

●PSF

Navy Dept.

July - Oct. 1940

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 2, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Attached are the tables that Admiral Stark mentioned in his memorandum to the President, of last Saturday.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

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Navy*

[Faint handwritten notes on the reverse side of the page]

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1934 --- 1,262,068.
 '38 --- 1,577,480 - increase of 295,412 --- 355.
 1939-40 --- 1,724,480 - " " 167,000 --- 115 = 3 CVs + 4 CA + 2 CL + 14 SS.
 1940-40 --- 3,049,480 - " " 1,325,000 --- 706 +

Confidential

Office of Naval Intelligence
 June 20, 1940

MAJOR NAVAL POWERS OF THE WORLD
 NAVAL VESSELS ACTUALLY IN EXISTENCE (UNDERAGE AND OVERAGE)
 COMBATANT VESSELS BUILT (UNDERAGE AND OVERAGE), BUILDING AND APPROPRIATED FOR.

TYPE	1 BRITISH EMPIRE		2 FRANCE		3	4 United States			5 United States					6 8 + 9		7 ITALY		8 GERMANY		9 RUSSIA # (data not reliable)				
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage		No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.	No.		No.	
																								1934
BATTLESHIPS	14	444,550	8	198,945	10				15	464,300					11	271,408	6	164,408	5	107,000	3	69,878	BB	
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS**	23	779,550	11	303,945	18	10			25	854,300		2	1	3	16*	456,488	8	234,488	8*	222,000	6	174,878	CV	
HEAVY CRUISERS	12	244,850	3	58,146	10	6			11	260,600			1	0	2	38,500			2	38,500	3	33,000	CA	
LIGHT CRUISERS	47	300,795	11	79,729	22				22	223,200				2	11	110,000	7	70,000	2	20,000	3	24,030	CL	
NEW DESTROYERS*** & TORPEDO BOATS	70	459,295	14	103,729	30	22			36	311,775			4	5	38†	206,662	28	137,262	10†	69,400	5	28,994	DD	
OLD DESTROYERS	106	157,498*	64	110,429	76				74	115,150					135	166,114	94	106,971	41	59,143	38	67,401	DD	
NEW SUBMARINES	134(+)	208,353	95	158,248	100	78			135	226,730		12	12	16	168(est)	172,837	106	122,171	62(est)	50,666	38	67,401	SS	
OLD SUBMARINES	71	79,570	1	915	43	43			123	139,060					32	23,056	32	23,056	0		15	17,206	SS	
SUB TOTALS	410	1,995,823	232	792,073	292	235			494	2,176,775		15	24	35	43	520	1,181,233	264	531,168	132	251,543	268	330,911	
RATIO		5.16		2.16						5.00						3.04		2.07		0.98		1.31		
		4.58		1.82						3.19						2.71		1.60		1.11		1.16		

ADDITIONAL COMBATANT VESSELS PROJECTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PRESENT U. S. LAW, AND AVAILABLE FOREIGN INFORMATION

TYPE	No.	Tonnage	Notes	No.	Tonnage	Notes	No.	Tonnage	Notes	No.	Tonnage	Notes	No.	Tonnage	Notes	No.	Tonnage	Notes	No.	Tonnage	Notes	No.	Tonnage	Notes
BATTLESHIPS	-	-					7	385,000	USS-11000 Phased house.															
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	-	-	Projected building program reported as totalling 200,000 tons - no details available			No data Table above includes total projects believed to be included under 4th program. All of these are appropriated for although some units may not be laid down until 1942.	7	200,000																
HEAVY CRUISERS	?	?					10	220,000																
LIGHT CRUISERS	?	?					19	200,000																
DESTROYERS	8(?)	?					115	250,000																
SUBMARINES	?	?					43	70,000																
SUB TOTALS							201	1,325,000																
TOTALS							695	3,501,755																

* Includes 2 pocket BB of 20,000 tons total. Does not include 2 OBS of 26,000 tons total. *Includes 2 Polish DDs. Information on new construction incomplete.
 † 1 CL believed sunk is deleted. Information concerning Russia cannot be considered reliable.
 ** CV's - category b - (with no flight decks) not included.
 ‡ Does not include 46 Ex-DD's converted to or being converted to 8 DMs, 16 AM's (Fast), 14 AVP's, 6 troop transports, and 2 anti-aircraft vessels.
 *** British Empire includes 2 Polish DD.
 †† Does not include 5 OCA of 45,250 tons.

‡ 4 Atlantes 6,000 tons - 5"
 - 4 Cleveland 10,000 tons - 6"
 ‡ Modified Wichita - 8"
 ‡ Lexington-Saratoga
 ‡ Yorktown-Enterprise
 ‡ Wasp

GENERAL NOTES: No data available as to projected foreign construction, except as noted.

Data as to ships under construction by foreign powers is probably incomplete, but based on best information available. Japanese new construction is estimated, but believed to be reasonably correct.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

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UNITED STATES COMBATANT TYPES (As of 30 June 1940)

Date- 12-2-69

30 June 1940

TYPE	Signature- <i>DD-ge</i> (1)		(2)		(3) = (1) + (2)		(4)		(5) = (3) + (4)		(6)		
	Present Built		Present Building or Appropriated For		Total Built and Building		Additional which Could be Laid Down in Fiscal 1941 Under Present Laws		Total Possible Overage and Underage Under Present Laws		H.R. 10,100 Recommended Tonnage Allocation of		
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	
BATTLESHIPS	15	464,300	10	390,000	25	854,300	-	42,500	25	896,800	7	385,000	BB
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	6	134,800	5	125,800	11	260,600	-	-	11	260,600	7	200,000	CV
HEAVY CRUISERS	18	171,200	4	52,000	22	223,200	-	(1,399	22	223,200	10	220,000	CA
LIGHT CRUISERS	19	157,775	17	154,000	36	311,775	-	(36	313,174	19	200,000	CL
NEW DESTROYERS	74	115,150	61	111,580	135	226,730	-	1,290	135	228,020	115	250,000	DD
OLD DESTROYERS	#123	139,060	-	-	123	139,060	-	-	123	139,060	-	-	DD
NEW SUBMARINES	33	49,845	41	60,525	74	110,370	-	756	74	111,126	43	70,000	SS
OLD SUBMARINES	68	50,740	-	-	68	50,740	-	-	68	50,740	-	-	SS
Totals	356	1,282,870	138	893,905	494	2,176,775	-	45,945	494	2,222,720	201	1,325,000	

TYPE	(7) = (4) + (6)		(8) = (5) + (6)		(9)		(10) = (5) - (9)		(11) = (6) + (10)		
	Total Overall Tonnage Available for Construction in Fiscal 1941 Including H.R. 10,100		Grand Total Underage and Overage, Including Built and Building, Available in Fiscal 1941 (Col. 4), and Including H.R. 10,100		Overage and/or Replaceable During The Fiscal Year 1941		Underage Possible Under Present Laws (Allowed by Acts of 1934, 1938 & 1940)		Underage = (8) - (9) Possible If H.R. 10,100 Is Enacted		
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage	
BATTLESHIPS	7	427,500	32	1,281,800	7	236,800	18	660,000	25	1,045,000	BB
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	7	200,000	18	460,600	-	-	11	260,600	18	460,600	CV
HEAVY CRUISERS	10	220,000	32	443,200	-	-	22	223,200	32	443,200	CA
LIGHT CRUISERS	19	201,399	55	513,174	9	63,450	27	249,724	46	449,724	CL
NEW DESTROYERS	115	251,290	250	478,020	-	-	135	228,020	250	478,020	DD
OLD DESTROYERS	-	-	123	139,060	123	139,060	-	-	-	-	DD
NEW SUBMARINES	43	70,756	117	181,126	3	8,170	71	102,956	114	172,956	SS
OLD SUBMARINES	-	-	68	50,740	68	50,740	-	-	-	-	SS
TOTALS	201	1,370,945	695	3,547,720	210	498,220	284	1,724,500	485	3,049,500	

NOTES

Does NOT include 46 Ex-DD's converted to or being converted to 8 DM's, 16 AM's (Past), 14 AVP's, 6 troop transports, and 2 anti-aircraft vessels.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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July 9, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I am attaching hereto a copy of letter received by Admiral Stark from Rear Admiral Pickens which may be of interest to the President.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

COPY
U.S.S. WICHITA, Flagship
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
26 June 1940.

Dear Betty,

The visit here at Rio has gone extremely well as was to be expected. President Vargas received me on the day of my arrival. Naturally, I called in blue, full dress, thereby causing my Brazilian Aide to don his blue dress for the first time in three years.

I was very favorably impressed with President Vargas. He is a great admirer of President Roosevelt. He has the situation well under control here, but all of them are a little jittery and are glad to see us.

I will gather in the QUINCY at Montevideo and thereafter make my visits in company, which will have a better effect and be easier on our hosts.

I don't know what has gone sour with the visit to Buenos Aires which Sumner Welles was anxious for me to make. I am afraid they were approached from the wrong side. Spears' trip might have had something to do with it, as he was advertised by Berlin Radio two days after he left Miami. It is too bad, as I think it was important that we should go there. The place to cultivate friendly relations is where they are not already all that you would like to have them. It is too bad that Argentine is singing, "Who's afraid of the Big Bad Wolf".

On my way down, I was inclined to believe the establishment of a South American Squadron was in order, but in view of Argentine's attitude and after consulting with Ambassador Caffery I am convinced that any such move would require a very leisurely and diplomatic approach.

I refrain from writing about Uruguay until I get there. The Brazilians were alarmed to the extent of giving Uruguay 5000 rifles (since increased to 20,000) and ammunition.

I have lost no opportunity to add to the friendly feeling which exists here. Last year Kimmel did not find it possible to accept their invitation to inspect their dock yard personally. It therefore turned out to be a happy decision when I elected to inspect in person. They have a fine plant and I was able to enthuse over it - so much so that it was written up in the afternoon papers. I hear from our Naval Attache that the Brazilians have decided that I am "Sympatico", so I can feel that my job here has been well done.

The Ambassador has been most helpful and our Mission here is doing an excellent job.

With best wishes to you and Kit.

Yours,

/s/ Pick
A.C.Pickens

Admiral H.R.Stark, USN,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

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In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

15 July 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached is a fine letter from your old friend and
shipmate, Admiral Pratt, for which I hope you can find a
minute to read.

Betty

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-27-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

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[Box 59]

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Newsweek--July 9-- Dear Stark

Here is a thought for you to mull over. It is rather novel for us, but it is what the Axis Group has been doing in the way of propaganda, and pretty successfully at that. But you would have to talk it over with your Chief, and particularly with Col. Stimson, now Secty. of War, with whom I was in close touch when he was Secty of State.

You will have noticed that in the past I have laid off everything which might be in the least embarrassing to the Dept.,- Have always consulted you first, and always respected your confidences, which I shall always do. But here is the idea. The Axis Powers are undoubtedly putting pressure on the advantages of our Fleet going to the Philippines--that is you outline what you would like to have me write--and I write it- Then if the repercussion is not good--you cuss the hell out of me--say that as a retired officer I have no voice and have no right to discuss such matters--The Dept. will look into it, etc.etc. I am willing to be the goat if any good will come out of it--Tear this letter up, but keep it under your hat--you might see a play coming up in which I could be used--If you should, talk it over with Ingersoll (but dont let another soul in), and then give me the broad outline of exactly what I might write about--After that I am the goat--and the Department disclaims me--as C-N-O on the active list, you are not only busier than a little bird dog, but much restricted in what you can say--So is the CinC (The President)--Think it over--Anything you write to me I shall quickly destroy and tell no one, simply keeping it in my mind--Sitting as I do in the Foreign Dept. of this publication, while I am not conversant with official matters, except as they come out in the press, I do have access to a good deal of under cover stuff, especially in the matter of trends, and I can say this, that Hitlers motives now, are mainly political and economic--he uses his Army--air force and especially propaganda as weapons--I hardly think he dares to invade England now (but being a strange man to deal with, no prophecy can be sure), but Ireland is another matter.--If you dont like the idea I have suggested, forget it and so will I--My sole idea was to help.

Sincerely,

/s/ Pratt.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 2-27-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

THE WHITE HOUSE
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
July 16, 1940.

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum showing the disposition of the French Fleet as of 11 July, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.


Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- 

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

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DDO DIV. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Date-

4-7-70 J12

Op-16-F

Disposition of French Fleet

Signature-

11 July 1940

	Total French Fleet (as of 1 July)	Under French Control	Under British Control	Sunk or Out of Action	No Definite Informa- tion
Battleship (BB)	4	1		3	
Old Battleship (OBB)	7	2	3	2	
Aircraft Carrier (CV)	1	1			
Seaplane Tender (CVS)	1			1	
Heavy Cruiser (CA)	7	4	3		
Light Cruiser (CL)	11	8	2	1	
Destroyer Leader (DL)	28	24	3	1	
Destroyer (DD)	37	24	11		2
Submarine (SS)	76	69*	9*		

Note: *The 78 submarines reported exceeds the known total (76) as of 1 July 1940 - two additional submarines may have been completed.

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70 JYH

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Op-16-F

Disposition of the French Fleet 11 July 1940

Signature

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BB	OBB	CV CVS	CA	CL	DL	DD	SS
----	-----	-----------	----	----	----	----	----

French Control:

Western Mediterranean	1 ⁽¹⁾	2 ⁽²⁾	4 ⁽³⁾	5	22	15	44
West Africa, Morocco				1	2	9	17
Martinique		1 ⁽⁴⁾		2 ⁽⁵⁾			
At Sea							8

British Control:

British Isles and Alexandria (A)		3 ⁽⁶⁾	3 ⁽⁷⁾	1 ⁽⁸⁾	3	11	9 ⁽⁹⁾
Singapore				1 ⁽¹⁰⁾			

Sunk or Out of Action:	3 ⁽¹¹⁾	2 ⁽¹²⁾	1 ⁽¹³⁾	1 ⁽¹⁴⁾	1 ⁽¹⁵⁾		
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No Definite Information:						2	
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Totals	4	7	2	7	11	28	78 ⁽¹⁶⁾
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Total French Fleet (as of 1 July)	4	7	2	7	11	28	76
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Basic Sources of Information: Naval Attache, London, Dispatch of 10 July 1940.

State, Cairo, Dispatch of 8 July 1940.

-1-

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Notes:

- (1) STRASBOURG (Reported torpedoed off Oran but ^{Survived.} escaped.)
- (2) CONDORCET and L'OCEAN (Demilitarized Training Ships.)
- (3) ALGERIE, DUPLEIX, FOCH and COLBERT.
- (4) BEARN
- (5) JEAN D'ARC and EMILE BERTIN.
- (6) COURBET (Portsmouth), PARIS (Plymouth), LORRAINE (Alexandria).
- (7) DUQUESNE, TOURVILLE, SUFFREN (Alexandria).
- (8) DUGUAY-TROUIN (Alexandria).
- (9) One of these is the SURCOUF (SF).
- (10) LAMOTTE-PICQUET
- (11a) DUNKERQUE (Beached at Oran following attacks of 3 and 6 July).
- (11b) JEAN BART (At Casablanca - 77% complete)
- (11c) RICHELIEU (At Dakar - 98% complete - Reported down by the stern and listing heavily to port following attack of 8 July.)
- (12) PROVENCE (Oran - set afire on 3 July); BRETAGNE (Oran - blown up on 3 July.)
- (13) COMMANDANT TESTE (Oran - Sunk or set afire on 3 July.)
- (14) One of the GALISSONNIERE class (Reported torpedoed off Algiers on 5 July)
- (15) MOGADOR (Oran - Reported set afire on 3 July.)
- (16) Exceeds the known total as of 1 July 1940 - two additional submarines may have been completed.
- (A) All immobilized.

/s/ W. S. Anderson

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
July 16, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached Bureau of Ships report of progress, as of July 1, 1940, on naval vessels under construction is forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

88

JULY 10, 1940

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF JULY 1, 1940

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion			
		July 1 1940	Gain for Month of June 1940	Keel Laid	TOTAL	Date of Contract	Mos. to	As per contract or Bld. Order	As reported by building yard
: BATTLESHIPS									
BB55: NORTH CAROLINA	: Now York	: 74.1	: 3.2	: 10/27/37:	: 6/13/40:	: 8/ 1/37:	: 49	: 9/ 1/41	: 10/15/41
BB56: WASHINGTON	: Philadelphia	: 69.4	: 1.7	: 6/14/38:	: 6/ 1/40:	: 8/ 1/37:	: 52	: 12/ 1/41	: 12/ 1/41
BB57: SOUTH DAKOTA	: N.Y.S.B. Corp.	: 22.6	: 2.7	: 7/ 5/39:	: -	: 12/15/38:	: 52	: 4/15/43	: 12/15/42
BB58: INDIANA	: NNSB&DD Co.	: 18.2	: 3.0	: 11/20/39:	: -	: 12/15/38:	: 52	: 4/15/43	: 4/15/43
BB59: MASSACHUSETTS	: B.S.Co. (Quincy)	: 20.8	: 2.7	: 7/20/39:	: -	: 12/15/38:	: 55	: 7/15/43	: 7/15/43
BB60: ALABAMA	: Norfolk	: 13.2	: 1.9	: 2/ 1/40:	: -	: 4/ 1/39:	: 52	: 8/ 1/43	: 8/ 1/43
BB61: IOWA	: New York	: 2.0	: 0.9	: 6/27/40:	: -	: 7/ 1/39:	: 49	: 8/ 1/43	: 3/ 1/44(a):
BB62: NEW JERSEY	: Philadelphia	: -	: -	: -	: -	: 7/ 1/39:	: 52	: 11/ 1/43	: 6/ 1/44(a):
BB63: MISSOURI	: New York	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 6/12/40:	: 48	: 6/12/44	: :
BB64: WISCONSIN	: Philadelphia	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 6/12/40:	: 48	: 6/12/44	: :
: AIRCRAFT CARRIERS									
CV8: HORNET	: NNSB&DD Co.	: 35.5	: 4.4	: 9/25/39:	: -	: 4/10/39:	: 34	: 2/10/42	: 2/10/42
CV9: ESSEX	: NNSB&DD Co.	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 7/ 3/40:	: 42	: 4/ 1/44(b):	: :
CV10:	: NNSB&DD Co.	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 7/ 3/40:	: 47	: 9/ 1/44(b):	: :
CV11:	: NNSB&DD Co.	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 7/ 3/40:	: 52	: 2/ 1/45(b):	: :
CV12:	: Norfolk	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 6/21/40:	: 45	: 6/ 1/44(b):	: :
: HEAVY CRUISERS									
CA68:	: B.S.Co. (Quincy)	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 7/ 1/40:	: 33	: 7/ 1/43(b):	: :
CA69:	: B.S.Co. (Quincy)	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 7/ 1/40:	: 35	: 9/ 1/43(b):	: :
CA70:	: B.S.Co. (Quincy)	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 7/ 1/40:	: 39	: 1/ 1/44(b):	: :
CA71:	: B.S.Co. (Quincy)	: :	: :	: :	: :	: 7/ 1/40:	: 43	: 5/ 1/44(b):	: :

(a) An extension in the building period of at least 6 months will be required on each vessel, the exact amount not now determinable.

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2/13/59

Signature- Carl S. Spear

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Pres

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Date of Completion:		
		July 1 1940	Gain for Month of June 1940	Keel Laid	Date of Contract	Mos. to	Contract or
		TOTAL	TOTAL		Launched	or Order	Bld. Order
<u>SUBMARINES</u>							
SS199:TAUTOG	:Elec. Boat Co. :	Delivered and Commissioned 3 July 1940					
SS200:THRESHER	:Elec. Boat Co. :	97.2	1.4	4/27/39	3/27/40	8/ 2/38	33 : 5/ 2/41: 9/ 9/40
SS201:TRITON	:Portsmouth :	83.0	10.4	7/ 5/39	3/25/40	9/ 1/38	30 : 3/ 1/41:11/ 1/40
SS202:TROUT	:Portsmouth :	72.7	7.6	8/28/39	5/21/40	9/ 1/38	32 : 5/ 1/41: 1/ 1/41
SS203:TUNA	:Mare Island :	62.8	4.5	7/19/39	-	11/ 1/38	30 : 5/ 1/41: 3/ 1/41
SS204:MACKEREL	:Elec. Boat Co. :	64.7	8.2	10/ 6/39	-	6/15/39	23 : 5/15/41: 3/31/41
SS205:MARLIN	:Portsmouth :	13.4	4.4	5/28/40	-	7/ 1/39	27 :10/ 1/41:10/ 1/41
SS206:GAR	:Elec. Boat Co. :	48.6	8.0	12/27/39	-	6/15/39	25 : 7/15/41: 6/15/41
SS207:GRAMPUS	:Elec. Boat Co. :	43.1	6.9	2/14/40	-	6/15/39	27 : 9/15/41: 8/15/41
SS208:GRAYBACK	:Elec. Boat Co. :	39.3	6.0	4/ 3/40	-	6/15/39	29 :11/15/41:10/15/41
SS209:GRAYLING	:Portsmouth :	39.0	12.6	12/15/39	-	7/ 1/39	25 : 8/ 1/41: 5/ 1/41
SS210:GRENADIER	:Portsmouth :	29.0	9.6	4/ 2/40	-	7/ 1/39	29 :12/ 1/41: 8/ 1/41
SS211:GUDGEON	:Mare Island :	39.0	5.5	11/22/39	-	7/ 1/39	27 :10/ 1/41:10/ 1/41
SS212:GATO	:Elec. Boat Co. :					6/12/40	20 : 2/12/42
SS213:GREENLING	:Elec. Boat Co. :					6/12/40	21½: 3/27/42
SS214:GROUPE	:Elec. Boat Co. :					6/12/40	23 : 5/12/42
SS215:GROWLER	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	24½: 7/16/42
SS216:GRUNION	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	26 : 9/ 1/42
SS217:GUARDFISH	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	27½:10/16/42
SS218:	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	29 :12/ 1/42
SS219:	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	30½: 1/16/43
SS220:	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	32 : 3/ 1/43
SS221:	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	33½: 4/16/43
SS222:	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	35 : 6/ 1/43
SS223:	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	36½: 7/16/43
SS224:	:Elec. Boat Co. :					7/ 1/40	38 : 9/ 1/43

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel Laid	Date of Contract	Date of Contract	Date of Contract	Date of Contract	Date of Completion:
		July 1 1940	Month of June 1940	TOTAL						
<u>SUBMARINES (CONT'D)</u>										
SS225:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	39 $\frac{1}{2}$:	10/16/43:	:
SS226:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	41 :	12/ 1/43:	:
SS227:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	42 $\frac{1}{2}$:	1/16/44:	:
SS228:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/12/40:	21 :	3/12/42:	:
SS229:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/12/40:	23 $\frac{1}{2}$:	5/27/42:	:
SS230:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/12/40:	27 :	9/12/42:	:
SS231:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	28 $\frac{1}{2}$:	11/12/42:	:
SS232:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	31 :	1/28/43:	:
SS233:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	33 $\frac{1}{2}$:	4/12/43:	:
SS234:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	36 :	6/28/43:	:
SS235:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	38 $\frac{1}{2}$:	9/12/43:	:
SS236:	:Mare Island :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	23 :	5/28/42:	:
SS237:	:Mare Island :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	26 :	8/28/42:	:
SS238:	:Mare Island :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	33 :	3/28/43:	:
SS239:	:Mare Island :	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	36 :	6/28/43:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:			
		July 1 1940	Month of June 1940	Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Contract	Mos. to	Order Bld.	Order Yard
<u>:DESTROYERS</u>									
DD420:BUCK*	Philadelphia	Completed 25 June 1940							
DD421:HENSON	B.S.Co.(Quincy)	95.5	2.4	5/16/38	11/15/39	9/30/37	32	5/30/40	7/25/40
DD422:MAYO	B.S.Co.(Quincy)	84.4	3.4	5/16/38	3/26/40	9/30/37	34	7/30/40	9/25/40
DD423:GLEAVES	Bath Iron Wks.	Delivered and Commissioned 14 June 1940							
DD424:NIBLACK	Bath Iron Wks.	93.9	5.6	8/8/38	5/18/40	9/30/37	36	10/3/40	8/7/40
DD425:MADISON	Boston	84.2	8.1	12/19/38	10/20/39	12/30/37	34	10/30/40	9/1/40
DD426:LANSDALE	Boston	80.7	6.6	12/19/38	10/20/39	12/30/37	36	12/30/40	11/1/40
DD427:HILARY P. JONES	Charleston	76.3	2.6	11/16/38	12/14/39	12/30/37	34	10/30/40	10/30/40
DD428:CHAS. F. HUGHES	Puget Sound	83.3	6.0	1/3/39	5/16/40	12/30/37	34	10/30/40	10/18/40
DD429:LIVERMORE	Bath Iron Wks.	77.9	4.6	3/6/39	-	8/15/38	28	12/15/40	10/30/40
DD430:EBERLE	Bath Iron Wks.	72.4	3.0	4/12/39	-	8/15/38	30	2/15/41	12/17/40
DD431:PLUNKETT	Fed.SB&DD Co.	97.7	3.8	3/1/39	3/9/40	8/17/38	30	2/17/41	7/12/40
DD432:KEARNY	Fed.SB&DD Co.	91.2	4.5	3/1/39	3/9/40	8/17/38	32	4/17/41	9/12/40
DD433:GWIN	Boston	47.5	3.4	5/1/39	5/25/40	10/1/38	29	3/1/41	3/1/41
DD434:MEREDITH	Boston	45.8	2.9	6/1/39	4/24/40	10/1/38	31	5/1/41	5/1/41
DD435:GRAYSON	Charleston	46.8	7.7	7/17/39	-	10/1/38	30	4/1/41	4/1/41
DD436:MONSSEN	Puget Sound	50.0	5.3	7/12/39	5/16/40	10/1/38	29	3/1/41	3/1/41
DD437:WOOLSEY	Bath Iron Wks.	50.6	3.6	10/9/39	-	6/15/39	24	6/15/41	5/15/41
DD438:LUDLOW	Bath Iron Wks.	44.9	3.8	12/18/39	-	6/15/39	26	8/15/41	7/15/41
DD439:EDISON	Fed.SB&DD Co.	46.6	6.8	3/18/40	-	6/15/39	24	6/15/41	4/15/41
DD440:ERICSSON	Fed.SB&DD Co.	40.7	7.7	3/18/40	-	6/15/39	26	8/15/41	6/14/41
DD441:WILKES	Boston	29.4	4.5	11/1/39	5/31/40	7/1/39	24	7/1/41	7/1/41

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:			
		July 1 1940	Gain for Month of June 1940	Keel Laid	Launched: or Order:	Contract to Bld.	Contract or Order	As per reported by building yard	
<u>:DESTROYERS (CONT'D)</u>									
DD442:NICHOLSON	:Boston	: 27.4	: 3.5	: 11/ 1/39:	5/31/40:	7/ 1/39:	26 : 9/ 1/41	: 9/ 1/41:	
DD443:SWANSON	:Charleston	: 23.5	: 5.8	: 11/15/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	26 : 9/ 1/41	: 9/ 1/41:	
DD444:INGRAHAM	:Charleston	: 17.8	: 3.6	: 11/15/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	28 : 11/ 1/41	: 11/ 1/41:	
DD445:FLETCHER	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	28 : 11/ 1/42(b):		
DD446:RADFORD	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	30 : 1/ 1/43(b):		
DD447:JENKINS	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	31 : 2/ 1/43(b):		
DD448:LA VALLETTE	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	33 : 4/ 1/43(b):		
DD449:NICHOLAS	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 7/ 1/40:	28 : 11/ 1/42(b):		
DD450:O'BANNON	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 7/ 1/40:	29 $\frac{1}{2}$: 12/16/42(b):		
DD451:PRINGLE	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 7/ 1/40:	30 $\frac{1}{2}$: 1/16/43(b):		
DD452:PERCIVAL	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	39 : 10/ 1/43		
DD453:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 6/12/40:	18 : 12/12/41		
DD454:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 6/12/40:	20 : 2/12/42		
DD455:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	22 : 5/ 1/42		
DD456:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	24 : 7/ 1/42		
DD457:	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 6/12/40:	18 : 12/12/41		
DD458:	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 6/12/40:	20 : 2/12/42		
DD459:	:Beth. S. B. Co. (S.E.):					: 7/ 1/40:	20 : 3/ 1/42		
DD450:	:Beth. S. F. Co. (S.F.):					: 7/ 1/40:	21 : 4/ 1/42		
DD461:	:Boston					: 6/12/40:	20 : 2/12/42		
DD462:	:Boston					: 6/12/40:	22 : 4/12/42		
DD463:	:Charleston	: 0.5	: 0.5			: 6/12/40:	20 : 2/12/42		
DD464:	:Charleston	: 0.5	: 0.5			: 6/12/40:	22 : 4/12/42		
DD465:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	34 : 5/ 1/43(b):		
DD466:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.					: 7/ 1/40:	35 : 6/ 1/43(b):		
DD467:	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 7/ 1/40:	31 $\frac{1}{2}$: 2/16/43(b):		
DD468:	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 7/ 1/40:	33 : 4/ 1/43(b):		
DD469:	:Bath Iron Wks.					: 7/ 1/40:	35 : 6/ 1/43(b):		

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Koel	Laid	Launched	or Order	Eld.	Order	Date of Completion	
		July 1 1940	Month of June 1940	TOTAL							TOTAL	Mo.
:DESTROYERS (CONT'D):												
DD470:	:Beth.S.B.Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40: 30 : 1/ 1/43(b):
DD471:	:Beth.S.F.Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40: 32 : 3/ 1/43(b):
DD472:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 32 : 3/ 1/43(b):
DD473:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 34 : 5/ 1/43(b):
DD474:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 36 : 7/ 1/43(b):
DD475:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 38 : 9/ 1/43(b):
DD476:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 30 : 1/ 1/43(b):
DD477:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 30 : 1/ 1/43(b):
DD478:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 32 : 3/ 1/43(b):
DD479:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 34 : 5/ 1/43(b):
DD480:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 31 : 2/ 1/43(b):
DD481:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40: 33 : 4/ 1/43(b):
DD482:	:Fed.S.E.&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40: 40 : 11/ 1/43(b):

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

July 10, 1940

Sheet 8

8e

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:			
		July 1 1940	Gain for Month of June 1940	Keel Laid	Launched	Order Pld.	Order yard	As reported	As Contract building
TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL
DESTROYER TENDERS:									
AD15 : PRAIRIE	: N.Y.S.E.Corp.	: 90.4	: 7.1	: 12/7/38	: 12/9/39	: 10/14/38	: 24	: 10/14/40	: 3/30/40
MINESWEEPERS									
AM55 : RAVEN	: Norfolk	: 59.4	: 7.4	: 6/28/39	-	: 9/1/38	: 24	: 9/1/40	: 12/13/40
AM56 : OSPREY	: Norfolk	: 59.3	: 7.6	: 6/28/39	-	: 9/1/38	: 26	: 11/1/40	: 1/15/41
AM57 : AUK	: Norfolk	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 15	: 9/12/41	:
REPAIR SHIP									
AR5 : VULCAN	: N.Y.S.D.Corp.	: 20.3	: 2.8	: 12/26/39	-	: 8/1/39	: 32	: 4/1/42	: 2/1/42
SUBMARINE TENDER									
AS11 : FULTON	: Mare Island	: 42.3	: 3.1	: 7/19/39	-	: 9/1/38	: 36	: 9/1/41	: 12/31/41
AS12 : SPERRY	: Mare Island	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 30	: 12/12/42	:
SEAPLANE TENDERS									
AV4 : CURTISS	: N.Y.S.E.Corp.	: 72.5	: 4.0	: 4/25/38	: 4/20/40	: 12/27/37	: 38	: 2/27/41	: 12/4/40
AV5 : ALBEMARLE	: N.Y.S.E.Corp.	: 53.7	: 5.9	: 6/12/39	-	: 10/14/38	: 32	: 6/14/41	: 4/4/41
AV7 : CURRITUCK	: N.Y.S.D.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 7/1/40	: 43	: 7/1/44	:
AV8 : TANGIER	: Moore D.D.Co.	Acquired from Maritime Commission and Commissioned in Ordinary 8 July 1940							
SEAPLANE TENDERS									
AVP10 : BARNEGAT	: Puget Sound	: 31.8	: 3.5	: 10/27/39	-	: 9/1/38	: 27	: 12/1/40	: 3/1/41
AVP11 : BISCAYNE	: Puget Sound	: 32.6	: 4.3	: 10/27/39	-	: 9/1/38	: 30	: 3/1/41	: 5/1/41
AVP12 : CASCO	: Puget Sound	: 14.5	: 2.6	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/1/39	: 24	: 7/1/41	: 7/1/41
AVP13 : MACKINAC	: Puget Sound	: 13.9	: 2.0	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/1/39	: 27	: 10/1/41	: 10/1/41
AVP21 : HUMBOLDT	: Boston	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 16	: 10/12/41	:
AVP22 : MATAGOEDA	: Boston	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 18	: 12/12/41	:
MINELAYER									
CM5 : TERROR	: Philadelphia	-	-	-	-	: 9/1/39	: 36	: 9/1/42	: 1/1/43

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion			
		July 1	Gain for	Month of	Keel	Date of	Contract	As per	As
		1940	June 1940	Launched	Contract	Contract	Contract	Contract	
SUBMARINE CHASERS		TOTAL	TOTAL	Launched	Contract	Contract	Contract	Contract	
PC449:	:Duders Mar. C. Co.	: 98.0	: 2.0	: 7/10/39	: 5/14/40	: 7/ 1/39	: 300	: 4/26/40	: 7/20/40(a)
PC451:	:DoFoo B&M Wks.	: 93.0	: 13.0	: 9/25/39	: 5/23/40	: 6/15/39	: 360	: 6/10/40	: 8/10/40(a)
PC452:	:DoFoo B&M Wks.	: 43.0	: 10.0	: 3/14/40	-	: 10/19/39	: 360	: 10/13/40	: 10/13/40
PTC1:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
to 12:	:E. B. Co. Elco Wks.	: 36.0*	: 15.0	-	-	: 12/13/39	: 300	: 7/10/40(c)	: 8/15/40(c)
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS									
PT1:	:Miami S. B. Corp.	: 86.5	: 0.5	: 7/12/39	: 8/16/39	: 6/ 8/39	: 165	: 11/20/39	: 8/15/40(a)
PT2:	:Miami S. B. Corp.	: 86.5	: 0.5	: 8/19/39	: 9/30/39	: 6/ 8/39	: 165	: 11/20/39	: 8/15/40(a)
PT3:	:Fisher Boat Wks.			Delivered 26 June 1940					
PT4:	:Fisher Boat Wks.			Delivered 26 June 1940					
PT5:	:Higgins Ind. Inc.	: 92.5	: 4.0	: 8/ 1/39	-	: 6/10/39	: 175	: 12/ 2/39	: 8/ 1/40(a)
PT6:	:Higgins Ind. Inc.	: 60.0	: 20.0	: 5/15/40	-	: 6/10/39	-	: 8/26/40	: 8/28/40(a)
PT7:	:Philadelphia	: 35.4	: 2.2	: 8/29/39	-	-	-	-	: 10/ 1/40
PT8:	:Philadelphia	: 80.1	: 4.7	: 12/29/39	-	-	-	-	: 7/ 1/40
PT9:	:E. B. Co. Elco Wks.			Delivered 17 June 1940					
PT10:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
to 20:	:E. B. Co. Elco Wks.	: 15.7*	: 6.0	-	-	: 12/13/39	: 390	: 10/ 8/40(c)	: 10/22/40(c)

(a) These vessels delayed due to late engine deliveries.

