

PSF Navy Folder 2-41
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
WASHINGTON

A13-1(390928-7)

12 April 1941

Memorandum for The President

file
~~Confidential~~

Subject: Submarine Destroyer Proposed By
Lt. Comdr. A. C. Dam, USNR (Ret)

Reference: (a) White House Memo to Secretary
of the Navy dated 9 April 1941

1. Early in December, 1940, I approved a recommendation from the Office of Inventions to carry out tests with an air propelled boat to determine its efficiency as a submarine chaser, and referred it to the Bureau of Ships for action. The Bureau of Ships selected a 54 ft. patrol vessel which was under construction at the Norfolk Navy Yard, with which to carry out these tests.

2. It is proposed to mount a 650 HP Allison engine, direct connected to an air screw on the after deck to accomplish the air propulsion, and to install both sonic and supersonic listening equipment and supersonic echo-ranging equipment in this hull. Tests will then be run to obtain data as to the comparative usefulness of this sonic equipment in the air and water screw propelled vessels.

3. The boat will be ready to receive the sound equipments by the middle of May. However, the only available sound equipments for this project are now installed and undergoing tests in other patrol vessels. The availability of this sound equipment for the air screw propelled vessel will depend upon the successful completion of these tests. It is estimated that the tests with the air screw propelled vessel can be undertaken early in June.

Frank Knox

TELEPHONE
STAMFORD 3-5706

Kaywood
SPRINGDALE, CONNECTICUT

Friday -
April 4, 41.

My dear Miss Le Hand -

I do want you to know how much I appreciate your passing on to the President my prayerful epistles on the subject of submarine destroyers -

Their delivery was proved by word I received from Commander Dam, that at long last the Navy Dept. and secret had gotten busy, even though they maintain their own independence as to what and how they will "seem" to conform to the President's demand for action -

I am therefore continuing to impose on your kindness and what I consider a patriotic service, by asking you to deliver the enclosed "supplement" to the President -

Please ask him however, to destroy the enclosure, as its filing or transmission to any one, would do anything but cause hard feelings -

Again thanking you, I am

Faithfully Yours

Robert C. Tracy -

TELEPHONE
STAMFORD 2-5706

Kaywood
SPRINGDALE, CONNECTICUT

Friday —
April 14, 41

My dear Franklin —
Thank you for having had
Capt Callaghan get after the Division
of Ships regarding their 15 month
hold up of Andrew Dani's submarine
destroyer plans —

I'm sorry to tell you however
that even Callaghan, as I suggested
in one of my letters, played the game
with his fellow officers and gave them
time to prepare a report for him to take
back to you that would indicate "progress" —

As a matter of fact they have gone
off on their own "face saving" ways and
appearing to give favorable consideration
to the scheme, by authorizing experiments
that are both costly and less effective
than the original idea —

Dani is moving from the Ambassador
to the Army Navy Club and once more I
beg you to get first hand information by
asking him to come over and show you the
reports which the Dept did not send you —

Our production cannot compete with
the destruction which gets worse all the time —

Once more — God bless you — and keep you
strong and well to lead us through —

Sincerely yours,
Selma Conway.

*PSF Many folders
2-41*

4/15/41

MEMO FOR THE FILES

Returned to Admiral Stark his Secret memo to FDR
1/28/41 enclosing copy of let to him from Admiral Thomas
Hart 4/4/41 re situation at Manila, P. I.

Navy Folder
2-41

APRIL 18 1941

~~SECRET & CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I am principally concerned over possible German operations in Scoresby Sound, northeast Greenland. That seems to be where the Germans are headed. Please let me have recommendations to counteract any possible establishment of military, naval or weather base at that point even if it be for the summer months only.

F. D. R.

Navy Folder
2-71

PSF

original + one copy
filed - State Folder
2-71

MEMORANDUM

April 19, 1941

To: Miss LeHand
From: Mr. Summerlin
Subject: U.S.S. Milwaukee to Azores, St. Vincent, Canary
Islands, and Lisbon.

Miss LeHand:

Supplementing the Secretary's memorandum for the President on the proposed visits of the U.S.S. Milwaukee to the Azores, St. Vincent and Lisbon, the Navy Department states that the Milwaukee has not sufficient fuel to make the visit to the Canary Islands, as planned, without refueling en route to Lisbon or on its return to American waters. The visit to the Canary Islands is, therefore, also necessarily in abeyance and I understand the vessel is now headed for home.

G.T.S.

PSF
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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2-41
PSF

April 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
ADMIRAL STARK

Referring to this memorandum from Betty in regard to the Naval Air Facilities on Albermarle Island, Galapagos, I have talked with Welles who thinks we should go ahead with the arrangement which Mr. Foster suggests. Later on something much more conclusive can be worked out, but this gives us a chance.

Please take up with Sumner Welles and put it through if possible.

F. D. R.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

Serial 038312

NAVY DEPARTMENT

Date- 4-8-70

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Signature- *JM*

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

April 1, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral McIntire:

Subject: Proposed Naval Air Facilities on Albermarle
Island, Galapagos.

1. I am informed that at your request Rear Admiral Turner, Director of the War Plans Division, talked to you over the 'phone concerning the proposition of setting up naval seaplane facilities on Albermarle Island, as has been recommended to the President by Mr. Paul F. Foster. You asked Rear Admiral Turner to let you have a memorandum giving a synopsis of the views which he expressed.
2. From time to time naval seaplanes have visited the Galapagos Islands. Last winter we sent a Special Aerial Surveying Party to the Islands to locate sites for seaplane bases. The Commandant of the Fifteenth Naval District has personally inspected the various sites. The confidential Naval Air Pilot Central America and Outlying Islands also describes the Islands. The consensus of opinion of all has been that there are two reasonably good positions in the Islands for the location of a small seaplane base. One of these locations is at Post Office Bay on the North Coast of Santa Maria. The Aerial Survey Party expressed a slight preference for this over another site, the Seymour Island, just off the North Coast of Santa Cruz. The Commandant of the Fifteenth Naval District stated that he considered the Seymour Island position the better, and stated that no other places in the Islands were at all suitable for a shore base.
3. On the East Coast of Albermarle Island is Cartago Bay, which is reasonably good for operations by tender-based seaplanes during westerly weather; on the West Coast of Albermarle Island is Elizabeth Bay, which is quite suitable for operations by tender-based seaplanes most of the time and in all except westerly weather. At neither place does it appear practicable to establish a shore base, because of the existence of comparatively new lava fields. The Commandant of the Fifteenth Naval District specifically recommended against both of these bays.

~~SECRET~~

Serial 038312

4. From what information we have to date it appears impracticable to set up a base in the Galapagos now, owing to probable objections by the Government of Ecuador. I am inclined to think that we could get the necessary rights were we at war, but that we might compromise this possibility, should we now go through with the arrangement which Mr. Foster suggests. The Navy is now assembling in the Canal Zone advance base outfits for establishing temporary shore bases for patrol seaplanes similar to the outfits being assembled for seaplane bases in St. Lucia, Antigua, and Jamaica.

5. I note that Mr. Foster did not find enough sulphur on Albermarle Island to make its recovery commercially profitable, and that he now proposes to raise cattle there and to sell them on the Mainland. Whether or not such a commercial adventure would be successful, I am not in a position to say.



H. R. STARK.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOB DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-8-70

Signature- 

Navy folder
2-41

Op-23M-8 IMO 4/19/41
(80)QSL/X13
Serial 046323

My dear Mr. President:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has transmitted to the Navy Department a request that the S.S. George Washington, recently transferred from ownership of the Maritime Commission to ownership of the Navy Department, be transferred, under the provisions of Public Law 11, to ownership of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

If this transfer meets with your approval, it is requested that I be authorized to make such transfer at a market value of \$1,761,729.00.

Sincerely yours,

F. D. R.

The President
The White House

F. K.
O.K.
F. D. R.

Copy to:
Rear Adm. J.M. Reeves
CNO
Chief of Bureau of Ships
Chairman, The Maritime Commission

PSF

Navy Folder
2-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1941.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Please speak to me about the possibility of a patrol on Hudson Bay this summer. I suppose this should be taken up through the Joint Canada-United States Commission, of which LaGuardia is Chairman. It occurs to me that in view of the fact that the Hudson Bay Mining and Smelting Company -- lately owned by J. P. Morgan and Company, has all kinds of shipping and docking facilities on Hudson Bay, these facilities might be used by Canada and the United States to prevent some German raider, submarine or otherwise, from entering this Bay and destroying all kinds of valuable property, both Canadian and United States.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memo to the Secretary of the Navy.

BF Navy Folder
2-41

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

COPY

April 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

It is reported to Huddleston, our Consul in Curacao, that he learns from the Netherlands Intelligence Service in Curacao that twenty-five German officers are reported to be expected in French West Indian possessions.

This should be thoroughly investigated by one of the Intelligence Services, and should include not only Martinique and Guadeloupe but also the other smaller French Islands and French Guiana.

This is coming pretty close to home.

F. D. R.

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 19 PAGES
3656 -
3659

~~SECRET~~

PSF

Navy

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

29 April 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am sending by special officer messenger copy of the questions you asked us to send to the British when we were last in the White House, and also am enclosing copy of their reply.

Please note the "secret status".

Betty

~~SECRET~~

April 25, 1941.

~~SECRET~~
My dear Admiral Danckwerts:

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has instructed me to convey to you his view that the provisions of paragraph 6 of the main report of ABC-1 ought to apply to major changes in the disposition of the forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, even in advance of the time that the United States may enter the war. He proposes, therefore, to keep the British Chief of the Naval Staff informed as to all contemplated shifts of United States naval forces, and to invite the advice of that officer concerning such movements.

2. I have already informed you orally that one aircraft carrier and five destroyers are now en route from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and that the primary reason for this movement is because the U.S.S. RANGER (Atlantic Fleet) is soon to undergo an extensive navy yard overhaul.

3. However, the Chief of Naval Operations has in contemplation other changes of a more important nature. He therefore requests that you obtain the opinion of the Chief of the Naval Staff as to the following:

(a) With due regard to the existing political situation in the Far East, and to the present strength of the United States Atlantic Fleet, would it be advisable, at this time, for the United States to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic three battleships, four light cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons? (Note that this force is nearly equal to the force to be transferred after the United States enters the war.)

(b) If Axis pressure forces the British Mediterranean Fleet to leave the Mediterranean Sea, would this Fleet remain in the Indian Ocean or Far Eastern waters? Would it be desirable at the time this British fleet retires to the eastward, for the United States simultaneously to shift strong naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

Sincerely,

/s/ R.K. Turner,
Rear Admiral, U.S.Navy.

Rear Admiral V.H. Danckwerts, C.M.G.,
British Embassy,
3100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

Copy to:

War Plans Division, U.S. Army
Rear Admiral R.L. Ghormley, U.S.N.

COPY

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, D. C.

