There were many political elements who in October would have accepted to work with Maresciallo Badoglio so as to give a sense of unity to the Italian Government and a sense of unity to the new Italian Army.

Although in these nine months Marshall Badoglio, for his own inclination and for polemic necessities got himself involved in reactionary and ex-fascist, pro-German circles, there were still many people ready to collaborate with him, believing his assertion that he was the best and only channel to collaborate with the Allies.

The contacts between Rome and the south after June the 5th, made it appear ever more clear to the monarchists, that Badoglio's policy towards the House of Savoy had been frankly unfair, and it was proved that he tried by all means to estrange the Army's sympathy from the Crown Prince. The Price, on the other hand, having a personal knowledge of Bonomi's loyalty and capacity was very favorable to his choice, and above all witnesses on both sides, proved that Badoglio's diplomatic activity had the aim of claiming himself indispensable to the Allies and to Italy, more than to bring about clear and loyal relations between the two. So when the Committee of National Liberation was requested to form the new Cabinet it naturally chose its representative id est Bonomi, without finding at Court, nor in the Army, nor in political pro-Allied circles any staunch friend ready to stand for Badoglio.
Dear Mr. President:

We visited Caserta yesterday and I had a conversation with Ambassador Murphy and, pursuant to an arrangement made with him, with General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and later with General Eakers with whom we spent a very interesting time. Ambassador Murphy may express some of our mutual reactions to you as he is shortly returning to Washington.

I reviewed particularly with General Wilson the question of the distribution of relief in Italy, having in mind that in view of the Allied position with respect to Italy which the very nature of our occupation must, as General Wilson emphasized, continue for an indefinite period, certainly for more than a year in one form or another. This occupation must be of a substantial enough character to meet the various emergencies which may arise in the transition from a Fascist Government to a more democratic government. The responsibility for relief activities and their success for the procurement of adequate food, clothing and housing depend upon Allied provision and I can confirm again the feeling in most quarters that, based upon present evidence, there is no assurance that in these categories the relief will be adequate to the need. Our effort to fit American Relief for Italy into the over-all picture without creating any disturbance with other existing agencies and to help spur the Italian Government to activity and responsibility on its part is my objective. General Wilson was most practical-minded, cooperative and frank. I feel there should be no difficulty in adjusting relationships with him and through him with all other services under his control. I indicated that it seemed essential that some single agency should be in control of the whole field of relief, simplifying procedures and accomplishing objectives with a minimum

The President,
The White House,
Washington.
of overlapping. He whole-heartedly agreed with this theory.

In the general field he seemed to be quite concerned by the constant changing of personnel, especially by our Government. He specifically mentioned the economic side, the retirement of Mr. Grady and the prospective retirement of General William O'Dwyer. He felt that this was demoralizing. He felt that the Vice President of the Allied Control Commission in charge of economic affairs should be a very experienced business executive who, with a staff of business-trained men on a permanent basis, would be most effective. In order to gain information I asked him why this vice president of the economic section should always be an American to which he replied that the whole scheme of the organization was one of balance and that the different agencies were set up in a balanced fashion as between the British and ourselves. It has been my impression since arriving here that in effecting this so-called balance some of our appointees have been put in the most difficult and, I would say, dangerous positions. That applies both to the field in which Colonel Poletti has been giving such heroic service and the field in which Mr. Grady and General O'Dwyer have been making such tremendous efforts. I do not see that the British are occupying posts subject to the same amount of public criticism. Unless there be some advantage in the handling of the economic section by our representative, the natural question arises whether it will not be advisable to let an outstanding British executive assume the post. General Wilson said that British personnel was spread out too thin at the present time and they did not have the same number of people to call upon as we.

I have just seen a statement prepared by the Food Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission which indicates a substantial reduction in the tonnages now proposed to import against the requirements for the period October through December, 1944.

I was considerably disturbed at the statement made by General Wilson that General O'Dwyer was soon to retire. I asked General O'Dwyer to call and he has just left me after an extended interview, the result of which moved me to send a telegram through the Vatican radio suggesting that I considered it very important that you should have a frank talk with him about conditions here before you meet the Prime Minister. That meeting has been announced in all the papers here although the date and place of the meeting is not generally known. In my opinion General O'Dwyer has gained a very realistic opinion of
the situation here and its dangerous possibilities especially during the winter to come. From my own knowledge in years past this country has been, beginning with the Ethiopian campaign, living under continual decreased rations to an extent that the needs of the Italian Army and the food production which has been constantly and increasingly taken away from the country to Germany has resulted in a very definite lowering of vitality of the whole population that recently reached its lowest point with the invasion by the Allies. That invasion has accentuated these conditions because of the interruption of transport, the destruction of property and a definite reduction in production. General Wilson and General O'Dwyer are of the same opinion that the crisis in this situation will come about December or January of this winter and if it is not then relieved the fate of large numbers of this undernourished and weakened population will be, as they express it, tragic. General O'Dwyer is the first one with whom I have talked who seems to comprehend the whole picture especially in respect to the liberated portions of Italy not primarily under Army jurisdiction. But as the lines move farther north and the burden of supply falls upon the economic agencies rather than the Army the problem becomes increasingly difficult.

In my own opinion this is the first of the conquered countries in which our professions of helpfulness to the civil population is undergoing a severe test. General Wilson and General O'Dwyer and I are of one mind, that we cannot afford to make a failure of this Italian enterprise. Assuming that you will arrange to have General O'Dwyer recalled for consultation for a few days before returning here where he is very much needed, I believe you will be put in the position of having a dependable impression of this situation. I am brought into this situation because of my association with American Relief for Italy and because of my regard for yourself and for our country. I believe that there are too many agencies between the War Department and the ultimate beneficiary of relief to operate with the greatest efficiency. My own opinion is that the Army should become increasingly active in this field because the supplies in a large sense have to move through its hands and facilities, that it should associate with itself the local agencies which I have been instrumental in bringing together with respect to American Relief for Italy, namely the Italian Government, the Italian Red Cross, the Catholic Church and a representative of the central labor party in Italy, but the Army with its
facilities, its adequate personnel and its power should be the determining authority.

With assurances of highest regard, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor
Dear Mr. President:

I have very recently had a call from Mr. George Baldanzi, Executive Vice President, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO. We discussed American Relief for Italy of which he is one of the Trustees. Among the statements which he made that I feel I should bring to your personal attention are the following:

-that there are in the United States about seven and a half million Italian-Americans;

-that the rumor has reached America that the Allies upon invading Italy immediately depreciated the lire to one cent and at the same time have employed common labor in Italy on the basis of seventy-five lire per day whereas under Fascist and Nazi conditions the lire had greater value and the daily wage minimum was one hundred twenty-five lire a day;

-that the reaction from this condition was unfavorable to the present Administration and that the balance of power in voting strength in America lies within that group, that is, among the Italian-American vote;

-that at the present time sixty-five percent of that vote is anti-Administration.

Those are pretty sweeping statements. In the brief time since I saw him I have endeavored to check upon the rate of pay and, where my own chauffeur engaged by the Army receives seventy-five lire a day, I have been told that common labor in the released portions of Italy is paid more than seventy-five lire a day. I shall seek further light upon this subject.

The President,
The White House,
Washington.
Antonini, another labor leader from New York, is also here and called upon me today. Baldanzi insists that the Confederation of Labor in Italy be given representation on the committee that we are undertaking to set up to govern the distribution of the materials donated through American Relief for Italy, claiming that labor organizations in America have made large donations. I believe that is true.

In my conversation with Mr. Luigi Antonini he indicated that his interest in Italy at the present time was to render assistance to it in developing its labor organizations. He is visiting several of the cities and towns in southern and central Italy within the next week when he will return to Rome and will give me his impressions. It is a bit difficult for me to understand why these American and British labor leaders should be in Italy at the present time when it would seem that labor organization matters should take second place to an effort to feed and clothe the population. I did not get a very clear picture from Mr. Antonini as to his proposed activities as I did from Mr. Baldanzi. No amount of organization will expedite the actual rebuilding of industry and the provision of jobs for the unemployed. Various dictator groups from Mussolini down have taken all the meat from the bone in this country and at the present moment the vital consideration is food, clothing and shelter.

With kind regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor
September 4, 1944.

Your Holiness:

I am deeply gratified, and I am sure President Roosevelt will be, with the profound allocution delivered to the world by Your Holiness on Friday last. It breathes the potent essence of brotherly love, tempered by clear insight into human nature; it appraises man's natural aspirations; it leads his thoughts along the paths of present day realities; it offers ultimate rewards splendid and obtainable; it encourages mankind in this tragic hour by its enlightened and clear statement that they may hopefully readjust their burdens; it points the forward path for the attainment of a greater and more enduring happiness.

I am deeply pleased, as Mr. Tittmann informs me of your remark to him on Saturday that you accepted my suggestion with respect to the international organization for peace and incorporated it in your allocution. This gives me infinite satisfaction.

With assurances of continuing homage and deep appreciation of many unusual courtesies shown my country and myself, believe me,

Faithfully yours,

(signed) Myron C. Taylor
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COPY

September 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HONORABLE CORDELL HULL:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F. D. R.

Carbon of letter which the President received from Hon. Myron C. Taylor, Rome, Italy, 8/29/44, enclosing carbon of letter which Mr. Taylor received from Albert Spalding, 8/27/44, attached to which is carbon of "Confidential Memorandum on the Monarchical Question", and carbon of "Memorandum of a Conversation With Marchese Carlo Bassano Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Justice at the American Embassy on August 28, 1944".
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HONORABLE CORDELL HULL:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.
F.D.R.
Dear Mr. President:

Albert Spalding, the American violin virtuoso, whom you undoubtedly know, is engaged with one of our propaganda agencies with the Army in Italy and frequently speaks in Italian over the radio. His activities here of course are, in a general sense, secret.

He recently dined with us and I was quite surprised during the course of our conversation to discover what definite information he seemed to have in respect to the political trend in Italy and I asked him if he would put his statements in the form of a memorandum, which he did and brought to me yesterday and which I now enclose for your information. I am sending two copies of this statement, one of which you may wish to send to Secretary Hull.

In addition to and somewhat at variance with the statement of Albert Spalding, I am attaching herewith a statement of my own recounting an interview that I had on August 28 with Marchese Carlo Bassano, Under-Secretary of Justice.

With my kind regards and best wishes, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosures:
Two copies of memorandum by Albert Spalding.
Two copies of memorandum on interview with Marchese Carlo Bassano.

The President,
The White House,
Washington.
27 August 1944

To The Honorable Myron Taylor,
Rome, Italy.

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Herewith attached, I am sending you an informal report on certain trends of Italian Political thought. I should have liked to have made it shorter, but there are some things you cannot telescope too much. Then too, remembering Voltaire's well known dedication of a book to a friend of his, when he apologized for the book being in two volumes, because he had not had time to write it in one! --, I am therefore counting on your indulgence for its length. With kind regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) Albert Spalding
You have asked me to set down in writing some of the ideas we discussed briefly the other day. I should make it clear that these opinions are personal ones and do not represent any official attitude.

As you know, the nature of my work brings me continually into contact with Italians from all parts and from all stations in life; therefore, my conclusions do reflect a fairly broad extent of what the Italian people are thinking today; what their hopes are; and what their doubts are.

The Italians as a whole are bewildered and confused. They recognize fully that up until about a year ago, Italy was an enemy country; and therefore, even a nation which was betrayed into a war it did not want, must in a large measure, bear the responsibility and consequences of that war. The anti-fascist forces in Italy would like to have seen quick action in eliminating all the elements responsible for what they considered to have been a betrayal not only of Italy's honor, but of Italy's future. The opinion is scarcely less unanimous among anti-fascists, that the monarchy is co-equally guilty with Fascism in betraying the country and in bringing about its downfall.

That there are important minorities who still support the monarchy as an institution it is true -- these include:

a) Many of the officers of the regular army.

b) A majority of the aristocracy.

c) Some, but not all, of the large industrialists.

d) An important portion of the Catholic Party (Christian Democrats).

Many of these above-mentioned elements, however, support the monarchy, not for affirmative reasons, but for negative ones. For the most part, they, too, join in an out-and-out condemnation of the King, and hold him almost equally responsible with Fascism for the betrayal of Italy. If they cling to the monarchy as an institution, they do so because of their fear of, what is to them the only alternative, communism. They claim that the monarchy as an institution, still has a cohesive force to maintain unity which would otherwise be absolutely absent from Italian political life. This argument would have more validity, in my opinion, if the Italian monarchy had more weight of historical continuity to support it, but such is not the case. The spirit which brought about the liberation of Italy at the time of the Risorgimento, was promoted largely by men who were anything but monarchical.

When in 1859, Italy became a free and united country, the monarchy was accepted as a compromise. It was wanted by some, accepted by many, and tolerated by the rest. For sixty years, Italy under a constitutional monarchy, although poor in material resources, made notable progress.
From 1860 to 1915, and particularly in the North of Italy, rapid strides were made in the fields of education, transportation, industry, and distribution. The King's conduct during the First World War gained him universal popularity and even by the opponents of the monarchy he was respected for his negative virtues. But even at that time, the Italian monarchy had no firm roots in the ground such as, for instance, the crown in Great Britain. It was still, in the minds of many Italians, a compromise to be accepted and tolerated; it was not an emblem of real unity. It could not, therefore, sustain the severe shocks that the following twenty years held in store for it.

The march on Rome: Could the King, should the King have prevented it? Most of the Italians with whom I have spoken, believe that it was his constitutional duty to do so.

The murder of Matteoti: At this moment Mussolini's prestige had fallen to a miserable low level. The opposition was strong and confident. The entire country was indignant and everyone expected the King to act. It was his duty as well as his prerogative to act. He did nothing. I won't go through the weary recital of time after time when constitutional monarchy in Italy betrayed the constitution and betrayed itself. It is a sorry story.

(I must again make it clear that in this informal report, I am trying to give you a resume of opinions collected from talks with responsible Italians over a period of many months.)

When on July 25, 1943, the King did finally act, and the fall of Mussolini was brought about, it was for a time hoped and believed that the King would not stop at half-measures, but would act decisively. He did not do this; he temporised and, in the six weeks that followed, delivered the major part of his country just rescued from Fascism, into the complete grip of the Nazis.

The King's first government after the fall of Fascism, headed by Marshal Badoglio, signed an armistice with the Allies, the terms of which, after nearly a year, have not yet been made public. The question in the minds of thinking Italians: Have the terms of the armistice been kept secret for so long merely for military reasons, or are they so severe and far-reaching that they are acceptable only to a tottering monarchy, intent solely on saving its own skin? Are the terms so dissonant with the principles of the Atlantic Charter that they are not likely to enjoy the support of public opinion in either the United States or Great Britain?

