MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 31 July 1944 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the revised estimated number in active service on 30 June 1944 is also included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 July 1944</th>
<th>30 June 1944</th>
<th>Net Gain For Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Navy</td>
<td>321,220</td>
<td>322,500</td>
<td>- 1,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obligated Enlistments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.N. Inductees</td>
<td>132,960</td>
<td>131,700</td>
<td>1,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Active</td>
<td>7,200</td>
<td>7,150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Reserve</td>
<td>5,472</td>
<td>5,522</td>
<td>- 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Reserve</td>
<td>58,946</td>
<td>56,500</td>
<td>2,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reserves</td>
<td>2,117,969</td>
<td>2,077,290</td>
<td>40,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,643,767</td>
<td>2,600,662</td>
<td>43,105</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. As of 31 July 1944, 1,271,499 men have been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very Respectfully,

Acting Secretary of the Navy

The President
The White House

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 8500.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-18-59
Signature- C.G. I. Speer
August 16, 1944

Respectfully referred to
the Chairman of the United States
Maritime Commission for recommenda-
tion to the President.

WILLIAM D. HASSELT
Secretary to the President

Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy, 2/4/44, in re
conversion of the USS LAFAYETTE. Carbon retained for our files.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subj: USS LAFAYETTE (ex-NORMANDIE); Conversion of.

Ref: (a) FDR memo of 23 June 1944.

Enclosed: (A) Summary of conditions governing major decisions concerning USS LAFAYETTE.

1. As requested by reference (a) I have prepared an explanation of the conditions which governed the various major decisions concerning the USS LAFAYETTE. This is submitted as enclosure (A).

2. I believe that the major decisions may be reduced for your purposes to the following which I summarize here:

   (a) The decision to convert the vessel to a convoy-loaded troop transport was dictated by the urgent needs of the military situation as they were foreseen on 23 Dec 1941. The alternative proposal to convert to an aircraft carrier was rejected because of the much greater time involved and the greater need for a troop transport at that time since our available troop lift was woefully inadequate to meet the present and projected troop movements.

   (b) The decision to undertake the raising of the vessel was dictated by the absolute necessity of removing the obstruction to navigation which the vessel was then constituting. Pending the outcome of the salvage operations and because of the impossibility of forecasting the military situation as it might be when the vessel was finally raised, decision as to eventual disposition of the USS LAFAYETTE was necessarily postponed.

   (c) When it definitely appeared that salvage operations were going to prove successful in the Spring of 1945, and as the war situation was such as to make it appear that even after the expiration of an 18 months' conversion period there would be an important military need for this ship, decision was made to undertake the preparation of plans for the conversion of the vessel to a 24-knot convoy-loaded troop transport with flight deck (APV). Man-power and material were considered available to undertake conversion.

   (d) Upon a careful examination of the ship's main propelling plant after raising in the fall of 1943, a re-estimate of the time and cost to convert the vessel to an APV was made and it was concluded that the conversion would require an expenditure of approximately $50,000,000 and the work of 4,000 men per day for 18 months.
In the light of these facts and the acute shortage of man-power and material which then existed, the Secretary of the Navy recommended on 20 Nov 1943 that "nothing be done that involves the refitting of this vessel to the extent that money would be spent in preparing her for an airplane carrier or transport vessel." Subsequently, on 28 Feb 1944, the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations reported that the "potential value of the vessel in war operations is not worth this cost" (4,000 men per day for 18 months, etc.). At this time, programmed conversions and construction of more suitable troop ships would adequately fulfill our projected troop lift requirements.

(e) Upon your request, discussions between the Navy Department and Chairman of the Maritime Commission on the value of the ship to American commerce in the post-war period resulted in a decision that the value would be less than that obtainable by putting the equivalent effort into other types of vessels and that the ship would likely prove to be an economic liability in actual operation. The War Department concurred in the Navy's conclusion that from the standpoint of military operations the USS LAFAYETTE should not be converted into a transport ship.

3. At present the USS LAFAYETTE is being held at the New York State Barge Canal Terminal Pier in Brooklyn where a skeleton working crew is being employed for her care and maintenance under the supervision of the Navy.

4. In view of the hopeful military situation, the present and prospective acute shortage of men and material, the excessive cost in time, money and man-power, and the probable post-war economic liability of owning and operating the vessel (cannot transit the Panama Canal and because of her deep draft could enter few ports of the Pacific), I recommend the following steps be taken:

(a) Pursuant to agreements made by the Chairman of the Maritime Commission, the former French owners and the French Ambassador early in 1942, the Maritime Commission should carry on further negotiations with the French -

(1) to determine the amount of compensation owing to the former French owners for the requisitioning of the vessel, and

(2) to provide sufficient opportunity for them to exercise their option to repurchase the vessel.

(b) The Maritime Commission to sell the vessel as soon as satisfactory negotiations can be completed, if it is decided that the U. S. no longer needs her.

(c) The Navy to continue to protect and maintain the vessel as at present with a skeleton working force.

James V. Forrestal
MEMORANDUM

Date: 3-18-49

Summary of Conditions Governing Major Decisions Concerning USS LAFAVETTE.

1. The NORMANDIE was held immobilized by her French owners, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique, a French corporation owned largely by the French Government, at Pier 88, New York City, from August 1939 until December 1941. During this period the ship remained in the custody of her French officers and crew.

2. On 18 May 1941, the United States Coast Guard was directed by the Treasury Department (which at that time had jurisdiction over the Coast Guard) to furnish the NORMANDIE with a detail of officers and enlisted men in order to protect the vessel against possible sabotage similar to the scuttling of the Italian and German ships in South American and Central American ports which took place a few weeks previously. The French officers and crew continued to remain in technical custody of the vessel.

3. Following the entrance of the United States into the War on 8 December 1941, the Navy Department, to which jurisdiction over the Coast Guard had been transferred on 1 November 1941, ordered the Coast Guard to take over full custody of the vessel and this was accomplished on December 12th. The French officers and crew were removed to Ellis Island on December 13th.

4. Following a conference which was held in the State Department on December 15th, and which was attended by representatives of the State Department, the Navy Department and the Maritime Commission, it was decided that the NORMANDIE would be formally requisitioned by the Maritime Commission under the authority of the Act of 6 June 1941 in order to secure title to the vessel in the United States and to avoid any difficulties which might otherwise have arisen in connection with liens outstanding against the vessel. The requisitioning was accomplished on December 16th.

5. On December 24th technical custody over the vessel was turned over by the Maritime Commission to the Commandant of the Third Naval District, representing the Navy Department, in order that the work of converting the vessel to a convoy loaded troop transport might be undertaken in accordance with orders issued by the Chief of Naval Operations on December 23rd.

6. On December 27th, by Executive Order No. 8901-A, the President authorized the Maritime Commission to agree to resell the NORMANDIE to her former owners "whenever the present emergency shall have ceased and the Commission shall determine that the United States no longer has need of said vessel." In accordance with this authorization memoranda were exchanged between the Chairman of the Maritime Commission (under date of 31 December 1941) and the French Ambassador (under date of 26 January 1942) setting forth the agreement.

(ENCLOSURE A)
of the United States to resell the NORMANDIE to her former French owners "when the present emergency shall have ceased," etc. The effect of the agreement was to give the former French owners an option to repurchase the NORMANDIE in such condition as she might then be at the time of such repurchase. There was no agreement on the part of the United States to restore the vessel to the condition in which she was requisitioned or to any other condition.

Discussions have been held from time to time by representatives of the Maritime Commission and representatives of the former French owners, looking toward the determination of the compensation to be paid for the requisitioning of the vessel. It is understood that mention has been made of an offering price of $10,000,000 and an asking price of $60,000,000 but to date no terms have actually been agreed upon with reference to any price.

7. Conversion of the NORMANDIE to a convoy-loaded troop transport was commenced during the last week in December by the Robins Dry Dock & Repair Company of Brooklyn, New York, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Todd Shipyards, Inc., and continued up to the time of the fire on 9 February 1942.

8. Following the burning and capsizing of the vessel on February 9-10, the Secretary of the Navy appointed a Naval Court of Inquiry which, after investigation and hearings, reported that "gross negligence and utter violation of the rules of common sense on the part of the Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co., was directly and solely responsible for the fire on the USS LAFAYETTE on February 9, 1942." After discussion with the Comptroller General and representatives of the Attorney General, the Navy Department released payments amounting to approximately $5,000,000 for work which the contractor had performed on the vessel prior to the burning, retaining out of such payments the sum of $500,000 as a special account pending further determination of the contractor's liability. This action, as evidenced by an agreement between the Navy Department and the contractor under date of 9 April 1942, was taken with the express understanding that it was not to constitute a concession by the Government that its claim against the contractor was limited to $500,000, or any particular amount. Discussions have been held from time to time with representatives of the Department of Justice concerning the disposition of the Government's claim against the contractor. The question still remains open, and in the meantime the Navy is continuing to hold the special account of $500,000.

9. On 15 April 1942 the Secretary of the Navy appointed a Special Committee to study and make recommendations with respect to the salvage or other disposition of the USS LAFAYETTE (the name of the vessel having been changed by the Secretary on 31 December 1941). On 1 May 1942 the Committee submitted a Report recommending that the vessel should be raised and recommend further that any decision as to the reconditioning or other disposition of the vessel be postponed until after the vessel was raised. The decision to recommend the raising of the vessel was based primarily upon the necessity of removing the obstacle to navigation which the vessel then constituted (a matter
approximately 24 months would be required to accomplish the desired conversion. The Bureau pointed out that the extreme vulnerability of a ship like the NORMANDIE would make its use as a combat carrier fraught with considerable risk and proposed, as an alternative plan, the conversion of the vessel to a troop transport with a flight deck. Because of the length of time which the Bureau estimated would be required for the conversion, and because of the fact that the NORMANDIE still remained in the technical custody of the French owners, no further action was taken at this time on the proposal to acquire the vessel and convert her to an auxiliary aircraft carrier.

2. In October, 1941, some consideration was given to the possibility of acquiring the NORMANDIE and converting her to an auxiliary vessel for the transportation of cargoes of planes in a knocked-down condition. Owing to the fact that no plans of the vessel were available to the Navy, and the difficulty of any naval representatives going aboard the vessel to make a thorough-going inspection so long as the vessel remained in the hands of her French owners, no further action was taken on this proposal.

3. Immediately upon the entrance of the United States into the War, the need for troop transports became acute and it was decided to take over the NORMANDIE and convert her to a convoy-loaded troop transport. The directive of the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 22 December 1941, which ordered the Bureau of Ships to proceed with the conversion of the NORMANDIE to a convoy-unit loaded transport capable of carrying about 10,000 troops, stipulated that the conversion was "to be accomplished with the least possible change in the existing ship's structure and installations" and that "the vessel was to be ready for service at the earliest practicable date." In the interest of improving the stability of the vessel, the Bureau of Ships on 1 February 1942 requested authorization to proceed with the removal of "some 1200 tons of the structure and outfit comprising the large public rooms above the Promenade Deck." It was estimated that a period of approximately 60 days would be required to accomplish this additional work. In view of the urgency of the need for the vessel's services with the least possible delay, it was decided that this work would not be undertaken in connection with the initial conversion of the vessel.

4. In the meantime the firm of Gibbs and Cox, Inc., submitted to the Chief of the Bureau of Ships two letters, dated 20 December 1941 and 26 December 1941, outlining a plan for the conversion of the NORMANDIE to an aircraft carrier. The second of these letters enclosed a memorandum by the well-known naval architect, Dr. William Hovgaard, in which Dr. Hovgaard compared the advantages of converting the NORMANDIE to a troop transport with those to be gained from the conversion of the vessel to an aircraft carrier. In view of the vulnerability of the ship to air attack, and the heavy loss of life which would be likely to result from such an attack if the vessel were operating as a troop transport, particularly during unloading operations, Dr. Hovgaard concluded that the greater advantage would be gained by converting the ship to a carrier. In acknowledging the receipt of the Gibbs & Cox letters, the Chief of the Bureau of Ships pointed out that the Navy Department's decision as to the use to be made of the ship had already been determined. No further action was taken on the Gibbs & Cox proposal.
5. Immediately following the burning and capsizing of the LAFAYETTE, the Chief of Naval Operations transmitted to the Bureau of Ships the desire of the President to convert the ship into an aircraft carrier and directed the Bureau to undertake a study of the proposal. In its reply (dated 14 March 1942) the Bureau reiterated the views which it had expressed in June, 1941, in connection with the similar proposal made at that time to the effect that the characteristics of the vessel were such as to make her unsuitable for conversion to a carrier for combat operations. The Bureau estimated that a period of from 2-1/2 to 3 years would be required to complete the salvaging of the vessel and the conversion of her to an aircraft carrier, and concluded that "it would be better to build a new carrier rather than to convert this ship to that use."

6. From this time forward, while consideration continued to be given to the possibility of converting the ship to an aircraft carrier, no definite action was taken toward arriving at a decision concerning any particular conversion until January, 1943, when the progress of the salvage operation indicated that if the vessel was to be rehabilitated at all, some decision should be reached as to the type of conversion desired, so that the preliminary design work could be undertaken and completed by the time the vessel was finally raised. On 8 February 1943 the Bureau of Ships forwarded to the Chief of Naval Operations two plans of conversion, one to an auxiliary aircraft carrier, and the other to a troop transport. In comparing the advantages of the two plans, the Bureau stated that the conversion of the ship to a troop transport appeared to have the greater promise in the way of a vessel of general efficiency for the purpose intended, and would require approximately 6 months less time. On 3 March 1943 the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, approved the Bureau's plan of conversion to a troop transport, but directed that study be given to the feasibility of adding a flight deck with certain specified characteristics. The Bureau replied on 31 March 1943 with a plan of conversion to a convoy loaded troop transport with a flight deck, commenting that while such a conversion would require the expenditure of considerable more labor and material than would be required for the conversion to a troop transport, it could probably be accomplished within the time which would be required to recondition the machinery for whatever conversion might be decided upon. In conclusion, the Bureau stated that it considered that the proposed conversion of a troop transport with a flight deck offered important military advantages over a straight convoy-loaded transport. On 6 May 1943 the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Naval Operations approved the proposed conversion of the LAFAYETTE to a 24-knot convoy loaded troop transport with a flight deck, and stated that the vessel, as converted, would carry the symbol APV, defining the purpose of the APV type as being "to provide a well armed convoy loaded troop transport capable of carrying a large cargo of aircraft, vehicles, and other large items of equipment, and capable of flying assembled aircraft." A directive incorporating this decision was forwarded to the Bureau of Ships on May 11th, and on May 29th the Bureau assigned to the Navy Yard, New York, the preparation of contract plans and specifications for the conversion of the LAFAYETTE to a convoy loaded troop transport, with flight deck.
7. The decision to undertake this conversion contemplated the rehabilitation of part of the vessel's existing machinery. When, however, the vessel was raised, and a careful examination of her machinery was made, it was found that (a) the boilers had deteriorated to such an extent that it would be necessary entirely to rebuild them or to replace them with new ones; (b) the main propelling machinery would have to be rebuilt in its entirety; (c) the steam turbines required complete overhaul and possible design modification; (d) all of the auxiliary machinery would have to be rebuilt or reconditioned. In view of these conditions, the Bureau decided that the installation of a modern turbo-gear drive would be cheaper, quicker, and more satisfactory than any reconditioning job. In reporting this situation to the Chief of Naval Operations on 10 November 1943, the Bureau of Ships stated that the conversion of the LAFAYETTE to a 24-knot APV, as had previously been directed, would involve an expenditure of at least $50,000,000 and would require a working force of about 4,000 men per day for a period of 18 months. Pointing out that apart from the time and cost involved, the undertaking of the conversion would place a severe strain on plants which were already overburdened with war work, and would further aggravate an already serious manpower shortage, the Bureau recommended that the decision to go forward with the conversion be given reconsideration with a view to deferring the work until a later date. Upon reviewing the Bureau's report and recommendation, the Secretary of the Navy, on 20 November 1943, directed that "...nothing be done that involves the refitting of this vessel to the extent that money would be spent in preparing her for an airplane carrier or a transport vessel."

