THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This O.W.I. publication showing aerial views of Japanese ships, is of possible interest to the President at this time.

Respectfully,

J. P. BEARDALL
MEMORANDUM FOR - The President

The following steps have been taken to place into effect the plans for security of ships and waterfront property in the harbors of the United States and outlying possessions:

1. The Commandant of the Coast Guard, acting for the Chief of Naval Operations, will be responsible to see that a proper organization is setup, appropriate instructions issued, and all other measures taken to insure security in our harbors.

2. The Commandants of the Naval Districts have been given the responsibility of seeing that appropriate security measures are taken in their Districts, under the general supervision of the Commandant of the Coast Guard, acting for the Chief of Naval Operations, and that they exercise their authority through the Coast Guard Captain of the Port organization, which is being setup under them by the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

3. Coast Guard officers selected by the Commandant of the Coast Guard, are being assigned by telegraph to the Staff of each Commandant of a Naval District, to carry out directly security measures. Coast Guard Captains of the Port have already been assigned to each major port and to many minor ports. Additional similar assignments will be made to other minor ports not now covered.

4. The Coast Guard Intelligence Service, a small but efficient organization which has been functioning ever since the days of prohibition, is being placed completely under the Captain of the Port organization. This Intelligence Service will be augmented by specially selected personnel, both within the Coast Guard and from civil life. This Intelligence Service will include secret agents drawn from the walk of life best suited for such work around the waterfronts of the various ports.

5. Several retired Fire Commissioners of the City of New York are being employed by the Coast Guard for inspectional duty and other similar duty in New York and elsewhere. One of these men conducted for years the school in New York for Fire Chiefs.
6. The National Association for Fire Protection has furnished the Coast Guard with their survey of various piers and docks in the various ports of the United States. Further surveys are being made to determine what piers should have better fire protection, better lighting facilities and increased guards.

7. A Coast Guard officer to administer security measures on the Atlantic coast and another for the Pacific coast have been designated.

8. Additional Reserve boats will be taken over by the Coast Guard and additional men enlisted for carrying patrol duties in the harbors.

9. In all large ports, the Coast Guard has already set-up coordinating committees among the various Federal, State, municipal and private agencies, to provide protection to ships and waterfront facilities. Under the authority of the recent Executive Order, Coast Guard Captains of the Port, acting under the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will see that these committees function efficiently or take further measures.

10. The heads of the various Federal agencies here in Washington, who have some responsibility for security measures are being contacted so as to use their facilities to the fullest extent.

11. Additional funds will be needed to provide housing and training facilities at the various ports and for additional boats for harbor patrol work. Further information will be furnished regarding the need for such additional funds.

I wish to emphasize that we are not losing time by conferences and by drawing up an elaborate plan. Action is being taken and officers are being assigned to duty promptly by telegraph.

Frank Knox
MEMORANDUM for The President:

Subject: Letter in Shreveport Times of November 12, 1941, from enlisted man to sister, and AP despatch based thereon.

Reference: President's Memorandum of November 17, 1941, to Secretary of the Navy.

1. The letter in The Shreveport Times was a true, though edited, copy of a letter from Daniel Warren Lacobee, signalman third class, USS SCHENCK, to his sister, Mrs. L. G. Powell, 2506 William Ave., Shreveport, La.

2. No disciplinary action against Lacobee has been taken.

Frank Knox
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I do not want this blue jacket reprimanded or warned in any way, but I think it is worthwhile checking the accuracy of this story given out by his sister in Shreveport.

I always remember that when the first Expeditionary Force went to France -- about 24,000 of them -- in June, 1917, a very large percentage of the sailors and Army personnel wrote home describing a purely imaginary submarine attack on the convoy.

I wish this youngster were right in announcing the capture of two subs.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 1 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

Report on the Azores Islands
sent to the President by Colonel
Donovan.
MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL

FOR THE INFORMATION OF
THE ARMY AND NAVY.

F. D. R.

Two reports prepared by George Walker on interviews with C. P. Grandgerard, until recently Otis Elevator Co. manager in Toyko, and with Emanuel Gran, until recently an architect (White Russian) in Shanghai. These were sent to the President by John Franklin Carter under date of Dec. 24, 1941.
My dear Mr. President:

Pursuant to your request for information with regard to the employment of aliens for private contractors with the department, the following is respectfully submitted:

All contracts for the construction of Naval combatant vessels are classified as restricted. On such restricted contracts it is required that no aliens may be employed on such a contract without the consent of the Secretary of the Navy. Contractors submit through the cognizant Bureau the names of aliens to be employed and appropriate investigation is immediately employed by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and submitted to the Secretary of the Navy for approval or disapproval. To date the request for the employment of 8126 aliens has been approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and requests for employment of 269 have been disapproved.

Contracts for the repair and alteration of noncombatant vessels are not classified but in practice such prior approval covering aliens is obtained where the work to be performed thereunder is, either in whole or in part, of such nature as to make it advisable. This procedure is followed in the regular course of its business by the Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company which undertook the conversion of the U.S.S. LAFAYETTE (ex NORMANDIE). The Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company has requested that consent be granted for a total of 149 aliens. The consent of the Secretary of the Navy has been granted for the employment of 50 aliens. Of these 50 aliens, 11 were citizens of the British Empire, 6 from Denmark, 1 Swedish, 5 Russian, 10 Norwegian, 2 Polish, 1 French, 3 Belgian, 4 German, 1 Austrian, 5 Italian, and 1 Hungarian. Of the 9 enemy aliens for whom consent was granted, in the case of 8 the company stated they would be barred from work on United States government contracts. Both the Germans and the Italians covered in this group have been in the employ of the company for from 18 years to a minimum of 5 years, and all of them have been in this country a minimum of 18 years.

The cases of 99 other aliens submitted by the Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company are still being investigated by the Office of Naval Intelligence. No permission has been granted to them to

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
12 February 1942
work on Navy classified contracts.

Attached hereto is a report just received from Admiral Andrews covering the employment of aliens on the U.S.S. LAFAYETTE. This report is not complete and further information will be received shortly.

Respectfully,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Bard

Admiral Andrews, Commandant of the Third Naval District, reported as
follows in connection with your question as to enemy and other aliens work-
ing on the USS LAFAYETTE (ex-NORMANDIE) at the time of the casualty:

The Robins Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company had 1759 men working
on the vessel. That Company reports that of these men there were 1284
American born citizens; 396 naturalized citizens; 105 claiming birth in
the United States, but without proof; 2 Allied aliens; 3 neutral aliens;
1 enemy alien who claims naturalization; total aliens, 6. There also were
3 Allied aliens with first citizenship papers; and 4 enemy aliens with first
citizenship papers, making a total of 7 aliens with first papers; also 1
enemy alien having U.S. Navy consent; thus making up the total of 1759 men.

In addition to the above, sub-contractors numbering between 60 and 90
had an estimated total working force on board the vessel at the time of the
casualty of about 700 men.

The Commandant is checking with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
the list of all workmen on board the Robins SB & DD Company and is
working on this check night and day. Up to the present time the check re-
veals that 94 of the men had no records at all as regards their citizenship.
He plans to continue this check with the F.B.I. and estimates that it will
take considerable time to run all cases down.

The Commandant is obtaining from the sub-contractors the names of their
men who were on board at the time of the fire and is also proceeding with
the check of the status of these men with the F.B.I. The Commandant also
stated that the Robins SB & DD Company had investigated all the men working
in the compartment in which the fire started and they assert that all were
American citizens.

The Commandant plans to call you tomorrow morning, Saturday, 14 February,
to explain personally to you the magnitude of this job and his procedure. The
Commandant admits that the length of time necessary to accomplish the full
check has been due to the laxity of the Robins Company in not having previously
made this check, in accordance with the instructions from the Commandant's
Office. This was probably due to some extent to the magnitude of the work to
be accomplished in the relatively short space of time given for its accomplishment.

C. A. Jones.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK AND GENERAL MARSHALL

This for your very confidential information and return.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Report on Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted men in active service on January 31, 1942, is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the actual number in active service on December 31, 1941 is also included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jan. 31, 1942</th>
<th>Dec. 31, 1941</th>
<th>Net Gain for Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulars</td>
<td>247,877</td>
<td>236,709</td>
<td>11,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Men</td>
<td>3,663</td>
<td>3,338</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Reserves</td>
<td>9,709</td>
<td>9,810</td>
<td>-101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reserves</td>
<td>131,829</td>
<td>80,964</td>
<td>50,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>393,078</td>
<td>330,821</td>
<td>62,257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

This is the best I can do now.
What do you think is the next step?
Please return for my files.

F. D. R.

Memo for the Naval Aide to the Pres. Re: McCrea's memo of Feb. 10 requesting information on a Japanese (two man) submarine.
February 17, 1942

Personal & Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL STARK

The action by those little Italian boats in the Eastern Mediterranean on December 22 was pretty good. I would say it was damned good. If they can do it, why can't we do it?

I wish you would turn loose your most imaginative people in War Plans to tell me how you think the Italian Navy can be effectively immobilized by some tactics similar to or as daring as those utilized by the Italians.

I can't believe that we must always use the classical offensive against an enemy who seems never to have heard of it.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

WOULD YOU THINK IT WORTHWhile SENDING THIS TO THE NAVY.

HERBERT L. HOPKINS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FORSTER

The attached copy of a letter signed by the President yesterday afternoon, and labeled SECRET in his own handwriting, is forwarded for your files. The original signed copy will be delivered by hand.

JOHN L. McCREA,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U. S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This allocation is to provide the funds for the project which Captain McCrea discussed with me.

[Signature]

REGRARED UNGCLASSIFIED
February 17, 1942.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the provisions of the appropriation entitled "Emergency Fund for the President", contained in the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942, approved December 17, 1941, I hereby allocate from the sum of $100,000,000 provided by said appropriation as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy Department</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be expended by the Navy Department in connection with emergencies affecting the national security and defense for projects of a confidential nature which I have approved.

The funds hereby allocated are authorized to be expended solely upon the certificate of the Chief of Naval Operations which shall be deemed a sufficient voucher and shall be chargeable against the limitation of $10,000,000 included in the appropriation for this purpose.

Please arrange for the necessary transfer of funds and advise the Chief of Naval Operations accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Treasury.

Copy For White House Files
It is believed that for the most part, outgoing messages from the President to the Prime Minister will be typewritten in duplicate (an original and one copy), both copies to be signed or initialed by the President.

The following procedure has been agreed upon and is hereby established:

1. The President has directed that messages passing between the Prime Minister and the President be filed in the White House Chart Room.

2. Messages originated by the President have consecutive serial numbers beginning with No. 101. Those originated by the Prime Minister have consecutive serial numbers beginning with No. 25.

3. The original copy of each message will be placed in the General Message Center which will be stamped "out" and then sent to the Chart Room for assignment of serial number and transmission. When the message reaches the Chart Room, the Chart Room Officer will log it in according to serial number, and immediately send the message, as this will always be done by the Chart Room Officer. If the message is originated by the Prime Minister, the Chart Room Officer will also assign or initiate it.

February 19, 1943.

P.S. The President has directed that messages passing between the President and the Prime Minister be filed in the White House Chart Room.

No. 1

P.S.F. By the President.

[Signature]

February 20, 1943.

[Signature]
INCOMING MESSAGES

It is expected that only one copy of incoming messages will be received. Immediately upon the receipt of an incoming message it should be logged in accordance with special instructions appearing later in this order, and delivered to the President, directly or via the Naval or Military Aides, as appropriate, considering the time of day and the urgency of the message. When a message is received outside of office hours, call the Naval Aide if doubt exists as to the necessity for immediate delivery.

While no difficulty is anticipated in maintaining an unbroken record of serial numbers for OUTGOING messages, it may occur that an INCOMING message will be received bearing a serial number which is not the next number following the last one of record. This may indicate that an intervening message has been received through a receiving agency other than the Navy, and which was delivered to the addresses without being cleared through the Chart Room. Should an instance of this kind occur, a corresponding space should be left blank in the incoming log, and the matter brought to the attention of the Naval Aide, who will then take steps to trace the message(s) which are not a matter of record.

It is intended that the single copy of an incoming message shall become the file copy after it has been shown to the President or any others that he designates to see it. If an incoming message requires a reply, it may be that it will have to be retained temporarily by the person who is to draft the reply. To the end that all messages received will eventually be lodged in the special file, the incoming log will be checked daily with the file of incoming messages to determine those that are not on file. If a message has been held for what appears to be an undue length of time, the matter will be drawn to the attention of the Naval Aide, who will make appropriate inquiries looking to its return to file.

The instructions embraced by this order are for the express purpose of insuring that the file dealt with shall be the MASTER FILE of all messages exchanged between the President and the Prime Minister, the only duplication of which will be those files maintained by the communication agencies involved, or by those persons submitting proposed messages to the President for release. Chart Room personnel are responsible only for the copies received, and they are enjoined to exercise particular care to insure that an unbroken series of incoming and outgoing messages is maintained.
4. All messages will be classified as SECRET.

5. A separate incoming and outgoing log will be maintained, using the following entries:

**OUTGOING**

Date and time received in Chart Room.
Number of copies received and their disposition:

Example: (2) Original - File.
1 - Navy (or)
1 - Army

Serial No. assigned.
Originator.
Addressed(s).
Time despatched to communication agency.
Name of officer messenger.
Time group assigned by communication agency (This will have to be obtained after message has been sent).
Initials of Watch Officer completing action on the message.

**INCOMING**

Date and time received in Chart Room.
Communication agency from which received.
No. of copies received and their disposition:

Example: (1) - "Shown to President by Naval Aide."
"Shown to President and/or Mr. Hopkins by Watch Officer."

Serial No. of message.
Originator.
Addressed(s).
Date and time group, or other identifying data shown on message.
Date to file. (This will not be entered until message has been returned and placed in the file).

---

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:
Miss Tully
Mrs. Brady
Miss Barney

- 3 -
February 21, 1942

Captain Joseph Patterson and Mr. John O'Donnell reached Hawaii before instructions were received in California to prevent their departure.

It is recommended that they be given no special priority in facilitating their return trip to the U.S.
My Dear Mr. President: This is from Nimitz - it's a belly laugh.

J.R.

Please give me 3 copies.


Pearl Harbor,
23 February, 1942.

"GO GET 'EM, McCLUSKEY!"

The story I am about to tell is, to my mind, the best war anecdote thus far. Not only does it typify the fighting spirit and skill of our armed forces, but it also seems to be as typically American as any story could be. That it should involve a bit of profanity only adds to its authenticity, for nicety in language is foreign enough to service men in times of peace and who would expect them to resort to the refined grammar of Tennyson and Dickens in times of conflict?

Mccluskey is an aviator. What is more, he's a damned good aviator. He pilots a fighter plane which is based on one of the carriers which recently conducted such a successful raid on the Gilbert and Marshall Islands.

During the raid on one of those island groups, Mccluskey's squadron was hovering over their carrier-home, providing air coverage for that ship while the dive bombers, torpedo planes and such struck their telling blows upon the Jap forces. Suddenly over the voice frequency by which planes maintained communications amongst themselves and with their ship came this tense command: "There's a fore-motor job up there about to make a run. Go get 'em McCluskey!"

Now Mccluskey is one of those fellows who doesn't have to have any pictures drawn for him. With a wave of the hand and a clipped "Aye! Aye! Captain" Mccluskey shoved his throttle forward and pulled out of formation.

I'm no authority on aviation combat tactics, but they tell me that Mccluskey used the "humming-bird" approach, which, I understand, means that he came up astern of the big bomber, the business end of his little fighter headed for the after belly of the Jap ship. The Jap pilot apparently realized his vulnerability under such conditions and headed for a cloud formation, hoping to lose his pesky little opponent therein.

Observers in planes and ships below saw the two planes enter the cloud. Then followed a sequence of events which must have reminded them of animated cartoons wherein two forces meet behind a board fence and suddenly the scene is littered with signs of terrific combat. First a piece of tail assembly dropped from the clouds, then part of a wing section. Finally, after sundry other parts of a plane's anatomy had started an earthward journey, flames and smoke billowed out around the claud.

Then followed several seconds of tense anxiety. Had the two planes collided? Which plane had exploded? Did the explosion get both planes? The answer was not long in coming. Out from the other side of the cloud, as cocky as a Scotty who has just given a mastiff the thrashing of his life, shot McCluskey. Then over the ether came one of the most descriptive blow-by-blow accounts that radio has ever known. It was Mccluskey, himself, his voice betraying much of the excitement, elation, and even disbelief that he must have been experiencing.

"I got him!" he chortled. "I got the son-of-a-bitch! By God, fellas, I shot his damned ass off!"

"Nice going, Mccluskey!" was all the squadron commander could say in reply.

(As written home by Ensign E. M. Jacoby, USNR)
February 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF:

ATTENTION: ADMIRAL STARK

I note that the J.I.C. Comment for February 24th, in discussing the Mediterranean, expresses the opinion that Germany will make an attempt to gain the Caucasus oil fields in 1942.

I would like an appreciation from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to whether or not they favor this view and an indication as to what are the probabilities of providing an effective defense and, if that defense does not seem to be adequate, what proposals do the Combined Chiefs of Staff make to assure the holding of those oil fields?

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please speak to me about this.

F. D. R.

Memo to the President from John Franklin Carter, dated February 23rd, re British Report on the "Sea Otter".

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972
Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.  

February 28, 1942

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. President:

Director Hoover has sent me a report of the investigation conducted by the FBI at the request of the Navy Department into the burning of the U.S.S. Lafayette, formerly the Normandie.

The evidence clearly establishes the origin of the fire to be accidental. On the morning of February 9, 1942, a crew was assigned to cut down four light stanchions in the grand salon of the vessel by acetylene torch. A number of kapok life preservers packed ten to a bale, each bale having been wrapped in water resistant tar paper and burlap, were piled near one of the stanchions. Before cutting operations were started, some of the bales were removed to a distance of approximately five feet from the stanchion. As an added precaution, a sheet of steel about five feet long and two feet wide was set up lengthwise between the stanchion and the bales. As the point at which the cut was being made was six inches higher than the metal shield, it was necessary for two men to hold sheets of asbestos above the shield to stop flying sparks. After the stanchion had been cut, and as it was being lowered to the deck, it got out of control and fell, damaging the metal spark shield. There remained to be cut a portion of steel approximately three inches long which had been used to steady the stanchion as it was being lowered. Because of the damage to the metal shield, it was discarded, and two men held asbestos sheets between the torch and the bales of life preservers. The sheets were so held that a space of approximately one and a half feet was left between the bottom of the sheets and the deck. A few minutes after the resumption of cutting operations, it was observed by several of the men that sparks and molten metal had escaped the asbestos sheets and had ignited the life preservers in several spots. Efforts to subdue the flames with buckets of water, by stamping out, etc., were of no avail, and as the heat and smoke drove the men away, the fire spread beyond control.
Nowhere in the evidence obtained by the FBI is there basis for the suggestion that sabotage was involved in the damage to the Lafayette.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Attorney General
FOR THE PRESIDENT

Japs nearing south coast Java by sea in addition to three landings on north shore.
Helfrich directs withdrawal allied surface forces resting naval defense Java on submarines. Our surface forces report definite sinking submarine about fourteen miles from Key West. Nothing from Halsey. Mac Arthur has nothing to report.

McCrea.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Bataan Peninsula quiet. Jap cruiser and four transports engaged in troop landings
Zamboanga. Glassford reports SHARK, one of our submarines, overdue for ten days and unheard
from February 7th. Nothing further Pacific Task Force.

McCREA
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have checked up on the matter of the employment of enemy aliens working along our waterfrosts as longshoremen or as employees in repair yards.

It appears that a good many aliens are employed, especially as longshoremen, and Admiral Waesche and others who are informed share Admiral Land's fear that we will run into grave difficulties if we bar them from this employment, because of a shortage of that type of labor. Since a barring of aliens seems impractical, I have initiated the next best thing, and that is the expansion of the existing secret service of the Coast Guard so as to give them enough undercover men to search out and find the dangerous aliens and get rid of them before they can do any damage, if possible. I have talked very earnestly and vigorously to Admiral Waesche about the necessity of doing this at once, and he is putting his plans into immediate execution.

