

PSF

Interior; Harold Ickes

Aug.-Dec. 1940

13

PSF: *gibbs*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR H.L.I.

Yours of August 2nd in regard to the destroyers did not reach me until after the Cabinet meeting. I think you will feel with me that we made real progress today and I am waiting for a reply to the proposal I made to William Allen White.

F.D.R.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1940.

PSF: Pkes

THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 2 12 11 PM '40
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

This letter is purely political.

Your prestige and popularity in the country were greatly enhanced when your prediction that Europe was on the verge of war was made good by the event. Now, if I am not mistaken, the country is becoming easier in its mind about the ability of the British to defend themselves against the threatened Nazi attack. Partly this is due to the fine speeches of Churchill and the stiffened morale of the British. Of course you and I know that one of the reasons that Churchill speaks so boldly and confidently is to keep up the morale of the British. But you and I also know that, for lack of small boats, particularly destroyers, there is grave doubt whether the British can hold their own against the Germans. We know also that heavy losses are being inflicted by the Germans upon the British destroyers.

What I am driving at is this: suppose, when the German drive does come, the British coast cannot be defended because of a lack of destroyers. The American people, when they learn this fact will ask two questions. The first will be why were we not told that the British needed help to defend the Channel? The second will be why did we not send help when help was both asked and needed? They will ask these questions if only to blame someone other than themselves.

It seems to me that we Americans are like the householder who refuses to lend or sell his fire extinguishers to help put out the fire in the house that is right next door although that house is all ablaze and the wind is blowing from that direction. I continue to believe that if our people were made to face the facts they would appreciate the importance of holding the enemy -- our enemy -- at the last remaining line of defense that we have beyond our own shores.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Fisher
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



File Personal
PSF
Interior
clerk

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 2 2 45 PM '40
RECEIVED
208

August 2, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

I have it one removed from M. Henri de Kerillis that the new French Ambassador is a close friend of von Ribbentrop; that he has visited Hitler, whom he greatly admires; and that he was involved in the Abetz spy case. He is even said to be in the pay of the Nazis. My information further is that the present Ambassador had indicated that he was willing to represent the present French "Government" faithfully but that Hitler insisted upon a creature of his own. If the foregoing is true, M. Henry-Haye will be in a position to be more embarrassing as the Ambassador from this puppet state than would a man who does not have such intimate personal ties with Hitler.

It is only fair to say that when I talked with Bill Bullitt by telephone yesterday about the new Ambassador, I found that he spoke enthusiastically of him. Bill regards M. Henry-Haye highly and denied in explicit terms that he was other than a loyal Frenchman who ably supported the anti-Nazi cause. I respect Bill Bullitt's judgment highly but I am wondering why a "Government" that is in bondage to Hitler should replace Saint-Quentin, who is willing to go along, with a man who is anti-Hitler.

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

August 6, 1940.

PSF: Ickes
2/2/40

THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 6 9 08 AM '40
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

Willkie will soon make his speech of acceptance at Elwood, Indiana. I suggest the possibility of a speech on a nation-wide hookup not earlier than five, nor more than seven, days preceding that speech, in which the hope will be expressed that in talking to the people Willkie will clear up certain doubts as to his availability for the office of President. A series of specific, but embarrassing, questions could be based upon his public utilities record, upon his connections with Morgan and Company, his membership in Tammany, his attitude toward Insull, the denial to Negroes of the right to live in Elwood for the many years that he was a citizen there, apparently without protest, his methods employed to destroy a free newspaper in Memphis, Tennessee, the reason why he is accepting in Indiana instead of at his home in Park Avenue, New York, as is customary, etc., etc.

I do not believe that Willkie should be allowed to make any further headway without serious opposition. After people once become committed it is not always easy to detach them. He has many things to clear up in the minds of the people and he ought to be put on the defensive. With a proper build-up, such a speech as I have suggested would go over big,

with the result that when people listen to his acceptance speech
they will be expecting answers that will not be forthcoming.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



PSF
Ickes

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

August 23, 1940.

RECEIVED
AUG 25
9 05 AM '40
THE WHITE HOUSE

My dear Mr. President:

I was very much impressed by the speech that Bill Bullitt made in Independence Square. I have felt for some time that the American people ought to be told in straight, blunt language what may be in store for us if England goes down before Hitler and Bill did a convincing and dramatic job. I hope that he will tell this story in different parts of the country during the next two or three weeks.

From a political point of view I am glad that Bill said nothing at all about American politics or indicated any choice for President. To have done so would have detracted seriously from the effect of what he said. If he makes similar speeches in the immediate future he ought to follow the same course. This will make him all the more effective when he swings over and advocates your reelection, as I am hoping that he will do not later than October 1.

I am, of course, willing to be used in the campaign wherever it is thought that I can be most helpful. I think that one speech ought to be made on Willkie and Civil Liberties. He needs a little debunking on that subject, too. Another speech ought to deal with Willkie and the public utilities and perhaps the setting for that ought to be in the west. Still a third should show the contrast between Willkie and McNary. As I see it, these two men do not see eye to eye on any domestic or international issue and the incongruity should be made clear.

Page 2.

Willkie's reaction to my speech shows how sensitive he is. And we ought to keep needling him. His denial that he was ever a member of Tammany and his violent rebound when he was confronted with the high eulogy that he had paid Samuel Insull in 1935 show that he lacks political seasoning and is likely to get himself out on a limb.

Aside from political speaking I would like to be of help, if I could, in the international situation. I have been intensely preoccupied with this for more than two years now and I am thoroughly persuaded that one of our primary duties is to tell the people how likely we are to be called upon to defend our own liberties.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.



*BSF
Interior
clerk*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1940.

Star
RECEIVED
AUG 26 9 11 AM '40
THE WHITE HOUSE

My dear Mr. President:

My heart aches for Tom Corcoran so I am venturing to write to you about him without his having the slightest intimation that I am doing so. He left Washington for Bar Harbor about a week ago and he may be here now. If he is I do not know where he is nor have I seen him.

Tom is one of the men who has had to take unusual punishment for his activities in connection with and his loyalty to you. Perhaps he has not had to endure as much in one period as Rex Tugwell, but it has been over a longer period. The very ferocity of the attack that has been directed against him testifies to the value of his work. It proves also that the critics of the Administration have a very real respect for his ability.

I am in a position to know how intelligently and faithfully Tom has worked to hold together the liberals, especially at times when, perhaps unjustifiably, they have been greatly discouraged. When the movement was started to round up enough delegates so that you might be able to control the last National Convention, even if you were unwilling to take the nomination yourself, Tom was invaluable. If wires had to be pulled Tom did the pulling. If money had to be raised Tom produced it when no one else could. He did not even hesitate to do what he could to repair the breach caused by Jim Farley's desertion. When Jim was using the machinery and resources of the National Committee to advance his own candidacy, it

Page 2.

was Tom who stuck his neck out on more than one occasion to help to checkmate Jim. However, his strengths constitute a decided balance

As I look back over these last two years I can honestly say that Tom has been invaluable. Some of us could speak and write for the cause that we were advocating, but it was Tom who did most of the practical work. As one example, I would not have gone to California, to iron out the difficulties there between the three factions, each of which was insisting upon running a Roosevelt-delegate ticket in the primary, if it had not been for Tom. If those rivalries had not been composed, Garner would have had at least an even chance to carry the state because your followers would have been split three ways. The overwhelming victory for you in California clinched the result and made it certain that you would be in control of the Convention.

As you know Tom has been in a vulnerable position ever since the Hatch Act was passed. As his friend I have thought that, lacking a position with the Government that would take him out of that Act, he ought to resign and yet I haven't wanted to see him resign because I regard him as a very valuable man for the Administration. It seems to me now, however, that he has no alternative except to resign unless he can be given some place that puts him beyond the reach of the Hatch Act.

In the present campaign Tom could be of tremendous help. I believe that he would be more useful in the campaign as a member of the Administration because it would be a very clear demonstration that the Administration does not permit its most hostile enemies to destroy those who are loyal to it. I know that Tom has his weaknesses and I know

Page 3.

what they are. However, his strengths constitute a decided balance over and above his weaknesses. He is loyal; he is efficient; he has initiative and imagination. In the hard fight that lies immediately ahead we are going to need everything that Tom Corcoran has to give.

I respectfully suggest that we cannot permit our enemies to select for us our generals and colonels and captains.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 27, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:

Dear Grace:

Here are the two letters about which I spoke to the President yesterday, recommending that he hold them and talk to Harold Ickes rather than attempt to answer them by letter.

The President agreed that this was the right thing to do.

I understand that the President will have Secretary Ickes and Mrs. Ickes on the train for the trip South next week. Probably then he will want these letters and will want to talk to Harold.

Anyhow, the train trip affords an opportunity for such a conversation.

S.T.E.

PSF: Ickes
Jh 1 40

BSF
Interior
Dept

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[Handwritten initials]

September 4, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

You said you wanted to
talk with the Secretary of the
Interior about these matters.

[Handwritten notes and scribbles]

<i>[Handwritten notes]</i>	<i>[Handwritten notes]</i>

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text on the right side of the page]



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

August 24, 1940.

20/ha
THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 27 9 01 AM '40
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

I wish to recall to you that after the Cabinet meeting of August 16 I told you about certain material that had been collected over the last few years by Mr. T. H. Tetens and which he, in collaboration with Karl E. Lachmann, as assistant solicitor in the Department of the Interior, had been worked over for several months. I related that I had discussed this matter, first, with Bob Jackson and then with Francis Biddle, as the result of which Mr. Tetens had been in touch with two or three persons in the Department of Justice. You were advised also that Mr. Tetens was strongly opposed to turning this material over to FBI because he felt that its importance had not been appreciated and that FBI was not in a position to do justice to it. I would like to remind you that Mr. Tetens went to Justice and to FBI before he or Mrs. Tetens ever approached me and before I knew anything about the matter.