28th April, 1941

~~TOP SECRET~~

My dear Admiral Turner:

I have to-day received a telegraphic reply from the British Chiefs of Staff to the contents of your letter dated April 25th, 1941 (Op-12-VED A16-1/EF13(Serial 5).)

2. The Chiefs of Staff express their gratitude for the proposals made in paragraph 1. of your letter, and ask that the Chief of Naval Operations may be informed of their full agreement with these proposals.

3. As regards the provision of reciprocal information, the Chiefs of Staff feel sure that the Chief of Naval Operations will appreciate the difficulty of providing a day to day report of all changes, but propose that a regular periodical summary of British major dispositions should be communicated by them. They suggest that it might be rendered weekly, and would be glad to know if this suggestion would be satisfactory to the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. The Chiefs of Staff consider that the move proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter would be advantageous. It would make more forces available for Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 2, and in the event of the United States entering the war would reduce the time taken for United States' Naval forces to relieve the British force at present based on Gibraltar. The Chiefs of Staff feel satisfied that the consequential reduction in the strength of the United States' Pacific Fleet would not unduly encourage Japan.

5. As regards the question posed in paragraph 3(b) of your letter, while the Chiefs of Staff do not anticipate that any such contingency is likely at present, they state that should the circumstance arise, and the Suez Canal still be open, the Mediterranean Fleet would probably be sent into the Indian Ocean in the first place. In that event they agree that a further transference of Naval forces from the United States' Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic would be desirable.

British Embassy,
Washington, D.C.

-2-

6. If the Mediterranean Fleet was not able to pass direct into the Indian Ocean owing to the blocking of the Suez Canal, the Fleet would be brought into the Atlantic through the Western Mediterranean; an operation which the Chiefs of Staff consider feasible. In this event, and assuming that no other capital ship force had been sent to the Far East or Indian Ocean, a further reduction in the strength of the Pacific Fleet would be undesirable.

7. As regards the reference to the movement of the Mediterranean Fleet being limited to the Indian Ocean as a first stage, I believe it to be the views of the Chiefs of Staff that if Japan was a belligerent it would not be advisable to send to the Far East itself, to be based on Singapore, a naval force weaker than that put forward in ABC-1, Annex III, Page 15. Until, therefore, that strength was available it would be their intention to retain the Mediterranean Fleet (three battleships, etc.) in the Indian Ocean based probably in Trincomalee.

8. Nevertheless, I interpret their reply to mean that in their view a U.S. naval strength similar to that of the Mediterranean Fleet could be transferred into the Atlantic, in addition to those units proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter, if the Mediterranean Fleet moved into the Indian Ocean and Japan still remained a non-belligerent. It will be realised that such a further transfer to the Atlantic from the Pacific Fleet would facilitate an earlier despatch to the Far East of additional British naval forces which, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Fleet, would provide the necessary strength for satisfactory operation from Singapore in the event of Japan entering the war.

9. If the Chief of Naval Operations wishes to pursue this matter further, perhaps we might have a discussion on the subject, after which I could question the Chiefs of Staff in more detail.

Yours sincerely

V.H.Dankwerts

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner,
U. S. Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.

1 Photo withdrawn on SUBJECT
PX 65-647 photo file; under Hollywood, Cal.

PST May 1941

Navy Folder

File personal

VISIT OF THE
CHIEFS OF NAVAL GENERAL STAFFS
OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS
TO THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA



AS GUESTS OF
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

MAY • 1941



Tript: 20 Days
Distance: 8500 Kilometers

BRAZIL

VICE ADMIRAL JOSÉ MACHADO DE CASTRO E SILVA

Chief of Staff of the Navy

Aide—LIEUTENANT FREDERICO G. HUET DE OLIVEIRA SAMPAIO

CHILE

VICE ADMIRAL JULIO ALLARD P.

Commander in Chief and Director General of the Navy

Aide—LT. COMMANDER HERNÁN H. CUBILLOS

ARGENTINA

VICE ADMIRAL JOSÉ GUISASOLA

Chief of the Navy General Staff

Aide—COMMANDER TEODORO HARTUNG

URUGUAY

REAR ADMIRAL GUSTAVO A. SCHRÖDER

Inspector General of the Navy

Aide—LIEUTENANT GABRIEL RETAMOSO-IRASTORZA

PERU

REAR ADMIRAL CARLOS ROTALDE G. DEL V.

Chief of Staff of the Navy

Aide—COMMANDER ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ

MEXICO

COMMODORE DAVID COELLO OCHOA

Director General of the Fleet

Aide—COMMANDER MANUEL ZERMEÑO ARAICO

CUBA

CAPTAIN JULIO DIEZ ARGUELLES Y FERNÁNDEZ CASTRO

Chief of Staff of the Constitutional Navy

Aide—LIEUTENANT (JG) FELIPE CADENAS Y AGUILERA

COLOMBIA

LIEUTENANT COLONEL FRANCISCO TAMAYO CORTES

Director General of the Navy

Aide—LIEUTENANT ANTONIO J. TANCO

ECUADOR

COMMANDER CÉSAR MOGOLLÓN CÁRDENAS

Commandant General of the Navy

Aide—COMMANDER FRANCISCO FERNÁNDEZ MADRID

VENEZUELA

COMMANDER ANTONIO PICARDI

Director of the Navy

PARAGUAY

COMMANDER RAMÓN DÍAZ BENZA

Chief of the Naval General Staff

Aide—LIEUTENANT ADOLFO ROIG-FRANCO

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4320-4327

[Faint handwritten signature]

file personal

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

PSF

*Navy Folder
2-41*

May

May 1, 1941.


My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith the memorandum, with enclosures, transmitted to you under date of April 28 by the Secretary of the Navy which you were good enough to send me for my information with your memorandum of April 30. I have given it to Murphy to read. The latter should be in Casablanca Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

Admiral Pratt's memorandum in particular has been most helpful to me.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Please read and return.
You can show it to Bob Murphy.

F. D. R.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 30, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Please read and return.
You can show it to Bob Murphy.

F. D. R.

Memorandum from Admiral
Pratt to the Secretary of the
Navy and another memorandum from
Joseph B. Phillips, the Foreign
Editor of Newsweek.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

April 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am enclosing herewith a couple of papers which you might find interesting reading. One is by Admiral Pratt and the other by Joseph B. Phillips, the Foreign Editor of Newsweek. I know in what high esteem you hold Admiral Pratt and I found them both very interesting.

J. A.

Enclosures - 2

April--22

Memo for Admiral Pratt

(1)--The need to protect our flank in the South Atlantic is pressing. Sierra Leone is the best base. In addition however there are numerous smaller islands in this region, which are worth consideration. Two weeks ago Newsweek had a story, based on a report by a French geographer, saying that Germany had established bases and stored fuel on some small islands off Bathurst. Nothing has been heard of this so far in the war. In addition I would like to point out that in my opinion, the French situation is deteriorating rapidly. The immediate German purpose may be to secure the French fleet and North Africa, but the influence will certainly extend to Dakar, and possibly to the Cameroons, and the present Free French Equatorial Africa. Contrary to the opinion often expressed, I am doubtful that the policy of the Petain Government, will be guided by French public opinion. The hold of Germany is too strong. There are too many men ambitious of power around Petain, or such as Laval. Consequently I submit that your memorandum might include a suggestion that within the immediate future, every possible pressure should be brought on France, through such things as the food question, and publicizing our own armaments effort and our determination to prevent a British defeat, to forestall a German success in France. To this end propaganda for the French public will do some good, but not enough. The important thing is to impress a few individuals, such as Admiral Darlan and General Huntzinger. I have recently heard you express an opinion on General Weygand with which I concur, nevertheless he is important in Africa, and I think it would be well to be certain that someone in our consular or diplomatic service has access to him with the ability to exert the desired pressure. To express a purely personal opinion, I believe that the next big break will come in France. Even such a thing as an American effort to secure the release of cer-

tain French war prisoners-say those needed for the Spring planting and harvest-while it would probably be fruitless,nevertheless would create a favorable impression.

While Sierra Leone would serve us well and could be acquired from Britain,nevertheless I feel that the acquisition of Dakar would make a much greater impression upon Europe.I do not have enough military information on the ~~military~~ situation there to know whether this is possible.If it is say,by a landing of marines,I would consider it an important step to convince both Europe and South America of our determination.

(2)--You and I have recently heard some interesting but uninformed discussions of our possible influence in the acquisition of Irish Bases.I have no special information on this subject,but would like to make the following suggestions-First that the influence we can exert on this problem must be secondary to the English-Irish problem.Second that one definite contribution we can make is to analyze Irish-American opinion in this country and to influence it as much as possible.Although my contact with these political groups is too slight to be of much use,it had been enough to give me the opinion that a serious study of such groups would be worth the while of the State Department or of the Navy Department.The divisions in Ireland are reflected here,and I have myself been present at meetings of persons who were contributing to the Irish Republican Army.My impression is that most Irishmen in the United States,are anti-English,and I feel that many of them have been influenced by such organizations as the Silver Shirts and Father Coughlin's followers.This however is only a suggestion that a more serious study should be made of these groups,with the idea that they cannot be influenced unless they feel that the final peace settlement is to be determined more by the United States

than by Britain.

(3)--As regards our position in the Far East, it definitely is not my opinion that we are doing enough if we merely leave Japan a way out from the Axis alliance by such devices as convoying ships defensively to the limit of the Neutrality zone. Japan is a nation on the prowl without resources and anxious for whatever she can get. The keys here are primarily Russia, and secondarily a bold front on our part and that of the British. This is true because for several years Japan has feared Russia more than it has us or Britain. I am of the opinion that unless we act immediately--(~~Note: It is to be understood that Japan is not to be taken as a threat to Russia.~~)--Russia will sell out China and force Chiang-Kai-shek to make a peace with Japan. Everything in Chiang's past record points to the probability that he will consent to this. You know there is a very serious division in the Japanese government over the Axis alliance, and that it has been accentuated by the new neutrality treaty with Russia, because there are a number of Japanese of influence who still think their main enemy is Russia. Consequently I have two suggestions to make, First that the State Department, and also Navy men, who often have more effective contacts with the Japanese should impress upon them that we are as determined to keep up our aid to China as we are to Britain, and second that we should make a very special effort to impress Russia. As you know I am of the opinion that this physically weak power is pursuing a policy designed to secure a compromise peace in Europe and in Asia, or a German or Japanese victory after an exhausting war. Nevertheless from first hand experience I am convinced that the primary objective of the Stalin regime is to survive among a growing host of enemies. I have what I consider to be reliable information that Germany has promised survival to this regime, which naturally has great influence in the Kremlin. It is within the bounds of possibility that

that Russia can force China to make peace with Japan, thereby freeing Japan for an attack on ourselves and British interests in the Far East--To offset this we can take three lines of action-1- as said above impress Russia that our aid to China will continue regardless of events in Europe--2--Make it clear to Russia that we are interested in the war in the Balkans and North Africa, and that we are anxious to prevent a German domination of the Straits of the Dardanelles which is a matter of old and vital interest to Russia, in spite of all the present talk about a possible substitute outlet through the Persian Gulf, and--3---to make every effort to impress Russia by our industrial war effort. This country for a variety of reasons, is more apt than any other to be impressed by the figures on the American war industrial effort. From two conferences which you and I have attended recently, I have the impression that the extent of this effort has not been fully publicized. Moreover it is to the advantage of Russian policy at the moment to encourage this effort and to lessen sabotage. This war is a struggle for power, in which ideologies are only the instrument of power groups, and I see no reason why given our true position in the world we should not be capable of playing upon the obvious weaknesses of both Russia and Japan to emasculate the danger to ourselves in the Pacific.

