My dear Mr. President:

I was delighted to receive your letter and to hear that you will join my Force, the BLACK Fleet, during Fleet Problem XX. Nothing could be done which would give a greater impetus to the esprit de corps of our Navy than to have you with us and thus show a personal interest in our Fleet at sea.

I have been assigned quite a task as Commander-in-Chief of the BLACK Fleet in intercepting convoys, defeating the WHITE Fleet and maintaining control of strategic approaches to the Panama Canal, and I am using every effort to cover every contingency trying to outguess the WHITE Commander-in-Chief and thus be able to carry out my mission. However, developments after the problem starts will determine the outcome.

I have been following with keen interest your ideas regarding National Defense and I believe that the people will strongly support you in this policy for it is very evident that a majority of our people have finally awakened to the necessity of adequate National Defense.

I am hoping that we may be able to continue our plans for building new ships, the completion of which will give us a Navy which should be able to meet conditions in this hemisphere. As you know, however, the Fleet cannot exist or operate without adequate shore facilities and I hope that in our plans for this year we may be able to develop certain shore activities which are essential to the proper operation of our Fleet.

I wish very much that you were here so that you could sail with us tonight for the Atlantic. It would be the greatest pleasure to have you with us. The Scouting Force is in all respects ready and we are looking forward to the cruise to the Atlantic with the greatest pleasure.

May I wish for you and your family, Mr. President, a very very happy and successful New Year.

With assurances of my highest regard and every good wish in the world for you, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
Memo

On 11 January 1939, Mussolini pressed the Japanese Ambassador in Rome to expedite the conclusion of what he considered the "triple alliance" between Japan, Germany, and Italy.
Marvin H. McIntyre, Esq.,
3106 Thirty-fourth Street, N.W.,
Washington,
D. C.

My dear Mac:

Thank you very much for your note of November 29th from Warm Springs. Although Olson appointed another man to the State Relief job, he appointed a first rate competent one and that's the main thing after all. Some of his other appointments have been good and others not so good, but it is an enormous improvement over the outgoing Republican Administration and its defunct standard bearer Merriam.

Again I am going to impose on your friendship and kindness. Captain Herbert S. Howard, U.S. Navy, now on duty in the Bureau of Construction, Navy Department, may be considered as a successor to Du Bose, the present Chief Constructor, who has about eighteen months to go before retirement. Howard's standing with the Navy in general and the Construction Corps in particular is of the highest, but you know, even better than I do, that high appointments in the Navy require more than Navy backing. I am going to ask you if you will do me the very great favor to bring his name to the attention of the President and, when Howard calls on you at my suggestion, you will be so kind as to arrange for him an appointment for a few minutes with the President so that he may have the opportunity of being
known personally to him. The rest will then depend, as it should, on the impression Howard makes and on his professional record, standing, and fitness.

Howard is my brother-in-law, having married my youngest sister Mary, but this has no bearing on my recommending him for the President's attention except that it has given me a special opportunity to observe and know, not only his fine professional attainments but his splendid personal character and qualifications.

With my affectionate regards to the President and my grateful appreciation to you.

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

24 January 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

As a possible aid to you in reaching a decision as to senior assignments on the Flag Slate I am enclosing herewith a table showing the billets, the name of the present incumbent of each billet, and five possible solutions of the problem.

These possible solutions were prepared by my direction in consultation with Admiral Leahy and Rear Admiral Richardson.

All things considered, it is my opinion that the columns headed "D" and "E" offer the best solution.

I recommend that a decision be reached as soon as practicable and, if possible, prior to your departure for the cruise with the Fleet.

I recommend that no announcement of the Slate be made prior to the conclusion of the critique following the Fleet Problem about 7 March, 1939.

With assurances of my highest regard and esteem, I am,

Very respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Encl.

The President,
The White House.
## POSSIBLE FLAG SLATES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Billet</th>
<th>At Present</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
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<td>Richardson</td>
<td>Richardson</td>
<td>Stark</td>
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<td>Anderson</td>
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- Stark
- Black
- Hart-Watts
- Richardson
- Snyder
- Richardson
- Blakely
- Kalbfus
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I fully appreciate and realize the soundness of your policy not to retain officers in positions beyond their normal tenure. In spite of this, however, I feel that circumstances and conditions warrant and justify my repeating to you my former recommendation that Admiral Bowen be retained for a minimum period of two years beyond the date of the termination of his present assignment as the Chief of the Bureau of Engineering.

The following are only some of the reasons why I believe the best interests of the Navy will be served by making an exception to your present policy in connection with the retention of Admiral Bowen:

(a) The fight for progress in engineering must be continued and the gains already made preserved if the Navy is to get the best ships obtainable and ships not out of date before completion.

(b) The "conservative bloc" in the Navy, by sheer force of numbers, would ultimately overrule even a progressive successor if he did not possess the extraordinary courage, firmness and ability of Admiral Bowen.

(c) The retention of Bowen would be a public vindication of the fight for progress in engineering and would do more to dispel the fog of misinformation on this subject than any other single act.

(d) My usefulness to you as Assistant Secretary and Coordinator of the shipbuilding program would be materially impaired if there should be any retreat from the present progress made.

(e) It is essential that I have known and proven loyalty not only to myself, but to my objectives on the part of the chiefs of the shipbuilding bureaus. This loyalty I know I have from Bowen.
(f) The soundness of Admiral Bowen's position in respect to the installation of the most modern propulsion and auxiliary machinery in our new ships is amply demonstrated by the performance of the ships already built, particularly in respect to speed, cruising radius and general reliability. The progress of the art in private industry is further evidence of the correctness of Bowen's judgment in this matter.

A Shipbuilding Program comparable in many ways to the war-time effort is now under way. Not only do we have to build ships but we have to catch up quickly with the great technological advances made during the long period of the "Naval Building Holiday". During that time Naval technical development was virtually stagnant. We are making rapid progress in this regard but are now in midstream and much remains to be done and gains consolidated.

The program of development and experimental work looking to the future is also highly significant. It needs intelligent, but most of all, sympathetic nursing from the top.

For reasons arising from what might be termed "Navy Politics", what happens about Bowen has taken on a significance of unusual importance. The decision will have a more far-reaching effect than any other appointment in the Navy, not even excluding the appointment of a new CNO or C-in-C of the Fleet.

I again urge you to break the policy in this instance and support my hand by re-appointing Admiral Bowen for at least two years.

Respectfully,

Charles Edison

Charles Edison
FORM 3106

UNITED STATES MARITIME COMMISSION

TO: Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics

FROM: Engineering

Engineering Church

No re-appointment of present incumbent

S A

Agent

C P

Cleaning Driver

Brand
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bureau - S & H
1. Baldwin
2. Spear
3. Young
4. O'Mara

Eng - 1. Church
2. Dunn
3. H. T. Smith

C & R - 1. Chantry
2. Lauren
3. Van Keuren

Aero. - 1. Towers
2. Bristol
3. Fitch
OPERATIONS

Grady's term expires - 1 April 1939
Bonnie's term expires - 29 May 1939
Harold's term expires - 1 Oct 1940
The Briston - Comyn Pat
Kincard - Comnendir 7
Birkley - Comnaisco
Todd - Comnendir 8
Skelley - Com Cardis 2
Ingertoll - Comnendir 6
Friedell - Cominron
Wilcox - Complaron
For Chief Richardson
Fisher

For Chief Mr. King:
them does not want

Drick? now with Bacon

Brooke - now N.Y. on the

battle-ship

Brennichman now Poyt Armour

Wills under Bannellian
PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN
CHIEFS OF BUREAUS

BuSandA - Spear, Baldwin or Comdr. Young.

BuRug - Tell Mr. Edison that President is considering Bonvillian, Broshek and Irish.

BuCAR - Make change when Bowen goes out. Consult Jerry Land about Chantry, Fisher and Brand.

BuAero - President has expressed no decision or definite inclination.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Relief</th>
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<tr>
<td>C.N.O.</td>
<td>Leachy - retire one month after Congress adjourns.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCUS</td>
<td>Bloch - remain until next winter.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC A.F.</td>
<td>Yarmell</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battle Force</td>
<td>Kalbros - relieve in June.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scouting For</td>
<td>Andrews - remain.</td>
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<td>AirPatFor</td>
<td>King</td>
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<td>BullAv</td>
<td>Richardson</td>
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</table>

- Stark
- Richardson
- Hart or Watts
- Richardson
- Snyder
- Blakeley
- Kalbfus or Wainwright or Anderson

[Signature: Himly]
Mr. President

The following slate, in my opinion is the best balanced line up I can recommend.

Some of the influencing considerations were
- Ability - Co-operativeness - Drive
- Integrity - Sympathy with present objectives.

CNO - Stark
Navy - Nimitz
Eng - Irish (* I shall urge reappointment of Bowen)
C4R - Van Keuren (Only in case other plans for Fisher don't work)
S4A - Spear
Area - Towers
44D - Moreel
Ord - Furlong
MOB - McIntire
JAG - Woodward

* Sec. Swanson also wants to submit the name of Church for consideration.

Charles Collier

P.S. This slate meets with the approval of the Secretary.
### Other names considered

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S+A</th>
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<th>C+R</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Forest</td>
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<td>Dunn</td>
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<td>Small</td>
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<td>Davis</td>
<td>Cov</td>
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</table>
Stack for CNO

Send Richardson to China Station
Replace with Johnson - Nov.
Replace DeBoz with Fisher C&R
" Concord with Spear S&G
Continue Bowen - Eng.
" Furlong - Ord.
" MacIntire M&G
Replace Cook with Towar - Area.
Continue - Woodson - JAG
March 22, 1939.

Adolphus:

My dear Admiral:

It was with a great deal of pleasure that I received your letter of March fifteenth enclosing your remarks at the Critique for Fleet Problem XII which I perused with a great deal of interest.

It was delightful to have you and my other friends in the Navy visit with me on board the Houston during the recent trip. I hope to see you all again soon.

With warm personal regards and best wishes, I am,

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, USN.,
U.S.S. Indianapolis, Flagship,
c/o Postmaster,
New York, N.Y.
March 22, 1939.

Memorandum For
The President.

Attached is a suggested reply to Vice Admiral Andrews.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan.
My dear Mr. President: 

The Critique for Fleet Problem XX has just been finished. Having had the honor and pleasure of having you with the BLACK Fleet I thought you might be interested in my remarks in summation which were confined to a period of ten minutes.

Your having been with us is of inestimable value to all hands. You have left the fine impression that you are not only keenly interested but that as a sailorman and one of us you understand our problems. I hope that some means may be found to provide fortified and well secured bases in this most important strategic area.

I wish to thank you again for your kindness in having me on board for luncheon. I greatly enjoyed the opportunity of being with you again.

With renewed assurances of my very highest regard and esteem, I am,

Most sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
In this problem the primary objective of BLACK was to maintain control of vital sea areas off the GREEN coast and approaches to the PANAMA CANAL. Success in carrying out this objective required the destruction of any enemy fleet which disputed this control. We had, however, specific orders to capture or destroy the 3 merchantmen (UTAHS) prior to their arrival at PORT WILLIAM. The importance of their aid to GREEN insurgents was greatly emphasized since military supplies furnished by them to GREEN insurgents meant the overthrow of the GREEN government. The history of South American Republics is filled with numerous revolutions and overturn of governments by insurgents. In this case it seemed that even though GREEN insurgents were able to gain control by the use of WHITE military supplies, continued control to be effective against BLACK must depend upon WHITE keeping open his lines of communication to PORT WILLIAM; which in turn depended upon WHITE sea power, in other words, the WHITE fleet. Therefore, defeat of this WHITE fleet was the paramount task of BLACK. I doubt under actual war conditions whether a BLACK Commander confronted with this situation would have jeopardized success of his primary mission by division of his forces and the consequent risk of destruction of valuable units without a strong protest to his government.

With restrictions of this problem the time and speed elements did not permit my sending the entire BLACK fleet to intercept the UTAHS, and as it turned out, to intercept
the Main Body covering them. Even if they had and had I known that the WHITE Main Body was accompanying the UTAHS I would not have projected the BLACK fleet away from its important strategic area and by doing so deprive it of support of VP squadrons.

At the beginning of this war the BLACK fleet was dispersed. The WHITE fleet could have intercepted and defeated it in detail. It was of vital importance for me first of all to concentrate my forces but at the same time to comply in spirit as well as letter with the specific order to intercept the UTAHS.

You have had explained to you the activities of the BLACK Trinidad Detachment. The information I received was that the entire WHITE Main Body less some destroyers and submarines had been intercepted by Crudiv Four; that UTAHS some 50 miles in advance of Main Body were convoyed by carrier and a division of heavy cruisers; that Crudiv Four had been sunk; that Crudiv Eight had been seriously damaged; that the SAVANNAH was trailing enemy Main Body in broad daylight. I did not receive the very important information that Crudiv Four had been engaged with 3 CAS of WHITE fleet and that these WHITE CAS were badly damaged.

