

PSF

Navy Dept.

July - Dec. 1942

CONTINUED

Navy Folder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN McCREA

Will you tell the Navy Band
that I don't like the way they
play The Star Spangled Banner --
it should not have a lot of
frills in it?

F. D. R.

COMINCH FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/A1-3

Serial 00907

~~SECRET~~

SEP 2 1942

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President.

Subject: Aircraft Production in 1943.

Enclosure: (A) Admiral Towers' Memorandum of the
29th of August.

1. In response to your memorandum of the 24th of August, I am forwarding herewith the comments and recommendations of Admiral Towers, relative to the number of Naval Combat Aircraft which should be produced in the United States in 1943, for the Navy and for the Navies of our Allies, in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy.

2. I do not concur with that part of Admiral Towers' recommendations which has to do with the production objective to satisfy your premise. I have made a careful study of Naval aircraft requirements based upon operating plans which are and will shortly be effective. In this study I have considered solely the question of what I would like to have for the world's Navies if I could get it, in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy. Ship-borne aircraft totals are, however, restricted to such ships as are built or building. On these premises the following are the "theoretical" Naval Aircraft requirements:

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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature-

Carl S. Spear

*Navy folder
2-42*

COMINCH FILE
 FF1/A1-3

UNITED STATES FLEET
 HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
 NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Date- 3-7-59

Signature: *Carl S. Spicer*

Serial 00907

SEP 2 1942

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Subject: Aircraft Production in 1943.

THEORETICAL PRODUCTION REQUIREMENT

	Required for U.S.Navy	Numbers in fore- going which might be operated by U.S.Army for Naval Support.	U.S. Production for Foreign Navies.	Total required U. S. Produc- tion for Naval Purposes.
VPB - 4 Eng.	500		500	1000
VPB - 2 Eng.	1200		1000	2200
Bombers - 4 Eng. land, heavy	1200		200	1400
Bombers - 2 Eng. land, med.	2400	(400)	300	2700
Bombers - 2 Eng. land, light.	1900	(800)	600	2500
Scout - observation	1500		200	1700
Fighters	14200	(2000)	800	15000
Fighters, Night	1500	(700)		1500
Bombers, dive, torpedo (1 Eng.)	14200	(2000)	800	15000
Transports, 4 Eng.	500			500
Transports, 2 Eng.	1600			1600
Transports, 1 Eng.	300			300
	41000	(5900)	4400	45400

COMINCH FILE
FF1/A1-3

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

OFFICE
DELIVERY
NO. 4507

Serial 00907

~~SECRET~~

SEP 2 1942

~~SECRET~~

Subject: Aircraft Production in 1943.

3. With one exception I concur with the recommendation of Admiral Towers concerning the possible production of aircraft based on the limiting factors of production possibilities, availability of pilots, transportation, etc. War experience has indicated that we require a greater proportion of land-type airplanes in the multi-engine class, and a corresponding smaller proportion of seaplane-types than recommended by Admiral Towers. I recommend that the production of multi-engine landplanes for the Navy, as shown on page 3 of Admiral Towers' report, be increased in the four-engine class to 450 and in the two-engine class to 1,000 and that a reduction be made as to multi-engined seaplanes to 300 in the four-engine class and to 900 in the two-engine class.

4. It is to be noted that the foregoing will require additional production of land-type multi-engine airplanes and that a change will be required in the current approved Naval Aircraft Program reducing the number of squadrons of the seaplane type and increasing the number of squadrons of the landplane type in the multi-engined classes. If you approve I shall ask the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics to prepare the specific changes required in the approved current program for your consideration.

5. In connection with aircraft production as a whole I am in hearty agreement with the recommendations of Mr. Donald Nelson which were submitted to you recently and which were referred to in paragraph six of Admiral Towers' memorandum.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature-

Carl A. Speer

E. J. King
E. J. KING

*H H
To read &
give to Capt
McCrea to
file*

200

Refer to No.

Aer-PL-6-EX

EEL

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS
WASHINGTON

29 August 1942

~~SECRET~~

S 358

MEMORANDUM

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
SUBJECT: Aircraft Production in 1943.
Reference:
(a) Memorandum from the President of the United States
to Admiral King, dated 24 August 1942.

1. In his memorandum of 24 August the President requested that I submit to you my judgment of the number of naval combat aircraft by types which should be produced for the Navy and the navies of our Allies in this country in 1943 in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy.

2. In accordance with the President's directive of 3 January 1942, the Bureau of Aeronautics, in conjunction with the U. S. Army Air Forces and the War Production Board, is exerting every possible effort to produce 60,000 aircraft in 1942 and 125,000 in 1943. The Navy share of the tactical aircraft in the 1943 program amounts to 21,790 planes, subdivided into types which in January appeared most suitable for the attainment of complete air supremacy. Changed conditions now indicate a revaluation of production objectives. Among the more important factors which occasion modification to the program from the naval standpoint are: developments of the strategic situation, in particular the scope of prospective operations in the Pacific and the extent of the submarine threat in the Atlantic; actual war experience on the relative effectiveness of individual types of aircraft; prospective attrition; the rate of construction and conversion of aircraft carriers; needs of the British and Dominion air services for naval types; requests of Latin-American republics; and the indicated deficiencies of 1942 production.

3. In the light of the foregoing, I submit the following production objective to satisfy the President's premise:



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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- Carl S. Spicer

Aer-PL-6-EK

EEL

SUBJECT: ~~SECRET~~ Aircraft Production in 1943.

Bombers, patrol (4-engine)	600
Bombers, patrol (2-engine)	1,500
Bombers, dive, torpedo (1-engine)	10,000
Fighters (1-engine)	10,000
Transports, large (4-engine)	250
Transports, small - communication and utility (1-engine)	250
Observation, scout	<u>1,200</u>
Total:	23,800

In addition to the foregoing, the Navy requires the following aircraft normally to be obtained from sources of production under the cognizance of the U. S. Army Air Forces:

Bombers, heavy (4-engine)	250
Bombers, medium (2-engine)	1,000
Fighters (night)	200
Transports (4-engine)	50
Transports (2-engine)	<u>1,000</u>
Total:	2,500

4. In the detailed preparation of this objective, I have assumed that the U. S. Army Air Forces will provide adequate strength to perform indicated tasks in theaters of naval responsibility. My production objective will permit attaining in 1943 an operating strength of 9,600 first line aircraft, with 3,750 service type planes assigned to the training and administrative establishment, adequate reserves and provision for interim wastage. In particular, it will provide for the operation of the multi-engine elements of the approved program totalling:

Bombers, patrol (4-engine)	276
Bombers, heavy land (4-engine)	180
Bombers, patrol (2-engine)	1,153
Bombers, medium (2-engine)	632

5. Currently approved aircraft production schedules included in War Production Board Report 8-K provide for a total of 107,111 planes as an initial objective for 1943. Of these planes, 22,298 are of Navy types, subdivided as follows:

Aer-PL-6-EK

EEL

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SUBJECT: Aircraft Production in 1943.

Bombers, patrol (4-engine)	504
Bombers, patrol (2-engine)	1,364
Bomber, dive, torpedo (1-engine)	10,262
Fighters	8,196
Transports, large	39
Transports, medium	59
Transports, small - communication and utility	215
Observation	<u>1,659</u>
Total:	22,298

In addition, there are scheduled for the Navy from sources of production under the cognizance of the Army Air Forces:

Bombers, heavy	240
Bombers, medium	566
Transports	398
Transports, small	<u>66</u>
Total:	1,270

6. While current production schedules do not satisfy in detail the objective I have set forth herewith, I feel that they should be accepted as an initial objective for 1943. Every effort is continuously exerted to revise discrepancies in the program to meet indicated requirements. Because of the outstanding importance of aircraft in our war effort, the highest priority should be accorded the aircraft program to insure the necessary flow of tools, material and equipment. In this connection, I share the view of Mr. Donald Nelson that the aircraft program as now scheduled should be given the "green light". I recommend that this be included in your reply to the President's memorandum.



J. H. TOWERS
Rear Admiral U. S. N.
Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics

-3-

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE (A)

C O P Y

C O P Y

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

August 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING:

I wish you would ask Admiral Towers to submit to you his judgment of the number of naval combat aircraft by types which should be produced for the Navy and the navies of our Allies in this country in 1943 in order to have complete air ascendancy over the enemy.

This report should be prepared without consideration for existing schedules or production possibilities or any other competing military requirements. I am asking for this because I would like to know what the theoretical requirements are to get complete control and domination of the air.

I realize fully, however, that there are limiting factors to the creating of air power, such as the availability of pilots, high octane gas, transportation and the competition of other essential critical munitions of war. Hence, I would like you and General Marshall to submit a second schedule based on these realities and the proper relationship of air power to the Navy and our ground forces.

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

~~SECRET~~

THIS CAN BE FILED

H.L.H.


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WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

September 24, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The study on Requirements for Air Ascendancy, submitted by the Army Air Forces in compliance with your directive of August 24, 1942, contains data on Naval Aviation. I have just been informed that the Navy was not consulted in the preparation of this study and that Admiral King does not accept it. The Army Air Force study has been submitted to the Joint Staff Planners for the further consideration contemplated in your memorandum based on the realities of limiting factors and the proper relationship of air power to the Navy and our Ground Forces.


Chief of Staff.

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THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*BF Navy folder
2-42*

MEMORANDUM

Date October 5, 1942.

From: Commander Freseman.

To: Admiral Leahy.

On October 2nd, in conversation with Admiral King, the President noted that construction of 400 to 500 PBV's under contract from Consolidated Aircraft were not yet begun. He asked Admiral King if it would not be better, in view of the existing situation, to build 2 and 4-engine land plane bombers rather than the remainder of the PBV's.

On the same day Admiral King referred this question to Admiral Towers by memo.

The attached memo from Admiral Towers is the reply, which is forwarded to the President, via you, by Admiral King.

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W.F.
DECLASSIFIED

REF ID: A665200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- *3-9-59*

Signature-

Carl S. Spicer

In reply address not the signer of this letter but Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department, Washington, D.C.

Refer to No.

Aer-PL-6-EK

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS
WASHINGTON

3 October 1942

30 Oct/42
For the President
via Adm. Leahy
EJH

MEMORANDUM for Admiral King.

Your memorandum of 2 October requested my comment on the President's remarks on the continued production of PBV's at Consolidated and the Navy's need for 2- and 4-engine landplanes.

As of 1 October 1942, there were 665 PBV aircraft yet to be delivered by Consolidated prior to termination of this production in June 1943. The planes are tentatively allocated: 154 to Great Britain, 28 to Australia, 12 to New Zealand, 8 to South American countries, 10 to Defense Supplies Corporation and 453 to the U. S. Navy. The airplanes for the Navy are required to meet Operating Force Plans for antisubmarine work in the Atlantic, patrol operations in the Pacific and for training of pilots and flight crews.

The future employment of the facilities now engaged in fabricating PBV's has been the subject of considerable study by the Bureau and the manufacturer. The most efficacious use is to augment production of the 4-engine PB2Y with the increased output being delivered as cargo carrying flying boats. This has been approved by the Joint Aircraft Committee. The PBV plant is not required for B-24 production since acceleration of this model is limited by availability of materials rather than productive floor space. Introduction of a new landplane into this plant is not expedient at this time. In aircraft production there are a multitude of factors to be considered in getting any new production under way. Once in process, production builds up a tremendous momentum which cannot be abruptly terminated without confusion.

Appraisal of naval aircraft requirements indicates that both landplane bombers and flying boats are necessary to fulfill the missions assigned to Naval Aviation - landplanes to operate from localities where adequate prepared fields are available, flying boats where they are not. The Navy has arranged for delivery of both 2- and 4-engine landplane bombers to meet Operating Force Plans requirements. From the procurement standpoint the Navy has the responsibility of anticipating flying boat needs of our Allies and being prepared to satisfy unforeseen contingencies in addition to meeting its own expansion and replacement requirements.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

Carl L. Spicer

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN McCREA

Have I passed on the case
of a Reserve Officer in San
Francisco named Aroff? You
might find out its present
status.

F. D. R.

PSF Navy folder
2-42

January, 1942

Captain White called Aroff and stated that Admiral Greenslade had informed him that Aroff was allowing too many Jews to receive commissions. Aroff told the Captain that he was evaluating qualifications of applicants, and not their race or religion. White stated that he knew that but Aroff should watch it. At that time before White's secretary, Aroff requested to be transferred out of the Procurement Office. Captain White refused the request.

