

PSF

Interior Dept.: Harold Ickes

1942-45

Bot 13

PSF Ickes Folder
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HAROLD ICKES:

Thanks for your suggestion about
using the religious matter from Germany.
I am passing it on to Bill Donovan.

F.D.R.

Copy to Bill Donovan.
Also copy of Ickes' letter to the Pres.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1942.

PSF Ickes
THE WHITE HOUSE
JAN 7 9 01 AM '42
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My dear Mr. President:

I suppose that Hitler will support the plan for a religion for Germany that has been announced by Rosenberg. Thus, Catholic Italy will be fighting side by side with a pagan Germany and a heathen Japan. The Catholics of this country and many even of the Protestants found it difficult to accept the involuntary support of Russia because that country is non-religious.

It is significant that Russia should sign an engagement to fight, among other things, for religious freedom, on the same day that Rosenberg should announce in effect that Mein Kampf was to be the future Bible of Germany, which of course means Hitler-worship.

It seems to me that much can be made of this situation. Formerly there were more wars for religion than for anything else and the religious conviction is a deep one, however much people may have fallen away from its open expression. My thought is that there ought to be a carefully planned campaign of nation-wide radio speeches to explain the religious implications in this war. Without mentioning them, it ought especially to be brought home to various Catholics and the German Lutherans that one of the prime objectives of Hitler is to uproot those two religions completely, while confiscating all church properties in Germany.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Ickes

The President,
The White House.

7
P.S.F.:
Interior

J. Edgar Hoover
1-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

The trouble with the writer of that letter to you is:

(a) that he fails to disclose just what Kelly said. His statement in the second sentence that "he left the inference that he, Kelly, might have the presidential blessing", is purely an inference on the part of the writer and is not backed up by what Kelly actually did say. I personally would like to know what Kelly actually did say.

(b) From this springboard of inference he inveighs against Kelly being a candidate himself. The joke on your correspondent is that when Kelly was here his candidacy was not discussed between us either directly or "by inference". The sole discussion lay in the fact that we both agreed that the Democrats

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

should put up the man who could get the most votes in the whole of the State of Illinois against Curley Brooks. That is a thing which I, of course, cannot concern myself with, first, because it is none of my business and, second, because I don't know!

Don't you agree with me?

F. D. R.



THE WHITE HOUSE
JAN 21 12 50 PM '42
RECEIVED
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I will tell you the name of the writer of the letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, the next time that I see you. For his sake, I simply cannot run the risk of his name appearing in the records but I know him well and will vouch for his capability as a political observer and his character as a citizen.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

Jan. 18, 1891.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Mayor Kelly returned from Washington the other day and gave out one of the most assinine interviews that I have ever known him to make. He disclosed that he had spent considerable time with the President discussing possible Democratic candidates for the Senate, and he left the inference that he, Kelly, might have the presidential blessing. I do not think that the average person in Illinois, heeding the presidential appeals for unity and all of that, delights in the knowledge that in the midst of war the President and the chief representative of the Kelly-Nash machine spent valuable time discussing partisan manoeuvres. Of course I realize that the President must give time to such discussions; I know that it is essential that Brooks be removed, and I know that Kelly is a powerful factor in the eventual removal of Brooks. I am in no way censoring the President for discussing the matter with Kelly. What I can not understand is that Kelly should expose the President, in times such as these, to any possibility of being charged with engaging in petty party politics in war time.

Kelly is wrapping the American flag around the Kelly-Nash machine, and thinks that under its cloak he, the chief engineer of an odorous machine, might possibly get to the Senate, and die a gentleman. He regards himself as the chief presidential spokesman in Illinois -- probably one of the reasons why the President's 1940 majority in Illinois was cut 600,000 under that of 1936.

If Kelly has convinced any one in Washington that he might be elected Senator from Illinois it is time, I believe, that whoever has listened to his ideas be unconvinced. At the present writing, Brooks will defeat Wright for the Republican nomination. Nominate Kelly on the Democratic ticket, and Brooks will return to the Senate. As much as I would hate to, I would vote for Brooks, an isolationist, before I will vote for Kelly, a corruptionist. Kelly, no doubt, will be nominated, if he runs. The machine can obtain the victory for him in a primary. But Kelly can not be elected, even if the President were to ask for it. For eight or ten years the people of Illinois have been told that Kelly is a boss, a corruptionist, and all of that. They believe it, and have grounds for their belief. In the meantime, he has gone on to victories in the city of Chicago but it should not be overlooked that he has been defeated everytime he has had a candidate for state-wide office. His candidate lost in the Democratic primary for Governor in 1936; his candidate lost for the Democratic nomination for Senator in 1938; his nominee for Governor lost to the Republicans in 1940; and if

Kelly is nominated for Senator in 1942, the President can be assured that he will have Brooks to aid other isolationists in frustrating lasting peace plans when the war is over.

If the President wants Kelly, and Kelly is assiduously spreading that idea, he better appoint him to some position, as I am certain he will never be elected Senator from Illinois.

The quib that is now going the rounds is that the President is mixed-up on his Kellys -- that he, the President, apparently has confused Ed Kelly with Colin P. Kelly.

Courtney is missing the boat. If he is going to run, he should become a little more active. As yet, people are unconvinced that he is, other than as a war development ala Brooks, a whole-hearted supporter of the President, or that he, as a Senator after the war, would be wholehearted in his support of social programs.

I find this to be true. Thinking people want a Senator who is not only right on foreign policy but right on domestic policy as well. I do not believe Illinois is going to be rushed into electing a Senator merely because he spouts patriotism in war times. They don't think we will be at war for the entire six years of a Senator's term, and they want to be certain of the type of representation they have in the Senate on matters other than war. That's one reason why they won't take Kelly; and, unless Courtney busies himself in that direction ere long, they might not take his.

Green, as Governor, is ineffectual. He is rapidly losing cast. Wright will make a lot of noise on Hill Blakett's money, but it is doubtful if he can defeat Brooks. Too many people know Wright's background; too many people know of the rubber check episodes, etc., in which he was engaged but a few years ago. He is, in essence, but a pseudo Huey Long, a poor imitation, at that. He is considered an opportunist who foresaw a swing in Illinois away from isolationism, and jumped on the bandwagon in the early stages. The Sun will use him as an instrument to bring about Brooks' defeat, if possible, but it will not adopt him as its own.

I am concerned over the damage that Kelly's interview may have done the President in Illinois, and I am also concerned over the possibility that Kelly, even if he doesn't run for Senator himself, may have put himself in the position that, if Courtney does run, the public will think it came about as the result of a deal in which Kelly figured too largely. I thought conferences with the President were more or less sacred; not to be used as a spring board for the making of political capital, as Kelly did in his interview. If the President has any more conferences with the Mayor the Mayor should be instructed that, when he returns home, he is to keep still.

I hope I have not overly taxed your time with this long letter, but I wanted you to know what is in the wind out here.

Sincerely



*file
Personal 95F
Interior*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

J. H. Folder

January 27, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Apparently I made a mistake in sending you a copy of the letter about the Illinois senatorial situation, or at least in sending it without some explanation.

I am wondering from your memorandum to me of January 22 whether you were under the impression that this letter was written to me with the idea that it would be transmitted to you. This was not the case. The writer was writing a personal letter to me, without any idea that you would ever see it. He and I have talked about the general Illinois situation a good many times and he knew that it was not necessary for him to etch in in detail, many matters the lack of which seemed to justify the whipping that you gave the letter.

The writer of this letter is a sincere New Dealer who is as fine as they are made. Moreover, he knows Illinois politics intimately. He didn't give me the impression that he was "inveighing" against Kelly being a candidate himself. He was merely pointing out that, in his opinion, Kelly, could not be elected although he undoubtedly could win the nomination. In that view I venture to concur. As I say, my correspondent, in writing to me, assumed that it would not be necessary to write in the detail with which he would have to write to another who was not so familiar with the Illinois background.

I have no personal knowledge that Kelly has ever wanted to be a candidate. He spent an hour with me when he was in Washington recently, and we had a very frank and friendly talk. We discussed the merits and the handicaps of various candidates but he gave me no intimation that he had ambitions of his own, and I did not attempt to find out whether he did have. The next day, he went to keep an appointment with Frank Knox that I had made for him and Frank called me later to say that it was clear to him that Kelly did have senatorial ambitions. Apparently others have the same view.

Frank Knox told me at Cabinet last Friday that Courtney had announced for the Senate. I had not seen the announcement. I told Kelly that I believed that Courtney was not nearly as strong a candidate as he would have been if he had followed the plan that was suggested to him in Washington and declared at an early date that he was wholeheartedly behind your foreign policies. For him to have kept silent until after Pearl Harbor will make people wonder as to just how



far he really goes in support of your foreign policy. Even Curly Brooks, since Pearl Harbor, is prominently ensconced on the bandwagon.

I remember when Roger Sullivan, the democratic boss, ran for senator. That was in 1914 and the opposition was split between the republican candidate and the progressive candidate. Sullivan lost.

I also remember when George E. Brennan, who succeeded Roger Sullivan as boss, ran for senator. Frank E. Smith was the republican candidate that time and I managed the campaign of an independent republican candidate, Hugh S. Magill. Another split opposition, yet Brennan lost.

I am sorry that I sent you the letter because you seem to mistrust the motives of my correspondent which I can assure you do not merit distrust.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Fehes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



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PSF *Jehes Folder*
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1942.

THE WHITE HOUSE
FEB 2 3 49 PM '42
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My dear Mr. President:

I know that you do not need to be told that, if we should lose on the political front next November, the going thereafter on the war front would be very difficult indeed. For my part I think that it is the part of prudence to anticipate that a real fight will be made by the opposition to capture the House of Representatives this year. Undoubtedly you have this in mind and are preparing to meet the enemy at the polls. If we should have some more disasters such as that of Pearl Harbor, or even if our production program should fail to keep the United Nations supplied so that the people are satisfied that everything has been done that could be done, there may be an unfortunate reversal in public opinion that would mean an anti-administration House of Representatives for two years. I don't have to point out to as able a political leader as you are what this would mean.

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

MEMORANDUM
from the desk of DONALD M. NELSON

February 5, 1942

The President

The White House

In accordance with your memorandum
I am returning the attached.

D. M. Nelson

*file
Personal*

12 16 PM '42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
DATE: 1/19/42
BY: [illegible]
SUBJECT: [illegible]

PSF Ickes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DONALD NELSON:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

*Noted check
[Signature]*

W339

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF John F. Alder

THE WHITE HOUSE
JAN 19 10 05 AM '42
RECEIVED

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF PETROLEUM COORDINATOR
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

January 17, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

You asked at Cabinet meeting on Friday how fast our new tankers were coming off the ways. The enclosed tabulation will tell you the story. If we are going to have additional sinkings along the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, and if we have a late, cold Spring, we will be running into trouble with respect to petroleum, especially in the North Atlantic Coast States. In view of the hell that I got last Fall for foreseeing the possibility of such a situation and trying to prevent it, I do not intend to say anything about this publicly until it becomes a certainty. If a shortage actually occurs, I may be able to make the front page with lyrical stories of what I am going to do by way of rationing to take care of that shortage. The shortage itself can be attributed to God while I reap a harvest of praise for my lack of foresight.

Sincerely yours,

Harold T. Fisher

Petroleum Coordinator
for National Defense.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

RECAPITULATION

AMERICAN-FLAG TANKER BUILDING PROGRAM

November 1, 1941

	<u>By Private Companies</u>		<u>By Maritime Commission</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>D.W.T.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>D.W.T.</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>D.W.T.</u>
<u>1941</u>						
(Nov-Dec) 4th Quarter	7	102,100	1	16,460	8	118,560
<u>1942</u>						
1st Quarter	10	146,780	1	16,460	11	163,240
2nd Quarter	8	122,240	7	115,220	15	237,460
3rd Quarter	8	128,040	11	181,060	19	309,100
4th Quarter	<u>12</u>	<u>183,540</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>279,820</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>463,360</u>
	38	580,600	36	592,560	74	1,173,160
<u>1943</u>						
1st Quarter	3	50,440	21	345,660	24	396,100
2nd Quarter	4	71,700	20	329,200	24	400,900
3rd Quarter	4	63,680	25	411,500	29	475,180
4th Quarter	<u>2</u>	<u>32,000</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>460,880</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>492,880</u>
	13	217,820	94	1,547,240	107	1,765,060
Total	58	900,520	131	2,156,260	189	3,056,780

Since completion of the above tabulation, information has been received that the following additional tankers have been contracted for:

<u>1944</u>						
(Jan-Feb) 1st Quarter	--	--	5	--	5	--



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Personal*

*PSF Deke's Folder
1-42*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1942.

RECEIVED
MAR 6 9 45 AM '42
THE WHITE HOUSE

My dear Mr. President:

I have a letter from a friend who knows what he talks about
in which he says:

"Fred Searls Jr. fifty thousand dollars a year mining engineer and expert for William Boyce Thompson and now mining engineer and director for the Newmont Mining Corporation which was his (Thompson's) family mining investment corporation. He has been a bitter opponent of the President's policies, threatened to move his family and citizenship to Canada because of 'Roosevelt's rotten policies', special enemy of FDR's Labor Policies and WPA. In the March 2nd issue of 'TIME' page 11 you will find picture and statement on Searls as one of 'Nelson's Brain Boys'.

"Searls is able and honest, a convinced conservative economic imperialist, anti-labor, anti-semite-anti-democrat and anti-FDR at all points. He was a close friend of the man who headed up your Mining Bureau and who you were led to dismiss from that position.

"He may be where he can do no harm and much good, for he knows his specialty from the ground up. All I am concerned about is that he does the good and not the HARM!"

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF
Interior

file
Confidential
This
folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR:

Thank you for your excellent
summary of the Puerto Rican situation.
I think we can let Rex rock along for
a while. You and I still have high
hopes.

F.D.R.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I have read the "Report on Puerto Rico" that came with your memorandum of March 7 and I have been careful not to let it get into anyone's else hands. I am returning it herewith.

I have wondered in my own mind how Rex has been getting along in Puerto Rico. I expected that his course would be a difficult one, however fortunate he might be. I have not permitted myself to become unduly worried because of the necessary reliance by Tugwell upon Munos Marin for political support. Without that support, Tugwell would have nothing to stand on unless he chose to rely upon the following of the late Martinez Nadal, which now constitutes a minority, although it is a minority by the slenderest of margins. Pagan, who represents Puerto Rico here, is a thoroughly discreditable person. He comes pretty close to speaking for the party that is in opposition to Tugwell.

From the very first you and I have not thought much of Munos Marin. He was too sleek, too plausible. But Gruening fell for him hard, which did not do the Gruening administration any good, and it may very well be that Rex is leaning too heavily upon him. When Tugwell brought Munos Marin into my office a few months ago, I was shocked at his appearance. I don't know whether you saw him on that occasion or not. You will remember what a handsome man he was of his type and how well set up. My last look at him revealed a fat, oily and altogether unpleasant looking figure.

It looks to me as though Rex might be damned if he went along with Munos Marin and damned if he didn't. I can't see that Rex could ever have anything in common with the rag-tag and bob-tail politicians who constitute the present opposition. Yet it cannot be gainsaid that Munos Marin barely won control of the legislature by an eyelash. One vote in the lower house, which was one outside of his own party, gave him the slender margin that he has. Yet, on the other hand, admitting that Tugwell might have to play with Munos Marin, there is a point beyond which he should never go. Whether he has gone beyond that point, I do not know of my own knowledge.

It is true that Tugwell does not speak Spanish, but neither did Admiral Leahy, who was the best Governor of Puerto Rico in our time.

The President,
The White House.

Tugwell's handling of the chancellorship of the university was bad. When he asked that a mass meeting of the students be called to vote upon whether he should be their Chancellor or not, he took a false step, in my opinion. I wrote and told him so at the time. I still think that he might be in a stronger position if he had gone through with his original plan of accepting the chancellorship and then taking a leave of absence during his incumbency as Governor. He would then have had an ace in the hole and he would have been more greatly respected for not having retreated.

I am not happy about the situation in Puerto Rico and yet I do not fully agree with the writer of the memorandum. I don't believe that all ideas of social and economic reform ought to be abandoned. If this should become the policy in Puerto Rico, or here for that matter, and the people should come to fear that, after the war, the pitiless hand of unlimited financial power will be laid even more heavily upon them they would have little incentive to give that support to the war effort that is essential if we are to win. I admit that we must trim our sails and wait for a better day before going forward vigorously with the new deal program both in Puerto Rico and here, but it seems to me to be vitally essential that hope is kept alive in the breasts of the people that, while we have limited our program, we have not abandoned it.

Of course, Rex was never much of a mixer but if he is seeing an undue amount of Munos Marin, the fact that he holds himself aloof -- if that is what he is doing -- from other people, makes him all the more subject to criticism. I believe that he should have made his address to the legislature even if he spoke to an empty hall. The people will not long follow a leader if they doubt either his physical or his moral courage.

