

Op-237-00

Serial 405723

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

- (h) Install balloon releasing tower. In this connection, it is to be noted that it is desirable to retain all lower masts.
- (i) Remove all upper masts and all yards.
- (j) Rig lower masts with jibs and trisails, if practicable.
- (k) All sails, yards, masts, etc., removed are to be turned into safe, well-protected storage at a Navy Yard.

3. The anti-aircraft armament recommended is the ultimate battery and is for permanent installation.

4. It is desired that the conversion be completed at the earliest practicable date. As soon as an accurate estimate can be made, the Bureau of Ships should furnish the recommended completion dates and recommendation for fitting out yard and fitting out period required.

-----  
Copies to:  
Coast Guard  
Capt. J. R. Beardall (Room 2078)  
Op-12  
Op-20  
Op-22  
Op-30  
Op-38  
ICB (2)  
Budget Officer,  
Navy Department.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN BEARDALL:

Will you let me see the photograph of this yacht and plan for conversion? I incline to her use as a weather patrol ship, that her four lower masts be retained and that she be rigged on these masts with two jibs and four trisails. This would enable her to maintain station for three or four weeks at a time under sea sail and average conditions of weather without having to use her engine. This also would make it easier to rig radio.

F.D.R.

To: Admiral Fisher.

Please take note of the  
President's request and  
comply via me.

JFK

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1941


MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Davies has been in to see Admiral Stark again about the Navy taking over his yacht, the SEA CLOUD. It appears that Mr. Davies will not be happy unless this fine yacht sees some Naval service in the present emergency.


There is attached a copy of the report of the Auxiliary Vessels Board on this vessel, which indicates that if acquired, she will later be restored and returned to her owner in the condition in which received by the Navy - if still afloat at that time.

Final action is withheld awaiting the President's further consideration.

Respectfully,




J. R. BEARDALL



00539

Yacht SEA CLOUD before being laid up

THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.





THIS OVERSIZE ITEM HAS BEEN  
MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.





West 90 of Greenwich 75 60 45 30 15 0 15 Long East 30 of Greenwich 45 60 75 90

ALEXANDER GROSS, F.R.G.S

**United States Senate**

**MEMORANDUM**

To Adm. Stark.

I shall not bother  
the President with this.  
I have told Adm. Robinson -  
son to go ahead  
on program as outlined.

JF

To  
Dept on  
12/12

PSF Navy Board - 1941

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

December 11, 1941

I consider it imperative that, for the next few years, we utilize our naval shipbuilding capacity to the utmost, by laying down new ships as soon as building ways are made available by the launching of ships in the current naval building program. Some building ways will become available in March 1942.

On this basis the appended tables show the additional combatant ships that can be laid down within the ~~next~~ calendar years 1942, 1943 and 1944, without interference with the present naval or merchant shipbuilding programs.

These tables are based on information available in November 1941 and do not fully take into account the effects of the recently ordered speed-up in our current naval program. Undoubtedly this speed-up will permit some advancement, particularly in the latter part of this supplementary program, but it is too early to make an accurate estimate of its effects.

This supplementary program does not include any battle-ships because it appears impracticable to include them without interference with current building programs.

The progress of the war may dictate some modification of the numbers and types presented in these tables.

It is respectfully recommended that immediate authorization be obtained to build 900,000 additional tons of combatant ships. It is further recommended that this authorization permit transfer, within the total of 900,000 tons, of tonnage from one type to another as war experience may dictate.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 3-3-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

J. H. R. Stark.

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-10-MD

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1941

Dear Mr. President:

We have very carefully gone over your thoughts as presented by Jack on the Carrier Program.

First, I would bring to your attention the fact that we have six C-3 merchant type vessels being built by the Maritime Commission (one just delivered) now being converted to LONG ISLANDS for the British. The flight deck extended to full length of the ship.

Second, the British have asked us for nine more converted ships of this type.

Third, we are looking into the additional fifteen for ourselves.

Getting these twenty-four additional vessels will be at the expense of the Allied shipping situation, with which you are familiar. We are taking this up with Land and of course under the new setup, Harry will be in this.

Now as to the Carrier Program (additional to the above) which we sent over:- both Newport News and New York Ship have reversed their previous statements that they could build HORNETS, that is, 21,000 ton ships, more quickly than they could ESSEX type of 27,500 ton type; this for the reason that the ESSEX type is now in production, is easier and quicker to build, and sources of supply of materials are fully developed. The reason that they are easier and quicker to build is:- the construction is simple and the ship can be erected quicker since the parts go together better. The ESSEX type has been specially engineered for rapid production by making the maximum use of welding. This was not done on the HORNET type. A redesign of the HORNET type to permit welding would mean much delay.

The small RANGER-WASP type has very inferior protection against under-water damage. They are really very vulnerable.

The ESSEX is much superior to either the HORNET or the RANGER. It has a much more reliable engineering plant and far better under-water protection.

You will remember when you called me over the phone I told you all dates referred to calendar years; that is correct. In making up the typewritten sheet, an error was made in using the term "fiscal" year.

We are working on the assumption that you approve the overall 900,000 tons and are sending over a bill for your approval.

It is my understanding that Senator Walsh and Congressman Vinson are prepared to push the bill through, once you approve.

The General Board, Bureau of Ships, and Bureau of Aeronautics concur with me in the recommendation that we build ships of the 27,500 ton ESSEX class.

*J. R. Stark*

The President  
The White House

SHIPBUILDING DIVISION (785)  
BUREAU OF SHIPS  
NAVY DEPARTMENT

NOVEMBER 14, 1942

EXTENSION TO CURRENT BUILDING PROGRAM

*No. Cancelled?*  
*No. Fiscal?*

	1942		1943 (1ST HALF)		1943 (2ND HALF)		1944		1945	1946	1947	TOTAL		
	LAY DOWN NO.	TONNAGE	LAY DOWN NO.	TONNAGE	LAY DOWN NO.	TONNAGE	LAY DOWN NO.	TONNAGE	COMPLETE NO.	COMPLETE NO.	COMPLETE NO.	COMPLETE NO.	NO.	TONNAGE
<i>NAVY</i> AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CV)	1	21,000			1	21,000			1	1			2	42,000 CV
<i>NAVY</i> AIRCRAFT CARRIERS (CV)	1	28,855		<del>28,855</del>	2	56,310		2	56,310	2	2	2	6	170,730 CV
LARGE CRUISERS (CB)								5	141,750		2	3	5	141,750 CB
LIGHT CRUISERS (CL)	2	21,000 <i>OK</i>	4	84,000 <i>OK</i>	1	10,500	11	115,500	2	6	10		18	189,000 CL
LIGHT CRUISERS (CL)					1	6,300				1			1	6,300 CL
DESTROYERS (DD)	11	24,255 <i>OK</i>	38	83,750 <i>OK</i>	35	77,175	4		62	17			84	189,220 DD
DESTROYERS (DD)	2	3,424 <i>OK</i>	8	13,696 <i>OK</i>	8	13,696	4		12				18	30,816 DD
SUBMARINES (SS)	7	13,218 <i>OK</i>	10	16,220 <i>OK</i>	14	22,828	7	25,568	14	13			54	86,508 SS
TOTALS	24	109,348	61	183,951	62	208,009	15	41,351,006	91	60	14	5	188	852,324

NOTE: THE ABOVE TOTAL TONNAGES HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY APPROXIMATELY FIVE PER CENT (5%) ABOVE THE DESIGNATED UNIT TONNAGES NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO TAKE CARE OF WAR DEVELOPMENTS.