February, 1942

Captain White telephoned Aroff and said that Admiral Greenslade's nephew would be in White's office to apply for a commission and that Aroff should interview and evaluate and expedite the application. Ten minutes later Aroff was called to Captain White's office and introduced to Mr. Bloom, Admiral Greenslade's nephew.

After the application was completed, a few days later Captain White called Aroff and said that Admiral Greenslade had just called and said that if anybody had Jewish blood, as in his nephew's case, who was half Jewish, Aroff always expedited them, and this applied to his nephew as well as to anybody else. Aroff told Captain White that the nephew had been expedited at Captain White's request. Captain White recalled that that was so. Aroff also directed Captain White's attention to the fact that on the application Bloom had indicated that he was a Catholic and Aroff had no way of knowing that the man had Jewish blood.

Bloom also gave Captain White a San Francisco hotel address but had to be reached in Idaho or Montana when his commission arrived.

March, 1942

A party believed to be named Sweeney applied for a commission and an application was forwarded to the Bureau of Navigation, Washington. An F. B. I. report arrived while application was pending in Washington. Report stated applicant was Pro-Nazi and had entertained many Nazi' sailors when their ship was in San Francisco about 1940.

Dispatch sent to Bureau of Navigation requesting that no action be taken on application, and applicant was notified that no action would be taken.

Applicant appeared at the San Francisco office and threatened that he would have Aroff removed through influence of his family in Washington.

The next day the parties mother came to the office and stated that her husband was in Washington D. C., and her son was on his way to Washington D. C., and within 30 days Aroff would be thrown out of office unless he permitted her son's application to go through.

A few days later the Bureau of Navigation wired asking why no action was requested on this application. The Bureau was referred to the F. B. I. report.

Within 30 days Aroff was relieved of active duty.

Aroff received a request for a graduate engineer for Navy commission.

Several Chinese applicants who were engineer graduates of the University of California came to the Office of Procurement.

Aroff started to accept same when Captain White ordered no Chinese applications to be accepted.

Aroff advised White that he had one already accepted and he was ordered not to forward application to the Bureau of Navigation and to send a letter to the Chinese applicant telling him that he did not fulfill physical requirements.

This applicant who was so informed was a graduate honor student in engineering - - Once an authorization came from the Bureau of Navigation authorizing the appointment for one Chinese for warrant officer in Naval Intelligence. When Naval Intelligence was so notified by Aroff, Naval Intelligence stated that it did not want any Chinese.

Naval Intelligence resented Aroff because Aroff wanted to send them many men with F. B. I. background or Department of Justice experience as well as those employed as investigators by the Treasury Department.

Captain McCullough protested to Captain White that Aroff insisted upon sending the above men and did not approve an assistant relief room clerk and a shoe clerk.

White called Aroff and agreed that Aroff was right.

Captain McCullough then called upon Captain White in person and requested that White approve the room clerk and shoe clerk as he had certain ~~Washington~~ obligations and he knew Washington would approve the applications. White then ordered Aroff to OK these, which was done, and the shoe clerk and assistant room clerk received their commissions with the Naval Intelligence, and the F. B. I men, Treasury Department men and Department of Justice men were rejected.

Lt. Gaddes and Kerrigan, it is rumored were responsible for a great deal of trouble for Aroff. As a matter of fact, Kerrigan started the rumor that a Hollywood plumber (Aroff) was running Captain White's office. Unsolicited, Kerrigan came into the office of Naval Procurement and apologized to Captain White and Aroff for the story and stated that he was responsible for it.

Subsequently Gaddes and Kerrigan told White that Fleishhacker had paid Aroff by check \$1,000.00 for his commission. Captain White knew this to be false because Fleishhacker came through on an order from Washington and had never been previously interviewed in San Francisco.

Although Captain was never accused Navy appointed him counsel.

Lt. Ray Robinson who was Aroff's counsel requested an interview with White and his counsel, and when Robinson started questioning him about the car and the cuff links White stated he knew all about it, and then White's counsel interrupted and instructed him that he knew nothing about it and that he should keep his mouth shut and deny any knowledge of anything.

PERSONAL RESUME

Courses

~~Courses~~ completed since being commissioned:

1. Correspondence Courses with the Navy:

(a) Navy Regulations	Mark 3.86
(b) Gunnery	3.99 (4.0 is perfect)
(c) Navigation (B)	3.89 (2.5 is passing)
(d) Communications	3.85
(e) Military Law (now doing)	

2. Navigation at the University of Southern California, receiving diploma as Master Navigator.

3. Six months of Radio at Heald's Engineering College.

4. Private tutoring in all mathematics.

Occupation and experience before being commissioned:

Master Plumber and Fitter
Distributor & Jobber of Paints & Plumbing
General Contractor
Small Boat Experience
Participant in practically all sports
Referee of Boxing at University ~~of~~^{of} California, L.A.

Friedman came into the service as all of the other V 7 enlistments from the Army.

The Directives for enlistment stated that after enlistment, the applicant would be given subsistence, quarters and transportation to his home. One applicant gave his home on the East Coast and wanted to be sent there. A despatch was sent to the Bureau requesting authority to do this and it was denied. I was then directed to have all V 7 enlisted men from the Army give a 12 N Dor San Francisco address as they were to be considered a transient, having been discharged from the Army, and having not arrived home.

The Director* was not deceived by this procedure as it was his orders.

The Director also met and had lunch with Mr. Friedman Sr., and knew that he was from Los Angeles. He also explained to Friedman Sr., that while in Washington, D. C., he had been asked regarding the enlistment of Friedman Jr., and he personally vouched for him.

*
Captain White

and verified
Cummings Jr., gave his address as the Sir Francis Drake Hotel; was interviewed by the Personnel Officer of the Western Sea Frontier, who evaluated all of his qualifications and approved same.

I introduced Cummings Jr., to the Director who also approved him, knowing that he came from 11 N.D. but as he was needed in a special billet it made no difference. When Cummings Jr., was appointed and reported for active duty, Cummings Sr., was in the city of San Francisco and I asked him to come to the office and be introduced to the Director. This he did, and Cummings Sr., explained to the Director his latest assignment at the Studio, a picture called "My Gal Sal", starring Rita Hayworth.

The Judge Advocate stated that I was knowingly and wilfully with intent to deceive the Director in both Friedman' and Cummings' addresses on their applications with a "Charge" --
Scandalous Conduct Tending to the Destruction of Good Morals

Not only did the Director have full knowledge of all facts in the above but regarding official residence H. 1802. of Bureau of Navigation Manual, Official Residence is defined as follows:

" The place where the Bureau of Navigation may, at any time, send a letter or telegram, and expect prompt delivery to the addressee."

The judge advocate pointed out the fact there was an addenda to this that we had never received.

After the trial, I was in the Commandant's office of Yerba Buena, and I asked the Chief Petty Officer for the Commandant what the definition of official residence was and he had the same answer as I had; he had never received any correction from the Bureau.

Stromberg left a pair of cuff links at my apartment from his mother and dad after his appointment. Approximately two weeks after his appointment, he paid me a visit to tell me how good his grades were and that he was near the top of this class. At that time I told him his folks should not have given me anything and that as I had no use for the cuff links, I had given them away. I invited him to dinner with the Director and his wife for the next evening, because I was proud of his progress in the service and wanted to explain his marks to the Director. At this dinner, I told the Director about him giving me some cuff links from his parents and as I had no use for them, I gave them to his former girl friend.

Cummings' cuff links were paid for by his dad and he was not even on active duty at the time, even though the charges state so and were disproved.

When Cummings Sr. was introduced to the Director, I wore the cuff links and after he left, I told the Director that Cummings Sr. had given them to me. At no time has there been any reprimand.

Regarding the car, the Director knew all the details from its inception. I never, at any time, withheld any information. He has ridden in the Studebaker many times and, at one time, wanted to buy it but when I explained the price of the car and the details for a later payment to Martin, he said he would wait a while. The Director also went with me when I bought the Cadillac.

At no time previous to May 14th was a car ever discussed by Naval Intelligence to Tony or me, but how do they explain my buying a \$500.00 bond for Tony on May 4th, and then telling him not to keep it but send it back to me.

When Tony tried to tell them the truth, that he had sold me the car, they told him it was not so, it was impossible. Tony was afraid to say anything but what they told him to say because of certain statements made to him.

At the trial, the judge advocate denied any knowledge of my personal file which, if presented, would have considerable bearing on the trial.

Three weeks after the trial, I received by registered mail, part of my personal file.

My complete file would show that many applications were processed as were Friedman's, Cummings' and Martin's, and that all irregular doings were routine for me.

The duty list showed that I worked seven days a week, approximately 80 to 85 hours per week since war was declared. This, the judge advocate tried to disprove by showing a letter on Navy stationery dated October, 1941, which was before Pearl Harbor.

I was also told by the Director that I had sold more "Defense Bonds" than any group in the district. This was also done when I could find any sparetime after office hours.

The judge advocate, by innuendo, suggested that something of a sinister nature was in the making because the afore mentioned men sometimes called at my department. In all of my lectures at universities, clubs, or hotels, I would invite attention to the fact that inasmuch as many of those present could not, because of their studies or work in essential industries, appear at my office during office hours, to call me at my hotel and not feel under any obligation as mine was a 24 hour a day job.

This information was contained in my personal file that was sent me including a letter pertinent to the enlistment of Martin and other programs.

I was suspended from duty on April 16th and my fitness report made out on May 2nd for September to March states that from an unknown source the Commandant had received information that I was arrogant and abrupt to applicants, and so informed the Director, who reprimanded me in January and February. The Director also stated in this fitness report that he was still satisfied to have me and gave me a passing mark. He also stated that he had received many letters during this period commending me on my work from many of the leading educators, government officials, civic leaders, and business men of the district.

At no time was I ever reprimanded for being arrogant. During this same period I was elevated to executive assistant director which would in all probability, within a short time and because of the expansion of the office, promote me to the rank of full Commander.

All of the above was explained to my naval counsel who arranged a meeting with the Director to see as to how far he would testify. Present at this meeting were the Director, his naval counsel, Mr. Martin, and Lt. Ray Robinson.

As the Director started to explain what he knew, he was advised by his counsel not to say anything; that he was not on trial, and even though he knew about all of the items contained in the specifications, to deny same and not become involved. When the Director was told this, Lt. Robinson accused the Director's counsel of suborning the Director to perjury and left the meeting without any further discussion.

After securing the record of the trial, Lt. Robinson asked for 30 days in which to prepare a brief, instead the next week he was ordered to report to the officers school of indoctrination Rhode Island.

April 16th. The Director and I were both suspended at the same time with no reasons given. I was not allowed to go into my office or go home. The next day, in headlines and on the radio, my name was smeared all over the country but no mention was made of the Director.

April 25th. Relieved of active duty and ordered home, and still no reason given. Meanwhile, all my friends in Los Angeles were taken to Naval Intelligence and questioned.

Received active duty orders for June 29th, and upon reporting was served with Charges.

Navy counsel was offered me and I made arrangements for additional civilian counsel. Mr. Don Marlin of Los Angeles. Mr. Marlin and the Judge Advocate, Irving Klein, met and my counsel was advised that the prosecution was ready for trial and set July 13th for the starting date. This would enable Marlin to arrange his office in Los Angeles. The Judge Advocate stated, in my presence, that in event any change should take place insofar as the starting date was concerned, Marlin would be notified.

Merlin arrived in San Francisco about the 8th and started to go ahead and prepare for trial. Remained in San Francisco until the 13th and then found out trial was delayed until the 27th. The Judge Advocate did not notify him. This alone cost me a considerable sum.

A member of the Court had a dog present at all times and every time it moved the Court would stop.

Several days before the trial, the newspapers and radio smeared me again, by announcing all the charges.

*As
soon
as
possible*

Rumors were being spread Aroff has been paid \$100 to \$150,000 for commissions and has received \$40,000 to \$50,000 worth of plumbing and paint business. Even the Director told me that certain officers informed him that they had the checks that were given me and even went so far as to mention a name and that they had many more.

All of this smear and much more was my payment for working conscientiously 80 to 85 hours a week, giving lectures at such places as the University of California, Stanford University, yacht clubs and hotels, after office hours.

Selling Defense Bonds in my spare time.

Expediting applications as ordered by the Bureau.

Refusing to go to the hospital as the navy doctor wanted me to so that I might have my stomach checked, because there was too much work to be done in the office.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
personal
navy
folder*

October 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I have carefully gone over the subject of the building of the four 45,000 ton carriers -- and, in addition to the opinion of high ranking officers, I have obtained the personal opinions of a number of Junior Officers who have been connected with aviation.

