Navy: Frank Knox 1942-45
copy

The Secretary of the Navy
Washington
January 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Yesterday Steve Early, at your request, sent me a copy of a letter someone had written you concerning Lindberg's offer of his services to the Army. I read the thing over yesterday and again today and I give you my sober reflection for what it may be worth.

If I were in your place, I would not become involved in any discussion about Lindberg but would leave it to the Army to handle. If it were a Navy question and were put up to me, I would offer Lindberg an opportunity to enlist as an air cadet, like anybody else would have to do. He has had no training as an officer and ought to earn his commission.

s/ FRANK KNOX
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I think it is vital to make a gesture to Chile before the Rio Conference meets on the fifteenth. Could the Navy send down even three or four training type seaplanes which could be used for shore patrol work at one or two places on the Chilean coast. This would help.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Please note enclosed.

F.D.R.

Intyre
Memo to the Pres. from Mac/re Normandie
disaster and several facts which have come
to his attention.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972
Memorandum for the President.

Relative to your memorandum of March 26 to the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Eastman, concerning lifting the coastwise shipping restrictions applying to Canadian boats, operating in Alaskan waters, and American boats using Canadian ports, so as to permit Canadian boats to supply Skagway and Haines, and the utilization of Prince Rupert as a supply base; the Secretary of the Treasury has issued orders to accomplish the desired objective. Copies of these orders are attached.

[Signature]

The Secretary of the Navy.
March 28, 1942.

C O P Y

C O N F I D E N T I A L

T I T L E 4 6 - S H I P P I N G

Subchapter A - Documentation, Entrance and Clearance of Vessels, Etc.

AN ORDER

Waiving compliance with the provisions of section 8 of the Act of June 10, 1886, as amended, and section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, as amended.

On the recommendation of the Secretary of War and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of Executive Order No. 8976, dated December 12, 1941 (6 F.R. 6441), as modified by Executive Order No. 9083, dated February 28, 1942 (7 F.R. 1609), I hereby waive the provisions of section 8 of the Act of June 10, 1886, as amended (46 U.S.C. 299), and section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, as amended (46 U.S.C. 883), to the extent necessary to permit the transportation on Canadian vessels from points in the continental United States to points in Alaska of the following:

(a) United States troops and their equipment.

(b) Civilians engaged in the construction of the Canadian-Alaskan military highway, and their equipment.

(c) Equipment, materials and supplies which are the property of contractors engaged in the construction of the Canadian-Alaskan military highway.

(Signed) Herbert E. Gaston
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
March 27, 1942

TITLE 46 - SHIPPING

Subchapter A - Documentation, Entrance and Clearance of Vessels, Etc.

AN ORDER

Waiving compliance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, as amended.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by Executive Order No. 8976, dated December 12, 1941 (6 F.R. 6441), as modified by Executive Order No. 9083, dated February 28, 1942 (7 F.R. 1609), I hereby waive compliance with the provisions of Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act, 1920, as amended (46 U.S.C. 883), to the extent necessary to permit the transportation of merchandise on Canadian vessels between points in Alaska, and also to permit the transportation of merchandise on Canadian vessels between Prince Rupert, B.C. and points in Alaska, as a portion of the transportation of that merchandise between points in the United States and points in Alaska.

(Signed) Herbert E. Gaston,
Acting Secretary of the Treasury.
My dear Mr. President:

I am very happy to report that my efforts to procure from the British an allocation of one hundred two-seated bombers from planes now being delivered to them, for use on the Atlantic Coast, was successful. They are going to turn these over to us at the rate of eight a day until a full hundred have been delivered. The necessary steps have been taken to provide naval crews to man them and Andrews is now working out the details. This ought to give us a tremendous boost in security along the coast. I have already written a very cordial expression of our appreciation to Admiral Dorling, to whom I appealed for this help and who was successful in putting it through.

The understanding I made was that if they would let us have the use of these ships for sixty days, at the end of that time, we would talk the matter over with them and decide whether we would return these identical ships to them or substitute one hundred additional new craft from the factories.

This has also been supplemented, according to a message I received from Secretary Stimson yesterday by six Army B-17's which are being fitted with ASW detection equipment which will pick up a submarine either day or night. These big bombers, with this equipment, may improve our defenses materially because they can work in the night time when the subs are operating principally.

Admiral Andrews made a very quick but resultful trip along the southern coast and came back and reported to me that he had worked out a plan for refuge harbors along the coast protected by mines and torpedo nets and patrol craft so that coastwise shipping could anchor at night all the way down and travel only in the day time. As soon as this arrangement is completed, we ought to reduce sinkings along the coast to a very marked extent. We are not only going to be able to deliver the sixty patrol craft, 110 and 173-foot, that I promised you but already there are indications that the total number before the first of May will be several in excess of that figure. With mine sweepers and
and converted yachts added, there is good prospect of increasing the
number of patrol craft by one hundred by the first of May.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Knox

The President
The White House
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND PLEASE RETURN FOR OUR CONFIDENTIAL FILES.

F.D.R.

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I agree with your letter of March 22nd in regard to newspaper correspondents but I would limit them definitely to Hawaii and Australia. The other Islands which we occupy in the north, central, south and southwest Pacific areas are definitely combat zones where the utmost secrecy is called for. New Guinea, Samoa, Midway, Fiji and the Aleutian Islands fall into this category. The Japs may not actually know all the places we are already in.

Keep people like Joe Patterson and Roy Howard out and be sure we avoid in the future episodes like the secret, personal letter which John O'Donnell brought home to the McCormack-Patterson outfit.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

I have given considerable thought to the matter of barring from Hawaii and outposts of that character all newspaper correspondents except representatives of the Associated Press, the United Press, and the International News Service.