8. On 30 November 1943, the firm of Gibbs & Cox, Inc., acting as design agent for the Todd Shipyards Corporation, submitted a Report of an engineering investigation which it had made of the LAFAYETTE in accordance with instructions issued by the Bureau of Ships in September, 1943. This Report set forth a detailed study of the comparative advantages of three types of conversion, viz., combatant aircraft carrier, combined troop transport with flight deck, and straight troop transport, and concluded that of the three, the conversion to a straight troop transport presented the greatest advantages. This Report was followed by a supplemental Report, dated 26 February 1944, comparing in detail the operating characteristics of the LAFAYETTE, as converted into a troop transport, with those of the QUEEN MARY and the QUEEN ELIZABETH. Subsequently on March 6th, in response to a request from the President, Mr. William Francis Gibbs submitted a memorandum discussing the possibility of converting the LAFAYETTE to a 25-knot passenger ship. In brief, this memorandum summarised the conclusions set forth in the two previous reports submitted by Gibbs & Cox and concluded that the conversion of the LAFAYETTE to a 30-knot troop transport would readily lend itself to a later conversion of the vessel to a 25-knot passenger ship.

9. By a memorandum dated 5 April 1944, the Acting Secretary of the Navy transmitted to the President Mr. Gibbs' letter of March 6th, together with comments thereon submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of the Bureau of Ships. Summarizing these comments, the Secretary noted that they
opposed any immediate conversion of the LAFAYETTE because of the critical manpower and material shortages, and the length of time which the conversion would require. The Secretary suggested that the decision as to conversion of the vessel should be postponed until the manpower and material shortages become less critical, and recommended that, pending such a decision, steps be taken to clarify the interest which the former French owners might have in the vessel. This memorandum was followed by a second memorandum, dated 22 April 1944, in which the Secretary of the Navy submitted to the President for decision the Navy Department's specific recommendation that, except for the preparation of plans, the conversion of the LAFAYETTE be deferred until the shipbuilding and ship repair load on the East Coast might become less congested. It was estimated that this would occur early in 1945. It was further recommended that at such time as the work might eventually be undertaken, it should proceed on the basis of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract and with a priority lower than that assigned to any other work which might be required at the time for the successful prosecution of the war.

10. In response to the Acting Secretary's memorandum of April 5th, and the Secretary's memorandum of April 22nd, the President, in a memorandum dated May 3rd, requested that the problem of the conversion of the LAFAYETTE be reconsidered in view of: (a) The value of the vessel in the war and the immediate post-war period in comparison with all other types now being built or converted; (b) Finding a solution for the reported difficulty of commencing the work without delay; (c) The value of the vessel to American commerce in the post-war period compared with other American ships that will be available at that time. In connection with its reconsideration of the problem along the lines indicated, the President requested the Navy to consult with the Chairman of the Maritime Commission. Following a further review of all aspects of the problem, and discussions with the Chairman of the Maritime Commission and the War Department, the views of the Navy Department were transmitted to the President by the Secretary of the Navy in a memorandum dated 2 June 1944, setting forth the following conclusions:

"(a) The value of the LAFAYETTE in the war and the immediate post-war period would be less than is obtainable by putting equivalent effort into other types.

"(b) Shortages in critical trades continue, and may be expected to be more critical after this summer's operations. To commence this work without delay would create serious interferences with other programs. There is no solution for this difficulty at this time.

"(c) The U. S. Maritime Commission has advised us definitely that the LAFAYETTE would have less value to American commerce in the post-war period than other American ships that will probably be available at that time."
"(d) In addition, we are bound by the agreement of 31 December 1941 to resell the NORMANDIE to the French owners.

"(e) It is believed, and in this the Maritime Commission definitely agrees, that the ship would be an economic liability. The operation of the LEVIATHAN also confirms this.

"(f) The movements of a vessel of this size are very much restricted on account of her size, and, in addition, she cannot transit the Panama Canal."

After enumerating the foregoing, the Secretary added the following:

"My conclusion after studying the recommendations made to me is that military considerations do not warrant the undertaking of this conversion.

"If, however, other considerations are sufficient to justify conversion, it is recommended that the initial work be deferred at least until September 1944, but preferably later."

/s/ R. L. COCHRANE

R. L. Cochrane
Chief of Bureau of Ships
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
25 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Disposition of Small Craft.

I would like to get your views on disposition of these boats whenever you have an opportunity to give me a few minutes.

As indicated in papers which I have sent to you previously, the total number runs into the thousands; I think we have a market in which they can be sold now, particularly as there are none being manufactured. I don't like to let it run too long.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

James Forrestal

[Signature]

After Cabinet
9-11-44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

This is a report called for by the President concerning the replacement of worn out guns on our ships and the dispersion of our gun factories.

[Signature]

WILSON BROWN.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By N. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1979
MEMORANDUM for Vice Admiral Horne

August 19, 1944

Subject: Information requested by Rear Admiral Wilson Brown

Enclosure: (A) Copy of Buord Regunning Bulletin of July 1944

1. The following information is submitted in accordance with your verbal inquiry of yesterday:

(a) Major Caliber Regunning

Schedule: Regunning of vessels of the Fleet are left up to the Fleet Commanders (or Service Force Commanders) to authorize. In order to keep the Commanders afloat adequately informed as to availabilities of guns for whatever regunning may be desired, a Regunning Bulletin is issued each month, containing information as to the readiness of guns and the state of gun wear on the major ships (according to latest reports from each vessel). Enclosure (A) is a copy of the July 1944 Regunning Bulletin.

Experience as to regunnings to date has been that ships are made available for this purpose in such numbers (during lulls between campaigns) that provision of regunning facilities have been requested for simultaneous regunning of as many as 5 - BBs, 1 - CV, 3 or 4 CAs and 8 or 9 CLs. Further, owing to the length of time necessary to reline major caliber guns, it has been found necessary for the Bureau to procure 100% spare guns for regunning and battle damage replacement of heavy ships, graduated down to 66-2/3% for heavy cruisers and 50% spare guns for light cruisers. This program is substantially in hand in the case of cruiser guns. In the case of the heaviest guns, spare guns on hand are approximately 60% of those installed afloat, and it is expected that the 100% figure will be reached by August 1945. In addition to spare guns, spare liner forgings are procured in quantities equal to the number of guns afloat in all major calibers (except 6"/53).

(b) Facilities for Relining

Complete facilities exist at the Naval Gun Factory, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., NOP Pocatello, Idaho, Bethlehem Steel Company, Allentown, Pa., and the Watervliet Arsenal, Watervliet, New York. Each is capable of relining any caliber of gun. In addition, the Naval Ordnance Plants at Louisville and South Charleston, and the Mesta Machine Company of Pittsburgh, Pa., are capable
of doing work on major caliber guns, NOP Louisville being limited to 6" gun machining and the other two plants being capable of heavier work. These facilities are considered adequate.

(c) **Handling Facilities**

Facilities for regunning heavy ships must be of sufficient capacity to lift the largest gun of 115 tons, and also should be of sufficient capacity to lift triple slide and gun assemblies in the older ships in which assembly weights run up to 260 tons (after stripping off sub-assemblies). Lack of facilities to lift these heavier weights would result in considerably more labor and time for the regunning job. However, provision of facilities for making repairs to turret rotating structures, requiring a lift of 315 tons for lifting a bare turret weldment (if all equipment is stripped therefrom), will provide all handling facilities necessary for regunning the heaviest ships. Three 350 ton facilities are in operation on the East Coast, but on the West Coast the one facility at Navy Yard, Puget Sound, is of 250 ton capacity, with one at Pearl Harbor capable of 200 tons lift only. There is, therefore, being constructed at Naval Drydocks, Hunters Point, San Francisco, a 450 ton facility which, according to recent information, should be in operation by early next summer. In the meantime, steps have been initiated for the transfer from the East Coast of the 250 ton crane ship (Ex-USS KEARSARGE) to the San Francisco Bay area, pending completion of the permanent facility. A second turret repair facility in the Pacific area has been recommended by the Bureau of Ordnance. Upon completion of this facility, it is considered that regunning facilities on the West Coast will be adequate.

2. With reference to the inquiry as to what facilities are available for bombardment training by ships on the East and West Coasts, it has been ascertained that the following islands are used:

**East Coast:**
- Seal Island (Casco Bay, Maine)
- Bloodsworth Island (Chesapeake Bay)
- Culebra Island (Virgin Islands)

**West Coast:**
- San Clemente Island

**Hawaiian Area:**
- Kahoolawe

In addition, there are several islands in the South Pacific designated for bombardment training, and an area on Kolombangara containing Japanese defensive installations has been used.
From: The Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
Commander, Third Fleet
Commander, Seventh Fleet
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet
Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet
Commanding Officers of all Battleships
Commanding Officers of all Heavy Cruisers
Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers

To: Commander, Third Fleet
Commander, Seventh Fleet
Commander, Eighth Fleet
Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet
Commander, Service Force, Atlantic Fleet
Commanding Officers of all Battleships
Commanding Officers of all Heavy Cruisers
Commanding Officers of all Light Cruisers

Subject: Main Batteries of Battleships and Cruisers Regunning Bulletin for July 1944 - Forwarding of

Reference: (a) BuOrd conf 1tr S72-4(34)(Mn5) of 18 July 1942.

Enclosure: (A) Two copies of regunning bulletin, serial Mn5-7-44 (one copy to BBs, CAs, and CLs)

1. Forwarded for information. Comment as to distribution is invited.

2.

JER:1m
Copy to:

G. F. HUSSEY, Jr.

Roger Brooks
By direction

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/68)

Date- MAR 1 1972

Signature:

CONFIDENTIAL
BUREAU OF ORDNANCE

REGUNNING BULLETIN

for

MAIN BATTERIES OF BATTLESHIPS AND CRUISERS

Table of Contents

Page

2

Summary of Information Contained in Previous Issues of Regunning Bulletin.

3-8

List of MSR Data for Individual Ships and Summary of Status of Available Replacement Guns.

9

Tabulation of Available 5"/51 Replacement Guns

10

Tabulation of Available 5"/38 Replacement Guns
SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

CONTAINED IN PREVIOUS ISSUE OF REGUNNING BULLETIN Page 2 of 10

Information of current interest is contained in previous issues as follows:

(a) Summary of Regunnings and Replacements

A summary of regunnings and gun replacements for the calendar years 1939-1943 inclusive is contained in Regunning Bulletin, Serial No. 5-3-44. Similar data for 1944 to date are listed below:

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<th>Caliber</th>
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<td>5&quot;/51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>March</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td>14&quot;/50</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARYLAND</td>
<td>5&quot;/51</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>April</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALT LAKE CITY</td>
<td>6&quot;/55</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLUMBIA</td>
<td>6&quot;/47</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISSISSIPPI</td>
<td>5&quot;/51</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>May</td>
</tr>
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</table>

(b) ESR Assignments

ESR assignments for A.P. and H.C. projectiles for each projectile-velocity combination used is contained in Regunning Bulletin, Serial No. 5-3-44.

(c) Velocity Loss and Erosion Photos

A tabulation of Latest Applicable MFG Photos will be found in Regunning Bulletin, Serial No. 5-3-44.

(d) Reports of Gun Wear

A statement of the date desired in ships reports of gun wear and the frequency with which these reports should be submitted is contained in Regunning Bulletin, Serial No. 5-3-44.

Note: Information on 5"/51 caliber is listed for the first time in Regunning Bulletin.
LIST OF BSR DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL SHIPS
AND SUMMARY OF STATUS OF AVAILABLE REPLACEMENT GUNS

GENERAL NOTES FOR PAGES 3 THROUGH 6

(A) Each major division lists all guns capable of being accommodated in the slides of the ships which comprise each class.

(B) Unless relevant to the summary, mods of the various marks of guns are omitted.

(C) Life is abbreviation for "Estimated End of Accuracy Life" in terms of E.S.E., as shown in OD-3596.

(D) P.D.C. is abbreviation for "Prospective Date Completion."

(E) Guns shown under Naval Proving Ground heading are not available for issue unless otherwise noted.

(F) "Proc." is abbreviation for MCP, Pocatello.

(G) Asterisk beside Av. E.S.E. indicate change from last Bulletin.

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Date- MAR 1 1972
Signature- [Redacted]
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<th>In Process of Work</th>
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<td>A. BATTLESHIPS</td>
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<tr>
<td>I. 16&quot;/50 CALIBER GUNS, MARK 7</td>
<td>Twist 1/25 - Plated - Life 300</td>
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<td>BB61 IOWA</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>NFG</td>
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<td>52 NEW JERSEY</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23 Mar 44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>POCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>53 MISSOURI</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1 Jun 44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NFG</td>
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<tr>
<td>64 WISCONSIN</td>
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<td>1 Jun 44</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>65-66 - Not in Service</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>II. 16&quot;/45 CALIBER GUNS, MARK 6 MOD 1</td>
<td>Twist 1/25 - Plated - Life 400</td>
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<td>BB45 NORTH CAROLINA</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>28 Apr 44</td>
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<td>NFG</td>
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<td>56 WASHINGTON</td>
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<td>30 Apr 44</td>
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<td>57 SOUTH DAKOTA</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>56(c)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>Enroute or scheduled for shipment to Poco. (BOSO 65190)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>Ex-BB57</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>Afloat total includes 2 guns assembled with adapters on BB45</td>
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<td>III. 16&quot;/45 CALIBER GUNS, MARK 8 AND MODS</td>
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<td>1 Apr 44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 MARYLAND</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1 Apr 44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48 WEST VIRGINIA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1 Jul 44</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>NFG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>22(a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) BB45 has two Mark 6 Mod 1 guns assembled with adapters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adapters for use Mark 6-1 Guns in COLORADO Class Slides - Summary of Status
1 - In use at NFG
2 - Installed in COLORADO
5 - Completed - unassigned
2 - 15 July
1 - 31 July
Will ship to Poco. (BOSO 72614)

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### For Main Batteries of Battleships and Cruisers 1 July 1944

#### IV. 14"/50 Caliber Guns, Marks 7, 11 and Mods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>E.S.R.</th>
<th>Ready for Issue</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td><strong>Name</strong></td>
<td><strong>Av.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Date</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB40</td>
<td>NEW MEXICO</td>
<td>106(a)</td>
<td>25 Mar 44</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB44</td>
<td>CALIFORNIA</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12 Apr 44</td>
<td>(21 ESR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mark 7 and Mods**
- Twist 1/32 - Unplated - Life 175
- (a) Ten guns only. Other two average 38
- (d) Enroute Poco. (BOSO 70339)
- (c) Waterlister to line and rifle guns. NGF to complete guns and overhaul breech mechanisms
- (e) Will ship from Waterlister for completion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>E.S.R.</th>
<th>Ready for Issue</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BB41</td>
<td>MISSISSIPPI</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB42</td>
<td>IDAHO</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26 May 44</td>
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<td>BB43</td>
<td>TENNESSEE</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26 May 44</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Mark 11 and Mods**
- Twist 1/25 - Plated - Life 225
- (g) Will ship Poco. (BOSO 80186)

**Totals**
- 60
- 22
- 35
- 3
- 129

#### V. 14"/45 Caliber Guns, Marks 8, 10, 12 and Mods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>E.S.R.</th>
<th>Ready for Issue</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>61</td>
<td>21 Mar 44</td>
<td>4(a)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB35</td>
<td>TEXAS</td>
<td>152*</td>
<td>26 Jun 44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB38</td>
<td>PENNSYLVANIA</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>31 Mar 44</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
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<th>Ready for Issue</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>BB36</td>
<td>NEVADA</td>
<td>160*</td>
<td>26 Jun 44</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>BB39</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Mark 12 and Mods**
- Twist 1/25 - Plated - Life .36 Δ Do
- (a) Ex-BB37. Four enroute NGF. Balance available 22 July (BOSO 53906)

**Totals**
- 42
- 22
- 9
- 4
- 2
- 79

#### VI. 12"/50 Caliber Guns, Mark 7 and Mods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>E.S.R.</th>
<th>Ready for Issue</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>BB33</td>
<td>ARKANSAS</td>
<td>147*</td>
<td>26 Jun 44</td>
<td>NGF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals**
- 12
- 1
- 37

(a) Worn ex-WYOMING guns not being worked on.