(4)--As regards the specific recommendations in your memorandum, I have only two suggestions to make--(a)--that the headquarters of a joint American-British strategy board might better be in Canada than in Washington--(b)--that such a Board should have its own press relations bureau, quite separate from the notoriously inadequate Ministry of Information in London, and that in the selection of such an organization the British Dominions and ourselves should have more weight than the British

...to allow this as per ...
...for an effect on ...
...the ...

5.

Note--As an addenda, I submit that all my information as a Foreign News Editor, is to the effect that in the case of defeat, the remnants of the British Fleet would be quite as apt to retreat to Singapore as to Canada.

Joseph B. Phillips

Memo on Sierra Leone

We should have a base at Freetown on the south side of the Sierra Leone river. It is a British possession, having an excellent harbor, with an anchorage space over 9 miles long and 1 mile wide, for ships of the deepest draught. It is protected from the seas on the north, by shoals extending well to seaward, over which heavy seas break, and by low flat land. There are Government docks at which ships drawing 30 feet of water could berth discharge and take on cargo. There is a nice little town with Churches, Hospitals, Barracks, and a Sanitorium in the hills. It should be reasonably cool and healthy, for it is open to the breezes from the north and west, and some of the quarters and barracks are in the hills.

It could not be attacked from the north, for the land on the north side is low and open to gunfire, and the flats extend well to seaward. The sea guards it on the west, and the river extends into the interior on the east. On the south it is protected by a series of hills and knolls, ranging from over 2,500 feet down, beginning about four and a half miles from the town and almost surrounding it. Any attack from the south would have to storm these hills and take them, before entry to the harbor could be made. It lies 450 miles south of Dakar, 2,760 miles from our base at Trinidad, and is 1590 miles from the nearest point in South America, approximately the same distance that Dakar is. It is a better spot for a base than Bathurst on the Gambia river, also a British holding, though Bathurst is nearer Dakar being 120 miles away.

IRISH BASES

The best bases to secure and use in Ireland would probably be, if such a move is practicable-Cobh-Lough Swilly-Berehaven in Bantry Bay. Berehaven was used as a destroyer base in the last war. It covers the air and sea approaches from the west and south--Cobh is the natural port

for the discharge of cargo--Lough Swilly is an extensive bay on the north coast of Ireland. It is the sea approach to Londonderry. A base in this vicinity would cover the northern and western approaches to Scotland and the Irish sea.

POINTS SUGGESTED FOR CONSIDERATION.

Since the Lend Lease Bill has given the authority, and the \$7,000,000,00 the power to start the wheels of production rolling, the most important factors to consider in the Aid to Britain program, are (a)-systematic and efficient planning between ourselves and Great Britain, and (b)-efficient and quick action in the matter of getting our production in the safest way to the localities where Britain can best use it. The need of speedy action in the case of-(b)-is evident since the successful solution of the Campaign of the Atlantic, is the most serious problem facing Britain now, and during the summer months, and transport across the sea is the weakest link in our aid to Britain scheme. In tackling this problem of shipping, there are two points to consider--(c)-the replacement of tonnage sunk, by the most rapid methods of construction, regardless of the size of the carriers-(d)-the safe transit of ships and their cargoes, with a minimum of loss, irrespective of any particular method by which ships cross the seas. In other words speed in transit and a reasonable degree of security are the key notes. If we attempt to safeguard shipping by escort, our own political position at home has to be considered, and the risk of involvement of a war in two oceans. Yet if we are not willing to assume some of the risks of defending the shipments regardless of what ships carry them, we might as well throw our money down the sink, and Britain may fall. If she does the logical spot for the British Government to move to is Canada, though the fleet might move to Singapore. Then we are in the war, for it has very definitely reached the Western Hemisphere, for we have defense commitments with Canada which we cannot

dodge. It would seem to be wiser policy to attempt to confine the fighting to Europe than have it come over here. A risk of our involvement in war, which is confined to sea and long range air activity, is a minimum risk, compared to what we would probably face if Britain fell. If the steps we take are in defense of our own rights as we view them, and we escort cargoes for the present no further than 30 degrees west longitude, which is within the limits of the western hemisphere, this might give Japan an out, in that the real aggressor might be termed the one who fired the first gun or torpedo, and Japan might be glad of an excuse not to go to war with us.

In general, in the matter of our sea and air aid to Britain, there are three courses we may pursue-(e)-we may turn over to Britain all the sea and air craft she needs, and which are at our disposal, with the promise of having them returned later. In the matter of aircraft, this presents no operational difficulties, and the speed up in our own production should give us a good safety margin, in case we had to look more closely to our own defense needs. The case of our war craft is different, though the difficulties attendant to turning over regular men of war, does not apply to smaller craft, such as Coast Guard ships-yachts-patrol boats-tugs-mine sweepers. If we turn over too many men of war at one time, there is the problem for Britain to find trained crews to man them-there is a training period for British crews to learn how to run them without breakdowns-and there is the matter of additions and changes in material to make our ships fit to war specifications. Away from gunfire and air attack we should be able to make a better and quicker job of it-(f)-there is the course of conduct where we hold fast to all our sea and war air craft, expecting to use them later. This is a negative effort, productive of no aid to Britain, and extremely wasteful of time-(g)-there is the com-

premise plan and this seems to me to be the one offering the most promise. This plan would be to turn over to Britain, all the sea and air craft she could use immediately, and which we could spare, having in mind our Pacific commitment, and that we should start convey immediately.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS.

- (1)--That a Board be appointed, composed of competent British and American naval and military men, to study the war, plan a joint strategy and determine upon the proper tactics for its execution, if and when the time comes, that joint action is required. The seat of this Board would best be in Washington-(possibly Canada)-removed from the center of strife, where quiet thinking is possible, with all information given it.
- (2)--That steps be taken toward locating suitable bases in Labrador and Greenland, for the purpose of establishing across the narrow waters separating them, direct air flights for all types of planes, from the U.S. to Newfoundland--Newfoundland to Labrador--Labrador to Greenland--Greenland to Iceland--Iceland to the British Isles.
- (3)--That steps toward the acquisition of temporary bases in Ireland and Sierra Leone be started.
- (4)--That direct sailings between our own ports and the Far sea be started. Turkey the key spot in the Eastern Mediterranean has not given in yet, and if she flights, air power -(the lack of which was one of the main reasons Greece fell)-in quantity will be needed. Our ships not to be consigned on this route, by ourselves or the British. For should we endeavor to protect them yet on this route against raiders. The effort to do this would cause a dispersal of our naval force more urgently needed elsewhere now. If raiders sink or capture one this is an act of aggression.

24 5.

- (5)--Turn over to the British, exclusive of the needs of the Pacific fleet, all sea and air craft they can use immediately, and which we will not need in the convoys we escort. This is a practical measure since every war craft and aircraft we so turn over, goes into full war use immediately, while those we retain will not get into full war use until we get into the war.
- (6)--Since British shipping is much tied up, if quick plane deliveries, are needed to West Coast African ports, in order to be flown to North Africa for immediate use, make the deliveries in our own fast ships, by direct sailings to West Coast African ports.
- (7)--Fit out immediately more ships of the C-type, similar to the one now being fitted out--that is the convoy, cargo aircraft carrier type.
- (8)--Since the rapid transit of cargo is more efficient by direct sailings than by convoy, the principle should be established, that each individual cargo carrier, as far as practicable should be made as immune to the submarine and aircraft as possible. In new construction this would put a limit on size, and the accent on speed, both in construction and in transit. Older ships of slow speed must be escorted in convoy, and all means of defense used, even with the autogyro and blimp if it is found possible to use them.
- (9)--That ships of 15 knots and over should not go in convoy
- (10)--That slow ships of 10 knots and under, should go in convoy
- (11)--That between 10 and 15 knots discretion should be used whether to send ships in convoy or not
- (12)--That convoys should be small
- (13)--That the Neutrality Zone be extended to 30 degrees longitude west, which is within the limits of the western hemisphere
- (14)--That we start to escort convoys to longitude 30 degrees west, and then turn them over to the British

- (15)--That as soon as practicable, we start an air patrol, by sea planes, conducted from those bases we have acquired or may acquire, which from their location in the Atlantic can give shipping important information.
- (16)--That the convoys we escort may be composed of ships of all nationalities, and form in our ports.
- (17)-- That when British war craft enter our ports for repair, the ~~fixer~~ matter is taken under consideration, can we swap for the time being, an undamaged ship of the same type for the one damaged. If not then train the crews of the damaged ships, so that in time they can handle one of our own without much further training
- (18)--That as our heavier battleships come along, they go to the Pacific, to relieve one or two of the older battleships, which may then be put in the Atlantic service as deemed advisable
- (19)--Should it develop later that we became an active belligerent and found that in turning over too many of our war and aircraft, while as a non belligerent, we had stripped ourselves of the means to conduct a joint war efficiently, we have an agreement with the British that such of our and air craft as we had loaned, be returned, or that a new realignment of forces, their distribution and operational tasks be assigned, in order to conduct efficiently the joint war, in whatever world areas war operations are conducted.
- (20)--That as soon as we decide to convoy, even to long, 30, a state of National Emergency be declared.
- (21)--That when a State of National Emergency is declared, or before, steps be taken to insure the safety of our merchant ships against acts of sabotage, or those inimical to our interests.
- (22)--If the present political crisis in Australia, leads to a diminution of their active aid to Britain, for their own defense purposes

7.

we may have to exert more pressure on Australia, to reassure them of our active support, in case their island is threatened by a southern Japanese move.

W.V. Pratt

3.

but that in a long war, with Britain and Germany exhausted--Stalin would be the only winner--then Communist influence would dominate the Orient, much to Japan's undoing--that he, and I judged most of Japan's informed military authority regarded Russia as a weak country, with Stalin under the thumb of Berlin--that Russia was not sincere and could not be trusted.

Nomura stated that of all foreigners in his country the Americans were the best liked.

