

● PSF

Navy Dept.

1933-34<sup>Sept</sup>

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Date- 11-17-64

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75F-NAVY

Navy Dept.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

(SC)EF37

~~Confidential~~

NOV - 8 1933

My dear Mr. President:

The attached clipping and memorandum were received from the White House on 16 October 1933.

Substantially the same news as is contained in the enclosure has been reported from various sources. For several years similar reports in regard to so-called surveying activities have reached this department. While Japanese-owned vessels, under the pretext of fishing, have been frequently charged with surveying expeditions along the West Coast of the American continent, it is difficult to understand how the employment of such vessels to obtain solely hydrographic information could be worth the expense and effort, when accurate and complete information is contained on charts and in sailing directions, both of which are readily available to the public. Such expeditions do, however, familiarize the personnel with local knowledge which might be of great value in war.

This particular fishing vessel is very probably one of the Japanese-owned but United States built and United States financed vessels of the high-seas fishing fleets which base on and operate from San Diego and San Pedro. About seventy-five of these vessels are of about fifty tons burden and represent a very considerable investment of the American canning firms which finance them. The Revised Statutes designed to protect coastwise trade prohibit alien-owned vessels of over five tons burden from engaging in the fishing trade from our ports but unfortunately the Statutes provide no penalty in case of a violation.

The Department of Commerce has brought this matter to the attention of past Congresses and has urged the enactment of remedial legislation - so far without success.

During the last few months the matter of these vessels received considerable agitation and publicity in Southern California when some of these vessels protested the efforts of the County of Los Angeles to collect the payment of State taxes on local fishing craft, the basis for the protest being that they were alien-owned. In connection with this agitation certain citizens of Southern California informed the Navy Department that some of the newer alien-owned fishing vessels were so constructed that they could readily be converted into mine layers within a few hours time. This feature, together with the large cruising radius, (6,000-10,000 miles) and their ability to remain at sea for periods as great as sixty days, renders them of great potential value in war. They could put to sea during a period of strained relations, equip with mines

~~Confidential~~

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from nearby foreign ports, large alien vessels at a sea rendezvous, or other sources unknown, and be in a position to strike at the fleet bases upon the outbreak of war. Recent information, believed to be reliable, indicates that the Japanese are interested in a type of submersible fuel and supply tank which they desire to purchase in considerable quantities.


As a result of a conference of representatives of this department with the Department of Commerce, the latter department will again endeavor to obtain remedial legislation at the next session of Congress. The new Congressmen from the Southern California districts have indicated that they will support this legislation. If the legislation is enacted either the vessels in question will have to come under American registry and American fishing laws, thus effectually breaking up the strictly alien character of their crews and making the vessels available to us as wartime auxiliaries; or they will have to move their bases to some other country.

Sometime ago it appeared that the Japanese were attempting to establish such a base in Mexican territory. However, the recent growth of anti-oriental feeling in Mexico and the enforcement of the Mexican labor laws, which require that 80% of all employees of all firms in Mexico must be Mexican, has apparently effectually stopped this effort. The continuance of our friendly relations with Mexico should tend to prevent the use of her ports for such a purpose.

Recent information indicates that this fishing fleet contemplates moving its base to the Republic of Panama. Whether this move is made or not it appears that such a fleet manned by Japanese and operating from any port on the coast of the American continents, is not without its menace to the Fleet.

A suggestion has just been received from various organizations in Los Angeles that the Japanese Fishing Fleet as such would be disbanded if the President under the emergency acts of Congress would place a prohibitive tariff on all fish products imported into the United States when the fish are not caught by American-owned vessels. This suggestion has been forwarded to the Department of Commerce for its consideration.

Sincerely yours,



Claude A. Swanson

The President

The White House.

~~Confidential~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*PSF*  
*Navy*

October 16, 1933.

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

HERE IS SOME MORE ABOUT WHAT I SENT  
YOU THE OTHER DAY. LET ME KNOW IF O. N. I.  
HEARS ANYTHING.

F. D. R.

(A) ✓

①

## JAPANESE SHIP MYSTERY.

Salvador and Honduras Hunt Vessel Seen Off Coasts.

Special Cable to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

SAN SALVADOR, Sept. 28.—A mysterious ship has been cruising on the Gulf of Fonseca in waters under the jurisdiction of Salvador and Honduras. It is a Japanese fishing vessel registered at San Francisco, but it is reported to be making soundings and surveys.

The governments of Salvador and Honduras have ordered a watch for the ship.

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 28.—Officials here say they do not take seriously the report of a Japanese ship in the Gulf of Fonseca.

The United States Chargé d'Affairs in Salvador informed the State Department that the Salvador Government had notified Honduras of the ship. It has sailed north and disappeared.

Henry P. ...

*Journal file navy - 1135 file*

*P5F Navy*

Office of Naval Intelligence  
December 12, 1933.

		TOTAL BUILT		BUILDING AND APPROPRIATED		ADDITIONAL PERMITTED BY TREATY TO BE LAID DOWN BEFORE 31 DEC. 1936.	
		UNDER AGE ON 31 DEC. 1933		FOR		FOR	
No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
							(3)
<b>UNITED STATES:</b>							
Capital Ships	15: 455,400	14: 429,300	0:	000:	0:	000	
Aircraft							
Carriers	3: 77,500	2: 66,000	3: 53,800	1: 15,200			
Cruisers (a)	11: 100,000	10: 92,550	7: 70,000	(1)1: 10,000			
Cruisers (b)	10: 70,500	10: 70,500	4: 40,000	(2)5: 47,100			
Destroyers	251: 267,470	3: 3,570	32: 50,800	65: 99,200			
Submarines	82: 67,790	45: 46,530	6: 7,460	30: 35,530			
Total	372: 1,038,660	84: 708,550	52: 222,060	102: 207,030			
<b>BRITISH EMPIRE:</b>							
Capital Ships	15: 473,650	15: 473,650	0:	000:	0:	000	
Aircraft							
Carriers	6: 115,350	6: 115,350	0:	000:	2: 34,100	(4)	
Cruisers (a)	19: 183,686	19: 183,686	0:	000:	0:	000	
Cruisers (b)	35: 165,045	20: 102,780	11: 75,400	12: 87,530			
Destroyers	160: 181,864	44: 58,374	27: 37,275	39: 63,696			
Submarines	57: 54,104	32: 40,209	10: 11,750	8: 9,362			
Total	292: 1,173,699	136: 974,049	48: 124,425	61: 194,688			
<b>JAPAN:</b>							
Capital Ships	9: 272,070	8: 242,740	0:	000:	0:	000	
Aircraft							
Carriers	4: 68,370	4: 68,370	2: 20,100	0:	000		
Cruisers (a)	14: 123,520	12: 107,800	0:	000:	0:	000	
Cruisers (b)	20: 93,375	17: 81,455	6: 51,000	0:	000		
Destroyers	104: 123,801	62: 83,981	24: 33,072	0:	000		
Submarines	70: 77,125	63: 71,779	15: 19,200	0:	000		
Total	221: 758,261	166: 656,125	47: 123,372	0:	000		
<b>FRANCE:</b>							
Capital Ships	9: 185,925	4: 88,756	1: 26,500	4: 148,500			
Aircraft							
Carriers	1: 22,146	1: 22,146	0:	000:	2: 37,854		
Cruisers (a)	9: 95,923	6: 60,000	1: 10,000	Not limited.			
Cruisers (b)	7: 45,928	5: 33,016	7: 49,886	Not limited.			
Destroyers	72: 103,051	48: 85,263	11: 26,737	Not limited.			
Submarines	90: 77,383	64: 59,559	21: 21,871	Not limited.			
Total	188: 530,356	128: 348,740	41: 134,994				
<b>ITALY:</b>							
Capital Ships	4: 86,532	4: 86,532	0:	000:	5: 175,000		
Aircraft							
Carriers	0: 000	0: 000	0: 000	3: 60,000			
Cruisers (a)	11: 103,642	7: 70,000	0:	000:	Not limited.		
Cruisers (b)	11: 41,970	4: 19,584	8: 48,502	Not limited.			
Destroyers	82: 84,447	49: 58,566	8: 7,480	Not limited.			
Submarines	53: 35,108	32: 26,949	22: 17,916	Not limited.			
Total	161: 351,699	96: 261,631	38: 73,898				

- (1) Authorized but not appropriated for and may not be laid down before 1 Jan. 1935.
- (2) Authorized but not appropriated for.
- (3) Except for 3 U.S. cruisers (b) and 1 British aircraft carrier all figures in this column are replacements for existing vessels becoming over age.
- (4) May also replace FURIOUS, EAGLE and HERMES (experimental ships).

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
GENERAL BOARD  
WASHINGTON

G.B.No. 420-8

PSF Navy  
MCM

8 March 1934.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Flight Deck Cruiser.

The General Board submits herewith a statement of the pros and cons with regard to the flight deck cruiser, as requested by the Secretary of the Navy, and pertinent extracts from the General Board's letter of February 20, 1934, on this subject.

*R. H. Leigh*

Copy to C.N.O.

FLIGHT DECK CRUISER.

Note: A flight deck cruiser absorbs an equal amount of cruiser tonnage.

<u>PROS</u>	:	<u>CONS</u>
1. Primary use is as carrier.	:	1. Fleet needs maximum treaty number of pure cruisers; this number less than actual fleet requirements.
2. Carries 16 planes more than a pure cruiser, and can operate plane complement with greater facility.	:	2. Additional planes supplied are few, as compared to total of 689 carried by other vessels of fleet, including those now under construction.
3. Provides an additional landing deck for aircraft - capacity 24 planes.	:	3. Five carriers, afloat and under construction, (+1 additional authorized in Vinson Bill but not appropriated for) supply decks with capacity for 538.
4. Has both gun and plane offensive power.	:	4. Gunpower limited by number of guns, 9 as against 15, and by inability to fire within approximately 45° of astern, on either quarter. Plane offensive power ineffective in low visibility.
5. Can function as a 9-gun cruiser if carrier properties are no longer available.	:	5. Value as cruiser lessened by limited gunpower and by slightly less protection that can be built into flight deck cruiser than pure cruiser.
6. More valuable than pure cruiser as scout, in good flying conditions, because of increased area covered by planes.	:	6. Flying conditions subject to interruption; gaps left in scouting line when flying interrupted.
7. Construction and use in fleet of one vessel can determine value of type.	:	7. Practically the same information can be determined by tests with SARATOGA and LEXINGTON.
8. Can receive planes on board under way, in any flying weather, in flights of 12 each.	:	8. Recent experiments demonstrate feasibility of recovering pure cruiser's planes singly at moderate speed, in good weather.
	:	9. Increased fire hazard due to planes and gasoline.
	:	10. Increased target due to hangar (and flight deck) height of 16' over main deck for more than half of ship's length.
	:	11. Inability to use main battery with planes on board, in firing abaft beam.
	:	12. Anti-aircraft battery cannot be so advantageously located.

Extract from General Board's letter, G.B.No. 420-8  
(Serial No. 1642) of February 20, 1934.

SUBJECT: Flying Deck Cruisers.

\* \* \* \* \*

6. \* \* \* The essential consideration is now the relative value to the fleet of the flight deck cruiser, as compared with the value of an equivalent tonnage of the pure cruiser type. It is presumed that one or more of the three 6-inch cruisers carried in the Naval Appropriation Bill for 1935 may be constructed of the flight deck type without conflict with the terms of the Bill.

7. With regard to the legality of the flight deck cruiser, if constructed in general accordance with the latest design, of February 14, 1934, offered by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Board, after examination of the records of the London Conference, believes that the construction of vessels of that design would not be contrary to the letter or the spirit of the London Treaty.

8. The General Board has endeavored in its inquiries of the various officers consulted to ascertain their views as to the value to the fleet of this type of vessel. All the evidence received by the Board indicates that the primary value of this ship is as an aircraft carrier, although of but limited capacity, and that its gunpower as a cruiser is of but secondary value, mainly for use after its utility as an aircraft carrier is lost by reason of damage or of expenditure of its planes. There has been a conflict of opinion as to its real worth, the majority of officers stating that the flight deck cruiser has little or none while others believe that it might be useful.

9. All agree, however, and the General Board concurs, that no definite assurance of its value can be now stated and that it can only be finally determined by experimentation. On this basis some officers recommend the construction of one of these vessels for such experimentation and determination. Although in sympathy with the development of naval science by necessary experimentation, in this instance the Board has some hesitation in recommending the inception of a possibly fruitless experiment which will cause both the expenditure of some 15-20 million dollars and the obligation of tonnage which under treaty limitations might be better applied to the construction of a vessel or vessels of the pure cruiser type, the value of which is already known.

10. To this end, therefore, the Board has considered the investigation which might be carried out with existing and prospective vessels to determine the value of the flight deck cruiser, with a view to obviating the necessity for the actual construction of such a vessel for purely experimental reasons.

(a) The strategical and tactical properties of the type might well be determined by the use in fleet exercises of the LEXINGTON and the SARATOGA with appropriate limitations as to speed and the ranges and arc of train of the gun battery. These two vessels are in fact large flight deck cruisers and can perform all the functions of the smaller type.

(b) As to the material construction of the vessel itself: Results to be obtained from the 6-inch 10,000-ton cruisers with the same hull and engine power should indicate the maneuvering qualities. To a limited degree the flight deck properties can be determined from experimentation with the LEXINGTON and SARATOGA, in conjunction with the LANGLEY.

11. The Board therefore concludes that, in view of the experiment and investigation which can well be conducted with means available now or before a flight deck cruiser could be carried to completion, its construction on purely experimental grounds is not warranted.

12. Aside, however, from the positive or negative determination of its worth by experimentation, the need for the flight deck cruiser as an additional carrier with the fleet is largely diminished by the number of aircraft carriers soon to be available. Five carriers will be completed and operating with the fleet before a single flight deck cruiser could be commissioned. A sixth would be available soon thereafter if the Vinson Bill is passed and appropriations secured for beginning the construction of this carrier in the fiscal year 1936.

13. Furthermore, it is possible that in the 1935 Conference the aircraft carrier tonnage allowed the United States may be increased or that in fact, by reason of failure of that Conference to agree upon a limitation treaty, all limits to aircraft carrier tonnage will be removed. In such case the Board has no doubt that the construction of aircraft carriers would be of more value to the Navy than the construction of flight deck cruisers. If one or more flight deck cruisers were commenced in the fiscal year 1935 they

would hardly have been begun before the 1935 Conference is concluded. In case, therefore, the construction of further aircraft carriers becomes possible as a result of that Conference, the completion of the flight deck cruiser would be inadvisable and its conversion with attendant difficulties and extra expense to a 6-inch pure cruiser would be preferable. In view of the time factor thus involved and the slight delay which would be occasioned by postponing any flight deck cruiser construction until after the 1935 Conference, the initiation of such construction at the present time, even if it should ultimately be desirable to build a vessel of this type, would not be warranted.

14. On the other hand, the need of the fleet for vessels of the pure cruiser type is positive and pressing. The General Board considers that the value of the pure cruiser to the fleet is greater than that of a flight deck cruiser, and that under the existing limitations of cruiser tonnage no diversion of such tonnage from pure cruisers to flight deck cruisers should be effected.

15. The General Board therefore recommends that:-

(a) The cruiser construction authorized in the 1935 Naval Appropriation Act be confined to vessels of the pure cruiser type.

(b) Investigation be conducted in the fleet with means now available as to the possible strategic and tactical properties and value of a flight deck cruiser.

(SGD) R. H. LEIGH.

Chief of Naval Operations.

MCM

G.B.No. 420-8

8 March 1934.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Flight Deck Cruiser.

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R. H. LEIGH

Copy to C.N.O.

C.N.O. - Standby  
 C in C - Sellers  
 Com bat fr - Reeves  
 Com desec - Kalfus  
 Com desec for - Army  
 Com desec - Fanning

} Against  
 } Agree  
 } with General Board

} For  
 } Disagree

FLIGHT DECK CRUISER.

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<u>PROS</u>		<u>CONS</u>
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	:	9. Increased fire hazard due to planes and gasoline.
	:	10. Increased target due to hangar (and flight deck) height of 16' over main deck for more than half of ship's length.
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Extract from General Board's letter, G.B.No. 420-8  
(Serial No. 1642) of February 20, 1954.

SUBJECT: Flying Deck Cruisers.

\* \* \* \* \*

6. \* \* \* The essential consideration is now the relative value to the fleet of the flight deck cruiser, as compared with the value of an equivalent tonnage of the pure cruiser type. It is presumed that one or more of the three 6-inch cruisers carried in the Naval Appropriation Bill for 1955 may be constructed of the flight deck type without conflict with the terms of the Bill.

7. With regard to the legality of the flight deck cruiser, if constructed in general accordance with the latest design, of February 14, 1954, offered by the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Board, after examination of the records of the London Conference, believes that the construction of vessels of that design would not be contrary to the letter or the spirit of the London Treaty.

8. The General Board has endeavored in its inquiries of the various officers consulted to ascertain their views as to the value to the fleet of this type of vessel. All the evidence received by the Board indicates that the primary value of this ship is as an aircraft carrier, although of but limited capacity, and that its gunpower as a cruiser is of but secondary value, mainly for use after its utility as an aircraft carrier is lost by reason of damage or of expenditure of its planes. There has been a conflict of opinion as to its real worth, the majority of officers stating that the flight deck cruiser has little or none while others believe that it might be useful.

9. All agree, however, and the General Board concurs, that no definite assurance of its value can be now stated and that it can only be finally determined by experimentation. On this basis some officers recommend the construction of one of these vessels for such experimentation and determination. Although in sympathy with the development of naval science by necessary experimentation, in this instance the Board has some hesitation in recommending the inception of a possibly fruitless experiment which will cause both the expenditure of some 15-20 million dollars and the obligation of tonnage which under treaty limitations might be better applied to the construction of a vessel or vessels of the pure cruiser type, the value of which is already known.

10. To this end, therefore, the Board has considered the investigation which might be carried out with existing and prospective vessels to determine the value of the flight deck cruiser, with a view to obviating the necessity for the actual construction of such a vessel for purely experimental reasons.

(a) The strategical and tactical properties of the type might be determined by the use in fleet exercises of the LEXINGTON and the SABATOCA with appropriate limitations as to speed and the ranges and arc of train of the gun battery. These two vessels are in fact large flight deck cruisers and can perform all the functions of the smaller type.

(b) As to the material construction of the vessel itself: Results to be obtained from the 6-inch 10,000-ton cruisers with the same hull and engine power should indicate the maneuvering qualities. To a limited degree the flight deck properties can be determined from experimentation with the LEXINGTON and SABATOCA, in conjunction with the LANGLEY.

11. The Board therefore concludes that, in view of the experiment and investigation which can well be conducted with means available now or before a flight deck cruiser could be carried to completion, its construction on purely experimental grounds is not warranted.

12. Aside, however, from the positive or negative determination of its worth by experimentation, the need for the flight deck cruiser as an additional carrier with the fleet is largely diminished by the number of aircraft carriers soon to be available. Five carriers will be completed and operating with the fleet before a single flight deck cruiser could be commissioned. A sixth would be available soon thereafter if the Vinson Bill is passed and appropriations secured for beginning the construction of this carrier in the fiscal year 1936.

13. Furthermore, it is possible that in the 1935 Conference the aircraft carrier tonnage allowed the United States may be increased or that in fact, by reason of failure of that Conference to agree upon a limitation treaty, all limits to aircraft carrier tonnage will be removed. In such case the Board has no doubt that the construction of aircraft carriers would be of more value to the Navy than the construction of flight deck cruisers. If one or more flight deck cruisers were commenced in the fiscal year 1935 they

would hardly have been begun before the 1935 Conference is concluded. In case, therefore, the construction of further aircraft carriers becomes possible as a result of that Conference, the completion of the flight deck cruiser would be inadvisable and its conversion with attendant difficulties and extra expense to a 6-inch pure cruiser would be preferable. In view of the time factor thus involved and the slight delay which would be occasioned by postponing any flight deck cruiser construction until after the 1935 Conference, the initiation of such construction at the present time, even if it should ultimately be desirable to build a vessel of this type, would not be warranted.

14. On the other hand, the need of the fleet for vessels of the pure cruiser type is positive and pressing. The General Board considers that the value of the pure cruiser to the fleet is greater than that of a flight deck cruiser, and that under the existing limitations of cruiser tonnage no diversion of such tonnage from pure cruisers to flight deck cruisers should be effected.

15. The General Board therefore recommends that:-

(a) The cruiser construction authorized in the 1935 Naval Appropriation Act be confined to vessels of the pure cruiser type.

(b) Investigation be conducted in the fleet with means now available as to the possible strategic and tactical properties and value of a flight deck cruiser.

(SGD) R. H. LEIGH.