---

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>E.S.R.</th>
<th>Av. Date</th>
<th>Ready for Issue</th>
<th>In Process of Work</th>
<th>Special No.</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IV. 12&quot;/50 CALIBER GUNS, MARK 8</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>OBI</em> ALASKA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1Jun44</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NOV 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>2 &amp; 3 - Not in Service</em></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>VIII. 8&quot;/55 CALIBER GUNS, MARK 14 AND 1093</strong></td>
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<td><em>CA24</em> NEW ORLEANS</td>
<td>125</td>
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<td><em>TOTALS</em></td>
<td>74</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>133</td>
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</table>

(a) ESR varies from 50 to 107.
(b) CA24 has 15 guns with adapters installed.
(c) Ex-CA25
(d) Will ship NYMI (BOSO 820032)

Also six adapters in store at Poco. and 3 at NYPHNL. Ultimate total of adapters is 34.
### STATUS AS OF 1 JULY 1944

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<td>2</td>
<td>OMMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MILWAUKEE</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>DETROIT</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>TROY</td>
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**L 6"/53 CALIBER GUNS, MARKS 12, 14, 18 AND 20**

**Twist 1/36 - Unplated - Life 400**

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<th>CL4</th>
<th>GUN</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>NPG</th>
<th>P.O.C</th>
<th>KSR</th>
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<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>106(b)</td>
<td>31Jan44</td>
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<td>NOF</td>
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<td>223</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>P.O.C</td>
<td>10J 44</td>
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<td>222</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>26Mar44</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>P.O.C</td>
<td>30J 44</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ORIOLE</td>
<td>69(b)</td>
<td>1Jan44</td>
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<td>HTP EARL</td>
<td>16 A 30 KSR</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>KANSAS CITY</td>
<td>91(b)</td>
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<td>HTK</td>
<td>46 KSR</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>MEMPHIS</td>
<td>53(a)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>L. Denmark</td>
<td>71 KSR</td>
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**Mark 18 and 20 (except No. 1 which is wet type)**

**Twist 1 36 - Plated - Life 450**

**CNOSVII**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>CL4</th>
<th>GUN</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>NPG</th>
<th>P.O.C</th>
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**TOTALS**

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<th>P.O.C</th>
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(a) Average for all singles
(b) Average KSR for ten guns

---

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[Page 7 of 10]
### STATUS AS OF 1 JULY 1944

#### Afloat

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Av.</th>
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<th>P.D.C.</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>VIRGINIA</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3Apr44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>ALABAMA</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>8Apr44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>HOUSTON</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>23May44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>MIAMI</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1May44</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ashore

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number in Process of Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**New Barrels (Proof Rounds Only)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number in Process of Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>JASON (ABD)</td>
<td>15 (c) (d) 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NYMI</td>
<td>439 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>L. Denmark</td>
<td>Crane 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Pico.</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>NYPME</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NYMI (b)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Replacement Spares (Partly worn)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number in Process of Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 ESR</td>
<td></td>
<td>400 ESR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Pico.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NYPME</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>NYP</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>L. Denmark</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>L. Denmark</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>NYP</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TODALS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number in Process of Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>696</td>
<td>1432</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) For this gun sufficient data has been accumulated to make origin enlargement the real measure of condition. In these terms, end of life has been found to occur only beyond 0.3". The value of 910 ESR given above is that from which origin enlargement of 0.3" will most likely result with average wear rate. The normal "regain" point to allow for expenditure of 250 rounds at the maximum known wear rate is 0.243". Depending on the type of firing this may be expected to occur roughly between 510 and 790 ESR.

(b) Installed in Spares Turrets.

(c) Will ship to Hunters Point (BG50 74342)

(d) Will complete at rate of twenty per month.

---

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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR 5200.3 (9/27/58)
### For Secondary Batteries

#### Status As Of 1 July 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afloat</th>
<th>Ashore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ship</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BB33</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GV</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUXILIARIES</strong></td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

It is recommended for maximum safety that steel nose plugs be substituted for point detonating fuses and for mechanical time fuses in 5"/51 caliber guns having more than .125 bore enlargement at the origin.

---

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**Declassified**

**DOD Dir. 5200.9 (9/27/50)**

**Date:** MAR 1 1974

**Signature:**

---
### Installed Afloat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ships Type</th>
<th>Number Barrels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBs</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGs</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLs</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVs</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDs</td>
<td>1485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEs</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUXILIARIES</td>
<td>602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>2810</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ashore Ready for Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Pacific Locations</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Atlantic Locations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
<td>Poco</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>MAD Crane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
<td>MAD Lake Danmark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>NYPS</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>NYBOS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Hunters Point</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>NYNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Terminal Island</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>MYPHIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>MYNOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>VPEARL</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>NYOHUL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Lion 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Espiritu Santo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Noumea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Melbourne</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6(a) Adak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Regunning During 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Spare Barrels Afloat Ready for Issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6(a)</td>
<td>BLACKHAWK (AD1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>DENEROLA (AD12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DIXIE (AD14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PRAIRIE (AD15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CASCADE (AD16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>VIEDMONT (AD17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6(a)</td>
<td>SIRNA (AD18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>YOSEMITE (AD19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>VARKAB (AD21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>HECTOR (AR7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>JASON (AR8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes
- (a) Enroute or Boso to be issued.
- Present rate of production 300 barrels per month (all purposes including new construction).
- Life of Gun Barrel - Reference OCL-630-44

Naval Proving Ground tests to date indicate that the 5"/38 caliber guns provide satisfactory fuse performance and accuracy up to at least 0.25" bore enlargement at the origin. Depending on the extent of prolonged firing of hot guns, this enlargement may be reached in from about 2500 to over 4000 cycles. Guns with 0.21 or 0.23 origin enlargement may be expected to fire about 600 or 300 KSR respectively under conditions of prolonged fire before reaching 0.25" enlargement.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.
This is a letter called for by the President. He will want to consider it when and if he has leisure.

WILSON BROWN.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
(No date given)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

This is in response to your request of 4 August for a further suggestion concerning appropriate names for the three aircraft carriers, large, (CVB) now scheduled to be launched in December, 1944, and April and September, 1945.

By cancelling certain names already assigned to naval vessels the names of successful battles of the present war may be made available for CVBs. It is suggested that only two of the three CVBs be named at this time and that assignment of a name to the last CVB to be launched be delayed in order to await further developments in the Pacific. Accordingly, the following names are recommended:

MIDWAY
CORAL SEA

The names MIDWAY and CORAL SEA are presently assigned to aircraft carriers, escort, (CVE) which are now in commission. However, in the event you approve this suggestion the names MIDWAY and CORAL SEA can be transferred to CVBs and suitable new names assigned to the CVEs.

In the event you do not approve the suggestion made above, the following names are recommended for CVBs:

TARAWA
SAIPAN

The name TARAWA is currently assigned to an aircraft carrier (CV-40), now under construction. In the event that you approve the second suggestion, TARAWA can be transferred to a CVB and a new name assigned to CV-40. Since CV-40 is not scheduled to be launched until 30 June 1945, a new name need not be assigned to this vessel until March 1945, at which time names of new battles may be available.

May I have your views in this matter?

Respectfully,

JAMES FORRESTAL

J.F. OK. F.D.R.
August 31, 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Personnel Requirements, 1st Provisional Marine Brigade

The Commandant of the Marine Corps proposes to bring the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to full divisional strength and to designate it then as the 6th Marine Division. Admiral Nimitz and Admiral King recommend approval. Your concurrence is requested.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

James Forrestal
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

It seems to me we should remember in the summary court martial of these 208 men that they were activated by mass fear and that this was understandable. Their punishment should be nominal.

F. D. R.

Report from the Secretary sent to Mrs. Roosevelt for her information and return for our files.

(No papers accompanied the original of the memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 2, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
E. R.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND
PLEASE RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR:

Miss Tully.

This is a report from the Secretary of the Navy about trouble with Colored sailors at Mare Island and resulting disciplinary action.

The action appears to me to be correct and the President may wish to glance through the report. No action required by him.

WILSON BROWN.
TH E SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. Following the explosion at the Port Chicago Pier on the night of 17 July 1944, it became necessary to evacuate some of the enlisted personnel from the barracks at that activity and three divisions of Negro enlisted personnel, consisting of 320 men, were transferred to the Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, California for duty.

2. On the afternoon of 10 August 1944, the three divisions of Negro enlisted personnel refused to perform their assigned duty of handling ammunition to be discharged from a merchant vessel then berthed at Mare Island. When the orders to work were repeated to the men individually, 70 of them obeyed, but 250 continued to refuse to carry out the orders. The men were informed with great care of the needs of the situation, their obligation to obey orders and their opportunity to be of especial service.

3. On 12 August 1944, the Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District visited the Naval Ammunition Depot at Mare Island and addressed the inordinate group of 250 men. The men were given an opportunity to explain the reason for their refusal to handle ammunition and thereafter were again required to state whether they would comply with orders. All but 6 of them stated that they would do so. However, 6 others again changed their minds and refused to work at the assigned duty of unloading ammunition from a ship.

4. The Commandant reports that the refusal to perform the required work arises from a mass fear arising out of the Port Chicago explosion. This fear is unreasonably associated with the handling of ammunition in ships, rather than in the handling of ammunition as such. No white enlisted personnel are performing similar work at the Naval Ammunition Depot or the Naval Magazine. To avoid any semblance of discrimination against Negroes, the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel has authorized the procurement and training of one battalion of white enlisted men for Fort Chicago and one for the Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island. Authority has also been granted to arrange necessary rotation.

5. The recalcitrant 65 and the 6 others who changed their minds were all transferred to the Naval Training and Distribution Center, Suisun, California to await further action.

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DOD DIR. 5800.9 (8/27/58)

Date- 3-1-2-59
Signature- Epa 1. Scale
6. As a result of the above incident the Commandant of the Twelfth Naval District reports that no action will be taken against the 70 men who first refused duty but who later obeyed when given orders individually. The 208 men who refused duty but later complied with orders after being addressed by the Commandant will be tried by summary courts martial on charges of refusing to obey orders. The 50 men who have continued to override authority will be brought to trial by general courts martial on charges of mutiny.

7. A copy of the complete report in this matter is attached hereto.

James Forrestal
From: Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subj: Refusal of enlisted personnel to handle ammunition.

1. Forwarded.

Randall Jacobs
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.
The Chief of Naval Personnel
OFFICE OF COMMANDANT
TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT
SAN FRANCISCO, 2, CALIFORNIA

14 August 1944

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Personnel
(2) Chief of Naval Operations

Subject: Refusal of enlisted personnel to handle ammunition.

Reference: (a) ComTwelve's ltr ND12-11-Fn, (SC) P16-3/LN, Serial 3970 to SecNav dated 12 August 1944
Enclosure: (A) MAD ltr P13-2 (50-37302) NH-NLe to ComTwelve dated 13 August 1944
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded to supplement Reference (a).

C. H. WRIGHT

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59
Signature- Carl L. Springer
13 August 1944

To: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

Subj: Mutinous action; Enlisted personnel from Naval Magazine, Port Chicago.

1. Confirming previous verbal reports to the Commandant on 11 August and various verbal reports to the Commandant since; a refusal to obey orders, sufficiently concerted and sufficiently persisted in to appear mutinous, occurred at the Naval Barracks of this Depot on the part of three divisions of enlisted (negro) personnel, formerly attached to the Naval Barracks of the Naval Magazine at Port Chicago and temporarily attached to the Naval Barracks of this Depot for duty at this Depot, occurred on 10 August 1944.

2. It had been necessary to immediately evacuate principal numbers of naval enlisted personnel from the barracks at Port Chicago following the explosion at the Port Chicago Pier on the night of 17 July. Since that time these personnel had been gradually reassembled, mostly at Port Chicago, some at the barracks of this Depot. Two of the three divisions concerned in this occurrence had been gradually reassembled at this Depot. The third arrived by bus from the Naval Magazine, Port Chicago the early afternoon of 10 August.

3. The first refusal to obey orders occurred when the division first assigned to work of unloading a vessel at the Depot pier were ready to march aboard the ferry at the ferry landing of the naval barracks located on the eastward side of Mare Island Strait in South Vallejo. This division refused to march aboard the ferry when ordered to do so.

4. Considering the average mentality of the men involved, exclusively negro enlisted personnel, particular care combined with patience was exercised in outlining to these men the needs of the situation which required their services, the opportunity presented to them to be of especial service, the obligations to obey orders resting on all personnel in any military service, and the serious consequences attendant upon a refusal to obey orders; threats of consequences were avoided.

5. As the mass refusal of the first division indicated a concerted action, the same procedure was followed with the two remaining divisions assigned to this task. One of these divisions, the third involved, had just arrived in buses from Port Chicago.

6. Following the separate refusal of each division involved to obey orders, the individual men of each division were separately given the same orders after the needs of the occasion, their responsibility, their obligations, and their opportunity respectively, and individually outlined to them. Beyond in-
forming them of the general seriousness of a refusal of any one in a military organization to obey orders, no threats were used. Out of the 325 originally involved, a total of 70 (26 including all petty officers present from one division; 20 including less than half of the petty officers from another, and 24 including less than half of the petty officers from the third), after this separate interrogation, signified their desire and willingness to obey orders. These were then immediately separated and the remaining 255 isolated aboard a moored personnel lighter at the barracks pier.