The RANGER accompanied by the ASTORIA and SOMERS was enroute to support our Trinidad cruisers but here again the time and speed elements prevented her arrival prior to 22 February. Subsequent to the cruiser engagement I estimated that WHITE had considered the arrival of UTAHS so essential that he had proceeded with his Main Body in support of UTAHS
and convoy; that although he had destroyed or seriously
damaged all BLACK cruisers in sight, he would realize
that other BLACK forces might well intercept the UTAHS.
I felt that as he had safely escorted the UTAHS/he would
make absolutely sure of their arrival at PORT WILLIAM by
accompanying them another day; and that having gone thus
far toward PORT WILLIAM it was too late for him to interpose
between our two battleship detachments in which event there
appeared to be no impelling reason for him to abandon the
escort. Having lost 3 CAs and 2 CLs with 2 CLs badly
damaged, leaving none of these cruisers to operate with
RANGER, I could ill afford to risk the further loss of my
only carrier with its accompanying vessels. In view of
these considerations with the important information that
his 3 carriers were with him, I ordered the RANGER and
escort to join my Main Body immediately. Later developments
and the subsequent use of the RANGER in destruction of the
ENTERPRISE and the RANGER'S employment in the main engagement
proved conclusively that this decision was sound.

May I touch briefly on the operations of the BLACK Air
Forces as applicable to actual war activities. The personnel
of these VP planes were used practically to their maximum
capabilities. Had this campaign continued as it would have
in war, our personnel would have been absolutely inadequate
to meet such conditions. I believe it would require at least
three times the attached personnel with adequate accommodations
for rest and comfort. Therein lies the crux of the situation,
for, at present, endurance capabilities of patrol planes far
outstrip that of personnel available or likely to be available in the early days of war. In a long continued campaign strain on personnel might well necessitate drastic curtailment in operations.

As the problem developed information was received from tracking centers on shore as well as from patrol planes. These centers while potentially valuable were of limited assistance in this problem. Under other circumstances, however, they could be very valuable in determining an area in which an enemy force was operating; and if properly placed and not at great distances from the scene of operations could fix his position and the rate and direction of movement with considerable accuracy. Had this problem continued I planned extensive tracking operations at night having in mind sending out destroyer attacks against enemy forces. This tracking would seem to be a most valuable use of WP planes in defending bases. In addition, extensive arrangements were made for obtaining information from friendly merchantmen and commercial aircraft but they resulted in but one report.

The most gratifying outcome of this exercise was its completion without a single casualty. This I think was due largely to the emphasis placed during our several conferences prior to the problem upon a policy of "safety first" and minimum physical strain upon personnel.

The employment of supersonic screens has already been briefly discussed. Let me remind you that supersonic devices are in process of rapid evolution and though in this problem the fleet was frequently maneuvered because of false reports I do not regret doing so. Further developments
wherein a submarine may be accurately identified when she comes within a certain range will prove of inestimable value to the fleet, and I believe this will be accomplished.

In the broader sense all of us should realize that this campaign culminating in the final engagement has been conducted and fought in what is the most important area for us in the Atlantic. These northern and eastern chain of islands with passages between them form the gateway to the PANAMA CANAL, the safety and security of which is vital to us. Insofar as the CUBA - PORTO RICO - VIRGIN ISLANDS line is concerned we have here potential bases which should be developed and made secure. Such bases should be heavily protected with anti-aircraft and other defenses against air and surface raids and should have adequate protection for supplies in the way of gas, oil, and spare parts, and protection for planes by underground hangars. If we had GUACANAYABO - GUANTANAMO - SAN JUAN and CULEBRA bases protected with strong anti-aircraft and surface defenses, in addition to mines and nets, I do not believe that WHITE would have willingly ventured raids, or had he done so under such conditions he would have paid a terrific price. The situation is very different in the eastern chain of islands and along the north shore of South America where enemy forces could proceed toward the canal and in to these important strategic areas with comparative safety. As the eccentric operations of this problem illustrated, however, additionally secure and well equipped bases at PORT OF SPAIN and beyond will be essential if our fleet be called upon to uphold the Monroe Doctrine by operations against an aggressive enemy in central or south Atlantic.
To project the fleet into such an area against a strong foe without the facilities for maintaining it there or without a secure line of communications would be contrary to any sound concept of strategy and so hazardous to our control of vital sea areas that it is unlikely ever to be attempted unless suitable bases are provided.

Important considerations necessitated bringing this problem to an end at an early date. It would have been of great interest and profit could the problem have developed normally. I had planned to use this rare opportunity for delaying tactics not only to increase the logistic difficulties of WHITE but to make and exploit opportunities for attrition attacks with aircraft and light forces before engaging in a decisive battle. It is pertinent to emphasize the fact that operations at a distance from well supplied bases will be greatly circumscribed by logistic considerations.

Touching briefly the main engagement, upon deployment I gave orders not to spread my forces at too great a distance. Heretofore I believe that in all deployments we have had cruisers and destroyers too far in the van. In our deployment I held these forces close to the Main Body thus giving them better opportunity to attack the enemy and at the same time maintaining better control by the CTO. I also placed 2 CAs and 1 CL in the van between the battle line and the destroyers in order that they might protect our destroyer attack and engage cruisers of the enemy carrying in destroyer attacks. This proved most effective.

The thought, study, and experiences resulting from the situations and developments of this problem have been of inestimable benefit not only by the senior officers but I hope by all officers, even the most junior. Prior to the problem I issued an order that every Commanding Officer would instruct all officers of his command as to our plan and the daily execution of it. It is in this way that we may train our officers giving them wide experience which may prove of great value in the future.
April 4, 1939.

Statement to the Press—Press Conf

Re-Signing Bill for Emergency National Defense in relation to the Air Service and the purchase of a large number of additional planes.

See: Steve Early folder—Drawer 2-1939
Confidential

April 20, 1939.

Memorandum For

The President.

The attached letter and resume of Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5 was received by me from Admiral Johnson. With the belief that you will be interested in this resume I forward it on for your perusal.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan.

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
U9O DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/57)

Date- 4-7-70
Signature- [Signature]
UNITED STATES FLEET
ATLANTIC SQUADRON
U.S.S. NEW YORK (Flagship)
Norfolk Navy Yard
Portsmouth, Virginia
18 April 1939

My dear Callaghan:

I am sorry that the recent visit of the U.S.S. NEW YORK in the West Indies, following Fleet Problem XX, was too brief for the President to personally observe some of the activities of Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5, which was temporarily interrupted due to the ships of the Atlantic Squadron taking part in Fleet Problem XX.

I am enclosing herewith a printed resume of Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5 which I hope you will find interesting.

You may recall that Jimmy Roosevelt, in his capacity of Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserves, took an active part in Fleet Landing Exercise No. 4, last year, and from what he told me his father was interested in this subject.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

A.W. DREYER
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Atlantic Squadron
United States Fleet

Captain Daniel J. Callaghan, USN,
Naval Aide to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
FLEET LANDING EXERCISE No. 5. FLEET PROBLEM XX.
and other
Navy and Marine Corps Operations in the Caribbean
1939

During the period 12 January to 19 March, the Atlantic Squadron, under my command and First Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, Brigadier General R. P. Williams, U. S. M. C., participated in Fleet Landing Exercise No. 5, in the Puerto Rico - Virgin Island area. The combined force also took part in Fleet Problem XX.

This resume covers only the larger aspects of these operations. Special reports submitted separately deal with specific phases in detail.

EMBARKATION OF TROOPS

The Fifth Regiment (infantry), tank, chemical, engineer and headquarters companies, pack howitzer battalion and anti-aircraft batteries, together with the aviation ground detachment were embarked in BatDiv FIVE at Hampton Roads. Tents, tanks, motor transport and other heavy equipment with working details were loaded into the CAPELLA at Quantico.

Destroyer Squadron TEN and Coast Guard Cutter BIBB accompanied the expedition.

On 14 January all surface units were clear of the Virginia Capes.

Aircraft ONE, F.M.F., the Brigade's air arm (56 airplanes), was flown south to the area of operations. The naval forces consisted of thirteen vessels. The landing force numbered approximately two thousand officers and men. Later in the winter this expeditionary force was joined by Cruiser Division EIGHT, Destroyer Division FOUR, Submarine Division ELEVEN, Patrol Squadron NINE, and Mobile Target Division ONE for special temporary duty.

ADVANCE FORCE LANDING

The night before the Squadron's arrival off Culebra, the 2nd Battalion 5th Marines was transferred in the lee of Saint Thomas from the WYOMING to six destroyers. The troops, carrying their rifles, machine guns, and mortars together with a day's supply of rations and ammunition, decended over cargo nets into the boats which rose and fell to a moderate sea. Despite the inexperience of the personnel, the transfer at sea from darkened ships was completed without a single casualty. The Battalion was then sent on as an advance landing force to seize the island of Culebra.

Though somewhat delayed, the destroyers were able to take assigned positions off the landing beaches well before dawn. Troops were then loaded into the destroyers' boats and experimental 18' skiffs. Attack planes of Aircraft ONE, despatched before dawn from their base at San Juan, simulated bombing against the beaches. Supported by the planes and simulated fire from the destroyers, the Battalion landed in four successive waves and immediately took up the advance inland in accordance with a prearranged scheme of maneuver.

Progress from the beach to the first objective involved a steep and difficult ascent through waist-high, rain-drenched sword grass. Not until 0825, was the Battalion ready to jump off from the first objective. The second objective was taken at 0910, and, by 1045, all weapons had been placed in position for the attack on the third objective. At 1225 the advance on the brigade beach head was launched. The maneuver ended at 1400.
The troops were then withdrawn and reembarked in the WYOMING. By 1800 all units were back aboard, fatigued and hungry after thirty-six hours of continuous activity, which, except for the absence of enemy opposition, had imposed upon them the rigors of actual war.

This advance force landing involved for the first time the transfer of a full strength battalion, complete with field equipment, rations, and unit of fire, from battleships to destroyers. Few of the officers or men had had previous experience either in a transfer at sea or in an actual night landing. The standard destroyer boats were too few in number and proved to be deficient in speed and in troop carrying capacity. That the advance force landing succeeded despite these obstacles speaks well for the naval and marine corps units involved.

ESTABLISHMENT OF CAMPS AND TRAINING ASHORE

The next day, 20 January, the Brigade disembarked and established camps for combat training on shore. The general distribution of the Brigade's personnel among the camps was as follows:

On Culebra — Camp Johnson — Isle de Fonso — 21 Officers and 1254 Men.
On Culebra — Camp Rowell — Landing Field — 13 Officers and 78 Men.
On Vieques — Camp Little — Santa Maria — 20 Officers and 328 Men.
On Puerto Rico — Camp Williams — San Juan — 63 Officers and 250 Men.
At Saint Thomas — Marine Air Station — Charlotte Amalie — 14 Officers and 146 Men.
(Permanent garrison)

The training schedule was designed as a preparation for the landing operations which formed the basis of the exercise, and also as a period for experimentation with weapons, vehicles, and boats in tests and maneuvers impossible on the limited ranges at Quantico. Combat training and firing with all weapons was immediately begun by infantry, artillery, tank, and anti-tank units. Aircraft ONE towed sleeves for anti-aircraft battery practices, spotted for naval gunfire, and exercised at reconnaissance, bombing, and machine gun practice. Under Colonel Geiger's able leadership, Aircraft ONE met all the varied demands which a joint expedition of necessity must make upon its aviation contingent. In combat flying, liaison with ground troops, and in the routine flights necessary to the expedition's communications, the Brigade's air arm performed its many duties in a highly praiseworthy manner.

As the training of troops progressed, experimental firings with machine guns and mortars were conducted from the various types of landing boats. Throughout the entire period, Coast Guard surfmen and naval personnel were employed in perfecting the technique of disembarking troops first on sheltered and later on exposed beaches.

In addition to these activities, the landing force was employed in the construction and organization of actual beach defenses on the eastern end of the island of Vieques, which had been leased as an "impact area" for naval gunfire practices.

Bivouacking near the beaches on the impact area, the 1st Battalion began the task of constructing a naval gunfire target system approximately 1000 yards in beach front and 1000 yards in depth. The work was completed by the 2nd Battalion. It consisted of barbed wire cheveaux de fris laid under water along the beach, tactical wire entanglements for confining landing forces within the cones of machine gun fire, and concrete pill boxes in underbrush flanking the beach. Further back, a company defensive sector was built complete with firing trenches and machine gun equipment and still further inland on higher ground installations for artillery were constructed. The entire works were manned by cardboard silhouettes representing defending troops.