MISSY:

Confidential file in President's  
Office.

*Hill*

*Nancy*

PSF Navy

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
GENERAL BOARD  
WASHINGTON

G.B.No. 420-8.

ICN.

→ 22 March 1934.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Size of cruisers.

The General Board submits herewith a statement of the pros and cons with regard to the size of cruisers to be built under the 1935 Naval Appropriation Act - small cruisers or large, as requested orally by the Secretary of the Navy.

*R. A. Keith*

Copy to C.N.O.

22 March 1934.

Size of Cruisers to be built under 1935 Naval Appropriation Act - Small cruisers or Large?

Note:- Three cruisers carried in Act, displacement not specified. Available tonnage under London Treaty 33,000; 14,100 additional available after 1 January 1936, to lay down replacements for OMAHA and MILWAUKEE; replacement of remainder of OMAHA class, 56,400 tons, may not be begun until 1940 and subsequently.

Pro (Smaller Cruiser)

1. Treaty limitations on total tonnage establish a direct relation between number of cruisers and individual displacement.
2. Number of cruisers claimed a paramount consideration.
3. Smaller 6-inch gun cruisers will in the main operate with fleet and may be designed for suitability for fleet work only.
4. Smaller cruisers more suitable for fleet work.
5. Multiplicity of targets advantageous in fleet battle.
6. With 33,000 tons available, (1) five 6,600-ton ships, or (2) four 8,250-ton ships may be built.

Con (10,000-ton type)

1. Existing treaty limitations on cruiser tonnage are subject to change as result of 1935 Conference. British probably will demand increase of small cruisers and may demand restriction of large cruisers.
2. In view of uncertainty of future cruiser tonnage limitations, the properties of the individual ship are more essential. Superiority necessary, ship for ship, to foreign vessels of the class.
3. All cruisers, for maximum utility, should be available for all-around duty. Every reduction in tonnage carries with it loss of gun-power, of protection, and of steaming radius.
4. Little if any loss in maneuverability in large type; substantial gain in protection and offensive power. Large cruisers unquestionably superior for independent duties, i.e., escort, commerce raiding, scouting, offensive screening. Large cruisers only type suitable for operations with carrier group.
5. Superiority of protection of each ship outweighs advantages of multiplicity of targets.
6. (1) The 6,600-ton ship vulnerable to destroyer gun-fire (5-inch). Five ships would give 40 guns, against 45 for 3 10,000-ton ships.  
(2) The 8,250-ton ship protected against 6-inch fire (cruiser guns) in 12,800-19,900 yard zone only; the 10,000-ton ship in 10,900-23,300 yard zone, a gain of 5,300 yards. Steaming radius (9,000 miles) reduced 2,000 miles from that of 10,000-ton ship (11,000 miles).

7. Four 8,250-ton ships would carry 48 guns as against 45 for 3 10,000-ton ships.
8. Construction large ships now would "freeze" tonnage involved and smaller ships could not be constructed if deemed desirable.
9. Plans for smaller cruiser (less than 10,000 tons) could be completed in 6 months and construction started about 1 January 1935.
10. Appropriation bill as worded permits discretion as to size of the three ships to be built.
11. Immediate cost of commencing and building three smaller cruisers less than that for three 10,000-ton cruisers.
7. Increased gun-power of group outweighed by better protection and radius of 10,000-ton ships and by superiority of individual ships in single ship action.
8. Similarly, construction of smaller vessels would "freeze" tonnage as against building larger ones if considered better type. If present cruiser limitations are continued, 70,500 tons in replacement of 10 OMAHA's (plus 3,000 tons of the present 33,000 if 3 10,000-ton ships are built) remains available for construction of smaller vessels in future.
9. Plans for 10,000-ton cruisers now ready and construction could be started when funds available, 1 July 1934, a six months' gain in date of completion and availability in the Fleet. Also beginning construction on 1 July 1934 would avoid subsequent gap in peak-load shipyard employment.
10. Appropriation Committee (House) report states specifically funds allotted to commencing "three 6-inch gun cruisers of 10,000 tons each," and notes this will obligate all available non-replacement tonnage. It might be difficult, if three smaller cruisers are now laid down, to secure appropriations next year for one or more additional ships to complete the utilization of the available treaty tonnage.
11. Final cost of building four or more smaller cruisers of equivalent total tonnage greater than that for three 10,000-ton ships.

00491

PS F Navy

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

WASHINGTON

JAN - 2 1935

(SC) NB/ND12

My dear Mr. President:

The development of a main home base in San Francisco Bay was discussed by the Chief of Naval Operations in his letter of 26 June 1931 to the Secretary of the Navy. At that time he stated that rather than build a concentrated base he considered the development of existing facilities was more advisable. This paper was referred to the General Board for study and recommendation. They concurred with the opinion of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Secretary of the Navy approved the General Board's opinion.

In line with this policy of developing existing facilities, the Shore Station Development Board decided that an additional dry dock in Mare Island was necessary. This decision was further confirmed by detailed studies made as recently as 1 February 1934 and based upon the requirements of the War Plans.

These studies revealed that for a mobilization of the fleet in the San Francisco area, the present docking facilities are only one third of the requirements. There is a particular shortage of dry docks for ships of lengths below 500 feet. For longer ships there is no leeway or margin of safety to care for vessels requiring time in dock for repairs beyond ordinary cleaning and painting. However, in view of the fact that for all but seventeen ships of the Navy there is sufficient water to reach Mare Island, provision of a dock at that yard would assist to relieve the urgency of this situation. The heavy cruisers could be docked at the new proposed dry dock, leaving Hunter's Point free to carry the load of the battleships and the larger carriers.

Last year the Mare Island dry dock was among the projects submitted to Mr. Ickes, for which it was hoped to obtain funds from the Public Works Administration.

The relative priority of proposed docking facilities, based upon War Plans, is as follows:-

- |   |              |
|---|--------------|
| 1. Pearl Harbor - Type "B" floating dry dock, | \$10,000,000 |
| 2. " " - " "D" " " "                          | 750,000      |
| 3. Puget Sound - Graving dry dock             | 4,500,000    |
| 4. Mare Island - Graving dry dock             | 3,500,000    |
| 5. Pearl Harbor - Type "A" floating dry dock  | 12,000,000   |

Since submitting the list of projects to Mr. Ickes, no further action has been taken by the Navy Department in the case of the dry dock at Mare Island.

SECRET

- 2 -

It is contemplated submitting, through the regular channels, a general authorization bill for needed public works at the Navy Yards and stations, and this bill will include the item of the above mentioned dry dock; this bill, however, will not carry any actual appropriations for same.

Sincerely yours,

*H. L. Roosevelt*

**H. L. ROOSEVELT**  
Acting.

The President,  
The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

**DECLASSIFIED**

**DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)**

Date- 2/12/59

Signature-

*Carl L. Spicer*

*File  
H. Roosevelt  
(5) (1)*

*"G. J. G."*



*Mr. Ingham  
F.F.P.'s*

(SC) A21-5

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON


*P.S.F. Navy  
H.R.  
(S) (U)*

2 February 1935.

Memorandum for Mr. McIntyre, Assistant Secretary to the President:

Subject: Colonization of Jarvis, Howland & Baker Islands in Pacific.

1. Colonel Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, has directed me to send you the attached confidential memorandum regarding subject matter.

  
W. R. Munroe, Comdr., U.S.N. Aide

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND NO.

(SC)A21-5

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

FEB 2 - 1935

Memorandum for Mr. McIntyre, Assistant Secretary to  
the President.

Reference is made to your confidential memorandum of  
29 January with respect to the proposed colonization of  
Jarvis, Howland and Baker Islands.

This department will furnish the necessary trans-  
portation for the Department of Commerce representative  
and personnel to those islands, together with their  
equipment and supplies.

In addition the Supply Officer of the Fourteenth  
Naval District at Honolulu will assist the Department  
of Commerce in making arrangements for the purchase  
by that department of supplies and equipment.

*H. L. Roosevelt*

H. L. Roosevelt,  
Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

RAF Navy OPERATIONS

assigned to flight

training

Designated  
naval  
units

Towers - June 1911 - Mar 1915

Bristol - April 1928 - Jan 1929

Fitch - Nov 1928 - Feb 1930

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

(SC)EF37

FEB 28 1935

Confidential

My dear Mr. President:

For your information I quote the following confidential dispatch from the Commanding Officer of the Fourth Marines, Marine Corps Expeditionary Force at Shanghai to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet:

"In accordance with information received from Abend of the New York Times T. V. Soong stated on 26 February during a private interview that he had been advised by the Soviet Ambassador that within three months the Union of Socialistic Soviet Republics will be attacked by Japan. It is the belief of Soong that in order to prevent smuggling supplies to Vladivostok as occurred in previous war (Japan) in this event will seize the mouth of the Yangtze River, this control possibly extending to river ports and at least covering Shanghai area. Abend was urged by Soong to proceed immediately south arranging press contracts Amoy and Foochow where in near future he (Soong) believes drastic action by Japan certain".

I understand that T. B. Soong is the ex-Chinese Minister of Finance who recently resigned because of his anti-Japanese sympathies. Abend is the New York Times correspondent in China and this department considers his reliability good.

Sincerely yours,

*Claude A. Swinerton*

Claude A. Swinerton

The President,

The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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BOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-8-66

Signature-

*Carl L. Spicer*

*I think this is a wild guess*



PSF: Navy

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~~SECRET~~

May 3, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I have carefully read your letter of April twenty-second with regard to Philippine bases. A consideration of all the phases of the matter leads me to the conclusion that I should not issue an Executive Order setting aside bases.

I see no reason why you should not, in the utmost confidence, inform your Chief of Operations and the General Board that:

(a) In the light of all circumstances if Philippine independence goes through and becomes an accomplished fact in ten years, the United States must not retain a Naval base in the Philippine Islands. From the point of view of Naval strategy alone, I would consider such a base in an independent territory a military-naval liability instead of an asset.

(b) In the event that independence does not go through, so much may happen in the next ten years that no one can foretell whether such a base or bases are advisable or not.

(c) To make a move at this time, pending further knowledge on whether the Washington and London Naval Treaties will be extended or not, an Executive Order of this kind would undoubtedly be regarded by Japan and other nations as contrary to our determined position in favor of extension of the Treaty.

(d) I cannot agree with the Military-naval proposal to keep the MANILA-SUBIC BAY AREA as a permanent defense area. It is well known that this area could not be defended over a long period of time against an army attacking it from the land side.

(e) The other areas referred to in 2,3,4, 5,6, and 7, I am familiar with but I think it is

a fair assumption that they have not been considered in the light of positive and complete information regarding their defensibility from the Naval point of view without the assistance of large Coast Defense and Army assistance.

I should be glad to have a report in regard to the latter point. Such a report should include, of course, the opinion of the joint Army and Navy Board.

In regard to the necessity for this Order at this time, I do not believe that failure to take action before the Constitutional elections in the Philippines this spring will in any way militate against the agreement between us and the Philippine Legislature and President during the ten year self-government period.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED

DOB DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

Date- 11-30-69

Signature- J.R.

~~SECRET~~  
(SC)A16/QH(Pacific)

APR 22 1935

My dear Mr. President:

I have caused to be made a study of the question of the retention by the Navy Department of naval reservations in the Philippine Islands. If the recommendations herein made meet with your approval, this question becomes an urgent one by reason of the necessity of designating naval reservations before the Philippine Constitution is accepted by the people of the Philippines on about May 14, 1935, in order that we may have a wide freedom of choice of sites when the question is eventually settled after independence is accomplished.

The Navy Department has consistently held the opinion that possession of an outlying main and of supporting secondary bases in the Philippines is a vital necessity, if the United States is to support its present policies of the Open Door, the territorial integrity of China, and the protection of national and economic rights and interests; and if protection is to be afforded in the future to the Philippines, whether free or in dominion or territorial status. Among the factors which have led to this opinion are the following:

- (a) Any war in which the United States may become involved because of its interests in the Far East must be fought in the Western Pacific.
- (b) In order to be able to exercise naval force in that area a main outlying base must be provided.
- (c) If no such base is provided in time of peace it will be necessary to establish one in time of war against enemy opposition. This will involve long, difficult, and costly operations; it may be an impossibility.
- (d) The only available sites for naval bases in the Western Pacific at the present time are in the Philippine Islands.

~~SECRET~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
DOD FORM 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date =

11-30-69

Signature -

*S. D. [unclear]*

(e) The added difficulties confronting the United States in attempting to exert force in the Far East, without an adequate base, are well known and if no fortified main base is held the influence of the United States in the affairs of the Far East will be practically negligible.

Regardless of all objection and difficulties, the Navy Department is of the opinion that the United States should retain and complete, under its own sovereignty, adequate fortified naval bases in the Philippines, unless it is definitely and finally determined not to support, under any circumstances, now or in the future, the existing Far Eastern policies or to be a factor in Western Pacific developments. The completion of a fully fortified and equipped base must be accomplished if the United States intends to effectively sustain her policies relating to the Far East. The principal obstacles to its completion appear to be the difficulty of obtaining Congressional sanction and appropriations; also objections on the part of the dominant Asiatic power might be carried to extreme lengths.

The Navy Department is of the further opinion that the Manila - Subig Bay area is by far the best available location for a main outlying base. Every effort should be made in the negotiations with the Philippine Government to hold it in perpetuity.

No naval base site, other than the present Manila - Subig Bay area, has been reserved. That site, at present insufficient will be the only preempted one subject to negotiations mentioned in Section 10(b) of the Philippine Independence Act, -- unless additional reservations are made prior to the acceptance of the Philippine Constitution (on or before May 14, 1935). In order to have other preempted sites with which to negotiate for the retention of the Manila - Subig Bay area, and also to have an alternate site available in case the negotiations for that area unfortunately fail, additional naval base sites should be reserved immediately.

The Navy Department therefore recommends:

(a) That an Executive Order immediately be promulgated reserving such areas in the Philippines as may be suitable for naval bases, including the area required for the defense thereof.

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIF 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 11-30-69

Signature- *J. D. [unclear]*

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

Op-123-CTB  
(SC)A16/QH(Pacific)

~~SECRET~~

25 April 1935.

Memorandum to accompany proposed proclamation  
for issue by the President in connection with  
the setting aside of naval reservations in  
the Philippine Islands.

The reason for the urgency in the issuing of the pro-  
posed Presidential proclamation setting aside naval reservations  
in the Philippine Islands is that:

- (a) The Plebiscite upon which the adoption of the  
Constitution will be decided will be held 14  
May 1935.
- (b) Only those naval reservations which have been  
set aside prior to 14 May 1935 may be considered  
for final retention. This is in accordance with  
the decision rendered by the Judge Advocate  
General of the Navy on 5 April 1935 and approved  
by the Secretary of the Navy on the same date.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 11-20-67

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~(b) That the areas reserved include the following: *212-40*

- (1) A completely delimited Manila - Subig Bay area, including all existing Naval and Army reservations, facilities and fortifications.
- (2) A Dumanquilas Bay area lying between longitudes 122° - 40' and 123 - 32' East and extending up to latitude 8° N.
- (3) A Jolo - Tawi Tawi area including the island of Jolo and all islands, anchorages and channels to the Southwestward down to and including Sibutu.
- (4) A Coron Bay area including the islands, anchorages and channels of the Calamian group.
- (5) A Polillo area including the Polillo Islands, the Calagua Islands and the Tanao Islands.
- (6) An area on Lopez Bay bounded as follows: Area lying between Long. 122 - 10 E. and Long. 122 - 16 E. and between Lat. 13 - 54 N. and Lat. 14 - 00 N.
- (7) An area on Casiguran Bay bounded as follows: Area lying between Long. 122 - 05 E. and Long. 122 - 08 E. and between Lat. 16 - 13 N. and Lat. 16 - 16 N.

(c) That the Navy Department proceed to complete prior to January 1, 1937, a study of the relative merits of naval base sites in the Philippines, in order that a decision may be reached, as to which sites should be retained and developed as bases.

(d) That, if the Washington Treaty is revised or replaced by a new treaty, the United States regain the right to establish and maintain a main outlying base and essential secondary bases in the Philippines.

Sincerely yours,

*Claude A. Swanson*

Claude A. Swanson

The President,  
The White House.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

Designation of Naval Reservations of the Government of  
the United States in the Philippine Islands.

ooOoo

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America, and pursuant to Section 5 of the Act of Congress approved March 24, 1934 (48 Stat., 456, 459; 48 U.S.C., sec. 1235), all those tracts, parts of tracts, pieces or parcels of land, and adjacent waters, in the Philippine Islands, located within the hereinafter described areas in the vicinities of Manila-Subic Bay, Dumanquilas Bay, Coron Bay, Lopez Bay, Casiguran Bay, Jolo-Tawi Tawi Islands, and Polillo-Calagua-Tanao Islands, are hereby designated as, and declared to be, naval reservations of the Government of the United States, subject to private rights, if any there be; said reservations being hereby placed under the governance and control of the Navy Department:

**MANILA-SUBIC BAY AREA**

All lands and waters within the following boundaries:

Beginning at a point on the three (3) mile limit of the eastern coast of China Sea opposite the mouth of the Bucao River and thence to the mouth of said river; thence along and including the outlines of said river to Mt. Gatas on the Zambales-Tarlac boundary line; thence south along the eastern boundaries of Zambales and Bataan Provinces to Manila Bay; thence south along a line three (3) miles east of the east coast of Bataan Province to a point three (3) miles east of Lamao Point; thence east to a point three (3) miles northeast of Sangley Point; thence south to the intersection of the Cavite-Rizal boundary line with Manila Bay; thence along said boundary line and to Silang; thence to Alfonso; thence to

Kaytitinga; thence to the Bayudbud River; thence following the outline of the Bayudbud River to its juncture with the Lian River; thence following the outline of the Lian River to China Sea; thence out to the three (3) mile limit; thence on a line three (3) miles out from the coast line northward to the point of beginning opposite the mouth of the Bucac River.

#### DUMANQUILAS BAY AREA

All lands and waters within the following boundaries:

longitude  $122^{\circ} 40'$  E. and longitude  $123^{\circ} 32'$  E.,  
latitude  $7^{\circ} 10'$  N. and latitude  $8^{\circ} 00'$  N.

#### CORON BAY AREA

The islands, anchorages and channels of the Calamian group within the following boundaries:

longitude  $119^{\circ} 35'$  E. and longitude  $120^{\circ} 40'$  E.,  
latitude  $11^{\circ} 20'$  N. and latitude  $12^{\circ} 50'$  N.

#### LOPEZ BAY AREA

All lands and waters within the following boundaries:

longitude  $122^{\circ} 10'$  E. and longitude  $122^{\circ} 16'$  E.,  
latitude  $13^{\circ} 54'$  N. and latitude  $14^{\circ} 00'$  N.

#### CASIGURAN BAY AREA

All lands and waters within the following boundaries:

longitude  $122^{\circ} 04'$  E. and longitude  $122^{\circ} 08'$  E.,  
latitude  $16^{\circ} 11'$  N. and latitude  $16^{\circ} 16'$  N.

#### JOLO-TAWI TAWI ISLANDS AREA

All lands and waters including the Island of Jolo and all islands, anchorages and channels to the southwestward down to and including Sibutu Island, within the following boundaries:

From a point off shore three (3) miles northwest of Pearl Bank to latitude  $6^{\circ} 45'$  N., longitude  $120^{\circ} 45'$  E.; thence to latitude  $6^{\circ} 10'$  N., longitude  $122^{\circ} 15'$  E.; thence to latitude  $4^{\circ} 22'$  N., longitude  $119^{\circ} 26'$  E.; thence to Talantam Shoal; thence to a point off shore three (3) miles northwest of Pearl Bank, the point of beginning.

## POLILLO-CALAGUA-TANAO ISLANDS AREA

All lands and waters including the Polillo, Calagua and Tanao Islands, anchorages and channels within the following boundaries:

longitude  $121^{\circ} 45'$  E., and longitude  $123^{\circ} 10'$  E.,  
latitude  $14^{\circ} 22'$  N., and latitude  $15^{\circ} 10'$  N.

THE WHITE HOUSE

April , 1935.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

~~Confidential~~

9 May 1935

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed information seems  
of such import as to warrant letting you know about it  
at once.

Very sincerely yours,

*Claude A. Swanson*

The President,  
The White House.

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**DECLASSIFIED**  
**BOB DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)**

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *JR*

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16

8 May, 1935.

~~Confidential~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

SUBJECT: Conversation with Captain Yamaguchi, I.J.N., Japanese Naval Attaché.

1. On Friday night, 3 May, 1935, I had a long conversation with Captain Yamaguchi, in which we discussed various phases of the Far Eastern situation. During the course of this conversation, he stated that his Government would probably be willing to accept the five to three ratio provided the United States would abandon all its bases in the Far East.