Now come letters from Mr. Lachmann and Mr. Tetens telling me that Mr. L. M. C. Smith, head of the Neutrality Division in the Department of Justice, has asked permission to turn this material over to the FBI. Apparently there has been another leak in Justice and FBI has learned that Mr. Tetens had been in conference with Mr. Smith and others in that department. Mr. Tetens writes me that he is strongly opposed to turning this material over to FBI and that rather than do so he will seek to publicize it through the newspapers.

I do not feel that I have any right to give any direction in this matter. The material belongs to Mr. Tetens and the study that was made of it was financed, as I informed you, by private funds. Accordingly, Mr. Tetens has a right to do what he wishes with it.

I am in no position to say just how valuable this material is, but I am sufficiently impressed to feel that some competent person ought to go into it carefully, if only to advise us whether it has value or not. You and I undertook to think of some such a person. I have not hit upon a man yet and I hope that you have been more fortunate. Certainly if this material has even 50% of the potentialities that Messrs. Lachmann and Tetens think that it has, we ought to pursue and develop them as quickly as possible.

Perhaps I may have an opportunity to discuss this matter further with you after I join you at Hyde Park on September 1.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

PSE
Interior

Ickes
1

Sept 9, 1940

Telegram from Jim Rowe to Grace Tully

Re: New Mexico Senate primary Saturday Sept 14th.
Ickes and Dempsey protesting against Chavez etc etc
Ickes telegram of Sept 10th to FDR re Dempsey attached.

See: Jim Rowe-Administrative Assts folder-Drawer 1-1940

1 United States Senate

MEMORANDUM

Dear General,
Please have
these suggestions
brought to the attention
of the President.
James F. Byrnes

MEMORANDUM

September 12, 1940

Governor Pinchot advises me that he talked with Willkie, who told him that he was opposed to the Forest Service being transferred from Agriculture to Interior. He told Pinchot that in the course of his campaign in the West he would express his opposition to the transfer in some speech.

Pinchot wants to support the President. Of course he is more interested in Forestry than he is in the President or anything else. Although he did not definitely say what he would do, he did state that the President's position in this matter was the main factor in his making up his mind as to whom he would support. However, he stated that he was to again see the President.

Notwithstanding the fact that he was to again see the President, he requested me to call the President's attention to this subject, and I promised to do so. He wants the President to make a statement that he does not intend to transfer this service.

I told him that the President had definitely advised me last Spring that he would not transfer it. He wanted to know if I thought the President would make a public statement or would permit him to make a statement after he had talked with the President.

If the President is willing to make the statement that he does not intend to transfer the Forest Service, I think it would be wise to do it before Willkie refers to it. I do not think it would be wise to let Pinchot make the statement, because it would look like it was done purely for political purposes.

I suggest that the President could write me as Chairman of the Reorganization Committee. In case he should desire to do so, I attach a letter to which he could reply.

PSF I ch

CARTER GLASS, VA., CHAIRMAN	FREDERICK HALE, MAINE
EDMUND MCKELLAR, TENN.	GERALD P. NYE, N. DAK.
CARL HAYDEN, ARIZ.	JOHN G. TOWNSEND, JR., DEL.
ELMER THOMAS, OKLA.	STYLES BRIDGES, N. H.
JAMES F. BYRNES, S. C.	HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR., MASS.
MILLARD E. TYDINGS, MD.	RUFUS C. HOLMAN, OREG.
RICHARD B. RUSSELL, GA.	ROBERT A. TAFT, OHIO
ALVA B. ADAMS, COLO.	
PATRICK MCCARRAH, NEV.	
JOHN H. OVERTON, LA.	
JOHN H. BANKHEAD, ALA.	
JOSEPH C. O'MAHONEY, WYO.	
HARRY S. TRUMAN, MO.	
EDWARD R. BURKE, ILL.	
THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I.	
FRANCIS T. MALONEY, CONN.	
DEWIS CHAVEZ, N. MEX.	

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

September 12, 1940

EVERARD H. SMITH, CLERK
JOHN W. R. SMITH, ASST. CLERK

Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Last Spring you advised me that you did not intend to exercise the power granted you by the Reorganization Act to transfer the Forest Service from the Department of Agriculture to any other Department.

Recently the statement has been made to me that because the power granted in the Reorganization Act to make this transfer would not expire until January 21, 1941, an effort would be made to have you issue an Order of Transfer under the Reorganization Act, and submit to the Congress at the next session.

I wish you would advise me whether or not you have changed your views about this subject and contemplate any such action.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES F. BYRNES.

JFB:sc

STANDARD FORM NO. 14A
APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT
MARCH 10, 1926

file

FROM INTERIOR DEPARTMENT *Jahres*

BUREAU Secretary's Office

CHG. APPROPRIATION _____

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 6-7134

Sept. 23, 1940.

*PSF
Interior*

The President,

To be sent through the White House

~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Suggest Lyndon Johnson for Secretary, National Committee.

Chip Roberts' quote resignation unquote is great news.

HAROLD L. ICKES.

H.L.I.

PSF Ickes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
SENATOR BYRNES

I am enclosing for your eyes only a confidential memorandum from Ickes. There is an awful lot in what he says. Personally I am inclined to think that the whole matter can be either (a) filed permanently or (b) filed for further study after election day!

Please return for my files.

F. D. R.

PSF: lokes

September 25, 1940

PRIVATE

Dear Harold:

You are right in suggesting that the whisperers are not saying I will resign because it will help me. I am not of a suspicious nature, as you know, but I have a sneaking feeling that these people would like to see me beaten. Isn't that horrid of them!

I suppose there should be a categorical denial -- as many as necessary. Perfectly simple to make. Perfectly true. Have no thought of resigning but a bomb or a machine gun or a fatal disease might put me out of the way though I do not anticipate any of the three.

Always sincerely yours,

the Honorable,
The Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

fdr/tmb



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 23, 1947

THE WHITE HOUSE
SEP 23 10 14 AM '47
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

The whisperers are saying that, if elected, you will resign shortly, thus turning the Government over to Henry Wallace. They are not saying this because it will help you, and for that reason I think that it should be met by some categorical and convincing statement, which ought to go somewhat beyond a mere negative.

I told Henry Wallace, when I met him in Alabama, that he was making a very good campaign. I believe this to be the fact; and, as you know, I was not without a conviction at the beginning that his campaign would be a poor one. However, I do not believe that the voters would accept Henry for President. And if I am right in this diagnosis, it will have a weakening effect if it is generally believed that you would resign shortly and thus permit Henry to take over.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes

The President,

The White House.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 26, 1930.

PSF
20/10/30
THE WHITE HOUSE
RECEIVED
SEP 27 10 25 AM '30

My dear Mr. President:

My information is that when Senator McNary went into the Vice President's office today to greet him, he said: "Why did you come back Jack? When you left you said that you weren't coming back." Garner's reply was: "Well, I had to get back to get things straightened out here. Everything is running amuck and someone has to take hold." He gave the impression of being very assertive and truculent.

To other Senators he is giving the impression more by inference than by direct statement, that he was called back because the international situation was so critical that he was needed to help to handle it.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

Via airmail

Personal and ~~confidential~~

file

September 28, 1940.

THE WHITE HOUSE

OCT 19 9 13 AM '40

RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

In continuation of my letter to you of September twelfth with regard to the Philippine Emergency Powers Act, I desire to report that President Quezon, apparently in pursuance of your request that he issue "a reassuring public statement ... as to his intentions regarding the administration of that Act," is reported to have made the following statement at a press conference held on September eighteenth:

The President told the press conference that, after surveying the situation again, he believes he may have no occasion to use his emergency powers under the powers act. He said that when he granted ₱1,000,000 of the ₱10,000,000 set aside under the national emergency law to the Philippine National Bank to be loaned to small farmers, he partially exercised emergency powers under that act but not under the powers act. The crop loan of ₱1,000,000 given to the bank, he explained, is nothing unusual as the money will be reimbursed to the government.

Ever sincerely yours,

Francis B. Sayre

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Oct 3, 1940

In accordance with the
President's instructions. phoned
just of this letter to Burlew.
No copies sent. RF

File

PSF Inks

file
personal
no ans.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER
MANILA

Via Air Mail

September 12, 1940.

Personal and confidential.

My dear Mr. President:

I have received the message, conveyed in the Interior Department's radio no. 471 of September seventh, which you desired me to convey to President Quezon with respect to the Philippine Emergency Powers Act. I have just had a long talk with President Quezon, in the course of which I delivered to him your message.

President Quezon replied that he feared your ideas were based on untrue press statements regarding his recent utterances concerning democracy. He said that he believed thoroughly in democracy and that what he was intending to hit at were the abuses of political partisanship and not at democracy as such. As a matter of fact, I think that he had become somewhat alarmed over the extended criticism and hostile comments which his earlier remarks had attracted and thereafter he made several speeches in which he shifted his position from that of apparently advocating a one party government to that of advocating a partyless government. In his remarks to me this morning he added little to what he has already said.

I told him that I felt your main concern was with the recent passage of the Emergency Powers Act. As a matter of fact, President Quezon two days ago, before the arrival of your telegram, in a conference held in my office between General Gru-
nert, him, and myself, had stated that he had sought the passage of the Emergency Powers Act so that the Commonwealth Government might be prepared, in the event of some sudden emergency arising, to act effectively and immediately to protect American interests. President Quezon now reverted to this statement and said that he had secured the passage of the Act so that the Commonwealth Government might be ready to act promptly for the interests of the United States in the case of sudden emergency and that he would not exercise the powers granted under

the

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

the Act unless such an emergency arose and then only if I should request him to do so. I asked him whether I might regard this as an assurance on his part which I could communicate to you and he unhesitatingly replied in the affirmative.

My own suspicion is that President Quezon's statement to General Grunert and myself that he desired the enactment of the Emergency Powers Act only to protect the interests of the United States in the event of a sudden emergency was an afterthought. On the day after the conference in my office between General Grunert, President Quezon and myself, President Quezon issued an Executive Order under authority of the Emergency Powers Act, by which he allocated \$1,000,000 to the Philippine National Bank, a government institution, for the purpose of enabling it to extend "credit facilities to tenants who may need the same for the purpose of their support during the period between harvest seasons and to cover the expenses incident to the purchase of seeds and the proper cultivation of the land which they work, under such conditions as the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank may determine". However, as this Executive Order was issued before President Quezon specifically agreed not to use the Emergency Powers Act except upon my request, and as the measure appears on the face of it at least to be merely for relief purposes, I have not made an issue of it.

