influence will again be available in meeting the problems of peace. France's vital interest in a lasting solution of the German problem and the contribution which she can make in achieving international security are fully recognized. Her formal adherence to the Declaration by United Nations three days ago and the proposal at the Dumbarton Oaks discussions, whereby France would receive one of the five permanent seats in the proposed Security Council, are indications of the extent to which France has resumed that position of strength and leadership in which she has always been associated in our minds.