2. Captain Yamaguchi made a special arrangement to see me and I think his proposal represents the present views of the Japanese Admiralty.

*W.D. Puleston*  
W.D. Puleston.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

**DECLASSIFIED**

**DDO DIB. 5200.9 (9/27/88)**

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *JW*

~~Confidential~~

*Personal & confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

MAY 29 1935

~~Confidential~~

My dear Mr. President:

Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum of May 24th enclosing a confidential Treasury Department report on the pro-Japanese gestures of the Nanking Government.

I was particularly pleased to receive this information as it corroborates many details previously obscure, and at the same time it reveals what appears to be a valuable source of information not previously available to the Navy Department.

I shall take immediate steps to facilitate the flow of such information to this department.

Sincerely yours,

*Claude A. Swanson*

The President,  
The White House

Claude A. Swanson

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 8-8-66

Signature-

*Paul S. Spriet*

~~Confidential~~

*PSF Navy*

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON



September 4, 1935.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing you herewith a clipping from the Richmond Times-Despatch which indicates that the situation in Virginia is very much clarified. I also enclose a clipping giving an account of the organization of a Roosevelt-for-President Club in Pittsylvania County, Virginia. This is my home county and is the largest in Virginia. These Clubs will continue to be organized in the various counties.

I will, very shortly, be able to furnish a list of about six thousand leading, active, and influential citizens of Virginia.

I hope you are enjoying your vacation. You need and deserve a good long rest.

With kind regards and best wishes,

I am

Sincerely yours,

*Claude S. Hamm*

The President,  
The White House.

Encs.

*file  
confidential*

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR AND ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Sc *NSF  
Navy  
(1)*

October 10, 1935.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- priation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion	
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract	As reported by Building Yard
			Oct. 1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Oct. 1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL						
<u>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</u>												
CV5 YORKTOWN	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	57.7	3.	54.6	3.1	5/21/34	-	8/ 3/33	38	10/ 3/36	3/15/37
CV6 ENTERPRISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	51.7	2.4	48.7	3.1	7/16/34	-	8/ 3/33	42	2/ 3/37	7/ 1/37
CV7	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>HEAVY CRUISERS:</u>												
CA39 QUINCY	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	91.1	1.8	89.4	2.3	11/15/33	6/19/35	1/ 9/33	36	1/ 9/36	1/ 9/36 (a)
CA44 VINCENNES	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	NIRA	67.2	1.6	66.9	3.5	1/ 2/34	-	8/ 3/33	41	1/ 2/37	1/ 2/37
CA45 WICHITA	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	I.N.	8.9	1.5	2.6	.4	-	-	11/ 1/34	38	1/ 1/38	1/ 1/38
<u>LIGHT CRUISERS:</u>												
CL40 BROOKLYN	New York Navy Yard	I.N.	36.8	2.5	20.1	3.5	3/12/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	4/ 1/37
CL41 PHILADELPHIA	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	32.7	2.7	13.5	2.3	5/28/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	1/ 1/37 (a)
CL42 SAVANNAH	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	26.7	.3	33.	.8	5/31/34	-	8/ 3/33	36	8/ 3/36	(a)
CL43 NASHVILLE	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	24.	.6	33.	.7	1/24/35	-	8/ 3/33	40	12/ 3/36	(a)
CL46 PHOENIX	New York S.B. Corp.	I.N.	15.4	2.2	10.6	.9	4/15/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	(a)
CL47 BOISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	I.N.	26.5	3.1	12.5	1.4	4/ 1/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	8/22/37 (a)
CL48 HONOLULU	New York Navy Yard	I.N.	19.5	5.6	11.2	1.	9/10/35	-	9/ 1/34	36	9/ 1/37	10/ 1/37 (a)
CL49	Newport News SB&DD Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CL50	New York Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>SUBMARINES:</u>												
SS172 PORPOISE	Portsmouth Navy Yard	NIRA	91.3	3.	91.7	5.	10/27/33	6/20/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	2/ 1/36 *
SS173 PIKE	Portsmouth Navy Yard	NIRA	78.4	3.5	78.9	4.	12/20/33	9/12/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	5/ 1/36
SS174 SHARK	Electric Boat Co.	NIRA	98.5	.5	88.	4.	10/24/33	5/21/35	8/ 3/33	24	8/ 3/35	2/15/36
SS175 TARPON	Electric Boat Co.	NIRA	96.	2.	77.	3.5	12/22/33	9/ 4/35	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	3/24/36
SS176 PERCH	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	52.2	4.8	17.5	6.	2/25/35	-	8/22/34	27	11/22/36	11/22/36
SS177 PICKEREL	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	48.	4.1	17.5	6.	3/25/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	2/22/37
SS178 PERMIT	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	44.3	4.5	17.5	6.	6/ 6/35	-	8/22/34	33	5/22/37	5/22/37

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved, amount of delay not determined.

\* Commissioned August 15, 1935.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract	As reported by Building Yard	
			Oct.1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Oct.1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
SUBMARINES (continued):													
SS179	PLUNGER	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	INEC	15.3	4.1	.6	.1	7/17/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37
SS180	POLLACK	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	INEC	14.2	4.	.5	-	10/ 1/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
SS181	POMPANO	Mare Island Nvy.Yd.	INEC	5.8	.6	23.	9.1	-	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37 (a)
SS182	SALMON	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS183	SEAL	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS184	SKIPJACK	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS185	SNAPPER	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS186	STINGRAY	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS187	STURGEON	Mare Island Navy Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DESTROYERS - 1850 TON:													
DD356	PORTER	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	53.1	5.3	64.5	2.7	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	28	12/ 3/35	(a)
DD357	SELFRIDGE	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	51.7	5.1	62.	2.1	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	(a)
DD358	McDOUGAL	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	47.9	3.4	60.2	1.8	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	(a)
DD359	WINSLOW	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	47.9	3.4	60.	1.8	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	(a)
DD360	PHELPS	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	83.6	7.5	87.4	3.2	1/ 2/34	7/18/35	8/ 3/33	28	12/ 3/35	2/ 3/36
DD361	CLARK	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	70.7	4.5	80.2	3.3	1/ 2/34	-	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	2/ 3/36 (a)
DD362	MOFFETT	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	63.4	2.1	74.5	2.2	1/ 2/34	-	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	4/ 3/36 (a)
DD363	BALCH	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	58.	1.7	70.6	3.1	5/16/34	-	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	6/ 3/36 (a)
DD381	SOMERS	Federal SB&DD Co.	I.N.	16.7	4.9	14.3	4.1	6/27/35	-	8/22/34	28	12/22/36	12/22/36 (a)
DD383	WARRINGTON	Federal SB&DD Co.	I.N.	16.	3.2	13.4	4.	10/10/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	2/22/37 (a)
DD394		Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD395		Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD396		Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DESTROYERS - 1500 TON:													
DD364	MAHAN	United Dry Docks, Inc.	NIRA	74.6	6.9	66.6	2.9	6/12/34	-	8/30/33	26	10/30/35	3/30/36
DD365	CUMMINGS	United Dry Docks, Inc.	NIRA	72.	6.8	65.6	2.9	6/25/34	-	8/30/33	28	12/20/35	4/30/36
DD366	DRAYTON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	68.	2.5	65.4	5.2	3/20/34	-	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	3/ 3/36
DD367	LAMSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	65.2	5.7	61.1	4.2	3/20/34	-	6/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	4/18/36
DD368	FLUSSER	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	72.4	7.5	72.1	4.9	6/ 4/34	9/28/35	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	4/15/36
DD369	REID	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	64.6	2.6	64.	4.	6/25/34	-	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	5/ 1/36
DD370	CASE	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	57.	5.5	41.5	5.5	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	7/ 1/36

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract	As reported by Building Yard	
			Oct. 1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Oct. 1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
DESTROYERS - 1500 TON (cont'd.):													
DD371	CONYNGHAM	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	54.5	5.	37.5	4.5	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD372	CASSIN	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	51.9	4.	30.9	7.2	10/ 1/34	-	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	5/ 1/36 (a)
DD373	SHAW	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	49.7	4.	30.5	7.	10/ 1/34	-	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	8/ 1/36 (a)
DD374	TUCKER	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	52.7	6.4	30.8	6.2	8/15/34	-	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	7/ 1/36
DD375	DOWNES	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	52.7	6.4	30.8	6.2	8/15/34	-	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	8/ 1/36
DD376	CUSHING	Puget Sound Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	56.7	2.4	45.1	10.	8/15/34	-	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	5/ 1/36
DD377	PERKINS	Puget Sound Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	50.6	3.4	45.1	10.	11/15/34	-	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	8/ 1/36
DD378	SMITH	Mare Island Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	48.	4.	32.5	5.	10/27/34	-	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	7/ 1/36
DD379	PRESTON	Mare Island Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	44.9	2.9	29.8	3.8	10/27/34	-	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD380	GRIDLEY	Beth. S.B. Corp. Fore R.	I.N.	14.8	1.8	10.7	3.4	10/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	27	1/ 2/37	1/ 2/37
DD382	CRAVEN	Beth. S.B. Corp. Fore R.	I.N.	14.2	1.6	9.7	2.8	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	30	4/ 2/37	4/ 2/37
DD384	DUNLAP	United S.B.&D.D. Corp.	I.N.	37.7	5.2	35.4	4.7	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	20	6/ 9/36	6/ 9/36 (a)
DD385	FANNING	United S.B.&D.D. Corp.	I.N.	36.6	5.1	32.6	4.7	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	22	8/ 9/36	8/ 9/36
DD386	RAGLEY	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	13.1	2.6	13.8	2.6	7/31/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD387	BLUE	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	11.8	2.2	12.3	1.1	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37
DD388	HELM	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	11.4	1.9	12.3	1.1	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD389	MUGFORD	Boston Navy Yard	INEC	12.	1.	21.	2.	-	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD390	RALPH TALEOT	Boston Navy Yard	INEC	12.	1.	21.	2.	-	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37
DD391	HENLEY	Mare Island Nvy. Yd.	INEC	10.5	1.5	13.8	2.7	-	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD392	PATTERSON	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	INEC	8.5	1.3	17.2	1.	7/23/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD393	JARVIS	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	INEC	8.5	1.3	17.2	1.	8/21/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37
DD397		Federal S.B.&D.D. Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD398		Federal S.B.&D.D. Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD399		Federal S.B.&D.D. Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD400		Beth. S.B. Corp. (Union Platt)	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD401		Ditto	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD402		Boston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD403		Boston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved, amount of delay not determined.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion	
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract	As repor- ted by Build- ing Yard
			Oct.1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Oct.1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL						
<u>DESTROYERS - 1500 TON (cont'd.):</u>												
DD404	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD405	Norfolk Nvy.Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD406	Norfolk Nvy.Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD407	Charleston Nvy.Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD408	Puget Sound Nvy.Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>GUNBOATS:</u>												
FG50	ERIE New York Navy Yd.	NIRA	64.9	4.1	32.	3.	12/17/34	-	11/ 1/33	27	2/1/36	5/1/36
FG51	CHARLESTON Charleston Nvy.Yd.	NIRA	65.	5.6	38.8	5.1	10/27/34	-	11/ 1/33	27	2/1/36	4/1/36

Authorized by Act of August 29, 1916:

1 Transport No. 2 - no funds for construction.

NOTE: The Vinson Bill (Public No. 135 - 73d Congress) was approved March 27, 1934. This bill authorized construction and replacement of vessels within limits established by the Washington and London Treaties.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR AND ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Sc  
Page 5.

COAST GUARD VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT NAVY YARDS - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1935.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Completion As reported by Building Yard	
		HULL		MACHINERY					
		Oct. 1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Oct. 1, 1935 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL				
65	<u>CRUISING CUTTERS:</u> GEORGE W. CALPPELL	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	36.4	6.6	36.7	26.4	5/ 1/35	-	7/ 1/36 (a)
66	SAMUEL D. INGHAM	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	35.	6.4	36.7	26.4	5/ 1/35	-	9/ 1/36 (a)
67	WILLIAM J. DUANE	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	35.8	6.3	36.7	26.4	5/ 1/35	-	11/ 1/36 (a)
68	ROGER B. TANEY	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	33.2	4.7	36.7	26.4	5/ 1/35	-	1/ 1/37 (a)
69	ALEXANDER HAMILTON	New York Navy Yard	21.7	2.7	8.7	.2	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37 (a)
70	JOHN C. SPENCER	New York Navy Yard	21.7	2.7	8.7	.2	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37 (a)
71	GEORGE H. BIBB	Charleston Navy Yard	17.9	2.9	4.4	.6	6/15/35	-	1/ -/37

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved, amount of delay not determined.

PSF Navy folder - 1935  
"filed" Personal  
B (2)

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON


5 December, 1935.

Dear Mr. President:

Your letter to me of December 4th  
about Naval Reserves and your letter to the Secretary  
reached me this morning.

In spite of fumbling the ball the team will  
try to do better in the "second half", beginning on  
12 December.

Respectfully,

  
Wilson Brown.

The President,  
The White House,  
Warm Springs, Georgia.

DSF Navy  
Jule H. Rosenblatt 1936.

Memo from M. A. L. to Asst. Sec. Navy (memo dated Dec. 20-35-)  
Attaching memo Prepared by Creed F. Cox for Sec. Dern  
Subject-Future Policy of U. S. regarding retention of  
naval bases in the Phillipines after independence.

SEE--War File--(S) Drawer 1--1936

1936

PSF: Navy

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CONSTRUCTOR  
WASHINGTON

Navy  
1936

Having been offered an attractive civilian job (not shipbuilding) which requires an answer (desired in October essential in November) the following questions are pertinent before I make reply:-

- (1) Does the President desire that I remain his Chief Constructor with the idea of being reappointed next March?
- (2) Has the President any idea of appointing

me on "The Maritime  
Authority Commission"?

(3) If the answer to both  
the foregoing questions is  
in the negative will the  
President approve my  
request for retirement?

[I have had 38 years  
service and am eligible  
for retirement; have 7 years  
to do before age retirement.]

Jerry Land.

PSF  
Jill Navy  
Drawer 1236

Naval Message  
from  
Frank Murphy

Subject-will undertake errand suggested by  
Pres. in letter of Jan-7th, 1936.

SEE--Gen-Corres-M-Drawer 2--1936

BF Navy

OFFICE OF  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

*file  
Roosevelt*

12 March 1936

MEMORANDUM for Colonel M.H. McIntyre,  
The White House.

Dear Colonel McIntyre:

The attached letter from Judge David I. Garrett, of Louisiana, together with the action Colonel Roosevelt had indicated on 19 February, his last day at the office, is forwarded for your information. As you will see, they were written up on 21 February.

In view of the confidential nature of Judge Garrett's letter, it has not been acknowledged.

*H. G. O'Neill*  
H. G. O'Neill

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

21 February 1936.

Memorandum for Colonel Marvin H. McIntyre.  
Assistant Secretary to the President

Dear Mac:

This letter came to me from Judge David I. Garrett, Fourth Judicial District, State of Louisiana.

Garrett was an officer of Marines during the World War and served in France. I pass this on to you for whatever it may be worth.

H. L. Roosevelt.

PSF Navy

STATE OF LOUISIANA  
**Fourth Judicial District Court**  
PARISHES OF QUACHITA AND MOREHOUSE  
Monroe, Louisiana

J. T. SHELL, JUDGE  
DAVID I. GARRETT, JUDGE

Office of the Assistant  
Secretary of the Navy.  
RECEIVED



FEB 20 1936

Feb. 17, 1936.

Hon. Henry Roosevelt,  
Asst. Sec. of the Navy,  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Col. Roosevelt:

You will recall that I wrote to you in Oct. 1934 to let you know how glad I was to hear of your appointment. At that time I promised to do what I could to help the President down here. The situation is now entirely changed. I regret very much the death of Huey Long, for while we were not together all the time politically still we were very good friends. Huey had me named as a member of the La. delegation in 1932 and I believe I was one of the first ones to try to get him to support Roosevelt instead of Garner and he decided at that time to let the delegation go uninstructed instead of for Garner, this was just before the State Committee meeting in La.

For your information (I guess you know it though) Robt. Maestri of New Orleans is the real leader in the present situation. Allen J. Ellender, a close friend of Maestri is the nominee and will be elected in the general election for the new term in the Senate to take Huey's place. Ellender expects to be in Washington

*David I. Garrett*  
*6 thought it best to write this letter*  
*privately and not through the papers*

STATE OF LOUISIANA  
Fourth Judicial District Court  
PARISHES OF OUACHITA AND MOREHOUSE  
Monroe, Louisiana

J. T. SHELL, JUDGE  
DAVID I. GARRETT, JUDGE

in the near future and that is the reason I am writing to you at this time.

Ellender was a very close friend of mine at Tulane University and since we left college we have kept up the friendship. I told him that I had served with you in the Marine Corps and wanted him to meet you. He will call upon you when he comes to Washington. Now Ellender admires the President and it occurred to me that you were in a position to gain in him a very influential friend for the President. While it looks like we will get the La. delegation this Summer, as the State Administration wants to make peace with the President, still this is too good an opportunity to pass up.

I was very fortunate myself in politics. I came up for re-election at the recent "State-wide upheaval" and all factions supported me so I had no opponent.

Kindly extend my best wishes to the President, tell him I shall always remember him as he looked when he inspected the 6th. Marines in a wheat field on the Marne.

With best regards to you and your family, I am,

Sincerely yours,

*David I. Garrett*  
David I. Garrett

*I thought it best to write this letter myself and not dictate it so pardon the typing -*

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

21 February 1936.


Dear Judge Garrett:

I thank you for your letter of February 17, 1936. I will see that the information contained therein receives consideration.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

H. L. Roosevelt.



Hon. David I. Garrett,  
Fourth Judicial District,  
Monroe,  
La.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File  
Navy  
Drawer 1-36*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 13, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY ANDREWS

Will you speak to me about this battleship situation within the next two or three days? In the meantime, please find out from C. and R., General Board, etc., whether it would not be better for us to spend the balance of this calendar year in perfecting plans based on later information about these British ships and possibly French and Italian ships.

If our own plans were in such shape by next January that bids could be promptly invited, an appropriation at that time would seem more advisable than to ask for one at this session. I do not believe there would be much difference in the actual time of laying down the ships.

F. D. R.



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON

(SC)S1-1/BB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAR 12 1936

My dear Mr. President:


I have just learned that on March 10 the House of Commons approved the British "White Paper" on the imperial defense, submitted to the Parliament on 3 March, which has among other provisions the announcement that it is the intention of the Government to lay down two new capital ships early in the calendar year 1937 and to continue the modernization of certain of their existing battleships.

Today I received through Mr. Norman Davis and the Department of State a despatch from Admiral Standley, from which I quote as follows:

"So that the United States may not suffer a year's delay and in order to enable it to begin the replacement of its over-age capital ships at the same time as the British, the Chief of Naval Operations recommends that the situation be presented to the President by the Secretary of the Navy and that he urge that funds be made available in the 1937 appropriation bill to enable the United States to begin the construction of two replacement battleships."

In accordance with this recommendation from Admiral Standley I request your authority to initiate the steps necessary for obtaining immediate Congressional appropriation for the replacement of two over-age battleships, the new construction to be commenced as soon as practicable after January 1, 1937.

Sincerely yours,

  
Acting Secretary of the Navy

The President,  
The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/12/59

Signature- Carl F. Spear

PSF Navy  
File Copy  
1939

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR -- BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

APRIL 10, 1936.