In order to avoid the danger you suggest of too great interference with the Coast Guard's duty of protecting the waterfrosts and harbors by the regular Navy, I have insisted upon an organization by the Coast Guard which will establish an officer of that organization on the staff of each District Commandant and the assignment to that officer of the responsibility for security, or at least that kind of security for which the Coast Guard is now to be held responsible. My first disposition was to put the Coast Guard exclusively in control, independent of the Navy District Commandants, but Waesche and the Navy people agreed that this was likely to produce more confusion than efficiency because of dual authority.

I shall get out a letter to every District Commandant pointing out that the Coast Guard is responsible for this type of protection and is not to be interfered with and is to be cooperated with in every possible way. I shall also instruct Admiral Waesche to inform me of any District Commandant who does not provide the right kind of cooperation so that I can correct such a situation, if necessary, by the removal of the Commandant.

I feel very keenly an acute responsibility to protect against a very real danger, and as your letter suggests, I am taking vigorous steps to insure every measure of safety possible.

[Signature: Franklin D. Roosevelt]
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral StARK:

Will you be good enough to take this up with the combined Chiefs of Staff?

F.D.R.

Letter from Halifax to the Pres. 28 Feb. re: that the American section of the Combined Secretariat should handle the distribution of the war reports heretofore handled by the Embassy.
Dear Mr. President,

With the completion of the secretarial arrangements for the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff have agreed that it would simplify matters considerably if the distribution of all British documents concerning the military situation to the United States authorities were undertaken in its entirety by the American section of the Combined Secretariat, and if accordingly the direct distribution of any such papers by this Embassy were to cease.

Such an arrangement will obviate possible misunderstandings and overlapping, and should also accelerate the distribution of individual papers. In view of the adoption of this procedure I would therefore propose, unless you wish otherwise, to cease, as from March 1st, sending you direct from this Embassy copies of the daily British "Operational" telegrams.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

s/ HALIFAX

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
March 5, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In his letter to you of 28th February, 1942, Lord Halifax proposes that the Secretariat of the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake the distribution to United States authorities of all British documents concerning the military situation. There is no objection whatever to this arrangement. As a matter of fact, this is one of the purposes for which the Secretariat was organized. I have instructed the Secretaries accordingly.

H. R. STARK,
Admiral, U. S. Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Type of Tonnage 1943 Merchant Ship Building Program.

In response to your memorandum of March 5, with regard to the 1943 Program of Merchant Ship Building, representatives of the Navy Department have conferred with those of the War Department and Maritime Commission and are in agreement with a program submitted by Admiral Land, with the substitution of 24 AVGs for C 3s and the addition of 12 C 3s to the Navy train.

This decision seems to be in line with the situation insofar as it can be determined at this time and has my approval, with the understanding that if there should be additional demands for troop carriers during 1943 the remaining C 3s and C 2s can be converted to provide the bare necessities required to make them into troop carriers.

H.R. Stark.

H.R. Stark.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Will you be good enough to
let me have a report on this?

F.D.R.

Confidential memo to the Pres. from the
Attorney General 3/9/42 stating that the
F.B.I. has learned that the U.S. Navy and
Marine planes bombed and possibly sank a
U.S.N. submarine in the strait between P.
Rico and Saint Thomas -- possibly the S.17

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date 3/1/1972
March 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have been advised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation that United States Navy and Marine planes bombed and possibly sank a U. S. Navy submarine in the strait between Puerto Rico and Saint Thomas, Virgin Islands, on February 28, 1942.

It would appear that the submarine was the S-17, probably returning to Saint Thomas from Puerto Rico. Two United States Marine Corps pilots claim to have hit a submarine from a low altitude. The S-17 is said to have been missing since the date of the reported bombing.

I thought you would wish me to send you this information.

Francis Biddle
Attorney General

DECLASSIFIED
By Authority of January 29, 1961

[Signature]
MAR 1 1972
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
24 March 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Sites for Training Stations.

The informal Board that was sent to the West Coast to look over sites for training stations has now reported. A number of sites for the two West Coast stations were investigated. In summary, it appears that the two locations best adapted for the construction of major Naval Training Stations are at Pend Oreille, Idaho and Lake Tahoe, California. Some objection was raised to the Lake Tahoe site because of the amount of snow fall and because of the concentration of construction activities in the State of Nevada. However, the snow fall is not a serious handicap for a Naval Training Station and if first priority is given to the Pend Oreille station and an eastern station it is believed that sufficient labor will be available to construct Lake Tahoe in the time required.

With respect to the eastern station, the best prospect for immediate relief of our training station congestion is to acquire the Tome School at Port Deposit, Maryland. This school is for sale. It is an endowied institution located on the Susquehanna River. The main buildings are all of permanent granite construction. There is a main school, an administration building, five dormitory buildings, headmaster's house, ten cottages, guest house, water supply, power plant, athletic facilities, etc. A quick appraisal by the Home Owners Loan Corporation indicates that a payment of approximately one million dollars for this property would be amply justified. To provide the same capacity in temporary construction would cost between two and three million dollars.

The present facilities of Tome School would enable us to accommodate at once at least 500 men. Land is available for purchase in the vicinity to augment the 350 acres now available so that we could expand the present facilities to take care of 20,000 men.

Acquisition of this school is being considered by the War Department it is understood for use in connection with the women's auxiliary. If the War and Navy Departments compete for this property the price paid will probably be more than necessary. Therefore, it is recommended that the President allocate this property to the Navy Department since it is believed that its use for a training station is more important than its possible use for the women's auxiliary.
24 March 1942

No site has as yet been examined for the second East Coast station. In accordance with the President's instructions it is proposed to examine the Finger Lakes area in New York State, the vicinity of Asheville, North Carolina and the Ohio River valley.

It is recommended that the President approve the acquisition of the Tome School by the Navy Department at a value to be determined by formal appraisal and the construction of Naval Training Stations at this site, at Pend Oreille, Idaho and at Lake Tahoe, California.

(In president's handwriting)

O.K. - as to Pend d'Oreille.
    Why do we need Tahoe as well?

O.K. - as to Tome School but try to get a price better than $1,000,000.

F.D.R.
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET

MEMORANDUM

Date 30 March/42

From: Admiral King

To: The President via Mr. Hopkins

In conversation last night with Mr. Nash (New Zealand) and Dr. Evarts (Australia) the idea was developed and discussed that there might will be "unity of command" on the political level in the Pacific Theater vested in the President of the United States.

Mr. Nash was quite receptive - Dr. Evarts was non-committal

Note - Mr. Hopkins please to do with this memo as he may see fit. E. J. King
Mr. Harry Hopkins
Via Captain McCrea
Personal
Delivered to the Navy
22 in January
41 " February
51 " March
Est. 40 " April

Above all Combatant Ships of all types.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT AND MATERIAL
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

April 2, 1942

For: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Patrol Craft.

There is enclosed herewith a statement, as of April 1, covering the 110' and 173' submarine chasers and the yachts undergoing conversion at Navy Yards.

At the bottom of page 4 you will find a summary showing that 24 of the PC boats are completed, that 36 more are scheduled for completion before May 1st, and that 10 vessels are appended to the list without exact completion dates, but they may be ready for delivery by May 1st.

J. W. Powell

Enclosure.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Estimated Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC499</td>
<td>Fishers Boat Works (Pancake)</td>
<td>Chicago, Ill.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC513</td>
<td>Quincy Adams Yacht Company</td>
<td>Quincy, Mass.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC508</td>
<td>Mathis Yacht Company</td>
<td>Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC500</td>
<td>Fisher Boat Works</td>
<td>Chicago, Ill.</td>
<td>April 1, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC536</td>
<td>Peterson Boat Works (Pancake)</td>
<td>Sturgeon, Wis.</td>
<td>April 2, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC521</td>
<td>Annapolis Yacht Company</td>
<td>Annapolis, Md.</td>
<td>April 2, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC505</td>
<td>Luders Marine Constr. Co.</td>
<td>Stamford, Conn.</td>
<td>April 3, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC515</td>
<td>Elizabeth City Shipyard</td>
<td>Elizabeth City, N.C.</td>
<td>April 4, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC514</td>
<td>Quincy Adams Yacht Company</td>
<td>Quincy, Mass.</td>
<td>April 6, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC503</td>
<td>Rice Bros.</td>
<td>E. Boothbay, Me.</td>
<td>April 6, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC524</td>
<td>Mathis Yacht Co.</td>
<td>Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>April 7, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC537</td>
<td>Peterson Boat Works (Pancake)</td>
<td>Sturgeon, Wis.</td>
<td>April 9, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC522</td>
<td>Annapolis Yacht Company</td>
<td>Annapolis, Md.</td>
<td>April 10, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC506</td>
<td>Luders Marine Constr. Co.</td>
<td>Stamford, Conn.</td>
<td>April 10, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC516</td>
<td>Elizabeth City Shipyard</td>
<td>Elizabeth City, N.C.</td>
<td>April 11, 1942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Submersible Chasers - 110' Long

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PC604</td>
<td>Rice Bros.</td>
<td>N. Boothbay, No.</td>
<td>April 13, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC638</td>
<td>Quincy Adams Yacht Yard</td>
<td>Quincy, Mass.</td>
<td>April 13, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC636</td>
<td>Peterson Boat Works (Pancake)</td>
<td>Sturgeon, Wis.</td>
<td>April 16, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC617</td>
<td>Elizabeth City Shipyard</td>
<td>Elizabeth City, N.C.</td>
<td>April 19, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC611</td>
<td>American Cruiser Co.</td>
<td>Detroit, Mich.</td>
<td>April 20, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC662</td>
<td>Fisher Boat Works (Pancake)</td>
<td>Detroit, Mich.</td>
<td>April 20, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC672</td>
<td>W. E. Abrams Shipyard, Inc.</td>
<td>Hailesite, L.I., N.Y.</td>
<td>April 20, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC655</td>
<td>Mathis Yacht Co.</td>
<td>Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>April 23, 1942</td>
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<tr>
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<td>April 25, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC653</td>
<td>Fisher Boat Works (Pancake)</td>
<td>Detroit, Mich.</td>
<td>April 30, 1942</td>
</tr>
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<td>PC618</td>
<td>Elizabeth City Shipyard</td>
<td>Elizabeth City, N.C.</td>
<td>April 30, 1942</td>
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<td>PC636</td>
<td>Mathis Yacht Company</td>
<td>Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>April 30, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC629</td>
<td>Quincy Adams Yacht Yard</td>
<td>Quincy, Mass.</td>
<td>April 30, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Estimated Completion Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC619</td>
<td>Vinyard Shipbuilding Company</td>
<td>Milford, Del.</td>
<td>April 30, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC620</td>
<td>Vinyard Shipbuilding Company</td>
<td>Milford, Del.</td>
<td>May 13, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC497</td>
<td>Rice Bros.</td>
<td>Rockport, Texas</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC601</td>
<td>Seabrook Yacht Company</td>
<td>Seabrook, Texas</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC498</td>
<td>Rice Bros.</td>
<td>Rockport, Texas</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC530</td>
<td>Rice Bros.</td>
<td>Rockport, Texas</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC502</td>
<td>Seabrook Yacht Corp.</td>
<td>Seabrook, Texas</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC507</td>
<td>Mathis Yacht Company</td>
<td>Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC508</td>
<td>Mathis Yacht Company</td>
<td>Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC529</td>
<td>Mathis Yacht Company</td>
<td>Camden, N.J.</td>
<td>?</td>
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</table>

20 Subchaser - 170 feet long

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>PC474</td>
<td>Defoe Shipbuilding Company</td>
<td>Bay City, Mich.</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC475</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC476</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC480</td>
<td>Bravo Corporation</td>
<td>Neville, Pa.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC496</td>
<td>Leathers Smith Coal &amp; Shipbd. Co.</td>
<td>Sturgeon Bay, Wisc.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Estimated Completion Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC477</td>
<td>Defoe Shipbuilding Company</td>
<td>Bay City, Mich.</td>
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<td>PC478</td>
<td>Defoe Shipbuilding Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC479</td>
<td>Defoe Shipbuilding Company</td>
<td>Bay City, Mich.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC483</td>
<td>Consolidated Shipbuilding Company</td>
<td>Morris Heights, N.Y.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC491</td>
<td>Bravo Corporation</td>
<td>Neville, Pa.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC492</td>
<td>Geo. Lawley &amp; Sons Corporation</td>
<td>Napanse, Mass.</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC570</td>
<td>Albina Engine &amp; Mach. Works</td>
<td>Portland, Oregon</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC484</td>
<td>Consolidated Shipbuilding Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC485</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC491</td>
<td>Bravo Corporation</td>
<td>Neville, Pa.</td>
<td>April 11, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC492</td>
<td>Geo. Lawley &amp; Sons Corporation</td>
<td>Napanse, Mass.</td>
<td>April 14, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC590</td>
<td>Leathem Smith Coal &amp; Shipbuilders Co.</td>
<td>Sturgeon Bay, Wisc.</td>
<td>April 20, 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC495</td>
<td>Bravo Corporation</td>
<td>Wilmington, Del.</td>
<td>April 24, 1942</td>
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</table>

Completed: 7 - 110', 1 - 155', 18 - 173', Total 26, 31 - 110' by 5/13/42, 8 - 110' by (t), 6 - 173' by 4/28/42.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YACHTS CONVERTED FOR PATROL CRAFT</th>
<th>Estimated Completion Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>USS Name</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALABASTER</td>
<td>FYc31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BERYL</td>
<td>FY23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FC826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AZURITE</td>
<td>FY22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYTHERA</td>
<td>FY26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>COLLEEN }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KROMAR IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MISPAH }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SKAFORTH }</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TANNIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOLITE</td>
<td>FYc24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JET</td>
<td>FYc20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERIDOT</td>
<td>FYc18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RHODOLITE</td>
<td>FYc19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAN BERNARDINO</td>
<td>PC59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OLIVIN</td>
<td>FYc22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yachts</td>
<td>USS Name</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLYMOUTH</td>
<td>P337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARNET</td>
<td>FYc12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCASITE</td>
<td>PT28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PTc26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAUMONT</td>
<td>P960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRASOL</td>
<td>PT27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARD</td>
<td>PTc23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:

While this is wholly unverified, it might be worthwhile to fit a PBY in Freetown with a search light and go into this locality on a clear night and try to find a German submarine on the surface.

F.D.R.

Cable from Dakar, Flexer, April 19, 115 re unverified reports re submarines sheltered nights off French Guinea.
Y.T.L.

L.B.P. - 105'-0"  
Max. Beam 32'-0"  
Full Load Displacement 286 (Landing) Draft for'd 3'-1 3/4"  
" aft 3'-9 3/4"

Light Displacement 12½ tons  
Cruising Radius 500 miles  
Speed 9 knots  
Armament - none  
Cargo - 6 medium tanks or 3 Heavy Tanks

LANDING LIGHTER (Bureau Type)

Length 50'-0"  
Beam 15'-9"  
Draft loaded 3'-6"  
Speed 10 to 11 miles per hour  
Capacity 60,000 (1 medium tank)  
Cruising Radius 240 miles  
Weight 50,000#  
Armament - none

LANDING LIGHTER (Higgins Type)

Length 50'-0"  
Beam 14'-0"  
Draft 3'-6"  
Weight 50,000#  
Speed 9 to 10 miles per hour  
Capacity 60,000 (1 medium tank)  
Cruising Radius 60 miles  
Armament - none
A.T.L.

L.B.P. - 316'-0"
Max. Beam - 50'-0"
Full Load Displacement - 3,775 tons  Drafts F.-7'-3" A 13'-6"
Light Operating Displacement - 1,412 tons  " F.-1'-1" A 7'-5"
Landing Displacement - 2,140 tons  " F.-3'-0" A 9'-4"

Armament - 6 - 20 mm.
Protection - Splinter
Speed - 11 knots  - Diesel - 2 - 900 H.P. Engines
Cruising Radius 5,000 miles at 10 knots (additional tankage 12,000 miles available.)
Cargo - 500 tons
Carry 20 Med. Tanks or 10 heavy tanks.

Note. In ocean condition ship can carry one Y.T.L. on Deck or (15 Army Trucks.)
A. P. M.

LBP - 454' - 0"

B(Max) - 72' - 0"

Full Load Displacement - 7100 Mean 14.5' drafts - Fl4.6' A 14.6"

Light Service Displacement - 5850 Mean 12.3" - Fl0.8' A 13.8"

Armament: 1 - 3"/50
8 - 20 M M.

Protection - Splinter for P.H. and gun emplacements

Speed - 16 knots - Steam - Turb - Uniflow

Cruiser Radius - 8,000 Mi. @ 15 kts.

Variable Loads -
14 - 50' TLs each with a 28 T med tank
or 2 - 190' TLCs 10"
or 2 - 183' 10" TLs 6"
or 3 - 105' YTLs 6"

Also will carry on upper deck 10 - 2½ Ton capacity trucks with each of above combinations.
50 FT. TANK LIGHTER
PORT QUARTER VIEW
CONTRACT NO. 93507
HIGGINS INDUSTRIES, INC.
NEW ORLEANS, LA, U.S.A.
4-25-42
36' RAMP TYPE LANDING BOAT
PORT BOW VIEW - FULL SPEED
CONTRACT NO. 85065
HIGGINS INDUSTRIES INC.
NEW ORLEANS, LA, U.S.A.
4-29-42
37' SUPPORT BOAT
EUREKA TYPE
BROADSIDE VIEW
BOAT DEAD IN WATER
CONTRACT NO. 85065 (OPTION NO.1)
HIGGINS INDUSTRIES INC.
NEW ORLEANS, LA, U.S.A.
4-24-42
Dear Mr. President:

I suggest you take the position on the telegraph merger bill that we allow Western Union and Postal Telegraph (with its cables) to merge, but nothing else at this time, as it is too big a subject to handle without serious detriment to the war effort. If we go all the way on mergers, there will be constant hearings, negotiations, here and abroad, and much detailed work, and we are all going the limit now, including the company officials.

Only good can come from delay, except Western Union and Postal Telegraph.

Another thing, we in the Executive Branch are none too confident of the knowledge and judgment of the Federal Communications Commission. They lack the background of the Executive Branch.

Respectfully,

S. C. Hooper,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy.

The President,

The White House.
Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Report on Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted men in active service on April 30, 1942, is as indicated below. For basis of comparison the actual number in active service on March 31, 1942, is also included.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>April 30, 1942</th>
<th>March 31, 1942</th>
<th>Net Gain for Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulars</td>
<td>258,465</td>
<td>254,681</td>
<td>3,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Men</td>
<td>5,903</td>
<td>5,438</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Reserve</td>
<td>9,455</td>
<td>9,516</td>
<td>loss (-) 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reserve</td>
<td>208,130</td>
<td>174,259</td>
<td>33,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>481,953</strong></td>
<td><strong>443,894</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,059</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Very respectfully,

James Forestal

The President
The White House
9:30 P. M.
13 May 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following message has been received by the Navy Department from Admiral Hoover:

Admiral Robert has agreed to the immobilization of French Naval Vessels at Martinique, and guarantees the ships will not move. He will take out fuel now. The Commander of Task Force 26.3 (Admiral Hoover) will return to San Juan and he desires to remove the containing force now.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
The White House
Washington

5-15-42

Memorandum for the President:

Newspaper headlines say Berlin claims U. S. Cruiser of Pensacola class, destroyer probably American, ice-breaker and merchant ship sunk by Luftwaffe in Arctic convoy battle.

Nothing is known in the Navy Department as to the truth of the above claims.

Captain McCrea
1:30 p.m.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON
May 21, 1942

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To: All Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department.

Subject: Asst. Chief of Naval Operations (Air) Assignment of Duties.
Reference: (g) CNO ltr. FF1/A3-1 Serial 1212 of May 15, 1942.