I am puzzled and disturbed and at a loss to know what to advise. It might be well to send someone to the Island to investigate on some plausible pretext -- someone who knows Spanish, has an objective sort of mind, and a discreet tongue. But it is difficult to find just the right sort of person. Moreover, Rex has been such a good friend of both of us that I feel a distaste for the very thought of sending an undercover man. In ordinary circumstances, I would not do so but we can't allow political conditions to get out of control in an Island that is one of our principle outposts in the Atlantic. If you have any suggestions to make, I will be very happy indeed to carry them out.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Pesh

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Read this but do not let anyone else see it and please send it back to me for my files. It sounds a little to me as if the writer of the report had been misled against Rex.

F. D. R.

Memorandum from John Franklin Carter, dated March 6, 1942, on Puerto Rico under Governor Tugwell.

See Jack Carter folder for memos of March 6th

*file
personal*

PS *J. Edgar Hoover*
THE WHITE HOUSE
MAR 23 3 12 PM '42
RECEIVED

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF PETROLEUM COORDINATOR
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I am sure that you will be interested in the enclosed memorandum
on the tanker situation.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Fisher

Petroleum Coordinator
for National Defense.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF PETROLEUM COORDINATOR
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

DEPUTY COORDINATOR

March 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM for Secretary Ickes:

I attach for your information three statements:

- Statement 1. U. S. owned or controlled tankers sunk or damaged by enemy action since December 7, 1941.
- Statement 2. British, Allied and Neutral tankers sunk by enemy action since December 7, 1941, with offsetting British tanker construction.
- Statement 3. U. S. tanker construction program since December 7, 1941 and for the remainder of 1942.

You will see that a total of 39 U. S. vessels have been sunk or damaged since December 7; that 41 British, Allied and Neutral vessels have been lost, and as against this, the combined U. S. and British tanker construction amounts to 23 vessels for the period since December 7. This leaves a net reduction in the U. S., British, Allied and Neutral tanker fleets of 57 vessels, over the period from December 7 to this date -- slightly more than three months.

Clearly, this rate of loss, if continued, would before a great length of time paralyze our tanker transport system.

RALPH K. DAVIES

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF PETROLEUM COORDINATOR
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
WASHINGTON March 21, 1942

United States Owned or Controlled Tankers Sunk or Damaged by
Enemy Action Since December 7, 1941

	<u>Flag</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>	<u>Deadweight Tonnage</u>
Astral	U. S.	Early Dec.	11,960
Manatoway	Phil.	Early Dec.	2,112
Emidio	U. S.	Dec. 2	10,745
Montebello	U. S.	" 23	12,304
Coimbra	Brit.	Jan. 15	10,121
Allen Jackson	U. S.	" 19	11,010
Walley (Damaged)	U. S.	" 19	12,585
Francis E. Powell	U. S.	" 28	10,600
Rochester	U. S.	" 28	10,841
W. L. Stead	U. S.	Feb. 2	2,750
India Arrow	U. S.	" 5	15,325
China Arrow	U. S.	" 5	15,325
Montrolite	Canadian	" 6	16,000
Victrolite	"	" 11	14,536
Arkansas (Damaged)	U. S.	" 16	10,626
Monrmas	Ven.	" 16	3,728
Oranjestad	Brit.	" 16	3,156
Federmoles	"	" 16	4,650
Son Nicolas	"	" 16	3,156
Tia Juana	"	" 16	3,253
E. H. Blum	U. S.	" 17	15,220
J. H. Few	U. S.	" 20	14,291
Pan Massachusetts	U. S.	" 21	12,600
Esso Copenhagen	Den.	" 22	14,225
Thalia	"	" 23	13,100
Republic	U. S.	" 24	7,940
Cities Service Empire	U. S.	" 24	12,575
R. P. Resor	U. S.	" 27	12,875
W. D. Anderson	U. S.	" 27	17,430
Oregon	U. S.	Mar. 1	10,767
Esso Bolivar (Damaged)	Ven.	" 8	15,255
Reiscent	"	" 9	11,915
Bolivar	Ven.	" 10	3,728
Gulftrade	U. S.	" 10	11,250
John D. Gill	U. S.	" 15	19,400
Australia	U. S.	" 18	12,685
Two Secony Tankers (Dates not yet available)	U. S.	" 18	20,000
E. M. Clark	U. S.	" 20	16,932
Total	39 Vessels	-	147,786

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF PETROLEUM COORDINATOR
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

British, Allied and Neutral Flag Tankers
(Not including U. S. Tankers)
Sunk by Enemy Action Since December 7, 1941

	No.	Deadweight Tonnage
British	21	196,770
Allied & Neutral	20	202,600
<u>Total</u>	41	399,370

British Tanker Construction		Deadweight Tonnage
	No.	Tonnage
Completed Dec. 7, 1941, to date	10	109,660

March 21, 1942

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF PETROLEUM COORDINATOR
FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
WASHINGTON

Statement 3.

March 21, 1942.

U. S. TANKER CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

	<u>Completions</u>		<u>Leadweight</u>
		<u>No.</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
New U. S. flag tankers delivered from Dec. 7, 1941 to date		13	198,060
	<u>Building</u>		
New U. S. flag tankers scheduled for delivery during remainder of 1942		68	1,079,860



file Personal *PSF* *Interior* *John Folder* *1-42*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Here I go again, but this time I am not protesting another raid on the Department of the Interior or suggesting that anything be transferred to it. This letter is about you and the war. I have debated for several weeks whether I should write it at all and just how I should phrase it.

The defeat of the dictator countries -- at least within a reasonable time -- depends on the United States and the United States depends upon you. This makes you the most important factor in this critical world situation. This, in turn, means that if the Congressional elections next Fall should result in reducing your strength in the Senate and of putting a man like Congressman Martin in the Speaker's chair in the House of Representatives, you would be greatly hampered in your war effort and your position of world leadership would be greatly weakened.

I know that your one preoccupation these days is the prosecution of the war. You want to win it. I can understand your disinclination to pay any attention to the political field. You might even say to yourself that it is up to the people themselves to decide whether they want to win this war or not. And yet it seems to me that it is your duty and the expected fulfillment of the obligation that you have entered into with the others of the United Nations to keep your political health in this emergency, just as it is your duty to keep your bodily health.

I am not of course suggesting a revival of narrow partisanship. The issue is not one of party labels; it transcends party lines and affects vitally the outcome of the war. A world-wide struggle to destroy fascism cannot be won by this nation under your leadership if political power passes into the hands of men fundamentally opposed to your leadership and to the basic democratic principles for which we are fighting.

You should not, you must not, let history record that, for want of attention to the political situation, your powers as the outstanding world leader were so impaired that the war was lost. Not that what history may say is the most important consideration. We are fighting to pass on to our children the America that we have inherited from our fathers.

Churchill has had to fight constantly on the political front. That the dictators are not so fighting is simply because they have no political opposition.

Forces are gathering in the United States to check your powers next November. These forces are powerful ones, well-financed and sustained by a hatred of you so intense and so enduring that they would rather destroy

you than win the war. And if they should carry the House of Representatives, to say nothing of making inroads in the Senate, why would not they have the right to insist that they have a clear mandate from the people? The Axis powers would make full and deadly use of your political defeat and even the nations that are now fighting side by side with us would be disconcerted and afraid. The blow at the morale of the peoples of the world who are fighting for freedom would be terrific.

We can't win unity in this country by any policy of appeasement. We have never had complete unity in any war in which we have been engaged. I don't suppose that any country has ever had such unity. What I would prefer to a fictitious unity would be a close unity in support of the war of all of those who believe in it, with the copper-heads separated out so that we could see them and know them for what they are. I would rather have my enemies in front of me than behind me. It seems to me that too many people are devoting too much effort to trying to build up an appearance of unity as if appearance rather than reality mattered.

You have not yet been attacked directly but your enemies are constantly seeking for every possible weakness in your armor. Your leaders in Congress sit tongue-tied, while vicious attacks are made upon various of your policies which, if successful, will weaken you and expose you to more direct attack as the enemy grows more bolder with success. The commentators, many of the columnists, and probably a majority of the press, support these efforts. They would tear down the labor legislation that you have been responsible for, regardless of its effect upon labor and the war effort in order to get at you. Mayris Chaney, Melvyn Douglas and Lowell Mellett have been eagerly seized upon as choice weapons to destroy your strength in the country.

We are fighting an external war against the dictator countries and an internal war against those who have been your enemies from the beginning and who have not ceased to be such, although we are fighting for our lives. The groups that we have known variously as "big business," or "concentrated wealth," or "economic royalists," might now be called American Fascists and that is how I classify them. There are not a few American Fascists and they are a dangerous lot because they have the power that goes with position and prestige and money.

I believe that there are many Fascists in the Army and the Navy. Nor is the civil side of the national Administration free from them. Most of these people are still working underground, although some of the more daring and more powerful are beginning to show their heads. This group doesn't care anything about the country. Its members believe that they can buy whatever freedom they may want for themselves. Before we got into the war, they openly said that we could do business with Hitler. They believe so today, and they are willing to do business with Hitler. They are looking forward to an opportunity to establish their own type of American Fascism in this country. They are totalitarian at heart. They believe that, once securely in control of the government, they, too, can impose their will upon the farmer, the laborer, the professional people and the small business man. And doubtless they could until the inevitable social revolution would overthrow them in its turn and make a shambles of our country.

In order to have their way they must destroy you, and the way to destroy you is to drive a wedge between you and the rank and file of the people, whose support has always been your great strength.

The only way in which you can defeat this effort is to hold onto the popular strength that you have and add to it. Your strength, as was Lincoln's, lies in the common people, the man on the farm, in the factories, in the little shops, and behind the counters. If the people can be convinced that you and your Administration are making a failure of this war, or if they can be persuaded that you have lost interest in them and have turned to the Fascists -- economic royalists would be a better term here -- as your main reliance in this crisis, the result will be tragic. The Fascists are fighting on both of these fronts insidiously, but persistently and adroitly. And to date we have been taking it lying down, not only in Congress but outside of Congress.

I wonder if I have been mistaken in thinking that, during recent Cabinet meetings, I have detected an increasing note of concern on the part of those who, by no stretch of the imagination, could be called New Dealers. It seems clear that members of the Cabinet think that something ought to be done to educate the people and to stir up sentiment in support of the war. Last Friday you said that there were probably from 125 to 130 subversive newspapers in the country. Francis Biddle spoke of repressive measures but wanted to give a little more rope with which Father Coughlin and others might further entangle themselves. Frank Knox wished that something might be done about the columnists. On two or three occasions, Don Nelson and Frank Walker have advocated military parades.

During the several meetings when it appeared to me that there was a mounting but unformulated belief that all was not well in the country and that something ought to be done about it, I have kept quiet. But last Friday I did express myself. I said that what was going on in the country was an effort to destroy you and that we had been taking it lying down.

The papers on Saturday indicated that you might go out to the country to sample the views of the people. I hope that this is true. You can do such a job as a hundred other men could not do, but your efforts ought to be supplemented. I believe that a persistent and carefully worked out campaign should be undertaken at once. Whenever a viper's head appears, a club should be taken to it. If the HERALD-TRIBUNE can come out in an editorial critical of McCormick and Patterson, surely others whose hearts are in this war can do the same thing. After all, how many people read an editorial in the HERALD-TRIBUNE or in any other paper?

The truth should be widely told about the effect of the 40-hour week law on war production. This is the only way to shut up the newspapers that are either misinformed or are being disingenuous in talking about labor's obstructive tactics. The fact that there is such a widespread belief in the lies that have been broadcast on this issue is because many of those in a position to speak with authority have been silent. Even as wise and well-informed a man as William Allen White, in a letter that I have just received, said to me: "This being a farm state, the most unanimous kick is against the 40-hour week * * *. The people out here -- and I suppose this goes down for Oklahoma, Nebraska and the Dakotas, don't feel that union labor should be coddled when our boys are volunteering by the thousands to get the jump on the draft." Now if a wise and humane social

man like Mr. White can be so far off the track, what is to be expected of the ordinary newspaper reader who keeps up with the current news by looking at the headlines of metropolitan papers that they think this is a good opportunity to join with the Byrds, the Smiths and the Dies "to put labor in its place".

If we do not start something immediately, we will be too late. Not only will there be more sentiment to overcome, but if we should start out on an active campaign of education -- strictly confined to war issues -- later we will be accused of campaigning for the November elections. Republicans, as well as democrats, honest conservatives, as well as New Dealers, should be enlisted in this effort. But it must be a comprehensive, a well-planned and a carefully executed effort. A desultory speech here and there by this or that individual, however influential he may be -- excepting only yourself of course -- will get us nowhere. I believe that if you should take such a trip as has been suggested, it should be followed by speeches in other parts of the country and on the air in order to get the maximum results.

Another reason for starting now is that it may reasonably be expected that there will be a good deal of bad feeling in the country when people really realize what we are up against with respect to rubber. I can understand your being very tired of the subject of rubber but I doubt if any of us has "heard anything yet" on the subject. We optimistic Americans refuse to believe that we are going to be denied anything until the actual denial occurs, and then we can be as angry as if we had never been forewarned. So when the farmer, the workman, the truckman and all of the thousands of people in this country who rely upon rubber as an essential to business, to say nothing of recreation or social activities, find that they cannot use their tractors, their trucks or their cars because they can't buy tires, I am afraid that public sentiment will be very bad indeed. And this resentment over what will be charged by your enemies as a failure of the Administration will express itself at the polls.

My own feeling is that there are too many Fascists operating today in Washington. I believe that you ought to sweep aside, not only every policy but every individual who either hampers the war effort at any time or has not been able to deliver the goods. I am sure that any of us ought to be willing to step aside, if that is the best contribution that he can make to the common welfare.

In England, Churchill has had to get rid of more and more of those in the Government who were in disfavor because they supported the appeasement policies of Chamberlain. I think that here we also owe it to the people to get rid of all persons who have been appeasers or defeatists or disloyalists. A man who is disloyal is none the less so if he is put into a position where he can make better use of his disloyalty.

This letter is much too long. However, it expresses not only my own feeling, but that of many others devoted and loyal to you, with whom I have talked and from whom I have heard. I would have taken my perturbations to someone else if I had known to whom to go. If we have some more disasters between now and November, as is not at all improbable, and if the people

are not prepared for them, and have not been educated to see that it is the last battle that counts and not intermediate skirmishes, we may well lose the war locally. And if we lose it locally, it will be an overall loss.

We must drive the disloyalists into the open. We must thwart the attempt to destroy you. The way to do this is to go to the people and tell them that if we permit our chosen leader now to be destroyed, we also will be destroyed. We can't win except under your leadership, but the validity of that leadership is being impaired, hour by hour, day by day, by our conscious and unconscious Fascists.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ichen

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

P.S. It is also my conviction that if the democratic hosts are led by Ed Flynn, their chances of victory will be greatly lessened. Flynn was a flop two years ago. You won, not because of, but in spite of him. His job is altogether too big for him. We can't win a national battle under the leadership of a Bronx politician, however clever he may be in the local field.

PSF

Ickes Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 20, 1942

PERSONAL MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HAROLD ICKES

As you know, Oscar Chapman is very seriously considering making the race for the Senate out in his home state.

Oscar is not asking for my "blessing" and understands perfectly that under present conditions I am not endorsing any candidates. He merely wants to know if I had any objections and, of course, I am entirely willing for him to do so if he so elects.

He talked with Mac about this and said he would like to take a little time off without pay and look the situation over before making a decision. I see no objection to this and have told Mac to advise him to take the matter up with you directly.

F. D. R.

mhm/tmb

RF *John F. Allen*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. DONALD NELSON:

To speak to me about on Friday.

P.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum
Coordinator for National Defense, 4/21/42, to the
President. In re petroleum situation, and urging
construction of oil pipe line to the East Coast.

file
personal

14 May '42

Ellis Folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

RECEIVED
MAY 14 3 19 PM '42
THE WHITE HOUSE

PS

Dear Mr. President —

I had an awfully good time last night. You are nice to have included Harold and me in so small a group that we had a chance to talk with you. And, you know, that is the first time that I have ever ranked high enough to sit next to you. I liked it.

I am sure you know that there will be a warm welcome for you whenever you should choose to come to Headwaters Room. Rather than importune you, I shall wait for you to say the word.

All I ask is a little advance notice so
that I can do well for you. The Farm is
on a war footing now, which means that
the luxuries of living are on the shelf. A
return to them, even for an evening, requires
a bit of planning.

It is a joy to see you looking so well!

Love
Ickes

May 14, 1942.

John F. Alder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1942.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do you think?

F.D.R.

Personal letter from Sayre regarding his
resignation as High Commissioner to the P.I.
together with memo re Sayre from Wayne Coy
5/11/42

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. FEB 24 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date _____

JFK Folder
1-12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
May 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HAROLD ICKES:

As you know, Francis Sayre wants to be relieved as High Commissioner to the Philippines in a few weeks. Frankly, I have no place to put him into at the present time.