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - JOINT REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF APRIL 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion			
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract	As reported by Building Yard		
			Apr. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Apr. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL								
<b>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</b>														
CV5	YORKTOWN	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	73.1	3.7	75.4	2.9	5/21/34	4/ 4/36	8/ 3/33	38	10/ 3/36	3/15/37	
CV6	ENTERPRISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	67.5	3.3	69.1	4.3	7/16/34	-	8/ 3/33	42	2/ 3/37	7/ 1/37	
CV7	WASP	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	4/ 1/36	-	9/19/35	36	9/19/38	9/19/38	
<b>HEAVY CRUISERS:</b>														
CA39	QUINCY	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	99.5	.1	96.2	.3	11/15/33	6/19/35	1/ 9/33	36	1/ 9/36	5/ -/36	
CA44	VINCENNES	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	NIRA	78.	2.3	79.9	4.6	1/ 2/34	-	8/ 3/33	41	1/ 2/37	1/ 2/37	
CA45	WICHITA	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	I.N.	18.	1.5	20.4	4.5	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	38	1/ 1/38	1/ 1/38 (a)	
<b>LIGHT CRUISERS:</b>														
CL40	BROOKLYN	New York Navy Yard	I.N.	56.7	3.2	46.4	4.9	3/12/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37	
CL41	PHILADELPHIA	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	NIRA	52.4	2.8	37.9	.6	5/28/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	4/ 1/37 (a)	
CL42	SAVANNAH	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	33.1	1.	52.3	1.1	5/31/34	-	8/ 3/33	36	8/ 3/36	6/15/37	
CL43	NASHVILLE	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	31.1	.9	50.8	1.2	1/24/35	-	8/ 3/33	40	12/ 3/36	9/15/37	
CL46	PHOENIX	New York S.B.Corp.	I.N.	23.1	1.1	20.5	1.4	4/15/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	12/15/37	
CL47	BOISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	I.N.	43.9	.9	27.	2.1	4/ 1/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	8/22/37	
CL48	HONOLULU	New York Navy Yard	I.N.	35.7	2.8	35.2	6.1	9/10/35	-	9/ 1/34	36	9/ 1/37	9/ 1/37	
CL49	ST. LOUIS	Newport News SB&DD Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	10/16/35	38 <sup>1/2</sup>	1/ 2/39	1/ 2/39	
CL50	HELENA	New York Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/16/36	39	5/16/39	-	
<b>SUBMARINES:</b>														
SS173	PIKE	Portsmouth Navy Yard	NIRA	99.4	3.1	99.5	2.1	12/20/33	9/12/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	5/ 1/36 *	
SS175	TARPON	Electric Boat Co.	NIRA	Delivered and Commissioned March 12, 1936.										
SS176	PERCH	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	84.5	6.4	54.	7.	2/25/35	-	8/22/34	27	11/22/36	11/22/36	
SS177	PICKEREL	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	76.9	5.6	46.	5.4	3/25/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	2/22/37	
SS178	PELWIT	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	67.8	4.	39.	.4	6/ 6/35	-	8/22/34	33	5/22/37	5/22/37	
SS179	PLUNGER	Portsmouth Navy Yard	INEC	45.9	6.9	46.	34.3	7/17/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37	
SS180	POLLOCK	Portsmouth Navy Yard	INEC	39.8	4.9	46.	34.8	10/ 1/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37	
SS181	POMPANO	Mare Island Navy Yard	INEC	21.7	4.1	46.8	2.9	1/14/36	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37	

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved, amount of delay not determined.

\* Commissioned December 2, 1935.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract	As reported by Building Yard	
			Apr.1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Apr.1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
SUBMARINES (Cont'd.):													
SS182	SALMON	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	10.9	1.6	3.3	.9	-	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
SS183	SEAL	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	10.9	1.6	3.3	.9	-	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	3/19/38
SS184	SKIPJACK	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	10.9	1.6	3.3	.9	-	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	6/19/38
SS185	SNAPPER	Portsmouth Navy Yard	I.N.	1.	.9	-	-	-	-	12/1/35	27	3/1/38	3/1/38
SS186	STINGRAY	Portsmouth Navy Yard	I.N.	1.	.9	-	-	-	-	12/1/35	30	6/1/38	6/1/38
SS187	STURGEON	Mare Island Navy Yard	I.N.	.1	.1	-	-	-	-	12/1/35	30	6/1/38	6/1/38
DESTROYERS - 1850 TON:													
DD356	PORTER	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	77.5	3.2	84.6	3.1	12/18/33	12/12/35	8/3/33	28	12/3/35	7/1/36
DD357	SELFLEDGE	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	72.2	2.7	77.	3.2	12/18/33	-	8/3/33	30	2/3/36	9/1/36
DD358	McDOUGAL	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	59.8	4.2	72.7	1.9	12/18/33	-	8/3/33	32	4/3/36	11/2/36
DD359	WINSLOW	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	59.	3.4	71.7	1.9	12/18/33	-	8/3/33	34	6/3/36	12/31/36
DD361	CLARK	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	97.4	3.8	95.4	1.3	1/2/34	10/15/35	8/3/33	30	2/3/36	5/-/36
DD362	MOFFETT	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	90.1	4.8	92.2	2.4	1/2/34	12/11/35	8/3/33	32	4/3/36	7/1/36 (a)
DD363	DAICH	Beth.S.D.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	82.1	3.3	87.5	1.8	5/16/34	3/24/36	8/3/33	34	6/3/36	8/-/36
DD361	SOMERS	Federal S&DD Co.	I.N.	42.9	2.4	39.9	2.3	6/27/35	-	8/22/34	28	12/22/36	5/22/37
DD363	WARRINGTON	Federal S&DD Co.	I.N.	39.9	2.6	37.8	4.9	10/10/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	3/22/37
DD394	SAMPSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	4.8	1.5	-	-	-	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
DD395	DAVIS	Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	4.8	1.5	-	-	-	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	3/19/38
DD396	JOUETT	Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	5.2	1.8	-	-	3/26/36	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	6/19/38
DESTROYERS - 1500 TON:													
DD364	MAHAN	United Dry Docks, Inc.	NIRA	94.	1.5	88.9	2.1	6/12/34	10/15/35	8/30/33	26	10/30/35	7/1/36
DD365	CUMMINGS	United Dry Docks, Inc.	NIRA	90.9	1.5	85.5	1.6	6/26/34	12/11/35	8/30/33	28	12/30/35	7/15/36 (a)
DD366	DRAYTON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	95.1	2.3	90.5	3.5	3/20/34	3/26/36	8/3/33	27	11/3/35	6/1/36
DD367	LAMSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	88.	2.3	86.4	2.4	3/20/34	-	8/3/33	30	2/3/36	7/13/35
DD368	FLUSSER	Federal S&DD Co.	NIRA	93.2	1.1	94.3	1.3	6/4/34	9/28/35	8/3/33	27	11/3/35	7/1/36
DD369	REID	Federal S&DD Co.	NIRA	90.8	1.8	89.8	1.5	6/25/34	1/11/36	8/3/33	30	2/3/36	7/15/36 (a)
DD370	CASE	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	86.6	3.6	79.3	4.8	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/1/33	27	2/1/36	9/1/36
DD371	CONYNGHAM	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	84.1	5.1	75.1	5.1	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/1/33	30	5/1/36	11/1/36
DD372	CASSIN	Philadelphia Navy Yd.	NIRA	66.3	3.1	78.5	2.3	10/1/34	10/28/35	11/1/33	27	2/1/36	9/1/36
DD373	SHAW	Philadelphia Navy Yd.	NIRA	84.1	3.1	77.8	2.1	10/1/34	10/28/35	11/1/33	30	5/1/36	10/1/36

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved. Amount of delay not determined.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract	As reported by Building Yard	
			Apr. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Apr. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
DESTROYERS - 1500 TON (Continued):													
DD374	TUCKER	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	88.1	4.7	84.8	3.1	8/15/34	2/26/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/ 1/36
DD375	DOWNES	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	82.1	4.7	82.7	9.	8/15/34	-	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD376	CUSHING	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	NIRA	84.9	3.9	76.3	4.2	8/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/ 1/36
DD377	FERKINS	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	NIRA	83.2	3.8	76.3	4.2	11/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD378	SMITH	Mare Island Navy Yd.	NIRA	81.4	5.6	74.2	5.6	10/27/34	2/20/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	8/ 1/36
DD379	FRESTON	Mare Island Navy Yd.	NIRA	76.1	7.5	70.8	6.2	10/27/34	-	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD380	GRIDLEY	Bethlehem S.E. Corp. F.R.	I.N.	35.1	3.3	34.4	7.	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	29	3/ 2/37	3/ 2/37
DD382	CRAVEN	Bethlehem S.E. Corp. F.R.	I.N.	33.8	4.1	31.1	5.9	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	32	6/ 2/37	6/ 2/37
DD384	DUNLAP	United SB&DD Corp.	I.N.	59.4	3.4	59.4	2.4	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	20	6/ 9/36	10/ 9/36
DD385	FANNING	United SB&DD Corp.	I.N.	59.	3.2	58.7	3.	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	22	8/ 9/36	11/ 9/36
DD386	DAGLEY	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	36.	4.5	45.3	11.6	7/31/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	1/ 1/37
DD387	BLUE	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	29.5	3.9	46.	7.6	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	3/ 1/37
DD388	HELM	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	28.5	2.9	46.	7.7	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD389	MUGFORD	Boston Navy Yard	INEC	28.3	4.3	48.2	1.2	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD390	RALPH TALBOT	Boston Navy Yard	INEC	27.8	4.3	45.6	2.6	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD391	HENLEY	Mare Island Navy Yard	INEC	26.2	5.	50.5	2.1	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD392	PATERSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	INEC	28.7	6.1	50.4	5.1	7/23/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD393	JARVIS	Puget Sound Navy Yard	INEC	25.3	4.6	50.4	5.1	8/21/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD397	DENHAM	Federal SB&DD Co.	I.N.	1.7	1.7	-	-	-	-	11/14/35	26	1/14/38	1/14/38
DD398	ELLET	Federal SB&DD Co.	I.N.	1.7	1.7	-	-	-	-	11/14/35	29	4/14/38	4/14/38
DD399	LANG	Federal SB&DD Co.	I.N.	1.7	1.7	-	-	-	-	11/14/35	32	7/14/38	7/14/38
DD400	McCALL	Beth. S. E. Corp. (Union)	I.N.	15.6	3.9	12.6	5.5	3/17/36	-	9/19/35	24	9/19/37	-
DD401	MAURY	Beth. S. E. Corp. (Union)	I.N.	15.6	3.9	12.2	5.6	3/24/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	-
DD402	MAYHANT	Boston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	-
DD403	TRIPPE	Boston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	-
DD404	RHIND	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	-
DD405	ROWAN	Norfolk Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD406	STACK	Norfolk Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD407	STERETT	Charleston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	-
DD408	WILSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion	
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract	As reported by Building Yard
			Apr. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Apr. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL						
PG50	NEW YORK NAVY YARD	NIRA	90.2	.0	84.1	1.	12/17/34	1/29/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	8/ 1/36
PG51	CHARLESTON NAVY YARD	NIRA	87.9	4.2	82.4	5.4	10/27/34	2/25/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/15/36

Authorized by Act of August 29, 1916:

1 Transport No. 2 - no funds for construction.

NOTE: The Vinson Bill (Public No. 135 - 73d Congress) was approved March 27, 1934. This bill authorized construction and replacement of vessels within limits established by the Washington and London Treaties.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION & REPAIR - BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

COAST GUARD VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT NAVY YARDS - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF APRIL 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Completion As reported by Building Yard	
		HULL		MACHINERY					
		Apr. 1, 1936	Gain for month	Apr. 1, 1936	Gain for month				
		TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL				
<u>CRUISING CUTTERS:</u>									
65	GEORGE W. CALDWELL	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	72.6	3.2	60.	3.	5/ 1/35	-	7/ 1/ 36
66	SAMUEL D. INGHAM	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	60.3	7.7	50.	3.	5/ 1/35	-	11/ -/36
67	WILLIAM J. DUANE	Philadelphia Navy Yd.	71.3	7.7	55.	6.	5/ 1/35	-	9/ 1/36
68	ROGER T. TANEY	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	65.4	7.3	45.	1.	5/ 1/35	-	1/ -/37
69	ALEXANDER HAMILTON	New York Navy Yard	41.5*	-6.6	43.6*	-1.8	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
70	JOHN C. SPENCER	New York Navy Yard	41.5*	-6.6	43.6*	-1.8	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
71	GEORGE H. DIDD	Charleston Navy Yard	39.5	4.	24.6	9.1	8/15/35	-	1/ -/37

\* Decrease due to revision of estimate submitted by Commandant, Navy Yard, New York.

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NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR — BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MAY 10, 1936

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - JOINT REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF MAY 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	App- pro- priation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion			
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract	As reported by building Yard		
			May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL								
<b>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</b>														
CV5	YORKTOWN	Newport News SB&D Co.	NIRA	75.9	2.8	77.3	1.9	5/21/34	4/ 4/36	8/ 3/33	38	10/ 3/36	3/ 15/37	
CV6	ENTERPRISE	Newport News SB&D Co.	NIRA	69.5	2.	72.	2.9	7/16/34	-	8/ 3/33	42	2/ 3/37	7/ 1/37	
CV7	WASP	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	4/ 1/36	-	9/19/35	36	9/19/38	9/19/38	
<b>HEAVY CAUISERS:</b>														
CA39	QUINCY	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	I.N.	99.6	.1	96.6	.4	11/15/33	6/19/35	1/ 9/33	36	1/ 9/36	6/ 2/36 (a)	
CA44	VINCENNES	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	NIRA	80.5	2.5	81.4	1.5	1/ 2/34	-	8/ 3/33	41	1/ 2/37	1/ 2/37	
CA45	WICHITA	Philadelphia Navy Yd.	I.N.	22.4	4.4	21.8	1.4	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	38	1/ 1/38	5/ 1/38	
<b>LIGHT CAUISERS:</b>														
CL40	BROOKLYN	New York Navy Yard	I.N.	60.2	3.5	49.8	3.4	3/12/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37	
CL41	PHILADELPHIA	Philadelphia Navy Yd.	NIRA	54.5	2.1	38.5	.6	5/28/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37	
CL42	SAVANNAH	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	35.	1.9	54.1	1.8	5/31/34	-	8/ 3/33	36	8/ 3/36	6/15/37	
CL43	NASHVILLE	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	33.6	2.5	52.1	1.3	1/24/35	-	8/ 3/33	40	12/ 3/36	9/15/37	
CL46	PHOENIX	New York S.B.Corp.	I.N.	24.4	1.3	21.6	1.1	4/15/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	12/15/37	
CL47	BOISE	Newport News SB&D Co.	I.N.	45.1	1.2	29.3	2.3	4/ 1/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	8/22/37	
CL48	HONOLULU	New York Navy Yard.	I.N.	39.9	4.2	36.	.8	9/10/35	-	9/ 1/34	36	9/ 1/37	9/ 1/37	
CL49	ST. LOUIS	Newport News SB&D Co.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	10/16/35	38 $\frac{1}{2}$	1/ 2/39	1/ 2/39	
CL50	HELENA	New York Navy Yard.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/16/36	39	5/16/39	5/16/39	
<b>SUBMARINES:</b>														
SS173	PIKE	Portsmouth Navy Yard	NIRA	Completed April 17, 1936.				-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS176	PERCH	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	88.8	4.3	63.	9.	2/25/35	-	8/22/34	27	11/22/36	11/22/36	
SS177	PICKEREL	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	83.	6.1	56.	10.	3/25/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	2/22/37	
SS178	PERMIT	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	73.1	5.3	45.	6.	6/ 6/35	-	5/22/37	33	5/22/37	5/22/37	
SS179	PLUNGER	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	INEC	53.4	7.5	55.5	9.5	7/17/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37	
SS180	POLLACK	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	INEC	44.7	4.9	48.8	2.8	10/ 1/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37	
SS181	POMPANO	Mare Island Navy Yd.	INEC	26.2	4.5	47.6	.8	1/14/36	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37	
SS182	SALMON	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	15.6	4.7	4.	.7	4/15/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37	
SS183	SEAL	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	14.2	3.3	4.	.7	-	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	3/19/38	
SS184	SKIPJACK	Electric Boat Co.	I.N.	13.9	3.	4.	.7	-	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	6/19/38	

(a) Preliminary trials completed.

Type Number and Name	Contractors	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract	As reported by Building Yard	
			May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
SUBMARINES (Cont'd)													
SS185	SHAPPER	Portsmouth Navy Yard	I.N.	2.9	1.9	-	-	-	-	12/ 1/35	27	3/ 1/38	3/ 1/38
SS186	STINGRAY	Portsmouth Navy Yard	I.N.	2.9	1.9	-	-	-	-	12/ 1/35	30	6/ 1/38	6/ 1/38
SS187	STURGEON	Mare Island Navy Yd.	I.N.	1.2	1.1	-	-	-	-	12/ 1/35	30	6/ 1/38	6/ 1/38
DESTROYERS - 1850 TON:													
DD356	PORTER	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	81.2	3.7	86.1	1.5	12/18/33	12/12/35	8/ 3/33	28	12/ 3/35	9/ 1/36
DD357	SELFRIDGE	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	76.1	3.9	79.3	2.3	12/18/33	4/18/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	10/ 1/36
DD358	McDOUGAL	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	62.6	2.8	74.1	1.4	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	12/ 1/36
DD359	WINSLOW	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	61.2	2.2	72.9	1.2	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	1/ 1/37
DD361	CLARK	Beth S.B. Corp. Fore R.	I.N.	99.3	1.9	96.9	1.5	1/ 2/34	10/15/35	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	5/20/36 (b)
DD362	MOFFETT	Beth S.B. Corp. Fore R.	I.N.	93.1	3.	93.3	1.1	1/ 2/34	12/11/35	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	7/ 1/36
DD363	BALCH	Beth S.B. Corp. Fore R.	I.N.	85.3	3.2	88.6	1.1	5/16/34	3/24/36	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	8/ 1/36
DD381	SOMES	Federal SB&DD Co.	I.N.	45.6	2.7	42.	2.1	6/27/35	-	8/22/34	28	12/22/36	5/22/37
DD383	WARRINGTON	Federal SB&DD Co.	I.N.	42.8	2.9	41.7	3.9	10/10/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	8/22/37
DD394	SAMPSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	5.9	1.1	7.9	7.9	4/8/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
DD395	DAVIS	Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	5.6	.8	6.9	6.9	-	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	3/19/38
DD396	JOUETT	Bath Iron Works Corp.	I.N.	6.4	1.2	6.	6.	3/26/36	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	6/19/38
DESTROYERS - 1500 TON:													
DD364	MAHAN	United Dry Docks, Inc.	NIRA	95.9	1.9	90.8	1.9	6/12/34	10/15/35	8/30/33	26	10/30/35	7/ 1/36
DD365	CURMINGS	United Dry Docks, Inc.	NIRA	92.4	1.5	86.3	.8	6/26/34	12/11/35	8/30/33	28	12/30/35	7/15/36 (a)
DD366	DRAYTON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	97.1	2.	93.1	2.6	3/20/34	3/26/36	8/3/33	27	11/ 3/35	7/ 1/36
DD367	LALSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	89.	1.	88.2	1.8	3/20/34	-	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	8/17/36
DD368	FLUSSER	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	93.8	.6	95.6	1.3	6/4/34	9/28/35	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	7/ 1/36
DD369	KEID	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	91.6	.8	91.2	1.4	6/25/34	1/11/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	7/15/36
DD370	CASE	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	89.5	2.9	82.	2.7	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD371	CONYNGHAM	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	87.	2.9	77.5	2.4	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD372	CASSIN	Philadelphia Navy Yard	NIRA	89.2	2.9	83.	4.5	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/ 1/36
DD373	SHAW	Philadelphia Navy Yard	NIRA	87.	2.9	82.	4.2	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD374	TUCKER	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	90.4	2.3	87.5	2.7	8/15/34	2/26/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD375	DOWNS	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	86.4	4.3	85.5	2.8	6/15/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD376	CUSHING	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	NIRA	87.8	2.9	81.	4.7	8/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/ 1/36

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved. Amount of delay not determined.