Italy recognizes the fact that, up until a year ago, it was an enemy country. It accepts the grave responsibility and the consequences which its fatal choice of June 1940 has imposed on it. It recognizes that it is a defeated nation. During the
last year that has passed it became a battlefield and has undergone great suffering. Italy also recognizes that it must "earn its passage back" and that that passage must be paid in terms of blood, and of toil, and tears. Democratic Italy representing, I believe, the majority of the nation, wants to be free and to resume an honorable place among free nations, but it wants likewise to know the total cost of its "passage back".

The six principle anti-fascist parties, notwithstanding their obvious differences, formed a union known as the Junta. It held its congress in Bari, the end of January 1944. This was accomplished in the face of many obstacles, including outright opposition from the King's Government, and an indifference that was scarcely less than hostile from the Allied Authorities. The order forbidding the congress to be broadcast was modified at the last moment, permitting the proceedings of two days to have five minutes on the air. A crumb was thrown to the famished democrats. Nevertheless, the Congress of Bari was an important occasion; and the inaugural speech of Benedetto Croce will go down in history as a memorable one.

Croce's indictment of the monarchy is all the more telling because of the old philosopher's nostalgic leanings toward monarchy as an institution. The speech can bear reading many times.

In the meantime, the movement of clandestine resistance in enemy occupied territory, the Patriot Movement, had gained great headway in Italy. Next to the revolutionary forces of Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, it was certainly the most important internal resistance movement in the whole of occupied Europe, up until the recent developments in France where, of course, the organized resistance movement in the whole of the French Forces of the Interior now assumes priority.

The Patriot Movement in Italy is drawn from all classes, privileged and unprivileged. That the unprivileged far outnumber the privileged is obvious; God made many poor people in Italy. There are many irresponsible elements among them; there are many swaggerers among them who strut much and do little; but, there are many brave men too, who are fighting and dying for the liberation of their country and whose achievements confirmed by Allied recognition, have given valuable aid to the common cause.

Starting in small groups, their ranks swelled from hundreds to thousands and from thousands to tens of thousands, and from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. It is customary in some quarters to minimize the achievements of these men; to look down upon them as a force so undisciplined and irresponsible that they constitute more of a menace to the future than they do a help to the present. They are drawn from all ranks and files, however, Many of them, especially from the north of Italy, are inscribed as members of the Communist party.
The Communist Party is well organized, capable and never at a loss to exploit possible advantages. This is going to be increasingly true as we go further north.

The leader of the Communist Party, Togliati, is an able, forceful, well-informed man. I have met and talked with him and was impressed by his over-all knowledge of the resources and limitations of his country. In the field of economics, for instance, his almost photographic memory permitted him to cite figures and statistics in a way that a trained economist might envy. He is also a shrewd politician and moves prudently, never making the mistake of letting his emotions run away with his balanced judgment. He may also be a good Italian, but of that, I should not like to give an affidavit until further proof is had. But, that he is a man and a force to be reckoned with, would be idle to deny.

I think that Togliati is fully aware that the Italian people as a whole, does not want Communism of the Russian brand. He is, therefore, biding his time and whether taking orders directly from Moscow, or from his own Italian conscience, his attitude toward the institutional question, toward the Vatican, even toward vested interests, has been more conciliatory than that of some of the other anti-fascist parties. The Communist Party has everything to gain and nothing to lose by this policy of waiting.

In the meantime -- what of us? I think that we, by our policy, have definitely weakened the representatives of the center and by insisting on maintaining the skeleton of a discredited monarchy, have, in reality, played directly into the hands of the extreme left.

In spite of the apparent strength and initiative of the Communist Party, I do not believe that Communism is wanted by the majority of the Italian people -- certainly not the Soviet brand of Communism. The Italian is too much of an individualist in every way. The mass movement psychology is not for him unless he has first let it trickle through an individual percolator. But he may turn to Communism, perhaps as a temporary measure rather than accept an outworn and discredited monarchy which he believes is being forced upon him against his wishes.

Last Sunday, Count Sforza made an important speech in Rome. It was attended by most of the members of the Italian Government who sat on the stage with him; the hall was packed with a fairly representative audience, which, to judge by their appearance, was drawn largely from privileged classes. Sforza carefully avoided mentioning the monarchy; but it is significant that when he spoke of "the stab in the back" on June 10, 1940, (Here, there was a great demonstration for France.) this was immediately interrupted by a voice shouting out "Yes, but the monarchy was equally guilty of this treachery!" and thereupon followed the biggest demonstration of the meeting with practically the whole audience shouting "Down with the monarchy!" This reaction came from an
audience that was not an unruly mass nor popular in its makeup, but rather from elements from whom support of the monarchy would be most likely to come.

To return to the Patriots......The influence that their opinion will have in Italy will, I think, be far out of proportion to their actual numbers. Practically the whole of Italy looks to them as the redeeming element in their unhappy plight. I have not minimized in my own mind and I would not like to do so to you, the problem that they also present. Many of them are an unruly lot, but I think it is no exaggeration to say that they may in future be compared to the same unruly lot of revolutionaries who fought at Valley Forge -- who were neglected by Congress and who, neither by manners nor appearance would have been welcome in any of the best homes of Boston or Philadelphia. The important thing is that the patriots of Italy, like the men of Valley Forge, constitute a symbol of a new-born country. My work brings me in daily contact with them. With but few exceptions, they are bitterly anti-monarchical. What they think, and what they feel is going to have great weight in the future of Italy.

A.S.
MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION WITH MARCHESE CARLO BASSANO
UNDER-SECRETARY OF THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
AT THE AMERICAN EMBASSY
ON AUGUST 23, 1944

A mutual friend suggested to me and to Marchese Bassano that it would be useful for us to have a conversation about Italian affairs. Marchese Bassano came to the Embassy and we had a discussion which lasted an hour and three-quarters. By profession he is an advocate, he is past middle age and is a man of culture, refinement and means. After the usual formalities he inquired what particular questions we would be most interested in.

I promptly inquired as to the former Minister of Justice, Dino Grandi, and his relationship to the Fascist Party. Somewhat to my surprise he replied that Grandi had always been at open war with Mussolini and that they hated one another, though Grandi was one of the original group in the so-called March on Rome. This did not mean that Grandi was not loyal to the earlier principles of Fascism but that he became increasingly independent and less a follower of Fascism in its later and more extreme stages. Grandi has been condemned to death by the Fascist Party for his conduct in ousting Mussolini in the last days of his regime and is a refugee from Italy.

I asked regarding the composition of the Cabinet, particularly of Bonomi. His response in great detail was in substance that Bonomi was favored by all the leading party representatives in Italy and that his prestige had grown since his appointment, and that the members of the Cabinet represented not only Rome but other parts of Italy. For example, the Minister of War comes from Milan and the Minister of Finance from Turin. He believed that in due course, if members of the Cabinet prove to be ineffective, the process of change of individual members could be effected without disorganizing the Cabinet as a whole. His considered opinion was that the present Cabinet was competent, representative and energetic.

There are six Cabinet members without portfolio, among which is Senator Conte Carlo Sforza. Conte Sforza has been put in charge of the Political Division as respects the gathering of information, the arrest and trial of extreme Fascists...
Fascists and, while a number of arrests of distinguished party members have been made the principal action thus far has been to dismiss small office-holders of known Fascist loyalty from public office. He felt that this was an understandable procedure and that there were in Italy perhaps not more than two or three thousand who should be punished in one way or another for their Fascist activities and that the mass who professed Fascism because it was in their interest to do so under a dictatorship should not necessarily be disturbed.

He was confident that the present Cabinet could weather any possible disturbance in various parts of the country and after reorganization from within from time to time would become a permanent mechanism to bring about more democratic satisfaction in Italy. He did not fear the Communist movement in Italy as the Communist Party, though large in membership and growing, had not shown the extreme Communist tendencies that in common parlance is understood as a dangerous and undesirable movement and felt that thus far in Italy the six parties who have collaborated to create the present Cabinet, each having within it its own chosen member, work in a cooperative spirit which would not give rise to internal discord leading to disruption. He discussed Medici and indicated that his failure to be included in the present Cabinet was because the majority of parties participating were unanimously against him. He discussed Orlando who he said had been offered opportunities to cooperate with the new government but had not been willing to do so except upon terms of individual power which was not congenial to the party plans and representation upon which the present government was constructed.

On the whole his opinion was that Italy, starting with the present regime, would, with adequate help from without, restore itself politically in a democratic spirit, economically and spiritually. We discussed relief in a brief way and it was obvious that there is concern in the present government as to Italy's situation in the coming winter, the principal difficulties confronting her being food, fuel and housing. In the fought-over sections of Italy there has been great destruction of homes and the tendency will be when winter comes for the inhabitants to flock to Rome in the hope of finding living quarters and living conditions more congenial. This will be, in his opinion, a difficult situation to meet. He inquired if Lend-Lease would likely be extended to Italy to which I replied that I did not know. I did, however, indicate that the present system of furnishing supplies to the Italian Government...
Government on the basis of an account current might in some respects be interpreted as an equivalent of Lend-Lease and that as long as that situation continued it might not be necessary to press for Lend-Lease aid.

Before leaving it was made clear to me that the Prime Minister had encouraged him to talk with me and to convey an invitation to lunch with the Prime Minister, the Marchese Visconti Venosta, the Under-Secretary of State on Monday next. I asked if Mr. Tittman might accompany me to which he replied in the affirmative. Mr. Tittman was present and acted as interpreter during the above interview.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE

2, Via Boncompagni

Rome, September 18, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

Colonel Leopold Amery, Minister for India, with whom I corresponded with respect to various matters with which you have been made familiar, has been here for the past week visiting the front and I have had two conversations with him. Among other things I inquired as to his reaction to his conference with Prime Minister Bonomi. His impression coincided with that of Prime Minister Churchill, Mr. Atlee, and my own as quoted in my memorandum of September 4, 1944. He believes also in the theory that if the present cabinet should grow weak in spots, the right procedure would be to reinforce it rather than run the risk of having it fall and a new one undertaken, as this would destroy the continuity of constructive development in this new political situation that should not be subjected to too many shocks.

Colonel Amery also had a long talk with the so-called head of the Communist Party in Italy and gave me his impression by way of a quotation, to wit: "that while he believes in the principles of better social democracy he did not wish to have the so-called Communist Party become an aggressive factor to the point of disrupting all the efforts of reconstituting a sound government in Italy. He indicated that he did, and would continue to put his influence behind the present government hoping that it would succeed".

I explained to Colonel Amery, as I did to Major Atlee, the plan for the national relief organization in Italy representing the State, the Vatican and the Italian Red Cross, and he agreed in all respects with the suggested plan. I am wiring you today that we have removed the last technical difficulties with A.F.H.Q. and A.C.C., and the statute will be completed this evening and publication of it will take place in the official governmental bulletin on Tuesday morning. I have prepared, and am sending you the text of a letter which I have written to the Prime Minister and to His Holiness the Pope, expressing appreciation of the cooperation they have given in the formation of this new national

The President

The White House

Washington.
entity and associating you, Mr. President, very prominently with its creation. I expect to send you a telegram later in the day confirming the public announcement of the plan by the Prime Minister.

I am happy to be able to inform the Prime Minister when we meet tonight that his request for five hundred repaired trucks which he asked for in our first interview is being granted: one half of this number being delivered before the end of the month and the remainder before the 10th of October. This, of course, satisfies the emergency which the Prime Minister had pointed out and which I had passed on to General Wilson of A.F.H.Q., and to Captain Stone of A.C.C. I discovered that there were 6,500 trucks needing repairs in Southern Italy, and from this number repairs were found to be possible in the case of 500 for immediate use. If the whole 6,500 could be likewise put into service, transportation problems in liberated Italy would immediately take on a much better aspect. This is the simplest and cheapest procedure to have followed; an alternative is to have new trucks manufactured and shipped from America which involves time and waste.

With assurances of continued regard, believe me

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SEP 18 1944

Subject: Transmitting Copy of Letter from the Honorable Myron C. Taylor, Vatican City

There is enclosed a copy of a strictly confidential letter, with its enclosure, written by Mr. Myron Taylor on September 9, 1944 which was brought to this country by his assistant, Mr. Harold Tittmann, who arrived in Washington on September 11. Since the original communication was in longhand Mr. Taylor requested Mr. Tittmann to have it typed here and forwarded to you in Quebec.

I have retained a copy for the Department's files.

Enclosures:
Letter from Mr. Myron Taylor with attachment.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-31-72
By J. Schaeble Date FEB 22 1972
PERSONAL

Dear Mr. President and Secretary Hull:

Last night Leopold Amery, Minister for India, and lifelong intimate companion of the P.M. (Churchill) dined alone with Annabel and me. I sent you quite recently his last letter on world affairs - I had sent previously, over more than two years, similar letters from and to him.

I had answered his last letter on Aug. 19, and enclose a copy. He defended his position with great ability and clear statement last night for nearly three hours.

Summing up - and he takes the same position in the Cabinet - I would say he leaves the world with

(a) An international organization like our plan without any enforcement provision

(b) Leave the several countries free in economic sense to trade in their own way.

He does not believe gold is any longer essential but that credit, represented by pound sterling, is adequate for purposes to trade - That his country is to find itself in so depleted a condition that it will

(a) Need to produce all it can at home on the land.

(b) That it must be free from any trade shackles in the world markets.

I am sure you will find the P.M. taking somewhat these positions when he is ready to discuss these matters. Our best brains are needed in this field.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

(Signed) MYRON TAYLOR

August 19, 1944.

Your ready response to my letter regarding terms to be imposed upon Germany - and I repeat "imposed" - quite agrees with my not only recent but continued conviction that there should be no armistice, no conference in the first instance; in other words, that we pass from active warfare to military occupation which should disarm and render innocuous the war potential of Germany as a whole. And not only that, but under one concept of control or another to continue for an indefinite future to inspect the German productive equipment so that war materials cannot be produced without Allied knowledge, and that facilities be organized so that if peaceful methods of suppression are not effective, forceful measures may be employed in the earliest stages, preventing dangerous developments and consequences.

This idea in its last feature seems at variance with your own remarks regarding the scope of authority of an international organization for the preservation of peace. I am convinced that unless some provision is made for continued inspection - with facilities for enforcement when necessary - all plans to preserve peace will fail. My own original conception regarding the partitioning of Germany has undergone considerable change during the past several years due, perhaps, to taking a longer view of the future, and probably because at home I, with Sumner Welles, were almost alone in insisting upon a three-region partition of Germany. Fear of creating an Irredenta in future was the moving impulse behind the opposing arguments. Then too, the idea seems in the final analysis to be in opposition to the second project discussed, i.e., a Federal Union of European States. My own earliest approach which I likewise defended was like your own: that there could be no European political security without economic collaboration, and that the foundation of the former rested upon the stability of the latter.