The construction of these defense and of two gunnery observation posts erected by the engineers involved moving tons of material up steep grades and over difficult terrain. Here the four wheel drive trucks again proved their worth. A temporary dock installed by the engineers facilitated the landing of supplies from the ships. In fact, many of the defense problems of actual war were met and solved during the construction of the target area. The supply of rations, the building of water tanks, the planning and policing of camps and bivouacks, all these activities were carried on under conditions similar to those which would be met by an expeditionary force dispatched in time of war to defend the landing beaches in our Caribbean possessions.
THE ATTACK ON CULEBRA

The second practice landing of the Marine Brigade, an attack on Culebra, contemplated an operation in two phases, first the seizure of two nearby islands as positions for supporting artillery, followed a day later by the landing in force on the principal island now dominated by the attacker's artillery. The first day, Luis Pena Cay and Southern Peninsula were occupied by a surprise dawn landing. The infantry immediately set to work with axes, bush hooks, and machetes, clearing trails for the artillery through tropical jungle. So dense was the underbrush that the rate of advance was but a quarter of a mile an hour. The 75 mm pack howitzer batteries were then landed and manhauled up the trails into their firing positions.

The next morning, an hour before dawn, the battleships, carrying the main landing force, reached the debarkation area. Boats were hoisted out and loaded. The delay that had accompanied the first practice landing was completely absent. Under cover of the darkness, the boats proceeded to their assigned area. Just at dawn, battleships opened simulated fire against the hostile beaches as the boats carrying the first of the four waves were proceeding toward the shore. At the same moment planes of Aircraft ONE simulated bombing and strafing. Again, as in the first landing, the element of surprise was sacrificed by the supporting fire from ships and planes. Whether or not the effect of that preliminary daylight bombardment was sufficient to justify disclosing the operation as it did is a matter of conjecture. A landing in the dark faces the danger of going astray. If unsupported by gunfire, it faces the further hazard of meeting an uninjured defense. On the other hand, a night landing unsupported by gunfire may completely surprise the defender and thereby pass unnoticed and uninjured through the dangerous approach and debarkation zones to the beach.

FLEET PROBLEM XX

The attack on Culebra marked the end of the first period of the exercise. Troops, except camp guards, were now reembarked. Ships proceeded to Saint Thomas for reprovisioning and then split up for short visits to liberty ports.

Tuesday 16 February was the date set for the assembling of BLACK forces at Culebra prior to the commencement of Fleet Problem XX. The establishment of an advance base in the Culebra-Vieques area was an important consideration in the strategic scheme of the BLACK defending forces. The ships of the Atlantic Squadron actually in this area were to be reinforcements supposedly despatched from Hampton Roads to join BLACK at sea. Shortly before this, our ships were ordered to fill up with fuel. As there were no tankers available at loaded speed toward the shore by bringing oil to them from Saint Thomas and San Juan. Some of this fuel was returned to these destroyers later when, in turn, became necessary to fuel them during the Fleet Problem.

The few days in company with the BLACK Fleet at Culebra were spent in staff conferences and signal drills, and in again disembarking landing forces, and rationing the camps for the period of the problem.

The ships of the Atlantic Squadron left Culebra in advance of the main body and proceeded to the northward. At the appointed time, these vessels, now designated as the HAMPTON ROADS DETACHMENT, effected the planned rendezvous 350 miles from Culebra. They were quickly merged into the organization of the BLACK Fleet, Batdiv FIVE with Batdiv THREE forming the battle line under my command. Captain Bunkley's 10th Destroyer Squadron joined the forces on the right flank. Tactical command of the wavened forces then passed to Vice Admiral Andrews, Commander of the BLACK Fleet. It is needless to mention here the strategical and tactical employment of the fleets during the problem.

Meantime, the units of the Fleet Marine Force were employed on their assigned problem tasks. The marine anti-aircraft battery, transported from Culebra aboard the Coast Guard Cutter BIBB, was sent to defend the San Juan flying field. The planes of Aircraft ONE, based at Culebra, Saint Thomas, and San Juan, acting in cooperation with BLACK's patrol planes, augmented their striking power. This temporary merging of forces normally based on our East and West Coasts is significant. For some time now, our main naval forces have been tactically concentrated in the San Pedro—San Diego area. There has grown up a school of thought which claims that only through this continued tactical concentration can full efficiency be secured. The smoothness with which the Atlantic Squadron was able to merge itself into the BLACK Fleet seems partially to disprove this theory and to emphasize the value of the common training doctrine under which all units of the United States Navy operate.
NAVAL GUNFIRE SUPPORT

Immediately upon the completion of Fleet Problem XX, amphibious operations were resumed. Naval gunfire practices against shore objectives on Vieques Island were conducted to develop the technique of naval gunfire in support of troops before and after landing, and to determine the effectiveness of different classes of projectiles against prepared defenses on shore.

The assumed tactical situation in the first practice was that the westward portion of Vieques was in our hands and that the enemy was advancing to attack an enemy holding the eastern portion of the island. The advance having been held up, the NEW YORK and TEXAS, about six miles off the southern coast, and WYOMING about the same distance off the northern coast, were called upon to furnish "Close Supporting Fire" and "Fire on Targets of Opportunity". The problem required that the Commander Land Force designate the targets. His request for fire support was then transmitted by radio to the ships concerned by their shore fire control parties using the Navy General Signal Book "M" square coordinate method. Ships fired main batteries only, the NEW YORK and TEXAS using 14" bombardment and WYOMING 12" armor piercing projectiles.

The next practice was fired by BatDiv FIVE and DesRon TEN using main and secondary batteries at ranges varying from 6,000 to 12,000 yards. The purpose of the practice was to develop the technique of rendering deep and close supporting fire for the initial assault wave of a landing force, to observe the effect of neutralization fire against visible material targets and silhouettes, and to observe the effect of counter-battery fire against unseen gun emplacements on reverse slopes. Ship and air spots were used, ships controlling their own fire.

The purpose of the final practice was to test the practicability of delivering fire on designated targets and to exercise at rapid shifts of fire from one target to another. This practice was conducted by CruDiv EIGHT and DesDiv FOUR, using 6" - 47 caliber and 5" - 38 caliber guns. The ships were called on to deliver deep supporting fire at medium and short ranges in order to neutralize machine gun fire from positions set well in from the landing beach. Ships spotted and controlled their own fire during this practice.

In the above practices distribution of fire over the areas was excellent. Observers were of the opinion that the firing would have resulted in complete neutralization and would have been demoralizing to troops located in the area. Though some shell craters were ten feet deep and thirty feet in diameter, the actual damage inflicted on the materiel targets was comparatively slight.

These practices showed the necessity of developing better types of shell than those now used in landing operations.

Details of the results of the firings are included in the report of the Senior Member of the Shore Observation Party.

THE ATTACK ON VIEQUES

The climax of Fleet Landing Exercise 5 was the attack on Vieques, 10-11 March. This was a two-sided maneuver designed to test the results of the winter's training.

The theatre of operations comprised an area eleven miles long and two miles deep in the eastern portion of the island. The defending force, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Shepherd, consisted of the 2nd Battalion 5th Marines, a pack howitzer battery, chemical company, engineer detachment, two tanks, and six airplanes. All units were familiar with the terrain to be defended.

The attack or landing force, under the command of Colonel J. C. Smith, comprised the 1st Battalion 5th Marines, Lieutenant Colonel Clement commanding, two pack howitzer batteries, plus three tanks. These units were embarked in the WYOMING, TEXAS and CAPELLA, which ships acted first as transports and later as a fire support group. The NEW YORK and six destroyers of Destroyer Squadron TEN augmented the naval gunfire support, while the planes of Aircraft ONE were ready at their bases.

Active operations began on the night of 6 March. Thereafter the defending force carried on under simulated war conditions. At dusk each day troops were moved into defense positions and at dawn were withdrawn to positions in reserve. The defense command post, the kitchens, ammunition dumps, and combat trains were so skillfully concealed in wooded and camouflaged positions as to escape detection by repeated reconnaissance flights. Trucks operating
without lights successfully distributed supplies to the widely dispersed troops. The attack energetically employed every means of obtaining information. Numerous reconnaissance and photographic flights searched the area of defense. Ground patrols, landed from the MANLEY in rubber boats under cover of darkness, reconnoitered the island for two days before they were reembarked.

With a front of over twenty-five miles to guard, the defending force faced an almost impossible task. On the morning of the attack, the difficulty of the defense was further increased by two well-planned feints at separate beaches, so designed as temporarily to immobilize the defender's reserve. By a combination of good intelligence work and no little luck, the attack selected the most weakly defended beach for the actual landing.

The landing force, carrying full field equipment accompanied by artillery and tanks, was loaded into its boats four miles off the beaches. Ships were completely darkened. A heavy sea was running. The course of the landing boats led through shoals and surf. That no serious casualties occurred in this dangerous landing speaks well for the preceding six weeks of intensive training. Despite initial smoke screen protection furnished by the destroyers, the loaded boats were sighted by the defense before they reached the beaches. Here they were subjected to simulated strafing attack by defending planes and to an attack with actual tear gas and simulated mustard. Had the machine gun fire been real, rather than simulated, the loss of personnel in the crowded boats would have been appalling. It is in fact doubtful if any beach landing, other than a night surprise, can succeed in the face of enemy air control.

Once ashore, the attacking troops met with little initial resistance. The beach head was seized without difficulty. The defense was now concentrating. By truck and by forced marches, its scattered forces succeeded in assembling for the defense on the ridge overlooking the beach head. The problem then passed from the field of amphibious war into a normal land operation.

The Vieques Attack should not be dismissed without noting the breakdown of communication security both for the attack and defense. The defending troops failed to cut telephone wires as they withdrew, thus enabling the attack to tap in and pick up the orders of the defense commander. The defense, on the other hand, broke down the attacker's code, and through intercepts learned many of their enemy's plans.

From the attack on Vieques, ably analyzed in a critique held aboard the WYOMING, it is apparent that we have gone far toward mastering the technique of landing operations. Our landing boats begin to be well designed for their peculiar purpose. Given the requisite training, our naval boats crew can maneuver through shoals and surf. Our naval gunners can fire effectively against defensive positions ashore. Our Marine units have learned the tactics of seizing the beaches. There still remains the menace of defending aircraft. That menace can be effectively circumvented only by such secrecy as to conceal the disembarkation. It can be destroyed only by an air preponderance sufficient to force down practically all defending planes. Thinking in terms of the defense rather than in terms of the attack, shore-based aircraft would seem to be our best protection against the hostile raids which might conceivably seek to gain a foothold in the Caribbean islands flanking the routes to the Panama Canal.

**SHIPS AND BOATS EMPLOYED**

Again this winter, battleships were of necessity employed both to transport troops and to furnish naval gunfire support. These functions are incompatible. They should be performed separately by ships of different types. Battleships have too deep draft and too limited troop accommodations to make good transports. Their magazine stowage is insufficient for their regular service allowance and the additional bombardment ammunition needed for fire support. Ships engaged in disembarking troops and in bombarding shore objectives are excellent targets for submarines. In war we would hardly be justified in withdrawing battleships form the battle line for either of these services.

Our fast, light draft, quick maneuvering cruisers, with service ammunition of common shell were found to be well adapted for furnishing fire support against land targets. They, rather than battleships, should make up our bombardment group.

A definite need exists for transports. At least one should be made available to the Fleet Marine Force for landing exercises.

Destroyers were employed in landing the advance force, furnishing fire support, and performing a variety of other duties for which they are well suited. They will always be needed
in overseas landing expeditions. The conversion of old destroyers into fast, light transports, carrying surf boats on quick-lowering, easily handled boat davits, should be continued. The MANLEY, first of this type, joined the expedition soon after her conversion. Constantly employed in making day and night landings with her surf boats on various beaches under various sea conditions, she proved her value as a light transport for advance landing forces.

The cargo ship CAPELLA was the only vessel accompanying the expedition capable of handling the Marine Brigade's heavy equipment. Hurriedly fitted out and commissioned after 19 years of inactivity, the CAPELLA took the place of the ANTARES, which vessel previously served in a similar capacity. Without the services of the CAPELLA the expedition could not have functioned. She was employed night and day, landing artillery, tanks, trucks and other heavy equipment and in provisioning the forces encamped at Vieque and Culebra. She was well handled and was unquestionably the most useful vessel in the expedition.

LANDING BOATS

Eighteen 30' surf boats, several inflated rubber boats, and eight outboard skiffs were taken south with the expedition.

The surf boats were used in landing troops and in special tests designed to determine the relative merits of the several types. Two types were found to be definitely superior to the others. After several years of development work, we can now say that we at last have a satisfactory surf boat for landing troops.

The 18' skiffs again proved their ability to land small detachments from destroyers if brought close to the beach in reasonably calm weather. There were many cases of motor trouble probably due to lack of experience in their operation.

The results of the tests with the experimental rubber boats were gratifying. A number of officers and men trained in their use clearly demonstrated that they could safely land them through heavy surf across jagged coral reefs under conditions heretofore considered insurmountable. These little craft were very useful in landing and returning reconnaissance patrols at night. Experimental machine gun firings both at and from the rubber boats were carried out with promising results. Training, experiments, and development should be continued with a view to exploiting their remarkable qualities. They should be procured in quantities sufficient for the training of two picked companies before the beginning of the next Fleet Landing Exercise.