1. In furtherance of reference (a), there is hereby established in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, under the immediate direction of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air and Aviation Division (Op-40)). A naval aviator of appropriate rank will be ordered as Director, Aviation Division, and will perform such duties as may be assigned by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air).

2. (a) The functions of the following divisions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, insofar as they pertain to aviation matters, are transferred to the Aviation Division:

   Fleet Maintenance (Aircraft Material) (Op-23-H)
   Naval Vessels and Aircraft Division (Op-38-E)
   Naval Transportation Service (Op-39-E)

   (b) The officer and civil personnel of the above divisions, hitherto performing the functions transferred by this order, are hereby assigned to the Aviation Division.

   (c) Those functions of the Plans Division (Op-12) having to do with liaison with other governmental agencies dealing with aviation, are transferred to the Aviation Division, as is membership on the Aeronautical Board. One of the Naval Aviators on duty in the Plans Division will be transferred to the Aviation Division.

   (d) All other aviation functions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations will remain as at present, but Directors of Divisions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations will take action to insure the coordination of such functions with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air) through the Aviation Division.

3. The title of the Naval Vessels and Aircraft Division (Op-38) is hereby changed to the Naval Vessels Division (Op-38).

4. Pending the allocation of space to the Aviation Division, personnel will continue to occupy space at present assigned.

(Signed) F. J. Horne.
May 28, 1942.

COPY MADE AND SENT TO MR. GLOVER BY
DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

G. G. T.
March 12, 1942.

Dear Frank:—

I have been very much touched by Admiral Bristol's letter in regard to the heroic conduct of the people of the little town of St. Lawrence in Newfoundland.

It would be possible for us to erect a memorial or to do something useful by way of thanks to them without going to Congress, but I am inclined to think that it would be a finer token of gratitude if an item could be included in the next naval deficiency bill, providing an appropriation of $50,000 in expression of the gratitude of the people of the United States in general, and of the United States Navy in particular, for their bravery in saving the lives of so many of our American naval personnel. I am inclined to think that the wording of the appropriation should be something like this:

"In token of the appreciation of the United States of America to the people of St. Lawrence, Newfoundland, for their heroic action in saving the lives of many of the officers and men of USS POLLUX and USS TRUXTON, wrecked near there 1942; the sum of $50,000 for the erection of a hospital, dispensary or other similar permanent good of the community."

Always sincerely,

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. BRADY:

MR. GLOVER - EXTENSION 3515 - NAVY

Is asking that the Navy Department be allowed to have the letter from Admiral Bristol which is attached to the letter from the Sec. of Navy to the President on March 5, 1942. This letter relates to the rescue of sailors from the USS POLLUX and the USS TRUXTON off the coast of St. Lawrence, N.F. The President wrote letter to Navy requesting Navy to obtain appropriation to erect memorial and Navy wishes the letter from Admiral Bristol to use before the APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE of the HOUSE today.

Will you please advise Mr. Glover if he may have the letter.

Irene L. Fencoast
Files
Confidential

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Some time when you have a minute, I think you would enjoy reading the attached memorandum from Admiral Bristol.

My first reaction is to try to find some rich man who would like to build a little hospital up there on behalf of the Navy as a memorial to the people of St. Lawrence. Possibly, however, it might be better to try to get a small appropriation from Congress for the purpose. What do you think?

[Signature]

Attachment

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 3-9-57
Signature: Carl S. Speer
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of the Navy
from Rear Admiral A.L. Bristol, U.S. Navy.

1. The recent loss of two of our ships on the Newfoundland
Coast has left me with a feeling that we owe an eternal debt of grati-
tude to the people of the little town of St. Lawrence, situated on the
west side of Placentia Bay. The tale is now fairly complete and out
of it all the fact stands out that without the prompt, efficient, and
tireless effort of these people only a handful of our men would have
been saved. Furthermore, of the number rescued, few would have re-
covered from the effects of immersion and cold had it not been for the
manner in which these people gave further assistance. They took off
their own clothes on the spot in order to clothe our men, and in
addition brought from their houses all the articles of clothing which
they could gather.

2. It is impossible to describe the scene of the catastrophe
unless one has been there. It is some of the worst terrain that I've
ever encountered. There was no road nearby and the physical effort
necessary in the rescue operations is almost beyond comprehension.

3. I hope that I'm not being too sentimental, but I would
like to see some lasting tribute paid to these people as a token of
gratitude from our Navy or from the people of the United States.
I'm afraid that I have no personal knowledge as to how such things are done or started, or even whether the idea is practical. I assume that eventually some memorial will be erected to the officers and men lost. In the normal course of events it would possibly take the form of some monument at the burial ground on the Navy leased land at Argentia. I can't help thinking how much better it would be if anything, which might eventually be done, was done now and took the form of something practical in the town of St. Lawrence. What follows is simply an idea of my own and of which I have not spoken.

4. I'm attaching a road map of Newfoundland, marked to show the scene of the grounding. You will note that this is an isolated series of small communities, connected by a single road. Their only communications with the rest of Newfoundland is by water. The people are a hardy race of English and Irish descent, quiet, dignified, and reserved; also, hard to know and very sensitive. Almost without exception they are poor and with few possessions.

5. The Newfoundland Government maintains a primitive hospital service under the Department of Public Health. Prior to our taking over at Argentia, one of these small hospitals was
maintained at this base. It is my understanding that there is none
in the area in question and that these people formerly used the one
at Argentina. It occurs to me that a fitting tribute would be a small
equipped hospital at St. Lawrence to be given by the U.S.; to fit into
the Newfoundland chain; to be erected in memory of the officers and men
of the POLLUX and TRUXTUN and as a tribute to the courage and gener-
osity of the people of St. Lawrence. As stated, I have done nothing
about this and have none of the details in hand. It would have to be
done of course through the Newfoundland Government, if acceptable to
them.

6. I might add that 99 years is a long time and that
presumable the Navy will be here after the war under totally different
conditions. I believe that something of this kind would go far toward
cementing lasting profitable relationship.

7. I am writing this memorandum because I confess that I
am totally ignorant as to the whys and wherefores and the ways and
means of anything of this kind.

A. L. Bristol.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

I have your letter of March 12 concerning some sort of memorial for the people of St. Lawrence, Newfoundland.

Adopting the suggestion your letter contains and which I thoroughly approve, I am instructing Admiral Allen, in the preparation of our next naval deficiency bill, to include this item in it.

I think the wording of the appropriation which you provide in your note fits the situation exactly and I will instruct that it be used in the drafting of the bill.

[Signature]
Newfoundland’s Salmon Fishing—The Sport of Kings

Hordes of silvery Atlantic salmon bottle their way up Newfoundland’s rivers, clear rivers ascending, seeking out the spawning grounds at the headwaters and the fertile estuaries. The skill of the king of sport, the sport of kings, is expected to test the greatest skill in fishing. No wonder Newfoundland is a fisherman’s paradise.

The salmon, a fresh-water fish, is like the trout in blood and habits. But while the trout remained sedentary, the salmon roamed, seeking more food, more room, more worlds to conquer. The ocean, pounding of the doorstep of the river in which he was born, provided a happy hunting ground for the satisfaction of his wanderlust. The unlimited food supply of the sea gave him size and strength and energy for the hard swim back to his native stream where he must return to spawn.

Not many regions are suited to this migratory existence of the salmon. There must be pure, cold waters with a slow current, unimpeded by dams, mills, or other obstructions. Newfoundland offers a perfect environment for this grand game fish. Entirely surrounded by ocean water into which flow over two hundred river streams, the island produces untold quantities of salmon every year.

Salmon start up the rivers on their annual migration sometime in May or June. The exact dates vary with the localities, but the start of the run which may continue for two months or more, can be predicted almost to the day for any specific stream. The fish work their way up against the current, reaching the spawning grounds by fall.

The salmon may remain at the headwaters and pass the winter in deep pools, returning on the higher waters of the next spring. At this time they are known as black salmon, or kelts, and are not as good eating as when they are fresh out of the sea. Tinned and frozen for their upward migration.

REGULATIONS AND LICENSES

The salmon fishing season extends from May 1 to September 30. Licences are issued by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans for a period of 30 days at $12.50 for the season. Newfoundland has wisely prohibited the hunting of salmon in river estuaries. The annual salmon catch in Newfoundland is small enough to remember that fishing is a sport and fishermen are protecting their resources.

Hotels, boarding houses, and cabins are available near the most popular fishing centers, and compañeros will find plenty of sheltered places near salmon rivers. Licensed guides, wise in the habits of Atlantic salmon, are prepared to help anglers select the right tackle and locate the best pools.

There’s no mystery about salmon fishing. Salmon and trout are both found in the same type water, but the trout rolls up in a pool, just ahead of where the fish breaks, and is much better for salmon than for trout. Trout fish are often short, and can catch salmon. The main difference is that salmon lead through the stream, rather than in the brood. But that extra distance adds to the sport of fishing over a salmon for a longer time, and is considered inadvisable. In most Newfoundland waters, no angler can spot salmon resting in a pool. But he can tell by their movements, on coming out over him. Then, after the first thrashing tug on the line, the exhilarating battle begins.

SUGGESTIONS AS TO TACKLE

Selection of tackle depends considerably on the fisherman’s own judgment. Many still cling to the old-fashioned, two-handled salmon rod, which runs from 15 to 18 feet in length. Especially popular in 4’s and 6’s, and an assortment of the leading patterns in these sizes will prove effective at any time. Add a few large and a few small flies for exceptionally high or very low water. Popular patterns in wet flies are Hattie Miller, Black Bloke, Flashy Brown, Silver Doctor, Thunder and Lightning, Pommenehpee Belle, Monarch, Cinnamon, Silver Grey, Gorgon, and Haave’s Em.

Tackle, as well as flies, fishing outfits, and supplies, can be procured at many places on the island.

A helpful introduction to the island’s fishing waters is "The Salmon Rivers of Newfoundland" by C.R. Palmer, a 270-page book available through the Newfoundland Tourist Development Board, St. John’s, Newfoundland, or its U.S.A. branch office, the Newfoundland Information Bureau, 50 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N. Y. In addition to data on tackle, conditions, accommodations, and seasons, the book includes numerous interesting drawings locating pools along several score rivers.

NO OVERCROWDING HERE

Where is the best fishing in Newfoundland? Almost every stream has its share of the big fellows, and anglers who like to explore wild, unspoiled country can cast their lines in waters which are practically untouched for an entire season, especially along the southwestern and southern coastlines.

But plenty of excellent fishing waters flow along more accessible coastlines by motor roads, railways, or coastal steamers. The most popular west coast waters are the Humber, Harry’s River, the Great Codroy, and the Little Codroy, while over to the east coast are the Roche’s River, Nain, and a couple of River, which attract many enthusiasts. All rivers mentioned here can be reached by road on the map on the upper left side of the map.

The mighty Humber, possibly the greatest salmon river on the island, offers an almost unbroken series of water and unparalleled scenery for a background. The lower stretch, from Bay of Islands to Roche’s River, is open to the sea. Harry’s River, on the other hand, offers more attractive scenery and nature for most anglers. The upper stretch, from Bay of Islands to Deer Lake, is heavy, deep water, with its low banks on the right, and its high, rocky cliffs on the left.

Beacons up to 45 pounds can be taken along the Humber from June to the season’s close. Harry’s River is smaller and more accessible than the Humber, paralleling the railroad for 25 miles from Bay St. George’s to St. George’s Lake. June, July, and August are good months on this river.

Further south, on the west coast flow two more abundant salmon rivers: the Great Codroy and Little Codroy, located 25 and 30 miles respectively from Port aux Basques. The Great Codroy splits into two branches, the North and South, about 15 miles from the mouth. The main river and both branches, which are far above the salt, contain numerous large, productive pools. The Little Codroy is a comparatively small stream, the section generally fished extending only about four or five miles upstream from the railroad bridge. Many salmon have been taken from its waters.

The Terra Nova, flowing northeast into Bonavista Bay near the east coast, is in fact a large river with salmon up to 30 pounds in the pools extending from the mouth to the river in the seven miles upstream.

The Grand Codroy and Exploits Rivers are the three longest on the island. The Grand Codroy runs over 100 miles long, and the favorite salmon fishing stretch is from the outlet of the Exploits River at Gander Lake to the sea, a distance of 25 miles.

Many other fine salmon streams branch off along Newfoundland’s deep-water coast line. On the west coast, between Grand Codroy and Harry’s River, in the Serpentine and Fox Island Rivers with several miles of excellent water running to the sea, the salmon fishing remains excellent. The Serpentine River has many accessible streams, including Bottom Brook, George’s River, Robinson’s River, Crabbe’s River, and Highlands River. Flat Bay Brook is a good summer stream, at its best during July and August. Fishers’ River and Middle Burachs Brook, on the other hand, have very early runs, starting as early as the latter part of May. The salmon are plentiful, but relatively small, averaging around three or four pounds.

SOUTH AND EAST COAST WATERS

Numerous salmon rivers flow into bays and inlets along the south coast, most of them rather inaccessible except by boat from the sea. The Grotto Bay River, La Pala River, Grundy’s Brook, White Bear River, and Little, or Grey, River are all flowing through prohibitively rough and bushy country.

Outstanding rivers along the east coast, in addition to the Terra Nova and the Grand, are the Gault River at the Village of Gambo and the Exploits River, which has many pleasant tributaries such as Denny Brook and Great and Little Running Brooks. Further north on the east coast flows Indian Brook, a delightful salmon stream with excellent pools. July and August are the best fishing months in these rivers.

Several beautiful streams winding their way down the south coast, particularly that near the foot of the mountain, are easily reached from St. John’s. From the end of June to the close of the season, salmon up to 15 pounds can be taken from these.

A small but picturesque salmon fishing ground is to be found at the mouth of the Flat Bay River, at Flat Bay, from a few miles above the mouth to the sea, with salmon up to 40 pounds.
SECRET

Report of the

Solomon Island Campaign - Makin Island Diversion.

Property of

The President.

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- Carl S. Sriver
From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.  
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.  
Subject: Solomon Island Campaign - Makin Island Diversion.  
Enclosures: (A) Comtask group 7.15 secret ltr. SS168/A16-3/(037) dated August 24, 1942.  
(B) Task Unit 7.15.3 secret ltr. dated August 21, 1942.  
(C) Comsubpac secret ltr. FFL2-10/A16-3/(01002) dated September 3, 1942.  

1. The raid on Makin Island on 17-18 August was planned to destroy enemy forces and installations, to gain information, and primarily to create a diversion confusing Japanese plans and diverting forces from the stronger concentrations being assembled to attack Guadalcanal in late August. It succeeded in all its purposes, inflicting loss of planes, ships, supplies, and men, and diverted ships and aircraft, by causing the formation of a Makin relief force.

2. In the raid Japanese losses were:
   1. 3500 ton AP or AK
   2. 1500 ton FT
   3. 2 seaplanes
   4. 100-150 men

   Radio stations, stores of gasoline and other equipment and material.

3. This loss was inflicted at the cost of 30 of our Marine raiders killed in action and drowned, and much of the raiding force equipment.

4. NARRATIVE. The account of the expedition as told by the enclosed reports needs little amplification or adjustment of conflicting observations; hence this section of the report is limited to a brief summary.

5. The Second Raider Battalion had been conducting extensive training for some weeks in the Hawaiian Islands. Part of the units had participated in the Battle of Midway and others had trained on that island afterwards. Immediately preceding the Makin Island landing they had trained in handling rubber boats in surf and had made several night landings on Oahu from submarines.

-1-
6. Two hundred and twenty-two officers and men of the raider battalion embarked in NAUTILUS and ARGONAUT and sailed from Pearl Harbor at 0900 (9½) 8 August. The voyage was uneventful, the submarines being able to run on the surface most of the time thereby making the ships habitable despite the large number of men carried. NAUTILUS, proceeding at higher speed in order to reconnoitre, made landfall on Little Makin Island at 0200 (-12), 16 August, and conducted a periscope reconnaissance. (All times hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, are Zero-12).

7. At 2116, 16 August, ARGONAUT and NAUTILUS joined at the rendezvous in spite of heavy rainfall and proceeded to the debarkation point. It was a clear night with scattered clouds, wind NE, force 4, raising moderate swells. At 0200, 17 August, the raider force commenced embarking in boats.

8. The plan called for assembly alongside NAUTILUS so that all boats might get underway together. The onshore wind and current drove the NAUTILUS toward the reef so that she frequently had to go ahead to keep clear. As a result boats could not keep alongside. Some boats from NAUTILUS had to take off troops from ARGONAUT and return to NAUTILUS. Many of the outboard motors would not start, adding to the difficulty of keeping boats assembled. The roar of the surf and the wash of the swell through the limber holes of the NAUTILUS drowned out orders.

9. After assembling off NAUTILUS, the force planned to proceed to two separate beaches for landing. Because of communication difficulties and some confusion among the boats, the Marine Commanding Officer ordered all troops to land on a single beach. They cleared the submarines and landed at 0500 on schedule, negotiating the surf easily. Fifteen of the eighteen boats landed together, with two others nearby. The remaining boat did not receive the change order and went to the beach originally assigned, to the south. It contained a Lieutenant and eleven men who were behind the enemy's lines throughout the day's fighting and inflicted considerable damage, at a cost of three men killed.

10. Boats had not been assembled in waves with each unit together, hence the various platoons were mixed in landing, and re-organization on the beach was necessary. Before this was completed, one man accidentally fired his gun. This was about 0530; dawn was just beginning to break.

11. Realizing that the alarm had been given, the Commanding Officer despatched one company to the other side of the island (less than ½ mile). In a few minutes this company reported having reached Government Wharf, near the northern edge of the settlement of Butaritari. This company was then deployed to advance down the island and the other company held in reserve. Meanwhile, voice radio communication had been established with the submarines.
Subject: Solomon Island Campaign - Makin Island Diversion.

12. In a few minutes the Japanese were contacted and by 0630 firing was general along the front. Natives, who were universally friendly, reported where Japanese troops were concentrated. The submarines were requested to fire on one of these groups and NAUTILUS responded promptly, firing 24 rounds in an area about one mile long. ARGONAUT did not fire for fear of bombarding own troops. At this time the shore force reported range and bearing from Government Wharf of two ships in the harbor and requested that they be taken under fire. NAUTILUS opened fire at 0716 but communication with the shore went out almost immediately so that there were no spots. Salvos were laddered widely in range and bearing, 46 rounds being expended. Both ships were hit and set on fire, and later sunk. One was a 3500 ton AP or AK which the natives stated quartered sixty marines.

13. The Japanese were prepared for a raid, probably because of a general alert following our landing in the Solomons. They took strong positions with machine guns, grenade throwers, automatic rifles, and a flame thrower. Well camouflaged snipers secured in the tops of coconut trees, where natives said they had been for three days, were the most difficult problem. They could not be brought down until the fronds concealing them were sawed off by machine gun fire. Snipers and machine gun fire killed eleven men on the Marine right flank and stopped the advance until about 1130. At that time a platoon of the reserve company was deployed on the left and slow progress resumed. This platoon had no casualties in the fighting.

14. Soon after NAUTILUS completed firing, ARGONAUT dive on false plane contact and NAUTILUS followed. They surfaced at about 1000, re-established voice radio with the land force, and upon request were preparing to resume fire on the ships which had not yet sunk when a biplane was sighted. Both ships made emergency dives at 1039. NAUTILUS surfaced at 1255 but immediately dived again when 12 plane appeared. Thereafter the submarines remained submerged until near sunset when danger from aircraft was considered past.

15. Three groups of planes appeared over the island during the day. Two biplanes, one of which had driven the submarine down, flew over the Marine Force at 1130. After reconnoitering for fifteen minutes, they dropped bombs and departed. The next group of 12 planes was sighted by forces ashore at 1320; four were seaplanes, two large and two medium. One each of these landed in the lagoon where both were destroyed by machine gun and 55 caliber anti-tank rifle fire. Natives reported that the large seaplane had brought thirty-five Japanese reinforcements. After bombing and strafing for over an hour, the remaining planes departed.
Subject: Solomon Island Campaign - Makin Island Diversion.