(b) Preliminary trials completed.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Date of Launched	Contract	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract	As reported by Building Yard	
			May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
<b>DESTROYERS - 1500 TON (Continued):</b>													
DD377	PERKINS	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	NIRA	86.4	3.2	81.	4.7	11/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD378	SMITH	Mare Island Navy Yd.	NIRA	83.8	2.4	81.1	6.9	10/27/34	2/20/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/ 1/36
DD379	PRESEON	Mare Island Navy Yd.	NIRA	79.1	3.	77.7	6.9	10/27/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD380	GRIDLEY	Bethlehem S.B. Corp. F.R.	I.N.	37.9	2.8	37.7	3.3	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	29	3/ 2/37	3/ 2/37
DD382	CRAVEN	Bethlehem S.B. Corp. F.R.	I.N.	36.5	2.7	34.6	3.5	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	32	6/ 2/37	6/ 2/37
DD384	DUNLAP	United SB&D Corp.	I.N.	63.6	4.2	62.1	2.7	4/10/35	4/18/36	10/ 9/34	20	6/ 9/36	10/ 9/36
DD385	FANNING	United SB&D Corp.	I.N.	61.6	2.6	61.1	2.4	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	22	8/9/36	12/ 9/36
DD386	BAGLEY	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	40.1	4.1	65.6	8.3	7/31/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	1/ 1/37
DD387	BLUE	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	33.	3.5	51.5	5.5	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	3/ 1/37
DD388	HELM	Norfolk Navy Yard	INEC	32.	3.5	47.5	1.5	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD389	MUGFORD	Boston Navy Yard	INEC	32.	3.7	51.	2.8	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD390	RALPH TALBOT	Boston Navy Yard	INEC	32.	4.2	50.	4.4	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD391	HEWLEY	Mare Island Navy Yd.	INEC	29.1	2.9	52.7	2.2	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD392	PATTERSON	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	INEC	33.5	4.8	53.6	3.2	7/23/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD393	JARVIS	Puget Sound Navy Yd.	INEC	29.5	4.2	53.6	3.2	8/21/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD397	BREHAM	Federal SB&D Co.	I.N.	2.6	.9	-	-	-	-	11/14/35	26	1/14/38	1/14/38
DD398	ELLET	Federal SB&D Co.	I.N.	2.6	.9	-	-	-	-	11/14/35	29	4/14/38	4/14/38
DD399	LANG	Federal SB&D Co.	I.N.	2.6	.9	-	-	-	-	11/14/35	32	7/14/38	7/14/38
DD400	McCALL	Beth. S.B. Corp. (Union)	I.N.	20.1	4.5	16.8	4.2	3/17/36	-	9/19/35	24	9/19/37	-
DD401	LAURY	Beth. S.B. Corp. (Union)	I.N.	20.1	4.5	15.9	3.7	3/24/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	-
DD402	LAYRAHT	Boston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD403	TRIPPE	Boston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD404	RHIND	Philadelphia Ny. Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	-
DD405	ROGAN	Norfolk Navy Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD406	STACK	Norfolk Navy Yd.	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD407	STERRET	Charleston Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	-
DD408	WILSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	I.N.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
<b>MINIBOATS:</b>													
PG50	ERIE	New York Navy Yard	NIRA	93.6	3.4	86.9	2.8	12/17/34	1/29/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	8/ 1/36
PG51	CHARLESTON	Charleston Navy Yard	NIRA	91.8	3.9	86.1	3.7	10/27/34	2/25/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/15/36

Authorized by Act of August 29, 1916; 1 Transport No. 2 - no funds for construction.

NOTE: The Vinson Bill (Public No. 135 - 73d Congress) was approved March 27, 1934. This bill authorized construction and replacement of vessels within limits established by the Washington and London Treaties.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION & REPAIR - BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Page 4.

COAST GUARD VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT NAVY YARDS - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF MAY 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Completion As reported by Building Yard	
		HULL		MACHINERY					
		May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	May 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL				
<u>CRUISING CUTTERS:</u>									
65	GEORGE W. CAMPBELL	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	82.5	9.9	79.9	19.9	5/ 1/35	-	7/ 1/36
66	SAMUEL D. INGHAM	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	73.2	4.9	62.8	12.8	5/ 1/35	-	10/ -/36
67	WILLIAM J. DUANE	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	76.1	4.8	73.7	18.7	5/ 1/35	-	9/ 1/36
68	ROGER B. TANEY	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	70.5	5.1	55.4	10.4	5/ 1/35	-	12/ 1/36
69	ALEXANDER HAMILTON	New York Navy Yard	45.4	3.9	56.8	13.	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
70	JOHN C. SPENCER	New York Navy Yard	45.4	3.9	56.8	13.	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
71	GEORGE M. BIBB	Charleston Navy Yd.	48.1	8.6	59.3	34.7	8/15/35	-	1/ -/37

**URGENT.**

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-8-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

R.F.  
Navy

In reply refer to Initials and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

WASHINGTON

~~Confidential~~

2 June, 1936.

Memorandum For The President:

Subject: Possible War Use of S. S. QUEEN MARY and S. S. NORMANDIE.

1. The following has been furnished by the Office of Naval Intelligence:

o- S. S. QUEEN MARY -o

Owing to her colossal size and restricted steaming radius it is believed that the QUEEN MARY was built without any specific war service in mind. Her size and draft limit her usefulness as a cruiser, although she would undoubtedly be armed for protection. It would require eighteen months to convert her to a plane carrier as compared to six months for a vessel of the MANHATTAN type. As a transport on short hauls, where berthing would be unnecessary, she would be able to carry between 30,000 and 40,000 men. She is too large to transit either the Suez or Panama Canals. There is only one drydock to accomodate her outside of the United Kingdom, that is at Singapore.

o- S. S. NORMANDIE -o

The French defensive plans include the rapid transfer of large numbers of troops in North Africa to France. For this purpose the NORMANDIE, which could make the crossing (Algiers to Marseilles) in about thirteen hours, could be used. She could thus deliver almost three divisions of troops every twenty-four hours. It is highly probable that this would be her primary mobilization duty. Conversion to a carrier or cruiser would otherwise be under the same disadvantages as in the case of the QUEEN MARY.

o- S. S. REX and S. S. BREMEN -o

Practically the same comment as for the S. S. QUEEN MARY and S.S. NORMANDIE, although these ships are not quite as large.

The majority of officers who have studied the uses of such vessels incline to the opinion that both for peace-time trading and conversion to war use the MANHATTAN and WASHINGTON type are ton for ton superior to the larger ships.

~~Confidential~~

Subject: Possible War Use of S. S. QUEEN MARY and S. S. NORMANDIE

----- p

Disadvantages of large vessels:

- (1) - Unable to transit Suez and Panama Canals.
- (2) - Limited in number of port and graving docks they can enter.
- (3) - Fuel consumption and steaming radius.
- (4) - Under war conditions too much is risked in one bottom, particularly on long voyages.

*Paul Bastedo.*  
Paul Bastedo.

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Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DND DIR. 1300.9 (8/27/58)

Date- 8-8-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

1  
"file personal"

PSF Navy

OFFICE OF THE SUPERINTENDENT  
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

3 June 1936

My dear Mr. President:


I have just received the radio message that you were kind enough to send me last Saturday night from the POTOMAC on completion of the water carnival at the Naval Academy.

Investigation shows that this message was relayed by the Station Ship at the Naval Academy to the ARKANSAS with instructions to deliver it to me. As I was on board the WYOMING and not the ARKANSAS the message was never delivered.

It is a matter of sincere regret to me that through failure in our communication system I appeared to be unappreciative of your message, and I can assure you that had it been received it would have been promptly acknowledged.

I hope that it is not too late for me to express my thanks and appreciation for your gracious message.

Very sincerely yours,



D. F. Sellers.

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

Received

U. S. S. POTOMAC

OFFICIAL DISPATCH  
(EXECUTIVE COPY)

Received

HEADING: Z LURK V FERN GR 3ø

Release

FROM: NAVAID  
TO: SUPNAVACAD.

I  
N  
F  
O

RF

TEXT

ø13ø FOLLOWING FROM THE PRESIDENT QUOTE IT GAVE ME THE KEENEST PLEASURE  
TO WITNESS AND PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST WATER PAGEANT OF THE NAVAL ACAD-  
EMY WELL DONE ROOSEVELT UNQUOTE 2138

C8L 2145 -3ø- LB.

SUBJ: NAVID  
FROM: NAVID  
EVID: NAVID  
RECEIVED

Received

U. S. S. POTOMAC  
OFFICIAL DISPATCH  
(ORIGINAL COPY)

Received

HEADING:

Release

FROM: NAVID  
TO: COMDRILLRON

I  
N  
F  
O

TEXT

Ø13Ø FOR ADMIRAL BROWN FOLLOWING FROM THE PRESIDENT QUOTE WISH I COULD  
BE WITH YOU ROOSEVELT UNQUOTE 214Ø

TOD VISUAL 2234 HUG.

LO: C  
LBOH: W  
HEVDZC: 11669

**Received**

**U. S. S. POTOMAC**

OFFICIAL DISPATCH  
(ORIGINAL COPY)

**Received**

**HEADING:** Z Q50 V J6

Release

**FROM:** COMDRILLRON  
**TO:** POTOMAC

I  
N  
F  
O

**TEXT**

øø3ø FOR NAVAL AIDE TO PRESIDENT QUOTE PLEASE INFORM THE PRESIDENT  
THE TRAINING SQUADRON IS INSPIRED BY HIS PRESENCE AND INTEREST BROWN  
UNQUOTE 2240

2259 VIA VISUAL HUGGINS.

UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY

Annapolis, Maryland

30 May 1936

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Water Carnival and Pageant, Evening 30 May 1936.

1. The Water Carnival and Pageant will be held on the evening of May 30, 1936. This Carnival is being given by the midshipmen in honor of the graduating class, their families and friends.

2. The subject of the Pageant will be the burning of the PHILADELPHIA by Decatur in the Harbor of Tripoli in 1804.

3. The action will take place in four phases.

PHASE 1.--7:30 P. M. to 8:30 P. M. The tennis courts along Dewey Basin will be converted into the City of Tripoli simulating the market place with the cafes. The natives will be feasting and celebrating the capture of the United States frigate PHILADELPHIA. Tripolitan corsairs will be roaming the streets of Tripoli, singing, dancing and celebrating this victory. All midshipmen not actually in the cast of the Pageant will be served supper in the City of Tripoli with their families and friends. Dewey Basin adjacent to the tennis courts will be decorated as the Harbor of Tripoli with forts at the entrance and the frigate PHILADELPHIA anchored in the harbor. The lateen rigged boats will be tied up at the docks with the crews ashore celebrating this festive occasion.


PHASE 2.--8:30 P. M. to 8:45 P. M. The attack and burning of the PHILADELPHIA by Decatur and American seamen disguised as corsairs. Decatur will sneak into the Harbor of Tripoli and request permission to tie up alongside the PHILADELPHIA posing as a friendly corsair boat. This permission will be granted and Decatur and the crew will board the PHILADELPHIA, set her on fire and simulate hand-to-hand fighting. As the PHILADELPHIA goes up in flames, the Tripolitans celebrating in the City of Tripoli will dash down to the docks and man their lateen rigged boats and pursue Decatur escaping out of the harbor. The forts will open fire on Decatur.

P3F Navy

PHASE 3.--8:45 to 9:30 P. M. After Decatur has escaped outside the Harbor of Tripoli pursued by the corsairs, Phase 3 will commence. Father Neptune with his court will come up from the equator, up the Severn River in his barge with his court of mermaids, circle the water front of the Harbor of Tripoli and go aboard the Destroyer BABBITT where he will be received by the Superintendent with full honors. The Superintendent will welcome Neptune. Neptune will reply appropriately and then join the Superintendent's party in the Superintendent's yacht and order a fireworks display in honor of the assembled crowds. The Superintendent, accompanied by Neptune, will go close aboard the POTOMAC and greet the President. An elaborate fireworks display will be set off from the opposite shore during which time the submarine chasers and patrol boats stationed at the Naval Academy will pass in review. These boats will be elaborately decorated with colored lights.

PHASE 4.--Upon completion of the fireworks display, battleships and destroyers will hold a searchlight display during which time all of the midshipmen of the first class, their families and guests will go out to the battleship WYOMING, led by the Superintendent and Father Neptune for a dance. Midshipmen of the second and third classes will adjourn to Dahlgren Hall where a hop will be held.

4. The City of Tripoli and the water front of the Harbor of Tripoli will be appropriately decorated and illuminated. The corsairs in the City of Tripoli and members of the cast of the Pageant will be in appropriate costumes. During the entire Pageant, historical dialogue and narrative will be given over a loud-speaker system which will permit all guests witnessing the Pageant to have a vivid account of this famous Naval episode.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'D. Y. S.', is written in a cursive style at the bottom right of the page.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA  
FLAGSHIP

PSF Navy



Passage, Balboa, Canal Zone,  
to San Pedro, California,  
5 June, 1936.

My dear Mr. President:

We are nearing our Southern California bases upon the conclusion of Fleet Problem XVII, and shortly after our arrival the heavy cruisers and the new destroyers will return from their visit to South America. In view of your interest in this Problem when I had the privilege of discussing it with you last December, I feel that I should give you, personally, a brief summary of the results. I am sure you will be gratified to learn that conclusions drawn from the Problem have completely confirmed the wisdom of your decision to maintain a concentrated fleet in Pacific Waters.

Problem XVII and the results of the entire cruise have been highly satisfactory; more than I had dared to hope. The weather favored us considering the tropical rainy season at this time of the year. There were few casualties; one aviator crashed at sea and another air fatality occurred in the Canal Zone. The MINNEAPOLIS suffered minor damage in a collision in Balboa Roads. The NEW MEXICO and MISSISSIPPI experienced turbine trouble, apparently due to faulty design. Otherwise, the material condition of the Fleet stood the strain of six weeks of hard steaming extremely well. Both officers and men showed a keen interest in the maneuvers and in the Problem, and it is a pleasure to report that the performance of the personnel was of a high order.

The Problem emphasized two or three most important recent developments in Fleet Tactics. I discussed these developments in my remarks at the Critique; and, knowing your keen interest and thorough understanding of all naval matters and problems of the Fleet, I am enclosing a copy of these remarks in which I have marked those portions which refer to these new developments.

I am sure you will be particularly interested in two subjects; "INDIRECT FIRE" and its development and progress during the past two years; and, the ability to spot gunfire by airplanes at night, which we have just demonstrated this year. You will immediately appreciate the tremendous value to a fleet which has superiority in its air force of these two developments. A fleet capable of indirect fire can render itself invisible to the enemy by a smoke screen, thereby blanketing the enemy's gunfire while it can continue to fire effectively through the smoke screen at the unseen enemy. A fleet employing indirect fire at night and spotting

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA  
FLAGSHIP

from airplanes by the use of airplane flares can deliberately seek night battle and fire effectively while an enemy untrained in these respects is restricted to firing blindly in the dark. I hope that we can keep our indirect fire and night spotting a secret while perfecting their development. Of course, much remains to be done and I trust that active progress may not be hampered by undue conservatism.

The Fleet Air arm performed most creditably. On this cruise, for the first time in fleet history, we carried out extensive night operations by carrier based planes on the high seas as a matter of routine. The battleship and cruiser based planes and the patrol squadrons functioned satisfactorily and without untoward incident. The destroyers carried out two practices in firing torpedoes at the battle line, while the fleet submarines had a maximum of practical employment and delivered telling blows against the BLUE Fleet. The Problem, of course, again emphasized the weakness of all our auxiliary vessels.

Our visit to the Canal Zone was made pleasant by the efficient and cheerful service rendered by Governor Schley and his organization. Eighty-two vessels, mostly destroyers and submarines, were moored in the Inner Harbor, leaving fifty-one battleships, carriers, cruisers, etc., anchored in the exposed Balboa Roads.

Although it was not deemed practicable by the Army to accept my proposal to carry out minor joint exercises, it was our pleasure to have as our guests in the Fleet some forty or fifty Army officers during a week of tactical exercises and torpedo firing. I feel certain that both Services profited by this relationship.

Advantage was taken of the rare opportunity afforded to direct the course of the Fleet across the Equator. On 20 May, just prior to releasing the units bound for South America, we crossed the Equator and initiated 29,751 Pollywogs and converted them into good sea-going Shellbacks. The number of Shellbacks in the Fleet was becoming woefully small. The Fleet is now almost 100% Shellback and this has had a fine affect upon morale. As I recall, this is the fourth time in American Naval History that the Fleet, as a whole, has "crossed the Line."

The Canal Zone and Panama were visited by personnel of the Fleet in varying numbers, up to about 20,000 men in a single day, over a period of eighteen days. It is a source of great pride for me to report the superb and exemplary conduct of our men on shore, thus repeating the high standard of conduct shown during recent years. President Arias, who seemed

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA  
FLAGSHIP

to be fully informed, spoke to me of the splendid conduct of our men while on liberty. I am very proud of the men and have complete confidence in them. Their performance is most encouraging when one realizes that victory in battle depends more upon personnel than upon material. Our progress in the prevention of venereal disease is indicated by the fact that an inspection of the entire crew of my Flagship, PENNSYLVANIA, just completed, revealed only one case. Intelligent instruction in the use of prophylaxis, the setting up of convenient prophylaxis stations ashore, and the liberal use of them after exposure, has made this showing possible throughout the Fleet. This will always be a serious military problem. The answer appears to lie in thorough education of the men and a practical application of prophylaxis.

That this confidence in the personnel of the Fleet is well founded was admirably shown just prior to the beginning of the present cruise when I ordered the entire Fleet to sea from San Pedro and San Diego, one Friday afternoon, on two hours notice. The response to this simulated emergency was enthusiastic and most encouraging.

The gunnery performance of the Fleet during the current year has shown the wisdom of removing the artificialities of stereotype target practices, thus permitting a close simulation of battle conditions. The results last year were considered a real step forward. However, our analyses of this year's firing show an even greater improvement, and I am glad to report that the gunnery record of the Fleet this year has set a new high standard.

It is with some misgiving that I write, appearing to praise the performance of the Fleet under my command, but I feel sure that no misconstruction will be placed upon my words. It is a pleasure in these instances to indicate my complete satisfaction and to praise the officers and men who by their hard work, intelligence, and initiative are deserving of commendation. In reading my remarks at the Critique, you will note my adverse criticism where and when I considered it required.


There is one fine thing about the Fleet - in an emergency it always rises to the occasion.

I hope, Sir, with the adjournment of Congress, that you may be able to take a much needed rest. During your vacation, I hope you may again find opportunity to inspect the Fleet, and that it may again receive encouragement and inspiration by the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF  
UNITED STATES FLEET  
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA  
FLAGSHIP

am With renewed assurances of my very high regard, I

Very respectfully yours,



J. M. REEVES,  
Admiral, U.S. Navy,  
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D.C.

REMARKS OF ADMIRAL REEVES, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U.S. FLEET DELIVERED AT CRITIQUE, PHASE TWO, FLEET PROBLEM XVII, AT BALBOA CLUBHOUSE, BALBOA, CANAL ZONE, 15 MAY 1936.

These Fleet Problems, and the Critique, and everything connected with them are confidential. I wish to point out, however, that a few of the remarks which I shall make will be regarded as secret. This is a critique. It is not a criticism. I don't think anyone ever takes it in that light. I think you will understand if the Commander-in-Chief speaks plainly in regard to this Problem.

I would like to praise the conduct of this Fleet Problem as having been conducted in the most efficient manner of any fleet problem that I have witnessed or participated in during the past twelve years, and I have been, I think, in every problem with the exception of one. There is some little misconception as to what a fleet problem is. A fleet problem represents or simulates war. It sets up a condition which we may expect in time of war, and we play that condition and treat it in every way exactly as if we were in war. Fleet Problem XVII had only a few of these conditions of a fleet problem. It was more in the nature of a fleet exercise. It was a set-up with one force decisively inferior to another, and that is not a condition which ordinarily exists in war. Fleet Problem XVII was not a campaign looking forward to a decisive fleet action. Fleet Problem XVII took an actual condition that would have existed in the BLUE country on the 1st of July had publically announced plans been carried out. According to those plans the BLUE fleet would have been divided between the Pacific and the Atlantic. It was definitely prescribed that Problem XVII would take place in the Canal Area. That area is the last area in which any fleet campaign is ever likely to occur in war. So this problem took over this situation which it was believed would exist on July 1st and by a small exercise of imagination transformed the time honored defensive attitude of a hypothetical WHITE Nation from a defensive attitude to an offensive attitude. They had been told nine months in advance that they would be supreme temporarily in the Pacific Ocean. Believing that war with BLUE eventually was necessary, is it any wonder that an aggressive nation should seize this opportunity to fight that war when it gave them a maximum advantage? Is it any surprise, or should it be a surprise to us that they suddenly shift from a defensive attitude to an offensive attitude?

I won't go further into the fleet problem except to say that it was not an expedition of an inferior force overseas seeking battle. It was a desperate effort on the part of the BLUE Nation to correct a fatal strategic error made by the division of the Fleet. There was but one thing for the BLUE Nation to do - endeavor immediately to concentrate the BLUE Fleet to save the BLUE Nation. It was a race between the BLUE Fleet in the Pacific and the WHITE Fleet for Panama. The problem, of course, illustrates the fatal danger of a division

of the BLUE Fleet either between the Atlantic or the Pacific, or otherwise.

Now in simulating war, the WHITE Fleet in the statement of the problem was assigned three battle cruisers. They were given superior speed in their battleships. All foreign WHITE Navies have battle cruisers, and they all have superior fleet speed. So far as possible when these WHITE Fleets are represented by BLUE ships, the BLUE ships must assume the characteristics of WHITE ships. All foreign WHITE Navies have a shorter cruising radius and superior speed. That in any war will be important. That in Fleet Problem XVII was a matter of prime and vital consideration. It affected all the strategy and the tactics of Fleet Problem XVII.

I will hurry through a few minor points because I wish to deal only with the vital, fundamental and important lessons of this problem.

Recognition signals as usual were cumbersome. Science, I hope, some time will solve this difficulty.

Communications: As one communication officer said to another, "had radio silence continued much longer the Fleet would have been out of radio blanks."