	ESTIMATED COSTS PER INCREMENT INCREASE		1942		1943 (1ST HALF)		1943 (2ND HALF)		1944		TOTAL	
	UNIT COST	NO.	NO.	COST	NO.	COST	NO.	COST	NO.	COST	NO.	AMOUNT
CV AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	\$55,000,000	1	1	\$55,000,000			1	\$55,000,000			2	\$110,000,000
CV AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	84,840,000	1	1	84,840,000	1	84,840,000	2	169,680,000	2	169,680,000	6	509,040,000
CB LARGE CRUISERS	84,587,000						5	422,935,000	5	422,935,000	5	422,935,000
CL LIGHT CRUISERS	40,844,000	2	2	81,688,000	4	163,376,000	1	40,844,000	11	449,284,000	18	735,192,000
CL LIGHT CRUISERS	30,000,000						1	30,000,000			1	30,000,000
DD DESTROYERS	14,634,000	11	11	160,974,000	38	556,092,000	35	512,190,000			84	1,229,256,000
DD DESTROYERS	12,000,000	2	2	24,000,000	8	96,000,000	8	96,000,000			18	216,000,000
SS SUBMARINES	7,625,000	7	7	53,375,000	10	76,250,000	14	106,806,000	23	175,467,000	54	411,966,000
TOTALS		24	24	\$459,905,000	61	\$976,598,000	62	1,010,520,000	41	\$1,217,366,000	188	\$3,664,389,000
GRAND TOTALS			85	\$1,436,503,000			\$147	2,447,023,000	188	\$3,664,389,000		

00549

CONFIDENTIAL

December 12, 1941

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

PROPOSED EXTENSION TO CURRENT BUILDING  
PLAN

DECLASSIFIED

DD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-3-59

Signature: *Carl L. Spicer*

<u>Calendar Year 1942</u>							
Type	Number That Can Be Laid Down In 1942	Tonnage by Type	Estimated Completion In:				
			1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
CV-9 Class	2	56,910		1	1		
CL-55 (Cleveland Class)	2	21,000		2			
DD	13	28,665	7	6			
SS	7	11,214	7				
1942 Total	24	117,789	7				

<u>Calendar Year 1943</u>							
Type	Number That Can Be Laid Down In 1943	Tonnage by Type	Estimated Completion In:				
			1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
CV-9 Class	4	113,820			2	2	
CL-55 (Cleveland Class)	7	73,500			5	2	
CL51 (Atlanta Class)	1	6,300			1		
DD	89	194,273	4	68	17		
SS	47	75,294		14	33		
1943 Total	148	463,187	4	82	53	2	

<u>Calendar Year 1944</u>							
Type	Number That Can Be Laid Down In 1944	Tonnage by Type	Estimated Completion In:				
			1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
CV-9	2	56,910					2
CB (Alaska Class)	5	141,750				2	3
CL-55	9	94,500			1	8	
1944 Total	16	293,160			1	8	3

Three Year Total      188      874,136

Keels to be laid in 1944 not included in contract awards now being made but the authorization granted should be for the entire amount of tonnage, i.e., 874,136 (rounded off to 900,000).

In reply address not the signer of this letter but Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

Refer to No. Aer-1-GB  
CV

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS

WASHINGTON

12 December 1941

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MEMORANDUM to THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Large versus small aircraft carriers.

1. Many studies of subject matter have been made by the Navy Department, in the most recent of which it has been necessary to take careful cognizance of the following factors which vitally affect design and displacement features:

(a) The increasing size, power, weight, and endurance of modern carrier airplanes.

(b) The increased take-off run necessary to launch these planes and corresponding increase in landing speed.

(c) Increased storage space required for fuel, oil, weapons, and other supplies incident to subparagraph (a) above.

(d) The need for heavily armored decks to protect hangar spaces from the lighter bombs and the vital spaces below the protective deck from penetration by heavy bombs.

(e) Sufficient beam to permit the degree of compartmentation needed to insure good water-tight integrity and damage control incident to under-water damage by mines or torpedoes.

(f) The vital necessity for high speed, thus requiring for any given tonnage large boiler and engine room spaces with corresponding reduction in spaces available for aircraft, their accessories, and supplies.

(g) Large, fast elevators needed to accommodate the latest planes and to accelerate their handling to and from the flight deck.

(h) Greatly increased anti-aircraft installations which of necessity encroach on the flight deck areas otherwise available for the operation and handling of airplanes.

2. Consideration of the foregoing leads to a strong case for the large carrier; by "large" is meant a type of the minimum overall dimensions and displacement of the ESSEX class, i.e.,

Standard displacement	.....	27,000 tons
Trial displacement	.....	33,700 tons
Length	.....	820 ft.
Beam	.....	93 ft.
Speed	.....	33 knots plus.

3. This type is capable of carrying a balanced complement of airplanes of formidable offensive potentialities (fighter, bomber, and torpedo) and has embodied characteristics which give for its displacement the maximum degree of security, protection, and flexibility of operation to its aircraft.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
**DECLASSIFIED**

**DOD DIR.** 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date-

3-3-59

Signature-

*Carl S. Spicer*

*J. H. Towers*

J. H. Towers

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
personal*

December 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The situation has changed fast in the last two days, but the attached memorandum on Guam and Mandated Islands (prepared by Dudley Knox) is in answer to the President's request.

Respectfully,

*J. R. Beardall*  
J. R. BEARDALL

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF  
NAVAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON GUAM

GUAM was occupied without resistance by landing forces from the U.S. Cruiser CHARLESTON on 21 June, 1898; the United States then being at war with Spain. The subsequent peace treaty fully confirmed American ownership of the island.

Although well recognized as being of great strategic importance, the island has never been strongly fortified by the United States.

The naval limitation of armaments treaty negotiated at Washington in 1922 by a conference of all powers concerned, contained a provision by which insular naval bases in the western Pacific Ocean were to remain in status quo as to defenses and naval facilities. The defenses of Guam were then so weak that the United States removed all of its defenses from the island.