In response to the statement in your message that you believe that the situation "calls for a reassuring public statement on his part as to his intentions regarding the administration of the Act" President Quezon informed me that he would hope to issue such a statement within the next few days. I shall be glad to send this to you when it is made.

I feel that your message has been immensely helpful. I suspect that President Quezon may have been trying out the situation to see how far he could go without interference. Your message has served a very salutary purpose in showing him that the American Government still is sovereign over the Islands. I think that as a result President Quezon will be much more restrained in the exercise of arbitrary powers under the Act.

As requested in your radio message I shall continue to observe carefully the manner in which the Emergency Powers Act is administered and keep you informed.

Our prayers are with you in the Herculean burdens which you are carrying.

Ever sincerely yours,

Frank Sayre

PSF Ickes

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEP 17 1940

Mr. Rudolph Forster,
Executive Clerk,
The White House.

My dear Mr. Forster:

On September 7, by direction of the President, this Department transmitted a message from the President to the United States High Commissioner at Manila concerning an Act of the Philippine National Assembly conferring emergency powers upon President Quezon.

I enclose a copy of a radiogram received from the United States High Commissioner quoting a message to the President in reply. If the air mail letter which the High Commissioner mentioned in this radiogram is received in this Department it will be transmitted to the President immediately. In the event that the letter goes direct to the President it is suggested that copies be forwarded to this Department for distribution to the various Departments which collaborated in drafting the President's original message of September 7.

Sincerely yours,



First Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure 1352987.

PSF Ickes

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) E. K. BURLEW

First Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure 1552987.

IT IS THE POLICY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT AND TO THE LANDS AND RESOURCES UNDER ITS CONTROL. INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT AND TO THE LANDS AND RESOURCES UNDER ITS CONTROL IS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT'S PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM. INFORMATION RELATING TO THE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT AND TO THE LANDS AND RESOURCES UNDER ITS CONTROL IS MADE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT'S PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20500

1-600 a

ENCLOSURE 1352987

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

*** 6-2011

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY
RECEIVED
WASHINGTON
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
UNITED STATES

CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE

PSF Jahn

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received September 13, 1940. deb
(Manila, P. I.)

EMERSON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
September 13 - No. 663.

Your September 7. Following for the President: I have received your radio concerning emergency powers act and delivered your message to President Quezon. I am sending you by airmail a report of my conversation with him.

SAYRE.

PSF Icb

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SEP 17 1940

Mr. Rudolph Forster,
Executive Clerk,
The White House.

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Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) E. K. BURLEW

First Assistant Secretary.

Enclosure 1352987.



File
file

PSF Ideas *rehears*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

A letter came to me two or three days ago from my friend, Dr. Henry W. Stuart, of Carmel, California, who retired recently as head of the Department of Philosophy at Leland Stanford. This was written after Willkie's recent invasion of California. The following excerpts may interest you:

"I listened to both speeches and there is no doubt that the S.F. speech was the most effective of his tour since Coffeerville. However the effect if considerable ought to have been evident in the betting odds. I attach the statement on the latter from this morning's paper. However again, it must be remembered that S. F. is a pretty tough Democratic town -- any sudden injection of respectability such as a Willkie speech might impart wouldn't be likely to last very long. But in L.A. perhaps it is different.

"I can't help feeling that there is danger in Roosevelt's attitude of aloofness -- that thousands, too many thousands of his followers will fail to understand the Olympian pose and will begin to feel that, in the face of such gross charges as Willkie has made, silence means confession of judgment. The London Economic Conference, for example. The man in the street has forgotten there ever was such a thing. But he is told there was, and that Roosevelt gaily "torpedoed" it -- presumably for the fireworks

display or for the sake of the headlines and the publicity. He will not realize that any successful outcome was probably impossible in view of the refusal of the French magnates to devalue their currency and that Roosevelt was merely recognizing, by his action, that (as he said) the situation would have to mature a while before anything could be accomplished. Why can this not be made clear by Jesse Jones or Roosevelt himself or by somebody? And the use of that paragraph from Churchill. Churchill after all is an English Conservative, not sympathetic any more than Willkie with the New Deal programme. Of course he would have been glad many terms for more trade with the U.S., but of how much value was his diagnosis of the depression of that trade? It seems to me dangerous for these things to be let go unanswered. I get an effect from this campaign, like that of stepping on the gas when the brake is on, or when the gears are not engaged. Nothing happens and there is a momentary illusion that the car is moving backwards. ~~The White House.~~ After all, are we in a campaign or not? A campaign is a campaign and there must be leadership on both sides. Otherwise ~~the~~ aggressive side will have the best of it. Roosevelt has no right to leave in the lurch the 95% of the Democratic voters who, according to the Gallup poll, wanted him for the nominee. (The Gallup poll of a few days since is encouraging to be sure but that was before Willkie's tour began and we are still six weeks from election day.) I agree with you that Willkie is an adroit and dangerous man who gets away with murder through the sheer audacity of his extravagant talk, and I expect his speeches to increase in effectiveness as they have up to date.

"That is my feeling. On the other hand Mrs. Stuart who has been going about among registered Democrats soliciting money and makes a point of

sounding out strangers here and there, gets many reflections of dis-
pleasure, not to say disgust among Republicans regarding Willkie's speeches.
Another reaction was from a husband whose wife was out of town when Mrs.
Stuart called. He said he had voted for Roosevelt in '32 and '36 but would
vote for Willkie this time because Roosevelt was too "idealistic" for
troubled times like these. When she took her departure from the palatial
house, over in Pebble Beach, he said, "Well, God bless you, but this time
I hope you lose" -- which is what Roosevelt said to Senator George. He
added that "you'd better not worry - I think Roosevelt will be elected!"

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Philips

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



*file
personal
✓*

*PSF Ickes
9/30/40*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 30, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

In the past I have given you letters to read that have come from my friend, Professor Paul Perigord, of the University of California. I have one from him under date of September 5, written after Willkie had been to the Pacific Coast, and I am appending certain excerpts which I thought might be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

C O P Y

A very close friend of mine, a very outstanding professor at the University of Paris, tells me a strange story. A French General whom he knows very well called, before the war, to the American General Staff office in Berlin, he found him studying a map of North America. He seemed to like his dynamic personality, although he was evidently tired. His General expressed his surprise. Then the German General answered that he was badly strained, and he gave his listeners the uncomfortable feeling that it might break any minute. His address was not outstanding. It is the same old story. He wishes us to ride in the same car, but with a new driver. His two most applauded remarks were: "I am not the indispensable man" and "I am a business man...(applause) and I am proud of it." (Applause.) One of the peculiar characteristics of his delivery is that he solicits applause; he stops after a remark which he deems especially good and waits until the audience applauds. Rather naive.

He could not help but endorse President Roosevelt's foreign policy, as all intelligent Republicans around here favor it. I had a talk with Dr. Millikan a few days ago. You know how bitter he has been in his criticism of the domestic policies of the Administration. Nevertheless, he said, "I don't like Roosevelt's home policies, but I fully agree with his foreign policy." I think, however, that President Roosevelt had better hurry about making some statement regarding American bases at Singapore, Australia, and eventually, Dakar. The best way to defend South America is to have air and naval bases at Dakar. -- At last the English are taking steps for the control of Dakar, but again, they have delayed too long. They could have acted earlier. Likewise they have made a fundamental mistake about their failure to act with more vigor against Italy proper.

20
C O S
A very close friend of mine, a very outstanding professor of the University of Paris, tells me a strange story. A French General whom he knows very well called, before the war, upon a German General whom he had saved, as a subordinate officer, during the last war. When he entered his office in Berlin, he found him studying a map of North America. The French General expressed his surprise. Then the German General answered: "Il faut être prêt à tout. Some day we may have to take on the United States. Foolishly the American General Staff expect us to attack on their eastern seaboard, but here is where we shall strike. He showed him the old route of invasion -- the only natural one -- the great American waterway, the St. Lawrence River, Lake Champlain, and the Hudson." He referred also to a secondary line of attack along the long and undefended Canadian frontier.

C O P Y

J Personal P3F
Interior

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

OCT 8 1940

MEMORANDUM for The President:

Immediate Defense Problems

The Board is concerned to make the planning personnel and materials developed over the last few years as useful and effective as possible in the national emergency. The limitations imposed by Congress in the amendment to the appropriation item for this year's funds raises some questions as to both the amount of money available and as to our right to use it on "Defense" problems.

We see needs for immediate planning activity in connection with Defense on

1. Field Studies on Industrial Location: The modest allotment given the Board for studies of criteria for location of industry does not permit the extent or kind of field activity and cooperation of State Defense Councils and State Planning agencies which are needed. Through their participation in the study, State and local problems and possibilities can be more accurately ascertained and improved understanding and cooperation can be developed.

2. Local Planning Defense Situations: The location of new industries in sparsely settled areas creates serious problems of land speculation, housing, public services, labor supply, etc. We have recently been appealed to for technical planning assistance to meet these problems in Charlestown, Indiana. Several other communities are in similar difficulties and need consulting assistance. There is real danger lest a bad local start may forfeit many of the advantages gained through decentrali-

zation of new Defense industries. Similarly, large expansions of naval and military establishments are certain to cause radical changes in surrounding areas.


Our panel of consultants and Field Officers includes the leading specialists on these problems and we would like to put them to work.

3. Public Works and Defense: To carry on our work on the preparation of six-year Federal Public Works Programs and on trends and bottlenecks in the construction industry, we have been straining to keep up without interfering with or delaying Defense contracts. Additional staff to expedite handling of Army and Navy projects is needed.

If we are to carry on these activities, we estimate that a Defense Allocation of \$250,000 would be required.

