(Jim Wright of the Buffalo News sat down on one of the three chairs on the left of the President's desk)

THE PRESIDENT: (to May Craig) All packed?

MR. EARLY: May, why don't you get in the middle?

(she sat down on the middle chair, and Earl Godwin on the third)

THE PRESIDENT: Now, isn't that nice? Isn't that nice? (laughter)

MAY CRAIG: All right.

THE PRESIDENT: What they call "last honors."

(laughter)

MAY CRAIG: No!

THE PRESIDENT: (laughing) Oh--oh. Getting everybody seated? It's all right.

MAY CRAIG: The old folks.

MR. GODWIN: Old age.

MAY CRAIG: The mourners' bench. (more laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: (in a half-whisper) I think I might announce that if they will look at the front row they will see what I shall call in the White House "the old people's home."

(laughter)

MR. GODWIN: Old people's home!

THE PRESIDENT: (to May Craig) Are you all
fixed up?

MAY CRAIG: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Good -- good. Grand.

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I was talking to Steve, and we have been trying to dig up something that could be called news, but there isn't anything at all. The next thing will be the monthly submarine statement, in about three days. (to Mr. Early): The tenth?

MR. EARLY: The tenth, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Outside of that, we are completely blank. And it's going to be a hot day -- (pause) -- so don't overwork. (laughter)

Q. Mr. President, is -- have plans progressed to the point where you can tell us whether or not you plan to make a statement prior to the Democratic Convention?

THE PRESIDENT: I haven't the faintest idea. I haven't thought of it.

Q. (aside) What was that?

Q. Mr. President, have you found a candidate for vice president yet?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that sounds like an unfriendly question. I won't answer it. (laughter)

Q. Mr. President, how is the war going in China?

THE PRESIDENT: Not well. We are a good deal concerned about the war in China:

Q. In what way, sir?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, they don't seem to be stopping these Japanese advances.

MR. GODWIN: Mr. President, in -- on that line, the Chinese Ministry of Information, through their New York offices, got out a long statement yesterday discussing this thing, and they had in it the view -- rather optimistic view, and peculiarly Chinese -- that the deeper Japan got into this, call it the China quagmire on the thing, in a global way, the Japanese were worse off; that is, attracting a great deal of the Japanese force into the mainland of China, leaving their homeland open. In brief, that was it. Is that a Chinese idea or has that been, would you say --

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) No. I would say that that was a strategic thought that could be talked about by anybody who knew anything about strategy. Of course, it is perfectly true that they are very much extended from the military, and naval, and shipping point of view.

MR. GODWIN: The Japs?

THE PRESIDENT: The Japs are.

MR. GODWIN: Yes, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Way down, all in the Dutch Indies, they are clear over through the Straits Settlements and Burma, and it means that their line of communications is dangerously long, unless they are sure of being able to maintain it.

Now, in the past -- in the past year, we have been threatening their line of communications all the time with these offensives; and so far we have, as you know, we have
got up as far as Saipan; and also, so far, you know that there we have sunk a great many Japanese ships -- both the naval ships, but especially the cargo ships. And as we knew, relatively, what they had in the way of a merchant marine at the beginning of the war, and we know, again relatively, what they have been able to build each year since the war, we feel that their merchant ship losses are greater than they have been able to replace.

And it may be wishful thinking, but we like to believe that they are having difficulty in getting raw materials a long distance over the water -- oil from the Dutch Indies, for example -- and are having difficulty in getting their replacements and equipment from Japan down to those distant points.

Of course, you can look on the map, it's a tremendous territory, a great many miles, but they have -- that they have gone south from Japan; and also, having got there, it is a long, long distance from the -- well, say the Solomons, clear over through New Guinea and the Celebes and the Dutch islands, Borneo, Philippines, clear on to Indo-China, Siam, the Strait Settlements, and Burma. It's tremendous territory to keep the supplies going, and get the supplies out of them back to Japan.

And so the -- personally, it has always been my thought that the Japanese strategic situation is not a good one -- never has been. But we are concerned, because they -- the distance from Japan to China is not very great, and they
have been able to put together forces in there and supply them. They have bitten in pretty deeply into the Chinese mainland, and we are hoping that the Chinese will, because of the depth in there, be able to resist more strongly, the further the Japs go. That's about all there is to it.

Q. Mr. President, ---

Q. (interposing) Mr. President, an American Army chemical engineer also reported that the Japs have used gas against the Chinese. Has an official recommendation or ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) I haven't -- I haven't heard anything. The last I heard was prior to what you are talking about, that some of our Army people were investigating the report. And I read last night that it had been. I haven't heard anything more from the War Department.

Q. Mr. President, as head of the Democratic Party, have you got any ideas on what the platform should contain, or how long it should be?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I'm not writing any platform.

Q. You are not?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

MAY CRAIG: Mr. President, would you care to say whether or not you think Governor Dewey will be a strong opponent?

THE PRESIDENT: (laughing) No, May. (laughter)

Q. (aside) That's a good word.

THE PRESIDENT: You know -- you know, May, what I am wondering about, I am -- I am taking it that you have
gotten down a few notes in the White House Correspondents' Association just -- just for history. And in these notes I would like to have it accurate, so far as possible, as to the procedure, the methods. And I would very much like to have for those notes some suggestion from you -- perhaps you will tell me outright as news, because it will be news forty or fifty years from now -- how do you people work out this method at these press conferences? (laughter) Do you draw lots? (more laughter)

I thought there was -- there was some young man, I didn't remember very well, the other day, over here on the right -- (indicating) -- that asked me that same type of question. Practically the same thing. (more laughter) Now, how did they choose him? (more laughter)

Now, today, how did they pick on you? (continued laughter)

It really -- it's a matter of great historic interest to know the procedure in these -- in the White House Correspondents' Association.

MAY CRAIG: Well, that's a secret process.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it? (more laughter) I see.

MERRIMAN SMITH: It's part of the great plan, sir. (continued laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: I won't -- I won't ask any more questions.

Q. Mr. President, May is always a volunteer -- she's never drafted.
MAY CRAIG: Mr. President, did you mean that you didn't want to answer the question? (loud laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: What was the name of the -- Pollyanna, wasn't it? Cheerful little girl. That's it. No, -- (then in a whisper): I didn't want to answer the question.

Q. Mr. President, when do you think we will get an answer to this type of question? (more laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I don't know. I should say probably around November. (continued laughter) Or even -- even before that. Maybe this month.

Q. (aside) There we go again.

THE PRESIDENT: I would hate -- I would hate to speculate on it.