We used the facilities of the shore establishments, the RCA, and the Mackay Systems, and the radio reports of the WHITE movements received from the various merchantmen flying the American Flag. We had for the first time our new deciphering device, - a definite advance. We employed our new super-frequency radio telephone limited in range to optical vision, a very important thing for tactics, a radio that is definitely limited in its range.

The use of GCT time, which in a fleet problem extending over a wide range I consider essential, appear to work with perfection, and seemed to cause no confusion.

Our communication force: I wish to recognize their hard and arduous work, watch and watch, and I understand on numerous ships the men were so weary that SAIL HYPO WILLIAM was missed by some of the operators. For the Army, SAIL HYPO WILLIAM means CEASE PRESENT EXERCISE.

About radio silence. Let us use common sense and not merely be strictly interpretive in the execution of rules and orders. Radio silence is prescribed for a practical and common sense purpose. When the purpose of radio silence ceases to exist there is no reason for radio silence. When enemy destroyers and submarines are attacking our fleet, why should we not operate tactically by radio tactical signals? There is nothing to conceal from the enemy who knows where you are. Use the

direct instantaneous method of tactical operation. You have got to deal with the circumstances that confront you at the time and not deal with theoretical orders about concealing yourself and preserving yourself. Your self-preservation lies in the character of your instant action at that moment.

What we learn in fleet problems one year must be carried out and exercised in following years. Submarines cannot operate on the surface of the water when they are within the range of enemy aircraft. That has been demonstrated in past problems. No submarine scouting for information or seeking to attack, will ever even gain sight of an enemy fleet if it stays on the surface during daylight, if that enemy fleet knows its business. If airplanes are operated in what is called the "doughnut" patrol; if the airforce, and destroyers, are indoctrinated, and if they follow the war instructions, then submarines which remain on the surface during daylight will certainly be sighted by the aircraft, and forced to submerge before making contact. Submarines must be forced to submerge, first by the aircraft, and then a destroyer stationed over the submerged submarine to keep that submarine down until after dark. Why our people did not do this in this problem I don't know. Why don't we apply the lessons we have learned? Had that been done major changes would have occurred in Fleet Problem XVII. Had that been done the first and complete contact report to the WHITE Commander would never have reached him. Had that been done the WHITE scouting line of heavy cruisers would never have been in the position they were in at dawn the day they sank the SARATOGA. Had that been done the SARATOGA would never have been torpedoed as she was, and reduced in speed which ultimately contributed to her destruction. Also had that been done the SARATOGA would never have been thirty miles in advance of a fleet, all alone, unprotected by heavy cruisers.

This Fleet Problem would have been a different picture if all our Force Commanders and individual Unit Commander had used their own brains and not the theoretical text book of radio silence - if they had applied the things they had learned and the things they know. That is what we expect of subordinate commanders, not supine submission to theoretical orders and theoretical doctrine. Face practically each situation that confronts you, for which you are individually responsible, and stand on your own feet. Use your own common sense, use just a little imagination, and picture yourself in war, and not in a fleet problem with arbitrary umpire rules. I have seen ships steaming in a formation in a screen attacked overwhelmingly by a superior force, and they maintained position. There is not a man on earth that would do that in war. It is not sensible.

Once a Fleet Commander has passed through a line, an obvious line of submarine patrol, or scouting line, that Fleet Commander should praise the Lord for his luck, accept whatever damage he has suffered, and go as fast as he knows how, straight for wherever he is going. That Fleet has no excuse for wandering about, and zig-

zagging and giving these submarines a chance for again attacking. The BLUE Fleet had 17 knots in speed, and the WHITE submarines 15 knots. It should have suffered just one submarine attack. Once the BLUE Fleet passed that submarine line at 17 knots, it should never have slowed. Why give the enemy another opportunity? Why play his game for him?

The inner air patrol has been mentioned. Why was this patrol flown in a formation? A perfect V! Utterly useless. Our aviators know better than that. They were not on parade. They were covering an area of water looking for submarines. It was vital to detect the submarines - our fleet submarines are dangerous, but you cannot detect submarines while flying in a formation.

Submarine lockouts - that was a splendid order of Vice Admiral Kempff who said, - "You stop reporting the wakes of battleships in the van as submarines." I tell you that is telling them what to do. Of course war is filled with erroneous submarine reports like that, but it is bad, very bad. Nerves aren't a help in war.

We need to train our submarine lockouts. I suppose even in a fleet exercise they got excited, but use common sense even when excited.

The CALIFORNIA was torpedoed by a submarine and fifteen minutes later the same submarine was allowed to torpedo the SARATOGA. No effort was made to warn the SARATOGA. It is a sad story. Another submarine was sighted fifteen miles ahead of the Fleet and attacked by BLUE aircraft, was also actually attacked by two BLUE destroyers, and the BLUE Fleet was permitted to steam straight ahead without warning straight for that submarine, which sank one BLUE battleship and torpedoed another. It is another sad, sad story. Well, we won't dwell on it.

It is just as sad when we have forgotten another lesson which we have known for twelve years; that our airplane carriers must have surface craft protection. If you have no heavy cruisers for their protection, then the carriers must stay with the battleships. I don't care how often they shuttle.

If for any reason in this known position with the battleships they are subject to heavy enemy bombing, then they must remove themselves to a remote position which calls for search to locate them, but that position must be with the battleships between them and the enemy. It required no imagination to foresee that at dawn on the next day after submarine contact enemy heavy cruisers would be exactly where they were. The air force of the BLUE Fleet was its main hope. It should have been preserved.

The VP's. Well, the VP's did a lot of flying - I don't remember how many thousands of miles they covered. It is not a

question of how many miles they flew, but of what part of the ocean they flew over. Well, that was not the fault of the VP's. The VP base (according to a prearranged plan) was moved ahead too fast. After contact, the VP mission became less one of strategy and one more of tactics. It is not the job of the Fleet to get into the area where the VP's are flying. The VP's ought to fly where they are needed. Their base was moved ahead too fast.

The carriers. I am more and more convinced since I first had anything to do with the Air Force some eleven years ago, that our carriers are becoming a weapon of combat and not a medium for scouting across the Pacific Ocean furnishing the Fleet with strategic information. They are for combat, and the planes must be preserved for battle. The strategic scouting should be done mainly by the Fleet VP Planes.

The objective of the WHITE aircraft assigned to attack the light forces of the BLUE Fleet was perfectly sound. The light forces, destroyers and light cruisers, are extremely vulnerable to air attack. They have little or no means for defense, and the effect of airplanes against that objective is decisive.

I don't know why the BLUE destroyers during the day stayed out in the screen a few miles from the protective muzzles of the BLUE battleships, and accepted these air attacks. They were not doing anything out there in daylight. Why not retreat under the defensive anti-aircraft battery of the battleships.

Now we come to another sad story. The effectiveness of the WHITE destroyer attacks delivered as they were in single attacks, and in minor strength is more than doubtful. By their method of attack they certainly gave the BLUE Fleet the maximum opportunity of defense. Certainly destroyer attacks would be more effective if delivered in greater strength with greater volume of torpedo fire, if delivered suddenly in coordinated and synchronized attacks, with a cross fire of torpedoes of perhaps 90 degrees. That would have restricted the maneuverability and flexibility and defensive powers of the force attacked. If you are going to attack an enemy, why give him the best possible opportunity to defend himself. It is not sound. It does not work. The attacks were made singly by single destroyers, or divisions of four destroyers, not simultaneously, but one little attack at a time at one point, under a full moon that was practically daylight up to the ranges involved. No effort at concealment, no effort at surprise. It is amazing. Destroyer umpires reported to the Chief Umpire claiming that they had delivered an attack of forty-eight torpedoes at 4,000 yards from the Battle Fleet, at 3,000 yards, and one little single destroyer reported claiming that under a full moon he had fired twelve torpedoes at the Battle Fleet at a range of 2,000 yards on its port beam, and he then declared himself sunk. He was correct in his last declaration, but he was incorrect as to the time when it happened.

I have no desire to minimize the value and effectiveness of destroyers. When they attack in strength, when they attack under cover of concealment, or surprise, when they are supported by the gunfire of cruisers or the gunfire of their own battleline in battle, when they attack from forward of the beam, when they make use of concealment by smoke screen or darkness, when they attack in strength, when they coordinate and synchronize their attacks and deliver a cross fire of torpedoes, when made in this manner then destroyer attacks can be devastating and destructive. Destroyer attacks delivered without observing any of these conditions are absolutely impossible in war. They are physically impossible in war. There may be a chance hit, but these hits have no relation whatever to the price that is paid in the useless sacrifice of destroyers and torpedoes. There is a proper time, a proper place, a proper manner, a proper support for destroyer attacks. Fleets cannot be destroyed by single weapons operating singly and alone. That is not the way our Fleet should fight. That is not why our Fleet is armed with different weapons. Destroyers alone can not destroy a fleet. No single weapon alone can do it. The principles of war are correct. They are sound. We cannot violate the principles of war and hope for victory.

Now the unopposed daylight air attacks against destroyers were effective. They were out of range of the battleship anti-aircraft batteries. The destroyer attacks delivered against the BLUE screen are a totally different story. These attacks were delivered in practically broad daylight, in full moonlight, in plain sight, and under short gun range of the batteries of the battleships. These battleships were able to cooperate and to support their destroyer screen. The attacking destroyers would have been slaughtered. The fight took place under the muzzles of battleship guns in plain sight.

The strategic part of this problem before contact has been discussed. After contact a new strategic situation was developed when the Panama Canal was blocked. Well that changed the whole set-up. That is why it was put in this problem. It called for a little thinking. It called for a new estimate. It called for new and independent decisions on the part of the BLUE and the WHITE Commanders. Lacking any orders and instructions from their home governments, they were put on their own.

Take the BLUE Commander. He had been ordered to go to Panama to concentrate the BLUE Fleet. The blocking of the Canal made this concentration physically impossible. The blocking of the Canal left the BLUE Commander free to continue to seek the protection of the guns of the Panama Canal, or to deliberately seek action with a superior WHITE Fleet, and it also left him free to turn and run for the defenses of San Francisco. His job was that of saving the BLUE Battle Force, which had been his job

from the very beginning. He was not sent into foreign waters to fight a superior WHITE Fleet. His mission from start to finish had been the salvation of the BLUE Fleet. He still had that mission, but the method of accomplishing it was different.

Well, consider the WHITE Fleet. That WHITE Fleet had been steaming, both before and since the 26th of April, when it was first sighted south of Honolulu. It had steamed thousands and thousands of miles at high speed. On May 4 it had arrived at Point QUEEN six hundred miles from the BLUE Fleet. When the Canal was reported blocked it was two hundred and twenty miles from the BLUE Fleet. How often it had been refueled no one knows. I don't know where its fuel came from any more than Admiral Hepburn, but I do know that it had to be refueled, and that fact had been deliberately provided for in the statement of the problem by saying that numerous high speed WHITE tankers were with the WHITE Fleet. There was a possibility of a protracted chase if the BLUE Fleet turned north. Even if the WHITE Fleet had been refueled on the 4th of May at Point QUEEN, since the 4th of May all vessels had been steaming at high speeds, and already some of his destroyers were in need of fuel, and some had actually been refueled. A study of the characteristics of foreign navies shows the WHITE Fleet fuel capacity and steaming radius at full speed to be; - for battleships 4700 miles, for four of his heavy cruisers 2200 miles, for the other eight heavy cruisers 3100 miles, and for his aircraft carriers 2890 miles. That is the steaming radius of the WHITE Fleet to fight this war. Well, there they were. Now here is a practical study of war conditions which would exist in an actual war, if an actual WHITE Fleet were there. Why study anything else? Well, the WHITE Commander had to decide whether with a superior speed of a few knots and a short steaming radius he could overtake the BLUE Fleet, which had ample steaming radius to return to the West Coast. Would he have enough fuel to overtake him? Would he have any fuel left to fight a battle if the BLUE Fleet turned north and WHITE gave chase? Mind you, the WHITE Commander's orders were to destroy the BLUE Fleet. Well, the WHITE Commander's decision was to postpone action twenty-four hours from Thursday to Friday, as though there were plenty of time, and no possibility of BLUE receiving reinforcements from the Atlantic or of running north. I think that several possibilities must have been overlooked. The possibility in war that information received from WHITE agents at the Canal might be based on rumors and might be wrong. The possibility that some or all of the Scouting Force had gone through the Canal before the report that it was closed came out. The possibility that if that were not so, all the aircraft in the Atlantic would be available in the fleet battle by flying across the Canal to the area of Bahia Honda. This is the area the WHITE Commander chose for his fleet action. Well, all of this was brought to the WHITE Commander's attention by the Chief Umpire in the form of a message from WHITE Agents at Panama reporting that a carrier and some units had gone through the Canal before the Canal was blocked and that many planes had flown across the Isthmus, and that these ships and planes were in

the Pacific and adjacent areas. The WHITE Commander decided to fight on Thursday - a wise decision.

Now, coming to the battle. The BLUE air force was vital to the BLUE Fleet from the beginning, first in protecting him against submarines; second, in protecting his light forces; and third, in attacking enemy light forces. The BLUE air force was vital to the BLUE Fleet throughout this problem, as it will be in all future wars, but it was absolutely vital in the fleet battle. When the SARATOGA was resurrected, and the BLUE air force restored, the possibility of victory was again placed in the hands of the BLUE Commander. Now, the BLUE Fleet possesses the ability to fight by indirect fire control, that is, fight an unseen enemy at long ranges of 33,000 yards, or at any range by day or by night. In the past year, and this is the secret part of my remarks, right now, the target practice score of the BLUE battleships at extreme range, firing on an unseen target is better, and a higher score has been obtained than the target practice results of Battleship Divisions firing by direct fire at shorter ranges.

The BLUE Fleet possesses this possibility - this power of firing effectively at an invisible enemy. There is no fleet in the world today other than the BLUE Fleet that can do this or anything approaching it. The BLUE Air Force makes this possible.

Now, consider the BLUE Fleet as the BLUE Fleet, and the WHITE Fleet as the WHITE Fleet in the situation confronting us as the battle joined. What is BLUE's battle plan? He has only six battleships against nine. He is crippled otherwise. There is to be a fleet action between the parallel battle lines. BLUE's battle plan here, as in the future, should be battle by indirect fire from start to finish. All BLUE had to do, with his air force restored, was to use his six remaining destroyers smoke apparatus, and his aircraft smoke laying apparatus to make a smoke screen on his engaged flank the moment the fleets deployed and thus blank out the BLUE ships from the vision of WHITE. BLUE then with his indirect fire could annihilate the WHITE Fleet, while he, himself, would suffer no damage except a chance hit through the smoke screen. Now, young gentlemen, that is the method of fighting the future battles of this BLUE Fleet. That is our battle tactics of tomorrow. These tactics have been twelve years in their development, but in the past year it has been demonstrated that this fire control is effective. Why not use it? Why expose yourself to destruction when you can protect yourself with a smoke screen? We are right now developing air spot at night. Now this night firing must also be indirect. Flares are insufficient to permit direct fire. They are merely to enable the spotters to spot and to facilitate getting on the target promptly. For the BLUE Fleet, the battle of the future must be with indirect fire, with smoke screens by day and flares by night. No battle in the future can be decisive at any range without indirect fire. All a worsted enemy need do with modern smoke laying destroyers and planes is lay a smoke screen and retire. With indirect fire this is

impossible. Indirect fire will give the BLUE Fleet overwhelming advantage. Indirect fire will give the BLUE Fleet decisive victory. Maximum damage to the enemy, minimum damage to our own battle line.

Well, of course, with the separation of the BLUE Fleet, the WHITE Fleet did not have to scout for the BLUE Fleet. All he had to do was to interpose. He knew the BLUE Fleet was going to Panama. WHITE was superior. He should have wanted early action. But what he wanted was attrition. Attrition does not win wars.

Heavy cruisers. Now we have another principle of war. First of all heavy cruisers came out scouting. The next thing they did was to station themselves just out of range completely surrounding the BLUE Fleet. That is the WHITE plan. If the BLUE Fleet had had any air force at this time, what would have happened to those cruisers? Bombed! Bombed! If they came within gun range - sunk. That is what would have happened to them. In the fleet battle the heavy cruisers T'd the rear of the BLUE battle line and engaged in gun action. I don't care whether it was T'd or not, whether the BLUE battle line ran over them. They were within gun range at 20,000 yards of the 16" guns of the BLUE Fleet, and what could the heavy cruisers with their 8" guns do to offset that peculiar situation? They might damage the upper works of the battleships, but no possibility of any important or vital damage to the BLUE battleships existed. 8" shell will not penetrate any armor of any importance on any battleship. It does not pay to fight a battleship when you cannot damage it vitally. You can do some superficial damage to the upper works, but at what a sacrifice!! A sacrifice of every heavy cruiser that comes under the gun range of the BLUE battleships, and continues such a battle. It violates all the principles of war. There is such a principle as the Principle of Objective. It is a very wise thing to know what you are supposed to fight. It is a very vital thing to know what a ship is able to fight.

Now I am talking plainly for the good of this Fleet. This Fleet will not succeed, it will never advance, it will never achieve a glorious victory by violating the fundamental principles of war, by violating common sense and practical possibilities.

Well, Fleet Problem XVII I have heard described as being the best Fleet Problem we have ever had, but as I have said, it is not really a fleet problem, and it certainly is not the best fleet problem we have ever had. I will tell you what it is. It is not the best but it is the most dangerous fleet problem that we have ever played. It is dangerous because of the possibilities of false deductions, erratic ideas, and incorrect conclusions. That is what is dangerous about it. Yes it is dangerous, but it is not the best Fleet Problem. The area of the real BLUE Fleet Problem does not lie in the waters off the Panama Canal in the Pacific. The area of the Real Problem for the BLUE Fleet stretches from the Aleutian

Islands to the Hawaiian Islands, to Midway Island, to the Islands in the mid-Pacific, and then on to the westward. There lies the real Fleet Problem of the BLUE Fleet. It is there that the Panama Canal will be protected so long as the BLUE Fleet remains afloat. When the BLUE Fleet Problem lies in the Panama Canal area, the BLUE Nation is defeated.

No, not the best Fleet Problem! It was not a problem for the protection of the Canal. We were forced to play it in the Canal area, but the motive and reason as you see was very carefully something else. It illustrated something that is dangerous, just as dangerous as false deductions. It illustrated the danger of ever dividing the BLUE Fleet. It illustrated the danger of assuming that a WHITE (foreign) nation will continue a defensive attitude when opportunity is afforded to assume an offensive attitude.

The superiority of the BLUE Fleet lies in the supremacy of its air force. The air force is supreme because the BLUE Fleet is not cursed with a Royal Air Corps, because it is not hampered with a unified air force. Just as long as foreign WHITE Nations are so handicapped and BLUE is not, just so long will I guarantee the supremacy of the BLUE Fleet air force, and as a corollary of that, just so long will I guarantee victory to the BLUE Fleet, because the air force is vital to victory. But like the destroyer, as a single weapon, it can never alone defeat any fleet. It has to be used as all other weapons of our fleet are intended to be used, in intelligent cooperation, conjunction, coordination with other weapons. That is the way the Fleet was raised to fight.

Obviously the great lesson of Fleet Problem XVII is the fatal danger of dividing the BLUE Fleet between the Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans, or otherwise, and the fool-hardiness of advertising it and publicizing it nine months in advance. If this BLUE Nation wishes for defeat, that is one sure and certain path. That is a simple lesson, that is an obvious lesson. Well, Fleet Problem XVII has another lesson to it. It illustrates the possibility of a nation that has always acted nationally and strategically on the defensive, suddenly and surprisingly assuming an offensive role. Now that is a very valuable thing to learn. We have no limitation treaties, but one WHITE Nation announced within the past forty-eight hours the necessity of building beyond the present treaty limit because of the building of the United States up to treaty strength; and another foreign WHITE Nation has announced within the past thirty-six hours the need of more destroyers than are permitted it under the present treaty. An armament building race is already in progress, but this one WHITE Nation which is building beyond treaty limit because we are build-to treaty strength, in building its recent ships, has built ships of long cruising radius for the first time in its history. Is that significant? Does that not indicate a change of national attitude from a passive defensive attitude behind a fortified chain of islands, and the assumption of a strategical and tactical offensive

attitude,- a challenge for supremacy as a world power? That is part of what we can learn from Fleet Problem XVII. I don't care whether this or that ship made smoke, or received this or that signal. These are minor things. This problem deals with deeper, more fundamental and more serious matters.

There is a Principle of War called The Principle of Superiority. This Principle of Superiority means more than a superiority of material strength alone. It comprises every form of superiority which contributes to victory. Victory can never be won by superiority of material strength alone. The vital essence of superiority which produces victory lies in the superior morale, valor, knowledge and tactical skill of the personnel which man the ships of a fleet. That is why, limitation treaty or no limitation treaty, armament race or no armament race, that, I say, is why the Blue Fleet is assured of victory in any possible future war.