Respectfully submitted,

FOR THE NATIONAL RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD:


Frederic A. Delano
Chairman



PSF
Ickes *Conf file*
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

I understand that, about 10 days ago, Bruce Barton was quoted in the WORLD-TELEGRAM, New York, as saying that the Irish, the Italians, and the Jews would vote for Willkie, for reasons given. He is also said covertly to have raised the religious issue.

Last Friday a Negro and German story broke at our headquarters in New York. This was eagerly seized upon by Willkie and the opposition press. Willkie can be depended upon to make all that he can out of this issue, by denouncing it as an attack on his wife. Parenthetically, Willkie's solicitude for and devotion to his wife are in the best American tradition, even if they are somewhat belated.

Now what I have on my mind is this:

Why should not someone, whose name will carry, repudiate the Democratic faux pas by saying that it was both deplorable and unauthorized, and then follow up by denouncing Bruce Barton as the man who originally raised the racial and religious issues in this campaign?

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Ickes

The President,

The White House.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

I do not know the writer of this letter and he may be as wrong as possible. However, straws like this are giving me a lot of worry, especially in view of the more detailed and more alarming reports that come to me from other sources.

No one is answering Willkie except with an occasional pin prick. No one can answer him now except yourself. I again urge you to lose no time in doing this. I hope that you will make a speech just as soon as you can get one ready—a fighting speech showing his falseness and insincerity. Later I hope you will go to New York for a day, ending with a mass meeting on a national hookup at Madison Square Garden.

This is not a personal matter, Mr. President. In ordinary times the country could stand it whoever might be elected. We have had some pretty shabby and incompetent Presidents in the past, yet the country marched on. It is not even of paramount importance that you as a person be elected, excepting only that you are the only one who can be elected other than Willkie. But it would be desperately tragic not to defeat Willkie; that is the important and overpowering task that transcends all others.

A man who had recently come from England said to me the other day that over there they realize that the battle to save the world is being



fought in two sectors—in the actual armed clash that is taking place there and in the political fight that is going on here. They realize and say that if either battle is lost civilization will go down.

This is what you are fighting for, Mr. President. This is what is at stake. What man in all history has ever held in his hand the power for good or ill that you hold?

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Pches

Enclosure.

The President,

The White House.

Ps F Ickes

J. H. Hill
711 North Rexford Drive
Beverly Hills,
California

C O P Y

October 11, 1940.

Hon. Harold L. Ickes
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This letter is written to try to advise someone in charge of the Roosevelt campaign that there is now a serious danger that the Roosevelt vote in this district is dwindling away. I know you are a fighter. I am not in politics, am a candidate for nothing -- never have been -- am connected in no way directly or indirectly with the Democratic Committee here. I am retired, of independent means and about 60 years old. I am therefore in a position to write you without prejudice. And I tell you your campaign here is dead. On the other hand the reactionaries in the Republican Party which means the entire Party and the reactionaries in the Democratic Party are earnest, alert, aggressive and abusive to the last degree. They have the offensive and are working night and day, publicly and privately. I know because nine out of ten of my friends are for Willkie. While I have only one vote (which is known to be for the President) I am being visited by selected individuals almost daily in an effort to change that vote.

And the Roosevelt Democrats sleep or sit on their chairs and play dominoes. You yourself know that the Democratic Party in this State is divided and that it has no leader. Olsen is probably all right but he is not popular. One might even go so far as to say he is definitely unpopular.

COPY

Some one should take cognizance of all this and get busy. I have written to the Democratic National Committee in New York but I guess they can't read my writing for I don't receive a reply. If they don't care it is all right with me but some one should care and look after the President's interests.

I know Wallace was here but all he got was a horse laugh -- in fact that's all he gets when his picture goes on in the picture houses while Willkie raises the roof.

This letter is written to you because I know you are a fighter. I wonder what recognition it will get. Incidentally I don't want a formal reply. I'm telling you something someone needs to know. Take it or leave it.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd) Joseph H. Hill

C O P Y

TELEGRAM

file

*RF Jones
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The White House
Washington

44WUC 39 3:23pm

BUFFALO, N.Y., Oct. 14, 1940.

THE PRESIDENT.

Sentiment here among influential leaders, who are your friends, is that Willkie is now gaining. They have volunteered the hope that you would make some fighting speeches. They expect you to carry the State only after a hard fight.

HAROLD L. ICKES.

PST. Johnson:
Ickes



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1940.

24

My dear Mr. President:

I will be sorry to miss Cabinet tomorrow if the question of an embargo on goods to Japan is to arise. I think that you know that I have been in favor of an embargo on oil from the time that Japan invaded China. I am more strongly than ever in favor of it now, and I believe that time is of the essence. We didn't keep Japan out of Indo-China by continuing to ship scrap-iron, nor will we keep Japan out of the Dutch East Indies by selling it our oil. When Japan thinks that it can safely move against the Dutch East Indies, and is ready to do so, it will go in, regardless. It will make it all the more difficult for it to go in if it is short on oil and gasoline.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.

PSF
Interior

2/11/40
I

MRS. HAROLD L. ICKES
HEADWATERS FARM
OLNEY, MARYLAND

November 10, 1940.

Dear Mr. President:

You are a darling to have written that note to Harold. It made him feel that the fight, bruising as it is, is ten times worth every hurt when you lead.

I have hesitated to put on paper how much your re-election meant to me. I want you to know, however, even though the words may sound extravagant.

I felt on Wednesday just as I did on a Tuesday morning in Dublin when Harold and I were to be married. At that time, it was incredible that I should be going through all the usual motions of preparing for the day, from tooth brush to black coffee, when that day was the most important in my life. After months of agonizing, the clouds had suddenly disappeared; it was like awakening from a hideous nightmare but to move still in a kind of dreamlike unreality. So on Wednesday. Just as suddenly, these last months of anxiety and apprehension were nothing but an unpleasant memory.

So much depended upon your election -- the chance to fight for a civilized life. Appallingly few times in history have enough people seen the true issues clearly and so swing the tide. You are the American leader not alone because of your great abilities, but even more because millions of common men and women ("paupers"!) love and trust you. You can count Harold and me among these who believe in your greatness and who follow you proudly.

Affectionately —
Jane Ickes



The Personal

PSF Interior files

58

John

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

Of course I am flattered and deeply moved by your note of November 8. Jane is too, as she will tell you the next time that she sees you.

In a time such as this, every citizen must do what his Chief tells him to do, and you are my Chief, as you have been for eight years. (I am not pretending that, at great personal sacrifice, I am consenting to do what I would rather not do). I realize that there have been times when you were at least entitled to regard me as a hair shirt, besides which I profoundly believe that you ought to have an opportunity to reshuffle or even to remake entirely your Cabinet for the four fateful years that lie ahead. You know, however, that if at any time you should feel that it would be helpful to you to send me to the sidelines, all that you will have to do will be to give me the signal.

Notwithstanding your very gracious note, I am going to let it appear that I have had no word from you. Frankly -- and here again I am assuming my attribute of a hair shirt -- I think that you may decide to make some rearrangement of your official family "for the good of the service." I am not unobservant and many people talk to me about various matters.

The President,
The White House.



The reason that I announced my resignation with such a blare of trumpets was because I hoped that, even if you wanted me to continue in the Cabinet, I might be able to serve as a decoy. Already two of my associates have spoken to me about my resignation. In the hope that other resignations will come to your desk, even from those below the rank of Cabinet member, I shall continue to rest publicly on the fact that I have submitted my resignation and that the whole matter lies in your hands.

If I read the signs of the times aright, you will need to be surrounded during the next four years by persons whose patriotism and whose personal loyalty are beyond question. I regard Mr. Willkie as a man of over-reaching ambitions who is utterly unscrupulous and who proposes to undermine you since he was not able to defeat you. I am afraid that there are men in the Government service who can be used, consciously or unconsciously, to serve his despicable and disloyal ends.

Let me assure you that I shall continue to serve you with a loyalty and an affection that you need never doubt, even if at times I revert to type and become a little testy. If it were not for Jane, I don't know what kind of a curmudgeon I would have developed into by now.

Sincerely yours,

Harold T. Pehos

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

24/11/40
November 8, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. I.

That is mighty sweet of you and
if I were a Frenchman I would kiss you
on both cheeks. As an American, all I
can say is "you are a very good boy.
Keep up the good work. And give my
love to Jane".

F. D. R.



THE WHITE HOUSE
NOV 7 11 09 AM '40
RECEIVED
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

In the belief that you ought to be entirely free to reshuffle or reorganize your official family to prepare for the four years that lie ahead, I hereby tender my resignation, to take effect at your pleasure.

I cannot close without expressing my very real appreciation of the opportunity that you have given me to work under the command of one of the greatest of our Presidents.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



THE WHITE HOUSE
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON 28 2 31 PM '40

RECEIVED
November 28, 1940.

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gibbs
chris

My dear Mr. President:

Probably you have most, if not all, of the following information about the Dies "Committee", but since you are going to do him the honor of seeing him, some of this may be helpful.

1. My understanding is that there has been no meeting of the Committee since last June.
2. Members of the Committee have urged that it be called together but he continues to play a lone hand. There are times when he will not even respond to attempts on the part of members of the Committee to get in touch with him.
3. During the campaign, Dies made many speeches, the burden of which was that your Administration is tainted with communism and that there are many communists and "fellow travelers" holding high office in the Government. It was reported that Willkie money went to Dies in consideration of these speeches.
4. Proceedings at executive meetings of the Committee find their way into the newspapers immediately.
5. Dempsey, Voorhis and Casey are opposed to many of the things that Dies does and they are becoming more and more impatient. Of these three, Casey is probably the most willing to make a stand. Voorhis, as usual, is inclined to be transcendental. The two republican members always line up with Dies because they know that he is



opposed to your Administration and would like to embarrass you. This leaves Starnes of Alabama as, in effect, the balance of power. I understand that he could be won over with a little personal attention by you. He is more critical of Dies' methods than he used to be, but he still gives Dies the breaks. If he should line up with Casey, Voorhis and Dempsey, that would constitute a majority of the Committee.