This defenseless condition continued until the expiration of the limitation treaties, effected upon the initiation of Japan at the end of 1936. Since then only inconsiderable defenses and facilities have been restored.

In 1939 Navy Department officials initiated efforts to strongly fortify Guam, in accordance with the recent recommendations of the General Board. Opposition in Congress to this was so strong that the attempt was abandoned. Only with great difficulty were funds obtained for harbor improvement and for modest seaplane facilities.

THE MANDATED ISLANDS

In contrast with this excessive American restraint respecting Guam, the Japanese, since February 1941, have been active in providing defenses for the more important islands of the extensive Caroline and Marshall groups.

These were captured from the Germans by the Japanese forces during the last world war, and were assigned as a mandate to Japan by the Treaty of Versailles. The conditions of the mandate forbade fortifications being placed on the islands, and such non-fortification status was re-affirmed by the limitation of naval armaments Treaty of 1922, in which the United States participated.

Although the latter treaty is no longer binding, the conditions of the mandate under the Versailles treaty appear to be still in force.

*PSF Navy Files*

SECRET  
PROPERTY OF THE  
NAVY DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Nevertheless, since last February the Japanese have been very active in placing defenses on most of those islands in the Carolines and Marshalls that would be of importance as naval bases in time of war. Fortifications have been reported on ten of them.

low 7/26  
Cincpac File No.  
(Personal)

COPY  
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET  
U.S.S. Pennsylvania, Flagship

PSF Navy Folder  
jhl

December 11, 1941

Dear Admiral:

This letter, written hurriedly, is to inform you that from a medical standpoint the situation to date is beautifully in hand. 90% of all casualties were expeditiously treated before "black-out" Sunday night. Stragglers, which completed the list, were billeted and dressed at emergency stations that night. Some dead had already been placed in the Hospital morgue.

I regret to state that Doctor R. R. RALL is dead, and Doctors Sam E JOHNSON and T. E. CROWLEY (Dental Corps) are missing. Doctor Fred M. ROHOW is in the Hospital but not seriously wounded.

A great number of men are missing and will be unquestionably classified as dead. The wounded, in various degrees of severity, amounted to 1,000. All these were treated. Approximately 200 were returned to duty the next day.

A great percentage of burns in various degrees was noted and these caused most of the deaths. This experience only emphasizes again our repeated insistence to prepare for large numbers of burns and to submit requests for equally large quantities of tannic acid products. The morphine syrettes proved invaluable. The value of dispersion of first-aid supplies throughout the ship was emphasized by the damages suffered as the many bombs struck at different areas. The supplies were more than adequate, except in the case of the SOLACE; she requested essential surgical materials early.

From all accounts, and from all hands, the medical personnel of the ships hit was loudly prasiad. No outstanding feat of heroism has been publicized as yet. There unquestionably were some which will come to light sooner or later. This was too severe a "show" and the bombing and torpedoing too concentrated not to have caused some outstanding feat. The morale was superb and everyone acted as at a drill.

The medical shore activities very promptly established first-aid stations which handled all wounded as they came out of the water and were transported by all sorts of vehicles.

Cincpac File No.  
(Personal)

PSF  
Navy

COPY  
(Two)

1941 [?] jhl

Mobile Base Hospital #2 functioned beautifully and deserves much credit for the manner in which it took 109 casualties. I personally informed Chambers during the bombing to prepare for casualties, he having no word in commission for patients at the time. By mid-afternoon he had the quota noted above and each patient was bunked, treated, and fed, where advisable; the surgical unit was functioning.

The Hospital at Pearl Harbor had admitted, by 1750, a total of 705 wounded and received 124 dead on December 7th; the SOLACE had received about 140 wounded and 17 bodies. All nicely handled in every respect.

Other emergency first-aid stations were quickly established in two buildings of the Receiving Barracks, Recreation Center, Yard Dispensary, Officers' Club, Submarine Base Dispensary, Naval Air Station Dispensary, Marine Barracks in the section occupied by the units of the Fleet Marine Force. Section Base #1 at Bishop's Point (net depot) assisted the Army at Hickam Field. I did not see this activity.

At present all hands are endeavoring to clean up the situation. Two casualty lists have been made and as yet can only be tentative due to the number of missing and the necessary housing of survivors in many different areas. All the records in some instances are lost; muster rolls are not available, and identification impossible due to burns and injuries, multiple, extreme. However, the situation is clearing rapidly and though some mistakes will be present in these lists they will be corrected as it becomes physically possible.

The clerical features are being assailed and skeleton health records started.

The dead were fingerprinted, where possible, identification marks and teeth charted, bodies marked with attached wooden tag, and wrapped in canvas. They were then placed in wooden caskets which was properly marked by means of paint and burried in two lots procured for this purpose and having in mind a national cemetery at a later date. A Navy chaplain holds service over each body or a small group of them. At the graves a volley is fired and each casket buried in an individual grave. All this is being done by a unit from the Hospital at Pearl Harbor. A Form "N" is made with each body and will be filled out with whatever identification is present for recording.

COPY  
(Three)

Cincpac File No.  
(Personal)

jhl

The unidentified bodies are numbered; in fact, all bodies are numbered.

The question of evacuating the casualties has already been taken up. I have asked our hospital facilities to submit a list of patients who will require more than sixty (60) days hospitalization, and another of more than forty (40), so that we may have some elasticity in our plans which must depend on contingencies. We have estimated that there will be a maximum of 400. I doubt this large number unless our outlying islands furnish lists which are unknown at present.

In conclusion, I feel extremely proud of the manner in which the medical departments involved handled this sad situation. All casualties were properly, expeditiously, and thoroughly treated and housed without the least confusion and with a splendid spirit. All this was performed without the necessity of calling for aid from outside sources other than the commandeering of Yard, and contractor transportation facilities and without withdrawing a single man or piece of equipment from the combatant branches. I can only say: "a hard job damned well done". As for morale: "God help the enemy!"

I still expect to awaken from a bad dream, or see the end of a war "movie".

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely

/s/ Gendreau

Elphege A.M. Gendreau  
Captain (MC) U.S. Navy  
Fleet Surgeon.

P.S. Please expedite the supplies requested in my despatch to the Supply Depot, Mare Island.

To: Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire, (MC) U.S. Navy,  
The Surgeon General,  
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,  
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

 file  
personal

PSF Navy Folder  
2-41

THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1941

Dear Mr. President:


I told Jack to tell you this morning, and I have been thinking about it seriously in these past tense days:-

You are not only the most important man to the United States today, but to the world. If anything should happen to you, it would be a catastrophe. I do not say this to you because of my own personal relationship, but as a cold-blooded fact.