TANK LIGHTERS

These remarkable, self-propelled craft, carried by CAPELLA, landed tanks, motor trucks, and artillery. Again and again they proved their value. The tank lighter built this year can carry two five-ton tanks, yet weighs less than the one built last year, which can carry only one. If heavier tanks are to replace the five-ton tanks now used by the Brigade, the problem of handling the increased weights will be difficult to solve. Careful consideration should be given them oAtt before a decision is made to adopt heavier tanks.

GENERAL

Success or failure in any landing operation depends to a large extent on the experience and training of boat crews. With experienced crews, boats that are not overloaded can be safely landed on unfamiliar beaches during darkness and through a moderate surf. Even under the average conditions on undefended beaches, landing operations are by their very nature hazardous. With inexperienced crews or untrained troops, landings on exposed beaches are likely to result in severe casualties.

A thorough knowledge of surf conditions, of reefs and shoals, and of the capabilities and limitations of his boats and men is essential to the commander of a joint landing operation. Grave indeed is the responsibility he must shoulder when the moment comes to decide for or against an attempted landing. Only experienced boat crews and trained troops can be relied on successfully to carry through the ship to shore movement, inherently the most difficult of all maneuvers in amphibious war.

THE VALUE OF FLEET LANDING EXERCISES

More significant than the tactics and the material of landing operations is the place which amphibious war now holds in the general scheme of our naval policy. That policy envisions land-
ing operations both as an offensive weapon and as a type of warfare against which we ourselves must prepare our own defense. In an overseas war, the capture of outlying bases might conceivably support the operations of our fleet. Experience proves that without proper numbers, equipment, and training, we are likely to sustain severe losses. The simulated capture of island bases by joint landing expeditions must therefore continue as a most important phase of our training.

We have now come to regard the Fleet Marine Force as our ready landing organization. Two years close association with this organization has confirmed my first confidence in the completeness and readiness of this small striking force. Trained especially in amphibious war, these troops are a ready weapon to the hand of our government, either for war or to assure order in areas of disturbance at home or aboard. The Fleet Marine Force is essential to any scheme of amphibious war. It should be maintained more nearly at full strength. Its augmentation and continued training along the lines followed this winter should be part of our preparations for the wars of the future.

Considered, not from the point of view of the offensive, but rather from the point of view of our basic defensive policy, which has always been the security of the Western Hemisphere, we must stand ready to guard against sudden raids especially in the Caribbean. Except for the garrison of the Canal Zone, our defenses in this vital area are entirely inadequate. The best defense against the actual landing of hostile troops is local air superiority. The recommendations of the Hepburn Board for an increase in our air power at San Juan and Saint Thomas should be followed in their entirety without delay.

Over and above the shore based aircraft which can be relied upon to turn back a hostile raid at the beaches, there is the larger problem of our naval power in the Atlantic. Even though we plan to guard against no more than a temporary raid, our Atlantic defenses must include naval ships numerous and fast enough to locate the raiders. A ready squadron sufficient to scout the passes into the Caribbean and sea areas adjacent thereto is the minimum force necessary to implement the oldest and most fundamental of our foreign policies, the defense of the Western Hemisphere under the Monroe Doctrine.

Distribution:

Chief of Naval Operations (10).
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (10).
Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force (2).
Commanding General, First Brigade, FMF (10).
Commanding Officer, U. S. S. NEW YORK (2).
Commanding Officer, U. S. S. ARKANSAS (2).
Commanding Officer, U. S. S. WYOMING (2).
Commanding Officer, U. S. S. TEXAS (2).
Commander Destroyer Squadron 10 (20).
Naval War College (2).
Post Graduate School, USNA (1).
Marine Corps School, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Va., (1).
Memorandum for the President.

My dear Mr. President:

Referring to your interest in the machinery installation of the eight thousand ton cruisers as expressed to me on Friday last, I have interrogated the Engineering Chief regarding the possibility of saving weight in the new cruisers by the installation therein of the latest type of the so-called "destroyer" machinery. Admiral Bowen informs me that the machinery to be installed in both the six thousand and eight thousand ton cruisers is of the latest design known to the art, and that insofar as he knows there is no possibility of saving weight in these ships by changing the planned machinery installations.

Upon inquiry of the Chief Constructor I find that work has already started on the four six thousand ton cruisers in advance of a formal completion of the contracts by the signature of the Secretary of the Navy. Detailed plans for the eight thousand ton cruisers cannot be completed prior to next October and it is expected that these ships will either be awarded to commercial industry or assigned to navy yards in December next.

The President,
The White House.
FROM: NAVY YARD PORTSMOUTH NH
ACTION: RADIO PORTSMOUTH NH
INFO: USS BROOKLYN; USS SCULPIN; OPNAV; COM 1.

PRIORITY

0024 FOURTH TRIP RESCUE CHAMBER BROUGHT EIGHT SURVIVORS OF SQUALUS TO SURFACE IN GOOD CONDITION AS FOLLOWS LIEUT O F NAQUIN USN LIEUT W T DOYLE USN ALLEN C BRYSON 261 89 92 F1C EUGENE D CRAVENS 346 51 04 GM1C CHARLES S KUNEY 380 79 00 Y2C CAROL N PIERCE 341 82 21 MM2C CHARLES A POWELL 274 13 21 RM2C DONATO PERSICO 238 55 59 SEAC1C

THIS COMPLETES RESCUE OF ALL KNOWN SURVIVORS INVESTIGATION OF FLOODED COMPARTMENTS WILL PROCEED AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE SUSPENDING OPERATIONS FOR THE NIGHT DUE DAMAGE TO RESCUE CHAMBER WHICH MUST BE REPAIRED BEFORE FURTHER USE 2338

2357 AY 24MAY 1939 WHITEHOUSE COPY
ACTION
NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: NAVY YARD PORTSMOUTH NH
ACTION: OPNAV
INFO: RADIO PORTSMOUTH NH; USS BROOKLYN; USS SCULPIN; COM 1.

PRIORITY

ØØ24 WILL ADVISE LATER WHEN USE OF RESCUE CHAMBER MAY BE RESUMED
AFTER REPAIRS 2358

ØØØ2 AY 25 MAY WHITEHOUSE COPY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

You said you wanted to talk to Admiral Stark about this when he comes.

(He will probably not be here until sometime in August).

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Date- 4-7-70
Signature- FRD
Memorandum for

The President

In reply to the President's query regarding the abolition of the General Board, presented to me a week ago by the President, I am forwarding the following information:

(a) The General Board was created by Navy Department General Order No. 544 of 13 March 1900.

(b) Its composition and duties were prescribed by the Navy Regulations in 1913, (Articles R-104, 166, 167).

(c) Present duties are purely advisory, regulations providing in part that "neither the board nor any of its members shall have any executive or administrative duties."

(d) The General Board has received statutory recognition in a number of Acts of Congress, particularly Naval Appropriation Acts, wherein certain sums of money were allocated for compensation for personal services of civil employees assigned to the General Board. The current Naval Appropriation Act contains a similar provision.

It appears from the above that the Executive Authority may abolish the General Board without substituting some other medium to perform its present functions. Also, under the authority of the recently enacted Reorganization Bill, it appears that the President has the power to abolish or otherwise deal with the functions of the General Board.

I have mentioned this matter to Admiral Leahy. In no wise desiring to interfere with your wishes in the matter, Admiral Leahy desires me to tell you that as a result of your directions there are shortly to be appointed to the General Board, to serve for the next year or so, some of the ablest officers in the Navy, i.e., Admiral Bloch, Admiral King, Admiral Greenslade and Admiral Sexton. Admiral Leahy feels that under the direction of these officers the General Board will continue to carry out its functions in a manner commensurate with that established by Admiral Hart during the past year.

Respectfully,

D. J. CALLAGHAN.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

June 22, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you speak to me

about this?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

21 June 1939

The Tuamotu Group offers suitable bases from which Japanese long range submarines could operate against the Canal Zone, the west coast of Central and South America, and even U. S. West Coast shipping; Fakarava being an excellent base in the Tuamotu Group from which U. S. submarines, patrol planes, and light forces could operate to prevent Japan from basing submarines in this general area, and would be a flanking position against attacks on the west coast of South America and against trade lines from Japan to the Straits of Magellan.

Should there be a world war with Germany, Italy and Japan against Great Britain and France, and the United States neutral, Japan would undoubtedly absorb the exposed British and French possessions in the Pacific, especially where no opposition is offered. If the United States owned or controlled Fakarava, this would provide a deterrent against Japanese aggression in this part of the Eastern Pacific.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 29, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND PREPARE
REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your oral instructions to me to visit neighboring Missions and write you of my impressions, I recently made a trip to Athens, out and back by one of the two excellent new Rumanian boats which gave me a six-day stopover in Athens, but unfortunately, only a few hours each way at Istanbul and not enough time to run up to Ankara. Jack MacMurray and practically all of the staff were at Ankara but I had some talks with the very knowledgeable Commercial Attaché, Gillespie, who has been in Turkey for many years, and with the Military Attaché. Our departing and regretted Military Attaché Major Reilly accompanied me.

While in Athens I saw quite a bit of our distinguished Minister Mr. MacVeagh. He has the qualifications, is able, well informed and a real authority on the classical Greek period, the latter being much appreciated and commented upon by the Greeks. While there I had many talks with former Colleagues, notably Djvura, the Rumanian Ambassador, and Baron van Breugel Douglas, the Dutch Minister who used to be in Washington, various informed Greeks, and also a conversation after dinner at MacVeagh's house with Mavrodi, the more or less acting Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs. There is a real

The President,
The White House.
real community of interest between Greece and Rumania. Caeomens, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, is shortly going to Athens on an official visit, and Prince Paul, the Diadoque, is coming here this week for the "Strajerii" or boy scout celebrations. While the Greeks are naturally very disturbed with the Italians in Albania, and the reported number of Italian troops has mounted now to over eighty thousand, which, with a further slight increase would be more than the Greeks themselves could muster, nevertheless there is as yet no tangible threat, only a potential menace. The Greeks are almost equally anxious as to what the future holds for Yugoslavia. Prince Paul of Yugoslavia, I feel convinced, will do his utmost to preserve the country's neutrality and categorical assurances to that effect were given to Caeomens when a few weeks ago he met with Sincar Markovic, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, on a boat at the Danube border. However, only the future can tell how these situations are going to work out.

Everywhere I went I heard, as I have here again and again, expressions of intense gratification over your messages. There is a feeling of hope in the air that America sympathizes with the problems of these little fellows over here and that you take a personal interest. Turkish solidarity also is a great comfort to them. There would appear to be no doubt as to its genuineness, and due to close Russo-Turkish relations that
that means that Russia is in reserve somewhere in the background: a less welcome prop but, nevertheless, potential.

The checkerboard of Europe now shows a fairly brave front for the white chessmen. Hitler ponders over his black chessmen thinking hard as to what his next move will be. England, France and Russia have succeeded in reestablishing a semblance of the old balance of power and of collective security. (A friend of mine refers always to the pending Russian agreement as an Alice in Wonderland contraption.) Personally, however, I doubt whether the brave front will be enough to restrain the Power Gluttons from trying out some new moves after the crops are practically gathered and recovery has raised its head again in America. In England and France it is already showing, in the latter due to the enlightened policies of Paul Reynaud. Hitler is talking himself and some of his people into a frenzy about "ensirclement". He will end up by believing it himself. And the Poles, bolstered up by the British promises, have become uncompromising. So possibly the next onslaught will be primarily upon Yugoslavia. It might be considered better tactics first to undermine the Balkan Entente and, with promises to Bulgaria, present both Turkey and Rumania, not to speak of Greece, with a menacing situation on their flanks.

In my humble opinion no assurance of the maintenance of the status quo can be had unless, in addition to the brave
brave front, tempting bait can be dangled before the Germans, during good behavior, in the form of a colony—west coast of Africa—raw materials, and/or, eventual financial and economic cooperation. In the latter field Russia could play a useful role. Germany's trade with Russia has dwindled to almost nothing. Formerly it was of major importance.

Meanwhile both here and in Greece there is deep disappointment and even chagrin over the result, or rather lack of result, of the recent City dictated negotiations with Leith Ross and his British Financial Mission. Britain seems anxious to "do something", but only if it does not cost too much. There is a feeling in the air that more passed at Munich between Chamberlain and Hitler than meets the eye and that Britain is going to be mighty careful not to step on any German toes in the field of trade in the Balkans. Here there were certain concrete results which, when pooled with recent French efforts to take more Rumanian oil, will help in the general picture—which, however, has a German foreground.

