Stы'l yroal
201
$7^{20 a d} S$
気
[frodry
3 P

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, and Members of the Congress (Senate and of the House of Representatives):

I hope that you will pardon me for an unusual posture of sitting down during the presentation of what I want to say, but I know that you will realize that it makes it a lot easier for me in not having to carry about ten pounds of steel 'round, on the bottom of my legs; and also because of the fact that I have just completed a fourteen-thousand-mile trip. (applause)

First of all, I want to say, it is good to be home. (applause)

It has been a long journey. And I hope you will also agree that it has been, so far, (was) a fruitful one.

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is (to be) entirely iruitful or not lies to a great extent in your hands. For unless you are here -- you here in the halls of the American Congress -- with the support of the Amerioan people -- oonour in the general conolusions (decisions) reached at a place called Yalta, and give them your aotive support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results.

And that is why I have come before you at the earllest hour I could after my return. I want to make a personal

Franklin D. Roonevelt Libsary
This is a transeript made by the Thite House stenographer from his shorthend notes taken at the time the speech sas made. Underlining indicates rords oxtemporaneously added, to, the prquioue $1 y$ prepared reading copy tert. Tords in perentheses are words that were onitted when the epeech was dolivered, though they appear in the previouely prepared reading copy text.
report to you -- and, at the same time, to the people of the country. Many months of earnest work are ahead of us all, and I should like to feel that when the last stone is laid on the structure of international peace, it will be an achievement for which all of us in America have worked steadfastly and unselfishly -- together.

I am returning from this trip - - that (whioh) took me so (as) far (as seven thousand miles from the White House --) -- refreshed and inspired. I was well the entire time. I did not -- I was not 111 for a second, until I arrived back in Washington, and there I heard all of the rumors which had occurred In my absence. (laughter) Yes, I returned from the trip refreshed and inspired. The Roosevelts are not, as you may suspeot, averse to travel. (laughter) We seem to thrive on it! (applause)

And far away as I was, I was kept constantly informed of affairs in the United States. The modern miracles of repid communication heve (has) made -- heve made this world very small. (; and) We must always bear in mind that fagt (in mind), when we speak (think) or think (speak) of international relations. I recelved a steady stream of messages from Washington - I might say from not only the Executive branch with all its departments, but also from the Legislative branch -- its two Departments -- and except where radio silence was necessary for security purposes, I could continuously send messages any place in the world. And of course, in a grave emergency, we could (even) have even risked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimea(n) Conference (my fellow Americans) with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace.

There were two main purposes in this (at the) Crimea( $n$ ) Conference. The ifrst was to bring defeat to Germany with the greatest possible speed, and (with) the smallest posgible loss of Allied men. Thet purpose is now being carried out in great force. The German Army, and the German people, are feeling the ever-increasing might of our fighting men and of the fllied Amies. And every hour gives us added pride in the heroic evidence of -- the heroic advance of our troops in Germany -- on (over) German so11 =- toward a meeting with the gallant Red Army, (applause)

The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an international accord that (which) would bring order and security after the chaos of the war, (and) that (which) would give some assurance of lasting peace among the nations of the world.

That goal, too -- in that goal -- toward that goal (also), a tremendous stride was made.

At Teheran, a little over a year ago, there were longrange milltary plans laid by the Chiefs of Staff of the three most powerful nations. Among the civilian leaders at Teheran, however, at that $t$ ime, there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. No political arrangements (agreements) were made -- and none was attempted.

At the Crimea( $n$ ) Conference, however, the time
had come for getting down to speaific cases in the political field.

There was on all sides at this Conference an enthusiastic effort to reach an agreament. Since the time of (the) Teheran (Conference), a year ago, there had developed among all of us a -- what shall I oall it? -- a greater facility in negotiating with each other (, which) that augurs well for the (future) peace of the world. We know each other better.

I have never for an instent wavered in my belief that an agrement to insure world peace and seourity oan be reached.

There were a number of things that we did that were concrete -- that were definite. For instance, the lapse of time between Teheren and Yalta without conferences of representatives -- of civilian representatives of the three major powers has proved to be too long -- fourteen months. During that (this) long period, locel problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland and Greece and Italy and YugoSlavia.

Therefore, we decided at Yalta that, even if circumstances made it impossible for the heads of the three governments to do it -- to meet more often in the future, we would make that sure by arranging that there were to (would) be (more) frequent personal contacts for the exchange of views, between the Secretaries of State and the Foreign Ministers of these three Powers.
(Accordingly,) We arranged for periodio meetings (of the foreign secretaries of Great Britain, Russia and the

United States) at intervels of thres or four months. And I feel very confident that under this arrangement that there will be no recurrences of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world-wide cooperation and collaboration.

When we met at Yalta, in addition to loying our strategio and tactical plans for the complete (a final) and final (complete) military victory over Germany, there were other (a number of) problems of vital politicel consequence. For instance, first, there were the problems of the occupation and control of Germany - - ofter victory - - the complete destruction of her military power, and the assurance that neither the Nazis(m) nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and the ofvilization of the world. (applause)

Secondy -- again for example -- there was the settlement of the few differences that (which) remained among us with respect to the International Security Organization after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. As you remember, at that time, I said -- after it -- that we had agreed ninety percent. Well, that's -- that's -- that's pretty good -- pretty good percentage. I think the other ten percent were ironed out ot Teheran - at Yalta.

Thirdly, there were the - the - there were the general political and economic problems cominon to all of the areas that would be in the future or which have been (which had been or would be) liberated from the Nazi yoke. Very special prob1em. We over here find it difficult to understand the
ramifioations of many of these probloms in foreign lands, but we are trying to.

Fourth, (there were) the special problems oreated by a few instances such as Poland and Yugo-Slavia.

Days were spent in disoussing these momentous matters and we argued freely and frankly aoross the table. But at the end, on every point, unanimous agreement was reached. And more important even than the agreement of words, I may say we achieved a unity of thought and a way of getting along together. (applause)

Of course, we know that it was Hitler's hope -- and the Germen warlords, -- that we would not agree -- that some slight crack might appear in the solid wall of Allied unity, $\underline{E}^{\text {a }}$ arack that (whioh) would give hira and his fellow gangsters one last hope of eacaping their just doom. That is the objective for which his propagande machine has been working for meny months.

But Hitler has failed. (applause)
Never before have the major Allies been more closely united -- not only in their war ains but also in their peace aims. And they are determined to continue to be united -- to be united with each other -- and with all peace-loving nations -- so that the 1deal of lasting (world) peace will become a reality.

The Soviet, and British and United States Chiefs of Staff held daily meetings with each other (, and). They oonferred frequently with Marshal Stalin, and (with) Prime

Minister Churchill and with me, on the problem of coordinating the strategio and tactical efforts of (all) the Allied Powers (forces). They completed their plans for the final knock-out blows to Germeny.

At the time of the Teheran Conference, the Russien front, for instance, was (so far) removed so far from the American and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategic cooperation was possible, there could be no taotical, day-by-day coordination. They were too far apart. But Russian troops have now orossed Polend (, and). They are fighting on the Fastern soil of Germany herself; British and American troops are now on German soil olose to the (River) Rhine River in the West. It's (is) a different situation today from what it was fourteen months ago; a closer tactical liaison has become possible for the first time in Europe -- and, in the Crimea( $n$ ) Conference, (this) that was something else that was (hes been) accomplished.

Provision was made for daily exchange of information between the armies under the command of General Bisenhower on the Western front, and those armies under the command of the Soviet marshals on that long (the) Bastern front, and also with our armies in Italy -- without the necessity of going through the Chiefs of Staff in Washington or (and) London as in the pest.

You have seen one result of this exchange of information in the recent bombings by American and English aircraft of points whioh are directly related to the Russian advance
on Berlin.
From now on, American and British heavy bombers will be used -- in the day-by-day tactics of the war -- and we have begun to realize, I think, that there is all the difference in the world between tactios on the one side, and strategy on the other -- day by day taotics of the war in direot support of the Soviet Armies, as well as in the support of our own on the Western front.

They are now engaged in bombing and strafing in order to hamper the movement of German reserves, German (and) materials to the Eastern and Western fronts from other parts of Germany or (and) from Italy.

Arrangements have been (were) made for the most effective distribution of all available material and transportation to the places where they can best be used in the combined war effort -- American, British, and Russian.

Details of (all) these plens and arrangements are military secrets, of course; but they are going to (will) hasten -- this tieing of things in together is going to hasten the dey of the finsl collapse of Germany. The Nazis are leerning about some of them already, to their sorrow. And I think all three of us at the Conference felt that they will learn more about them tomorrow and the next day -- and the (every) day after that! (applause)

There will be no respite to these attacks (for them). We will not desist for one moment until unconditional surrender. (applause)

You know, I've always felt that common sense prevails in the long run -- quiet, overnight thinking. I think that's true in Germany, just as much as it is here.

The German people, as well as the German soldiers must realize that (the) sooner -- the sooner they give up and surrender -- surrender by groups or by (es) individuals, the sooner their present agony will be over. They must realize that only with complete surrender can they begin to reestablish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

We made it clear again $_{2}$ at Yalta, and I now repeat (--) that unconditional surrender does not mean the destruction or enslavement of the German people. The Nezi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them -- they are working at it day and night -- for it is -- for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own skins, how to (and) deceive their people into continued and useless resistance.

We did, however, make it clear at the (this) Conference just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, Frence, and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a separate zone of Germany -and the administration of the four zones will be coordinated - coordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of
representatives of the four nations.
Unconditionel surrender (elso) means something else. It means the end of Nazism. (applause) (, and) It means the end of the Nazi party -- and (all) of all its barbaric laws and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence In (the) public, private and cultural life of Garmany.

It means for the Nazi war criminals a punishment that is spesdy and just -- and severe.

It means the complete disarmament of Germany; the destruction of its militarism, of (and) its military equipment; the end of its production of armament; the dispersal of all (of) Its armed forces; the permenent dismemberment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Germany will have to make reparations -- reparations in kind for the damage which (it) has been done to the innocent victims of its aggression.

By compelling reparations in kind -- in plants, (and) in machinery, (and) in rolling stock, (and) in raw materials -we shall avoid the mistake that we and other people -- other nations made after the last war, the (of) demanding of reparations in the form of money whioh Germany could never pay.

We do not want the German people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objective in handing Germany is simple -- it is to secure the peace of the rest of the (future) world now and

In the future. Too much experience has shown that that objectIve is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive warfare. (applause)

Now, these (That) objectives will not hurt (harm) the German people. On the contrary, they will give them -they (it) will protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on them before, and which Hitlerism is now imposing upon them again a hundredfold. It will be removing a cancer from the German body politic, which for generations has produced only misery and only pain to (for) the whole world.