Some of us here struggled long and faithfully with a plan for an Eastern European Union as a buffer between Russia and Germany. We tried out many plans for unified transportation

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 11-11-72

By J. Schaubie Date____FEB 22 1972
transportation, customs arrangements, trade practices, monetary arrangements, etc. etc. We found ourselves in a maze of difficulties which led us to move toward the Briand and similar projects involving Europe as a whole (including Germany). Many of us have found difficulty in implementing this plan, at least in the earlier period of occupation, for military occupation must be of considerable duration in order to effect necessary disarmament, etc. etc., the creation of a new and dependable government - so that I would say an European Commonwealth could only be born in the third period or in the latter part of the second - the first being war with unconditional surrender; the second the exercise of an unqualified authority over Germany with an effective military Government, the destruction of the Socialist Party and all elements of autarchy, disarmament and demobilization of the military machine and Germany's war potential, the institution of a program of restitution and reparation, beginning of economic reconstruction, and to assist in creating a durable political structure.

The third step, as I see it, and we are beginning really too late to prepare for it - is the creation of an international organization to preserve peace. I go much further than you in this field. If such an organization is effective, it can control Germany without the need for partition. I worked a long time on the territorial lines to be drawn in partitioning Germany. (Mr. Welles has made some in his book - "The Time for Decision" - Harper's recently published). I was never satisfied with my own thinking on this feature. Your review of past experience with the League is interesting and of course accurate. Several points in the chain of events of those days stand out in clear relief:

I. The League was powerless to enforce its decisions, for no provision was made for real enforcement.

II. Britain and France were not alive to their danger - or if they were, their failure to act in the earliest days was the grossest negligence.

Some of us who visited Europe every year knew of the danger and marveled that nothing was being done.

With
With the U.S.A. outside the League, there was all the more reason why Britain, France and the European countries should have protected themselves before it was almost "too late". But that is "old stuff" so to speak.

I am a firm believer in an international organization "with teeth" - real "teeth".

I believe the plan we developed in the State Department which is being discussed by the Four Powers in Washington this week and which you have seen or soon will see, is a workable plan. As the features regarding the regulation of armaments and specifying forces and facilities to be available require legislative ratification, it would seem wise now to have a Four Power interim agreement to provide force to keep the peace for the third period from the end of the fighting until such special agreements can be formulated and concluded.

Your observations regarding world economic problems interest me very much. Your profound interest in this phase of national and international affairs is based upon similar belief on my part. The political structure is dependent upon the economic for its permanence. How far national interest is to be or in some cases must be paramount is a question requiring careful study.

My reaction after months of effort to frame a simple formula that would be applicable and workable as well as enduring, left me in doubt. This state of mind was not improved by our preliminary discussions in the Washington meetings between your economic experts and our own last September-October of which I acted as Chairman. We reached only a preliminary stage, but went far enough to develop many of the difficulties. We reached no definite conclusions. We adjourned to reassemble in January but did not. Nothing has happened since except in certain special fields such as aviation, oil, etc. etc.

Your paragraph 3, page 2 et sq. leads to further doubt whether a world economic policy of a permanent character is possible. One permanent feature of the proposed international organization that has been stressed a good deal is an economic bureau which would make a continuing study of international trade and commerce, and serve in course of time to bring about some of the major projects for a more free world trade.

In
In the stress of war and its conclusion and its immediate aftermath I am not confident that the various and mighty questions in the field of national and world economy can be made clear on the soundest lines, or translated into immediate practice, so fluctuating are the movements of trade, influenced by varying productive factors affecting cost, etc. etc. Your expressed thoughts are far more crystallized than my own. An economic commission to study such projects could be set up promptly, and in time it could give way to or be absorbed by that arm of the international organization which would deal permanently with those problems.

Regarding World Bank and Stabilization Funds - the Bretton Woods Conference did its best, I assume, to find a sound and workable plan in both fields. Anything resulting requires the approval, at least through appropriation of funds, at least with us, of our Congress. Much time may be taken in debate, the outcome of which depends on a number of factors, political and economic. One can hardly predict the outcome. Public opinion is divided - our banking community are opposed to both.

These, then, are my frank observations on the several questions which present the greatest opportunity for clear and wise thinking and action which can come to us in generations. Will we measure up to it?

Mrs. Taylor has joined me here where we have a house at 22 Via Gregoriana.

Your Prime Minister is here for a few days. The news of our troops being in Paris came to us at luncheon. What a historic moment - Rome, Paris, Berlin - it sounds like a time table of an express train or air way.

When Germany has brought her remaining troops back within her own borders, she may make a final effort, but it cannot last long.

Our kind regards to your wife and yourself.

Sincerely,
My dear Mr. President:

For your entertainment, I am sending herewith translation of a series of articles on the madness of Mussolini and the Diary of Ciano, that have particular reference to "how Italy entered the war". I believe it will refresh your recollection of many events in which we were both interested in that moment.

With kind regards, believe me

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosure:

Translation.

The President

The White House,

Washington.
"The Italian people must revenge the death of my husband. And if they do not do so - I will do it with my own hands". This was the last message that Countess Edda Ciano sent to her father Mussolini from Switzerland.

In reality the Italian people have many deaths to revenge and therefore can not think of revenging Count Ciano's, however horrible his end seemed to have been.

Countess Ciano further writes to her father: "And do not hope that You or Your friends can rob me of my husband's diary, because it will be useless to try, as I have made seven copies, which are deposited in seven different cities."

What kind of a diary is it, that Mussolini would like to tear out of his daughter's hands? and which the daughter defends so tenaciously? It is the most serious and terrible document of accusation held against Mussolini.

I happen to know quite a good part of that diary, maybe the most important part that it contains. Count Ciano read it to me himself. I will therefore relate what I know, and I must do it right now - and not later. And I ask the "Risorgimento Liberale" kindly to publish following statement: "It was a strange happening. It was during the first days of August last year - about a week after the State Collapse - that a certain person locked me up and asked me if I would have any difficulty in meeting with Count Ciano. I was surprised..."
surprised at his question, because up to that moment I had only met the X. foreign secretary but once. I replied that I would have no difficulty whatsoever, but wished to know why I was supposed to see him. My friend then told me that Ciano intended to entrust some documents to me. Evidently he wanted to make a testimony for himself for future use, and this testimony could - for different reasons not be given to an official journalist connected with the government. He urged me to accept the appointment and the following day at five o'clock in the afternoon, I entered the house of Count Ciano.

CONTRADICTING DECISIONS

The Count received me very courteously and after exchanging a few words as to the present situation, which could be considered extremely unstable, he opened up a safe and drew forth some large papers saying: "This is my diary, I will read it to You. Where do You want me to begin? Is it alright if I start from August in 1939?". As I replied that I would be pleased, the Count began to read. He had only read a few pages when he cut short the reading and turned to me, looking me into the face. I think my readers will understand my great amazement at the Count's words: "I ask You not to make any comments. Surely, that which I have to say will make a most odd impression upon You".

I listened with great interest as the Count read. That diary was not so much a political document as a psychological one. In the summer of 1939 Mussolini was almost completely mad: this according to the testimony of his relative. If he had been in this state for any length of time, I cannot tell, but it is probable, because the illness was already in year
year 1939 considerably developed.

A certain day Bocchini paid Ciano a visit and secretly confided to him: "It is necessary that the family of the "Duce" persuade him to take another anti-lzetic cure. He is in a state of constant agitation and it is not possible for me to talk to him." Ciano's reply was: "I am in the same predicament as You."

From the day of the outbreak of the war in Europe, Mussolini wavered from one decision to another. One day he decidedly wanted to declare war - another day he wished to remain in peace - a third day he was on the verge of declaring war immediately - and the fourth day he decided to wait another two years. Each day he changed his mind, sometimes without reason and sometimes for the most trifling reasons.

Two English newspapers had commented: that the reason for Italy's decision for not entering the war was perfectly logical, as it was impossible for Italy to declare war, unprepared as the country was. Mussolini became enraged: "I can't make war?" he raged - "I want to make it at once!"

Thus - that which the public had always perceived came true, Mussolini was capable of taking the most serious decisions, because of trifles. He would declare war after seeing a caricature, or after reading an article in a newspaper. This is confirmed in the diary written by the one, who was his most intimate co-worker.

Many of the minor personalities in the Fascist Party which appeared in the diary, always gave more or less bad advice to the mad man. General Fariani assured that the army was in perfect order and therefore could make war with clear...
clear conscience. Ciano commented this with: "He is a liar
and a traitor." The quadruplex De Vecchi wanted the war,
and Ciano commented: "to have other honours and other medals."
Count Grandi also urged for the war.

The Occupation of Norway

Thaon de Revel showed Ciano a very strange Finance
theory, which probably had already been laid before Mussolini.
"And it is true", he said, "that our financial position is
not flourishing, and that our gold-reserves are soon finished,
but therefore there is no reason for worry: the gold is of
no importance whatsoever now: it is the work that counts -
and we can therefore calmly enter the war."

It was at the end of March 1940 - if I remember right
March 26th, that Mussolini took his final decision. Nothing
had happened. That day Mussolini on leaving his office, met
Ciano. As he saw him, he lifted his finger and pointing to
Ciano's face, he said: "Germany will win the war. You must
get that into Your heads, all of You, beginning with You, and
work according to that basis."

And from that day, there was not one moment of hesita-
tion. He marched towards the abyss with resolute steps
and with the stubbornness of a crazed mule.

It was at the time of the occupation of Norway, that
Mussolini's disturbed mentality reached its height and
developed into a state of perfect madness. In the night of
April 9 - 10th, 1940 at four o'clock, Ciano was called to
the telephone. It was the Ambassador of Germany, von
Mackensen. "I must, he said, at once deliver a message of
utmost importance to "Il Duce", will You please accompany
me."...
me?"

Half an hour later Mackensen was at the house of Ciano and together they went to see Mussolini. Mackensen immediately delivered the message, quoting: "In the night at five o'clock German troops will be disembarking in Norway and will also at the same hour occupy the frontier of Denmark. 'The Führer' wished the Duce to be informed at once." Maybe the landing-operations had already commenced at the very moment when Mackensen delivered his message. Mussolini received the news with an outburst of enthusiasm. "Splendid", he cried, "that is the way to make war!" And he instructed Mackensen to express his congratulations and admiration to the Führer. But - the following days, as the German undertaking seemed to be developing in their favour, Mussolini became more and more discontented and nervous. He was tormented by a foolish envy, due to Hitler's "Glory". And at last, when the German victory seemed sure, he wired the Italian Ambassador in Berlin Attolico, and ordered him to visit Hitler and advise him, in the name of Mussolini, to content himself with the victory in Norway and avoid further attacks in the West. He considered himself the man to give such advice to Hitler! And he thought that Hitler would ever listen to similar suggestions!

The latter sent Mussolini a courteous reply - and continued on his own way. Meanwhile Mussolini no more hesitated, but marched stubbornly towards war. The efforts, which had been made from various parties to prevent him from entering into war, were all in vain, and had no other effect upon him, than to rouse his stubborn contradiction. The French offers were received by him with disregard. In exchange for the

Italian...
Italian neutrality the French Government declared itself willing to discuss matters on this basis: No concessions for Corsica or any other French Metropolitan parts, possibility of arrangements for Tunis and Gibuti. Ciano commented in his diary: "other things are wanted! They have not yet understood that Mussolini wants - the war."

**REYNAUD'S MESSAGE**

Paul Reynaud made an extreme effort: he sent a personal message to Mussolini. François Poncelet handed it over to Ciano in a sealed envelope. He never read it, nor was informed as to its contents. He merely got the instructions from Mussolini a few days later to communicate with François Poncelet and inform him that the message was not acceptable. Ciano commented Mussolini would avoid partaking in the war in one case only: if Hitler should cease fighting. A few days later Count Ciano had two dramatic conversations with the Ambassador of Great Britain, as well as the French Ambassador. It was in the month of May and France was already on her knees after the German assault. François Poncelet's face was lined with the sufferings of his country. He knew that Ciano was against the war. And at a certain moment he threw all diplomatic reserve away, saying: "The Germans are intolerable masters. Even You will find that out." And his prophecy came true.

There were quite a few unpleasant incidents in those days. The walls of Rome were papered with ugly manifests of Fascist propaganda. Some British subjects were overtaken by the Fascists, as they tried to remove the manifests, and were punished by being mistreated. Sir Percy Lorraine presented...
presented himself immediately at the Chigi Palace and made an official protest. Ciano tried to justify the government, but Sir Percy was not satisfied and insisted that his protest be taken seriously. At last Ciano became impatient and said: "that it was not the moment to take such trifles tragically, when the air "buzzed" with matters that were much more serious." Sir Percy Lorraine slightly paled at these words, but after gaining control of himself, he answered: "well - if our fate must be decided with the point of the sword, may it be so, but remember that Great Britain is in the habit of winning her wars!" England - at that moment was without an army and without weapons, at its side it had a dying ally and it fought for one thing only: "to survive".

THE FATAL HOUR

The fatal hour drew near. Mussolini had already decided to intervene, but constantly avoided to set the date for his participation in the war. At times he seemed inclined to enter the war immediately - and then again he would postpone it another two or three weeks. At last he set the date for June 15th. That is, if Hitler would not find it necessary to postpone it. But the situation at the French front hastened the course of matters and Mussolini, fearing that he would come too late, once more changed his mind and set the date for Italy's entering into the war to June 10th. Ciano had instructions to meet with the English and French Ambassadors and to read to them Italy's declaration of war. The first to arrive at Chigi Palace was François Poncet. Count Ciano received the French Ambassador with a depressed look on his face. He said: "Perhaps You have guessed..."
guessed the reason for this meeting?" François Poncelet smiled
a sad little smile and replied: "I am not very intelligent,
but I gather that I have guessed the reason." He continued:
"Permit me, however, to pronounce a wish in this moment; that
in spite of the outbreaking war, there will not be a bottom-
less gulf between us. I have a feeling that our ways once
more will cross." Thereafter Count Ciano read the war declara-
tion and the Ambassador took his leave. Sir Percy Lorraine
then made his entry. Count Ciano announced that he must
read him the war declaration. Sir Percy did not whimper. His
only words were: "A pencil, please." Ciano commenced reading
and Sir Percy made notes on a sheet of paper. When finished
he folded the sheet in four and placed it into his pocket.
Then he said: "I have a personal request to You Count."
Ciano made a sign that he was at his disposal, and Sir Percy
continued "I have a mule which I am very fond of, would You
take care of it for me?" Ciano replied that he was willing
to do so. At this Sir Percy expressed his gratitude and
walking to the door he once more shook hands with Ciano and
left. Reaching this part of the reading, I interrupted
Count Ciano by asking: "And what happened to the mule?"
"I do not know." "How is it that You don't know? Did You
not give the mule care?" "Well! It was cared for about
fifteen days, then I gave it to Starace and he in his turn
handed it over to a Gendarmery-riding school and since then
I have heard nothing more about it." It seemed to me that
Count Ciano did not realize having given no less than a
word of honour.

