THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Memo for President

German Subs to
torpedoes from planes,
derozers and carriers
after pounding with
sewn of 2 BLS. British
report Bismark unmanned
by gunfire alone. No
further info on Prince
Eugen or British carrier.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the President's memorandum of May 19th, the Navy Department received the substance of the attached message via Navy Department officer designated to review all State Department messages and cull out those of possible interest to the Navy Department.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL

(Dispatch returned to State Dept.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

VERV CONFIDENTIAL

May 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you check and see whether the Navy Department received this message? Please return enclosure.

F. D. R.

Message from Linthicum at Pernambuco re ZAMZAM leaving Pernambuco for Capetwon direct, and reporting no information that orders were changed after her departure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

May 27, 1941.

The attached sketch is interesting in connection with the report of the MODOC which was in the vicinity at the time of the action between the BISMARCK and the HOOD.

The MODOC was move to in the position shown, in a northwesterly gale, speed 4, course 315 true, when she observed a single biplane standing down from the northwest which passed to her starboard, turned and headed back northwest. A couple of minutes later MODOC sighted the BISMARCK bearing about northwest, and about eight minutes later a squadron of planes with British markings, headed southwest. At that time BISMARCK was observed to be firing, presumably at the single plane first sighted.

MODOC about twenty minutes later sighted three naval vessels, which appeared to be one large and two small, bearing north-northeast and headed southwest. The BISMARCK by this time had changed course to the southeast, bearing slightly forward of MODOC's port beam. She was engaged in firing heavy antiaircraft barrages, presumably at the squadron of planes which had previously passed astern of the MODOC.

As the MODOC was in line of fire of the opposing surface forces she increased speed and stood clear to the northwest. The types of vessels were hard to discern on account of distance, haze and approaching darkness.

The MODOC evidently did not see any part of the engagement between the surface forces.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

J. R. BEARDALL.
May 24, 1941
57° 18' N
36° 00' W

2137
E

2135
Single Plane

Moff

2145
British Planes

S

W

E

S
MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL

The enclosed report does not satisfy me in the least bit. On both List A and List B the "status or activity engaged in on July 1, 1941" means nothing at all, as you and I well know.

On the Navy Register every ship has an assignment to a base force or a train or a naval transportation service. That assignment does not mean that the ship is actually operating in any of these capacities.

What I want to know is what each ship was actually doing on July 1, 1941:

(a) Where she was
On the high seas? If so, where and on what mission?

(b) In Harbor
Loading or unloading? How long she had been there and when she was expected to leave?
In other words, what I want is to show actual continuous use of these ships taken over by the Navy from commercial occupations. If the ships are not in actual use, I want to be able to borrow some for very much needed short runs for other defense purposes.

Will you please go into this personally and let me have a report of what each ship was actually engaged in doing on the first of July? This list, as you and I well know, means nothing at all.

F. D. R.

Confidential letter from Secy. Knox to FDR 7/14 forwarding lists of vessels acquired by the Navy with notations regarding dates of acquisition, dates of placing in service and the present status or the activity to which these vessels are assigned as of 1 July 1941. Also Let from Jerry Land 7/3 with three lists of ships turned over to Navy for conversion, for cargo and transport purposes, etc.
Memorandum from Captain Beardall, Letter from Under Secretary of the Navy, and lists of vessels acquired by the Navy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 21, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LAND

Please read enclosed from Under Secretary Forrestal and let me have your comment.

It is my thought that there could be some kind of an understanding that if and when any merchant type ship belonging to the Navy is not actually on active service, i.e., at sea or loading or discharging, the Maritime Commission should be able, in consultation with the Navy, to use said ship for some special voyage or task.

You will, of course, note that in the last column of this list a very large number of ships are undergoing conversion and that in most of these cases it is stated that they will be assigned to this, that or the other duty. Mere assignment does not mean use.

You might talk this over with Forrestal and work out some method by which actual and active use becomes the criterion.