6. The White Paper was not submitted to the Committee before it was issued. The same is true of the Red Paper which came out yesterday. The employees, who look to Dies, prepare these reports and issue them as Committee reports on orders from Dies. With reference to the White Paper, there was a judicious "leak" in advance so that nothing could prevent the giving out of the full report.

Dies will twist his appointment with you to his own advantage if he can possibly do it. He is an unscrupulous demagogue who is more dangerous now than formerly for the reasons assigned in your telegram of rebuke to him yesterday. He will move heaven and earth to get a bigger appropriation and if he gets it, it will be the greatest help to the fifth columnists in this country that they could possibly have. The republican members of the House will support his plea for additional money and many of the newspapers that have been fighting you so bitterly will give him public support. The only thing that will curb him will be a lack of money and I am not sure that he could not finance himself from private sources. He may be now supplementing the money that Congress gives him in this way.

15MAY 1954
SUBJECT TO

I am glad that you rebuked him publicly. You may feel that you ought to go further after your interview with him and tell the people just why he is making it difficult, if not impossible, for the FBI or any other agency to deal with the fifth columnists. You are the only one who can put this man in his place. I may be mistaken but I think that you could put more of a crimp into Mr. Dies if you had in with him the other democratic members of the Committee. At least you would be recognizing that there are more than Dies on the Committee and you would not be excluding from your interview with the chairman, who is disloyal, the members who are loyal to you, and Starnes who could be won over.

Sincerely yours,

Harold T. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

COPY

PSF Ickes
9/2/40
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OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D. D.

November 29, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have your note about the material from Secretary Ickes on Sparks, Briggs, and others regarding the Philadelphia Convention. I have had Mr. Milligan going into this matter, and he will investigate it thoroughly with grand jury. In fact, he is doing down the line on the whole works.

Signed--R.H.J.

Attorney General

For original of this
See: Jackson - Wraener 1-1940



*PSF
Interior
clerk*

*7
Feb
Personal*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

I express the hope that Tom Corcoran will be given some position of prestige in Washington that will take him out from under the Hatch Act, and make it possible for him to contribute service that I believe will be of increasing importance as you go into your third Administration.

I know of no one who can perform the valuable services of which Tom is not only capable but for which he seems to have a real gift. Quite aside from this, however, it seems to me that the main source of criticism of Tom has been those politicians who have fallen away from you. Specifically, when a certain type of politician, including Jim Farley, was unable or unwilling to perform important and necessary political services, it was Tom who, either on his own initiative or under a commission, performed them. If money was needed when the funds of the national committee were being devoted to a cause other than that of the democratic party itself and its leader, it was often Tom who was called upon to produce that money. When it was desperately necessary to defeat John O'Connor in his New York district, it was Tom who set up and financed the campaign, which resulted in the election of Congressman Fay.

It would be impossible for anyone who has not worked closely with Tom to understand the great value of his services. That he has faults no one would deny. I am aware of at least some of them and there have been times when they have irked me. But we must take the bad with the

good in anyone and we ought to take it, especially if the good outweighs the bad.

I wonder if even you are aware of the degree to which a considerable number of your most loyal supporters among the liberals in your Administration have come to rely upon Tom. Not only has he been the amalgam that has held us together, he has given us positive leadership and courage at times when we needed both.

I do not want to make any invidious comparisons, but it is my opinion that the independent organization set up under LaGuardia was of much greater value to you during the recent campaign than the Democratic National Committee. I was glad to learn that LaGuardia, who originally took Tom Corcoran into this organization with grave misgivings, was warm in his praise of Tom when he lunched with me a week ago.

No friend of Tom's would advise him to continue in the Administration if it has to be in such an anomalous position as he occupied before his resignation to take part in the campaign. I have understood that this is your own view. If he cannot be offered a position, and in saying this I am speaking for a considerable group of your devoted friends, that will give him prestige while taking him out from under the Hatch Act, then he ought to stay out of the government and go back to New York to practice law.

As I look ahead, you are going to need a type of organization on the outside that you do not now have. Until Jim Farley lost his head and became a candidate for the nomination for President, you could rely upon him as liaison man between the White House and Congress. Jim could

reach here and there and bring certain forces to bear in behalf of measures in which you were interested. It was when Jim had begun to fall away from you and when the Vice President and others within the party organized an actual opposition to your policies that we ran into difficulty on the Hill with respect to New Deal legislation. As more Congressmen began to take the bit into their teeth, it became more and more necessary to have a Jim Farley on call. But there was no Jim Farley.

Now I am not proposing that Tom Corcoran should be delegated to do this type of work. I do not believe that he ought to be. I am fully aware that while there are some men on the Hill -- important men -- who like him and would work with him, there are many who would not do so. This is a fact that all of us must accept.

As I see it, a different type of thing needs to be done during the coming session. Lyndon Johnson demonstrated during this last campaign a great capacity for leadership. I believe that we owe to him, in large measure, the fact that the democratic majority in the House has been actually increased, even if only slightly. Many doubted, and not a few feared, that you would be reelected with a republican majority in the House. This would have made it even tougher sledding for you than the situation that has existed during the present session of Congress.

Lyndon Johnson has told me of his talk with you. He has unfolded his plan and I think that it is good. I have volunteered to help to the fullest possible extent in carrying out his plan, provided always that you do not disapprove of it. It seems to me to be a good idea for members of Congress and for executive officers, including members of

your Cabinet, to come to know each other better than some of us now do. I have always found that personal association wipes out many prejudices. It has worked this way in the past and it can be made to work this way in the future. Lyndon Johnson has established an unusually fine relationship with Sam Rayburn. With proper support, his influence will be a growing one. He will always be circulating among the members of the House and there will be others to help him. Under-Secretary Wirtz can be of great value and if you can find a place for Jack Dempsey in Interior, he, too, can be put to work at a job that is congenial to him and that he does naturally and easily.

As you know, the very heart of Lyndon Johnson's concept is to be able to assure democratic members of Congress who faced a tough fight in 1940 and who know that they will have to face at least as tough a one in 1942 that they will be supplied with enough money -- not to exceed \$2500 each -- to make it possible for them to make a decent campaign. To do this, Lyndon Johnson will have to have help and I know of no one who is in a position to give it to the degree that Tom Corcoran is. Lyndon Johnson goes so far as to tell me that he cannot carry his plan through unless he has your endorsement and unless he has Tom to work with him. I concur in these views of Lyndon Johnson's.

Perhaps I am over optimistic, but I can foresee the possibility of a more cohesive democratic majority in the House during this next session than in the last. And I believe that this can be done without arousing any antagonism on the part of Ed Flynn. After all, the work will be done under the leadership of Lyndon Johnson, who will be well within his rights

in operating with and among fellow members of the House of which he is a member. Moreover, if I know anything about the present situation, including what is running in the minds of the democratic members of Congress who came from close districts, Lyndon Johnson will be in a position of greater influence and leadership on the Hill than Ed Flynn could possibly be, even if the latter were in good health and were prepared to devote all of his time to the work.

As I see it, the materials are at hand for doing a first-class job. The spirit is willing. But time is of the essence and Tom Corcoran is an indispensable ingredient in the prescription that must be filled if you are to have the maximum of support on the Hill. Of course Tom might be able to function from New York but I would have little hope of effective work on his part if his first consideration necessarily had to be the building up of a law practice. To do this job effectively, one must be on the spot and his interests cannot be divided.

Another factor that is involved is the possibility that Ben Cohen would go to New York with Tom. Although he operates in a somewhat different field, Ben's loss would be almost irreparable. I happen to know that Ben would much prefer to stay here but you appreciate the deep attachment between the two men and I am not at all sure that Ben would find it in his heart to say "no" if Tom urged.

Sincerely yours,

Harold T. Pches
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF: Ickes THE WHITE HOUSE

Dec 12 11 37 AM '40



RECEIVED
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

*File
Personal*

~~December 12, 1940~~

*Let.
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My dear Mr. President:

I am forwarding to you, for your information, a memorandum from the Acting Director of the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, commenting upon a controversy in the press of the Philippine Islands that has been entered into by President Quezon and High Commissioner Sayre.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Peters

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON, D.C.

PSF Ideas

FILE COPY
Surname:

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
DIVISION OF TERRITORIES AND ISLAND POSSESSIONS
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1940.

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Asst. Sec'y.
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DEC 10 1940
SECRETARY'S
MAIL CENTER

MEMORANDUM for the Secretary:

In connection with the amendments to the Philippine Constitution, which were recently approved by the President, I attach a copy of a radiogram which was received in this Division from High Commissioner Sayre quoting public statements made by President Quezon and by Mr. Sayre following announcement of the President's approval of these amendments.

RECEIVED
DEC 10 1940
ASSISTANT
SECRETARY

There is also attached a Manila press dispatch dated December 9 quoting Mr. Quezon as taking direct issue with Mr. Sayre on this question. While relations between Mr. Quezon and Mr. Sayre have for some time been strained, this appears to be the first instance where Mr. Quezon has allowed himself to be quoted in the press as criticizing Mr. Sayre by name. Public statements of this nature by Mr. Quezon as to what the President of the United States has power to do are to be deplored but it seems equally deplorable that the High Commissioner should allow himself to be dragged into a press controversy on such a question.

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DEC 11 1940
SECRETARY'S
MAIL CENTER

RECEIVED
DEC 11 1940
SECRETARY'S
MAIL CENTER

In this particular controversy, it seems that Mr. Quezon has a fairly plausible argument and Mr. Sayre did not give the whole picture in his statement. The section of the law which he quotes does say that amendments to the Philippine constitution do not become effective until approved by the President. President Quezon, however, takes the position that the same broad interpretation should be given to the procedure for the approval of amendments as was provided for by Congress in connection with the original constitution. In authorizing the drafting of the original constitution, Congress, except for requiring certain specified commitments to protect the interests of the United States pending complete independence, stipulated only that the Constitution should be "republican in form" and should contain a Bill of Rights. The Act says also "If the President finds that the proposed constitution conforms substantially with the provisions of that Act he shall so certify - - -."