PORFIRIO

Nr. 18

THE DIARY OF CIANO...
THE DIARY OF CIANO

HOW THE IRON-PACT WAS SIGNED

II

I have already related that part of the diary, which was read to me by Count Ciano. I will now go back a little and tell how I happened to make the acquaintance of Count Ciano.

As I for a very long time had not had the occasion of reading a single American or English newspaper, I happened to think of the Foreign Ministry, where all foreign newspapers were kept on file. The superintendent of that department told me, that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in my reading the papers as much as I wished, but on one condition only: that I would obtain the permission of the Minister. At that - there was nothing else to do than to apply to Count Ciano - whom - I until that moment had never met.

Fascist Propaganda

Count Ciano received me with the utmost courtesy, and as soon as I had informed him of the character of my visit, he gave me the permission to read all the papers and magazines, which I desired. At this promise, I rose to leave, but he detained me by saying, that he had reserved three quarters of an hour, because he wished to discuss a few things with me. I was very much surprised at this request, because usually journalists like to hear the opinions of ministers - and not the contrary. But I said: "I notice that You read quite a few newspapers?" He replied that he followed the press with great attention. I wondered a bit ironically, if he found anything of interest in our papers.

At this....
At this, he replied: "Many more interesting reports than many of our ministers can produce." I watched him with great surprise. "That what You say is a very serious thing in regard to our diplomacy." He smiled, saying "I did certainly not refer to the articles of Gayda. They are it seems, not even worth reading." "And why do You make him write them then?" "Certainly I don't". "I do not wish to contradict You, but permit me to remind You, that Gayda recently published an article, where he supported the idea that Italy ought to have half of Africa, from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. A similar article must have been inspired, if not directly dictated, by no other than Your Ministry." He answered to this with indignation: "I have never inspired nor authorized such extravagances. That article was one of Gayda's personal articles. After reading it, I felt very bad about it and found it deplorable."

"Allow me to make two observations: In the first place, an official journalist has no right whatsoever to permit himself such a "personal initiative" - and if he does - the day after the publication of such an article, he can no longer be considered an official journalist.

In the second place: All the papers receive their instructions from the Board of Education to publish articles of mentioned kind. Therefore the initiative was taken by the Board of Education (the Ministry) and not by Gayda. "You are wrongly informed. It is not true." "I can assure You that it is true." "It is not true. I can give You my word as to that." I remained silent and stupefied. But in that moment everything seemed to reveal itself; the vast disorganization of the Fascist propaganda. The Minister of the Board of Education, Favolini, had probably grasped
some of Mussolini's phrases, and in the belief that he would merit himself, forwarded instructions to the press, but evidently these instructions were given without the knowledge of the Foreign Minister, who knew nothing about it until he read the papers. When Ciano then protested, Pavolini denied having given instructions assuring that Gayda and the other papers had written the articles on their own personal initiative. As it was, the discussions regarding the press and the diplomacy were ended - and I was quietly expecting the Minister to question me. After a few moments of silence, he asked me, what I thought of the situation. I hesitated in replying, because after all, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, whom I talked to for the first time in my life, and furthermore, I was not sure how far I dared go in speaking my mind, but being induced by him to speak frankly, I finally decided to do so. I told him, that according to my conviction the war was already lost - and that we were in a desperate situation. I also told him, that it would have been still worse had Germany won the war, because we would have become slaves under the German yoke for centuries.

WITH RIBBENTROP IN MILAN

Count Ciano approved vivaciously. He said: "It is exactly as You say. It is a terrible thing to have the Germans as enemies, but still worse to have them as allies. They fight like lions, but they understand nothing - and just because they do not understand, they ruin themselves as well as those bound to them. They imagine certain things and act accordingly and stubbornly refuse to believe or admit..."
or admit that things are different, even if they can touch them with their own hands. When Ribbentrop went to London as Ambassador, von Neurath, who at that time was Foreign Minister, surprised me with a dull-witted joke. He said: 'Von Ribbentrop will experience for himself that it is easier to receive a "yes" when one goes to London as a representative introducing a new mark of champagne, than when going there as Ambassador to Germany.' In fact, Ribbentrop experienced it. And after that he wanted to punish England; punish it because she had not said "yes" to his demands, had not accepted the Nazi greeting. In fact, he wished to punish, because things were not as he had thought them to be - and consequently did not work out the way he had imagined."

I was very much surprised at Count Ciano's frankness of speech and I told him so. I even advised him to be more careful. But he told me, that he was in the habit of speaking his mind openly. "Furthermore - whom would it hurt? Mussolini?" And at these words he shrugged his shoulders. "To the Germans? But the Germans owed him gratitude. I have given them the best of advice. I told them: 'Do not start the war! Do not start it, because You will lose it and ruin yourselves altogether.' The facts have proved that I was right in what I predicted. So they ought to pay me homage." "Homage" - I said - "no, on the contrary, they will never forgive You. The beaten man never forgives the one that gave him the good advice that would have saved him; never forgives the one, who on every occasion can say: "I told You so!" "It is true", he replied - "but after all, they can do what they please to me. I want to say what I think." He then turned to me with a question "But do they know...
know how I think outside?" At that moment I realized that the public might be informed of his anti-German attitude. I replied "yes, they know a little." "And what is the public opinion?" I shrugged my shoulders and replied "Well, they say it is alright, but, there is the iron-pact?" His face darkened as he said "Ah! in regard to that, they will one day find out how it was concluded." I replied that I might already know, or believed that I knew. He responded that he was curious to know if it were true and I then proposed to relate that which I knew, and if I were wrong, he should please correct me. He accepted and I started my version of the pact:

"You left for Milan to meet Ribbentrop. Up to that moment no pact had ever been mentioned between Italy and Germany. There was an agreement between You and Mussolini, that it would be worth while siding with Germany and use it as a valuable playcard in the game with England, but You never had the intention of letting things go too far, but to keep things within a certain limit." Ciano followed my story with growing surprise. As I made a pause, he exclaimed "Exactly, so it was!" "You had hardly arrived in Milan and scarcely communicated with Ribbentrop when You were called to the telephone. It was Rome calling. Over the wire came the voice of Mussolini. He said: 'Offer them a military alliance.' You remained speechless. Then You tried to object, but Mussolini insisted, 'I have told you to offer Ribbentrop a military alliance.' And then You asked to have the main paragraphs of the proposed pact dictated. And - in fact - there were three paragraphs - the most..."
the most important. Once more Count Ciano interrupted me with the words "Just exactly, so it happened". Then You proposed the agreement to Ribbentrop, and the former seemed just as surprised at Your request, as You were, when You received the order from Mussolini. He asked You for a couple of days time, to be able to get in contact with Hitler and to have his instructions. In one way or another he had to justify his prolonged stay in Milan, and therefore let himself be ciceroned around the city - churches and monuments for three days. "No", corrected Count Ciano - "two days - this, being the only mistake made in Your otherwise exact version." "But it is of small importance," I said. "After two days the instructions came - and the iron-pact was signed. Am I right? "Very right" replied Ciano. "Strange how precisely these things are known."

MUSSOLINI'S SPEECH

After having finished the story of the iron-pact, we turned to other topics. All of a sudden Count Ciano made a new inquiry. "What impression did You have of Mussolini's speech?" I hesitated. To gain a few moment's time for reflection, I replied "How shall I answer You? As one answers an old Café friend?" "If I ask, it is because I wish to know the truth." "Well," I replied resolutely, "very bad". "Is it Your personal impression, or that of others?" "It is my personal impression as well as that of all people with good sense, that I since then have talked to." "And why?" "I could mention a hundred reasons. I will begin with the most insignificant of all, so insignificant, that it seems almost ridiculous. For instance "The smoking-suit at five" and I will close with the more serious one, the advice to the Italian..."
Italian population to move away from the larger centers. Just as if the poor Italians were rich tourists, all of which possessed villas outside Milan and Turin." I had not chosen this argument by mere chance, as I had a presentiment, that there was a rift between my listener and Mussolini. And in fact, as I cited "smoking at five" Ciano's face lightened up in a large understanding smile. But when I mentioned the Mussolini advice to move away from the large cities, he interrupted me at once. "Not only that!" he cried, but the government does nothing. They advise the Italians to move out of Milan, Turin and Genoa, they advise hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, and what does the government do? Not one single thing to prepare lodgings for all these people, not one single preparation to assist them in any way. They give an advice - and then they wash their hands. And that is not all. Mussolini says, that the Italian soldiers are good, if they are well commanded and well armed, fine! And who has the responsibility of commanding them well? Who is the one to arm them well?" I looked at him in great surprise. Then I said "I wish to give You an advice. Please do not talk that way in the future, because You will have trouble." He shrugged his shoulders. "From Mussolini I have nothing to fear." Tragic ingenuity.

WHY MUSSOLINI HATED HITLER

III

The conversation turned once more to the Germans. As it is over a year and a half since this private talk took place - and being that it was a very long one, I cannot possibly remember everything that was said, or the different turns of the conversation, nor why and how we came to pass from...
from one subject to another. I am trying to be as exact as possible in relating the topics discussed by the Count and myself.

Count Ciano spoke of the Germans with a deeply-rooted hatred. We remember his speech of the 16th Dec. 1939, where the hostility of the Fascist foreign politics keenly proved to be anti-German. He said, that at the time the reception rooms of his Foreign Ministry were thronged with visitors, but as soon as the rumour was spread of his disagreement with Mussolini, they were quickly abandoned and the visitors disappeared. I remarked "If You had gone to the German Embassy, You would have found them there. They only changed waiting-rooms." He answered "Yes, that is probable."

An absurd situation

I asked Count Ciano, if I must consider myself bound to keep secret what he had confided to me. He hesitated a little before he replied "Well - it would not hurt them to know my opinion of the Germans, or what do You say?" He cherished the thought that his anti-German sentiments had, or would procure him a certain popularity. I was cruel enough to tell him, that he had better tear himself from any illusions of that kind. I asked him "Why don't You ask for Your dismissal?" Once more his face darkened. He replied "I wanted to do so. Indeed, I had already decided, if one can term it so. When we entered the war, You will remember that I enrolled. My idea was this - as a country engaged in a very serious war could not get along without a Foreign Minister, I could not just leave after a week's notice, but they would have to substitute me. In this way, I would have reached my goal, which was to leave the government without...
without slamming the door behind me. But the war with France ended all of a sudden and my calculations blew up like soap-bubbles. I was called back for the Armistice negotiations - and once more I was caught. "But" I said, "if I understand right, You were already long aware of the great danger that the Hitlerian Germany would be to Italy and for Europe." "I have always regarded German politics with seeing eyes. I have always understood that Germany marched boldly towards war and that we were a playcard in their game; a card that would be sacrificed at the first opportunity. And if I had not come to understand it by myself, if I had not seen with my own eyes - Attolico would have made me see." "The Ambassador to Berlin, does he see clearly?" "He always did. His reports were a constant cry of alarm. It can be said, that he had hardly arrived in Berlin, before he knew, before he understood that Germany wanted war and was prepared for it - and would to any cost force the outbreak of that war."

When he later on read a part of his diary to me, these same words met me from the pages, but it also occurred, that while Attolico called our attention with allarming cries, the Counselor to the Embassy in Berlin, Magistrati, brother-in-law of the Minister, wrote optimistic and tranquilizing letters, as to the German situation and Nazi politics. "You see," I said, "that sometimes our Ambassadors are worth a little more than the journalists." "But tell me, if he were such a good Ambassador, why must he leave? Maybe just for that reason: of being a good Ambassador?" He refused to answer my question.

Alfieri appointed Ambassador

I will now make an extensive parenthesis. Later when Count...
Count Ciano invited me to his house to read me the diary, I was to know the true course of things. Under a certain date, following notification was read: "In the car Mackensen informed in a confidential manner, that Attolico was not liked in Berlin and that we would have to call him back. He made me understand that there were two acceptable names on the list. These were Farinacci and Alfieri. As I listened to the reading of this passage, I observed: "so - the Italian Ambassador to Berlin was practically chosen by the German Government". Ciano replied with a vague nod, which could be quoted as: "As You see, so it was". I could not help smiling, "And thus Alfieri was appointed Ambassador to Berlin?" "Un jeune homme très gentil, complètement dépouillé d'intelligence." This was the definition made by Miss Fontanges, the adventureress with whom Mussolini had had a ridiculous adventure. Count Ciano smiled, "What choice have You? From two evils, You choose the least bad." I once more asked, "And did not Mackensen assign also Anfuso?" "No he did not. Anfuso had always been considered pro-German, but Mackensen did not assign him." "Always pro-German" I replied surprised. "But how is that? I have a literary friend with whom he always has anti-German disputes." "Yes, I know," said Count Ciano. "You mean a certain Sicilian novelist, but in spite of this, he has always been pro-German." I remained speechless. Count Ciano's reply pointed to two small puzzles, of which one was a little difficult to solve, and the other almost impossible. The first was: the Sicilian Novelist, Vitaliano Brancati, well - there was Anfuso, who for years had made anti-German debates with Brancati - who happened to be an old friend of his, from his earliest
youth - and - who in reality, was pro-German? It seemed more than strange. The second mystery: Anfuso made anti-German debates with Brancati and Count Ciano was well informed as to this. I realized that, when he made the comment "Yes, that Sicilian Novelist," But by whom was he so well informed? Evidently by Anfuso himself. Strange! And why? For what reason? I must confess that I could not solve this mystery. And for this reason, I close this extended parenthesis and continue my conversation with Count Ciano.