Please return these papers for my files. F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

July 28, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached comparison of United States and Estimated Foreign Plane Strengths, as of July 1, 1941, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
### Table A-I

**United States and Estimated Foreign Plane Strengths Compared**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>First line Bombers &amp; Fighters</th>
<th>Utility Observation &amp; Obsolescent Combat</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Estimated Monthly Production</th>
<th>All Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>3,956</td>
<td>507</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,989</td>
<td>6,777</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>2,992</td>
<td>5,433</td>
<td>10,733</td>
<td>620 (expert)</td>
<td>2,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITISH EMPIRE</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>(---------8,000--------)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>600 (fr. U.S.)</td>
<td>2,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>(---------20,000--------)</td>
<td>33,000</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>(---------4,300--------)</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>350</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAPAN</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>170</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>(---------400--------)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definitions:** "First line Bombers & Fighters" of the United States are planes rated "Service" by the U.S. Navy, and planes rated "Standard" or "Service Test" by the U.S. Army. FOREIGN ESTIMATES ARE COMPRISSE FIGURES reached after a study of the material available in D.N.I., M.I.D., and the Army Air Force. They are subject to radical revision. German data derive from many independent neutral and belligerent observation posts and differ widely.

**NOTES:** The format and content of Table A-I are slightly modified in the present issue. Changes in the content consist chiefly of omission of the figures previously carried for "Maximum Production Capacity per Month". These figures are no longer considered to have meaning, for in July 1941 the production of aircraft unsuitable for military missions has practically ceased while all nations build all the military aircraft which, under existing conditions, they are capable of building. Consequently, it is no longer useful to speculate on the number of military planes which a nation might produce if they were to employ floorspace, tools, materials and skilled artisans which are not now available and being used. Present production of military aircraft is, in fact, total present potential production of military aircraft.

The effect of the large increase in Army planes was 675; the net increase in Navy planes was 252. 71 of the Army's new bombers and 9 of its new trainers lack propellers.

**Op-16-P-10 DISTRIBUTION:**

- **Op-10**: Aide to President
- **Op-12**: Aide to SecNav
- **Op-16**: Aide to SecNav
- **Op-16-F**: Aide to Under SecNav
- **Op-16-F-1-7 (7)**: Aide to AstNav
- **Op-22**: Div. of A. R. & S.

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**Confidential**

Thomas H. Osterman

Division of Naval Intelligence

July 26, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Navy Department has received confirmation from our Naval Attache at London of the following losses by convoy OG 71, off the coast of Spain:

Note: Convoy shadowed by enemy planes during afternoon August 22nd and by U-Boot which made four reports.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack No. 1</td>
<td>2100, 8/22</td>
<td>British CLONCLARA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2250, 8/22</td>
<td>Tug EMPIRE OAK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack No. 2</td>
<td>0120, 8/23</td>
<td>British ALDERGROVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>British STORK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack No. 3</td>
<td>0530, 8/23</td>
<td>H.M.S. ZINNIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norwegian SPING, straggler from above convoy, was shelled and set afire at 0600 position, 40-42 N., 11-39 W., and was sunk by escort as salvage impossible. Crew of SPING and 16 from H.M.S. ZINNIA picked up.

Norwegian INGER, detached from convoy ON 9, torpedoed at 2303 August 23rd, at 58-58 N., 07-50 W., enroute Reykjavik.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The attached comparison, as of August 1, 1941, of United States and Estimated Foreign Plane Strengths, is forwarded as being of possible interest to the President.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First line Bombers &amp; Fighters</th>
<th>Utility, Observation &amp; Obsolescent Combat</th>
<th>Trainers</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>Estimated Monthly Production All Types</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>4,232</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>4,568</td>
<td>7,423</td>
<td>701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITED STATES</td>
<td>2,366</td>
<td>3,077</td>
<td>6,212</td>
<td>11,655</td>
<td>361 (export)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITISH EMPIRE</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>20,600</td>
<td>1,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GERMANY</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>31,500</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUSSIA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,950</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITALY</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>(1000-400-400)</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Definitions: "First line Bombers & Fighters" of the United States are planes rated "Service" by the U.S. Navy, and planes rated "Standard" or "Service Test" by the U.S. Army. FOREIGN ESTIMATES ARE COMPROMISE FIGURES reached after a study of the material available in D.N.I., M.I.D., and the Army Air Force. They are subject to radical revision. German data derive from many independent neutral and belligerent observation posts and differ widely.

NOTES:

United States: Monthly production figures are actual deliveries in the month of July. They do not include ll planes delivered for commercial use, or the small trainers being produced for civil training schools.