I have said if I were Hitler and were timing it, and he probably has timed it, that I would have ready a spectacular raid on the United States - Washington, New York, or somewhere. Because he knows as well as any man what it would mean were anything to happen to you.

Please, Mister, let Ben Moreell or somebody provide, and provide as quickly as possible, a place where, in case of an air raid or any other disturbance, not only your safety, but the precious hours of sleep which you need and which are probably too few, would be provided for against any disturbance of any kind, so far as we can humanly make it possible.

Sincerely,



The President  
The White House

PSF

Navy Folder

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
WASHINGTON

12 December 1941

THE WHITE HOUSE  
Dec 15 9 52 AM '41  
RECEIVED

file

Dear Mr. President:

I am in receipt of information as to the gallant conduct of our Marines on the Island of Wake, and I send it to you as an indication of the morale of our Marine Forces.

The Island of Wake with its small garrison has been attacked four times by enemy bombers and nine of the twelve Marine fighting planes were lost. Then, they were attacked again at dawn on 10 December by several enemy light vessels. The sinking of one enemy light cruiser and one enemy destroyer was reported, but it is not clear as to whether by the Marines or by our other forces in that vicinity.

Enemy transports, with cruiser and destroyer escorts, have been sighted in the vicinity and unquestionably a landing will be attempted. However, this weakened force of Marines is still resisting and the general tone of the dispatch indicates their determination to deliver the fullest measure of punishment to the enemy.

Sincerely,

*James Forrestal*

James Forrestal

The President  
The White House

IN REPLYING ADDRESS  
THE MAJOR GENERAL COMMANDANT  
AND REFER TO NO.



A-111-pt1

HEADQUARTERS U. S. MARINE CORPS  
WASHINGTON

11 December 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Dear Mr. Secretary:

A cheery note comes from Wake and the news is particularly pleasing at a time like this. The island with its small garrison was attacked four times by enemy bombers and nine of the twelve Marine fighting planes were lost. Then, they were attacked at dawn yesterday by several enemy light vessels. In spite of the materiel and personnel losses which they had suffered and, as I said, with only three fighting planes remaining, they were able to report the sinking of one enemy light cruiser and one enemy destroyer. Enemy transports with cruiser and destroyer escort were sighted in the vicinity and unquestionably a landing will be attempted. However, Wake, with its weakened forces is still resisting and the general tone of the dispatch indicates the sort of determination to do their job which we like to see.

The above information is from CONFIDENTIAL dispatches but I think the Department is planning to make a release on the incident.

T. HOLCOMB.

-----

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
personal*

*Tracy folder  
PSC*

RXWB128 24 XC

CORONADO CALIF DEC 13 1941 1210P

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

THE WHITE HOUSE

ARRIVED SAFELY SANDIEGO THIS MORNING LEAVE IMMEDIATELY FOR  
WASHINGTON WILL REPORT ON ARRIVAL AM GIVING OUT NO  
STATEMENTS PRIOR TO MY REPORT TO YOU

FRANK KNOX.

348P

*Way file*

*Navy folder  
BF*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*File personal*

WB45 20 COLLECT

MY MIDLAND TEX DEC 14 1155A

THE PRESIDENT

WHITE HOUSE

HAVE BEEN GROUNDED IN MIDLAND TEXAS BY FOG TAKING OFF

SHORTLY EXPECT TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON LATE THIS

EVENING

FRANK KNOX.

RECEIVED  
DEC 14 1955

125PM.

Published in Transcript of  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

14 Dec 1941

~~SECRET~~

~~EX-6227~~

Part V, p. 2338 -  
2339

not file

1941

PSF Navy folder

Given me by L.H. 10 p.m. Dec 14 when  
he landed here from Hawaii

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO THE PRESIDENT.

The Japanese air attack on the Island of Oahu on December 7th was a complete surprise to both the Army and the Navy. Its initial success, which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of a state of readiness against such an air attack, by both branches of the service. This statement was made by me to both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and both agreed that it was entirely true. Neither Army or Navy Commandants in Oahu regarded such an attack as at all likely, because of the danger which such a carrier-borne attack would confront in view of the preponderance of the American Naval strength in Hawaiian waters. While the likelihood of an attack without warning by Japan was in the minds of both General Short and Admiral Kimmel, both felt certain that such an attack would take place nearer Japan's base of operations, that is, in the Far East. Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington, through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday.

A general war warning had been sent out from the Navy Department on November 27th, to Admiral Kimmel. General Short told me that a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made.

Both the Army and the Navy command at Oahu had prepared careful

estimates covering their idea of the most likely and most imminent danger. General Short repeated to me several times that he felt the most imminent danger to the Army was the danger of sabotage, because of the known presence of large numbers of alien Japanese in Honolulu. Acting on this assumption, he took every possible measure to protect against this danger. This included, unfortunately, bunching the planes on the various fields on the Island, close together, so that they might be carefully guarded against possible subversive action by Japanese agents. This condition, known as "Sabotage Alert" had been assumed because sabotage was considered as the most imminent danger to be guarded against. This bunching of planes, of course, made the Japanese air attack more effective. There was, to a lesser degree, the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same prominence in Naval minds, both arms of the service lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. There were no Army planes in the air at the time of the attack and no planes were warmed up in readiness to take the air.

The Navy regarded the principle danger from a Japanese attack without warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provisions to cope with such an attack. As a matter of fact, a submarine attack did accompany the air attack and at least two Japanese submarines were sunk and a third one ran ashore and was captured. No losses were incurred by the fleet from submarine attack. One small two man submarine penetrated into the harbor, having followed a vessel through the net, but because it breached in the shallow water, it was immediately discovered by the Curtis and was attacked and destroyed through the efforts of

that vessel and those of the Destroyer Monaghan. This submarine fired her torpedoes which hit a shoal to the west of Ford Island.

The Navy took no specific measures of protection against an air attack, save only that the ships in the harbor were so dispersed as to provide a field of fire covering every approach from the air. The Navy morning patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward, where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. This patrol consisted of ten patrol bombers who made no contacts with enemy craft. At least 90% of officers and enlisted personnel were aboard ship when the attack came. The condition of readiness aboard ship was described as "Condition Three", which meant that about one-half of the broadside and anti-aircraft guns were manned, and all of the anti-aircraft guns were supplied with ammunition and were in readiness.

The first intimation of enemy action came to the Navy shortly after seven a.m., when a Destroyer in the harbor entrance radioed that she had contacted a submarine and had (they believed) successfully depth charged it. Thus an attempted attack by submarine preceded the air attack by approximately a half hour. Quite a number of similar incidents, involving reports of submarine contact, had occurred in the recent past and too great credit was not given the Destroyer Commander's report. Subsequent investigation proved the report to be correct. Admiral Block received the report and weighed in his mind the possibility that it might be the start of action, but in view of submarine contacts in the past dismissed the thought.