During my stay in $-\frac{1 n}{}$ (at) Yalta, I saw the kind of reckless, senseless fury, the terrible (and) destruction that (which) comes out of German militarism. Yalta, on the Black Sea, had no military significance of any kind. It had (, and) no defense(s).

Before the last war, it had been a resort -- a resort for people like (the) Czars and princes, and (for the) aristocracy (of Russia) -- and the hangers-on. (Afterward) However, after the war, after the Red Revolution, (and) until the attack on (upon) the Soviet Union by Hitler, a few years ago, the palaces, (and) the villas of Yalta had been used as a rest and recreation center by the Russian people.

The Nazi officers took these former palaces and villas
-- took them over for their own use. The only reason that the so called former palace of the Czar was still habitable, when We got there, was that it had been given -- or he thought it
had been given -- to a German general for his own property and his own use. And when Yelte was so destroyed, he kept soldiers there to protect what he thought would become his own, nice villa. It was a -- it was a useful rest and recreation center for hundreds of thousands of Russian workers, farmers and their families, up to the time that it was taken again by the Germans. The Nazi officers took these places for their own use, and when the Red Army forced the Nazis out of the Crimea -- Just almost a year ago -- last April, I think it was -- all of these villas were looted by the Nazis, and then nearly all of them were destroyed by bombs placed on the inside. And even the humblest of the homes of Yalte were not spered.

There was little left (in Yalta) of it except blank (but) walls - ruins -- destruction (and desolation).

Sevastopol -- that was a fortified port, about forty or filty miles away -- there again was (also) a scene of utter destruction -- a large oity with great navy yards and fortifications -- I think (with) less than a dozen buildings were left intact in the entire (whole) city.

I hed reed about Warsaw and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coventry -- but I saw Sevastopol and Yalta! And I know that there is not (enough) room enough on earth for both German militarism and Christian decency. (prolonged applause)

Let us go on with the story, which I hope to do under an hour.

Of equal importance with the military arrangements at the Crimean (sic) Conference were the agreements reached with
respect to a general international -- international organization for lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. There wes one point, however, on which agreement was not reached (at Dumbarton Oaks). It Involved the procedure of voting -- of voting in the Security Councils. I want to try to make it clear by making it simple. It took me hours and hours to get the thing straight in my own mind -- and many conferences. At the Crimea(n) Conference, the Americans made a proposal -- a proposal on the (this) subject which, after full discussion, I am glad to say, was unanimously adopted by the other two nations.

It is not yet possible to announce the terms of it (that) (agreement) publicly, but it will be in a (very) short time.

When the conclusions reached (at the Crimean Conferonce) with respeot to voting (in the Seourity Council) are made known, I think and I hope that (I believe) you will find them fair -- that you will find them a fair solution of this complicated and difficult problem; because it's -- it's a -- might almost say it's a legislativg problem. They are founded in justice, and will go far to assure internationel cooperation in the maintenence of peace.

There is going to be held, as you know -- after we
have streightened thet voting metter out -- there is going to be held in San Prancisco, a meeting of all the United Nations of the world, on the 25 th of April -- next month.
(A conference of all the United Nations of the
world will meet in Sen Francisco on April 25, 1945). There, we all hope, and confidently expect, to execute a dafinite charter of organization upon (under) whioh the peace of the world will be preserved and the forces of aggression permanently outlawed,

This time we are (shail) not making (make) the mistake of waiting until the end of the war to set up the machinery of peace. This time, es we fight together to win (get) the war finally (over quickly), we work together to keep it from happening again.
I -- as you know -- I have always been a believer in the dooument called the Constitution of the United States. And I spent a good deal of time in educating two other nations of the world in regard to the Constitution of the United States. The charter has to be -- and should be -- approved by the Senate of the United States, under the Constitution. I think the other nations all know it now. (laughter) I am aware of that fact, and now all the other nations are. And we hope that the senate will approve of what is set forth as the charter of the United Nations when they all come together in San Francisoo next month.
(I am well aware of the constitutional fact -- as are all the United Nations -- that this cherter must be approved by two thirds of the Senate of the United States -- as will some of the other arrangements mede at Yalte,)

The Senate of the United States, through its appropriate representatives, has been kept continuously advised of the program of this government in the creation of the

International Security Organization.
The Senete and the House (of Representatives) will both be represented at the Sen Francisco Conference ${ }_{\perp}$ (. The) the Congressional delegates (to the San Francisco Conference) to (will) consist of an equal number of -- and Senatorial -- an equal number of Republican and Democratic members. The American Delegation is -- in every sense of the word -- bipartisan.

But, I think that world peace is not exactly a party question. I think that Republicans want peace just as much as Democrats. (applause) It is not a party question -- any more than is military viotory -- the winning of the war.

When the (our) Republio was threatened, first by the Naz1 clutch for world conquest back in $1940 \ldots 39 \ldots$ and then by the Japanese treachery in (of) 1941, partisanship and politics were laid aside by nearly every Amerioan; and every resource was dedicated to our common safety. The same consecration to the cause of peace will be expected, I think, by every patriotic American, (and) by every human soul overseas, too.

The structure of world peace cannot be the work of one man, or one party, or one nation. It cannot be just an American peace, or a British peace, or a Russian, (a) Frenoh, or a Chinese peace. It cannot be a peace of large nations -or of small nations. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole world.

It must be a structure of complete -- it cannot be, What some people think, a structure of complete perfection at first. But it can be a peace -- and it will be a peace --
based on the sound and just principles of the Atlantic Charter -- on the concept(ion) of the dignity of the human being -- and on the guarantees of tolerance and freedom of religious worship.

As the Allied Armies have marched to military victory, they have libereted people(s) whose liberties had been orushed by the Nazis for four long years, (and) whose economy has (had) been reduced to ruin by Nazi despoilers.

There have been instances of political confusion and unrest in these liberated areas -- that is not unexpected -- as in Greece or in (and) Poland or in (and) Yugo-Slavia, and there may be more (other places). Worse than that, there actually began to grow up in some of these places queer (them vaguely defined) ideas of -- for instance, "spheres of influence" that (which) were incompatible with the basic prinoiples of international collaboration. If allowed to go on unchecked, these developments might have had tregio results in time.

It is fruitless to try to place the blame for this situation on one particular nation or on another. It is the kind of development that (which) is almost inevitable unless the major powers of the world continue without interruption to work together and (to) assume joint responsibility for the solution of problems that (which) may arise to endanger the peace of the world.

We met in the Crimea, determined to settle this matter of liberated areas. Things that might happen that we
cen't foresee at this moment might happen suddenly -- unexpectedly -- next week or next month. And I em happy to confirm to the Congress that we did arrive at a settlement -- and, incidentally, a unanimous settlement.

The three most powerful nations have agreed that the political and economic problems of any area liberated from (the) Nazi conquest, or of any former Axis satellite, are a joint responsibility of all three governments. They will join together, during the temporary period of instability - - after hostilities $=$ - to help the people of any liberated area, or of any former satellite state, to solve their own problems through firmly established demooratic processes.

They will endeavor to see -- to see to it that interim governing -- the people who carry on the interim government between occupation by (sic) Germany, and by true independence (sic), that such an interim government will be (authorities are) as representative as possible of all democratic elements in the population, and that free elections are held as soon as possible thereafter.

Responsibility for political conditions thousends of miles away (overseas) can no longer be avoided, I think, by this great nation. Certainly, I don't want to live to see another war. As I have said, the world is smaller -- smaller every year (it is a smeller world). The United States now exerts a tremendous (vast) influence in the cause of peace (throughout all the world). What we people over here are thinking and talking about is in the interest of peace,
because it's known all over the world. The slightest remark in the -- either House of the Congress, it's known all over the world the following day. We (It) will continue to exert that influence, only if we are (it is) willing to continue to share In the responsibility for keeping the peace. It will (would) be our own tragic loss, I think, if (were) we were to shirk that responsibility.

The final decisions in these areas are going to be made jointly, therefore; and therefore they will of ten be a result of give-and-take compromise. The United States will not always have its way a hundred percent ( $100 \%$ ) -- nor will Russia nor (or) Great Britain. We shall not always have ideal answers二- solutions to complicated international problems, even though we are determined continuously to strive toward that (the) ideal. But I am sure that ( -- ) under the agreements reached at Yalta (--) there will be (a) more stable politioal Europe -and the parts of $1 t$-- than ever before.

Of course, once that there has been a true (free) expression of the peoples* will in any country, our immediate responsibility ends -- with the exception only of such eotion as may be agreed on (upon) by the (in the) International Security Organization that we hope to set up.

The United Nations must also (soon) begin to help
these liberated areas adequately to reconstruct their economy -I don't want them starving to death -- so that they are ready to resume their places in the worla. The Nazi war machine has stripped them of raw materials and machine tools and trucks
and locomotives, and things like that. They have left the (their) industry of these places stagnant and much of the (their) agricultural(e) ereas are unproductive. The Nazis have left a complete ruin, or a partial ruin in their wake. To start the wheels running again is not a mere matter of relief. It is to the national interest that (of) all of us - all of us (to) see to it that these liberated areas are again made self-supporting and productive so that they do not need continuous (continued) relief from us. I should say that was an argunent based on plain common sense.

One outstanding example of foint action by the three major Allied Powers (Allies) (In the liberated areas) was the solution reached on Poland. The whole Polish question was a potential source of trouble in post-war Europe -- as it has been sometimes before -- and we came to the conference determined to find a common ground for its solution. And we did $=$ even though everybody doesn't agree with us, obviously.

Our objective was to help to create a strong, independent, and prosperous nation. That's the thing we must always remember, those -- those words, agreed to by Russia, by Britain, and by me: the objective of making Poland a strong, independent and prosperous nation, with a government ultimately to be selected by the Polish people themselves.

To achieve that (this) objective, it is (was) necessary to provide for the formation of a new government much more representative than had been possible while Poland was enslaved. There were, as you know, two governments -- one in London,
one in Lublin -- practically in Russia. Accordingly, steps were taken at Yalta to reorganize the existing Provisional Govemment in Poland on a broader democratio basis, so as to include democratic leaders now in Poland and those abroad. This new, reorganized government will be recognized by all of us as the temporary government of Poland. Poland needs a temporary government in the worst way -- an ad interim government, I think is another way of putting it.

However, the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will be pledged to holding a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and a secret ballot.

Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on Russia have been made. Twice in this generation, Germany has struck at Russia through this corridor. To insure European security and world peace, a strong and independent Poland is necessary to prevent that from happening again.

The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was, frankly, a compromise. I dian't agree with all of it, by any means, but we didn't go as far as Britain wanted, in certain -- certain areas; we didn't go so far as Russia wanted, in certain areas; and we didn't go so far as I wanted, in certain areas. It was a compromise. The decision under -- is not only a compromise -- is one, however, under whioh (however) the Poles will receive oompensation in territory in the North and West in exchange for what they lose by the Curzon Line in the

East. The limits of the Western border (boundary) will be permanently fixed in the final Peace Conference. We know, roughly, that it will include - in the new, strong Poland -- quite a large slice of what now is oalled Germany. And it was agreed, also, that the new Poland will have a large and long coast line, and many new harbors. Also, that East Prussia -- most of it -- will go to Poland. A corner of it will go to Russia. Also, that the -- what shall I call it? -- the anomaly of the Free State of Danzig, I think Danzig would be a lot better if it were Polish.

It is well known that the people east of the Curzon Line -- just for example, here is why I compromised -- the people East of the Curzon Line are predominantly white Russian and Ukrainian -- they are not Polish; and a very great majority of (that) the people west of the line are predominantly Polish, except in that part of Bast Prussia and Zastern Germeny, which will go to the new Poland. As far back as 1919, (the) representatives of the Allies agreed that the Curzon Line represented a. Iair boundery between the two peoples. And you must remeraber, also, that there was no Poland before -- hedn't been any Polish government -- before 1919 for a great many generations.

I am convinced that the -- that this agreement on
Poland, under the oircumstances, is the most hoperul agreement possible for a free, independent and prosperous Polish State.

Now, the Crimea( $n$ ) Conference was a meeting of the three major military powers on whose shoulders rested (the) ohief responsibility and burden of the war. Although, for
this reeson another nation was not included, France was not a partio1pant in the Conference, no one should detract from the recognition that was (there) accorded there to (of) her role in the future of Burope and the future of the world.

Prance has been invited to accept -- this was on -on my -- second part was on my motion (sic) -- France has been invited to accept a zone of control in Germany, end to partieipate as a fourth member of the Allied Control Council of Germeny.

She has been invited to join as a sponsor of the International Conference at Sen Francisco next month.

She will be a permanent member of the International Security Council together with the other four major powers.

And, finally, we have asked (that) Prance that -that she be associated with us in our joint responsibility over the liberated areas -- all of them -- in (of) Europe.

Of course, there are a number of smaller things that I haven't got time to go into on which agreement was had, and we hope that things will straighten out.

Agreement was (also) reached on Yugo-Slavia, as announced in the communique; and we hope that it's (is) in process of fulfillment. But, not only there but some other places, we have to remember that there are a great many prima donnas in the world. All of them wish to be heard, before anything becomes final, so we may have a little delay while we listen to more prima donnas.

Quite naturally, this (the Crimean) Conference
concerned itself only with the Buropean war and with the political problems of Europe -- and not with the Peoifio war.

In (At) Malta, however, our Combined British and American Staffs made their plans to increase the attaok against Japan.

The Japanese warlords know that they are not being overlooked. They have felt the force of our B-29's, and our carriar planes; they have felt the naval might of the United States, and do not appear very anzious to come out and try it again.

The Japs now know what it means to hear that "The United States Marines have landed." (prolonged applause) And I think I (we) can add that having Iwo Jima in mind, that "The situation is well in hand." (more applause)

They also know what is in store for the homeland of Japan now that General MacArthur has completed his magnifioent march back to Mianila -- (applause) -- and that Admiral Nimitz is establishing (his) air bases right in their own (the) back yard (of Japan itself -- in Iwo Jima). (more applause)

But, lest somebody else lay off work in the United States, I can repeat what I have said -- a short sentence -even in my sleep: "We haven't won the wars yet" .- with an S on "wars."

It's (is) (still a tough) a long, tough road to Tokyo. It's longer to go to Tokyo than it is to Berlin, in every sense of the word. The defeat of Germany will not mean the end of the war against Japan. On the contrary, we (America) must
be prepared for a long and costly struggle in the Pacifio. But the unconditional surrender of Japan is as essential as the defeat of Germany. (applause) I say that advisedly, with the thought in mind that that is espeoially true (,) if our plans for world peace are to succeed. For Japanese militarism must be wiped out as thoroughly as German militarism.

On the way back (home) from the Crimea, I made arrangements to meet personally King Farouk of Bgypt, Haile Selassie, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. Our conversations had to do with matters of common interest, They will be of great mutual advantage because they gave (us) me, and a good many of us, an opportunity of meeting and talking face to face, (and of) in exchanging views in personal conversation instead of formal correspondence.

For instance, on the problem of -- of Arabia, I learned more about that whole problem -- the Moslem problem, the Jewish problem - by talking with Ibn Saud for five minutes, than I could have learned in the exchange of two or three dozen let ters.

On my voyage, I had the benefit of seeing the (our)
Army and Navy and the Air Force at work.
All Americans, I think, would feel proud -- as proud of our armed forces as I am, if they could see and hear what I did.

Against the most efficient professional leaders (soldiers and sailors and airmen of all history, our men stood and fought -- and won. (applause)

I think that this is our chance to see to it that
the sons and the grandsons of these gallant fighting men do not have to do it all over again in a few years.

The Conference in the Crimea was a turning point -m I hope in our history and therefore in the history of the world (in American history). There will soon be presented to the Senate (or the United States) and (to) the American people a great deoision that (which) will determine the fate of the United States -- and I think, therefore, the fate of the world -- for generations to come.

There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world confliot.

I know that the word "plenning" is not looked upon with favor in some oiroles (quarters). In domestic affairs, tragio mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning; and, on the other hand, many great improvements in living, and many benerits to the human race, have been accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning -- reclamations of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, provision for adequate housing, and a dozen different topics.

The same will be true in relations between nations. For the (a) second time in the lives of most of us this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objective, the nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not. The groundwork of a plan has now been furnished, and has been submitted to humenity for discussion and decision.

No plan is perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Francisco will doubtless have to be amended time and agein over the years, just as our own Constitution has been.

No one can say exaotly how long any plan will lest. Peace cen endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for it -- and sacrifice for it.

Twenty-five years ago, American ilighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for whioh they fought and surfered. We falled them. We falled them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world (again) to survive again.

I think the Crimea( $n$ ) Conference was a successful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground of (for) peace. It spells -- it ought to spell -- the end of the system of unilateral action, the (and) exclusive alliances, the (and) spheres of influenoe, the (and) balances of power and all the other expedients that (which) have been tried for centuries -- and have always failed.

We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in whioh all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join.

And I am conrident that the Congress and the American people will acoept the results of this Conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world in which our children and grandchildren -- yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world -- must live, and can live.

And that, gy friends, is the only message I can give you. But I feel it very deeply, es I know that all of you ere feeling it today, and are going to feel it in the future. (prolonged applause)

F153 102150:


This is the transcript of the Prosidentls Address made March lIst, as taken dom by the House reporters.
(Copy of the Congressional Record attached also as it contained tho Address)



The second purpose was to continue to build the foundation for en international accord whin would bring order and security after the chaos of ear，and which mould give some assurance of lasting pesce among the nations of the world．

Toward that goal side，a tremendous stride de was made． a－liade
At Teheran，over a year ago，there were long－range military plans laid by the Chiefs of staff of the three most powerful nations．Among the civilian leaders at Teheran， however，there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion．No political agreements were made－－and none was attempted．
artangent
At the Crimean Conference，however，the time had come for getting dom to apeoifio cases in the political field， a year nov，
There was on all fides at this Conference an enthusiastic effort to reach figisrouent．Since the tine of
 a greater facility in negotiating with each other，yhiohchor $\hat{A}$ cell it P－． augurs well for the suture peace of the world．We than col sobereoter

I have never for an instant wavered in my belief that an agrement，to inquire world peace and security can be reached．
 anne－hubert dy conferences of lapse of tivilian representatives of the Yalta in thou $\frac{2}{7} \overbrace{4}=\frac{1}{2}$ powers has proved to be too long－fourteen months．During thur thine long period，local problems were permitted to become acute in places like Poland and Greece and Italy and Yugoslavia．

Therefore we decided at Yalta that，even if eircyestances made it impossible for the heads of the three government st to meet more often in the future，we would make flare that there would be mere frequent personal contacts for C change of views
heeerdingis，We arranged for periodic meetings of the fereigh－seoretazias of Great－Britaln，Huesla gid the United States at intervals of three or four months it i feel very confident that under this arrangement there will be no recurrences of the incidents which this winter disturbed the friends of world－wide，collaboration．
the compile te fiscal
When wo met at Yalta，in addition to laying our strategic and tactical plans for＊－Saul and complete military victory over Germany，there were s－mutioy－of problems of vital political consequence．

Triter
Trimetanc，Surat，there wore the problems of the oceupstion and control of Oemminy after victory；＂the complete dostrugtion of her military power，and the assurance that nell the Nazis nor Prussian 聠litariam could again be revived to threaten the peace and civilizati on of the world．（apglawse）
that Secondly，there was the settlement of the few differences
inion remained affong us with respect to the International
Security Organisation after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference． unseat（1）HeRE the－de ．－the ne were

Thirdly there were，the general political and economic problems oomon to 211 of the areas nwhioh－had been－sen－mould－be liberated from the Mast yoke． engender（C）mess

Fourth，therefor the special problems orated by e far，
Yugo－Slavia． Poland and Yugo－Slavia．

Days were spent in discrusaing these momentous matters and we argued freely and frankly across the table．But at the wad，of every point，unanimous sfromeat wis ranobed．

And nore freportant oven than the agremont of mords, I nay say wo achieved a unity of thought and a nay of getting along togother. (ayplawe) -vind the ibsman worlondi.. Pofcounse, we fiwow that it wos Hitlor's hopo athat we mould not agreo - that som slight crack =1ght appear in the solid wall of Alliod unity ionteh would givo him and his follow gangstors one last hope of oscaping their just doon. That is the objoctive for which his propaganda machine has boen vorking for fonths. Tlue But Hitlor has failod. (appolame) Manamy But. Hitlor has radlod. (appalamee) alor H he tailid Hover before have the major Al21es boen norg closoly unit od - not only in thoir var aims but in thoir paace aims. And they aro deternined to cont inue to be united fit th oach othor - and "ith all posce-loving nationa - so that the idcal of lasting meyden peace will boccoe a romility. hold daily ineotings oith, eech othoof and) conforred frequantly with Marshal Stalin, wicfi Prine Hnistor Churchill and with me, on tho problon of coordinating tho stratogic and tactical offorts of $\$ / 42$ the Alliod sampes. Thoy completed their plans for the YLral. knock-out bloni to Gernany.
/fr indave $A t$
If the Teheran Conforence, the Russian frant, was so-fer ranoved, from the Ancrican and British fronts that, while certain long-range strategle cooperation was possible, thore could be no tactical, day-by-day quoprdination. Thy whe tav But Pussian troops have now, crossed poland and are fighting on the Bastarn soil of Gerratiy British and Amoflcap troops arp nor on Corman 3011 close to the Rhwor Rhino ant the West. It ife a difforent situation todayi a closer tacticnl liaison has beocno possiblo $\lambda *$ end, in the Crimcey, Conforcnice, thise thar whe has-been accomplishod. on the hation four, and

Provision was mgde for daily oxchange dyformation botwoop tho amice undor Comand of Gonoml Eisonhower those amira und or somand of the Sovict marahala on the Eastorn front, and our amias in Italy - without the nocosaity of going through the Chfers of Staff in Washingtan alis London as in the past.