Then there is the important question of armament. I have been impressed by the spontaneous mobilization in this country and the spirit shown. The Rumanian peasant is a good soldier, intensely patriotic and can stand any amount of hardship and punishment. Between four to five times as many more responded to the mobilization call than were expected. The Rumanian Army, however, could only put up a real stiff resistance if properly equipped. The trade pacts with England
and France do not help much as neither Britain nor France are in a position to supply anything substantial in the way of arms. Under Leith Ross's recent accord I am given to understand that the British are quietly passing along a few old "Warspite" planes which are now lumbering and out of date. Our markets are practically closed due to the Johnson Act and the inability of Rumania to raise the money to pay on the nail on a cash and carry basis. Personally, I have been here long enough to have formed the conviction that the Balkan Entente, if properly equipped, could—and probably would—put up a magnificent fight against German political domination. Were perchance our markets open and made accessible I think that even Bulgaria might join up. Together with Poland and Turkey that would make a very formidable bloc indeed. On the other hand, if Yugoslavia is weakened or otherwise incapacitated by fissiparous methods, who knows what the future role of Rumania will eventually be. One can be sure that if Germany really makes a move on the Ukraine, Germany will endeavor to entice the Rumanians by promises, inter alia, of a slice thereof if they are good and march along. I admit that I am trying to peer a long way into the future but stranger things than this have happened. But there are, of course, two schools of thought in Rumania: that which believes Rumania should stick to its former allies—with reservations as to present day Russia—and that which holds it should tie up
up with Germany. The latter is very much the lesser so far and has but a small following as yet. Above all, Rumania wants to live. This nation wants to continue. It is progressing rapidly and has had a foretaste of what a greater developed Rumania might be. They like to compare Rumania's possibilities with our country before the great development after the Civil War. The King has a stake, and a big one, a fine boy coming along, and if aid from elsewhere is not forthcoming this country cannot fight alone and ill equipped. Due to the geographical difficulties not too much can be expected of Great Britain in time of stress. There is also always the big potential leverage for the Germans of control of Rumania's principal source of arms and equipment. Any increase in German political influence in Rumania would almost certainly bring in its wake sad times for the Jews here.

As long ago as March 17, 1938 in a Despatch to the Department, No. 215, I concluded with the following paragraph:

"Whatever one reports nowadays, with the present world tempo, is usually stale by the time it reaches you, but with economic conditions as they are and, inter alia, with the decline in respect for France, above all for its everlasting politics and politicians, with Great Britain either unwilling or unable to make up its mind, with the fatalistic reception accorded here in high circles of the union of the Germans under Hitler, with the subtle and skilful diplomacy of the German Minister in Bucharest, Herr Fabricius, with the horror and dread which prevails of Russia and even of the passage of Russian troops—on the ground that once in they could never be got out again—I would venture to say that this country will tend to swing more and more, though cautiously, towards Berlin. Whether bloodshed will so be averted and whether history will be any the more peacefully written
written for this development, or how soon it will occur, or whether suddenly or by gradual processes, I am as yet unable to determine, but nothing short of a really startling development of strength in England and France, coupled with real interest in this country, a miraculous strengthening of the Little and Balkan Ententes or some other unforeseen development, can arrest the trend."

I sincerely hope that your health has entirely recovered and that the summer will not be too hard on you. My wife and I have taken a villa at Sinaia near here, but first I am going to London and Paris when I hope to have the advantage of talking things over with Ambassadors Kennedy and Bullitt. These occasions with their opportunities of personal contact are of great value, at least to me.

The vernacular press reports that Mrs. Roosevelt, your Mother, is planning a trip to Rumania. If true, it would be splendid. She would have a wonderful reception. I would be most awfully grateful if I could have some advance notice of her coming. It is true that Bucharest in summer is frightfully hot, but not quite as hot, as a rule, as Washington. However, Sinaia and other resorts in the mountains are only two hours or so away by car. The King moves to his summer residence at Sinaia towards the end of June and all the Cabinet manage to find excellent reasons why they should be there—if not away on leave—as much, if not more than they are in Bucharest. Another good thing about the summer here is that the heat subsides earlier than with us, usually around the first of September.

With highest regard, dear Mr. President, believe me,

Yours most respectfully,
Memorandum for the President.

July 21st

On the me maintenance, Congressmen Vinson and Maas, on the Navy Personnel Bill, I understand that their contemplated action regarding the controversial matter in the bill will go along the following lines, when they meet with the Senate Conferees on Tuesday next:

(a) The House will agree to accept the Senate action in striking out the section which makes mandatory the retention of all fitted officers until 30 June 1944, but will substitute an amendment which will require the retention until 30 June 1944 of all Naval Aviators in the fitted status, now on the active list, who entered the Navy during the World War from civilian source.

(b) The House Conferees will insist in their opposition to the re-instatement of General Meade, but will compromise to the extent of permitting him to draw the pay of a Major General on the retired list. If necessary, they will also grant him the rank. In order to avoid complications in the future the wording will be such that it will be applicable to General Meade alone.

Respectfully,

C. W. Nimitz.
NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)

From: ASTALUSHA CHUNGKING
Released by: [Signature]
Date: 5 AUGUST 39
NITE to: ALL ADDRESSEES
PRIORITY to:

To: ALUSHA PEIPING
To: ASTALUSHA SHANGHAI CINCAF COMYANGPAT OPHNAY

0005 THERE IS NO CHANCE THAT CHIANG KAI CHEK WILL MAKE PEACE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AS HE IS DIRECTING ALL HIS ENERGIES TOWARD AN EXTENSIVE DRIVE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE COMING YEAR AND TO THIS END IS CONDUCTING ONLY ATTRITION OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE AND IS SAVING HIS STRENGTH UNTIL HE IS COMPLETELY PREPARED X AT THE MOMENT IT IS CLAIMED THAT THE CHINESE FORCES NUMBER ABOUT 600,000 MEN IN THE FIELD (ABOUT 120 DIVISIONS) BACKED UP BY APPROXIMATELY 1,000,000 RESERVES AND ABOUT 2,000,000 MEN IN TRAINING X THE $136,000,000 (U.S. DOLLARS) LOAN RECENTLY MADE TO THE CHINESE BY THE SOVIETS IS TO BE USED MOSTLY TO PURCHASE MILITARY SUPPLIES AND AIRPLANES AS THE CHINESE ARE ASSERTLY PRODUCING ALL THEIR OWN AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS UP TO AND INCLUDING HEAVY MACHINE GUNS X THE ONLY EQUIPMENT NOW BEING PURCHASED ABROAD IS MECHANIZED EQUIPMENT AND ARTILLERY $930.

DISTRIBUTION
1...ACTION
01...5...16...11...16...19...20A...30...MARCORPS(2)....

TOR CODE ROOM 4644

DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR. 5200.3 (9/27/58)

Date: 4-7-70

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

Hyde Park, N. Y.,
August 11, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL STARK

What do you think of the tentative
suggestion which the Secretary of the
Interior has made to me, confidentially,
that Admiral Yarnell be made the Chief
of the Bureau of Islands and Territories
in place of Gruening, if the latter goes?

F. D. R.
Information, believed to be reliable, indicates that in Shanghai there is an Italian organization to recruit and train Italian volunteers to take part in the Japanese war against China. Most of these volunteers come from Spain and Somaliland, and are experts in technical phases of warfare. A considerable number of them have already been sent to Manchoukuo.

W.S. Anderson, Rear Admiral, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence.
Sent by Admiral Starke from the Naval Attache in Paris.
FROM ALUSNA PARIS
ACTION OPNAV
RESTRICTED ROUTINE

Date-11-5-62
Signature-CLS

0024 ESTIMATE ALL GERMAN FORCES IN POSITION ENTER POLAND NOT LATER THAN FRIDAY NIGHT TODAY'S ACTION DANZIG APPEARS HOSTILITIES INEVITABLE WITH DRIVE TO SOUTHEAST THROUGH HUNGARY POSSIBLE MY OPINION ENGLAND AND FRANCE WILL FIGHT X FRENCH MOBILIZATION PROCEEDING RAPIDLY WITH REQUISITION LAW NOW EFFECTIVE AND GENERAL MOBILIZATION IMMINENT FRENCH FLEET STILL AT NORMAL BASES X SPANISH CHARGE PARIS TOLD ALUSNA TODAY SPAIN REMAINS ABSOLUTELY NEUTRAL

183φ

DISTRIBUTION
16 ACTION
10 11...19...20...A...FILE...

TOR CODEROOM 1532
24 AUGUST 1939
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

SECRET

24 August 1939

Memorandum for the President:

1. In regard to the Aviation training facilities at Trinidad and Bermuda, after conversation with Mr. Wells this afternoon I have made the following arrangements with Mr. Ryhl, Vice President of the Pan American Airways:

(a) AT TRINIDAD: Mr. Ryhl stated that a U.S. Navy Department lease of a portion of Pan American Airways facilities at Trinidad is considered consummated as of 4:30 p.m. today, August 24, 1939.

(b) AT BERMUDA: Pan American Airways and Imperial Airways use facilities leased from Bermuda Government. I have asked State Department to transmit via American Consul a request to the Governor to lease these facilities to U.S. Navy Department not to interfere with Pan American Airways or Imperial Airways.

2. Unless you direct otherwise, I am sending by commercial air transportation a qualified aviation officer to Bermuda and one to Trinidad to complete details and advise Department as to further facilities necessary.

H.R. STARK,
Admiral, U.S. Navy.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

25 August, 1939.

MEMORANDUM.

When certain Japanese Diet members were in Washington, 29 July, they had conversations with Messrs. Vandenberg and Bankhead, regarding notice of abrogation of the treaty. Both these American gentlemen made clear the deep concern the United States entertained when United States rights were interfered with – and Mr. Bankhead stated that the conclusion of the new treaty depended entirely upon the Japanese attitude between now and that time, and that he hoped, in the meantime, the Japanese would strictly respect the existing treaty.

W.S. Anderson,
Rear Admiral, USN,
Director of Naval Intelligence.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

25 August, 1939.

SECRET

There is authoritative reason for believing that the Japanese are concerned with regard to their future supply of oil, in connection with the United States' notice of abrogation of the treaty, and they intimated that it will have a serious effect on their supply if the United States places an embargo upon oil, scrap iron, lead, copper, steel, etc.

There is good reason to believe that the Japanese are much interested in the development of the port facilities of Salina Cruz, an oil port on the Pacific side of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Japan is willing to increase its purchases of Mexican oil in order to speed up the development of the facilities of that port.

W.E.A.
W.E. Anderson,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Director of Naval Intelligence.
NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>CINCAF</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Released by</td>
<td>(signature)</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>26 AUGUST, 1939.</td>
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<td>NITE to</td>
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<td>PRIORITY to</td>
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<td>INFORMATION</td>
<td>ACTION</td>
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<tr>
<td>Write A.C.K. after address requiring acknowledgment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TASS AGENCY HAS ISSUED A DISPATCH WHICH GIVES TERMS OF RUSSO-GERMAN PACT AS FOLLOWS:

1. REICH DISBAND ANTI-SOVIET ORGANIZATIONS AND CEASE PROPAGANDA WITH REGARD TO UKRAINE AND BREAK UP INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

2. REICH RECOGNIZE SOVIET SPECIAL POSITION IN BALTIC COUNTRIES.

3. USSR TO GET HER OLD SECTION OF POLAND.

4. RUSSIA TO RESPECT REICH'S SPHERE OF INFLUENCE IN POLAND,

5. RUSSIA TO APPROVE GERMANY'S ANNEXATION OF DANZIG AND SUPPORT GERMAN COLONIAL DEMANDS.

COMBINED FLEET (JAPANESE MAIN FLEET) IS AT SEA SOUTH OF SASEBO AND MAY BE CONTEMPLATING CONCENTRATION IN AREA OF TAKAO.

SEVERAL INDICATIONS OF A POSSIBLE PROGRESSIVE MOBILIZATION OF JAPANESE NAVY.

Signature: C.S. -

Date: 11-5-42

Make original only. Deliver to Communication Watch Officer in person. (See Art. 76(4), Navy Regulations.)

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIA 8900.19 (1/27/88)

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT LIBRARY
FROM: ATTACHE PARIS
TO: NAVINTEL

RESTRICTED  25 AUG 39

Routine.

G25. The Government has taken over all factories working on war materials. Army GHQ established outside Paris. Some units of Brest squadron enroute Mediterranean. French Navy reports all units German fleet now in Baltic. Believe Germans may enter Poland any moment but such action will not necessarily precipitate general war as numerous reports indicate strong possibility another Munich 1839.

TOR CORDEROOM 1455
25 August 1939

DISTRIBUTION
ACTION NAVAID......gta....
5...1g11...f1...13...19...2gA...2g......FILE...
SUBJECT: Scientific Yachting Expedition to the West Indies - Caribbean - South American Area.

1. In the near future the yacht SALEE will depart on this expedition under the command of Captain Sherwood S. Picking, U.S.N., ostensibly on leave. Accompanying him will be Mr. Robert Moore, Jr., a lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve, a cotton broker of New York and New Orleans, who will combine business with pleasure; also, Captain Picking's nephew, Frank A. Harding, Jr., an ensign in the Naval Reserve, and the regular sailing master of the yacht which has been leased in Mr. Moore's name. Approximately five naval enlisted ratings will serve as the crew in a simulated civilian status.