I think the place should be kept filled -- especially by somebody who knows the Far East and would understand the problems of the future in that area -- also somebody who would be persona grata to you and Quezon.

Do you know Hornbeck of the State Department? He has been their principal Far Eastern so-called expert and knows the whole subject pretty thoroughly. Probably the future job as High Commissioner will entail less routine work in the Islands and more connection with the Chinese, the Javans, the Malays, etc. than heretofore. In other words, it is my private thought that when this war is won, we shall probably have to help clean up the mess for about a year and then turn the whole works over to the Philippine Government under some form of neutralization and some form of mutual tariff agreements, retaining possibly only an American adviser to the Philippine President.

I can think of no one who would fit into a situation of that kind better than Hornbeck.

"F.D.R."
F.D.R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~Confidential~~

Anything said about Hornbeck
and Phillifines is not to
affect any function of
Mr. Tolles, whatever that
may be —

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date
THE WHITE HOUSE

FEB 24 1972

WASHINGTON

PRIVATE AND
CONFIDENTIAL

June 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have talked with Ickes in regard to the High Commissionership to the Philippines. The situation seems to be this: That Sayre should probably resign on June 30th -- the end of the fiscal year. His successor will have very little to do as a matter of actual fact, yet I hesitate to leave the place vacant in view of the fact that the new High Commissioner should get to know Quezon and keep in touch with him and Osmena. He would have few executive duties, and I wonder a little if he should receive the full salary of High Commissioner until the time comes for return to the Philippines.

See if you can devise some way by which he would get only a portion of the salary.

Ickes has nothing against Hornbeck and my only question is that Hornbeck is too useful in the State Department to give him a nominal job at this time. Ickes suggests Ben Cohen.

What is your present thought about all this?

F. D. R.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1942.

James F. Adder
JUN 8 1 26 PM '42
RECEIVED
THE WHITE HOUSE

My dear Mr. President:

I have been doing a good deal of pondering about the High Commissionership to the Philippine Islands, and I hope that you will think as well as I do of the idea that Ben Cohen would be an admirable selection.

As I indicated to you in an earlier letter on the subject, I am willing to take this whole matter up with President Quezon if you instruct me so to do. I suggest that it would be better to settle it when it can be done naturally and normally.

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

JDI

file
Personal

Johns Folder

Dear Mr. President —

A fine hostess I have turned out to be — delivering a
gilt-edged invitation and then running out on it. It is
the worst of luck that Harold is speaking in Boston on
Wednesday. I am going along because most of my friends
are near Boston, and I am sure that it won't be long be-
fore civilians have a tough time travelling — so, I am

going while the going is good.

Will you try it again in about a week? Harold has
to be away again about the 11th or so of June.

Best!

John Jones

Saturday



*file
personal*

BSF

*John Folder
1-42*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

May 25, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

The whole question of gasoline rationing, pipeline, barges, tanks and tankers, etc., is loaded with dynamite, and for your own sake I hope that you will be sure of your grounds and the public reaction thereto before you make any statements.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
personal*

June 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MAC

Will you try to find a place for Governor Harwood of the Virgin Islands -- preferably some kind of a Judgeship? He was Judge in the Canal Zone and, as far as I know, did a good job, but he is not a success in the Virgin Islands. Will you take it up with Biddle?

F. D. R.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

How much longer Governor Harwood of the Virgin Islands?
Above all imagining he is something God-awful. If you think that
this is merely prejudice on my part, I beg you to take a secret
poll of those who have to do business with him (if and when he
happens to be anywhere where one can do business with him) or who
have personal contacts with him. I would have shown signs of impatience
long before this except that I have a martyr complex, besides which I
haven't so low an opinion of anyone in the Administration that, without
conscientious reverberations, I would want to wish Harwood onto him.

Has enough been said?

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Fisher

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

B5F John Fisher

Deke Folder

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1942.

PRIVATE AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT X

Referring to your private and confidential memorandum of June 9 in regard to the High Commissionership to the Philippines, I see no objection to acceptance of Sayre's resignation on June 30. There would probably be some advantage in making the new appointment promptly, although if this should not prove feasible the situation would probably be taken care of satisfactorily by your letting it be known that you intended to fill the position.

With regard to the question of devising some way by which a new High Commissioner would get only a portion of the salary, I am enclosing a memorandum prepared by our legal people which may be useful to you and others concerned with this problem.

The situation is not clear-cut, but seems to be about as follows:

No



DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date FEB 24 1972

No one (with perhaps the exception of the persons mentioned in the last paragraph) could be appointed to the position of High Commissioner without his being legally entitled to full salary. Any appointee could, of course, agree to waive any portion of his salary. Retired Army and Navy officers could be appointed to the position while retaining their status on the retired list; such an officer might more readily agree to waive the High Commissioner's salary or a portion thereof.

A member of the staff of the High Commissioner or an officer of the Army or Navy could be appointed Acting High Commissioner and need not receive any salary other than his salary as a member of the staff or as an Army or Navy officer.

There is a possibility that certain Ambassadors and Ministers who are unable to function at their posts because of the existing emergency and whose compensation would be limited by law to \$9,000 per annum might be appointed either as High Commissioner or as Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure:
Memorandum.

C H

Of course, the President has legal authority to appoint any person to the office and with the title of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippines with the advice and consent of the Senate and subject to the law prohibiting appointment to an office to which compensation is attached if the appointee already holds an office with compensation of \$2,500 per annum. Under this law appointments would be limited to (1) persons holding no office under the Government, (2) persons whose office carries compensation of less than \$2,500, and (3) Army and Navy officers on the retired list.

Any person appointed to the office and with the title of the United States High Commissioner would be legally entitled to demand the full salary of the office, but if the person selected agreed to accept a smaller salary there would appear to be no legal objection to such procedure.

Some of the difficulties incident to an appointment to the office and title of High Commissioner at a salary less than the full salary of the office might not arise if someone were designated to act as United States High Commissioner. Specific authority for such designation

is contained in Title 48, Section 1237(b), United States Code, under which the President is authorized to "designate a member of the staff of the United States High Commissioner to the Philippine Islands or an officer of the Army or Navy of the United States to act as the High Commissioner in the event of a vacancy in said office".

Pursuant to this authorization the President could direct that the person designated as Acting High Commissioner receive only the salary of his office as a member of the High Commissioner's staff or as an Army or Navy officer.

With a view to examining all possibilities, reference is also made to the first deficiency appropriation act approved April 1, 1941 (Title 22, Section 41, United States Code), which provides that any one of certain Ambassadors or Ministers who are unable, because of the existing emergency, to function at their posts "may be appointed or assigned to serve in any capacity in which a Foreign Service officer is authorized by law to serve". Salary under such authorization is expressly limited to \$9,000 per annum. While it is not entirely clear whether the authorization of this act would justify the appointment of one of these Ambassadors or Ministers as United States

States High Commissioner to the Philippines, it cannot be said that such an appointment would conflict with the authorization, since the High Commissioner to the Philippines might be regarded as performing a function comparable to that of a diplomatic representative (also because there is already legal authority for the assignment of Foreign Service officers to the Philippine Islands to perform the functions customarily performed by Foreign Service officers and to advise and assist the High Commissioner (Title 48, Section 1238(a), United States Code)).

Should it be considered advisable to appoint someone as Acting High Commissioner, one of these Ambassadors or Ministers might be so appointed -- especially if he were first made a member of the staff of the High Commissioner.



*file
pres mail*

*PSE Jones Folder
1-42*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE
AUG 3 1 13 PM '42
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

Count Sforza sent this to me and, with the thought
that you might be interested, too, I am sending it
on.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Jones

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

MESSAGE TO SPORZA FROM ROME RECEIVED JUNE 1942.

The Italian situation presents itself in the following general terms:

a) The Monarchy: Twenty years of gradual "constitutional abdications" in domestic as well as international affairs have prostrated the monarchy which finds itself today stripped of all its attributes and prerogatives and is utterly incapable of regaining prestige or taking the initiative for future action.

b) The Army: It is a known fact that the Army has never been in favor of the present war. The humiliation of military setbacks, the general state of unpreparedness existing at the time it was suddenly dragged into the conflict, and the complete lack of confidence in its leaders, whose political tie-ups with the Regime were only too well known in Army circles, have transformed this general attitude into one of deep resentment. The Army ascribes its present unhappy condition not only to the dishonesty and incompetence of the Fascist Regime, but also to the passive role of the Monarchy.

c) The Bureaucracy: Signs of disintegration and distrust in the Government, rendered more acute at the sight of corruption in high places, are clearly visible in all the organs of the State, and even in its remotest ramifications.

d) Industry and business: Uneasiness and panic are beginning to affect this group too. The over-confident attitude of former days, when the people of this group had voiced their full support of the Axis ambitions, has died down by now, and in its place one finds a cold awareness of the fact that they are bound to fall with the Regime as they grew with it in wealth and influence. They know that their existence cannot be separated from the trends followed by the Fascist Regime; they know perfectly well that they are a genuine product of these trends. This holds true both for the rich industrialists of pre-fascist times, who found in the economy of parasitism privilege known to the world as the economy of self sufficiency, their unexpected boom, and for the fascist-created plutocrats, who come for the most part from the ranks of the Party.

e) The intellectual bourgeoisie: Except for an important nucleus, which opposed the Regime from the very beginning and is still opposing it at the present moment, a considerable section of Italy's intellectual bourgeoisie had been ~~over~~ over to the side of fascism by means of resistance-breaking policy of jobs, privileges and other allurements. This group is now confronted with a serious moral crisis. One may however add that all the senseless myths, all the historical constructions, all the abstruse philosophies which had at one time been created and divulged throughout the world with the help of this group, or had been accepted by the people of this group as a comfortable alibi and a justification for the senselessness of fascism, have now been rejected in full by these same people.

f) The rest of the Italian bourgeoisie: This section of the population had been easily won over, with the usual promises of a better social order and with the skillful display of patriotic verbiage and slogans, especially created for the occasion. This group later endorsed for the same reasons the imperialistic mirage of Ethiopia, but it finds it increasingly hard to go on paying the moral, physical and economic expenses of the peace and wartime policies of the present Regime. The awakening of this group from the fascist illusion is also an accomplished fact.

g) Labor: The working classes too have a sad reawakening after falling for the fascist promises. The privileges granted them in the past 20 years are ended or completely meaningless by now; labor is hard-pressed by the increasing difficulties

of everyday life; the lower and less privileged strata of labor look at Bolshevism for a solution and hope in a widespread social upheaval.

h) The youth of bourgeois origin: The best elements of this group which had formerly fallen under the spell of fascist rhetoric, have a very clear vision of Italy's needs and problems. They are very outspoken in asking for a complete renovation of Italy's political set-up, and in expressing their will to revolt. Ample proof of their feelings may be found in the all-too frequent news of repressions on the part of the fascist police of antifascist movements headed by youngsters from the middle classes. These brave youngsters do their best in trying to flank the political activities of other and more serious underground movements, which are even more cruelly repressed.

This being the situation, and considering all of its possible developments, one may infer that Fascism has no chances of survival after this war, and that its present strength consists solely in its police force. This is, in fact, the only surviving activity of the entire Fascist Regime in Italy.

Rumors to the effect of possible separate peace offers to Italy are the object of widespread speculation abroad. This possibility however seems to be out of the question as long as Nazism can still count on its military machine which exerts direct control over Italy's life through a powerful army of occupation. A second and less direct form of control is provided by the news of Nazi successes and Nazi power, which still exert intimidating influence on certain sections of the population. However, even if a separate peace were possible today some sort of a putsch is to be expected as soon as the end of Fascism is near enough to appear inevitable.

This putsch may consist in an attempt on the part of the Monarchy to offer itself as the bearer of a solution of compromise, which the international organization at the disposal of the Vatican would try to guarantee and support.

The new ruling group would include in this case : elements from the Army, all of the clique of industrial profiteers who found their greatest opportunity in the ill-famed economy of self-sufficiency, the reactionary elements of the Church, and the so-called lukewarm Fascists. In other words all those faked liberals who had already adhered to the Fascist Regime under the cloak of the corporative organization, including certain Catholic and Socialist elements, would be represented in the new set-up.

That such a group may ever represent a solution of Italy's internal ills is to be excluded - as is to be excluded also that such a solution may best meet the requirements of a future international order. We may safely say that such an attempt, while resulting in the temporary individual rescue of the accomplices of Fascist despotism, would only exasperate the passions stewing in Italy's political waters, and cause them to seek an outlet elsewhere.

The monarchic-reactionary compromise must be avoided at all costs, if we wish to prevent Italy from once more becoming the cause of new political disorders in Europe, be it under the flag of bolshevism or of a new incarnation of Nationalism - such as the compromise in discussion would offer us.

The real sentiment of the country, in other words the feeling of the people, after the collapse of the fascist experiment, must be clearly understood and brought to the light.

This sentiment reveals itself already and unmistakably in the new orientation of the intellectual bourgeoisie. It also manifests itself concretely in the opposition of the Italian youth to the Government, in the behaviour of the younger generation which is fighting tyranny in all parts of the country. It has also become the sentiment of a growing section of the middle classes, both bourgeois and laborers, who have rediscovered in democracy not only the ideal which prompted the Italian wars of Independence (Risorgimento), but also the only safeguard of their spiritual evolution and of their future economic progress.

These forces are now gathering around that nucleus of Italians who from the very beginning, and with daily sacrifices, fought for the ideals of liberty and democracy, as opposed to dictatorship in all of its nationalistic marks. The people of this group are fully aware of the responsibilities of statesmanship. They also know who shall be held responsible in Italy for the present disaster.

The new forces of Italy ask for a complete renovation, both in the institutions of the country as in the people manning them; this renovation will be made possible, in a real democratic spirit and with new democratic institutions, only if all the forces responsible for the rise and success of the fascist experiment are wiped off at the first chance and without mercy.

 Postscriptum. May 1942.

The above note was drafted by a group of friends, this winter. We know now that it has reached the person to whom it had been addressed. If it contributed at all to the shaping of his official declaration of policies of January 21, 1942, this is to us a cause of deep satisfaction.

The situation has evolved in the course of the last months, and is evolving now in the sense forecast in said declaration.

The disillusionment of the fascists, who are by now convinced of the impossibility of an Axis victory, and the fears of the fascist plutocrats, work in favor of a solution of compromise which would be obtained by gathering around the remnants of the Monarchy, all the so-called moderate fascist elements, namely the Nationalists, the newly rich, the recently emblazoned Aristocracy of fascist creation, and in general all those who took part in the comedy of non-belligerency. To these should be added the plutocracy, likewise of fascist origin, and the reactionary catholics, all under the belied disguise of an old-fashioned liberalism, revarnished for the occasion, and represented by some decrepit surviving member of the old parliamentary class.

This political putsch, for which manoeuvres and conversations are in progress, and which counts on the help and support of certain Anglo-American circles, using the traditional scarecrow of a communist revolution for the purpose, will fatally confuse and render more difficult the solution of the Italian crisis which best fits the Italian needs and best interprets the historical problems of the moment.

Even if this premeditated putsch should reach its aim of taking by surprise the Italian public and the misinformed portion of international public opinion, it still would have a scant chance of stability in the future, while it would only succeed in stiffening the resistance of the true anti-fascist forces - by which word true we mean the forces that for twenty years have fought the fascist-monarchic dictatorship,

under the common banner of a General opposition to fascism in all its forms.

These considerations prove the exactness of the official stand taken January 1942 by the highest exponent of the antifascist movement, with regard to the shape of things to come in post-war Italy.

In fact, in our opinion, the above-mentioned stand is not only essential in that it states the full responsibility of the Monarchy as a partner in the Fascist experiment, but it is also essential to the future of Italy, because it is the only program for the future collaboration of the different political forces existing in the country, based on sound principles and capable of beneficial and lasting effects both at home and in the world at large. This is why we ask that this particular point be given due emphasis and be stressed with ever increasing energy. Action is being taken to this effect over here also with regard to the socialist and catholic-democratic groups.

With regard to our note it is superfluous to confirm our full endorsement of all other items mentioned by the mentioned leader in his declaration of January 1942.

We wish to add however that from a purely tactical point of view it will be advisable to maintain and strengthen our position of full intransigence with regard to all problems connected with our future institutional and democratic order.

We finally warn, in order to avoid all possible misunderstandings, against any communication which may contradict the principles and facts by us herein detailed, and advise that it be viewed as tendentious and taken with the utmost reserve.

Translators Note:

This document is translated by the "Mazzini Society". For the reader's better understanding of the allusion to an "official declaration of policies of January 1942" - the "Mazzini Society" adds the text of Count Sforza's letter to the N.Y. Times, January 21, 1942.