The Army carried out no dawn patrol on Sunday, December 7th, the only air patrol being that sent to the southward by the Navy.

The Radar equipment installed on shipboard, is practically use-

less when the ships are in Pearl Harbor because of the surrounding mountains. Reliance therefore of both branches of the service is chiefly upon three Army detector stations on the Island of Oahu. Until 7 December, it had been customary to operate three Radars for a large portion of the day. However, on 6 December, permission was requested and obtained from the Control Officer to, on 7 December, operate only from 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. Accordingly, on 7 December, the stations were manned from before dawn until seven a.m., when they were closed officially. However, by pure chance one Army officer remained at his post to practice on such planes as might take the air, and probably with no thought of enemy approach. At least a half hour before the attack was made this Officer's radar indicator showed a concentration of planes to the northward, about 130 miles distant. He reported this to the Air Craft Warning Information Center, which was the place from which it should have been reported to Headquarters. The Officer there, a Second Lieutenant, took it upon his shoulders to pass it up, explaining that he had been told the Enterprise was at sea, and that the planes he had located were probably from that carrier. No report of this discovery of an enemy air force approaching from the north reached either the Army or the Navy Commander. If this information had been properly handled, it would have given both Army and Navy sufficient warning to have been in a state of readiness, which at least would have prevented the major part of the damage done, and might easily have converted this successful air attack into a Japanese disaster.

The Officer at the Radar Station, I was advised, showed this air force on his instrument as they came in and plotted their approach.

I have seen the radar plot, which also included a plot of the enemy air forces returning to the carriers from which they had come to make the attack. This latter information did not reach the Navy until Tuesday, two days after the attack occurred, although many and varied reports as to various locations of radio bearings on the Japanese carriers did come to the Navy Commander-in-chief.

The activities of Japanese fifth columnists immediately following the attack, took the form of spreading on the air by radio dozens of confusing and contradictory rumors concerning the direction in which the attacking planes had departed, as well as the presence in every direction of enemy ships. The Navy regarded the reports of concentration of enemy ships to the southward as most dependable and scouted at once in that direction. It is now believed that another unit of the Japanese force, using the call letters of their carriers, took station to the southward of Oahu and transmitted. Radio Direction Finder bearings on these transmittals aided in the false assumption that the enemy was to the southward. A force from the westward moved over from there in an attempt to intercept a Japanese force supposedly moving westward from a position south of Oahu. Subsequent information, based upon a chart recovered from a Japanese plane which was shot down, indicated that the Japanese forces actually retired to the northward. In any event, they were not contacted by either of the task forces, one of which was too far to the westward to have established contact on 7 December.

The Army anti-aircraft batteries were not manned when the attack was made and the mobile units were not in position. All Army personnel were in their quarters and the guns were not manned or in position

for firing, save only those in fixed positions. Early anti-aircraft fire consisted almost exclusively of fire from 50 caliber machine guns.

The enemy attacked simultaneously on three Army fields, one Navy field and at Pearl Harbor. This attack was substantially unopposed except by very light and ineffective machine gun fire at the fields and stations. Generally speaking the bombing attacks initially were directed at the air fields and the torpedo attacks at the ships in the harbor. The first return fire from the guns of the fleet began, it is estimated, about four minutes after the first torpedo was fired, and this fire grew rapidly in intensity.

Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. The torpedo planes, flying low, appeared first over the ~~mountain~~<sup>hills</sup> surrounding the harbor, and in probably not more than sixty seconds were in a position to discharge their torpedoes. The second wave over the harbor was resisted with far greater fire power and a number of enemy planes were shot down. The third attack over the harbor was met by so intensive a barrage from the ships that it was driven off without getting the attack home, no effective hits being made in the harbor by this last assault.

The Army succeeded in getting ten fighter planes in the air before the enemy made the third and final sweep, and in the combat that ensued they estimate eleven enemy craft were shot down by plane or anti-aircraft fire. The Navy claims twelve more were destroyed by gunfire from the ships, making a total enemy loss of twenty-three. To these twenty-three, eighteen more may be added with reasonable assurances, these eighteen being Japanese planes which found themselves without

sufficient fuel to return to their carriers and who plunged into the sea. Conversation between the planes and the Japanese fleet, in plain language, received in Oahu is the basis for this assumption. If true, it makes a total of forty-one planes lost by the Japanese.

The estimate of the number of planes attacking varies. This variance lies between a minimum of three carriers, carrying about fifty planes each, and a maximum of six carriers. This would indicate an attacking force somewhere between one hundred fifty and three hundred planes.

From the crashed Japanese planes considerable information was obtained concerning their general character. Papers discovered on a Japanese plane which crashed indicate a striking force of six carriers, three heavy cruisers and numerous auxiliary craft including destroyers and other vessels. It is interesting to note that the Japanese fighter planes were Model O-1, equipped with radial engines and built in early 1941. None of the planes shot down and so far examined, was fitted with any armored protection for the pilot nor were any self sealing gasoline tanks found in any plane. American radio and other American built equipment was recovered from the wreckage. One plane was armed with a Lewis gun of the 1920 vintage. Some observers believed that the planes carried an unusual number of rounds of ammunition, and the use of explosive and incendiary 20 millimeter ammunition was a material factor in damaging planes and other objectives on the ground. The torpedo bombers were of an old type and used Whitehead torpedoes dating about 1906, equipped with large vanes on the stern to prevent the initial deep dive customary of torpedoes dropped by planes. It is pleasing to note that the attack has not disclosed any new or potent weapons. With this in mind it was found that the Armor

piercing bombs employed were 15 inch A.P. projectiles, fitted with tail vanes. In actual combat when American planes were able to take the air, American fliers appear to have proved themselves considerably superior. One Army pilot alone is credited with shooting down four Japanese planes. All of the pilots who got in the air returned to the ground confident of their ability to handle Japanese air forces successfully in the future. At neither Army or Navy air fields were planes dispersed. At Kaneohe some VP planes were, however, moored in the water. They, too, were destroyed by machine gun fire, using incendiary bullets. Consequently, most of them were put out of action by the enemy in the initial sweep. Hangars on all of the fields were heavily bombed and many of them completely wrecked. At Hickam Field a very large barracks building was burned with heavy loss of life. The heaviest casualties in the Navy were incurred aboard ships subjected to torpedo attack. The bulk of the damage done to the fleet was done by torpedoes and not by bombs, some ships being hit by four or more torpedoes. With the sole exception of the Arizona, bombs proved ineffectual in causing serious damage. Many of the Officers and men of the crews when their ships were set afire were compelled to take to the water. A very considerable number were trapped below decks aboard the Oklahoma and the Utah, both of which capsized. By cutting through the bottom of these two vessels, while the attack was in progress, twenty six additional men were rescued alive. Throughout the action, small boats from other ships and from the harbor swarmed over the harbor engaged in the rescue of men who were driven overboard from their ships. The rescue of men from drowning and the recovery and swift treatment of the wounded was carried on throughout the engagement.

by both service people and civilians with the greatest gallantry. Temporary hospital quarters were provided in half a dozen different places and the wounded were cared for promptly. Because of the huge number of unidentified dead, many being burned beyond recognition and a large number having been picked up in the harbor unrecognizable after several days in the water, several hundred were buried in a common grave on Government land adjoining the Navy Yard. While I was still there bodies were being recovered from the water, but all were in a condition which prevented identification. Dispositions made by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District (Admiral Block) were adequate and were efficiently carried out.