2. The SALEE is a 2 masted auxiliary schooner, 70 feet along the water line, 16 foot beam. She is equipped with a 75 horsepower Chrysler gasoline engine, speed 8 to 9 knots, radius 150 miles. This radius will be doubled by the addition of temporary fuel tanks. A field radio or similar portable set will be installed on the SALEE in addition to the commercial receiver with which she is at present equipped.
To the President
Memo from Col Watson
Aug-28-1939

Attaches report from Chief of Military Intelligence, Army in regard to movements of Russian Naval Vessels.

See--War Dept Folder-Drawer 1-1939
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

27 August, 1939.

To: The White House.

The below quoted message is forwarded to the White House under instructions of Admiral Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations:

"From: G B R (Rugby Radio).
To : G B X Z (Not listed in International Radio Call List).

(Text of message addressed to all British Naval Units)

Important. From Admiralty. Broadcast this message on twenty-seventh, twenty-eighth, twentyninth and thirtieth August by GBMS (G.B. Marine Signal) organization in the area for which you are responsible begins Admiralty message: BRITISH MERCHANT SHIPS BOUND FOR GERMAN DUTCH OR DANISH PORTS ARE. ONE. IF IN NORTH SEA TO RETURN TO A UK* PORT. TWO. IF BEYOND NORTH SEA TO CALL AT A UK* PORT. BRITISH SHIPS IN GERMAN, DUTCH OR DANISH PORTS ARE TO RETURN TO UK* BT 1725/27 VA.

* - United Kingdom.

This message was intercepted by the Radio Security Unit operating at Chealtenham, Md.

R. J. Fabian,
Lieutenant, U.S.N.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

28 August 1939.

Memorandum to Admiral Ghormley.

Subject: Status of new Naval Air Bases.

A contract was awarded on August 5 for the construction of the new Air Bases at Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Kaneohe and Pearl Harbor. Work is actively under way at Pearl Harbor, and designs and materials are being prepared for all of these bases.

We will award, today, a contract for the Air Bases at Kodiak and Sitka, Alaska. This award will be subject to the President's approval.

These contracts include all of the work at these Bases.

A contract was awarded on August 25 for waterfront work at the new Tongue Point Base, and the remainder of the work will follow along rapidly without interruption.

A contract was awarded on August 18 for the dredging and filling for the Puerto Rico Base, and the remainder of the work will follow along as rapidly as we can get on the land.

Contracts have been awarded for hangars, landing field and personnel structures at Pensacola, and the remainder of the work will follow along rapidly.

Today a conference is being held in the office of the Secretary of War relative to the transfer of the Jacksonville site and it is expected that final arrangements will be made today. The work will be inaugurated within 10 days after the site is transferred.

At Hampton Roads and Quonset Point we have authority only for the purchase of the sites. The appraisals for these sites are now under way.

B. Moreell.
See also: Louis Johnson
Folder-Drawing 1-1939
Re-contracts for planes for
Canada
MEMORANDUM

For: Admiral Stark.

SUBJECT: Airplanes for Canada.

Air Commodore Steadman, representing the Canadian government, submitted a request for approximately 50 airplanes of three different types. He stated that his government is appropriating $7,500,000 for this procurement. The types he desired and the present situation regarding them are as follows:

(a) **Landplane Bombers** - He first desired about 25, but in view of the improbability of obtaining planes of another type this number has been increased to 35, and the War Department is arranging to let the manufacturer, Douglas Company, make diversions from War Department order up to 35.

(b) **Advanced Training Planes** - 15 desired. Navy Department agreed to let the manufacturer (North American Company) divert 15 planes on order for the Navy and standing on the floor, practically completed. North American has proposed as an alternative to build and deliver within 45 days 15 of the type previously delivered to Canada, which type is slightly different from those built for the Navy and more acceptable to the Canadians. Decision as to which course to be followed is in the hands of Air Commodore Steadman. Probably will be made today.

(c) **10 - 15 Twin-engine Patrol Planes.** None of this type are available in the hands of any of the manufacturers. A proposed method of diversion in a manner which would at best be barely within the law and which could not escape publicity was, according to Assistant Secretary of War Johnson, rejected by the President. These large planes require a long time to fabricate, apparently too long to make that method of procurement interesting to the Canadians. Steadman has been informed of the situation and it is my understanding that as a result he increased the bomber order to 35, although he led me to believe that he was hopeful of obtaining through diplomatic channels reversal of the President's decision.
The following Standard Oil Tankers of between 13,000 and 18,000 tons are now in ports, or en route, as indicated below, according to information which was received by Admiral Stark in a telephone conversation with Mr. Sadler, a Vice President of Standard Oil:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>ARRIVES</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>FROM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George McKnight</td>
<td>29 August</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Aruba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clio</td>
<td>29 August</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penelope</td>
<td>30 August</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. N. Senior Heineich Reitermann</td>
<td>31 August</td>
<td>Newport News</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thalia</td>
<td>2 September</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leda</td>
<td>4 September</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. A. Mowinckel**</td>
<td>12 September</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Aruba (via Venezuela)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prometheus**</td>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. H. Bedford, Jr.</td>
<td>20 September</td>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>Cape Verde Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry G. Seidel</td>
<td>22 September</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spithiod</td>
<td>28 September</td>
<td>Bergin</td>
<td>Buenos Aires</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoebus</td>
<td>16 August</td>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>Due to sail 13 Sept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calliope</td>
<td>now at</td>
<td>Rio: having refused to sail because of orders from Germany to remain in neutral port.</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

NOTE:  
* This ship should be in the Panama Canal about today - 28 Aug.  
** This ship has engine trouble and may not sail on time.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

29 August 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

While it is legal for retired, naval reserve, or militia personnel to be ordered, with their consent, to active duty in time of peace, the law entitles them to active pay when on active duty. Since the annual appropriation Acts limit the number of such personnel who can be paid active pay, it, in effect, becomes impossible to order such personnel to active duty unless a national emergency exists.

While such a national emergency would ordinarily be proclaimed by the President there is no legal requirement that this be done. Any definite statement or act by the President indicating that a national emergency exists would be sufficient to warrant application of the laws based on a national emergency.
NAVAL MESSAGE
(NAVY DEPARTMENT)

NPM 3248
From: ALUSNA PEIPING

Release: (signature)

Date: 30 AUGUST 79

NITE: ROUTINE

To: OPNAV

To: CINCP
ASTALUSNA CHUNGKING
ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI

Wrote A.C. after address
requiring extraneous judgment

$30 SHOULD WAR BREAK OUT IN EUROPE THE MAJOR FLEET BASES WILL
BE LOCATED IN HAINAN AND FORMOSA. X HAINAN WILL BE MOSTLY
SUBMARINES AND AIRCRAFT AND THERE WILL BE SOME SUBMARINES AT
SPRATLEY X THE BRITISH HAVE RECALLED ALL THEIR LOCAL ARMY
STUDENTS TO SINGAPORE X THE JAPANESE NAVAL ATTACHE IN PEKIN
STATES THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMIRAL YOSHIDA IS PARTLY DUE
to the fact that he is responsible for the US War Plan 15$0

DISTRIBUTION

TOR CODE ROOM $7$0

NAVY $20

CONFIDENTIAL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 4/7/70

Signature: [Signature]
31 August 1939

MEMORANDUM:

#2 - TOR 1035

Information received from New York from same source as previous memorandum to the effect that England is completing mobilization of both Army and Navy.

cc: Capt. Bode
MEMORANDUM

Information has been received from New York to the effect that a report has been received from a source believed reliable that the London Stock Exchange will close tomorrow, Friday, for indefinite time. Reason for action given is to afford opportunity for evacuation of women and children from ten points in the British Isles.

cc: Capt. Bode

[Signature]

31 August 1939
For: Admiral Stark.

SUBJECT: Acting Secretary's conference of 30 August 1939 on Aircraft Matters.

1. To hold up at the manufacturers' plants deliveries of Naval aircraft would not, even over a period of several weeks, accomplish the purpose desired in that those several weeks represent a period when very few aircraft are scheduled for delivery. This is an annual occurrence. To be exact, less than half a dozen aircraft, exclusive of experimental types, would be affected. Delivery of experimental types promptly is essential to us. Nevertheless, I have issued orders to hold up deliveries of production types, but feel that those orders should be rescinded as limited numbers of various types would have only a nuisance value.

2. In accordance with instructions I am having a study made of the subject of component parts of aircraft for the purpose of determining possibilities. It is my opinion that little can be accomplished along this direction that would be of value and that any initiative should be taken by manufacturers rather than government agencies, because any plan evolved by such government agency, to be effective, would have to be widely disseminated, therefore fraught with dangerous consequences.

3. I reiterate my opinion that the problem is one which best and most safely can be settled between the manufacturers and the customers with the Government rendering such indirect assistance as is possible under current laws. To my mind it is of the utmost importance to maintain a neutral status for Canada. I am informed by a high ranking Canadian officer that the officials of his government are divided on the subject of whether or not Canada automatically becomes a belligerent upon declaration of war by Great Britain. I am also informed that State Department officials have expressed the view that Canada would be regarded by this Government as a belligerent. Canada as a neutral could purchase planes or any other munitions, including those now on order for the British and French governments, in any quantities desired from whatever sources available, and I believe every possible step should be taken to preserve the neutral status of Canada, at least for a reasonable period of time.
From: Chairman General Board;  
To: Secretary of the Navy;  

SUBJECT: Are We Ready?  
Reference: (a) SecNav letter of 10 August 1939 and enclosure.  
Enclosure: (A) Digest and Supplement - to follow as soon as ready.

1. Origin

(a) The reference required that the General Board prepare a short estimate of the condition of the Navy and its readiness to meet a "serious emergency," for likely submission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy for his information.

(b) A topical summary with brief comments upon each topic was suggested, to indicate not only those places where the Navy is in fact ready but also particularly wherein it is not ready and the action needed to remedy any such conditions. The time made available for such a survey marked the lack of detail to be expected.

2. Procedure

(a) For the purposes of this survey, the Board defined "serious emergency" to mean "one which requires immediate mobilization of the entire Naval Establishment with the prospect of conducting a major naval war."

(b) The General Board has canvassed the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet; has reviewed the Chief of Naval Operations' "Estimate of the Situation" of 15 April, 1939, and the Annual Report (1939) of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet; and has made use of other pertinent sources of information.

(c) In its survey, the Board has striven to keep in mind not only the foregoing definition of "serious emergency" - with stress on "immediacy" - but has further endeavored to limit its comment to readiness for mobilization and to what is planned to happen within the ensuing three months.

(d) Using the enclosure of reference (a) as a guide, a "digest" has been prepared with appropriate topical headings wherein succinct entries appear under each heading, amplified as deemed necessary by "supplementary notes."
5. Certain Included Considerations

(a) The all-inclusive scope of the survey - conducted within the limited time available - has necessarily precluded a definitive report. The results may not be far removed from characterization as "impressionistic" but they are adequate to indicate the general state of readiness and to emphasize in what respects there is a critical lack of readiness.

(b) The Board has taken into account the handicaps which always operate, in a democracy, to prevent the advanced degree of preparation which would permit a satisfactory answer to the question "Are we Ready?" especially when confronted with an "emergency."

4. Are We Ready?

The realities of the case are deemed to require an explicit answer to this question. The answer herein conveyed, therefore, presents a contrast of what we are ready to do with what we should be ready to do and contains the Board's comments on what we are now able to do to improve our readiness. We are

(a) NOT READY to meet a serious EMERGENCY,

(b) MORE READY with WAYS - LESS READY with MEANS,

(c) (1) NOT AS READY with WAYS as is NOW ATTAINABLE,

(2) NOT AS READY with MEANS as is NOW PRACTICABLE.

5. Critical Deficiencies Include:

(a) Ships - auxiliary -

(1) Seaplane tenders

(2) Fast tankers

(b) Bases -

(1) In Pacific westward of Hawaii

(2) Major patrol plane base in Hawaii

(c) Personnel. Regular enlisted personnel. Trained reserves - officers and men.
G.B.No. 425 (Serial No. 1868)

(d) **Shipbuilding** - Building ways for large ships.

(e) **Ship Repair and Conversion** - East Coast - because of concentration of shipbuilding in Navy and private yards.

(f) ** Decommissioned Ships** - Storage batteries for submarines.

(g) **Conversion of Merchant Vessels** - Auxiliary machinery of all kinds.

(h) **Aircraft Building** - Existing plants now at full load - chiefly to meet Army expansion and foreign orders.

(i) **Aircraft Equipment** - Same as above.

(j) **Advance Base and Expeditionary Force Equipment** - Landing boats and lighters; armament for Fleet Marine Force.

(k) **Facilities to Repair Underwater Damage** - Coffer-dams and accessories for use when ships are remote from dry docks.