He stated that the capitalist group in Japan were distinctly opposed to the Axis economic system--that Japan's system was the growth of one patterned after ours and that of Britain, and that the supremacy of the Nazi system would distinctly disrupt their own, and as I gathered would interfere much with Japan's economic policy in the Orient, as it was fundamentally different from the one Japan visualized.

The immediate purpose of the discussion with me, was in connection with a visit he hoped Matsuoka would be able to make to this country in the near future--When Matsuoka went to Berlin--he, Nomura had cabled him, asking that he return via the United States--Matsuoka could not do it then, as he had to complete arrangements with Russia--I gathered that the feeling was, if an atmosphere was created in this country, which was not hostile to him, since Japan was an Axis partner, that he Matsuoka might be glad to come to this country to talk things over.

I told Nomura then, if the suspicion was aroused in this country that Matsuoka came as an Axis agent ~~xxxxxxx~~ agent, prepared to spread the Nazi doctrine of a conquerors peace, it would in my opinion be futile, and would only result in a greater antagonism in this country, for we would feel then that Japan had been sold lock, stock

3.

and barrel to the Nazis--But that if Matsuoaka came with the purpose of establishing friendly relations with this country on the basis of limiting the war to Europe--establishing a condition of peace in the Orient,not to be broken by further military conquests there, and keeping the peace so that war could not spread to the Orient, there might be ~~an~~ a possibility--I was not a statesman,nor in a position to make statements which carry any weight,but it was my opinion that the one successful approach to this country,and the only one giving any promise might be along the lines I suggested.

I asked him about Matsuoaka, stating that I heard he was in sentiment hostile to this country--The Ambassadors reply was to this effect-- That Matsuoaka must not be judged entirely by what he says--that he is a disciple of the American political method of saying a great many things to see their effect--but what he has in his heart may be quite another matter.

I gathered however from the whole conversation,that there was a growing fear in Japan,that ultimately,if the Axis were the victors Japan might have to fear Hitler,about as much as they do Stalin-- that he Momura looks forward to a long war,and in the end he did not see how Hitler could prevail over Britain and the United States with their great reserve power

This represents the gist of the conversation.

W.V.P Pratt

5 May 1941

BF

file Navy
personnel

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5-5-41

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Admiral Stark phoned that Admiral King has a report indicating the probable presence of a submarine south of Nantucket.

Stark says he is not convinced of the authenticity of this report but wanted you to know in case it is confirmed later.

Emmy
E.M.W.

PSF: Navy folder - 1941
7 5/31/41

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1941.

Dr. Bowman seemed to feel that there were disadvantages in announcing any line of demarcation between the two hemispheres because it might result in similar announcements by other nations -- by Japan, for instance. Also the line might be taken not only as a limit against European aggression, but also as a renunciation of our rights and interests in the area, to the eastward of the line.

Dr. Bowman emphasized, therefore, the importance of the first paragraph, and the first sentence of the second paragraph, in his paper as prepared.

He has kept Tuesday, May 20, and Wednesday, May 21, free of all engagements in case it should be desired that he come to Washington for further discussion of the questions involved.

Frank Sherman

Dear Mr President -

I sent ~~Frank~~ Sherman to Baltimore for Dr Bowman's papers. Sherman has been in charge of our studies of Greenland - hence my sending him to Dr Bowman -

Dr Bowman will be glad to come over to see you, if you so desire -

Betty.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

May 19, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

In the accompanying memorandum I attempt a solution based on the meridian of 25° west longitude. Three small deviations from this meridian, all based on the same principle, are proposed at the Cape Verdes, the Azores, and Iceland (see red line on attached map).

It is urged, however, that you weigh the alternative of 30°. I do not recommend 30° because critical military and political questions must be answered first. These questions are as follows:

1. Consider our total military strength. Is that strength sufficient, with the contingencies of Singapore, Hawaii, Panama, South America, Greenland, etc., in view, to permit us to dispatch and support whatever naval and air strength may be required to patrol or hold the Azores? You may decide that you must patrol or hold them even at high cost rather than suffer loss of prestige by leaving or losing them once you have included them in Western Hemisphere plans. I do not know if we possess that much total strength. You have the means at your command to secure an answer, or at least an opinion, based upon naval and industrial sources.
2. Every part of the 25° line is secure and double-riveted as to our rights, except the Azores. The opinions of geographers as recorded in existing geographical literature is clearly on the side of Old World connections for the Azores. We have to face those published opinions. The Azores are oceanic, central, and of as much strategic interest to us as to Europe, but we cannot say that they are western, not eastern, in geological and historical associations. Our strongest position with respect to the Azores (if we include them) is
 - a) that we have no ultimate territorial designs on them, and
 - b) that we aim only to neutralise the evil designs of others.

But an European coalition could say the same thing. It would come down to "we" vs. "they", and force alone would decide.

3. How far would American opinion sustain boldness of action in the Azores? How far would American support go if we suffered heavily at the Azores and a critical public attitude came to be fashionable? Could fifth-column agents use heavy U. S. commitments or losses at the Azores as an excuse for attacking our whole position on hemisphere limits and defense?

If war comes, we shall be obliged to revise our present attitudes and judgments. Certainly we would then be free to take the Azores, Cape Verdes, Dakar, and anything else we could take and thought militarily desirable to take. Do we now want to take (or patrol) anything that might diminish our ability to attain other and possibly more vital military objectives?

I do not trust my judgment on these politico-military questions for I do not have all the required facts at command.

Sincerely yours,

Isaiah Bowman

Special Note: If the 30° meridian is taken the South Atlantic meridian should be 20° west longitude up to the parallel of 10° south latitude, where a northwesterly rhumb line would be followed through the Africa -- South America gap to the intersection of 30° west and 15° north (see black line on accompanying map). Thence the line should run due north along 30° west longitude to $64^{\circ} 30'$ north latitude. Thence it should run due northeast to join the median line of Denmark Strait.

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Mr. Isaiah Bowman

The Johns Hopkins University
Baltimore, Maryland

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
(A Note on Atlantic Limits)

Hemisphere limits have reference to territory and special protection: they do not restrict our sea-borne trade.

Since the foundation of the Republic it has been our settled policy to uphold the right of Americans freely to go and come upon the seven seas in pursuit of peaceful trade. One of the avowed purposes in creating the Union was to assure respect for our flag and protection for our commerce. To defend this fundamental right of peaceful trade we have more than once taken up arms. At times, however, we have deliberately and voluntarily restricted the sphere of our trade in the interests of neutrality and peace. At the outbreak of the present war, in accordance with the Acts of the Congress, American shipping was barred from a war zone as defined by the President. Such restriction was not imposed upon us by international law; it was based upon our desire to avoid entanglements that might lead to war. No foreign power has a right to request that such voluntary restriction of our trade be maintained, much less to request that we still further restrict it in the interest of totalitarian conquest.

Territorial inviolability is a seasoned Western Hemisphere policy.

Meanwhile, without surrendering our right to trade in any part of the world, it is proper that we should define the area within which we continue a policy of territorial inviolability, a policy established for a hundred years. Within the area so defined all merchant vessels must be

free to move in safety, whatever flag they fly. Within that area all warships, airplanes, and submarines must be under the surveillance of our armed forces. Notice is given that within that area all armed intrusions are subject to enquiry and challenge. Self-defence is the ultimate law. In defence of the Western Hemisphere we propose to make specific application of a seasoned policy. We have shown by a series of positive, prompt, and vigorous actions that we mean to back up the principle of inviolability with instant force. Attempted invasions of the principle in the past have only given it greater strength.

The American people are firmly united in their conviction and their resolution that they will not now improvise a craven policy of withdrawal from hemisphere responsibilities. They do not propose to invite aggression by vacillating in the face of danger. During the past two years they have had ample time to observe the tragic effects of conquest abroad and to reflect upon the abundance and freedom of their own democratic inheritance. The time has come for me to speak on their behalf and to express their deepest convictions. The world has a right to know the measure of our common resolution. A direct statement of purpose becomes a solemn obligation.

I propose at this time to lay down a clear definition of hemisphere responsibility. It is based upon the realities of the modern world. These realities have been brought home to every American by the cruelties of successive conquests that have already spread their effects past the inner threshold of the Western Hemisphere.

The eastern and western island approaches have heightened significance today from the Arctic to the Antarctic.

Down to the time of air transport everyone thought of the Western Hemisphere in conventional terms. The atlas makers found the boundaries of 20° west longitude, and 160° east longitude, convenient in make-up. The question of exact or alternative hemisphere limits has remained largely academic. Practically all atlases — German, English, Italian, Swiss, Swedish, American — show the same conventional limits. However, when it comes to international questions in our modern age, it is not cartographic convenience that we consult but the facts of history and the new meanings which modern armament and aviation give to maritime outposts of unquestionable concern.

No extensive historical review is required to show the increasing importance of these outposts during the past century. For fifty years our eastern and western approaches have gained in importance as we have more sharply realized that island footholds of power may strongly affect continental destiny. In 1887 when we obtained our first naval station in the Hawaiian Islands; in 1914 when we completed the Panama Canal and bound our eastern and western coasts by a more direct sea route; again in 1916 when we purchased the Virgin Islands; and yet again in 1920 when we solemnly reaffirmed our underlying interest in Greenland, we were consistently following the principle that vigilance with respect to our eastern and western approaches is as necessary as the construction of battleships and coastal defences.

We make no claim to other people's territories; we seek no exten-

sion of our rights or titles. We seek only to provide against the spread of a conflict. For this temporary purpose we must define the limits of our special responsibility. We are forced to state where our primary rights begin when aggressors deprive other governments with Western Hemisphere possessions of their freedom of decision and action. We must establish our obligation of enquiry and challenge at clearly defined points and lines.

The twenty-fifth meridian.

We take our stand on the meridian of 25° west longitude, with consistent and specified deviations in the latitude of the Cape Verde Islands, the Azores, and Iceland. The meridian of 25° west longitude approximately divides into equal parts the ocean space between the westernmost point of Africa and the easternmost point of South America. It lies 5 degrees of longitude west of the conventional eastern limits of the Western Hemisphere as shown in all modern atlases. In the South Atlantic it is much nearer South America than Africa. In the North Atlantic it is 13 degrees of longitude west of the easternmost point of Greenland.

The westernmost point of the Cape Verde Islands lies at 25° 23' west longitude, and our hemisphere line deviates at this point to provide 25 miles of open water west of the Cape Verdes. The Cape Verde deviation thus brings the line to approximately 26° west longitude at its westernmost position. At the Azores the 25° meridian practically coincides with the eastern extremity of the easternmost Island of Santa Maria. Here

also the hemisphere limit bends away from the line of 25° west longitude, to provide 25 miles of open water east of Santa Maria. The western point of Iceland is at $24^{\circ} 32'$ west longitude. In this latitude the line becomes a westward and northward swinging arc which excludes from the Western Hemisphere 25 miles of open water off Iceland's northwesternmost coast. The arc then swings northeasterly until it merges with the median line of Denmark Strait between Iceland and Greenland. The breadth of Denmark Strait is approximately 190 miles. We therefore provide a 95-mile stretch of water on either side of the median line up to the coast of Greenland on one side and of Iceland on the other.