Of the eight battleships in Pearl Harbor when the attack was made on 7 December, three escaped serious damage and can put to sea in a matter of a few days. These are the Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Tennessee. The Nevada can be raised in a month, and will then require a complete overhaul. The California can be raised in two and one-half months, and then must be given temporary repairs in order to send her to the Pacific coast for a year's overhaul. The West Virginia can be raised in three months, and will require a year and a half to two years for overhaul. The Oklahoma, which was overturned, it is estimated can be raised in four months. Whether she will be worth overhaul cannot be determined now. The Arizona is a total wreck, her forward magazine having exploded after she had been damaged by both torpedoes and bombs. The Colorado was on the Pacific coast for overhaul.

There were six cruisers in the harbor at the time of the attack. The Detroit put to sea at once and is uninjured. The New Orleans and the San Francisco are now ready to go to sea. The Honolulu will be ready on December 20th. The Helena was badly damaged and may require a new engine.

She will be ready to go the Pacific coast for overhaul December 31st. The Raleigh was flooded throughout her machinery spaces and seriously injured in other respects. It is estimated she will be ready for the trip to the Pacific coast for overhaul on January 15th.

There were ten destroyers in the harbor at the time of the attack. Seven of these put to sea at once and were uninjured. The Cassin and the Downes were in the same drydock with the Pennsylvania. Bombs designed for the Pennsylvania hit the two destroyers and totally wrecked both of them. Although both destroyers were badly burned, prompt fire fighting work saved the Pennsylvania from any damage. The destroyer Shaw was in the floating drydock at the time of the attack. All of this ship forward of No. 1 stack was seriously damaged or blown off. The afterpart of the ship is still intact and can be salvaged, and a new section can be built to replace that part of the ship now destroyed.

The mine layer Oglala was lying moored outside the Helena, and received the impact of the torpedo attack designed for the cruiser. She is a total loss. The airplane tender Curtis, which was bombed and injured by fire started when a torpedo plane plunged into her crane, will be ready for service on December 17th. The Vestal, one of the ships of the train, which was damaged, will be ready to go the Pacific coast on December 17th for overhaul. The old battleship Utah, which had been converted into a training ship for anti-aircraft instruction, is a total loss.

#### GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

There was no attempt by either Admiral Kimmel or General Short to alibi the lack of a state of readiness for the air attack. Both admitted

they did not expect it, and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it came. Both Kimmel and Short evidently regarded an air attack as extremely unlikely because of the great distance which the Japs would have to travel to make the attack, and the consequent exposure of such a task force to the superior gun power of the American fleet. Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted it would be made in the Far East.

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island, is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.

There was evident in both Army and Navy only a very slight feeling of apprehension of any attack at all, and neither Army or Navy were in a position of readiness because of this feeling.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that there was available to the enemy in Oahu probably the most efficient fifth column to be found anywhere in the American possessions, due to the presence of very large numbers of alien Japanese. The intelligence work done by this fifth column before the attack, provided the Japanese Navy with exact knowledge of all necessary details to plan the attack. This included exact charts showing customary position of ships when in Pearl Harbor, exact location of all defenses, gun

power and numerous other details. Papers captured from the Japanese submarine that ran ashore indicated that the exact position of nearly every ship in the harbor was known and charted, and all the necessary data to facilitate a submarine attack was in Japanese possession. It is an interesting fact that the Utah at the time of the attack occupied a berth normally used by an aircraft carrier, and she was a total loss. The work of the fifth column artists in Hawaii has only been approached in this war by the success of a similar group in Norway. \* Insert: Page 13 - next page hereto.

The fighting spirit of the crews aboard ship and ashore was superb. Gun crews remained at their station with their guns in action until they slid into the water from the Oklahoma's deck or were driven overboard by fires on other ships. Men ashore manned every available small boat and carried on rescue work saving the lives of the men who were driven overboard while the heaviest fighting was going on. Some of the crew of the Utah, swept from the deck of the ship as she capsized, were rescued by destroyers leaving the harbor to engage in an attack on the enemy forces. Although clad only in their underclothes, they insisted on joining the crews of the destroyers which rescued them and went to sea.

The evacuation of the wounded and the rescue of men from drowning was carried on with such superb courage and efficiency as to excite universal admiration, and additional hospital accommodations were quickly provided so that the wounded could be cared for as rapidly as they were brought ashore.

The removal of the convalescent wounded to the mainland promptly is imperative. I recommend that the Solace should be loaded with these convalescent wounded at once and brought to the coast with or without escort.

\*This is Page 13.

The reported attempted landing on the west coast of Oahu, near Luahalei was an effort on the part of Japanese fifth columnists to direct the efforts of the U. S. task forces at sea and to lure these forces into a submarine trap. Fortunately, this fact was realized before certain light forces under Rear Admiral Draemel reached the vicinity of the reported landings. His ships were turned away just prior to the launching of a number of torpedoes by waiting submarines, which torpedoes were sighted by the vessels in Admiral Draemel's force.

The same quality of courage and resourcefulness was displayed by the Naval forces ashore as by the men aboard ship. This was likewise true of hundreds of civilian employees in the yard, who participated in the fire fighting and rescue work from the beginning of the attack.

It is of significance to note that throughout the entire engagement on 7 December, no enemy air plane dropped any bombs on the oil storage tanks in which huge quantities of oil are stored. This was one of many indications that appear to foreshadow a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with landing forces, in the near future. Every effort to strengthen our air defenses, particularly in pursuit planes and anti-aircraft artillery is clearly indicated. This anticipation of a renewal of the attack is shared by both Army and Navy Officers in Hawaii. As a matter of fact, in the ranks of the men in both services it is hoped for. Both are grimly determined to avenge the treachery which cost the lives of so many of their comrades. Instead of dampening their spirits, the Japanese attack has awakened in them a stern spirit of revenge that would be an important factor in the successful resistance of any new enemy approach.

#### SALVAGE OPERATIONS.

The salvage operation involved in raising the sunken battleships is one of the most important pieces of defense work now under way. Its magnitude warrants that it should receive maximum attention and all facilities in arm power and materiel that will further its expeditious progress, including top priorities for material and high speed transportation facilities to and from the mainland and Hawaii.