It cannot be said that the amendments were not "republican in form" or that they did not comply substantially with the provisions of the Act. As a matter of fact, Mr. Sayre some

INVESTIGATION
OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION AND RECORDS
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
UNITED STATES

time ago wrote to the President advising him of this contention of Mr. Queson, and as the President has approved the amendments, there is no evidence that he supports Mr. Sayre's line of reasoning. In other words, he is arguing about something on which, as the Filipinos see it, the President has not supported him, and the more he argues the more pleasure they will take in reminding him of that fact.

I forward this information to you not as a matter which requires any action, but as evidence of a situation which exists in the Philippines which obviously leaves much to be desired.

Mr. Sayre's predecessors, both as Governors-General and High Commissioner, who have been most successful in their dealings with the Filipinos, have, even if openly attacked, refused to make public statements in reply. There is nothing to be gained by such controversies which delight the Filipinos and it impairs the prestige of the High Commissioner as the President's representative when he engages in them.

Paul Hampton
Paul Hampton,
Acting Director.

Enclosures.

Quezon Raps Sayre on ^{Dec 9} Amendments

MANILA, Dec. 9 — President Manuel Quezon left a sickbed today to summon newspapermen and bitterly assail the statement of U. S. Commissioner Francis B. Sayre that President Roosevelt had the power to disapprove amendments to the Philippine constitution.

"I am not going to beat around the bush," Quezon said, then launched into his attack on the statement made by Sayre a week ago in connection with Mr. Roosevelt's approval of four constitutional amendments.

Quezon deplored what he termed Sayre's utilization of press conferences to voice opposition to bills pending in the Philippine Assembly and said he was shocked that Sayre, "who has appeared to be such a lover of liberty and democracy, should make such an avowal in variance with all the principles of democracy."

The Tydings-McDuffie Act, Quezon said, was intended to give Filipinos full responsibility in establishing a government of their own, subject to certain limitation clearly defined by Congress.

Quezon thought the best answer to Sayre's statement was the fact Mr. Roosevelt had approved the amendments.

RADIOGRAM RECEIVED DECEMBER 6, 1940.
(NPM 1290 MANILA CK 245)

HAMPTON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
December 6 - No. 884.

In proclaiming President's approval of Philippine constitutional amendments President Quezon on December 4th issued following statement: "We should be, and in fact are, happy and grateful over the approval by President Roosevelt of the constitutional amendments. There should never have been any doubts in our minds as to what action the President would take. Under the Independence Act, the President of the United States may only disapprove the proposed amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines if they do not conform with the provisions of the said Independence Act. On no other ground may the President disapprove amendments to the Philippine Constitution. Furthermore, President Roosevelt, being a Progressive and a Liberal, would naturally incline to let our people assume responsibility for our own Government.

I have telegraphed the President our thanks."

At press conference today when questioned in regard to President Quezon's statement I read Section 7, Paragraph 1, Tydings McDuffie Act and said that it is clear from that language that it is exclusively for the President of the United States to approve or disapprove such amendments as may be proposed to the Constitution of the Philippines, and I know of nothing in the Independence Act or in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution restricting his right or power to do either.

Please forward copy to State Department.

SAYRE.

RECEIVED
NOV 20 1940
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

(HAWAIIAN BUREAU OF LANDS)
RECEIVED DECEMBER 9, 1940



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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

DEC 19 1940 WHITE HOUSE

The President,
The White House.

Dec 19 1 40 PM '40
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

I transmit herewith a radiogram, dated December 10, addressed to you by the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands, regarding certain public statements which have been made in the Philippines by the High Commissioner and by President Quezon of the Philippine Commonwealth in connection with your recent approval of amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Copies of previous radios and letters mentioned in this radiogram are attached with the exception of the confidential letter of September 11 referred to which is not of record in this Department and which, it is understood, was sent to you direct by Mr. Sayre.

It does not appear that any reply to this message is required. It has been evident for some time that relations between Mr. Sayre and President Quezon were becoming strained and this message indicates that an open break has occurred.

If I receive any further information regarding this matter I will transmit it to you promptly.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior.

Enclosures 2778601.

TRANSLATION OF RADIOGRAM RECEIVED IN CODE DECEMBER 11, 1940.
(NPM 1911 MANILA CK 225)

HAMPTON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
December 10 - No. 901. RUSH. CONFIDENTIAL.

For the President: "See radio No. 884 December 6th from me to Hampton. I made statement of December 6th quoted therein in order to defend position and powers of President and because of the inappropriateness of President Quezon's undertaking to attempt to dictate the limits within which President of the United States may act. See my confidential letter to you of September 16, 1940. President Quezon yesterday morning at a press conference called specifically for the purpose bitterly and with unconcealed emotion criticised and attacked my statement of December 6th, reiterating the view previously expressed in his press statement of December 4th. The issue of course is at present a purely academic one and I hope the incident will be closed with President Quezon's outburst. In answer to requests from the press for a further statement I have told the press I have nothing to add to my original statement.

Please refer to my radio No. 538 of August 2, to Department of the Interior and my confidential letter to you of September 11th in regard to Emergency Powers Act. President Quezon is manifesting increasing irritation and impatience whenever anything is said or done which tends to impair his full freedom of action and resents restraints resulting from American sovereignty. I am doing my best to avoid difficulties but I believe that unless American sovereignty is resolutely upheld until the date when independence is granted we will be faced with increasing difficulties here."

To Hampton: Please send to President with this message copy of my radio to you No. 884 December 6th concerning press statements.

SAYRE.

... December 6
... 1940 No. 884
... CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL (SEE 1937 ACTIVITY OF 1937)
INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYERS REVEALED IN CASE DECEMBER 6

RADIOGRAM RECEIVED DECEMBER 6, 1940.

HAMPTON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
December 6 - No. 884.

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Please forward copy to State Department.

Sayre.

THE UNITED STATES HIGH COMMISSIONER

MANILA

September 16, 1940.

Via Airmail

My dear Mr. President:

In connection with the Philippine constitutional amendments recently adopted and now awaiting your action, I should like to report a conversation which I have had with President Quezon during the last few days concerning the scope of your power to disapprove them.

You will remember that the Independence Act of March 24, 1934 contains provisions empowering the President to approve or disapprove (1) the original Philippine constitution, (2) constitutional amendments, and (3) certain acts passed by the Philippine Assembly. His power to disapprove the original Philippine constitution is sharply restricted by the provisions of Section 3 of the Independence Act, which provides that the President shall approve the constitution if he "finds that the proposed constitution conforms substantially with the provisions of this Act". In this case, therefore, the President clearly is not free to act upon his unrestricted discretion. His power to approve or disapprove constitutional amendments is dealt with by Section 7, subsection 1 of the Independence Act (and this was carried into the "Ordinance Appended To the Constitution" as subdivision 18 of Section 1 thereof). Both are entirely silent as to the basis on which the President shall exercise his power to approve or disapprove, merely providing that "if the President approves the amendment or if the President fails to disapprove such amendment within six months from the time of its submission, the amendment shall take effect as a part of such constitution". In the third place, his power to approve or disapprove acts passed by the Philippine Assembly is dealt with by Section 2, subsection 9 of the Independence Act, which merely provides that certain kinds of acts "shall not become law until approved by the President of the United States." See also Section 7, subsection 2.

It will be noted, therefore, that although the President's power to approve or disapprove the original constitution is closely limited by the phraseology in Section 3 of the Independence Act, his power to approve or disapprove certain laws passed by the Philippine Assembly is unlimited; he may approve or disapprove them in the exercise of his discretion. The question arises whether subsection 1 of Section 7 dealing with constitutional amendments is to be interpreted by reading into it the same limitations as expressed in Section 3 or whether the President's power to approve or disapprove constitutional amendments is unrestricted, as it is in the case of legislation, leaving him free to approve or disapprove in the exercise of his discretion.

President Queson in his recent conversation with me admitted that the power of the President to disapprove certain acts of the Assembly was unrestricted, but claimed that the President's power to approve or disapprove proposed amendments to the Philippine constitution is restricted by the same limitations as those expressed in Section 3 pertaining to the adoption of the original constitution. He claims that the President in such a case is free to disapprove a constitutional amendment only if he believes the amendment violates the principles of a republican form of government as set forth in Section 2 of the Independence Act, and characterized action upon any other basis as "unconstitutional and tyrannical".

I informed President Queson that it manifestly lay outside of my power to give an official opinion regarding the correct interpretation of subsection 1 of Section 7 of the Independence Act. I said, however, that in my own personal and quite unofficial opinion, since Congress did not express in that subsection the limitations which it did write into Section 3, it seemed to me evident that Congress did not wish the power of the President so curbed and circumscribed, and that in my opinion the President is free to approve or disapprove a constitutional amendment in the exercise of his discretion. I told President Queson that my own personal opinion was of little consequence, however; that it was the President and only the President who could decide this question and that even if I should agree with President Queson's view I would have no power or right to circumscribe the President's action in the matter.

President Queson agreed with me that as a matter of practical administration the President's decision must be ultimate and, since it could not be reviewed in the courts, it must be taken as final. He stoutly maintains, however, that in acting upon Philippine constitutional amendments the President has only the power to disapprove if the amendment violates a republican form of government as set forth in Section 2 of the Independence Act.

Undoubtedly President Queson's view will be urged upon you by Speaker Yulo who is now on his way to the United States to press for your approval of the constitutional amendments. I suspect that you will not wish to yield to such a view.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Francis B. Sayre.

Translation of Radiogram in Code Received August 3, 1940.
(Manila)

deb.

EMERSON.
Interior Department.
Washington.
August 2. - No. 538.

Urgent. Please deliver following strictly confidential and personal message to the President:

President Quezon on July 15 in his message to Assembly said: "I must, therefore, have authority to control the food resources of the country and, to this end, to require all citizens to render personal civil service; to prevent, whenever the public interest so requires, strikes and unwholesome social agitations; and to commandeer ships and other means of transportation in order to facilitate the free and continued movement of goods and merchandise." In response to President Quezon's request a Bill has been introduced in Assembly, has been reported out of Committee and is now being debated in Assembly.