It would be superfluous at this time to review the argument for the New World character of Greenland. Nearly a thousand years of record and all modern critical opinions support the position we have taken. Our modern interest in Greenland was established by a series of American Arctic expeditions which culminated in Peary's traverse and mapping of the northern coast of Greenland in 1900 as far east as $23^{\circ} 10'$ west longitude. Within a year there have been published at Copenhagen surveys and historical reports giving due credit to the brilliant achievements of Peary. The authenticity of his work is thus independently affirmed on the basis of recent extensive field work including aerial photography. Our priorities in Greenland are thus clearly established and it is this indisputable fact that gives the northerly position of our hemisphere line its validity.


It is true that we waived American rights in Greenland in 1916, as a part of the general agreement under which we purchased the Virgin Islands. But we waived those rights, not in an absolute sense, but in favor of

Denmark and Denmark alone. We did not put them aside as of no consequence to us or as if we had no concern about changes of sovereignty in this hemisphere. In May, 1920, when it was suggested by a third power that Denmark might wish to dispose of Greenland, the United States at once informed both of the governments concerned that it was not disposed to recognize the right of preemption. Our government reserved for future consideration its position with respect to any future proposal. In August, 1921, when Denmark placed the whole of Greenland under its administration, we reaffirmed our concern over any preemption that might occur. Next to the rights of the free Danish government, therefore, stand the rights of the government of the United States, clearly and promptly expressed on every appropriate occasion. Our paramount interest in Greenland as a part of the Western Hemisphere being clearly established, we are obliged to assume responsibility for positive acts at this time, when the Danish government is obviously deprived of the power of sovereign control over its own acts and territories.

The case of Iceland is not so clear. There is a difference of opinion as to its position on the rim of the Western Hemisphere. We do not propose to include doubtful territory within the limits of our present concern. We therefore act on sound historical and geographical principles when we set a North Atlantic limit to the hemisphere by drawing the boundary line half-way between Greenland and Iceland.

For surface vessels the effective limit of navigation in Arctic waters is set by heavy sea ice. Since the position of the edge of such ice varies with ^{the} season and the year, the northern end of the line will vary so far as surface navigation is concerned. The airplane has a wider range. We therefore extend the line from its median position in Denmark Strait in a northeasterly and northerly direction to and beyond the edge of the pack ice at a conformable distance off Greenland's east coast.





*Former Naval
Person*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.

State Department dispatch
to the President from Former Naval
Person, dated May 23, 1941.

(File "Box" when returned)

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

27 May 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Admiral LeBreton has just returned from his first trip on the patrol near the convoy routes.

He tells me that he was able to plot the positions of the convoys and that he was about 20 miles to the southward of the general route of the convoys, but as these were changed from day to day and did not all take the same route he had to vary his position. At one time he had to change course to avoid running headon into one of them.

I thought you would be interested to know that he was very much nearer to the convoys than we had originally thought.

HRS.

we have 3 S.S. basing on
St Thomas - (answering your
question about S.S. in San Juan Area)

HRS

Navy Folder

PSF

~~SECRET~~

May 27, 1941

~~SECRET~~

The following British ships were sunk or damaged in recent Operations around Crete:

SUNK	DAMAGED AND OUT OF ACTION	DAMAGED BUT STILL SERVICEABLE	DAMAGED BUT EXTENT OF DAMAGE UNKNOWN
<u>4 DD</u> JUNO 1690 tons KASHMIR 1690 " KELLY 1695 " GREYHOUND 1340	<u>3 CL</u> CARLISLE 4200 tons (AA CRU) NAIAD 5500 " PERTH 6980 "	<u>2 BB</u> VALIANT 30600 tons WARSPITE 30600 "	<u>2 CL</u> CALCUTTA 4200 tons (AA CRU)
<u>2 CL</u> FIJI 8100 tons GLOUCESTER 9300 " <u>1 ESCORT VESSEL</u> GRIMSBY 990 tons	<u>4 DD</u> KINGSTON 1690 tons KIPLING 1690 " HAVOCK 1340 " ILEX 1370 "	<u>2 CL</u> ORION 7270 tons AJAX 7270 " PHOENIX 5450 " <u>1 CV</u> FORMIDABLE 23000 "	

(NOTE FOR ADMIRAL TURNER)

Using information furnished by despatch of the 6th of May, which gave the number and types of British ships in the Mediterranean based at Alexandria, and subtracting from this number the ships sunk or damaged as per table above, we find the following number of undamaged ships remaining in the Mediterranean.

2 BB
1 CL
1 AA CRU
1 CRU MINE LAYER
3 ANTI SUBMARINE SLOOPS
27 DD
7 MINE SWEEPING SLOOPS
20 SS
8 CORVETTES

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 4-8-70

Signature- JWR

SUMMARY OF CRETE - MAY 27, 1941

The Germans continue to report satisfactory progress in consolidation, with claims that British naval interference has been eliminated. There is mention of new landings at two points in the southwest and in Kisamo Bay in the northwest.

There are indications of a German move from Retimo in the center toward the narrow neck of the island.

Rome reports the ferrying of troops and materials to Crete by water.

Bomb hits are claimed by the Axis on a British carrier and on a remaining British cruiser. The sinking of another British destroyer is also reported.

The British are dropping supplies to the ground units from the air. They claim as high as 14,000 German casualties.

ARS

PSF

Navy Folder

May 28, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish you would take the full responsibility for delivering the PEYs that are to be flown to England to the point of ultimate take-off.

I am convinced that we can speed up the process of getting these bombers to England and I am anxious to cut through all of the formalities that are not legally prohibitive and help the British get this job done with dispatch.

I think that Lend-Lease funds can be used to some extent in connection with fields in Canada and Bermuda.

For your confidential information I am suggesting that the R.A.F. take the responsibility for the planes at the point of ultimate take-off but whether this suggestion of mine is approved by the British Government or not I want the Navy to make sure that these planes are delivered speedily.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy.

HLH/lmb

PSF

Navy Folder

May 29, 1941

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am very anxious that the Navy Department issue letters of intent or place under contract not later than July 1, 1941 the material and munitions authorized by funds appropriated to the Department. The same should apply to funds transferred by me to the Department under the Lend-Lease Act.

This memorandum applies to all funds available to the Department as of this date.

I feel that it is a matter of the utmost urgency that firm commitments be made by the Navy Department to the industrial plants that are to carry out these contracts. I appreciate that this is going to require a tremendous effort on the part of the Navy Department but it is urgently necessary that it be done.

Very sincerely yours,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy.

Letter similar to this
also sent to Secy of War

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

*File AF Navy
Personal Folder*

June 2, 1941

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Report on Enlisted Personnel, U. S. Navy.

1. The number of enlisted men in active service on May 31, 1941, is as indicated below: For basis of comparison the April 30th figures are included also:

	<u>May 31, 1941</u>	<u>April 30, 1941</u>	<u>Net Gain For Month</u>
Regulars	201,583	198,426	3,157
Retired Men	688	543	145
Fleet Reserves	8,391	7,894	497
Other Reserves	<u>24,629</u>	<u>19,966</u>	<u>4,663</u>
	235,291	226,829	8,462

Very respectfully,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

*File Personal Navy Folder
PSF*

June 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Recall to Active Service of Officers and Men of the Merchant Marine Reserve, and Retired Enlisted Men of Regular Navy and Marine Corps.

1. In view of the unlimited National Emergency which now exists it is necessary that the restrictions, heretofore applied, in the employment of officers and men of the Merchant Marine Reserve and retired enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps be now removed.
2. In your Executive Order No. 8245 of September, 1939, you authorized the active employment of such personnel provided it was done on a voluntary basis. All other classes of the Naval Reserve are being called to active duty with or without their consent, as their services are necessary.
3. Merchant Marine Reserve Officers serve in vessels of the Merchant Marine, and on Army transports. When any of these vessels are taken over by the Navy it is desirable that the Reserve personnel on board be called to active service in the Navy, and wherever practicable, remain in the same vessel.
4. The present demands for petty officers are so great that the services of all retired enlisted men, who are physically fit to perform duty ashore, are necessary. Their employment will permit the release of active personnel ashore for duty afloat.
5. It is urgently requested that the voluntary provision in the case of the above mentioned personnel be rescinded, and that the Secretary of the Navy be authorized to call such personnel to active service as he may deem necessary.
6. No action will be taken which may interfere in the normal operation of strictly Merchant Marine vessels without prior consultation with the Maritime Commission.

Respectfully,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MISS ROBERTA BARROWS

With the return of the letter which Lieutenant Commander Andrew C. Dam, U.S.N.R., sent to the President on 2 June, 1941, please find copies of correspondence I have sent in connection therewith.


J. R. BEARDALL,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

Navy Folder

June 4, 1941.

My dear Mr. Dam:

The President has asked me to acknowledge your letter of 2 June and to say that owing to the press of affairs, it is not possible to grant you an interview to discuss the matter of your anti-submarine boat, at this time.

I am fully cognizant of the interest the President has shown in the development of your ideas, therefore I am bringing the subject matter of your letter to the attention of the Secretary of the Navy.

Your kind reference to the President's recent speech was greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. R. BEARDALL,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

Lt. Com. Andrew C. Dam, USNR, (Ret.),
107 Grassmere Avenue,
Interlaken, New Jersey.

June 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Reference: Your memorandum to the President of
12 April 1941.

In a recent letter to the President, Lieutenant Commander Andrew C. Dam, USNR, (Ret.), outlines what the Department is doing in connection with the development of his silent anti-submarine boat, and ends up with the statement that, "the Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department is insisting upon conducting a series of tests of the separate features of my proposal which might consume months of time. These tests relate to matters upon which there is already available data, and the completion of them would neither prove nor disprove the merits of my submarine destroyer as a whole, which can only be demonstrated by the construction of a vessel embodying all of the features."

Lieutenant Commander Dam asked for an interview with the President on this matter, which the President hasn't the time for just now. The President has requested that the Navy Department handle this matter for him.

J. R. BEARDALL,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

THE ARMY AND NAVY CLUB
WASHINGTON

2 June 1941

Honorable Franklin D Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr President:

I am advised that you are acquainted with my proposal for a new type of Submarine Destroyer, and am deeply appreciative of the interest you have taken in it since it was brought to your attention by our mutual friend, Eckford DeKay.

I have been working with the Navy Department on the project for over a year. It has received favorable comment after intensive study, by the Naval Research Laboratory and the Office of Inventions and Research of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. The Naval Research Laboratory has conducted tests of the most important principle involved, that of the "silent boat", which tests proved successful.

I am convinced that these departments, on the basis of the studies they have made, would agree that the construction of the Submarine Destroyer would be fully justified.