The Navy is fortunate that Lieut. Comdr. Lemuel Curtis, who is an Officer in the Naval Reserve, and who is one of the most expert salvage men in

the United States was in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. He is in full charge of the salvage operations under Commander J. M. Steele, USN, the representative of the Base Force Command. With personnel already available and with certain additions to be immediately provided, adequate organization to carry on this work with maximum speed has been assembled.

I am proposing to send to Pearl Harbor a large force of partially trained men from San Diego to assist in the salvage operations, and to be trained to form part of the crews of the new salvage ships due to be completed next autumn. The most rapid delivery to the job of materiel and men to expedite this salvage work is essential, and I am proposing to arrange for the purchase or charter of the S.S. Lurline of the Matson line, or of some other suitable high speed vessel to be utilized primarily for this purpose. Such a ship would also be available for returning to the United States the families of Officers and men who should be evacuated because of the dangers inherent in the Hawaiian situation. In addition, any available cargo space in this vessel not needed for the transfer of materiel for the salvage operations can be used to assist in the transportation of food to Hawaii.

Lieut. Comdr. Curtis is the authority for the estimates of time required for the salvage operations on the Nevada, California, West Virginia and Oklahoma.

#### REPAIRS TO DAMAGED VESSELS.

The possibility of advancing the repairs on salvaged vessels was discussed with the Commandant and with the manager of the Yard at Pearl Harbor.

A suggestion that help might be rendered direct to the Navy Yard by Continental Repair Yards did not meet with their approval for reasons that were compelling, but the desirability of dispersing part of the Naval work on this Station

resulted in the suggestion that the Navy take over, by purchase or lease, three small ship repair plants located in Honolulu and that these be operated under a management contract, with personnel to be furnished by private ship repair yards on the west coast. These three plants are the Honolulu Iron Works, the Inter-Island Steam Navigation Company and the Tuna Packers, Inc. Only so much of these plants as are useful in ship repairs would be taken over, and the Navy Yard would assign work to them on destroyers, small vessels and yard craft, thus relieving congestion and scattering the risk in case of further possible attack. I am studying this proposal with the various interested parties. With these added facilities, the Navy Yard can adequately handle the work load presently to be imposed upon it.

#### INSTRUCTIONS TO WEST COAST NAVAL DISTRICTS.

Upon arrival in San Diego, I was met by the Commandants of the <sup>and Navy Yard Mare Island,</sup> 11th ~~and 12th~~ Naval Districts and gave them the necessary information and instructions to post them on the Pearl Harbor attack to permit them to safeguard their <sup>commands</sup> ~~Districts~~ so far as possible. This included all available information about the two men submarines which might provide a serious menace to the west coast. The Commandant of the <sup>Navy Yard Mare Island</sup> ~~12th Naval District~~ undertook to pass on all of this information to the Commandant of the <sup>12th and</sup> ~~the~~ 13th Naval District who could not attend this meeting.

#### SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

In conclusion, may I invite particular attention to the following points in my report and draw certain conclusions therefrom:-

(1) Neither the Army or the Navy Commandant in Oahu regarded an air attack on the Army air fields or the Navy Stations as at all likely.

(2) The Army and Naval Commands had received a general war warning on November 27th, but a special war warning sent out by the War Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until some hours after the attack on that date.

(3) Army preparations were primarily based on fear of sabotage while the Navy's were based on fear of submarine attack. Therefore, no adequate measures were taken by either service to guard against a surprise air attack.

(4) Radar equipment manned by the Army and usually operated for a longer period, was only operated from 4:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m., on December 7th. This change was authorized by the Control Officer. Accurate information of the approach of a concentration of planes 130 miles to the northward relayed to the Aircraft Warning information Center by an unofficial observer was not relayed beyond that office. Nor was other information from Army Radar showing the retirement of enemy aircraft to their bases received as such by the Navy until two days after the attack.

(5) The first surprise attack, simultaneously on five principal objectives, caught them all completely unprepared. It was about four minutes before the first anti-aircraft fire by the Navy began, and as the Army aircraft batteries were not manned nor their mobile units in position it was some time before their anti-aircraft fire became effective.

(6) Most of the damage to Army fields and Navy stations occurred during the first attack, which concentrated on planes, airfields and capital ships.

(7) As anti-aircraft fire increased the second and third attacks resulted in successively less damage.

(8) The final result of the three attacks left the Army air fields and the Naval stations very badly damaged and resulted in the practical immobilization of the majority of the Navy's battle fleet in the Pacific for months to come, the loss of 75% of the Army's air forces on the Islands, and the loss of an even larger percentage of the Navy's air force on Oahu. <sup>^ ship</sup>

(9) Once action was joined the courage, determination and resourcefulness of the armed services and of the civilian employes left nothing to be desired. Individually and collectively the bravery of the defense was superb. In single unit combat the American pursuit planes proved themselves superior to the Japanese and the American personnel in the air demonstrated distinct superiority over the Japanese.

(10) While the bulk of the damage done to Naval ships was the result of aerial torpedoes, the only battleship that was completely destroyed was hit by bombs and not by torpedoes. Hangers of the type used on all four stations are a serious menace and should be abandoned ~~in~~ ~~possible attack~~ for use for storage purposes in possible attack areas.

(11) The loss of life and the number of wounded in this attack is a shocking result of unpreparedness. The handling of the dead and wounded has been prompt and efficient. The wounded should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible.

(12) The families of combatant forces should be evacuated to the mainland as soon as possible. Orders to this end are already in preparation.

(13) Salvage facilities and personnel are excellent and, as presently to be augmented, will be ample to meet the Station's needs and

will place the damaged vessels in repair berths in the shortest possible time.

(14) Repair facilities are adequate to promptly carry out such repairs as are to be made on this Naval Station. Auxiliary repair facilities are under consideration to relieve the yard from small craft and to lessen the concentration of vessels at one harbor.

(15) In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, the usefulness and availability of this Naval Station must be restudied. Its air defenses must be strengthened immediately by the despatch of as many fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns as can be assigned to it. Special defenses against aerial torpedoes, such as balloon barrages and deep floats to be moored alongside important combatant units must be developed. Pending these studies and the addition of satisfactory safeguards, no large concentration of Naval vessels can be permitted at Pearl Harbor.

(16) This attack has emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military information in the hands of the Japanese, the meticulous detail of their plans of attack, and their courage, ability and resourcefulness in executing and pressing home their operations. It should serve as a mighty incentive to our defense forces to spare no effort to achieve a final victory.

*Frank Knox*

*file  
war file*

*PSE Navy Folder*

**THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON**


December 14, 1941  
1210

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Colonel Knox has not taken off from Midland, Texas, yet. Weather chart shows foul weather there. A message to Anacostia states he will probably take off at 1100. On that basis, earliest arrival Washington about 2130.