(c) First vessel only, balance scheduled for delivery at uniform intervals thereafter.

(d) Delivery date delayed due to construction of replacement boat.

* Estimated completion for class.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 16, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

A somewhat long, but most interesting
document prepared by O.N.I.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

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Date-

Signature-

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-F-2

Date-

Signature-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 July 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese Policy of Empire Expansion.

1. Highly reliable information has been received that the Japanese Minister to Budapest, Hungary has made the following recommendations to his government concerning Japanese foreign policy. These recommendations were forwarded during the first week of July.

The Japanese Minister at Budapest acknowledges receipt of the statement by the Japanese Foreign Minister concerning the necessity for southward expansion of the Japanese Empire. In regard to this statement of policy the Japanese Minister at Budapest offers these following suggestions: I heartily approve of the program outlined by you (Japanese Foreign Minister) and venture to express my fervent hope that at the time of concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union you (the Japanese Foreign Minister) will also consider the problem of selecting an opportune time for entering the war on the side of Germany and Italy, thereby bringing about a speedy termination of the China incident and clearing up the various problems of the Southwestern Pacific. My reasons for urging action as outlined above are as follows:

(A) Under present circumstances the only powers who can hope to oppose our policy and to back up their opposition with force are Soviet Russia and the United States. In view of the fact that the Soviet Union is still engaged in domestic reorganization, it seems highly doubtful that we shall encounter any strong armed interference from that source, particularly if our armed preparedness on the continent of Asia is maintained. Therefore in pursuing our program, we must center our principal consideration on the attitude of the United States and it will be necessary for us to closely observe United States movements. We must be thoroughly prepared to face the worst eventuality which, of course, would face us in case it was necessary to come to a showdown with the United States. The facing of such a situation is necessary, however, in order to firmly establish a condition which will guarantee our right of existence as a world power. While we should be prepared to face a showdown with the United States if necessary, we should do everything in our power to prevent such an occurrence.

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-2-

(B) To my mind there are four factors which ~~will~~ operate to restrain the United States from using her armed forces to interfere with our program, namely:

- (1) Our own (Japan's) armed forces. We must place implicit confidence in our land and sea fighting services and at the same time we should reorganize our economic structure along totalitarian lines and further develop the spirit of our own people.
- (2) The elimination of forces tending to restrain or hinder our program of expansion. I believe it is necessary that our relations with the Soviet Union be basically readjusted with objective of crushing the Chiang regime in China and of completing our preparations for determined expansion to the South.
- (3) The elimination of the influence of foreign powers in South-western Asia. With Germany and Great Britain engaged in a fight to the finish, our only armed opposition in the areas involved will be the colonial forces of England, France and others and therefore the United States cannot expect much armed assistance from other sources.
- (4) Restriction of United States action by Italy and Germany. I believe the United States will hesitate a long time before she uses force to interfere with our program in view of present developments in Europe. If she should decide to fight us, however, we will find it much to our advantage if Germany and Italy could be persuaded to act jointly with Japan.

(C) There are many indications that Russia is prepared now to seriously discuss non-aggression terms with us. After the European conflict is over, it is apparent that German and Italian pressure against the Soviet Union will be increased. In view of the foregoing factors, I believe that it is entirely possible that a Japanese Soviet non-aggression pact can be reached at this time.

(D) I have considered the subject of our entering the war on the side of Germany and Italy from various points of view and my conclusions are as follows:

Advantages

1. Our entrance into the war would be of considerable help to Germany and Italy, both from the point of view of military strategy and of moral support. Our cooperation with Germany and Italy at this time will bring about a quicker settlement with England and at the same time will place us in a more advantageous position for pursuing our own policy unmoledsted.
2. At any peace conference we will be in possession of a strong position for airing our opinions if we have been participants in the war. Moreover, by concluding advance agreements with Italy and Germany, it should be possible to exact guarantees concerning our new territories which would be confirmed at the peace conference. Such action will make it impossible for Germany and Italy to sign a peace treaty with England and France without considering our territorial aspirations.
3. If we are allied with Italy and Germany the United States will be very hesitant about interfering with our program.

4. Domestically, our military alliance with Germany and Italy will clarify our objective to our own people and will tend to unite our people in a common cause.

5. We will be enabled to participate as an equal in the work of reconstruction subsequent to the conclusion of the war.

Disadvantages

1. Should the war in Europe so develop that Italy and Germany would be placed at a disadvantage, we would find ourselves in a very difficult position. Judging by events of the recent past, however, such an eventuality seems most unlikely.

2. Should the war in Europe become unduly prolonged, we would find ourselves involved in a long time war with increased danger that the war would increase in scope more than is necessary to us for the attainment of our own objective.

3. Our entrance into the war would contradict our previous statement that our policy was one of non-involvement in the European war.

4. It is not inconceivable that the United States will become involved in the European war eventually. Should we be involved in the war on the side of Germany and Italy, it might give the United States an excuse for concentrating her entire power against Japan. The fact that the United States Fleet is still in the Pacific points to the possibility of such action. It is not possible to determine the real motives of the United States at this distance. It seems unlikely, however, that she will plunge into the European war at this time when it should be apparent that she will be backing the losing side. I am of the opinion, therefore, that United States assistance will not go further than the supplying of material to England. Furthermore, I doubt that armed action by the United States against us will have any bearing on the outcome of the conflict in Europe. I consider it doubtful that Americans will continue to countenance the destruction of their ancestral countries in Europe while the United States herself engages in a war in the Orient. The areas involved in our (Japan's) expansion to the Southward are merely colonies of other countries and the United States does not stand to suffer much direct loss. Moreover, should the United States succeed in crushing Japan, the United States would eventually be faced with a situation that she least desires, that is, of having the Soviet Union overrun the Asiatic continent.

5. Germany and Italy have no desire to make the United States an active belligerent in the war. Therefore, they may leave us to take on the United States alone.

(E) Consideration of the above advantages and disadvantages will show that the crux of the situation seems to be whether the United States can be sufficiently restrained or not. At the present time the United States is undecided as to whether or not to interfere with our Far Eastern program. If, at this time, we openly enter into the European war I believe that such action would tend to restrain the United States from interfering with our objectives. If, on the other hand, we attempt to pursue our program in the Far East with the force of arms, without first

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-4-

Date:

declaring our intention of entering the European war, there is grave danger that any later declaration of war would tend to assume the proportions of a supplementary act on our part. If the foregoing line of reasoning is sound, it is clear that it would be to our advantage to definitely enter the European war at this time and to give clear and unmistakable signs of our aims and determination.

(F) We should give a clear and explicit explanation of our aims to the United States, giving them proof that we have no political aspirations in the Philippine Islands. Moreover, should the United States so desire, we should be prepared to sign a non-aggression pact with her, guaranteeing mutual respect for one another's territory. I believe there is a need to make such a move at this time in order to ease the tension between the two countries (United States and Japan).

(G) There are certain elements within our own country that advocate restricting our policy to settlement of the China incident, putting off to a future date armed aggression in the Southwest Pacific area. There are probably others of our country who are opposed to Germany and Italy because of the ruthlessness with which they have conducted their international policies. These elements are therefore probably in favor of continuing in the pursuit of an entirely independent policy. The following considerations, however, tend to refute the soundness of the policy advocated by the elements above, namely:

(1) It is impossible to establish a condition which will guarantee our right to existence as a growing power, without first resorting to armed force.

(2) Settlement of the China Incident and securing our right to existence as a growing power are part and parcel of the same thing and cannot be treated as two separate and distinct topics.

(3) Japan must be prepared to utilize action similar to that utilized by Germany and Italy in the fulfillment of her national policy.

(4) At a time when we are laboring to bring about a new order in East Asia, it is nothing short of miraculous that world conditions have developed to their present state. If we do not take this God-given opportunity now, no man can say when or in what future world another comparable opportunity will be offered.

(5) It is my firm belief that now is the time for action abroad and the assumption of an indomitable determination at home. It is our high duty to our country to join together at this time to push our policies through to a definite conclusion.

(H) Our territorial aspirations must include the following:

(1) The acquisition and confirmation of full territorial rights to the Mandated territories of the South Seas.

(2) Independence of French Indo-China and guarantees regarding its future.

(3) Possession by Japan of the Malay Peninsula and Dutch East

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Indies, Australia, New Zealand, New Caledonia and other British and French islands and possessions and Mandated territories. (Because of Australia's and New Zealand's relations with the United States, the time and the method in the acquisition of these two territories will require especially careful consideration.)

W.S. Anderson
W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to the President ✓
CC - C.N.O.
MID.
State
File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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DOD DIR. 6200.6 (9/27/59)

Date-
Signature-

*PSF
Navy*

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personnel
confidential
Navy
1*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 18, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached ONI memorandum on Japanese measures to counteract the Havana Conference is forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan

D. J. CALLAGHAN

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- *4-7-70*

Signature- *Jel*

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *[Handwritten Signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18 July 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese measures to counteract Havana Conference.

Highly reliable information has reached the Department to the effect that the Japanese Government considers a successful economic consolidation of the Western Hemisphere at the Havana Conference to be so inimical to her interests as to warrant the utmost efforts to prevent it.

Tokyo has therefore approved putting into operation suitable measures from among those recommended to Tokyo at the conclusion of the recent Rio de Janeiro and Washington conferences of Japanese diplomats. (For outline of the program adopted at Rio, see G-2 "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff (No.10)" dated 25 May 1940).

In addition, Tokyo has issued to all diplomatic missions in North, Central and South America the following special instructions:

1. Work particularly on persons in the countries to which accredited, who are in any way connected with the Havana conference. These efforts are to be carried out with discretion to avoid an appearance of anything unusual.

2. Propaganda work in this connection should stress the following points:

(a) Economic

(1). Future development of Central and South America has unlimited possibilities for the future, because of the rich undeveloped natural resources. This development is only possible, however, if consumer markets are maintained throughout the world. Any economic tie-up with a single country would prevent this and would in reality be impracticable.

(2). The Far East, rather than the United States, offers a more promising market for those exports previously consumed by Europe. Furthermore, as a source of supply for imports to replace those cut off from Europe, the Far East has many advantages. These points will become of in

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *W.S.A.*

creasing importance as the war continues.

(b) Political and Military

(1) Political and Military ties with a single country limits future freedom of action and are therefore disadvantageous.

(2) An alliance with the United States would considerably increase the danger of involvement in the European War regardless of desires in this respect. In addition, since such alliances would strengthen the position of the United States, she is liable to use them in such a way as to be of advantage and profit only to herself.

(c) General

Central and South America is in an ideal position to act as a balance of power between the United States, the Far East, and Europe. Such an advantageous position is possible only if freedom of action is maintained.

3. The danger to be particularly guarded against is the possibility that any strengthening of the hand of the United States in international affairs as a result of the Havana Conference, may be used to exert pressure on Japan. It is therefore essential that our course of action prevent this situation from developing.

W.S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to President.

CC- C.N.O.

M.I.D.

State

File.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

PSF
Navy
1
HFE/pt

July 21, 1940

MEMORANDUM for the President of the United States

FROM: Duty Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT: Sinking of Two British Merchant Ships in the Western Atlantic by German Raider.

1. As requested by telephone call from Captain D.J. Callaghan, U.S. Navy, the following is forwarded for the information of the President. The substance of a letter received from the British Embassy yesterday, July 20th, is quoted:

(a) Quote In approximate positions latitude 18° north longitude 54°-30 west and latitude 20° north longitude 60° west, it has been reported in some reliable information received that two British merchant vessels were sunk about 13 July. It is reported that the above vessels were sunk by a German armed raider. We have no other information as to the type of the raider except that its displacement was about 9,000 tons. Insofar as it is practicable by the available British cruisers, the approaches to the Carribean are being guarded. Unquote.

(b) A memorandum in the files of the Duty Officer of the Office of Naval Operations dated July 19th quotes as follows from an Associated Press dispatch:


SS DAVISIAN and MS KING JOHN - The Associated Press reported this morning that a report received today from Fort de France, Martinique, quoted a dispatch from the French Island of St. Barthelemy as saying that 41 men arrived there in two lifeboats on 17 July from two British cargo vessels, the ST. JOHN and the DAVISIAN, which had been sunk "by enemy action 400 miles east of that point". This position is just outside of the Neutrality Zone of the Panama Conference. A U.P. dispatch later today states that these vessels were sunk

File Personal
July 21, 1940.

MEMORANDUM for the President of the United States

by a converted merchantman; that is, a raider, whose nationality is not known.

2. The Navy Department has received no information concerning this matter from its own forces and no other official information is available.


H. F. ELY,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Duty Officer, Office of
Naval Operations.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

*file
personal*

*RAF
Navy
1*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

24 July 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I think the enclosed despatch is worth your while not to mention Eddie Semans' (my son-in-law) letter to the man who sold him his supposedly pure bred Springer Spaniel.

Nothing more important for the present.

Betty

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF BUREAU
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM COMMONFOLKDIST (CG)
ACTION COMDT (CG) WASHN
PASSED BY COMDT (CG) WASHN TO OPNAV FOR APPROPRIATE ACTION
PRIORITY

AT 1310 THIS DATE MESSAGE RELAYED FROM LITTLE MACHIPONGO
INLET LIFEBOAT STATION MACHINISTS MATE HERMAN L MARSH
TEMPORARILY IN CHARGE AS FOLLOWS QUOTE AN EXPLOSIVE SHELL
FELL AT 1250 TODAY 61 YARDS FROM LITTLE MACHIPONGO INLET
LIFEBOAT STATION X THE EXPLOSION WAS SO GREAT THAT IT ROCKED
THE BUILDING BUT DID NO DAMAGE X HOWEVER IT DUG A CONSIDERABLE
HOLE IN THE GROUND AND LEFT A PIECE OF STEEL APPROXIMATELY
2 YARDS SQUARE X THERE WAS NO AIRPLANE OF ANY DESCRIPTION
IN SIGHT OR HEARING UNQUOTE MATTER NOW BEING INVESTIGATED
1916 JULY 20

MEMORANDUM

23 July 1940

Here was the makings of a real scare, at least to those
on the spot.

Investigation, so far made, indicates clearly it was an
oxygen tank which had been inadvertently left in the sun
and the expansion of the gas caused it to explode.

RSF
Navy

July 5, 1940.

Edwin W. Semans, Esq.,
1106 Girard Trust Building
Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Mr. Semans:

A catastrophe has just occurred. Our veterinarian told us yesterday that the puppies of the litter from which you bought your pup are not, in fact, pure bred Springers, but are nothing but mongrels, apparently containing a good deal of Pointer blood.

This being so, I would be delighted to refund to you the \$30.00 and take the dog back. However, if your children have become so attached to the dog that they do not want to part with it, I will be glad to refund \$20.00 to you, as I feel that \$10.00 is a fair price for the puppy, the parentage being what it now appears to be.

Yours very truly,
ROBERT S. INGERSOLL, JR.

Robert S. Ingersoll, Jr., Esq.
1035 Land Title Building
Broad and Chestnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Mr. Ingersoll:

I have read with much amusement your letter of July 5th advising me that the registered Father of our puppy was just the endorser and not the maker of our canine note. Although the real father is possibly not a gentleman for indulging in such an impropriety, he may well have been something of a scholar and certainly a salesman.

We have been wondering for some time when our puppy was going to undergo a metamorphosis and begin to look like a spaniel, at the same time defending his social standing against all of the doubting friends. Now that we know the awful truth and the possibility that the pointer strain may become dominant, I wonder if you can supply us with the South end of his tail.

He is a really fine little pup and the children are delighted with him, so I am only too glad to accept your valuation of \$10. on the combination policy, with some reluctance, however, because of your own situation.

Incidentally, we had the pup over to Dr. Stader's in Ardmore for de-worming, but apparently he did not recognize that something was wrong in Denmark, for he made no mention of it.

EWS/s

Sincerely yours,

PSF
Hart
1

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1940.


CONFIDENTIAL

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum outlining a conversation between the Netherlands Naval Attache and our Director of Naval Intelligence is forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- JPD

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

Date- 7-7-40

Signature- *W.S.A.*

23 July 1940

In reply refer to No.

Op-16

A19/Havana Conference

~~Confidential~~MEMORANDUM for the Chief of Naval Operations:

Subject: Conversation between Captain Ranneft, Netherlands Naval Attache, and the Director of Naval Intelligence (Rear Admiral Anderson) on July 22, 1940.

Captain Ranneft stated that rumors at his Legation were to the effect that, at the Havana Conference, Venezuela would bring up a proposal to take over the Island of Curacao, and that Brazil would put forth a proposal to take over Surinam (Dutch Guiana).

Captain Ranneft added that he had been instructed by his Legation to state that it was his (Captain Ranneft's) personal opinion that they would offer resistance in both cases with all the resources at their disposition.

Captain Ranneft further stated that it was his personal opinion there would be no opposition if the United States of America, or a group of American countries including the United States of America, should think it necessary to take these countries over as a temporary protectorate.

The Netherlands' Minister in Washington is ill in bed with heart trouble and has been so indisposed for sometime.

~~Confidential~~

W. S. Anderson
W. S. Anderson
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

cc: State Dept.
President's Naval Aide ✓
M.I.D.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 30, 1940.

file
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The HANNIBAL is to be equipped with laboratory equipment suitable for testing DeGaussing equipment. She will be the experimental ship for the development of counter measures against magnetic mines. This installation is to be made at Norfolk.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 31, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

A somewhat long but interesting resumé of the data collected by officers who made recent visits to South American countries in connection with hemispheric defense.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 21 1973

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

July 27, 1940.

Memorandum for the President:

I enclose herewith

- (1) A summary of the results of the conversations conducted by the officers who were sent to consult with Latin American countries on hemispheric defense.
- (2) The report of the staff conversations recently held with Mexican Naval authorities. It is expected that the Mexican Government will inform us, if the agreements reached are satisfactory.

H. R. Stark

H. R. Stark.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

10 July 1940.

Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations

Subject: Hemisphere defense - Condensed reports and recommendations.

1. About 1 June, 1940, a number of Army, Navy and Marine Corps officers were detailed to assist our diplomatic representatives in finding out the attitude of certain Latin American countries in regard to hemisphere defense. The principal questions to be determined were:

- (a) Will the government concerned accept aid from other American Republics.
- (b) Will it extend aid to these states.
- (c) When the emergency arises will the government concerned make available necessary bases for land, air and naval forces, with necessary communication facilities, to those states extending aid.
- (d) Will the government concerned give assurance now that its existing air dromes, ports and port facilities, as well as anchorages in its territorial waters will be available to the United States as required.
- (e) If the government concerned agrees to the action proposed above, will it authorize staff conversations at some future date between its designated representatives and those of our War and Navy Departments with a view to preparation of Joint Plans?

2. The following is a brief synopsis of the replies obtained in each of the countries mentioned:

- (a) Argentine
 - (1) No commitments could be made without the approval of Congress.
 - (2) "If any country near to Argentine, however, should be in need of aid, it would without doubt be authorized by Congress. Also, any assistance Argentine might need would be obtained from the other American Republics. Argentine feels that mutual aid should include the fields of culture and commerce and should embrace the removal of barriers to trade, and should not be confined to aid in military matters. The Government of the Argentine Republic, in the event of a situation of real danger,

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

~~SECRET~~

would, in accordance with the mutual consultation policy evolved at the Lima conference, examine the matter with our Government and with the Governments of the other American countries." (Dispatch of American Ambassador).

- (3) No further replies have been made to questions (c), (d) and (e).
 - (4) Argentine Navy, except Minister of Marine, is considered pro-Ally. Argentine Army is pro-Nazi, due to training of German military mission. Air force, with American Army mission, is considered about 50 - 50.
 - (5) Argentine will probably request following:
 - \$20,000,000 for agricultural machinery - Export-Import Bank.
 - \$25,000,000 purchase of canned beef as U. S. Army stores.
 - \$50,000,000 loan to purchase air planes, tanks, etc.
 - (6) Fifth column Germans well organized in vicinity of Buenos Aires. Organizations now being greatly expanded due to affiliations with Italian organizations.
- (b) Brazil.
- (1) Replies to all questions generally favorable but effective action depends on prompt delivery of war materials.
 - (2) Following quotations from dispatches of American Ambassador show the urgency of obtaining material:

"The importance of this question of material for the Brazilian Army cannot be overemphasized. - - The majority of the officers are still sympathetic to the United States and believe in PanAmericanism, but they continually state that Germany is the only country that will furnish us with arms on reasonable terms. - - ProGerman sympathy in the Army and in the Government is growing rapidly as a result of German successes and the shipment to Brazil of military equipment on easy terms. - The government continues in power at the will of the Army."

"We will not be able to keep Brazil in line if we fail to help her arm herself. Much as we may dislike the fact, the fact remains, if we fail to furnish arms to Brazil, the Germans will furnish them and possibly furnish them free; in that case we cannot expect to maintain our present favorable position here. - - Aranha and Dutra are pressing us a little bit harder every day: Are you, or are you not going to help us?"

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (S)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

~~SECRET~~

"Soon we shall be obliged to give them an answer and if the answer is 'No' we must prepare ourselves to face the consequences."

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs says to me quote your government must understand that if it is interested in restraining Brazil from going Nazi, our people can no longer be satisfied by speeches and good will. Results are needed unquote".

"General Goes Monteiro reminded Col. Miller - that we had been talking for about a year about cooperating with Brazil on military lines and that after a year of talk, not a gun, not a round of ammunition had reached Brazil from the United States."

(c) Chile.

(1) Answers to all questions favorable.

(2) The following is quoted from American Ambassador to Chile:

"I am positively assured that the Nazis here are thoroughly organized and prepared to strike in a coup d'etat at any time. Certain things we positively know:

That the Germans are thoroughly organized and that at least seven thousand are military trained.

That there are between twenty and thirty German officers here without any visible business.

That there are Gestapo agents from Germany.

That there is an undetermined number of Army officers here on whom the Nazis depend for cooperation.

That arms, machine guns, etc. have been smuggled into Chile via Argentina."

(3) Lt. Col. Alvarez and Major Marin of the Chilean Embassy in Washington have been designated to act informally and unofficially as liaison officers for any conversations of a plan for hemisphere defense.

(4) Chile desires certain officers and men be taken at once into certain units of the Fleet for instruction.

(5) No request for material received.

(d) Columbia.

(1) Replies to all questions favorable except that Colombia desires to patrol her own waters.

(2) The following quoted from American Minister:

"At the present time the predominant necessity is to have accurate and adequate Intelligence information."

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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"The Minister of War stated that he will utilize the personnel of our military and naval missions, particularly the latter, in the capacity of technical advisers. He recognizes - - the existence of the Fifth Column danger."

"The President stated that Colombia would go to the limit if a PanAmerican conference were to be convened, that Colombia would go as far as others wished to and even to making alliances or an American League of Nations."

- (3) Requests installation of one powerful radio receiving set, at the American Embassy, including unilateral direction finder, to be operated by two Navy enlisted men. Delivery of another similar set in Baranquilla to be operated by Colombian personnel. Delivery of third set to be used as required.
- (e) Ecuador.
- (1) Replies to all questions favorable. However, the present government is in power only until September, 1940. Prior to September 1st there is a strong possibility of an armed attempt to overthrow the government. This attempt will be headed by a powerful and wealthy banker, named Eshada, with strong Nazi backing.
 - (2) Ecuador desires a Naval Mission of four officers, patrol vessels, also a military and air mission to replace present Italian military mission. The Ecuadorean Navy is quite anxious to obtain some ships, apparently three old type destroyers are preferred. If destroyers not available, gunboats or Eagle boats, in order named, are desired.
- (f) Peru.
- (1) Replies to all questions were favorable.
 - (2) Peru has asked for a Marine Corps air mission of two officers. Also desires to send officers to U. S. Fleet.
 - (3) Peru desires old training planes to teach pilots. They have dismissed the Italian air mission and desired it to be replaced by American mission at earliest possible moment.
- (g) Uruguay.
- (1) Replies to all questions satisfactory except that they are unofficial. The government has not as yet replied officially. All Army, Navy and Air Corps representatives very enthusiastic for cooperation.
 - (2) Uruguay has passed a measure allotting \$65,000,000 for the purchase of war materials. Considerable of this was spent in Brazil to obtain rifles to quell recent Fifth Column movement.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

-4-

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

(3) Uruguay desires three old destroyers, aircraft, a number of anti-aircraft guns and other war material to be decided by Staff conversations. Army, Navy and air officers with technical assistants requested for instruction in operation.

(h) Venezuela.

(1) Replies to all questions favorable.

(2) The following is quoted from U. S. Minister: "The apparently complete trust which the Venezuelan government is now placing in the United States involves a very grave responsibility on our part. - - Venezuela is asking for assistance along various lines, some of which may appear unnecessary or impracticable, but it cannot be stressed too strongly that every effort should be made to give the appearance of careful and dignified consideration to its desires."

(3) Venezuela desires instructors in a school for training secret agents.

(4) Following material desired:

- Enlarge air fields at Maracaibo, Ciudad Bolivar and Maracory.
- Increased number of patrol and fighting planes.
- Organize a patrol and defense service for territorial waters consisting of Coast Guard vessels of high speed.
- Equip part of Army with modern equipment.
- Development of Merchant Marine and civil aviation.

(5) Will require Army, Navy and air missions. Details to be arranged in staff conversations.

Central America

(i) Costa Rica.

(1) Replies to all questions favorable.

(2) Has great fear of Nazi and Communist Fifth Column. Following quoted from American Minister Hornbeck:

"Out of a maze of rumors, canards and facts, I have been able to confirm one statement which has heretofore been made in prior dispatches, and that is that the Costa Ricans themselves are thoroughly alarmed, worried and frightened over the possibility of a "Fifth Column" movement. This fear is not confined to official circles, but is general among people of all classes. American and British nationals are equally worried, and through conversations with Costa Ricans have unfortunately fanned the fears of the Latins to a white heat."

"It appears that we can hardly afford to temporize with the situation. A gunboat or destroyer should in my opinion be dispatched to Puntarenas at once, arms should be sent to the Costa Rican Government, and a trained officer or two should be sent here to instruct the Army in the use of

~~SECRET~~

these guns. If these precautions are taken, I believe we need have no fear of a successful German drive in this country."

"With from fifteen to twenty German commercial airplanes available to the Germans at the Sabana air port for an attack on the Canal locks, the close proximity of this country to the Canal Zone, the growing feeling on the part of the Costa Ricans that Germany will ultimately win, and the well organized, thoroughly planned and worked out German program for ultimately changing the personnel of the Government, it appears to me that we must give some concrete evidence of our interest in the maintenance of the present regime."

"They (the Costa Ricans) expect and demand something more concrete than words."

"I should roughly say that three-fourths of the people here are pro-Ally and pro-American at heart, but they will play with us only as long as they are convinced we are ready to play the game with them."

"They expect our material aid as a condition precedent to further cooperation. In my opinion this aid should be given speedily and without cost to the Costa Rican government."

(3) Costa Rica wants 4,000 rifles, 45 automatic weapons as gift or loan, also a military mission. Wants loan to build Pan American highway. Wants \$5,000,000 for use of Cocos Island.

(j) Guatemala.

(1) Replies to all questions favorable.

(2) Following quoted from American Minister to Guatemala:

"In regard to the internal situation and the possibility of Fifth Column action, the President stated that he knew he had a lot of Germans in the country, but that they were under careful surveillance. He stated that he would not make the mistake of over-indulgence, of which the United States is guilty."

"In the matter of hemisphere defense, the President stated that in relative importance to the United States, the countries of Latin American fall into two groups, those beyond the Canal in South America, and those in the Caribbean area. The latter, he considered, of most vital concern to the United States and should receive preferential treatment because of their strategical location. He has heard rumors that Germans in Mexico are preparing a fillibustering expedition, presumably

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

to occupy Belize. He felt that he should be permitted to occupy Belize (British Honduras), but said he would give it up if subsequent arbitration decided against his claim."

- (3) Guatemala has equipment for mobilizing about four divisions, most of which is old and unservicable. The President desires equipment for twenty-five divisions, about 260,000 men.

(k) Honduras.

- (1) Replies to all questions favorable.
- (2) Can handle Fifth Columnists but needs Coast Guard vessels.