16. Because of the report of reinforcements, the conclusion that the next flight would bring more, and the fact that snipers were still troublesome, the Marine Commanding Officer decided to withdraw the center and right of his line, hoping to bring snipers out of the heavy foliage protecting them. This he did; but the snipers did not advance. As he states the principal gain was that when a third of the planes attacked at about 1630 they concentrated on the area his troops had vacated and the area beyond where Japanese resistance had been strongest. Our troops suffered no casualties from any of the air attacks this day.

17. Although the mission of destruction of enemy forces and installations had not been completed, after the last bombing the raider commander decided to withdraw according to plan. The appointed time of departure was approaching and he considered that it was necessary to fall back slowly so as to permit an orderly embarkation into the boats. It appears that there were only a few Japanese soldiers left alive, yet such is the effect of boldness in a few resolute men that is seemed to the raider commander at this time that he was still opposed by a large force.

18. The withdrawal was accomplished without enemy attack. Embarkation in rubber boats was carried out as planned, but new came the major disaster and major good fortune of the expedition. Motors would not start. When the boats reached the surf, which had been easily transited that morning, they were forced back or turned over. For an hour the Marines struggled desperately to get through. Equipment and clothes were lost. Men jumped into the water trying to push the boats through the short, sharp surf, only for the most part to be forced to give up in exhaustion and return ashore. Several were probably drowned at this time. Hardly more than one-third of the men reached the two submarines. The remaining 120 men assembled on the beach with a little equipment salvaged from the water, set up sentries, and waited miserably in the rain for dawn and another attempt to pass the surf. At 2100 one of the sentries encountered a Japanese patrol of eight men and killed three of them before falling seriously wounded by a shot through the chest. Because of the possibility of Japanese reinforcements in the morning, prospects looked dreary.

19. NAUTILUS and ARGONAUT waited off the appointed beach throughout the night. At daybreak boats were again loaded and set against the surf. Several containing a total of about fifty men got through. Volunteers in one boat returned from NAUTILUS to the surf with a line throwing gun and with a message that though the submarines might be forced down by aircraft they would return, and would remain as long as necessary to remove all troops ashore. The boat had scarcely delivered its message when ARGONAUT submerged on false contact and NAUTILUS followed. They surfaced about 0900 but were almost immediately forced down again, this time by true radar contacts. The boat from the NAUTILUS with its volunteer crew of five men was strafed by one of the planes and its crew probably killed. One man from ashore who had decided to swim to the the NAUTILUS arrived exhausted just as she went down. He was at "the limit of his endurance" but nevertheless swam back ashore.
20. Japanese planes were over the atoll much of the day from about 0920 to 1730. Four large flights bombed and strafed the length of the main island, the smaller island to the north, and Little Makin to the south. Our forces remained under cover during the bombing and received no casualties except for those strafed in the rubber boat.

21. With no chance of reaching the submarines during daylight, the Marines on the beach turned back ashore; and now the good fortune of their disaster was revealed. As patrols spread out over the island they discovered that contrary to the opinion of the previous evening there was no strong resistance remaining. In fact, there was practically none. On the "front" Japanese were lying dead around their machine guns or behind palm trees which had been cleanly pierced by our .50 caliber AP bullets. Throughout the day only two snipers were encountered. They were shot. Total enemy dead counted on the field of battle was 83. These with personnel on the two sunken ships, resulted in a total loss to the enemy of 100 to 150 men.

22. Patrols fired gasoline stowage of 700 to 1000 barrels, destroyed the main radio station, and carried out other demolition. No heavy gun fortification existed. When the submarines reappeared off the landing beach at 1930 they were requested to proceed to the quieter water at the lagoon entrance. A sloop in the harbor had appeared to be likely transportation for our troops but on inspection, after a single Japanese Marine defending it was killed, it was found unseaworthy. Remaining rubber boats and a native outrigger were used, the submarines being reached at 2330, 18 August, after nearly two days ashore.

23. The return journey was without event except for the excellent surgery of the accompanying Navy doctors under difficult conditions. NAUTILUS moored at Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, about noon, 25 August, and ARGONAUT at 1245 (0:12), 26 August.

CONCLUSIONS

24. Submarines were excellently handled and proved themselves well suited for raider operations; however, they need several changes to improve habitability. Humidity and heat were severe even though additional air conditioning units had been provided. It would have been impossible to take care of the large number of men aboard with existing equipment had most of the cruise not been made on the surface. ARGONAUT is now being converted into a submarine transport, with necessary changes to make her more suitable for prolonged cruising with a large number of men aboard.
25. The raider loading and landing plan had several defects which should be eliminated in subsequent operations. A single unit with all boats should be in one ship. Units should load in boats in desired landing order, and boats should proceed in waves to the beach so that reorganization will not be necessary ashore. Frequent drill in this phase of landing is essential.

26. In raids of this nature which depend above all on surprise and swiftness of execution, the raiding force cannot let itself be tied down by position fighting. It must maintain mobility, striking rapidly, seeking to surprise and rout the enemy before they can recover and organize defenses. Should the force be pinned down by a "fire fight", it must continue offensive reconnaissance instead of retreating or remaining static. After the first part of the engagement, the raider force did not strike aggressively; for example, the platoon on the left flank suffered no casualties and made slow progress.

27. The plan of operations, including withdrawal, must be on a definite time schedule, as in the subject operations, it is necessary to coordinate the raid with the movements of ships. With effective anti-submarine measures the Japanese could have prevented the submarines from remaining an extra day.

28. Reconnaissance prior to landing must be extensive. Raiders landing without organization on the beach might have been stopped by a single machine gun. In addition to periscope reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance or information is desirable. In this operation is could have been obtained by landing a man ashore in advance of the raid.

29. Native reports should be considered with suspicion. The Japanese may have deliberately spread the rumor of reinforcements in order to influence the decisions of the raider commander. Active patrols would have given him sound information as to the location and strength of the enemy.

30. The old story is war of the importance of the offensive was again demonstrated. On the afternoon of August 17, had the raiding force sent out reconnaissance patrols and pushed forward instead of withdrawing, they would have discovered that the apparent heavy resistance was the fire of only a handful of men fighting to the death. They could have destroyed installations on the island and reembarked to their leisure, probably saving most of the loss of life from drowning and from strafing by planes on 18 August.

31. Radar was invaluable both for plane contacts and for navigation close to the beach in strange waters at night. SD radar picked up one group of planes at sixteen miles.
Subject: Solomon Island Campaign - Makin Island Diversion.

32. Communication appears to have been satisfactory between submarines but they had difficulty receiving messages from the port radio sets ashore, especially when these were carried across the island and were transmitting through trees. Similar experience in Guadalcanal confirms the need for an improved portable voice radio.

33. Diesel powered submarine boats would have been valuable on this expedition and will be carried in future ones.

34. A more rugged type of outboard motor than the Evinrude is needed. If better ones are available, it is requested that a suitable supply be obtained.

35. Several men, highly trained in handling boats through surf, should be attached to each raider unit.

36. Bombardment ammunition for 6" guns, under production at the time of this expedition, has now become available and is being supplied to submarines mounting this caliber of gun.

37. Japanese defense forces were very good at camouflage, were bold and resolute, and fought until killed. Apart from these excellent characteristics, however, they appear to have been inferior to our Marines. Their fire power was weak, their aim poor, and their dispositions faulty, most of the men being bunched so that they were killed in groups. With equal courage, approximately equal numbers, and equal boldness of leadership, our Marines will defeat the Japanese every time.

38. At no danger of too frequent repetition, the final recommendation of the raider commander, wrought from sore experience, is set down here again: "The night of August 17... emphasizes the truth that is as old as the military profession: No matter how bad your own situation may appear to be, there is always the possibility that the situation of the enemy is much worse." To this might be added another truth that a few resolute men seem like battalions.

39. Through the courage and endurance of the Marines and cool headed cooperation of submarine personnel, this expedition was successfully carried to completion against and by the aid of various chances of fortune. Losses were somewhat larger than they should have been but the goals of the expedition were achieved. Considerable damage was inflicted on the Japanese, and at a crucial time in the Solomon Islands operations they were forced to divert men, ships and planes to the relief of Makin Island.

C. W. NIMITZ.
Cincpae Pile
Pac-90-wb
AL6-3/MAXIN

Serial 03064

SECRET

Subject: Solomon Island Campaign - Makin Island Diversion.

Copy to:
Commandant, USMC
Comsubpac
Comamphibforpac
Comsocpac
Comamphibforsocpac
Comnwespac
Comnwespac
Comsubron FOUR
CO 2nd Marine Rdr. BN.
Comtaskgroup 7.15
Comtaskunit 7.15.3
CO ARGONAUT
CO NAUTILUS

/signed/
P. V. MERCÉR
Flag Secretary.
From: Commander Task Group 7.15.
To: Commander Task Force 7.
Subject: Report of Marine-Submarine Raider Expedition.
Reference: (a) CTF-7 Operation Order 71-42.
(b) CTG 7.15 Operation Order 1-42.

1. This report covering the execution of references (a) and (b) represents a summary of events, experiences and conclusions incident to the operation. Detailed reports of the activities of the individual Task Units will be submitted separately by their respective commanders. Certain figures given in this report are approximations (which will be indicated) due to lack of opportunity for free communication between the various units of the Task Groups subsequent to the start of the expedition and up to the time of submitting this report. It is believed however that sufficient information is in the hands of the group commander to permit submission of a reasonably accurate account and analysis of the operation at this time and it is accordingly so submitted.

2. The report is presented in the general form prescribed for war patrol reports of submarines of the Pacific Fleet with such departures therefrom as may be indicated.

NARRATIVE

The task group departed Pearl at 0900, August 8, 1942 and proceeded in company under escort until nightfall of that date after which time two submarine units proceeded independently.

The NAUTILUS being required to arrive at the destination earlier than the ARGONAUT in order to conduct a periscope reconnaissance of the objective, proceeded at best sustained surface speed, approximately 14.5 knots.

No contact with enemy forces was had en route and almost the entire trip was made on the surface, the day preceding arrival being the only one during which more than a hours submersion was resorted to. On that occasion the NAUTILUS was submerged from 0930 to 1700.

Landfall was made on Little Makin Atoll at 0300, August 16, all islands of the group being completely blacked-out, and submerged reconnaissance of the south eastern coast of the main island

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of Makin Atoll was begun at day break.

It was found that almost no distinguishing features existed other than some questionable tangents which crossed when within the limiting distance of two miles from the barrier reef in a very wide cut. By close observation however the set and drift of the current throughout the lagoon in which the landing was expected to be effected was determined and agreed in general with that described in the coast Pilot. It was found however to shift direction rapidly as the day wore on and accordingly no great confidence was placed in the data obtained.

Endeavor was also made to reconnoiter the shore off the alternate landing beach selected, but tide rips and strong currents off Ukiangong Point rendered this impracticable in the time remaining.

The rendezvous with the ARGONAUT at Point Airm was effected during a heavy rain squall at 2116, a fact which evidenced most excellent navigation on the part of that vessel, as current experienced en route was considerable and unpredictable.

After passing an operation order from a prospective attack on Little Makin Atoll to the ARGONAUT, the two vessels proceeded in company to the point of debarkation (Point Baker) the troops rigging boats and gear en route. Arrived at designated point at 0300. Weather at this time was clear with scattered clouds, wind N.E., force 4. A moderate swell was running from the eastward, but conditions for the landing were considered favorable.

The ship at this time was experiencing great difficulty in maintaining position due to a current of about 12 knots which set us continuously to the westward and in towards the reef. While the surf line could be faintly seen in the darkness, cuts on existing landmarks indicated the ship was within 500 yards of the reef and the commanding officer was forced to continually kick ahead to keep clear of it. As the boats were being put over at this time, it was impracticable to run out from the reef for any great distance.

Boats were cleared from the ship at scheduled time after some confusion due to the requirement that several of the boats from the ARGONAUT pick up personnel from the landing force of the
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NAUTILUS which interfered with the loading of the latter vessel's boats. The noise from the surf and the wash from the limber holes of the ship rendered enterboat communication by voice difficult and it was apparent that more detailed training and indoctrination in this phase of the operation is indicated for the future.

All boats were clear at the scheduled time however, and had been given the correct course allowing for current to take them to their respective landing beaches. It was subsequently learned that they departed en masse instead of in two groups as planned, due to the confusion aforementioned. They landed at beach Z at the scheduled time of 0500 except one boat which became detached and landed alone near beach Y, and two boats which landed north of the main body.

The submarines pulled clear of Point Baker and took position about 4 miles off the landing beaches. Communication by voice radio was established at 0513 with the Raider Unit.

At 0656 request was received from commanding officer raider unit to open fire with deck guns on lake area of Ukiangong Point. The NAUTILUS which was then on a southerly course complied at 0703, starting at the extreme end of the point and working down it about a mile. A total of twelve salvoes or 24 rounds were fired at this time. Fire was then checked as the group commander had ordered a reversal of course in order to avoid unmasking the supposed shore battery at Flink Point.

For some reason not yet determined, the ARGONAUT which had instructions to follow the motions of the NAUTILUS in opening fire, had failed to do so, although supposedly listening in on the TRX over which the target had been designated.

Before the reversal of course by the NAUTILUS was completed and fire resumed request was received from C.P. (Col. Carlson) to take merchant ship, bearing 350° from government wharf, distance 3000 yards, under fire. This presented a difficult gunnery problem as no point of aim in deflection was presented due to lack of distinguishable land marks, and the NAUTILUS own position was only approximately known. The resultant range was computed and the guns set on a computed bearing as being the only feasible solution to the problem. At this time communication with the shore failed due to interference.
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Fire was opened at 0716 and a total of 23 salvoes or 46 rounds were fired. The salvoes were laddered widely in range and deflection in order to cover the lagoon area as thoroughly as possible, after no spots were received from shore following the first three salvoes fired on the computed bearing of the merchant ship.

"Cease firing" was then ordered by the group commander pending resumption of communications with the shore as it was felt that ammunition was being wasted and a casualty to the after ammunition hoist required repair. The battery was accordingly secured, the presence of enemy air units being expected momentarily on the basis of intelligence information.

Shortly there after the ARGONAUT suddenly submerged, presumably on a radar contact, as no planes were visible. The indication of the NAUTILUS radar was negative but presuming the ARGONAUT had good cause for submerging it was decided to follow suit.

After checking the trim and there being no further indication of aircraft in the vicinity the NAUTILUS surfaced at 0958 followed shortly by the ARGONAUT.

Voice radio was reestablished with the shore and the ARGONAUT immediately after surfacing. C.P. again requested gunfire against merchant ship off government wharf. The ARGONAUT was ordered to open fire with deck guns but before she could comply a biplane was sighted standing towards the atoll from the southeast and both ships made emergency dives at 1059.

The NAUTILUS surfaced at 1255 but was immediately forced down by the sighting of a formation of twelve shore based planes at high altitude and approaching from the southeast. The ARGONAUT was directed by under water sound, not to surface until further orders.

Both submarines remained submerged for the remainder of the afternoon as continued presence of enemy aircraft was anticipated to within two hours of darkness. Advantage was taken of this period to get a little much needed sleep, practically all hands having been up since the preceding evening and the captain and navigator since midnight of the evening preceding that.
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Directed submarines to proceed submerged towards Point Baker to arrive by 1830 preparatory to picking up returning troops, ships to surface on signal. Received a message from the ARGONAUT via sound, stating she would be forced to surface at 1800 due to an exhausted battery and requesting permission to remain in her present location at minimum speed, in the hopes that planes over the atoll would not sight her against the setting sun. Affirmative was of course given, but much anxiety was felt until upon surfacing at 1845 no planes were sighted and the ARGONAUT was observed standing in to the rendezvous.

As no serviceable motors remained on board the NAUTILUS and as the Marines who had returned on board were in too exhausted a condition to undertake the trip by paddle, the group commander directed the ARGONAUT to break out and send in with volunteers their two reserve boats and motors. The senior marine officer on the ARGONAUT recommended against this procedure until after daylight, as being suicidal. Feeling that this officer knew conditions on the beach better than he, the group commander modified his order to the extent of directing the sending of relief boats at the discretion of the senior marine officer on the ARGONAUT.

At daybreak several boats were observed to be putting off from the beach and to render their task as easy as possible the NAUTILUS moved in to within 500 yards of the reef and received two more boat loads of Marines, the majority of whom were without outer clothing and almost devoid of arms and equipment. The first of these boats to arrive was immediately fitted with a motor which had been rendered serviceable during the night and manned by five
volunteers. They were given instructions to assure the commanding officer of the raider unit that if the submarines were forced to submerge they would return as soon as circumstances permitted and by 0930 at the latest and would continue to endeavor to pick up any boats which came out.

Two more boats were observed to have cleared the reef and the ARGONAUT was directed to pick these up. They had scarcely done so when the ARGONAUT was observed to be diving. No radar contact was indicated but as the ships were close up against the shore line it was thought that perhaps the height of the palm trees had prevented indication of the approach of planes from that direction as the NAUTILUS followed suit and submerged. It is now believed that the ARGONAUT submerged on a false visual contact probably a bird, of which there were many.

The NAUTILUS surfaced at 0901 followed by the ARGONAUT but was forced down at 0914 on a definite radar contact at 14 miles and coming in fast. Did not sight planes but dove when radar indicated 5 miles. Have since discovered they were a formation of high level bombers and were probably nearly overhead at the time the NAUTILUS dove. Two bombs or depth charges were heard but were not close.

As it was again anticipated and later verified the enemy planes would remain over the atoll and vicinity during daylight hours, decided to remain submerged clear of the atoll for the remainder of the day in order not to unnecessarily compromise the area in which it was expected to recover troops.

NAUTILUS and ARGONAUT arrived close in on the beach at 0930 preparatory to picking up remainder of the raider unit. Upon arrival received blinker message from the commanding officer of raider unit ashore requesting submarines pick his force up at Flink Point Lagoon entrance at 2130, also stating that lagoon entrance was not fortified as previously supposed.

Proceeded as requested and received the remainder of the raider unit on board at 2330. The commanding officer of the raider unit reported to the group commander that he was satisfied that all surviving personnel of his command had been evacuated from the island.
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It was decided at this time that because of (a) lack of suitable arms and equipment (b) a report by natives that no troops nor military installations existed on that island, and (c) a further report by the natives that the Japanese had bombed and strafed it that afternoon apparently under the impression that we had also occupied that island, the projected raid on Little Makin would not be made.

Accordingly the ARGONAUT was directed to proceed to base as previously directed and at 2353 M August 18, 1942, the NAUTILUS departed for Pearl.

The following morning the ward room was rigged as an operating room and five seriously wounded were operated on by the raider unit medical officer, Lieutenant William B. McCracken, U. S. Naval Reserve. These operations covered a period of more than 12 consecutive hours, and the skill, stamina, and devotion to duty exhibited by this officer upon this occasion is considered most praiseworthy and will be made the subject of special recommendation.

No personnel casualties nor loss were experienced outside of Task Unit 715:3 and final report on these will be made by the commander of the unit subsequent to arrival at Pearl. An estimate of personnel losses and casualties was submitted by despatch from this command on August 20, 1942.

Subsequent to the return to the ships of the raider unit it was learned that the following damage was done to enemy installations by the 6" gunfire from the NAUTILUS:

(a) Natives reported "considerable" damage to enemy reserve area on Ukiangong Point.
(b) One 3500 ton AP or AK, and one 1500 ton PG sunk in lagoon.

The latter is of course the sheerest good luck, as no accurate knowledge of the whereabouts of these vessels with relation to the fall of shot was had at the time of bombardment. Effort was made however, by continuous shift in range and deflection to cover lagoon anchorage as thoroughly as possible.

The return trip to Pearl was made on the surface.
WEATHER

This was normal for the time of year and only on two occasions did it have any adverse affect on the operation, both of them of relatively minor consequence.