I feel very keenly that any further delay in the development of a more efficient technique of submarine destruction would be most unfortunate in the present national defense emergency.

If my proposal has merit, the need for its adoption will never be greater than it is at this moment.

However, the Bureau of Ships of the Navy Department is insisting upon conducting a series of tests of the separate features of my proposal which might consume months of time. These tests relate to matters upon which there is already available data, and the completion of them would neither prove nor disprove the merits of my Submarine Destroyer as a whole, which can only be demonstrated by the construction of a vessel embodying all of the features.

Being keenly aware of the many great burdens you are carrying, I have hesitated a long time before writing you. I know of no other way of overcoming the delay, and so I hope I am justified in appealing to you for a brief interview in order that I may present


THE ARMY AND NAVY CLUB
WASHINGTON

-2-

a plan which I believe will meet with your approval.

In closing may I tell you how deeply moved and impressed I was by your inspiring radio talk on Tuesday Evening. I feel sure it is going to have a great and salutary influence on the country.

Faithfully yours,



Andrew C Dan,
Lieut. Commander,
U.S.N.,R., Ret.

In reply refer to Initials
and No.

file
personal

PST Navy Folder

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

12 June 1941

Dear "Pa":

Probably nothing to do with the enclosed
except transfer it to the waste basket but it is a
follow-up of the memo you showed me yesterday.

Give me a credit mark for getting in and
getting through very quickly yesterday.

Keep cheerful.

Betty

General E.M. Watson, U.S. Army,
The White House.

Tell the President
The
warship - down for overhaul
at Bannerton - goes there
by heading east - from the
Bad Sea -

WRS

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1941

file personal
Navy Folder
PSF

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I admit that that is one up for the little birds at Hyde Park.

However, I was not aware that the entire Marine Corps were included in the tentative figures and, most emphatically, I did not know of the inclusion of nearly 300,000 Selectees. The figure I was interested in is that which is listed in the enclosed memorandum as "Regulars", which you will observe is around 400,000 as I said.

However, this note is only for the purpose of acknowledging the accuracy of your Bird Councilors and advising you that I am going after the recruiting of regulars, as you instructed, in the regular order and without any intention whatever of using Selectees in the Navy.

Frank Knox

17 May 1938.

1943 NAVY

*Dear Frank
One of that flock
of Little Birds
at High Park
JWR*

Total Navy Enlisted 587,700

Begin year with	338,455	(regular)
" " "	<u>14,000</u>	(Rtd. & F.R.)
Regulars	352,455	
Selectees	<u>235,245</u>	

587,700

Total Marine Enlisted 117,540

Begin year with	60,000	(regular, Rtd. and Res.)
Selectees	<u>57,540</u>	

117,540

705,240

Regulars (all)	412,455
Selectees (all)	<u>292,785</u>
	<u>705,240</u>

Nurses

One Nurse to each $8\frac{1}{2}$ patients
Sick load - 29 per 1,000
 $29 \times 705,000 = 20,445$ patient load

Nurses 2,406

For ratio only →

Total Personnel Reserves to Regulars	<u>412</u> 292
--------------------------------------	-------------------

Regular Nurses	1,550
Reserves (Selectees)?	<u>850</u>
	2,400

	<u>Begin</u>	<u>End</u>	<u>Average</u>
Nurses, Navy	624	1,550	1,087
Nurses, Reserve	<u>380</u>	<u>850</u>	<u>615</u>
	1,004	2,400	1,702

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT

Navy Department, 17 June 1941

PSF
Navy

Total Enlisted Strength, 14 June 239,387

Fleet Reservists (enlisted) on active duty 8,596

Other Reservists " " " " 26,451

Retired Men " " " " 766

Total 35,813

Aggregate Enlistments (last 24 hours) 234

Aggregate Discharges " " " " 131

Gain 103

Admiral Towers stated today that Air Marshall Harris, R.A.F., has arrived in Washington for duty as direct representative of the Chief of Air Staff. The present Air Attaché, Air Commodore G. C. Pirie, R.A.F., will serve under Air Marshall Harris as his Chief of Staff. Air Chief Marshall Bowhill, until recently in command of aircraft of the Coastal Defense of the United Kingdom, is due to arrive in the United States this week to take direct charge of the problem of overseas ferrying of aircraft built in the United States for Great Britain. It is believed that these two details will be of great assistance to our part of aircraft aid to Great Britain.

Admiral Kimmel today warned Naval families to be wary of anonymous telephone calls since they are used to obtain information about ship movements and to create suspicion and discord in families.

2.

Paymaster General of the Navy, to leave the 23rd of June for visit to the First and Third Naval Districts, making an address on June 26th at the new Navy Supply School at Harvard University where there are about 440 student Naval Reserve Officers of the Supply Corps.

Bureau of Ships. The Carrier Ship Maintenance Desk has been consolidated with the Battleship Maintenance Desk.

All minesweepers and all Bird Class minesweepers converted to other purposes, which had been under the Carrier Desk, were transferred to the Auxiliaries Ship Maintenance Desk.

Captain Sheldon advises contractors are expected to complete work on the Bethesda Medical Center in October. It is expected the Center will be ready for occupancy around January 1, 1942. Partial occupancy will begin as soon as possible.

Hawthorne, Nevada ammunition depot expected to be expanded to provide additional storage space. A contract involving \$1,999,500.00 is under consideration as authorized in the 40-41 Building Program.

UAW, (CIO), and A.F. of L., production workers of Electric Auto Lite Company, Port Huron, Michigan, threaten to strike over a wage increase. This company has a Navy contract

3.

for electric cable and magnetic wire.

Hipper and Scheer drydocked at Kiel on June 12 according to reliable reports.

Admiral Leahy advised on June 13 that the CAPITAINE DAMIANI and ALBERT (French tankers) were sent to CONSTANZA in order to test the possibility of supplying France (by sea) with some of the oil that the Rumanians agreed to deliver to France. This scheme may be given up since the CAPITAINE DAMIANI was torpedoed and badly damaged on June 14.

Twenty-one Japanese warships and transports heading South from Wenchow at midnight June 12 and 13. Effective midnight June 16 and 17 Japan closed waters in Swatow area to shipping according to reports.

Dakar's inner harbor is protected by a submarine net according to reliable reports. One of the ships recently arrived at DAKAR from CASABLANCA brought ten light and ten medium tanks. The rains are now getting underway and most of the roads will be useless until October or November.

Sun Shipbuilding Company employees, Chester, Pa., received twelve cents an hour pay increase and have accepted a pact banning strikes and lockouts for two years.

4.

Perkins advises German naval units, including some heavy types, have been concentrating in and around Copenhagen the last few days, perhaps because of desire to obtain better facilities and greater security or for possible naval demonstration in the Baltic.

Germany pressing Russia to turn over warships to Japan according to unconfirmed reports - 50 Soviet destroyers, 20 submarines, 14 minelayers, and 300 military planes reported involved.

Inland Steel Company, East Chicago, Ill., experiencing continuing series of minor slow-downs and department strikes. Possibility of major trouble indicated.

Italian submarine believed to be shadowing convoy NE of Azores on June 14.

London is full of conjectures on the Russian-German situation. There was a tendency to believe Russia would give in to Hitler's demands, both economic and military, if they have not yielded already.

French trucks and automotive equipment in Algeria being taken over by the Germans will prove worthless when it arrives in Libya.

Port of Lagos, Nigeria, was swept with magnetic gear on June 15 and it was expected to be open on June 16th.

Confidential

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
Navy Department, 18 June 1941

<u>Total Enlisted Strength</u> , 16 June	239,722
<u>Fleet Reservists</u> (enlisted) on active duty	8,596
<u>Other Reservists</u> " " " "	26,635
<u>Retired Men</u> " " " "	766
Total	35,997
<u>Aggregate Enlistments</u> (last 24 hours)	204
<u>Aggregate Discharges</u> " " " "	65
Gain	139

Admiral Moreell reports out of a total of 14,293 housing units completed by all Government housing agencies, 44% has been built by the Navy according to June 7 Weekly summary sheet of Defense Housing Coordinator. The first funds for the construction of low-cost defense housing became available to the Navy on August 12, 1940. The first contract was awarded October 2, 1940, the intervening 50 days being required to prepare plans and specifications as none were available. By February 7, 1941, all but 120 out of a total of 17,110 housing units for which funds were available were under contract. The remaining 120 were placed under contract by May 4, 1941. The first houses were occupied March 1, 1941, and as of June 16th the total occupied is 6,325 in various localities. In addition to the 17,110 units previously mentioned, 548 more units are being built with savings made in the construction cost under the

2.

\$3500.00 limit determined by Congress.

Richard R. Adams, Ex. V-P, Grace Lines, advises confidentially continually worried of sabotage by members of crews. Has asked Navy cooperation to prevent sabotage.

This confirms concern by certain officers about possible trouble from seamen in merchant marine.

Merchant Marine reserve officers may now be ordered to active duty without their consent. The Secretary of the Navy instructed in exercising this authority it is intended to conflict with the functions of the Merchant Marine to the minimum extent consistent with the urgent needs of the Navy.

Naval censorship has been established for the Island of Guam through a notice sent to the Governor.

A Naval Air Station has been established at Kodiak, Alaska.

Proposed bridge across the Columbia River from Port of Astoria Docks to Point Ellice, Washington is in most undesirable location since it would seriously jeopardize Navy patrol plane operations and approaches in bad weather when visibility is poor during routine operations from Naval Air Station at Tongue Point four miles away. Army Engineer holding hearings at Portland during next 2 weeks.

3.

General Vandergrift reports 2nd Defense Battalion USMC ready to move to Parris Island. Move will start on June 23rd, and will continue one train a day for approximately four days.

Royal Norwegian Navy is requesting cooperation of British Admiralty and U.S. Navy in sending relief expedition of 2 small ships to the East Coast of Greenland the middle of July for party of 7 Norwegians and 22 Danes collecting meteorological data. Party needs supplies; has radio station capable of reaching Copenhagen and probably would be in position to operate another in McKenzie Bay capable of supplying meteorological data to Iceland.

Suva (Fiji Island).--Hawaii radio link was discontinued on June 15th in order to prevent shipping agents in Suva announcing arrivals and departures of allied shipping to West Coast - U.S. - Western Union has discontinued their arrival and departures service.

Leaves have not been cancelled by general order in the Marine Corps as rumored. Some leaves may be curtailed from time to time due to special training operations it is reported.

Acting Secretary of the Navy Forrestal announced on June 17 establishment of the U. S. Naval Reserve

4. Aviation Base at New Orleans, La., effective as of July 15, 1941 thereby completing the Navy's program for establishing 16 Naval Reserve bases throughout the country.

Temporary appointment of Naval Warrant Officers or enlisted men as commissioned officers required by the Naval expansion program is provided in the bill passed by the House and sent to the Senate yesterday.