JIM WRIGHT: Mr. President, if we may go back to that Chinese situation where you -- when you started in, you were talking about the seriousness that -- serious condition we would face, if the Japs succeeded in rolling up the coast of China. I thought you were going to talk to us for a moment on what it would do to our attempt to build a road across the ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Again, it's a perfectly -- it's just a question of looking at the atlas, really, Jim.

JIM WRIGHT: Yes, but I don't believe the American people, generally, realize how much the coast of China has been counted on for the attacks on Japan proper, and it seems to me that if you wanted to discuss that a little bit ---
THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Well, of course, the more the Chinese can hold eastern China, down around the coast, the better it is. But of course, on the other hand, with the use of modern bombing, we are today within bombing range of Japan, which is very definitely something. If we -- if the Chinese had lost the eastern coast a year ago, it would have been a far more serious thing than if they should lose it today.

MR. GODWIN: Well, we are -- the bombing that you are speaking of is from the Pacific, is it not, ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) Yes.

MR. GODWIN: (continuing) -- and will get closer and closer?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. We are about -- what is it? -- twelve to thirteen hundred miles from Japan now.

MR. GODWIN: Yes. The Japanese mainland, if it should be entirely rolled up or taken over by the Japanese, means almost another major war -- military operation, does it not?

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the Chinese mainland?

MR. GODWIN: Yes. The Chinese mainland.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, of course. What you have to think of is the tremendous territory ---

MR. GODWIN: (interposing) Tremendous territory. Pretty near as big as half the United States, that one corner is.

THE PRESIDENT: That's it. That's it.
MR. GODWIN: As Jim says, I don't think the American people have any idea ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) I think that's perfectly true. We have had -- the Chinese (meaning Japanese) have had spots along that whole Chinese coast -- that different one; or to the -- to the northeast, somewhere else, they have half a dozen spots -- given places. The next year, they have half a dozen other different spots. They have lost what they have, and they have gone to other places. It might be called an occupation of movement, ---

MR. GODWIN: (interjecting) Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) --- not a campaign of movement but an occupation of movement.

PETE BRANDT: Mr. President, can you tell us about the intended scope of your talks with General de Gaulle?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, all kinds of things, Pete. We haven't got any agenda. Talking about a great many things. Well, for instance, I will talk to him today about the operations of the underground, which are -- within France, a great deal of it down in southern France. We have a good deal of information from our own sources. We will compare notes about that. I can't think of anything else. It's an absolutely open -- wide open thing. Anything that's of interest.

Q. Well, Mr. President, recognition come in?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q. The question of recognition of the National Committee come in?
THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. That has not come in.

THE PRESIDENT: No. That didn't come in. That
didn't come in in London, either.

MR. GODWIN: It is presumed, or are you taking up
with him the matter of the governing of these liberated areas
as they are liberated? Does that enter into it?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that probably will. We will
talk it over in a perfectly friendly way, and work out various
problems.

Of course, so many people get the wrong slant.
What is a liberated area? Well, we are in France now -- and
the British are in France now -- a little toe-hold, I think
about one-tenth of one percent of France, something like that,
whose army -- soldiers are all over that one-tenth of one per-
cent. Obviously, of course, it's a -- a military zone. We
are going into Cherbourg to open it up to ships, with unloading
and transportation, and so forth and so on. It's a
military operation.

And when you come down to the -- to the civilian
question, it is essentially that part of France, as our armies
advance, which ceases to be a military zone and becomes a
civilian zone.

I think some people don't think the thing through.
They are very apt to say that if we capture a -- a village
from the French on a Monday morning it becomes a civilian
zone. Well, they don't do it, because we might get thrown
out by the Germans by Monday night, and therefore it wouldn't be a sensible thing to do. It isn't an operating -- it's an operating military zone, and not yet a civilian zone.

Q. Mr. President, what are the De Gaullist representatives doing in France at the present time? Are they wielding a certain amount of authority, or are they simply observers, you might say, like ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Acting as liaison officers.

Q. Liaison officers?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Perfectly friendly cooperation.

Q. (aside) Go ahead, Merriman.

MERRIMAN SMITH: Thank you, Mr. President.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.
99 newspapermen and women were present at this press conference.

MR. DONALDSON: All in.

THE PRESIDENT: I have taken a -- you will want to know something about De Gaulle -- I took from a memorandum a third person thing, which I think makes the situation fairly clear -- as a result of the talks -- that the President is prepared, pending the free selection of a government by French people, to accept the Comité as the de facto authority for the civil administration of France -- semi-colon; General Eisenhower remaining as Supreme Allied Commander, with clear-cut authority to cause to be taken all steps -- that means all-inclusive -- which in his judgment are necessary to finish the military operations and to drive the Germans from French soil.

In other words, the location of civil administration, certain areas which are non-military areas, will be determined solely by General Eisenhower.

And in this respect we are prepared to use as a base -- the basis, the drafts that have been worked up by certain French and British officials. That will take some time, because it's a question of drafting.

There seems to be complete accord, and we are therefore proceeding on that line.
Can't think of anything else on the De Gaulle end of things.

Q. Does that mean, sir, that this Government will sign a British-French agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: No, no. We are using it as a basis for re-drafting.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Will we sign an agreement with the French, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Memorandum, probably.

Q. Memorandum. Just an exchange?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Mr. President, could you tell us something about your visit yesterday with the Foreign Minister of Mexico (Ezequiel Padilla)?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I had a very excellent meeting with him -- the second meeting I have had. There have been, of course, a number of things which he has been working on with the State Department; and I think things are going along very well. There isn't very much news in it, one way or the other.

Q. Is there anything you could say about special problems, or any continuation of the talks at Monterrey?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't think so. I think about the only thing I can think of is that they are proceeding. Everything is going all right on that.

Q. Is there any comment, sir, you can make on the press conference statement of Mr. Padilla that if asked
Mexico would be glad to send troops to the front?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I am allowed to say that. I think that is a -- purely a military matter.

Q. Mr. President, getting back to the French, will -- will these memos be confined merely to metropolitan France, or do you go in ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) No, no, ---

Q. (continuing) --- to the French Empire?

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) --- just metropolitan France.

Q. Metropolitan France?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. Mr. President, what would be the difference, if any, between the memorandum you speak of, and an agreement?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I don't know. That's a technicality that needn't worry any of us. What is the difference? I don't know. The question ---

Q. (interposing) Mr. President, is the text of the memorandum which you read available?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q. Is the text of the memorandum which you read available for ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) No. I suppose the State Department has the -- the tentative thing, which was done in London, and that is the ---

MR. EARLY: (interposing) The text of this memorandum ---
THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) What?