There seems to be substantial support for the building of these very large ships -- always on the assumption that because of the availability of ways for large ships we would not substantially increase the number of smaller ships if the larger ships were not undertaken.

Also, I am informed that the present number of carriers of various types now authorized for construction or completion within the next two years is considered adequate.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

I am, therefore, willing to approve the immediate laying down of these four large carriers on two conditions:

1. That the General Board will certify that the program for the immediate construction of smaller carriers is adequate for the next two years.
2. That greater speed can be made in the construction of these 45,000 ton carriers than is indicated in the report of the General Board of September eleventh.

In other words, I want a definite effort made to complete the first two in the first quarter of 1945 instead of the third quarter of 1945; the completion of one other in the second quarter of 1945 instead of the fourth quarter; and the fourth in the third quarter of 1945 instead of the first quarter of 1946. And I do not want the General Board's "out" in regard to a possible additional period of six months for shakedown after completion.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-3-

If everybody puts their minds
to work on this problem, I think
the objective can be obtained --
but I want it in writing.

F. D. R.

Navy Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN McCREA

I would like to talk with
you about this matter this
evening.

F. D. R.

Letter from Knox to the President (secret)
on the subject of carrier construction.

BF Navy folder

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

53230

September 22, 1942

(SC)CV/S1-1
(045300A/GRC)

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

My dear Mr. President:

You will remember that a short time ago you wrote me a memorandum asking that a careful study be made of the whole subject of carrier construction. I immediately submitted this question to the General Board and I attach herewith a reply which also carries with it the endorsement of the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and also of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House

Enclosure

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

Pub. No. 48868

THESE ARE COPIES OF ORIGINAL LETTERS
DELIVERED TODAY, 9-23-48, WHICH WERE
INADVERTENTLY DETACHED.

(SC) FILE ROOM OF OPMAY

September 22, 1942

(SC)CV/S1-1
(045300A/GRC)

~~SECRET~~
SECRET

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Frank Knox

The President

The White House

Enclosure

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spier*

September 23, 1942

(SC)S28-2/AC122
(045400A/GRC)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

My dear Mr. President:

Several days ago, you wrote me a memorandum suggesting the possibility of naming one of our new cruisers after the CANBERRA, which was sunk in the Southwest Pacific.

In accordance with your directions, I have talked the matter over with the Secretary of State and he gave it his prompt approval. I also asked Admiral Jacobs to assign the first available unnamed cruiser the name of CANBERRA and this has been done. The ship is being built at the Bethlehem Steel Company and the predicted launching date is November 1, 1944. If this postpones the ceremony too long, we can make a change which will bring the ceremony earlier by naming some other ship the CANBERRA.

Please let me know if the present arrangement is satisfactory to you.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

The President
The White House

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature-

Carl S. Speck

COMMON FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF1/S1

Serial: 001003

~~SECRET~~

SEP 17 1942

~~SECRET~~

SECOND ENDORSEMENT to
G.B. 420-7 (Serial 223) of
September 11, 1942.

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and
Chief of Naval Operations.
To : Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: 45,000 ton aircraft carriers.

1. Forwarded, concurring fully with the recommendation of the General Board as amplified in the first endorsement.

E. J. King
E. J. KING.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/88)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- *Paul F. Spicer*

M. Carter
OFFICE
DELIVERY
NO. 5323

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

51347

Op-10 Hu
(SC) CV/31-1
Serial 06210

First Endorsement


From: Vice Chief of Naval Operations
To: Secretary of the Navy
Via: Commander in Chief, U.S.Fleet

SEP 16 1942

SUBJECT: 45,000 ton Aircraft Carriers.

1. The Vice Chief of Naval Operations has been studying the question of aircraft carriers for several years and has carefully considered the present report of the General Board. As a result he is strongly of the opinion that the construction of four 45,000 ton carriers with the characteristics as previously proposed by the General Board should be prosecuted immediately and every possible effort made to expedite their completion.

2. Should the War not be finished by the time these carriers are available to the Forces afloat they will be of inestimable value in the final stages of the War in the Pacific, and should the War be over by the time they are completed it is firmly believed that they will be of great service to the Navy during the period of world rehabilitation.



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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

1942 SEP 16 15 35
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Date- 3-9-59

Signature- *Carl S. Speier*

SECRET

49962

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
GENERAL BOARD
WASHINGTON**

G.B.No. 420-7
(Serial No. 223)

RAH

~~SECRET~~

SEP 11 1942

From: Chairman General Board.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: 45,000 ton Aircraft Carriers - New Design of.

References: (a) Secnav 1st End. (SC)CV/SI-1 (036500A/GRC) of August 17, 1942. *RELEASED - A FILED*
(b) General Board Confidential Letter G.B.No. 420-7 (Serial No. 174) of March 14, 1942. *SEP 11 1942*

Enclosures: (A) Table of Carrier Characteristics. *SECRET*
(B) Table of Completions - Carrier Program. *File No. (SC) CV/SI-1*
(C) Graph of Carrier Availability. *Int. No. 60481*
Page No. 1 of 3

1. By reference (a), the Secretary of the Navy forwarded to the General Board a memorandum from the President of the United States and requested that a careful study be made of the subject matter and a report furnished as soon as possible. In this memorandum the President approved a combatant ship program for 1943-44 with the exception of four new design 45,000 ton aircraft carriers which were "not approved at this time" for two reasons; and he desired that a study be made "as to the advisability of building 16-11,000 ton carriers of the slower type, seeking to put into service 8 in 12 months and 8 more in the following 12 months--in other words, 8 carriers by the Autumn of 1943; 8 more by the Autumn of 1944 and the possibility of still another 8 by the Autumn of 1945--at which time we would get the first of these proposed 45,000 ton carriers."

2. The reasons expressed by the President for withholding approval of the 45,000 ton carriers at this time are:

(a) That the first two would not be completed until the third quarter of 1945, three full years from now; one in the fourth quarter of 1945; and the fourth in the first quarter of 1946, with a possible additional period of six months in each case before the ships would be ready to take their places in combat,

(b) A question whether tactically a single large carrier is better than two carriers or three carriers each carrying one-half or one-third the plane carrying capacity respectively.

The President also called to attention that this war may well be over before the lapse of three years.

RECLASSIFIED
DATE 11/11/00
BY 60303

3. The General Board has carefully considered this matter, has consulted with the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations; and has held a hearing attended by representatives of the interested Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department.

4. At the present time, there are, in commission, in the United States Navy, certain aircraft carriers which were designed and built as such. Additionally there are:

23 aircraft carriers of the ESSEX (26,500 ton) Class, designed as such, building and projected;

9 aircraft carriers, of about 10,700 tons, being light cruiser conversions, building;

36 carriers, C-3 type conversions completed, in the process of conversion, or now being built as carriers;

4 carriers, U.S. Navy oilers, (CIMARRON Class), now being converted; and

50 carriers to be built as such on expanded P-1 type hulls for the Maritime Commission by Mr. Kaiser, presumably for Navy account.

(The above are exclusive of 15 C-3 type hull conversions, completed or under conversion and allocated to Great Britain).

Details of these vessels, and of their expected completion dates are shown in tables and graphs appended hereto. Of these vessels, the General Board understands that by "carriers of the slower type" is meant vessels converted to the aircraft escort type from C-3 or tanker hulls or the P-1 hulls under construction by Mr. Kaiser, all of which are expected to have a speed of from about eighteen to twenty knots.

5. The advisability of building sixteen 11,000 ton carriers of the slower type, as suggested by the President, is largely a question of the availability of building ways and of materials. The General Board is informed that there are no ways available for these vessels, nor can any be made available without displacing scheduled production and thus causing confusion and delay in present programs of construction of combatant and other vessels of great importance to the war effort. As to materials, the situation is acute, not only as regards raw materials but also with respect to

G.B.No. 420-7 (Serial No. 223)

manufactured articles and equipment. As an instance, the Board is informed that only a certain number of main propulsion units are now being produced, and that it would be necessary to displace propulsion units intended for destroyers, cruisers, or other vessels to provide the necessary units for the vessels under consideration. If the suggested program is considered of sufficient importance to justify the disruption of other programs now in progress and to warrant granting the highest priority, it can be taken in hand; even so, it is improbable that the first eight vessels could be completed in the Autumn of 1943 due to the difficulty of starting a new line of construction quickly.

6. With a view to presenting a more complete picture of the carrier situation as regards both the matter of bringing our utmost resources into action in the shortest possible time and the actual combat value of those resources, the General Board has gone somewhat beyond the specific question presented. Pertinent considerations having to do with other types of carriers and other types of vessels are briefly discussed in the following paragraphs.

7. In the interest of maintaining orderly schedules of ship construction, the General Board has looked into the possibility of obtaining additional carriers of the ESSEX type or of either the converted CIMARRON or converted light cruiser types.

(a) At Newport News: If the four 45,000 ton carriers are approved, the first keels will be laid down late in 1943; considerable material would be assembled prior to keel laying, and the expectation would be for completion of the first three ships late in 1945. If these four ships are not laid down, it would be possible to obtain, instead:

(1) Four ESSEX Class carriers, the first deliveries probably in the Summer of 1945; or

(2) Four carriers similar to the converted cruiser type, all to be completed in 1945; or

(3) Ten converted CIMARRON Class carriers, two late in 1944 and the remainder by the end of 1945.

(b) At New York Shipbuilding Company: There are now nine light cruisers under conversion to carriers at this plant. Additional cruisers are to be constructed there and if nine of these were ordered converted, three carriers of this type could be obtained in the summer of 1944 and six more during 1945.

(c) At Sparrows Point: Fourteen oilers of the CIMARRON type are under construction by the Maritime Commission for the Navy. If these were to be converted to carriers, three would be completed late in 1943, and the remainder (11) during 1944.

8. There has been no experience whatever with carriers converted from CIMARRON Class oilers or from light cruisers; the experience with those converted from C-3 hulls is very limited; the plans for the ships to be built by Mr. Kaiser have not yet been completed but they follow rather closely the designs of any of the merchant ship conversions. The usefulness of any of these ships is, therefore, somewhat problematical, but it is obvious that they will have a limited usefulness only, dependent upon their various characteristics and the characteristics and number of the aircraft which they can operate, which in no single instance equal those of an acceptable all around aircraft carrier and its complement of planes. In the opinion of the General Board:

(a) Carriers of the converted light cruiser type

- (1) Have entirely satisfactory speed (33 knots).
- (2) Are deficient in underwater torpedo protection and in protection against bombs, though such protection is very good considering the size of the ship.
- (3) Are deficient in battery power for defense against aircraft, destroyers or larger surface craft.
- (4) Are uneconomical as to personnel, inasmuch as they require a total of 1352 officers and men to operate 30 planes as against totals of 2217 and 2382 officers and men on the HORNET and ESSEX respectively, both of which operate 82 planes.
- (5) Have insufficient strength of landing decks to fly on airplanes other than those types now in existence; increased size and weight of planes required by higher performance demanded in active operations are precluded.
- (6) Have insufficient size overall (11,000 tons standard) to insure satisfactory take-off and landing of planes except under very favorable weather conditions--will be lively in a sea-way.
- (7) Have flight decks which are on the short side; take-off runs are increasing in length due to weight additions to planes on account of armor, leak-proof tanks and other military essentials so that runs of over three hundred and fifty feet may be experienced frequently.

(b) Carriers of the converted CIMARRON type, converted C-3 hull type and the Kaiser ships:

(1) Have unsatisfactory speed (16-1/2 - 20 knots). The take-off run of a plane is, roughly, inversely proportional to the square of the wind-speed over the flight deck. Experience in the fleet has shown that a take-off run of at least three hundred and fifty feet with a wind-speed of twenty-five knots over the flight deck is essential to successful flight operations. This wind-speed is not obtainable under many conditions with slow speed ships; weight additions to planes for various military purposes require longer runs, thereby seriously reducing the number of aircraft that can be operated. A ship speed of at least twenty-five knots is required in order that operations may be conducted in calm weather. Since these ships make less than twenty-five knots, a catapult will be provided for launching planes, but the use of the catapult means that the take-off interval is increased requiring about four times as long to complete launchings. Under many weather conditions not abnormal, landing operations will be uncertain and hazardous, as the slower ship speed increases the space in which the plane's way must be stopped, and also increases the relative speed of the airplane on landing. The net result is that the aircraft for these carriers are subject to such limitations that they must, in future, be specially designed in a way which is incompatible with high performance.

(2) Have no underwater torpedo protection, deck protection against bombs, or side protection against gunfire.

(3) Are deficient in battery to protect against aircraft or fire from surface ships.

(4) Have insufficient strength of landing decks to land planes other than those types now in existence.