7. The 70 loyal men were sent to work at 0600 the following morning, 11 August, and obeyed orders without any further question or difficulty. The remaining 255 were kept so isolated until the late afternoon of 11 August, at which time they were brought on the parade ground under guard and addressed by the Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, in person. Immediately following his remarks, these 255 were separated by divisions and a physical separation made between those who were desirous and willing to obey orders and those who still refused. On this occasion all of one division signified their desire to obey orders. Of the two remaining divisions all except 22 in each of these divisions signified their desire to obey orders. The remaining 44, who still refused to obey orders, were at once isolated from the remainder, were taken to the large pier at the Naval Magazine, Fort Chicago, and kept so isolated until transferred for safe keeping under authority of the Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, to the Naval Training and Distribution Center, Shoemaker, on 12 August.

8. The following day, 12 August, the men of each division who had signified their desire to obey orders on the afternoon of 11 August, were sent over to the Depot and purposely put to work aboard ship. The men of the first division (who had unanimously expressed a desire to obey orders the previous afternoon) were sent first; all obeyed. Of the division next in order, all obeyed orders to board the ferry for passage to the Depot side to begin work; however, after arrival on the dock at the ship to be worked, three of these refused to obey orders. When the time came for the remaining division to go to work, three refused to start work from the Naval Barracks side. The six men thus involved in this repeated refusal to obey orders have been isolated, and arrangements are being made to transfer them under guard to Shoemaker to be included among the previous 44.

9. There are undoubtedly agitators, ringleaders, among these men. They have always been present since such personnel were first received at this Depot in early July 1942. It has been found, in practice, that it is extremely difficult to determine who the ringleaders are. Such negro enlisted personnel are very close-mouthed, and while a considerable number of agitators have been identified in the past, such identification has mostly come from adding various circumstances together. In most all cases the correctness of the selection has most been shown by whether or not particular aspects of difficulty disappeared when the suspected individual was eliminated.

10. In the early days particularly, but to an apparent lesser degree recently, negro enlisted personnel have certainly been subjected to outside propaganda and subversive influence. The first ones to arrive, all of whom were voluntary enlistments, were much endowed with it. Enlisted personnel of this character have all along exhibited the normal characteristics of negroes, as was to be expected. They have, however, continuously exhibited additional characteristics which have never been observed by me in a long experience in dealing with naval personnel, which has generally included some negroes. These are a persistent disposition to question orders, to argue and in effect to attempt to bargain. Another new
characteristic which I had never observed before among negroes, has been a consistent attitude towards discrimination; never justified, as far as I could ascertain, after earnest effort; generally fancied and often purely imagined. The disposition, however, to seek opportunity to complain against fancied discrimination has always been present among present day negro enlisted personnel. Some of the disposition to argue and to attempt to bargain has possibly been due to the extreme care and patience which has been exercised both at Mare Island and at Fort Chicago to avoid discrimination, and particularly to explain what was needed, what was required, and in actual fact to assist and help these men in every possible manner, realizing their background and the very slight amount of military training they have had.

11. One action taken which has produced favorable results to some degree at least, has been emphasis on continued military training. The necessities of the war effort have all along, both at Mare Island and Fort Chicago, required accomplishment of work by these men. The work schedule, however, has purposely been arranged to include regular and systematic military inspections as a part of each week's routine, even though such inspection periods were at the expense of work needed to be accomplished. Such schedules always included definite liberty periods, known in advance and adhered to although sometimes at the expense of needed work.

12. The concerted action and persistent refusal to obey orders indicated a mutinous attitude on the part of the personnel so involved. Steps are accordingly being taken to recommend such individuals for general court martial. No action is being taken against those who signified a desire to obey orders after the needs of the occasion had been first individually explained to them, and who did then obey orders and proceed to work the following morning. Individuals who persisted in their refusal to obey orders after individual interrogation on the first day, but who subsequently expressed a desire to obey orders following the visit of the Commandant, and who later obeyed orders and went to work at the first opportunity are being tried by summary court martial.

N. H. 3038
Commanding Officer

c: Bn ORD
CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subj: Refusal of enlisted personnel to handle ammunition.

1. Forwarded.

2. This Bureau concurs with the disciplinary action to be taken as indicated in paragraph 7 of the basic letter.

Randall Jacobs
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.
The Chief of Naval Personnel

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59
Signature- Carl I. Spicer
CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Via: (1) Chief of Naval Personnel
(2) Chief of Naval Operations

Subject: Refusal of enlisted personnel to handle ammunition.

1. On 11 August the Commandant was informed by the Commanding Officer of the Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, that three divisions of enlisted personnel from the Naval Barracks, Fort Chicago, had refused to perform their assigned duty in handling ammunition to be discharged from a merchant vessel then berthed at the Ammunition Depot; that when the orders to work were repeated to the men individually 70 of them had obeyed and 258 continued to refuse to obey; that these 258 men had been segregated; and that necessary work was proceeding because of the detail of other men to this duty.

2. On 12 August the Commandant visited the Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, for consultation with the Commanding Officer, and to address the insubordinate group. The men were given an opportunity to explain the reasons for their actions. About 25 did so and they appeared to speak freely but respectfully.

3. After this visit the men were again required to state whether they would comply with orders. All but 44 stated that they would do so. The recalcitrant 44 were again segregated. Today all except these 44 and 6 others who again changed their minds, were at work performing the assigned duty of unloading ammunition from a ship.

4. The following facts are of interest:

(a) All of the men involved are Negro.
(b) Petty Officers, with the exception of Chief Petty Officers, of the three divisions are Negro. The highest Negro petty officers of the divisions were second class gunnery mates. About 40% of all the Negro petty officers of these divisions persisted in the refusal to work when individually ordered to do so on August 10.
(c) There are no divisions of white enlisted personnel performing similar work at the Naval Ammunition Depot or the Naval Magazine.
The Negro divisions have heretofore turned in a satisfactory record in the loading of ammunition. Their records of tons per man per day equal those of civilian stevedores in this area.

Since the explosion of Fort Chicago, Negro personnel at that station have done necessary work at the Naval Magazine in connection with transfer of ammunition including loading of barges.

This was the first occasion since the explosion at Port Chicago that these men had been called upon to perform work loading ammunition into, or discharging ammunition from, a ship.

Prior to the explosion at Port Chicago, there were insufficient qualified volunteers from the ammunition handling divisions at the Naval Ammunition Depot and at the Naval Magazine to make up outgoing drafts which these activities were at times called upon to supply.

5. After personal investigation and inquiry, the Commandant is of the opinion that:

(a) Unusual and successful effort has been made at these two stations to avoid any semblance of discrimination against negroes.
(b) The refusal to perform the required work arises from a mass fear arising out of the Fort Chicago explosion. This fear is unreasonably associated with the handling of ammunition in ships, rather than in the handling of ammunition as such.
(c) A considerable proportion of the men involved are of a low order of mentality, and as such are particularly susceptible to group influence and to the belief of wild rumors.
(d) The use of negro enlisted personnel at ammunition depots is a logical employment where many of them will be more useful than in other naval assignments.
(e) Pains must be taken to insure that there is no justification for an opinion that any type of hazardous work is assigned exclusively to negro personnel.
(f) It is necessary that there be set up a system of rotation of duty which will insure that negro enlisted personnel at the Naval Ammunition Depot, Mare Island, and the Naval Magazine, Port Chicago, be not retained indefinitely at those stations if they desire other duty for which they are suitable.

6. Authority has been received by telephone from Chief of the Bureau of Personnel for procurement and training of one battalion of white enlisted men for Port Chicago and one for the Naval Ammunition
Confidential

Depot, Mare Island. Authority has also been received to arrange necessary rotation.

7. No action will be taken against the 70 men who at first refused duty but who obeyed when individually ordered to do so. The 208 men who refused duty, but who complied with orders today will be tried by Summary Courts Martial on charges of refusing to obey orders. The 50 men who have now continued to override authority will be brought to trial by General Courts Martial on charges of mutiny.

C. H. Wright

cc: CO, NADMI
    CO, N.Mag, Pt. Chi.
Dear Fidel,

And now for you.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FDR

September 9, 1944
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT.

CL 115 was omitted through a clerical error in a list you previously approved. The cancellation or construction of CL 115 is also recommended for approval as it is now considered not to be needed.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You approved my memorandum of 5 September, proposing cancellation of construction of three light cruisers, CL's 112, 113, and 114.

The proposal of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, upon which said memorandum was based, included CL 115, in addition to those above mentioned. CL 115 was omitted in my memorandum through error.

Your concurrence in my proposal to cancel construction of CL 115 is therefore requested.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

James Forrestal
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I propose to authorize cancellation of construction of CL's 112, 113, 114, provided it meets with your approval.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

James Forrestal
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 31 August 1944 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the revised estimated number in active service on 31 July 1944 is also included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>31 August 1944</th>
<th>31 July 1944</th>
<th>Net Gain For Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Navy</td>
<td>323,190</td>
<td>322,500</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obligated Enlistments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.N. Inductees</td>
<td>133,808</td>
<td>132,800</td>
<td>1,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Active</td>
<td>7,150</td>
<td>7,140</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Reserve</td>
<td>5,469</td>
<td>5,519</td>
<td>-50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Reserve</td>
<td>62,196</td>
<td>59,946</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reserves</td>
<td>2,138,090</td>
<td>2,110,000</td>
<td>28,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,669,903</td>
<td>2,657,905</td>
<td>31,998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. As of 31 August 1944, 1,293,120 men have been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/58)
Date- 3-1-59
Signature- Carl L. Spaer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 31 August 1944 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the revised estimated number in active service on 31 July 1944 is also included:

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</tr>
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</table>

2. As of 31 August 1944, 1,293,120 men have been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President
The White House
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. JAMES FORRESTAL:

In regard to the discontinuance of Camp Lee-Stephenson, Eastport, Maine, what has been done by the Navy Department to find, if possible, some other use for the property?

F.D.R.
As a consequence of the continuing reduction of SeaBee training, present plans point to the discontinuation of the use of Camp Lee-Stephenson, Eastport, (Quoddy Village), Maine in approximately three months. Thereafter it is planned to put the Camp in a caretaker status. Subject to your wishes or any other status you may desire for Quoddy, the action now proposed would result in discontinuance at about the end of the year.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
ADMIRAL BROWN

What about this?

F. D. R.

Confidential Memorandum, 9-22-44, from Lt. Comdr. D. F. Loctt, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. Stonewall, to Vice Chief of Naval Operations giving weekly progress and readiness report; states that the general situation with regard to assembly of the outfit and stores is unsatisfactory, etc.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY:

Is there anything I should do about this?

F.D.R.

October 17, 1944
September 21, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Future of the Combined Boards

There is transmitted herewith a copy of a policy document on the future of the Combined Boards for your information in the event that this question, on which you have previously corresponded with Mr. Churchill, may arise for current discussion. This document has been approved by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy and is intended to serve as an instruction to a United States committee for conversations on the future of the Combined Boards with a British committee.

[Signature: CH]

Enclosure:

Secret document
no. EOFF D-54/44,
 dated September 20,
1944.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY
Committee on War-time Trade Controls

THE FUTURE OF THE COMBINED BOARDS

It has been and is the long term objective of this
Government to work toward an expansion of private
international trade on a multilateral basis without
discrimination or undue restriction. War-time trade
controls and governmental participation in trade have
been introduced for the purpose of effective prosecu-
tion of the war in all its phases. All such controls
and governmental participation cannot be eliminated as
soon as the war ends. Steps should be taken, however,
to set limitations on such controls, consistent with
the solution of major national and international prob-
lems arising during the transition from a war-time to a
peacetime economy. Among other things, this calls for
a reexamination of the scope of operations of the
Combined Boards.

Present Work of the Combined Boards

The three boards in question—the Combined Food
Board, the Combined Raw Materials Board, and the Combined
Production and Resources Board—were set up to secure the
most efficient disposition, in the light of war needs,
of the resources of the non-Axis world. All supplies and
facilities were to be regarded as a pool and related to
total requirements. As a result, almost every Board
recommendation has foreign trade implications. New trade
patterns have been set up. Export and import markets
have been established which often do not coincide with
a preestablished or normal basis. Such dislocations are,
of course, inevitable in war-time.

Recent Examination of the
Future of the Boards

Preliminary discussions concerning the Combined Boards
were brought to a head when on July 30, 1944, Sir Ronald
Campbell addressed a letter to the Under Secretary, request-
ing the opinion of this Government on the future of the
Combined Boards.
Combined Boards. This letter has been acknowledged and copies sent to the U.S. members of the three Boards mentioned above, with the suggestion that the U.S. members meet with their British and, in appropriate cases, Canadian colleagues in order to obtain a preliminary statement of the recommendations of those immediately concerned with the operation of the Boards. Sir Ronald Campbell's inquiry has underlined the urgency of reaching a judgment with respect to the American position. The lack of a clear definition of the future status and of the proper sphere of current operations of the Combined Boards has led to uncertainty on the part of the operating officials.

Preliminary Position of the United States
concerning Membership on the Boards

Abolition of the Boards, so long as war needs exist, cannot be considered. Direct enlargement of membership has been considered, but seems inadvisable at this time because of reasons of security, because the primary responsibility for meeting supply problems must fall upon the United States and the British Empire, and because working relations cannot now be readily established with a large group of countries. It may become advisable, however, to place on certain important committees of the Boards representatives of other countries when their peculiar position as important producers or consumers should be taken into account. This has already been done on occasion, and in the future consideration should be given to the principles and methods by which added representation may be given.

Preliminary Position of United States
concerning Scope of Operations

It is believed that the scope of operations of the Boards should be redefined. But in the most general terms, the Boards should restrict their allocation recommendations to cases of (1) items which are in short supply and which are needed for direct war purposes or for the maintenance of essential civilian economies, related to the war and
However, it is felt that informal consultation and interchange on common industrial and agricultural production problems of a technical nature may be useful in the transition to peace as well as in war. Therefore, the Boards with their statistical and technical staffs and background of experience may continue to act as convenient forums for such informal discussion and interchange.

**Corollaries of the Preliminary United States Position**

This position that the Boards should restrict their activities to questions of short supply and transportation has a number of corollaries. It means:

(a) That the Boards should not recommend allocations of long supply items, except when transportation considerations make them necessary.
(b) that the Boards should not use allocation recommendations of items in short supply to increase exports of long supply items;
(c) that the Boards should not make recommendations for the purpose of controlling foreign prices of items in long supply, or of items in short supply that are not necessary to the war or to essential civilian economies;
(d) that the Combined Boards should not recommend allocations of capital goods for export for long-term reconstruction and industrialisation, except where such goods are both in short supply and an allocation is necessary to meet direct war needs or to maintain essential civilian economies in the transitional period;
(e) the several member governments would be generally expected to advise the appropriate personnel of the other member governments in advance of affecting substantial outbacks in procurement or development procedures in third countries.

**Transitional Surpluses**

If the scope of the Boards' operations is to be gradually contracted, the question arises as to what steps need to be taken to handle transitional problems, particularly those of surplus commodities. It is recognized that the Combined Boards have statistical and technical facilities concerning
concerning many commodities and products, and these should be maintained in operation. It is recognized also that the problems of transitional surpluses can be advantageously studied by the technical staffs of the Combined Boards.