You have soen ono result of thia exchango of Information in the rocent boubingery Arorican and English airerait of points which aro directly relatod to tho Russien advance on Borlin.

> (DIMERTT HEAE

Froe now on, Athorican and Britith hcavy bonbors will bo usod - in the dey-by-day tactics of the war i* in diract support of the Soviot inules, 88 woll es in support of our own on the Joatem front.

Thiy are now angagod in bonbing and strurling in ordar to hanper tho novenont of Ocrman resorvos, ad natcrivis to tho Enstem and Wostorn fronts fron other parta of Gemany on and from Italy.
hoe ber

Arrangonont s evuru made for the nost offective distribution of all availahlo material and traneportation to the places where they can beat bo used in the corbined mar offort - Anorican, British, and Rusalan.
military seorotgh but they wifi hastongini day of the final collapas of Gorfhry. The liszis aro 10 cming about sone of thea alroady, to thed $r$ soppoti, $\lambda$ thoy wfll loarn nore nbout



There $w 111$ be no respite for them. We $\times 111$ not desist for one moment until unconditional surrender. ( $1 / 7$ planes)
 oars must by groups or Arr individuals, the sooner the $r$ present agony mill be over. They must roalias that only with complete surrender can they begin to reestablish themselves as people whom the world might accept as decent neighbors.

Te made it olear, again, at Yalta, and I now repeat $\rightarrow \hat{b}$ that unconditional surrender does not man the destruction or enslavement of the German people. The Nazi leaders have deliberately withheld that part of the Yalta declaration from the German press and radio. They seek to convince the people of Germany that the Yalta declaration does mean slavery and destruction for them $\lambda$ - for that is how the Nazis hope to save their own Bling, deceive their people into continued and useless resistance. low to
king
Wo did, however, make it el ear at this Conference Just what unconditional surrender does mean for Germany.

It means the temporary control of Germany by Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States. Each of these nations will occupy and control a soparate zone of Geranny $-\infty$ and the administration of the four sones will be coordinated in Berlin by a Control Council composed of ropreauntatives of the four nations.
-nceeno opucdeing las. It
Unconditional surrender ${ }^{3380}$ means the end of Naziame. (ar ry lawn) and of the Nazi party - and az of, alta barbaric law and institutions.

It means the termination of all militaristic influence in ehf public, private and cultural life of Germany.

It means for the Most mar oriminsls s punishment that ia speedy and just - and severe.

It means the complete pdissmasant of Germany; the destruction of its allitarism esd its military equipment; the and of its production of arpent; the dispersal of all of ito armed forces; the permanent dismemberment of the German General Staff which has so often shattered the peace of the world.

It means that Oureany will have to make reparations-- Town. In idind for the damage which to has done to the innocent victims of ito aggression. thutive and cher perph-woth nation

By compelling reparations in kind -- in plants, and in machinery, and rolling stook, abd ram matorlale - we shall avoid the mistake monde after the last mar, of difirnnding of reparations in the form of money which Germany could never pay.

We do not want the liernan people to starve, or to become a burden on the rest of the world.

Our objuotive in handling Germany is simple - it is to secure the peace of the future world Too much experience has shown that that objective is impossible if Germany is allowed to retain any ability to wage aggressive war face. (apyplones)

If fen, that objectiveshell not that the contrary te 111 protect them from a repetition of the fate which the General Staff and Kaiserism imposed on then before, and which Hitlerian ia now imposing upon them again a hundredfold $1 t$ mil be removing a inner from the lerpesp body, which for generations has produced only misery and, path $\epsilon_{5}$ Noe the whole world.
-they will give thou .- by


## -troonsix fou e nemator

## chars



Thi Sonnto and th. Hous of peqweeentreive will both be ropresonted at the San Frnnelses Confercnec. The Congrossienal delogntes, to the gerk Braneiven Conforenee fill consist of an equal nubber of fiepublicon and Denocratio nonbera. The inoriesn Dologation is - in ovory senac of the word - bipartisang,
 is niliters victory $\mathbf{c}^{- \text {- the commin fow war. }}$
ithen the Ropublic fras thriatonod, first by the Nari elutch for, norld conquost, in 1940 a and then by tho Japanose troachory \& 1sil, partiacnsinip and politics vere laid aaide by noarly ovory Amoriean; and overy rosource was dedieatod to our corrion safoty. The sund consocration to the cause of peace vill bo expected, dy cocry patmiotio dre rican, ayd by ovory hunan soul overebase tifis chinth,

Tho structure of world paseo cannot be the work of one aan, or onc party, or one retion. It caunot bo/an Lunorican peace, or a British a Pusoinn, X French, dr $\chi^{Z}$ Chincse pesce. It canutat bo $b_{\text {a peacc of of large retions - or }}$ of saxa 11 nations. It aust bo a pace which reates on the cooporative offort of the whole torld.
 first. But it con bo a poaco - and it will bo a poace basod on thicesound and just prineiples of the Atlantic Chartor - on the conc optibes of tha dignity of the huran bofing - Wh the guarantecs of toloranco and froodon of roligious norchip.

Ls the M111od jraics duvo narchid to military victory, they have liborated pooplof whose 1 ibortios had boen orushod by tho liazis for foumprcars, whe thoso oconory hed boon roduc od to ruin by Mizi dospoilcrs.

Thare havo boon instanges of political confusion and unrost in these ilboratod arcas, - as in Grooco, ene Poland of.if Yugo-Slavia, and othap-pineoe. Worsc than that, there actuelly pezan to grow up in somo of sheevagualy, iefined idcas of $\mathrm{X}^{\text {sphorps }}$ of influenco" vafehryore incompati ble with tho basic principlss of int crmationsy/collaboration. If allowod to epo indjoeliced, those dovorleprants adight havo had tragic rosultâdintech in ther. lekat

It is fraticse to try to placo tho blano for this situation on ono partigtiar ration or, , inother. It is the kind of developnopt wheah is alnost inovitable unless the najor powars of tha world cant inue without intarrup tion to work togotico and to assune joint responsibility for the solu-tion-of problons wheh nay arise to ondanger the poaco of tho tiorld.
and, inadalally,
 of liberated arcas. of $^{2}$ an happy to conflim to tic Congross thet wo did arkive at a sottlesont - $\Lambda$ a unanimous sottlonent.
his haveo non

Tho throe nost poridrful nati oris havio agreed that tho political and econonic problens of, hity aroa liberated from the ilazi conquoet, or of any fophor hise antcl1140, aro a jofnt rosponalbility of all throo/govommonts. They will join togothor,
 satcilite state, to solvo tho ir om probions through fimmy establishod denoeratio proe osecs.

Rncy vill findoavor to $\overline{500}$ to it thet intorim foworntre oulinemilier ous as roproaentative as possible of all dencoratic alononts in the population, and that froe eloetions aro hold as socn as pogriblederinenf(ar:

10. feoponsiollity for political oonditions thousands of nillos owarbeas coir no longer be avoid od, oy this groat nation. Cevtainly, ${ }^{\text {? }}$ excrts a whet influonce in the cause of poaco throughout-all tho soridr त-jo will continue to oxert that influonce, anly If weare it-is vililine to continue to sharo in the rosponsibility for kooping the peaco. It weuld be our own traglc loss vesc me wave to shirk that rosponaibilityd wile , \%hemk, if

Whe finel deeisions in theso aross aro going to be made jointiysiain thorofore they will ofton be a rosult of give-andtalico comprondse. The Unitcd Statce will not alvays have its kiay $100 \%$ - nor mill Passiaf oor Oreat britaln. To shall not alrays have idénts solutions to conplicated int omational probleng ef gyon though to are detorained cont inuously to strive toward ${ }^{\text {efe }}$ idenl. But $I$ an sure thet $\alpha$ undor tho agroonents roachod at Yalta $*$ thero vill bo $X$ nore stsblo political Buropecthan over bofore.

Of courso, onco thore has boon a free exprossion of
of and
the peopless will in any obuntry, our Irtiodiato roeponaibility ends - with the oxcoption only of such action as ray be agroed Whin in tho Int ornational Socurity Organization we hoper. कs est app.

The Unitod Nations must niso stin bogin to help thoso 11 borated areas adequately to recenstruct thedr econony $s 0$ that thay aro roady to rosum theig places in tho vorld. The Nazi nar machine has strippod thor of raw materials and rachine tools and trucks and locomotives, Thoy haye jeft the is, industry of tuce stagnant and nuoh of tholin agryfulturatunproductive. 2he Nezio, plowes

To start tho whools ruming again efp not a ncro rattcr Co of roliof. It is to tho national int crost and all of u5 A sol and that those 1 tocrated aross aro again mado solf-supporting and produetive so that thoy do not neod continued roliof from us. $9 a / \mathrm{CN}$ d

Opy odtstanding cxarplo of joint action by the throe najor $\alpha 1110$. An the 1 ib orated-ersee mas the solution rachod on Poland. The tholo Folish question mas a potontial sourco of troble in post-nar Burope, mpde wo cane to tho eonforence deterninod to find a corion grgend for its solution. ${ }^{1}$ Wo did. ( $X$ to
 aclocted by the Polisit pooplo thaiacivos.
 for tho fomation of a now sovomacint puth noro rcyrcsqntative than lad been possible sanilo poland yas enslavod. A Aocordingly, stops zore taltan at Yaita to roorgorize the cxisting Provisional Government in Poland on a broadey descoratic besis, so es to Include dosocratio loaders novi In Poland and thoso abrond. This nev, roorganisod govormant gill be rueoghizod by all of us as the tomporary governnont of Poland. iveseer (1) Nete

Houcver, the nov Polish Provisional Govarnnent of Hational Unity $11 i 2$ os pludgod to holding a froe elcetion as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrago and a secrot ballot.