Admiral J.M. Reeves, U.S. Navy,  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

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NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR -- BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

July 10, 1936.

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - JOINT REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF JULY 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract or order	As reported by Building Yard	
			July 1, 1936	Gain for month	July 1, 1936	Gain for month					TOTAL	TOTAL	
<b>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</b>													
CV5	YORKTOWN	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	80.1	2.7	81.	1.2	5/21/34	4/ 4/36	8/ 3/33	38	10/ 3/36	3/15/37
CV6	ENTERPRISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	75.6	4.1	77.	2.1	7/16/34	-	8/ 3/33	42	2/ 3/37	7/ 1/37
CV7	WASP	Beth, SB Corp. Fore R.	R.N.V.	3.8	.9	1.3	1.3	4/ 1/36	-	9/19/35	36	9/19/38	9/19/38
<b>HEAVY CRUISERS:</b>													
CA44	VINCENNES	Beth, SB Corp. Fore R.	NIRA	85.2	3.3	87.	3.8	1/ 2/34	5/21/36	8/ 3/33	41	1/ 2/37	1/ 2/37 (a)
CA45	WICHITA	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	30.1	2.5	26.	3.	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	38	1/ 1/38	5/ 1/38
<b>LIGHT CRUISERS:</b>													
CL40	BROOKLYN	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	65.5	2.9	59.7	5.8	3/12/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37
CL41	PHILADELPHIA	Philadelphia Navy Yd.	NIRA	58.7	2.	43.7	2.6	5/28/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37
CL42	SAVANNAH	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	38.2	2.1	56.9	1.8	5/31/34	-	8/ 3/33	36	8/ 3/36	6/15/37
CL43	NASHVILLE	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	36.4	1.8	54.9	1.7	1/24/35	-	8/ 3/33	40	12/ 3/36	9/15/37
CL46	PHOENIX	New York S.B. Corp.	R.N.V.	27.4	2.	25.1	1.4	4/15/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	12/15/37
CL47	BOISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	48.2	1.9	34.2	2.2	4/ 1/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	8/22/37
CL48	HONOLULU	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	46.9	3.9	44.8	4.8	9/10/35	-	9/ 1/34	36	9/ 1/37	9/ 1/37
CL49	ST. LOUIS	Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	1.7	1.7	-	-	10/16/35	38 1/2	1/ 2/39	1/ 2/39
CL50	HELENA	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/16/36	39	5/16/39	5/16/39
<b>SUBMARINES:</b>													
SS176	PERCH	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	93.9	2.3	83.	10.	2/25/35	5/ 9/36	8/22/34	27	11/22/36	12/22/36
SS177	PICKEREL	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	90.9	3.4	71.	8.	3/25/35	7/ 7/36	8/22/34	30	2/ 22/37	3/ 8/37
SS178	PERMIT	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	80.	3.2	58.	7.5	6/ 6/35	-	8/22/34	33	5/ 22/37	5/22/37
SS179	PLUNGER	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	65.5	5.	69.9	4.	7/17/35	7/ 8/36	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37
SS180	POLLACK	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	53.6	4.	64.8	3.1	10/ 1/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
SS181	POMPANO	Hare Island Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	36.2	5.8	53.1	2.2	1/14/36	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	8/ 1/37
SS182	SALMON	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	26.7	4.6	6.5	1.7	4/15/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
SS183	SEAL	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	25.6	7.1	6.5	1.7	5/25/36	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	3/19/38
SS184	SKIPJACK	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	23.	5.3	6.5	1.7	-	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	6/19/38

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved. Amount of delay not determined.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract or order	As reported by Building Yard	
			July 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	July 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
<u>SUBMARINES (Continued)</u>													
SS185	SNAPPER	Portsmouth Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	5.7	1.6	3.8	3.8	-	-	12/ 1/35	27	3/ 1/38	3/ 1/38
SS186	STINGRAY	Portsmouth Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	5.7	1.6	3.8	3.8	-	-	12/ 1/35	30	6/ 1/38	6/ 1/38
SS187	STURGEON	Mare Island Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	3.6	.5	.1	.1	-	-	12/ 1/35	30	6/ 1/38	6/ 1/38
<u>DESTROYERS - 1850 TON:</u>													
DD356	PORTER	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	94.8	5.4	93.8	4.5	12/18/33	12/12/35	8/ 3/33	28	12/ 3/35	8/28/36
DD357	SELFRIDGE	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	88.	6.7	84.	4.1	12/18/33	4/18/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	10/30/36
DD358	MCDUGAL	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	73.2	6.7	79.2	4.5	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	12/30/36
DD359	WINSLOW	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	70.9	5.4	78.	3.9	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	2/26/37
DD362	MOFFETT	Beth. SB Corp. Fore R.	R.N.V.	97.8	2.2	96.3	1.2	1/ 2/34	12/11/35	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	8/10/36
DD363	BALCH	Beth. SB Corp. Fore R.	R.N.V.	90.5	3.1	92.8	2.1	5/16/34	3/24/36	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	10/ 3/36
DD381	SQIERS	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	52.	3.3	49.1	2.1	6/27/35	-	8/22/34	28	12/22/36	8/ 1/37
DD383	WARRINGTON	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	49.3	3.	48.4	2.1	10/10/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	9/22/37
DD394	SAMPSON	Bath Iron Wks. Corp.	R.N.V.	9.8	2.1	16.2	5.1	4/ 8/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	2/19/38
DD395	DAVIS	Bath Iron Wks. Corp.	R.N.V.	8.9	1.9	13.3	4.6	-	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	5/19/38
DD396	JOUETT	Bath Iron Wks. Corp.	R.N.V.	9.9	1.8	11.3	3.6	3/26/36	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	8/19/38
<u>DESTROYERS - 1500 TON:</u>													
DD364	MAHAN	United Shipyards, Inc.	NIRA	98.5	1.2	93.7	1.2	6/12/34	10/15/35	8/30/33	26	10/30/35	8/15/36
DD365	CULLINGS	United Shipyards, Inc.	NIRA	94.7	1.3	90.2	1.4	6/26/34	12/11/35	8/30/33	28	12/30/35	9/ 1/36
DD366	DRAYTON	Bath Iron Works, Corp.	NIRA	99.1	.7	97.2	2.1	3/20/34	3/26/36	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	8/15/36
DD367	LAMSON	Bath Iron Works, Corp.	NIRA	94.6	3.3	92.	2.6	3/20/34	6/17/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	10/15/36
DD368	FLUSSER	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	96.1	1.2	98.3	.6	6/ 4/34	9/28/35	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	9/ 1/36
DD369	REID	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	93.3	1.4	96.3	2.1	6/25/34	1/11/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	10/15/36
DD370	CASE	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	96.	3.	91.	4.	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD371	CONYNGHAM	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	93.	2.5	86.	3.	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD372	CASSIN	Philadelphia N. Yd.	NIRA	95.7	3.1	90.3	3.9	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD373	SHAW	Philadelphia N. Yd.	NIRA	93.3	2.9	89.	3.7	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD374	TUCKER	Norfolk Navy Yd.	NIRA	95.4	2.	91.1	2.5	8/15/34	2/26/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD375	DOWIES	Norfolk Navy Yd.	NIRA	92.4	2.	89.1	2.5	8/15/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD376	CUSHING	Puget Sound N. Yd.	NIRA	93.2	2.8	85.9	1.6	8/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD377	PERKINS	Puget Sound N. Yd.	NIRA	92.1	3.5	85.9	1.6	11/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/15/36
DD378	SLITH	Mare Island N. Yd.	NIRA	89.	2.8	87.3	2.7	10/27/34	2/20/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD379	PRESTON	Mare Island N. Yd.	NIRA	85.8	4.2	84.4	3.	10/27/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	11/ 1/36

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract or order	As reported by Building Yard	
			July 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	July 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
<u>DESTROYERS 1500 TON (Cont'd.)</u>													
DD360	GRIDLEY	Beth.SB Corp.F.R.	R.N.V.	45.4	3.1	53.2	6.8	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	29	3/ 2/37	3/ 2/37
DD382	CRAVEN	Beth.SB Corp.F.R.	R.N.V.	44.8	3.3	49.	10.1	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	32	6/ 2/37	6/ 2/37
DD384	DUNLAP	United Shipyards, Inc.	R.N.V.	71.	6.	68.8	3.8	4/10/35	4/18/36	10/ 9/34	20	6/ 9/36	12/ 9/36
DD385	FANHING	United Shipyards, Inc.	R.N.V.	66.4	3.3	67.6	4.1	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	22	8/ 9/36	1/ 9/37
DD386	BAGLEY	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	46.2	3.2	72.4	3.	7/31/35	-	10/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	3/ 1/37
DD387	BLUE	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	39.2	3.3	58.3	3.	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD388	HELM	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	38.2	3.3	54.3	3.	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD389	MUGFORD	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	41.	5.	55.	2.	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	4/ 1/37
DD390	RALPH TALBOT	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	41.	5.	54.	2.	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD391	HENLEY	Mare Island Nvy.Yd.	R.N.V.	37.	4.6	59.7	1.7	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	7/ 1/37
DD392	PATTERSON	Puget Sound Nvy.Yd.	R.N.V.	40.7	4.	59.6	3.7	7/23/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37
DD393	JARVIS	Puget Sound Nvy.Yd.	R.N.V.	36.7	4.4	59.6	3.7	8/21/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD397	HENHAM	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	3.9	.4	.6	.6	-	-	11/14/35	26	1/14/38	1/14/38
DD398	ELLET	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	3.9	.4	.6	.6	-	-	11/14/35	29	4/14/38	4/14/38
DD399	LANG	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	3.9	.4	.6	.6	-	-	11/14/35	32	7/14/38	7/14/38
DD400	McCALL	Beth.SB Corp.(Union)	R.N.V.	25.2	2.7	21.9	2.6	3/17/36	-	9/19/35	24	9/19/37	9/19/37
DD401	MAURY	Beth.SB Corp.(Union)	R.N.V.	24.8	2.7	20.2	1.9	3/24/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
DD402	MAYRAIT	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD403	TRIPPE	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD404	RHIND	Phila.Navy Yard	R.N.V.	.2	.2	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD405	ROWAN	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	.8	.6	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD406	STACK	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	.8	.6	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD407	STERETT	Charleston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	1.7	1.5	.1	.1	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD408	WILSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
<u>GUINBOATS:</u>													
PG50	ERIE	New York Navy Yard	NIRA	98.	1.9	93.4	4.5	12/17/34	1/29/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	8/ 1/36
PG51	CHARLESTON	Charleston Navy Yard	NIRA	98.1	1.4	94.7	2.8	10/27/34	2/25/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/15/36

Authorized by Act of August 29, 1916: 1 Transport No. 2 - no funds for construction.

NOTE: The Vinson Bill (Public No. 135 - 73d Congress) was approved March 27, 1934. This bill authorized construction and replacement of vessels within limits established by the Washington and London Treaties.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION & REPAIR - BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

COAST GUARD VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT NAVY YARDS - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF JULY 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Completion As reported by Building Yard	
		HULL		MACHINERY					
		July 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	July 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL				
<u>CRUISING CUTTERS:</u>									
65	GEORGE W. CAMPBELL	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	97.4	4.5	98.	3.5	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	7/15/36 *
66	SAMUEL D. INGHAM	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	86.	7.8	75.	5.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	10/15/36
67	WILLIAM J. DUANE	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	90.2	6.8	85.	5.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	9/ 1/36
68	ROGER B. TANEY	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	83.2	7.	62.	2.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	11/ -/36
69	ALEXANDER HAMILTON	New York Navy Yard	53.7	4.5	64.2	6.	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
70	JOHN C. SPENCER	New York Navy Yard	53.7	4.5	64.2	6.	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
71	GEORGE H. BIRB	Charleston Navy Yard	57.4	4.5	70.5	3.4	6/15/35	-	1/ -/37

\* Commissioned June 16, 1936.

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Navy  
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NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR--BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

AUGUST 10, 1936.

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - JOINT REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF AUGUST 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract or order	As reported by Building Yard	
			Aug. 1, 1936	Gain for month	Aug. 1, 1936	Gain for month					TOTAL	TOTAL	
<b>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</b>													
CV5	YORKTOWN	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	82.9	2.8	83.	2.	5/21/34	4/ 4/36	8/ 3/33	38	10/ 3/36	3/18/37
CV6	ENTERPRISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	78.	2.4	78.4	1.4	7/16/34	-	8/ 3/33	42	2/ 3/37	7/ 1/37
CV7	WASP	Beth. SB Corp. Fore R.	R.N.V.	5.	1.2	4.3	3.	4/ 1/36	-	9/19/35	36	9/19/38	9/19/38
<b>HEAVY CRUISERS:</b>													
CA44	VINCENNES	Beth. SB Corp. Fore R.	NIRA	88.1	2.9	88.3	1.3	1/ 2/34	5/21/36	8/ 3/33	41	1/ 2/37	1/ 2/37 (a)
CA45	WICHITA	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	32.4	2.3	28.9	2.9	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	38	1/ 1/38	5/ 1/38
<b>LIGHT CRUISERS:</b>													
CL40	BROOKLYN	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	67.	1.5	59.8	.1	3/12/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	6/ 1/37
CL41	PHILADELPHIA	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	60.7	2.	45.7	2.	5/28/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	7/ 1/37
CL42	SAVANNAH	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	39.9	1.7	58.3	1.4	5/31/34	-	8/ 3/33	36	8/ 3/36	6/15/37
CL43	NASHVILLE	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	37.5	1.1	56.3	1.4	1/24/35	-	8/ 3/33	40	12/ 3/36	9/15/37
CL46	PHOENIX	New York S.B. Corp.	R.N.V.	29.7	2.3	27.9	2.8	4/15/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	12/15/37
CL47	BOISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	51.6	3.4	35.9	1.7	4/ 1/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	8/22/37
CL48	HONOLULU	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	49.4	2.5	44.8	.0	9/10/35	-	9/ 1/34	36	9/ 1/37	9/ 1/37
CL49	ST. LOUIS	Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	5.4	5.4	2.8	1.1	-	-	10/16/35	38 1/2	1/ 2/39	1/ 2/39
CL50	HELENA	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	1.	1.	.9	.9	-	-	2/16/36	39	5/16/39	5/16/39
<b>SUBMARINES:</b>													
SS176	PERCH	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	95.5	1.6	90.	7.	2/25/35	5/ 9/36	8/22/34	27	11/22/36	12/22/36
SS177	PICKEREL	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	93.2	2.3	80.	9.	3/25/35	7/ 7/36	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	3/ 8/37
SS178	PEWEE	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	85.	5.	64.	6.	6/ 6/35	-	8/22/34	33	5/22/37	5/22/37
SS179	PLUNGER	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	70.2	4.7	73.9	4.	7/17/35	7/ 8/36	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37
SS180	POLLACK	Portsmouth Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	57.8	4.2	67.8	3.	10/ 1/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
SS181	POMPANO	Mare Island Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	41.1	4.9	56.	2.9	1/14/36	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	8/ 1/37
SS182	SALMON	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	33.9	7.2	8.3	1.8	4/15/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
SS183	SEAL	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	32.	6.4	8.3	1.8	5/25/36	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	3/19/38
SS184	SKIPJACK	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	28.2	5.2	8.3	1.8	7/22/36	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	6/19/38
SS185	SNAPPER	Portsmouth Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	8.	2.3	7.9	4.1	7/23/36	-	12/ 1/35	27	3/ 1/38	3/ 1/38
SS186	STINGRAY	Portsmouth Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	7.8	2.1	7.9	4.1	-	-	12/ 1/35	30	5/ 1/38	5/ 1/38
SS187	STURGEON	Mare Island Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	4.5	.9	6.6	6.5	-	-	12/ 1/35	30	6/ 1/38	6/ 1/38

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved. Amount of delay not determined.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of contract or order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract or order	As reported by Building Yard	
			Aug. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Aug. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
<b>DESTROYERS - 1850 TON:</b>													
DD356	PORTER	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	99.6	4.8	97.3	3.5	12/18/33	12/12/35	8/ 3/33	28	12/ 3/35	8/28/36
DD357	SELFRIDGE	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	91.	3.	86.	1.3	12/18/33	4/18/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	10/30/36
DD358	McDOUGAL	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	81.9	8.7	80.6	1.4	12/18/33	7/17/36	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	12/30/36
DD359	WINSLOW	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	77.2	6.3	79.3	1.3	12/18/33	-	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	2/20/37
DD362	MOFFETT	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	99.4	1.6	98.5	2.2	1/ 2/34	12/11/35	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	8/25/36
DD363	BALCH	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	92.4	1.9	94.8	2.	5/16/34	3/24/36	8/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	10/ 3/36
DD381	SOMERS	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	54.8	2.8	53.9	4.8	6/27/35	-	8/22/34	28	12/22/36	9/ 1/37
DD383	WARRINGTON	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	52.4	3.1	52.9	4.5	10/10/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	10/ 1/37
DD394	SAMPSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	12.2	2.4	19.4	3.2	4/ 8/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	2/19/38
DD395	DAVIS	Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	10.8	1.9	16.5	3.2	7/28/36	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	5/19/38
DD396	JOUETT	Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	12.3	2.4	14.6	3.3	3/26/36	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	8/19/38
<b>DESTROYERS - 1500 TON:</b>													
DD364	MAHAN	United Shipyards, Inc.	NIRA	99.3	.8	94.6	.9	6/12/34	10/15/35	8/30/33	26	10/30/35	9/ 1/36
DD365	CUMMINGS	United Shipyards, Inc.	NIRA	96.7	2.	91.6	1.4	6/26/34	12/11/35	8/30/33	28	12/30/35	11/ 1/36
DD366	DRAYTON	Bath Iron Works, Corp.	NIRA	99.3	.2	97.9	.7	3/20/34	3/26/36	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	9/ 1/36
DD367	LAMSON	Bath Iron Works, Corp	NIRA	96.	1.4	93.7	1.7	3/20/34	6/17/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	11/ 1/36
DD368	FLUSSER	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	98.1	2.	98.5	.2	6/ 4/34	9/28/35	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	9/ 5/36
DD369	REID	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	95.4	2.1	97.	.7	6/25/34	1/11/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	10/15/36
DD370	CASE	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	97.5	1.5	93.	2.	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD371	CONYNGHAM	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	95.5	2.5	91.	5.	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD372	CASSIN	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	97.7	2.	91.7	1.4	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD373	SEAW	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	95.5	2.2	89.7	.7	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD374	TUCKER	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	97.4	2.	93.1	2.	8/15/34	2/26/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	1/ 1/37
DD375	DOWNES	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	94.4	2.	91.1	2.	8/15/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD376	CUSHING	Puget Sound Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	97.2	4.	89.1	3.2	8/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	10/ 1/36
DD377	PERKINS	Puget Sound Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	96.2	4.1	89.1	3.2	11/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	10/15/36
DD378	SMITH	Mare Island Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	92.1	3.1	88.6	1.3	10/27/34	2/20/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD379	PRESTON	Mare Island Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	88.7	2.9	86.	1.6	10/27/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD380	GRIDLEY	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	51.8	6.4	58.3	5.1	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	29	3/ 2/37	3/ 2/37
DD382	CRAVEN	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	49.7	4.9	52.2	3.2	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	32	6/ 2/37	6/ 2/37

\* Commissioned July 23, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract or Order	As reported by Building Yard	
			Aug. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Aug. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
<b>DESTROYERS (1500 ton-continued):</b>													
DD384	DUNLAP	United Shipyards, Inc.	R.N.V.	74.1	3.1	69.5	.7	4/10/35	4/18/36	10/ 9/34	20	6/ 9/36	1/ 9/37
DD385	FANNING	United Shipyards, Inc.	R.N.V.	70.	3.6	68.6	1.	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	22	8/ 9/36	2/ 9/37
DD386	BAGLEY	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	50.	3.8	79.2	6.8	7/31/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	3/ 1/37
DD387	BLUE	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	43.	3.8	66.6	8.3	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD388	HELM	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	42.	3.8	62.6	8.3	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD389	MUGFORD	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	43.5	2.5	58.	3.	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	4/ 1/37
DD390	RALPH TALBOT	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	43.5	2.5	57.	3.	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD391	HENLEY	Mare Island Navy Yard	R.N.V.	39.1	2.1	61.	1.3	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	7/ 1/37
DD392	PATTERSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	R.N.V.	45.1	4.4	63.1	3.5	7/23/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37
DD393	JARVIS	Puget Sound Navy Yard	R.N.V.	40.6	3.9	63.1	3.5	8/21/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD397	BENHAM	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	4.3	.4	1.1	.5	-	-	11/14/35	26	1/14/38	1/14/38
DD398	ELLET	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	4.3	.4	1.1	.5	-	-	11/14/35	29	4/14/38	4/14/38
DD399	LANG	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	4.3	.4	1.1	.5	-	-	11/14/35	32	7/14/38	7/14/38
DD400	McCALL	Beth.SB Corp.(Union)	R.N.V.	29.5	4.3	22.9	1.	3/17/36	-	9/19/35	24	9/19/37	9/19/37
DD401	MAURY	Beth.SB Corp.(Union)	R.N.V.	29.1	4.3	21.6	1.4	3/24/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
DD402	MAYRANT	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	1.5	1.5	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD403	TRIPPE	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	1.5	1.5	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD404	RHIND	Phila.Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.3	2.1	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD405	ROWAN	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.	1.2	.3	.3	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD406	STACK	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.	1.2	.3	.3	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD407	STERETT	Charleston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.6	.9	.1	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD408	WILSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	R.N.V.	1.	1.	.01	.01	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
<b>GUNBOATS:</b>													
PG50	ERIE	New York Navy Yard	NIRA	98.8	.8	95.1	1.7	12/17/34	1/29/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	10/15/36*
PG51	CHARLESTON	Charleston Navy Yard	NIRA	98.8	.7	98.3	3.6	10/27/34	2/25/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/15/36**

Authorized by Act of August 29, 1916; 1 Transport No.2 - no funds for construction.