Although the Boards are inadequately constituted to deal with surplus situations, the problem of surpluses will come before the technical staffs dealing with commodities. The exchange of information between the technical staffs should be continued as long as the Boards continue in existence or until some international mechanism is established to deal with post-war commodity problems. The United States officers of the Combined Boards, with the assistance of other interested agencies, should draw up and submit a statement of findings to the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy for the Committee's consideration and recommendation of action where surpluses are found. Until the United States position is established United States members of the Boards and the technical staffs should not undertake to formulate solutions of surplus problems with the representatives of other nations.
This is the matter the President wishes to discuss with Jonathan Daniels at 11 o'clock.
Mr. Letta says Admiral Brown has original of memo of July 28
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Jonathan Daniels

Apropos of the memorandum I sent you on Friday with regard to the Waves, Dave Miles tells me that when you visit Hunter College this Saturday you are reviewing a number of Waves. This will give special point to the Negroes' protest against the Navy rule prohibiting the enlistment of Negroes in the Waves.

Miles and the others in New York concerned with the Negro vote hope that it will be possible for you to act with regard to the Forrestal memorandum before you go to New York.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
FROM: Jonathan Daniels

The War Department has decided to modify their policy on redistribution centers in connection with Negro servicemen. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy tells me that in a discussion Wednesday, the Secretary of War expressed the feeling that the ground forces and the air forces should abandon this whole program, using camps for reclassification and providing new centers only for those veterans suffering from some types of minor war neuroses.

It is important, I am sure, to announce this change of policy, if it is announced, in such a way as to make it clear that the Army is not throwing the whole project overboard because it had to make a change with regard to Negroes. The Secretary of War is sending a memorandum to you on this subject, and I hope to have the opportunity to discuss it with you before you reply.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

If and when Negro women are admitted to the Women's Reserve, it is proposed to adopt the following procedure:-

First: Nominations of Negro women officers will be requested from a selected list of Negro and White men and women. To start the program not more than ten women will be appointed as officer candidates and will be sent for training to the Naval Reserve Midshipmen School (WR) at Northampton. They will assist in the subsequent planning and supervision of the program for Negro women which will be administered as an integral part of the Women's Reserve.

Second: For Negro enlisted women, recruit training will be conducted at the Recruit Training School (WR) in the Bronx. It is planned to form a company of 240 Negro recruits to be housed together at the school but to share all facilities of the station with the other recruits. How many such companies will be trained will be determined by the needs of the service and the number of qualified applicants who are available.

Third: Specialized training will be conducted in existing facilities. An effort will be made to approximate for Negro women the ratio of rated to unrated women which applied to White recruits admitted at the same time.

Fourth: Negro women will be detailed wherever needed within the continental limits of the United States, preferably to stations where there are already Negro men.

Fifth: When government quarters are provided, they will not ordinarily be shared with White women but will be similar to those occupied by White women. Local conditions will determine whether or not the mess is shared by both races. On some stations Negro men and women will eat in their own mess halls. On other stations, they will share the mess with White personnel. In every case equal, if not identical, facilities will be provided for Negro and White personnel.

I propose to proceed with the above plan in the near future. I consider it advisable to start obtaining Negro Waves before we are forced to take them.

Your views would be appreciated.

/s/ James Forrestal
Have you the money of 1st 26th.  If so put this with it.  -MC.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Camp Lee-Stephenson (Quoddy Village) Eastport, Maine -- Use of for Recuperative Personnel.

1. This is in response to your inquiry of September 28, 1944 in regard to what had been done by the Navy Department to find a possible other use for Camp Lee-Stephenson, Eastport, Maine.

2. The Department has studied the question of other use for the camp and has determined that wider and continued usage as an activity for all recuperative Naval Personnel, particularly those suffering from Malaria or Filariasis, would be desirable. Plans are going forward for use as such.

James Forrestal

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 3-18-59
Signature: Carl L. Spencer
The attached was brought in by Secy. Forrestal. They are notes found in Secy. Knox's desk re Pearl Harbor.

23 Oct 1944
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 23, 1944.

The date of enclosed penciled memorandum by F. D. R. (with a few inserted words in Knox's handwriting) was found in the latter's desk after his death.

It is evident that it was written by me sometime after December 11, 1941 -- possibly several months -- because of the references to the ARIZONA, CASSIN, SHAW, DOWNES and OKLAHOMA. In other words, it must have been after a fairly comprehensive survey.

F. D. R.

***************

[Signature]
1. The general facts of attack on Hawaii are now at hand.

2. Essential fact is that Japanese plan to knock U.S. out of the war before it began. Made apparent by observation practiced by the preparations going on for many weeks before the attacks, which were made simultaneously throughout the Pacific.


4. The U.S. services were not
which many been
damage varies from ships already
refaired and ready for use or which
have just been
to be few
ships which will take from a week
to several months to repair. In
these are category is the older
battlehips which have
harpoons but can be sighted and
repaired.

[Insert statement regarding]
8. Japanese material losses and
human and 2,500 casualties and
41 aircraft, ...
9. Enemy losses were severe in
aircraft and some hangars but
replacements have arrived or are
on the way.

16. The figures of killed, wounded, and missing will run to about 4,000. The figures of killed and missing in the Navy personnel is especially heavy, about 2,700 out of the total.
1. General facts of attack on Hawaii are now at hand.

2. Essential fact is that Jap purpose was to knock U.S. out of the war before it began. Made apparent by deception practiced, by the preparations going on for many weeks before the attacks, which were made simultaneously throughout the Pacific.


4. The U.S. services were not on the alert against the surprise air attack on Hawaii. This calls for an formal investigation which will be instituted (sic) immediately by the President. Further action is of course dependent on the facts & recommendations made by the investigating board. We are all entitled to know if (a) there was any error of judgment which contributed to the surprise (b) if there was any dereliction of duty prior to the attack.

5. It is clear that after the attack the defense was heroic and was conducted skillfully and bravely.

6. The Navy lost:
   (a) The Battleship Arizona, destroyed by magazine & boiler explosions.
   (b) The old target ship Utah, which has not been used as a combatant ship for many years.
   (c) Three destroyers, Cassin, Shaw & Downes.
   (d) Minelayer Ogden, (very old)

7. The Navy sustained damage to other vessels. This damage varies from ships which have been already repaired and ready for sea or which have gone to sea to a few ships which will take from a week to several months to repair. In the last category is the older battleship Oklahoma which has capsized but can be righted and repaired. Insert statement of remainder of fleet is ready for any action [Last sentence not in FDR's handwriting.]

8. Japanese material losses are known to be 3 submarines and 41 aircraft, not including.

9. Army losses were severe in aircraft and some hangars but replacements have arrived or are on the way.

10. The figures of killed wounded and missing will run to about 4,000, the figure of killed and missing in the Navy personnel is especially heavy, about 2,700 out of the total.

[Not FDR's handwriting]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This telegram came in from Harry Hopkins. He is also sending a suggested hundred words which you might read tonight without a formal release. He also suggests you might consider releasing this entire telegram at the time you make your speech.

S.I.R.
REPORT FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM ADMIRAL KING ON NAVAL
BATTLE OFF THE PHILIPPINES.

NAVAL BATTLE OFF THE PHILIPPINES.

1. THE NAVAL BACKGROUND FOR THE SEA ACTION THAT HAS
RECENTLY BEEN FOUGHT OFF THE PHILIPPINES IN WHICH WE HAVE ADMINIS-
TERED A VERY SEVERE DEFEAT TO THE JAPANESE, STARTED DEFINITELY ON
THE 10TH OF OCTOBER. ON THAT DAY CARRIER AIRCRAFT OF OUR THIRD
FLEET STRUCK THE JAPANESE BASE OF OKINAWA IN THE RYUKU ISLANDS.
OUR SAME FORCES MADE SUSTAINED ATTACKS UPON FORMOSA ON THE 12TH AND
13TH, AND ON THE NORTHERN AND CENTRAL AREAS OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
THE 11TH TO THE 21ST.

2. THIS MASSIVE SERIES OF AIR ATTACKS BY THE THIRD
FLEET COVERING AN AREA OF 1000 MILES FROM NORTH TO SOUTH AND 600
MILES FROM EAST TO WEST, SERVED AS COVER TO THE MARSHALLING AND
APPROACH OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA TO
LEYTE OUR TROOPS BEING EMBARKED IN AND ESCORTED BY THE SEVENTH
FLEET. THE ATTACKS OF THE THIRD FLEET, ASSISTED BY UNITS OF THE
ARMY AIR FORCES, WERE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND RESULTED IN THE DE-
STRUCTION OF ABOUT 1230 ENEMY PLANES IN THE AIR OR ON THE GROUND,
IN THE SINKING OF 187 SHIPS AND SMALL CRAFT AND THE PROBABLE SINK-
ING OR DAMAGING OF 227 MORE AS WELL AS TREMENDOUS DAMAGE TO
JAPANESE GROUND INSTALLATIONS.
PAGE 2. WHITE HOUSE FROM HOPKINS TO JUDGE ROSENMAN

THE ENEMY REACTED HEAVILY AND MADE MANY AIR ATTACKS. IN SPITE OF HIS CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY HE DID LITTLE DAMAGE TO OUR FORCES, OUR LOSSES WERE LESS THAN 100 PLANES PLUS TWO CRUISERS DAMAGED BY AIRCRAFT TORPEDOS. NEITHER OF THESE VESSELS HAS SUNK.

3. ON THE 18TH THE SEVENTH FLEET ARRIVED OFF THE ENTRANCE TO LEYTE GULF AND DISEMBARKED ARMY TROOPS WHICH SEIZED TWO SMALL ISLANDS. THE MAIN LANDINGS ON LEYTE ITSELF BEGAN ON THE 20TH. MEANWHILE THE SEVENTH FLEET WAS PURSUING ITS CONTINUING TASK OF GIVING GUN-FIRE AND AIR SUPPORT TO THE ARMY, SWEETING MINES, AND DISEMBARKING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES.

4. AT ABOUT THIS TIME GROUPS OF JAPANESE WARSHIPS WERE SIGHTED CONVERGING ON THE PHILIPPINES FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE ASIATIC MAINLAND AS WELL AS FROM THE EMPIRE. AIR AND SUBMARINE FORCES MADE ATTACKS WHICH DAMAGED OR SANK A FEW OF THESE VESSELS.

5. ON THE 23RD THE SITUATION BEGAN TO CRYSTALLIZE WHEN A POWERFUL FORCE INCLUDING BATTLESHIPS, CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS WAS LOCATED IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA JUST WEST OF THE ISLAND OF PALAWAN. ANOTHER GROUP WAS LOCATED WEST OF LUZON. THESE FORCES WERE ATTACKED, A CRUISER WAS SUNK, AND TWO OTHERS AND A DESTROYER WERE DAMAGED AND FORCED INTO PORT.
6. 

EARLY IN THE MORNING OF THE 24TH WE HAD LOCATED TWO GROUPS OF HEAVY SHIPS FORCING THEIR WAY THROUGH THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO. THE SOUTHERN GROUP, IN AT LEAST TWO SEPARATE UNITS AND VARIOUSLY REPORTED AS COMPRISING 2 TO 4 BATTLESHIPS, 4 TO 8 CRUISERS AND 10 DESTROYERS, WAS IN THE SULU SEA WEST OF MINDANAO EVIDENTLY ADVANCING TOWARD SURIGAO STRAIT. THIS STRAIT LIES SOUTH OF LEYTE AND SEPARATES IT FROM MINDANAO. THE SECOND GROUP, COMPRISING ABOUT FOUR BATTLESHIPS, 8 CRUISERS AND A DOZEN DESTROYER, WAS IN THE SIBUYAN SEA JUST EAST OF MINDOLO, EVIDENTLY BOUND FOR SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT WHICH LIES BETWEEN LUZON AND SAMAR. THESE TWO STRAITS, SURIGAO AND SAN BERNARDINO, ARE THE ONLY PASSAGES BY WHICH IT IS PRACTICABLE FOR FLEETS TO TRAVERSE THE PHILIPPINES AND REACH LEYTE FROM THE WESTWARD. IT WAS NOTABLE THAT THERE WERE NO CARRIERS WITH EITHER OF THESE FORCES.

7. 

IN THE MID-AFTERNOON OF THE 24TH, CARRIER PLANES OF THE THIRD FLEET LOCATED THE ENEMY'S CARRIER FORCE, COMPRISING 4 OR 5 CARRIERS, 2 TO 4 BATTLESHIPS AND SEVERAL CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS ABOUT 250 MILES NE OF LUZON. THE 3 MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE JAPA ATTACK WERE NOW LOCATED.

8. 

THROUGHOUT THE AFTERNOON OF THE 24TH BOTH THE SURIGAO AND SAN BERNARDINO GROUPS WERE ATTACKED BY PLANES OF THE THIRD AND SEVENTH FLEETS. MUCH DAMAGE WAS DONE TO THE SAN BERNARDINO FORCE AND IT WAS FORCED TO TURN WESTWARD, THOUGH THIS LATER PROVED TO BE ONLY TEMPORARY.
9. THE SURIGAO FORCE CONTINUED TO ADVANCE INTO THE STRAIT. ABOUT MIDNIGHT IT WAS MET BY THE SURFACE FORCES OF THE SEVENTH FLEET RANGING FROM PT BOATS TO BATTLESHIPS, AND THE ENEMY SUMMARILY DISPOSED OF. THE NEXT MORNING EIGHT OF THE ENEMY SHIPS, TYPES AS YET NOT DEFINITELY ESTABLISHED, WERE SEEN TO SINK. IT IS PROBABLE THAT AT LEAST ONE BATTLESHIP WAS ALSO SUNK IN THE NIGHT ACTION. THIS FORCE HAS EVIDENTLY CEASED TO EXIST AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR.

PAGE 5. WHITEHOUSE FROM HOPKINS TO JUDGE ROSENMAN

IN ADDITION A LARGE CARRIER AND TWO BATTLESHIPS WERE PROBABLY SUNK.

BY THE MORNING OF THE 26TH THE SCATTERED REMNANTS OF THIS FORCE HAD
FLED NORTH TO THE LATITUDE OF FORMOSA.

11. A THIRD BATTLE DEVELOPED ON THE 25TH. THE ENEMY FORCE
WHICH HAD APPARENTLY BEEN TURNED BACK FROM THE WESTERN ENTRANCE OF

12

12 - THIS ENEMY ATTACK ON LEYTE GULF CAUSED DAMAGE TO SEVERAL OF OUR ESCORT CARRIERS, TWO OF WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED SUNK. THERE WAS ALSO LOSS AND DAMAGE AMONG OUR DESTROYERS AND DESTROYER ESCORT VESSELS.
BY THE MORNING OF THE 26TH, THE SITUATION WAS GENERALLY AS FOLLOW S; THE ENEMY NORTHERN, OR CARRIER, GROUP WAS DEFEATED WITH HEAVY LOSS AND HAD FLED OUT OF RANGE TO THE NORTHWARD.