(l) Nicaragua.

- (1) Replies to all questions favorable.
- (2) No fear of Fifth Column.
- (3) President suggests a military depot in the Gulf of Fonseca as a central distribution point for troops and armament not only for Nicaragua but for all Central American countries.
- (4) Nicaragua can place 15 to 20 thousand troops in the field in 48 hours. Can raise 40,000 men but no equipment available.
- (5) Requests patrol boats.
- (6) Desires early completion of Pan American highway.

(m) San Salvador.

- (1) Accepts all proposals but needs no help to suppress Fifth Column. Principal danger from Communists.

(n) Mexico.

- (1) The questions of hemisphere defense were discussed by the Mexican Ambassador with representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments. The Ambassador stated that, in advance of the arrival of Mexican officers for further discussions, he wished to explain personally the deep interest of President Cardenas in the cooperation for hemisphere security and to stress that the Mexican government was prepared unreservedly to collaborate with the United States in the development of plans for the common defense.
- (2) Ambassador felt that there should be a general political agreement as a necessary basis for concerted and coordinated military and naval action when the emergency arose.
- (3) Ambassador stated that the officers coming to Washington would bring a list of material desired.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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- (4) Ambassador appeared to discount possibility of foreign totalitarian activities in Mexico as being serious. He stated that there were only about 6,000 Germans in Mexico, and the Mexican Government had already taken measures to control this element.
- (5) The Ambassador intimated that the Mexican Government was prepared to develop air fields and naval bases in Mexican territory at strategical locations for national as well as hemisphere defense.

West Indies

(o) Cuba.

- (1) Replies to all questions favorable.
- (2) Recommendations of Colonel del Valle:
Extend and improve air port at Camaguey at expense of United States. German activity in Cuba greatly exaggerated and will be met completely by prompt action on our part by having secret staff conversations in Cuba immediately, and prompt action in developing Camaguey.

(p) Haiti.

- (1) Replies to all questions favorable.
- (2) Present rulers of Haiti are uneasy and are therefore anxious to have our government take immediate measures to increase their stability.
- (3) Col. del Valle recommends enlarging existing air field at Port au Prince at our expense. Also study possibilities of air ports at Leogene, Cape Haitien, Mole St. Nicholas and Hinche. Possibilities of Island La Gonaive should not be overlooked. Recommends required arms and ammunition be furnished without delay after staff conversations.

(q) Santa Domingo.

- (1) Replies to all questions favorable.
- (2) Fifth Column activities under control.
- (3) Generalissimo Trujillo suggested and asked for study of the possibilities of the Saona Island area, southeast of La Romana, for a sea and land plane base and possible anchorage for small surface craft and submarines, in controlling the Mona Passage. As a matter of good will, Colonel del Valle suggests that an examination and study be made regardless of results.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

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3. Resume:

- (a) Answers to all questions generally favorable, except from Argentina. Uruguay is favorable, but has not replied officially.
- (b) There is a possibility of Fifth Column activities in all Latin American countries. Most active at present time seems to be in the following states: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Ecuador. Urgent action required in Costa Rica and Ecuador.
- (c) Following table shows:
 - (1) Countries now having United States military, naval, or air missions.
 - (2) Additional missions requested.
 - (3) Approximate material requested.
 - (4) Approximate value of war materials requested.

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SOUTH AMERICA

Country	:Existing Missions	: Requests for additional missions	: Approximate Material Required	: Approximate Value of War Materials Desired
	: Naval -		: Aircraft	(\$50,000,000)
	: 3 off.		: AA guns	
	: Army ---		: Tanks	
<u>ARGENTINA</u>	: Air 7 off.	None		
	: Naval		: Aircraft	(\$100,000,000)
	: 9 off.		: AA guns	
	: Army 5 off.		: Anti-tank guns	
<u>BRAZIL</u>	: Air ---	---	: Coast Artillery	
	: Naval ---	: Requests that certain officers and	: List to be submitted	: ---
	: Army 3 off.	: men be trained in U.S. Fleet.		
<u>CHILE</u>				
	: Naval		: Requests three radio sets with direction finding apparatus	: ---
	: 6 off.			
	: Army 2			
<u>COLOMBIA</u>	: Air 2	---		
	: Navy -	: Four naval officers.	: Three old type destroyers	: ---
	: Army -	: Requests also Army and air missions to replace Italians.		
<u>ECUADOR</u>				
	: Navy 3	: Requests officers to be trained in U. S. Fleet.	: Desires old type training planes.	: ---
	: Army			
<u>PERU</u>	: Air 2			
	: Navy	: Will request Army, Navy and air missions later.	: Three old type destroyers, aircraft, AA guns	: \$6,500,000
<u>URUGUAY</u>				
	: Navy	: Will require Army, Navy and Air Missions	: Air ports, Air craft	: :To be delivered
	: Army			
	: Air	: Details to be arranged in staff conversations	: Patrol vessels	
<u>VENEZUELA</u>				

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 OSD letter, May 4, 1973
 BY RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

CENTRAL AMERICA AND WEST INDIES

Country	:Existing :Missions	:Additional :Missions required	:Material :required	:Approximate value :of war materials
	:Navy	: Desires	: 4,000 rifles	:
	:Army	: Military	: 45 machine guns	:
<u>COSTA RICA</u>	:Air	: Mission	:	: \$5,000,000
	:Navy	:	: Equipment to	:
	:Army 1	: ----	: mobilize 25	:
<u>GUATEMALA</u>	:Air	:	: Divisions	: To be determined
	: Navy -	: ----	:	:
	:Army -	: ----	:	:
<u>HONDURAS</u>	:Air -	: ----	:	:
	:Navy	:	: Requests	:
	:Army 1	:	: patrol boats	:
<u>NICARAGUA</u>	:Air	:	:	: ----
	:Navy -	: ----	:	:
	:Army -	: ----	:	:
<u>SAN SALVA-</u>	:Air -	: ----	:	:
<u>DOR</u>	:	:	:	:
	:Navy -	: ----	: List not yet	:
	:Army -	: ----	: submitted	:
<u>MEXICO</u>	:Air -	: ----	:	: Indeterminate
	:Navy -	: ----	: Extend and improve:	:
	:Army -	: ----	: air port at	:
<u>CUBA</u>	:Air -	: ----	: Camaguey	: Indeterminate
	:Navy -	: ----	: Extend and improve:	:
	:Army 3	: ----	: air ports at Port	:
	:Air -	: ----	: au Prince, Leogame,	:
	:	:	: etc. Equip Army with	:
<u>HAITI</u>	:	:	: modern weapons.	: Indeterminate
	:Navy -	: ----	: Survey of Saona	:
	:Army -	: ----	: Island Area.	:
<u>SAN DOMIN-</u>	:Air	:	:	: ----
<u>GO</u>	:	:	:	:

4. Recommendations as to action to be taken.

- (a) Assumption: (1) The Monroe Doctrine will be enforced to the fullest extent. This includes the recent declarations that we will assist any American republic, who desires our aid, in maintaining their form of government against Fifth Column activities.
- (b) The most probable course of events seems to be the following:
- (1) Fifth Columnists in Latin America will not cause open breaks until sure of support from Axis powers. It is probable that they will content themselves in perfecting their organization anticipating the lifting of the blockade either by an Axis victory or by a negotiated peace with Great Britain.
 - (2) The first Axis efforts will probably be a commercial ^{drive} desire to obtain necessary wheat, meat, corn, cotton and coffee from South America. Having no money, they will trade by bartering excess war materials. This will serve the double purpose of gaining supplies and arming Fifth Columnists. The greatest activity will be among the ten million Germans and Italians in Southern Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Bolivia. Other countries near the Canal will also receive attention, but in a commercial way.
 - (3) The second phase will possibly be a revolution fostered by Fifth Columnists. In case the United States interferes, aid will be asked from the Axis Powers. This revolution may be the result of a legal government in Argentina, Uruguay or Brazil desiring to join the Axis Powers.
 - (4) The third phase will possibly be a sudden invasion of northeast Brazil by air and by the establishment of strong air bases in the Natal region to gain control of the Atlantic between Brazil and the African coast. At the same time, an expeditionary force of one or two divisions may be sent to Southern Brazil, Argentina or Uruguay for consolidating Argentina, Uruguay, Southern Brazil, Chile and Bolivia as a German possession.
 - (5) The fourth phase will probably then be to extend Axis domination toward control of Panama Canal.
- (c) To meet above threats the following action is recommended:
- (1) To recognize that immediate action is necessary to prevent all of South America south of 20° South Latitude falling in the Axis orbit, and to prevent Fifth Column damage to the Panama Canal.

- (2) To make necessary commercial and financial arrangements with Latin America to keep them in the orbit of our influence until we can completely arm ourselves.
- (3) To hold staff conversations with all the countries who have expressed willingness to do so as soon as possible.
- (4) To comply as far as possible with all requests for material and personnel assistance now, even if it is merely a gesture with future promises, of completely fulfilling their requests.
- (5) To increase our diplomatic, consular, commercial and secret service agents to the fullest extent possible to cover foreign propaganda and Fifth Column activity.
- (6) To build up offices of Military and Naval Attaches in important locations like Brazil, Argentine, Chile and Uruguay to war requirements.
- (7) To build up a counter propaganda organization in Latin America by utilizing trained writers and by the use of the motion picture industry. Remove all restrictive laws which restrict use of movies for propaganda and exercise censorship in exporting films to Latin America.
- (8) To establish air bases in northeast Brazil and in Uruguay.
- (9) To establish Naval Operating Bases at Bahia, Rio de Janeiro and at Montevideo. Equip with stores, fuel and local defenses.
- (10) To establish a strong South Atlantic Squadron, with scheduled periods of training with the Argentine and Brazilian navies.

d. To organize in each of the four hemispheres task forces comprising the following:

- (1) An Amphibious Task Force.
- (2) An Air Task Force.
- (3) An Air Task Force.
- (4) An Air Task Force.
- (5) Additional Task Forces to meet special situations.

e. To supplement the above task forces by additional U. S. Naval Forces if necessary to operate against superior enemy forces.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 24, 1940.

RESULT OF STAFF CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
MEXICAN NAVY AND THE UNITED STATES NAVY

1. In accordance with previous diplomatic arrangements made, Staff conversations between representatives of the Mexican Navy and the United States Navy were initiated in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 0900, Friday, 19 July, 1940.

2. As a result of numerous meetings and discussions regarding the organization and material resources of the two Navies and having in view the urgency for hemisphere cooperation against possible non-American aggression, it was decided to recommend the following cooperative action to the two governments concerned:-

- a. To establish offices in the two Navy Departments for the purpose of maintaining a close liaison in furthering cooperative action necessary for hemisphere defense.
- b. To organize the four naval districts of Mexico to provide machinery for military and administrative coordination of all Mexican Naval activities.
- c. To provide a close liaison between the Eighth and Eleventh Naval Districts of the United States, and the First and Third Naval Districts of Mexico in order to obtain rapid communications and mutual assistance.
- d. To organize in each of the four Mexican Naval Districts operating forces comprising the following task forces:-
 - (1) An Inshore Patrol.
 - (2) An Offshore Patrol.
 - (3) An Escort Force.
 - (4) An Attack Force.
 - (5) Additional Task Forces to meet special situations.
- e. To supplement the above task forces by additional U. S. Naval Forces if necessary to operate against superior enemy forces.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

B. RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- f. To provide an efficient code for communications between U. S. Naval Forces and Mexican Naval Forces.
 - g. To provide that the Offshore Patrol will be taken over completely by U.S. Naval Forces if required by existing conditions.
 - h. To assign duties to the various task forces as prescribed by U. S. Navy Department Naval District Manual.
 - i. To provide for the mutual use of Naval Bases, Air Bases, airdromes, and shore facilities in order to effect a closer cooperation.
 - j. To place Mexican floating equipment in good operating condition, the officials of the U.S. Navy rendering whatever services that may be practicable for this purpose.
 - k. To assist the Mexican Navy in building up its organization by furnishing appropriate books, manuals, charts, and other non-confidential descriptive literature.
 - l. To manufacture in Mexico as much of the additional material required for the Mexican Navy as practicable.
 - m. To provide necessary reserves of ammunition, fuel, and stores for the operation of the Mexican Forces.
 - n. To exchange information regarding movements or actions of individuals, organizations or forces which threaten the peace or security of either State.
 - o. To extend such aid in the local defenses of other Central American States as may be practicable (Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica), with their previous consent, the U.S. Navy and Mexican Navy operating singly or in cooperation.

3. The conversations were completed and recommendations agreed to as above by the undersigned on Wednesday, 24 July 1940, the Mexican Naval Attache, Capitan de Fragata Manuel Zermeno Araico, having taken part in some of the conversations.

W. O. Spears,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

David Coello Ochoa
Capitan de Navio C.O.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972
MAY 21 1973
By RT; NARS Date

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

17 July 1940

FROM: Captain W.O. Spears, U.S.Navy.
TO : The Chief of Naval Operations.

SUBJECT: Hemisphere Defense - Notes on visit to Argentine.

REFERENCE: (a) Record of first meeting of Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs.
(b) Record of interview with Argentine Minister of Marine.
(c) Questionnaire submitted to Argentine Government.

1. The conversations with the Argentine officers could hardly have taken place under more unfavorable conditions. Our conversations started on 10 June, the day Italy declared war, and had not been completed when France had capitulated.

2. It is a well known fact that the principal sympathy for the Allies has been the Argentine love of France. With France out of the picture there is little to hold them to the Anglo-Saxon coalition. Although the Navy generally is considered to be pro-ally, the Minister of Marine, Admiral Scasso, is of Italian descent, leans towards Fascism. He appears to be very unpopular with the rank and file of the Naval officers. Of course the Army, having had a German Mission for training, is decidedly pro-Nazi.

3. As shown by reference (a), it is evident that the Argentine personnel at the first meeting had been instructed to pursue a policy of delay. The highest representative of the Foreign Office present was third in rank to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The highest Naval official was a Captain, Deputy Chief of Staff. This group was a mere screen to pass on to their superiors what was wanted without, in any way, committing the Argentine Government.

4. Reference (b) shows record of conversations with the Argentine Minister of Marine. His replies were the same as those it was predicted he would make. In other words, the Minister of Marine had no intentions of acceding to any cooperation until this had been thoroughly discussed as a matter of Foreign Policy and, of course, he expected to get the best possible bargain for the Argentine Navy.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By RT; NARS Date 11 1973

5. It should be noted that our questionnaire is confined to committing the Argentine Government to cooperate with our Naval forces and nothing is arranged for the cooperation of the land forces. This places them in an embarrassing position in that even though Navy cooperation should be possible, the Government could hardly make commitments without also committing the land forces.

6. The Argentine Policy appears to be: - To exact certain financial and economical assistance from the United States as a condition for cooperation in Hemisphere Defense. The whole question seems to be bogged down awaiting results of certain financial and economic arrangements.

7. I was in Buenos Aires when it was agreed to make a loan of 20 million dollars from the Export-Import Bank of the United States for the purchase of certain machinery. I also am aware of the negotiations for the purchase of possibly 25 million dollars of canned meat for creating better economical relations. On these particular loans I have no comment to make. There is a third loan, however, which the Argentine Government might possibly request which is to furnish about 50 million dollars worth of war materials. My recommendation is that before furnishing this money we insist, as a condition, that the German Military Mission be replaced by a U.S. Military Mission. It would also be helpful to use this loan as a leverage to increase good relations between our Naval Mission in the Argentine and the Argentine Navy.

8. As the pro-Nazi elements seem to be well established, indeed they have been for many years, there is no surprise regarding the present situation. However, the fact that the Italians are now organizing, possibly in combination with the Germans, makes the situation more serious.

9. Situation in Argentine may be summarized as follows: -

- a. They claim that they can see no danger or threat to themselves or to any other South American Republic.
- b. Invite the United States to inform them of such danger, if it exists.
- c. In case such danger is found, will discuss steps to be taken in accordance with their interpretation of the Declaration of Lima. That is, they will call a reunion of foreign ministers to discuss necessary further steps.
- d. They are unwilling to make any advance agreements as to cooperation as this requires the approval of their Congress.
- e. However, in case any cooperative agreements are made, in case of danger, it should include cultural and financial agreements.

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OSD letter, May 8, 1972

2.

By RT, NARS Date **MAY 21 1973**

- f. German merchants are offering deliveries from August on with 5% penalty clause. Believe this is partly bluff and propaganda.
- g. In case staff talks are carried on in Argentine they should be conducted through the Naval Mission.
- h. In case no other good came out of visit - believe steps have been started to get a better recognition of Naval Mission to Argentine.
- i. Visit of WICHITA seemed to be ill timed for our negotiations. The whole Embassy Staff was solid against visit to Buenos Aires. Captain Baker, Captain Brereton and myself were consulted as to the advisability of a visit to Port Belgrano or other Atlantic Coast port of the Argentine. As the government then had under consideration whether they would let us utilize their bases in case of danger, it appears to us that such visit was not timely. It would appear like we were forcing their hands.
- j. Argentine wishes us to provide them with: -
- (1) \$20,000,000 agricultural machinery - Export-Import Bank.
 - (2) \$25,000,000 purchase of canned beef as war stores.
 - (3) \$50,000,000 planes and tanks - details to be arranged.
- k. Developments since leaving Argentine -
- (1) President has taken indefinite leave of absence.
 - (2) German Military Mission contracts have not been renewed.
- l. Argentine refused to follow us in barring submarines. However, they have given orders to fire on any foreign submarine operating against belligerent or neutral shipping in territorial waters.
- m. Altho everything in Buenos Aires was supposed to be pro-Nazi, was present at a remarkable gathering to raise funds for Dutch and Belgian refugees, about 1500 members of best Argentine society were present.
- n. Argentine defense situation, being involved with financial and economical affairs, will have to await result of Havana conference for further clarification.
- o. The general attitude of the Argentine citizen is that he has closer ties with Europe than with the United States. His prosperity depends on exporting wheat, meat and corn. These commodities compete with our own exports. The blockade has played havoc with their European trade. The fall of France has made

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E).

3.

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D), or 6
OSD letter, May 8, 1972
By BT, ~~PLANS~~ Date MAY 21 1973

o. (Cont'd.)

conditions much worse. If the British are unable to maintain their present purchasing power in Argentine, due to defeat or even pressure from their Colonies, the plight of Argentine will become desperate unless the United States comes to the rescue. They will have no other recourse except to make barter trade with the Axis powers to obtain machinery, munitions, etc. in exchange for their wheat, meat and corn. It is the solution of this economical plight of Argentine that is causing all the delay in defense cooperation. They are willing to mark time to see which way the fortune of war is going before making final decisions. It is to be hoped that the Havana Conference will find a solution .

10. RECOMMENDATIONS -

Subject to general naval policy in supporting the Monroe Doctrine to the fullest extent, the following is recommended: -

- a. To recognize that immediate action is necessary to keep Argentine in the orbit of Pan Americanism.
- b. If necessary, this government should finance entire Argentine exports through some such agency as an Inter-American Bank.
- c. In rendering financial assistance, establishing credits or making loans, conditions should be exacted which would require a close cooperation in hemisphere defense.
- d. Staff conversations should commence as soon as possible through the U.S. Naval Mission to Argentine.
- e. Establish the principle that furnishing war materials to Argentine, or any other Latin American country is conditioned on abolishing all non-American Military or Naval Missions.
- f. Build up our Military and Naval Attache offices to whatever degree is required by war plans.
- g. Increase the number of Consular and other agencies to obtain a better coverage of Nazi-Fascist propaganda.
- h. Initiate a strong American propaganda in all of South America. The best vehicle available for this is the motion picture industry. Create a rigid censorship on the tupe of movies sent to South America. Change the law to permit propaganda strips to become part of movie programs. Speeches made in the United States for local consumption about our unpreparedness, has had a very depressing affect on our South American relations.

- [REDACTED]
- i. Establish a strong South Atlantic Squadron with frequent visits to Argentine ports, if and when Argentine agrees to cooperate.
 - j. Create Naval and Air Bases in Uruguay as being the most strategical spot to cover Argentine, Southern Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Bolivia.
 - k. In case Argentine decides to buy war materials in this country, invite a large Mission of high ranking Army, Navy, and Air officers to visit the United States and take steps to have them inspect some of our principal industrial establishments. They have no conception of the potential strength of our industrial set up.

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OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

BSF Navy
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file →
August 1, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The two attached memoranda outlining Japanese negotiations with Portugal for sale of Japanese arms, and contemplated Japanese policy with respect to France and her Colonies, are forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- JAB

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

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DD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-F-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

31 July 1940 Date- 4-7-70

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations Signature JVA

SUBJECT: Japanese Negotiations with Portugal for Sale of Japanese Arms.

1. It has been learned from sources considered thoroughly reliable that at the end of May 1940, Portugal sounded out Japan on the possibilities of obtaining Japanese arms, particularly field guns for use in Portuguese colonies, offering to pay for them partly in cash and partly in products of Portuguese colonies.

2. While at first non-committal, the Japanese Minister, on instructions early in June from Tokyo, continued negotiations with a view to consummating such a deal along the following lines:

(a) Every effort is to be made to have payments in cash for these transactions in order to obtain foreign exchange, but some goods may be accepted if necessary.

(b) Detailed information on arms desired and places they are to be used is requested.

(c) If part payment is to be made in strategic raw materials, full details on these materials is desired, including value, location, and quantities.

(d) Japan particularly desires to obtain this type of business and is prepared to undertake it at any time provided satisfactory methods of payment can be arranged. However, this business is invariably handled through the Showa Trading Company without the government appearing a party to it in any way.

(e) Careful consideration must be given to the Allied blockade so that there will be no interference from this source.

(f) The possibilities of using these negotiations to obtain concessions later on in Timor are to be kept in mind.



W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to President.

CC - C.N.O.

M.I.D.

State

File (2)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-F-2

WASHINGTON

31 July 1940.

~~Confidential~~

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Contemplated Japanese Policy with respect to France and her Colonies.

1. Highly reliable information has reached the Navy Department that the Japanese Ambassador to France is making an effort to influence French government to turn away from the United States and England, and to enter into closer relations with Japan for the protection of French interests in the Far East. The Japanese Ambassador has reported to his Government that widespread anti-British sentiment has followed in the wake of the French surrender and that in important French circles there is evidence of a profound disappointment with the tenor of the final U.S. reply to the French appeal for help.

2. In view of the foregoing considerations the Japanese Ambassador to France has recommended that his Government pursue a policy of outward magnanimity, avoiding all action that might have the appearance of taking advantage of defeated France. The Ambassador believes that such a policy will be effective in forestalling any French tendency to turn to the United States for aid while at the same time Japan will be enabled to attain all of her objectives by adopting a vigorous attitude in any subsequent negotiations.

W. S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to President
CC - C.N.O.
M.I.D.
State
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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *JAD*

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Personnel*

August 13, 1940.

*PSF
Raw
1*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

For the President's information I am forwarding
copy of recent letter from Cincus on personnel
situation.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan

D. J. CALLAGHAN

Callahan

UNITED STATES FLEET
USS PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CINC File No.

PL6-1/AM/(2452)

Pearl Harbor, T.H.

August 6, 1940

~~RESTRICTED~~

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

Subject: Enlisted Personnel - Need for Increased Numbers of.

1. On page 14231 of the Congressional Record of July 10, 1940, the following statement by Senator Walsh of Massachusetts appears:

"The present number of 170,000 enlisted men authorized for the Navy in the next fiscal year will be ample in my opinion; but the new vessels that are coming forth and being commissioned each year will require increased personnel, and we are training men now for that purpose."

2. Inasmuch as many Senators look to Senator Walsh for accurate information regarding the Navy, and since at times in the past his expressed views have represented those of the Navy Department, it appears desirable to urge that the Navy Department undertake to correct, at an early date, the erroneous impressions that may have been created by his inaccurate remarks.

3. The Commander-in-Chief believes that Senator Walsh's statement contains two serious inaccuracies: the present number of 170,000 enlisted men authorized for the Navy in the fiscal year 1941 is inadequate to properly man the ships already in commission, much less provide trained crews for ships now on the building ways, without reducing the efficiency of the present Fleet so that it cannot carry out its war mission.

4. Every Force and Type Commander in the U. S. Fleet, and numerous Commanding Officers, have brought to my attention the inadequate numbers of enlisted personnel now available within their commands for carrying out necessary preparations for war and have urgently requested additional personnel. So far their requests have not been met. They cannot be met within present appropriation limits, and will not be met within a reasonable time by any plan of the Bureau of Navigation of which the Commander-in-Chief is aware.

5. In order that the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation may be able to add the weight of the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief to his own, the following recommendations are made.

6. I recommend that every ship in the Fleet be provided with not less than 115% of its complement of personnel at the earliest practical date they can be enlisted and put through the training stations. The 15% in excess of complement will permit men for the ships now on the building ways and authorized but not yet laid down, to be trained.

7. I do not believe that the limit of 191,000 enlisted men, which is the present maximum the President can incur a deficiency in appropriations to maintain, anywhere near meets the requirements of the situation. I recommend that the authority to enlist additional men be obtained well in advance of the time when we are able to enlist them.

8. I think the material needs of the Navy are being rapidly cared for, and recommend that the attention of Congress should now be directed to the personnel needs.

9. I note in Senator Walsh's statement that someone has informed him it was estimated that it required 17,000 officers and 226,000 men to man the Navy prior to the 70% increase in the Navy which is now authorized. On this basis the least that should be obtained from Congress is an authorized strength of 226,000, plus 70%, or 384,000, as the upper limit and an immediate start should be made enlisting towards that figure, expanding the training stations so as to produce not less than 12,000 recruits monthly.

Include 20% additional strength of 226,000, plus 70%, or 384,000, as the upper limit and an immediate start should be made enlisting towards that figure, expanding the training stations so as to produce not less than 12,000 recruits monthly.

10. A reduction in the present reasonably satisfactory state of industrial qualification in rating of petty officers is to be expected incidental to expansion to 384,000. The sooner we obtain the additional personnel the sooner the reduction in qualification will take place, and the more quickly the whole new personnel can be trained to a war standard.

11. The limited Naval Reserve personnel can be expected to suggest but not to replace personnel of the regular Navy. Experience to date with enlisted men of the organized and volunteer reserve indicates that they can be expected to satisfactorily fulfill only the duties of one pay grade lower than that held - owing principally to the highly technical nature of present machinery and gunnery installations.

12. Gunnery Officers are continually getting, and correctly so, that they are unable to get the maximum out of their batteries because of the lack of experienced enlisted personnel at present serving in their batteries. In recent destroyer full power runs it was necessary to transfer engineering ratings to the destroyers making the runs in order to have an adequate number of men to safely handle the engineering plant.

13. Failure to take immediate and adequate action along these lines will surely result in the Navy's being unable to render in an efficient manner the service to the Nation for which it has been created and maintained.

/s/ J. O. Richardson

Copy to:
CINC AF
Force Comdrs., U.S. Fleet
Type Comdrs., U.S. Fleet

(COPY)

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 9-27-59

Signature- *Carl F. Spear*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF Navy
File
Personal
Navy


August 13, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Copy of letter received by Admiral Stark.

Respectfully,



D. J. CALLAGHAN

Capt. Callaghan

757 Navy

Zurich (Switzerland), 11 July 1940

To the Admiral Shark,

Chief of the American Navy,
- - - WASHINGTON - - -

Dear Sir,

I offer you :

New weapon who put every ship out of action: equal efficacy, same power, in attack and defence --- this weapon is unknown, otherwise it would be in action everywhere --- put also battle-ships of 45'000 or 50'000 tons out of action --- one can gain sea-battles with this new weapon --- one can even exterminate an entire navy ---

Various other uses, for expl. : a little war-ship can combat unassisted (alone) a battle-ship and beat it --- further: this new weapon is a first class coast-guard --- besides : save to be constrained to build many battle-ships very dearly ---

In addition to that, an invaded country could attain that the ships of the attacker risk no longer to use the rivers and coasts of this country.--- An invaded country also derange and interrupt the navigation of the invader in such a manner, that his supplies, specially with arms and ammunition &c., could seriously suffer and force the attacker to retreat.--- Only 2 till 4 men are capable to put every ship out of action --- my invention is also the best weapon for the guerilla-war against ships.-

My conditions : If on the occasion of my practical demonstration J, or other persons, will together put out of action 3 (tree) ships, you pay me the price concluded (fixed) and deposited.--- Practical demonstrations are possible in 15 days nearly --- in a few other weeks a certain number of this new weapon could be ready for combats --- Fabrication very rapid, and not dear.-

I have also make the following inventions :

Against T a n k s and against all other vehicles for war: a new unknown weapon with which every simple soldier can put out of action 3 to 5, or even more Tanks &c. (including colossus of 80 tons) --- with this invention a defensive-army can put out of action 500 to 2'000 Tanks &c., daily.- Can be demonstrated immediately.-

Against parachute-men, troops clinged round, fortresses isolated,

Places encircled, &c : the most efficacious weapon for attacks --- to force the Surrender --- annihilate all resistance --- absolutely unknown --- Tanks and Stukas are attack-weapons specially for the war in the open country --- my new arm is also for the attack against greatest natural obstacles --- there is only one unknown special defence which resist --- it is impossible to improvise this defence --- his special construction require a long time.-

Against all flying-machines and Stukas: a new unknown weapon who makes possible to bring down perhaps till 50% of the aggressors - this weapon defend of a complete new manner - a revolution in the defence against flyers - this fourth invention is not yet quite terminated - it requires still trials.-

MEM REPT
DEVL. STI
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- 2 -

Please let me know for every weapon the addresses of about
10 great Establishments in U.S.A., who manufacture weapons of
this kind.- Many thanks.- I am, Sir, your respectfully

/s/ E. Rychner, Neustadtgasse 7,
Zurich 1.
(Switzerland)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*File
Personal
Navy
1* PSF

August 14, 1940.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The War Department informs me that the AMERICAN LEGION is scheduled to sail from Petsamo on 16 August, with tentative arrival date at New York set for August 27th. However, this is subject to change, due to the fact that the German Air Force has objected to the proposed course to be taken by the vessel, and several more days may elapse before clearance is given the vessel for course that she is to take.