(5) May be reasonably satisfactory in a sea-way, but not as good as desired.

(6) Have flight decks that are on the "short" side; the CIMARRON conversions are the longest, and the C-3 conversions the shortest.

(7) CIMARRON conversions will carry about 10,000 tons of cargo fuel as against 16,000 tons in a similar oiler.

9. In connection with a suggestion to convert additional light cruisers and oilers to carriers, the General Board has given thought to the numbers of cruisers and oilers built, building and projected and to the prospective needs for such vessels. As regards cruisers, the number now in service is inadequate for war needs, and if the number now building and projected are all completed as cruisers, it is seriously doubted if the total will be sufficient for all of our war purposes. A large carrier, while operating in hostile waters, should be guarded by up to three cruisers and a squadron of destroyers. Cruisers are needed for escort duty, for support of amphibious operations, for many kinds of service detached from the fleet and for general fleet use. The war losses in cruisers probably will be heavy and the need for cruisers certainly will increase as the war continues. As regards oilers, the need for them is also increasing; with the loss of the East Indian oil fields to Axis powers, the greater burden of supplying fuel to our fleet from American fields requires more fast oilers; and if the Near East oil fields are also lost, the problem of the supply of fuel will be greatly increased. In the opinion of the Board, it is of very real importance that no more light cruisers and that no more oilers be converted to carriers, this by reason of the urgent need for vessels of these classes for service with the fleet, by reason of the number of converted carriers already in hand, and further that such vessels, when converted, will not be satisfactory as carriers.

10. With any suggestion that ESSEX Class carriers be laid down in place of 45,000 ton carriers, the General Board is definitely not in accord. It is true that repeat ships of the ESSEX Class could be completed a few months prior to the 45,000 tonners, but the smaller ships are much inferior to the larger ones. The 45,000 ton carriers would have as effective underwater protection as could be devised, would have greatly increased protection against projectiles and aircraft bombs, - all of which, together with their size, would result in a vastly superior power of survival against all forms of attack; there would be a larger battery for protection against aircraft and the fire of surface ships; and, of the utmost importance, they would have very strong flight decks permitting the use of planes of greater weight, with corresponding increased performance and combat value, designed to meet and defeat the best enemy aircraft. There are actual restrictions, at the present time, on the character of aircraft that should be under development to compete successfully with enemy aircraft, due to operational restrictions on all carriers built and projected with the exception of the four 45,000 ton ships. The Board is of the opinion that the substitution of ESSEX carriers for the larger type should not be made. However, the design of the ESSEX Class should be studied with a view to modification to permit the use of heavier planes if this can be done without delays in completion.

11. With respect to the President's suggestion that the war may be ended within three years, the General Board is very sensible of the fact that political and economic considerations may have an equal or greater weight than military developments in bringing about a finish to the conflict. From the military point of view alone the Board is constrained to limit its consideration to bringing the utmost combat resources into play at the earliest possible moment in a war of indefinite duration and it was this basic concept that led the Board to advise construction of the 45,000 ton carriers. Within a year, certainly within two years, or before the substitutions considered herein can have material influence on the military decision, the outlook as regards duration of the war should be much clearer. If within a year, or two years, the end of the war is in sight, work on the 45,000 ton carriers may be suspended or continued as circumstances at the time may dictate. If, however, the end of the war is not in sight within two years the value of the large carriers will be even more important and the need for them more urgent than it is today.

12. The General Board recommends that:


(a) On account of lack of building ways and shortage of materials, and by reason of the number of similar vessels already authorized--of limited usefulness as regards both ships and aircraft--the program of construction of 11,000 ton carriers of the slower type be not adopted;

(b) no further conversions to carriers of light cruisers and oilers be undertaken;

(c) ESSEX Class carriers be not substituted for carriers of the 45,000 ton class; and

(d) four carriers, each of 45,000 tons, be laid down as soon as practicable.

Copy to Cominch
V.C.N.O.


NAVY DEPARTMENT

Vice *Sept. 11, 1942*
For Chief of Naval
Operations for comment.

..... 
Frank E. Beatty
By direction.

Enclosure A

CARRIER INFORMATION

SERIAL NO. 223

	CV's								AVG's			
	SARATOGA	ENTERPRISE	RANGER	WASP	HORNET	ESSEX	EX-CL's	45000	C-3 Conversion	C-3 Bldg.	AO Conversion	Kaiser
Tonnage	33,000	19,900	14,500	14,700	20,000	26,500	10,700	45,000	13,500	13,500	24,300	9,900
Length	Std. 850	Std. 770	Std. 730	Std. 690	Std. 770	Std. 820	Std. 600	Std. 900	Full Ld. 465	Full Ld. 465	Full Ld. 543	Full Ld. 490
Beam	111	81'-6"	80	80'-7"	81'-6"	93	71'-6"	113	69'-6"	69'-6"	75	65
Draft	29'-9"	25'-9"	24'-6"	24'-6"	25'-9"	26'-10"	22'-6"	33	23'	23'	31'-2"	19'-6"
Speed	Opt. Bat. 33.9	Opt. Bat. 32.5	29.25	29.5	Opt. Bat. 32.5	Trial 33	Trial 32	33	Full Ld. 18	Full Ld. 18	Full Ld. 18.5	Full Ld. 19
Flight Deck-Length	888	814	726	739	814	870	552	932	440	440	510	477
Beam-Max.	106	86	86	100	89	109	73	113	80	80	85	80
Beam-Isld.	82	80	76	85	80	95	73	96	80	80	85	80
Armament-Main Batt.	16-5"/38	8-5"/38	8-5"/25	8-5"/38	8-5"/38	12-5"/38	2-5"/38	18-5"/38	2-5"/51	2-5"/38	2-5"/51	1-5"/51
Heavy M.G.	9-1.1 Q	4-1.1 Q	6-1.1 Q	4-1.1 Q	4-1.1 Q	6-40mmQ	8-40mmT	16-5"/54 At least 8-40mmQ	4-40mmT	4-40mmT	4-40mmT	4-40 mm T
Light M.G.	32-20mm	34-20mm	30-20mm	32-20mm 8-.50	32-20mm	24-20mm	14-20mm	Max. No.	4-1.1 Q 10-20mm	4-1.1 Q 10-20mm	4-1.1 Q 10-20mm	10-20mm
Planes-VF	27	27	27	27	27	27	12	36	12	12	12	12
VSB	37	37	37	37	37	37	9	48	-	-	9	12
VTB	18	18	12	12	18	18	9	36	12	12	9	-
Tot. Complement Planes	82	82	76	76	82	82	30	120	24	24	30	24
Complement-Offs.-Ship	100(14)*	86(14)*	81(14)*	86(14)*	86(14)*	96(14)*	48(8)*	106(16)*	33(8)*	33(8)*	40(8)*	31(6)*
Enl.-Ship	1840	1280	1288	1435	1280	1435	971	3100	436	436	522	?
Offs.-Avia.	141(121)*	141(121)*	120(100)*	120(100)*	141(121)*	141(121)*	55(45)*	210(100)*	55(45)*	55(45)*	41(36)*	32(27)*
Enl.-Avia.	710	710	659	659	710	710	278	Incl. in Ship	159	159	278	?
Total-Offs. & Enl.-Sh & Av.	2791	2217	2148	2167	2217	2382	1352	3416	683	683	881	?

* Figures in () are numbers of aviators.

	Completion Data by Quarters (Cal. Years)																Total Program Built and Building	
	On Hand	1942		1943				1944				1945				1946		
		3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1		2
"ESSEX"	0	0	1	3	1	0	2	1	3	0	4	2	0	0	2	3	1	23
Ex CL's	0	0	1	1	2	3	0	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
(45,000)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	-	(4)*
AVG (C-3)	3	4	6	7	7	7	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36
AVG (AO)	0	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
AVG (Kaiser)	0	0	0	8	12	12	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50

* Not yet authorized

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Date- 3-9-59


Signature- Carl J. Speer

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
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16-58810
Rev. 10-15-54



NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON,

SUBJECT: 223. 45,000 ton Aircraft Carriers - New Design of.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL BOARD:

The recommendations contained in the General Board's
letter ~~endorsement~~ G. B. No. 420-7 dated 11 September 1942
have been this date and action will be
taken, as follows:
.....
.....
.....
.....

By direction of the Secretary:

N. B. S. 1

ADDRESS BUREAU OF SHIPS, NAVY DEPARTMENT
AND REFER TO NO.

*file
Memorandum*

*Navy folder
2-42*

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ENCLOSURES

October 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCREA

Attached hereto is a memorandum on the ⁺Lawrence
Engineering and Research Corporation, Linden, N.J. I believe
this gives all the information relative to work performed by this
company for the Bureau of Ships.

W. H. Lawrence

Bureau of Ships

URGENT

732(RMB/ep)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 15, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for ADMIRAL VAN KEUREN:

SUBJECT: Lawrence Engineering and Research Corporation, Linden, New Jersey.

1. The following are highlights of information on Lawrence Engineering and Research Corporation:

- (a) The company is currently engaged in producing gasoline engine driven generator equipment for aircraft.
- (b) ELCO used Lawrence air cooled gasoline engine driven generators of 5-KW capacity in early PT boats.
- (c) The engine on these sets proved unreliable in operation, particularly when boats were in tropical waters. One reason for their unreliability was difficulty in cooling of the engine.
- (d) About November 1941 the Bureau of Ships began furnishing engine driven sets for PT boats building at ELCO and elsewhere. Water cooled engines were adopted. 2-1/2-KW generators were used. Contracts as a result of competitive bidding were placed with U.S. Motors. Unit price was about \$500.00.
- (e) Subsequent to November 1941, purchases of Lawrence equipment by Bureau of Ships has been limited to replacement units and spare parts for our own PT boats and, under Lend-Lease, for British MGB craft (ex-70' ELCO Boats). Unit price for both engines and spare parts were regarded as excessive and there is correspondence by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts that indicates attempt to reduce price to lower level.
- (f) Current orders are:
Lend-Lease: Contract NL40s-5017A covering four (4) 5-KW engine gasoline generators.
Contract NIs-10799 for spare parts, \$22,301.04.
U.S. Navy: NIs-9407, 25 replacement 5-KW generator sets, \$3,875.50 each.
- (g) Deliveries are reported as fairly good.
- (h) Design Section 517 states that Lawrence Engineering and Research Corp. has often sent representatives to the Bureau. Recently they did so and at that time it was stated that they did not know of the trouble their equipment had been giving, nor the reasons for discontinuing use of same.
- (i) Section 643 has recently awarded development contracts for developing light weight water cooled 5-KW gasoline engine driven generator sets. Contractors are: L. D. Edwards, Stroudsburg, Pa.
Capital Engine Company, 4536 Vernon Blvd.,
Long Island City.

I have suggested that Section 643 contact Lawrence Engineering and Research Corporation and invite them to submit a proposition upon their development of a similar unit.

October 15, 1942

2. To summarize: Lawrence Engineering units have proven unreliable, costly, and very costly to maintain. Use of this equipment was discontinued for that reason. There appears to exist no prejudice against the company but a definite conviction, by design people, that present Lawrence equipment is not satisfactory.

Refer to No. Aer-PRD-3-LET
QM(4917)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS

WASHINGTON

15 October 1942

M E M O R A N D U M

From: Commander G. C. Irwin
To: The Assistant Chief of the Bureau of
Aeronautics

SUBJECT: Lawrence Engineering & Research Corporation,
Linden, N.J., Status of Production

1. This information was requested at 1100, 14 October
by Lieutenant Currie for Captain McCrae, Aide to the President.

2. Subject company are manufacturing the following
items for the Bureau:

- (a) 30 D Auxiliary Power Units (2 cylinder)
- (b) 30 C-2 Auxiliary Power Units (2 cylinder)
- (c) 75 B Auxiliary Power Units (5 cylinder)

(a) The first seven of these units were to be delivered
August, and fifty-eight (58) to be delivered September. These
schedules were not met because of a Lawrence engineering error
resulting in reverse rotation. Prompt steps were taken to
remedy this situation by this Section as soon as the error be-
came apparent. It seems that we shall get deliveries starting
25 October. It is anticipated that this will enable us to
provide units in planes as they come off the line without the
customary sixty day lead.

(b) Approximately eighteen of these units still remain to
be built. Production is being sidetracked at present to benefit
Model 30 D since the urgency for 30 C at the moment is not great.

(c) These units are being delivered on schedule.

3. During the past few months there has been discord
between groups of stockholders. This came to a head last week.
This Section took prompt action to keep fully abreast of the
situation. Reorganization appears complete. Minority dissident
stockholders, and a few blood relatives and friends employed
there have attempted to stir up trouble.