Section 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national emergency which makes it necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage and other subversive activities, by preventing unemployment, and by insuring to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply. To carry out this policy the President is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations which shall have the force and effect of law during the existence of the emergency but in no case for more than two years from the date of the approval of this Act, unless sooner amended or repealed by the National Assembly. Such rules and regulations may embrace, among others, the following objectives:

- (1) To suppress espionage and other subversive activities;
- (2) To require all able-bodied citizens to engage in any useful occupation, (a) to engage in farming or other productive activities or (b) to perform such services in any part of the Philippines, as may be necessary in the public interest, subject to such reasonable compensations as the President may determine;
- (3) To control farm land in order to prevent failure or shortage of crops and avert hunger and destitution;
- (4) To exercise control over industrial establishments, in order to insure continued production during the emergency;
- (5) To prohibit lockouts and strikes whenever necessary to prevent undue suspension or dislocation of any productive enterprise or in the interest of national security;
- (6) To insure an even distribution of labor among the productive enterprises;
- (7) Subject to such reasonable compensation as the President may determine, to commandeer ships of Philippines registry and other means of transportation in order to facilitate the free and continued movement of goods and merchandise;

Volume 3 - No. 120
Department
Internal Memorandum
RECORD

INVESTIGATION OF REPTILES AND AMPHIBIANS
(MURKIN)
INVESTIGATION OF REPTILES AND AMPHIBIANS
INVESTIGATION OF REPTILES AND AMPHIBIANS

- (8) To regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of prime necessity both imported and locally produced or manufactured; and
- (9) To prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding, injurious speculations, and private controls affecting the supply, distribution and movements of foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemicals, building materials, implements, machinery, and equipment required in agriculture and in industry.

Section 2 makes violations of any of the rules or regulations punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment or \$5,000.00 fine.

The Bill is so sweeping in the powers which it grants to the President and is so lacking in limitations on these powers that if it were abused individual liberty in the Philippines would be reduced to a vanishing point. In my opinion the present situation is not such as to justify the grant of such emergency powers. Although I can not say whether or not Bill will be passed in its present form, it is now in a debate stage and since President Queson in his message to Assembly asked for extraordinary emergency powers it is not unlikely that Bill will be passed by end of this week or early next week.

President Queson has privately explained to me that he desires power to conscript civilian labor in order to compel men to work in rice fields and on farms because he fears a food shortage.

For sometime there has been a pronounced drift here away from Democracy and in the direction of Totalitarianism and Dictatorship, as evidenced by various laws passed in the last Assembly, by the adoption of recent constitutional amendments (See my confidential airmail letter to you of July 25), by President Queson's speech of July 16, and most markedly by character of provisions of foregoing Bill.

Under Tydings-McDuffie Act presumably foregoing Bill would not require approval by you to become law. Nevertheless, it seems such a flagrant departure from Democracy as we know it in the United States that in view of your powers under Tydings-McDuffie Act, Section 2, you may wish to consider whether or not you care to take steps to prevent Bill's passage by Assembly or its signature by President Queson by requesting me at once to see President Queson, to inform him of your opinion that this proposed measure is so arbitrary in its sweeping and unlimited powers as to constitute a threat to Democracy, and to request that the Bill be not passed. If any special action is to be taken we must move swiftly. To save President Queson's face if action is to be taken it would be very desirable to block Bill before passage by Assembly; since President Queson who has asked for emergency powers would find it difficult to refuse to sign Bill except by blaming situation on you.

Unless and until I receive instructions from you I shall do nothing.

SAYRE.



PSF
clerk

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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

THE WHITE HOUSE

DEC 19 1 48 PM '40
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The action by the House yesterday in sustaining your veto of the Walter-Logan Bill was a great victory of itself and it came at a time when it would do the maximum of good in the effect that it would have upon party opinion in the new Congress. But, to me, its real significance lies in the fact that it shows what can be done if there is a group of loyal, intelligent and aggressive Roosevelt men who are willing to get out on the firing line when the need arises. Here was a striking instance of what can be accomplished by some such loose confederation of individuals as I discussed in the letter that I wrote you a fortnight ago, prayerfully urging that Tom Corcoran be not allowed to depart from Washington.

As you doubtless know, after the House adopted the Senate amendments to this Bill, Sam Rayburn left Washington in disgust. He made no secret of the fact that, even if you vetoed the Bill, the House would pass it over that veto. I understand that he had no intention of returning to Washington until after the holidays. He even persuaded Lyndon Johnson to go with him. McCormack, the Majority Leader, was left in charge but McCormack knew what Rayburn thought about the possibility of the Bill if it should be returned by you and apparently he accepted that as an inevitable result.

Then, over the week-end, Tom Corcoran got busy. He began to work on McCormack, insisting that a fight ought to be made even if we could not win. Fortunately, there was a McCormack instead of a Woodrum to work on. Otherwise the situation would have been hopeless. Tom did a good job on McCormack.

I had barely reached my office on Monday morning when McCormack called me on the telephone. He said that he would rather go down fighting than tamely to accept defeat. He felt that there was a chance of sustaining your veto. He asked me to check back on the original vote on this Bill in the House and see what I could do with some of the Congressmen who had voted for the Bill on that occasion.

Then Congressman Sabath called me. He talked along the same line. He wanted me to get busy. Then I heard from Jack Dempsey who had just returned from a trip to Panama and was already at work. Next Tom Corcoran came through. The result was that I did look up the list of Congressmen and I got busy myself on the telephone. I was encouraged by the responses that I got. Jack Dempsey lunched with me and we further considered strategy. He was satisfied then that your veto would be sustained. Here was another instance of Dempsey's ability to appraise the House.

Sam Rayburn decided to come back and with him came Lyndon Johnson who also went to work. And this is the way the victory was won -- a most timely and significant victory, as I have said.


What was done yesterday can be done on other occasions; that is, it can be done if certain men keep in touch with each other and are prepared to get busy when you need help. On this occasion these men worked harmoniously and understandingly without ever meeting to discuss matters.

With 1942 just in the offing, when the republicans will make a particularly desperate effort to win control of the lower House as a

curtain raiser to 1944, it is more than ever necessary that we maintain a fighting esprit de corps among the democrats of the House. And the best way to do this is to keep together a unit, the constituent parts of which understand each other and can work together. As I see it, this would also relieve you of a good deal of a burden that you have had to carry in the past of actually organizing the democrats of the House for strategic moves.

But we can't do this, we can't even hope to do it, without Tom. This is not only my opinion but the opinion of others. In a situation such as this he is invaluable.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Harold C. Ickes". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

This book is the first copy of a limited edition of a reprint of Lauchlan McKay's treatise on American shipbuilding, "The Practical Shipbuilder", originally issued in 1839 and used as a guide by shipbuilders here and abroad during 1839 and the 1840's.

A bit of wood taken from the original ways of the Donald McKay shipyard at East Boston has been affixed to the inside cover. Donald McKay's grandson, Richard McKay, who sponsored this edition, stated in his correspondence that these are the original ways from which were launched the FLYING CLOUD, GREAT REPUBLIC, and LIGHTNING, a model of the last of which he understands occupies a prominent place in your office.

The second title page is a photographic reproduction of the original manuscript, and the next to the last page certifies that this is the No. 1 copy of the limited edition of 250 issued on August 28, 1940.

I hope that a satisfying sense of a difficult duty well done will be yours on Christmas Day and that you will enter the coming year with confidence and strength and courage to undertake the tremendous tasks that lie ahead.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.



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Interior
docs*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1940.

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DEC 27 3 52 PM '40
THE WHITE HOUSE

My dear Mr. President:

Today I have sent to you a recommendation to appoint Charles Harwood Governor of Puerto Rico. *originally considered as Ambassador to Mexico in 1934*

I did my best to persuade him to take an appointment on the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico instead. I really believed that this would be a better interim appointment, pending your ability to make him a Federal Judge, than the Governorship. Moreover, I am not without my reservations as to his qualities for the latter office.

In all frankness, I told him that, if he took the Governorship, he was likely to be a sad and disillusioned man by the end of a year. I might have made it a shorter period. This is one of the toughest offices in the Federal administration; certainly it is the most difficult in this Department. Harwood has never had any executive experience and he does not give me the impression of being a decisive executive. He will take over under especially unfortunate circumstances because he will follow the best man who has ever served as Governor of Puerto Rico under this or any other administration. Governor Leahy won the respect even of those who felt that they had to criticize him for political reasons.

However, as I told Harwood, I will give him my full backing and support. He will need all that all of us can do for him.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Philips

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 27, 1940.

*File
Personal
Jehes
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My dear Mr. President:

I have had a report, to which probably there is nothing at all, that Ernest Gruening is being seriously considered ^{to} Ambassador to Mexico in the event of the resignation of Ambassador Daniels. I would consider this a mistake. Gruening knows Mexico and if he were now the man that he used to be he would have many qualifications to do a good job. But he has become very conservative and appears to have lost almost entirely his former liberal point of view.

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Jehes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

*PSF
Lakes
Interior*

December 27, 1940.

December 21, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I find that Oscar Chapman is distinctly interested in the suggestion, which I believe was made to him by Harry Hopkins, of some active position in connection with the Democratic National Committee. However, Ed Flynn has not yet said anything to him about this, although they had a short general talk.

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Fisher

The President,
The White House.

1. This copy shall contain a copy of the original document and shall be retained in the file of the document.



RECEIVED
WASHINGTON
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
personal*

December 31, 1940

GIVE TO THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE
UP WITH ED FLYNN AT LUNCH ON THURSDAY.

FDR/dj

L

PSF
Anterior

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Johns
1-40

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

December 28, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. NELSON ROCKEFELLER

Will you speak to me about
Mr. James W. Young at your con-
venience?

F. D. R.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 5, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL except as to the President

My dear "Missy":

I discussed with you on Tuesday a situation that is of deep concern to me as a member of the Administration and as a friend of the President.

In the office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics is a communications division of which Mr. James W. Young has been made head by Mr. Nelson Rockefeller. To this communications division, there has been allocated, I am informed, about \$2,000,000 out of the funds that the President set aside for the use of the office of Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the American Republics.