(l) **General Stores** -

1. Naval Supply Account Fund only $75,000,000 - requires large increase.

2. Storage on West Coast and in Hawaii.

(m) **Ordnance** -

1. Conversion of 3-inch guns to A.A.

2. Only 25 per cent of necessary machine guns.

3. Torpedoes - numbers and manufacturing facilities.

(n) **Reserve Munitions** (other than ordnance) - only about 5 per cent on hand.

(o) **Strategic Materials** - only about 10 per cent overall.

(p) **Security of Fleet Bases** - against aircraft; sabotage; submarines.
Steps available to Improve "WAYS" Include:

(a) U.S. Naval Policy - adopt revision now ready - last approval in 1933

(b) War Plans
   (1) Development of "RAINBOW" plan.
   (2) Tentative plans involving cooperation of other countries.
   (3) Development of a "maximum-effort" mobilization and material plan common to all major "color" plans.

(c) Organization and Administration
   (1) Navy Dept - objective study premised on operation of Navy as a whole - to include greater coordination with increased decentralization in administration.
   (2) Fleet - Define command function of "Forces" - revise composition of "Forces" as to function (advance; main body; maintenance and supply) - effect greater decentralization in administration.
   (3) Naval Districts - Effect grouping into major strategic operating areas - to promote cooperation with Fleet and to permit consequent decentralization of operating control by Navy Department.

(d) Communications - develop and train communication reserve.

(e) Ships - combatant - reduce turnover of personnel - intensify AA training.

(f) Ships - auxiliary
   (1) Commission available Navy ships as seaplane tenders.
   (2) Perfect arrangements to take over fast tankers "as is" on 24 hours' notice.

(g) Ships Out of Commission - Improve material condition of destroyers at Philadelphia.
G.B.No. 425 (Serial No. 1868)

(h) Conversion of Merchant Vessels - Provide naval districts with personnel and funds to develop plans.

(i) Personnel - Regular - Reduce turnover - revise complements to give full effect to current naval operating force plans.

(j) Personnel - Reserve - Intensify training.

(k) Fleet Bases - Expedite Navy occupation of all FORD ISLAND (Hawaii).


(m) Ship Equipment - Intensify studies by Munitions Board - revise allocations to enhance Navy priority.

(n) Aircraft Building - Aircraft Equipment - Revise allocations to ensure Navy priority.

(o) Aircraft Research - Intensify development of factors looking to reliability, ruggedness, safety, and increased endurance in flight.

(p) Fuel -

(1) Keep Hawaiian storage filled.

(2) Perfect arrangements to take over non-Navy storage in Hawaii, Canal Zone, New England, Chesapeake Bay, San Francisco, Puget Sound.

(q) Stores - Divert (as practicable) funds to NSA Account.

(r) Ordnance -

(1) Use available funds for conversion of 3-inch guns to AA.

(2) Revise machine gun allocation to give priority to Navy needs.

(3) Use available funds to intensify production and conversion of torpedoes.
(4) Review and confirm adequacy of bombs available and of plans for expansion of production.

(s) Strategic Materials -

(1) Arrange for priority for Navy needs.

(2) Apply available funds to maximum practicable extent to provide, to the degree that they are lacking, for those items which are of greatest importance.

(t) Security -

(1) Perfect plans to avert sabotage and other subversive activities.

(2) Perfect plans for Fleet bases to provide nets, booms, etc., and for their transportation to ports as needed.

(3) Perfect plans for acquisition of vessels suitable for mine laying and mine sweeping.

(u) Repair of Underwater Damage - Perfect and provide facilities for use when ships are remote from dry docks.

7. General Steps to Improve "MEANS" Include:

(a) Apply current funds, as practicable without resort to legislation, to the correction of

(1) "critical deficiencies" - see par. 5 above,

(2) other deficiencies - see par. 8 following.

(b) Obtain legislative authority as necessary to apply current funds to correct "critical" and other deficiencies.

(c) Develop 1941 budget with emphasis on the correction of "critical" and of other deficiencies.

(d) Revise allocations being made by joint agencies (Army, Navy and other) to ensure priority for Navy needs.
8. **Steps Available to Improve "MEANS" Include:**

(a) **Ships - Combatant** -
   1. Improve or augment AA gun batteries.
   2. Modernize radio facilities.
   3. Perfect ship reproduction data.

(b) **Ships - Auxiliary** -
   1. Commission available Navy ships as seaplane tenders.
   2. Make ready to take over American-flag fast tankers "as is" on 24 hours' notice.
   3. Make ready to take over American-flag fast passenger vessels "as is" on 24 hours' notice.
   4. Consider taking over needed American-flag vessels for use "as is" to maximum extent practicable.

(c) **Bases** -
   1. Intensify acquisition of advance base and Expeditionary force equipment - landing boats and lighters; armament for Fleet Marine Force.
   2. Intensify all action looking to completion of authorized bases, with emphasis on outlying bases.
   3. Navy take over at once all of FORD ISLAND (Hawaii).

(d) **Shipbuilding, Repair, Conversion** - Expedite completion of plans for allocation of activities for
   1. Building
   2. Commissioning of decommissioned ships
   3. Maintenance and repair of naval vessels
(e) **Ship Equipment** - Develop maximum use of commercial products.

(f) **Aircraft Building** - Complete availability of current plans as to types to be duplicated.

(g) **Aircraft Equipment** - Develop maximum use of commercial products.

(h) **Aircraft Research** - Intensify development of methods of rapid construction by use of standard fabrications and their combination.

(i) **Fuel** - Perfect arrangements to take over tankers "as is" for supply to bases and acquired non-Navy storage.

(j) **Stores** - Apply maximum available funds to increase of NSA stocks of such nature that commercial products cannot be made to serve the purpose.

(k) **Ordnance** - See par. 6(r) above.

   (1) Expedite conversion of 3-inch guns to AA.

   (2) Expedite acquisition of machine guns.

   (3) Expedite readiness to expand torpedo manufacturing facilities.

(l) **Strategic Materials** - See par. 6(s) above.

(m) **Security** -

   (1) Apply funds to provide readiness to counter sabotage and other subversive activities.

   (2) Expedite completion of booms, nets, etc.

   (3) Improve facilities - to include ships - for mine laying and mine sweeping.

(n) **Repair of Underwater Damage** - Expedite provision of facilities (cofferdams and accessories) for use of ships when remote from dry docks.
9. Conclusion

(a) The foregoing comments cannot be considered as either definitive or all-inclusive but they suffice to indicate appropriate lines of immediate endeavor and of immediate action for all agencies of the Navy.

(b) It is apparent that this survey - even under the condition which limited its thoroughness - has served a purpose which is so useful that the General Board recommends that a similar survey be made a continuing activity of the Board and that a report be rendered to the Secretary at least annually.

Copy to C.N.O.

[Signature]

Acting
MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL BOARD:

The recommendations contained in the General Board's letter G.B. No. 425 dated 31 August 1939 have been this date and action has been taken, as follows:

By direction of the Secretary:
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SEEM

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If it is desired to retain attached document(s) indefinitely please remove original of this routing and transfer slip and return same to Room 2053, Office of C. N. O.

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Sec. 665. Expenditures in excess of appropriations; voluntary service forbidden; apportionment of appropriations for contingent expenses or other general purposes. No executive department or other Government establishment of the United States shall expend, in any one fiscal year, any sum in excess of appropriations made by Congress for that fiscal year, or involve the Government in any contract or other obligation for the future payment of money in excess of such appropriations unless such contract or obligation is authorized by law. No shall any department or any officer of the Government accept voluntary service for the Government or employ personal service in excess of that authorized by law, except in cases of sudden emergency involving the loss of human life or the destruction of property. All appropriations made for contingent expenses or other general purposes, except appropriations made in fulfillment of contract obligations expressly authorized by law, or for objects required or authorized by law without reference to the amounts annually appropriated therefor, shall, on or before the beginning of each fiscal year, be so apportioned by monthly or other allotments as to prevent expenditures in one portion of the year which may necessitate deficiency or additional appropriations to complete the service of the fiscal year for which said appropriations are made; and all such apportionments shall be adhered to and shall not be waived or modified except upon the happening of some extraordinary emergency or unusual circumstance which could not be anticipated.
at the time of making such apportionment, but this provision shall not apply to the contingent appropriations of the Senate or House of Representatives; and in case said apportionments are waived or modified as herein provided, the same shall be waived or modified in writing by the head of such executive department or other Government establishment having control of the expenditure, and the reasons therefor shall be fully set forth in each particular case and communicated to Congress in connection with estimates for any additional appropriations required on account thereof. Any person violating any provision of this section shall be summarily removed from office and may also be punished by a fine of not less than $100 or by imprisonment for not less than one month. (R.S. Sec.3679; Mar. 3, 1905, C.1494, Sec.4, 33 Stat.,1257; Feb. 27, 1906, C.510, Sec.3, 34 Stat.,48).

Memorandum

2 Sept., 1939, 4:30 p.m.

At a conference this morning in the Department of Justice, between representatives of the Attorney General and the Judge Advocate General of the Army and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy expressed the opinion that if the President called additional enlisted personnel to the colors for naval service up to 191,668, as authorized by law, he would be authorized also to incur a deficiency in the above quoted law (Title 31, Sec. 665, U.S.Code)

A few minutes ago, the Judge Advocate General of the Army called me and informed me that the Attorney General's Office had just called him and informed him that the Attorney General concur red in the opinion above outlined and requested him ( JAG-Army) to inform me to that effect.

Judge Advocate General of the Navy
U.S. Code, Title 34 - ENLISTED PERSONNEL

Section 151. General provisions. The permanent authorized enlisted strength of the active list of the regular Navy shall be one hundred and thirty-one thousand four hundred and eighty-five: Provided, That the President is hereby authorized, whenever in his judgment a sufficient emergency exists, to increase the authorized enlisted strength of the Navy to one hundred and ninety-one thousand men. (July 1, 1918, c. 114, 40 Stat. 714; July 11, 1919, c. 9, 41 Stat. 137.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re your request of Admiral Andrews, the following was received:

"Talked with the Acting Governor of San Juan. No information on German Submarines. Has had rumors. Will make further inquiries and report back."

Gen. E. M. Watson
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The rumor that a French ship put into San Juan, Puerto Rico, chased by a submarine, has been thoroughly investigated by O. N. I., and the report is that it is thoroughly unfounded.

E. M. W.
We have obtained the aviation bases for "routine training flights" at places indicated for sums noted. I have no other details at present.

Bermuda $500 a year
St. Lucia - Details entirely lacking, except we have it.
Trinidad 1.00 a year (confirmation, however, of our understanding is lacking so it cannot be considered as yet on ice)
Fakarava 1000.00 a year

Admiral Johnson is being directed to formulate plans for the offshore patrol to be initiated just as soon as practicable. Will keep you informed. Meanwhile plans will be in the making for inner patrol.

A study is being made as to what additional tenders will be necessary to support the above, plus other contemplated activities.

Have detailed two new destroyers on sea lanes to southward of Grand Banks in longitude about 55 as rescue and observation vessels and ready for any emergency. Mr. Edison signed a letter this afternoon to Secretary Morgenthau regarding two Coast Guard cutters for this same duty. Secretary Morgenthau informed me he would turn these two ships over to us to operate.

The old destroyers operating on this coast are something over 50% manned. They do not have their torpedoes nor torpedo personnel on board. Am taking steps to have all these destroyers fully manned, and fully armed. Torpedomen will be transferred from the Pacific.
Am directing Admiral Johnson to discontinue the Reserve Cruises so that these ships may be ready for neutrality duty at the earliest moment. I am also directing him to cancel visits of vessels to ports for flower show purposes. I regard these directions essential in the interest of early readiness for any duty.

Instructions have been issued to Philadelphia and San Diego to proceed with work necessary to get the 40 (22 at San Diego, generally in good condition, and 18 at Philadelphia in condition not so good) destroyers priority one ready for commissioning as soon as possible; also to bring the 68 destroyers in priorities two and three to a condition of priority one as soon as practicable.

Have directed Admiral Nimitz and General Holcomb to go ahead and enlist right away to the strength for which funds have been appropriated by Congress for fiscal year 1940, namely:

- Navy 116,000
- Marines 19,000

Of course getting these immediately will exceed funds appropriated as this strength was not to be reached until the end of the fiscal year.

Nimitz and Holcomb have also been directed to lay their plans for recruiting up to:

- Navy 145,000
- Marines 25,000

As reported to you this can be done without declaring an emergency of any kind whatever; there is authority for creating the resultant deficit. Just as soon as Nimitz and Holcomb are ready I shall ask your permission to go ahead with this item. We have urgent need of these men in the Fleet and for vessels to be commissioned. Also we
are very greatly in need of the personnel mentioned in the next item, but for these a national emergency declaration will in all probability be required.