I shall keep in touch with the AMERICAN LEGION's movements and inform the President when I have anything definite on this vessel.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF Navy

*File
personal
confidential*

August 16, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached report of progress, as of August 1, 1940, on vessels under construction for the Navy is forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

33 Navy

Se

REGISTRATION

AUGUST 10, 1940

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF AUGUST 1, 1940

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:						Date of Completion		
		August 1 1940	Gain for Month of July 1940	Keel Laid	Launched	or Order	Eld. order	As per contract	to or contract	As reported by building yard
<u>BATTLESHIPS</u>										
BB55: NORTH CAROLINA	:New York	: 77.6	: 3.5	: 10/27/37:	6/13/40:	8/ 1/37:	49	: 9/ 1/41	: 7/15/41	
BB56: WASHINGTON	:Philadelphia	: 72.5	: 3.1	: 6/14/38:	6/ 1/40:	8/ 1/37:	52	: 12/ 1/41	: 12/ 1/41	
BB57: SOUTH DAKOTA	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 26.6	: 4.0	: 7/ 5/39:	-	: 12/15/38:	52	: 4/15/43	: 12/15/42	
BB58: INDIANA	:NNSB&DD Co.	: 19.7	: 1.5	: 11/20/39:	-	: 12/15/38:	52	: 4/15/43	: 4/15/43	
BB59: MASSACHUSETTS	:B.S.Co. (Quincy):	: 23.6	: 2.8	: 7/20/39:	-	: 12/15/38:	55	: 7/15/43	: 7/15/43	
BB60: ALABAMA	:Norfolk	: 14.7	: 1.5	: 2/ 1/40:	-	: 4/ 1/39:	52	: 8/ 1/43	: 8/ 1/43	
BB61: IOWA	:New York	: 2.8	: 0.8	: 6/27/40:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	49	: 8/ 1/43	: 6/ 1/43	
BB62: NEW JERSEY	:Philadelphia	: 1.2	: 1.2	: -	-	: 7/ 1/39:	52	: 11/ 1/43	: 6/ 1/44(a)	
BB63: MISSOURI	:New York	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40:	48	: 6/12/44	:	
BB64: WISCONSIN	:Philadelphia	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40:	48	: 6/12/44	:	
<u>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</u>										
CV8: HORNET	:NNSB&DD Co.	: 40.2	: 4.7	: 9/25/39:	-	: 4/10/39:	34	: 2/10/42	: 2/10/42	
CV9: ESSEX	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	42	: 4/ 1/44(b):		
CV10: BON HOMME RICHARD	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	47	: 9/ 1/44(b):		
CV11: INTREPID	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	52	: 2/ 1/45(b):		
CV12: KEARSARGE	:Norfolk	:	:	:	:	: 6/21/40:	45	: 6/ 1/44(b):		
<u>HEAVY CRUISERS</u>										
CA68: BALTIMORE	:B.S.Co. (Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	33	: 7/ 1/43(b):		
CA69: BOSTON	:B.S.Co. (Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	35	: 9/ 1/43(b):		
CA70: PITTSBURGH	:B.S.Co. (Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	39	: 1/ 1/44(b):		
CA71: ST. PAUL	:B.S.Co. (Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	43	: 5/ 1/44(b):		

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

- (a) An extension in the building period of at least 6 months will be required on each vessel, the exact amount not now determinable.
(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

Date- 2-18-59

Signature-

Carl J. Spicer

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				:Date of Completion				
		August 1	Month of	Keel	Date of	Mos.	contract	to	or	building
		1940	July 1940	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld.	order	yard	As per reported
:LIGHT CRUISERS		TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld.	order	yard	As
CI51:ATLANTA	:Fed.SB&DD Co.	: 19.9	: 3.6	: 4/22/40	-	: 4/25/39	36	: 4/25/42	4/25/42	
CI52:JUNEAU	:Fed.SB&DD Co.	: 17.4	: 3.3	: 5/27/40	-	: 4/25/39	38	: 6/25/42	6/25/42	
CI53:SAN DIEGO	:B.S.Co.(Quincy)	: 12.7	: 1.8	: 3/27/40	-	: 4/25/39	39	: 7/25/42	7/25/42	
CI54:SAN JUAN	:B.S.Co.(Quincy)	: 12.0	: 1.3	: 5/15/40	-	: 4/25/39	41	: 9/25/42	9/25/42	
CI55:CLEVELAND	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 0.8	: 0.4	: 7/ 1/40	-	: 3/23/40	36	: 3/23/43	12/ 1/42	
CI56:COLUMBIA	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 0.6	: 0.2	: -	-	: 3/23/40	39	: 6/23/43	2/ 1/43	
CI57:MONTPELIER	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	36 $\frac{1}{2}$: 6/27/43	5/ 1/43	
CI58:DENVER	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	39 $\frac{1}{2}$: 9/27/43	7/15/43	
CI59:AMSTERDAM	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	40 $\frac{1}{2}$: 11/15/43		
CI60:SANTA YN	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	42 $\frac{1}{2}$: 1/16/44		
CI61:TALLAHASSEE	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	44 $\frac{1}{2}$: 3/16/44		
CI62:BIRMINGHAM	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40	32	: 3/ 3/43		
CI63:MOBILE	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40	35	: 6/ 3/43		
CI64:FLINT	:B.S.Co.(Quincy)	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	41	: 12/ 1/43		
CI65:PASADENA	:B.S.Co.(Quincy)	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	47	: 6/ 1/44		
CI66:SPRINGFIELD	:B.S.Co.(Quincy)	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	50	: 9/ 1/44		
CI67:TOPEKA	:B.S.Co.(Quincy)	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	52	: 11/ 1/44		
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				:Date of Completion			
		August 1	Month of	Keel	Date of	Mo.	contract	by	
		1940	July 1940	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld.	order	yard
:SUBMARINES									
SS200:THRESHER	:Elec. Boat Co.:	99.1	: 1.9	: 4/27/39:	3/27/40:	8/ 2/38:	33	: 5/ 2/41:	8/27/40
SS201:TRITON	:Portsmouth :	86.1	: 3.1	: 7/ 5/39:	3/25/40:	9/ 1/38:	30	: 3/ 1/41:	11/ 1/40
SS202:TROUT	:Portsmouth :	76.6	: 3.9	: 8/28/39:	5/21/40:	9/ 1/38:	32	: 5/ 1/41:	1/ 1/41
SS203:TUNA	:Maro Island :	70.8	: 8.0	: 7/19/39:	-	:11/ 1/38:	30	: 5/ 1/41:	3/ 1/41
SS204:MACKEREL	:Elec. Boat Co.:	73.6	: 8.9	:10/ 6/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	23	: 5/15/41:	3/31/41
SS205:MARLIN	:Portsmouth :	19.8	: 6.4	: 5/28/40:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	27	:10/ 1/41:	10/ 1/41
SS206:GAR	:Elec. Boat Co.:	55.1	: 6.5	:12/27/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	25	: 7/15/41:	4/22/41
SS207:GRAMPUS	:Elec. Boat Co.:	47.6	: 4.5	: 2/14/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	27	: 9/15/41:	6/ 2/41
SS208:GRAYBACK	:Elec. Boat Co.:	43.1	: 3.8	: 4/ 3/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	29	:11/15/41:	7/14/41
SS209:GRAYLING	:Portsmouth :	52.0	: 13.0	:12/15/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	25	: 8/ 1/41:	5/ 1/41
SS210:GRENADIER	:Portsmouth :	37.5	: 8.5	: 4/ 2/40:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	29	:12/ 1/41:	8/ 1/41
SS211:GUDGEON	:Maro Island :	45.0	: 6.0	:11/22/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	27	:10/ 1/41:	10/ 1/41
SS212:GATO	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.4	: 0.4	:	:	: 6/12/40:	20	: 2/12/42:	2/12/42
SS213:GREENLING	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.4	: 0.4	:	:	: 6/12/40:	21	: 3/27/42:	3/27/42
SS214:GROUPE	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.4	: 0.4	:	:	: 6/12/40:	23	: 5/12/42:	5/12/42
SS215:GROWLER	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	24	: 7/15/42:	7/15/42
SS216:GRUNION	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	26	: 9/ 1/42:	9/ 1/42
SS217:GUARDFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	27	:10/16/42:	10/16/42
SS218:ALBACORE	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	29	:12/ 1/42:	12/ 1/42
SS219:AMBERJACK	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	30	: 1/16/43:	1/16/43
SS220:BARB	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	32	: 3/ 1/43:	3/ 1/43
SS221:BLACKFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	33	: 4/16/43:	4/16/43
SS222:BLUEFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	35	: 6/ 1/43:	6/ 1/43
SS223:POWFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	36	: 7/16/43:	7/16/43
SS224:COD	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.3	: 0.3	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	38	: 9/ 1/43:	9/ 1/43

Type, number and name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Completion		
		August 1940	Gain for Month of July 1940	TOTAL	TOTAL			Date of contract	Mos. to order	contracted by
: SUBMARINES (CONT'D):										
SS225: CERO	: Elec. Boat Co.	: 0.3	: 0.3	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	39½	: 10/16/43:	10/16/43
SS226: CORVINA	: Elec. Boat Co.	: 0.3	: 0.3	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	41	: 12/ 1/43:	12/ 1/43
SS227: DARTER	: Elec. Boat Co.	: 0.3	: 0.3	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	42½	: 1/16/44:	1/16/44
SS228: DRUM	: Portsmouth	: 1.0	: 1.0	:	:	:	: 6/12/40:	21	: 3/12/42:	
SS229: FLYING FISH	: Portsmouth	: 1.0	: 1.0	:	:	:	: 6/12/40:	23½	: 5/27/42:	
SS230: FINBACK	: Portsmouth	: 1.0	: 1.0	:	:	:	: 6/12/40:	27	: 9/12/42:	
SS231: HADDOCK	: Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	28½	: 11/12/42:	
SS232: HALIBUT	: Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	31	: 1/28/43:	
SS233: HERRING	: Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	33½	: 4/12/43:	
SS234: KINGFISH	: Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	36	: 6/28/43:	
SS235: SHAD	: Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	38½	: 9/12/43:	
SS236: SILVERSIDES	: Mare Island	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	23	: 5/28/42:	5/28/42
SS237: TRIGGER	: Mare Island	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	26	: 8/28/42:	8/28/42
SS238: WAHOO	: Mare Island	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	33	: 3/28/43:	3/28/43
SS239: WHALE	: Mare Island	:	:	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	36	: 6/28/43:	6/28/43

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion			
		August 1 1940	Month of July 1940	Keel Laid	Launched	Date of contract to or bld.	Mos. order	contract or	As reported building yard
<u>DESTROYERS</u>									
DD421: BENSON	: B.S.Co. (Quincy):			Delivered	and Commissioned	25 July 1940			
DD422: MAYO	: B.S.Co. (Quincy):	90.6	6.2	: 5/16/38:	3/26/40:	9/30/37:	34	: 7/30/40:	9/25/40
DD424: NIBLACK	: Bath Iron Wks.:			Delivered	and Commissioned	1 August 1940			
DD425: MADISON *	: Boston:	96.2	12.0	: 12/19/38:	10/20/39:	12/30/37:	34	: 10/30/40:	9/ 1/40
DD426: LANSDALE	: Boston:	88.4	7.7	: 12/19/38:	10/20/39:	12/30/37:	36	: 12/30/40:	11/ 1/40
DD427: HILARY P. JONES	: Charleston:	84.3	8.0	: 11/16/38:	12/14/39:	12/30/37:	34	: 10/30/40:	10/30/40
DD428: CHAS. F. HUGHES	: Puget Sound:	93.4	10.1	: 1/ 3/39:	5/16/40:	12/30/37:	34	: 10/30/40:	10/18/40
DD429: LIVERMORE	: Bath Iron Wks.:	83.7	5.8	: 3/ 6/39:	8/3/40:	8/15/38:	28	: 12/15/40:	10/10/40
DD430: EBERLE	: Bath Iron Wks.:	78.6	6.2	: 4/12/39:	-	: 8/15/38:	30	: 2/15/41:	12/ 5/40
DD431: PLUNKETT	: Fed. SB&DD Co.:			Delivered	16 July 1940	Commissioned	17 July 1940		
DD432: KEARNY	: Fed. SB&DD Co.:	94.6	3.4	: 3/ 1/39:	3/ 9/40:	8/17/38:	32	: 4/17/41:	9/17/40
DD433: GWIN	: Boston:	53.2	5.7	: 5/ 1/39:	5/25/40:	10/ 1/38:	29	: 3/ 1/41:	3/ 1/41
DD434: MEREDITH	: Boston:	51.5	5.7	: 6/ 1/39:	4/24/40:	10/ 1/38:	31	: 5/ 1/41:	5/ 1/41
DD435: GRAYSON	: Charleston:	51.8	5.0	: 7/17/39:	8/ 7/40:	10/ 1/38:	30	: 4/ 1/41:	4/ 1/41
DD436: MONSSEN	: Puget Sound:	59.8	9.8	: 7/12/39:	5/16/40:	10/ 1/38:	29	: 3/ 1/41:	2/ 1/41
DD437: WOOLSEY	: Bath Iron Wks.:	54.8	4.2	: 10/ 9/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	24	: 6/15/41:	5/15/41
DD438: LUDLOW	: Bath Iron Wks.:	52.1	7.2	: 12/18/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	26	: 8/15/41:	7/15/41
DD439: EDISON	: Fed. SB&DD Co.:	52.4	5.8	: 3/18/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	24	: 6/15/41:	3/15/41
DD440: ERICSSON	: Fed. SB&DD Co.:	47.1	6.4	: 3/18/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	26	: 8/15/41:	5/15/41
DD441: WILKES	: Boston:	34.3	4.9	: 11/ 1/39:	5/31/40:	7/ 1/39:	24	: 7/ 1/41:	7/ 1/41
DD442: NICHOLSON	: Boston:	32.3	4.9	: 11/ 1/39:	5/31/40:	7/ 1/39:	26	: 9/ 1/41:	9/ 1/41
DD443: SWANSON	: Charleston:	29.0	5.5	: 11/15/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	26	: 9/ 1/41:	9/ 1/41
DD444: INGRAHAM	: Charleston:	20.2	2.4	: 11/15/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	28	: 11/ 1/41:	11/ 1/41

* Commissioned 6 August 1940.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel Laid	Launched	Date of contract	Date of order	Date of Bld. order	Date of Completion	
		August 1 1940	Gain for Month of July 1940	TOTAL						TOTAL	As reported by building yard
DESTROYERS (CONT'D)											
DD445:FLETCHER	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	28	11/ 1/42(b):			
DD446:RADFORD	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	30	1/ 1/43(b):			
DD447:JENKINS	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	31	2/ 1/43(b):			
DD448:LA VALLETTE	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	33	4/ 1/43(b):			
DD449:NICHOLAS	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40:	28	11/ 1/42(b):			
DD450:O'BANNON	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40:	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	12/16/42(b):			
DD451:CHEVALIER	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40:	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	1/16/43(b):			
DD452:PERCIVAL	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	39	10/ 1/43 :			
DD453:BRISTOL	Fed.SB&DD Co.					6/12/40:	18	12/12/41 :			
DD454:ELLYSON	Fed.SB&DD Co.					6/12/40:	20	2/12/42 :			
DD455:HAMBLETON	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	22	5/ 1/42 :			
DD456:RODMAN	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	24	7/ 1/42 :			
DD457:EMMONS	Bath Iron Wks.					6/12/40:	18	12/12/41 :			12/12/41
DD458:MACOMB	Bath Iron Wks.					6/12/40:	20	2/12/42 :			2/12/42
DD459:LAFFEY	Beth.SteelCo.(S.F.):					7/ 1/40:	20	3/ 1/42 :			
DD460:WOODWORTH	Beth.SteelCo.(S.F.):					7/ 1/40:	21	4/ 1/42 :			
DD461:FORREST	Boston	0.4	0.4			6/12/40:	20	2/12/42 :			2/12/42
DD462:FITCH	Boston	0.4	0.4			6/12/40:	22	4/12/42 :			4/12/42
DD463:CORRY	Charleston	0.7	0.2			6/12/40:	20	2/12/42 :			2/12/42
DD464:HOBSON	Charleston	0.7	0.2			6/12/40:	22	4/12/42 :			4/12/42
DD465:SAUFLEY	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	34	5/ 1/43(b):			
DD466:WALLER	Fed.SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40:	35	6/ 1/43(b):			
DD467:STRONG	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40:	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	2/16/43(b):			
DD468:TAYLOR	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40:	33	4/ 1/43(b):			
DD469:DE HAVEN	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40:	35	6/ 1/43(b):			

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion				
		August 1 1940	Gain for Month of July 1940	Keel Laid	Launched or order	Date of contract	Mos.	contract to	As per or	:As reported by building yard
<u>:DESTROYERS (CONT'D):</u>										
DD470:BACHE	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	30 :	1/ 1/43(b) :	:	
DD471:BEALE	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	32 :	3/ 1/43(b) :	:	
DD472:GUEST	:Boston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	32 :	3/ 1/43(b) :	3/ 1/43	
DD473:BENNETT	:Boston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	34 :	5/ 1/43(b) :	5/ 1/43	
DD474:FULLAM	:Boston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	36 :	7/ 1/43(b) :	7/ 1/43	
DD475:HUDSON	:Boston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	38 :	9/ 1/43(b) :	9/ 1/43	
DD476:HUTCHINS	:Boston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	30 :	1/ 1/43(b) :	1/ 1/43	
DD477:PRINGLE	:Charleston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	30 :	1/ 1/43(b) :	1/ 1/43	
DD478:STANLY	:Charleston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	32 :	3/ 1/43(b) :	3/ 1/43	
DD479:STEVENS	:Charleston :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	34 :	5/ 1/43(b) :	5/ 1/43	
DD480:HALFORD	:Puget Sound :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	31 :	2/ 1/43(b) :	:	
DD481:LEUTZE	:Puget Sound :	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	33 :	4/ 1/43(b) :	:	
DD482:WATSON	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	40 :	11/ 1/43(b) :	:	
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion			
		August 1 1940	Gain for Month of July 1940	Keel Laid	Launched	Date of contract	Mos. to	contract or	building order
		TOTAL	TOTAL						
<u>DESTROYER TENDERS:</u>									
AD15	:PRAIRIE	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
			:Delivered and Commissioned 5 August 1940						
<u>MINESWEEPERS</u>									
AM55	:RAVEN	:Norfolk	: 68.5	: 9.1	: 6/28/39	-	: 9/ 1/38:	24	: 9/ 1/40:12/13/40
AM56	:OSPREY	:Norfolk	: 67.9	: 8.6	: 6/28/39	-	: 9/ 1/38:	26	:11/ 1/40: 1/15/41
AM57	:AUK	:Norfolk	: 0.1	: 0.1	:	:	: 6/12/40:	15	: 9/12/41: 9/12/41
<u>REPAIR SHIP</u>									
AB5	:VULCAN	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 26.6	: 6.3	:12/26/39	-	: 8/ 1/39:	32	: 4/ 1/42: 8/ 1/41
<u>SUBMARINE TENDER</u>									
AS11	:FULTON	:Mare Island	: 48.3	: 6.0	: 7/19/39	-	: 9/ 1/38:	36	: 9/ 1/41: 9/ 1/41
AS12	:SPERRY	:Mare Island	: 0.2	: 0.2	:	:	: 6/12/40:	30	:12/12/42:12/12/42
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>									
AV4	:CURTISS	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 81.4	: 8.9	: 4/25/38	4/20/40:	12/27/37:	38	: 2/27/41:11/ 1/40
AV5	:ALBEMARLE	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 58.8	: 5.1	: 6/12/39	6/13/40:	10/14/38:	32	: 6/14/41: 2/ 1/41
AV7	:CURRITUCK	:N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	48	: 7/ 1/44:
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>									
AVP10	:BARNEGAT	:Puget Sound	: 37.9	: 6.1	:10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38:	27	:12/ 1/40: 3/ 1/41
AVP11	:BISCAYNE	:Puget Sound	: 37.9	: 5.3	:10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38:	30	: 3/ 1/41: 5/ 1/41
AVP12	:CASCO	:Puget Sound	: 20.4	: 5.9	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/ 1/39:	24	: 7/ 1/41: 7/ 1/41
AVP13	:MACKINAC	:Puget Sound	: 19.7	: 5.8	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/ 1/39:	27	:10/ 1/41:10/ 1/41
AVP21	:HUMBOLDT	:Boston	: 1.6	: 1.6	:	:	: 6/12/40:	16	:10/12/41:10/12/41
AVP22	:MATAGORDA	:Boston	: 1.6	: 1.6	:	:	: 6/12/40:	18	:12/12/41:12/12/41
<u>MINELAYER</u>									
CM5	:TERROR	:Philadelphia	: 1.2	: 1.2	:	-	: 9/ 1/39:	36	: 9/ 1/42: 1/ 1/43

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion				
		August 1	Gain for	Month of	Keel	Date of	Contract	Cal.	As per	
		1940	July 1940	July 1940	Laid	contract	order	or	reported	
		TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched	or order	Days	order	yard	
<u>SUBMARINE CHASERS:</u>										
PC449 :	:Ingers Mar. C. Co. :	99.9 :	1.9 :	7/10/39 :	5/14/40 :	7/ 1/39 :	300 :	4/26/40 :	8/15/40(a) :	
PC451 :	:DeFoe B&M Wks. :	99.0 :	6.0 :	9/25/39 :	5/23/40 :	6/15/39 :	360 :	6/10/40 :	8/10/40(a) :	
PC452 :	:DeFoe B&M Wks. :	54.0 :	11.0 :	3/14/40 :	- :	10/19/39 :	360 :	10/13/40 :	10/13/40 :	
PC453 :	:Fisher Boat Wks. :	:	:	:	:	7/ 8/40 :	360 :	7/ 3/41 :	:	
PTC1 :	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	
to 12 :	:E. B. Co. Elco Wks. :	26.0 *	- 10.0 (b) :	- :	- :	12/13/39 :	390 :	1/ 6/41 :	12/ 1/40(c) :	
<u>MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS</u>										
PT1 :	:Miami S. B. Corp. :	88.5 :	2.0 :	7/12/39 :	8/16/39 :	6/ 8/39 :	165 :	11/20/39 :	11/15/40(a) :	
PT2 :	:Miami S. B. Corp. :	88.5 :	2.0 :	8/19/39 :	9/30/39 :	6/ 8/39 :	165 :	11/20/39 :	11/15/40(a) :	
PT5 :	:Higgins Ind. Inc. :	96.5 :	4.0 :	8/ 1/39 :	- :	6/10/39 :	175 :	12/ 2/39 :	9/15/40(a) :	
PT6 :	:Higgins Ind. Inc. :	80.0 :	20.0 :	5/15/40 :	- :	6/10/39 :	- :	8/26/40 :	9/15/40(a) :	
PT7 :	:Philadelphia :	44.7 :	9.3 :	8/29/39 :	- :	6/23/39 :	- :	- :	10/ 1/40 :	
PT8 :	:Philadelphia :	90.6 :	10.5 :	12/29/39 :	- :	7/18/39 :	- :	- :	10/ 1/40 :	
PT10 :	:	:	:	:	:	:	300-	:	:	
to 19 :	:E. B. Co. Elco Wks. :)	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	
PT20 :	:E. B. Co. Elco Wks. :)	46.0 *	30.3 :	- :	- :	12/13/39 :	390 :	10/ 8/40(c) :	9/15/40(c) :	
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	2/ 1/41(e) :	3/ 1/41(e) :	

- (a) These vessels delayed due to late engine deliveries.
 (c) First vessel only, balance scheduled for delivery at uniform intervals thereafter.
 (d) Delivery date delayed due to construction of replacement boat.
 * Estimated completion for class.
 (b) Percentage completion affected by revision in contract delivery dates.
 (e) Date changed due to design change.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


August 16, 1940.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Although Admiral Stark spoke to the President over the telephone last night about this matter, I thought the President might be interested in reading the reasoning which lead to Admiral Stark's suggestion concerning Fleet Problem.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK:

I fully approve the plan outlined
in yours of August 14th. Please notify
Admiral Richardson and General Marshall.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Date- 2. 27-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*~~Confidential~~NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

14 August 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall Richardson's request that because of summer target practices scheduled it would not be convenient to bring the Fleet back to the Coast until September. The question as to whether the Fleet be brought back then, that is in September, is still an open one.

The next Fleet Problem (Fleet Problem No. 22) you may recall has been scheduled for the Third Quarter in the Panama-Pacific Area, everybody participating, all Army possible and all available ships in the Atlantic - the Canal to be attacked from both sides. To accomplish this a lot of planning and spade work will have to be done with the Army as it is the first time as far as I know where we want to make our Fleet Problem include a more or less major Army Problem. Air forces in particular will have a large part.

The Army is making preparations now and the question comes up as to whether a movement of the Fleet to the Panama Area will best fit in with the requirements of the international situation.

The two main factors are of course;-first the actual and prospective status of the British Fleet, and second the developments in the Far East and the position or attitude taken by the United States in regard to these developments. If, and as the status of the British Fleet becomes more hazardous, the weight of the influence of the United States Fleet in restraining aggression in the Far East grows weaker. Nevertheless we are now maintaining a stand in Shanghai and elsewhere, the main support of which rests upon the Fleet in the Pacific, linked up with United States Economic Power.

If the Fleet is withdrawn to the Panama Area for the Fleet Problem,- and during the period in advance of the Fleet Problem it were to become known that such a move were to be made-, it might be interpreted to some extent by the Japanese

to indicate that United States Naval Pressure to the Westward was being relaxed, or perhaps even abandoned.

If, on the other hand, the position in the Atlantic becomes much worse the movement of some fleet units toward the Atlantic may become unavoidable. In such event the holding of the Fleet Problem in the Panama Area might well fit in. From Panama the Fleet is in position for a quick move to the Atlantic; or for a move to the West Coast or Hawaii.

Another alternative would be for the Fleet Problem to consist of an attack on the West Coast. Here again the Army could be brought extensively into play. An incidental advantage to such a Problem, and perhaps not so incidental either, would be the resultant visit of ships to their home ports, seeing their families, and a corresponding boost in morale.

Of course you recall the pros and cons of our previous discussion about bringing the Fleet back to the West Coast and J.O.Richardson's feelings about it, except that he did not want to return before September on account of the target practices and other problems scheduled for the First Quarter.

All in all it is most anybody's guess but it does seem that the Fleet Problem should be geared to the international situation.

If the international situation continues approximately as is, a Fleet Problem in the Northern Pacific Area would be indicated. If the situation in the Atlantic in regard to Britain's position becomes much worse, the carrying out of the Problem in the Panama-Caribbean Area as now planned would be indicated.

Accordingly, I recommend that the present plans for the scheduled exercises in the Panama Area be completed, but that alternative plans for a Problem in the Northern Pacific be tentatively sketched so that we can be ready for a quick shift either way. As to whether a Problem in the Northern Pacific should be one directed against the West Coast or one in the Hawaiian Area, I should like to consult J.O. before coming to any decision.

If you approve of the foregoing I will immediately notify J.O.Richardson and General Marshall and proceed along the lines indicated.

I might add that in case a Fleet Problem is not held in the Panama Area, we propose to have a separate Problem involving an attack by our ships in the Atlantic on the Canal and of course will give Marshall every opportunity to join in to the fullest extent possible. As a matter of fact I look on these as Joint Army and Navy Problems.

Betty-

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 19, 1940

get to the point
ASF
Henry
(Co. as Target)


My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of this morning, I am enclosing herewith the two drafts which I read to you over the telephone and which you approved.

Lothian has not yet returned to Washington, but I have sent word that I wish to see him urgently this afternoon and as soon as I can talk with him, I shall hand him these copies as we agreed.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:
Drafts A and B.

The President,
The White House.

DRAFT A

I am instructed by H. B. M. Government to transmit in its name to the Government of the United States the following commitments:

1. In accordance with the statements made by the Prime Minister to Parliament on June 4 last, in the event that, during the course of the present war in which the British Empire and the Dominions are engaged, the waters surrounding the British Isles become untenable for British ships of war, the latter would in no event be surrendered or sunk, but would be sent to other ports of the Empire for continued defense of the Empire.

2. The British Government will make available to the Government of the United States, for immediate establishment and use, naval and air bases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana, such bases to be leased by the United States for a period of 99 years.

The two Governments will immediately determine by common agreement the exact location of such bases within the colonies above mentioned as may be required in the judgment of the United States for purposes of defense as

well as for peacetime training.

The British Government, in the terms of the leases to be agreed upon, will grant to the United States for the period of the leases all the rights, power, and authority within the bases leased, and within the limits of the territorial waters adjacent to such bases, which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory and waters above mentioned to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the British Government and its agents of such sovereign rights, power, or authority. However, individuals other than citizens of the United States who may be charged within the area of the bases leased with crimes or misdemeanors amenable to the laws of the British Colonies within which such bases are located shall be delivered by the appropriate United States authorities to the duly authorized authorities of the Colonies in question.

The British Government will accept as in full compensation for the leases referred to in paragraph 2 as above set forth, the following naval and military materiel:

DRAFT B

I have received your communication of
of which the text is as follows:

(Quote)

In as much as in the opinion of the Government of the United States the commitments on the part of the British Government contained in the two numbered paragraphs of your communication are destined to enhance the national security of the United States and greatly to strengthen its ability to cooperate effectively with the other nations of the Americas in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, they are gladly received and accepted.

The Government of the United States will immediately designate commissioners to meet with commissioners designated by the British Government to determine upon the exact location of the naval and air bases mentioned in paragraph two of your communication under acknowledgment.

In full payment for the 99 year leases for such bases, the Government of the United States will immediately transfer to the British Government the naval and military materiel listed in your communication above quoted, and which is as follows:

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

*file
confidential*

PSF: Navy

*Navy
(to check up on)*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

21 August 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the possibility of an exchange of 50 of our destroyers, 5 Navy long range patrol bombers, and 5 Army flying fortresses for 99-year leases of bases in the islands of Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and in British Guiana:-

Section 14 (a) of Public 671, 76th Congress, Third Session, approved June 28, 1940, stated:

"Notwithstanding the provision of any other law, no military or naval weapon, ship, boat, aircraft, munitions, supplies, or equipment, to which the United States has title, in whole or in part, or which have been contracted for, shall hereafter be transferred, exchanged, sold, or otherwise disposed of in any manner whatsoever unless the Chief of Naval Operations in the case of naval material, and the Chief of Staff of the Army in the case of military material, shall first certify that such material is not essential to the defense of the United States."

Section 14 (b) of the same Statute provides:

"The copies of each contract, order or agreement herein referred to shall be transmitted to the respective chairmen of the committees not later than twenty-four hours after such contract, order or agreement is made, and the chairman of each committee shall consider such contracts, orders or agreements confidential unless a majority of the members of his committee shall direct the particular transaction to be made public."

Independently of other considerations I could not certify that the United States naval material above referred to is not essential to the National Defense of the United States. The question naturally arises as to whether or not I could make such a certification if in place of this naval material we were to receive something in exchange which, in my opinion, would be of greater value to the National Defense of the United States than the material which we would release.

I consulted the Attorney General on this point;- appended is a copy of his decision - the meat of which is contained in the last sentence which I quote:-

"It is my opinion that the Chief of Naval Operations may, and should, certify under section 14(a) that such destroyers are not essential to the defense of the United States if in his judgment the exchange of such destroyers for strategic naval and air bases will strengthen rather than impair the total defense of the United States."

It is my opinion that an exchange of such destroyers and naval aircraft for naval and air bases on 99-year leases in Newfoundland, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and in British Guiana, will strengthen rather than impair the total defense of the United States; provided of course we are able to secure the location of the leases at the sites that are considered adequate to our needs, and provided the conditions imposed by the leases are broad enough to give the United States all necessary jurisdiction and provision for developing and defending the bases. Of course in making such a certification I must assume that money for the development of these bases will be forthcoming.

In view of this, as well as the statutory aspects previously mentioned, I would like to suggest the following for your consideration. Take into your confidence the Chairmen of the Senate and House Naval and Military Affairs Committees and the Chairmen of the Senate and House-Sub-committees on Appropriations, and such other Members of Congress as you might consider appropriate. It would seem particularly desirable to carry out some such procedure in view of the fact that the Secretary of the Navy is required to report to the respective committees of Congress within twenty-four hours after the negotiations are closed.

H.R.S.

"This is the time when a feller needs a friend"

H.R.S.



*file
Confidential*

*PSF: Navy
Navy*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1940

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a copy of a letter I have received today from Lord Lothian in which he sets forth the desire of the British Government for further materiel from the Government of the United States.

I have sent copies of this communication to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy for their information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
From the British Ambassador,
August 22, 1940.

The President,
The White House.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

August 22nd, 1940

SECRET

Dear Mr. Welles,

As I told you this afternoon I append a list of the further desiderata which my Government hope the United States will be able to give favourable consideration to, apart from the releasing of 50 destroyers, 20 motor torpedo boats, 5 PBV-5 flying boats and the 5 flying fortresses and, it is earnestly hoped, the 250,000 Lee-Enfield rifles which have been the subject matter of our recent agreement.