Senseless words

At a prolonged pause, I inquired "Why do You not write down Your memories? You have partaken of and assisted at such strange and important happenings, that it could be considered Your duty to make them known." Once more a large, understanding smile brightened up his face as he replied: "It is already done." He rose and went to a small safe, which was near the window. He took out a large note-book bound in black. I noticed that there were several of the same kind, but he only took forth one. Closing the safe, he returned to his seat and laid the book on the table. "It is my diary", he said. He was still smiling and seemed pleased. "Years back I started writing down the important things that happened during the day." He opened the book. It was written with a clear, upright handwriting. No cancelations were to be seen. Here and there extra pages were folded and attached. I complimented him for the neatness with which it was written. There was a note of vanity in his voice as he replied: "You know, I was once a journalist." Then he added jokingly...
jokingly: "Do you believe me, when I say, that if things should go wrong for me, I could sell this to any foreign country and receive enough for it, to be able to live." "Doubtless - I said - but meanwhile you could read some of it to me." He looked smilingly at me and vivaciously exclaimed "Just to you! No, never, never." "Why do you say 'Just to you,' why not read it to me as well as to somebody else?" He continued saying no to my requests, but all the time I knew that he had a great desire to read me something. The book lay open on the table. "You have asked me what Mussolini thinks of the Germans." Indeed, I did not recall having asked a similar question, but replied either yes or no. I quietly waited for him to begin. "Well, just see what happened to come under my eyes: the news had been transmitted that the German troops had entered Rumania," he began reading from the open page of the diary. "Mussolini called me to the Venezian Palace. He was enraged. He cried out: 'Once more Germany has played one of its plotted tricks. But, next time Hitler opens the newspapers, he will read that I have attacked Greece.' He was silent for a moment, then he let his fist drop down on the table and cried 'Corfu.'" I burst out laughing. I could picture the scene; I saw the man, who had dreamt that he dominated his ally, suddenly wake up and find himself his slave. Above all, I saw him furiously pounding the table with his fist, crying out 'Corfu'. "But why Corfu?" I demanded. "He had many good reasons for being angry with the Germans. Why should he just choose Corfu? for which he was indebted to the English. Revenge the death of Traiano. Moreover King Carlo...
Carlo, Roman Emperor. "You criticize too much"—said Count Ciano smilingly—and I will not read You any more." And with these words he closed the diary. I insisted that he read me some other part, but it was in vain. "As You wish"—I said—"but one day You will read it all to me." These words slipped over my lips.

**CHINESE AND JAPANESE**

We also discussed the Orient. Count Ciano had been in China for quite some time and had a profound knowledge of the Chinese people. He spoke of them with great sympathy. He boasted of being the first one to realize that the Chinese would have become good soldiers. He learned this by watching the Shanghai police—which—as we know—is mixed: one part being Chinese and the other European and Japanese. He considered the Chinese police to be the best of all. It was the Japanese, who with their brutality and bestial cruelty had forced these peaceful people to become warriors, but Count Ciano was convinced that the Japanese would never succeed in breaking the Chinese resistance. They could never go through with an occupation of the vast Chinese territory. They would only be able to cast forth their expedition corpse. When the Japanese arrived, they set fire to a few houses, destroyed some villages—then passed, without leaving other traces behind them than a couple of hundred of graves. And the war spread around the country like fire. It could be likened to a ship that cleaves the water: the sea opens up—and immediately closes—no trace is left. While he was talking, I could not help thinking of the unhappy destiny...
destiny of that man, who had given up in everything, who acted contradictory to his own feelings and opinions.

Later - as I walked downstairs from the Chigi Palace, I asked myself why Ciano had told me all these things, and I arrived at the conclusion, that some was said because he wished to tell it - and furthermore, wished to make a good impression upon me, whom he considered an intellectual with a certain standing, and at last, maybe for the craving of just speaking to somebody. And I thought to myself: Maybe I will be able to print it all - one day.
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO HIS HOLINESS THE POPE
2 Via Boncompagni
Rome, September 18, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith copy of a letter dated
September 9, 1944 which I have received from Monsignor
J. B. Montini, Under Secretary of State of the Holy See.

It contains a message from His Holiness, the Pope,
in reply to a communication of mine on the occasion of
the Pope's recent allocution in which, it seemed to me,
there were many matters to be praised and of which it
seemed wise to take notice.

I am also enclosing copy of my letter of September
4, 1944 addressed to His Holiness, Pope Pius XII.

With kind regards, believe me

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosures:

to the Pope, September 4;
from Mgr. Montini, Sept. 9.

The President
The White House
Washington.
Dal Vaticano, 11 September 1944

Segreteria Di Stato

DiSua Santita

Your Excellency:

At the gracious behest of His Holiness, it is my honored duty to convey to you His profound appreciation of your esteemed note of September 4, 1944. It was with a sense of real satisfaction that His Holiness learned of Your Excellency's warm and, indeed, enthusiastic concurrence in the directives which He enunciated in His radio message to the world September 1, 1944.

It was a source of particular encouragement and consolation to the Sovereign Pontiff to find that Your Excellence not only approved of the guiding principles set forth on that occasion, but also regarded them as fully within the realm of realization and as milestones on the forward path for the attainment of a greater and more enduring world happiness.

The reference made by His Holiness to the International Organization for the Preservation of Peace, in which the President of the United of America has manifested so great an interest, was but another indication of the heartfelt desire of the Holy See to foster and encourage any project for the establishment and furtherance of a just and enduring peace.

His Holiness would have me assure you of His prayerful confidence that the attainment of the objectives outlined in His discourse and generously seconded by Your Excellency will, through the sincere cooperation of men of good will everywhere, be permanently secured as a heavenly blessing on men and on nations.

With the renewed assurance of my cordial sentiments of highest consideration, I am, Your Excellency,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ J. B. Montini

His Excellency
Mr. Myron Taylor
Personal Representative of
The President of the United States
To His Holiness Pope Pius XII
Via Boncompagni 2, Rome.
My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith copy of a letter dated June 6, and of my reply dated August 19, together with my confidential letter dated August 3 to Secretary Hull. It may be that this correspondence has not reached your hands, but I think it is important enough for me to send you a copy for your confidential consideration. It would be unfortunate to have this correspondence get into public hands owing to its confidential character.

With best regards, believe me, Dear Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosures:
as listed.

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.
My dear Myron Taylor,

I received your letter of May 22nd a few days ago, in which you wondered how far the views I had put to you in previous letters had been modified or expanded owing to the events of the war or the lapse of time itself. I have accordingly refreshed my memory with copies of these letters and am interested to find how little I should be inclined to change any of their general conclusions.

As regards the European situation I still believe that the right ultimate solution is some sort of loose Federation or Commonwealth of the main body of European nations west of the Russian frontier. In such a Commonwealth a chastened and regenerated Germany must obviously play her part, and that is why I am all against long term punishment and all in favor of drastic punishments, economic and territorial, to be carried out at the moment of victory. A good deal of that will be looked after by those who have been the victims of German oppression, as well as by internal trouble in Germany itself. But I would not, for instance, wait for any peace treaty before expelling the German population of East Prussia and other districts which are to go to Poland, and beginning to colonize them with the Poles whom Russia is I gather willing to release.

I fully realise that the conception of a European Commonwealth, which Churchill and almost every speaker in the recent House of Commons debate have blessed, may not be very palatable to the Russians, and there may be an initial stage in which we may be mainly concerned in bringing together the states of Western Europe and letting them form a nucleus of the future European Union. But that should be only a transitory stage and should not be allowed, by the consistent exclusion or depression of Germany, to drive her into Russia's arms. The Russian system expanding to the Rhine might very well become a menace to Western civilization such as Mackinder has envisaged in his book. In any case I still feel as strongly as ever that neither this country, nor Russia nor the United States, could, for varying reasons, become actual members of a European Commonwealth though concerned actively in facilitating and sponsoring it during the early years of its growth. You will find the argument on this developed in a recent lecture

by...
by Sir Walter Layton which I think has been freely published on your side, as well as in Coudenhove-Kalergi's latest book, and also in one of the chapters in my little book "The Framework of the Future" which I sent you some time ago.

There is, however, one aspect of the matter which may confront us whether we like it or not. Judging from what is happening in the Balkans, I think also in Italy, and probably, when the time comes, in Germany and in her satellites, there is very little immediate vitality or energy in the Democratic parties as compared with the enthusiasm and ruthless aggressiveness of the Communist Parties, who will certainly not miss the opportunity afforded by the breakdown of Germany in order to seize power at the critical moment. In this they may be helped by the very fact that there is no real essential difference between Fascism, Nazism and Communism in that the kind of young men who have been ardent Nazis or Fascists may many of them easily become ardent Communists. We may therefore have to face the possibility of a preliminary stage of widespread Communism, or something near it, followed no doubt in time by a reaction towards more moderate and democratic policies. Meanwhile both the movement towards the Extreme Left and the subsequent reaction may all help to tone down the extreme Nationalism which has broken up Europe and in that way ease the path towards European reconstruction.

One thing, as I said in my letter of February of last year, that it is really important for you to realise, is that economic policy in these matters cannot be divorced from the political objective. If there is to be any form of European Union it cannot be on the basis of maintaining the Most Favoured Nation Clause, but only on the assumption that the European nations, like those of the British Empire, are entitled to give each other whatever special economic terms they wish in order to promote and encourage their Union, and that that cannot be any ground for complaint by any nation outside. I will go even further in expressing my strong personal views that the present economic outlook of your Government bears very little relation to the economic trend in the world as a whole and looks much more, as seen from this end, like an attempt to restore nineteenth century individualist economics in a world which has inevitably become nationalist, even though the process is to some extent concealed from American eyes by the immense development of the United States behind a nationalist economic policy in the past. It may well be in the interest of the United...
the United States themselves, as it was in ours a hundred years ago, to lower their tariffs, possibly even to indulge in Free Trade. But that doesn't mean that there is the least likelihood of other countries following their example, or indeed that it would be for their benefit or for that of the world as a whole that they should do so. You will, I daresay, have studied the valuable monograph entitled "The United States in the World Economy" published by your Department of Commerce. From that it is clear that the great European depression between the two wars was not due, as current legend sometimes asserts, to high tariffs, quotas and exchange restrictions, even if your 1930 Hawley-Smoot tariff may have accentuated it. It was due primarily to the nations, more particularly of Europe, getting back onto the gold standard with the help of lavish American lending and so having the whole basis of their economic life pulled away from under them when Americans, first for the sake of their own boom and secondly because of their own slump, withdrew their support. The Most Favored Nation Clause prevented them from giving each other mutual preference and so keeping trade and credit circulating within their own borders, and was therefore a main contributory cause of the disaster. The memorandum points out that the only possibility for a world of free multilateral trading and investment depends on the future internal as well as external stability of the American economic system. But who can guarantee that? The memorandum on the other hand also points out that the other countries recovered even quicker than the United States, or Canada which was closely tied up with you, as a result of the various measures which may have impeded world trade but stimulated domestic production.

I think you will find that all the nations practically after this war will want to build up their own economies on the basis of stability of employment and maintenance of their domestic standards. For that purpose they will have to keep their hands free to impose whatever regulations may at any moment be convenient and will be very reluctant to commit themselves to any far-reaching agreement tending in the direction of freer international trade. In our own case we shall have tremendous difficulties, for many years I think, in paying our way in the world, i.e., in being able to export enough to cover our immediate requirements in the shape of raw materials and such food stuffs as we cannot reasonably produce in this country. But that means that we shall have to give vigorous protection to our domestic agriculture and keep out unnecessary luxuries and manufactured goods...
goods, and that we can only afford to relax that policy in return for definite concessions in other markets, and not merely on the off-chance of increasing our export trade in the world at large under a regime of low tariffs and Most Favoured Nation Clause.

I would go even further and express my own grave doubts whether anything in the nature of the proposed Monetary Fund is either likely to come off or to be of benefit to the world if it did. It is after all based on the assumption that the maximum of international trade is the main object and that parity of exchange is an important contributory factor in international trade and investment. But for countries which base their policy, as most countries will in future, on stability of employment and production and consequently also on the stability of the price level internally, it will be far more important to be free to exercise complete control over exchange and investment than to enjoy the minor convenience of international parity of exchange.

In all these matters we here seem to be in a state of considerable uncertainty. The Government has just issued a White Paper on Employment which is based entirely on the principle that stability of employment depends on the regulation and control of expenditure and investment. But it only applies the principle with regard to domestic expenditure and investment and makes no attempt to follow it up in its application to the control of imports or of foreign investments. I have just come across an article in your New York Times which draws attention to this lack of illogical coherence on our part and enclose a copy of it in case you may not have seen it.

I see Mr. Cordell Hull has been raising the question of a world organization to preserve peace, as indeed has Mr. Churchill. My own profound conviction is that so long as it is clearly understood that the world organization exists for conference and conciliation and, as such, definitely excludes coercion from its purview, it may fulfil a very useful function in creating world opinion in favour of peace and in helping to adjust many minor differences, which, if allowed to develop, might become more serious. On the other hand, if the world organization professes, again as such, to enforce peace it will inevitably break down and by its very existence paralyze the action of individual nations who might be prepared to preserve peace. The League of Nations played a very useful part during the years between...
between 1925, when we definitely rejected the Geneva protocol, and 1935, when we committed ourselves to the coercion of Italy by sanctions. During those ten years British policy made it quite clear that it did not believe in the use of sanctions and only regarded the League as an instrument of conciliation. If that policy had been followed it might have been quite easy for France and ourselves together quietly to tell Italy that we could not allow her to swallow Abyssinia, and to arrive at some reasonable compromise. As it was, once the thing was referred to the League of Nations, the first step was to hamstring the Abyssinians, by saying that arms should not be sent to either disputant. After that it was quite obvious to Mussolini that the League never meant real business and he got away with it. On the other hand the pinpricking policy of the League so exasperated him that it drove him straight into Hitler's arms, whereas in the spring of that year he had been prepared at Stresa to co-operate with France and ourselves in setting definite limits to Hitler's restless ambition. So I definitely take the view that those who favoured "putting the teeth into the League" were mainly responsible for the present war, and that any similar policy is far more likely to promote a world war than to prevent it.

In all that I have dictated above I have been frankly expressing my personal opinions. They are very far indeed from being the opinions of the British Government as a whole or of Mr. Churchill, or of the main body of British public opinion. All the same I believe the event will prove them right. Anyhow, I have stated them with uncompromising frankness.

You must have been greatly relieved to know that Rome has not only been liberated but liberated intact.

With every good wish,

Yours sincerely,

The Hon. Myron Taylor.
Rome, August 3, 1944.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Secretary:

During the last few years I have sent you from time to time the letters that I have received from a distinguished correspondent in London. These letters had to do with settlements during and after the war and the creation of an international organization to preserve the peace of the world.

Some little time before I left home for my present destination I wrote my British correspondent inquiring whether - because of the progress of the war - the views he had expressed in previous letters had been modified or expanded. I have now had forwarded from my office the enclosed private and confidential letter which I think will be of interest to you. The President and yourself have had access to the previous correspondence; no copies of it, however, are on file either at the White House or at the State Department, and it is not desired that the present letter should reach the files or be offered for reading by others than the President and yourself. I have eliminated the name and title of the author.

I assume that the President is absent and that you will bring this letter to his attention upon his return. I am not sending a copy to him personally because of his absence.

With kindest regards, believe me

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated
June 6, 1944.

Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington
August 19, 1944.

... your ready response to my letter regarding terms to be imposed upon Germany - and I repeat imposed - quite agrees with my not only recent but continued conviction that there should be no armistice, no conference in the first instance; in other words, that we pass from active warfare to military occupation which should disarm and render innocuous the war potential of Germany as a whole. And not only that, but under one concept of control or another to continue for an indefinite future to inspect the German productive equipment so that war materials cannot be produced without Allied knowledge, and that facilities be organized so that if peaceful methods of suppression are not effective, forceful measures may be employed in the earliest stages, preventing dangerous developments and consequences.