" No reward is deserved for the simplest of duties! - to keep faith to the ideals of freedom in spite of menaces alternated with offers of bribes. My compatriots - especially in the Americas - have granted me an undeserved reward when, by hundreds of thousands, they have chosen me, in recent occasions, as the interpreter of their ideals without asking me questions. My life under fascism seemed to them the best unsolicited answer to any question. And I am deeply grateful to them.

" But distinguished Americans and British, Latin Americans and Continental Europeans have recently asked me - sometimes with a bit of anxiety for the future - how we consider, my friends and myself, the reconstitution of Italy after the Fascist disaster. Some, after having heard my answer, suggest that we ought to issue a manifesto.

" Although I do not feel that I am an exile - am I not with all my soul in Italy? - declarations from abroad are dangerous. The salvation of Italy must be the travail of all the Italians. Therefore no manifesto for the time being at least. But the views, the hopes and - why not? - the certainties I share with many representative Italians are so clear in our minds and the attempts at confusion from well-embusbed fifth columns are so probable that it has become necessary to state publicly our stand even on our most delicate after-war problems.

" I. As soon as freed from the Nazi-Fascist oppression the Italian people will choose their political institutions.

" II. All Italians will bow to the results of a free plebiscite. And if - as is probable - a democratic republic will have been the choice of the nation, all I hear from Italy gives me the absolute certainty that there will be no opposition and no grudge from any side - quite the contrary. Did not one of the highest and oldest pre-Fascist Italian dignitaries write a few weeks ago "How can we support suicide!"

" III. But institutions matter little without men. And a free Italy will need men who know that the safest way to defend democracy and to promote the advent of a higher social justice is to impose the sternest respect for the law. These men exist even in the barren islands to which fascism has deported them. After years of demagogic charlatans Italy will know how to choose.

" IV. The old humanistic civilization of Italy will find the necessary equilibrium between freedom of the spirit and economic organization. A decentralization based on our best intellectual traditions will help to create the new atmosphere of complete freedom of thought, of press and of course of cult.

" V. A judicial system completely independent will initiate the new era with the most severe sanctions on those who in the highest ranks betrayed their solemn oath. Such severe justice will make it possible to pardon those who sinned mainly through fear or incomprehension, thus creating an Italy of peace, not of revenges.

" VI. The new Italian Government, just because composed of men who hailed the Atlantic Declaration of 1941 as a generous message of human justice, will have the authority to insist for an equitable distribution of raw materials the Italian people need to maintain their admirable traditions of intelligent work.

" VII. We Italians know that these and other social and economic problems may be solved only in a world based on international solidarity, where there will be no more place for the anarchical independence of the nationalistic States. That is why free Italy will give the most ardent support to the advent of such an organized world. Is not the proof of the anti-Italian character of fascism given by the fact that our noblest intellectual traditions, from Dante to Mazzini, are more internationally minded than elsewhere?

" VIII. The Italians will cooperate with courage and serenity to the solution of any international problem concerning them; with only a condition: that there will be no discussion of Italian problems as such, but of Italian sides of European problems.

" Of course, in the Europe of tomorrow the nationalities must remain living flames of thought and art; but no more must they become pretexts for aggressions. As an Italian, I never forget that our immortal Mazzini wrote: "I love my country because I love all the countries."

SFORZA

BF Ickes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Transmitting copy of memorandum which the
President sent to the Secretary of Agriculture
under date of 11/10/42, in regard to food.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

I expect to have a meeting shortly in regard to food. I am not inclined to go along with the idea of WFB that food control be placed under the WFB. It should be under the Secretary of Agriculture.

Therefore, I wish you would be thinking about some form or organization which would be set up under you but which probably should have a Director or Administrator at its head.

Harold Ickes believes that he should have somebody in the new set-up to handle those things which are in the field of the Department of the Interior -- especially food fish -- and I think there is merit to that suggestion.

I wish you would talk with Harold Ickes in regard to the obtaining of a much larger fish catch. I am sure it can be done,

PSF Ickes

WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

in the field of the small fish,
of the pan fish and other
varieties which are found next
to shore and which can be gaught
from rowboats or small motor
boats with very little equipment.

"F. D. R."

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of
this memorandum to the Secretary of
Agriculture.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

NOV - 2 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

A recent letter from the Chairman of the War Production Board informed me that the entire question of food was undergoing a comprehensive study. The Washington newspapers of October 31 and November 1, 1942, mentioned that the appointment of a food administrator had been recommended by the Chairman of the War Production Board, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture. Having had no part either in the study of the food problem or in drafting the above recommendation, I must urge that consideration be given to certain aspects of the Nation's food resources and production, as well as the administration thereof, that involve responsibilities and functions of the Department of the Interior. These duties do not appear to be well understood by the present Food Requirements Committee of the War Production Board, nor are they recognized appropriately in any food programs that have been initiated or developed up to the present time.

The commercial fisheries of the United States and Alaska produce annually about five billion pounds of fish and fishery products, the bulk of which is used for food. This important source of protein food ranks second in volume, following pork and beef, among the various sources of animal protein. The fisheries also provide our only source of Vitamin-A oils, industrial oils used in manufacturing war materials and munitions, fish meal for animal feeding, and other essential by-products that cannot be derived from other sources in adequate quantities if at all. The Department of the Interior, through the Fish and Wildlife Service, is responsible for the maintenance, conservation, and development of the fishery resources of the Nation. Although its regulatory functions are limited to the fisheries of Alaska, the Department is responsible for biological and technological research, economic development, and the formulation of over-all policies and programs for the fisheries. Moreover, the States rely on the Department to provide the scientific and economic foundation for their regulatory and administrative functions.

You recognized the importance of the fisheries in the war program and the responsibilities of the Department of the Interior by designating the Secretary of the Interior as Coordinator of Fisheries and by establishing the Office of the Coordinator of Fisheries in Executive Order No. 9204, dated July 21, 1942. This additional responsibility has been discharged diligently. I report with considerable regret, however, that the lack of direct representation of the Department of the Interior on the Food Requirements Committee established by the Chairman of the War Production Board on June 4, 1942, has resulted in con-



BF Baker folder
1-42

siderable confusion and duplication of effort in the handling of fishery and other food matters of direct concern to the Department.

In addition to the Office of the Coordinator of Fisheries and the Fish and Wildlife Service, functions and responsibilities directly concerned with problems of food production and allocation are exercised by the Office of Indian Affairs, the Grazing Service, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Division of Territories and Island Possessions, all of the Department of the Interior.

In order that the Department of the Interior may carry out its duties in producing and maintaining food supplies essential for the war program, I respectfully request an opportunity to present the claims of the Department for direct participation in planning before final action is taken on the appointment of a food administrator, or the establishment of any new or revised food-planning organization. This request is prompted by my earnest desire to insure that the Department functions efficiently and that its responsibilities and interests in the Nation's food program are coordinated effectively with those of other Departments and agencies of the Federal Government.

Sincerely yours,

Harold C. Parks

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,

The White House.



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BF Ickes folder 1-42

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

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November 16, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

When I had the pleasure of lunching with you last Monday you suggested that I call together some of the liberals for a political powwow. Upon careful consideration, I have come to the conclusion that I am not the man to do this. My motives might be misunderstood and I doubt whether I could accomplish the results that are so necessary if we are to be in any position in 1944 to put up a real fight on the political front.

Sincerely yours,

Harold G. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

TSF H. Ickes folder
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personnel 2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HAROLD ICKES

If you bring food, especially disguised or alibied food, to the White House you will be in the clutches of the Secret Service about thirty seconds after you come into the gate. What is a better idea is that I should go out to dine with my old farmer's wife, named Jane. The Secret Service would, I think, trust her where you would not have a chance!

F. D. R.

PSF Ickes



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

I am inviting myself to lunch with you at your pleasure, if any, and convenience. I will bring the food, or the principal items thereof, and I will also produce the cook if you will provide a range for him. Fish and Wildlife has been experimenting with new foods, or with old foods prepared in a new fashion. We want to interest the public. And what better stage setting than the Presidential desk? I have only one condition, and that is that you do not ask what the food is until you have "et" it.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

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PSE Laker folder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Letter from John Brophy, Director of Industrial Union Councils, Congress of Industrial Organizations, 718, Jackson Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., 11/30/42, to the President, enclosing marked copy of the 11/15 issue of the United Mine Workers Journal. States that it is full of veiled or direct thrusts at the Administration and the war effort.

JDI

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2-42

10 Dec 1942

Dear Mr. President —

These are two reasons why you have not sooner
heard from the farmer's wife: (1) The shuffles; (2) a
manpower problem all my own. Thank goodness
there is still Mr. Mc NUTT to sustain it!

Will you name the day, the hour, and the people

whom you want with you. I guarantee that you
won't be turned into quinea pigs for the occasion. You
might instead be exposed to home industry - home efficiency!
That is the way I make Harold's living now!

It has been too long since you have been here. The baby boy
who sat on your knee is now walking and talking and is, I
think, almost old enough to remember all his life that he once
kissed you.

I hope that you will come.

December 10, 1942.

John Jones

The President _____

Personal

(325)
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TSE Ickes folder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. LEON HENDERSON

Dear Leon:

Harold is right. Please
return this for my files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from Hon. Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum Administrator for War, 12/10/42, to the President, enclosing clipping which appeared in the Washington Star, Tuesday, 12/8/42, entitled "Consumers Offered Method of Checking Fuel Oil Allotment". Mr. Ickes sends this to the President's in connection with the President's statement at the last Cabinet meeting that he didn't know how to fill out the fuel oil blank that had come to him at Hyde Park.

~~(367)~~
hm

P37 Ickes folder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL LEAHY

Will you take this up with
the Joint Board in connection
with the Churchill telegram?

F. D. R.

Memorandum for the President from
Hon. L. W. Douglas, Deputy Administrator,
War Shipping Administration, 12/15/42,
returning letter which the President
received from the Secretary of the Interior
under date of 12/10/42, attached to which
is photostatic copy of letter which
Mr. Ickes received from H. Wilkinson,
British petroleum representative in the
U.S., dated 12/5/42, urging that every
effort be made to allocate additional
tankers to the British fleet for carrying
oil.

WITH THE CHIEF OF BUREAU
THE 1942 BUDGET IN CONNECTION
WITH THE 1942 BUDGET IN CONNECTION

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE CHIEF OF BUREAU
WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

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hm

PSE Schenfelder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. LEWIS W. DOUGLAS

What is the answer to this?

F. D. R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior,
12/10/42, to the President, enclosing photostatic
copy of a letter from H. Wilkinson, British
petroleum representative in the U.S.A., dated
12/5/42, urging allocation of additional tankers
to the British fleet for carrying oil.

WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1942

Handled by Adm. Leahy
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THE WHITE HOUSE
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
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In reply to yours of the 11th enclosing letter from the Secretary of the Interior (which is returned herewith), the best answer that can be given now is that every possible means of increasing U. K. stocks of oil is being explored by us, the Office of Petroleum Administrator, and the Navy.

One of the plans being adopted, effective today, is to load more oil in New York instead of Texas for the U. K., with the result that more oil will be dispatched for England than is presently the case, in the same number of ships that are presently employed. We expect shortly to increase the number of tankers in the service.

I saw Wilkinson yesterday.

Respectfully submitted,


L. W. Douglas,
Deputy Administrator.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 10, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed photostatic copy of a letter from Mr. H. Wilkinson, British petroleum representative here, relates to a situation that merits the earnest consideration of all of us.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Fehos

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

PSF Ickes


TELEPHONE NATIONAL 2526



BOX 680
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN STATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

H. WILKINSON
BRITISH PETROLEUM REPRESENTATIVE
IN THE U.S.A.

December 5th, 1942.



Hon. Harold L. Ickes,
Petroleum Administrator,
Petroleum Administration for War,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received an urgent telephone call from Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd, Minister of Petroleum, in which he informed me that the Cabinet had the oil stock situation in England under review, and that they are seriously alarmed.

Heavy as has been the constant decline in stocks over the past months from the peak of over 7,000,000 tons in February of this year, yet there has been a further decline over the last two weeks of over 150,000 tons bringing the present stock figure down to but little more than 5,200,000 tons. Unless, therefore, there is a sharp change in the immediate future, it is feared that operational plans next year are bound to be affected.

The Authorities in London are aware, and I have kept them closely informed, of the very constructive measures which are on foot, with particular reference to the plan whereby the Navy will provide us with about 20,000 tons a day of oil in New York as of December 15th, which will allow a much shorter turn-around for those tankers uplifting from that point to the U.K.; likewise they know full well how closely you are watching the situation and how alive you are, and indeed always have been, to its needs.

The meat of the message therefore is to convey their great appreciation for all that is being done, and at the same time to urge that every effort be made to allocate any additional tankers to our fleet that can possibly be done. Here again they are highly appreciative of all that has and is being done, but time is of the essence and they are hopeful that new construction will prove of some assistance in this respect.

Yours sincerely,

H. Wilkinson

PSF:

Ickes folder
2-42

December 23, 1942

My dear Harold:

I have received your letter of December 11 regarding the shipment of gasoline and fuel oil to Sweden.

Following consideration of the matter by the Board of Economic Warfare and upon the specific recommendation of Admiral Leahy, and of the British Government, I directed the release of various petroleum products for immediate shipment to Sweden in two Swedish tankers at that time in this hemisphere. The shipment to which you refer comprises a part of the cargo of one of these tankers.

These shipments are for the exclusive use of Swedish Armed Forces and were released only after receiving satisfactory safeguards against their diversion to the enemy.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Harold L. Ickes,
Petroleum Administrator for War,
Secretary of the Interior.

PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR

PSF Ickes

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

*W.H. Ickes
12/20/42*

I have been greatly disturbed to learn that a Swedish tanker at Port Arthur, Texas, is taking on a load of 4800 tons of 80 octane gasoline, in addition to an undisclosed amount of fuel oil. I may be unduly suspicious, but on the basis of past experience I would expect at least some of this gasoline, which is of a sufficiently high test to be available for air work, will get into the hands of Hitler. I would far rather see it go to Russia or to some other destination where it could be used against Hitler. I hope that you will stop this.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes

Petroleum Administrator for War.

The President,
The White House.

Department of State

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ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

Secretary of Interior


PSF Ideas

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
December 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In compliance with your memorandum of December 15,
I submit herewith a draft of a reply for your signature
to the letter dated December 11 addressed to you by the
Petroleum Administrator for War.

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "A. M. Keith". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "A" and a long horizontal stroke.

Enclosure:

Draft letter addressed
to the Petroleum Administrator
for War.

The President,

The White House.

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2-42*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE STATE DEPARTMENT

For preparation of reply
for my signature.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Letter from Hon. Harold L. Ickes, Petroleum Administrator for War, 12/11/42, to the President, stating that he is greatly disturbed to learn that a Swedish tanker at Port Arthur, Texas, is taking on a load of 4800 tons of 80 octane gasoline, in addition to an undisclosed amount of fuel oil. Mr. Ickes states he may be unduly suspicious, but on the basis of past experience, he would expect at least some of this gasoline, which is of a sufficiently high test to be available for air work, will get into the hands of Hitler. He would far rather see it go to Russia or to some other destination where it could be used against Hitler. Expresses hope that the President will stop this.



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Ickes folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1943

THE WHITE HOUSE
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My dear Mr. President:

To my way of thinking, J-e-f-f-e-r-s spells trouble. At least each of them contains seven letters.

I have never seen a more extraordinary letter than the one that Jeffers wrote to Leon Henderson under date of December 31 (a similar ukase went to Director Eastman). In case you haven't seen it, I will quote a sentence or two:

"* * * I am convinced that we must simplify forms and procedures and make sure that each farmer's real needs are understood by those who determine his gasoline allowance."

"I shall appreciate it, therefore, if you will immediately make whatever amendments are needed to insure, between now and March 31st, that no farmer or stock raiser lacks gasoline to carry on operations essential to his maximum production."

"I shall appreciate it if you will let me know what steps you take to comply with this request."

I have been here for almost ten years but I have never received from you such a letter as this. And you are my commanding officer. Jeffers has no shadow of right to order Leon about. And if he takes this attitude toward Henderson we may expect him soon to give the rest of us orders.

I haven't liked Jeffers' interviews and speeches in the Middle West. It does not make for good spirit among the people for him to go about criticizing Henderson's and Eastman's rationing procedures and assuring them that he was going back to Washington to simplify those procedures. This is dangerous demagogic stuff that must have some purpose back of it, unless Jeffers suffers from an ego as big as that of Hitler.

Jeffers was on the same program with me recently at the Economic Club of New York. The evening newspapers had just carried the news of Henderson's resignation, notwithstanding which Jeffers devoted a large part of his extemporaneous remarks to a criticism of the questionnaires set up in Washington. He didn't mention Leon by name but he didn't have to. In that same speech he was at pains to make it clear that he was still President of the Union Pacific and neither part nor parcel of the Administration. I didn't like that either.