They are:

1. P.B.V. Flying Boats - Unless release of an additional quantity can be granted of the older type of flying boat (P.B.V. 4) of which it is understood there are important stocks now on hand, that the United Kingdom be allowed priority to the extent of 1 for 1 alongside the United States Navy for future deliveries, irrespective of present relative delivery contract dates.
2. Fighter Planes - Should the need become very vital in the next few weeks, that 200 pursuit planes, equipped and ready for action, be made available.
3. Tanks - A request has been made for immediate priority on 70 M2A4 tanks for use in fighting in Africa. It is understood deliveries are being made to the United States Administration on a 3-a-day basis, shortly rising to 5 a day. There might be an advantage from the United States view in having these tanks tried out under war conditions.
4. Rifle Ammunition - It is particularly asked that nothing be allowed to interfere with the 10,000,000 per month deliveries promised us for August to December of .30 calibre rifle ammunition, bearing in mind the priority was granted as a part of the release to the United Kingdom of some 80,000 .30 calibre machine guns and 500,000 Lee Enfield rifles for which there is no other ammunition supply source in the immediate future.

Yours sincerely,

LOTHIAN

The Honourable
Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State,
Washington.

PSF 495
Navy

BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS

MEMORANDUM

Date 27 August, 1940

*File
personnel
2-57
1-40*

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. The present procurement situation is:
 - a. Orders in the period 1 June to 15 August were placed on 1686 airplanes, 31 of which are to be paid for out of fiscal 1940 appropriations.
 - b. ^{1401 Tr. 243 C. 11 JR misc.} 1655 are to be paid for out of 1941 appropriations. The value of these is, for the planes \$20,614,782 and for the govt furnished material to be installed therein \$18,502,177, (of which latter 1 amt \$6,274,888 is under contract now).
 - c. Planes on order, but not delivered as of 15 August were 2541 ^{1489 Tr. 21 Misc VA 1031 Combat}
 - d. During the period 1 June to 15 August 84 airplanes have been delivered.

68 Tr.
1 A Combat
2 Misc. JR

(Signature)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Employment
acceleration in
yards & shops.

33 1/3% increase
in number working -
~~side~~ in one week.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Morcel

Gen Lave

San Diego

Newport

Hampton Rds. -

Look up temporary
barracks for training

U S Prod. per mo.

Aug	821	Plan
Sept	875	"
Oct.	938	"

(over half being made by Army)

BF
Navy
1-40

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16
A6-5/The White House
A8-5/EF30/EF28-20

Aug 27 1943

~~Confidential~~

file →

MEMORANDUM for General Watson:

SUBJECT: Rumored proposed German attempt to seize French Guiana.

The President requested information on the subject of a rumored proposed German attempt to seize French Guiana.

Neither State, Army, or Navy has any information on this except that, on 24 May, our Naval Attache in London transmitted a report that the British Admiralty had a report to that effect which was not evaluated highly by this office.

The State Department is, today, sending a Vice Consul to Cayenne, capital of French Guiana. I have interviewed him and asked him to forward any information on the subject he can obtain.

W. S. Anderson

W. S. Anderson,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

~~Confidential~~

Date- 1-7-70

Signature- *JR*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached confidential despatches from Berlin and London are forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

*To
personnel
+
Confidential
Navy*

APR 30 1970

WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE

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DOO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-9-66

Signature- Carl J. Spicet

NAVAL DISPATCH
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: ALUSNA BERLIN 291630CR455
TO : OPNAV
INFO:
RELEASE:

DATE: 29 AUGUST 1945
PRECEDENCE: CABLE
TCR CODEROM: 0028/38

THIS IS CONSIDERED RELIABLE INFO:

AT KIEL THE BATTLESHIPS SCHARNHORST AND GNEISENAU NOT BADLY DAMAGED. REPAIRS ARE ABOUT COMPLETED ON THE CAPRINZEUGEN WHICH WAS BADLY DAMAGED. WORK IS GOING ON CV ZEPPELIN AT GDYNIA. SINCE THE EIGHTH OF AUGUST THE ~~XXXX~~ CL EMDEN HAS BEEN OVERHAULING. TWENTY SIX SUBMARINES ARE BUILDING AT HAMBURG. FIVE WERE DESTROYED THE NINTH. ESTIMATE THAT THERE ARE 150 PT AND 120 SS IN COMMISSION. THE PT WITH BUILT IN TORPEDO TUBES ARE BETTER BOATS. THERE ARE ORDERED OR BUILDING: ONE HUNDRED SEVEN FIFTY TON UBOATS. TWO HUNDRED FIVE HUNDRED TONNERS. 100 TELWUNKEN RADIO SETS FOR SUBMARINES. FOUR SUBMARINE CRUISERS. TANKS CAPABLE OF OPERATING FIFTY FEET SUBMERGED AND CARRYING 30 MEN ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ EACH ARE REPORTED. SIX HUNDRED JU-90 PLANES WHICH HAVE BEEN REFITTED TO CARRY AN EIGHT TON TANK EACH.

ALL OF THE LABOR BATTS HAVE BEEN MOVED TO THE RUSSIAN BORDER TO BUILD NEW EAST WALL.
AIR RAID LAST NIGHT: ONE RADIO TOWER HAUEN WAS HIT. MINOR DAMAGE TO BERLIN MOSTLY IN THE OUTSKIRTS.
GIVE ARMY THIS INFO.

DISTRIBUTION: ACTION 16
10/11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 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2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 214

NAVAL DISPATCH
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: ALUSNA LONDON

261556CR54

DATE: 26 AUGUST 1940

TO : OPNAV

PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

INFO:

TOR CODEROOM: 1940

RELEASE: WRL

CORRECTED COPY

FOUR ITALIAN SHIPS WERE SUNK BY THREE TORPEDO PLANES AT BOMBA BY
FLEET AIR ARM X THIS SOMEWHAT LUCKY AS TWO HITS STRUCK AND SANK
NET OF TENDER SS AND DES ANOTHER HIT ON SUB XX AS THIS WEAPON
HAS HERETOFORE BEEN A DISAPPOINTMENT IT IS DESIRED TO MAKE NO
ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS SUCCESS AND CONCEAL ITS EFFICACY. THE GERMANS
ARE USING SOME TORPEDO PLANES BUT ARE NOT MUCH GOOD SO FAR.

DISTRIBUTION:

16...ACTION

10/11...12...13...NAVAID...BUAER...OPNAV DO...FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS DISPATCH SHOULD BE PREPARED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OF THE "INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING
THE USE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C."

~~SECRET~~

PSF

May

Sept
1940

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[?]

Memo for the President:

Subject: Names of Rear admirals
selected for furlough.

Pursuant to the President's
instructions, I asked Admiral
Stark's opinion as to the
names selected by the
President, viz: Neal
Watts
Todd
Dungen

Admiral Stark considers the
President's selections as just
and equitable.

Re Admiral Watson, Admiral
Stark stated that he had not,
in recent years, come in contact
with the former and was not
able, therefore, to form a first hand
opinion of the former's capabilities.

Respy,
J. B. Cunningham

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 4, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached despatch recently received from our Naval Attache, London, is forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

CONFIDENTIAL
EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
BY THE WHITE HOUSE

Pres for info.

NAVAL DISPATCH
NAVY DEPARTMENT

FROM: ALUSNA LONDON 031900CR926
TO : OPNAV
INFO:
RELEASE:

DATE: 3 SEPT 40
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
TOR CODEROOM:

DURING TIME THEY WERE LAYING MINES IN NORTH SEA 1 SEPTEMBER BRITISH DESTROYERS EXPRESS, IVANHOE AND ESK WERE ORDERED TO JETTISON MINES AND ATTACK A REPORTED NAZI CONCENTRATION OF SHIPS NEAR TERSCHELLING, WHILE ENROUTE THEY RAN INTO GERMAN MINE FIELD, THE ESK WAS SUNK; WHILE REMAINING TWO BEING TOWED STERN FIRST TO PORT AT 5 KNOTS THE IVANHOE WAS LOST. ON SAME DATE GALATEA WAS SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BY MINES WHILE ENTERING IMMINGHAM, PRINCE OF WALES BEING COMPLETED AT BIRKENHEAD RECEIVED MINOR DAMAGE FROM BOMB STRIKING NEARBY AND THE FIJI TORPEDOED IS NOW RETURNING ESCORTED BY DESTROYERS. ON 22 AUGUST GERMAN SUBMARINE KNOWN TO BE OPERATING 500 MILES WEST OF ICELAND. ON AUG 31 THREE GERMAN U BOATS REPORTED 10 MILES SOUTH OF PORTLAND.

DISTRIBUTION:

16.....ACTION

19-11....12...13...NAVAIDE...OPNAV D O....FILE

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-9-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS DISPATCH SHOULD BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 66 OF THE INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE USE OF NAVAL COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AT WASHINGTON D.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF navy

September 4, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from the Director of Naval Intelligence is forwarded for the information of the President.

Respectfully

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *JR*

To the Pres. for his info. sfo
In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3 September 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese Propaganda Expenditures and Organization in the United States.

1. This office has learned from highly reliable sources that the Japanese government's direct expenditures for propaganda purposes within the United States now amount to about four and one-half million yen annually. Over half of this is expended under the direction of Japanese Foreign Office and its personnel in the United States. Of the remainder about one and one-half million yen is spent by agencies of the Ministry of Trade and Industry and one-half million yen by agencies of the Ministry of Railroads, including the Tourist Bureau.

2. The chief function of the "Press Attache" of the Japanese Embassy in Washington is the effective expenditure for propaganda of ¥ 2,500,000 by the Japanese Foreign Service in the United States. In addition the "Press Attache" is charged with coordinating the propaganda expenditures of the agencies of other Ministries.

3. Information now at hand indicates that Ambassador Horinouchi considers the above administrative organization unsatisfactory. In particular he states that there is a certain amount of overlapping and duplication of effort, resulting in some inefficiency in spending the limited foreign exchange funds now available to Japan. He has consequently recommended to Tokyo the following corrective steps:

(a) All propaganda agencies abroad should be placed directly under the Foreign Office.

(b) Especially able and competent civilians should be sent to the more important diplomatic offices abroad to administer this propaganda work. While on this duty they should be temporarily accorded a pay grade and treatment or rank equivalent to Minister or Counsellor of Embassy.

W.S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

000 DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- J/R

Original to Aide to the President.
CC - C.N.O.
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TSF Navy
file
personal
11/11

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1940.


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Admiral Stark is anxious for the attached memorandum to reach the President as soon as possible following the President's return from Alabama.

The letter which Admiral Stark mentions in his penned postscript is also attached.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

PSF Navy
17 September 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

After your O.K. to me of two million dollars for temporary structures to relieve our extremely acute office space situation, due to Army having walked back the cat (and with which we are taking no issue) on the previous understanding that we would get three wings of their building, and further conference with the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretary, Admiral Moreell, War Department representatives, and Mr. Reynolds, Commissioner of Public Buildings:

We are all agreed that we could cut our money needs for additional structures here at the Navy Department from approximately two million dollars to approximately five hundred thousand dollars by eliminating the building in the rear and confining ourselves simply to the additional east wing and the penthouse on the existing first one. These buildings will be entirely temporary in construction, of the cheapest construction possible, of a guaranteed life of five years, and with very careful nursing beyond that point up to a possibility of about ten years.

The reason we could eliminate the big structure in the rear at a saving of approximately a million and half dollars is because Mr. Reynolds is going to make some space available for the Navy in another building.

Mr. Reynolds has sent an estimate to the Bureau of the Budget for the new wing and penthouse mentioned above of approximately five hundred thousand dollars.

This is just a follow-up to tell you that everybody here is in agreement and to explain the five hundred thousand dollar item which will come to you from the Budget instead of two million.

Of course we don't like dividing our organization but there is no other solution for the moment and it is the best we can do. The Army, I believe, will be in seven different buildings, so relatively we are not so badly off in two.

Of general interest:- Second batch of eight destroyers sailed yesterday for Halifax and not a peep in the press about it. Another six sail tomorrow.

*Will shortly send you
a letter from Tommy Hart
which I think you will find
worth while reading - Copies
furnished state - Betty.*

PSF Navy

(COPY)

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U.S.S. AUGUSTA, Flagship

Wr

Shanghai, China,
20 August, 1940.

My dear Stark:

My last to you was 24 July, the letter going to Manila via the FINCH, and thence via clipper under the usual circumstances. This letter will come by the same method, except that it will go to Manila in the P-class submarines.

In the first place, about those submarines: - I came down here from Tsingtao in one of them, (a case of the old man's last ride in a ship of his pet service, I suppose). I am glad that I did such an unusual thing because it had a good effect all around, including on my friends (?) over here in Shanghai. The six boats of the Division are here now doing a week of liberty in Shanghai, and then on to Manila. The entire submarine squadron, tender and all, will there be assembled in the Islands, and I am glad that they are getting south early. I have found that these six new boats are at a very high peak of efficiency. Though complicated, they are extremely able craft. There have been almost no personnel changes in a year, and I think that Division is really my most valuable weapon in these parts.

I have been mostly at Tsingtao since I last wrote you, and during the time we had one of those "incidents". It was a riot on shore, beginning with two Americans and one Jap who got too drunk together, and it was rather a bad mess. We had a long palaver with the Japs, at the end of which we did a certain amount of apologizing for the part of our men. Our own play during the negotiations was not "apologies" (although I may tell you that the drunk Jap was soaked by his own people much more severely than was any one else concerned), but to create an atmosphere which would reduce the danger of recurrence. We got that action in unexpectedly good measure in the form of very stiff injunctions from the Japanese authorities for all Japs in town to watch their step as far as we were concerned. Nothing else out of the ordinary has happened in Tsingtao or other places in North China since I last wrote you. The virtual abandonment of Chefoo which I forecast, has taken effect.

Down here now, and before I come to the most important part of this letter, a little about the Gendarme-Marine incident of 7 July; - the Navy Department was given very little information about the negotiations concerning that incident. The Consul General here, as usual, was sending in reams to his Department, and it seemed to me quite alright to let it go at that. It happens that about three days before the State Department took an action, by giving Ambassador Grew a mission in connection with it, came to look to me as if we had already gone quite far enough with the Japanese. I had made Glassford a suggestion to that effect, but he begged to go on with some negotiations which were "hot" at the moment, and I acquiesced. As soon, however, as the State Department made their move, it became sure that we had already gone quite far enough locally, and we chopped the discussions off at the first convenient stopping point.

The incident lies unsettled. My own judgment is that it had best remain so. It's already five or six weeks old. With the possible exception of the Japs, the whole affair is pretty much forgotten, and unless they come in with a solution which looks entirely suitable to us, we intend to take no further steps. I fear that at times we were in danger of going a little too far, so that we would have been in a position of apologizing for something which we did not really do, but the record is now clear, and I am quite sure will remain so. Glassford and Peck have done a grand job - and believe me it was a trying occupation.

This last thing, the situation raised by the British troops running from Shanghai, is a matter of vast importance. I imagine it is difficult at Washington to realize what an influence over the entire Far Eastern situation is comprised right in this central district of Shanghai, which is one of the two areas being evacuated by the British. Those seven blocks along the British Bund constitute the last open chink in the "open" door of China. For one thing, the financial influence which lies on and back of those few blocks is a vital factor all over the East. Further Japanese encroachment into the International Settlement, which would still more imperil its political and economic integrity, is just something which must not happen. It, of course, would not put our own country's nose out of joint so awfully much, but as regards free China, those seven blocks on the Bund are a more important question than is the Burma Road.

I don't think that, to be entirely frank with you, we at first received very good response from Washington in making our plays incident to the British evacuation. In one case at least, an important despatch from me seems not to have been even carefully read, and the reply which came back, rather than bringing a certain amount of help as I had hoped and expected, did rather the other thing. However, I will not go on with that question of relationships, etc., any further right now.

We were entirely set for starting things up when informed of the British break-away. I think we have played such cards as we held to the best advantage possible, and in general things went on in the various steps in about the best possible way for us. Our negotiators were Peck, insofar as open matters in the Defense Committee were concerned, and Glassford in the informal "conversations", which also were all-important; his vis a vis was Vice Admiral Iwamura, who is the Jap's best man here. As you know, at a certain stage the play in the game shifted from here to Washington and Tokyo, which is the stage that we have reached at the moment. My guess is that we would have succeeded locally in having our way with the Japanese, (would have arranged to take over B Sector), because I think that we had the upper hand of them psychologically. They think I held stronger cards than I did have. However, there was a chance that we would fail in getting our way by an agreement, and then of having a really serious incident or set back. That chance I believed in avoiding, and I think, at the time of writing, that the shift from local negotiations to those between capitals was entirely well advised and was properly timed. In fact, thus far we are alright. The question is how well we go on from here - as between governments.

I am leaving town shortly because I think my departure now will be timely insofar as the Shanghai matter is concerned, and also I should be getting back to my command post. I am just sending the Department a short despatch expressing my view of the vast importance of this question and urging insistence upon

our own virtual control of Sector B in some form or other, which as I see it, is the only way to keep the Shanghai situation from further deterioration.

In closing, I will enlarge upon one thought which I have previously expressed. That is the matter of graft in China on the part of the Japanese. In my judgment, it has become an extremely important feature of the entire Sino-Japanese situation, and furthermore, is going to cause the Japanese government untold amount of future trouble.

The Japanese, of course, have all along been set on making money out of China. Their original idea in that was for their own treasury, rather than for private individuals, to make the money. There may be some money going from China into the Jap treasury, but what has surely happened is that numerous individuals in official jobs in China are making the money hand over fist. That practice seems to have begun in the Gendarmes, - which really is part of the Japanese army, and they are bad hombres. The officers begin it; the non-commissioned officers crashed in on it; the grafting extended to the privates and also extended into the rest of the army in China. We have very little evidence that there is thus far much involvement of the Japanese navy.

But counting the Japanese forces in China as a whole, I think that the grafting very often determines the moves which those forces make in China. None of what I am writing can, of course, be proven or disproven, but the conviction has been growing upon me that what I am writing you is really true. Perhaps I can further explain as follows: -

The officer corps, particularly of the army, is full of intrigue and cliques, the actions of which for some time have been going so far as to amount to grievous indiscipline. This graft factor, when mixed into that, makes the pursuance of money the major objective of many of the men who have the say as to what the Japs really do on this continent. A considerable portion of the Japanese army is living in China under circumstances of luxury which they never had before and never would get in their own country. They can be expected not only to hold to those emoluments, but to seek extensions, and some of our best observers think that portions of their forces over here would really go to the extent of mutiny in order "to have and to hold". (They don't want to get home.) I expect that all the above would be disbelieved by the average American, but I am sure that it is mostly true, and the importance of it is a considerable factor in taking a look at the Sino-Jap situation.

Well, this is long enough. I will only add that I still feel very much out of touch with "the management" and that does not make my lot easy.

With best regards,

Most sincerely,

THOS. C. HART,
ADMIRAL, U. S. Navy,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Wash. D.C. - 3 -

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

T3 F Navy
[Handwritten signature]

September 18, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached report, indicating progress on vessels under construction for the Navy, as of September 1, 1940, is forwarded for the information of the President.

Respectfully,

[Handwritten signature]
D. J. CALLAGHAN

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

50

SEPTEMBER 10, 1940

VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1940

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:					
		September 1, 1940	August 1940	Gain for	Month of	Keel Laid	Launched	or order	Filed	order	yard
BATTLESHIPS											
BB55: NORTH CAROLINA	New York	80.1	2.5	10/27/37	6/13/40	8/1/37	49	9/1/41	7/15/41		
BB56: WASHINGTON	Philadelphia	74.9	2.4	5/14/38	6/1/40	8/1/37	52	12/1/41	12/1/41		
BB57: SOUTH DAKOTA	N.Y.S.B. Corp.	28.5	1.9	7/5/39	-	12/15/38	52	4/15/43	12/15/42		
BB58: INDIANA	NNSB&DD Co.	22.2	2.5	11/20/39	-	12/15/38	52	4/15/43	4/15/43		
BB59: MASSACHUSETTS	B.S.Co. (Quincy)	27.7	4.1	7/20/39	-	12/15/38	55	7/15/43	7/15/43		
BB60: ALABAMA	Norfolk	16.1	1.4	2/1/40	-	4/1/39	52	8/1/43	8/1/43		
BB61: IOWA	New York	4.0	1.2	6/27/40	-	7/1/39	49	8/1/43	6/1/43		
BB62: NEW JERSEY	Philadelphia	1.7	0.5	-	-	7/1/39	52	11/1/43	6/1/44 (a)		
BB63: MISSOURI	New York					6/12/40	48	6/12/44	3/1/44		
BB64: WISCONSIN	Philadelphia					6/12/40	48	6/12/44	6/12/44		
BB65:	Philadelphia					9/9/40		11/1/45			
BB66:	Norfolk					9/9/40		5/1/45			
BB67:	Philadelphia					9/9/40 (c)					
BB68:	Philadelphia					9/9/40 (c)					
BB69:	New York					9/9/40 (c)					
BB70:	New York					9/9/40 (c)					
BB71:	Norfolk					9/9/40 (c)					

- (a) An extension in the building period of at least 6 months will be required on this vessel, the exact amount not now determinable.
(c) Building periods to be determined later.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 2-18-59

Signature- Carl T. Spicer

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				Keel Laid	Launched	: Date of Completion		:As reported by building yard
		:September 1:	:Month of	:Date of	:Mes.:			:contract	:by	
		:1940	:August 1940							
		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Laid	:Launched	:or order:	:Eld.:	:order	:yard	
<u>:AIRCRAFT CARRIERS:</u>										
CV8 :HORNET	:NNS&DD Co.	: 45.3	: 5.1	: 9/25/39	: -	: 4/10/39	: 34	: 2/10/42	: 2/10/42	
CV9 :ESSEX	:NNS&DD Co.					: 7/ 3/40	: 42	: 4/ 1/44(b)		
CV10: BON HOMME RICHARD	:NNS&DD Co.					: 7/ 3/40	: 47	: 9/ 1/44(b)		
CV11: INTREPID	:NNS&DD Co.					: 7/ 3/40	: 52	: 2/ 1/45(b)		
CV12: KEARSARGE	:NNS&DD Co.					: 9/ 9/40	: 57	: 6/ 9/45		
CV13:	:NNS&DD Co.					: 9/ 9/40	: 62	: 11/ 9/45		
CV14:	:NNS&DD Co.					: 9/ 9/40	: 66	: 3/ 9/46		
CV15:	:NNS&DD Co.					: 9/ 9/40	: 70	: 7/ 9/46		
CV16:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 43	: 4/ 9/44		
CV17:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 46	: 7/ 9/44		
CV18:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 64	: 1/ 9/46		
CV19:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 66	: 3/ 9/46		
<u>:LARGE CRUISERS</u>										
CP1 :	:N.Y.S.P. Corp.					: 9/ 9/40	: 54 $\frac{1}{2}$: 4/ 1/45		
CP2 :	:N.Y.S.P. Corp.					: 9/ 9/40	: 58 $\frac{1}{2}$: 8/ 1/45		
CP3 :	:N.Y.S.P. Corp.					: 9/ 9/40	: 62 $\frac{1}{2}$: 12/ 1/45		
CP4 :	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.					: 9/ 9/40	: 66 $\frac{1}{2}$: 4/ 1/46		
CE5 :	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.					: 9/ 9/40	: 70 $\frac{1}{2}$: 8/ 1/46		
CE6 :	:N.Y.S.B. Corp.					: 9/ 9/40	: 74 $\frac{1}{2}$: 12/ 1/46		
<u>:HEAVY CRUISERS</u>										
CA68: BALTIMORE	:B.S. Co. (Quincy):					: 7/ 1/40	: 33	: 7/ 1/43(b)		
CA69: BOSTON	:B.S. Co. (Quincy):					: 7/ 1/40	: 35	: 9/ 1/43(b)		
CA70: PITTSBURGH	:B.S. Co. (Quincy):					: 7/ 1/40	: 39	: 1/ 1/44(b)		
CA71: ST. PAUL	:B.S. Co. (Quincy):					: 7/ 1/40	: 43	: 5/ 1/44(b)		
CA72:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 58	: 7/ 9/45		
CA73:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 59	: 8/ 9/45		
CA74:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 60	: 9/ 9/45		
CA75:	:Beth. Fore River:					: 9/ 9/40	: 61	: 10/ 9/45		

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

September 10, 1940

Sheet 3.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				:Date of Completion:			
		:September 1:	:Month of:	:Gain for:	:Koel:	:Date of:	:contract:	:to:	:or:
		:1940	:August 1940			:contract:	:to:	:or:	:building:
		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Laid	:Launched:	:or order:	:Bld:	:order	:yard
<u>:LIGHT CRUISERS</u>									
CL51:ATLANTA	:Fed.SB&DD Co.	: 22.9	: 3.0	: 4/22/40:	-	: 4/25/39:	36	: 4/25/42:	4/25/42:
CL52:JUNEAU	:Fed.SB&DD Co.	: 20.8	: 3.4	: 5/27/40:	-	: 4/25/39:	38	: 6/25/42:	6/25/42:
CL53:SAN DIEGO	:B.S.Co.(Quincy):	: 15.4	: 2.7	: 3/27/40:	-	: 4/25/39:	39	: 7/25/42:	7/25/42:
CL54:SAN JUAN	:B.S.Co.(Quincy):	: 15.0	: 3.0	: 5/15/40:	-	: 4/25/39:	41	: 9/25/42:	9/25/42:
CL55:CLEVELAND	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	: 1.5	: 0.7	: 7/ 1/40:	-	: 3/23/40:	36	: 3/23/43:	3/ 9/43:
CL56:COLUMBIA	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	: 1.3	: 0.7	: 8/19/40:	-	: 3/23/40:	39	: 6/23/43:	6/ 9/43:
CL57:MONTPELIER	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	: 0.1	: 0.1	:	:	: 6/12/40:	36 $\frac{1}{2}$: 6/27/43:	6/27/43:
CL58:DENVER	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	: 0.1	: 0.1	:	:	: 6/12/40:	39 $\frac{1}{2}$: 9/27/43:	9/27/43:
CL59:AMSTERDAM	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	: 0.1	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	40 $\frac{1}{2}$: 11/16/43:	11/15/43:
CL60:SANTA FE	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	: 0.1	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	42 $\frac{1}{2}$: 1/16/44:	1/15/44:
CL61:TALLHASSEE	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	: 0.1	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	44 $\frac{1}{2}$: 3/16/44:	3/15/44:
CL62:BIRMINGHAM	:NNSB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	32	: 3/ 3/43:	:
CL63:MOBILE	:NNSB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	35	: 6/ 3/43:	:
CL64:FLINT	:B.S.Co.(Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	41	: 12/ 1/43:	:
CL65:PASADENA	:B.S.Co.(Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	47	: 6/ 1/44:	:
CL66:SPRINGFIELD	:B.S.Co.(Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	50	: 9/ 1/44:	:
CL67:TOPEKA	:B.S.Co.(Quincy):	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	52	: 11/ 1/44:	:
CL76:	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	44	: 5/15/44:	:
CL77:	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	57 $\frac{1}{2}$: 7/ 1/45:	:
CL78:	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	59 $\frac{1}{2}$: 9/ 1/45:	:
CL79:	:N.Y.S.B.Corp. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	61 $\frac{1}{2}$: 11/ 1/45:	:
CL80:	:NNSB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	38	: 11/ 9/43:	:
CL81:	:NNSB&DD Cov. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	68	: 5/ 9/46:	:
CL82:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	63	: 12/ 9/45:	:
CL83:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	65	: 2/ 9/46:	:
CL84:	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	39	: 12/ 9/43:	:
CL85:	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	45	: 6/ 9/44:	:
CL86:	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	51	: 12/ 9/44:	:
CL87:	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	57	: 6/ 9/45:	:
CL88:	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40 :	63	: 12/ 9/45:	:

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

September 10, 1940

Sheet 4.