MR. EARLY: (continuing) --- he refers to the memorandum you just read, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: No, because it isn't -- it isn't in shape.

MR. EARLY: (interjecting) That's right.

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) I just used that as the basis of -- of unprepared conversation.

Q. Mr. President, the United States has no objections to General de Gaulle's plans to move the capital to -- from Algiers to metropolitan France as soon as possible?

THE PRESIDENT: I read it in the papers this morning. The first I heard about it.

Q. Mr. President, what is the next step, now that we are negotiating these -- these agreements and memoranda?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes?

Q. Any formalizing of your understanding with General de Gaulle, ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interjecting) Yes.

Q. (continuing) --- or is there any objective you are shooting at?

THE PRESIDENT: It isn't yet formalized. That is why I used "memorandum" instead of agreement.

Q. You are just drafting the memorandum?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. Mr. President, could it be said there are not any differences left; that is, the -- all the difficulties have
been solved or taken care of?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, if you will put a time limit on that question, I would say Yes. In other words, all problems of the -- of the actual fighting for the liberation of France, I think under this, are pretty well taken care of.

Q. Mr. President, could you clarify a little bit the distinction between military areas and those which have already been liberated, so far as --

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) None of them has been liberated as -- as yet, except in the latest situation. About one-tenth of one percent of French territory has been occupied by British and American armies. Obviously, there can't be a civil administration in that area. You have got to get away from the fighting. Lines of supply have got to be guarded -- protected.

Q. Mr. President, is there any reason why we should not have a transcript of what you said in that first paragraph explaining this, to be used as a direct quote?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that's for your information.

MR. EARLY: They could refer to Jack's notes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

Q. Mr. President, if you would check back -- General Eisenhower will have the authority to determine what is a civilian area?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Yes. After we have moved in, it will be up to Eisenhower personally to say where.
Obviously, the military has got to decide that, as the further he goes, the further his line of supplies.

Q. Mr. President, does this step now give General de Gaulle authority to issue currency in the name of the government of France?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is -- I would rather -- I would rather give you something for background on this, because it is -- it is just one of "them" things.

The present French currency that they have been using over the most of France is the old French currency that has been issued from the printing presses under the domination of the Germans; and that has been going on for four years. And nobody has -- the French haven't -- we haven't, and the British haven't -- any idea of how much of it is out. The printing presses may have been running just by day; they may have been running by day and night. Nobody knows how much of that currency is outstanding.

And we have issued currency, purely temporary currency, for the use of the troops -- it's a small percentage of their pay -- to buy a package of -- I was going to say cigarettes, but some districts haven't got any cigarettes -- buy a glass of beer, if they have any, keeping it down to the minimum. That is being used in the very small area that the troops are in, and it is being -- it is being taken.

We are still talking about the advisability of issuing a brand-new Committee currency -- National Committee. I -- I assume a great many people think it would be easier to issue
a temporary National Committee currency than to expand the issue of this temporary currency which the troops are using. So that still -- I don't think it has been decided, but there is no particular reason why -- why the Committee should not issue a -- a temporary currency which would be interchangeable with ours.

Q. Mr. President, ---

Q. (interposing) Mr. President, from a purely diplomatic point of view, does what you said indicate that we now regard the De Gaulle group as the provisional government of France, ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) No, ---

Q. (continuing) --- rather than the French Committee of Liberation?

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) -- I didn't say anything to that effect.

Q. Mr. President, does your understanding with De Gaulle mean now that General Eisenhower is no longer free to deal with any other French authorities outside of the Committee?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, No. Let -- let me give you an illustration -- which will probably clear it up in the simplest way.

Suppose there is a community which is going -- a town which is going to -- into a civil area. The French Committee will appear before General Eisenhower's committee -- he has a committee handling this, British, French and American -- and suggest the name of somebody who looks all right to go in there; and in all probability some other people might want
to suggest names. They have complete freedom to suggest other names of -- what is it? -- a temporary mayor. On the doctrine of the chance that these people are all right, the Committee's selection will go through.

Suppose there was an awful row in that town after he went in. Peace, and absence of any violence would be, of course, necessary. If he didn't work out, someone would have to get somebody better to maintain peace and avoid riots, and so forth and so on. General Eisenhower, because he is responsible for the safety of his rear has the authority, of course, to put in somebody who would maintain peace, the same way as he would have the right to put in troops to maintain peace. It's a very -- it's a very simple proposition. The military element is of course paramount, because we want peace in France, not just throwing the Germans out.

(laughing) Does that answer the question?

Q. Yes, sir.

Q. Mr. President, ---

Pete Brandt: (interposing) Mr. President, ---

Q. (interposing) Mr. President, can you tell us ---

Pete Brandt: (continuing) --- what happened to the frozen French gold under that? Does that remain ---

The President: (interposing) Pete, we didn't even mention gold.

Pete Brandt: Those credits that are frozen?

The President: I know nothing about it.

Q. Mr. President, was your phrase "the de facto
authority?"

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q. Was the -- in the memorandum that you read to us at first, was the phrase "de facto authority of the government of France"?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, yes.

Q. Mr. President, ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) What -- what?

Q. Excuse me, I didn't ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) Don't say "Thank you, Mr. President," because the doors are closed and you can't get out. (laughter)

Q. I wasn't going to say "thank you." Why are they locked, sir? (more laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: I have got something else! (more laughter)

Q. Is it an announcement about your fourth term intentions, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you can't tell. You are guessing again. You have done it before. This time -- this time you are right. (continued laughter)

Q. Good.

THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear that? (continued laughter)

Q. Mr. President, if this is going to be good enough to lock the doors, will you take it a little slow?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. You will get it when you get
out. One reason for closing the doors is that I am very much interested in the preservation of human life. I am really interested in cutting down accidents in this country, and if this group in this room all beat it to the door at the same time, probably somebody would get hurt. (laughter)

You go ahead. You had anything else?

Q. No, sir. You go ahead. (loud laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: Well, there are two letters here, one that I got yesterday from Hannegan. (to Mr. Early): Have you got these things ready for them?

MR. EARLY: They are ready, sir.

THE PRESIDENT: All right then. You won't have to take notes.

(reading): "Dear Mr. President. As Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, it is my duty on behalf of the Committee to present for its consideration a temporary roll of the delegates for the National Convention, which will convene in Chicago on July 19, 1944.