Germany: Combat planes in depot storage, of which perhaps 50% are estimated to be modern types, are included in the "Utility, Observation and Obsolescent Combat" category on the ground that they are not immediately available for front line service.

Russia: The Soviet policy of refusing to permit foreign military observers with the field armies has resulted in a total blackout of information regarding Russian air strength. Berlin claims that 11,250 Russian planes have been destroyed since June 22nd. This figure is higher than the total of 8,400 previously carried in this table, and is thought to be higher than the German High Command estimate of Russian air strength prior to the beginning of hostilities on the Eastern front. Moscow admits the loss of 4,500 planes in the war with Germany.

Co-16-F-10 DISTRIBUTION:

- Op-10: Aide to President BuAero
- Op-12: Aide to SecNav Marine Corps C-In-C Lant
- Op-16: Aide to Under SecNav C-In-C U.S. C-In-C A.F.
- Op-16-F: Aide to SecNav P.A.T.U.
- Op-16-F-1-7 (7): Aide to AstNav ConBatFor Naval War College
- Op-22: Div. of A. R. & S. ConSecFor M.I.D.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you speak to me about this very confidentially and please don't let anyone see this letter?

F. D. R.

I spoke to the President about the attached letter and have consented to his instruction orally to Comm. Hooper.

FDR.
Dear President Roosevelt:

I appreciated your courteous reply to my letter. Now that I have established the fact with you, that I do not wish an appointment, I would like to advise you was originally an undersecretary, rather than a naval communication matters, of this in all rights. Of course any thing about the Navy I would send through official channels. But you need help in naval communication matters, and you are not getting the right picture altogether.

First I would like to recommend General MacArthur to fill the vacancy in the F.C.C. I have not discussed
That with him as he is away, but he is a strong man, and the best Chief Signal Officer the Army ever had by far.

I would like to have admired things Chairman Fly, but she is impossible. I called on him when he first came, and offered to give him the history of every thing, and my convivials, but he never reciprocated. I called twice after that, also Mrs. Harper and I called at their home. But no calls were ever returned. It became evident that he did not want anyone in the picture who knew anything or who had a reputation. That was a pity — or I wanted nothing for myself except to help our country. All she wanted is publicity, and to be the only one.
National problems of the nature

Any way, with the help of yourself and Admiral Belland in 1919, my dream
of a U.S. naval radio system, and
research laboratory came true in time for
this war, and is a going concern.

Everything I predicted about the Red

ship's scheme came true also. It has
become a treasure to all of us, and
just been a treasure to all of us, and
my good to our country came out of it.

As good to our country came out of it.

It resulted in loss of experts. The inventors
had most of their money; the Post dropped
and the European factories are gone.

But, and the European factories are gone.

If you will me to continue to advise
you this way, please let me know.

I am only trying, as a government official,
and I am only trying, as a government official,
10 years hence, should a

10 years hence, should a

AS: Mrs. Harper knows. Respectfully yours,

S. C. Hooper

Respectfully yours,

Pens Admiral.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you speak to me about this very confidentially and please don't let anyone see this letter?

F. D. R.

Letter to the President dated September 2, 1941, from Rear Admiral S. C. Hooper in re Chairman Fly and the F.C.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 6, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL

What do you think we should do?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter from A. Bruce Fahnestock, 12 Chelsea Lane, West Hartford, Conn., and Sheridan Fahnestock, Glen Mary Farm, Great Mills, Md., undated, to Gen. Watson, with enclosed letter to the President from Messrs. Fahnestock, giving their impression in connection with their trip to the Indies, Java, Madoera, Kangean, Bali, Singapore, and Biliton.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BRANDALL:

I am returning herewith the menus which Admiral Stark asked the President to sign. The President would very much appreciate it if you had two extra copies—one for Elliott and one for Franklin, Jr.

Grace G. Tully
October 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPT. BRANDALL:

Will you tell Aymar Johnson how interested I have been in seeing his report and thank him?

F.D.R.

Letter to the Pres. 10/2 from Aymar Johnson, Socatean Ledges, Somerset, Bermuda.

Re: Bermuda Base, tells us enormous water tank installed on the Naval Base thereby eliminating the men from suffering when the drought takes place. Artillery guns on the West end and the East end of the Island, etc.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL

Will you get me the low-down on this without disclosing from whom it comes?