Ss

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:			Keel Laid	Date of contract	:Date of Completion:	
		: 1940	: August 1940	: TOTAL			: to	: or
:LIGHT CRUISERS (CONT'D)								
CL95:	:Beth.Union & Risdon:					: 9/ 9/40:	33	: 6/ 9/43:
CL96:	:Beth.Union & Risdon:					: 9/ 9/40:	35	: 8/ 9/43:
CL97:	:Beth.Union & Risdon:					: 9/ 9/40:	49	: 10/ 9/44:
CL98:	:Beth.Union & Risdon:					: 9/ 9/40:	51	: 12/ 9/44:
:	:							

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:		: Keel :	: Launched :	:Date of Completion:		
		:September 1940	:August 1940			:Mos.:	:contract:	:by
		: TOTAL :	: TOTAL :	: Laid :	: Launched :	: or order :	: Pld. order :	: yard :
<u>:SUBMARINES</u>								
SS200:THRESHER	:Elec. Boat Co.:	Delivered and Commissioned 27 August 1940						
SS201:TRITON *	:Portsmouth :	89.0	: 2.9	: 7/ 5/39:	3/25/40:	9/ 1/38:	30 : 3/ 1/41:	11/ 1/40 :
SS202:TROUT	:Portsmouth :	81.2	: 4.6	: 8/28/39:	5/21/40:	9/ 1/38:	32 : 5/ 1/41:	1/ 1/41 :
SS203:TUNA	:Mare Island :	76.2	: 5.4	: 7/19/39:	-	:11/ 1/38:	30 : 5/ 1/41:	3/ 1/41 :
SS204:MACKEREL	:Elec. Boat Co.:	80.6	: 7.0	:10/ 6/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	23 : 5/15/41:	3/31/41 :
SS205:MARLIN	:Portsmouth :	28.9	: 9.1	: 5/28/40:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	27 :10/ 1/41:	10/ 1/41 :
SS206:GAR	:Elec. Boat Co.:	62.6	: 7.5	:12/27/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	25 : 7/15/41:	4/21/41 :
SS207:GRAMPUS	:Elec. Boat Co.:	54.5	: 6.9	: 2/14/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	27 : 9/15/41:	6/ 2/41 :
SS208:GRAYBACK	:Elec. Boat Co.:	47.3	: 4.2	: 4/ 3/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	29 :11/15/41:	7/14/41 :
SS209:GRAYLING	:Portsmouth :	63.1	: 11.1	:12/15/39:	9/ 4/40:	7/ 1/39:	25 : 8/ 1/41:	5/ 1/41 :
SS210:GRENADINE	:Portsmouth :	55.1	: 17.6	: 4/ 2/40:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	29 :12/ 1/41:	8/ 1/41 :
SS211:GUDGEON	:Mare Island :	47.9	: 2.9	:11/22/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	27 :10/ 1/41:	10/ 1/41 :
SS212:GATO	:Elec. Boat Co.:	1.1	: 0.7	:	:	: 6/12/40:	20 : 2/12/42:	2/12/42 :
SS213:GREENLING	:Elec. Boat Co.:	1.1	: 0.7	:	:	: 6/12/40:	21½ : 3/27/42:	3/27/42 :
SS214:GROUPE	:Elec. Boat Co.:	1.1	: 0.7	:	:	: 6/12/40:	23 : 5/12/42:	5/12/42 :
SS215:GROWLER	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	24½ : 7/16/42:	7/16/42 :
SS216:GRUNION	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	26 : 9/ 1/42:	9/ 1/42 :
SS217:GUARDFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	27½ :10/16/42:	10/16/42 :
SS218:ALFACORE	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	29 :12/ 1/42:	12/ 1/42 :
SS219:AMEERJACK	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	30½ : 1/16/43:	1/16/43 :
SS220:BARB	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	32 : 3/ 1/43:	3/ 1/43 :
SS221:BLACKFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	33½ : 4/16/43:	4/16/43 :
SS222:BLUEFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	35 : 6/ 1/43:	6/ 1/43 :
SS223:BONEFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	36½ : 7/16/43:	7/16/43 :
SS224:COD	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.7	: 0.4	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	38 : 9/ 1/43:	9/ 1/43 :

* Commissioned 15 August 1940.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:		Keel Laid	Date of Launching	Date of Completion:	
		September 1940	Month of August 1940			Mos. contract	As per reported
		TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld. order
<u>SUBMARINES (CONT'D)</u>							
SS225: CERO	:Elec. Boat Co.	: 0.7	: 0.4	:	: 7/ 1/40:	39 $\frac{1}{2}$:	10/16/43:10/16/43
SS226: CORVINA	:Elec. Boat Co.	: 0.7	: 0.4	:	: 7/ 1/40:	41 :	12/ 1/43:12/ 1/43
SS227: DARTER	:Elec. Boat Co.	: 0.7	: 0.4	:	: 7/ 1/40:	42 $\frac{1}{2}$:	1/16/44: 1/16/44
SS228: DRUM	:Portsmouth	: 3.8	: 2.8	: 9/11/40:	: 6/12/40:	21 :	3/12/42:
SS229: FLYING FISH	:Portsmouth	: 3.0	: 2.0	:	: 6/12/40:	23 $\frac{1}{2}$:	5/27/42:
SS230: FINBACK	:Portsmouth	: 2.0	: 1.0	:	: 6/12/40:	27 :	9/12/42:
SS231: HADDOCK	:Portsmouth	: 1.0	: 1.0	:	: 6/28/40:	28 $\frac{1}{2}$:	11/12/42:
SS232: HALIBUT	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	31 :	1/28/43:
SS233: HERRING	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	33 $\frac{1}{2}$:	4/12/43:
SS234: KINGFISH	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	36 :	6/28/43:
SS235: SHAD	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	38 $\frac{1}{2}$:	9/12/43:
SS236: SILVER SIDES	:Mare Island	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	23 :	5/28/42: 5/28/42
SS237: TRIGGER	:Mare Island	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	26 :	8/28/42: 8/28/42
SS238: WAHOO	:Mare Island	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	33 :	3/28/43: 3/28/43
SS239: WHALE	:Mare Island	:	:	:	: 6/28/40:	36 :	6/28/43: 6/28/43
SS240:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	35 $\frac{1}{2}$:	8/24/43:
SS241:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	36 $\frac{1}{2}$:	9/24/43:
SS242:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	37 $\frac{1}{2}$:	10/24/43:
SS243:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	38 $\frac{1}{2}$:	11/24/43:
SS244:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	39 $\frac{1}{2}$:	12/24/43:
SS245:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	40 $\frac{1}{2}$:	1/24/44:
SS246:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	41 $\frac{1}{2}$:	2/24/44:
SS247:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	42 $\frac{1}{2}$:	3/24/44:
SS248:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	43 $\frac{1}{2}$:	4/24/44:
SS249:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	44 $\frac{1}{2}$:	5/24/44:
SS250:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	45 $\frac{1}{2}$:	6/24/44:
SS251:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	46 $\frac{1}{2}$:	7/24/44:
SS252:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	47 $\frac{1}{2}$:	8/24/44:
SS253:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	48 $\frac{1}{2}$:	9/24/44:
SS254:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	49 $\frac{1}{2}$:	10/24/44:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Date of Completion:		
		September 1940	August 1940	Keel Laid	Date of contract	Mos. order	building yard
		TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched	or order	Bld. order
<u>SUBMARINES (CONT'D)</u>							
SS255:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 50 :	: 11/24/44:	:
SS256:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 51 :	: 12/24/44:	:
SS257:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 52 :	: 1/24/45:	:
SS258:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 53 :	: 2/24/45:	:
SS259:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 54 :	: 3/24/45:	:
SS260:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 55 :	: 4/24/45:	:
SS261:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 56 :	: 5/24/45:	:
SS262:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 57 :	: 6/24/45:	:
SS263:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 58 :	: 7/24/45:	:
SS264:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	: 9/9/40 : 59 :	: 8/24/45:	:
SS265:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 34 :	: 7/ 9/43:	:
SS266:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 37 :	: 10/ 9/43:	:
SS267:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 40 :	: 1/ 9/44:	:
SS268:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 42 :	: 3/ 9/44:	:
SS269:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 44 :	: 5/ 9/44:	:
SS270:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 51 :	: 12/ 9/44:	:
SS271:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 53 :	: 2/ 9/45:	:
SS272:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 55 :	: 4/ 9/45:	:
SS273:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 57 :	: 6/ 9/45:	:
SS274:	:Manitowoc S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 59 :	: 8/ 9/45:	:
SS275:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 31 :	: 5/ 1/43:	:
SS276:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 33 :	: 7/ 1/43:	:
SS277:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 35 :	: 9/ 1/43:	:
SS278:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 37 :	: 11/ 1/43:	:
SS279:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 39 :	: 1/ 2/44:	:
SS280:	:Portsmouth :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 41 :	: 3/ 1/44:	:
SS281:	:Mare Island :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 36 :	: 10/ 1/43:	:
SS282:	:Mare Island :	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40: 39 :	: 1/ 2/44:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				:Date of Completion:			
		:September 1:	:Month of	:Keel	:Date of	:Mos.:	:contract:	:by	
		:1940	:August 1940	:Laid	:contract:	:to	:or	:building	
		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Launched:	:or order:	:Bld.:	:order	:yard	
<u>:DESTROYERS</u>									
DD422:MAYO	:B.S.Co.(Quincy):	96.5	: 5.9	: 5/16/38:	3/26/40:	9/30/37:	34	: 7/30/40:	9/14/40
DD425:MADISON *	:Boston	99.6	: 3.4	:12/19/38:	10/20/39:	12/30/37:	34	:10/30/40:	9/20/40
DD426:LANSDALE	:Boston	94.2	: 5.8	:12/19/38:	10/20/39:	12/30/37:	36	:12/30/40:	10/10/40
DD427:HILARY P. JONES**	:Charleston	90.9	: 6.6	:11/16/38:	12/14/39:	12/30/37:	34	:10/30/40:	10/30/40
DD428:CHAS. F. HUGHES**	:Puget Sound	98.0	: 4.6	: 1/ 3/39:	5/16/40:	12/30/37:	34	:10/30/40:	10/18/40
DD429:LIVERMORE	:Bath Iron Wks.:	92.0	: 8.3	: 3/ 6/39:	8/ 3/40:	8/15/38:	28	:12/15/40:	10/10/40
DD430:EBERLE	:Bath Iron Wks.:	85.0	: 6.4	: 4/12/39:	-	: 8/15/38:	30	: 2/15/41:	12/ 5/40
DD432:KEARNY	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	97.7	: 3.1	: 3/ 1/39:	3/ 9/40:	8/17/38:	32	: 4/17/41:	9/12/40
DD433:GWIN	:Boston	61.3	: 8.1	: 6/ 1/39:	5/25/40:	10/ 1/38:	29	: 3/ 1/41:	3/1/41
DD434:MEREDITH	:Boston	59.3	: 7.8	: 6/ 1/39:	4/24/40:	10/ 1/38:	31	: 5/ 1/41:	5/ 1/41
DD435:GRAYSON	:Charleston	58.1	: 6.3	: 7/17/39:	8/ 7/40:	10/ 1/38:	30	: 4/ 1/41:	4/1/41
DD436:MONSSEN	:Puget Sound	65.0	: 5.2	: 7/12/39:	5/16/40:	10/ 1/38:	29	: 3/ 1/41:	2/ 1/41
DD437:WOOLSEY	:Bath Iron Wks.:	60.9	: 6.1	:10/ 9/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	24	: 6/15/41:	7/15/41
DD438:LUDLOW	:Bath Iron Wks.:	58.4	: 6.3	:12/18/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	26	: 8/15/41:	5/15/41
DD439:EDISON	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	60.2	: 7.8	: 3/18/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	24	: 6/15/41:	3/15/41
DD440:ERICSSON	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	55.8	: 8.7	: 3/18/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	26	: 8/15/41:	5/15/41
DD441:WILKES	:Boston	40.9	: 6.6	:11/ 1/39:	5/31/40:	7/ 1/39:	24	: 7/ 1/41:	7/ 1/41
DD442:NICHOLSON	:Boston	38.9	: 6.6	:11/ 1/39:	5/31/40:	7/ 1/39:	26	: 9/ 1/41:	9/ 1/41
DD443:SWANSON	:Charleston	32.9	: 3.9	:11/15/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	26	: 9/ 1/41:	9/ 1/41
DD444:INGRAHAM	:Charleston	26.4	: 6.2	:11/15/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	28	:11/ 1/41:	11/ 1/41
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

* Commissioned 6 August 1940.

** Commissioned 5 September 1940.

*** Commissioned 6 September 1940.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel Laid	Date of contract	Date of Completion:		
		September 1940	Month of August 1940	TOTAL			Month of contract	As per contract	As reported
<u>DESTROYERS (CONT'D)</u>									
DD445:FLETCHER	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	28	11/ 1/42(b)	11/ 1/42:
DD446:RADFORD	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	30	1/1/43(b)	1/ 1/43:
DD447:JENKINS	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	31	2/ 1/43(b)	2/ 1/43:
DD448:LA VALLETTE	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	33	4/ 1/43(b)	4/ 1/43:
DD449:NICHOLAS	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40	28	11/ 1/42(b)	:
DD450:O'BANNON	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40	29 $\frac{1}{2}$	12/16/42(b)	:
DD451:CHEVALIER	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40	30 $\frac{1}{2}$	1/16/43(b)	:
DD452:PERCIVAL	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	39	10/ 1/43	10/ 1/43:
DD453:BRISTOL	Fed. SB&DD Co.					6/12/40	18	12/12/41	12/12/41:
DD454:ELLYSON	Fed. SB&DD Co.					6/12/40	20	2/12/42	2/12/42:
DD455:HAMBLETON	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	22	5/ 1/42	5/ 1/42:
DD456:RODMAN	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	24	7/ 1/42	7/ 1/42:
DD457:EMMONS	Bath Iron Wks.	1.5	1.5			6/12/40	18	12/12/41	12/12/41:
DD458:MACOMB	Bath Iron Wks.	1.5	1.5	9/ 3/40:		6/12/40	20	2/12/42	2/12/42:
DD459:LAFFEY	Beth. Steel Co. (S.F.)					7/ 1/40	20	3/ 1/42	:
DD460:WOODWORTH	Beth. Steel Co. (S.F.)					7/ 1/40	21	4/ 1/42	:
DD461:FORREST	Boston	0.7	0.3			6/12/40	20	2/12/42	2/12/42:
DD462:FITCH	Boston	0.7	0.3			6/12/40	22	4/12/42	4/12/42:
DD463:CORRY	Charleston	1.0	0.3	9/ 4/40:		6/12/40	20	2/12/42	2/12/42:
DD464:HOBSON	Charleston	1.0	0.3			6/12/40	22	4/12/42	4/12/42:
DD465:SAUFLEY	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	34	5/ 1/43(b)	5/ 1/43:
DD466:WALLER	Fed. SB&DD Co.					7/ 1/40	35	6/ 1/43(b)	6/ 1/43:
DD467:STRONG	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40	31 $\frac{1}{2}$	2/16/43(b)	:
DD468:TAYLOR	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40	33	4/ 1/43(b)	:
DD469:DE HAVEN	Bath Iron Wks.					7/ 1/40	35	6/ 1/43(b)	:

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:		Keel Laid	Date of contract	Date of Completion:	
		September 1940	Month of August 1940			Mo.:	contract to or by:
		TOTAL	TOTAL	Launched:	order:	Bld.:	order:
<u>DESTROYERS</u> (CONT'D)							
DD470: RACHE	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):				7/ 1/40:	30	1/ 1/43(b): 1/ 1/43:
DD471: BEALE	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):				7/ 1/40:	32	3/ 1/43(b): 3/ 1/43:
DD472: GUEST	:Boston:				6/28/40:	32	3/ 1/43(b): 3/ 1/43:
DD473: BENNETT	:Boston:				6/28/40:	34	5/ 1/43(b): 5/ 1/43:
DD474: FULLAM	:Boston:				6/28/40:	36	7/ 1/43(b): 7/ 1/43:
DD475: HUDSON	:Boston:				6/28/40:	38	9/ 1/43(b): 9/ 1/43:
DD476: HUTCHINS	:Boston:				6/28/40:	30	1/ 1/43(b): 1/ 1/43:
DD477: PRINGLE	:Charleston:				6/28/40:	30	1/ 1/43(b): 1/ 1/43:
DD478: STANLY	:Charleston:				6/28/40:	32	3/ 1/43(b): 3/ 1/43:
DD479: STEVENS	:Charleston:				6/28/40:	34	5/ 1/43(b): 5/ 1/43:
DD480: HALFORD	:Puget Sound:				6/28/40:	31	2/ 1/43(b):
DD481: LEUTZE	:Puget Sound:				6/28/40:	33	4/ 1/43(b):
DD482: WATSON	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				7/ 1/40:	40	11/ 1/43(b): 11/ 1/43:
DD483:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	34	7/ 9/43
DD484:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	35	8/ 9/43
DD485:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	36	9/ 9/43
DD486:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	37	10/ 9/43
DD487:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	38	11/ 9/43
DD488:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	39	12/ 9/43
DD489:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	43	4/ 9/44
DD490:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:				9/ 9/40:	44	5/ 9/44
DD491:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):				9/ 9/40:	19	4/ 9/42
DD492:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):				9/ 9/40:	23	8/ 9/42
DD493:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.:				9/ 9/40:	28 1/2	2/ 1/43
:	: Co.:						
DD494:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.:				9/ 9/40:	29	2/15/43
:	: Co.:						

(b) Contract delivery date subject to change and is dependent upon delivery of contract plans and specifications to design contractor.

September 10, 1940

Sheet 11

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Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:		Keel	Launched	:Date of Completion:		
		:September 1940	:August 1940			:Date of contract	:Mos. to order	:As per contract
:DESTROYERS (CONT'D)		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Laid	:Launched	:or order	:Bld. order	:yard
DD495:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 29 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 3/ 1/43:
DD496:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 30:	: 3/15/43:
DD497:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 30 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 3/31/43:
DD498:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 46:	: 7/ 9/44:
DD499:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 48:	: 9/ 9/44:
DD500:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 50:	: 11/ 9/44:
DD501:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 52:	: 1/ 9/45:
DD502:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 54:	: 3/ 9/45:
DD503:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:
DD504:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:
DD505:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:
DD506:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:
DD507:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:
DD508:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 29 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 3/ 1/43:
DD509:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 30 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 4/ 1/43:
DD510:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 36 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 10/ 1/43:
DD511:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 37 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 11/ 1/43:
DD512:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 39 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 1/ 2/44:
DD513:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 40 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 2/1/44:
DD514:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40:	: 41 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 3/ 1/44:
DD515:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 42 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 4/ 1/44:
DD516:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 46 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 8/ 1/44:
DD517:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 49 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 11/ 1/44:
DD518:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 51 $\frac{1}{2}$:	: 12/31/44:
DD519:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 33:	: 6/ 9/43:
DD520:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 36:	: 9/ 9/43:
DD521:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 39:	: 12/ 9/43:
DD522:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 40:	: 1/ 9/44:
DD523:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 42:	: 3/ 9/44:
DD524:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 46:	: 7/ 9/44:
DD525:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 49:	: 10/ 9/44:
:	:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 50:	: 11/ 9/44:

STANDARD

September 10, 1940

Sheet 12.

Sa

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Completion:			
		September 1, 1940	Month of August 1940	Month of			Date of contract	Mos. to	contract or	reported by
		TOTAL	TOTAL				order	order	yard	
<u>DESTROYERS (CONT'D)</u>										
DD526:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	25	:	10/ 9/42	:
DD527:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	27	:	12/ 9/42	:
DD528:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	29½	:	2/24/43	:
DD529:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	30	:	3/ 9/43	:
DD530:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	31	:	4/ 9/43	:
DD531:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	33	:	6/ 9/43	:
DD532:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	34	:	7/ 9/43	:
DD533:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	37	:	10/ 9/43	:
DD534:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	39	:	12/ 9/43	:
DD535:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	40	:	1/ 9/44	:
DD536:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	40½	:	1/24/44	:
DD537:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	41	:	2/ 9/44	:
DD538:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	44	:	5/ 9/44	:
DD539:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	45	:	6/ 9/44	:
DD540:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	48	:	9/ 9/44	:
DD541:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	49	:	10/ 9/44	:
DD542:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	50	:	11/ 9/44	:
DD543:	:Beth. Union & Riedon	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	51	:	12/ 9/44	:
DD544:	:Beth. San Pedro	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	30	:	3/ 9/43	:
DD545:	:Beth. San Pedro	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	31	:	4/ 9/43	:
DD546:	:Beth. San Pedro	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	41	:	2/ 9/44	:
DD547:	:Beth. San Pedro	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	42	:	3/ 9/44	:
DD548:	:Beth. San Pedro	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	51	:	12/ 9/44	:
DD549:	:Beth. San Pedro	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	52	:	1/ 9/45	:
DD550:	:Gulf S.E. Co.	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	34	:	7/ 9/43	:
DD551:	:Gulf S.E. Co.	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	40	:	1/ 9/44	:
DD552:	:Gulf S.E. Co.	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	45	:	6/ 9/44	:
DD553:	:Gulf S.E. Co.	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	50	:	11/ 9/44	:
DD554:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E. Co.	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:		:	6/30/43	:
DD555:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E. Co.	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	34	:	7/15/43	:
DD556:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E. Co.	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	34½	:	7/31/43	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel	Launched	Date of Completion:		
		September 1, 1940	Month of August 1940	TOTAL			Month of contract	to or by	order or building
<u>DESTROYERS (CONT'D)</u>									
DD557:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 35 :	: 8/16/43:	:
DD558:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 35½ :	: 8/31/43:	:
DD559:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 38½ :	: 12/ 1/43:	:
DD560:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 39 :	: 12/15/43:	:
DD561:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 39½ :	: 1/ 3/44:	:
DD562:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 40 :	: 1/15/44:	:
DD563:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 40½ :	: 1/31/44:	:
DD564:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 49½ :	: 10/31/44:	:
DD565:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 50 :	: 11/15/44:	:
DD566:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 50½ :	: 11/30/44:	:
DD567:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 51 :	: 12/15/44:	:
DD568:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 51½ :	: 12/30/44:	:
DD569:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 34 :	: 7/ 9/43:	:
DD570:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 35½ :	: 8/24/43:	:
DD571:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 37 :	: 10/ 9/43:	:
DD572:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 38½ :	: 11/24/43:	:
DD573:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 40 :	: 1/ 9/44:	:
DD574:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 41½ :	: 2/24/44:	:
DD575:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 43 :	: 4/ 9/44:	:
DD576:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 44½ :	: 5/24/44:	:
DD577:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 46 :	: 7/ 9/44:	:
DD578:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 47½ :	: 8/24/44:	:
DD579:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 49 :	: 10/ 9/44:	:
DD580:	:Consolidated Steel	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 50½ :	: 11/24/44:	:
DD581:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 37½ :	: 11/ 1/43:	:
DD582:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 39½ :	: 1/ 2/44:	:
DD583:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 41½ :	: 3/ 1/44:	:
DD584:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 43½ :	: 5/ 1/44:	:
DD585:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 45½ :	: 7/ 1/44:	:
DD586:	:Boston	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 47½ :	: 9/ 1/44:	:

September 10, 1940

Sheet 14.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel Laid	Launched	Date of Completion:	
		September 1940	Month of August 1940	TOTAL			Mos. contract	by building
		TOTAL	TOTAL					
<u>DESTROYERS</u>	<u>(CONT'D)</u>							
DD587:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	34 1/2:	8/ 1/43:
DD588:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	37 1/2:	11/ 1/43:
DD589:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	40 1/2:	2/ 1/44:
DD590:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	43 1/2:	5/ 1/44:
DD591:	:Charleston	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	46 1/2:	8/ 1/44:
DD592:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	32 1/2:	6/ 1/43:
DD593:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	34 1/2:	8/ 1/43:
DD594:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	36 1/2:	10/ 1/43:
DD595:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	38 1/2:	12/ 1/43:
DD596:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	40 1/2:	2/ 1/44:
DD597:	:Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	42 1/2:	4/ 1/44:

September 10, 1940

Sheet 15.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:						Date of Completion:				
		September 1940	August 1940	Keel Laid	Launched	or order	Fld. order	yard	As reported	by building	contract	order
<u>MINESWEEPERS</u>												
AM55	: RAVEN	: Norfolk	: 74.6	: 6.1	: 6/28/39	: 8/24/40	: 9/ 1/38	: 24	: 9/ 1/40	: 12/13/40		
AM56	: OSPREY	: Norfolk	: 73.8	: 5.9	: 6/28/39	: 8/24/40	: 9/ 1/38	: 26	: 11/ 1/40	: 1/15/41		
AM57	: AUX	: Norfolk	: 0.3	: 0.2				: 6/12/40	: 15	: 9/12/41	: 9/12/41	
<u>REPAIR SHIPS</u>												
AR5	: VULCAN	: N.Y.S.E.Corp.	: 30.3	: 3.7	: 12/26/39	-	: 8/ 1/39	: 32	: 4/ 1/42	: 8/ 1/41		
AR6	:	: Los Angeles S.						: 9/ 9/40	: 36	: 9/ 9/43		
	:	: E. & D.D.Co.										
<u>SUBMARINE TENDER</u>												
AS11	: FULTON	: Mare Island	: 53.1	: 4.8	: 7/19/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 36	: 9/ 1/41	: 9/ 1/41		
AS12	: SPERRY	: Mare Island	: 1.4	: 1.2				: 6/12/40	: 30	: 12/12/42	: 12/12/42	
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>												
AV4	: CURTISS	: N.Y.S.E.Corp.	: 91.2	: 9.8	: 4/25/38	: 4/20/40	: 12/27/37	: 38	: 2/27/41	: 11/ 1/40		
AV5	: ALBEMARLE	: N.Y.S.E.Corp.	: 64.7	: 5.9	: 6/12/39	: 7/13/40	: 10/14/38	: 32	: 6/14/41	: 2/ 1/41		
AV7	: CURRITUCK	: N.Y.S.E.Corp.						: 7/ 1/40	: 48	: 7/ 1/44	: 7/ 1/44	
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>												
AVP10	: DARNEGAT	: Puget Sound	: 46.6	: 8.7	: 10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 27	: 12/ 1/40	: 3/ 1/41		
AVP11	: BISCAYNE	: Puget Sound	: 43.2	: 5.3	: 10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 30	: 3/ 1/41	: 5/ 1/41		
AVP12	: CASCO	: Puget Sound	: 30.7	: 10.3	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/ 1/39	: 24	: 7/ 1/41	: 7/ 1/41		
AVP13	: MACKINAC	: Puget Sound	: 28.9	: 9.2	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/ 1/39	: 27	: 10/ 1/41	: 10/ 1/41		
AVP21	: HUMSCIDT	: Boston	: 2.7	: 1.1	: 9/ 6/40			: 6/12/40	: 16	: 10/12/41	: 10/12/41	
AVP22	: MATAGORDA	: Boston	: 2.7	: 1.1	: 9/ 6/40			: 6/12/40	: 18	: 12/12/41	: 12/12/41	
<u>MINELAYER</u>												
CM5	: TERROR	: Philadelphia	: 2.3	: 1.1	: 9/ 3/40	-	: 9/ 1/39	: 36	: 9/ 1/42	: 1/ 1/43		

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion			
		September 1: 1940	Gain for Month of August 1940	Keel Laid	Launched: or order	Date of contract: Cal.	As per contract or	As reported by building yard	
SUBMARINE CHASERS									
PC449:	:Luders Mar. C.Co.	: 99.9	: 0.0	: 7/10/39	: 5/14/40	: 7/ 1/39:300	: 4/26/40	: 9/13/40(a)	:
PC451:	:DeFoe E&M Wks.	: Delivered August 11, 1940. Commissioned August 12, 1940							
PC452:	:DeFoe P&M Wks.	: 66.0	: 12.0	: 3/14/40	: -	: 10/19/39:360	: 10/13/40	: 10/13/40	:
PC453:	:Fisher Boat Wks.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 8/40:360	: 7/ 3/41	:	:
FTC1:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
to 12:	:E.F.Co.Elco Wks.	: 44.0 *	: 18.0	: -	: -	: 12/13/39:390	: 1/ 6/41	: 12/ 5/40(c)	:
MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS									
PT1 :	:Miami S.F.Corp.	: 88.5	: 0.0	: 7/12/39	: 8/16/39	: 6/ 8/39:165	: 11/20/39	: 11/15/40(a)	:
PT2 :	:Miami S.F.Corp.	: 88.5	: 0.0	: 8/19/39	: 9/30/39	: 6/ 8/39:165	: 11/20/39	: 11/15/40(a)	:
PT5 :	:Higgins Ind.Inc.	: 98.5	: 2.0	: 8/ 1/39	: -	: 6/10/39:175	: 12/ 2/39	: 10/15/40(a)	:
PT6 :	:Higgins Ind.Inc.	: 90.0	: 10.0	: 5/15/40	: -	: 6/10/39: -	: 8/26/40	: 10/15/40(d)	:
PT7 :	:Philadelphia	: 54.3	: 9.6	: 8/29/39	: -	: 6/23/39: -	: -	: 10/ 1/40	:
PT8 :	:Philadelphia	: 93.0	: 2.4	: 12/29/39	: -	: 7/18/39: -	: -	: 10/ 1/40	:
FT10 :	:E.F.Co.Elco Wks. :)	:	:	: -	: 8/20/40	: 12/13/39:300-	: 10/ 8/40(c)	: 9/25/40(c)	:
:	:	:	:	:	:	:	: to	:	:
PT11 :	:	: 61.0 *	: 15.0	:	:	:	:	:	:
to 19:	:E.F.Co.Elco Wks. :)	:	:	: -	: -	: 12/13/39:390	:	:	:
PT20 :	:E.F.Co.Elco Wks. :)	:	:	:	:	:	: 2/ 1/41(e)	: 3/ 1/41(o)	:

- (a) These vessels delayed due to late engine deliveries.
- (c) First vessel only, balance scheduled for delivery at uniform intervals thereafter.
- (d) Delivery date delayed due to construction of replacement boat.
- (e) Date changed due to design change.
- * Estimated completion for class.

PSF May

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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
September 23, 1940.

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memoranda from ONI are forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,


B. J. CALLAGHAN

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- 

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16 September 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Recognition of the Wang Ching-wei Government in China.

1. Highly reliable information has been received that the government of Spain has agreed to accord recognition to the Wang Ching-wei government of China simultaneously with the recognition of this government by Italy. It is understood that both the Italian and Spanish governments will announce recognition in the near future, shortly after the Wang Ching-wei government is recognized by Japan.

W.S. Anderson
W.S. Anderson.

Original to the Aide to the President.

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DAD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 4-7-70
Signature- *8/12*

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NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

16 September 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Gasoline and Oil Exports to Japan.

1. Highly reliable information has been received that on 20 August 1940 the Japanese Consul General at San Francisco informed his government that in spite of the restrictions on exports of petroleum products from the United States, no difficulty had been experienced in arranging for shipments of ordinary gasoline and of crude petroleum.

2. The Consul General at San Francisco informed his government in detail as follows:

(a) All the details connected with applications for export permits for petroleum products are being left in the hands of American agents by the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies of San Francisco. These American agencies from whom the oil is bought go ahead and make suitable arrangements with the government authorities at Washington.

(b) The Mitsubishi agency at San Francisco has been notified by the local office of the Associated Oil Company that of the applications for export permits already filed in Washington by the Associated Oil Company, export licenses have been granted for about 22,000 tons of Kettleman Hill crude oil and for a similar amount of other California crude oil. This material was applied for as "special blend" crude oil.

(c) Considering results so far, there would appear to be no chance of securing export licenses for aviation gasoline contracted for prior to 1 August nor that export permits will be issued for this material on the basis that exports should be permitted because the companies were under contract prior to the application of the export license system.

(d) Recently ordinary gasoline was loaded on board vessels of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi companies in the amount of some 85,000 barrels. Permits for the export of this gasoline were granted on application for the export of ordinary freight.

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100-1118-5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- 8/12

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

(e) American oil dealers in the San Francisco area selling to Mitsui and Mitsubishi, of which the principal one is the Associated Oil Company, feel that there will be no difficulty about continuing the shipment of ordinary gasoline to Japan.

W.S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to the President.
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M.I.D.
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DDO (11) 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *JD*

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AND DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE Date-
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-F-2 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

19 September 1940

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese plans to obtain U.S. Aviation Gasoline in Mexico.

1. From highly reliable sources this office has learned that the Japanese Legation in Mexico City has been negotiating since early August, 1940, with a Mexican importer of U.S. petroleum products to obtain 87 to 89 octane leaded U.S. aviation gasoline. The offer to supply this gasoline in any quantity came initially from a J. R. Rowe Company located in Mexico, possibly Mexico City.

2. With a view to establishing this source of aviation gasoline in the event of a U.S. embargo, the Japanese Government approved entering into negotiations for an initial purchase of 100,000 drums. This deal is known to have fallen through within the last several days because of the high price. It is believed however that negotiations are continuing and that if a satisfactory price arrangement is eventually reached purchases will be made.

3. From sources available in Washington, D.C., it has been learned that the Rowe Company obtains gasoline from the American Petroleum Co., (possibly the American Petroleum Export Co.,) of Houston, Texas, to fill contracts with the Mexican Government and with commercial companies in Mexico.

4. No difficulty is expected by the parties concerned in obtaining U.S. export licenses for quantities in excess of requirements in Mexico. It is contemplated that these excess quantities, ordered as part of a Mexican order, would then be sold to the Japanese firm of Mitsui, or the Japanese controlled Pacific Oil Company in Mexico, for reexport via Manzanillo.

5. It is expected that shipments, if made, will be in Japanese, or Japanese chartered ships, but if foreign ships are used the shipments would be directed to a dummy addressee in the Far East for later diversion to Japan. These precautions have been considered necessary by the Japanese because of the vigilance of the U.S. Consul at Manzanillo in watching ship loadings.

W.S. Anderson
W. S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to the President.
CC - C.N.O.
M.I.D.
State
File

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

PS F Navy
J

September 28, 1940

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. SUMNER WELLES

Will you please talk with me about the possibility of a loan--or gift - from special fund to Mexico in return for certain naval rights in places like Magdalena Bay, Salina Cruz and possibly something near the northeast corner of Yucatan?

F. D. R.

For original of this memo
See: Summer Welles-Drawer 1-1940

OPERATIONS
To Mr. President -
worth
your while reading
Betty

More gadgets for destroyers,
cruisers, etc. !!! Resp. J. G. ...

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1971

(came to file Sept 28-1940) PSF Navy
File
Personal
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Navy

CONFIRMATION MEMORANDUM

[9-28-40]

Caller: Commander S. K. Hall, U.S.N.
Callee: Lt-Comdr. M. E. Miles, U.S.N., Recorder, Interior Control Board.
Time: 1000, 24 September 1940.
Subject: Fueling from tanker at sea.

1. Commander Hall called the Recorder, Interior Control Board, and informed him that he had received a letter originating in the Bureau of Ships suggesting the installation of a gyrocompass repeater with a long lead which could be passed over from an oil tanker or other large vessel to a ship fueling from alongside while under way. Commander Hall asked the Recorder of the Interior Control Board what his opinions were in the matter. The Recorder of the Interior Control Board informed Commander Hall as follows:

The Captain and other personnel of a destroyer are not particularly interested in the exact course of a tanker after they have made the approach. Once the approach is over and contact is made, the exact course to be steered is determined by the breast. According to many good authorities (mostly the older ones), the most important thing is the breast. The breast should not be too taut but should be slightly "at angle". Under no circumstances should the breast be so loose as to drag in the water. The older and more experienced personnel like an 8-inch breast in preference to a 6-inch one.

2. After receiving the above, Commander Hall decided that the free gyrocompass repeaters to pass over to destroyers was not necessary. This decision was concurred in by the Recorder, Interior Control Board.

/s/ M. E. Miles

PSF
Mary

THE WHITE HOUSE
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Personal
Confidential
Mary

October 3, 1940.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from ONI is
forwarded for the President's information.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

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E.O. 12958 (9/27/98)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *AK*

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E.O. 12958

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2 October 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Conversation between Ciano and Amau.