This idea in its last feature seems at variance with your own remarks regarding the scope of authority of an international organization for the preservation of peace. I am convinced that unless some provision is made for continued inspection - with facilities for enforcement when necessary - all plans to preserve peace will fail. My own original conception regarding the partitioning of Germany has undergone considerable change during the past several years due, perhaps, to taking a longer view of the future, and probably because at home I, with Sumner Welles, were almost alone in insisting upon a three-region partition of Germany. Year of creating an Irredenta in future was the moving impulse behind the opposing arguments. Then too, the idea seems in the final analysis to be in opposition to the second project discussed, i.e., a federal Union of European States. My own earliest approach which I likewise defended was like your own; that there should be no European political security without economic collaboration, and that the foundation of the former rested upon the stability of the latter.

Some of us here struggled long and faithfully with a plan for an Eastern European union as a buffer between Russia and Germany. We tried...
tried out many plans for unified transportation, customs arrange-
ments, trade practices, monetary arrangements, etc. etc. we found
ourselves in a maze of difficulties which led us to move toward
the grand and similar projects involving Europe as a whole (in-
cluding Germany), many of us have found difficulty in implementing
this plan, at least in the earlier period of occupation, for military
occupation must be of considerable duration in order to effect neces-
sary disarmament, etc. the creation of a new and dependable govern-
ment - so that I would say an European Commonwealth could only be born
in the third period or in the latter part of the second - the first being
war with unconditional surrender; the second the exercise of an unqual-
ified authority over Germany with an effective military Government,
the destruction of the socialist party and all elements of anarchy, disarm-
ament and demobilization of the military machine and Germany's war
potential, the institution of a program of restitution and repairation,
beginning of economic reconstruction, and to assist in creating a dur-
able political structure.

The third step, as I see it, and we are beginning really too late
to prepare for it - is the creation of an international organization to
preserve peace. I go much further than you in this field. if such an
organization is effective, it can control Germany without the need for
partition. I worked a long time on the territorial lines to be drawn
in partitioning Germany. (Mr. Welles has made some in his book - "The
Plan for Decision" - Harper's, recently published). I was never satis-
fied with my own thinking on this feature, your review of past experi-
ence with the League is interesting and of course accurate, several
points in the chain of events of those days stand out in clear relief.

1. The League was powerless to enforce its decisions, for no
provision was made for real enforcement.

2. Britain and France were not alive to their danger - or if
they were, their failure to act in the earliest days was the grossest
negligence.

3. None of us who visited Europe every year knew of the danger and
marveled that nothing was being done.

With the L. S. A. outside the League, there was all the more
reason why Britain, France and the European countries should have
protected themselves before it was almost "too late", just that is
"old stuff", so to speak.

I am a firm believer in an international organization "with
tooths" - real "teeth".

I believe the plan we developed in the State Department which is
being
being discussed by the Four Powers in Washington this week and which
you have seen or soon will see, is a workable plan. As the features
regarding the regulation of armaments and specifying forces and facili-
ties to be available require legislative ratification, it would seem
wise now to have a power interim agreement to provide force to
keep the peace for the third period from the end of the fighting until
such special agreements can be formulated and concluded.

Your observations regarding world economic problems interest me
very much. Your profound interest in this phase of national and
international affairs is based upon similar belief on my part. The
political structure is dependent upon the economic for its permanence.
Your national interests must be paramount is a question requiring careful study.

My reaction after months of effort to frame a simple formula
that would be applicable and workable as well as enduring, left me
in doubt. This state of mind was not improved by our preliminary
discussions in the Washington meetings between your economic experts
and our own last September-October of which I acted as chairman. We
reached only a preliminary stage, but went far enough to develop many
of the difficulties. We reached no definite conclusions. We adjourned
reassemble in January, but did not. Nothing has happened since
except in certain special fields such as aviation, oil, etc.

Your paragraph 3, page 2 et seq., leads to further doubt whether a
world economic policy of a permanent character is possible. One per-
manent feature of the proposed international organization that has
been stressed a good deal is an economic bureau which would make a
continuing study of international trade and commerce, and serve in
course of time to bring about some of the major projects for a more
free world trade.

In the stress of war and its conclusion and its immediate after-
math I am not confident that the various and mighty questions in the
field of national and world economy can be made clear on the soundest
lines, or translated into immediate practice, so fluctuating are the
movements of trade, influenced by varying productive factors affecting
cost, etc. etc. Your expressed thoughts are far more crystallized than
my own. An economic commission to study such projects could be set up
promptly, and in time it could give way to or be absorbed by that arm
of the international organization which would deal permanently with
those problems.

Regarding World Bank and Stabilization funds - the Bretton Woods
conference did its best, I assume, to find a sound and workable plan
in both
in both fields. Anything resulting requires the approval, at least through appropriation of funds, at least with us, of our Congress. Much time may be taken in debate, the outcome of which depends on a number of factors, political and economic. One can hardly predict the outcome. Public opinion is divided - our banking community are opposed to both.

These, then, are my frank observations on the several questions which present the greatest opportunity for clear and wise thinking and action which can come to us in generations. Will we measure up to it?

Mrs. Taylor has joined me here where we have a house at 22 Via Gregoriana.

Your Prime Minister is here for a few days. The news of our troops being in Paris came to us at luncheon, what a historic moment - Geneve, Paris, Berlin - it sounds like a time table of an express train or airway.

When Germany has brought her remaining troops back within her own borders, she may make a final effort, but it cannot last long.

Our kind regards to your wife and yourself.

Sincerely,
Rome, September 21, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information, I am sending you herewith a set of photographs which were arranged for by the office of Prime Minister Bonomi at the time of the inauguration of the National Agency for Distribution of Relief Supplies in Italy. On the back of each photograph are indicated the names and titles of those taking part in the ceremony.

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosure:

3 photographs.

The President

The White House

Washington, D.C.
(1) Neyen Taylor with Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi

(2) Neyen Taylor
Prince F. Donia Pamphili, Mayor of Rome
Dr. Umberto Zavalli - Bianco,
Pres. Italian Red Cross
Frank C. Groven, Amb. to Mr. Taylor
Prince Carlo Pamphilj

(3) Neyen Taylor and Prime Minister Bonomi.

Placed in Photograph 5-15.
My dear Mr. President:

Recently I was invited by the present representative of the founder family of the Bambino Gesù Hospital in Rome (Marchesa Salviati) to visit the hospital, as I had been through one experience or another, requested to visit several civilian hospitals in Rome. The one in question proved to be a children's hospital where 500 children up to 5 years of age were cared for. Many of them were orphans from poor families, and a few came from more representative families who for one reason or another found it desirable to have their offspring cared for by this institution. I visited the hospital and found it entirely clean and orderly and cared for by an immaculate group of nuns and a very high class staff of doctors headed by a cousin of the Pope as director.

During the course of our conversation I spoke of the use of penicillin: they knew nothing about it except as a name. I thought it might be interesting for them to learn more about it from some of the medical and surgical officers in one of the Army hospitals where the substance is being used with such great success. I therefore suggested that the group should come some day to our office where I invited an experienced officer to give them useful information. This took place last week and the reaction of the visitors was one of great appreciation. I am attaching hereto copy of a letter from the director of the hospital in question who speaks on behalf of those who attended the informal meeting. I thought it would be interesting for you to know that they are spreading the gospel of good news wherever they come in contact with those who are in darkness.

With kind regards, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosure.

The President
The White House
Washington.
Roma, 11 14 settembre 1944

OSPEDALE
DEL BAMBINO GESU
ROMA
DIREZIONE

Sir,

Both myself and my colleagues have appreciated very much the interesting lecture you had the kindness to arrange for us.

The subject was fully and clearly illustrated and we all found the lecture greatly absorbing.

kindly accept our very best and grateful thanks.

I am, Sir, very respectfully yours

(sgd) Dr. Prof. Francesco Olivieri
Sanitary Director of the hospital

H. E. Myron Taylor
Via Boncompagni, 2
Roma
Dear Mr. President:

I am transmitting herewith copy of a letter dated September 23, 1944 which I have today received from the Grand Master of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, enclosing a check for five hundred thousand lire as an initial contribution to the cause of national relief in Italy.

I would like to call your special attention to the paragraph referring to the most helpful assistance given by the Civilian War Relief of the American Red Cross to the Sovereign Military Order of Malta during the period before the entry of the allied troops in Rome.

I am sending copy of this document also to the headquarters of the American Red Cross in Washington for its information.

With kind regards, believe me

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosure.

The President,
The White House
Washington.
Excellency,

As His Highness the Grand Master was temporarily absent from Rome, I informed him at once by letter on the 19th inst. of the meeting that had taken place on that same day, following your invitation, of the various Chiefs of Mission of the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See, in which you informed us of the founding of the "Ente Nazionale dei Soccorsi".

His Highness returned yesterday to Rome, and he asked me to express to you all his admiration and deep appreciation for your special interest in this matter, and the understanding you have shown of the moral and material needs of the Italian people so hardly tried. The Grand Master has charged me likewise to hand to your Excellency the enclosed cheque of 500,000 lire as a contribution stated by the Counsel of the Sovereign Order of Malta in favour of the "Ente Nazionale dei Soccorsi".

The International Order, as you already know, has its national organisations in the various countries: the Italian branch of the Order has done and is doing its utmost to alleviate the difficulties and suffering caused by the war. Every possible kind of assistance is being given through its hospitals, first-aid posts, nursing-homes, hospitals-trains, including personal assistance to refugees.

On this occasion I wish to convey to your Excellency the sincerest gratitude of H.H. the Grand Master Prince Chigi Albani for the valuable help given by the Civilian War Relief of the American Red Cross to our Order with the large consignments of clothing, food and medical supplies. This help was especially useful during the months preceding the entry of the Allied troops in Rome, when the Sovereign Order was thus able to alleviate the suffering in Southern Italy, especially in Naples through our various charitable institutions that are there.

I am...
I am your Excellency's

very sincerely

(sgd) STANISLAO PECCI
Minister of the Sovereign Order of Malta to the Holy See.

His Excellency
Mr. Myron C. Taylor
Personal Representative of President Roosevelt to His Holiness Pio XII,
Rome.
September 28, 1944

Dear Myron:

I have received your letter of September 6, 1944, enclosing a memorandum of your recent conversations with the Italian Prime Minister. The problems of the Italian situation, principally the economic ones, have our attention very much these days. We are taking a new view of our policy toward Italy. You have undoubtedly seen the joint Anglo-American statement on Italy which was released on September 26. I feel that you will agree that it answers many of Bonomi's questions.

I have sent a copy of your memorandum to Cordell Hull for his information.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Myron C. Taylor,
Personal Representative of the
President at the Vatican,
Vatican City,
Rome, Italy
Rome, September 6, 1944.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a memorandum which I made after a conference with Prime Minister Bonomi on Monday, September 4, at his invitation at the Caccia Club in Rome, which you may find of interest. I am sending two additional copies since you may desire one for Secretary Hull.

The Prime Minister spoke very frankly with me on the basis that it was a confidential conversation. He indicated his desire to have further confidential conversations for repetition to you in the future.

With kind personal regards, believe me,

Sincerely,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosures:
Three copies of memorandum.

The President,
The White House,
Washington.
1. The difficulty in securing action after projects have been discussed and agreed upon is very embarrassing to the government.

2. The most urgent problems facing the government are means of transportation for food for Rome which by January will become a very serious menace. This results from the fact that for six years the population of Italy and of the Rome section particularly have been severely and increasingly rationed to an extent that medical opinion indicates that the vitality of the people especially in the poorer classes is so reduced that a severe winter lacking additional food, proper clothing and adequate shelter will give rise to tragic consequences. Second, in southern Italy where most of the villages have been destroyed there is as yet no provision for temporary housing and the poorer classes who have no alternative shelter and who have largely been living in an improvised fashion during the heated summer months will be in a most dangerous situation for they too have been suffering from the same food deficiencies prevalent in the Rome area and particularly throughout Italy south of the industrial section which has the advantage of the productive area adjacent to the Po River, there being no similar productive area, except for grain, in the southern section.

3. The housing situation as above described can readily be remedied in the opinion of the Prime Minister if an adequate, though for this particular purpose a relatively small, number of trucks were made immediately available. He assured us that there were adequate supplies of all materials necessary for these emergency structures which would be made of concrete sections one story in height and designated by him as a type of barracks which can be quickly constructed, for the time element now is one of the greatest importance. The Prime Minister indicated also that there were adequate facilities for cement making in southern Italy. For this problem alone 100 trucks would be adequate. For the food situation in and about Rome and in southern Italy 400 additional trucks would be required. This figure is at variance with some of the statements that I have heard where the demand was for several thousand trucks...
trucks. Doubtless the larger number would be needed if an attempt were made promptly to set in motion the facilities that would assist in general reconstruction and restore some semblance of normal traffic conditions but I think from the statements made 500 trucks would care for the particular emergencies described so that no unpleasant reaction would follow because of lack of housing or food in this critical area during the coming winter. The truck situation is rendered increasingly difficult as stated by the Prime Minister because not only did the Germans take away with them many Italian trucks and many transport vehicles but the Allied Armies in turn took practically all that were left. If from this number 500 could be restored to the Government for the purposes indicated or if used trucks from the Army not suitable for the most effective requirements in the field of operations in the number of 500 were released to the Italian Government it would meet the request so frankly made by the Prime Minister and show a cooperative spirit that would be not only justified but unusually productive of good will. It would also be an effort to support this government without which popular reaction may further endanger its permanency. My own impulse would be that America should make a gift to the Italian Government of this item of 500 trucks and I am confident that if the problem were submitted to American Relief for Italy and it were permitted to raise the funds and donate the 500 trucks funds would be forthcoming without delay. I have no doubt the Italian community in America would quickly undertake the cost so that prompt action might be taken. This presents an immediate, essential and a modest operation in aid of the reconstruction of Italy which should be accomplished without the delays consequent upon passing through a large number of bureaus and committees and to that extent at least I support the Prime Minister's statement that upon agreed projects there was too much delay due to what might be called cumbersome committee action. I asked the Prime Minister if the Italian Government would support this construction program and if so to what extent and he promptly replied that the Government would with an initial appropriation of a milliard lire.