"The National Committee has received from the State officials of the Democratic Party certification of the action of the State conventions, and the primaries in those States, which select delegates in that manner.

"Based on these official certifications to the National Committee, I desire to report to you that more than a clear majority ---- "

Wait a minute, I want a cigarette. (laughter) Unfortunately, this is not a Murad. (more laughter) (Mr.
Early lighted it for him)

Q. Take your time, Mr. President, we are in no hurry. (more laughter)

THE PRESIDENT: What's the word? -- nonchalance? (giving it the French pronunciation)

Q. Clear majority.

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing reading): "----- clear majority of the delegates to the National Convention are legally bound by the action of their constituents to cast their ballots for your nomination as President. This action in the several States is a reflection ---

Q. (interjecting) Louder.

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) --- of the wishes of the vast majority of the American people that you continue as President in this crucial period in the nation's history.

"I feel, therefore, Mr. President, that it is my duty as Chairman of the Democratic National Committee to report to you the fact that the National Convention will during its deliberations in Chicago tender to you the nomination of the Party, as it is the solemn belief of the rank and file of Democrats, as well as many other Americans, that the nation and the world need the continuation of your leadership.

"In view of the foregoing, I would respectfully request that you send to the Convention or otherwise convey to the people of the United States an expression that you will again respond to the call of the Party and the people. I am confident that the people recognize the tremendous burdens
of your office, but I am equally confident that they are determined that you must continue until the war is won and a firm basis for an abiding peace among men is established. Respectfully, Robert E. Hannegan."

And then I dictated this last night. It’s rather hurried -- about the same length.

(reading): "Dear Mr. Hannegan. You have written me that in accordance with the records a majority of the delegates have been directed to vote for my renomination for the office of President, and I feel that I owe to you, in candor, a simple statement of my position.

"If the Convention should carry this out, and nominate me for the Presidency, I shall accept. If the people elect me, I will serve.

"Every one of our sons serving in this war has officers from whom he takes his orders. Such officers have superior officers. The President is the Commander-in-Chief and he, too, has his superior officer -- the people of the United States.

"I would accept and serve, but I would not run, in the usual partisan, political sense. But if the people command me to continue in this office and in this war, I have as little right to withdraw as the soldier has to leave his post in the line.

"At the same time, I think I have a right to say to you and to the delegates of the coming Convention something which is personal -- purely personal.

"For myself, I do not want to run. By next spring,
I shall have been President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces for twelve years -- three times elected by the people of this country under the American constitutional system.

"From the personal point of view, I believe that our economic system is on a sounder, more human basis than it was at the time of my first Inauguration.

"It is perhaps unnecessary to say that I have thought only of the good of the American people. My principal objective, as you know, has been the protection of the rights and privileges and fortunes of what has been so well called the average of American citizens.

"After many years of public service, therefore, my personal thoughts have turned to the day when I could return to civil life. All that is within me cries out to go back to my home on the Hudson River, to avoid public responsibilities, and to avoid also the publicity which in our democracy follows every step of the Nation's Chief Executive.

"Such would be my choice. But we of this generation chance to live in a day and hour when our Nation has been attacked, and when its future existence and the future existence of our chosen method of government are at stake.

"To win this war wholeheartedly, unequivocally and as quickly as we can is our task of the first importance. To win this war in such a way that there will be -- that there will be no further world wars in the foreseeable future is our second objective. To provide occupations, and to provide a decent standard of living for our men in the Armed Forces after the
war, and for all Americans, are the final objectives.

"Therefore, reluctantly, but as a good soldier, I repeat that I will accept and serve in this office, if I am so ordered by the Commander-in-Chief of us all -- the sovereign people of the United States."

And that's that. And now, if you will go out quietly -- (laughter) ---

Q. (interposing) Mr. President, there is one more question. What about your talk with Vice President Wallace yesterday? Did that have any ---

THE PRESIDENT: (interposing) No ---

Q. (continuing) --- bearing ---

THE PRESIDENT: (continuing) --- No. Talked about China. Now get out! (much laughter)

Q. (hurriedly) Thank you.
Q. All in, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I just want to say what a pipe dream this has been. Greatest sight in the world. Think of the people who would like to change places with you.

Q. What can you tell us of your visit here, your trip, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I have had quite a full three days. Accomplished a great deal. I don't know what the release date on this will be -- some time in the future. I have seen many things here. Where I am going, I cannot tell you. When I am to get back, I cannot tell you. And where I am going on my return, I don't know. That's a lot of good news, and it can't be released until I am ready. So you see, you have an awful lot of information.

Q. Mr. President, at that time -- on this H Day -- this distant future, do you plan to report to the American people on this future date, say within the next six months, or shall I say soon?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, soon. I have had important conferences. I can't tell you much about them now, of course, but I shall report on them in time. I have had an extremely successful three days. By coincidence, I think it was exactly ten years to the day since my previous visit.

Of course, I find many changes here on the
military and naval front -- on the service front. I never imagined any place could change as much as the Island of Oahu has -- change as much as this place has. Today, city-occupied land extends right up to the military and naval areas. The city has gone to the military and naval areas, where a few years ago the military and navy had to go to the city. There are small communities all over the island. Land is scarce, instead of being plentiful.

One other thing I noticed. Two and one-half years ago -- December, 1941 -- I got from the Islands a whole great flood of telegrams asking me to please send food right away. They thought everybody in the Islands was going to starve. They were asking for food. I said, "I am frightfully sorry. I haven't got any food to send you. Haven't got any ships to send it in if I had it."

So I made the very simple recommendation: grow more. And the Islands have grown more. As for the necessities of life, they have been forced to solve their own problem. They have solved it, and they have helped, too, by not demanding everything from the continent. And I don't notice that anybody has starved. They've done a good job, and done it out here.

Q. Mr. President, could you -- say to help our stories -- describe the purpose of your visit to the Hawaiian Islands?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, as I remember, one of the objects of the trip was to look this place over. This is no longer the outpost of our defense. A few years ago it was. We
weren't allowed to fortify Guam. Today the outermost points of our defense line are thousands of miles to the westward. Hawaii is still the main distributing point, but not the outpost. It is our main depot nearest to where we are meeting the enemy in the Pacific.

The other thing that we have talked about, of course, is the strategic question. I have had two very successful days with Nimitz, MacArthur and Leahy, talking about future plans. It's perfectly obvious that any operation has to be planned ahead. You've seen that -- seen about a particular operation. And you'll remember that that particular operation was talked about, and the logistics of it talked about, for many, many months before. We've had several conferences on different questions. Of course, I cannot go into more details than that.