Jeffers assumes that he has a "mandate from the people". You didn't appoint him to his present job. The people elected him without a dissenting vote. Anyone with whom he has dealings in Washington can tell you that he goes about pounding desks and loudly asserting that he is going to have what he demands or else he will take the case to the people. I don't like the "or else --" line. His tour of the Middle West was nothing less than a campaign to bring

pressure to bear upon Nelson, et al, here. There are rumors that he has made a deal of some sort with the farm leaders.

There is also an impression that he is "running for something." His deputy, Dr. Dewey, is a good man technically, my own technicians tell me, but it appears that he also has become a loud voiced desk pounder. Of course I know that the rubber program is in bad shape. I knew that a year ago. But this makes it all the more important that Jeffers shouldn't be allowed to run away with the ball. The situation can become too explosive for that. All that we have to do in order to appreciate its potentialities is to think back to the situation prior to the appointment of the Baruch Committee.

In railway circles, Jeffers has been known for some time as "Mussolini" Jeffers. I have had one fifteen minute interview with him since he assumed the purple. On that occasion, in my office, he thumped his chest twice and told me what a "tough" man he was. Now he has to play up to his own conception of himself.

I am saying to you, Mr. President, in all seriousness that you are likely to have a real problem child on your hands if a check is not put on Jeffers promptly and effectively. He is in a position to raise hell and the longer he is footloose the greater will be his power to raise hell. He regards himself as being entirely independent of the Administration. There is enough brass in his composition to assure us all that there will be no lack of that metal whatever the war demands may become. He is bluffing some people in the Administration by his sheer impudence. If there is to be a row with him it will be less serious now than any day later. Harriman might be able to clip his wing now but let him get the notion that he is speaking for the people and that they are behind him and no one will be able to do anything with him.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



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THE WHITE HOUSE
JAN 2 2 59 PM '43
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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

The air seems to be full of rumors of committees to investigate this and committees to investigate that. It would seem to me that the field is already well occupied, but the opposition will find more than one crack into which to insert a wedge. I would suggest that the Democratic leadership anticipate, if possible, where the opposition will try to pry in and get in first with resolutions to appoint investigating committees, thus avoiding the prospect of unfriendly chairmen. Otherwise we are likely to be fighting a defensive battle throughout the session.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.



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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

January 5, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I am writing you this because I am aware that the suggestion has been made, not only to you, but to others on other occasions, that Drew Pearson finds me a source of information that should be regarded as highly confidential.

In his column in the WASHINGTON POST this morning he refers to a colloquy between you and Henry Stimson, with reference to the Army school at Charlottesville, Virginia, in which connection I am quoted as saying:

"And what about one spot of completely American territory -- Hawaii? Let's begin by establishing civil government at home."

This is not exactly what I said but I did say something to this effect. However, I want to assure you that I did not relate this episode to Drew Pearson or, so far as I can remember, to anyone. One thing that I have been scrupulous about, and that has been not to talk about what occurs at Cabinet meetings. The Washington correspondents gave up a long time ago any questioning even of me along these lines.

One day last week, Drew Pearson called me up on the telephone. He said that he had this item of news. He proceeded to relate to me substantially what he wrote in his column. I made no comment. I did not ask him to refrain from printing this item. After all, he is a newspaper man whose value to his readers is greatly enhanced when he can pick up gossip of this sort. I can assure you that if I had related this story to Pearson, I would have asked him either not to print it or to print it in such fashion as would protect me. That I think may be taken for granted.

Two or three weeks ago, Pearson related with substantial accuracy another Cabinet episode and I realized then that he must have some source of information from within the Cabinet group, incredible as that might seem. As to who this might be, I haven't the slightest notion. I haven't asked Pearson because he would, very properly, say that he had to protect his source.

It can be taken as axiomatic that the purveyor of information that is supposed to be confidential is protected by the columnist because otherwise information from that source would soon dry up. To one who knows this truism, as undoubtedly you do, it must be clear that neither you nor Henry Stimson nor I told of the colloquy between the three of us on the occasion in question because all of us were quoted. Notwithstanding this, some of my many admirers and well wishers undoubtedly will try to make me appear to be the putative father of this child.

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Philips

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

file

Lakes folder
2-43

PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR

WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

On two occasions during the last year I have urged at Cabinet meetings that we undertake, in cooperation with the Mexican Government, the building of a 100-octane gasoline plant in Mexico. No opposition was expressed on either occasion to this proposal. On the contrary, it seemed to meet with general approval, and when I brought it up you indicated to Under Secretary Welles, who was attending the Cabinet meeting in the absence of Secretary Hull, that you would like the matter looked into. Under Secretary Welles expressed assent but, I would say, not necessarily approval.

At intervals I have communicated with you in writing on the subject because nothing seemed ever to happen. Since Secretary Jones had indicated when the question was first raised that he would be willing to finance such a project, I didn't feel that the block was there. It began to dawn on me that the State Department was responsible. Subsequent developments have satisfied me that I was right.

I know that you have issued categorical instructions to the State Department to proceed with this project. A short time ago, when I was having a conference with certain gentlemen from the State Department on an unrelated matter I incidentally learned that there was grave doubt in the State Department as to the wisdom of going ahead with a 100-octane gasoline plant at this time. It was Mr. Duggan who referred to the matter and I told him and his associates that I was always willing to reopen any question that had not been finally worked out and examine it as clearly and as objectively as possible.

Subsequently, certain gentlemen, including Mr. Duggan, and headed by Ambassador Messersmith, came to my office. This was one day last week. They went rather extensively into oil matters as related to Mexico. They were all clearly of the opinion that, until our general oil policies as related to Mexico had been worked out, it would be a mistake to go ahead with the 100-octane gasoline project. I agree in principle with this position, but I also think that we ought to lose no further time in working out general oil policies with Mexico.

This places us back where we were a year or more ago. The general question of our future relations with Mexico on oil was under consideration in the State Department then, and apparently is now. At the present rate of progress, no 100-octane plant will be built in Mexico for this war which I think is a great misfortune from a defense standpoint particularly.

The Mexicans, dependent as they are upon us for materials, technicians, and money, are naturally going to be cautious in putting forward policy proposals as to future American participations in oil development in Mexico. Ambassador Messersmith stated as much in his recent meeting in my office and, beyond that, he indicated that the Mexicans would like some indications from our side as to the course that we would like to see them pursue. He said, in

fact, that if he were in a position to let the Mexicans know what we wanted, he felt reasonably certain that the Mexican Government would come forward with proposals pretty much in keeping with such indications from us.

From a Petroleum Administration standpoint the position briefly is this:

- (1) This Office sent an oil mission to Mexico in August of last year. From the report rendered, we know what is required there.
- (2) It is clear that if these things are to be done, assistance must come from this country. This means American participation upon some basis in Mexican petroleum operations.
- (3) The Mexican Government rather naturally wants an indication from the United States Government as to the kind of participation and relationship we would like to see developed. For this it is looking to the State Department.
- (4) Until the State Department clarifies the position and makes known whether it objects to American participation, we are effectively blocked from making any progress with the 100 octane plant or anything else.

I think with you that the 100 octane project might easily be accomplished through negotiation with the Mexican Government. The plant must be built by a competent American group and, if it is to be efficiently operated and the investment returned, it must likewise be at least supervised by capable American technicians familiar with a complex refinery operation of this kind. We have had before our Office for some time one proposal from a group of independent oil men looking to the negotiation of such an arrangement with the Mexican Government but, in the absence of State Department clearance, we have been unable to give these people an answer or to make progress in any way.

Thus, until matters within the jurisdiction of the State Department are disposed of, your Petroleum Administration for War unfortunately continues to be prevented from being effective in this matter of the 100 octane plant for Mexico.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Peltas

Petroleum Administrator for War.

The President,

The White House.

JDI

file
personal.

Jakes folder
1-43

My dear Mr. President —

You have heard too much of the farmers' woes to
need a further explanation of why I have waited 4
days before thanking you for the excellent photograph.
I am especially proud of the inscription. It makes the
photograph really mine — a personal remembrance of you

Which will be cherished by many two little people.

When are you going to snatch a moment from your
overcrowded schedule for a bit of peace. Perhaps it would be
more comfortable for you when the weather softens a bit.
The Iker's house has inclined toward the Arctic this winter!
Do make it this spring tho! It would be a great day for all
of us.

Best to you!

Sincerely -

Toni Iker's

February 26, 1943.

file

PSF
Interior
Debes

PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1943.

~~ESPECIALLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

My dear Mr. President:

I have reviewed our file with respect to the proposed 100-aviation gasoline project in Mexico, especially having in mind the attitude and acts of the State Department.

The file discloses that the State Department stresses the great dangers connected with any attempted return of the expropriated companies to Mexico. At the same time it suggests in correspondence with our Mexican Ambassador and in policy memoranda that this is in fact something to be sought provided it can be accomplished with the operating companies "ostensibly Mexican" and "not in popularly recognizable form".

In any consideration of the problem of the rehabilitation of the Mexican oil industry, or the 100-octane project, our Office has taken the position that if the Mexican Government desires to encourage American capital to vest in Mexico, there should be no favorites played and no "preferential rights" to any one. I fail to see how we can subscribe to the principle of preference to any group. Further, I think that we must disassociate ourselves emphatically from the suggestion that the expropriated companies return to the Mexican scene under any disguise or by any corporate manipulation. Any such move would be altogether indefensible, it seems to me, and a disservice to the expropriated companies themselves; in fact, I doubt whether the companies themselves would consent to participate in a plan so dangerous.

In recent conferences in Washington with representatives of the Mexican Government the State Department has developed with the Mexicans and, officially approved, a plan calling for the employment of the Universal Oil Products Company of Chicago as the American firm to be associated with the Mexican Government in the 100-octane development. This arrangement was reached without consultation with our Office and, incidentally, violates the organizational procedure suggested by you in your Executive Order of December 2, 1942, establishing the Petroleum Administration for War.

The Universal Oil Products Company is a process engineering firm -- and a competent one -- owned by a group of major companies largely dominated by the companies whose Mexican properties were expropriated. I am advised also that it is a patent pool for the big companies that, in effect, constitute it. In proposing or approving the selection of this firm as the American participant in the 100-octane development in Mexico, the State Department lays itself open to



the charge that here is precisely the "not popularly recognizable" means by which the initial step is to be taken to return the expropriated companies to the Mexican oil field with "preference".

Here again I think that we must disassociate ourselves from such plans. They spell nothing but trouble ahead. I question that the interests of the participating companies themselves are well served by an arrangement so vulnerable. That the Petroleum Administration for War cannot afford to be involved, I am quite positive.

Over a year and a half ago a group of independent oil men came to this office with a plan looking to the development of a 100-octane plant and related facilities in Mexico. This plan they have, over the months, perfected with technical detail through field work in Mexico and otherwise. Their proposal was reviewed here by the appropriate members of our staff and approved as to its technical sufficiency. However, no further progress was made for the reason that we were never able to obtain from the State Department an answer to our question as to whether or not it had objection to the completion of negotiations with the Mexicans by this oil group. Without State Department clearance the Mexicans advised that they did not consider themselves free to proceed though otherwise ready to do so.

The Office of Petroleum Administration has always the responsibility of seeing that major and minor companies alike receive fair treatment. The equities in some cases are not easily determined but by and large we have been able to date to deal successfully with the problem. In no other case, however, in our relations with independent oil groups have we been required so to evade and delay in our dealings. For the reasons here given the record is not good and if now, still without an answer to this group, we associate ourselves with the plans described herein, I think that we subject ourselves to attack. These independents could well charge that after having spent liberally of their time and money they were denied a hearing and forthright answer in order that others might be assured of a "preference".

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Forbes

Petroleum Administrator for War.

The President,
The White House.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1943.

*PSK Decker folder
2-43*

*file
Personal*

Dear Grace:

I am glad you told me in your letter of May 5 that Missy would like to have a copy of my book. I have some more under order and I will send her one just as soon as they come from the publisher.

Jane is feeling all right but the trouble is that she works too hard. We still haven't given up hope of your coming out one of these nights.

Sincerely yours,


Harold G. Decker

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

*BSF Ickes folder
2-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1943.

PRIVATE 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE:

Will you speak to me about
this?

F.D.R.

Especially confidential let to the Pres.
from Ickes April 20th re proposed 100-
aviation gasoline project in Mexico and
his views on same.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972

(1592)

km

PSF; Interior Dept.

2-43

Notes

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JONATHAN DANIELS:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F.D.R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, 7/1/43, to the President, with attached memorandum of 6/30/43, which the Secretary received from S.K. Padover, submitting a list of names for the President to select from for his proposed National Committee on Race Relations, and memorandum which the Secretary received from S. K. Padover under dated of 7/1/43 - "Our National Minorities".

T-134

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

LEO CROWLEY:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Ickes folder
2-43

PSF

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith Mr. Ickes' confidential letter of April 20, 1943, addressed to you on the subject of the 100-octane aviation gasoline plant for Mexico.


In connection with this high octane plant for Mexico, it is my understanding that the Petroleum Administration for War has recently expressed approval to the representative of Petroleos Mexicanos of a United States engineering firm, Arthur G. McKee and Company, Cleveland, Ohio, to act as general consultants for Petroleos Mexicanos. It is also my understanding that the Petroleum Administration for War has approved in principle the design of a plant which will be finally cleared by the Petroleum Administration for War when the detailed design for this plant is submitted.

Apart from the foregoing this Department, through the United States Ambassador in Mexico, is carrying on informal conversations for the purpose of ascertaining under what conditions the Government of Mexico would be prepared to permit the United States oil companies to renew and to carry on operations in Mexico. The Department, of course, has no particular interest in any company or companies, whether they be large or small, or whether or not they had been engaged in the petroleum business in Mexico at any previous time. These conversations are progressing satisfactorily and it is hoped that before very long some arrangement may be worked out with the Mexican Government whereby any legitimate United States petroleum interest may be permitted to enter the Mexican field under conditions satisfactory to the Government of Mexico and those United States interests concerned.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
From Mr. Ickes,
April 20, 1943.

The President,
The White House.





*PSP
Chutson*

*file
journal* *Jones folder
2-43*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 1, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

Lyle F.

I agree with what you said in your memorandum of October 18 about Chief Forester Watts. I have not met him, but I have a high estimate of him based upon what I have been told by people in a position to know what they were talking about.

I believe that he did send word to his people in the Jackson Hole area not to take any part on the Monument controversy. But you and I have known instances in the past when orders from Washington, even although you, yourself, had sent those orders, were disregarded. The reason I am sure that the forestry people are continuing their opposition to the Monument is because I now have on my staff the forestry man who used to be Regional Director in that area and he has told me the attitude of the forestry people out there and how they put over their stuff. I believe that the forestry men in the field, with few exceptions, do about as they damn please. Each region is governed by a Teutonic knight as though in his own right.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

(1968)

Leno

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

In regard to yours of September 17th, I had a good talk with Watts the other day and I think he is really honest in saying that he sent word at the beginning of the Jackson Hole business that his people were to take absolutely no part in the controversy. He thinks that most of them have lived up to this, but says frankly that there may be a few of the old ones, especially those who have been there a long time, who may have violated the order.

He has sent out word again that the situation is being watched in regard to what he thinks is a small number of violators. I think you and I can work with Watts.

"F.D.R."

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of the Interior.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

October 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Dr. Watt, the Chief Forester,
'phoned me as follows:

"When I talked to the President this morning about the Jackson Hole controversy, he stated that in some information which had come to him there was mentioned the name 'Robert Miller', as being very active in the controversy. I told the President I thought this man had retired, but upon checking our files, find he has been dead four or five years."

EMW
E. M. W.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON:

I want to see the Chief
Forester for ten minutes and will you
give this to me when he comes in?
Do not show it to him.

F.D.R.

8.
You told me you wished to see the Chief
Forester re Jackson Lake. Would you like to
have him come in one day this week? and should
it be off the record?

(1790)
hms

928

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 22, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY IOKES:

PRIVATE

Please speak to me about
this. I think it is time to do
something effective.

F.D.R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior,
9/17/43, to the President, in re establish-
ment of Jackson Hole Monument. Quotes
portion of letter received from Horace
M. Albright, pointing out that the Forest
Service has been very active in this
fight against the establishment of this
Monument.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1943.

Oct 15
B.R.

My dear Mr. President:

I suppose that you know that we have been having a fight over the Jackson Hole Monument which you established some time ago to take care of the Rockefeller and other lands lying to the south of Jackson Lake. The opposition started off in full cry but we didn't do any -- or at least fast -- running, with the result that I think that we are going to lick a bill introduced in the House by Congressman Barrett of Wyoming to abolish the monument. We have also had to take on Joe O'Mahoney in the Senate, but I think that he will pull in his horns too.