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Aer-PRD-3-LET
QM(4917)

SUBJECT: Lawrence Engineering and Research Corporation,
Status of Production

We continue to keep in close touch with the situation, and believe it well in hand at the moment.

Should anything occur which will menace deliveries we shall be promptly informed.

H. C. Futura

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please speak to me and no
one else about this!

F. D. R.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972

C O P Y

*PSF Navy folder
2-42*

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Once I suggested that the fine large steamers that carry news-print from the CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S paper mills in Canada to its place of defilement on the Chicago River, be requisitioned by the Army or the Navy. I still think that my idea was a bright one.

Now I pass on another suggestion. I understand that certain Canadian papers are taking vigorous exception to the CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S attitude in the war. Why could not the Canadian government be encouraged to shut off this news-print at the source, on the ground that when it gets to this country it is put to a use that is of aid and comfort to the enemy?

I make no charge for these bright little thoughts.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) HAROLD L. ICKES
Secretary of the Interior

The President,
The White House.

MELVIN J. MAAS
4th Dist. Minnesota

Navy folder
2-42
C. A. JORDAN
SECRETARY

file personal

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Oct. 22, 1942.

Memorandum for President Franklin D. Roosevelt

- 1.- PERSONNEL. I am convinced that it is absolutely essential that one man be placed in supreme command of the entire Pacific theatre of war, and that the artificial line now separating the Pacific at the 159th Parallel be eliminated. This will necessitate transferring both General MacArthur and Admiral Gormley to other assignments. The officer who should command this area must have broad general naval experience, with an extensive and intimate naval aviation background. Vice Admiral William Halsey seems to fit these requirements.
- 2.- EQUIPMENT. Inadequate military forces, equipment and supplies have been sent to the Pacific area. It is absolutely essential that sufficient equipment, particularly airplanes, be diverted to the Pacific area to at least hold our present positions. This will require the addition of not less than three hundred bombers and three hundred fighters; and the resulting total number must be constantly maintained.
- 3.- It would appear to me to be an extremely wise move to place in both the War and Navy Departments at least one vigorous young man with military and naval background, as Assistant or Under Secretary, to provide the essential liaison between the strictly military and the civilian direction of the war effort.

Melvin J. Maas

Navy folder
2-42

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THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.
WASHINGTON.

October 24, 1942 Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(SC)SS/S1-1
(SC)A4-1/QS1
(O47300A)

file

Date- 8-9-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

My dear Mr. President:

Recently the question was raised as to what exactly had been done toward the conversion of the submarines, BASS, BONITA and BARRACUDA to cargo carriers.

Upon checking up on this matter, I find that the decision to convert these vessels was made on September 5 and they are now at the Navy Yard in Philadelphia undergoing these changes. The tentative date of completion is March 30, 1943.

You have also directed me to investigate the presence at Buenos Aires of a large number of former Japanese trawlers. I think the number mentioned in your memorandum was 40. I immediately asked the Office of Naval Intelligence for such information as they had concerning this and their reply indicated there were only two. Thereupon, I directed them to send a dispatch to the Naval Attache at Buenos Aires in order to get the latest possible information. From the Naval Attache, the following reply has just been received:

"PRESIDENT MITRE and PRESIDENTE ROCA are the only former Japanese trawlers here. Both are about four hundred tons, use diesel index 40 fuel viscosity Saybolt Universal at 100 degrees fahrenheit 34 to 45. Both ships believed to be in excellent condition. High powered radio installations now removed. No Japanese reported in crew lists."

I am at once initiating efforts to see if these two trawlers can be purchased.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1942.

*file
personal,
Navy
folder
2-42*

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I heard yesterday that there is a fleet of former Japanese owned trawlers operating out of the Argentine under Argentine ownership. I am told they are about 400 tons and have large fuel capacity. Please have the question of our purchasing them studied. I think ONI knows about this.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

"FDR"
F. D. R.

Transmitting copy of the President's joint memorandum of 11/2/42 to the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff of the Army, in re Japanese situation in Hawaii.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY

In the Secretary's letter of October twenty-eighth he mentions that General Emmons believes the Japanese situation in Hawaii is being taken care of but that General Emmons is also taking into consideration the labor needs in the Islands.

I think that General Emmons should be told that the only consideration is that of the safety of the Islands and that the labor situation is not only not a secondary matter but should not be given any consideration whatsoever.

The amount of sugar or pineapples grown or harvested has such a small ratio of effect on our national economy that the United Nations can get along with a large reduction in the Hawaiian supply if necessary.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

-2-

**General Emmons and Admiral
Nimitz should be advised of this.
Military and naval safety is
absolutely paramount.**

"F. D. R."

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of War; copy of the memorandum sent to the Chief Staff of the Army.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONWAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

OCT 29 1 05 PM '42

RECEIVED

BF

October 28, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

You have asked for my comments and recommendations on that portion of Secretary Knox's letter to you of October 17, 1942, herewith returned, which refers to the Japanese situation in Hawaii.


I think that I can safely say that all persons of Japanese ancestry resident in the Hawaiian Islands who are known to be hostile to the United States have been placed under restraint in internment camps either in the islands or on the mainland. In addition, many others suspected of subversive tendencies have been so interned.

As you are aware, the question of evacuating the Japanese from Hawaii has been considered carefully on several occasions. There is a wide divergence of views in both services on the subject, but after consultation with the naval authorities it has been determined to evacuate certain Japanese and Japanese Americans to the mainland. It is intended to move approximately five thousand during the next six months as shipping facilities become available. This, General Emmons believes, will greatly simplify his problem, and considering the labor needs in the islands, is about all that he has indicated any desire to move although he has been given authority to move up to fifteen thousand.

The evacuees from Hawaii will be received on the West Coast by the Army and then shunted through immediately to the Relocation Centers which are under the jurisdiction of War Relocation Authority. Facilities already exist for handling them.

I am writing you a separate letter on the question raised by Elmer Davis of permitting Japanese Americans to enter the Army.

Faithfully yours,



Secretary of War

The President
The White House

Encl.

copy of Secy of Navy's letter, 10-17-42 and the above from Secy of War in
War Dept. folder - 2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Navy folder
2-42*

October 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
FOR COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII.

F. D. R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Navy, 10/17/42,
to the President, in re subject of Japanese,
who are American citizens, and who were evacuated
from the Pacific Coast. Copy of letter retained
for our files.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

WASHINGTON.

October 17, 1942



My dear Mr. President:

Recently you sent to the Navy Department, during my absence, copy of a letter to you from Elmer Davis dealing with the subject of Japanese, who are American citizens, and who were evacuated from the Pacific Coast. On this letter you asked for our recommendations. I would regard it as unwise and unnecessary that you make any statement on the two bills presented in Congress dealing with the evacuated Japanese, one of which proposes to deprive citizenship and the other which proposes to intern them for the duration of the war.

I do not think either of these bills has any chance of passage and I do not regard either of them of sufficient importance to warrant a statement from you.

The feeling in the Navy Department with respect to the enlistment in the Navy of citizens of Japanese descent is adverse to such action. The maximum of use which we could make in the Navy of people of this character might be in a civilian capacity in the Intelligence service.

I do not regard this particular problem set forth in Mr. Davis's letter as anywhere near as important as the problem of dealing with the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands and, concerning this latter problem, nothing, apparently, is being done despite the fact that there is a very large number of Japanese sympathizers, if not actual Japanese agents, still at large in the population of Oahu, who, in the event of an attack upon these islands, would unquestionably cooperate with our enemies. I still believe very earnestly that some steps should be taken to separate the loyal from the disloyal in that population. I think this is far more important than the other matter.

Sincerely yours,

Handwritten signature of Frank Knox in cursive script.

The President

The White House

(2104 - Secy. State)
(2105 - Secy. of the Navy)
(2106 - Secy. of the Interior)

Navy Dept. folder

2-43

PSF

hms

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

Please work this out definitely
during my absence.

F. D. R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, 11/1/43, returning confidential letter, with enclosed papers, which the President received from the Secretary of the Navy under date of 9/13/43, in re report of the General Board on the subject of a Naval petroleum policy, sent to the Secretary of State; copies of the President's memorandum, with explanation of enclosures, sent to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Interior.

COPY

(118-Navy)
(119-Budget)
(150-Admiral Leahy)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Navy folder
2-42

PSF Navy

November 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

PSF Navy

Replying to your memoranda of October 16th and November 6th I am authorizing an actual enlisted strength of 1,450,000 men for the Navy for June 30, 1943 and a planning strength of 2,250,000 enlisted men for June 30, 1944. The peak strength to be reached on June 30, 1944 will operate to give the Navy an average of 1,850,000 men as an average for the fiscal year 1944 and I am directing the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to revise the average figure of 1,500,000 to the 1,850,000 men for budget purposes.

You state in your memorandum of November 6th that you will reach a strength of 1,000,000 men in the current month. The strength figures which I am approving can be reached by a recruiting program of an average of 85,000 men per month from December 1, 1942.

I would appreciate it if in the future you would present your proposals concerning the enlisted strength of the Navy to me through the Joint Chiefs of Staff allowing sufficient time for the planning group of the Joint Chiefs to study your proposals and make recommendations to me. In other words, before the planning strengths for December 31, 1943 and June 30, 1944 are translated into actual strength, the Joint Chiefs of Staff should review the proposals of the Navy Department.

The procedure stated in the preceding paragraph should be followed in dealing with the strength of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard.

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

cc to: Bureau of the Budget
Admiral Leahy

Copies of this memorandum have been sent to Budget and Admiral Leahy,
11/17/42
hm

626 Wood

STANDARD
SHELLS

(111-111111)
(111-111111)
(111-111111)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

Will you check this over
and talk with me about it?

F. D. R.

AVENUE
MOTEL

60517

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(sc) P16-1

OCT 16 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Strength of the Navy - Fiscal Year 1943.

Enclosure: (A) Table showing distribution of enlisted men ashore and afloat during fiscal year 1943.

1. Estimates have been submitted for the fiscal year 1943 to provide for enlisted strength of 1,000,000 men to be reached by June 30, 1943 as approved by you on my memorandum of May 1, 1942.


2. The enclosure which is an extract from the revised Operating Force Plan for fiscal year 1943 dated August 29, 1942 indicates that a total of 1,547,000 men will be required by the end of this fiscal year.

3. At the present rate of recruiting this strength can be attained by voluntary enlistments.

4. Your authorization of this total is requested for the purpose of making coordinated plans and estimates.

5. The increases in personnel are required for increases in the number of ships, the expanded aviation program and personnel requirements for outlying bases.

Respectfully,



Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-4-59

Signature- Carl L. Spicer

CONFIDENTIAL

"PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO VESSELS IN COMMISSION"

<u>Item</u>			<u>Complement</u>
1.	(BB)	23 Battleships	38,719
2.	(CA)	20 Heavy Cruisers	18,064
3.	(CL)	31 Light Cruisers	25,940
4.	(CV)	15 Aircraft Carriers	19,329
5.	(DD)	64 Destroyers (Overage)	8,696
6.	(DD)	248 Destroyers (Underage).....	55,132
7.	(DE)	80 Destroyer Escort Vessels	14,400
8.	(SS&SM)	57 Submarines (Overage).....	2,186
9.	(SS)	106 Submarines (Underage)	5,691
10.	(CM)	7 Mine Vessels, Mine Layers	1,805
11.	(CMc)	1 Mine Vessels, Mine Layers, Coastal	85
12.	(DM)	8 Mine Vessels, Light Mine Layers	1,056
13.	(DMS)	18 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers, Highspeed	2,424
14.	(AM)	126 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers	9,339
15.	(AMc)	8 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers, Coastal	112
16.	(YMS)	228 Mine Vessels, Motor Mine Sweepers	5,472
17.	(PC)	557 Patrol Vessels, Submarine Chasers	20,051
18.	(PE)	8 Patrol Vessels, Eagles	472
19.	(PG)	51 Patrol Vessels, Gunboats	7,028
20.	(PT)	260 Patrol Vessels, Motor Torpedo Boats	3,695
21.	(PY)	19 Patrol Vessels, Yachts	1,140
22.	(PYc)	35 Patrol Vessels, Yachts, Coastal	1,179
23.	(YP)	13 Patrol Vessels, District	184
24.	(AD)	13 Auxiliaries, Destroyer Tenders	9,547
25.	(AE)	8 Auxiliaries, Ammunition Ships	1,862
26.	(AF)	18 Auxiliaries, Provision Storeships	3,061
27.	(AG)	19 Auxiliaries, Miscellaneous	3,388
28.	(AGS)	3 Auxiliaries, Miscellaneous Survey Ships	323
29.	(AH)	5 Auxiliaries, Hospital Ships	1,950
30.	(AK)	31 Auxiliaries, Cargo Ships	5,326
31.	(AKS)	3 Auxiliaries, General-Stores-Issue Ships.....	574
32.	(AN)	3 Auxiliaries, Net-laying Ships	1,020
33.	(AO)	61 Auxiliaries, Oilers	11,548
34.	(AOG)	8 Auxiliaries, Gasoline Tankers	752
35.	(AP)	83 Auxiliaries, Transports	29,225
36.	(APc)	65 Auxiliaries, Transports, Coastal	780
37.	APD)	6 Auxiliaries, Transports, Highspeed, Dest.....	828
38.	(APH)	3 Auxiliaries, Transports, Evacuation	873
39.	(APV)	2 Auxiliaries, Aircraft Transports	406
40.	(AR)	9 Auxiliaries, Repair Ships	6,418
41.	(ARD)	5 Auxiliaries, Floating Dry Docks	306
42.	(ARS)	14 Auxiliaries, Salvage Vessels	924
43.	(AS)	11 Auxiliaries, Submarine Tenders	7,679
44.	(ASR)	10 Auxiliaries, Submarine Rescue Vessels	715
45.	(AT)	65 Auxiliaries, Ocean-going Tugs	4,504