Q. Within the limits of security, can you tell if these conferences involved any new offensives against Japan?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Soon, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: They have been continuing in fairly regular progress in the last year, and now that we have the offensive we shall keep it.

Q. Is there anything you can tell us about the German situation?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I know anything more about it than you do.

Q. Do you think from what we know about the general situation that it might become an internal situation?
THE PRESIDENT: That is too general a question. We can all have our own ideas about it.

Q. Do you have any plans at this time for any future meeting with Mr. Churchill in the Pacific?

THE PRESIDENT: Where? What kind of meeting?

Q. A conference with Mr. Churchill in particular.

THE PRESIDENT: He is not here, and I am not expected to meet him here; and my future meeting with him, that is subject to a lot of things.

Q. I would like to ask, for our soldiers in the Pacific, do you have any ideas, from your observations out here, of how the morale of the soldiers might be improved?

THE PRESIDENT: We have been and we are doing everything we can to keep up the morale. Of course, I haven't been out to the actual front, but the morale is definitely good, and we are doing all that anyone can ask for to keep it up.

Q. Do you have any express message for the troops in this area?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think so. I would have to write it out beforehand. All that I have done is to ask General MacArthur on his return to the Southwest Pacific to give my greetings to our personnel down there, and to tell them that we are not forgetting them back home, and that we will bring them back home as soon as we can.

Q. May we quote that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and I was going to say exactly the same thing to Richardson and Nimitz.
Q. At your conference at Casablanca, you gave us a very fine phrase about unconditional surrender. Are we going to make that our goal out here in the Pacific? I wonder if you could tell us anything about that from your talks here?

THE PRESIDENT: There is nothing I can tell you, except that at Casablanca I made no differentiation between our European enemy and our Far Eastern enemy. The same thing applies to Japan.

Q. And the goal with Japan is still unconditional surrender?

THE PRESIDENT: Still is with everybody. Just for background -- it means no quotes from me, but merely to give you an idea to keep in your heads to write in your story -- there has been a good deal of complaint among some of the nice, high-minded people about unconditional surrender, that if we changed the term "unconditional surrender," Germany might surrender more quickly.

Mr. Churchill and I have made no modification of the terms of unconditional surrender.

They complain that it is too tough and too rough. I will explain it a little this way.

Back in 1865, Lee was driven into a corner back of Richmond, at Appomattox Court House. His army was practically starving, had had no sleep for two or three days, his arms were practically expended.

So he went, under a flag of truce, to Grant. Lee had come to Grant thinking about his men. He asked Grant for his
terms of surrender.

Grant said, "Unconditional surrender."

Lee said he couldn't do that, he had to get some things. Just for example, he had no food for more than one meal for his army.

Grant said, "That is pretty tough."

Lee then said, "My cavalry horses don't belong to us, they belong to our officers and they need them back home."

Grant said, "Unconditional surrender."

Lee then said, "All right. I surrender," and tendered his sword to Grant.

Grant said, "Bob, put it back. Now, do you unconditionally surrender?"

Lee said, "Yes."

Then Grant said, "You are my prisoners now. Do you need food for your men?"

Lee said, "Yes. I haven't got more than enough for one meal more."

Then Grant said, "Now, about those horses that belong to the Confederate officers. Why do you want them?"

Lee said, "We need them for the spring plowing."

Grant said, "Tell your officers to take the animals home and do the spring plowing."

There you have unconditional surrender. I have given you no new term. We are human beings -- normal, thinking human beings. That is what we mean by unconditional surrender.

Q. The fact is that unconditional surrender
still stands?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Practically every German denies the fact they surrendered in the last war, but this time they are going to know it.

And so are the Japs.

Q. Is that to demonstrate the fact that eventually we may have to feed the liberated in all these countries?

THE PRESIDENT: We will help them get back on their feet physically. We don't believe in wholesale starvation.

Q. This is no longer background, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, this is still background. But it doesn't mean that we will send the first spare food that we have into Germany. We will take care of our own and our Allies first.

Q. The possibility of bringing war criminals to justice for the atrocities they have committed against our men and people, have you anything to say about that now?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think anything can be given out on that now about Europe or Japan. It's a little premature. Premature -- that's a good word to use.

Q. This is probably the wrong place to bring up this subject, but have you had any word from your running mate, Senator Truman?

THE PRESIDENT: Very nice telegram from him.

Q. On the record, sir?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. I would show you a copy, but I've already had it filed away. It's not handy.
Q. Have you been in communication with Hannegan or Truman?

THE PRESIDENT: No, just the one telegram from Truman.

Q. Is there anything you can tell us about your plans for 1944?

THE PRESIDENT: The Good Lord is considerate again, as I have no plans.

Q. When General MacArthur was about to leave the Philippines, I recall he said something to the general effect that "I will return." In view of the setting of this meeting with him, is there anything that you could tell us? Is that true now?

THE PRESIDENT: The only thing I could say in answer to that question, in answer to any direct question, would be such as to possibly give the enemy an inkling as to which way we are going. We are going to get the Philippines back, and without question General MacArthur will take a part in it. Whether he goes direct or not, I can't say.

Q. Can we say that General MacArthur will return to the Philippines?

THE PRESIDENT: He was correct the day he left Corregidor, and I told him he was correct. Remember, I came out and said it then?

Q. When I say General MacArthur, I mean that we shall return to the Philippines.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, and General MacArthur shall take part.
Q. Mr. President, from your conferences here, will there be any emphasis or speedup in the conduct of the war?

THE PRESIDENT: Neither one nor the other.

Q. Were you reviewing or re-establishing strategy?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you review or re-establish strategy about once a week as you go along, it's just normal procedure. But it was very useful, this particular conference. I think it was one of the most important we have held in some time. I found it was awfully hard to get along without it, because I haven't talked in person with General MacArthur in the past seven years -- have not seen him for seven years. He was then my Chief of Staff in Washington.

Q. What can you tell us of the impressions you gathered from your survey of the local situation?

THE PRESIDENT: Perfectly wonderful. What has been done here is almost beyond belief. And to see the speed of doing it! I don't know how long you young people have been in the service, but in the older days, say we could do a particular job in six months. Today, when the same sort of job comes up, it can be done in a much shorter time. That speed of doing things is the one thing about Pearl Harbor that has impressed me most -- today's speed as compared with that of two years ago.