F. D. R.

Letter to Doc O'Connor, dated September 30, 1941, from Hans Hinrichs of 117 Liberty St., N. Y. C., re the Shinnecock Inlet.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following personnel are taking passage in XPB2-Y leaving Scotland 16 October, weather permitting, for Washington via Horta and Bermuda:

Harold Balfour, Under Secretary of State for Air
W. Averill Harriman
General Cheney
Admiral Standley
Captain Braine
Captain Thomas
Robert P. Meiklejohn
William L. Batt, Jr.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Shinnecock Inlet, Long Island

Letters on file in the Navy Department show that Mr. Edward Frederick Pyle previously approached the Navy Department in April and December, 1939, and on March 8, 1941, in connection with the improvement of the approaches to Shinnecock Inlet and the construction of a jetty there. The Navy Department has consistently taken the stand that the use of Shinnecock Bay for naval purposes is not contemplated and that the improvement is a matter coming under the cognizance of the War Department - that the military value of the inlet is insufficient to warrant a recommendation for its improvement as a national defense measure.

Just recently the Navy Department communicated with the Commandant Third Naval District in regard to this subject and verified that from the strictly Navy point of view there is no contemplated use for Shinnecock Bay, as there is not enough water in the bay (10' low water) and Naval local defense vessels would require at least 12' or more. However, further inquiry of the Coast Guard developed the information that they consider it highly desirable that Shinnecock Inlet be dredged to 10' depth, particularly in order to permit the life boat now located at the new Shinnecock Coast Guard Station at Ponquogue Point to get to sea in rough weather. The depth at Shinnecock Inlet at present is a maximum of 3\(\frac{1}{2}\)', which is insufficient in rough weather.

The Coast Guard is now taking yachtsmen for the Coast Guard Reserve for use largely to effect the security of harbors, but, of course, small boats or light craft could be used within Shinnecock Bay as a kind of a coast patrol and might in this way be of more use in wartime. That would be the only strictly wartime use of this inlet and bay, which is the only opening in this coast for a considerable stretch. Roughly estimated, it would cost one million dollars to build a breakwater and dredge the inlet to 10' depth. The breakwater would be necessary to insure against silting up again. The Coast Guard is anxious that this dredging be done and I feel that this is the only basis for any recommendation that might be made in requesting that necessary funds be made available.

As the project for the inlet seems to be chiefly of local interest for peacetime operations of small boats, pleasure craft, etc., it would, as such, come under the cognizance of the War Department (Rivers and Harbors). Inquiry as to its status among Rivers and Harbors projects shows that it is
not carried in the present Rivers and Harbors authorization bill, and there is no record of a survey of this project having been made. As items considered not necessary for the National Defense have little or no chance of passage at this time, it is felt that the only possible grounds upon which the project might be aided at this time are those of the Coast Guard's desire to improve the inlet for the reasons stated above.

I am attaching a chart of this area, together with the return of the letter addressed to Mr. O'Connor by Mr. Hinrichs.

Respectfully,

J. R. BEARDALL
The White House
Washington

October 31, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR DOG O'CONNOR:

The enclosed is sent to you in confidence for your information.

F.D.R.
Note: The President asked Harry Hopkins for the Navy Hydrographic Chart current in 1924 and now probably in their historic files.

Hopkins had me ask Beardsell to get Chart.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. HARRY HOPKINS

We have searched the Navy Hydrographic Office, and have made inquiries of the Interior Department, the War Department and the National Geographic Society, and can locate no other detailed charts of the Florida Keys except the one herewith of the Long Key area.

J. R. BEARDALL,
Captain, U. S. Navy,
Naval Aide to the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR
CAPTAIN BEARDALL:

To read and return for our files.

F.D.R.

Jack Carter's memo on Japanese Problem (West Coast, Mexican Border)
12/8/41
E - Bismarck, course 140°, 22-26 knots at 1300 GCT, 26 May.  
Bismarck's position not known. Two Focke-Wulf planes sighted in vicinity. Visibility about 3 miles.

A - King George V (Civie Home Fleet), 100 mi. to NE, parallel course.
B - Rodney, 35 mi. to north.
C - Renown, Ark Royal 35 mi. to S.E.