Mr. James W. Young, formerly was vice president of the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency and I believe that his connections there are still close, both personally and financially. This was one of the agencies that played a principal part in the nomination of Wendell Willkie for President and in the campaign for Willkie following his nomination at Philadelphia. Mr. Young is an advertising man of great experience and outstanding ability. His family used to live in Winnetka where he and the other members of his family were known to the members of my family. His son Dick and my son Raymond were inseparable friends until the Youngs moved to New Mexico. The relationship between our families has always been pleasant but, except in the instance that I have indicated, not intimate. Against Mr. Young I have no criticism personally. This is evidenced by the fact that last July I appointed him as a member of the

Indian Arts and Crafts Board. He is fitted for this post by his knowledge of merchandising as well as by his sympathetic outlook toward the Indians.

During the recent presidential campaign, Mr. Young openly advocated the election of Wendell Willkie, although he was then connected with the Government. He came here originally as chief of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the Department of Commerce. Be it said to his credit, that Mr. Young, at least during the campaign, did not pretend that he was a supporter of the President or a believer in the New Deal. On the contrary, he has no hesitation, I am told, in proclaiming that he is "not a New Dealer", nor a believer in the President's policies or purposes.

According to Mr. Young's plans, as I have learned of them indirectly, he will build up a large staff which will include some people taken from the various agencies of the government. The members of this staff will be paid by government funds out of the sum allocated by the President. However, they will work under the personal direction of Mr. Young and in close cooperation and collaboration with the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency. I suspect that some of them will soon be at a loss to determine whether they are working for the government or for this advertising agency; whether in any degree their future will depend upon whether they make good for the government or for the agency. Since they will work through this agency under Mr. Young's direction, it would be natural for them to take the coloration desired by Mr. Young and the agency. There can hardly be any doubt that sympathy for and an understanding of the aims of the New Deal

will neither be fostered nor inspired by such associations.

However, this is not all of the story.

At a recent Cabinet meeting the President appointed a committee to consider and report to him on the advisability of setting up an agency of the government to reeducate our own people along democratic lines and to counter foreign propaganda both in South America and in this country. A report embodying the conclusions and recommendations of the committee was forwarded to the President over my signature as chairman on November 28. At all of the meetings of this committee I urged that our proceedings, and even the fact of our existence, be kept in the strictest confidence. So careful were we to keep everything confidential that no member of the committee was permitted to send a substitute to any meeting, except in the case of Secretary Stimson, who sent Mr. McCloy, a particularly qualified man.

Yet almost before the report of this committee was on the President's desk, Mr. Young knew what we had been working at. Among other things, he knew that the report recommended a director under a Cabinet committee and an advisory committee to have active charge of the work. He was sufficiently interested so that he decided, either on his own motion or at the suggestion of someone else, to become a candidate for director. Within a few days after the last meeting of the committee he had a meeting with Mr. Louis Brownlow who was one of the members of the committee.

Mr. Young's present position involves connections of strategic importance of the advertising, publishing and movie worlds. It is a position of vast political potentiality which can be used in the interest

of those who supported Willkie in the recent campaign. However, the power and opportunity flowing from Mr. Young's present position would be nothing as compared with the power and opportunity that would result if he should be appointed Director of the organization proposed by the President's committee to be set up to counteract foreign propaganda and to carry on a campaign of education in this country along patriotic lines.

A man in either or both of these positions who believed in the President and his policies and purposes could achieve much in the way of buttressing his philosophy and in supporting his program. But one who disbelieves in the President's philosophy and is hostile, not only toward him personally but to his purposes, could help to pave the way for that capture of the government which Mr. Willkie and his backers intend.

I regard this as one of the most serious threats that has been made against this Administration since 1933. It is all the more serious because, apparently, Mr. Young has the support of and is being built up by some person or persons in whom the President evidently has trust and confidence.

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Pches
Secretary of the Interior.

The Honorable Marguerite LeHand,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*PSF
Interior
Ickes*

December 28, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. DAVID E. LILIENTHAL

As you know, it is, of course, absolutely vital that the whole matter of regional authorities should be sponsored by the Interior Department and not by any locality or by the TVA.

I suggest, therefore, that you have a talk with Secretary Ickes and explain to him that you are only seeking to help and not to put this thing through as your child.

F. D. R.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1940.

My dear Mr. President:

It would appear that Mr. David Lillienthal has been active in the west stirring up sentiment for the creation of independent three-board authorities to cover (a) the area served by Bonneville and Grand Coulee, and (b) the Central Valley Project of California. I take great exception to this voluntary activity on the part of Mr. Lillienthal.

When you proposed, at the outset of this session of Congress, to issue an order requiring TVA to clear through me to you it was without any suggestion on my part that you do so. I was interested in other matters but not in this, as you will recall, although my view all along has been the same as yours, namely, that all of the power activities, excepting those of the Power Commission, which has quasi-judicial functions, should head up in one department for their mutual benefit and to augment the general strength of public power. When Lillienthal heard what you had in mind, he rushed to Senator Norris and Senator Norris made such strong representations to you that you decided to lay aside your plan. I made no protest, although I had reason to feel an exception to some of the unjustified statements that Mr. Lillienthal was making about me. He assumed, and so charged, that I was trying to "grab" his baby in satisfaction of my lust for power.

I accepted your decision without demur. Now I find that, both by private interviews and by public statements, Mr. Lillienthal has been trying

to chisel away my Department. Admitting that he believes in principle in an independent three-man board, I submit that he is badly out of order in interfering in my Department or in trying to force your hand on a policy that is yours to determine. He has no more right to do that than he had to go behind your back and bring pressure to bear upon you in the matter of the TVA order.

As I understand it, your policy, which I have gladly followed and which I believe to be a sound one, is to keep the power activities that are executive in the same Department. This is a wise policy. It means cooperation, understanding, absence of rivalry, and well-rounded, carefully considered executive policies, with resulting strength to each power project from the mutuality that it enjoys with others. Lillienthal's interference is in the direction of disunity by the creation of more independent agencies, while your plan has been to have fewer independent agencies.

Moreover, Senator Norris has interested himself in this matter, either with or without any suggestion on the part of Mr. Lillienthal.

After it had been approved by you, the Department bill covering Bonneville and Grand Coulee was introduced by Senator Bone in his branch of The Congress and by Representative Leavy in the House. Senator Norris has talked to these two men so that they are now in doubt, as I am informed, whether to press these bills or to amend them so as to provide for an independent agency.

Lillienthal also had a conference with Governor Olson in California, followed by one here. After leaving the White House after an interview

with you the other day Olson announced that you had designated Mr.

Lilienthal to confer with him and with my Department on a bill for Central Valley. Whether he quoted you accurately in all respects, I do not know, but what he did give out disturbed me. At a prior interview with me I had told him that, in principle, I agreed on the setting up of an agency for the Central Valley but that I believed that it should be along the lines needed as Secretary of the Interior. As a matter of fact, while technically of what we were proposing for the northwest, so amended as to take care of there are three men on the board of TVA, in practice there is only one, the special problems of Central Valley. I also told him that I believed in a single administrator, as at Bonneville, and not in a three-man-board. After talking with you he was to come to see me again but he left Washington without communicating with me further.

At a time when you are carrying a heavier load than any President in history, it is proposed to set up some more independent agencies to report directly to you. As usual the argument is: "Secretary Ickes is all right; he can be trusted on power but he won't be Secretary of the Interior forever". Of course, Secretaries of the Interior will come and Secretaries of the Interior will go, but so will independent boards and even Presidents. If you should be succeeded by a man who is opposed to public power, the fact that there were three-men boards for such projects as TVA, would not protect them. Necessarily a Secretary of the Interior will carry out the policies of his Chief if he is loyal, and if he isn't loyal, his Chief can be an unjust reflection upon my Department. It would be putting in reverse your wise policy of abolishing boards as far as possible and putting together in the same Department activities of the same general nature. I believe that my Department has done a good job at Bonneville and is doing

In discussing with you on Friday the defense set-up, I made the observation that I believed in a one-man administration. I said that one could not administer through a debating society. This was before I had learned of Mr. Lillienthal's pestiferous activities in the far west. Three men are not needed to run Bonneville or TVA any more than three men are needed as Secretary of the Interior. As a matter of fact, while technically there are three men on the board of TVA, in practice there is only one. Mr. Lillienthal runs that show. I venture to say that there are thousands of people in this country who have heard of TVA and of Lillienthal who could not even name the other members of this board.

Another argument that sounds plausible but is not, is that an independent authority means decentralization and local control. So far as local control of TVA is concerned, the board consists of one local man, Dr. Morgan, who is immersed in his scientific pursuits, one man from the State of Wisconsin, and one from the State of Idaho. I doubt whether five percent of the lawyers, the technicians, and the executives who run TVA are local products. I know that in the case of Bonneville, try as we would, we could find only few local men who were competent.

These activities are now in my Department. To take them away would not only harm the power policy of the Administration as a whole, it would be an unjust reflection upon my Department. It would be putting in reverse your wise policy of abolishing boards so far as possible and putting together in the same Department activities of the same general nature. I believe that my Department has done a good job at Bonneville and is doing

a good job both at Grand Coulee and in the Central Valley. I believe further that if it had not been for the vital and enormous financial help given to TVA by PWA under my administration, Mr. Lillienthal would not be in a position to do so much boasting about what TVA has done, especially in the power field.

There is so much to occupy your attention that I think it is too bad that this totally unnecessary issue should be raised at the incoming of the new Congress. Mr. Lillienthal could hardly hope that I would take his uncalled interference with my Department lying down. I trust that you will send him word that you are still determining the policies of your own administration and that you haven't changed your mind about having fewer rather than more independent agencies.

One last word. You abolished the Coal Commission of seven and, over my objection, transferred its activities to me. I honestly did not want this administration. I appointed a single administrator and what had become a public scandal is now an efficient and able administration that has won the confidence and respect, not only of the miners, but of the coal industry.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Philips

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.