Q. Didn't you say at Schofield the other day that this area has shown greater inventive genius than any other?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that is correct. I have never seen as much done anywhere as I have here. For example, take Hickham Field. Ten years ago there was nothing much there
but a swamp. Look at it now!

Q. Why do you think that United States soldiers have been able to beat the Japanese at their own game of atoll and jungle fighting?

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps it sounds like a little bit of boasting, but it is the difference between our type of civilization and our type of fellow, and their type of civilization and fellow. We will take them on at any game, war or pleasure, and beat them at it.

Q. May we quote that?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but check it first.

Q. Do you, Mr. President, view the situation in China as serious at the present time -- the military situation?

THE PRESIDENT: I believe about a month ago I said I wasn't satisfied with the progress in China. I think I can say that the general situation seems to be a little better now, and strategically the situation is no worse. There is still a long ways to go. It's a big country. The mere size of the country presents a problem. In getting things in, we have to cross the highest mountains in the world.

Q. There was some discussion about whether or not there was a prospect of another major war in the Orient to defeat Japan. Anything more about that?

THE PRESIDENT: We are going to do whatever it requires. We are going right through with it to clean up Japan. I wouldn't call it another major war. Just carrying this war through to a finish. The battlefields have not been chosen
yet. But we are ready for them wherever they come.

Q. Many of our people have no definite idea of the size of this place.

THE PRESIDENT: It's a little bit late. So many of them don't understand geography. The size of the Pacific doesn't mean anything to them. They don't understand the immensity of it. We are conducting military operations from Hawaii at a great distance from our west coast, at a distance from Hawaii farther than from New York to Normandy -- a terrific distance.

We are doing many other things here, too, that the people back home don't realize, like flying in the wounded from Saipan, the wounded who had been taken down to one of the other islands by ship and flown directly into Pearl Harbor. And at the hospitals! Look what modern science is doing today. We couldn't have done that under the most modern of conditions two years ago. Today, we are doing it.

And we have control of the ocean -- have to have it to get the wounded ships back here from areas some two thousand miles away. Many of them come directly to Pearl Harbor to get repairs. That doesn't mean that we have one hundred percent control of the ocean. The enemy still picks off an occasional ship of ours. But essentially we are in control. It is a much greater distance from our west coast to the actual fighting front in the Pacific than it is from our east coast to the fighting front in France.

I think the average American coming to Hawaii is
perfectly amazed at what we are doing right here -- the workings of the three services. You've got to see these things with your own eyes. I have been here before, and I am amazed. I have seen all the plans -- plans for the buildings -- but I had to see it to visualize it.

Q. Who have been the principal figures in your strategical conferences here?

THE PRESIDENT: Admirals Leahy and Nimitz, General MacArthur, Admirals Ghormley and Halsey, and General Richardson. You know Admiral Leahy is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Nimitz is the naval officer in command of the Pacific. General MacArthur is the Army officer in command of the Southwest Pacific. So these three tie right in with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Leahy also ties in with the Combined Chiefs of Staff (United States and British) and myself.

Q. General Richardson, did he figure in these conferences?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but only on the local situation. So did General Buckner, who is in charge of the Aleutians, the Northwest Area.

Q. Do you know of any particular problems at home?

THE PRESIDENT: Nothing at all. Nothing developing.

Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

(report by Lieut. Wm. Rigdon)
(the President opened the press conference by telling the story of Admiral Brown and his little "low," as follows:)

(On the train in North Dakota, August 14, 1944. "Mary Had A Little Lamb -- 1944 Version")

Shortly after leaving Honolulu, clear blue sky, calm sea, no wind, there appeared over the horizon a cloud as small as a man's hand. It saw us and approached slowly.

It turned out to be one of those rather rare animals known as a "low." The party was on deck, and as soon as the "low" saw us it recognized Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N., and headed straight for us.

We cannot shake it off.

It smiled all over, circled us several times and took a position just off the stern. It followed us all night and the next day and the next.

After three more days, we reached Adak, where it went ashore and played happily in the wake of Admiral Brown. With it came wind and rain and fog.

We all realized that it was a nice little cloud but to be accompanied everywhere by a "low" was getting to be monotonous. Its presence became so persistent that the tug boats were prevented by it from pulling us off the dock. In other
words, it was an annoying "low." Our expert said it would pass us to the eastward and finally when it went off to gamble on the horizon for a few minutes, we got under way and had only been headed for Kodiak for an hour or two when the little "low" turned up again from nowhere and accompanied us. All the way to Kodiak it hovered around us, and while it was kind enough to run away while we caught a fish, there it was back again all the rest of the day, and all the next day, and accompanied us in to Auk Bay.

By unanimous cursing, we persuaded it to go away while we caught some more fish, and the sun actually came out. But having transferred to a destroyer, Admiral Brown seemed to be somewhat worried, and sure enough his little "low appeared again that evening. He was so glad to see it that it never left us. We think that he fed it surreptitiously under the table.

It was with us all the way down the Inland Passage day after day, and actually followed us into the Puget Sound Navy Yard. We pleaded with the Admiral to say goodbye and leave it there. He said he would do his best, and we think he did do his best, but to no avail.

In the late afternoon we went to Seattle and boarded the train, and to our horror the next morning after we woke up across the Cascade Mountains, there was the little "low" following us. It kept on going all the way into Montana and the following day across Montana and into North Dakota.

What can we do about it?

The trouble is that it has lots of friends in the
party. For instance, it has encouraged Admiral McIntire to use a new word with almost every sentence. If we cannot see the horizon, we are told it is an occluded front. It seems to me that is a very long word to apply to a little lamb or a little "low." Anna and the girls had never seen an occlusion. They think it is just a nautical term for bad weather, and we tell them that it is just an old Navy custom.

So here we are approaching the Twin Cities, and we have got the bright idea that Admiral Brown should continue to feed his little "low," and bring it with us all the way to Washington. Washington needs a little "low," and so we must never forget that Wilson had a little "low" and write a new children's book about it.

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Q. Why did we not go on further north, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: The reason was, I thought I would go on further west which is a closed area, strictly closed, out Kiska way.

Q. When we saw the stories out of the Aleutians, we gnashed our teeth.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, they were so happy to file those stories. Sitting way up there, week after week, and month after month, they were really happy to publish them.

Q. Not that we suffered any in Seattle.

Q. I would trade the Seattle train yards for a good little "low."

Q. One of our men was in Alaska from Seattle when
the story came out, and it was the first time since the war that the censors had allowed Adak to be mentioned, or the warehouses. You could, up to that time, mention anything but the warehouses.