The Judge Advocate General is trying to find a way for us to employ retired and reserve personnel without issuance of a national emergency proclamation. Late this afternoon the Judge Advocate General's office report they doubt if this can be done but they are making further study for some loophole or alternative. The number of people desired under this item is

1000 retired naval officers
150 retired warrant officers
3000 men from the Fleet Reserve
1500 additional naval aviation cadets at Pensacola

A declaration of the national emergency would cover a multitude of sins. Of course I fully realize that many considerations besides the Navy's needs must enter into this decision.

Woodson tells me national emergency declaration not required for transfer of floating dry dock from New Orleans. An Executive Order is being prepared for transmission to you via the Budget.

Have directed Towers to go ahead with an order for 300 patrol planes, flying boat type. While we will hope by special appropriation to get some extra money to cover this, Towers is prepared to carve this out of current appropriation by cuts elsewhere, if he has to.

Mr. Edison is directing the speeding up and the anticipation of dates as far as possible on all outstanding manufacturing orders.

Have stopped all transfers of ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific for the present. I will take up with you the possible exemption of new submarines from this order. We have 20 old sub-
marines available as follows:

6 Canal Zone
12 New London
1 Annapolis
1 Portsmouth

We will take steps looking toward getting all interesting, available information on unusual happenings in the Caribbean.

The two destroyers previously scheduled for Europe in October will leave the United States about 12 September. They will be equipped with new high power radio. Instead of relieving the two destroyers now in Europe they will simply augment that force, which on their arrival will consist of TRENTON and 4 DDs.

Instructions for the transfer of one patrol squadron of 12 planes (plus 3 spares on LANGLEY) to the Asiatic, plus the LANGLEY as Mother Ship, have been issued. LANGLEY has not catapult. 5 seaplanes will be on board. I believe it advisable to issue statement that these planes are being sent to the Philippines for neutrality duty.

Admiral Hart requested (by despatch) there be transferred to the Asiatic (in addition to the above squadron) a Division of four heavy cruisers or in lieu thereof a minimum of two additional MARBLEHEADS. I talked to Yarnell about this and he says that Hart among other things is probably worried about how to evacuate our 8,000 Nationals from China in case of emergency. Only our naval ships are available for this duty and they are inadequate to any emergency evacuation. I say no to the four CAs but am studying the 2 CL alternative.

Except as noted above am not generally undertaking items listed in the memorandum given you today involving $167,137,350.
However, realizing our present condition I believe the situation is such as to make it extremely desirable to obtain the men, the officers and the material requirements at the earliest practicable moment. As noted we can - if and when you direct - at least get up to the 145,000 enlisted men Navy, and 25,000 Marines, and that would be an enormous help.

Regarding the location of Bureau of Navigation Recruiting Stations that you mentioned, the Bureau has a complete approved plan for mobilization which includes recruiting and to which they would like to adhere. Callaghan has a copy of this.

Admiral Anderson will give you the information tomorrow morning regarding French and Dutch submarines.

---

Tuesday morning, 5 Sept.

Admiral Woodson just in and has handed me the enclosure for your consideration. If you approve this letter it will permit us to go ahead on personnel.

I expect the two destroyers for the Grand Banks Patrol to leave for their stations not later than early this afternoon.

Nimitz reports he will reach his 116,000 complement in November.

As regards expenditures not provided for in regular appropriation have authorized the immediate expenditures in connection with and in support of the earlier enlistment up to 116,000 men, Navy, 19,000 men, Marines; the getting ready for commissioning of priority one destroyers and initiate the change in priorities of destroyers in priorities two and three to priority one; the logistics for supporting neutrality patrol measures, including the placing in commission of at least one Tanker, probably the PATOKA; the making up of submarine nets ready for use.
At present we are, of course, using funds from current appropriation hoping later to get them from a special appropriation for deficiency.

[Signature]

N. R. Stark
Chief of Naval Operations
From: Tokyo (Abe)  
To: Washington.  
September 4, 1939.  

Also sent as Circular #2124 addressed to Wuhu, Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow, ________, Amoy, Nanking, Tsingtao, Hongkong.

I. Policy of the Japanese Government:

With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, our policy is to maintain essential neutrality.

II. The Measures of our Government:

Upon the receipt of an official communique that England and France have declared war on Germany the government will not immediately declare our neutrality, but will publish a statement to the following effect, VIZ:

"With the outbreak of this war, we do not intend to become involved therein, but will turn our whole endeavor toward the settlement of the China Incident."

III. Diplomatic Measures:

With the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, we will issue this statement to the representatives of the belligerent countries, and at the same time, inform them that we will protect the lives and property of nationals of belligerent countries within our sphere of influence. We will furthermore inform the nationals and authorities of the belligerent countries that we will suppress all attempts to help Chiang and all activities designed to embarrass us in the settlement of the incident.

IV. Scope of the activities of our various agencies in China:

(1) Our economic and consular agencies in China will adapt
themselves to the economic measures of the Japanese Government and warn
the economic and consular agencies of the belligerents, each and all,
either to evacuate their defense troops or to disarm them. The com-
manders of the forces of belligerent countries in China will inform
each of their subordinate officers of these measures and get them to
see that they are carried out. As to the time for this, they will be
given instructions by our government.

(2) We will permit no cruising of the vessels of the bel-
ligerents near any of the ports.

(3) We will send this proclamation to the United States and
also to Italy even though they do not join the war.

(4) We will have the new Chinese Government declare its
neutrality.

(5) In case this warning is not heeded, we will take steps
to disarm the garrisons of the belligerents.

I informed you all in separate message #2124 of the decision
reached today in a cabinet meeting concerning the attitude to be taken
by the Japanese Government upon the outbreak of hostilities in Europe,
and of our intention to restrain the troops of the belligerents in China.

The steps to be taken by our consuls in the various Chinese
centers are not to be taken until the government has completed its
measures, and then we will instruct you all as to the time, manner and
exact nature of your task.

This message and the separate message are addressed to Wuhu,
Tientsin, Tsingtao, Shanghai, Nanking, Hankow, Amoy, Canton and Hongkong.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Commanding Officer of the Fourth Regiment of U.S. Marines reports that Japan will soon act toward removal of English and French forces from Shanghai basing their action on an enforcement of neutrality period. They plan to seize French and British areas and specifically are planning to prevent extension of our sector.

Copy to State Dept.

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Date: 8-8-66
Signature: Carl L. Speck

1. Recent events have called particular attention to the fact that the President as Commander-in-Chief has no single organism which can serve as his agency in unifying and insuring completeness of plans for the national defense.

2. In England this function is performed by the Committee of Imperial Defense, of which the Prime Minister is President, and on which are representatives of government departments and major national interests. This Committee has an active Deputy Chairman, at present Lord Chatfield, a former First Sea Lord. More than any one else, Lord Hankey, its first secretary, assisted in the inception of this Committee some years ago. It provides a liaison between all government departments and interests and works toward a unity of conception in national defense plans. It provides numerous sub-committees for working out different phases of the national defense with appropriate preparation by each of these committees to insure that a truly national plan will result.

3. There is also an Imperial Defense College, attended by representatives of the Army, Navy, Royal Air Force, Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade and other departments and interests as necessary. They work out imperial defense problems.

4. By analogy, it is submitted that the United States should have a National Defense Committee and a National Defense College. Such a National Defense Committee would here, of course, include the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War and Navy, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, other executive department heads, principal assistants and other helpful personages as required. This National Defense Committee would probably never meet as a whole. Its work would be done by small sub-committees limited to personnel representing the departments and interests involved. This Committee would not in any way abridge the authority and responsibilities of any executive department. It is not intended that this National Defense Committee should cause the abolition of any agency now existing to promote collaboration in the national defense, such as the Joint Army and Navy Board, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the War Resources Board, et cetera. It is the intention that such a National Defense Committee with a carefully chosen secretary and staff, under a highly qualified and experienced deputy chairman, should study existing agencies and joint effort in the national defense, with a view to supplementing them where necessary, and also providing additional agencies, such as sub-committees, where there may be an existing deficiency in the joint plan and joint effort. Plans worked out and mutually agreed upon by sub-committees would largely concern the delimitation of respective zones of responsibility of definite departments with respect to matters in which more than one department is interested. The scheme visualizes mutual agreement worked out in the sub-committees subject to final approval by the head of each executive department concerned before receiving final approval and issue by the President.

5. The establishment of such a National Defense Committee and National Defense College should result in truly national defense plans and national defense directives covering not only the requirements for the armed services, but for all phases of the national life.
Letter to the President from Felix Frankfurter-dated Sept 13, 1939

In re-Neutrality Law—also encloses letter from Frank W. Buxton of the Boston Herald.
The President makes several comments on F.F's letter in longhand—he says, "In every case puts us on side of the offenders." etc etc

See: Neutrality folder-Drawer 2-1939
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With regard to sending a destroyer to Tampico to watch and report on the movements of converted merchantmen or other belligerent craft: This would certainly border on if not actually constitute an un-neutral act. I question its desirability, particularly at this time when it seems so necessary to avoid giving any possible ammunition to the opponents of your program regarding desirable modification of the so-called Neutrality Act. Accordingly, pending further instructions from you, I am doing nothing (occasionally a good thing to do).

Just now, the Germans are proclaiming their adherence to the laws and usages of international law on the high seas.

Admiral Johnson, who is running our neutrality patrol in the Atlantic, has orders to report what he sights in code. In turn we will immediately acquaint you with anything of interest. I do not believe that we as neutrals should pass this information on to the Public, at least unless and until conditions materially change from what they are at present.

[Signature]
adm. Stark
MEMORANDUM COVERING SUBSTANCE CONVERSATION WITH
REPRESENTATIVES OF STANDARD OIL, NEW JERSEY

21 of the tankers flying the flag of Panama, all diesel except one, have American crews. Every effort has been made to substitute foreign crews but so far they have only been successful in finding two crews, one Danish and one Norwegian, leaving the 21 vessels still with American crews. This is primarily because of the shortage of diesel engineers. If their European requirements are to be taken care of they feel it essential that these Panama vessels, notwithstanding their American crews, be permitted to move cargoes to English and French ports.

It is not planned to use any American tankers in the Trans-Atlantic-European service. However, British flag vessels formerly trading to Canada, as well as in the Far East, have been diverted to the Trans-Atlantic service. It is necessary that American vessels, to at least some extent, be substituted in these services, i.e. in trades from Aruba to Canada, as well as to other British Colonies such as Australia, India, and South Africa. If American vessels are barred from this service they do not know how these markets can be supplied. There is available a large surplus of American tankers but if these tankers cannot be utilized in the foregoing trades they will simply have to tie them up.

I believe, in any neutrality legislation to be passed, it should be left to the President to declare what zones are to be declared actual danger zones from which ships of American registry are to be excluded.

I also believe that stipulations regarding our Nationals entering danger zones should be left entirely in the hands of the President; for example, passengers are one thing but American seamen employed on foreign ships and accepting such employment at their own risk might be entirely another. But in any case these regulations should not be prescribed by law.

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 29, 1939.

COPY OF THE PRESIDENT'S LONGHAND MEMO

1. Congress authorizes 191,000.

2. Pres. under emergency powers increases Navy up to 191,000.

3. So far all legal. He can create for obvious reasons deficiency for food, clothing and pay.

4. Is it common sense to hold that the additional 70,000 men cannot be housed or given medical care (added dispensaries & bed), storage facilities for food, etc.?
1. Campus authorities say.
2. Pro worker many remain overseas insane factory up to 1914.
3. In fee all legal. No can be made for wrongs. Would deficiency for food clothing or pay
4. Do it. Common sense to know that the additional 70,000 men cannot be killed. Give medical care (added discomforts - bed,箱子, facilities for food - etc.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


Adm. Anderson:

"Referring to the submarine reported off the Maine Coast the 23th, the patrol was directed to investigate by surface ships and aircraft. Today report has been received that Coast Guard planes investigated the location and sighted nothing. Planes are continuing to investigate the area daily.

"The submarines reported off the Gulf of Panama and off the Gulf of Nicoya have been ordered investigated and no reports yet received.

"The instructions regarding reports desired of unneutral service by ships from ports in the Americas have been sent out by both Navy and State Deps."

[Signature]
29 September 1939

MEMORANDUM for Admiral Anderson.

The following message was telephoned from the Coast Guard at 1740 Thursday 28th.

A fishing trawler, the Richard S., sighted unidentified submarine at 1400 Wednesday 27th., bearing 135° T - 3 Mi. from Matinicuss Rock off the Coast of Maine.

The above information was communicated to the White House, General Watson, Maritime Commission, Admiral Stark and by despatch to Comatron.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Commander, U. S. Navy
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have just received the following from Commander Phillips, duty officer in Naval Operations, as coming from the duty officer in Headquarters, Coast Guard:

"Fishing trawler RICHARD S. sighted unidentified submarine 1400 Wednesday, 27th, bearing 135 true, 8 miles from Matinicus Rock off coast of Maine. Matinicus Rock is about 23 miles southeasterly from Rockland, Maine."