Throughout history, Poland has boen the eurricior through thich attacks on Russia hrve been nisde. Ti=1eo in this Gonuration, Gormany lino struik at Russia tirough this corgidar. To Ensuro Europoan socurity and rorid poico, a gtron;: and inciopondent Pulend is nocessary, -topeownt ethar funcly tro duetns on wist (O) HERE

The ducigion "ith roapoot to the buandarius of Poland ragh a coagroidscenunder चhiclyg nemeery the Polce fill racoive eocponsation in territory in tho North and Toat if oxehangr


Wabwewe wer yot therer tar rovernenden 5 th ace cin herarn, one 1, sublin. - visetionath
for what thgy lose by the Curzon Line, The Lisd ts of the Featern bofindary wili be permunentiy fixed in the final Pesce Conferemces. -t whs agreed that a large poast line, and yany Poe Corese ohoold bo daetucled.

It is woll known that the people east of the Curson Line are predominantly white Kuasian and Ukrainian, And chere the poople west of the line are predominantly Polish, Nef for back as 1919, the ropresentativas of the Allies agread tyat the Curzon Line roprasented a fadr boundary between the two peoples. INSERT $Q$, AFAFE
pratina yindig of thut of
I an convinced that the agrement on Poland, under the olroumstances, is the most hopeful agreanant possible for a free, independent and prosporous Polish State.

Ar the Crimeaf Conferince mas a meeting of the three major military powtrs on whose shoulders rester chief responsipility and fourden of the war. Although, for this reason, france was not a participant in the Conference, no one abould detract fron the rocognition there accorded of \% hur role in the future of Burope and theptorid. Nlshure

Franoe has been invited to accoptici zone of control In Oermany, and to partscipate as a fourth nimber of the killed Control Counell of Gormany.
haseat (B) heks
The has boen invited to foin as a sponsor of the Internatid onsl Conference at San Franclaco nancr houck.

She will be a permanemt merber of the Anternational
Security Council together with the other four major powers.
thar- thut ahe
And, finally, we have asked thet Franoe, be assooisted تith us in our joint responsibility over the liberated areas, ale of A ef. Europe. we-hogec that ils
Agroument was ayo reached on Yugo-Slavia, as announced In the gommalque; and in in procegs of fulfillmenty
dinsert (T) HEXE ches
Quite naturally, the Cifngon Conference concemed itself only with the puropean war and meftr the political problems of Europe - and not mph the Pacif1c war.

If ht Mults, however, our Combined Britiah and Aanican Stsiffs wade their plana to inorease the sttack against ispan.

The Japanese war lords lonow that they are not being overlooked. They have folt the force of our B-29's, and our carrier planes; they have felt the naval uight of the United States, and do not appear very anxious to come out and try it again.

The Japs, Jonow what it means to hr-ar that "The United States Marines have landed", And foan add, thaving Two Jlea


They also know what is in store for the homeland of Japan now that Gemeral Moarthur has eompletod his magnificent narch back to Manila and Ndiniral Midits is setablishing hie


Itsix ath21 a tomeh, lons, road to Tokyo. The defeat
 On the contrary, nourion must be prepared for a long and oostly strugele in the Paciric.

But the unoonditional surrender of Japan to as essentiel as the dareat of Gamany app if our plans for world poace are to aucoeed. For Japnnese pdilitarlan neast be wippi out as thoroughly as Ooman milifarian.

On the way heep, from the crimes, I made arrangengnts to meet personally King Farouk of Egypt, Hale Selassie, the Emperor of Ethiopia, and King In baud of Saudi arabia. Our conversations had to do with matters of common interest. They $w 11$ be of great mutual advantage because they gave int pow germany of $\infty$ opportunity of meeting and talking face to face, within gown exchanging views in personal conversation instead of formal correspondence.

NSERT (v) YESE The
on ap voyage, I had the benefit of seeing our stay


All Americans, would feel as proud of our amid fores as I am, if they could see and hear meet I did.

Against the most efflelent professional selttitars and anilors and adrmon of all history, our men stood and fought and won. (egeplawe)
Pg Chime chat this is our chasse to see to it that the sons and the grandsons of these gallant fighting son do not have to do it all over again in a fou years.

The $Q$ onference in the Crimes was a turning point, in hairy ane Amokican-hietory, There will soon be presented to the Senate Thergac in $6 h_{4}$ of the United states and to the American people a great decision titch will determine the fate of the United States -- and of the world -- for generations to come.

There can be no sidle ground here. We shall have to take the responaiblilty for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict. circles.
I know that the word "planning" is not looked upon with favor in some quarters. In domestic affairs, tragic mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning; and, on the other hand, many great improvements in living, and many benefits to the human race, have bee accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning - reclamations of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, provision for adequate housing, and a chaw diffecut
 tropics. in the lifts mot of -no
The sane will be true in relations between nations. For the $X$ second tire this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objectil we, the nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not. The groundwork of a plan has now been furnished, and has been subusittod to humanity for discussed on and decision.
's
No plan ie perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Franelsoo Will doubtless have to be amended time and again over the years, Jut as our own Consti tuition has been.

No one can say exactly how long any plan will last. Poses can endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for it - and sacrifice for it.

Wa fails them.
Thenty-five years ago, hadrian fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered. We failed them then. We cannot fid l thun again, and expect tho world agita to surviveagain,
glitch the Crimond Conference was a suceessani afrort by the three leading nations to find a common ground Ref peace. It spellacthe and of the system of unilateral action, and exclusive Allianeop, and spheres of influence, ned balances of power and all the other expedients etch have been tiled for conturies and have fasted.


We propose to substitute for all these, a universal orgeniatition in which all poece-loving nations mill finally have a chance to join.

Clef I am confidant that the Congress and the doerlean people will accept the rewults of this Conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that botter world in which our children and grandchildren - yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world - rust Live, and can live.

Ane that, ny minds, is the orly meade zee 9 own tire yon. Hint godel it wary. deegely, as Q Enow ald if on are felling it Colly, and
are pong 4 fol it in the future ore pong t fol it in the future. (yarrlouged app. (one)

HOUR\& OP REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D. C. March 1, 1945


ADDRESS OP THE PRESIDENT OP THE UNITED STATES BEFORE 4 JOINT SESSION OF THE SEDATE AID THE BOUSE OF FEPRKSEITTATIVES ON THE SUBJECT OF THE YAMA COIPEREMCE.

The PRESIDEIT, Mr. Vioe-Preaident, Mr. Speaker,

Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives

I hope you will pardon me for the unusual posture of sitting
down during the presentation of what I wi ah to easy, but I
know you will realise it makes it a 11 title easier for mo

In not having to carry about ten pounds of steel around the
bottom of <compat>ᄆy lego (Laughter) and also because of the fact

I have just ocmpleted a 14,000-milo trip. (Applause).

Prat of ali, I want to say that it is good to
be home. It has been a long journey and I hope you will also
agree, so far a fruitful one.

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether

It is entirely fruitful or not isles to a great extent in
your hands, for unless you here in the halls of the American

Congress with the support of the Arextian people concur in
the general conolusions reached at that place oalled Yelte, and give them your active support, the meeting will
not have produced lasting reaultas and that is why I navi
come before you at tho earliest hour I could after my
return. I wint to mako a personal report to you and at
the aese time to the people of the country.

Kany months of samnest work are aheed of us all,
and I should like to reel that whon the last atone is Iaid
on the atructure of international peace it will be an
echievenent toward which all of us in America have worked
steadfastly and unselfishly toge ther.

I an returning from this trip that took me so
far, refreghed and inspired. I was not 111 for a second
until I arrived back in Fiabhington, and here I heard $\mathbf{1 1}$
of the remarks Which had ooourred in wif absence. (Laughter ${ }_{\psi}$ )

Yees I returned froo the trip refreshed and inspired,

The Roosevelte are not, as you nay suspect, everee to travel?
(2aughter.) wo soem to theive on it (Applause.)

And far away an I was, I was kopt oonatently

Informed of affaire in the United States. The modern

Elraeles of rapld ocomunieation have made this vorld very
ama11. We muat always bear in mind that faet then we
speale or think of international relations. I received a
steady strean of messages from Washington, I might say from
not only the exeautive branch with all ita departmente,
but also froe the legialative branch in its two departaents:
and excopt where radio silence was necessary for security
purposes I could continuousiy send mesasges my place in
the wor2d, and, of oourae, in a grave emergenay ve could even
have misked the breaking of the security rule.

I come from the Crimen conference with a firzi
bellef that we have made a good start on the rond to a world
of pesee. There were two miln purposes in thia Crimenn
eonference: the flret was to bring defuet to Germany with
the groatest possible apeed and the smalleat poseible lose
of A11ied men. That purpose is now boing earried out

With great force. The Gemaen arng, the German people ape feeling the over-inereasing might of our sighting ann and of the dilied armies; and overy hour gives us added pride In the heroie advanee of our troope in Germany on Geyman soll toward a neoting with the gellant Red armies. The seoond purpose was to continue to build the foundation for an International aceord that would bring order and seourity
after the chaoe of the war, that would give scese assuranoe
of lasting peace among the nations of the world. Toward
that goel a tromendous stride wee nede.

At Toheran a 1ittle owr a jear ago there were
long range allitary plans laid by the chiofe of staffe of the three mont powerful nations. Among the eivilien lesders at Teheran, however, at that time there were only exchanges of views and expressions of opinion. Ho politienl arrangements wore made and none was attempted. At the Crimean conference, however, the time had oase for getting dom to
spooifio oases in the political fiold. There was on all
sides at this oonforenee an enthusiagtio offopt to reaeh an agreement.

Sinee the timo of Teheran, a year ago, there had
developed mong all of us -- what shall I eall 1tt A greater
faelility in negotiating with each othor that augura woll
for the peace of the world; we lonow each other better.

I have never for an ingtant wivered in my beliof
that an agreement to insure world peace and security oan bo reached.

There were a mumber of thinge that we did that
were conezete, thet wore definite; for instance, the lapse
of time between Toheran and Yalta without conferences of
representatives, of oivilien representatives of the three
major powers, has proved to be too long $=\mathbf{- 2} 14$ months.