THE CENTER, OR SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT GROUP, HAD RETIRED WESTWARD TO THE VICINITY OF MINDORO ISLAND. ITS REMAINING FOUR BATTLESHIPS, SIX CRUISERS, AND TEN DESTROYERS WERE HEAVILY DAMAGED AND WERE STILL UNDER ATTACK BY PLANES OF THE THIRD FLEET. THE SOUTHERN, OR SURIGAO STRAIT, GROUP WAS DISINTERGRATED COMPLETELY AND ONLY A FEW UNITS, WHICH WERE APPARENTLY TRYING TO HIDE IN THE PASSAGES OF THE NUMEROUS ISLANDS, REMAINED IN EXISTENCE.

14

THE LOSSES INFLECTED ON THE ENEMY IN THIS SERIES OF OPERATIONS ARE DEEMED TO BE AS FOLLOW ;

IN THE PREPARATORY RYUKU, FORMOSA, PHILIPPINE STRIKES -

1230 PLANES DESTROYED

414 WAR AND MERCHANDISE SHIPS SUNK OR DAMAGED.

IN THE SEA BATTLES OF THE PHILIPPINE,

3 TO 4 BATTLESHIPS SUNK OR PROBABLY SUNK, 6 TO 8 DAMAGED.

2 CARRIERS SUNK, 1 PROBABLY SUNK
4 CRUISERS SUNK, 5 PROBABLY SUNK, NUMEROUS DAMAGED.
10 DESTROYERS PROBABLY SUNK.
AT LEAST 200 PLANES SHOT DOWN.
BAS On ALL AVAILABLE REPORTS, OUR LOSSES IN THIS SERIES OF ACTIONS WERE THE PRINCETON, TWO ESCORT CARRIERS, TWO DESTROYERS AND ONE DESTROYER ESCORT SUNK.

THE THIRD FLEET IS COMMANDED BY ADMIRAL W F HALSEY. THE SEVENTH FLEET, WHICH OPERATES UNDER THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTION OF GENERAL MAC ARTHUR, IS COMMANDED BY VICE ADMIRAL T C KINKAID. THE SEVENTH FLEET INCLUDES SHIPS OF THE AUSTRALIAN NAVY.

END

1245P
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

11 NOV 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 31 October 1944 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the revised estimated number in active service on 30 September 1944 is also included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 October 1944</th>
<th>30 September 1944</th>
<th>Net Gain for Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Navy</td>
<td>323,600</td>
<td>323,800</td>
<td>- 200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obligated Enlistments)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.N. Inductees</td>
<td>137,300</td>
<td>136,000</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Active</td>
<td>7,160</td>
<td>7,160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Reserves</td>
<td>5,393</td>
<td>5,395</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Reserve</td>
<td>66,762</td>
<td>64,273</td>
<td>2,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reserve</td>
<td>2,223,300</td>
<td>2,192,000</td>
<td>31,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,763,515</td>
<td>2,728,628</td>
<td>34,887</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. As of 31 October 1944, 1,337,078 men had been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very respectfully,

James Forrestal

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-18-59
Signature- Carl L. Speer
The President
The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Captain Edward Macauley, USN, Retired, is a Commissioner of the United States Maritime Commission and a Deputy Administrator of the War Shipping Administration. He has recently been confirmed by the Senate as a Commissioner for a new six-year term.

In connection with his recent appointment, we discussed the excellent work he had done, and is doing, in connection with the training and manning activities of the Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administration. His splendid work on the personnel side has successfully paralleled ship production which together have played such a vital part in the war effort.

In view of the above, it is recommended that you promote Captain Macauley to the rank of Rear Admiral on the Retired list of the United States Navy.

(/s/) JERRY LAND

E. S. Land,
Chairman.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DEC 15 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Under the provisions of Public Law 204, approved December 17, 1943, you have previously been directed to acquire and construct not to exceed a total of 2,200,000 tons of auxiliary vessels.

You are hereby directed to acquire or construct the remaining 300,000 tons of auxiliary vessels as authorized under the provisions of Public Law 204, approved December 17, 1943, in a manner determined necessary by you for the prosecution of the war.

It is my desire that, to the greatest extent practicable, acquisitions be made through the War Shipping Administration and construction be carried on by the Maritime Commission without transfers of funds or title.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable

The Secretary of the Navy
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This requests that you authorize the release of 300,000 tons for auxiliary vessels for the Navy. All reports of growing logistic demands in the Pacific appear to justify this provision. Approval recommended.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

WALTON BROWN

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Dated 3/2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In compliance with Mr. Letta's memorandum of the 9th for recommendation on the Secretary of the Navy's letter of December 5, 1944, which is returned herewith, I have prepared the attached reply which is recommended for your signature, if you approve.

HDS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
December 8, 1944

Respectfully referred to the Director of the Budget for recommendation to the President.

M. C. Latta
Executive Clerk

Memo for the President, 12/5/44, from the Secretary of the Navy; requesting the release of remaining 300,000 tons of auxiliary vessels for general use.
Respectfully referred to the
Directors of the Budget
for recommendation to the
President.

[Signature]

Keep the Haskell
Minutes here
December 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

The President requests that this memorandum be referred to the Bureau of the Budget for recommendation.

Regards.

Bill

W. D. H.

Memo of 12/5/44 to the President from the Secretary of the Navy, requesting that the President authorize the release of 300,000 tons for auxiliary vessels for the Navy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR:
ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN:

The President requests that this memorandum be referred to the Bureau of the
Budget for recommendation.

Regards,
[Signature]
W. D. H.
Memorandum for the President

My dear Mr. President:

Public Law 204, approved 17 December 1943, authorized the conversion or acquisition of 2,500,000 tons of auxiliary vessels "or such portion thereof as may be directed by the President".

To date you have directed the acquisition or conversion of 2,200,000 tons against this authority. I request that you release the remaining 300,000 tons to me for general use, in order that I may have it available for future requirements as they develop.

Your previous directives are summarized as follows:

(a) Your memorandum dated 28 December 1943 as amended by your letter dated 21 July 1944 released not to exceed 1,640,303 tons covering 309 specific ships.

(b) Your letter dated 21 July 1944 further directed the acquisition or construction of not to exceed 359,697 tons of auxiliary vessels as determined necessary for the prosecution of the war. Eighty (80) vessels with a total displacement of 319,139 tons have been obligated against this 359,697 tons leaving an unobligated balance at present of 40,558 tons.

(c) Your letter dated 10 February 1944 released for general use 200,000 tons under Public Law 204, all of which has been committed except a small balance for tonnage adjustments.

Present program requirements, necessitating future obligation, are nine (9) A0 (oilers) totalling 53,305 tons. It is believed the release of the remaining 300,000 tons under Public Law 204 will provide for any deficiencies in auxiliaries that may develop during the calendar year 1945.

Sincerely yours,

James Forrestal

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59
Signature- Carl S. Speer
December 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

I think it would be a good thing to carry out Jerry Land's recommendation to give Captain Edward MacClellan, U.S.N., Retired, a promotion to the rank of Rear Admiral on the Retired List as another recognition of the fine service the Maritime Commission has rendered the armed forces.

Will you please look out for it?

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 7 1972

Attachment:
Personal & Confidential
Memorandum from Admiral Land to
the President, dated 12-14-44.

Copy to:
Vice Admiral E. S. Land,
Chairman, Maritime Commission.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

This is the same recommendation that the President referred to Admiral Brown a few days ago. He thinks the best way to get action would be by a memorandum from the President.

W. M. Rigdon.
Memorandum for Miss Tully, 12/14/44, from Vice Admiral F. S. Land, enclosing a personal & confidential memorandum for the President recommending that Capt. Edward Macaulay, USN, Retired, be promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Captain Edward Macaulay, USN, Retired, is a Commissioner of the United States Maritime Commission and a Deputy Administrator of the War Shipping Administration. He has recently been confirmed by the Senate as a Commissioner for a new six-year term.

In connection with his recent appointment, we discussed the excellent work he had done, and is doing, in connection with the training and manning activities of the Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administration. His splendid work on the personnel side has successfully paralleled ship production which together have played such a vital part in the war effort.

In view of the above, it is recommended that you promote Captain Macaulay to the rank of Rear Admiral on the Retired list of the United States Navy.

(Signed) JERRY LAND

E. S. Land
Chairman
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 20, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

FOR RECOMMENDATION

F. D. R.

Confidential memo, 12-18-44 to the Pres. from Adm. Brown, re urgency of enclosed recommendation for a replacement program of 8 aircraft carriers, escort (CVE) - Sec. of Navy now requests this as second replacement, also confidential memo, 12-14 from Sec. Forrestal (copy attached).
Memorandum for the President

My dear Mr. President:

The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations on 31 October 1943 established a replacement program of eight (8) Aircraft Carriers, Escort (CVE) to follow the CVE 105 class program.

You approved my Memorandum serial 0711323-05 dated 17 December 1943 for the construction of the first eight (8) replacement CVE's.

Your approval now is requested of the construction of the second replacement group of eight (8) CVE's of the 105 class which the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations considers should be initiated without delay.

Yours sincerely,

James Forrestal

[Signature]

James Forrestal

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- [Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

I have informed the President of your memorandum in reference to the proposed promotion of Captain Edward Macauley, U.S.N., Retired. The President thanks you for clarifying Macauley's status but requests that you do proceed with necessary steps to promote him to the rank of Rear Admiral, either by act of Congress or by recalling him to active duty, as you see fit.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Note: Lt Rigdon brought this over.
Memorandum for

The President.

Referring to your personal and confidential memorandum to me of December 20, 1944, concerning Jerry Land's recommendation for the promotion of Captain Edward Macauley, USN, Retired, to the rank of Rear Admiral on the Retired List:

Due to the fact that existing statutes do not permit the promotion of a naval officer on inactive duty, it will require special legislation to authorize Macauley's promotion on the retired list.

Do you wish to proceed with this matter?
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

9 JAN 1945

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 31 December 1944 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the revised estimated number in active service on 30 November 1944 is also included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>31 December 1944</th>
<th>30 November 1944</th>
<th>Net Gain for Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Navy</td>
<td>322,400</td>
<td>325,000</td>
<td>-600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.N. Inductees</td>
<td>139,000</td>
<td>138,150</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Active</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>-200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Reserve</td>
<td>5,004</td>
<td>5,206</td>
<td>-202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Reserve</td>
<td>75,000</td>
<td>70,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reserve</td>
<td>2,288,000</td>
<td>2,264,500</td>
<td>23,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,633,904</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,808,056</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,848</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. As of 31 December 1944, 1,375,171 men had been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President
The White House
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Combatant Vessel Construction Program.

Reference: (a) Secretary's Memorandum (SECRET) to the President, Serial 0035005, dated 8 Jan 1945.

1. I informed the President this morning of your recommendation to proceed with the construction of approximately 750,000 tons of combatant vessel construction already authorized. The President did not have time to study your recommendation but said that you could inform the Budget that he favored the construction and authorizes you to take it up with the Budget.

2. This memorandum is to confirm a message I have already given to Captain Roper by telephone.

Very respectfully,

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Note: St. Regis brought this over.

REGRARED UNCLASSIFIED
Memorandum for the President

My dear Mr. President:

The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations on 6 January 1945 recommended and I approve of the construction of the following combatant vessel program totaling 644,000 tons to supplement the existing program:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Total Tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVB</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>165,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;CL(5&quot;)&quot;</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS (about)</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 644,000

* The above includes eight (8) CVE for which approval was requested in my Memorandum to you, serial 033705 dated 14 December 1944.

There is now available a balance of approximately 750,000 tons of legislative authorization for combatant vessel construction which represents small adjustments in the tonnage of ships already built or building, tonnage made available through cancellations, and tonnage made available as the result of losses which are replaceable under existing law.

Advantage will be taken of the experience gained in the war to improve the designs of the various types to the maximum extent. No radical changes in design are indicated at this time.

Your approval of the above action is requested.

Yours sincerely,

James Forrestal
8 January 1945

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed letter deals with the subject which I spoke to you about after Cabinet Friday—namely, getting appropriations to initiate additional construction under our present legislative tonnage balance of 750,000 tons.

The 16 ships involved of above 7,000 tons, i.e., carriers, heavy cruisers and light cruisers, could be completed it is estimated before the expiration of the calendar year 1947. They would follow on ways made available as our present program runs out. Obviously, the work could be stopped if a turn in the events of the war warranted such action.

It occurs to me that you may want to send a message to Congress on this subject. If so, I can get the material up for you. What I have in mind is that an explanatory note may be desirable to tell why it is we want this additional tonnage in the light of the announced damage inflicted on the Japanese Fleet.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President,

The White House.

JF 1800
CONFIDENTIAL

January 15, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Because the President's schedule has become so crowded with most urgent war problems, it is becoming more and more difficult to make time available for the personal presentation of Medals of Honor by the President. The War Department has decided that they will not request him to deliver any more until further notice. It would be helpful if the Navy Department could arrange to have presentations made by the Secretary or his representative.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

Copy to:
Commandant of the Marine Corps.
The Chief of Naval Personnel.
Senior Member, Navy Dept. Board of Decorations and Medals.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

Note: Lt Rigdon brought this over.
January 29, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Construction of the Second Replacement Group of Eight (8) CVE's of the 105 Class.

Reference: (a) SecNav's Memorandum to the President dated 14 December 1944 (copy attached).

1. The President has approved the request contained in reference (a) for the construction of the second replacement group of eight (8) Aircraft Carriers, Escort (CVE), of the 105 Class.

WILSON BROWN,
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S. MAR 1 1972

By W. J. Stewart Date
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

14 Dec 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations on 31 October 1943 established a replacement program of eight (8) Aircraft Carriers, Escort (CVE) to follow the CVE 105 class program.

You approved my Memorandum serial 0711323-05 dated 17 December 1943 for the construction of the first eight (8) replacement CVE's.

Your approval now is requested of the construction of the second replacement group of eight (8) CVE's of the 105 class which the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations considers should be initiated without delay.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ JAMES FORRESTAL.

"J.F.
"OK
F.D.R."

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-20-59
Signature- (redacted)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Construction of eight aircraft carriers, escort, for replacement purposes.

The attached memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy requests your approval of a second group of eight aircraft carriers, escort (CVE), for replacement purposes.

Construction of the first group of eight carriers for replacement purposes was recommended to you by the Secretary of the Navy on December 17, 1943, in order to maintain orderly construction at the plant of the Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding Company and to permit completions to follow without interruptions. The Chief of Naval Operations directed that construction of these vessels be carried on at the rate of about eight ships per year. The last of this group is now scheduled for delivery early in the calendar year 1946.

If construction of an additional group of eight carriers is approved now, deliveries will probably be made during the period from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947. These vessels will be of the CIMARRON class, and the eight proposed for construction will cost about $65,000,000.

It is difficult to appraise the need for these vessels for replacement purposes due to the lack of any sound basis for estimating probable future losses, and it may be that the construction of this second group of eight, in addition to the eight already under construction, will result in an increase in the number of this type to be in commission. However, they are vulnerable to attack not only by surface vessels, but also by aircraft, and losses could exceed present estimates.

The foregoing is a resume of the information available in this office with respect to this program. Whether the construction of the additional carriers now recommended should be approved or not is primarily a military question concerning which I would prefer not to make any recommendation. I do feel that the matter should be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review, as there is no indication in the correspondence that this has been done.