Among other things, there was a hearing in the Jackson Hole country on the subject matter of this National Monument. Horace M. Albright went out to do what he could to help and I have had a letter from him recently which contained a paragraph that I think will interest you:

"It seems quite certain that the Forest Service has been very active again as you and I suspected. I am informed by one letter from the Jackson Hole: 'Fifty per cent of the dirty fighting in here has been done by the Forest Service, retired or active. Seventy five per cent of all the trouble has been due to the Forest Service. This has been going on, as everyone knows, since the time of Robert Miller. Furthermore, it is a running sore which will continue and spread because the moment a young and innocent Forester comes in here, he is at once indoctrinated by the recalcitrants. The Forest Service in here has been playing favorites and using the whip of granting or withholding uses of all kinds, even grazing rights. I don't suppose that any Government bureau wants that to come out does it?'"

Sincerely yours,

Harold I. Philips

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

16

*PSF
Interior*

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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

For your information I am sending you an opinion from Fowler Harper, Solicitor for the Department of the Interior.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enc.

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NOV 9 - 1943
SECRETARY

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NOV 10 1943
FIVE ASSISTANT

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
WASHINGTON 25

NOV 9 - 1943

*Chapman
Strain*

MEMORANDUM for the Secretary.

About two weeks ago the Attorney General submitted a title opinion and a deed from the President covering his property at Hyde Park, which did not meet with my approval because its provisions contravened the New York statutes. The Department of Justice concurred with my views.

I have been advised today by Assistant Attorney General Littell that three alternate proposals have been submitted to the President for his consideration:

1. A Deed Providing for a Joint Life Estate in Mrs. Roosevelt and the Five Children.
2. A Deed Creating Two Life Estates Only.
3. A Lease for a Term of Years.

The first proposal is not recommended by the Assistant Attorney General because there is no New York authority to uphold the recommendation, although in Michigan, which has the same statute, the courts have upheld the proposal. Since the New York courts have not passed upon the question, the principle of law involved is not entirely free from doubt, but I think if the President wants to take the chance, in view of the remoteness and improbability of an adverse ruling, the recommendation should be considered by the President. If the courts should hold that the second joint estate is void, the first joint estate for the life of the President and his wife would be upheld. This proposal has the advantages of the second, which provides for two life estates only and has the added advantage that the courts might uphold the entire reserved estate.

With respect to the third recommendation, the Assistant Attorney General seems to think an amendment to the existing legislation would be advisable. I do not concur with that conclusion because the language of the act of July 18, 1939 (53 Stat. 1062, 1065), is broad enough to authorize the acquisition of valid title subject to a leasehold, if that is administratively satisfactory to this Department.

In conclusion, the acceptance of either the first or third proposal would more closely meet the President's original objectives than the second, which I think would be the least desirable as it fails to provide for the use of his property by his children.

I have related the above facts for your information. Conceivably the President may want to discuss the matter with you.

Fred C. Harper
Solicitor.



file personal
BSF Interior

John J. Ford
2-43

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1943.

Dear Grace:

Last Saturday afternoon Ezra Van Horn came through on my house telephone, which has a blind number, although it is listed with the White House switchboard. I asked him whether he had come through the Interior switchboard and his answer was "no, I got you direct." Upon inquiry I found that he asked for my house telephone of my switchboard but he was refused. I know that my operators are very strict about this. They always ask me first before giving my number or even before putting anyone through. It also develops that during this conversation with my switchboard, Van Horn said something about the White House. This leads me to wonder whether he got my number from the White House switchboard. I am not making a point of it because it might have been done by mistake, but if this did happen I simply want to caution against its happening again because it is troublesome to keep changing my house telephone number.

It did Jane a lot of good to see you the other evening and I enjoyed it too.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House.

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2-44
Interior

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[REDACTED]
January 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

What do you think we
should do next?

Please return enclosure
with your reply.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.


By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972 F. D. R.

Memorandum for the President from Hon. Ganson Purcell, Chairman, SEC, 11/13/43, enclosing memorandum from Sumner T. Pike to the Chairman of the SEC, 10/26/43, in re crude oil price increase. States this information is in compliance with the President's request (on the occasion of Mr. Purcell's visit to the President with Ed Burke) for estimate of the problem involved in breaking down the costs and profits of the big "integrated" oil companies.

Scherfeger 2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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* RECEIVED *
JAN 21 1944
* OFFICE *
THE SECRETARY



January 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

What do you think we
should do next?

Please return enclosure
with your reply.

F. D. R.

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By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972

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PETROLEUM ADMINISTRATION FOR WAR

WASHINGTON

MAR - 9 1944

My dear Mr. President:

I have given considerable thought to your memorandum of January 20 enclosing Chairman Purcell's communication of November 13 relating to the problem of breaking down the cost and profits of integrated oil companies. I agree that the present statutory powers of the Securities and Exchange Commission do not seem sufficiently broad to cover such an inquiry.

I am doubtful whether an inquiry of this character would serve any very useful purpose. Cost accounting in any multi-product industry like oil is at best a series of wholly arbitrary assumptions - useful as a matter of internal control within any single company, but almost valueless for comparative purposes between companies. Not only are there no two oil companies which agree as to a "proper" basis for allocating cost between production, refining, transportation, and marketing, but even within the same company the accountants invariably disagree as to what operations should be classified as part of each of these branches. The permutations and combinations are almost infinite. These companies engage in thousands of different operations, manufacturing hundreds of products from a great variety of crude oils, condensates, and natural gases, which in their turn are produced, bought, sold, transported, refined, distributed, and marketed in so many different ways and in ever changing amounts and proportions. No accepted uniform cost accounting system exists for integrated operations of such complexity. Of course, a single arbitrary system could be promulgated and each company required to answer a questionnaire based on such a system, but each would have to recast its accounts, in whole or in part, and after the results were tabulated, whatever classifications were adopted, would still be open to endless attack and justifiable argument.

It seems unlikely that any complicated uniform "cost" survey could contribute any substantial refinement in the general conclusions which experts in the petroleum industry can now readily reach. Fortunately there are enough companies operating in only a single so-called branch of the business to give a reasonably good index of conditions in that branch. If the profits and losses of a properly selected cross section of companies operating in the various branches of the



industry be surveyed and averaged, I am certain that such averages would constitute a good index of moneys currently made or lost by integrated companies in the various branches of their operations. This type of a "breakdown" could be made from existing financial statements and reports to the SEC and Treasury Department.

I shall be glad to collaborate in such a study if you desire. As you requested, I am returning the enclosure which accompanied your memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Paken

Petroleum Administrator for War.

The President,

The White House.

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
18TH AND LOCUST STREETS
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

GANSON PURCELL
CHAIRMAN

November 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

On the occasion of my visit to you with Ed Burke, you asked me to obtain for you an estimate of the problem involved in breaking down the costs and profits of the big "integrated" oil companies. I am sorry that I have not been able to reply sooner but the delay has been due to the absence on account of illness of one or two key men on the staff whose views I felt it necessary to obtain.

As I told you at the time, we do not under our regular securities filings obtain this segregated information. However, it is my opinion that a questionnaire could be devised which the oil companies could reply to without too much difficulty which would reflect the costs and income items in the various divisions of their operations -- production, refining, transportation and marketing. I doubt if this Commission has any authority presently to make such an inquiry. If you would like us to make such a study I will be glad to discuss the appropriate means of obtaining authority with the Attorney General and members of his staff.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY

With the help of Sumner Pike, I was able to obtain a fairly good estimate of production costs of the big companies which seem to conform generally to those of the individual producing companies. His memorandum to me was most interesting and I enclose a copy for your perusal.

I shall await your further instructions.

Faithfully yours,

Ganson Purcell
Ganson Purcell,
Chairman.

October 26, 1943

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Chairman
Securities & Exchange Commission

FROM: Sumner T. Pike

SUBJECT: Crude Oil Price Increase

In the recent discussion on the price of oil, two points have generally been stressed in favor of a price increase:

(1) That the independent "wildcatter" and producer is being forced, by increasing costs and frozen prices, to sell his properties to the larger integrated companies; and

(2) That the big companies make their money in other than their producing operations while the straight producer is operating at a loss.

With both of these statements I thoroughly disagree.

(1) The little man is being forced out of business. We have taken a record of all the straight producing companies available to the SEC and find that they did better in 1941 than in 1940, showed a further increase in 1942, and for the first six months of 1943 made still higher earnings. (A similar tabulation by OPA showed the same trend).

These earnings are after income taxes and are given in detail on Table III attached.

Any increases in costs have been more than absorbed by better efficiency and increased volume. We are still told that the little man is losing money. Strangely enough, however, in all the hearings on the price of oil held by seven different Committees of the House and the Senate not one income statement or balance sheet has been offered in support of this contention.

There is, however, a wave of selling by individual producers. This is not distress selling. It is due to the high prices for oil properties offered by integrated concerns which must protect their investments in other branches of the industry.

In a recent letter to an independent producer who is an old friend and former partner, I stated the case as follows:

"I have a strong feeling that these purchases by integrated companies mean that they are more scared than you. They have pipelines, refineries and market facilities, and are worried about not having enough oil to put through them for the next 25 years. Without oil these facilities aren't worth much, and it begins to look probably that we can't continue to find in these United States enough to supply our growing requirements.

"I am sure that the Government would prefer the small producers to keep their properties; but when the major companies are willing to pay the high prices that are being offered now, nobody can be blamed for selling out."

This still represents my opinion.

(2) The big companies are willing to lose on production because they make it up in other operations.

From 1939 through the third quarter of 1941, the big companies made consistent profits out of production. These profits by the large companies increased from 22-8/10 cents a barrel in 1939 to 27-3/10 cents in 1940 and approximately 35 cents in the first three quarters of 1941. While these figures stop at the end of the third quarter of 1941, there is no reason to believe that later statistics would show any deviation from the upward earnings trend shown by the straight producing companies in the figures mentioned under point (1).

We have in the office a mass of further detail on these and kindred arguments. My net conclusion is that the arguments have little, if any, merit.

TABLE I

CRUDE PETROLEUM: PRODUCTION, COST AND MARGIN,
 FOR ALL REPORTING PRODUCERS, TWENTY LARGE COMPANIES, AND
ALL OTHER PRODUCERS, 1939, 1940, AND FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF 1941 *

	Company Interest Production Per Bbls.	Sales Value of Oil Per Bbl.	Net Cost Per Bbl.	Margin Per Bbl.
<u>1939</u>				
All Producers	748,135,296	\$1.022	\$0.785	\$0.237
Twenty Large Companies	540,202,546	1.016	.788	.228
All Other Producers	207,932,750	1.033	.779	.254
<u>1940</u>				
All Producers	807,769,147	1.018	.759	.259
Twenty Large Companies	567,850,914	1.056	.783	.273
All Other Producers	239,918,233	.934	.702	.232
<u>1st Quarter 1941</u>				
All Producers	182,029,539	1.027	.754	.273
Twenty Large Companies	142,254,249	1.019	.742	.277
All Other Producers	38,775,290	1.053	.797	.256
<u>2nd Quarter 1941</u>				
All Producers	192,436,685	1.119	.751	.368
Twenty Large Companies	150,766,570	1.115	.742	.373
All Other Producers	41,670,115	1.141	.783	.358
<u>3rd Quarter 1941</u>				
All Producers	200,884,202	1.171	.764	.407
Twenty Large Companies	155,751,345	1.174	.758	.416
All Other Producers	45,132,857	1.166	.787	.379

*Tariff Commission Study.

TABLE II

CRUDE PETROLEUM: NET MARGINS FOR ALL REPORTING
PRODUCERS AND FOR 60 LARGEST PRODUCERS *

	<u>60 Largest Producers</u>	<u>All Companies</u>
1939	\$.247	\$.237
1940	.273	.259
1941	.381	
1 Q	.287	.273
2 Q	.381	.368
3 Q	.417	.407
9 Mos.		.349
4 Q	.426	
1942		
1 Q	.400	
2 Q	.331	

Note: The margins for all companies are much more heavily weighted by the figures of the 60 large producers than by the other producers.

*Tariff Commission Study.

TABLE III

PROFITS OF PRODUCING OIL COMPANIES*

1936	20,677,800
1937	23,830,458
1938	16,969,462
1939	15,568,463
1940	10,970,373
1941	21,823,069
1942	25,185,216
First six months of 1942 ...	10,440,763
First six months of 1943 ...	12,440,763

* Amerada Petroleum Corp., Barnsdall Oil Company, Bishop Oil Co. (Calif.), Darby Petroleum Corp., Houston Oil Co. of Texas, Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. (Md.), North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc. (Ill.), Pacific Western Oil Corp. (Del.), Penn. Valley Crude Oil Corp. (Del.), Plymouth Oil Co., Republic Petroleum Co. (Calif.), Seaboard Oil Co. of Delaware, South Penn Oil Co. (Pa.), Sunray Oil Corporation of Del., Superior Oil Company (Calif.), Superior Oil Corporation, Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co., and Universal Consolidated Oil Co.

1912 70' 170' 103
 1913 32' 162' 379
 1914 37' 332' 099
 1915 70' 310' 213
 1916 12' 206' 493
 1917 70' 300' 723
 1918 32' 530' 723
 1919 30' 841' 800

TABLE OF HANDLING OIL COMPANIES

JUNE III

Mrs. Brady:
 Thank you
 very much.
 Dorothy Hallam
 Petroleum Adm.

[Faint, illegible handwriting on a small piece of paper]

Alorathy Wallace
Rm 6515
Interior Bldg

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

FORM 111

Ickes folder
2-44

File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1944.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Harold Ickes told me on the phone that he had called up Mr. Courtney and urged him to run for Governor. But Courtney had found out that Colonel Knox was not going to support him and for that reason Harold could not persuade Courtney to run.

Harold then tried to get in touch with Colonel Knox and found he was out of the country.

In consequence, Harold thought there was little chance of accomplishing this, and wanted me to tell you right away.

Respectfully,

E. M. W.

E.M.W.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date FEB 24 1972

Ickes folder
2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Please read and return for my files. He and you and I all have green in our eyes which has come to us from long experience!

F. D. R.

letter from Josephus Daniels, Raleigh, N.C. to the Pres. Feb. 22, re Elk Hills Naval Reserve in California. Says he is greatly disturbed because Ickes put an officer of the Standard Oil Co. of Calif. in as Oil Administrator and urged an increase in the price of gasoline.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
FEB 24 1972

By W. J. Stewart Date _____

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Miss Grace Tully
FROM: Jonathan Daniels

JD

My father asked me to pass this letter
on to the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Delors folder
2-44

MAR 9 12 48 PM '44

RECEIVED

PSF

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1944.



My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a memorandum from Secretary Chapman, together with a newspaper clipping. What a Senator, and, more particularly, what a democrat!

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Enclosures.



OFFICE OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

*PSF
Chapman
Interior*

March 8, 1944

MEMORANDUM for the Secretary.

A special Congressional election held in Denver yesterday went to the Republican candidate by 2800 votes. One of the reasons given over the phone to me this morning was Senator Johnson's speech which was published in full in the Denver Post by the Republicans.

Chapman
Assistant Secretary

Rocky Mtn. News 11-3-35

Johnson's Raps At New Deal Cut Out of Broadcast

Criticism of the New Deal, included in a radio transcription prepared in Washington by U. S. Senator Ed C. Johnson, to aid the congressional candidacy of Maj. Carl E. Wuertele, was deleted when the speech was broadcast over KFEL last night.

The transcription was flown to Wuertele headquarters in Denver.

Senator Johnson pleaded that Major Wuertele not be held responsible for the sins of bureaucracy, which grew to its present proportions while Wuertele was fighting the Japanese.

Hot Spots are Elided

The portions of the Johnson speech, copies of which were mailed to Denver friends, which did not appear in the broadcast, included:

"On Nov. 7, not March 7, will be the time to call President Roosevelt to task for his sins, if he has any. Nov. 7 will be the day to repudiate the New Deal and the Administration, if you are mad at them. That will be your day in court to protest against Washington bureaucrats. Don't take your spite out on the man who was away fighting your war and had less to do with these things than you yourself.

New Deal 'Worst Fraud'

"As I see it, the New Deal has been the worst fraud ever perpetrated on the American people. It has bankrupted the federal treasury and it has tried with considerable success to destroy the free-enterprise system. I wouldn't walk across the street to give aid or comfort to a rubber-stamp New Deal candidate for Congress. They come a dime a dozen down here in Washington and I have yet to see one worth the salt in his bean soup.

"But everything that has been done in Washington in the past 12 years has not been bad. Much that has been done is good, sound, wholesome and permanent. What the nation needs is discriminating congressmen with the courage and intelligence to support the good and reject the bad—discriminating congressmen, free to separate the wheat from the chaff. I am convinced Major Wuertele is this type of man—his record shows it."

The address is scheduled for re-broadcast on KFEL at 12:15 p. m. today and 4:15 and 8:45 p. m. tomorrow, and on KMYR at 9:45 p. m. Monday.