1. From highly reliable sources this office has learned that three days before the 27 September announcement of the Tri-Power pact, the Italian Foreign Minister held a confidential conversation with the Japanese Ambassador Amau, in which Ciano stated that he and Ribbentrop had been exploring every means of increasing the Axis war effort. Ciano expected that as a result of these talks they had further strengthened the already overwhelming odds in their favor to win the war.
2. Japan's role was also discussed, but it had been agreed to leave all details of negotiations with Japan entirely in Ribbentrop's hands. Ribbentrop would get in touch with Japan on this.
3. Ciano doubted that the U.S. would declare war, despite her acting like a belligerent in intensifying aid to England. Amau gained the impression that Ciano harbored some anxiety with regard to the United States. Ciano was not particularly concerned about prospects of reaching a settlement with the Soviet on problems in the Balkans. With reference to Spain, negotiations were in progress and therefore nothing definite could be stated other than Spain was becoming constantly more pro-Axis.
4. Regarding future phases of the war, Ciano admitted that Germany must land troops in England before she can be crushed. The success of such landings depends largely on the weather, as well as other factors. The Egyptian campaign would be a tough one, but it is progressing favorably. Concerning French colonies, the Axis considers the situation dangerous and plans to meet it with every means at its disposal. This applies not only to French colonies in Africa, but elsewhere as well.
5. It was implied several times during this conversation that a long war was in prospect. Syrian oil would be needed eventually, but for the present Italy did not desire to unduly alarm or antagonize Turkey.

Original to Aide to the President.
CC - C.N.O.
M.I.D.
State
File

W.S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *FWJ*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PSI: Navy
File
Personal
Confidential
Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 10, 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I thought the President would be interested in knowing of the varied ration of the British seamen — after removal of the condiments, etc., outlined in the attached despatch.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

REPRODUCTION LAW
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY OF THE ORIGINAL
DATE: 10/11/40

DEPOSED TO THE
MUSEUM
THE MIDDLE HORSE

COPY

PSF: Navy

FROM: COMDESATRON

071759CR676

~~SECRET RESTRICTED~~

8 OCTOBER 1940

ACTION: USS CONWAY BAILEY ROBINSON STOCTON RINGGOLD WICKES MEADE-
PHILIP-EVANS-TWIGGS-TILLMAN-CLAXTON-CONNER- MCCALLA-SWASEY-
YARNALL-FAIRFAX-RIDGERS-SHUBRICK
INFO: SANDA-OPNAV-COMATRON-NSD NORFOLK-COMDESRON 33-COMDESRON 39

BRITISH AUTHORITIES HAVE REQUESTED THAT FOLLOWING DRY PROVISIONS BE DE-
LETED FROM STORES OF VESSELS PRIOR TO ARRIVAL PORT OF TURN OVER BECAUSE

THESE ITEMS NOT INCLUDED IN THEIR RATION X CORNMEAL, CHIPPED BEEF, KIDNEY
BEANS, LIMA BEANS, ASPARAGUS, CANNED CORN, CANNED SWEET POTATOES, SAUER-
KRAUT, SPINACH, APPLESAUCE, COFFEE, DRYMILK, CEREAL, GELATIN, CHILI POWDER
PREPARED MUSTARD PUMPKINS SPAGHETTI JELLO LEMON POWDER CRACKERS
HOMINY POWDERED SUGAR NOODLES MACARONI COCOA ESSENCES BLACK TEA OYSTERS
AND CLAMS COCONUT TOMATO JUICES PICKLES COMPLYAS PRATICABLE

SANDA ACTION

10/11 12 38 FILE

NOTE: ANY REPLY TO THIS MESSAGE MUST BE MARKED RESTRICTED

Don - For President

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 9-27-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Y PSF
Merry

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


October 10, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT


The attached memorandum from ONI is
forwarded for the information of the President.

Respectfully,


E. J. CALLAGHAN

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- 

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 9, 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

- SUBJECT: Japanese consuls and other agencies in the United States take Steps to increase own Security and flow of Intelligence.
1. Highly reliable information has been received to the following effect:
 - (a) On October 1st the Japanese Foreign Minister instructed all Diplomatic and Consular officers in North and Central America to take steps to insure that Domei (Japanese News Agency) made prompt and accurate reports of U.S. reaction, both favorable and unfavorable, resulting from Japan's conclusion of a Military Alliance with Germany and Italy.
 - (b) On the same date Japanese Diplomatic and Consular Officers were instructed to bring to maximum efficiency all agencies for gathering information about the United States, particularly those agencies gathering information concerning U.S. movements involving Japan.
 - (c) Shortly after the receipt of the foregoing instructions, the Japanese Consul General at San Francisco expressed the opinion that it was essential that improved facilities for obtaining military-naval information be made available. In this connection he observed that the official status of Japanese Naval Officers assigned to the Naval Attache Office, to the Office of the Japanese Naval Inspector at New York, and to the Japanese Naval Office at Los Angeles, so limited their freedom of action as to render them of small value in obtaining vital information concerning U.S. military and naval activity directed against Japan. In order to improve the situation the Japanese Consul General recommended that a naval officer, disguised as a Consular Clerk, be assigned to the consulates at Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, and New York.
 - (d) At the end of September the Japanese Ambassador at Washington pointed out to all Japanese Consuls in the United States that as a result of the conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese alliance, greatly increased U.S. surveillance of Japanese activities, including tapping of

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DDO Lit. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- JAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

telephone wires, could be expected. Consuls were enjoined to increase the security measures of their offices; to warn all Japanese government agencies, Japanese chambers of commerce, Japanese Associations, and influential Japanese business firms and banks to redouble precautions for security. All of the above Japanese agencies, their personnel, and resident Japanese in general, must be warned to be discreet in making statements, particular caution being exercised in the use of the telephone.

W.S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson.

Original to the Aide to the President.
CC - C.N.O.
MID.
State
File
F.B.I.

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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *WML*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

In reply address not the signer of this letter, but Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. Refer to No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF
Horn
Lew to
Pres for
his naval
file
off

HH.

11 October 1940.

Memorandum for

Captain Callaghan.
Naval Aide to the President.

The attached cartoon is returned to you with the compliments of Mr. M. Horn, of our Transportation Division, who brought it from Halifax. He is pleased for the President to have it for his files.

Respectfully,

G. W. Bains
G. W. Bains,
Aide to Admiral Nimitz.

107.4/40
P. 2
Mrs. Larrabee
The President has indicated that he would like to have the attached cartoon for his Navy file
Attachment.

P.

SPINACH!



WITH the United States securing the right to establish naval and air bases on British territory in the Western Hemisphere, with Canada and the United States working in the closest of military co-operation, and with American destroyers going now to reinforce the strength of the British Navy . . . well, it must be a flood of bad news for the Nazi-Fascist combination.

But it is the best of good news for the English-speaking peoples, who see in these arrangements that long-hoped-for get-together that is as natural and inevitable as an undefended frontier across the North American Continent.

To the American officers and men who have brought these ships to Canadian waters goes a hand of hearty welcome and a cordial salute. They will realize on this visit that blood is in reality "thicker than water" and that they are making a cousinly call. And on behalf of the whole British Commonwealth of Nations, Canada greets them and thanks them for this tangible evidence of their friendship and goodwill.

A Hearty Salute!

— AN EDITORIAL —

YESTERDAY the world witnessed an event of profound significance, not in the conduct of this war alone, but in the history of the English-speaking peoples.

It was the arrival in Canadian waters of American destroyers, flying the American flag, manned by American crews—ships of war to be transferred to the strength of the British Navy.

And (as the British Prime Minister has said) by "the long arm of coincidence" British crews are meeting these destroyers on schedule.

The point will not be lost on anyone of understanding and imagination.

THESE American "four-stackers" are described officially as "over-age" destroyers. The description indicates a technical status. Actually, they are able, formidable fighting ships, which, at this psychological moment, will form a welcome addition to the British Fleet.

In his speech of August 20 Mr. Churchill hinted at what was likely to come to pass:

"We hope," he said, "our friends across the ocean will send us a timely reinforcement to bridge the gap between the peace flotillas of 1939 and the war flotillas of 1941."

This timely reinforcement is now on its way: the first practical evidence of it appeared in Canadian waters yesterday. And already it has been a positive inspiration to the peoples of the British Empire who are bearing the weight of this titanic struggle!

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1007
October 14, 1940.

file →
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached ONI report dealing with efforts of Japanese Ambassador at Washington to influence American policy through the American press is forwarded for the information of the President.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 21 1973

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

WASHINGTON

October 11, 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Efforts of Japanese Ambassador at Washington to influence American policy through the American press.

Highly reliable information has been received to the following effect:

1. Recently the Japanese Ambassador at Washington advised his Foreign Minister that the Ambassador was in full accord with the statement of policy announced by the Japanese government at the time that the German-Italian-Japanese military alliance was announced, namely: that the treaty merely served to clarify the objective of the new orders in Europe and greater East Asia and that it was in no sense indicative of a desire on Japan's part to cease attempting to improve relations with the United States. The Ambassador went on to say that if the Japanese could succeed in making the American people have a proper understanding and appreciation of Japanese aims, he believed that public opinion in the United States would compel a reversal of present United States policy of exerting pressure on Japan and that this would result in both avoiding a clash with the United States and in insuring a continued flow of supplies vital to Japanese national defense.

2. The Japanese Ambassador stated that with a view towards getting the Japanese viewpoint before the American public, he had been maintaining particularly close relations with persons prominent in publicity circles in the United States. He stated that there are a number of persons in the United States who are impressed with the gravity of the situation and who are imbued with a desire to effect an improvement in relations between the United States and Japan. Furthermore these persons have indicated a willingness to cooperate with the Japanese in guiding journalistic opinion in the United States.

3. The Japanese Ambassador continued in detail as follows:

(a) The New York Daily News has been steadily publishing at least one editorial a week urging better relations with Japan. Immediately upon the announcement of the Japanese-German-Italian military alliance, Publisher Patterson of the New York Daily News sent a special reporter to see the Japanese Ambassador and through this reporter advised the Japanese Ambassador that the pro-Japanese policy of the New York Daily News would be continued. The Ambassador told the reporter that he felt that a clash between the United States and Japan could be avoided

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

CSD letter, May 8, 1972

By RT,

NARS Date

MAY 21 1973

as long as the United States does not enter the European war. Mr. Patterson also informed the Ambassador that he was bringing pressure to bear on Mr. Willkie to come out in the open for peace with Japan.

(b) David Lawrence whose editorial opinions appear in many newspapers throughout the United States has repeatedly urged the maintenance of friendly relations between the United States and Japan. Recently this Mr. Lawrence called on the Japanese Ambassador and told him that he had written a piece urging the establishment of a committee composed of civilians to make a study of Japanese-United States relations. The Ambassador reported that the foregoing article was published in the Washington Star on the same day that the military alliance with Germany and Italy was announced. Mr. Lawrence then called on the Japanese Ambassador and told him that the announcement of the conclusion of the military alliance had impressed on the American masses the gravity of the situation. Mr. Lawrence then stated that now there was no doubt that Roosevelt will be reelected and he seemed to be extremely pessimistic concerning betterment of Japanese-American relations. The Ambassador told Mr. Lawrence that he did not feel that the situation was hopeless and explained the Japanese viewpoint to him at length, taking the occasion to point out the serious errors that the United States had made in her conduct with Japan during the past year. On the following day Mr. Lawrence published an article in the Washington Star which accurately reflected what the Japanese Ambassador had told him and urged the American people to reconsider their policy in regard to Japan.

(c) On the 30th of September, Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers published an article in all of his newspapers urging the setting up of a committee to study the Far Eastern situation. On the same day he sent his foreign editor, Mr. Simms, to call on the Japanese Ambassador. Mr. Simms advised the Japanese Ambassador that Mr. Howard attached a great deal of importance to the statement made by Under-Secretary of State Welles that United States-Japanese negotiations were still possible. Mr. Simms said that Mr. Howard was advocating the immediate establishment of a committee for studying the Far Eastern subjects with the idea of mollifying public opinion both in Japan and the United States and he requested the Ambassador's opinion concerning this proposal. The Ambassador replied that he was sure that such a move would be productive of good, especially as it was being volunteered by the United States. The Ambassador added that it was the strong arm policy of the United States which was causing matters to go from bad to worse. On the following day, the first of October, Simms published his interview with the Japanese Ambassador in all of the Scripps-Howard newspapers, which at the same time carried an editorial entitled "Can't we avoid fighting Japan?"

(d) The Hearst papers and the Scripps-Howard papers have been arguing that there was no need for a clash between the United States and Japan and are urging a reconsideration of the situation by the people of the United States.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

4. The Japanese Ambassador concludes with the statement that it is very fortunate for Japan that all of these organs of public opinion are inclined to lend themselves to further Japanese propaganda efforts in the United States and that he will continue to maintain close and intimate connections with these news organs with a view towards affording them suitable guidance in furthering Japanese policy.

W.S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to the President.

CC - CNO.

MID

State

File

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

PSF. Navy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

top file

October 15, 1940.

*file
Personal
Confidential*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached report of progress, as of October 1, 1940, on vessels under construction for the Navy is forwarded for the information of the President.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RESUMED

Ss

OCTOBER 10, 1940
VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION, UNITED STATES NAVY - REPORT OF PROGRESS AS OF OCTOBER 1, 1940

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:		Keel Laid	Launched	or order	Bld. order	yard	Date of Completion	
		October 1, 1940	September 1, 1940						Month of	Year
BATTLESHIPS										
BB55: NORTH CAROLINA	: New York	: 83.0	: 2.9	: 10/27/37	: 6/13/40	: 8/1/37	: 49	: 9/1/41	: 7/15/41	:
BB56: WASHINGTON	: Philadelphia	: 77.5	: 2.6	: 6/14/38	: 6/1/40	: 8/1/37	: 52	: 12/1/41	: 12/1/41	:
BB57: SOUTH DAKOTA	: N.Y.S.B. Corp.	: 33.1	: 4.6	: 7/5/39	-	: 12/15/38	: 52	: 4/15/43	: 12/15/42	:
BB58: INDIANA	: WNS&ED Co.	: 24.6	: 2.4	: 11/20/39	-	: 12/15/38	: 52	: 4/15/43	: 4/15/43	:
BB59: MASSACHUSETTS	: Beth. Fore River	: 30.4	: 2.7	: 7/20/39	-	: 12/15/38	: 55	: 7/15/43	: 7/15/43	:
BB60: ALABAMA	: Norfolk	: 18.7	: 2.6	: 2/1/40	-	: 4/1/39	: 52	: 8/1/43	: 8/1/43	:
BB61: IOWA	: New York	: 6.0	: 2.0	: 6/27/40	-	: 7/1/39	: 49	: 8/1/43	: 6/1/43	:
BB62: NEW JERSEY	: Philadelphia	: 2.3	: 0.6	: 9/15/40	-	: 7/1/39	: 52	: 11/1/43	: 6/1/44(a)	:
BB63: MISSOURI	: New York	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 48	: 6/12/44	: 3/1/44	:
BB64: WISCONSIN	: Philadelphia	:	:	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 48	: 6/12/44	: 6/12/44	:
BB65:	: Philadelphia	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40	:	: 11/1/45	:	:
BB66:	: Norfolk	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40	:	: 5/1/45	:	:
BB67:	: Philadelphia	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40	:	: (b)	:	:
BB68:	: Philadelphia	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40	:	: (b)	:	:
BB69:	: New York	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40	:	: (b)	:	:
BB70:	: New York	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40	:	: (b)	:	:
BB71:	: Norfolk	:	:	:	:	: 9/9/40	:	: (b)	:	:

- (a) An extension in the building period of at least 6 months will be required on this vessel, the exact amount not now determinable.
(b) Building periods to be determined later.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 2-18-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

October 10, 1940

Sheet 2.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:				
		October 1:	Month of	Gain for	Month of	Date of	Mos.	contract:	As per	
		1940	September 1940:	Kael	September 1940:	contract:	to	or	building	
		TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched:	or order:	Eld.:	order	yard	
<u>AIRCRAFT CARRIERS</u>										
CV8 :HORNET	:NNSB&DD Co.	: 50.0	: 4.7	: 9/25/39:	-	: 4/10/39:	34	: 2/10/42:	2/10/42	:
CV9 :ESSEX	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	:	: 4/15/44:	:	:
CV10: BON HOMME RICHARD	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	:	: 9/15/44:	:	:
CV11: INTREPID	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 3/40:	:	: 2/15/45:	:	:
CV12: KEARSARGE	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 7/15/45:	:	:
CV13:	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 12/15/45:	:	:
CV14:	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 4/15/46:	:	:
CV15:	:NNSB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 8/15/46:	:	:
CV16:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 4/ 9/44:	:	:
CV17:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 7/ 9/44:	:	:
CV18:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1/ 9/46:	:	:
CV19:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/ 9/46:	:	:
<u>LARGE CRUISERS</u>										
CB1 :	:N.Y.S.E.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 4/ 1/45:	:	:
CB2 :	:N.Y.S.E.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 8/ 1/45:	:	:
CB3 :	:N.Y.S.E.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 12/ 1/45:	:	:
CB4 :	:N.Y.S.E.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 4/ 1/46:	:	:
CB5 :	:N.Y.S.E.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 8/ 1/46:	:	:
CB6 :	:N.Y.S.E.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 12/ 1/46:	:	:
<u>HEAVY CRUISERS</u>										
CA68: BALTIMORE	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	: 6/14/43:	:	:
CA69: BOSTON	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	: 8/14/43:	:	:
CA70: PITTSBURGH	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	: 12/14/43:	:	:
CA71: ST. PAUL	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	: 4/14/44:	:	:
CA72:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 7/ 9/45:	:	:
CA73:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 8/ 9/45:	:	:
CA74:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 9/ 9/45:	:	:
CA75:	:Beth.Fore River:	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 10/ 9/45:	:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				:Date of Completion:			
		:October 1:	:Month of:	:September 1940:	:Keel:	:Date of:	:Mns.:	:contract:	:by:
		:1940:	:September 1940:	:Keel:	:Date of:	:Mns.:	:contract:	:by:	:As per reported:
		:TOTAL:	:TOTAL:	:Laid:	:Launched:	:or order:	:Bld.:	:order:	:yard:
<u>:SUBMARINES</u>									
SS201:TRITON *	:Portsmouth	: 93.4	: 4.4	: 7/ 5/39:	3/25/40:	9/ 1/38:	30	3/ 1/41:	11/ 1/40 :
SS202:TROUT	:Portsmouth	: 85.3	: 4.1	: 8/28/39:	5/21/40:	9/ 1/38:	32	5/ 1/41:	1/ 1/41 :
SS203:TUNA	:Mare Island	: 82.8	: 6.6	: 7/19/39:	10/ 2/40:	11/ 1/38:	30	5/ 1/41:	3/ 1/41 :
SS204:MACKEREL	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 85.7	: 5.1	:10/ 6/39:	9/28/40:	6/15/39:	23	5/15/41:	3/31/41 :
SS205:MARLIN	:Portsmouth	: 31.5	: 2.6	: 5/28/40:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	27	10/ 1/41:	10/ 1/41 :
SS206:GAR	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 71.2	: 8.6	:12/27/39:	-	: 6/15/39:	25	7/15/41:	4/21/41 :
SS207:GRAMPUS	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 60.9	: 6.4	: 2/14/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	27	9/15/41:	6/ 2/41 :
SS208:GRAYBACK	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 53.2	: 5.9	: 4/ 3/40:	-	: 6/15/39:	29	11/15/41:	7/14/41 :
SS209:GRAYLING	:Portsmouth	: 64.0	: 0.9	:12/15/39:	9/ 4/40:	7/ 1/39:	25	8/ 1/41:	4/15/41 :
SS210:GRENADIER	:Portsmouth	: 56.7	: 1.6	: 4/ 2/40:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	29	12/ 1/41:	8/ 1/41 :
SS211:GUDGEON	:Mare Island	: 56.2	: 8.3	:11/22/39:	-	: 7/ 1/39:	27	10/ 1/41:	10/ 1/41 :
SS212:GATO	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 4.7	: 3.6	:10/ 5/40:	-	: 6/12/40:	20	2/12/42:	2/12/42 :
SS213:GREENLING	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 4.7	: 3.6	:	:	: 6/12/40:	21 1/2	3/27/42:	3/27/42 :
SS214:GROUPER	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 4.7	: 3.6	:	:	: 6/12/40:	23	5/12/42:	5/12/42 :
SS215:GROWLER	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	7/16/42:	7/16/42 :
SS216:GRUNION	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	9/ 1/42:	9/ 1/42 :
SS217:GUARDFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	10/16/42:	10/16/42 :
SS218:ALBACORE	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	12/ 1/42:	12/ 1/42 :
SS219:AMBERJACK	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	1/16/43:	1/16/43 :
SS220:BARB	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	3/ 1/43:	3/ 1/43 :
SS221:BLACKFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	4/16/43:	4/16/43 :
SS222:BLUEFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	6/ 1/43:	6/ 1/43 :
SS223:BONEFISH	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	7/16/43:	7/16/43 :
SS224:COD	:Elec. Boat Co.:	: 0.8	: 0.1	:	:	: 7/ 1/40:	:	9/ 1/43:	9/ 1/43 :

* Commissioned 15 August 1940.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:			Keel	Launched	or order	:Date of Completion:	
		:October 1940	:Month of September 1940	:Gain for				:Date of	:Mos.:
		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Laid	:Launched	:or order	:Bld.:	:order	:yard
:SUBMARINES (CONT'D)									
SS225:CERO	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.8	0.1	:	:	7/1/40:	10/16/43:	10/16/43	:
SS226:CORVINA	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.8	0.1	:	:	7/1/40:	12/1/43:	12/1/43	:
SS227:DARTER	:Elec. Boat Co.:	0.8	0.1	:	:	7/1/40:	1/16/44:	1/16/44	:
SS228:DRUM	:Portsmouth	6.0	2.2	:	9/11/40:	6/12/40:	21	3/12/42:	1/31/42
SS229:FLYING FISH	:Portsmouth	5.0	2.0	:	:	6/12/40:	23 ¹ / ₂ :	5/27/42:	3/31/42
SS230:FINBACK	:Portsmouth	4.0	2.0	:	:	6/12/40:	27	9/12/42:	5/22/42
SS231:HADDOCK	:Portsmouth	1.0	0.0	:	:	6/28/40:	:	11/12/42:	7/10/42
SS232:HALIBUT	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	:	1/28/43:	9/15/42
SS233:HERRING	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	:	4/12/43:	11/6/42
SS234:KINGFISH	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	:	6/28/43:	12/31/42
SS235:SHAD	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	:	9/12/43:	2/23/43
SS236:SILVERSIDES	:Mare Island	0.7	0.7	:	:	6/28/40:	:	5/28/42:	5/28/42
SS237:TRIGGER	:Mare Island	0.7	0.7	:	:	6/28/40:	:	8/28/42:	8/28/42
SS238:WAHOO	:Mare Island	0.7	0.7	:	:	6/28/40:	:	3/28/43:	3/28/43
SS239:WHALE	:Mare Island	0.7	0.7	:	:	6/28/40:	:	6/28/43:	6/28/43
SS240:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	8/24/43:	:
SS241:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	9/24/43:	:
SS242:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	10/24/43:	:
SS243:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	11/24/43:	:
SS244:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	12/24/43:	:
SS245:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	1/24/44:	:
SS246:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	2/24/44:	:
SS247:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	3/24/44:	:
SS248:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	4/24/44:	:
SS249:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	5/24/44:	:
SS250:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	6/24/44:	:
SS251:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	7/24/44:	:
SS252:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	8/24/44:	:
SS253:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	9/24/44:	:
SS254:	:Elec. Boat Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/9/40:	:	10/24/44:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:		:Laid	:Launched	:Date of Completion:	
		:October 1940	:September 1940			:Date of Mes. contract	:to or building
		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Laid	:Launched	:order	:order
<u>SUBMARINES (CONT'D)</u>							
SS255:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 11/24/44:	:
SS256:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 12/24/44:	:
SS257:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 1/24/45:	:
SS258:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 2/24/45:	:
SS259:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 3/24/45:	:
SS260:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 4/24/45:	:
SS261:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 5/24/45:	:
SS262:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 6/24/45:	:
SS263:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 7/24/45:	:
SS264:	:Elec. Boat Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 8/24/45:	:
SS265:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 7/ 9/43:	:
SS266:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 10/ 9/43:	:
SS267:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 1/ 9/44:	:
SS268:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 3/ 9/44:	:
SS269:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 5/ 9/44:	:
SS270:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 12/ 9/44:	:
SS271:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 2/ 9/45:	:
SS272:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 4/ 9/45:	:
SS273:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 6/ 9/45:	:
SS274:	:Manitowoc S.E.Co.	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 8/ 9/45:	:
SS275:	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 5/ 1/43: 5/ 1/43	:
SS276:	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 7/ 1/43: 7/ 1/43	:
SS277:	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 9/ 1/43: 9/ 1/43	:
SS278:	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 11/ 1/43: 11/ 1/43	:
SS279:	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 1/ 2/44: 1/ 2/44	:
SS280:	:Portsmouth	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 3/ 1/44: 3/ 1/44	:
SS281:	:Maro Island	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 10/ 1/43: 8/ 1/43	:
SS282:	:Maro Island	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	: 1/ 2/44: 9/ 1/43	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:			
		October 1: 1940	Month of September 1940:	Keel Laid	Launched: or order:	As contract:	As per to or building:	reported by yard	
<u>DESTROYERS</u>									
DD422:MAYO	:Beth.Fore River :			Delivered and	Commissioned 18	September 1940			
DD425:MADISON *	:Boston :	99.8	0.2	:12/19/38:10/20/39:12/30/37:	34	:10/30/40:10/26/40 :			
DD426:LANSDALE ****	:Boston :	96.2	2.0	:12/19/38:10/20/39:12/30/37:	36	:12/30/40:10/15/40 :			
DD427:HILARY P.JONES ***	:Charleston :	95.9	5.0	:11/16/38:12/14/39:12/30/37:	34	:10/30/40:10/30/40 :			
DD428:CHAS.F.HUGHES **	:Puget Sound :	99.1	1.1	: 1/ 3/39: 5/16/40:12/30/37:	34	:10/30/40:10/18/40 :			
DD429:LIVERMORE	:Bath Iron Wks. :			Delivered and	Commissioned 7	October 1940			
DD430:EBERLE	:Bath Iron Wks. :	89.7	4.7	: 4/12/39: 9/14/40: 8/15/38:	30	: 2/15/41:11/27/40 :			
DD432:KEARNY	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :			Delivered 12	September and	Commissioned 13	September 1940		
DD433:GWIN	:Boston :	66.4	5.1	: 6/ 1/39: 5/25/40:10/ 1/38:	29	: 3/ 1/41: 3/ 1/41 :			
DD434:MEREDITH	:Boston :	64.4	5.1	: 6/ 1/39: 4/24/40:10/ 1/38:	31	: 5/ 1/41: 5/ 1/41 :			
DD435:GRAYSON	:Charleston :	64.9	6.8	: 7/17/39: 8/ 7/40:10/ 1/38:	30	: 4/ 1/41: 4/ 1/41 :			
DD436:MONSSEN	:Puget Sound :	69.7	4.7	: 7/12/39: 5/16/40:10/ 1/38:	29	: 3/ 1/41: 3/ 1/41 :			
DD437:WOOLSEY	:Bath Iron Wks. :	64.8	3.9	:10/ 9/39: - : 6/15/39:	26	: 8/15/41: 6/15/41 :			
DD438:LUDLOW	:Bath Iron Wks. :	63.5	5.1	:12/18/39: - : 6/15/39:	24	: 6/15/41: 4/15/41 :			
DD439:EDISON	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	66.6	6.4	: 3/18/40: - : 6/15/39:	24	: 6/15/41: 3/15/41 :			
DD440:ERICSSON	:Fed.SB&DD Co. :	62.4	6.6	: 3/18/40: - : 6/15/39:	26	: 8/15/41: 5/15/41 :			
DD441:WILKES	:Boston :	45.0	4.1	:11/ 1/39: 5/31/40: 7/ 1/39:	24	: 7/ 1/41: 7/ 1/41 :			
DD442:NICHOLSON	:Boston :	43.0	4.1	:11/ 1/39: 5/31/40: 7/ 1/39:	26	: 9/ 1/41: 9/ 1/41 :			
DD443:SWANSON	:Charleston :	40.7	7.8	:11/15/39: - : 7/ 1/39:	26	: 9/ 1/41: 9/ 1/41 :			
DD444:INGRAHAM	:Charleston :	30.9	4.5	:11/15/39: - : 7/ 1/39:	28	:11/ 1/41:11/ 1/41 :			