THE PRESIDENT: I did not mention it because Adak is within very easy flying range of the Japanese. From Attu and the outer isles, it is only 600 miles to the Kuriles. We were less than 250 miles from Attu.

Q. Why have the Japs not come over?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. They did see a submarine off Kodiak about fifty days before I was there, and we think we got her.

Q. What is their explanation for no Jap air blows?

THE PRESIDENT: The question is, have they got any planes to make the complete trip? We are running into that same thing in Germany. I suppose if you were in Europe you would get half-a-dozen guesses.

Q. Do the Russians say anything about their destruction?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Except we are destroying them as fast as they are being built. Another possibility is they have turned a lot of their plane factories into these flying bomb things.

Q. In our raids of attrition on Japan, are not we knocking down more planes than they can build?

THE PRESIDENT: There again, everybody's guess has been wrong on Jap planes. You can make only a guess. When the war started, our best intelligence was the Japs could
build -- the Army said -- 250 a month. The Navy said 350, and I said they were crazy and I put the figure at 400. Actually, today -- and this is purely a guess -- I think the Japanese, giving them two years in which to build up their manufacturing, could turn out between 1,000 and 1,500 a month. But this is purely a guess. We have been knocking them down more than the 250 a month. Their flyers are not so good as the first flyers they have encountered.

Q. Mr. President, for our going-home stories, what are some of the things you plan on top of your schedule, when you get back?

THE PRESIDENT: For once, the editorial desks are pretty good. The editorial in the Star was pretty good about the defense of the Pacific. It is in my room on my bed. I think that editorial is just about as good about the defense of the future as any I've seen; and I especially call attention to the fact we have the wherewithal -- the planes and the ships. It is our duty to defend Central and South America on the Pacific side just as much as on the Atlantic side, and not just the Monroe Doctrine. That in a way enters into it, but there is a common sense procedure. We could not let any enemy in the Pacific get a foothold any more than we would want anybody from the European or African to get a foothold.

Q. As a result of what you have seen, do you plan any special conferences on the Pacific?

THE PRESIDENT: I hold them all the time. That really is -- on the Pacific -- not much that goes before the Combined
I am not talking about the Burma, I am talking about the air and troops and control in the Pacific, but it is not to be confused with Mountbatten's command. Those decisions, because relatively speaking, we are a great deal stronger and have more in there than the Allies -- Australia and New Zealand. That, of necessity, is our present responsibility, decided by the Joint Staffs, who meet right along, instead of going to London to talk with the British about it.

Q. I assume, too, when you get back, that you will see the Congressional Leaders right away?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, when I can.

Q. Marshall and King?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of War -- the Secretary of the Navy is away -- I will see within the next three days. Because then, off the record, I hope to go up to Hyde Park for three or four days.

Q. How about Truman?

THE PRESIDENT: He is in Washington, and I will see him.

Q. Mr. President, will you be in town for the Cabinet meeting?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think I will have one.

Q. How about the Pacific War Council?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't believe I can work it in. I probably will be away.

Q. What happened to the Pacific War Council? It has not met since Cairo and Teheran.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, so many have been away. The Australian Prime Minister was here, and we could not arrange it because too many people were away. In effect, while we have not had a formal meeting we have been in quite close touch. Fraser and Curtin have been in touch, but no meeting. Perfectly obvious.

Q. Mr. President, do you know of any special domestic things waiting for you at home?

THE PRESIDENT: No. I don't think so. The only thing I will have to do, as soon as I get home, is this bill for relief of the unemployed. One is the Kilgore Bill. The other is the George Bill.

Q. What do you think of this situation, not commenting directly on the bills, but on the need?

THE PRESIDENT: That is something you cannot tell, what the need will be. But you have to be prepared if the need arises.

And then, of course, there is one phase that I cannot comment on directly, but I could talk about it off the record but for background -- that is a good one, off the record but for background. Being somewhat of a philosopher, it always amuses me -- it ought to be divorced from politics -- and it is damn hard to do it. For eleven years I have been up against a problem raised by both Republicans and Democrats.

With their right hand they hoist the flag for State's rights. "This is a terrible situation and something has got to be done about it. We don't want the Federal Government to do..."
it. We want the States to do it." And everybody applauds. Then with the left hand, they say, "There is a crying need, and something has got to be done. Will the Federal Government give us the money?"

I am being purely philosophical about it. It cuts across both parties. What they want is all the money in the world to take care of the unemployed. But they want to take care of the unemployed in the several States.

The answer is this. If you have -- there are no property values in Georgia. They are so low that the taxes which the State receives are barely able to run the government in the State of Georgia. For example, around Warm Springs, I think the principal of the Warm Springs School -- a man -- gets $400 a year, and I think the teachers get from $200 to $350 a year.

Q. They eat well.

THE PRESIDENT: They all eat well, and they drink pretty well, too, if you don't mind corn whiskey.

In Georgia, if you left those thrown out of work to the State of Georgia, they would have to go in debt. I suppose they might give them ten dollars a month. One of the fellows mentioned, "What about the fellow in the next foxhole?" And you are a great friend of the fellow in the next foxhole. We can afford in New York State to pay him thirty dollars a month. Take two people in Detroit, thrown out of work at the end of the war -- intimate friends living together, getting the same wages -- one fellow goes back to Georgia and is paid very little, while in New York we pay him thirty dollars a month.
Q. In the same philosophical sense, you mean the Governor of New York can afford to shout "State's rights" because he has a surplus?

THE PRESIDENT: Because he has Governor Lehman's surplus. (laughter)

Q. What do you think can be done about it?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I am going to study it. But it is being made an issue of, State's rights. Either the States are coming to the Federal Government for money, or one State is going to pay ten dollars and the next State thirty dollars.

Q. What about the labor situation? There have been two or three flare-ups.

THE PRESIDENT: There again, off the record but for background, you will see between now and the 7th of November an increasing number of plants that we have to take over. Need I ask why?

Q. Yes, you do.

THE PRESIDENT: Because every labor dispute you can come to there will be a strike crisis. You take this truck situation. It was the employers and not the men. It is going to be fomented. Obviously for political reasons. You will see between now and November 7th an outbreak of a great many strikes. Again the philosopher.

Q. What can you do to head those off?

THE PRESIDENT: Not one damn thing. Because essentially they are political strikes or lockouts.
Q. If they get severe enough, can't you identify them?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Only a Westbrook Pegler could identify a thing like that.