C
O
P
Y

PSF *schw folder* 2-44

April 8, 1944

Dear Harold:

I note from your letter of March 29 that you have communicated with Justice Byrnes with reference to the recent limitation imposed upon the production of Puerto Rican rum during 1944. I know that you will hear from him shortly and that he will be as liberal with Puerto Rico as the urgencies of our war production will reasonably admit.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.

(Orig. copy of this letter is filed - Puerto Rico Folder,
Drawer 1-44.

(2893)

hms

PSF

*Ickes folder
2-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY ICKES.

DEAR HAROLD:

THANK YOU FOR THE CHART
IN REGARDS TO THE GAIN IN TANKER TONNAGE.
THAT IS GREAT WORK.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of
this memorandum to Secretary Ickes.



file personal PSF interior

gk folder 2-44

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

MAY 22 8 54 AM '44 WASHINGTON

May 19, 1944.

RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

I have told you heretofore how Governor Harwood of the Virgin Islands manages to have himself summoned as a witness before our subcommittee on Appropriations, at which he sabotages our Interior program in that administrative area. Recently I have discovered that he takes advantage of such occasions to build up sentiment against Governor Tugwell and the things for which the majority in Puerto Rico stand.

This man is not only mischievous, he is dangerous, and I beg of you to send him elsewhere if he must be kept in the Federal employment.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Phas

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.



File Personal

PSF

2ckis folder 2-44

*Y
Luncheon
appt made
July 6th*

THE WHITE HOUSE

JUL 3 11 01 AM '44

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

RECEIVED

June 30, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

When I saw you a fortnight ago, I expressed the hope that upon your return to Washington -- you were leaving that day -- you might give me an appointment at which I might discuss with you the question of my resigning from the Cabinet. I am feeling more and more strongly about this. I would prefer to talk the matter over with you but, of course, if you prefer, I will set down my reasons in writing.

My plans are to go to California in a week or ten days on a trip that will not get me back until after the Chicago convention.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

Ickes folder *2-44*

FROM Secretary's Office

BUREAU _____

CHG. APPROPRIATION _____

PSF Interior
File
Plasma

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-1723

The President,
(to be sent through the White House).

July 15, 1944.

Report has reached me that Farley will issue a release tomorrow in Chicago to following general effect: quote We must protect ourselves against threat of dictatorship in this country. It is too late to prevent renomination of President Roosevelt but we can prevent his dictating the nomination of Vice President. unquote. The result would be that if Wallace should not be renominated, especially after you had indicated that he was your first choice, Farley would get wide acclaim as the man who stopped him, despite your endorsement. And if Wallace should be renominated the charge would be made that you had dictated the nomination, especially in view of fact that few, if any, concede any chance to Wallace except as a result of your support. If this is Farley's intention, he will be capitalizing at your cost, whether Wallace is or is not renominated.

Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior.

H.L.I.

PSF

Seen folder 2-44

The White House
Washington

JUL 19 6 26 PM 1944

XVWU52 539

CHICAGO ILL JULY 19 1944 401P

URGENT THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

I WANT YOU TO BELIEVE THAT I WOULD NOT SEND YOU THIS TELEGRAM
UNLESS I SAW AN ISSUE IMPENDING THAT WILL BE MADE TO ORDER FOR
DEWEY. FOR TRUMAN I HAVE HAD BOTH GENUINE LIKING AND RESPECT.
NEXT ONLY TO DOUGLAS HE HAS BEEN MY CHOICE FOR VICE PRESIDENT
IT IS NOT THAT I OBJECT TO HIS NOMINATION PER SE BUT THE
METHOD OF IT. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AMERICAN HISTORY WE SEE THE
BOSSES OF CORRUPT POLITICAL MACHINES TAKING CONTROL OF A
NATIONAL CONVENTION AND OF THE ORGANIZATION OF A MAJOR PARTY.

RECEIVED
MORSE AVENUE
CHICAGO ILL 707A TO 1000 PM
MAY 20 1948

W 13 C 111 111

WU52/2

NO ONE HERE IS DECEIVED AS TO THE IMPETUS BEHIND THE TRUMAN CANDIDACY. IT IS MANNEGAN, KELLY, HAGUE AND FLYNN WITH THE GHOST OF PENDERGAST PRESIDING AT THE TABLE. HERE IS AN ISSUE MADE TO ORDER FOR DEWEY WHOSE WHOLE REPUTATION AND WHOSE NOMINATION TODAY IS BASED UPON HIS APPARENTLY FEARLESS ONSLAUGHT ON THE KIND OF MACHINE AND CORRUPT POLITICS REPRESENTED BY THE MEN IN QUESTION. THERE ARE OTHER NAMES THAT ARE BEING USED WHICH IF THEIR AUTHENTICITY CAN BE VERIFIED AND BROUGHT INTO THE OPEN WILL BODE NO GOOD FOR NOVEMBER. IN MY OPINION A GRAVE POLITICAL ERROR IS ABOUT TO BE COMMITTED. I WAS IN CHICAGO FOUR YEARS AGO AND WITNESSED THE NOMINATION OF A CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT

... THE ...
... ANGUS ...
... 11 ...
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WU52/3

WHO WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO DELEGATES. I FELT THAT THAT
NOMINATION WAS A MISTAKE. THE FACT THAT THE RENOMINATION OF
THAT MAN HAS BEEN DECIDED AGAINST ON THE SCORE OF HIS POLITICAL
UNAVAILABILITY PROVES THAT HIS ORIGINAL NOMINATION FOUR YEARS
AGO WAS A MISTAKE. YOU KNOW HOW I FEEL ABOUT WALLACE NOT AS AN
INDIVIDUAL BUT AS A POLITICAL PERSONALITY, BUT IN MY JUDGMENT
WALLACE BY NOVEMBER WOULD PROVE TO BE MUCH LESS OF A LIABILITY
THAN TRUMAN DESPITE HIS FINE PERSONALITY AND OUTSTANDING
PUBLIC RECORD WILL PROVE TO BE. I SAY THIS WITH EMPHASIS.
TRUMAN'S DEFENSE OF PENDERGAST ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE WILL
BECOME A SOUNDING BOARD FOR EVERY REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGNING FOR

WU2/4

DEWEY. THE BOSSES REFERRED TO ARE MAKING NO EFFORT EVEN TO DISGUISE THE PLAY. THEY ARE BEING BRAZEN ABOUT THE WHOLE MATTER. THEY HAVE MADE UP THEIR MINDS THAT TRUMAN IS THE MAN AND THEY ARE BROADCASTING IT ALL OVER THE PLACE THAT HE HAS YOUR APPROVAL. WHETHER HE HAS OR NOT I DO NOT KNOW BUT I DO KNOW THAT YOU COULD NOT HAVE APPROVED IN ADVANCE SUCH PROCEEDINGS AS ARE IN PROGRESS HERE. I DOUBT WHETHER YOU COULD EVEN HAVE ANTICIPATED THE CRUDENESS AND THE ROUGHNESS OF WHAT IS GOING ON. I CERTAINLY DID NOT DO SO OR I WOULD NOT HAVE COME TO CHICAGO. THE LIBERALS ARE NOT ONLY DISHEARTENED THEY ARE ANGRY. I BELIEVE THAT I HAVE NEVER BEEN SO IMPERSONAL IN ALL MY LIFE WITH RESPECT TO A POLITICAL NOMINATION. I WANT YOU

WU52/5

REELECTED ABOVE ANYTHING ELSE BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE
GOING TO BE ELECTED WITHOUT A CLOSE HARD FIGHT. THAT BEING
SO I HAVE HOPED THAT NOT ONLY THE PERSONALITY OF THE CANDIDATE
FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUT THE MANNER OF HIS SELECTION WOULD BE
SUCH AS NOT TO CONSTITUTE ANY HANDICAP. WHAT I AM WITNESSING
HERE IS IN VIOLATION OF MY POLITICAL JUDGMENT AND IS CREATING A
GRAVE POLITICAL HAZARD

HAROLD L. ICKES.

... I am very glad to hear that you are well and hope you are enjoying the summer. I have been very busy with the campaign but I will be home in a few days. I will be glad to hear from you again. I am sure you will be very successful in your work. I am sure you will be very successful in your work. I am sure you will be very successful in your work.

1944 JUL 21 1944

The White House
Washington

WB42 303

JUL 21 12 41 PM 1944

CHICAGO ILL JUL 21 1944 1056A

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

YOU MADE A GREAT SPEECH LAST NIGHT TO A CROWD THAT PACKED AND OVERFLOWED THE STADIUM. BUT THE CITY BOSSES ISSUE IS GROWING TO A DEGREE THAT I DID NOT ANTICIPATE WHEN I TELEGRAPHED YOU TWO DAYS AGO. UNFORTUNATELY HANNEGAN FOR SEVERAL DAYS CIRCULATED THE REPORT THAT HE HAD A LETTER FROM YOU IN WHICH YOU HAD EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR TRUMAN AS A CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT. HE REFUSED TO SHOW THE LETTER UNTIL YESTERDAY AFTER THE DEMAND HAD BECOME SO INSISTENT THAT HIS HAND WAS IN EFFECT

LOWE THE WIND ARE IN EFFECT
THE LETTER WHICH WAS IN EFFECT
AND V. TULLER HULLIG ASSASSINATE WALLER
EDMUNDSONIA NUMBERED FOR THE VICE PRES
THE CITY BOSSSES UNQUOTE
THE CHICAGO SUN HAS RAISED THE QUOTE
THE DEMONSTRATION FOR WALLACE LAST NIGHT
AT THE CONCLUSION OF YOUR SPEECH WAS IMPRESSIVE
SO MUCH SO THAT THE MANAGEMENT DECIDED
TO RECESS INSTEAD OF GOING FORWARD WITH
THE PLAN TO NOMINATE IF POSSIBLE LAST NIGHT.
THE ISSUE OF THE CITY BOSSSES IN THE
EVENT OF TRUMAN'S NOMINATION IN MY JUDGMENT
WILL CUT DEEPLY INTO THE ELECTION AND MAY
VERY WELL MEAN THE RETURN OF AN OPPOSITION
CONGRESS. FEELING FOUR YEARS AGO AND YOU
KNOW WHAT

CHICAGO IFF 707 31 1044 10044
20 51 15 11 11 11
CITY BOSSSES

FORCED. THEN THE LETTER APPEARED NOT ONLY TO BE AGREEABLE AS
TO TRUMAN FOR THE VICE PRESIDENCY BUT EQUALLY TO DOUGLAS.
MOREOVER THE LETTER WAS DATED THE NINETEENTH WHICH WAS AFTER
THE DATE WHEN THE RUMOR WAS FIRST PUT INTO CIRCULATION. THE
WHOLE THING HAS CREATED A BAD INCIDENT AND DELEGATES IN PRIVATE
CONVERSATIONS LAST NIGHT WERE DEMANDING THAT MANNEGAN RESIGN.
EVEN THE CHICAGO SUN HAS RAISED THE QUOTE CITY BOSSSES UNQUOTE
ISSUE. THE DEMONSTRATION FOR WALLACE LAST NIGHT AT THE CONCLUSION
OF YOUR SPEECH WAS IMPRESSIVE SO MUCH SO THAT THE MANAGEMENT
DECIDED TO RECESS INSTEAD OF GOING FORWARD WITH THE PLAN TO
NOMINATE IF POSSIBLE LAST NIGHT. THE ISSUE OF THE CITY BOSSSES
IN THE EVENT OF TRUMAN'S NOMINATION IN MY JUDGMENT WILL CUT
DEEPLY INTO THE ELECTION AND MAY VERY WELL MEAN THE RETURN OF
AN OPPOSITION CONGRESS. FEELING FOUR YEARS AGO AND YOU KNOW WHAT

PSF

20000 folder 2-44

file
journal

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

xvwu52 539 URGENT

JULY 20, 1944.

CHICAGO ILL JULY 19 1944 4010

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

I WANT YOU TO BELIEVE THAT I WOULD NOT SEND YOU THIS TELEGRAM UNLESS I SAW AN ISSUE IMPENDING THAT WILL BE MADE TO ORDER FOR DEWEY. FOR TRUMAN I HAVE HAD BOTH GENUINE LIKING AND RESPECT. NEXT ONLY TO DOUGLAS HE HAS BEEN MY CHOICE FOR VICE PRESIDENT IT IS NOT THAT I OBJECT TO HIS NOMINATION PER SE BUT THE METHOD OF IT. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN AMERICAN HISTORY WE SEE THE BOSSES OF CORRUPT POLITICAL MACHINES TAKING CONTROL OF A NATIONAL CONVENTION AND OF THE ORGANIZATION OF A MAJOR PARTY. NO ONE HERE IS DECEIVED AS TO THE IMPETUS BEHIND THE TRUMAN CANDIDACY. IT IS HANNEGAN, KELLY, HAGUE AND FLYNN WITH THE GHOST OF PENDERGAST PRESIDING AT THE TABEL. HERE IS AN ISSUE MADE TO ORDER FOR DEWEY WHOSE WHOLE REPUTATION AND WHOSE NOMINATION TODAY IS BASED UPON HIS APPARENTLY FEARLESS ONSLAUGHT ON THE KIND OF MACHINE AND CORRUPT POLITICS

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

(2)

REPRESENTED BY THE MEN IN QUESTION, THERE ARE OTHER NAMES THAT ARE BEING USED WHICH IF THEIR AUTHENTICITY CAN BE VERIFIED AND BROUGHT INTO THE OPEN WILL BODE NO GOOD FOR NOVEMBER. IN MY OPINION A GRAVE POLITICAL ERROR IS ABOUT TO BE COMMITTED. I WAS IN CHICAGO FOUR YEARS AGO AND WITNESSED THE NOMINATION OF A CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT WHO WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO DELEGATES. I FELT THAT THAT NOMINATION WAS A MISTAKE. THE FACT THAT THE RENOMINATION OF THAT MAN HAS BEEN DECIDED AGAINST ON THE SCORE OF HIS POLITICAL UNAVAILABILITY PROVES THAT HIS ORIGINAL NOMINATION FOUR YEARS AGO WAS A MISTAKE. YOU KNOW HOW I FEEL ABOUT WALLACE NOT AS AN INDIVIDUAL BUT AS A POLITICAL PERSONALITY. BUT IN MY JUDGEMENT WALLACE BY NOVEMBER WOULD PROVE TO BE MUCH LESS OF A LIABILITY THAN TRUMAN DESPITE HIS FINE PERSONALITY AND OUTSTANDING PUBLIC RECORD WILL PROVE TO BE. I SAY THIS WITH EMPHASIS. TRUMAN'S DEFENSE OF PENDERGAST ON THE FLOOR OF THE SENATE WILL BECOME A SOUNDING BOARD FOR EVERY REPUBLICAN CAMPAIGNING FOR DEWEY. THE BOSSES REFERRED TO ARE MAKING NO EFFORT EVEN TO DISGUISE

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

(3)

THE PLAY. THEY ARE BEING BRAZEN ABOUT THE WHOLE MATTER. THEY HAVE MADE UP THEIR MINDS THAT TRUMAN IS THE MAN AND THEY ARE BROADCASTING IT ALL OVER THE PLACE THAT HE HAS YOUR APPROVAL. WHETHER HE HAS OR NOT I DO NOT KNOW BUT I DO KNOW THAT YOU COULD NOT HAVE APPROVED IN ADVANCE SUCH PROCEEDINGS AS ARE IN PROGRESS HERE. I DOUBT WHETHER YOU COULD EVEN HAVE ANTICIPATED THE CRUDENESS AND THE ROUGHNESS OF WHAT IS GOING ON. I CERTAINLY DID NOT DO SO OR I WOULD NOT HAVE COME TO CHICAGO. THE LIBERALS ARE NOT ONLY DISHEARTENED THEY ARE ANGRY. I BELIEVE THAT I HAVE NEVER BEEN SO IMPERSONAL IN ALL MY LIFE WITH RESPECT TO A POLITICAL NOMINATION. I WANT YOU REELECTED ABOVE ANYTHING ELSE BUT I DON'T BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE GOING TO BE ELECTED WITHOUT A CLOSE HARD FIGHT. THAT BEING SO I HAVE HOPED THAT NOT ONLY THE PERSONALITY OF THE CANDIDATE FOR VICE PRESIDENT BUT THE MANNER OF HIS SELECTION WOULD BE SUCH AS NOT TO CONSTITUTE ANY HANDICAP. WHAT I AM WITNESSING HERE IS IN VIOLATION OF MY POLITICAL JUDGEMENT

Signal Corps, United States Army

Received at

(4)

AND IS CREATING A GRAVE POLITICAL HAZARD.

HAROLD L. ICKES.

RECEIVED



JUL 20 1944 AM

PSF
Interior

file
personal

Ickes folder
2-44

August 15, 1944.

Dear Harold:

Yours of July twenty-fourth met me after I tied up on my destroyer at the Puget Sound Navy Yard. I think your analysis of the Convention is excellent. Henry grew greatly in stature. Yet, a lot of people who follow your line of thought and mine blame me greatly for things I did not do or have any part in. Most certainly Henry must not leave the Government. He is much too valuable and much too fine -- and the same thing applies to you in spite of what you said just before I left.