Secretary Knox will be informed on landing at Anacostia to come directly to the White House.

Respectfully,

  
J. R. BEARDALL

*file  
pres mail*

*PSF Navy Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 14, 1941  
1640

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Word has been received from Naval  
Air Station, Anacostia, via OpNav Duty Officer,  
that Secretary Knox is expected to arrive in  
Washington at about eight o'clock tonight.

Respectfully,

*G. A. Leahy, Jr.*  
G. A. LEAHEY, JR.,  
Watch Officer.

*Navy Folder*  
*PSF*  
*file*  
*Confidential*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1941  
1700

NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS REPORTS -

Radio Honolulu in communication with  
Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Cavite, Samoa and Midway.  
Not with Guam. Honolulu sending blind to Wake,  
and receiving receipt therefor later. Report as  
of 1645, Monday, 15 December.

*S. A. Lange*  
S. A. LANGE,  
Lieutenant, U. S. N.  
Watch Officer.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 15, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Ice Conditions in the Bering Sea.

Except in bays and sheltered places, the ice consists of detached fields, floes and cakes, continually in motion. At no time is the sea one continuous sheet of ice.

The general southern limit of the ice is from Bristol Bay to the west end of St. George's Island (southern one of the Pribiloffs) and thence about WNW to the Siberian shore. As a rule, no heavy ice will be encountered south of the Pribiloffs.

Extremes: In a heavy winter, ice jams have blocked False Pass (between Unimak Island and tip of Alaskan Peninsula). In a mild winter U.S.C.G. CHELAN has made trip from Unalaska to Pribiloffs and return without encountering ice, during February.

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Subject: Italian liner - CONTE BIANCOMO.

The Italian liner CONTE BIANCOMO, which was seized at Panama, is still undergoing repairs in that port. One turbine is in the States for repairs.

The vessel is still in the hands of the Maritime Commission. Date of completion of repairs is tentatively set at January 15, 1942. As presently scheduled, it is to be released to the United States Lines for service to the United Kingdom.

Respectfully,

  
J. R. BEARDALL

*file*  
*see special*

PSF *Navy Folder*

(Message phoned by Colonel Thomassen at 11:15 p.m.,  
December 16, 1941.)

From Naval Attache, Madrid, dated December 15,  
1941, 4:45 p.m.

Despite rumors to the contrary there is no evidence in Spain or Bordeaux-Iran area that Germany plans an immediate invasion Iberian peninsula. Preparations begun early fall have ceased. German forces Bordeaux-Spanish frontier remain unchanged at 2 1/2 division of Landwehr troops. The Ministers of Marine, Air, Under Secretary Foreign Office and officers Spanish general staff have been personally interviewed during past week by the Naval Attache. All these officials express optimism concerning Spanish possibilities and determination to remain out of the conflict. However all are concerned over future developments in French North Africa. This anxiety has been growing recently due to successes of British and pressure of German Ambassador Madrid to obtain definite commitment from Suner and Spanish general staff to secure Spanish cooperation with Germany in the event of an attack by the democracies against French North Africa, Dakar, Casablanca, or outlying Spanish or Portuguese islands. Ministers of Marine, Air and Under  
Secretary

Secretary of Foreign Office have all made positive statements to the Naval Attache that Spain had made no military commitments whatsoever with Germany. The Attache believes these statements but is convinced that Suner as well as a limited number of army and air officials favor cooperation with Germany in event of any direct threat to above-mentioned territory. Spanish determination to resist German pressure grows with each democratic victory. Suner's tenure of office still in balance. END OF MESSAGE


THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
December 20, 1941

*file 7*  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached memorandum gives the present status and plans for the Danish Government Training Ship DANMARK, as requested by the President.

Respectfully,

  
J. R. BEARDALL

*May Folder*

In reply refer to Initials  
and No.

Op-23E-RLF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN BEARDALL

SUBJECT: Danish Government Training Ship DANMARK.

1. Characteristics: Gross tonnage 777, net tonnage 555, length at water line 188.6 ft., beam 33 ft., depth 17 ft., speed in smooth water about 6 knots. Although fitted with a six cylinder diesel engine, this is purely auxiliary for the purpose of keeping way on when the sails cannot be used.

2. Admiral Waesche advises present plans for this ship, of which the State Department has been fully informed, are: The vessel is to be docked at Jacksonville, Florida, and the cost of docking is to be paid by the present Danish Captain who has funds; the vessel is then to be brought from Jacksonville to the Coast Guard Academy at New London. Upon arrival there, the Danish personnel is to be taken off the ship and the Danish payroll and put on the payroll of the Coast Guard in civilian status. The Coast Guard will thereafter utilize the ship for the purpose of training Coast Guard cadets.

3. Admiral Waesche advises the vessel will be unsuitable as a weather station vessel, primarily because of her low speed.

*W. S. Farber*  
W. S. FARBER

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NIN 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 8-9-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

*1204*  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Will you speak to me about  
this?

F.D.R.

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
SECY'S OFFICE - RECORD DIV.  
RECEIVED



DEC 23 1941

SF  
Navy

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS  
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

TWENTY-FIRST AND C STREETS NW.

WASHINGTON, D. C.  
December 20, 1941.

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

File Reference:  
1-12,20-1.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The attack by the Japanese on December 7 has brought the people of the United States to a high patriotic fervor. Men in all walks of life are trying to make an individual decision as to their part in the solution of the Nation's problems. Many have reached that decision and the recruiting stations are crowded with men seeking to enter the armed forces. In many instances they are men of skills who should stay in war production or vital civilian activities. This tends to unduly disrupt vital war industries and essential civilian activities. An appropriate agency of government should decide where best the individual may serve his Nation in total war.

The full utilization of our manpower in our present war effort requires that the selection of men for the armed forces or their deferment because of civilian activity be determined by a systematic and orderly method of selection. This device is found in the Selective Service System.

The Secretary of War has announced a cessation of Army recruiting, effective when the present wave of enthusiasm is over, but that is not enough. It is advisable that all recruiting cease.

I do not take the position that Navy and Marine Corps recruiting should stop immediately. Recruiting for those services might go on for a reasonable period, thus affording the Navy and Marine Corps full opportunity to adjust themselves to the abandonment of recruiting and the adoption of the new system of procurement.

In the last war, as you will recall, the problem was solved piecemeal. The Army stopped recruiting men of draft age in December 1917; and all recruiting for the Army, Navy and Marine Corps was stopped in August 1918. It is believed that we should benefit by that experience which, coupled with our present knowledge, indicates most definitely the necessity for a stoppage in all recruiting at an early date.

*Lewis B. Fushy*  
DIRECTOR