TIDAL INFORMATION

This is covered in more detail in the reports of the unit commanders. In general it may be said that both current, and rise and fall of tide coincided fairly closely with expectations. The relative affect of these were not properly evaluated however, it being found that the state of tide of the reef was of relatively minor import while the current along the reef affected the landing and recovery operations considerably.

NAVIGATIONAL AIDS

This constituted one of the most baffling angles of the problem, as aside from so called tangents on the island there were practically no distinguishing landmarks. These tangents when ships were in position for landing troops crossed at an angle of approximately 160° thus being of little value in establishing position laterally along the beach. It was discovered moreover, that existing charts of the atoll were quite inaccurate in this area. It was also indicated that contrary to information contained in the Coast Pilot depths to eastward of the barrier reef did not drop off sharply but rather shelved in from a distance of about 1/4 miles from the reef.

ANTI-SUBMARINE MEASURES

None, except as indicated in narrative i. e. two bombs dropped from aircraft.

COMMUNICATIONS

This proved to be one of the most unsatisfactory features of the operation, particularly with regard to ship to shore communication. The need for supplementary means of communication to voice radio was apparent, particularly during daylight hours, and in future operations, this feature should be gone into more thoroughly.

In the apparent absence of anti-submarine craft free use was made of the QC equipment for communication between the two submarines.
during daylight, but in an area adequately patrolled by anti-submarine craft this would prove impracticable, as would the use of flashing light at dark, a method which was also sparingly used.

**HEALTH AND HABITABILITY**

This presented one of the least known factors of the problem prior to its inception. True evaluation of this subject cannot be made until after opportunity is presented to compare notes with the ARGONAUT upon arrival at Pearl; but based upon experience gained during the rehearsal, prior to the start of the expedition, it may be assumed that conditions existing on the ARGONAUT were considerably less favorable than those of the NAUTILUS due to the greater number of men carried in the former, and her internal arrangement. Consequently unfavorable comment made in regard to conditions existing on the NAUTILUS may be expected to apply with greater force to the ARGONAUT. Habitability will be broken down into its components of berthing, messing, toilet facilities, bathing facilities, ventilation or air conditioning and diversion.

**Berthing:** This is the least troublesome of the factors involved, except perhaps as regards accommodations for officers. With proper study, planning and alteration it is believed that an appreciable increase of berthing space can be provided over that arranged for in this instance. It should be appreciated however, that by this, berthing space is meant just that, a berth for a man to recline in, and that any increase in this space must be made at the expense of space already existing, which in turn means a decrease in space normally associated with the efficient operation of a submarine over protracted periods. It is not considered advisable to further increase the berthing space at this time, until more experience is had with the present installation. For a period up to three weeks it is not considered that the present arrangement works undue hardship upon the personnel, particularly if a more comfortable bunk is provided. It means however, that the individual practically remains "in bed" for that period except for meals and for answering calls of nature. This applies of course only to the troops, although the ship's company when off watch must resort to similar practice.

In order to lessen the effects of such confinement and to insure as far as possible that the troops arrived at their destination in the best possible physical condition, it was the practice on this expedition while en route to the objective, to bring the troops
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on deck twice daily for air and exercise, once in the morning and again immediately after dark. The daylight period was discontinued when within range of enemy air patrols. This practice appeared to keep the troops in good physical condition, and the risk involved is considered warranted under the then existing conditions.

Handling: With careful planning and good management it is considered that the present facilities are adequate, and little complaint was heard on this score. It is required on the average three hours to serve each meal in six sittings, which in turn meant that the galley was preparing meals almost continuously, and this in turn resulted in higher temperatures in the ship, particularly while submerged.

Toilet Facilities: These, though overcrowded, proved adequate with proper supervision.

Bathing Facilities: Due to the need for conservation of fresh water, particularly at the start of the expedition, bathing facilities were almost non-existent during the outgoing trip. It is believed however, that with careful supervision and training adequate provision can be made for an essential amount of bathing.

Ventilation and Air Conditioning: This factor is one that gives the group commander more concern than any other, as it has been demonstrated during the course of this expedition that with the ship sealed up for diving the air in the ship is rapidly vitiated and in the course of a submergence of more than 10 hours resort must be had to the use of soda-lime and oxygen.

Moreover, when operating in waters of high injection temperatures the effect of body heat and humidity greatly aggravates an already extremely uncomfortable condition, that the air conditioning equipment now installed is inadequate to handle.

It is believed that if circumstances required daily all-day submergence under conditions similar to that encountered on this expedition over a period of several consecutive days, the cumulative effect of a deficiency of properly conditioned air would be great enough to seriously impair the efficiency of both the troops and the ship's company. The obvious solution to this problem is to increase the amount of air conditioning equipment and hold to a minimum the period during which troops must be carried on board. Further research into this feature of habitability is urgently indicated.
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This is born out by the statement of the commanding officer of the NAUTILUS that his crew evidences greater exhaustion during the current expedition than on a previous war patrol in enemy waters of nearly triple the duration of the present one.

DIVERSION

This is relatively unimportant during an expedition of short duration, but might become a considerable factor in an extended one. The only facilities which come to mind at the present time which could be expanded are reading matter, card and acey ducy games, and record players.

PLANNING

This is faulty in that the matter was not placed in the hands of those responsible for this phase of staff work as a concrete proposition, in sufficient time to permit of a thorough and unhurried survey of the problem.

It is believed that the tendency was to make the plan in too detailed form and too inflexible. This undoubtedly stems from the history of guerrilla warfare and previous commando experience. It is submitted however, that in guerrilla warfare as well as in commando work the attacking force has most accurate knowledge of the terrain either from local knowledge or from intelligence reports, and in most cases detailed knowledge of the strength and disposition of the enemy forces as well. When such information is available detailed planning is an assurance of success. On the other hand where the unknown both in regard to enemy terrain and forces and to the capabilities of our forces assumes as large proportions as was the case in this instance, an inflexible plan is an invitation to catastrophe.

It is realized that with the element of surprise so important a factor, communication at the scene of action must be held to a minimum, but it is believed that by means of a general plan with wide latitude for change, and by more thorough indoctrination of the intentions and methods of the leader, plus as much field training of the entire naval and marine units as possible, the greater assurance of success under various conditions will be had, even if not of the magnitude of one lucky one achieved where everything went according to plan.

ORGANIZATION

This feature while generally satisfactory had several points
which should be changed for future operations of this character:

a. A directing head of the expedition should be designated as early as practicable before the scheduled sailing date of the task group. Five days is not sufficient time in which to properly coordinate an organization requiring such team work and precision as a commando expedition.

b. The senior officers of both the naval and the marine corps sections of the organization were charged not only with organization and training of their respective units but with the planning of the expedition as well. This is considered to be bad practice in organizations of this size, as no staff is available to work out the details of the enterprise and consequently either the planning or the training must suffer as such an arrangement throws too much detail work upon the shoulders of one man.

c. The troops carried on each submarine should not be required to transfer or receive personnel to or from other units of the expedition. This was one of the primary causes of difficulty during the current expedition, as it resulted in considerable delay and confusion at the time of debarkation. If the groups are of different sizes due to variations in the troop-carrying capacity of the individual submarine, the tasks assigned the various groups should be in accordance with this difference. In this connection, it is considered that the individual groups should proceed directly from their submarine to the landing beach assigned rather than to attempt to rendezvous with other groups prior to landing. The submarine to approach the assigned location as closely as practicable. The necessity for this was demonstrated when strong currents and wind along the beach rendered the accurate approach to a landing on a long beach most difficult. The debarkation and landing under the proposed change must of course be done on an absolutely strict time schedule.

**TRAINING**

It is considered that in the time available every opportunity for training was utilized to the utmost. The methods used however, seem to be susceptible of improvement in some instances. It is considered for instance that more day and night rehearsal of approach, launching of boats, landing and recovery, are very much in order, together, with the field test of various systems of communications. It is realized that practical difficulties in the form of security
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Measures may prevent such drills from being held on Oahu, but other outlying islands of suitable terrain might be utilized.

Another suggestion is that the marines who were largely self-taught in the handling of their rubber boats in the surf, be furnished the most experienced instructors available from such sources as the navy, coast guard, and Hawaiian surf-men.

MATERIAL

Several deficiencies came to light on this score, the most important of which are set forth below.

Rubber Boats. While being admirably suited for riding surf in to a landing, their buoyancy and light draft make them difficult to handle in a chop with any wind blowing and also renders their passage out through the surf difficult under certain circumstances. It is considered that here the use of a diesel driven submarine type boat would prove most valuable in towing the boats in to the surf line where they were experiencing difficulty, and in acting as a seaward anchor for them in getting clear of the reef. Such a boat would also prove invaluable at times for intership communication. The risk accepted in hoisting it out is scarcely more than that involved in handling the rubber boats, and can be carried on simultaneously with such evolution. If forced to dive, the boat and possibly the coxswain would be sacrificed.

The need for additional air conditioning equipment has been indicated earlier in this report and should receive the highest priority.

Urgent need is felt for bombardment type ammunition for the 6" batteries of the submarines of this type. It is recommended that such be obtained at the earliest practicable date.

In order to decrease the wash from the limber holes in the vicinity of the boat loading stations, it is recommended that experimentally limber holes in this location be blanked off.

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

This expedition, the first of its kind so far as is known, in history, is considered to have successfully accomplished its primary mission, i.e. the destruction of enemy troops and installations on
Makin Atoll.

The measure of this success is not as great as had been hoped, and the losses sustained in men and equipment by our own forces were greater than had been anticipated. The reasons for this are fairly obvious from a consideration of the narratives of the expedition, but may be briefly set forth as follows: (a) Semi-alert state of the enemy (b) change of landing plan, necessitated by debarking difficulties (c) failure of ship-shore communication (d) difficulties encountered by raider unit in clearing the reef upon attempted return to the ships (e) inflexibility of general plan (f) inexperience (g) lack of sufficient training.

It is considered that against weakly held enemy outlying stations and when surface patrols are weak or non-existent that this manner of raiding offers excellent chances of success. In this instance even though the enemy had been expecting the raid for three days, previous to its inception, the landing was effected undetected and had not an accidental discharge of one of our firearms occurred thus alerting the enemy, a complete surprise would have been attained.

With further experience, the strengthening of fire power on the part of the raider units, and an increase in the number of submarine units, it is considered that possibly enemy stations of considerable strength may be successfully raided; except where effective night surface patrols are encountered, the submarine being practically vulnerable while debarking or embarking troops.

The experience had in this instance when efforts to reembark in the face of practically impossible surf conditions, almost resulted in disaster, indicated that the time and locality of embarkation within certain limits, should be designated by the commander of the shore forces, and not set forth arbitrarily in the operation order. In this connection it was revealed here that the time necessary to complete mop-up operations is greatly in excess of that previously thought necessary. This might not be the case if accurate knowledge of terrain and enemy forces were available prior to the raid.

It is strongly believed that except for possible additional periscope reconnaissance, that only one objective should be attempted during any one expedition, as the chances of successfully carrying
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It through are greatly reduced in the face of enemy alertness, and the inevitable fatigue of the troops and dislocation of their equipment after the initial raid.

3. Finally the group commander is unable to adequately express his feelings in regard to the privilege accorded him in being placed in charge of this expedition. With the spirit existing among the officers and men of this task group, failure of the enterprise was impossible. In the face of lack of opportunity for adequate preparation and training, the spirit of cooperation existing between the units of the group and their determination to overcome difficulties large and small as they arose was inspiring to observe.

Although it is most difficult to single out from such a group of officers and men, where everyone from the unit commanders down to the newest mess cook or mess attendant, gave of their utmost towards the success of the expedition, the group commander submits for special consideration the performance of duty of the following named officers and men as indicated below:

Lt. Col. Evans Carlson, U.S.M.C.R. -

Commanding officer of Task Unit 7.15.3 for his splendid leadership and untiring efforts in organizing, training, and taking into successful action against an unexpectedly powerful enemy force, the Marine Raider Unit.

Lt. Comdr. Wm. H. Brockman, Jr., U.S.N. - Commanding Task Unit 7.15.1 and

Lt. Comdr. J. H. Pierce, U.S.N. - Commanding Task Unit 7.15.2 -

for their outstanding display of leadership and initiative, as well as their courage and resourcefulness.


Lt. Comdr. F. J. Parker, U.S.N., U.S.S. ARGONAUT -

for their outstanding performance of duty as navigators of the respective ships.

Lieutenant W. B. McCracken, (MC), U.S.M.R. -

Medical officer assigned Company "B" of the Raider Unit for his
subject: report of marine-submarine raider expedition.

conduct under fire as described by his commanding officer, his rescue
from drowning of two brother officers, and his outstanding performance
of duty as a surgeon when for more than 12 continuous hours he
carried on successfully a series of six major operations under most
disadvantageous conditions as to facilities.

L. R. Wetmore, CBM(AA), U.S.N. - U.S.S. NAUTILUS -

for his outstanding performance of duty as sound and radar
operator in manning his equipment almost without rest for a period of
more than 72 hours.

F. R. Porterfield, CBM(AA), U.S.N. - U. S. S. NAUTILUS -

for his splendid performance of duty in taking charge of the
unrigging and securing of the returned raiders boats and equipment
over a period of 48 hours.

L. V. Kelly, CCStd(PA), U.S.N. - U. S. S. NAUTILUS -

for his outstanding performance of duty in meeting the un-
precedented demands placed upon his commissary force in feeding
more than double the usual number of men his organization is normally
called upon to handle.

Robert V. Allard, Sgt., U.S.M.C.R. - Second Marine Raider
Battalion

Dallas H. Cook, SGT., U.S.M.C. - Second Marine Raider Battalion

John I. Kerns, Pvt., U.S.M.C.R. - Second Marine Raider Battalion

Richard N. Gilbert, PFC, U.S.M.C.R. - Second Marine Raider Battalion

Donald R. Robertson, Pvt., U.S.M.C. - Second Marine Raider Battalion

for their heroism in volunteering for duty in and manning a
rescue boat sent to the aid of their commanding officer and comrades
who were in a most dangerous position ashore. These five men knew
they were in imminent danger of enemy air attack in an open boat,
yet eagerly volunteered for the duty. After contacting their
commanding officer they and the boat in which they were, was observed
to be heavily strafed by an enemy plane. They are up to the present
time missing.
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The cases cited above have all come to the personal attention of
the group commander while on board the NAUTILUS. Other deserving
cases may and probably do exist in the two other Task Units and if
so will be made the subject of separate correspondence.

/signed/
John M. HAINES,
Commander, U.S. Navy,
Commanding Task Group 7.15.

Copy to:
ComSouPac (1)
CinCPac (1)
ComSubRon 4 (1)
ComTaskUnit 7.15.3 - (1)
CSD 42 - (3)
SECRET

TASK UNIT 7.15.3
Hd., on board USS NAUTILUS, at sea,
21 August, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander, Submarines, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Operations on MAKIN, August 17-18, 1942.

Reference: (a) Operation Order No. 1-42, Task Group 7.15,
6 August, 1942.
(b) Operation Order No. 1-42, Task Unit 7.15.3,
7 August, 1942.
(c) Organization of Task Unit 7.15.3

Enclosures: (1) Copy of reference (c).

1. In compliance with reference (a) this task unit
proceeded to MAKIN on the USS ARGONAUT and USS NAUTILUS as the
landing force component of Task Group 7.15. Reference (b) covered
the plan for the landing, except that the time of landing was
changed to 0500 when it was found that daylight began at 0525.
Landing was actually made at 0500 on the 17th, and the last troops
were withdrawn at 2000 on the 18th, at which time the island of
BUTARITARI was in our control.

2. NARRATIVE:

(a) Approach to the debarkation point (Point Baker)
was made on 17 August according to schedule. A strong on shore
wind added to the difficulties of embarking in the boats. Heavy
swells and the necessity for keeping the submarines moving in order
to avoid being carried on to the reef made it impossible to
assemble boats alongside the NAUTILUS for the take off, as had been
planned. Failure of many motors to start augmented the difficulty of
establishing control. The resulting confusion in the darkness of
the night made a quick change plan for the landing imperative
if we were to get in before daylight and have a semblance of control
when we landed. I decided to take both companies to the same beach
and passed the word as best I could for all boats to follow me. I
headed on a course which would take us to a point generally opposite
GOVERNMENT WHARF (Beach "2"). Fifteen of the eighteen boats actually
landed here. Two boats landed a mile north, the occupants joining
our main force during the fire fight. One boat, containing
Lieutenant Pettross and eleven men, landed over a mile to the south
which placed this group in rear of the enemy when the battle started.
I was without knowledge of it until about 1400.
(b) Both companies were badly intermingled on landing. However, we had reached the shore undetected and there was no cause for alarm. Security was placed along the higher group (five feet) above the shore, and under this protection the force was reorganized. However, while the reorganization was in progress one man accidentally discharged his piece, giving the alarm. I immediately directed Lieutenant Plumley, commanding Company "A", to move his company across the island, seize the road on the lagoon side, and report our location with relation to the wharves. The time was 0530 and dawn was beginning to break.

(c) At about 0545 Lieutenant Plumley reported that his point was at GOVERNMENT WHARF and that he had taken GOVERNMENT HOUSE without opposition. I directed him to deploy across the island and advance south on the JAPANESE TRADING STATION. At the same time Captain Coyte, commanding Company "B", was directed to place his company in reserve, and to provide for the security of our left flank. A few minutes later the 1st Platoon of "A" Company made contact with the enemy along the lagoon road near the native hospital. It continued to advance until stopped by an enemy machine opposite our right flank. Enemy reinforcements came up by truck and were forced to unload three hundred yards down the road by our Boys .55 cal. anti-tank rifles. By 0630 our center and left were heavily engaged.

(d) Natives moving north from the village of BUTANIRAI ahead of the enemy troops had reported to me that the bulk of the JAPANESE were at ON CHONG'S Wharf, while others were on UKIANGONG POINT in the vicinity of the lakes. Consequently, I requested the submarines to fire on the lake area of UKIANGONG in the vicinity of the causeway, hoping to cut off any reinforcements which might move from that direction. This mission was carried out promptly though it was impossible to spot for the firing from ashore. Subsequently the submarines were requested to fire on two ships which entered the lagoon from the west. One ship appeared to be a small transport of about 3,500 tons. The other was a patrol vessel of about 1,000 tons. Both were set on fire and sunk.

(e) By 0700 the pattern of enemy defense was apparent. It was built around four machine guns, two grenade throwers, automatic rifles and a flamethrower, with infantry supporting the automatic weapons and with a corps of snipers operating from the tops of coconut trees. The snipers and machine guns provided the most effective part of the resistance. Snipers were cleverly camouflaged and their fire was extremely effective.

(f) Snipers and machine gun fire had taken a heavy toll on our right flank, and little progress was being made there. I then directed that one platoon from Company "B" enter the line on the left of "A" Company. This maneuver was skillfully executed by Lieutenant Griffith. By 1130 the line was able to move forward...
though snipers continued to be a problem.

(g) At this time (1130) the first enemy planes appeared, two Navy reconnaissance planes (Type 95) arriving to scout the situation. After fifteen minutes, spent in circling the zone of action, they dropped two bombs and flew north. At 1320 a flight of twelve planes arrived. It consisted of two Kawanishi flying boats (four motored), four zero fighters, four Type 94 Reconnaissance-bombers and two Type 95 seaplanes. Bombing and strafing continued for an hour and a quarter. One of the Kawanishi bombers and one Type 95 landed on the lagoon off KING'S Pier. Both were engaged by our machine guns and one Boys Anti-tank rifle (.55 cal.), on our right flank. The Type 95 caught fire and burned. The Kawanishi, evidently hit by the Boys gun, attempted to take off. After circling violently several times it managed to take off only to crash into the lagoon. The final air attack on the 17th began at 1630 and lasted for thirty minutes.