<u>Item</u>	<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>	<u>Complement</u>
46.	(ATR) 40 Auxiliaries, Rescue Tugs	1,400
47.	(AV) 8 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders	4,083
48.	(AVD) 14 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders, Destroyers	1,328
49.	*(AVG) 55 Auxiliaries, Aircraft Escort Vessels	24,788
50.	(AVP) 24 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders, Small	3,616
51.	(LCI(L)250 Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)	5,250
52.	(LSD) 2 Landing Ship, Dock	348
53.	(LST) 350 Landing Ship, Tank	18,900
54.	(YAG) 2 Auxiliaries, District, Miscellaneous	111
55.	(YN) 6 Net Tenders	240
56.	(YO) 12 District Oilers	342
57.	(IX) 6 Unclassified	603
58.	8 Mobile Hospitals	2,072

* Classification and designation changed to Auxiliaries, Aircraft Carriers (ACV), effective August 20, 1942.

3,205	Total Assigned to Vessels in Commission	397,789
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59.	Fleet Aircraft (Not including Marine Personnel)	79,881
60.	At Sea - Flag Allowances, Transit, Sick, etc	16,266
61.	Extension of Naval Establishment Ships requisitioned, confiscated or otherwise acquired.....	49,394

Personnel Assigned to Vessels in Service, Miscellaneous

Duty at Sea, Naval Bases and Training

62.	Recruiting	4,300
63.	Training Stations	
	Operating Force	20,000
	Under Training	169,834
64.	Service Schools (General Service)	
	Operating Force	11,000
	Students	87,500
65.	Service Schools (Aviation)	
	Operating Force	9,000
	Students	60,000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<u>Item</u>	<u>Complement</u>
66. Hospitals (Exclusive of Mobile Hospitals)	
Operating Force	14,000
Patients	30,163
67. Prisons	25
68. Submarine Bases	5,200
69. Receiving Ships and Stations	
Operating Force	10,000
General Detail	20,199
70. Navy Yards and Naval Stations (Includes Staff Headquarters, Advance Base Depots, Degaussing Projects, Net and Mine Depots, Harbor Entrance Control Posts, Section Bases, Naval Operating Bases, Port Directors, and Routing Offices)	30,000
71. District Craft (Includes Local Defense Forces and Small Craft)	25,215
72. Naval Communications	8,500
73. Ammunition Depots and Torpedo Stations	10,350
74. Naval Air Stations and Naval Reserve Aviation Bases	111,942
75. Armed Guard and Communication Liaison Units for Merchant Vessels	33,000
76. Projects	89,000
77. Construction Battalions	98,000
78. Miscellaneous (Includes Naval Academy, Naval R.O.T.C. Units, Embassies, Hospital Corpsmen with Marines, Intelligence Organizations, etc.)	30,000
79. Crews of Ships not in Operating Force Plan but to be commissioned on or shortly after July 1, 1943.....	15,000
80. In Transit Ashore	20,199
81. Extension of Naval Establishment (New bases and stations to be occupied or established and increases in present establishment.)	<u>91,243</u>
GRAND TOTAL	1,547,000

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Pursuant to the instructions in your memorandum of October 19 transmitting the memorandum of the Secretary of the Navy relative to the strength of the Navy, I have checked into the proposals to some extent.

After receiving your memorandum of October 29 stating that the average enlisted strength of the Navy for the fiscal year 1944 should be 1,500,000 I notified the Secretary of the Navy accordingly. His proposal to you of October 16 would require an average strength of 2,000,000 men in the Navy for the fiscal year 1944. The Navy will have 1,000,000 on December 1, 1942. The Secretary is asking for 1,547,000 on June 30, 1943. You have previously approved a planning strength of the Navy of 2,000,000 men for December 31, 1943 (your endorsement of memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 30, 1942). The Secretary of the Navy is asking for a planning strength of 2,650,000 for June 30, 1944.

In summary, the request of the Secretary of the Navy would be met if you authorized a strength of 1,500,000 on June 30, 1943, approved planning strengths of 2,000,000 for December 31, 1943 and 2,500,000 for June 30, 1944. These planning strengths would give the Navy an average of 2,000,000 men for the fiscal year 1944.


Attached with the Secretary's memorandum of October 16 is an extract from the revised Operating Force Plan for the fiscal year 1943 showing the disposition of the 1,547,000 men for which your approval is asked. These requirements compiled by the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Admiral Jacobs) have not been checked by any other authority. The matter has been discussed with Admiral Jacobs and he insists that the figures set forth are the minimum requirements of the Navy. Admiral Jacobs is willing to concede that the 47,000 men can be dropped and the requirements rounded off at 1,500,000 for the end of the 1943 fiscal year.

The whole question of the strength of the Navy was discussed Thursday morning with Admiral Leahy and he is of the opinion that it would be better to look at the problem for the period covering the 19 months from December 1, 1942 to June 30, 1944. On that basis he and I concur in the recommendation that the strength of the Navy on June 30, 1944 should be set at 2,250,000 at this time. That strength could be reached by stabilizing the recruitment program calling for 65,000 men per month beginning December 1, 1942. The Navy has reached a peak of 131,000 recruitments in the current month and on the basis of their own proposals to you would drop their recruitment to 81,000 a month effective immediately.

It is recommended that you approve 1,450,000 enlisted men as the authorized strength of the Navy for June 30, 1943; planning strength of 2,250,000 men for June 30, 1944 and that you authorize the Director of the Budget to include in the budget for the fiscal year 1944 an average 1,850,000 men as the strength of the Navy. A draft of a memorandum replying to the Secretary of the Navy is attached herewith.

It should be pointed out that a supplemental estimate for the fiscal year 1943 is necessitated by the Navy's reaching enlisted strength of 1,000,000 men during the current month. The authorized strength of the Navy for June 30, 1943 will determine the size of the required supplemental estimate.

I should also like to point out that the Navy expects to reach a strength of 3,000,000 enlisted men in 1945 with the completion of the present ship building program.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Raymond S. Ames". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "R".

Nov 13 1942

NOTE: Please furnish copy to the Bureau of the
Budget and to Admiral Leahy when signed.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Navy folder
242*

October 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

Will you check this over
and talk with me about it?

F. D. R.

Confidential memorandum for the President from the Secretary of the Navy, a copy of which has been retained for our files, in re Strength of the Navy - Fiscal Year 1943, attached to which is a table showing distribution of enlisted men ashore and afloat during fiscal year 1943.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Sc) P16-1

OCT 16 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Strength of the Navy - Fiscal Year 1943.

Enclosure: (A) Table showing distribution of enlisted men ashore and afloat during fiscal year 1943.

1. Estimates have been submitted for the fiscal year 1943 to provide for enlisted strength of 1,000,000 men to be reached by June 30, 1943 as approved by you on my memorandum of May 1, 1942.

2. The enclosure which is an extract from the revised Operating Force Plan for fiscal year 1943 dated August 29, 1942 indicates that a total of 1,547,000 men will be required by the end of this fiscal year.

3. At the present rate of recruiting this strength can be attained by voluntary enlistments.

4. Your authorization of this total is requested for the purpose of making coordinated plans and estimates.

5. The increases in personnel are required for increases in the number of ships, the expanded aviation program and personnel requirements for outlying bases.

Respectfully,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- *Carl F. Spicer*

18

7

1 May 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Strength of the Navy - Fiscal Years 1943 and 1944.

Enclosures: (A) Table showing distribution of enlisted men ashore and afloat during fiscal year 1943.
(B) Similar table for fiscal year 1944.

1. You recently approved a revision in personnel estimates to 526,000 enlisted men by June 30, 1942 necessitated by a revised operating force plan.
2. The enclosures are extracts from the current proposed operating force plans for fiscal years 1943 and 1944 prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations. x18-R
3. Enclosures indicate that 1,023,000 men will be required by 30 June 1943 and 1,309,000 by 30 June 1944 to man the contemplated ships and stations.
4. Your authorization is requested for these numbers for the purpose of fiscal estimates to be submitted to the Bureau of the Budget.
5. Upon your approval estimates will be submitted for the following numbers to be reached by the end of the fiscal years 1943 and 1944:

	30 June 1943	30 June 1944
Regular Navy	400,000	450,000
Retired, Active	7,000	7,000
Fleet Reserves, Active	9,000	9,000
Other Reserves, Active	<u>607,000</u>	<u>843,000</u>
Total	1,023,000	1,309,000

6. The increases in personnel are required for the increases in the number of ships, the expanded aviation program and the personnel requirements for outlying bases.

*OIC for 1,000,000 men by June 30, 1942. I cannot go beyond that now!
J.D.K.*

Respectfully,

Frank Knox

The President,
The White House.

5/2/42

FISCAL YEAR 1943

SECTION A

SEAGOING FORCES IN COMMISSION

<u>Item</u>		<u>Allowance</u>
1. (BB)	23 Battleships	37,506
2. (CA)	22 Heavy Cruisers	19,596
3. (CL)	41 Light Cruisers	35,043
4. (CV)	18 Aircraft Carriers	24,297
5. (DD)	70 Destroyers (Overage)	9,492
6. (DD)	281 Destroyers (Underage)	63,767
7. (DE)	150 Destroyer Escort Vessels	22,500
8. (SS&SM)	64 Submarines (Overage)	2,441
9. (SS)	116 Submarines (Underage)	6,221
10. (CM)	3 Mine Vessels, Mine Layers	1,119
11. (CMc)	3 Mine Vessels, Mine Layers, Coastal	404
12. (DM)	8 Mine Vessels, Light Mine Layers	1,056
13. (DMS)	18 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers, Highspeed	2,424
14. (AM)	101 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers	5,952
15. (AMc)	42 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers, Coastal	2,718
16. (YMS)	20 Mine Vessels, Motor Mine Sweepers, District	480
17. (PC)	466 Patrol Vessels, Submarine Chasers	18,592
18. (PE)	8 Patrol Vessels, Eagles	448
19. (PG)	17 Patrol Vessels, Gunboats	2,193
20. (PR)	3 Patrol Vessels, River Gunboats	168
21. (PT)	107 Patrol Vessels, Motor Torpedo Boats	920
22. (PY)	17 Patrol Vessels, Yachts	1,000
23. (PYc)	22 Patrol Vessels, Yachts, Coastal	757
24. (YP)	3 Patrol Vessels, District	34
25. (YO)	11 District, Oilers	309
26. (AD)	12 Auxiliaries, Destroyer Tenders	8,593
27. (AE)	6 Auxiliaries, Ammunition Ships	1,120
28. (AF)	15 Auxiliaries, Provision Storeships	2,782
29. (AG)	11 Auxiliaries, Miscellaneous	2,845
30. (AH)	2 Auxiliaries, Hospital Ships	780
31. (AK)	30 Auxiliaries, Cargo Ships	5,636
32. (AKS)	2 Auxiliaries, General-Stores-Issue Ships	374
33. (AN)	5 Auxiliaries, Net-laying Ships	1,538
34. (AO)	29 Auxiliaries, Oilers	5,964
35. (AOG)	5 Auxiliaries, Gasoline Tankers	375
36. (AP)	55 Auxiliaries, Transports	21,377
37. (APD)	6 Auxiliaries, Transports, High Speed (Destroyer)	756
38. (APH)	1 Auxiliaries, Transport, Evacuation	390
39. (APM)	8 Auxiliaries, Mechanized Artillery Transports	1,392
40. (APR)	11 Auxiliaries, Transport Rescue Vessels	1,100