The Prime Minister accentuated the importance of promptly building the barracks described above in the Casino section to house that and other similar populations in that area, but Cassino particularly was one that he felt...
should be promptly cared for as it had received world-
wide attention and the national reaction to taking action
there would be very helpful to encouragement of faith in the
government. I inquired whether it were not desirable to re-
adjust the populations in these ruined places so that they
might be more conveniently situated to the occupations in
which they would normally be engaged to which he replied
that that would not be possible at the moment because the
relocation of populations was a question for subsequent
careful study and that the immediate concern should be to
house them in the locality with which they were accustomed
and where their opportunities to subsist would be promoted
rather than to move into a new locality and among strange
people where they might find it more difficult to subsist.

4. The question of transportation by sea was next discussed,
the Prime Minister feeling that at the end of the war Italy
should not make the mistake that it did after the last war.
He stated that on that occasion Italy began a very active
shipbuilding program at a time when there were too many
ships already in being in the world, and that it was his
hope that after this war there could be released to Italy an
adequate merchant marine which would avoid further over-
supplying the world with ships and he looked to our country
to make some satisfactory provision for Italian shipping.
This led to the question of immediate water transportation
which I raised as related to the bringing of provisions and
other supplies from Spain, Portugal and African ports to
Italy, it being a shorter haul than from America or else-
where and requiring less ships for such a short haul. He
proved to be very much interested in that subject and he
and his cabinet are going to make a careful study of it.
In regard to the provision of wheat, the Prime Minister
indicated that there was adequate wheat in Italy at the
present time to see the country through to January on the
300 gram unit basis, the present basis being 200 grams.
As winter approaches the higher basis would seem to be
essential for the preservation of health and perhaps life.
The problem therefore is to bring to Italy wheat or flour
or both in adequate quantities so that the period beginning
January 1 until the next crop season in Italy will be
provided for. He indicated in response to a question that
the flour milling capacity of the country was adequate to
convert the present wheat crop into flour. This is
encouraging because it indicates that the mechanical
equipment for this particular purpose has not been as
badly injured as had been anticipated.

5. ...
5. I brought up the question of the wage basis in Italy and asked if 75 lire was the base rate for wages. I was not entirely satisfied with the discussion on this point for it appears that while the base rate of pay in certain sections is 75 lire per day the government has prevailed upon the employers to add to it another 40 lire per day making the wage 115 lire per day. This applies of course only to those who have jobs. I inquired if any provision was made for those with a family who were without jobs and he said that it had not been done on a national basis but that it had been undertaken to administer simple relief where needed but no plan of unemployment payment had been adopted. He felt that there was work enough in Italy if permitted to function under its own direction and with its own facilities in major aspects without introducing at this time, when such a tremendous opportunity exists, such a plan but at a later time if unemployment developed they would consider a plan of unemployment allowances. I inquired the average number in an Italian family. He replied it might be five in southern Italy and in northern Italy probably four.

6. The Prime Minister referred to the need of reconstructing the railroads offering as it does a tremendous opportunity for employment. In that field it would be essential to have quantities of copper as the Germans as well as the Italians denuded the railroad electric system of all the copper they could commandeer. I indicated that it would probably require considerable time to produce the motive power to operate the railroads whether it were electric or with any other sort of motive power, the alternative to which was transportation coastwise by ships or over the roads by truck.

7. I raised then the question of the political situation in northern Italy which might develop after it is conquered to which the answer seems to be that they expected very great difficulties when Rome was liberated but that with careful handling they had overcome in general the opposition to the government and had been given a measure of support that was not anticipated. They felt that, while the northern industrial area and the partisans might impose a problem, they had the fullest confidence that it could be met and overcome by the same methods employed in southern Italy.

The Prime Minister spoke with satisfaction of his relations with General O'Dwyer who seemed to grasp the
problems and to be constructively cooperative.

The Prime Minister gave me the impression of being vigorous, mentally very alert, composed, readily willing and able to answer all questions, and to have a firm grasp of the problems which surround him. He conducted himself with simplicity and unusual intelligence and frankness. My first impression was entirely satisfactory.

The Prime Minister consented to become Chairman, ex officio, of Italian Red Cross and seemed pleased with the opportunity and the prospect of reorganizing Italian Red Cross. He nominated Mr. Zaniboni, High Commissioner for War Refugees, Professor Doctor Giovanni Canaperia, General Medical Inspector and Chief Director of Ministry of Interior and Doctor Emilio Tamberlini, Chief of Medical Section of Ministry of Interior, the Italian Government members of the Central Committee proposed in my number 124.

The Italian Red Cross has likewise named Professor Umberto Zanotti, President of Italian Red Cross, Marchese Teodoli, Executive Director of Italian Red Cross, and Professor Doctor Zapponi as its representatives on the Central Committee.

The Vatican has named the following: Mons. Walter Carroll, Mons. Baldelli, and one other member yet to be chosen.

I have not yet adjusted the representation, if any, with the Confederation of Labor. There exists in some quarters a fear of conflict between the so-called Communist Party and the other parties which might impair the work of the Central Committee. I believe we can adjust the situation in a few days.

Others from his Cabinet whom he had with him at luncheon were Marchese Giovanni Visconti-Venosta, Under Secretary of State who, by the way, is an old acquaintance of ours, Marchese Carlo Bassano, Under Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and, at my request, Mr. Harold Tittmann.

Myron C. Taylor

Rome, September 5, 1944.
Postscript:

Since the foregoing memorandum was dictated, I have had a call from representatives of AFHQ, Caserta, Col. J. E. Butterworth and Lt. Col. F. K. Levis, and from Col. R. A. Martino of the Allied Control Commission, who reviewed the situation from the supply point of view in respect to relief by Army authorities in Italy for the coming winter.

Among other things, they indicated that there were available 6,500 trucks requiring modest repairs, principally lacking tires and batteries. This being true, it would seem that the easiest solution of the transportation problem as outlined by Prime Minister Bonomi would be to equip a limited number of these machines with tires and batteries. I believe the maximum number of trucks that have been requisitioned through the ACC for Italian use was 3,000. Here then appears to be a number far in excess of that which are on the ground and can be put into use if a reasonable amount of supplies and repairs are made upon them.

M.C.T.
CROCE ROSSA ITALIANA
Il Presidente Generale

Rome, 5th Sept. 1944

To His Excellency, Mr. Myron Taylor
Chairman of Board of Trustees
American Relief Committee for Italy
Rome.

Your Excellency,

I am glad to be able to inform you that I have laid the main lines of our plan before H. E. the Prime Minister and that he has expressed his agreement with it.

As regards more particularly the expenditure involved, - the major portion of which, as you know, is to be met by the Department of the Interior, H. E. Bonomi as Minister of the Interior anticipates no difficulties in that respect.

With my kindest regards, I remain

Yours sincerely

(signed) Umberto Zanotti-Bianco

(Dott. Umberto Zanotti-Bianco)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 28, 1944

Subject: Report from Myron Taylor.

Thank you for sending me Myron Taylor's letter of September 6, 1944, enclosing a memorandum of conversations he had with the Italian Prime Minister on September 4, 1944.

I have made copies of the memorandum for the Department's files and have drafted an acknowledgment to Mr. Taylor for your signature, if you approve. Mr. Taylor's letter and memorandum are returned herewith for your files.

Enclosures:

1. Department's letter to Mr. Taylor for the President's signature.
2. Mr. Taylor's letter and memorandum dated September 6, 1944.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR
MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter to the President, 9-6-44 from Hon.
Myron C. Taylor, Rome, enclosing copy of a
memorandum of a conference with Prime Min.
Bononi on Sept. 4th, 1944.
To His Excellency
Myron C. Taylor
Personal Representative of the President of the United States of America.

It was with real pleasure that we read Your Excellency's letter of September 15th, in which on behalf of President Roosevelt and American Relief for Italy Inc., Your Excellency very kindly expressed appreciation of our encouragement of the "National Agency for the Distribution of Relief Supplies for Italy."

Constantly animated as we are by the resolve to avail ourselves of every occasion to alleviate the sad consequences of a conflict which, alas, we were unable to prevent, we are most happy to give our fullest support to an organization that has been set up with the object of bringing help to one of the peoples most severely tried by the war; all the more so because the elements constituting this National Agency give every reason for confidence in its lofty ideals and thorough efficiency. Indeed, information already
reaching Us affords gratifying proof of the earnestness of its generous, zealous leaders. This confidence has now been increased by the assurance Your Excellency gives that American Relief for Italy, Inc., has accomplished much and we express the hope that, under the able and enlightened leadership of Your Excellency, other governmental and benevolent organizations will lend their hearty cooperation to further the most praiseworthy aims of this National Agency.

While then We implore the most plentiful blessings of God on the united efforts of all concerned with these noble enterprises, We voice the prayer that the work already begun may develop and grow apace, and that it may serve to offer suffering peoples an unmistakable testimony of the active presence in the world of that Christian charity without which justice would be inadequate to ensure for mankind the inestimable gift of peace.

We are happy on this occasion to renew the expression of Our sincere good wishes to Your Excellency.

From the Vatican, October 4th, 1944.

Pius XII
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

I am transmitting herewith a sealed envelope addressed to the President by the Honorable Myron C. Taylor, which has been received in the Department from Rome.

George F. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol

Enclosure:
Sealed envelope.
Rome, September 13, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

One of your great admirers, Avv. Salvatore B. Cherchi, 4 Via Giuseppe Ferrari, Rome, in gratitude for the relief of Italy has asked permission to dedicate his small brochure "Allarme agli Italiani" to you. I am transmitting both his letter and the document in question for your consideration.

With best regards, believe me, my dear Mr. President

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor

Enclosures:

From S.B. Cherchi
September 10, 1944;
brochure "Allarme agli Italiani"

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Roma, 10 SET. 1944

Sig. Ambasciatore,

Stimo mio dovere inviare la prima copia di
la mia pubblicazione "Allarme agli Italiani" che
ho voluto dedicare al sig. Presidente degli S. U. di America, J. Delano Roosevelt, da lei rappresen
tato in Roma presso la S. Sede.

Sebbene il mio lavoro valga poco e per ragioni contingenti appaia in fana così modesta, mi au
guro che questa vocina per una di tormenti di altre
vittorie degli italiani oppressi, siano lette negli S. U. di America e nei paesi Alleati, cui l'Italia,
che la salvette e la riconquista l'libere.

Noi credereemo di essere degui di questo dono.
Confido, e questa sarà l'aspirazione una più grande,
di potere - col che Lei alto affricco, di poter fare
omaggio del libro al sig. Presidente, se egli aversi
in sua presenza la Città Eterna.
Avv. S. B. CHERCHI

ROMA

Perdono l'ordine di cellule, e con iscrizione del mio presente onegiútio, vi crede
di me

Avv. Salvatore Cherchi

Via Giuseppe Ferretti
N. 4 - Roma

Sig. Ambasciatore

Miron C. Taylor

Amb. S.U. d'America
presso la S. Sede

Roma
Allarme agli Italiani

XXVIII OTTOBRE 1922 - IX SETTEMBRE 1943
Il popolo Italiano, cui queste pagine sono dedicate, considere Giorgio Washington fondatore della libertà, dell'indipendenza degli S. U. d'America.

L'autore dedica queste pagine di sofferenza italiana a Delano Roosevelt che, seguendo quelle grandi orme, è il ricostruttore della libertà dell'Europa e del mondo.

Salvatore Cherchi

Introduzione

Sono gli idi di Marzo.
Sento già che questa primavera non è di rinascita; per l'Italia, purtroppo, saranno giornate di passione....
Scivo nell'ora forse più tragica per l'Italia, che sembra sommersa da un gigantesco cataclisma.
Lo sconforto, il dolore, il patimento se sono grandi nel mio animo, li sento nell'animo di tutti che sono inebetiti, sia che vengano a Roma in cerca di carità umana o di sollievo, sia che vi risiedano da tempo, fra enormi sofferenze fisiche e morali.
Le vie dell'Urbe rigurgitano di dispersi di guerra, senza tetto, con gli sguardi spenti, raminghi, assenti dai focolari domestici, carichi di masserizie e di sacchi, seguiti da innocenti creature affamate e senza meta. L'alma città vorrebbe accoglierli tutti nel suo seno, ma ciò non è possibile. Andranno più lontano con la stessa sorte.
Lo scrivere è per me un sollievo; è un bisogno che mi spinge a scrivere vertiginosamente, convinto che tutto è inutile perché tutto innanzi a me è scomparso, come inghiottito da un immenso diluvio...

L'Italia da oltre vent'anni per la pazzia sfrenata di un uomo non ha più pace, un giorno di respiro: il suo benessere, le sue forze economiche, le sue arti, le sue campagne, la sua salute, persino le sue forze morali sono caduti nel vuoto.

L'esercito della patria, come nebbia al sole, è scomparso nell'avvilimento, nell'iniquo tentativo di farlo risorgere. La nazione non ha più un governo responsabile che la guidi: ha una stampa asservita allo straniero che la jugula ogni minuto e la calpesta: tende a condurre tutti noi alla disperazione, nell'esasperazione generale.
Storicamente retrocediamo di venti secoli in ogni bene conquistato col lavoro dai nostri antenati.

Il tedesco, che da tempo ha varcato le Alpi, non è solo in marcia verso Roma; come gli antichi barbari all'epoca di S. Gregorio Magno, non arretra, ma è già fra noi per spogliarci di tutti gli averi, per dissanguarci con l'intenzione di uccidere i corpi morti.

Non sono gli italiani che lo hanno chiamato.

Mentre scrivo, nelle vicine caserme abbandonate dall'esercito italiano, sono rinchiusi — come in un serraglio — migliaia di giovani nostri fratelli, circondati da milizie naziste che li hanno razziani per la strada, in attesa di essere condotti in Germania per essere gettati nella mischia, deportati e dati in preda, senza via di salvezza, alle trionfanti armi russe.

Ogni istante, attorno agli accerchiati che si aggirano nei cortili delle caserme e si arrampicano alle finestre per salutare i loro cari, madri e spose, con in braccio tenere creature, tentano di avvicinarsi ai cancelli per ricambiare un saluto.

Una giovane sposa è caduta innanzi ai nostri occhi, colpita dal piombo delle orde mercenarie della repubblica sociale, dei ricostituiti battaglioni « M ».

E' lì, in una pozza di sangue...

Un cittadino sopraggiunge e uccide due o tre dei criminali.

Questo isolato tentativo di ribellione pubblica offre ai mercenari rinnegati, e perciò armati dai soldati tedeschi, l'occasione di gettarsi come forzennati sui passanti, in una sarabanda di colpi di moschetto a getto continuo, che dovrà durare per oltre tre giorni.

E i giornali tacciano sull'episodio, accennandovi per via indiretta; danno naturalmente la colpa di questi eccessi ai sabotatori della guerra, ai comunisti, agli agenti provocatori.

In queste contingenze così fosche e tristi m'accingo a scrivere queste note ispirate dal cuore, a scatti, senza pretese perché dirette al popolo, a tutti i soffranti.