(h) At about 1430 I was informed by natives that the Kawanishi plane had brought thirty-five reinforcements for the enemy. Others were expected to arrive in the next flight. At that time the center of our line was located in an area thick with foliage which provided an advantage for snipers. I decided to attempt to draw these snipers onto the ground more advantageous to us by withdrawing my right and center two hundred yards to a line where there was a good field of fire, while leaving my left extended so as to enfilade the advancing snipers. This maneuver was successfully accomplished. The principal gain to us came during the subsequent bombing (1630), when the planes thoroughly bombed the area we had recently vacated, inflicting casualties on their own troops.

(i) When the planes departed, at about 1700, I estimated the situation to be as follows:

Our mission was to destroy enemy forces and vital installations and to capture prisoners and documents. We had not accomplished our mission but we had inflicted heavy damage on enemy troops and we had sunk two planes. Our submarines had destroyed two ships. The enemy still appeared to be strong in our front, and he was in a position to receive reinforcements. The time agreed on for our withdrawal was 1930 (2100 at the latest), and we were expected to raid LITTLE MUKIN on the following morning. I could adopt one of two courses: (1) Continue the attack and make as much progress as possible before withdrawing. By pursuing this course there would be a chance of taking prisoners and of destroying installations, but the short time remaining before the withdrawal hour meant that relatively little could be accomplished, and the task of breaking off the engagement would be most difficult. (2) I could hold my present position and provide for an orderly withdrawal by stages so as to get away at the appointed time. I decided to adopt the latter course.

(j) At 1840 our line was shortened by pivoting on our
left flank and swing the right back to the GOVERNMENT HOUSE. Boat crews went to prepare the boats. At 1900, a covering force having been established closer to the beach, the bulk of the force was withdrawn to the boats. At 1915 the boats began to enter the water from the outboard flanks and working progressively towards the center. The covering force of one squad, with myself, embarked at 1930 from the center after all other boats had left.

(k) The hour of 1930 had been selected for the retirement because darkness would have set in and the tide would be high, enabling boats to get over the reef. The surf had given us no trouble when coming in in the morning. It did not look tough, not nearly as tough as other surfs we had worked in, though rollers followed each other rapidly. No one was apprehensive of difficulty in getting through the surf. However, I failed to take into account the speed of the waves and the rapid succession in which they followed each other. The following hour provided a struggle so intense and so futile that it will forever remain a ghastly nightmare to those who participated.

The experience of those in my own boat was typical. We walked the boat out to deep water and commenced paddling. The motor refused to work. The first three or four rollers were easy to pass. Then came the battle. Paddling rhythmically and furiously for all we were worth we would get over one roller only to be hit and thrown back by the next before we could gain momentum. The boat filled to the gunwhales. We bailed. We got out and swam while pulling the boat — to no avail. We jettisoned the motor. Subsequently the boat turned over. We righted it, less equipment, and continued the battle. All this time I thought ours was the only boat having this difficulty, for the others had left ahead of us. However, after nearly an hour of struggle men swam up to our stern and reported that their boat had gone back because the men were exhausted. They intended to rest, then walk the boat up the beach and try another spot. I directed our boat be turned around and returned to the beach for our men were equally exhausted. On arrival at the beach I found that over half the boats were there and that all men were in a state of extreme exhaustion. Most of their gear had been lost in the surf. The wounded, of who there were four stretcher cases and several ambulatory, were particularly helpless. I directed that the boats be pulled well up on the beach and that the men rest. Security was established with such arms as could be scraped together. Subsequent attempts were made by individual boats at other spots along the beach, but without success.

(l) At about 2100 Private Hawkins, one of those posted as security above the beach line, was challenged by a Japanese patrol of eight men. He opened fire with his automatic weapon and was fired on from two sides, the bullets entering his chest from two sides, seriously but not mortally wounding him. Investigation showed that he had killed three of the Japanese in the instant before he was shot. This incident showed that enemy resistance was no means ended.

(m) The situation at this point was extremely grave. Our initial retirement had been orderly, but the battle with the
surf had disorganized us and stripped us of our fighting power. Planes would undoubtedly return at daylight, and it was probable that a landing force would arrive. My plan was to await daylight, move to the north end of the island and attempt to find sufficient outrigger canoes to take us to the submarines. A check showed that 120 men were still on the beach, and there was no assurance that others had not landed at points farther away. Rain and the fact that most of the men had even stripped themselves of their clothes in the surf added to the general misery. This was the spiritual low point of the expedition.

(n) Shortly after daylight one group of men requested permission to make another try through the surf. After a terrific battle they made it. Other groups were then organized and followed. It was useless to send the wounded, especially the stretcher cases, so I directed Major Roosevelt, my Executive Officer, to return in one of the boats and take charge of our force on the submarines. My duty was to remain until the last man could be evacuated. A total of four boats got through safely before an air raid put an end to this piece-meal evacuation. Seventy men were left on the beach.

(o) It is necessary at this point to mention the devoted efforts of the officers and men of the submarines to relieve us. We were in communication with both subs by blinker through the night, our radios being useless. Early on the morning of the 18th they moved close to the beach, remaining there until enemy air forced them to dive. At 0740 one rubber boat with a motor which was operating left the NAUTILUS with five Marines who volunteered to come to our relief. The boat came to a point just outside the reef and shot a line to us. One man swam in with a message from the Commodore that the subs would remain off the island until we were evacuated. Planes came over and the boat headed out to sea. The boat was strafed and nothing more was seen of it or of the crew. The NAUTILUS signalled just before diving that she would return at 1930.

(p) On the 18th a total of four flights of planes came over between 0920 and 1730. It was evident from their actions that the enemy was confused as to the situation. Heavy bombers bombed the island north of BUTARITARI as well as the length of BUTARITARI itself. Natives from the north reported that LITTLE MAKIN was also bombed. The heaviest bombing on BUTARITARI was in the vicinity of ON CHONG'S and KING'S Wharves. By this time I had learned that the enemy force ashore consisted of only a few men who were widely scattered. I sent patrols out to gather food and to destroy the radio station at ON CHONG'S. A patrol on the north end of the island discovered and shot one Japanese marine. The patrol which went to ON CHONG'S shot another. I took a patrol and went over the battle field of the preceding day, checking our own dead and inspecting the enemy dead, searching for papers and collecting equipment with which to arm our own men,
Total enemy dead on the field was 83. Opposite our right flank, where the enemy had sought shelter behind coconut palms, our machine gun AP bullets had passed through the bodies of the trees, killing the men on the opposite side. Thirty enemy dead lay here on the lagoon side of the road. To the east machine guns were surrounded by their dead crews, killed by our grenades and riflemen. Our own dead on this northern front numbered eleven, including my intelligence officer, Lieutenant Holtom, who had been up on the right flank looking for me. Our other three men killed in action were members of Lieutenant Fotross' boat crew, which landed behind the enemy lines to the south.

(q) It is necessary here to mention the part taken in the action by Lieutenant Fotross and his eleven men. I was without knowledge of his whereabouts until about 1400 on the 17th when one of his joined our main force, having penetrated through the lines. Fotross found himself east and south of the JAPANESE TRADING STATION after landing. He had missed the rest of the boats after leaving the submarines, and, heading for shore, the current carried him to the south. Firing began to the north as he landed. He moved inland and then turned north. When near the TRADING STATION he engaged enemy troops along the lagoon side road, killing eight. Three of his own men were killed. During the balance of the day he continued to harass the enemy's rear, searched houses, destroyed a small radio station, picked off messengers and burned a truck. At 1230 he reembarked and, after a difficult struggle with the surf, succeeded in regaining the NAUTILUS. The presence of mind, judgment, skill, courage and devotion to duty displayed by this your officer, who was under fire for the first time, are considered outstanding. Recommendation for commendation will be made the subject of a separate letter.

(r) Food in the form of canned meats, fish and biscuit had been found at the JAPANESE TRADING STATION. During the afternoon of the 18th I had moved our force back to the vicinity of GOVERNMENT HOUSE, where water and cover were available, and where the form of an old defense position provided added protection. Patrots were operated from here. Natives had assured men that there were no guns on FLINK POINT or KOTABU ISLAND. It was decided to evacuate the remainder of the force at 1200 by way of the lagoon and the south lagoon entrance. A small sloop with an auxiliary motor was anchored off the JAPANESE TRADING STATION. Lieutenant Lamb and two men one possessing experience with marine engines, volunteered to row out to the sloop and explore the possibility of using her for the evacuation. At the time, 1700, I had a patrol in the vicinity of the TRADING STATION destroying stores. We covered Lieutenant Lamb's approach to the sloop. As his boat arrived alongside shots were heard. The party boarded but departed a few minutes later. Lamb reported that when they arrived he was fired at by a pistol thrust through a porthole. The bullet going wild. A hand grenade was tossed through the port and after they boarded they finished off the Japanese marine who was guarding the ship. As the ship was half full of water and in a dilapidated condition it was unusable.
(s) The patrol I took to the south late in the afternoon was for the purpose of accomplishing what destruction of stores was possible in the time remaining. The most important job proved to be a quantity of aviation gasoline (Associated), estimated to aggregate from 700 to 1000 barrels. This was fired by shooting into the barrels and using TNT for ignition. On this trip the office of the Japanese Commandant, who had been killed in the battle, was searched and all available papers, plus a chart, were secured.

(t) The evacuation was executed from the lagoon side by carrying four boats (all of which remained serviceable) across from the sea side. Natives provided one outrigger, thus affording space for our seventy men, including the stretcher wounded. The evacuation was supervised by Captain Coye and Lieutenant Leck, the latter twice wounded and nearly drowned on the 17th, and narrowly missing death at the sloop on the 18th. All five boats were lashed abreast each other. Two boats had motors, though only one worked throughout. With what few souvenirs of the battle our limited space could accommodate we set off across the lagoon at 2030. The NAUTILUS had previously been informed of our desire that she meet us off FLINK POINT. The passage was distressingly slow, but there was no surf to interfere. Ashore the only indication of life came from the billowing flames of the gasoline fire OFF FLINK POINT we flashed a signal and received an immediate response from the NAUTILUS. At 2308 we arrived alongside.

3. COMMENTS: Our estimate of the situation at MAKIN was not far from the mark. The island was held by Japanese Marines numbering about 100, with a reserve force of about 100 (civilians available for active duty in an emergency). The defense consisted of lookout along the beaches and a mobile reserve. The reserve was based at ON CHONG'S, for the attack was expected to come there or in the vicinity of GOVERNMENT WHARF. No guns were in position off the lagoon entrance south), and there was no evidence of mines. UKIANGONG POINT was in the process of being prepared for use as a dispersion area for stores, according to the natives. The AP which was sunk was reported by natives to have 60 marines on board.

A small radio station was located at the JAPANESE TRADING STATION, a larger one at ON CHONG'S, and it is believed that a third may have been located on UKIANGONG.

The lagoon off ON CHONG'S and KING'S Harbors provides a good anchorage for seaplanes and the Japanese used it as such. It is difficult to understand why a better defense had not been prepared, for no wire obstacles were observed. Natives reported that the sea beach opposite ON CHONG'S had been wired.

The natives reported that the enemy had three days advance notice of our arrival. In preparation the defending force had held maneuvers up and down BUTARITARI between ON CHONG'S and GOVERNMENT WHARF. The snipers which were located in the tree tops between GOVERNMENT HOUSE and STONE PIER were said by the natives to have been in position for three days.
While this hardly seems credible it is true that when the troops arrived on our front they were fully clothed even to wrapped puttees.

The natives, incidentally, were most cooperative throughout. They cut coconuts that the men might quench their thirst with the milk. They carried ammunition for the machine gunners. On one occasion Corporal Barnes handed his Garand rifle to a native while he was correcting the position of the men of his squad on the firing line. The native shot two snipers from trees. Joe Miller, the native Chief of Police, and his cousin, William Miller, were unusually helpful. They instructed how to form a local constabulary and told to retrieve weapons which we lost in the surf and use them for this purpose against the Japanese. They promised to do so.

Our doctrine of defense against aircraft was to take cover and remain immobile. It was very effective for there were no casualties among our ground troops from attacking aircraft.

4. **RECOMMENDATIONS:** Probably the most important result of the raid was the experience gained and the opportunity now afforded to organize raids which will be more effective and less costly to us. Some of the errors made have been noted in the above narrative. Specifically I would list the following with recommendations for their correction:

(a) The plan should provide for the subdivision of task units moving directly to the landing beach from the submarine to which each is assigned. This movement must be executed precisely on a time schedule, and there must be sufficient drill in the operation to assure that it will go forward without a hitch.

(b) The SCR 536 radio-telephone is inadequate for ship to shore communication, probably due to the densities of the foliage and because the submarine is so low in the water. The landing force must take a TBN ashore for this purpose.

(c) Raiding operations should not have an inflexible time limit imposed. The time for withdrawal should be determined by the commander ashore in accordance with the dictates of the situation there. As in the case at MAJIN, it is possible to take over a small island for one or two days and withdraw at will by the most feasible route.

(d) Rubber boats can be landed safely through quite a heavy surf and on beaches unsuitable for Higgins boats. But they cannot take off against such surfs without adequate power. From this truth derives the fact that if motors are available rubber boats with paddles can still be used for landing operations provided it is planned to take over the island and withdraw at will.

(e) The present type of gasoline operated outboard motor (Evinrude) is entirely inadequate for raiding jobs because of its unreliability. Men of these two companies had been thoroughly trained in the use of these motors. The motors had been meticulously overhauled immediately prior to the expedition. Yet most of them failed. It has been reported to men that there is an electric outboard motor on the market which is waterproofed. Such a motor
would appear to fit our need. It is recommended that this matter be explored immediately and that a satisfactory motor be obtained.

(f) Our men must be trained in sniping from tree tops and in combating this type of sniping. Japanese sniping was excellent and their snipers were so well concealed that it was necessary to shoot off branches of trees in order to get the snipers -- a most uneconomical operation.

(g) In my own organization I intend to increase the proportion of Garand (M-1) rifles and Bars per squad, and decrease the proportion of Thompson sub-machine guns. The Thompson gun is not sufficiently accurate against snipers, while the Garand is both accurate and possesses a high rate of fire, which give an advantage over the Japanese.

(h) I am more convinced that ever of the value of raids in the conduct of war in the PACIFIC, especially raids from submarines. There is no question that the Japanese command in the Eastern MARIANAS was confused by this raid. It did not know how our force got ashore, at what points it had landed, whether it was merely a raid or an occupational force or whether it was the spearhead of a larger force which intended to drive into the MARIANAS. Such raids can be used to confuse the enemy, pull him off base and open the way for the drive of a larger force against vulnerable and vital points.

(i) Finally, I would invite the attention of all military leaders to the illustration provided by our situation at MAKIN on the night of August 17th which emphasizes a truth that is as old as the military profession: no matter how bad you can situation may appear to be, there is always the possibility that the situation of the enemy is much worse.

6. I cannot close this report without expressing the deep appreciation of the officers and men of this Task Unit for the magnificent cooperation and support afforded them by the commander of Task Group 7.15, the officers and men of the USS NAUTILUS and the USS ARGONAUT, and of those officers and men of the Submarine Base, PEARL HARBOR, who aided with the preparations for the raid. There was always a free and unrestrained exchange of effort and ideas. A harmony of spirit and of unrelenting self-sacrifice reigned throughout the expedition which could not but induce a corresponding spirit in the men under my command. This unity of mind and effort brought success to the expedition.

As for the officers and men of this Task Unit, their action and attitude left nothing to be desired. During the action at MAKIN units were frequently intermingled, yet each individual displayed initiative, resourcefulness and willingness to work effectively in whatever team he found himself. None had been under fire before, but there was no hesitation about closing with the enemy. In fact, most of our casualties came from carelessness of enemy fire in order to "take out" the opposition. There were
many examples of extraordinary heroism which will be made the subject of special recommendation at a later date.

Special credit is due to the members of the Medical Corps, particularly to Lieutenants W. B. MacCracken and Stephen L. Stigler, (MC) USNR. On the night of the 17th Doctor Stigler managed to get aboard the ARGONAUT, and he took charge of the wounded there. Doctor MacCracken remained ashore until the final evacuation, and then spent the next twenty-four hours operating.

This operation justified in full the policy of assigning one medical officer to each Raider Company.

/signed/

EVANS F. CARLSON,
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve.
TASK UNIT 7.15.3
21 August 1942.

ORGANIZATION OF TASK UNIT 7.15.3 for
RAID ON MAKIN.

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Company "B":
Co Hq:
2 Rifle Platoons (1 Off & 33 Enl each) | 2 | 15 |
1 Weapons Platoon (2 MG Sec) | 2 | 66 |
Medical Section | 1 | 19 |
| TOTAL COMPANY | 5 | 102 |
TOTAL TASK UNIT: 13 | 208 |
From: The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Report on Raider Expedition against Makin - comments on.
Reference: (a) Comsubpac conf. despatch 270351 of August 1942.
(b) Comsubpac conf. despatch 270354 of August 1942.

1. This is the first operation of this type in which submarines of this task force have taken part. That is considered remarkable. Many lessons were learned by the submarine personnel concerned and the experience gained by the Raider Battalion should prove invaluable in later operations.

2. For expeditions of this type, the submarine makes an excellent transport for a task force of moderate size. Being able to arrive at the scene of operations with great assurance of being undetected and even observing the island before attack lends confidence to all hands. Surprise of the enemy is most essential.

3. Steps to be taken in preparing for an expedition of this type in the future are:

(a) Communications-A more suitable radio should be provided for communication between the submarines and the battalion ashore. Training under service conditions should be held.

(b) Air Conditioning-The two submarines used were poorly equipped in this respect for their normal complement. Additional units were added, but personnel were still uncomfortable.

(c) Complete Raider Unit on each Submarine-That is, boats, etc., for a group of marines should be carried on their own submarine.
SUBMARINES PACIFIC FLEET

Subject: Report of Raider Expedition against MAKIN-

(d) Training - As much night rehearsal and training as
time and conditions permit should be held.

(e) Boat Engines - The engines used in the rubber boats
on this expedition were not satisfactory. It is
understood that a better engine has been found.
This should be given all possible attention.
Slightly different conditions on the night of
August 17 might have resulted in disaster for
120 men from this cause alone.

(f) Ship's Boats - Diesel powered submarine boats would
have been of great assistance on this expedition.
In future operations, submarines should take at
least one such boat.

(g) Bombardment Ammunition - Six-inch bombardment ammunition
was not available in Pearl Harbor for this trip.
It is now available and is being placed on all sub-
marines with six-inch guns. It should be carried on
all future expeditions.

(h) Periscope Reconnaissance - If time permits, more
periscope reconnaissance should be provided for.
In this expedition, time was not available.

(i) Planning - Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet, cannot
concur with the Group Commander that it was bad prac-
tice to charge the senior officers of the marine and
naval units with the planning of the expedition as
well as the organization and training of their respec-
tive units. It is considered a fundamental principal
that an officer a job work out his own details
in accordance with a general directive which is not
to restrictive.
SUBMARINES PACIFIC FLEET

Serial 01002

CARE of Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
September 2, 1942.

SECRET

Subject: Report of Raider Expedition against MAKIN - comments on.

4. The Commander Submarines, Pacific Fleet considers that this expedition was carried to a successful conclusion. Recommendations for awards are being made in separate correspondence.

5. A list of casualties was reported in references (a) and (b).

/signed/
R. H. ENGLISH.

Copy to:
Cominuit
ComsoWesPac
ComSubsSoWesPac
ComSubRon 4
ComSubdiv 42
CO 2nd Marine Bdr. BN.
CO ARGONAUT
CO NAUTILUS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET

Cap't. McCrea

Please give this
G. B. paper re organization
of Navy Dept. to the President

[Signature]
[No. 283]

GENERAL BOARD COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF NAVY DEPARTMENT

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
GENERAL BOARD,
Washington, December 6, 1939.

From: Chairman General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Proposed organization of the Navy Department.