During that long period loenl probleme were pernitted to
beaome aoute in places like Polend, Greeee, Italy, and

Tugo-slavis. We deelded at Yaita therefore that oven if
olroumatances made it impossible for the heade of the three
governments to meet more often in the future, we would
sake that sure by arranging that there be frequent personal
contacts for the exchange of views between the secretaries of state and the foreign ministers of these three powers;
we arranged for periodic meetings at intervale of three or
four months. I feel very confident that under this arrange-
went there $\boldsymbol{w 1 1}$ be no recurrences of the incidents which
this winter disturbed the friend e of world wide cooperation
and collaboration.

When wo mot alta, in addition to laying out
strategic and tactical plans for the complete and final
military victory over Germany, there were (dieouased) other
problems of vital political consequences for instance,
first there was the problem of the occupation and control
of Germany after vietory, the complete destruction of her
military power, and the assurance that neither Masiem nor

Pruselen militarise could again be revived to threaten the

seoondly, again for example, there was a settle-
ment of the fow iffferonces that remalned arong us in
meapeat to the international seourity arganization after the Dumbarton Oaks conferanee. As you remerber, at that
tine and afterwarde I said we had about 90 peroent mooord.

That is a pretty good pereentege. I think the other 10
pereent were ironed out at Yalta.

Thirdiy, there ware the general politioal and
eoonomio problems common to all of the areas that would
be in the future, or wilch have been, IIberated from the

Masi yoke, a very apecial problem. wio over here find it
very diffioult to underatand the ramificationo of many of
theae problems in roreign lands, but we are trying to.

Fourth, there wero the special problem areated
by a fow Instances such as Poland and Yugomslavia.

Daye were spent in discussing these momentous
matters, and we argued freely and frankly aross the table.

Bat at the ond of every point unanimoue agreement was
reached; and more important even than the egreament of
vords, I may say, we aohieved a unity of thought and a vay of getting elong together. (Applauge.)

We know, of course, that it was the hope of

Hitler and the Gemman war lords that we would not agree,
that some silght arack might appear in the solid wall
of Allied unity, a orack that would eive him and his
follow gengetery one last hope of esoaping their just doome.

That was the objective for which hie propagande machine
has bean working for many months.

But Hitler has falled. (Applause.) Hevor before
have the major Allies been mere olosely united not only

In their war aime but also in their peace afme, ond they
are determined to oontimue to be united, to be united

With esoh other and with all posee loving nations so that
the fdeal of lasting peace will beoone a Feality.

The Soviet, and British, and United States

Ahsafa of staff hold dally meetinge vith eads other.

They onforwed frequentiy with Mapmat statie, Brimg

Minister Churibili, and with me on the peghive of asowiveting


They oompleted theis plane for the final fonewtest tiees
to derneny.

At the time of the Foheren corderesee the Hesestay
front, for instence, wee removed se fle five the Amerians
and Epitioh fronte that while sertian inmqerenge steretegle
operations were poseible theve could be no tepticel deg-ty
day acordinationg they wore teo far opart, But liveoles
troope have now apoased Foland they are figitiac se the
seatem soil of Gevmeny hopsolf. Dritith est Amogione
troope are now on Gemwan soil slose te the Hithee siver is
the west. It is a Aifievent sfination telay stras wiat is
was 14 monthe ago. A eleser tectien 1 fafeos fos hesury
possible for the ifret time in tivepe. That wes onsilling


Froviden wes abse for deify antinge of farour


 firsef, and aldo Fith ser apuice in Iteily witheet tivo nocoverify of goling thrown the antefy of ateff in winingten or low on do for the seate

Tew haw seen one weale of shise exdhenge of

Inforevelon in the woone bonbinge tr Americes ant Inglidt
asounce of gotnee whioh ape ifrectiy velated to the Poutios adrunee on Ber1ins. Frose now on Ameriomen and
 evetion of the wer. Wo how not toge to mollise, I





meser the mevoust of Goness rosernes, Comen materiate
for the ateleps and westeps fronte frow other perte of

Genveny of fyom 1telly.
theracgenente have been mede for the moet offce-
tive sistributsion of all avesidblo meterial med trensm
portation to the steces thiere they sen west to soed fos the conbines wer offort, fmerisen, Hitich, and reosien.

The deteile of these plane and arrenjoments are militery
seovets, of eserres, fie thile tying of thinge in together


The thesie are lemping bout some of then alrsedy to theip
convos, end I think all thrse of we at the eonfervised
sole thet they will leaen mere about it toworvon, and the
neart day, and the day after that. (Appleuse) There will
be no reapite to these attaelas wo will net doeiot for
one moment until unconditional aurrender. (Applase)

So. I have alvigy folt that acmoon seose pro-

While to the lang ran, eter invet thintoling. I thith




sooner thels pooset ayevy alst bo ower. They sues
sealise thet oely with eqgiote sarrovier aes lhey suets

seept an dopost nelyiturs.







at 新 Acy


We did however make it olear at the conferenee
fuet thtt untonditional surrender does mean for Oermany. It eitint the temporary oontrol of Qermany by Great Dritain, Puesfis, Frence and the United States. Eqah of those sations ज1II oeeugy and control a soparate sone of Commany, and the adrenistration of the four sones will be coordinated, ooordinated in Bes-lin by a control atill composed
of the representatives of the four nations. Uneonditional
surrender meane Just that; it means the ond or Fiaziem.
(Applause) It means the end of the Nexi party and of all
of 1 ts barbaple Iaw and Institutions. It moens the
termination of alr militariatio influence in the public,
private, and cultural 11fe of Germany.
It meana for the Hasi war oriminale a punish-
ment that is apeedy and just and severe. It mona the
-
eomplete disarmanent of Germany, deatrucilon of ite
militarism, of its military equipment, the end of ite
pesdastion of armenent, the dieperasi of all of 1 te
arsed foraes, the permanent dismemberaent of the German general etaff which had so often shattered the posoe of the world.

$$
\text { It msans that Gemanny w } 111 \text { have to make repera- }
$$

tions, reparations in kind for the damage which has been done to the innoeent viatims of. Ite eggreasion. By compelifing reparations in kind in plents, in maohinery, in rolling atook, in raw materials we oould avoid the mistakes
that wo and other people, other nations made arter the
last var, the domanding of raperations in the form of
money whidh Cormany could never pey.

We do not vant tho Oerman people to stawe or
to beeame a burden on the reat of the world.

Our objeotive in handing Gormany in smplet

It is to secure the pesce of the rest of the warld now
and In the future. Too much experionce has shown that
thet objective is Imposeible if Germany is allowod to
rotain any ability to mge eggressive wasfare. (Applause)
These objeetives will not hurt the Gexman
people; on the oontrary, they will give than proteotion from a ropetition of the fate whioh the goneral atarf and Talsorism imponed on them berore, and whioh Hitiorism is now imposing on thom again a mundredrold. It will be ree moving a cancer froa the German body politio which for generations has produoed only misery, only pain for the whole world.
During my atay in Yalta I sar the kind of reok-
10si, senseless fury and terrible destruction which ocess out of Garmen militariam. Talta on the Black sea had no military aignifloanoe of any kind. It had no derense. Before the last war it hed been a rescrt, a resort for
people 2ike the osara, princes, and the aristooracy of
Fugala. Afterwards, howevor, after the war, after the
Red rovolution and until the attack on the Soviet Union
by Fitler two jears ago, the palaces and the villas of

Faite hate been used se a west and regratton obintor by
the Russian people. The Hasi officors took over the
forner palaces and villas for thoir own use. The only reason
that the no-called palace of the former Czar was atill
standing when we got thare was that it had been taken over
by a formen general fer hie own property for his own uee,
and when the rest of Y alta was destroyed he kept soldier
there to proteot whet he thought would beoome his ofn paraonal
ville. It was used as a rest and reareation center where
hundrads of thousande of Fussian woricers, famars and
their families - up to the time it was taicen agein by the

Oermanis, when tho Mazi officers took those places for their
own use. When the Fed anmy foroed the Masis out of the

Crimes almost a year ago lat April, it was found that all
of the palaces were looted by the Naples, and then nearly
all of them were deatroyed by bombs placed an the ineide.

Even the humblest of the homes of Yalte were not apareds
thore wae little left of it exeept blank wally, ruin and
deatruetion.
Sevastopol, that other fortified port about ..... 40
or 50 miles away $=$ - there again was a scene of utter
destruction of ale city and great navy yards and great
Portifiostions. I think loans than a dozen building a wore
left intact in the entire city. I had read about Warsaw
and Lidice and Rotterdam and Coventry, but I saw Sevastopol
and Yales and I know there in not room enough on earth
for both German militarism and Christian decency. (Applause)Fut, to go on with the story which I hope to do
In under an hour - of equal importance with the military
arrangements at the $C_{\text {rime }}$ oonsforence wore the agreements
reached with respect to a general international organizationfor lasting world peace. The foundations were laid at
Dumbarton Oaks. There was one point, however, on which a gree-
mont was not reached. It involved the procedure of voting
of voting in the Seaurity Council. I want to thy to make
It clear by making it sfrple. It took me hours and hoursto get tho thing straight in wy wind ma nd any con

```
ferences.
    At the Grimoan oonforence the Americans made a
proponal, a proponal on the subjeat, whioh arter full die*
oussion I amglad to mey was unaniwousiy adopted by the
othor two netions.
    It Is not yet possible to announce the torms of
It publialy, but it will be in a short time. When the
conelusions reachod with respect to voting aro made known
I think, and I hope that you w111 find thom fair, that you
Fill find them a fair solution of this oomplionted and
diffioult problom -- I might almost say it is a legialative
problem. They are founded in Justice and wili go far to
Insure International eooperation for the maintenanee of
peree.
```

                    There is going to be held, you know, after we
    have straightened that voting matter out, there is going
to be hald in San Francisoo a meeting of all the United

Wations of the Forla on the 8sth of April next month.

There we all hope and oonfidently expect to execute a def-

Inite oharter of the organisation upon whiah the peace of the
world will be pmeserved and the forees of agresesion pere
manontly outlamed.

This time te ara not making to mitake of waiting
unt12 the end of the war to sot up the machinery of pesoe.

This tine as we fight together to win the war Innally we Fork together to keep it rrom happening again.

As you know, I havo alvage been a believert in
the doevment called the Constitution of the United States.

I spent a good deal of time in educeting the other nations
of the world vith regapd to the Constitution of the mited

States.

The oharter hae to be and ahould be approved by
tho Senste of the United States under the Constitution.