(Signed) Harold D. Smith

Director

Attachment

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

Subject: Proposed Combatant Vessel Construction Program.

I have noted, with interest, your comment in your memorandum of 17 January on this subject. A simple measure of relative strength with the enemy ship for ship, even though it shows a substantial numerical superiority in our favor, is not a sound criterion by which to challenge the proposed program of the Navy Department for the additional 644,000 tons of combatant vessels. The Navy is now engaged in carrying the war to the enemy over a very long supply route with ships operating far from repair bases, in areas where the navigational and meteorological hazards are at the maximum, and a sizable percentage — perhaps between one-quarter and one-third — will be normally under overhaul in the ordinary course of operations. It is also an accepted military axiom that a successful offensive should comprise two or even three times the strength of defending forces.

This war differs from any other in that amphibious operations are indispensable to it and the landing of ground forces is only made possible by the bombardment preparation and continual support of great numbers of combatant ships. Furthermore in such operations ships are subject to loss and damage not only from enemy ships but likewise from land-based aircraft, and our recent experiences have demonstrated that we can expect a greater percentage of this type of fleet casualty as well as losses from mine fields and enemy submarines, as we approach the heart of the enemy stronghold. Indeed the entire Japanese surface fleet could be eliminated without appreciably diminishing this hazard. The proposed building program, therefore, cannot be viewed solely as a mathematical measure of our fleet versus the Japanese fleet, but as an insurance against losses which we may expect to incur as we come to closer quarters with Japan itself. It is proper then to view this as insurance from the point of view of its cost. Assuming that the program were undertaken at once and that it might be possible to cancel it at the end of six months, the demands on the Treasury would be approximately $32,000,000; at the end of 12 months, approximately $160,000,000; at the end of 18 months, approximately $320,000,000; at the end of two years, approximately $920,000,000; and at the end of 2½ years, approximately $1,300,000,000. These figures, of course, will be somewhat increased by an indeterminate amount incident to the termination and cancellation of the contracts, which the Navy estimates will be approximately equivalent to the outlay for the program in the quarter next succeeding cancellation.

Since these programs would go into yards already engaged in the production of combatant vessels, they would not involve any appreciable, additional demands upon manpower, but rather depend upon the continued employment of men already on the payrolls.

I am inclined to support the proposal of the Secretary of the Navy.

[Signature]

[Stamp: Navy Dept. order 2-41]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposed combatant vessel construction program

Pursuant to your instructions transmitted through Vice Admiral Brown, the Secretary of the Navy has submitted a proposal for the construction of approximately 644,000 tons of additional combatant vessels. The types and numbers proposed for construction compared with the number of each type on hand and under construction on December 1, 1944, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>On hand Dec. 1, 1944</th>
<th>Under construction Dec. 1, 1944</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Proposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVB Aircraft carrier, large</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CV Aircraft carrier</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE Aircraft carrier, escort (various types)</td>
<td>64*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA Heavy cruiser</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Light cruiser</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD Destroyers</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Submarines</td>
<td>234*</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excludes vessels leased or to be leased.

The estimated cost for constructing this program is $1,800,482,000, made up of $1,368,482,000 for construction of hulls and machinery, and $432,000,000 for armor, armament, and ammunition.

There are some indications that this program for additional construction has been inspired by the Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee. While Mr. Vinson may be entirely correct in his estimate of the situation, I should like, without undertaking to pose as a naval expert, to suggest the following points for your consideration.

Because of the critical situation at present with respect to manpower and materials, any proposal of the size contemplated by the Secretary of the Navy should be considered with the view of determining whether the proposed use of manpower and materials will contribute more to the war effort than if they were used to meet existing...
shortages in other items of military needs. The Secretaries of War and Navy state that additional manpower must be provided to meet our war needs and that there are critical shortages in a number of items. The Chairman of the War Production Board in the last few days has emphasized the enormous load to be placed on our facilities for military production. This is no time to undertake or continue the production of additional equipment unless it can be shown that it is essential to winning the war.

We now possess what is said to be the largest navy in the world. We have naval superiority over the Japanese without considering the contribution of the British fleet. The enemy can only be defeated through the destruction of his fleet—not by adding vessels to our fleet. No matter how many vessels we build, we cannot completely eliminate the element of risk to be taken when we finally meet the Japanese main fleet in decisive battle. Therefore, whenever we reach the point where our fleet is deemed capable of the ultimate destruction of the Japanese navy, further naval construction should be postponed until after the war when full advantage can be taken of all the lessons learned and yet to be learned during the war.

If we now have built and building a fleet of a sufficient size to accomplish the defeat of the enemy, replacements of our losses are unnecessary so long as our losses do not exceed those of the Japanese navy. To clarify this point, if we assume that we have at present 90 vessels to 60 for the Japanese, we would have a superiority of 1 ½ to 1; but, after both sides lose 30 vessels, our superiority would be 2 to 1. Furthermore, unless the present war is to last into the calendar year 1948, some of the vessels proposed for construction will not be in action during the present conflict.

I understand from Vice Admiral Brown that you are in favor of proceeding with the construction proposed by the Secretary of the Navy. This conclusion is undoubtedly based on your knowledge of the military situation, and under such circumstances, there can be no sound objection to the program. You may wish to review the matter, however, in the light of the foregoing considerations, and unless the war situation is such that in your judgment the proposed construction is an essential step towards ultimate victory, I recommend that it be disapproved.

I sometimes ask myself—what kind of insurance does the Navy want? Must it have several times the fleet of the enemy to establish self-confidence. I cannot believe it. It may well stop to call a halt.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is the old Navy request for 644,000 tons of additional combat vessels which you have previously indicated your approval and against which the Director of the Budget entered a mild demurrer. The Secretary of the Navy and Admiral King now request you to sign the attached endorsement continuing your support of favorable action.

My own opinion is that at every stage in the war our building program has looked enormous and possibly too large when it was first planned, and that it has never yet proved to be too much. It seems to me like preparation for war — it is much better to have too much than too little to do the job.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Admiral King has prepared the attached reply, for your signature, to the Director of the Budget.

James Forrestal
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 19, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Secret Memorandum for the President, 1-17-45, from Hon. Harold D. Smith, Director of the Budget, re proposed combatant vessel construction program. (644,000 tons)
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

February 26, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Jonathan Daniels.

For preparation of reply.

F. D. R.

Ltr. from SecNAV, 11-18-44, forwarding Undersecretary Bard's letter of resignation (11-16-44).
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I agree with most people who have personally studied the situation that Bushrod Island is the proper place for this base.

I think the contract should be gone over very carefully for the elimination of any unnecessary items. Why, for example, should we build a bridge from Monrovia to this Island? There will be practically no traffic over it and I do not see why a ferry will not do.

F. D. R.

Original of this memorandum and carbon of attached letter of March 2, 1945 from the Under Secretary of the Navy, sent to Under Secretary Bard March 7, 1945.

M. C. L.
CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

It is considered desirable to advise you at this time concerning the status of the project for construction of a port at Liberia, in which you have evinced such a keen interest.

The Raymond Concrete Pile Company of New York, who have been selected as contractors on the work, has been issued a Letter of Intent to award a contract which will cover the preliminary surveys, preparation of plans, and construction of the Port.

The preliminary surveys, which have now been completed, covered proposed sites at the following locations:

(1) Memba Point, which is immediately contiguous to the city of Monrovia;

(2) Bushrod Island, which is across the river from Monrovia, distant approximately 2 miles;

(3) Mouth of the St. Pauls River, which is about 5 miles north of Monrovia;

(4) Bassa Point, which is approximately 40 miles south of Monrovia and near the town of Marshall;

(5) Hooper's Patch, in the vicinity of Marshall.

Marshall is the port for operations carried on by the Firestone Plantations Company.

In August and September 1944, the Directors of the Planning & Design Department and the Construction Department of the Bureau of Yards and Docks visited all of the proposed sites and consulted with the officials of the Liberian Government and local representatives of the contractor.

In December the Raymond Concrete Pile Company submitted an interim report which stated that the results of studies
made to that time clearly indicated that the development should be located at Bushrod Island. These conclusions were based, of course, on engineering and cost considerations, together with consideration of possible commercial use of the Port. The proposed port layout provides ample area for the construction of facilities for submarines in accordance with the recommendations of the Navy General Board. The interim report stated that the final report would also recommend the Bushrod Island location. The final report has not yet been received, but is expected within the next few days. When received it will be studied by the Chief of Naval Operations, with regard to the location of the port as affected by strategic considerations, and also the detailed layout as regards feasibility for possible developments for a naval base.

The interim report indicates that the estimated cost at Bushrod Island is $11,729,540, exclusive of the contractor's fee. Funds in this amount are now available. The estimate covers the provision of the following items:

(a) Two breakwaters enclosing a harbor, with a 1000' entrance between the breakwaters. The harbor has a maximum length of approximately 14,000', a width of 7300' and a total area within the breakwater of 1460 acres.

(b) Dredging of channel 30' deep from the breakwater entrance to the quay wall.

(c) Construction of 2000' quay wall permitting berthing of 4 freighters of ordinary size.

(d) Necessary storehouses, customs building, together with essential power and water facilities at the port site.

(e) Access road, including a bridge over the Mesurado River from Monrovia to the port site.

The contracting company is now recruiting the necessary personnel and assembling general construction equipment and materials in preparation for initiating actual construction at an early date.

The State Department and Foreign Economic Administration have reviewed the preliminary plans, and concur in
that the proposed site at Bushrod Island appears to be the best of the sites studied taking into consideration all pertinent factors.

The Liberian Government, on January 16, 1945, advised the State Department that it was withholding its approval to the proposed scope of the port for the reason that it did not include a large hydro-electric power plant for the furnishing of power and a water supply system for the City of Monrovia. In reply the Liberian Government was advised by the State Department that adequate provision is being made in present plans for power and water for the port facilities only, and that the construction of a large hydro-electric plant for port purposes would involve a cost far exceeding the present funds available; furthermore it would provide power and water capacity far in excess of that required for the port alone, or for any requirement now reasonably foreseeable. The reply stated that consideration would be given to a separate request for the facilities desired by the Government of Liberia to be submitted through proper channels.

The Liberian Government has since indicated its approval of the scope of the port as outlined above; also of its location on Bushrod Island.

It will be noted that the facilities being provided under the present allocation of Lend-Lease funds are primarily commercial facilities in that no naval installations are now included. However, the fact that harbor and port facilities will be available after construction is completed, is a definite contribution to the national defense, inasmuch as these same facilities will be available to naval vessels. Furthermore, there is adequate area behind the proposed breakwaters and practically unlimited area on shore for the future construction of naval facilities, including aviation facilities. The proposed harbor is large enough to provide a 10,000-foot seaplane runway. Under the terms of the basic agreement between the Governments of the U. S. and Liberia, the latter agrees to the establishment of such military and naval facilities as may be required by this Government.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

 Acting Secretary of the Navy

The President,
The White House.
CAMP LEJEUNE

Camp Lejeune, situated on New River at Jacksonville, N. C., is a Marine combat college. Besides being the Marine Corps' east coast training and replacement center, it is the second largest all-purpose Marine base. (Camp Pendleton, Calif., is larger.)

Camp Lejeune has schools for officers and enlisted men, for men and women, for whites and Negroes, for riflemen and specialist. The teachers include many combat veterans, who are passing on the lessons they learned in battle at Guadalcanal, Bougainville, New Georgia, New Britain, Tarawa, Saipan, Guam, and elsewhere.

Fighters are trained in all phases of jungle warfare, with emphasis on ship-to-shore assault, jungle operations and beach defense. Specialists, such as engineers and quartermaster and communication personnel—get practice in establishing and maintaining their lines under simulated combat conditions.

Naval medical officers and corpsmen are shown the latest methods of caring for the sick, tending and evacuating the wounded, and maintaining health of personnel in the war zones. Coast Guardsmen learn to handle and maintain the various types of landing craft used by Marines in establishing beachheads. And clerks are instructed in the inevitable paper work that accompanies the administration of military forces.

(more)
Riflemen, special weapons operators, artillerymen, searchlight operators, engineers, amphibian tractor operators, tankmen, motor transport operators and mechanics and other quartermaster personnel, telephone, telegraphy and radio operators and maintenance men and other communications personnel, war dogs and war handlers—all these are trained here for their particular tasks, then trained to cooperate as a team on combat problems.

There are thousands of acres within the multilateral borders of Camp Lejeune—65,155 of land and 26,000 of water. Fronting 12 miles along the Atlantic Ocean and extending back approximately 15 miles from the coast, it has an area of 173.68 square miles.

Its sandy coastal wastes and tangled lowlands provide realistic terrain for the type of war the Marines are waging in the Pacific. Moreover there is adequate space for range firing of the various weapons utilized by the Corps—rifles, mortars, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns and coastal batteries.

Little more than three years ago the site of the camp was a wilderness. Today it is dotted with more than 1,400 brick or concrete buildings and as many more frame and temporary structures.

While the camp was being transplanted from plans into actuality, Marines who avenged Wake Island in the Solomons; and Soldiers who helped rout Rommel in North Africa, were maneuvering on the reservation. Since then thousands of Marines and supplemental naval personnel have been prepared for combat.
By the time of Pearl Harbor, the First Marine Division was training here, and left a short time later under the command of Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, now a lieutenant general and Marine Corps commandant.

The initial phase of construction, devoted principally to temporary buildings, was completed in September, 1941, and on the 15th of that month the Marine Barracks and Training Center were opened officially. Command was delegated to Brigadier General Allen Hal Turnage, now a major general.

The emphasis in 1942, along with continuous training, was on permanent construction.

At the beginning of 1943 the base was organized into three commands, Marine Barracks, Training Center and Fleet Marine Force. Early in 1944 the Training Center was redesignated as the Training Command.

Present administrative setup here is the Camp, and the Training Command. The Camp, headed by Major General John Marston, includes Headquarters, Service; Guard, Women's Reserve and Medical Battalions, Montford Point and the Coast Guard Detachment.

Under the Training Command, headed by Brigadier General Alfred H. Noble, are three regiments: Schools, Specialist Training and Infantry Training Regiment. Schools Regiment includes the Infantry Schools Battalion and the Officer Candidates Battalion. Specialist Training Regiment includes the Artillery, Signal and Engineer Battalions, and the War Dog Training Company. Infantry Training Regiment includes Training Battalions and Replacement Drafts as formed. Separate units under Training Command are Headquarters, Range and Quartermaster Battalions. (more)
The camp has 128 miles of paved roads, 80 miles of sidewalks, 16½ miles of railroads, Diesel and steam electric generating plant, six electrical substations in addition to service from an electric power company, 141 miles of electrical distribution lines, 166 miles of telephone distribution lines, 18 central heating plants, 45 miles of steam distribution conduits, 100 miles of water distribution lines, 59 water pump houses and wells, two water treatment plants, and more than 3000 buildings and structures.

Post exchanges, with barber shops attached, are scattered over the camp; and clubs, with fountain service, bowling alleys, billiard and table tennis facilities and games are operated for the enlisted personnel.