Sono talvolta, come in un abbozzo rudemente accennati, degli episodi di un'epoca terroristica ed avvilente, dei problemi che meritaranno di essere sviluppati come insegnamenti ai giovani perché le libertà, quando sono conquistate debbono essere gelosamente custodite e difese fino all'ultimo respiro.

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POST-SCRIPTUM. — Poiché al lettore del tempo in cui potranno venire alla luce queste pagine interessa soprattutto conoscere la fonte, dirò che l'A. si onora di non aver mai fatto parte del Partito fascista.
E pur essendo per ragione di professione iscritto dal 1912 al Consiglio dell'Ordine degli Avvocati di Roma, che dovette essere soppresso e sostituito dieci anni più tardi come fucina di incarichi e prebende, dal Sindacato professionale, rifiutai di aderirvi.

Rimasi quello che ero dalla nascita: un seguace, come mio Padre, delle idee di Giuseppe Mazzini.

All'ideale del grande italiano sono ancora, come molti compagni de' "La Ragione" e del mio tempo, devoto. A questo riguardo il lettore, nella sua naturale diffidenza, può essere tranquillo.

La sola mia ambizione è di dargli l'allarme che molti problemi l'attendono dopo il ricordo di tristi pagine di un periodo nefasto; pagine di cui molte sono a sua conoscenza, di alcune, forse, no.

Può credermi, perché conosco quello che dico e nulla ho chiesto o da chiedere a nessuno.

In queste ore di ansia, mentre il popolo ode il tuono dei cannoni sui colli Albani e sente la vigilia della sua liberazione, non ho casacca da mutare, uscire da nessun nascondiglio per preparare alibi per domani, gomitate e nuovi assalti alle cariche, da narrare mie personali sofferenze, che furono di noi tutti.

Roma, marzo 1944.
I.

SALUTO ITALICO ALLE DEMOCRAZIE. — Nel momento in cui le gloriose truppe anglo-americane si apprestano, dopo aver valorosamente combattuto e vinto uno dei più forti eserciti del mondo, a consolidarsi a Roma, culla della civiltà, il popolo italiano, che in più di venti anni di traversie, di dolori e di patimenti, non ha potuto esprimere il proprio pensiero, compreso da una duplice tirannia, le saluta con animo franco, ed aperto; le saluta con ansiosa attesa, nella certezza di ritrovare, non i rappresentanti di popoli oppressori, bensì quelli di popoli liberi e democratici, che hanno una tradizione di civiltà, d'uguaglianza, di fratellanza.

Gli occupanti di ieri, che un tempo guardavano a Roma, come centro irradiatore di civiltà, di scienza, di arte, nel mondo intero, trovano il popolo italiano che vi si è rifugiato come tale, esausto, da un triste esperimento voluto da una oligarchia prima, poi da un'altra grave sventura, a carattere punitivo e vendicativo: l'occupazione tedesca che taccia, tutto un popolo avvilito, da traditore.

Molti preconcetti debbono essere dissipati di fronte al mondo nei confronti degli italiani, preconcetti che credevamo fossero ormai superati, e invece, abbiamo, purtroppo, sentito ribadire nella stampa estera, nei parlamenti e nei circoli diplomatici, proprio nel momento più triste della storia recente italiana quando il cittadino, superato momentaneamente una crisi di denegata libertà, ne dovette fra patimenti, lutto e dolori, soffrire un altro peggior: la schiavitù dello straniero.

Confidiamo, perciò, che le truppe anglo-americane, si considerino e si comportino come soldati vincitori dei tedeschi, e non del popolo italiano, che non volle la guerra e li saluta, ancora, come soldati liberatori.

Ed occorre, innanzi tutto, mettere in massima evidenza, questi fatti inoppugnabili, che la storia dovrà mettere all'attivo del popolo italiano:

a) che questo dal 28 ottobre 1922 in poi e fino ad oggi, non fu
padrone di esprimere le proprie idee, (abolizione dello statuto e di ogni altra legge e garanzia costituzionale), oppresso da una masnada di criminali, agli ordini di un dittatore, corrotto, pertanto seguito, applaudito, incensato nelle sue forme morbide, da una «troupe» di malfattori e da una turba obbligata, e la stragrande maggioranza dei cittadini, nulla poteva dire, fare, pensare, operare.

Occorre, quindi, ben distinguere il popolo italiano dal suo megalomania tiranno, dagli intrighi di un re debole, e dei suoi gallonati di S. M. Lo Stato aveva accentrato tutto in una persona onnipotente—proprietà privata, commerci, merci, prodotti, giustizia sociale, proventi e risparmi immensi, polizia cieca, amministrazione — per togliere al cittadino ben pensante, ogni facoltà d'intendere e di civilmente vivere, in pace ed in concordia umana.

b) Che quella parte,—la migliore e la più eletta,—intellettuale, che tentò di sottrarsi al basto del regime, fu inesorabilmente relegata al confino, o gettata nelle carceri, vittima di tribunali del terrore.

c) Che molti, come impiegati e funzionari dello stato, dovettero entrare nelle file dei fasci che aborrivano, per non perdere il posto che occupavano; altri dovettero subire la stessa sorte per lavorare e per vivere.

Tutto questo dobbiamo dire ai governanti delle nazioni unite, principalmente a Winston Churchill e Delano Roosevelt, mentre ci accingiamo a sviluppare, con ordine per sommi capi, questi ultimi dati di fatto di una triste storia recente, che dovevano culminare nel principio, «L'Italia sono io» di Mussolini.

Nei primi due anni del regime, a tendenza... repubblicana, di fronte ad un sovrano abulico, debole e timido, per non parlare del Senato, la Camera dei Deputati aveva ormai cessato di rappresentare qualcosa.

L'ira degli oppressori, allo scopo di intimidire il popolo ed i suoi rappresentanti, si era riversata sull'On. Matteotti, e su altri deputati che furono orribilmente trucidati, altri, per sottrarsi alla stessa fine, dovettero riparare esuli in terra straniera.

Il regime si può dire che era finito dopo il delitto Matteotti, la via della successione era aperta; tutti attendevano una mezza parola del Sovrano, il quale ebbe una ottima occasione per licenziare il dittatore, salvare così la sua dinastia, ma invece tacque, lasciando tutto il tempo agli omicidi di serrare le loro file, rotte dopo la parodia di una così detta marcia su Roma, per uscire dalle loro tane, e rincrudire sempre più contro la nazione, togliendole ogni possibilità di difesa. Il partito fascista, per bocca di un suo ignobile portavoce, ebbe l'inaudita sfrontatezza di assumere in proprio dinanzi alla civiltà umana la re-

Ma un giorno, ne siamo certi, essi saranno ritrovati e conosciuti, nella loro terribile condanna e requisitoria per il regime.

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II.

LA POLITICA DELLA CORRUZIONE NEI VARI POTERI STATALI. — In questo capitolo dobbiamo esaminare le opere di corruzione, rinnovate dopo molti secoli in Italia alla ennesima potenza, nei vari rami dell'Amministrazione dello Stato.

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Parlando però costituzionalmente dovremmo trattare in prima linea del potere esecutivo nel periodo dal 1922 al 1943; ma su questo punto a nostro modesto avviso, e se si tiene conto delle nostre premesse, il saggio potere esecutivo propriamente e giuridicamente detto, non ha mai funzionato in questo senso, e nel periodo in oggetto. Lo abbiamo detto: a Palazzo Viminale, nel nome del capo e per proprio tornaconto, funzionava da arbitra la polizia con tutte le sue brutture, vendette e malefatte; da De Bono a Senise, il primo colpito alla schiena da quel piombo che egli stesso aveva preparato, il secondo tolto dalla circolazione per ignota sorte. Il Ministero degli Interni, per confessione di un vecchio questore, era diventato un covo di spioni e di agenti provocatori che si controllavano a vicenda; ben quattrocento fannulloni e spostati erano addetti alla censura telefonica interna; una dozzina di prefetti a ricevere le denunzie dei complotti immaginati, ad arreolare ufficiali in congedo, professionisti ed esaltati, in qualità di delatori e di agenti provocatori, lautamente retribuiti; le anticamere del capo della polizia erano letteralmente prese
di assalto da grandi dame ognigente e da gentiluomini, da politici per riferire sulle voci raccolte il giorno prima nei cosidetti ritrovamenti, nelle osterie, negli alberghi o sui treni o per chiedere di essere assolti alla mangiatoia delle spese segrete.

Il capo della polizia era naturalmente il soprattendent alla preziosa vita del duce; alla squadra presidenziale, un misto di moschetteri, di milizia e di gendarmi, era riservato questo speciale compito che veniva così a mangere alle casse dello Stato centinaia e centinaia di migliaia di lire all'anno! Il sunnominato questore ci narrò di avere visto raccogliere ben 18 carte da mille che erano cadute dalla busta di un deputato socialista, reduce da un colloquio del defunto dott. Bocchini, capo della polizia, mentre l'ignobile uomo stava per risalire nella sua rombante automobile.

In compenso dei suoi servizi, il creduto rivindicatore e compagno di Matteotti, aveva libero accesso alle Carceri e poteva esercitare la sua professione di penitenza fuori legge colla maschera di antifascista. Nel maggio 1944, radio Londra segnala il nome dell'avvocato, assieme ad altri, come spia tedesca.

Ognuno ora agevolmente comprende a quale livello di bassezza fosse ridotto il Palazzo Viminale: un sistema di polizia corrotta e corruitrice; gli organi dipendenti erano completamente decentrati, al comando dei segretari federali del partito, dei prefetti e dei podestà, quasi ovunque in contrasto fra loro. Mussolini nominava dei Ministri.

Se si consideri che i Ministri erano creati per continuare, a proprio tornacanto, a disaggregare e dilapidare le risorse ed il lavoro della Nazione, non contavano nulla di fronte al padrone. Erano licenziati a libito del tiranno, e se qualcuno, anche di lui parente arricchitosi favolosamente, ha tentato di ribellarisi per poi tradirlo, ha pagato il fio delle sue malefatte.

III.

DEL POTERE LEGISLATIVO, — La famigerata marcia su Roma, doveva segnare la fine ignobile della Camera dei Deputati, rimanendo solo in funzione, come una rappresentanza, eletta dal capriccio del re, il Senato, che rivestito di gabbane d'orbace, colle nuove
nomine decrete da Mussolini, veniva saturato di tutte le scorie ligie al regime. La Camera dei Deputati non tardò a sentire, — derisa ed insultata, nel suo prestigio, dal nuovo Capo del Governo, — il principio della sua abolizione.

L'aula sorda di Montecitorio, a dire del tiranno, poteva diventare bivacco per le sue legioni di camicie nere, strame per i suoi accolti.

Gli On. Giacomo Matteotti, Giovanni Amendola, Turati, Sforza ed altri, cercarono di reagire al furente despot, ma dovevano pagare con la vita o col confino, il loro tentativo di difendere le libertà pubbliche e la dignità dell'Assemblea.

Il tiranno ha ormai deciso di abolire in toto tutte le libertà costituzionali, e quindi la fine del Parlamento è segnata.

I rappresentanti del potere legislativo sono singolarmente perseguitati, minacciati, derisi, oltraggiati, mentre il Parlamento agonizza.

Agli eletti della pentarchia non resta altra funzione, quando sono radunati, che spellarsi le mani ad applaudire il nuovo Messia, rafficare con i canti della... rivoluzione, in blocco e per acclamazione, le leggi fasciste.

La sopraggiunta Camera delle Corporazioni, non merita neppure di essere ricordata, tanta è la nausea che ancora ispira nel buon popolo italiano, che ha vissuto nel regime abominevole di terrore e di assolutismo, fra le catene.

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IV.

DEL POTERE GIUDIZIARIO. — Devesi premettere che l'opera indipendente, saggia del magistrato è stata in ogni epoca, ed in ogni paese del mondo, universalmente riconosciuta come garanzia suprema dei cittadini ossequienti alle leggi.

Ed è doveroso riconoscere che gli amministratori della giustizia hanno saputo in ogni tempo di libertà in Italia, corrispondere alla loro alta missione con onestà e purezza d'intenti.

Ricordiamo che il giudice all'inizio della sua carriera era ricompensato, come capo della giustizia, con poco più di cento lire mensili, quando nelle altre nazioni lo stipendio era di ben altre misure.
Nel periodo in oggetto, la stragrande maggioranza dei Magistrati cercò di resistere finché poté ai nuovi dolorosi eventi.

E fra i primi Ministri, ricordiamo l'On. Oviglio di Bologna; egli cercò di sottrarre i giudici ed i promotori di giustizia, fin che poté, all'influsso degli avvenimenti politici, ed al disopra delle competizioni di parte.

Il culto della giustizia, per la difesa della dignità umana, non doveva mai cessare.

Ma ecco che quel tale Ministro è sospetto di antifascismo e deve cedere il posto per il così detto cambio della guardia.

Si arriva così ai ministri di pura marca fascista — tipo Rocco — i quali iniziarono l'opera di assoggettamento del Giudice, di correzione, di accapparramento degli affari penali, civilì e commerciali. Sorgono studi legali succursali del Ministro in carica diretti da parenti senza scrupoli i quali accentrandone ogni cosa nelle mani di questi nuovi giuristi, vendono sentenze, ordinanze, decisioni, grazie, ed ogni bene di Dio, in favore di chi più offrì.

I magistrati più renitenti sono licenziati, od addirittura sospesi; altri compressi nella carriera; gli ossequienti, di buona o di cattiva volontà, se vogliono continuare nel loro impiego devono piegare la schiena.

La pubblicazione dei nuovi codici e leggi sullo stato giuridico del magistrato hanno continuato ad aggravare le condizioni del giudice.

I Procuratori Generali non sono, dopo questa nuova legislazione, che dei fedeli interpreti ed esecutori dei nuovi principi e sistemi della polizia; le funzioni dei Presidenti delle Corti e dei Tribunali sono di soggezione e di assoluta obbedienza; nessun incarico, come abbiamo osservato, è possibile affidare a chi non è tesserato.

La toga cede al vestito di orbace, obbligatorio nelle parate agli ordini del Segretario Federale o peggio.

Le Preture mandamentali nei grandi centri sono unificate, ed il Pretore, che un tempo era circondato di tanto rispetto dai cittadini, diventa un maschino amanuense del suo capo.

La professione dell'avvocato, oberato di tasse, quando minore è il reddito, cade nel ridicolo e nelle immondizie.

Dobbiamo ricordare altre due nobili istituzioni sottratte alla garanzia della libertà del popolo: la Corte di Assise della quale la giuria dei cittadini è stata messa alla porta, ed il Giudice Istruttore.

Tutti sanno quali nobili e delicate mansioni esplicassero questi due uffici.

Il Giudice Istruttore nei processi più gravi e che richiedevano una complessa istruttoria nella prima fase del procedimento penale, ve-