Enclosure (A)

<u>Item</u>		<u>Allowance</u>
41.	(APV) 2 Auxiliaries, Aircraft Transports	406
42.	(AR) 8 Auxiliaries, Repair Ships	5,380
43.	(ARD) 2 Auxiliaries, Floating Dry Docks	108
44.	(ARH) 1 Auxiliaries, Heavy Hull Repair Ships	800
45.	(ARS) 12 Auxiliaries, Salvage Vessels	792
46.	(AS) 12 Auxiliaries, Submarine Tenders	6,445
47.	(ASR) 11 Auxiliaries, Submarine Rescue Vessels	726
48.	(AT) 50 Auxiliaries, Ocean-going Tugs	3,053
49.	(AV) 7 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders	3,401
50.	(AVD) 14 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders, Destroyers	1,652
51.	(AVG) 16 Auxiliaries, Aircraft Escort	7,232
52.	(AVP) 25 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders, Small	4,123
53.	(YAG) 4 Auxiliaries, District, Miscellaneous	340
54.	(IX) 2 Unclassified	30

1998

348,947

55.	Fleet Aircraft, including Marine Aircraft Wings (Not including Marine Personnel) Heavier Than Air (HTA)	61,717
56.	At Sea - Flag Allowances, Transit, Sick, etc.	18,492
57.	Extension of Naval Establishment Ships requisitioned, confiscated or otherwise acquired	21,458
	Total at Sea, including Aircraft	450,614

qDISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL NOT IN "FORCES AFLOAT"

<u>Item</u>		<u>Allowance</u>
1.	Recruiting	4,000
2.	Training Stations Operating Force Under Training	6,500 84,027
3.	Service Schools Operating Force Students	15,000 121,000
4.	Hospitals Operating Force Patients	9,000 19,785
5.	Prisons	25

Enclosure (A)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Allowance</u>
6. Submarine Bases	5,000
7. Receiving Ships and Stations	
Operating Force	4,500
General Detail	13,296
8. Navy Yards and Naval Stations	
(Includes Staff Headquarters, Local Defense & Small Craft, Advance Bases, Degaussing Projects, Net & Mine Depots, Harbor Entrance Control Posts, Section Bases, Naval Operating Bases, Port Directors & Routing Offices.)	102,000
9. Naval Communications	3,200
10. Ammunition Depots and Torpedo Stations	1,500
11. Air Stations, Nav. Res. Air Bases & Squadrons	90,000
12. Miscellaneous	
(Naval Academy, Naval R.O.T.C. Units, Embassies - Hospital Corpsmen with Marines, Armed Guard, Construction Companies, Intelligence Organi- zations, etc.)	53,000
13. In Transit Ashore	13,297
14. Extension of Naval Establishment	
(New bases and stations to be occupied or established and increases in present establishment)	27,256
Total Shore Establishment	572,386
Total Sea	450,614
	<hr/>
GRAND TOTAL	1,023,000

Enclosure (A)

FISCAL YEAR 1944
SECTION A

SEAGOING FORCES IN COMMISSION

<u>Item</u>		<u>Complement</u>
1.	(BB) 26 Battleships.....	43,506
2.	(CA) 24 Heavy Cruisers.....	21,604
3.	(CB) 4 Large Cruisers	5,800
4.	(CL) 51 Light Cruisers	44,321
5.	(CV) 25 Aircraft Carriers.....	32,854
6.	(DD) 65 Destroyers (Overage).....	8,832
7.	(DD) 307 Destroyers (Underage)	70,631
8.	(DE) 250 Destroyer Escort Vessels	45,000
9.	(SS&SM) 57 Submarines (Overage)	2,186
10.	(SS) 137 Submarines (Underage)	7,360
11.	(CM) 3 Mine Vessels, Mine Layers	1,119
12.	(CMc) 3 Mine Vessels, Mine Layers, Coastal	404
13.	(DM) 8 Mine Vessels, Light Mine Layers	1,056
14.	(DMS) 18 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers, Highspeed	2,424
15.	(AM) 279 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers	19,262
16.	(AMc) 7 Mine Vessels, Mine Sweepers, Coastal	595
17.	(YMS) 20 Mine Vessels, Motor Mine Sweepers, Dist.....	480
18.	(PC) 663 Patrol Vessels, Submarine Chasers	25,997
19.	(PE) 8 Patrol Vessels, Eagles	448
20.	(PG) 16 Patrol Vessels, Gunboats	2,036
21.	(PR) 3 Patrol Vessels, River Gunboats	168
22.	(PT) 226 Patrol Vessels, Motor Torpedo Boats	3,400
23.	(PY) 17 Patrol Vessels, Yachts	1,000
24.	(PYc) 27 Patrol Vessels, Yachts, Coastal	940
25.	(YP) 3 Patrol Vessels, District	34
26.	(YO) 11 District, Oilers	309
27.	(AD) 14 Auxiliaries, Destroyer Tenders	14,000
28.	(AE) 6 Auxiliaries, Ammunition Ships	1,150
29.	(AF) 15 Auxiliaries, Provision Storeships	2,782
30.	(AG) 11 Auxiliaries, Miscellaneous	2,847
31.	(AH) 2 Auxiliaries, Hospital Ships	780
32.	(AK) 28 Auxiliaries, Cargo Ships	5,264
33.	(AKS) 3 Auxiliaries, General-Stores-Issue Ships	555
34.	(AN) 5 Auxiliaries, Net-laying Ships	1,538
35.	(AO) 34 Auxiliaries, Oilers	6,844
36.	(AOG) 11 Auxiliaries, Gasoline Tankers	825
37.	(AP) 55 Auxiliaries, Transports	21,675
38.	(APD) 6 Auxiliaries, Transports, High Speed, (Dest.)	756
39.	(APH) 1 Auxiliaries, Transport, Evacuation	390
40.	(APM) 8 Auxiliaries, Mechanized Artillery Transport ...	1,392
41.	(APR) 11 Auxiliaries, Rescue Transports	1,100
42.	(APV) 2 Auxiliaries, Aircraft Transports	406
43.	(AR) 9 Auxiliaries, Repair Ships	6,166
44.	(ARD) 2 Auxiliaries, Floating Dry Docks	108
45.	(ARH) 1 Auxiliaries, Heavy Hull Repair Ships	800
46.	(ARS) 21 Auxiliaries, Salvage Vessels	1,512

Enclosure (B)

<u>Item</u>		<u>Complement</u>
47.	(AS) 14 Auxiliaries, Submarine Tenders	7,677
48.	(ASR) 11 Auxiliaries, Submarine Rescue Vessels	726
49.	(AT) 76 Auxiliaries, Ocean-going Tugs	4,880
50.	(ATL) 100 Auxiliaries, Tank Lighter Carriers	7,500
51.	(ATR) 40 Auxiliaries, Rescue Tugs	1,400
52.	(AV) 10 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders	5,273
53.	(AVD) 14 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders, Dest.	1,652
54.	(AVG) 16 Auxiliaries, Aircraft Escort	7,232
55.	(AVP) 60 Auxiliaries, Seaplane Tenders, Small	11,823
56.	(YAG) 4 Auxiliaries, District, Miscellaneous	340
57.	(IX) 2 Unclassified	30
	2,850	461,189
58.	Fleet Aircraft, including Marine Aircraft Wings (Not including Marine Personnel) Heavier Than Air (HTA)	104,888
59.	At Sea - Flag Allowances, Transit, Sick, etc.	21,522
60.	Extension of Naval Establishment Ships requisitioned, confiscated or otherwise acquired....	29,380
	Total at Sea, including Aircraft	616,979

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONNEL NOT IN "FORCES AFLOAT"

<u>Item</u>		<u>Complement</u>
1.	Recruiting	4,000
2.	Training Stations	
	Operating Force	6,800
	Under Training	87,526
3.	Service Schools	
	Operating Force	15,000
	Students	121,000
4.	Hospitals	
	Operating Force	11,500
	Patients	25,256
5.	Prisons	30
6.	Submarine Bases	7,000

Enclosure (B)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Complement</u>
7. Receiving Ships and Stations Operating Force General Detail	6,200 17,128
8. Navy Yards and Naval Stations (Includes Staff Headquarters, Local Defense & Small Craft, Advance Bases, Degaussing Projects, Net & Mine Depots, Harbor Entrance Control Posts, Section Bases, Naval Operating Bases, Port Di- rectors, & Routing Offices.)	125,000
9. Naval Communications	4,000
10. Ammunition Depots and Torpedo Stations	1,500
11. Air Stations, Nav. Res. Air Bases & Squadrons	150,000
12. Miscellaneous (Naval Academy, Naval R.O.T.C. Units, Embassies - Hospital Corpsmen with Marines, Armed Guard, Con- struction Companies, Intelligence Organizations, etc.)	60,000
13. In Transit Ashore	17,128
14. Extension of Naval Establishment (New bases and stations to be occupied or established and increases in present establish- ment).	32,953
Total Shore Establishment	692,021
Total Sea	616,979
GRAND TOTAL	1,309,000

Enclosure (B)

(162-Navy)
(163-Admiral Moreell)
(164-Hon. Donald Nelson)

Am

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
REAR ADMIRAL BEN MOREELL
HON. DONALD NELSON

I approve the construction of the dry dock program if the Navy can complete it out of their present assignment of steel without impinging on their essential programs.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy; copies sent to Admiral Ben Moreell and Hon. Donald Nelson.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM TO

MR. RUDOLPH FORSTER.

Here are the memoranda which I requested
you to place with the letter which I am in-
formed Mr. Donald Nelson is sending to the
President today.

John McCrea

John L. McCrea,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.

Attachments

Navy folder
2-42

IN REPLY ADDRESS
THE BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS
AND REFER TO NO.

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

14 November 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN McCRAE.

Herewith is the answer to the President's memorandum of November 10 relative to our floating dry dock program.

I have discussed this matter in some detail with Mr. Eberstadt, who is Vice Chairman of the War Production Board, and Mr. Eberstadt has just read to me over the telephone Mr. Nelson's reply to the President which states, in effect, that there is every reason to believe that the materials required for these dry docks can be made available without affecting other elements of the Navy's construction program.

I might state, parenthetically, that I have been studying the Navy's docking requirements intensively for the past ten years. The program herein provided for is the result of very detailed studies. We have never had enough docks and I don't suppose we ever will. But the prospective need in the light of our own needs as well as those of our allies is more pressing than ever before.

It is of interest to note that the great dock at Pearl Harbor which we completed one year ahead of schedule and two weeks prior to December 7, 1941, has been in continuous use since December 9, 1941. It has been invaluable to the fleet.

B. Moreell

James Forrestal



THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

NOV 12 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In reply to your note attached hereto on the Secretary's letter of October 31st, considerations which led to our recommendation that this program of dry dock construction be initiated at once are as follow:

We have a crying need for vastly increased docking facilities all over the world. As the operations of our Fleet are extended into new areas this need is accentuated and dictates the construction of highly mobile docks which can follow the Fleet or accompany it. In addition, we have very urgent requests from the British Admiralty to provide them with docking facilities in the active theatres of war. Because of the difficulties of transportation of men, equipment and materials and the long time required for the construction of graving docks, the construction of mobile floating docks would best meet the needs of our Allies, as well as our own needs. Therefore, in every respect our program of highly mobile floating dry docks appears to meet our current and prospective needs.

With respect to the materials necessary for the construction of these docks, we have laid out a very carefully studied program for dry dock construction to begin in January, 1943 and extending over a period of twenty months. The program has been so designed that the maximum consumption of steel plate in any one month is 11,000 tons, and this has been so correlated with other Naval construction that the total consumption of steel plate in any one month is well below the present allocations of this material. The maximum consumption would occur in August, 1943.

The total consumption of steel plate for these docks is only 116,000 tons or an average over the twenty months of 5800 tons per month.

As a safeguard we have arranged that the rate of completion of these docks will be controlled by the availability of materials. In other words, if in any month the plate steel is insufficient to carry on all Naval construction the docks will be temporarily held in abeyance.

The Navy Department is now receiving an allocation of steel plate from the War Production Board. Under the "Controlled Materials Plan" which will shortly go into effect absolute control of the consumption of materials for the entire Naval program will be possible. In order that the maximum progress can be made on these vitally needed docks within the limitations of the availability of materials, it is strongly recommended that we proceed with the program as outlined, and with the understanding that the Navy Department will keep within its allocation of steel and that the construction of the docks will not interfere with more urgent Naval construction. Our studies indicate that this can unquestionably be accomplished.