Japanese government has allotted seven million dollars for spreading propaganda in the U. S. during 1941, it is reliably reported.

Axis submarine refueling in West African waters possible from mother ship designed as freighter, from Canary Islands, bases on uninhabited coasts, or from BISSAGOS ISLANDS. DAKAR not being used. WASSON wants permission from State Department to investigate.

Japanese Naval Concentration reported still steaming South.

Japanese bombing of U.S.S. TUTUILA either criminal carelessness or a deliberate attempt to bomb the American Embassy and TUTUILA is indicated from military study.

Axis seamen (460) reportedly leaving Tampico on June 19 for GUADALAJARA.

Schoenfield (Helsinki) advises German military circles reported to believe that Soviet army must be eliminated in 1941. Phillips reports Vatican believes Soviet will not compromise with Nazis.

Confidential

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT
Navy Department, 2 July, 1941.

Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, chief of Bureau of Aeronautics stated: There are indications that the Germans have constructed, recently, a large number of airplanes designed specifically for sweeping for magnetic mines. Inasmuch as it is known that the British have sown a large number of such mines for protection against invasion, this program may have special significance.

Admiral McIntire reports hospital dispensary plans for Bermuda, Argentia and Trinidad have been approved and sent to Yards and Docks and that Quantico Hospital went into Commission 1 July.

Fort Schuyler taken over by Navy last week. 150 reserve college men arriving there 7 July for Navy Ordnance indoctrination. Fort Schuyler will now become receiving ship for all Ordnance Ensigns. From there they will be taken for instruction at gun factories. While there they will be shown all major industrial plants in New York Area.

System of Battle Signal Lights being changed from horizontal to vertical. Involves Emergency purchases of certain materials through the Bureau of Supplies and

2.

Accounts for forwarding to Portsmouth.

Traffic between Sweden and Germany now temporarily established through Denmark it is reported.

Two Portuguese trawlers SANTA PRINCESA and SANTA JOANNA, a number of two and three masted schooners all equipped with radio or radio telephone and 12 French Schooners of three or four masts but without radio are reported fishing on the BANK OF BANKS. Convoy data could be communicated by enemy vessels to ST. PIERRE for transmission to Germany but it is not known whether this is done, it is reported.

Turks appear utterly amazed at Vichy request for right of transit to Syria and for war material it is reported from a reliable source.

German Armistice Commission criticizes Weygand as impeding and sabotaging work of Commission in North Africa it is reliably reported.

British and Chinese military staffs will meet in Burma during first week in July to conclude agreements on Mutual Co-operation in case Japanese attack British. Plans are laid for use by British planes of Chinese airbases and British assistance to Chinese guerillas it is reported from a reliable source.

Russians continue to suspect and mistrust the British and

3

are tolerating the British Military Mission instead of keeping it fully informed and making use of it according to impressions reported by Steinhardt.

Admiral Noyes reports that consideration has been given to a request from the Radio Club of America asking if various Government Departments approved the use of this Organization's facilities and mailing lists to assist in securing technicians for the British Civilian Technical Corp. State, War and Navy saw no objection.

French and Germans appear to be attaching great importance to LATAKIA, Syria it is reported.

BORDEAUX and NOZIMA MARU each with a cargo of chrome ore (total 9,600 tons) - from Philippines to United States, reported requisitioned by the Japanese Government. It is pointed out this is a method of blocking movement of the United States strategics without actual overt act.

Japanese Extremists including the Army and Navy groups urging immediate action in support of Berlin it is reported. Grew reports Prince Konoye said Japan could reconcile U.S.S.R. neutrality treaty and Tripartite Pact, Germans expected to be successful and will control Western portion of U.S.S.R., but did not believe German influence would reach the East and that the So-

4.
viet may not collapse.

2 British Destroyers sunk 1 July, a third badly damaged in Axis Air and Submarine Attack in East Mediterranean it is reported.

13 German Ships in Orient ports reported loading wartime supplies preparatory to sailing halfway around the world in an effort to run the British blockade.

Finland now has 13 divisions fully mobilized and three more are being mobilized it is reported.

Portuguese Trawler believed to have been taken over by the Germans, found to have fuel oil concealed below salt when seized by Canadians at St. Johns.

FORT de FRANCE departed from Martinique for Cayenne under escort by Naval auxiliary cruiser BARFLEUR, carrying cargo of 1233 tons consisting mainly of flour of American origin.

KOKUYU MARU a special service vessel under charter to the Japanese Navy, is reported to have sailed from the Naval Station at Kure to load oil and gasoline at Los Angeles.

Italian Vessels departed South American ports as follows: from Para towards open sea the MON BALDO 27 June. From Recife 28 June "Twentyfour Maggio" for Hamburg it is reported.

Confidential

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT
Navy Department, 3 July, 1941.

Japanese general opinion is that Nazis will gain quick victory; if so Japan may occupy maritime provinces it is reported from a reliable source. American Officials at Mukden and Harbin have noted no indications that Japan is preparing to attack Russia. Reports from Third Naval District from a reliable informant close to Japanese industrial interests states they expect Japan to move against Russia about 20 July. Japanese vessels of one Japanese steamship company have received orders to be west of Panama by 25 July regardless of passengers or cargo. The vessels of another Japanese company are ordered to discharge all cargoes on the Pacific coast for the present, it is reported from a reliable source. 5 Japanese vessels due New York first half of July.

Axis shipping losses up to 17 June as follows: 102 freighters 469,000 tons taken or seized; 198 freighters 1,060,000 tons sunk by British or scuttled by own crews; 345 ships 1,725,000 tons unidentified total 645 ships 3,254,000 tons - additional 47 freighters 84,000 tons under Axis control or in their service were sunk; 53 vessels 320,000 tons seized in South American or

2.

United States Harbors it is reported from a reliable source in London.

Ships reported sunk include: MALAYA II (British.) MAASDAM (Dutch) 8812 tons. GRAYBURN (British) 6342 tons. AURIS (British Tanker) 8030 tons. BARRHILL (British) 4972 tons. MONTFERLAND (British) 6790 tons. RABOUL (British) 5618 tons. TRAFALGAR (British) 5542 tons.

Possible torpedo attack on Panama Canal between 1st and 15th of July is reported from a reliable source "in spite of the fact it sounds fantastic."

Rumors are current in the Iberian peninsula which alleges that the United States is considering early action against the CANARIES the AZORES, CAPE VERDE and ICELAND. On the other hand the Italians, Germans and French in Spain are very much afraid that the United States will move against West Africa and Dakar while the Germans are busy with Russia: all West Africa is considered to be vulnerable by German High Command which considers that an American attack would prove disastrous to the future plans of the Reich according to reliable reports from Madrid.

Russian Air Forces is reported from a reliable source as follows: 5552 first line planes in 346 squadrons divided as follows:

Type	Number of Squadrons		Number of Aircraft	
	Army	Navy	Army	Navy
Pursuit	100	16	2000	292
Light Bombers *	160	20	2270	292
Heavy Bombers	20	None	320	None
Patrol	<u>None</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>378</u>
	280	66	4590	962

* includes reconnaissance and dive bombers. The above are first line planes - estimated reserves are 30%.

Personnel includes 10,000 officer pilots, 10,000 non-flying officers, 9,000 officer observers, 6,000 cadets, 75,000 enlisted men from all ranks, 100,000 parachutists and airborne troops (reported.) Air force is poorly organized, trained, equipped and has poor morale. Planes copied from 1st class power's models 3 or 4 years old. Relative Russian strength to German in ratio 2:3, Japan 5:3 (in Far East). 1,200 aircraft in Far East cannot be withdrawn without yielding air superiority. Aircraft industry will not function in war time. Anticipate large numbers of Soviet planes to be shot down in combat or destroyed on ground.

Germans will reach Moscow in 5 days according to British informant it is reported from a reliable source.

British Admiralty is printing ten thousand copies of a booklet on the identification of German, Japanese, Italian and French merchant ships. It is designed for use by

4.

ships and planes and contains among other things scaled aerial silhouettes. Wide unrestricted distribution is intended and copies will be made available to U.S.N.

General Weygand is reported to have earnestly requested that American radio broadcasts accord less prominence to his name because his relations with the Germans have been made far more difficult by this practice.

Gunther reports from a reliable source, a dummy city of Ploesti has been constructed a few miles from the real city. It is said to have been based on aerial photographs. It is possible that the fires which were reported to have been ignited, according to Russian communiques, were fires set in the dummy city to deceive the enemy.

Barrage balloons are proving effective in England and Germany for defense purposes. Army has about three thousand on order now. U.S.M.C. planning for their use in connection with outlying possessions it is reported. Balloon barrage defense against aircraft in Moscow indicated abandoned it is reported from a reliable source in Moscow. No coordinated planning of air raid protection in Moscow.

Nazi troops withdraw during the past week 15th, 52nd and 86th German divisions from France and official estimates place not over 35 divisions now in Holland, Belgium and France it is reported from a reliable source.

Confidential

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT
Navy Department, 7 July, 1941.

Expansion of Axis commercial air activities in Natal region has seemingly opened a relatively safe steamship traffic between Europe and South America and possible domination of an invasion route from Africa to Brazil, inimical to United States interests. Italian and German commercial planes apparently carry out air reconnaissance against British ships and afford protection for sailings of own vessels it is reported from a reliable source.

Shortages are reported by the Director of the Navy Budget and Reports as follows: STEEL-The shortage of mild and alloy steel in the defense effort is acute and is becoming more so every day. All bureaus using steel report delays. These delays are occurring regardless of preference ratings and notwithstanding the fact that steel has been placed on the critical list; ALUMINUM and MAGNESIUM-Both Aluminum and Magnesium are now under mandatory priority. Even so and with numerous substitutions delays caused by lack of these materials are becoming worse each day. As an example, the Adapti Company

2.

a subcontractor for Dravo cannot get a promise of delivery from the Aluminum Company even though this item carried a priority of A-1-A it is reported; MACHINE TOOLS-All Bureaus report delays due to lack of machine tools. Estimated delays in vital machine tools vary from a few months to one year. Of the 5,723 machine tools of various descriptions due during the period January 1, 1941 to May 31, 1941, 3,414 or about 60% are overdue; TIN-is causing delay in the delivery of tinned provisions ordered by the bureau of Supplies and Accounts; OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS-Shortage of Optical instruments in cameras, binoculars, fire control instruments, etc. continue due to lack of optical glass and personnel qualified to produce lenses; INSTRUMENTS-At present the shortage in this category is being felt chiefly by the aircraft industry and for certain anti-aircraft instruments. The shortage in this field will not be felt until the ships now being laid down approach completion, FACILITIES-Many projects under the cognizance of Yards and Docks have no priority ratings, CLOSE-RANGE ANTI-AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT-the obtaining of these guns, mounts, ammunition and fire control equipment remains critical. Progress is being made but the obtaining of machine tools, cartridge case brass, steel and powder remains very critical; OTHER

MATERIALS-Forged armor for Battleships is now running 8 to 15 months behind schedule.