References: (a) See Nav letter Op-13/PS. (SC) A3-1 of September 29, 1939; (b) confidential committee print, June 23, 1939, Seventy-sixth Congress, first session; (c) Secretary of the Navy file No. (SC)/A3-1 (300613) of September 30, October 4 (2) and November 6, 1939; (d) G. B. No. 446 (serial No. 1881-A) of this date, returning comments forwarded by reference (c).

I. DIRECTIVE

1. That part of reference (a) which contains the directive for this report reads:

* * * A proposed bill for reorganization of the Navy Department is forwarded herewith for comment and recommendation of the General Board.

In its consideration of the subject, it is requested that the Board study not only the specific reorganization contained in the bill but also the question of what changes, if any, are necessary or desirable in the present organization and * * * full comment and recommendation on any reorganization of the Navy Department which the Board, as a result of its study, believes desirable.

2. By reference (c) the General Board has had made available to it comments on the Naval Committee bill received from the commander in chief and several other flag officers holding high positions in the United States fleet from two former Chiefs of Naval Operations, and from all chiefs of bureaus of the Navy Department. None of the comments received was favorable to the proposed bill; many of the comments included views as to how the Navy Department should be organized, in whole or in part.

Note 1.—These comments are being returned under separate cover (reference d).

II. GENERAL

3. The General Board has given careful attention and consideration to this important subject. It may be remarked that the question of the organization of the Navy Department has previously been before the Board in December 1933, in connection with the report of the Roosevelt Board; and in January and April 1934, as to a bill similar to the Naval Committee bill—reference (b); but on this present occasion the Board has been requested to present an organization of the Navy Department in accordance with its own views.

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4. The General Board has been impressed from the outset with the necessity that its considerations be premised on an objective study of the functions and purposes of the Navy Department. Such an objective study must be based on realities, and is essential not only for full perspective as to the inherent relationships involved, but also to provide the means wherewith to examine the adequacy and suitability of the proposed bill—reference (b)—and of the existing organization, to recommend such changes as may be required to develop a sound organization, and to determine to what extent existing agencies can be made to serve the purposes of organization.

Note 2.—Accordingly, notes and appropriate comment on the Naval Committee bill—reference (b)—will hereinafter appear as to its adequacy and suitability.

III. THE EXISTING ORGANIZATION

5. As a preliminary to the considerations involved, it is advisable to present a review of the major features of the Naval Establishment as a whole, with suitable comment where appropriate. The Constitution provides that:

Congress shall have power * * * to * * * provide for the common defense * * * to provide and maintain a Navy * * * to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces * * *.

and

The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States * * * shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States * * *

In accordance with the foregoing, the Congress has provided, in suitable enactments, for—

an executive department * * * the Department of the Navy, and a Secretary of the Navy, who shall be the head thereof—

and—

An Assistant Secretary shall be appointed, from civil life, by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate * * * shall perform such duties as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Navy or required by law—

and that—

The Secretary of the Navy shall execute such orders as he shall receive from the President relative to the procurement of naval stores and materials, and the construction, armament, equipment, and employment of vessels of war, as well as all other matters connected with the Naval Establishment.

6. The Navy Department is the 'head office' of the entire Naval Establishment. Within the Navy Department, under the Secretary of the Navy, and responsible to him, are:

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, who is, by law, * * * charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war. The functions thus imposed were, and continue to be, so delimited in the law itself that it has been necessary to adopt regulations in the endeavor to effect the coordination and cooperation essential to the proper performance of the basic duties.
(6) (1) The Bureaus of the Navy Department, for which existing law prescribes that—

Except as otherwise provided * * * the business of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be expedient and proper among the following bureaus:

First. A Bureau of Yards and Docks.


Third. A Bureau of Construction and Repair.


Fifth. A Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.


Eighth. A Bureau of Aeronautics.

and also that:

all of the duties of the Bureaus shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders shall be considered as emanating from him, and shall have full force and effect as such.

(2) The special and peculiar feature of existing law as to the bureaus is that it makes mandatory the distribution of all the business of the Navy Department to the bureaus, except as specifically provided otherwise by statute. This mandatory provision serves to restrict even the Secretary of the Navy himself from assigning to legally constituted agencies, other than the bureaus, certain administrative functions which the growth and development of the Navy have demonstrated to be desirable and necessary.

(c) Various offices and boards of the Navy Department, statutory and otherwise, have been established from time to time to meet specific and continuing needs of the Naval Establishment. Examples are the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Compensation Board, the Shore Establishment Division, the Naval Communications Division, the General Board, the Office of the Judge Advocate General, examining and retiring boards. Some of these offices and boards are directly under the Secretary of the Navy, or the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and some are included within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. They perform necessary functions that must be provided for, in their appropriate relationships, in any reorganization.

(d) The headquarters of the Marine Corps, with the Major General Commandant at its head. The functions of the Marine Corps, while interlocked with those of the Navy, and included in the concept of the Naval Establishment, are distinctive in character. It is appropriate to provide that its entity be preserved, while at the same time ensuring that its activities are adequately correlated and colligated with those of the Navy proper.

7. The Naval Establishment, outside of the Navy Department, consists of:

(a) The naval forces.—The "vessels of war"—armed ships, armed aircraft, and the personnel who man them—constitute the naval forces which are the essence of the Navy and the common concern of the entire Naval Establishment.

(b) The naval districts comprise coastal and inland areas conveniently delimited to accord with strategical and other considerations. While they are designed primarily for facilitating coastal operations they are at the same time made use of for decentralizing certain administrative functions.
(c) The field agencies, a term here used collectively for all of those activities on shore outside of the Navy Department which contribute, directly or indirectly, to the effectiveness of the naval forces and their operations; they are sometimes referred to as shore establishments. Most of them are nonindustrial field agencies of the several bureaus or offices; some are industrial field agencies doing the work of one or more bureaus; others are naval bases which comprise two or more field activities.

8. The financial system.—The existing financial system of the Naval Establishment comprises the conduct of finance matters in three general phases:

(a) The budget, which embodies the combined proposals of the bureaus and other agencies of the Department, duly approved by the Secretary of the Navy, as the basis on which funds are sought via the Bureau of the Budget and, when duly approved by the President, are presented to the Congress for appropriation.

(b) The appropriations, which are embodied in a bill under particular headings, some general in character, some allocated directly to particular bureaus and other agencies, but all comprising items for specific purposes for which specific moneys are assigned.

(c) Appropriation accounting, which refers to the means whereby due notice is taken that the appropriations are applied to the particular purpose for which they were appropriated, and that they are not exceeded.

In the course of time, the principal appropriation headings have tended to become, in some instances, general, rather than particular. This process may well be applied further in the interests of simplicity and of accuracy of intent, and is facilitated by the general trend toward clarification and correlation of functional activities such as herein set forth.

9. The purchasing system: Included within the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is an agency equipped for the purchase of naval supplies and materials of all kinds required for the naval service. It consists essentially of means whereby, upon receipt of specifications duly framed by the responsible bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, the requirements of law in regard to proposals and bids are duly carried out. The arrangements include the reference of bids thus received to the bureau and offices concerned for comment and recommendation and the subsequent further steps which result in the purchase of the desired supplies and materials, subject to inspection and acceptance by the appropriate bureaus and offices. This agency is an effective one for the purpose and the broadest possible use of it should be made.

IV. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

10. The principal and fundamental premises are:

First. The Navy consists inherently and primarily of vessels of war—armed ships including aircraft and the personnel who man them—frequently referred to as “the fleet” but more comprehensively described as “the naval forces.”

Second. The Naval Establishment consists of these naval forces—vessels of war and the personnel who man them—and of the agencies necessary to maintain the naval forces and to administer the Navy as a whole.
Third. Such necessary agencies are contributory to the effectiveness and efficiency of the naval forces and so, though important and even indispensable, are inherently subsidiary.

Fourth. The Navy Department, itself the headquarters of the Naval Establishment, exists to administer the entire Naval Establishment.

11. The constitutional and legal provisions for the Naval Establishment comprehend, in addition to strictly naval professional matters:

First. Public funds which are currently dealt with by means of the Budget, appropriations, and accounting for expenditure of appropriations; all of which involve relations with the President and the Congress.

Second. Constitutional and statutory provisions which include not only general policies and "rules for the government and regulation of the naval forces," but also all those other matters connected with the Naval Establishment which involve relations with the President and the Congress and with other executive departments and agencies (commissions, boards, etc.); with the press and the public; and the government of certain island possessions.

Third. Certain requirements as to appropriated funds, legal affairs, disciplinary action and other provisions which are vested by statute in the Secretary of the Navy alone; and, as well, civil-service matters and civil-service personnel.

12. The foregoing relations, proper for the Secretary of the Navy only to conduct, and certain statutory responsibilities, vested in the Secretary of the Navy alone, which comprise what may be called the civil functions of the Navy Department, are readily and appropriately consolidated in one agency in the Navy Department, hereinafter called the "Office of the Secretary."

Note 3.—The Naval Committee bill provides for an Office of the Secretary, which includes the above matters.

13. All other matters comprised in the Naval Establishment are distinctively naval in character and purpose, relating directly to the readiness and effectiveness of the naval forces, of the personnel who man them, and of the agencies contributory thereto. These matters clearly come within the scope of what is the "naval profession."

14. The primary purpose of the Navy Department is to administer the Naval Establishment to insure the maximum practicable degree of effectiveness of the naval forces of the United States.

15. The composition of the naval forces, although authorized by civil agencies of the Government, is arrived at through the study, consideration, and recommendation of seagoing officers of the Navy, trained and experienced in the art of naval warfare. Their recommendations are premised on knowledge of the sea and sea areas, the strength and probable capabilities of possible enemies, the number and types of ships required to oppose them successfully. These same considerations are necessarily the basis for the formulation of war plans for the effective use of the naval forces. It follows that the naval forces so authorized, constituting the naval strength of the United States, must be maintained in a high state of efficiency for war.

16. A high state of efficiency for war involves not only the composition of the naval forces and the formulation of war plans for their
effective use, but their operations in war and their training and material readiness in peace and in war. These matters are so interlocked as to necessitate the direction thereof by a single naval professional agency.

17. Therefore, although essential and even indispensable in their functions, those agencies which supply the naval forces with respect to personnel and material must subordinate themselves to the demands of the operational needs, the maintenance of a state of war readiness, and the requirements incident to the execution of the war plans. This fact may not be lost sight of if the correct status of the contributing agencies of the Naval Establishment is to be recognized and maintained.

18. The necessary contributory agencies are strictly naval in character and purpose; are inherently necessary to the readiness and effectiveness of the naval forces; and they have no other reason for existence than to render services connected with the "naval forces" which are the Navy. Among these agencies are those which have to do with "* * *" the procurement of naval stores and materials, and the construction, armament, equipment * * * of vessels of war * * *" frequently generalized as "material." There are also those agencies which have to do with the naval personnel who man the "vessels of war" and the contributory agencies themselves, for which the generalization is "personnel."

19. The realities of the case are:

First. That the naval forces—vessels of war and the men who man them—are indissolubly linked with that "* * *" employment of vessels of war * * *" which is commonly generalized as "operations."

Second. That the naval forces and their "operations" are supported and served by the contributory agencies commonly generalized as "material" and "personnel."

Third. That the "material" and "personnel" agencies, deriving their functions from the needs of the naval forces and their operations must be considered in their proper relationship to "operations."

NOTE 4.—The Naval Committee bill is defective in that it does not recognize the subsidiary nature of material with respect to the Navy Department. The basic law setting up what has become known as the "bureau system" originated in 1842 and has been modified from time to time to meet naval needs. In the course of time, bureaus have been added, one has been merged in others, and the latest modification has been the addition of the Bureau of Aeronautics (in 1921). In the course of nearly 100 years since the bureau system was established in the Navy Department, the bureaus have developed into agencies which fulfill their several specific functions in a generally appropriate and acceptable manner. It seems both fitting and efficacious to continue them in their several specific functions to the extent and in the relationships as to which examination confirms their adequacy and suitability.

NOTE 5.—The Naval Committee bill does away with "bureaus" as such but creates more than double the number of "divisions," which are, in effect, "bureaus." In so doing, some "bureaus" have merely been renamed, the duties of some have been divided, notably those of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, whose present functions have been distributed among some five "divisions."
21. In general, the demonstrated usefulness and appropriateness of
the several bureaus is such as only to require them, together with other
naval professional agencies of the Navy Department, to be placed in
relationships which will ensure that their activities are duly coordinated
and colligated to the common end, which is strictly naval in character
and purpose.

Note 6.—While the Naval Committee bill recognizes this basic conception, it
does not embody it in a sound manner, as set forth in the several notes.

22. The chiefs of bureaus are consulted by the Secretary of the Navy
as to matters involved in their several specific functions, including
those which arise from relationships with agencies and individuals
outside the Navy Department, an arrangement which should con-
tinue in force.

23. All of the other naval professional agencies now perform functions
which require to be continued, but also require to be brought into
those proper relationships which consideration shows to be essential.

24. From these considerations it is evident—
First. That, throughout the existence of the Navy Department, the
best interests of the Government have been served in that the Secre-
tary of the Navy has always been appointed from civil life, which is
required by law in the case of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Second. That the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy are inherently not of the naval profession.

Third. That the distinctively naval character of the Naval Estab-
lishment (the Navy and its contributory agencies) requires that the
Secretary of the Navy have available at all times competent profes-
sional naval advice and opinion to enable the many and varied
technical activities to be dealt with in their proper relationships.

Fourth. That among the professional naval advisers must be those
charged with executive responsibility to insure that duly approved
matters of which they have cognizance are carried into effect by the
appropriate and available means.

Fifth. That as among several naval executive advisers, charged
with particular technical or other professional functions, there are
certain to be conflicts of viewpoint and consequent divergent opinions
which can best be fully considered, adequately evaluated, and clearly
presented to the Secretary of the Navy, with whom final decision must
rest, by a principal naval executive adviser of recognized professional
ability and of extensive naval experience.

Sixth. That the principal naval executive adviser is the proper
responsible agent of the Secretary of the Navy to insure that all
duly approved naval professional measures are carried into effect,
and he must be that one who is primarily and directly concerned
with "employment of vessels of war," commonly gen-
eralized as "operations."

Note 7.—The Naval Committee bill recognizes this fundamental conception
but does not embody its full import.

25. The records of the Navy Department contain many instances
when the need for a principal professional adviser and executive has
not only been recognized but where the pressure of events has led the
Secretary of the Navy to employ an officer or existing agency of the
Navy Department to meet the need. During the Civil War, Mr.
Gustavus V. Fox, an ex-naval officer of some 18 years' experience, was
so employed. He occupied the position of Assistant Secretary (created for him) and was able to conduct a workable and effective relationship among the essentially related functions and agencies and with the naval forces. Following the Civil War, this professional coordinating of bureau effort in the operation and maintenance of the fleet came more and more to be performed by the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, acting not as a Chief of Bureau so much as a professional aide or executive to the Secretary of the Navy in the heading-up of the disparate responsibilities of the several bureaus. This dual role of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation was never clearly defined and was administratively unsatisfactory. However, it was recognized that the maintenance of the efficiency of the Navy through the several bureaus was functionally impracticable without provision for their professional heading-up.

26. Following the endeavor (1910–15) to rectify organizational defects by the inadequate four-aide set-up, an Office of Naval Operations, with a Chief of Naval Operations at its head, was established by law in 1915. Beyond doubt an expectation then existed that an objective view of the Navy's administrative difficulties would prevail, and the the Chief of Naval Operations would be accepted as the appropriate officer to effect the smooth functioning of the organization.

**Note 8.**—Here is the principal defect in the organization of the Navy Department, which some 24 years of experience have only sufficed to make the more obvious and more needful of correction. The Naval Committee bill retains this basic defect.

27. Existing law states that the Chief of Naval Operations is "* * * charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war" and thus embodies the basic conception of a principal naval professional adviser and executive, under the Secretary of the Navy. The appropriate and logical further step is that the Chief of Naval Operations shall become in fact that principal naval professional adviser and executive, to deal with the naval forces and the agencies servicing them, which together and inseparably comprise the Naval Establishment. This conception does not in any manner impair the paramount responsibility and control of the Secretary of the Navy, any more than the existence of the War Department and the Navy Department impair the prerogatives of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

V. THE NAVAL COMMITTEE BILL

28. The Naval Committee bill—reference (b)—represents an endeavor to bring within the scope of one bill not only, first, a reorganization of the Navy Department including, second, indirect reorganization of the finance system but also, third, a rearrangement of the officer personnel of the Navy. While the second matter bears a certain relation to the first, the third has no relation to the second and is not essential to the consideration of the first.

29. Inasmuch as the matters proposed that relate to officer personnel do not bear any direct relationship to the organization of the Navy Department and do not affect it one way or the other, they comprise a subject that is best dealt with in a separate bill for that particular purpose.
30. The finance system outlined in the bill will effect a complete change from the existing general system wherein funds are appropriated to the several bureaus and to some offices and for certain purposes directly under the control of the Secretary of the Navy. Since the "bureaus" are done away with as such, although many "divisions" are set up, the principal appropriation of funds is to be made to the four "offices" which constitute the principal grand divisions in the proposed organization. It is noteworthy that the proposed "Office of Naval Material," in the performance of its functions, is to be financed by funds allotted to it or allotted to other offices and transferred to it. It is apparent that the finance system as outlined is so interlocked with the proposed organization that it cannot well be evaluated separately.

31. Notes constituting comment on certain features of the organization of the Navy Department, as proposed in the Naval Committee bill, have been inserted at appropriate places in this report. In review, they comprise general comment to the effect that the Naval Committee bill does not embody provisions which are premised on an objective study such as is the basis of this report, and specifically:

First. That the provision of an "office of the secretary," while in line with the results of this study, includes the administration of naval personnel (a naval professional matter) in an "office" which properly deals with those functions which are largely civil in character and general in purpose.

Second. That in the provisions creating a director of naval material, responsible directly to the Secretary of the Navy, the proper status of this proposed officer in relation to the Chief of Naval Operations is not recognized. Development of naval material is so closely linked to the fighting and operational effectiveness of units of the naval forces that it is clearly a matter of paramount concern to the Chief of Naval Operations who must have the necessary authority over material development to ensure its adaptability and efficiency in that use. Therefore, in this most important matter, there should be no intervening officer between the principal naval adviser and the heads of the designing and producing material bureaus; in other words, there is no place in the organization of the Navy Department for a director of naval material.

Third. That in not realizing and recognizing the contributory, therefore subsidiary, character of certain agencies, it perpetuates the basic defect in the existing organization of the Navy Department.

Fourth. That in its virtual abolition of the bureaus, it does not make use of those agencies which have in the course of time come to be recognized as well suited for their several specific functions. While it is true that the existing organization is defective in positive provision for the proper relationships of the bureaus to the broader functions of the Naval Establishment, the due recognition of such broader functions by no means requires the elimination of the bureaus as such.

VI. PARTICULAR CONSIDERATIONS

32. While the various bureaus and offices of the Navy Department should in general be continued in their present functions, there are particular instances wherein a redistribution of business should increase the general efficiency of the Department as well as of the bureaus and offices themselves.
(a) The Bureau of Construction and Repair is now charged, in general terms, with the design, construction, and repair of ships as a whole; the Bureau of Engineering is similarly charged with design, construction, and repair of propelling machinery of ships and auxiliaries essential thereto. It is apparent that these two bureaus, both directly concerned with what constitutes a ship as an entity, perform functions which must overlap and thus develop conflicts of authority or duplication of effort. The consolidation of these two bureaus into a single agency, to be called the Bureau of Ships, should increase the efficient conduct of these functions.

(b) The Bureau of Navigation, originally established as a “scientific” bureau, has come to be, in the course of some 50 years, the naval personnel agency of the Navy Department, which makes it advisable to change it name to “Bureau of Naval Personnel,” and to transfer nonpersonnel matters to other cognizance.

(c) As to the other bureaus, examination confirms their usefulness for the performance of their several specific functions and consideration warrants their continuance as distinctive agencies. It may be found advisable to make certain adjustments in the cognizance of these bureaus.