I will see you soon.

As ever yours,

Honorable Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

This is not so much a post mortem as an attempt at an appraisal of what happened in Chicago.

I did not intend to go to Chicago for the Convention. In the end I went, hoping that I might be able to be of some help, if there were any chance to nominate Bill Douglas whom, as you know, I regarded as the strongest possible candidate for Vice President. As I explained at a caucus of the Illinois delegates, I had only one interest and that was in your reelection. Having this concern, it necessarily followed that secondarily, I was interested also that we should nominate a man for Vice President, who, if he could not be of any particular help, at least would not be a handicap. As you know, I was convinced that Henry Wallace would be a handicap and that he should not be nominated.

I am bound to say that the situation in Chicago, after I got into it, surprised me very much indeed. There is no doubt in my mind, or in the minds of some of your other friends with whom I have talked, that Henry Wallace was the strong man of the convention. If it had not been for astute political management Henry would have been renominated. The sentiment for Truman was built up. Whereas I had gone with Douglas as my first choice and Truman as my second, I found that, in good conscience, I could not support Truman on the basis upon which his candidacy was being promoted. As I told the Illinois delegation, the method of the selection of the candidate was no less important than his personality. I felt that we could not afford to go out of Chicago with a candidate, who, obviously, was nominated because of the insistence of the political bosses of corrupt city machines. Truman could have been nominated, if that were the desirable objective, with some subtlety. But the bosses were brazen. They were in the saddle and they evidently proposed that it be known that they were running the convention.

There were also some double-crossing and some misrepresentations. Frankly, I do not believe that if you had been in Chicago to appraise for yourself the atmosphere of the convention you would have permitted the methods to be pursued that were recklessly indulged in. I need not remind you that I was opposed to Wallace four years ago. I told you so the first opportunity that I had upon my return to Washington in 1940. I not only objected to Wallace, I was more opposed to the method of his nomination. But this year we have seen the city bosses, in your name, demand the nomination of a man whom the convention did not want. So I found myself in the extraordinary position of voting on the last ballot for Wallace, the man whom I had gone to Chicago to oppose.

After all, I have fought this kind of politics all of my life. If I represent anything at all in politics in my city and state, it is opposition to corrupt political machines, whether they are democratic or republican, that sustain themselves on patronage, contractors' graft and the levying of tribute upon gambling, vice and prostitution. I couldn't have come home to face my family if I had allowed such a man to deliver me to whatever candidate. It would have been all right if these bosses

had gone along as part of a general movement. But it has done no good for newspaper headlines, day after day, to refer to the "Big Four" meaning Hannegan, Kelly, Flynn and Hague. They might have added Ed Pauley, although he is not a city boss. If my information is correct, he put questionable pressure upon the California delegates, in your name, to force them to vote for Truman when they wanted somebody else.

I have seen a good deal of Truman during the last two years. Most of all about him, I admire his modesty. He does not have an exaggerated opinion of himself. He has done an outstanding job fearlessly and ably. No one needs to apologize for supporting him for vice president even if there might be reservations as to whether he is really big enough for the job. But, Mr. President, I wouldn't have been for the Angel Gabriel himself as the "take it or leave it" candidate of Hannegan, Kelly, Flynn and Hague. For the first time in American history the machinery of a major political party has been taken over by the bosses of the big city machines. This is such an issue as Dewey himself could not have made or even hoped for. In the caucus of the Illinois delegates I warned of the danger of this issue.

It is all over now and I am willing to do whatever I can to help reelect you. I will have no reservations in supporting Truman. I was not responsible for the manner of his nomination and I believe him to be an honorable and upright citizen. I was urged to take the floor myself and denounce this combination of bosses and only one consideration restrained me. I could not allow myself to do anything that could be used as ammunition by Dewey in the pending campaign. I am more intensely interested in your reelection than I was even in 1936 or in 1940. I regard Dewey as a dangerous and unscrupulous man whose election might be fraught with the gravest consequences to the country. Because I felt his danger so keenly is why I felt that it was important to nominate for the vice president the strongest possible candidate in the best possible manner.

Some of your closest friends were worried at the end of the first ballot on Friday. They felt that great damage was being done to your cause. The hope of some of us was that we could adjourn Friday night, after the second ballot, and then it was my purpose to make a serious attempt to try to bring about an agreement on Bill Douglas. But the bosses were in the saddle. They knew how to handle the convention and from their point of view they did a good job.

I am not writing this in a bad humor. Never before have I been so indifferent as to who might be selected as a candidate. My only interest was that we choose a man who would help you and not handicap you. I say in all earnestness that at Chicago Henry Wallace was by far the stronger man of the two. He has come out of this convention with added prestige and that, too, you ought to know. The Henry Wallace as of today is a much bigger man than the Henry Wallace of a week ago and certainly of a year ago. I was greatly surprised to find that he had the strength that he had and that delegates were as devoted to him as they were. Let me say for him, too, that he was careful every minute of the time to avoid saying or doing anything that might hurt you. A different man, who was thinking only of himself, could have rent that convention in two.

And so I, the man who went to Chicago to try to help select some one else than Wallace, left Chicago with a heightened affection for him and a deeper respect than I have ever had. Others may depreciate Wallace's strength and question his attitude;

some may rejoice merely in the fact that Truman was nominated -- it is so human to want to be with the winner -- but I know that you will be too wise, after you have been informed by persons of differing points of view, not to realize that one of the outstanding National figures of this day is Henry Wallace. Next only to yourself, and of course even at that, to a much lesser degree than you, I believe that he has the greatest and most devoted personal following of any man in the democratic party.

I hope that those who were instrumental in pulling him to earth as he was gallantly fighting a hopeless fight will not be permitted to tear him to pieces.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Fisher

The President,
The White House.

COPY, 4-19-49, Kf.

*PSF
Adkins*

TELEGRAM

GV NEWYORK NY AUG 16 1920

HON FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT

CARE J BRUCE DREMER BUTTE MONT

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM IGNORED ALASKA ON WHICH TERRITORY SEATTLE IS
VERY DEPENDENT ADVISED REPUBLICAN COMMITTEEMEN FOR WASHINGTON AND
ALASKA WROTE HARDING THIS WOULD COST HIM FORTY THOUSAND VOTES IN
WASHINGTON HENCE HARDING MENTIONED ALASKA IN ACCEPTANCE AND FOR NO
OTHER REASON PERIOD OUR UNDERSTANDING MENTION IN PLATFORM IGNORED
ACCOUNT OF SATISFYING CONSERVATION ELEMENT TO WHICH WEST IS
HOSTILE PERIOD BRING OUT IN SEATTLE SPEECH THAT CONSERVATIONISTS STILL
WANT TO BOTTLE UP ALASKA AND YOU WILL INFLUENCE ALASKANS NOW RE-
SIDING IN WASHINGTON OUR SIDE ALL WEST RABID AGAINST PINCHOTISM

RIGGS

GOVERNOR OF ALASKA

AUG 17 1.30 AM

220000000 2-44

PSF
Anterior

file
personal

August 24, 1944

"Private"

Dear Harold:

That article the other day in the Times was a real boner. The fact is that a month and a half ago I telegraphed to see whether Marshal Stalin would meet with me and Churchill in the near future. Stalin replied in a very nice tone that he could not possibly leave his army, which is now on the offensive, at this time but that he did want to meet with Churchill and me as soon as he could.

In view of this, I gave up all thought of a trip overseas to meet Mr. Churchill alone. There are several things which I do have to talk over with him because they relate to Anglo-American operations in the near future that do not concern Russia.

Therefore, very confidentially, I expect that Churchill will come to this hemisphere somewhere within the next two or three weeks -- not Washington, D. C.

I have no thought of going to London, Paris, or to any point in that direction.

I expect to be here the day after Labor Day and will see you then.

Give my love to Jane and I hope that you are getting a real holiday.

Always sincerely,

Honorable Harold L. Ickes,
c/o Acadia National Park Offices,
Bar Harbor,
Maine.

fdr/
tmb



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

August 21, 1944.

AUG 23 11 39 AM '44
WHITE HOUSE
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

I am up here in Acadia National Park with Jane and the children so that I am not any too sure from the newspapers as to what is happening. But an article by Turner Catledge of the NEW YORK TIMES the other day has given me such concern that I am again venturing to intrude upon you and I apologize for doing so.

I hope that it is not true that you are proposing to go to London, and perhaps to Paris, before the election. With Wilson's trips to Europe after the last war so easy to recall, I believe that the opposition would have little difficulty in arousing apprehensions that would have disturbing results. I wonder if, politically speaking, it is not one thing to meet Churchill on neutral ground, such as was the case in North Africa or Teheran, and another to go to the capital of the British Empire. It would be all right for Churchill to come to Washington again. The people are used to that and rather like the idea. But, deep down, I doubt if they would take to the notion of our President going to London, or even to Paris.

There is another possible point that might be emphasized. Dewey cannot go abroad and your ability to do so, thus availing yourself of an opportunity that is not his, might be charged as taking an unsportsmanlike advantage. Moreover, I wonder if there is anything to the thought that the people might not like it if you should be out of reach for either spoken or unspoken questions. If you should fail of reelection, to which absence from the country might be thought to have contributed, it would be a terrific cost for the country to pay.

The day that Dewey made his speech in Chicago I predicted to Jane that that would be the day of his greatest strength. As I look back I have reason to believe that, so far, my prediction has been true. I do not believe that he has gained anything since his nomination. I further think that your cause fell off somewhat following the Democratic Convention but that you have been gaining lately and, considering that November 7 is still relatively far ahead, the situation is satisfactory -- too much so, from my point of view, to venture too many risks. It seems to me that the most important thing in the world right now is your reelection.

I had a chance yesterday to hear people express themselves upon this matter -- not the stuffed-shirt "hate-Roosevelt" crowd that one associates with Bar Harbor but intelligent people, some of whom were for you and some of whom were in doubt. Every one of them felt that, with the precedent created by President Wilson, it might be nothing short of disastrous for you to carry out such plans as were indicated in the Turner Catledge article. For my part, I cannot believe that Catledge was accurate but you know and will pardon, I

hope, my disposition to be concerned about a situation out of which either you or the incredible Dewey will be elected President next November.

I have heard from Abe Fortas about Alaska and the Potomac Bridge and martial law in Hawaii. As always, I am keeping in daily touch with my office and Fortas at all times will be in a position to represent my views. I have written to "Pa" Watson expressing the hope that I may be able to see you shortly after my return to Washington on September 3. Of course, you understand that I will cut my stay here short if you should need me but I would like to stay here for the appointed time if it can be done without damage to my official duties or to your political interests.

Sincerely yours,

Herold L. Fehos

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

PSF

Ickes folder
2-44

December 9, 1944.

Dear Harold:-

In spite of our conversation -- in spite of your letter of resignation -- you will, if you say anything more about it, find a Marine Guard from Quantico dogging your footsteps day and night.

That is especially true because all those impecunious tears of yours are disproved by the fact of that letter the other day that said your country place is worth \$1,000,000.

Of course, I want you to go along at the old stand where you have been for twelve years. We must see this thing out together.

Affectionately,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

THE WHITE HOUSE
DEC 8 2 38 PM '44
RECEIVED

My dear Mr. President:

filed Interior folder, 2-44

I enclose resignations of Under Secretary Fortas and of Assistant Secretaries Straus and Chapman. These three men constitute an efficient team in Interior and unless you have some reason that I am not aware of for accepting any of the resignations I suggest that they be declined. I am enclosing letters for this purpose if you care to make use of them.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

Encs.

Ans

PSF

Ikes folder 2-44

December 16, 1944.

Dear Harold:-

Thank you for your mighty nice letter of December thirteenth. I will be back on Tuesday next and will see you then.

Don't forget that your leadership in the Interior Department is going to be more important in the next year at least than ever before -- and it all ties up with the kind of peace we are going to get.

As ever yours,

"J.D.R."

Honorable Harold L. Ikes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

Your letter of December 9 makes me feel all fluttery. To have you write about me as you did is like an accolade to my spirit. No one can be so generous as you and from no one else would what you wrote mean so much.

I wish that I could come to you not as my President but as my understanding friend who might be aware of the very real quandary in which I find myself. My impulse, of course, is to respond quickly and loyally to your suggestion and yet for your sake and my own, my decision must be right from every point of view. You could readily find another Secretary of the Interior and I am not asking to be courted. I will, if I may, hold the matter open for a few days and prayerfully weigh your generous words against what has become a firm conviction that if you do not realize that I have outgrown my usefulness to you it is therefore not the least part of my duty to our greatest President that I fully comprehend my duty by you and act accordingly.

When I spoke to you about retiring from the cabinet I really meant it. That was no sudden decision. I had been talking the matter over with Jane and had reached the conclusion that I expressed although it was against her judgment which I value highly.

I was one of the first to see this war coming. When Jane and I came back from London and Paris in 1938, we both had the conviction that war was impending over Europe and we did not see how it could be averted from the United States. I had hoped that if war came I would be cast for a different role in your administration. However, I was grateful for the opportunity that you gave me in Petroleum and Hard Fuels, although I would have been much happier in a more active war job. But neither directly nor indirectly did I present myself to you as a suppliant. I went ahead as best I could with the duties that I already had and the new ones that came to me.

As I see it, I have done all that I can do as Secretary of the Interior. I found a dispirited Department when I took over and it is now one of the going concerns of your administration. I might stay on for one year or two years or even for four more and not have any greater feeling of accomplishment, so far as Interior is concerned, than I now have. It needs guidance and direction, a knowledge of its duties and an appreciation of its destiny but it does not need me for these things. I like to do things; to build; to develop new ways. These are the reasons that I have liked Interior and revelled in in Public Works. I suppose that, deep down, I am really prouder of what I was able to accomplish, with your guidance and help, in Public Works than as Secretary of the Interior.


As I was interested in the war, so am I interested in the peace -- rather fearfully interested at times. We are on the verge of a great spiritual adventure -- the greatest in history and you have been chosen by the people to be the leader of the world in the direction of peace. The Secretary of Interior, although he holds an honorable and eye-filling job, would not be any closer to the peace and its evolvment than if he were a surf-fisherman casting for blue fish off of the coast of Cape Cod. And so it has been running in my mind that if I could get myself a job as a writer I might have more to say about and do with the peace than as a frustrated Secretary of the Interior.

I am speaking frankly to you, not only because that is my nature but because the occasion calls for it. I don't know the answer -- at least not today. Perhaps I will never know. It may be that in the end I will be able to do no better than to take a long breath and decide upon the chance casting of the die that in the end may prove to be neither well nor badly cast. If I might, I would like to talk the matter over with you. In any event, I hope that you will be patient with me for a short spell realizing, as I hope that you do, that I am not trying to be coy.

But whatever I may decide in the end, I hope will have your approval. No ultimate decision can affect the feeling of warm pride and gratification that your letter has given me.

With affectionate regards,

Sincerely yours,


Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF
Chamberlain

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 22, 1945.

~~HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR:

If you have any urgent messages which you wish to get to me, I suggest you send them through the White House Map Room. However, only absolutely urgent messages should be sent via the Map Room. May I ask that you make them as brief as possible in order not to tie up communications. If you have very lengthy messages the Map Room officer will have to exercise his discretion as to whether it is physically possible to send them by radio or whether they will have to be sent by pouch.

F.D.R.

(Identical memos sent to all Cabinet Members + memo, 1/19/45, from Adm. Brown re this is filed - Adm. Brown folder, 2-45)

PSF
Antisoir

Ickes folder 2-45-

March 27, 1945.

Dear Harold:

I have won a great victory! I, too, have an invitation to the Gridiron Club Dinner on April fourteenth and I am told they have at last abandoned white veskits, white ties, and full dress suits. This is a great moral victory for me. It has taken twelve years to attain it.

Unfortunately, I shall be away on April fourteenth. I hope that your absence from the dinner will not weigh on your mind too greatly.

As ever yours,

F. D. R.

Honorable Harold L. Ickes,
Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D. C.



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

March 26, 1945.

My dear Mr. President:

I have an invitation to the Gridiron Club dinner on April 14. I do not yearn to attend this dinner. As a matter of fact, before the club was discontinued on account of the war I had declined some invitations despite the fact that on one occasion the president of the club, whom I happened to like, came to see me to try to persuade me to go.

The way I feel about this coming dinner is that if you are going and want the support of your friends, I will be willing to make a sacrifice hit. But if you are not going, I would enjoy sending my regrets.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Peters
Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

4353

Eckes folder
2-45

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ASF
Interior

April 7, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

F. D. R.

Memo of 4/5/45 for the President from the Sec of the Interior (TOP SECRET); is greatly disturbed as result of reports as to the attitude of the Army and Navy with respect to the international trusteeship problem; recommends that the mandated territories and any territories which may be separated from the enemy should be placed under the trusteeship system.