I think the othor nations of the world know it now. (Laughtor)

1 an aware of that raot and noe all the othor nationa aros
and we hope the Senate elli appeove of what is eet forth
as the oharter of the United Mations Then they all oome
together in San Franoineo next month.

The Senate of the Dnited Statel through ite appro-
priato mepreasentatives havo been kept oontinuously advised
of the progran of this govarzment in the areation of the

International Becurity organizetion.

The Sanate and the House will both be represented
at the San Frandeco conferenee. The congreanional dolegates

- 111 oonsiat of an equal mumber of Fepubliaan and Demooratia

Nembers. The American delegation is in evary sanco of the
word bi-partisen, beoause world pence io not exmotly a
pasty question. I think that Ropublioans went peace Just
as much as Demoorats. (Applause) It is not a perty question
any more than is military viatory, the winning of the war.

Then the republic was threatened firat by the

Hasi oluteh for morld oonqueat baok in 1939 and 1940, and
then by the Japanese treaohery in 1941, partisanahtp and
politice were Ieta mside by nosmiy overy fmevican, and
overy resourec was dedicated to our somsion safoty. The
emine eonmeoration for the aake of peace will be expected

I think by overy patelotic Amarioan, by every human soul
overseas too.

Tho struature of world pence onmot be the work
of one man or one party or one nationg it cannot be just an

Amerion poaco, or a British poaco, or a Russian, Frenoh, or a Chineso peaces it annot be a pence of large nations, or of amell nationas it must be a poase that rests on the sooperative efforte of the whole world. It muat the a structure complete. It cannot be what sore people think, a
struoture of complete perfeotion at first, but it oan be a
peace and it will be a peace besad on the sound and just
prinoiples of the Atlentic Cherter, on the concoption of the
aignity of the human being, on the guarantee of tolerance
and freedom of religious worahip.

As the Allied armios have marohed to military

Fietory they have ifberated peoples whose ilberties had
been orvahed by the Nasis for four long years, wheee
econony had been redueed to ruin by Masi despoileri.
There have been instances of politieal oonfusion,
of unrest in these ifberated areas.-- that is not unexpeoted -
as in Oreese, or in Poland, or in Yugomiavias and there
may be more. Woree than that, there aotually began to
grow up in same of these places queer ideas of, for instance,
spheres of influence that were inccupatible with the basio
prinoiple of international collaboration. If allowed to
go on unoheoked these developeents might have hed tragio

resulta in time.
It is fruitioan to try to place blame for thia
eituation on one partioular nation or on anothar. It is
the kind of trouble that is inevitable unless the major
powers of the world contime Eithout interruption to work
together and essume joint responsibility for the solution
of problem that may arise to andanger the pease of the world.

Fe met In the Grinoe detorninged to mettie thic
mattor of ifberated areas, thinge that might happen to nesd to be eared for this weok, that might happan suddenly and unexpectediy next weok, next monthy and I en happy to conrime to the Congress that wo did bring on a eettlement and, inoidentelly, a unanimous settiemont.

The three nont powerful nations have egreed that the polltion and eoononic problems of any area ilberated from the Maxi olutoh, or of any fomar Axis satollito, are a joint reaponifibllity of all three governemente. Theypill Join togethor during the termporary period of inatability after hostilitien to help the poople of any liberated aree, or of ang former antelilite state, to solve their own problems through flinily eatablinhed dencoratie processes.

Thoy will endeavor to see to it that interim
governents -- the people who earry on the intorin governmenta between the ocoupation of Germany and the dey of
true independense, that euch an Interim governmont would
be as reprosentetive ae posestble of aypemoersatse elomente In the popolation, and that free oleotions are held as soon as posaible thereafter.

The responasbility for politioal oonditions
thousands of milea away aan no longer be avolded, I think, by thie great nation. Cortainly I do not mant to ifve to $s 00$ anothor war. As I have said, the world is amallor, amilar evory goar. The Unitad Staton now oxerte a tromondous Influence in the oance of peace. Thatever people over here think or talk in the intereata of peace is of oourse known the world over. The slightast reanark in althar house of Congress is known all over the world the following day. We will continue to exort that influence only if we are willing to contime to ahare in the
responalblilty for keopling the peace. It will be ous own tragic loss if we were to
shiry that responsibility.
made jointiy, therefores and, therefore, they will often
be the result of give-end-take ocopronsse. The United

States ㅌill not alive have ite way one hundred percents nor
will Puseia, ner Oreat Beitain. Wo shall not alwege have

Ideal solutions to cocmilicated international problems
even though wo aro deternined oontinuously to atrive tovard
that Ideel. But I mare that under the sgreesent reached at Yalta there will be a more atable politioal Europe --
parte of it - than over before. Once there has been a true expression of the people's will in any country, of oourse, our imnodiate reaponaibility onds, with the oxoeption oniy of auch setion as may be agroed on by the international
seourity organisation we hope to set upe

The United Hations mate also begin to holp these

Ifberated aress adequately to reeonatruet their economy--

I do not want them to etarve to death $-\infty$ so that they are
ready to resume their pleces in the world. The Masi war
nachine hae atpipped them of raw nateriele, machine toole,
truoke, loocsotives, and thinge 2ite that, They have 205 t
the Induster of these pleoos stegnant and maoh of the
agrioulturel areas unproductive. The Flasis have lort
complete or partial ruin in their wake. *

To start tho vieels rujning egain is not a mase
matter of relief; it is to the national interest of all of
us - of all of us - to see to it that these ilberated
areas aro syth mado se2r-supporting and productivo so that
they do not neod oontinuous rollof froe use I should seg
that was an erguent based upon concion sense.

Ono outstanding example of jolat action by the
threo major Allied powers was the solution reached on

Poland. The wholo Polish question was a potential souree
of trouble in poetwar Surope find wie catio to the Eonference
deternined to find a ocrion g round for ita solution; and
we did. We lmow evergbody does not agree with it e- obviouely. Our objeotive man to help oreate a atrong.

Independenty and proeperous nationg thet was the thing we
mut all rempaber $-\infty$ those worde mgreed to by Funesa,
by Beitain, and by met the objoctive of meking Poland a
strong, independent, and propposoug nation with a governe
ment ultimately to be aoleoted by the Polish people
themnelves.
To sohieve this objective it is neacsaary to
provide for the forcation of a new gowerment awoh sore
ropresentative then had beon posaible while Poland was
ensinved. There wero, you know, two govercmenta; one in
London, one in Tablin, practically in Paesia.
Conorete stope were takon at Ialta to reorgenize
the existing provisionsl government of Foland on a troader
demooratio basis so as to Include democratic lenders now
In Poland and those abroad. This ner, reorgenised govera-
mant $\# 111$ be reeognised by all of us as tho temporary
goverrment of Poland. Poland needs a termporary government
In the Forst way $-\cdots$ an interim govornment is anothor way
to put it. Howeverg the nel Polieh provisional government
of Fational Uaity will be pledged to holating a free eleetion
an soon an poseible on the basie of universel suffrageand by searet ballot.Throughout history Poland has bean the oorridortheough whith attack on Rusaia hes been made. Twios inthis generation Germany has struak Ruses through thisoorridor. To Insurs European seourlty and world peaoe
a strong and Independent Poland Is necessary to prevent that
from happening again:
The dectistorswith respeot to the boundarise of
Boland woro frankiy a compromise. I did not agree with
011 of it by any means. But we did not go as far as Britain
vanted, we-it4-mot-go as fac as Bcitain-manted in eortain
areas we did not go an far as fussia wantad in cortain
aroast and we did not go an far as I manted in oartain
veanf. It ves a conpromive.
While the decision is a compromise it is one,
however, under which the Roles will meeeive oompeneation

In territory in the north and west in exahange for what they lose by the Curzon 12 ine in the esat.

The 2frite of the wostern border will bo permanently
fixed in the ifinal peace aonforenoo. Roughiy it will ine olude in the new, atrong Poland quite a large alion of What is now aniled Gormany. It was agreed also that the now Poland will have a large and long coast live and many new harbors; also that Rast Prumela -- most of it - will
go to Poland; a eorner of it will zo to Russia; also that What ahell I oall it $\rightarrow$ the anomoly of the Pree State of Dansig - Danzig Fill be a lot bettor if it is Poilahe It is woll known thet the people east of the Curnon 1ine - this is an example of thy it is a conpronise - the peoplo east of the Curzon line are predominently white Puselans and Ucrainians - a very great nafority - not

Pollahy and the people west of that line are preluaimantiy

Polleh excopt in that part of Rast Pruasia and eactern
amenay whtol vould so to the nev Poland.

As for back as 1019 representatives of the Allies
agreed that the Cusion IIne sepresented a ralr boundery
between the two peoplew. Iou must remember also that there
wes no Paland ar had not been any Polish goverment before

1919 for a great many sonoratione.

I an convineed that this agreement on Polond,
under the olraungtanoes, is the most hopofal agreament
posaible for a free, Independent, and proaperous Pollsh atato.

The Crimean oonforence wes a meeting of the three
major military pomers on whome shoulders resta the ohfof
responalbility and burden of the war. Although for this
reason another nation vas not included -- Prance was not
a partioipant in the conforenoe - no one shouid detract frow
the reaognition which was acoorded there to her role in
the suture of Burope and the future of the morld.

France has been invited to mecept a sone of
oontrol in Oermany and to partietpate as a fourth meaber
of the dilled eontrol eounali on Oemange

She has been Invited to join an aponsor of
the International conferenoe at San Pranoiseo next month,

Sbe will be a parmanent member of the international
seourity counoil together with the ot iner four major pomers.

Finally, wo have aaked Trance that ohe be asso-
ointed with us in our joint responsibility over the liberated
areas of Burope.

There were, of course, a number of mailler thinge

I have not time to go into on which joint agreoment was
had. We hope thinge will straighton out.