(d) The Shore Establishment Division has a diversity of duties which, with the exception of those of the Division of Civil Personnel Administration and Management, are of a naval professional character, and are largely concerned with the industrial field agencies performing work requiring funds under the cognizance of two or more bureaus of the Navy Department.

These naval professional duties include the assignment and coordination of the construction, manufacturing, maintenance and repair facilities of naval industrial plants (navy yards) with a view to ensuring the maximum degree of efficiency in maintaining the material readiness of the naval forces for war, as well as economy and proper distribution of work. The necessary association and direction of these various activities can be accomplished most advantageously under the Chief of Naval Operations, who has partial control now through the medium of the approved estimate of the situation, war plans and current plans, and availability and assignment of ships to navy yards.

Many of the naval professional duties now performed within the Shore Establishment Division are duplicated within the Office of Naval Operations and are of such a character that they can be taken over in their entirety by the Office of Naval Operations with but little disruption of work and to greater advantage. Such of these professional duties as may not fit into the Office of Naval Operations can be readily absorbed by the Bureau of Ships due to the consolidation of the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Engineering into this proposed bureau.

(e) The Central Division: This division in the Office of Naval Operations performs a combination of duties—some appropriate to the Office of the Secretary, such as liaison work with other departments of the Government and administrative work connected with Territorial (island) governments under naval jurisdiction; others appropriate to the Office of Naval Operations, such as current plans and intradepartment liaison. These diverse duties, properly performed by naval
officers, require to be appropriately reassigned, in accordance with the relationships herein outlined.

(f) The Hydrographic Office and the Naval Observatory, now under the Bureau of Navigation, perform functions of great importance to the Navy, which are so intimately concerned with operations of ships and could be advantageously transferred as entities within the Office of Naval Operations.

33. In order that the necessary correlation and colligation of the various offices and bureaus in the Navy Department may be effected in a manner leading toward greater efficiency and increased readiness of the naval forces for war, it is considered that—

(a) The Chief of Naval Operations, “charged with the operations of the fleet, and with the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war,” is the senior officer of the Navy and is the logical officer under the Secretary of the Navy to be responsible for the efficacy and readiness of the naval forces. Therefore, he should have the authority to direct what is to be done by the various naval professional agencies in all matters affecting the naval forces in their preparation and readiness for war.

(b) The Chief of Naval Operations, in issuing directives regarding the preparation and readiness of the naval forces, should not engage in any administrative activity that would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department or that would cause any duplication of or delay in the work thereof.

(c) The chiefs of bureaus, as the officers responsible for carrying out what is to be done, should be the direct agents of the Chief of Naval Operations in regard to all those matters within their respective bureaus affecting the preparation and readiness of the naval forces for war and should have direct access to the Chief of Naval Operations at all times.

(d) The chiefs of bureaus should be responsible directly to the Secretary of the Navy for all matters affecting their respective bureaus and should have direct access to the Secretary of the Navy at all times in connection with such matters.

34. This correlation and colligation of the work of the several bureaus and offices in the Navy Department charged with the details of operational, personnel, and material requirements of the naval forces requires that the Chief of Naval Operations be provided with a suitable organization within the Office of Naval Operations.

(a) The Office of Naval Operations should be organized so as to facilitate the formulation of policies and plans relative to training, employment, maintenance, etc., of the naval forces, and the preparation of directives for carrying out approved policies and plans.

(b) The logical groupings of these functions would be operations, personnel and material readiness. Operational and personnel matters are not subdivided amongst so many diverse agencies as are material readiness matters, and may be readily grouped together for administrative purposes. Therefore, it will provide a practical organization of the Office of Naval Operations if there are two principal assistants to the Chief of Naval Operations, one for handling both operational and personnel matters and the other for handling material readiness matters.
CONCLUSIONS

35. As a result of the foregoing study, the General Board has arrived at the following conclusions affecting the organization of the Navy Department.

First. That there should be an Office of the Secretary wherein may be readily and appropriately consolidated the general civil and certain other functions of the Secretary of the Navy.

Second. That within the Office of the Secretary of the Navy there should be included a Secretariat and a Division of Civil Personnel.

Third. That directly under the Secretary of the Navy there should be:

- The General Board.
- The Budget Office.
- The Office of the Judge Advocate General.
- The Compensation Board.
- The Examining and Retiring Boards.
- The Petroleum Reserves.

Fourth. That the Chief of Naval Operations should be the principal naval adviser and executive to the Secretary of the Navy, charged by law with the operations of the naval forces, with their preparation and readiness for use in war, and with the direction of the efforts of the various naval professional bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, not directly under the Secretary of the Navy, in relation to the readiness of the naval forces for war, and that in addition he should perform such other duties not assigned by law as the President may direct.

Fifth. That the Chief of Naval Operations in exercising such direction of the efforts of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department should not engage in administrative activity that would involve impairment of the responsibility or initiative of the chiefs or the heads of bureaus and offices of the Navy Department or that would cause any unnecessary duplication of or delay in the work of these agencies.

Sixth. That the Chiefs of Bureaus of the Navy Department should be directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for all matters affecting their respective bureaus and should have direct access to the Secretary of the Navy at all times in connection with such matters.

Seventh. That the Chiefs of Bureaus of the Navy Department should be the direct agents of the Chief of Naval Operations in regard to all matters within their respective bureaus affecting the preparation and readiness of the naval forces for war.

Eighth. That the Office of Naval Operations should be so organized under the Chief of Naval Operations as to permit a logical grouping of the work into two branches; one for operations and personnel matters, and the other for material readiness matters.

Ninth. That the Chief of Naval Operations should be provided with two principal assistants of adequate rank and experience as heads of each of these two branches.

Tenth. That the basic law governing the distribution of the business of the Navy Department to the bureaus exclusively, except as provided otherwise by specific statutes, should be modified to authorize such business to be distributed to the bureaus and to other appropriate offices in the Navy Department.
Eleventh. That the character and purpose of the Marine Corps warrants its placement as a distinctive entity in the organization of the Navy and Navy Department.

Twelfth. That the Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering should be consolidated into a single bureau to be called the Bureau of Ships, and that such assistants should be provided to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships as to permit effective allocation and carrying out of the functions of this bureau.

Thirteenth. That the name of the Bureau of Navigation should be changed to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and all nonpersonnel matters be transferred to the cognizance of other offices or bureaus in the Navy Department.

Fourteenth. That the Bureaus of the Navy Department should be retained as distinctive agencies in the organization, and that such adjustments in the cognizance of matters under these bureaus be made as may be found advisable.

Fifteenth. That, in order to avoid duplication, the functions of the Shore Establishment Division should be transferred to appropriate offices and bureaus of the Navy Department.

Sixteenth. That the Central Division should be retained in the Office of Naval Operations, but that such of its functions as relate essentially to matters directly under the Secretary or to the office of the Secretary should be taken out of the Central Division and placed under the office of the Secretary.

Seventeenth. That the Hydrographic Office and the Naval Observatory should be placed within the Office of Naval Operations as distinct entities, singly or combined.

Eighteenth. That progressive improvement in the financial system should be effected by reducing the number of the principal appropriations for the support (operation and maintenance) of ships and field agencies, e. g., one should cover all funds for naval personnel (present" Pay, subsistence, and transportation"); one should cover all funds for the operation and maintenance of the naval forces; and another should similarly cover all expenses of field agencies. The principle to be followed is that all funds for the operation and maintenance of any one individual organization unit, i. e., a ship or a field agency, should be included in either the appropriation for the operation and maintenance of the naval forces or the field agencies as the case may be.

Nineteenth. That the authority of the Secretary of the Navy to distribute the business of the Navy Department should be applied, in those matters in which two or more bureaus (offices) may duplicate their efforts as to particular materials, in such a way that one bureau becomes the agent for the other bureaus (offices) concerned.

RECOMMENDATIONS

36. The General Board recommends that the Naval Committee bill for the reorganization of the Navy Department be not adopted, and in lieu thereof the Board recommends that the foregoing conclusions be embodied in a reorganization of the Navy Department, in which the guiding principles are:

(a) The Secretary of the Navy under the direction of the President shall be responsible for and shall direct the administration of the
entire Naval Establishment. He shall guide and control its general policies, and, within the scope of existing law, may modify, as he may deem proper, its various activities. He shall be assisted in the discharge of these functions by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, who shall perform such duties as the Secretary of the Navy may direct.

(b) The office of the Secretary shall be directly under the Secretary of the Navy and shall be especially charged with the relations of the Naval Establishment with the President, the Congress, other departments and agencies of the Government, and with public relations generally, as well as with regulations governing naval administration; with such legal, financial, and disciplinary matters as statutory provisions make the specific responsibility of the Secretary of the Navy alone, including the government of Territorial possessions administered under naval jurisdiction; and with civil service matters and civil service personnel.

(c) The Chief of Naval Operations, under the direction of the President or of the Secretary of the Navy under the direction of the President, shall have control over all naval forces and their operations and such supervision and direction of supplemental activities as may be essential to the effective operation of the naval forces as a whole, and, specifically, he shall so direct the efforts of the bureaus of the Navy Department as to insure at all times the maximum readiness of the Navy for war. He shall advise the Secretary of the Navy upon all aspects of the Naval Establishment that bear on the effectiveness of the naval forces and shall be responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for the organization, training, discipline, operation, and readiness for war of all naval forces. He shall perform such other duties as may be assigned by the President or by the Secretary of the Navy.

(d) The Office of Naval Operations shall be directly under the Chief of Naval Operations for the purpose of assisting him in the execution of his functions and duties. It shall be charged with such executive and administrative duties as may be specifically assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations within his authority; and with the formulation of such plans and directives for operating, manning, and maintaining the naval forces as are essential to insure at all times the maximum readiness of the Navy for war.

(e) The Major General Commandant of the United States Marine Corps shall, under the Secretary of the Navy, have control over all activities that distinctly pertain to the Marine Corps alone. He shall carry out such approved plans and directives as may emanate from the Chief of Naval Operations. The Marine Corps headquarters shall be maintained within the Navy Department.

(f) The chiefs of bureaus of the Navy Department shall be directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for all matters affecting their respective bureaus and shall be the direct agents of the Chief of Naval Operations in regard to all matters within their respective bureaus that affect the preparation and readiness of the naval forces for war.

(g) The constant effort shall be to centralize the formulation of guiding policies and plans but to decentralize the execution of such policies and plans to the utmost; and to effect wholehearted and loyal cooperation throughout the entire organization.

(h) The inherent functional relationships among naval professional matters shall be the basis of organization, authority, and responsibility.
authority duly vested by law in the President and in the Secretary of the Navy, and that the provisions making the reorganization completely and legally effective, whether they be specific enactments of law or the equivalent thereof by virtue of being set forth in a plan submitted to the Congress by the President, and approved by that body in accordance with the Reorganization Act of 1939, should be worded substantially as follows:

1. (a) There is hereby created and established in the Department of the Navy:
   1. The Office of the Secretary.
   2. The Office of Naval Operations.
   3. The Bureau of Construction and Repair and the Bureau of Engineering are consolidated into one bureau which shall be designated the "Bureau of Ships."
   4. The Bureau of Navigation hereafter shall be designated the "Bureau of Naval Personnel."

2. (a) Pursuant to the foregoing changes, the business of the Navy Department shall hereafter be distributed in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be expedient and proper among the following bureaus and offices:
   1. The Office of the Secretary.
   2. The Office of Naval Operations.
   3. The Bureau of Naval Personnel.
   4. The Bureau of Ships.
   5. The Bureau of Ordnance.
   6. The Bureau of Aeronautics.
   7. The Office of the Judge Advocate General.
   8. The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.
   10. The Bureau of Yards and Docks.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations shall hereafter, under the direction of the President, or of the Secretary of the Navy under the direction of the President, be charged with the operations of the naval forces, and with their preparation and readiness for use in war; and to this end he shall so direct the efforts of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, except the office of the Secretary, as to insure at all times the maximum readiness of the Navy for war. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to lessen the responsibility or impair the initiative of the heads of the several bureaus and offices of the Navy Department, nor shall the authority contained herein be so exercised as to cause unnecessary duplication of or delay in the business of the Navy Department.

3. Two officers of the active list of the line of the Navy may be detailed as assistants to the Chief of Naval Operations, and such officers shall receive the highest pay of their rank. In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the Chief of Naval Operations, they shall, in order of their seniority, the one to the other, until otherwise directed by the President, as provided by section 179 of the Revised Statutes, perform the duties of such chief until his successor is appointed or such absence or sickness shall cease.

4. One or more officers of the active list of the Navy may be detailed as Assistant Chiefs of Bureau, for each bureau, and such officers shall receive the highest pay of their rank.

(Signed) W. R. Sexton.
June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I am more and more disturbed by the two Operations' orders which went out to the Bureaus. There may be more of them which neither you nor I have seen. Therefore, will you please do the following:

(a) Direct Operations to cancel the two orders which we have seen and tell them to let you and me have copies of the cancellation.

(b) Please ask Operations for all orders in any way affecting departmental organization or procedure, for thirty days back. You and I can then see if anything else needs to be cancelled.

The more I think of the two orders which you and I saw, the more outrageous I think it is that Operations went ahead to do, without your approval or mine, what I had already disapproved when I turned down the general plan of reorganization. I am very much inclined to send for the Officers down the line and give them a good dressing down. They are old enough to know better -- and old enough to know that you are the Secretary of the Navy and that I am the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

F. D. R.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

JUN 13 1942

My Dear Mr. President: I think this completely conforms with your instructions received by me this morning on the re-organization matter.

Your sincerely,

Frank Knox
From: Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Your Memorandum of this date.
Reference: Your Memorandum of this date.
Enclosures: 3

1. I attach hereto copy of the order which cancels the orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations dated May 15th and May 28th, respectively, as directed in the first and second paragraphs of the reference.

2. There are also attached hereto copies of all orders (other than the two which have been duly cancelled) which have been issued by me - or at my direction - from and including May 12th - which in any way affect departmental organization or procedure.

3. There is further attached hereto a copy of the order which cancelled the order issued by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations relating to certain personnel matters.

4. All activities connected with the President's oral directive (of March 12th) in regard to the development of the organization of the Navy Department have been suspended.

[Signature]
UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Serial: 1649

June 13, 1942

From:
Chief of Naval Operations.

To:
Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department.

Subject:
Assistant Chiefs of Naval Operations for Personnel, Material, and Air.

Reference:
(a) CNO File FFl/A3-1 Serial 1212 of May 15, 1942.
(b) CNO File FFl/A3-1 Serial 1409 of May 28, 1942.

1. References (a) and (b) are hereby cancelled.

Copy to:
SecNav
CincCen
Cinopac

G. L. RUSSELL,
Flag Secretary
NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-13A/PS
Ser. No. 5513
SN-52527

May 21, 1942

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations
To: All Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department

Subject: Asst. Chief of Naval Operations (Air) Assignment of Duties

Reference: (a) CNO ltr. FN1/A3-1 Serial 1212 of May 15, 1942.

1. In furtherance of reference (a), there is hereby established in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, under the immediate direction of the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air) an Aviation Division (Op-40). A naval aviator of appropriate rank will be ordered as Director, Aviation Division, and will perform such duties as may be assigned by the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air).

2. (a) The functions of the following divisions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, insofar as they pertain to aviation matters, are transferred to the Aviation Division:

   - Fleet Maintenance (Aircraft Material) (Op-23-H)
   - Naval Vessels and Aircraft Division (Op-38-E)
   - Naval Transportation Service (Op-39-E)

   (b) The officer and civil personnel of the above divisions, hitherto performing the functions transferred by this order, are hereby assigned to the Aviation Division.

   (c) Those functions of the Plans Division (Op-12) having to do with liaison with other governmental agencies dealing with aviation, are transferred to the Aviation Division, as is membership on the Aeronautical Board. One of the Naval Aviators on duty in the Plans Division will be transferred to the Aviation Division.

   (d) All other aviation functions of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations will remain as at present, but Directors of Divisions in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations will take action to insure the coordination of such functions with the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Air) through the Aviation Division.

3. The title of the Naval Vessels and Aircraft Division (Op-38) is hereby changed to the Naval Vessels Division (Op-38).

4. Pending the allocation of space to the Aviation Division personnel will continue to occupy space at present assigned.

(Signed) P. J. Horne
June 10, 1942

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Personnel).
Subject: Bureau of Naval Personnel Functions being performed by other Bureaus and Offices.
Reference: (a) Vice CNO ltr. Op-10 30 6 41002, dated June 3, 1942.

1. Reference (a) is cancelled.

F. J. HORSE

Copies to: All Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF PROCUREMENT AND MATERIAL
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM

June 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HOPPE:

I have to date issued no orders as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Material).

S. M. Robinson
Vice Admiral, USN
NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF NAVIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

(Now Bureau of Naval Personnel).

13 June 1942.

Memorandum for

Admiral Horne.

I have signed no mail as Assistant Chief of
Naval Operations (Personnel).

RANDALL JACOBS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

In view of the conference
at the White House yesterday, we are trying
to work out a new program which will not
cut into merchant shipbuilding as this
proposal would do. They are trying to
work out a new plan.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary
of the Navy, undated, reading as follows: "Herewith
the recommendation on those Kaiser-built carriers
and the 100 Destroyer Escort vessels, we talked over
on last Friday. Will you ok so we can start it on
its way." Attached is a memorandum for the President
from Admiral E. J. King, 6/20/42, a copy of which
has been retained for our files.
CONFIDENTIAL

June 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

VIA: The Secretary of the Navy.

It is recommended:

1. That 48 aircraft transport vessels be built, utilizing going Maritime shipbuilding facilities now being devoted to merchant ship construction. The Maritime Commission to supply all material and equipment except guns, fire control, radio, radar, catapults and arresting gear.

2. That 100 destroyer escort vessels of approximately 20 knots be built utilizing Maritime shipbuilding facilities and industrial facilities. The Navy to provide materials, plans and specifications.

3. That priorities for material and equipment for the vessels be assigned in accordance with existing priority regulations and the priority of individual ships in the Naval Shipbuilding Program to be in accordance with the precedence list established by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. That the Maritime Commission be responsible for the construction of the above vessels.

E. J. KING.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 3-9-57

Signature: Carl T. Spacke
It is recommended:

1. That 48 aircraft transport vessels be built utilizing going Maritime Shipbuilding facilities now being devoted to merchant ship construction. The Maritime Commission to supply all material and equipment except guns, fire control, radio, radar, catapults and arresting gear.

2. That 100 destroyer escort vessels of approximately 20 knots be built utilizing Maritime shipbuilding facilities and industrial facilities. The Navy to provide materials, plans and specifications.

3. Priorities for material and equipment for the vessels be assigned in accordance with existing priority regulations and the priority of individual ships in the Naval Shipbuilding Program to be in accordance with the precedence list established by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. The Maritime Commission to be responsible for the construction of the foregoing vessels.
Dear Mr. President:

Your photograph just arrived. It is great. In fact, I think it the best of you I have ever seen, and to say that I am delighted to have it in my office at these headquarters, is stating it very mildly.

Will have you flanked with King George, (he presented me with a photograph when I was up at Scapa on his invitation), on one side and Winston Churchill on the other, and, grouped around you three will be Colonel Knox, Secretary Hull, King and Marshall.

Many, many thanks.

Have sent back so much dope to King since arrival over here that I think that he must almost groan every time he sees a new batch come in, but I find so much of interest, and I have so much wide opportunity, that to date I have just kept a regular stream going back to the Department. We are bending every energy for coming events.

Every good wish in the wide world as always,

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

Answering your memorandum of June 17 concerning the rumors that have reached you that some of the Navy recruiting officers are asking recruits what their attitude was on the Spanish War and their attitude toward Russia, I have had an investigation made and the report I have received is to the effect that in no case are recruits interrogated as to whether they are in favor of Loyalist Spain or cooperation with Russia.

I think I have taken the necessary steps now that, in case any of this was going on secretly or outside the office, it will be stopped.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House