There are theaters, or theater-gymnasiums, in each of the camp areas where free movies are shown nightly. The theater-gym also are utilized for basketball, dances, and other events. Athletics available to personnel, in addition to basketball, include football, tennis, baseball and softball.

For those who seek diversion in books, there are libraries in the various camp areas.

The spiritual welfare of all denominations receives adequate attention. Chaplains of all major faiths are on duty at the base. There are two large chapels at Hadnot Point. There are other facilities for worship at Hadnot Point, Tent Camp, Montford Point, Rifle Range and Courthouse Bay.

The camp is named for the late Lieutenant General John Archer Lejeune, 40 years a Marine, World War I hero, Commandant from 1920 to 1929 and superintendent of Virginia Military Institute from 1929 to 1937. The camp received its name shortly after the general's death in the fall of 1942. -USMC-
PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE
Headquarters, Camp Lejeune
North Carolina

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(more)
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Report of Enlisted Personnel, United States Navy.

1. The estimated number of enlisted personnel in active service on 28 February 1945 is as indicated below. For basis of comparison, the revised estimated number in active service on 31 January 1945 is also included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>28 February 1945</th>
<th>31 January 1945</th>
<th>Net Gain for Month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular Navy</td>
<td>322,350</td>
<td>321,900</td>
<td>$  450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.N. Inductees</td>
<td>142,506</td>
<td>140,496</td>
<td>$  2,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired Active</td>
<td>6,140</td>
<td>6,330</td>
<td>$       190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Reserve</td>
<td>5,095</td>
<td>5,152</td>
<td>$       57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women's Reserve</td>
<td>71,791</td>
<td>72,200</td>
<td>$     409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Reserve</td>
<td>2,329,978</td>
<td>2,300,770</td>
<td>$   29,208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,877,860</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,846,848</strong></td>
<td><strong>$ 31,012</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. As of 28 February 1945, 1,432,339 men had been inducted into the Navy through Selective Service.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Dear Mr. President:

I have your memorandum of March 10 relative to the prospective acquisition of St. Johns College at Annapolis.

I note the questions which you propound in connection with the future planning for the Naval Academy. We are instituting a study of this matter, in conjunction with the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, and will, as you suggest, obtain the opinions of the Board of Visitors on some of the questions involved.

Upon the completion of our studies the matter will be again referred to you.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President
The White House
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

15 MAR 1945

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Respectfully,

James Forrestal

The President
The White House

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD Dir. 5200.9 (8/27/58)
Date- 3-26-59
Signature- (Carl I. Speer)

CONFIDENTIAL
March 13, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Subject: St. Johns College.


As indicated in my memorandum of 10 March, I do not think we should take steps to acquire St. Johns College grounds and buildings or additional property across the river until we have worked up the additional information indicated in my memorandum of the 10th.

I think it would be all right to go ahead now to find out whether St. Johns wants to sell to the Government or whether there is still opposition to such a transfer. It would also help to know how much they expect to get for the sale and whether their price is considered reasonable.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: St. Johns College.

1. I don't want to move too fast on this without being sure that I have your approval on principles; Senator Tydings is being importuned by a group of his people who believe the time is ripe to acquire the St. Johns property and he in turn is asking me for expression of our desires.

2. As I recall it you agreed in principle to this procedure:

(a) Acquire St. Johns College, grounds and buildings, and keep the buildings intact, adapting them so far as may be to uses of the Naval Academy, although this use will be somewhat limited.

(b) Proceed with the acquisition of property across the river to provide for expansion of the Academy. In conjunction with this we may want to give consideration to the acquisition of adjacent property for construction of an airfield. There is general agreement that air instruction in some form should be embodied in the general course at the Academy.

3. Ben Moreell is going ahead with the preparation of plans looking to the acquisition of the property involved -- both St. Johns and across the river -- together with plans for such restoration as might seem desirable on the St. Johns buildings, plus an estimate of annual maintenance costs.

4. Any definitive action will, of course, be subject to your subsequent approval but I do not want to initiate these steps unless you are in accord in principle.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal
Please return to
St. Rigdon when
signed.
The President,

The White House.
March 10, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Subject: Acquisition of St. Johns College at Annapolis.

I am glad to have your memorandum of 9 February concerning your telephone conversation with Senator Tydings in reference to the possible acquisition by the Government of the St. Johns College property.

I think now, as I did in 1941, that the St. Johns buildings and grounds should be preserved unless very strong reasons of national interest make it necessary to destroy them. If the owners of the property are anxious to sell, either to the Government or to any other purchaser, I think the Government should buy in order that the property may be safeguarded as long as the public interests may permit.

If the owners of St. Johns property do not seek a purchaser, I think we should have further information before deciding whether or not the Government should endeavor to secure ownership at this time. Some of the questions that I think should be answered before a decision is reached are:

(a) The present value to the nation and the state of Maryland of St. Johns College as an educational institution;
(b) The probable financial status of the college in the postwar period;
(c) Whether the Navy will draw all of its officer material from the Naval Academy after the war, or whether a considerable proportion will come from other sources;
(d) The probable future size of the Naval Academy student body;
(e) Assuming that the Naval Academy should soon have a plant capable of housing and instructing a student body of 7,000 or more, is it possible that in time we may have to double even that figure? Is there a limit to the number of students that can be taught at the Naval Academy in time of peace without a serious lowering in the quality of graduates?
(f) Will the acquisition of St. Johns property allow for all the expansion that the future may demand or would it be better now to bridge the Severn and start a new development that will have ample room for all future expansion needs?
(g) Could dormitories and some instruction buildings be established on the eastern bank for the Third and Fourth Classes without prejudice to the quality of graduates?

I suggest that the opinion of the Board of Visitors on some of the above questions might be helpful.

Copy to:
Chief of Naval Personnel
Supt., U.S. Naval Academy
Mr. Leonard Draper, Bureau of Naval Personnel.

/s/ ROOSEVELT.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:
ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN.

For preparation of reply.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: Acquisition of St. Johns College at Annapolis.

I have recently had a telephone conversation with Senator Tydings in which he informed me that a group of citizens of Annapolis were interested in promoting the acquisition of St. Johns College by the Navy for use in the postwar expansion of the Naval Academy.

You will recall that the matter has been previously discussed with you. On January 18, 1941, Admiral Wilson Brown sent to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation after conference with you a memorandum in which he indicated your desire to preserve the buildings and grounds of St. Johns. It appeared, at that time, that the College was in poor financial condition and might be forced to sell. It is my understanding that the College was able to weather the financial storm and is now in a fairly secure position.

We have been making some studies for the possible postwar expansion of the Naval Academy to take care of a large increase in the student body, it being contemplated that a total capacity of 7500 midshipmen might have to be accommodated to serve the postwar Navy.

These studies indicate that in addition to the acquisition of three blocks on the north side of King George Street which are now occupied by private residences and which project into the Academy grounds, it will be essential for an orderly plan that we acquire the St. Johns College grounds for the erection thereon of a midshipmen's dormitory and mess hall. There is no other land available for this purpose unless we should acquire a large area of heavily built-up residential property in the City of Annapolis. Any other area which might be utilized for the dormitory would be too far removed from the academic group (recitation halls, laboratories, armory, chapel, etcetera). The prospective utilization of the St. Johns College grounds would require that the present buildings be demolished. These buildings would be of little value for Naval Academy purposes and the erection of other buildings on the St. Johns grounds would not only spoil the appearance of the existing buildings but would also provide inadequate housing facilities for the Academy.

The remainder of the expansion of the Naval Academy would take place on the north and west sides of Dorsey Creek. This expansion would consist of a hospital, bachelor officers quarters, married officers quarters, shop buildings, storehouse, laundry, a stadium and athletic field, and miscellaneous industrial buildings.
Serial 801
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

While I recognize the great desirability of preserving the buildings of this historic college, I believe that the need for this land for the orderly expansion of the Naval Academy would warrant the removal of these buildings.

It has been suggested that in order to preserve the historic value of the institution, if the buildings are removed, a scale model in detail should be made and placed on exhibition in a specially prepared room which would be provided on the college grounds for this purpose.

Before taking any further steps in regard to this matter, I would appreciate your views with respect to the acquisition of St. Johns College by the Navy and the removal of the college buildings.

James Forrestal
The White House
Washington
February 26, 1945.

Memorandum For:
Admiral Wilson Brown, X 50-78
For preparation of reply.

F. D. R.

Attachment:
SecNav's memorandum to the President,
2-9-45, re acquisition of St. John's
College at Annapolis.
Dear Mr. President:

I have your memorandum of March 6, 1945, relative to the harbor development for Liberia, and I am pleased to note that you are in agreement with the selection of Bushrod Island as the proper location for this development.

I note your statement relative to the elimination of unnecessary items from the contract. The entire project has been developed with a view to including only essential items and, at the same time, to meeting the desires of the Liberian Government insofar as this may be practicable within the limitations of sound economy. However, a re-examination of the plans and specifications will now be made to determine whether any additional items can be properly eliminated.

With respect to the bridge from Monrovia to Bushrod Island, since the quarry for breakwater stone will be located at Mamba Point, near Monrovia, the most economical means of transporting this stone is by truck over a temporary bridge to Bushrod Island. It has been contemplated that this bridge could be cheaply transformed into a permanent structure with concrete deck and concrete hand rail to serve as a permanent means of access from Monrovia to the Island. An alternative which has been given consideration, in view of the expressed desires of the Liberian Government, is to build the permanent bridge across Providence Island, but that project has not been included in the estimates. It is not feasible to locate the temporary construction bridge across Providence Island because of the distances involved and congestion along this route through the City of Monrovia. With respect to the use of a ferry, the conversion of the construction bridge into a permanent structure and its subsequent maintenance would be much cheaper than the first cost, maintenance and operation of a ferry.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
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Respectfully,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This evening Admiral Nimitz released a Communicate from Guam announcing that Admiral Spruance's fast carrier groups have completed a two-day strike on the Jap homeland which included a "crippling attack" on the Jap Fleet in its bases in the Inland Sea. The following is a partial list of the damage inflicted:

200 planes shot down
275 planes destroyed on the ground
1 or 2 battleships damaged
2 or 3 large carriers damaged
2 or 3 light carriers damaged
2 escort carriers damaged
1 heavy cruiser damaged
1 light cruiser damaged
2 destroyers damaged
6 small freighters sunk
7 freighters damaged.

Very Respectfully,

Robert W. Bogue
Lt. U.S.N.R.
March 22, 1945

Dear Jim:

Justice Byrnes advises me that Admiral King states there is a real need for the 12 CVE's ships included in the 84 combatant ship program which has been disapproved. He states you also wish these 12 ships built.

In view of the expressed need for these 12 CVE's I have authorized Justice Byrnes to advise the War Production Board that materials may be made available for their construction.

It is to be understood that the remaining 72 ships in this program are not to be placed in construction and that any contractual commitments therefor are to be cancelled.

Sincerely yours,

F. D. R.

Honorable James V. Forrestal
Secretary to the Navy
Washington, D. C.
Dear Grace:

Can you get this signed for me this afternoon?

J. F. B.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I talked with Carl Vinson Thursday morning about the Naval construction program.

I advised him that upon the recommendation of Admiral King, you authorized the construction of the twelve CVEs but had decided the rest of the program should not be constructed and that contracts should be cancelled.

Carl said that under the circumstances he agreed to the cancellation of the rest of the ships and would have nothing more to say about it. He said it was really his program; that he had insisted upon the department recommending it but was satisfied now with our decision.

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Carl said that under the circumstances he agreed to the cancellation of the rest of the ships and would have nothing more to say about it. He said it was really his program; that he had insisted upon the department recommending it but was satisfied now with our decision.

J. F. B.
MEMO FOR AUDREY TURNER

Will you hold until we get back?

G. G. T.
April 2, 1945.

Give to the President on his
return to Washington to talk with
Admiral Brown about.

G. G. T.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY HASSITT:

This was handed me by the Secretary of the Navy this morning and I send it along because I think the President may wish to think about it before his return to Washington. I recommend that he should not reach any decision until further discussion with the Secretary of the Navy.

I understand that Jacobs favors Kinkaid but is very lukewarm about the other two candidates. I agree with him but have to admit that I know very little about DuBoise or Holloway. However, I agree with Jacobs that the next Superintendent of the Naval Academy should be someone whose war record is so outstanding that he will carry to the office all of his war-time prestige for the post-war readjustment. It seems to me that Halsey, Spruance, Mitscher, Hewitt and Kinkaid all are popular figures in the minds of the American public as well as throughout the Service. Mrs. Kinkaid would be a great help.

W. T. Brown

WILSON BROWN.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I know one of the subjects which always engages your interest is the question of the Superintendency of the Naval Academy; I would like to discuss this the next time you have a chance to see me.

Among the names that have been suggested is that of Vice Admiral Kinkaid, who it is felt has the combination of academic and sea background which would make him an appropriate choice.

There is the other possibility of getting a younger man who also has sea experience and who has shown great interest in the work of the Academy, particularly in the relationship of Reserves to it. In this category the names of two officers are in my mind, either of whom from the above considerations would be well qualified. They are Rear Admiral Laurance T. DuBose, who was at the head of a Board I named to study the question of the Reserves, and Captain James L. Holloway, whose vigor and interest in the preparation of the course on "Foundations of National Power" impressed me greatly. Both have had successful sea duty.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

James Forrestal
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Navy Secretariat.

I have secured the approval of the Chairmen of the Senate and House Naval Affairs Committees to the suggestion, which you approved, in my memorandum of 15 March about two additional temporary Assistant Secretaries of the Navy to deal with business arising out of the wind up of the war -- cut backs, termination of contracts, etc.

Ralph Bard wants to resign sometime before the first of July. My thought would be to move Hensel up to Under Secretary.

Ed Pauley arrives here around the first of May and I will ask him then to come into the Navy on a mutually experimental basis. John Sullivan is inquiring about his status because Basil O'Connor has asked him to go abroad for the Red Cross.

I would like John in the Navy right now, because he could be very useful on account of his knowledge of other government departments, The Hill, etc. If we get Congressional approval on the two additional Assistant Secretaries we could then provide for both John and Pauley, and there will be plenty for both to do.

I am therefore going to tell John that I would be glad to have him come with us as a Special Assistant and to fill one of the temporary Secretarial positions when they receive Congressional approval.

Respectfully,

James Forrestal

James Forrestal
REAR ADMIRAL HARRY E. YARNELL, retired, died last night at the Newport, R.I. Naval hospital where he had been a patient for two weeks. He was 84.

Admiral Yarnell, Far East Expert

NEWPORT, R. I. — (AP) Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, O. S. N. (Ret), 83, who helped form the United States' firm policy in the Far East immediately before World War II, died yesterday at the Newport Naval hospital. He had been hospitalized for two weeks. The cause of death was not reported.

** ADMIRAL YARNELL ** was commander of the Asiatic fleet when the Japanese sank the U. S. gunboat Panay on the Yangtze river in China in 1937. He was instrumental in bringing about the Japanese payment of $2,200,000 indemnity for the incident.

He served for many years in the Far East and was given a free hand in meeting diplomatic problems on the spot. He said "no" to the Japanese for three years prior to Pearl Harbor and the United States' stand during the turbulent years of the undeclared Sino-Japanese war came to be known as the "Yarnell policy."