Japanese developments reported include: abrogation of Russian Neutrality Pact in the near future is predicted to be followed simultaneously or soon afterwards by an attack on Siberia; consideration of an extension of the limits of Japan's territorial waters which would cut off Vladivostok from normal trade and hamper any shipments of United States materials to Russia is reported; Japanese ships continue to expedite loading, unloading and departure direct to Japan from the East Coast ports of North and South America; concern is reported over attempts made by the Japanese to extend their influence among various Moslem peoples in regions as distant as Iraq; Russians evacuating women and children from Japanese territory; 2 air craft carriers at YOKOSUKA; and the next Japanese move is to be complete occupation of French Indo-China to begin within one week according to German sources in Tokyo.

Bismarck Survivors verify the British suspicion that the vessel displaced over 45,000 tons it is reported from a reliable source. Secret report on Bismarck sinking by Navy expert to be available by end of week.

4.

Mail for United States ships now routed and sorted in New York and San Francisco. A plan is being considered to sort official mail in Navy Post Office for trans-shipment by pouch thereby reducing the number of people knowing where ships are located in the interest of security.

Soviet Commissariats are busy moving their offices, presumably toward the East, Steinhardt reports.

Nazis have 200 rigs ready to operate in Soviet oil fields a reliable source reports.

Religious fervor among the masses in Russia is re-awakening on a large scale and the Army has been permeated by this sentiment is the interesting report of the Father General of the Society of Jesus who suggests rejecting atheistic Communism in Russia and emphasizing the religious and nationalistic character of the defenses of Russia to have emerge something resembling the old "Holy Russia", Phillips reports.

Leahy reports Mechin's Mission to Turkey to obtain transit of troops and war material "a complete failure."

Reinforcements for Dakar are reported from 3 French ships arriving from Morocco carrying several hundred native troops (to be demobilized), military trucks and 690 tons of rubber.

Confidential

BULLETIN TO THE PRESIDENT
Navy Department, 8 July, 1941.

Leahy reports Henry (French Ambassador to Japan) indicates the Japanese Imperial Council probably reached a decision in favor of action against U.S.S.R. on the basis of the following motives (1) Obvious military reasons (2) The hopes of producing a collusion between Japan and United States and (3) Nazis have plans of their own for Dutch East Indies.

Partial mobilization of all forces has been ordered in Japan it is reported reliably.

Chiang Kai-shek predicted (5 July) that Japan would abrogate the Neutrality Pact with Russia and would attack Siberia it is reported from a reliable source.

Assistant Secretary Bard is to inspect shore Naval activities at Boston and Newport and will open Naval Air station at Quonset Point on Saturday. Admirals Towers, Hepburn and Moreell will join him at Quonset Point.

Appearance of United States Blue Jackets in United Kingdom causes many questions of number of Naval observers in London. Winant asks if there is any objection to releasing these figures.

Bureau of Ordnance expects the delivery of the first

2.

American made 20 mm Anti Aircraft (AERLIKON) gun this week from the British Production Line at Providence, Rhode Island; future production from this plant will be furnished the British and USN on percentage basis. This gun will be successor to the 50 calibre gun for anti air craft and probably in time will be used on Merchant ships as well as on battle ships. Ordnance has its own exclusive production of this gun from other sources including the Hudson Motor Car Company.

Wholesale price index for all commodities for week ending 28 June 1941: 87.7.

For the purpose of cooperating in every way possible with the spirit of the President's executive order 8802. Assistant Secretary Bard reports the formation of a committee to investigate the extent to which the enlisted personnel of the Navy and Marine Corps is representative of all American citizens. In case there should be evidence of discrimination because of race, creed, color or national origin, the committee is to suggest corrective measures.

German instructions apparently have been given to advise Berlin of all information concerning shipping and cargo from the United States to the Red Sea.

If United States enters the war all northern South American

countries will follow suit according to opinion of important German Secret Agent "Greif" in South America.

Marked departure in the past 36 hours from usual routine by Japanese Merchant Marine units in communications practice has been reported.

French Government is negotiating with the Government of Brazil for purchase of 60,000 bales of Sao Paulo cotton it is reported.

Cape Verde Islands now have 1600 of troops on the Island it is reliably reported.

Communitistic strike activities in the United States being held in almost absolute abatement it is reliably reported. "It is hoped" a new spirit will be injected into the personnel and that lack of direction, initiative, and coordination will be replaced by accelerated action in the war effort in the Middle East with the appointments of Generals Haining and Auchinleck, it is reported.

In YOKOHAMA BAY ships of the following classes are reported: Battleships: 2 HYUGA, 1 FUSO; Cruisers: 3 KAKO, 1 CATORI, 1 JINTSU; Destroyers: 8; Submarines: KAIGUN TYPE; Gunboats: 1 SAGA; Tenders: 3; Tankers: 2 SHIRIYA and SARUTO.

Miniature Mass X-Ray is being used by Navy Medical Corps

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to detect early tuberculosis among recruits. This is a Navy development which already has demonstrated its value. It is an inexpensive method.

Heavy armour piercing bombs again dropped on berths of German warships SCHARNHORST GNEISENAV and PRINZ EUGEN at Brest, where bomb dropped from altitude of 50 feet also hit stern of 10,000 ton liner. 43 Wellingtons in air attack on Brest dropped 128,000 pounds of bombs. One stick possibly straddled the SCHARNHORST it is reported.

S. S. ANTINOUS is the first American ship that has arrived at Suez it is reported.

LARAMIE expects to arrive BAHIA, Brazil 22 July for duty, under Comtask force 3.

Underwater obstacles, probably anti submarine nets have been placed in areas in Hiroshima Bay off Kure the Japanese have notified mariners.

Commanding General of Fort Richardson, Alaska, has sent a fine letter of commendation to Com Thirteen regarding the splendid cooperative spirit of the Army, Navy and Marine forces and their civilian assistants in Alaska.

Italian Gun Cruiser (8 inch) thought to be the GORIZIA was sunk on 29 June by a submarine of the Mediterranean fleet.

Confidential

BULLETIN

16 July, 1941

Facilities of More than 20 large corporations are not now being used in Defense Production Mr. Batt has reported. Investigation in Navy shows there is considerable plant capacity not now being used and more is becoming available as priorities begin to take hold. The difficulty today is to find work for these Companies to do. There is a marked increase in the desire to take part in Defense Production, probably resulting from necessity because of scarcity of material, etc. Navy is concentrating on this problem and is cooperating fully with OPM, particularly with the Defense Contract Service and the Federal Reserve Board activities in both the country-wide and local efforts to utilize all productive capacity as fully and as quickly as possible. A Navy order of 14 July has been distributed to further the expedition and prosecution of work - subcontracting. Naval Liaison Officers will appraise the Defense Contract Service of (1) "so called bottlenecks" (2) necessities for "speed ups" of production (3) necessity for more sub-contracting (4) inefficient management or opera

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tion (5) unsuccessful attempts to contact sub-contractors and (6) expansion needs. Every effort will be made to remedy these situations locally and reports will be sent to the Navy Department on each case. Mr. Mehornays Defense Contract Service may be being by-passed in OPM it is reported.

Status of Section Bases is that all but two of the thirty are under construction; 17 are in use although the construction work has not been completed. The two bases not started are being held up pending the acquisition of the necessary land, and it is anticipated that they will be started in the near future. It is tentatively proposed to construct 16 additional Bases and add to the facilities of at least 5 of the existing Bases, it is reported.

Entrance to Manila Bay and the nearby Subic Bay area are being mined for "General defense purposes." The Navy Hydrographic Office reports that the areas "will be dangerous after daylight 17 July." The Hydrographic Office also reports a restricted Pilot Chart of the Northern North Atlantic Ocean embracing the waters surrounding Greenland and Iceland has been evolved and has appeared regularly since June 1941.

The Suez Canal is closed to through traffic as a consequenc-

of recent air bombings it is reported from a reliable source

Increased air activity over Malta is reported.

Invasion of England temporarily abandoned by Germans because of slowness of Russian campaign, effectiveness of RAF raids on Nazi war industry and severe losses in Russian War it is reported from a reliable source in Berlin.

Plans have been made and are being carried out for the evacuation of many Commissariats and institutions from Moscow" Steinhardt reports as of 13 July 5 P.M. This, in spite of official statement to the contrary reported 13 July. Kazan (Soviet Russia) might be seat of Government or at least for the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Chinese G-2 is uncertain whether Japan will move North or South but believes the appointment of Okamura to command in North China and Itagaki in Korea is significant since they are Manchurian and Russian experts. A Chinese member of North China puppet regime states Japan will attack Siberia when Moscow falls it is reported.

Complete disruption of Portugal banking and commercial system has resulted from sudden blocking of port accounts causing hardship, financial loss and creation of ill will toward the U.S. at a most critical time it is reported.

Morris reports continued attention of German press to the

occupation of Iceland may be to prepare the German Public for a possible "call" for help from Portugal in order to protect some of her outlying possessions from President Roosevelt's "aggression."

Portuguese vessel CARVALHO ARAUJO (1,210 tons full load) arrived 13 July noon from Terceira where it is reported to have discharged a special cargo of military supplies and about 1,000 troops it is reported from Ponta Delgada (Azores on Sao Miguel Island.)

JOAO BELO (Portuguese SS 6,365 tons) carrying large quantities "of war materials" arrived from Lisbon on 13 July. One full infantry (1,200 men) battalion (fully equipped) was landed. The JOAO BELO was expected to depart for Fayal (Azores - chief town of Horta) and Terceira (Azores) 15 July with about 1,000 troops for these islands it is reported from a reliable source.

Sprinkler systems are not relied on in London against incendiary bombs.

The Secretary of the Navy has ordered that enlisted men of Naval Reserve on active duty be not discharged or reenlisted or their enlistments extended. This order is the result of a decision of the Comptroller General of the United States dated 9 July, 1941.

Confidential

BULLETIN

22 July, 1941

Rumors, at variance with one another, in Japan makes reporting developments difficult, Grew reports. Many of these rumors have German origin. He believes "efforts by Japan to secure a privileged position in Indo-China should be taken with gravity;" however, he thinks "the chief preoccupation for Japan remains China."

Japan will take military and economic control of Indo-China in the near future is the opinion of important Thai Government officials it is reported by a reliable source.

Japanese Naval Units reported maneuvering in VAN DIEMEN Strait (Japan) south of KYUSHU (Southernmost of main islands of Japan) on 16 July included: 3 carriers, 7 battleships and between 52 and 57 destroyers and submarines it is reported from a reliable source.

No decision has as yet been reached in connection with the Department's request to send two American Naval Observers to Vladivostok and American Military Attaches are not to be granted permission to visit the Russian-German front it is reported from a reliable source.

10 Nazis divisions are at present concentrated on the