James Forrestal

WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

WASHINGTON, D. C.

November 14, 1942.

IN REPLY REFER TO:


THE WHITE HOUSE
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My dear Mr. President:

The answer to the question contained in your memorandum of November 10, 1942, attached to Secretary Knox's letter to you of October 31, depends upon the relative importance of the dry docks referred to in Secretary Knox's letter with relation to other items in the Navy program.

I feel that the total allocation of the Navy will always be such that they can meet the dry dock requirements out of it without sacrificing other items of equal or greater urgency. We have discussed the matter with Admiral Moreell and have arrived at a formula which, in my opinion, will enable them to proceed with their dry dock plans in a satisfactory manner without impinging upon other essential programs.

Sincerely yours,



Donald M. Nelson,
Chairman.

The Honorable,
The President,
The White House.



EXHIBITS
AND
THE WHITE HOUSE

Navy folder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please take up the question of steel for the Dry Docks with Don Nelson, and perhaps Land, at once. This is not merely a matter of my approving contracts for the Dry Docks. I must first have clearance of some kind on the materials.

"DR"

F. D. R.

Transmitting copy of letter from the Secretary of the Navy, 10/31/42, to the President, in re dry docks that will be available to the United Nations to accommodate the various types and sizes of vessels expected to be involved in the prosecution of the war. To provide for a portion

(over)

OCT 31 1942
CONFIDENTIAL

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
November 10, 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE

of the deficiencies, the Dept. proposes to construct certain additional steel floating dry docks-highly mobile and seaworthy in character and self-contained - for use at advanced bases, the sum of \$210,000,000 being required. Therefore, requests Presidential authority to contract for this dry dock program at an estimated cost of \$210,000,000 in advance of Congressional authority.

Very truly yours,
The Secretary of the Navy

E. A. Tamm

Enclosure

SO 10311039

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

October 31, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

A global study has been made of the dry docks that will be available to the United Nations to accommodate the various types and sizes of vessels expected to be involved in the prosecution of the war. This study clearly predicts a shortage of dry docks. To provide for a portion of the deficiencies, the Department proposes to construct the following additional steel floating dry docks - highly mobile and seaworthy in character and self contained - for use at advanced bases:

5	18,000 Ton Dry Docks
18	3,000 Ton Dry Docks
25	1,000 Ton Dry Docks

It is estimated that the cost of constructing these dry docks will be approximately \$133,000,000 and that supporting facilities where installed will cost approximately \$77,000,000; thus, a sum of \$210,000,000 will be required.

The small balance of funds available under the existing appropriation "17X0605(3) Repair Facilities, Navy" is needed for tentative commitments, and, therefore, is not available for this new program. The Department proposes to request through the usual channels Congressional authority and appropriation in the amount of \$210,000,000 for this program. However, this work is of such urgency that serious delay will result if authority is not granted immediately. Therefore, Presidential authority is requested to contract for this dry dock program at an estimated cost of \$210,000,000 in advance of Congressional authority.

After a re-estimate of the requirements of shipbuilding facilities, it has been determined that there are available under appropriation "17X0603 Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels, Construction and Machinery" and "17X0607(3) Increase and Replacement of Naval Vessels, Emergency Construction" sufficient funds which, if so desired, may be in effect transferred to the appropriation "17X0605(3) Repair Facilities, Navy" to pay for the dry dock program. When Congressional authority is requested, this availability of funds already appropriated will be brought to the attention of Congress.

Sincerely yours,

The President,
The White House.

Frank Knox

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Navy folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

November 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN E. L. COCHRANE

Here is the correspondence in regard to the 45,000 ton carriers for your eyes only. Please let me know what your opinion is in regard to speeding up the completion of these carriers to a time substantially shorter than the estimate.

I am inclined to go along with the immediate starting of this program and, frankly, the reply of the General Board cannot be classified as satisfactory.

Please return file, as it is for your personal information only.

F. D. R.

REGRADUATED UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL WATSON

Will you arrange an appointment for me this week sometime -- fifteen or twenty minutes -- with Cochran who is to be the new head of the Bureau of Ships? Please give the attached correspondence to me when he comes in.

F. D. R.

Captain E. L. Cochran

Navy 3585

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

November 30, 1942

REMINER FOR THE PRESIDENT

You said you wanted to
talk this over with Mackenzie
King when he comes on December
fourth.

G.

*file
per mail*

MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

November 11, 1942


MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

In regard to this matter, the Secretary of the Navy tells me he did speak to you about it but he had no specific recommendations to make. He said that you agreed that neither you nor he could move in a matter like this - but of course it should be done. Just how to get it done isn't clear in his mind.

G.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Please speak to me and no
one else about this!

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972



navy folder
2-42
PSF

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1942.

My dear Mr. President:

Once I suggested that the fine large steamers that carry news-print from the CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S paper mills in Canada to its place of defilement on the Chicago River, be requisitioned by the Army or the Navy. I still think that my idea was a bright one.

Now I pass on another suggestion. I understand that certain Canadian papers are taking vigorous exception to the CHICAGO TRIBUNE'S attitude in the war. Why could not the Canadian government be encouraged to shut off this news-print at the source, on the ground that when it gets to this country it is put to a use that is of aid and comfort to the enemy?

I make no charge for these bright little thoughts.

Sincerely yours,

Harold Z. Parker

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

PSF: Navy
file
personal
new folder
12-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1942

This map, made in 1942
by the Navy, shows a route
over the Clipperton Islands
and the Marquesas' to Australia,
which is the exact line pro-
posed by me to the Navy Depart-
ment in 1934.

F. D. R.

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MICROFILMED IN SECTIONS.







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ALEXANDER GROSS, F.R.G.S.

2840 WOODLAND DRIVE
WASHINGTON

file Navy Folder
Personal

My dear Mr. President:

We're getting young
Kaiser here Wednesday. It's
a grand idea.

Yours truly

NAVAL APPROPRIATIONS

Fiscal Years 1896 - 1942

Fitz Personal PSE Navy Folder 2-41
1942(?)

Year	Increase in Navy	O. & O.S.	BuShips (BuRng) (BuGAR)	Marine Corps	Public Works	Aircraft (Includes) (Airships)	RS & T	Miscellaneous	Total
1896	13,367,871	2,831,752	2,666,197	1,002,355	1,370,275		9,106,590	340,612	30,686,652
1897	11,579,054	2,747,243	2,970,319	1,127,347	1,265,356		9,795,725	1,783,230	31,268,274
1898	14,058,783	4,846,196	9,454,042	1,175,705	1,639,120		11,142,720	20,676,947	62,993,513
1899	21,387,273	15,299,202	15,352,307	1,945,436	6,033,440		20,775,460	39,128,662	119,921,780
1900	10,442,402	5,558,971	9,558,853	2,549,952	8,129,877		16,606,704	6,241,788	59,088,547
1901	17,315,699	6,037,040	11,110,602	2,729,859	9,649,549		15,362,137	4,016,098	66,220,984
1902	29,599,849	4,428,456	10,746,767	2,860,617	11,286,065		18,401,367	7,119,590	84,442,711
1903	22,768,010	6,452,019	12,244,345	10,149,983	9,910,598		20,127,889	939,384	82,592,228
1904	28,085,632	6,059,086	8,338,835	3,805,814	6,390,354		22,601,309	12,645,187	87,926,217
1905	45,397,360	6,853,247	8,270,148	3,951,274	11,542,295		24,508,632	13,000,513	113,523,469
1906	42,413,833	7,032,028	7,977,690	4,696,950	4,501,040		25,619,568	12,864,772	105,105,881
1907	33,725,829	10,447,035	8,082,834	4,777,120	5,437,306		27,022,320	15,137,241	104,629,685
1908	25,863,915	14,816,840	8,106,132	5,261,718	5,352,218		31,248,280	17,475,318	108,124,421
1909	30,157,962	14,534,263	14,502,364	6,614,106	7,603,525		38,680,734	12,525,853	124,618,807
1910	39,024,595	15,557,965	15,973,889	7,192,076	7,025,472		40,731,806	12,273,540	137,779,343
1911	33,770,346	15,357,826	15,006,814	7,178,462	8,321,709		42,166,991	11,874,540	133,676,688
1912	26,500,546	15,682,800	14,892,144	7,398,066	8,024,477		44,689,087	11,020,262	128,207,382
1913	20,569,373	22,577,914	15,675,592	7,482,479	5,209,611		46,681,231	12,448,675	130,644,875
1914	35,325,695	17,133,500	17,007,000	7,811,896	4,935,437		47,863,290	12,942,205	143,019,023
1915	41,391,734	11,878,390	18,569,735	7,345,470	3,662,584		49,533,537	15,413,573	147,795,023
1916	45,853,801	12,526,540	19,137,553	7,989,691	3,057,736	322,100	51,926,000	16,358,896	157,172,317
1917	145,345,287	42,171,720	24,316,285	12,866,021	8,679,475	1,214,975	61,061,930	22,742,135	318,397,828
1918	646,332,323	414,118,243	128,510,840	53,245,148	79,234,813	19,817,528	243,909,455	189,522,325	1,774,690,675
1919	327,397,000	541,354,633	157,919,436	163,949,407	98,877,645	81,501,918	440,503,356	413,666,199	2,225,169,594
1920	148,000,000	29,625,000	61,400,000	43,960,508	13,945,885	4,527,250	218,867,994	105,783,725	626,110,362
1921	104,000,000	17,925,000	60,447,000	29,724,289	11,736,622	5,383,400	181,876,537	361,642,108	772,734,956
1922	90,000,000	14,200,000	43,000,000	27,700,341	7,578,805	5,323,000	144,228,169	176,124,501	508,154,816
1923	7,500,000	9,667,000	30,795,000	26,146,748	5,698,430	6,537,000	148,052,743	96,270,328	330,607,249
1924	54,097,000	11,203,000	30,225,000	25,495,948	1,366,500	5,798,950	144,946,247	29,722,817	302,855,462
1925	47,950,000	9,797,000	33,125,000	25,566,140	3,133,000	5,264,826	146,614,000	37,353,837	308,809,803
1926	11,444,000	11,147,250	36,500,000	23,949,650	2,831,500	8,243,375	140,800,000	75,675,496	310,591,271
1927	23,725,000	11,844,000	36,100,000	25,163,978	3,515,300	12,362,500	143,734,500	75,626,081	332,071,359
1928	39,165,000	12,450,000	36,650,000	27,128,784	9,199,870	8,722,000	148,092,927	66,922,941	348,331,522
1929	48,400,000	12,989,450	36,746,250	27,909,976	6,942,556	18,300,000	150,896,957	80,957,679	383,142,868
1930	48,350,000	12,669,400	41,213,800	26,306,877	5,502,834	15,215,000	154,512,782	60,922,621	364,693,314
1931	49,400,000	12,668,400	40,038,700	25,720,361	17,485,030	14,833,801	156,484,500	86,612,043	403,242,835
1932	38,300,000	12,930,585	37,300,540	25,375,127	12,090,860	13,475,000	154,040,870	65,685,810	359,198,792
1933	263,063,000	11,271,000	33,851,000	21,914,839	11,490,000	8,650,000	150,877,831	70,808,902	571,926,572
1934	43,910,785	10,849,750	33,380,750	20,989,077	29,447,487	12,229,391	142,977,450	58,648,112	352,432,802
1935	67,565,442	11,266,310	31,479,552	21,891,813	331,535	19,033,772	150,306,897	44,420,821	346,296,142
1936	131,905,000	21,700,000	38,950,000	23,863,110	19,380,000	26,715,660	168,283,083	58,207,892	489,004,745
1937	168,500,000	21,700,000	40,550,000	25,641,266	3,755,300	20,980,000	183,492,981	64,439,701	529,059,248
1938	130,000,000	24,429,800	41,538,800	27,145,213	6,829,000	27,186,000	195,108,579	72,534,382	524,771,774
1939	190,613,150	26,849,600	50,181,500	27,683,080	74,370,000	24,633,000	204,067,302	75,393,918	673,791,550
1940	431,604,712	62,808,000	84,072,000	39,495,235	54,473,550	69,419,000	230,938,960	164,796,490	1,137,607,947
1941	1,047,770,351	441,345,298	228,898,180	81,496,898	454,618,475	288,846,562	339,878,019	699,685,584	3,582,539,327
1942	1,757,000,000	462,442,665	586,470,000	160,836,600	660,626,460	350,372,000	559,959,983	1,146,140,199	5,683,847,907

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