- * Commissioned 6 August 1940.
- ** Commissioned 5 September 1940.
- *** Commissioned 6 September 1940.
- **** Commissioned 17 September 1940.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel Laid	Date of contract:	Date of Completion:	
		October 1 1940	Gain for Month of September 1940	TOTAL			to contract:	As reported by building yard
: DESTROYERS (CONT'D)								
DD445: FLETCHER	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	11/ 1/42:	4/ 1/43 :
DD446: RADFORD	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	1/ 1/43:	5/ 1/43 :
DD447: JENKINS	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	2/ 1/43:	6/ 1/43 :
DD448: LA VALLETTE	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	4/ 1/43:	7/ 1/43 :
DD449: NICHOLAS	: Bath Iron Wks.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	11/ 1/42:	:
DD450: O'BANNON	: Bath Iron Wks.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	12/16/42:	:
DD451: CHEVALIER	: Bath Iron Wks.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	1/16/43:	:
DD452: PERCIVAL	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	10/ 1/43:	10/ 1/43 :
DD453: BRISTOL	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 0.8	: 0.8	:	:	6/12/40:	18 12/12/41:	12/12/41 :
DD454: ELLYSON	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 0.8	: 0.8	:	:	6/12/40:	20 2/12/42:	2/12/42 :
DD455: HAMBLETON	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 0.8	: 0.8	:	:	7/ 1/40:	5/ 1/42:	5/ 1/42 :
DD456: RODMAN	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	: 0.8	: 0.8	:	:	7/ 1/40:	7/ 1/42:	6/ 1/42 :
DD457: EMMONS	: Bath Iron Wks.	: 3.2	: 1.7	:	:	6/12/40:	18 12/12/41:	12/12/41 :
DD458: MACOMB	: Bath Iron Wks.	: 3.4	: 1.9	: 9/ 3/40:	:	6/12/40:	20 2/12/42:	2/12/42 :
DD459: LAFFEY	: Beth. Steel Co. (S.F.):	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	3/ 1/42:	:
DD460: WOODWORTH	: Beth. Steel Co. (S.F.):	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	4/ 1/42:	:
DD461: FORREST	: Boston	: 1.0	: 0.3	:	:	6/12/40:	20 2/12/42:	2/12/42 :
DD462: FITCH	: Boston	: 1.0	: 0.3	:	:	6/12/40:	22 4/12/42:	4/12/42 :
DD463: CORRY	: Charleston	: 2.0	: 1.0	: 9/ 4/40:	:	6/12/40:	20 2/12/42:	2/12/42 :
DD464: HOBSON	: Charleston	: 2.0	: 1.0	:	:	6/12/40:	22 4/12/42:	4/12/42 :
DD465: SAUFLEY	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	5/ 1/43:	8/ 1/43 :
DD466: WALLER	: Fed. SB&DD Co.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	6/ 1/43:	9/ 1/43 :
DD467: STRONG	: Bath Iron Wks.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	2/16/43:	:
DD468: TAYLOR	: Bath Iron Wks.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	4/ 1/43:	:
DD469: DE HAVEN	: Bath Iron Wks.	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	6/ 1/43:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Keel	Launched	Date of Completion:	
		October 1940	Month of September 1940	TOTAL			to	or
:DESTROYERS (CONT'D)								
DD470: BACHE	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	1/ 1/43:	1/ 1/43:
DD471: BEALE	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	3/ 1/43:	3/ 1/43:
DD472: GUEST	:Boston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	3/ 1/43:	3/ 1/43:
DD473: BENNETT	:Boston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	5/ 1/43:	5/ 1/43:
DD474: FULLAM	:Boston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	7/ 1/43:	7/ 1/43:
DD475: HUDSON	:Boston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	9/ 1/43:	9/ 1/43:
DD476: HUTCHINS	:Boston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	1/ 1/43:	1/ 1/43:
DD477: PRINGLE	:Charleston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	3/ 1/43:	3/ 1/43:
DD478: STANLY	:Charleston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	5/ 1/43:	5/ 1/43:
DD479: STEVENS	:Charleston:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	2/ 1/43:	2/ 1/43:
DD480: HALFORD	:Puget Sound:	:	:	:	:	6/28/40:	4/ 1/43:	4/ 1/43:
DD481: LEUTZE	:Puget Sound:	:	:	:	:	7/ 1/40:	11/ 1/43:	11/ 1/43:
DD482: WATSON	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	7/ 9/42:	7/ 9/42:
DD483:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	8/ 9/43:	8/ 9/43:
DD484:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	9/ 9/43:	9/ 9/43:
DD485:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	10/ 9/43:	10/ 9/43:
DD486:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	11/ 9/43:	11/ 9/43:
DD487:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	12/ 9/43:	12/ 9/43:
DD488:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	4/ 9/44:	3/ 1/44:
DD489:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	5/ 9/44:	4/ 1/44:
DD490:	:Fed.SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	4/ 9/42:	:
DD491:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	8/ 9/42:	:
DD492:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.):	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
DD493:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	2/ 1/43:	:
:	: Co.:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
DD494:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E.:	:	:	:	:	9/ 9/40:	2/15/43:	:
:	: Co.:	:	:	:	:	:	:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Date of Completion:				
		October 1:	Gain for	Month of	As per	reported	by		
		1940	September 1940:	Keel	Date of	Mos.:	contract:		
		TOTAL	TOTAL	Laid	Launched:	or order:	Fld.:	order	yard
:DESTROYERS (CONT'D)									
DD495:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E. Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/ 1/43:	:	:
DD496:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E. Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/15/43:	:	:
DD497:	:Seattle Tacoma S.E. Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/31/43:	:	:
DD498:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 7/ 9/44: 6/ 1/44:	:	:
DD499:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 9/ 9/44: 7/ 1/44:	:	:
DD500:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 11/ 9/44: 12/31/44:	:	:
DD501:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1/ 9/45: 2/ 1/45:	:	:
DD502:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/ 9/45: 3/ 1/45:	:	:
DD503:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:	:	:
DD504:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:	:	:
DD505:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:	:	:
DD506:	:Fed. SB&DD Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1945:	:	:
DD507:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/ 1/43:	:	:
DD508:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 4/ 1/43:	:	:
DD509:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 10/ 1/43:	:	:
DD510:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 11/ 1/43:	:	:
DD511:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1/ 2/44:	:	:
DD512:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 2/ 1/44:	:	:
DD513:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/ 1/44:	:	:
DD514:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 4/ 1/44:	:	:
DD515:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 8/ 1/44:	:	:
DD516:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 11/ 1/44:	:	:
DD517:	:Bath Iron Wks.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 12/31/44:	:	:
DD518:	:Beth. Steel Co. (S.I.):	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 6/ 9/43:	:	:
DD519:	:Beth. Steel Co. (S.I.):	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 9/ 9/43:	:	:
DD520:	:Beth. Steel Co. (S.I.):	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 12/ 9/43:	:	:
DD521:	:Beth. Steel Co. (S.I.):	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 1/ 9/44:	:	:
DD522:	:Beth. Steel Co. (S.I.):	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 3/ 9/44:	:	:
DD523:	:Beth. Steel Co. (S.I.):	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 7/ 9/44:	:	:
DD524:	:Beth. Steel Co. (S.I.):	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	: 10/ 9/44:	:	:

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:			Keel	Launched	or order	:Date of Completion:			
		:October 1:	:Month of	:September 1940:				:Date of	:Mos.:	:As	:As per
										:reported	:contract:
		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Laid	:Launched	:or order	:Bld.	:order	:ward		
:DESTROYERS (CONT'D)											
DD525:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.I.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:11/ 9/44:	:		
DD526:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:10/ 9/42:	:		
DD527:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:12/ 9/42:	:		
DD528:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:2/24/43:	:		
DD529:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:3/ 9/43:	:		
DD530:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:4/ 9/43:	:		
DD531:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:6/ 9/43:	:		
DD532:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:7/ 9/43:	:		
DD533:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:10/ 9/43:	:		
DD534:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:12/ 9/43:	:		
DD535:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:1/ 9/44:	:		
DD536:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:1/24/44:	:		
DD537:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:2/ 9/44:	:		
DD538:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:5/ 9/44:	:		
DD539:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:6/ 9/44:	:		
DD540:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:9/ 9/44:	:		
DD541:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:10/ 9/44:	:		
DD542:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:11/ 9/44:	:		
DD543:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.F.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:12/ 9/44:	:		
DD544:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.P.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:3/ 9/43:	:		
DD545:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.P.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:4/ 9/43:	:		
DD546:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.P.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:2/ 9/44:	:		
DD547:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.P.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:3/ 9/44:	:		
DD548:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.P.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:12/ 9/44:	:		
DD549:	:Beth.Steel Co.(S.P.)	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:1/ 9/45:	:		
DD550:	:Gulf S.B.Co.	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:7/ 9/43:	:		
DD551:	:Gulf S.B.Co.	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:1/ 9/44:	:		
DD552:	:Gulf S.B.Co.	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:6/ 9/44:	:		
DD553:	:Gulf S.B.Co.	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:11/ 9/44:	:		
DD554:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	:	:	:9/ 9/40:	:6/30/43:	:		

October 10, 1940

Sheet 13.

8a

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:		Keel Laid	Launched	or order	Bld. order	yard	:Date of Completion:	
		:October 1:	:Month of:						:Date of:	:Mes. contract:
		: 1940	: September 1940:						: or	: building
		: TOTAL	: TOTAL							
:DESTROYERS (CONT'D)										
DD555:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 7/15/43?	:
DD556:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 7/31/43:	:
DD557:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 8/16/43:	:
DD558:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 8/31/43:	:
DD559:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 12/ 1/43:	:
DD560:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 12/15/43:	:
DD561:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 1/ 3/44:	:
DD562:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 1/15/44:	:
DD563:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 1/31/44:	:
DD564:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 10/31/44:	:
DD565:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 11/15/44:	:
DD566:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 11/30/44:	:
DD567:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 12/15/44:	:
DD568:	:Seattle Tacoma S.B.Co.:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 12/30/44:	:
DD569:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 7/ 9/43:	:
DD570:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 8/24/43:	:
DD571:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 10/ 9/43:	:
DD572:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 11/24/43:	:
DD573:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 1/ 9/44:	:
DD574:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 2/24/44:	:
DD575:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 4/ 9/44:	:
DD576:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 5/24/44:	:
DD577:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 7/ 9/44:	:
DD578:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 8/24/44:	:
DD579:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 10/ 9/44:	:
DD580:	:Con.Steel (Orange)	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 11/24/44:	:
DD581:	:Boston	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 11/ 1/43: 11/ 1/43	:
DD582:	:Boston	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 1/ 2/44: 1/ 1/44	:
DD583:	:Boston	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 3/ 1/44: 3/ 1/44	:
DD584:	:Boston	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 5/ 1/44: 5/ 1/44	:
DD585:	:Boston	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/44: 7/ 1/44	:
DD586:	:Boston	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40:	:	:	:	: 9/ 1/44: 9/ 1/44	:

		Percentage of Completion:				Date of Completion:			
		October 1:	Month of	Keel	Date of	Mos.:	contract:	to or	building
Type, Number and Name	Contractor	1940	September 1940:	Laid	Launched:	or order:	Bld.:	order:	yard
		TOTAL	TOTAL						
<u>MINE SWEEPERS</u>									
AM55	: RAVEN	: Norfolk	: 83.1	: 8.5	: 6/28/39	: 8/24/40	: 9/ 1/38	: 24	: 9/ 1/40: 12/30/40
AM56	: OSPREY	: Norfolk	: 79.4	: 5.6	: 6/28/39	: 8/24/40	: 9/ 1/38	: 26	: 11/ 1/40: 1/31/41
AM57	: AUK	: Norfolk	: 0.6	: 0.3	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 15	: 9/12/41: 12/12/41
<u>REPAIR SHIPS</u>									
AR5	: VULCAN	: N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 33.8	: 3.5	: 12/26/39	-	: 8/ 1/39	: 32	: 4/ 1/42: 8/ 1/41
AR6	:	: Los Angeles S.B.	:	:	:	:	:	:	:
	:	: & D.D.Co.	:	:	:	:	: 9/ 9/40	:	: 9/ 9/43
<u>SUBMARINE TENDERS</u>									
AS11	: FULTON	: Mare Island	: 58.5	: 5.4	: 7/19/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 36	: 9/ 1/41: 9/ 1/41
AS12	: SPERRY	: Mare Island	: 2.5	: 1.1	:	:	: 6/12/40	: 30	: 12/12/42: 12/12/42
AS15	:	: Mare Island	:	:	:	:	: 10/ 3/40	:	: 9/30/43
AS16	:	: Mare Island	:	:	:	:	: 10/ 3/40	:	: 6/30/44
AS17	:	: Puget Sound	:	:	:	:	: 10/ 3/40	:	: 1/31/45
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>									
AV4	: CURTISS	: N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 97.5	: 6.3	: 4/25/38	: 4/20/40	: 12/27/37	: 38	: 2/27/41: 11/ 1/40
AV5	: ALBEMARLE	: N.Y.S.B.Corp.	: 72.7	: 8.0	: 6/12/39	: 7/13/40	: 10/14/38	: 32	: 6/14/41: 12/27/40
AV7	: CURRITUCK	: N.Y.S.B.Corp.	:	:	:	:	: 7/ 1/40	: 48	: 7/ 1/44: 7/ 1/44
<u>SEAPLANE TENDERS</u>									
AVP10	: BARNEGAT	: Puget Sound	: 50.9	: 4.3	: 10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 27	: 12/ 1/40: 6/ 1/41
AVP11	: BISCAYNE	: Puget Sound	: 47.6	: 4.4	: 10/27/39	-	: 9/ 1/38	: 30	: 3/ 1/41: 8/ 1/41
AVP12	: CASCO	: Puget Sound	: 37.5	: 6.8	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/ 1/39	: 24	: 7/ 1/41: 11/ 1/41
AVP13	: MACKINAC	: Puget Sound	: 34.7	: 5.6	: 5/30/40	-	: 7/ 1/39	: 27	: 10/ 1/41: 12/ 1/41
AVP21	: HUMBOLDT	: Boston	: 4.9	: 2.2	: 9/ 6/40	:	: 6/12/40	: 16	: 10/12/41: 10/12/41
AVP22	: MATAGORDA	: Boston	: 4.9	: 2.2	: 9/ 6/40	:	: 6/12/40	: 18	: 12/12/41: 12/12/41
<u>MINELAYER</u>									
CM5	: TERROR	: Philadelphia	: 3.3	: 1.0	: 9/ 3/40	-	: 9/ 1/39	: 36	: 9/ 1/42: 1/ 1/43

October 10, 1940

Sheet 16.

Se

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	Percentage of Completion:			Kool	Launched	or order	Days	Date of Completion:	
		October 1:	Month of	September 1940:					Col.	contract:by
		1940	Month of	September 1940:					Col.	contract:by
		TOTAL	TOTAL	Leid	Launched	or order	Days	order	yard	
<u>SUMMARY CHASERS</u>										
PC449:	Luders Mar. C.Co.:				Delivered 19	September 1940				
PC452:	DeFoe B&M Wks.:	76.0	10.0		3/14/40:	-	10/19/39:	360	10/13/40:	10/13/40
PC453:	Fisher Boat Wks.:	20.0	20.0				7/ 8/40:	360	7/ 3/41:	7/ 3/41
PTC1:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				6/13/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	12/27/40
PTC2:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				6/20/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	1/ 3/41
PTC3:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				6/26/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	1/10/41
PTC4:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				7/ 2/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	1/17/41
PTC5:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				7/ 9/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	1/24/41
PTC6:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):	54.0*	10.0		7/15/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	1/31/41
PTC7:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				7/23/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	2/ 7/41
PTC8:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				7/26/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	2/14/41
PTC9:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				8/ 1/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	2/21/41
PTC10:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				8/ 7/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	2/28/41
PTC11:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				8/13/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	3/ 7/41
PTC12:	E.B.Co. Elco Wks.):				8/23/40:		12/13/39:		1/ 6/41:	3/14/41

* Percentage completion for class PTC1 to 12.

Type, Number and Name	Contractor	:Percentage of Completion:				:Date of Completion:				
		:October 1:		:Month of:		:Date of:		:contract:		:As
		:1940	:September 1940:	:Keel	:Laid	:Launched:	:or order:	:Days:	:order	:reported
		:TOTAL	:TOTAL	:Laid	:Launched:	:or order:	:Days:	:order	:yard	
<u>:MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS:</u>										
PT1 :	:Miami S.B.Corp. :	88.5 :	0.0 :	7/12/39 :	8/16/39 :	6/ 8/39:	165 :	11/20/39 :	11/15/40(a):	
PT2 :	:Miami S.B.Corp. :	88.5 :	0.0 :	8/19/39 :	9/30/39 :	6/ 8/39:	165 :	11/20/39 :	11/15/40(a):	
PT5 :	:Higgins Ind.Inc. :	98.5 :	0.0 :	8/ 1/39 :	- :	6/10/39:	175 :	12/ 2/39 :	11/12/40(a):	
PT6 :	:Higgins Ind.Inc. :	92.0 :	2.0 :	5/15/40 :	- :	6/10/39:	- :	8/26/40 :	10/26/40(a):	
PT7 :	:Philadelphia :	71.0 :	16.7 :	8/29/39 :	- :	6/23/39:	- :	- :	10/ 1/40 :	
PT8 :	:Philadelphia :	94.5 :	1.5 :	12/29/39 :	- :	7/18/39:	- :	- :	11/18/40 :	
PT10:	:E.F.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	2/26/40 :	8/20/40:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	10/25/40 :	
PT11:	:E.F.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	4/ 1/40 :	- :	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	10/28/40 :	
PT12:	:E.F.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	4/ 9/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	11/ 1/40 :	
PT13:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	4/17/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	11/ 8/40 :	
PT14:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	4/26/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	11/15/40 :	
PT15:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	69.0# :	8.0 :	5/ 6/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	11/22/40 :	
PT16:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	5/13/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	11/29/40 :	
PT17:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	5/24/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	12/ 6/40 :	
PT18:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	5/31/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	12/13/40 :	
PT19:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	6/ 7/40 :	:	12/13/39:	300 :	10/ 8/40 :	12/20/40 :	
PT20:	:E.B.Co.Elco Wks.):	:	:	:	:	12/13/39:	:	2/ 1/41 (e):	3/ 1/41 :	
PT21:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	4/ /41 :	:	
PT22:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	4/ /41 :	:	
PT23:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	4/ /41 :	:	
PT24:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	4/ /41 :	:	
PT25:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	5/ /41 :	:	
PT26:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	5/ /41 :	:	
PT27:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	5/ /41 :	:	
PT28:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	5/ /41 :	:	
PT29:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	5/ /41 :	:	
PT30:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	6/ /41 :	:	
PT31:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	6/ /41 :	:	
PT32:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	6/ /41 :	:	
PT33:	:Elec. Boat Co. :	:	:	:	:	9/17/40:	:	6/ /41 :	:	

- (a) These vessels delayed due to late engine deliveries.
 (d) Delivery date delayed due to construction of replacement boat.
 (e) Date changed due to design change.
 # Percentage completion for Class PT10 to 20.

Navy Folder 1-40

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 17, 1940.

file

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

I am forwarding for the President's information a chart showing British and French bases, or possible bases, for surface ships, submarines or aircraft in the islands in the Pacific east of the International Date Line, (also some to the westward of that). There is forwarded also a distance chart for convenience in picking off distances.

This is the information requested of Admiral Richardson during the course of the President's recent conversation with him.

With respect to the query made in connection with fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four old light cruisers, the answer is "No." Only sufficient oil storage available in Samoa for local needs.

[Handwritten mark]

Respectfully,

[Signature]
D. J. CALLAGHAN

*Refer C. N. O. to start
storage at once*

[Signature]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Henry
October 18, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum from the Director of Naval Intelligence is forwarded for the information of the President.

Respectfully,


D. J. CALLAGHAN

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 11-30-64

Signature- J. Rep

PSF: Navy

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.
Op-16-F-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 16, 1940.

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Japanese Plans to Seize the Dutch East Indies.

1. Highly reliable information has been received that commencing about 26 September and continuing until the present time, the Japanese Foreign Office is being advised by their Ambassadors in the United States, Great Britain and by the heads of their Missions in the Dutch East Indies, to take steps to effect the military seizure of the Dutch East Indies at the earliest opportunity.

2. It is particularly noteworthy that Ambassador Horinouchi, at Washington, has advised his government that the United States is incapable of taking action at the present time to prevent Japanese seizure of the Dutch possessions in the Far East and that no time should be lost in effecting such a seizure. The Japanese Consul General at Batavia has on two recent occasions urged the early seizure of the Dutch possessions by Japan and this advice is echoed by the diplomatic head of the Japanese Economic Mission that is now in the East Indies. Within the last few days the Japanese Ambassador at London has added his advice to those urging early action to seize the Dutch East Indies.

W.S. Anderson

W.S. Anderson.

Original to Aide to the President
CC - C.N.O.
M.I.D.
State
File

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DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 11-30-69

Signature- *J. R. Reynolds*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

100

PSF
10/18

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 18, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached despatch from London may
prove to be of interest to the President.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

RECEIVED
OCT 21 1940
AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON

PSF Na

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P
Y

SD11

USC

AMERICAN EMBASSY LONDON 21/20 18/140P

OPNAV

WASHN

181350 CONTRARY TO REPORTS APPEARING IN THE AMERICAN PRESS THERE ARE
NO EPIDEMICS AS YET IN LONDON

TOD 750A OCT 18 1940

ALUMNA

THATS ALL

*PSP
Navy*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

*Jib
Personal
Confidential
Navy!*

October 25, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the attached report of the Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding a proposed exportation of 60,000 tons of gasoline to Japan, my information is as follows:

On October 3 an application was submitted by the Pan-Pacific Trading and Navigation Company to export 600,000 barrels of gasoline to Japan. The gasoline to be exported was described in the application as "Clear gasoline, boiling between 80° and 350° F. 75/77 octane number." On the face of the application was an affidavit of the president of the company stating that the gasoline "will not by the addition of tetraethyl of 3 c.c. per gallon exceed 87 octane number by the A.S.T.M. Knock Test Method and will not contain any material from which by commercial distillation there can be separated more than 3% of such gasoline, hydrocarbon or hydrocarbon mixture." This gasoline, thus technically described by the applicant, is gasoline of a quality which under existing regulations may be exported to Japan. The export license was issued on October 4.

On October 18 we received information from two sources--

the

the office of Colonel Maxwell, Administrator of Export Control, and Mr. Patrick J. Hurley, former Secretary of War and counsel for one of the companies from which the licensee is endeavoring to purchase the gasoline to be exported--to the effect that there appeared to be reason to believe that the licensee might endeavor to export high quality aviation gasoline under the license issued to him and described above.

Upon receipt of this information and with the full cooperation of the Bureau of Customs, we instructed the Collector of Customs at Los Angeles not to permit any of this proposed shipment to be exported until samples drawn from each lot have been analyzed.

If when the proposed shipment is analyzed it appears that the gasoline does not conform to the type described under oath in the application for license, this case will be brought, without delay, to the attention of the Attorney General for appropriate action.

Handwritten initials consisting of a large, stylized 'C' followed by a large 'H'. The 'C' is formed by a single continuous stroke that loops back to its starting point. The 'H' is formed by two vertical strokes connected by a horizontal crossbar.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 22, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The attached ONI memorandum dealing with the alleged export of aviation gasoline to Japan is forwarded for the information of the President.

Respectfully,

D. J. Callaghan
D. J. CALLAGHAN

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EO 12958 (9/27/92)

Date- 4-7-76

Signature- *AVR*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16-F-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 21, 1940

Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Export of Aviation Gasoline to Japan.

1. Highly reliable information has been received to the following effect:

The Japanese Consul at Los Angeles has informed his Government that about October 8th the United States State Department granted export permit EB-520 to the Pan-Pacific Trading and Navigation Company for the export of 60,000 tons of gasoline. In reply to a query from his own government, the Consul positively affirms that the gasoline has an Octane rating of 87. He states that there is a good chance of getting an export permit for an additional amount of 60,000 tons of the same quality of gasoline. Active steps are being taken to charter tankers to carry this fuel and the charter party for at least one Norwegian tanker is about to be signed. Some \$500,000 have been deposited to the credit of Mr. John F. Dolan with the Yokohama Specie Bank at Los Angeles in order to cover initial payments on the gasoline shipment.

Mr. Dolan and his Japanese partner, Kojima, are making the contracts on behalf of the Pan-Pacific Trading and Navigation Company for the purchase of the gasoline and are in turn selling it to the Japanese through the Showa Trading Company. Purchases are being financed through the Yokohama Specie Bank.

W.S. Anderson
W.S. Anderson

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D9B DIR. 5280.9 (9/27/58)

Original to the Aide to the President.

CC - CNO

MID

State

File

FBI

Date- 4-7-70

Signature- *JR*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 25, 1940.

file →

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

The President might be interested
in reading Admiral Hart's recent letter to
Admiral Stark.

Respectfully,

W. J. Callaghan
W. J. CALLAGHAN

RECEIVED
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCT 10 1940
AIR MAIL SERVICE

C O P Y

UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET
U.S.S. AUGUSTA (Flagship)

Shanghai, China,
October 3, 1940.

~~Confidential~~

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EOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)
Date: 0-8-66
Signature: Carl Lippa

Dear Stark:

My last to you was of 20 August, and I don't know how it sounded by the time it reached you! Things move so fast now that I am far from sure of the usefulness of any one of this series of letters. Well anyhow here is one more, - it is going to Manila on a destroyer and then via clipper air mail.

Except from 4 to 6 September, I have been in or somewhere near Tsingtao since I last wrote you. All ships are down from up north now, and by 10 October all will be in the Philippines except this ship and, of course, the river patrol craft.

There were no particular events or adventures while up north. One event did recently worry the consular service to the point of starting despatches to Washington. That was the information from an "informer" about the danger of our ships getting submarined off Tsingtao. We decided that the informer was a fake and carried our exercises on at sea without interruption of schedules. I used the fillip of interest to take the cruisers out and drill at anti-submarine work, the conditions being unusually realistic; probably drilling my own self was the most beneficial factor of that.

I left the Shantung Peninsula more convinced than ever that the Japs are there to stay, that they like those lands better than any other part of China, and that that province is the last portion they will ever relinquish. I am about ready to opine that they will even give up Manchukuo before Shantung. There is no great Japanese force in occupancy; only the railroads, ports and cities are held, but that is quite sufficient to give them a strangle hold on all trade, etc. That situation as you know exists all over China, however. Incidentally, our new Consul at Tsingtao is a very good one indeed, - and so is his wife.

Now as regards Shanghai - still the most important place in the Far East; -

The excepted date noted above, 4 to 6 September, was when I came to Shanghai in MARBLEHEAD, which was making a scheduled visit for stores. That ship movement was a lucky circumstance because the timing was exactly right, - as the correct occasion for me to show up here at the stage of Mr. Grew's negotiations about Defense Sector B, of the international Settlement, then current. As you were informed at the time, we got nowhere and the only accomplishment of the visit was to develop that the local Japanese were entirely set against our Marines extending their territory and influence. We had evolved a

Capt. Callaghan

~~Confidential~~

plan for negotiations with the local Japanese, looking toward some rather unimportant compromise on the compromise, (i.e., the defense sector solution which was voted by the Defense Council), but which might be enough to save the Japanese face and perhaps arrive at a local settlement. But I think in the meantime Tokyo had told their people here to stand fast, - that is, to insist on permanency for the temporary arrangement involving S.V.C. garrisoning of Sector B. As the Glassford -Iwamura conversations developed, there was no chance to put forward any such minor compromise proposal.

Well, you know without this all that's happened on the subject. I am sure that our side has lost no tricks, and the teamwork between here and Washington was perfect, (that is, after the initial stage about which I mildly kicked to you in my last). The State Department took a very strong stand indeed in its instructions. Between the lines I think I read that the American Embassy at Tokyo was decidedly surprised at the strength of said stand. I hope that their hearts were in it, as they negotiated with Minister Matsuoka et al.

Where are we now as regards old Sector B? At just the same place. The Japs are quite satisfied with the present setup, i.e., the S.V.C. occupancy. Their gendarmes are plentiful in the Western Area, (one of the two sectors abandoned by the British), but they claim no garrison has entered it. Their intention most likely is to, somewhat later, claim to have demonstrated that there is no necessity for third power troops in Shanghai.

I see that the Tokyo negotiations on the subject are at a standstill, even deadlocked. That's the way we are locally at the moment. However, the gendarmes, who are the real troublemakers, have "taken steps" against one of our sailors, which I hope is going to turn out to be a big mistake on their part. It's recent, work is still going on about it, but I hope to be able to utilize the mistake to revive the Sector B conversations in a way that will at least be troublesome for the Japanese. Won't try to estimate how it will develop, but I am hopeful and decidedly in an improved state of mind myself, because at last I have a chance for attack rather than this eternal defensive which seems to lower my spirits!

However, many other events in other places crowd the whole picture now to such an extent that the importance of this Sector B affair may not look so great. I will try to keep things properly evaluated. There is no useful purpose in my writing you much of anything about said other places and things, for I would have nothing to give you from my own experiences and observations.

There seems no doubt that the radical elements among the Japanese organizations all over China are very decidedly feeling their oats. That alone makes me concerned about AUGUSTA's safety because she is vulnerable against that sort of thing, particularly in this port. I feel that Glassford and Peck are now so well qualified to deal with any situation here that I am really less needed at Shanghai.

than at any other place on the Station. Shanghai is the best place on the Station for my retaining touch with our entire picture, in that there are better sources of information here than at any other place. Also I think it is locally beneficial for me to occasionally appear, when such appearances are judiciously timed, as has thus far been the case; but actually I feel so much more confidence in those that I leave in charge here than is the case over the rest of my beat that I should not stay here overmuch. So I am planning to leave Shanghai somewhere between the 12th and 20th of October and proceed south. I have for weeks been considering the advisability of my appearing in Hong Kong, "on passage", and find that my mind changes on the subject with changes in the general situation. As the time approaches, I shall probably request by despatch the Department's views on the point.

As a generality, will say that the situation seems to be rapidly changing as regards the relative importance of this command's two missions. The peacetime mission of guarding American lives and interests is, with me, being forced back somewhat by the necessity of being "set" in the other part of our job out here. Naturally any action which we take on that thesis will be kept from becoming apparent, as long as it can be done. I do have to worry about leaving too many "hostages to fortune" - in the shape of Marines and river gunboat personnel in China.

The Department's action about transportation of naval dependents to this command and the facilities given me for reducing the number already here are most welcome. We have just made a count of our women and children and find the result somewhat extraordinary; - there are almost a round two thousand of them out here. As I have advised before, my position in the matter is that those women and children simply constitute that many more Americans on the Station, and that as far as I am concerned they are in no position of preference whatever. Their presence here might, however, at any time of stress put us in a bad light with other Americans because there is so much less reason for their being here than obtains with those others. I really am delighted that the Department is taking steps in the matter, and I am sure that it was high time for such action. Nimitz possibly does not know it, but eastbound commercial passenger capacity is pretty scarce now. President Line ships, which constitute most of the capacity available to Americans, are already booked pretty full for some time to come.

That naval family situation is one which in general really seems to be a decided drag upon the war readiness of our entire Navy. We are far and away the most married naval service that there is in the world. I know that other navies shake their heads about us over that fact alone; but the worst of it is our system and practice of encouraging them all to be camp followers, so that we have the situation which exists with this Fleet right now and which is so very embarrassing. I've no idea as to how this feature looks around the Hawaiian Islands right now, - but I have my suspicions. In general

I think that the Navy has gone considerably too far in permitting its personnel to go so much and so early into raising families - in the first instance. That would not matter so greatly, however, if so much were not done toward promoting the camp follower idea in them. I say nothing about the expense thereof, for it is unimportant as compared with the embarrassment and the great amount of administrative work which obtains whenever our forces do much moving about. This Fleet, of course, is the best place to observe those bad effects; but I had become quite cognizant of them before I ever came here. I think something should be done about the whole show; possibly administrative action in the Department would suffice, and if not, the legal basis for it all should be altered.

Well, I began by saying that I am not so sure these letters will be of any use, and I'll end on the same note. Perhaps I will find something in Manila that I'm sure I should write you about.

With best regards,

Most sincerely yours,

(Signed) Thos. C. Hart,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

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DDJ Win 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 8-8-66

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

11 NAVAL SHIPS COMPLETED


<u>DESTROYER</u>	<u>DATE DELIVERED</u>	<u>NUMBER OF MONTHS</u>	
		<u>CONTRACT TO DELIVERY</u>	<u>KEEL TO DELIVERY</u>
Flusser	Sept. 1936	38	28
Reid	Oct. 1936		
Somers	Nov. 1937	39	29
Warrington	Feb. 1938		
Benham	Feb. 1939	39	29
Ellet	Feb. 1939		
Lang	Mar. 1939		
Anderson	May 1939	31	18
Hammann	Aug. 1939		
Plunkett	July 1940	23	16
Kearny	Sept. 1940		

38 NAVAL SHIPS UNCOMPLETED

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CONTRACT DATE</u>	<u>DELIVERY</u>				
		<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
2 - 6000 Ton Cruisers	Apr. 1939		2			
5 - 10000 Ton Cruisers	Sept. 1940			1	2	2
*2 - 1600 Ton Destroyers	June 1939	2				
2 - 1600 Ton Destroyers	June 1940	1	1			
2 - 1600 Ton Destroyers	July 1940		2			
8 - 1600 Ton Destroyers	Sept. 1940		6	2		
8 - 2100 Ton Destroyers	July 1940			6	2	
5 - 2100 Ton Destroyers	Sept. 1940				4	1
2 - 1100 Ton Destroyers	Sept. 1940					2
2 - 750 Ton Destroyers	Sept. 1940					2

* - Destroyer DD439 (Building on Way #2)

Contract	-	June 15, 1939
Keel	-	March 18, 1940
Launch	-	November 23, 1940
Delivery	-	(Contract) June 15, 1941 (24 Months)
		(Schedule) Feb. 15, 1941 (20 Months)



PSF
Navy
1-40

October 31, 1940

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

From: The Secretary of War.
The Secretary of the Navy.

To: The President of the United States.

Subject: Report of Board of Experts appointed in connection with the Acquisition of Naval and Air Bases from the British Government in the Western Hemisphere.

Enclosures: (A) Original Report of Board for bases in Jamaica.
(B) Modified draft of lease.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith recommending that the President approve the report of the Board subject to minor modifications made in Enclosure (B), which is a draft lease putting into form for final action the substance of the Board's report.

2. The substituted draft of lease, Enclosure (B), follows the same form in so far as applicable as in the cases of the proposed leases at Bermuda and Newfoundland the form and substance of which were approved by the Attorney General of the United States.

3. Early approval of this lease is requested in order that the State Department may initiate action to obtain execution of the lease by the British Government.

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DR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

4-7-70

signature: *[Handwritten Signature]*

Henry L. Stinson

Frank Knox