Agreeusnt was reached on Yugo-Slevie, as announoed

In the ocmuniques and we hope that it is in process of
fulfillment. not ont; there but in aome othar placese

The haw to reaseber that thore aro $=$ grat many prime Connss

In the world all wiahinc to be haard before ayything beoomes
finaly so we may have aittie delay while wo listen to
more petan dounes. (Laughter)
Guite naturally this eonference eonoornod
Itmelf only with the Europesn was and with the politian
probleme of IIaropes and not Fith the Faosfla war. At
Yalte, homever, our oceblnod military staffe made their
plans to Inorease their attack ageinat Japan.
The Japenese war lorde lenow that they awe not
befng overlooked. They have folt the roivee of our B-29's
and our aarrier planeas they have folt the naval might
of the infted States and do not appear vexy anxione to
sorm out and try it again.
The Jape know what it moans to hear that the
Thited Statea Narinos have landed. (Applause) And I
think I may add, having Ivo Itma in mind, thet"the
eitustion is well in hand $y^{\prime \prime}$ (Appianes) They also know
what is in atore for the huwaland of Japan noe that
Genowel Mieohrtirur has completed his magnificent meah
back to Kanila (Appiauso) and تith Adniral Minits establiahing
Afv beses right in theif orn baok yard. (Appiaues) But

1est sonebody 1ay off wook in the UnSted Etates I' thall
ropeat what I have said -a a short soatonoe even in my

wars. It is a tough roed to Tokgo; it is longar to Tokjo
than it is to Beriin in every sense of the word.

The defeat of Cormany =111 not moan the end of
the wer against Japan; on the oontrary, we aust be prepared
for a lons and a coatly etrugele in the Paoific.

Aut the unoonditional surrender of Japan is
sa eseential as the defeat of Gernany. (Applause) I say
thet advisediy; and ve zuat bear in mind that that is
especially true if our plans for world pesee are to suc-
ceed: Japanese militarism suat be wiped out as thoroughly as Gercan militar:ame

On the way back from the Criman I made arrange-
ments to meet personally King Farouk of Egypt, Haile

Solasaio, Zaporer of Ethegopa, and King Ion Saud of Saudi

Arebia. Our oonvorgetions had to do with mattere of
ocmmon interent, and they $\begin{aligned} & \text { I } 12 \text { be of great matual adventage }\end{aligned}$
becmues they cave us the opportunity of moeting face to
face, and of oxohanging viowe in peraonal oonveration

Inatead of formel correspondence. For instence, from

Ibn Saud of Arabla I leazned more of the rbole proble
of the Hoslons and nore about the Jewieh problen In five
minutes than 1 could have learned by the exohange of
a doson lattorn.

On ny vagage I had the benorit of aeeing the
axry, the navy, and the air force at work. All faerioans

Fould foel as proud of our ansed foreos is I an if they
oould see and hear what I dide

Againet the most officient professionsl soldiert, and
sailors, and afwen of all history our men stood and

Fought -* and von. (Appleuse.)

I believe that this is our chance to see to it that
the sons and granisons of these gallant flchting men do not
heve to do it all ovor again in a fev years.

The conferonce in the crimes vas a turning point, I
hope, in our hisiteory and, therefore, in the history of the
vorid. Thers will soon be presented to the Senate and to
the Aserican people a great decision thet vili deternine
the rate of the United States - and I think, therefore, the
fate of the world - Por gonerations to coas.

There can be no middle ground; we shall heve to face
the responaibility for vorld collaboration, of ve shall
have to bear the responsibility for another vorid conflict.

I notioe the vord "planing" is not looked upon vith
favor in wose airoles. In donentio affalye twagio mistalces
heve besen made by reason of lack of planning. On the other
hand, Eaxg great iaprovenents in Living, and mang benefits
to the human race have been accomplished as a result of
adequate, Intelligent planning: reclametion of deaert areas,
developnent of whole river vallegs, provielon for adequate
housing, and a dozen different topios. The same vill be
true in our relations betweon nations.

For the second time in the lives of most of us thisth
generation is face to face with the objective of preventing
vers. To meet that objective the netions of the voeld
vil2 either have a plan or they vill not. The groundrowk
of a plan has now been fiurnished and has been subaitted to
manenty for disoussion and decision.

Mo plan is perfeet. Whatever is sdopted at Sen Franoisoo
vill doubtlese have to be aponded time and again orer the

# years, Juet as ox curn Conatitution has to be. Mo one 

 can say ecmetly hov long ary plan will 2ast. Feace canendure onis so lons as hument ty really Insists upon it
and is villing to vork for it and secrifice for it.

Tventy-five years ago American righting men loolsed
to the statemen of the vosid to rinish the woalc of pesce
for which they fought and suffered. We fasled there, we
rasled theat then; wo cannot fasl them again and axpect the
vorld to survive.
I belleve the Crimean oonference was a suocoserful
effort by the three lending nationa to find a oommon
ground of peses. It epellm, and it ought to spell, theond of the syatem of unilateral action, sxolusive ellianoes,
and sphorss of influence, and balances of power, and all
the othor systems which have been tried for centuries and
have always railed.
We propose to subetitute for all these/univeran
orgenization in Whioh all peece loving nations will
Pinally have a ohanoe to joinj and ${ }^{1}$ an oonfident the
Congrese and the Anorican people will acoopt the results
of this conference as tho beginninge of, a permanent
struoturo of peace upon which we oan begin to build, under
God, that bettor vorld into wioh our ohildren and grand-
ohildren, yours and mine, and the ohildren of the whole
wovld, must live and oan live.

And that, my friende, it the oniy mesasge I
oan give youg I feel very deeply as I know all or you are fooling and as they are going to foel $1 /$ in the ruture. (Applaume.)

NAME: David M. Pinter

## ORGANIZATION:

```
ADDRESS: 232 Spring st. Middletown, PX
```

TELEPRONE :
(717) 944-0311

INFORMATION REQUESTED OR DISCUSSED 97-853

ACTION TAKEA I explained that the document may be a draft of a segment of FDR' \& March 1, 1945 address to Congress on Yalta. I suggeated that he consult an appraiser and gave him the names and telephone numbers of two appraisal organizations. He asked if we would be interested in it. I said we would accept a donation. He asked if there was a tax benefit for such a conation; and I told him I thought there was but to consult a tar advisor.

I placed the copies in the speech folder on the Yalta speech. Nr. Pinter thought his mother may have got it from a William B. Ball who was with a law firm she worked for in Harrisburg, PA in the 1970 s .

Aen A. Tichnex:
Wasgoring thriugh may mottwiv estate al found the excloved papec. Ther is a note attachal that paid thy an bekind to be notes by F.D.R's pecuting on his ritiux iffic speen at YALTA.

Ang irfo you can gine us wald be appucidet of Counse, we hosu kupt the origerinls.

Slinin Sr. Willen:
46 II HILLSIDE ROAD
HARRISBURG, PA 17109

$$
(7,7) 671-1855
$$

(OR)
DAVID M. PINTER 232 SPRING ST. MIDSLETOWN, PA hTOS
(B)
B. 19

Sriaji fuel week
Har ai carat "imer $\gamma$ hno her prot it by prany poople thy PRan - cor on, rate netmide wurel-mdeem ta puchened and Duproce wi amol givan forthelus $x$ Dinuo fro the retanste. pa kumt 2 contre
water shet or the in powent yi: keno cme or are uen? berobet © cmpes. dinetheith bs made choth mustes teamse beh plaming ifner $\ln _{\rightarrow} 5$ duas no Guncrity cuent ungtaminizs $s$ qror $>$ h - bum buge in cruppe ploming akend.

Wo ocot trine
neatys 4 netin
awo tiv. ToNay
v come + permind
$\stackrel{H}{ } \mathrm{~B}$ am rectave -
$c$ enting foepuntiot wraes.
Giter $D>$ noed o (

- Hear not $x$ the found whis o treen finmosed $\rightarrow$ untel foer $>$ peejples $>$ wrod L met puet and aze whink simuthe a frocel
decinern blu an an
plan 1 the tiver timat
hw frem o pujest
Inheres dema
aमplit 1.5.7.1.6
druitiders $>$ ka iment feerne
Croot on
amentult $x+x+\infty$
7 信
Kuwar dele ato
hent Cinfevine: I
thushings man 'umints

net
d our carrier ed States, and again.
"The United d that, having ."
land of Japan $s$ magnificent tz is establish. - in Iwo Jima. United States, ntence - even with an $s$ on
nger to go to d. The defeat nst Japan. On sostly struggle
ssential as the ie thought in orld peace are d out as thor-
angements to assie, the Embbia. Our conest. They will re, and a good g face to face, on instead of
:d more about wish problem I I could have ars.


## 138. Address to Congress on Yalta Conference

On my voyage, I had the benefit of seeing the Army and Navy and the Air Force at work.
All Americans, I think, would feel as proud of our armed forces as I am, if they could see and hear what I saw and heard.

Against the most efficient professional soldiers and sailors and airmen of all history, our men stood and fought - and won.

This is our chance to see to it that the sons and the grandsons of these gallant fighting men do not have to do it all over again in a few years.
The Conference in the Crimea was a turning point - I hope in our history and therefore in the history of the world. There will soon be presented to the Senate of the United States and to the American people a great decision that will determine the fate of the United States - and of the world - for generations to come.

There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict.

I know that the word "planning" is not looked upon with favor in some circles. In domestic affairs, tragic mistakes have been made by reason of lack of planning; and, on the other hand, many great improvements in living, and many benefits to the human race, have been accomplished as a result of adequate, intelligent planning - reclamation of desert areas, developments of whole river valleys, and provision for adequate housing.

The same will be true in relations between Nations. For the second time in the lives of most of us this generation is face to face with the objective of preventing wars. To meet that objective, the Nations of the world will either have a plan or they will not. The groundwork of a plan has now been furnished, and has been submitted to humanity for discussion and decision.

No plan is perfect. Whatever is adopted at San Francisco will doubtless have to be amended time and again over the years, just as our own Constitution has been.

No one can say exactly how long any plan will last. Peace can $5^{8} 5$

## 138. Address to Congress on Yalta Conference

endure only so long as humanity really insists upon it, and is willing to work for it - and sacrifice for it.

Twenty-five years ago, American fighting men looked to the statesmen of the world to finish the work of peace for which they fought and suffered. We failed them then. We cannot fail them again, and expect the world again to survive.
The Crimea Conference was a successful effort by the three leading Nations to find a common ground for peace. It ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries - and have always failed.
We propose to substitute for all these, a universal organization in which all peace-loving Nations will finally have a chance to join.
I am confident that the Congress and the American people will accept the results of this Conference as the beginnings of a permanent structure of peace upon which we can begin to build, under God, that better world in which our children and grandchildren - yours and mine, the children and grandchildren of the whole world - must live, and can live.

And that, my friends, is the principal message I can give you. But I feel it very deeply, as I know that all of you are feeling it today, and are going to feel it in the future.

NOTE: In February, 1945, the President had sent me on a special mission to various European countries to ascertain the need for immediate civilian supplies for the liberated countries and to make certain investigations on the trial of war criminals. While in London on this mission, I was summoned to fly to Algiers to join the President on his return voyage from the Yalta Conference.

On the morning of February 18,