NOTE: The Vinson Bill (Public No. 135 - 73d Congress) was approved March 27, 1934. This bill authorized construction and replacement of vessels within limits established by the Washington and London Treaties.

\* Commissioned July 1, 1936.

\*\* Commissioned July 8, 1936.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION & REPAIR--BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Page 4.

COAST GUARD VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT NAVY YARDS - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF AUGUST 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Completion As reported by Building Yard	
		HULL		MACHINERY					
		Aug. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Aug. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL				
<u>CRUISING CUTTERS:</u>									
65	GEORGE W. CAMPBELL	Philadelphia Navy Yd.		Completed July 15, 1936.					
66	SAMUEL D. INGHAM	91.8	5.8	80.	5.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	10/15/36	
67	WILLIAM J. DUANE	96.8	6.6	95.	10.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	9/ 1/36*	
68	ROGER B. TANEY	88.6	5.4	65.	3.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	11/ -/36	
69	ALEXANDER HAMILTON	New York Navy Yard	59.5	5.8	66.7	2.5	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
70	JOHN C. SPENCER	New York Navy Yard	59.5	5.8	66.7	2.5	9/11/35	-	1/ 1/37
71	GEORGE M. BIBB	Charleston Navy Yard	61.	3.6	73.4	2.9	8/15/35	-	1/ -/37

\* Commissioned August 1, 1936.



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

PROCUREMENT DIVISION

WASHINGTON

August 11, 1936



MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

The destroyers listed within are old and antiquated and I believe should be sold, after advertisement, to the highest bidder.

Thirty days advertisement is a sufficient period of time in these days of quick publicity. The practice of advertising on either a cash or installment-payment basis has been followed by the Navy Department since the war, particularly on old materials and it worked out to advantage - the interests of the government being protected by proper bond or security to insure payment of the installments.

The junk market is rather strong and it is believed that prices above the appraised values should be obtained.

It is recommended, therefore, that the accompanying recommendation be approved.

Director of Procurement



file  
personal

PSF  
Harry Brown 1-26  
(2)

**GLENEAGLES HOTEL**  
**PERTHSHIRE**

TELEPHONE:  
AUCHTERARDER 70

TELEGRAMS:  
GLENEAGLES HOTEL, PERTHSHIRE

Tuesday, 18 August 1936.

Dear Mr. President

This cruise abroad, arranged while we were cruising along the coast of Nova Scotia, seems like a dream.

Helen and I sailed the day after you left Quebec. The crossing via Belle Isle

and the northern lane was  
pleasant enough - some fog,  
but that was no concern  
of mine!

We landed at South-  
ampton. After three days  
in London we made the  
"grand tour" of southern  
Ireland. I saluted the  
Blarney Stone in the hope  
it may improve my technique.

We went north and crossed from  
Larne, near Belfast, to Stranraer in  
the southwestern portion of Scotland. From  
there we have had three glorious days  
of motoring through the Highlands via  
Ayr, Loch Lomond, Inverness and  
now down here just north of Edinburgh.

We are planning to work through  
the Cromwell and <sup>the</sup> Shakespeare country  
to London taking in Cambridge and  
one or two cathedrals on the way.

I trust the benefits of that grand  
cruise on the Lewana are still with you.  
For me it will ever be a memorable  
and happy experience.

Helen joins me in the kindest of regards  
to you and to Mrs. Roosevelt.

Sincerely and respectfully  
Paul Bastedo.

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
AND REFER TO INITIALS  
AND NO.

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PSF  
Navy*

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

Op-23-RSM

22 August, 1936.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: U.S.S. VINCENNES - Fire on board.

The U.S.S. VINCENNES, under construction at Fore River, Massachusetts, had a fire at noon, 19 August, in the enclosed booth, forward second platform deck (Number one 8" turret lower handling room). This booth consisted of a non watertight compartment about 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ' x 4 $\frac{1}{2}$ ' x about 8' between decks, located against the forward bulkhead and immediately under the protective deck, containing 133 cables and 17 junction boxes. All cables lead either through the bulkheads of the compartment through bushings or down through the deck through watertight stuffing boxes. There were no leads up through the protective deck. Leads, downward, go into bomb stowage magazines; no other leads pass into magazines. The fire was of undetermined origin but it is suspected it was not accidental for the booth was clear of loose trash and loose gear. The leads had been inspected by the Inspector of Machinery and tested about ten days or two weeks previously by ringing through. The fire appeared to be confined largely to the starboard after corner. Leads going through the deck were not burned below about 9" above the deck. Lights in the lower handling room were fed from a cable in the booth which cable was the only one energized at that time. These lights were lit when the accident was discovered and continued in operation during the use of pyrene and foam fire extinguisher (which apparently had very little effect) and until water was turned into the booth, at which time these lights went out. No portables were in the vicinity which might have caused shorts. The fire was confined to the enclosed booth with some softening and heating of the cables outside the stuffing boxes in the bulkheads, but the fire burned not over an estimated time of twenty or twenty-five minutes before being extinguished. The fire was discovered at 12:05 p.m., and extinguished at 12:25 p.m. The cable burned was not leaded nor in conduit but was insulated by varnished cambric and rubber and therefore was not flame proof.

The damaged cable will be replaced by recently developed "heat and flame resistant" cable. It is estimated that the loss, covered by insurance, on the VINCENNES is about \$30,000. The cables that were burned will be replaced throughout their full length by "heat and flame resistant" cable. This change it is estimated will cost about \$15,000 additional, chargeable to the Government. The damage caused by the fire will involve a delay of about one month in the immediate work and may or may not involve a delay in the delivery of the VINCENNES to the Government.

*M. S. Dudley*  
Acting Secretary of the Navy.

*4122*

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NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR-- BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SEPTEMBER 10, 1936.

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - JOINT REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract or order	As re- ported by Building Yard	
			Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
<b>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</b>													
CV5	YORKTOWN	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	84.9	2.	84.5	1.5	5/21/34	4/ 4/36	8/ 3/33	38	10/ 3/36	3/18/37
CV6	ENTERPRISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	NIRA	80.4	2.4	79.5	1.1	7/16/34	-	8/ 3/33	42	2/ 3/37	7/ 1/37
CV7	WASP	Beth. SB Corp. Fore R.	R.N.V.	6.9	1.9	5.7	1.4	4/ 1/36	-	9/19/35	36	9/19/38	9/19/38
<b>HEAVY CRUISERS:</b>													
CA44	VINCENNES	Beth. SB Corp. Fore R.	NIRA	91.	2.9	90.1	1.8	1/ 2/34	5/21/36	8/ 3/33	41	1/ 2/37	1/ 2/37 (a)
CA45	WICHITA	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	R.N.V.	35.	2.6	32.6	3.7	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	38	1/ 1/38	5/ 1/38
<b>LIGHT CRUISERS:</b>													
CL40	BROOKLYN	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	69.5	2.5	62.	2.2	3/12/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	6/ 1/37
CL41	PHILADELPHIA	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	NIRA	62.8	2.1	47.6	1.9	5/28/35	-	11/ 1/33	36	11/ 1/36	7/ 1/37
CL42	SAVANNAH	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	41.4	1.5	59.5	1.2	5/31/34	-	8/ 3/33	36	8/ 3/36	6/15/37
CL43	NASHVILLE	New York S.B. Corp.	NIRA	39.	1.5	57.3	1.	1/24/35	-	8/ 3/33	40	12/ 3/36	9/15/37
CL46	PHOENIX	New York S.B. Corp.	R.N.V.	31.8	2.1	29.2	1.3	4/15/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	12/15/37
CL47	BOISE	Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	55.1	3.5	42.7	6.8	4/ 1/35	-	8/22/34	36	8/22/37	12/22/37
CL48	HONOLULU	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	51.	1.6	47.9	3.1	9/10/35	-	9/ 1/34	36	9/ 1/37	9/ 1/37
CL49	ST. LOUIS	Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	6.4	1.	3.7	.9	-	-	10/16/35	38 1/2	1/ 2/39	1/ 2/39
CL50	HELENA	New York Navy Yard	R.N.V.	1.4	.4	1.3	.4	-	-	2/16/36	39	5/16/39	5/16/39
<b>SUBMARINES:</b>													
SS176	PERCH	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	97.1	1.6	95.	5.	2/25/35	5/ 9/36	8/22/34	27	11/22/36	12/22/36
SS177	PICKEREL	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	95.1	1.9	88.	8.	3/25/35	7/ 7/36	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	3/ 8/37
SS178	PERMIT	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	87.9	2.9	70.	6.	6/ 6/35	-	8/22/34	33	5/22/37	5/22/37
SS179	PLUNGER	Portsmouth Navy Yard	R.N.V.	75.	4.8	77.8	3.9	7/17/35	7/ 8/36	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	2/ 1/37
SS180	POLLACK	Portsmouth Navy Yard	R.N.V.	63.3	5.5	71.	3.2	10/ 1/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
SS181	POMPANO	Mare Island Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	44.4	3.3	66.2	10.2	1/14/36	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	10/ 1/37
SS182	SALMON	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	38.5	4.6	10.	1.7	4/15/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
SS183	SEAL	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	36.3	4.3	10.	1.7	5/25/36	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	3/19/38
SS184	SKIPJACK	Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	33.8	5.6	10.	1.7	7/22/36	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	6/19/38
SS185	SNAPPER	Portsmouth Navy Yard	R.N.V.	11.3	3.3	15.8	7.9	7/23/36	-	12/ 1/35	27	3/ 1/38	3/ 1/38
SS186	STINGRAY	Portsmouth Navy Yard	R.N.V.	10.8	3.	15.8	7.9	-	-	12/ 1/35	30	5/ 1/38	6/ 1/38

(a) Reports indicate a delay may be involved. Amount of delay not determined.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of contract or order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per con- tract or order	As reported by Building Yard	
			Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain month TOTAL	Sept. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain month TOTAL							
SUBMARINES (continued):													
SS187	STURGEON	Maro Island Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	5.7	1.2	10.9	4.3	-	-	12/1/35	30	6/ 1/38	6/ 1/38
SS188		Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS189		Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS190		Electric Boat Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS191		Portsmouth Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SS192		Portsmouth Navy Yd.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DESTROYERS - 1850 TON:													
DD356	PORTER	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	Delivered August 26, 1936; Commissioned August 27, 1936.									
DD357	SELFRIDGE	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	94.8	3.8	90.5	4.5	12/18/33	4/18/36	6/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	10/30/36
DD358	McDOUGAL	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	84.8	2.9	83.1	2.5	12/18/33	7/17/36	8/ 3/33	32	4/ 3/36	12/30/36
DD359	WINSLOW	New York S.B.Corp.	NIRA	80.8	3.6	81.7	2.4	12/18/33	-	6/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	2/20/37
DD362	MOFFETT	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	Delivered and Commissioned August 28, 1936.									
DD363	BALCH	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	95.2	2.8	95.5	.7	5/16/34	3/24/36	6/ 3/33	34	6/ 3/36	11/ 3/36
DD381	SOMERS	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	58.	3.2	56.4	2.5	6/27/35	-	8/22/34	28	12/22/36	10/ 1/37
DD383	WARRINGTON	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	55.9	3.5	55.2	2.3	10/10/35	-	8/22/34	30	2/22/37	10/22/37
DD394	SALPSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	16.	3.8	24.5	5.1	4/ 8/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	2/19/38
DD395	DAVIS	Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	14.4	3.6	22.1	5.6	7/28/36	-	9/19/35	30	3/19/38	5/19/38
DD396	JOUETT	Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	15.7	3.4	19.4	4.8	3/26/36	-	9/19/35	33	6/19/38	8/19/38
DESTROYERS - 1500 TON:													
DD364	MAHAN	United Shipyards, Inc.	NIRA	99.8	.5	95.	.4	6/12/34	10/15/35	8/30/33	26	10/30/35	10/ 1/36
DD365	CURLINGS	United Shipyards, Inc.	NIRA	98.3	1.6	92.6	1.	6/26/34	12/11/35	8/30/33	28	12/30/35	12/ 1/36
DD366	DRAYTON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	Delivered and Commissioned Sept. 1, 1936.									
DD367	LAHSON	Bath Iron Works Corp.	NIRA	97.7	1.7	94.9	1.2	3/20/34	6/17/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	11/ 1/36
DD368	FLUSSER	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	99.1	1.	99.2	.7	6/ 4/34	9/28/35	8/ 3/33	27	11/ 3/35	10/ 1/36
DD369	REID	Federal SB&DD Co.	NIRA	96.6	1.2	98.1	1.1	6/25/34	1/11/36	8/ 3/33	30	2/ 3/36	11/ 1/36
DD370	CASE	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	98.5	1.	96.	3.	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD371	CONYNGHAM	Boston Navy Yard	NIRA	97.	1.5	94.	3.	9/19/34	9/14/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD372	CASSIN	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	NIRA	98.2	.5	94.4	2.7	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD373	SHAW	Philadelphia Nvy.Yd.	NIRA	97.2	1.7	92.4	2.7	10/ 1/34	10/28/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	1/ 1/37

\* Commissioned August 21, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Ap- pro- pria- tion	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of contract or order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract or order	As reported by Building Yard	
			Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
DESTROYERS 1500 TON (continued):													
DD374	TUCKER	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	98.6	1.2	95.3	2.2	8/15/34	2/26/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	1/ 1/37 *
DD375	DOWNES	Norfolk Navy Yard	NIRA	95.6	1.2	93.3	2.2	8/15/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	2/ 1/37
DD376	CUSHING	Puget Sound Navy Yard	NIRA	99.5	2.3	95.	5.9	8/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	10/15/36 **
DD377	PERKINS	Puget Sound Navy Yard	NIRA	97.5	1.3	94.	4.9	11/15/34	12/31/35	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	11/ 1/36
DD378	SMITH	Mare Island Navy Yard	NIRA	96.	3.9	90.8	2.2	10/27/34	2/20/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	12/ 1/36
DD379	PRESTON	Mare Island Navy Yard	NIRA	93.3	4.6	87.7	1.7	10/27/34	4/22/36	11/ 1/33	30	5/ 1/36	12/15/36
DD380	GRIDLEY	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	56.7	4.9	63.3	5.	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	29	3/ 2/37	5/ 2/37
DD382	GRAVEN	Beth.S.B.Corp.Fore R.	R.N.V.	54.3	4.6	56.7	4.5	6/ 3/35	-	10/ 2/34	32	6/ 2/37	8/ 2/37
DD384	DUNLAP	United Shipyards, Inc.	R.N.V.	77.3	3.2	73.	3.5	4/10/35	4/18/36	10/ 9/34	20	6/ 9/36	1/ 9/37
DD385	FANNING	United Shipyards, Inc.	R.N.V.	73.	3.	72.	3.4	4/10/35	-	10/ 9/34	22	8/ 9/36	2/ 9/37
DD386	MAGLEY	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	53.3	3.3	80.8	1.6	7/31/35	9/ 3/36	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	3/ 1/37
DD387	BLUE	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	46.3	3.3	68.2	1.6	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	5/ 1/37
DD388	HEIM	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	45.3	3.3	64.3	1.7	9/25/35	-	11/ 1/34	30	5/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD389	MUGFORD	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	47.	3.5	59.5	1.5	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	4/ 1/37
DD390	RALPH TALBOT	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	46.5	3.	58.5	1.5	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD391	HENLEY	Mare Island Navy Yard	R.N.V.	45	5.9	62.2	1.2	10/28/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	7/ 1/37
DD392	PATTERSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	R.N.V.	52.6	7.5	65.3	2.2	7/23/35	-	11/ 1/34	24	11/ 1/36	5/ 1/37
DD393	JARVIS	Puget Sound Navy Yard	R.N.V.	48.8	8.2	65.3	2.2	8/21/35	-	11/ 1/34	27	2/ 1/37	7/ 1/37
DD397	DENHAM	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	5.	.7	1.3	.2	-	-	11/14/35	26	1/14/38	1/14/38
DD398	ELLET	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	5.	.7	1.3	.2	-	-	11/14/35	29	4/14/38	4/14/38
DD399	LANG	Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	5.	.7	1.3	.2	-	-	11/14/35	32	7/14/38	7/14/38
DD400	McCALL	Beth.SB Corp.(Union)	R.N.V.	34.5	5.	26.7	3.8	3/17/36	-	9/19/35	24	9/19/37	9/19/37
DD301	MAURY	Beth.SB Corp.(Union)	R.N.V.	33.2	4.1	24.6	3.	3/24/36	-	9/19/35	27	12/19/37	12/19/37
DD402	MAYHANT	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.	.5	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD403	TRIPPE	Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.	.5	-	-	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38
DD404	REIND	Philadelphia Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.8	.5	.3	.3	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD405	ROWAN	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.2	.2	.4	.1	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD406	STACK	Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.2	.2	.4	.1	-	-	2/14/36	30	8/14/38	8/14/38

\* Commissioned July 23, 1936.

\*\*Commissioned August 28, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Appropriation	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Contract or Order	Months to Build	Date of Completion		
			HULL		MACHINERY						As per contract or Order	As reported by Building Yard	
			Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL							
<u>DESTROYERS (1500 Ton) Continued:</u>													
DD407	STERETT	Charleston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	3.4	.8	.1	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD408	WILSON	Puget Sound Navy Yard	R.N.V.	2.9	1.9	.01	-	-	-	2/14/36	28	6/14/38	6/14/38
DD409		Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD410		Bath Iron Works Corp.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD411		Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD412		Federal SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD413		Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD414		Newport News SB&DD Co.	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD415		Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD416		Boston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD417		Norfolk Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DD418		Charleston Navy Yard	R.N.V.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>GUNBOATS:</u>													
PG50	ERIE	New York Navy Yard	NIRA	99.3	.5	97.	1.9	12/17/34	1/29/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	10/15/36 *
PG51	CHARLESTON	Charleston Navy Yard	NIRA	99.1	.3	99.4	1.1	10/27/34	2/25/36	11/ 1/33	27	2/ 1/36	9/30/36 **

Authorized by Act of August 29, 1916:

1 Transport No.2 - no funds for construction.

NOTE: The Vinson Bill (Public No.135 - 73d Congress) was approved March 27, 1934. This bill authorized construction and replacement of vessels within limits established by the Washington and London Treaties.

\* Commissioned July 1, 1936.

\*\* Commissioned July 8, 1936.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION & REPAIR --BUREAU OF ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

COAST GUARD VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT NAVY YARDS - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1936.

Type Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion				Keel laid	Launched	Date of Completion As reported by Building Yard	
		HULL		MACHINERY					
		Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL	Sep. 1, 1936 TOTAL	Gain for month TOTAL				
<u>CRUISING CUTTERS:</u>									
66	SAMUEL D. INGHAM	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	96.8	5.	90.	10.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	10/15/36
67	WILLIAM J. DUANE	Philadelphia Nvy. Yd.	Completed August 21, 1936.						
68	ROGER D. TANNEY	Philadelphia Navy Yd.	93.7	5.1	70.	5.	5/ 1/35	6/ 3/36	11/15/36
69	ALEXANDER HAMILTON	New York Navy Yard	63.7	4.2	74.6	7.9	9/11/35	-	3/15/37
70	JOHN C. SPENCER	New York Navy Yard	63.7	4.2	74.6	7.9	9/11/35	-	3/15/37
71	GEORGE M. DIDD	Charleston Navy Yd.	61.8	.8	75.6	2.2	8/15/35	-	4/15/37