Q. Will he identify those particular strikes?

THE PRESIDENT: He will not! (laughter)

Q. Are there any Messages to Congress developing?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Anything about the trip?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. Do you know what your total mileage will have been?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it's 3,000 across the country; 2,200 to Hawaii; 2,200 to Adak; from Adak back via Kodiak and Juneau another 2,200; back to Seattle and 3,000 across.

Q. About 14,500 miles is what we estimated it.

Q. Considering the mileage that we drove on Oahu, can't we get a 15,000 mileage? We must have driven 300 miles or more.

THE PRESIDENT: I would say, all in all, about 16,000 miles.

Q. Is this your longest absence from Washington -- five weeks?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Teheran was more than thirty days.

Q. Teheran was from Armistice Day, and you got back on the 17th of December. This is a five-weeks trip, and
Teheran was, I think, about 36 or 37 days.

THE PRESIDENT: Of course, Congress was away most of the time. That was one of my speeches in Adak which you cannot print. I said I have to go back to Washington -- this was in the Mess Hall with all the enlisted men -- I have to go back not because I have anything to do, but because Congress is sitting. (laughter)

Q. Have you had any political communications other than that telegram from Senator Truman?

THE PRESIDENT: No.

Q. I judge you have been aware of some of the criticism in the paper?

THE PRESIDENT: No. What did they say?

Q. That the whole trip is political, is the point of a number of columns.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, they must know better than I do. (laughter)

Q. Anything we can say about a future meeting with Prime Minister Churchill? The summer is nearly gone and there are only two seasons left.

THE PRESIDENT: Don't use it, but the answer is not quite yet. You cannot use that for security reasons.

Q. What could we use generally? That has come up speculating.

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I don't see why you should not say this. It has been our custom ever since we got in the war to meet about once every six months, and purely on
a speculative basis we have now on the development of the landing in France -- and what we will get tonight is the landing in Southern France -- we have landed which is a very important operation. Both of those things have been launched. Anybody knows any major operation takes a hell of a long time. It seems reasonable to suppose that it is time for us to meet again very soon to talk over the next steps which of course have to be prepared for. I think that is all right. I think it is all right to put it on that basis.

Q. The recurrence of stress inside Germany, coupled with the rapid allied progress in France, does it add up to anything yet?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Not yet.

Q. Have you gotten anything you feel sure of on that German thing? I mean honestly.

THE PRESIDENT: I haven't the faintest idea. I hope that there will be more trouble inside of Germany itself. But it is purely on a basis of wishing. No human being knows. It may turn out to be wishful thinking. Obviously, the quicker there is trouble in Germany, the faster the war will progress. Of course, if I were -- what is the name of the best war writer? -- Major George Fielding Eliot. I think he is the best writer on the war. He keeps his mind on the war, and does not go traveling on. He is way ahead of Walter Lippmann, who has not thought about these things as Eliot has.

If I were George Fielding Eliot -- this is just for background -- I would write an article on the psychology of
the Germans -- not just the German people but the German command. Really, ever since the last war they quit just before any enemy got into Germany, and I still think there is a good deal in it. I don't think they will make any last-ditch defense around Berlin. I think it is a characteristic of the Germans to throw up the sponge instead of dying fighting. They do not want Germany over-run by the enemy. That is one reason why I have felt that Germany would not quit, or maybe they might revolt from the inside until they were driven back to the boundaries of Germany. Of course, that can happen from both sides.

Q. Will we let them quit then?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Nothing like last time. That is out. That was a gift from God and General Foch. And the only man who stood out among them was General Pershing. If we let them get away with it this time the next generation will tell us they have won the war.

Q. We would like to use that.

Q. Even though Germany were to quit, even though we get to her borders, we are still going into Germany?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. And the same thing applies to Japan?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. That is a reiteration of unconditional surrender?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q. Do you think the American people will need much salesmanship on the Pacific front when Germany falls?

THE PRESIDENT: You have been on the Coast more
than I have.

Q. I don't think there is any question about out there, but in the East, I mean.

THE PRESIDENT: Do the job instead of half the job. Because if we let Japan go on and do this thing in another twenty years, the psychological effect would be that if Japan gets away with it, a lot of people would start imagining that Japan did not really get licked.

Q. We judge from your speech your idea is that once we defeat Japan we should build at least a figurative fence around Japan until we have proof that she can live with us. Is that right?

THE PRESIDENT: Just because you cannot trust them -- even if I had a complete F.B.I. there it would get you nowhere.

Q. Do you think the Russians will cooperate with us in maintaining that fence?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That is why I said off the record it would not do to have it attributed to me to say the Russians would hop in on our side as soon as we win. Off the record, I think she will, but I cannot prove it. I know that Russia wants to build up Siberia and put an enormous population in there. Talk to Ross about it. He was on the old ALBANY after the last war, in 1919, and we had quite a number of ships up there, and we saved Siberia from the Japs at that time. We were supporting old [CHORUS] and his army against the advancing Bolsheviks -- some forty or fifty thousand. Actually, we came damn close to fighting the Japs ourselves. They were throwing
troops into Siberia but literally we saved Russia from the Japs. We were trying to keep old man in power. If we had not done it, the Japs would have put in there and grabbed it from the Bolsheviks. A most wonderful country four or five hundred miles from Vladivostok -- more like the west coast country.

Q. Vladivostok would be within fighter range of Japan, would it not?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

There are all kinds of things to prove what I mean. I was approached about 1939 about the outbreak of the war by the Japs, who asked to make an alliance and agreement with them to go into Siberia and take it away from the Russians. This was an honest proposal. And then we would divide it up for the process of colonization and all the concessions of military, and so forth. That is the kind of they have.

Q. Has there been a legitimate peace offer in this war? Anything resembling one?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Not a thing. The Pope makes a speech every once in a while, and says we ought to have peace and stop fighting. The only thing we have had was the collapse of Italy.

Q. At Bremerton you made an interpolation -- something about voluntary censorship. I missed it.

THE PRESIDENT: I just said appreciation of the press and radio, that they had not broken anything. Actually, I got word from Steve that a great many people had written letters
home. That is why we broke the story. A lot of papers were getting individuals coming into their offices saying, "Will you look what my boy has just written me from Pearl Harbor, that the President was there and is going to the Aleutians?" Only one paper printed it.

Q. What paper was that?

THE PRESIDENT: A paper in Texas. Must have been a slip-up on the part of the Army censors. You couldn't censor every letter, however.

Q. There was a letter back in San Francisco by the time we got there. There was a strict block on the mail while we were over there.

(taken by Dorothy Brady)