The more I think about it, the less I am inclined to think that is a wise thing to do. The amount of very favorable publicity which the Navy has received as the result of having trained eye witness accounts of operations in the Pacific is the reason for my hesitation. Besides, the British have pretty well established the practice of permitting correspondents to go with the combatant ships on the various missions at sea. In fact, I have a man right now who is with the Mediterranean Fleet and a number of other American papers have similar representatives with the British Fleet.

I think we could bar out visitors like Patterson and Roy Howard by putting up the bars against any but working newspaper writers enjoying these privileges. We are already requiring the most rigid obligations of all correspondents who go with the Fleet concerning the maintenance of secrecy concerning military questions and the requirement that every line of copy sent out shall be subjected to scrutiny by the Navy people before it is released.

I would suggest we let things ride along as they are for a while and I will take care of the other matter by some quiet instructions to the people who grant credentials.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR
AND THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

I share the concern of the Secretary of the Navy in regard to the security of Oahu, and to this I would add my concern for the security of the other islands of the Hawaiian group. In most of them there are large numbers of Japanese. We must remember that the Island of Hawaii, the foremost of the group, is extremely vulnerable to a Japanese landing expedition and that it is so far from Oahu as to make the short legged pursuit planes almost useless, for if they flew there from Hawaii they would have to turn around almost immediately because of lack of fuel.

I think we should do something about this because I am not satisfied that the reports that the Hawaiian Islands are secure against attack are correct.

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Secretary of the Navy, 4/20/42. (Confidential), in re security in Oahu, and express an opinion that project of taking all Japs out of Oahu and putting them in a concentration camp on some other island in the group ought to be pressed vigorously, letter from Col. Wm. J. (over)
Donovan, 3/13/42 to the Secretary of the Navy, with enclosed excerpts taken from a letter he received from Commander John Ford at Honolulu, in re situation there, sent to the Secretary of War; copy of memorandum indicating papers which accompanied memo, sent to the Secretary of the Navy.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I agree with your memorandum of May first in regard to the employment of radio operators whose only offense is being a Communist. The Soviet people in Moscow are said to have little liking for the American Communists and their methods -- especially because it seems increasingly true that the Communism of twenty years ago has practically ceased to exist in Russia. At the present time their system is much more like a form of the older Socialism, conducted, however, through a complete dictatorship combined with an overwhelming loyalty to the cause of throwing every German out of Russia. That being so, the American Communists are going along with us almost unanimously in the help we are giving to Russia in winning the war.

There are, however, a good many cases of radio operators who
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

-2-

have failed in the pre-war period to
give weather information to other
ships or to planes; or who have
sought to foment what amounts to a
form of mutiny on the high seas.

F. D. R.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

May 1, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. President:

I hate to bother you with things like this but this involves a policy which can only originate with you.

I am attaching a report by Adlai Stevenson on the subject of disbarring men from service in the Merchant Marine as radio operators under the present law. My present disposition is to disregard a charge against the radio operator who, in other respects has done his duty well and obeyed orders, solely because he is called a Communist, even where the proof is pretty substantial that he has been a Communist. Of course, in other respects where there was insubordination or drunkenness or any other thing, we make short shrift of them.

With Russia as our ally, it seems to me the course I have outlined above is the only one we can pursue, although I confess to you a grave doubt as to the ultimate loyalty of these men if later difficulty of any kind should arise between us and Russia. For some strange reason, these American Communists seem more loyal to Russia than they do to the United States but, as I said, this difficulty is not present at the present time, although it may be later.

I should like to have you confirm to me whether my thought runs along parallel channels with yours on this subject.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House

Attachment

P O D M. 5200.8 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-57

Signature- Carl I. Spear
April 30, 1942

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

Public Act 351 (approved December 17, 1941) makes it unlawful during the emergency to employ as radio operator on any American merchant vessel any person whose employment has been disapproved by the Secretary of the Navy.

This Act is administered by a five man Board consisting of Admiral Staton as Chairman and representatives of the Navy Department, Coast Guard and Maritime Commission. The Board has considered some 90 cases and discharged 38 men. About 25 have appealed and 8 have been reinstated.

Appeals are heard by local boards convened by the Commandants of the Districts. The "defendant" is not informed as to the basis for his discharge.

The cases involving cowardice, insubordination, drunkenness or pro-Nazi sympathy present little difficulty. But most of the cases involve operators charged with Communist Party membership or Communist sympathy. The Board automatically discharges any operators whose investigation record is sufficiently convincing on the score of Communist sympathy, irrespective of his competence and record of conduct in his job.

Many of the members of the American Communications Association (CIO), including the President, Vice President and possibly other officers, have been or may be discharged. The total number of radio operators on the ONI suspect list is about 600 and about 500 of them are "Communist" suspects.

I understand that the Board rests its practice of automatic discharge of all alleged Communists on the policy of Congress expressed in various enactments prior to the Russo-German War, which forbid Federal employment of Communists, Bundists, etc.

The problem presented by the present method of administration of Public 351 is whether identification with Communism, even if sufficiently proven, is sufficient grounds to disqualify a man without some other evidence of incompetence or unreliability in his job as a radio operator on a merchant ship. In other words, in view of the present military alignments, political considerations and shortage of qualified radio operators, should we discharge operators because of their political opinions only? Or should we say that hostile political opinion is only one element of fitness and a man must not be discharged whose record in his job is in all other respects satisfactory.

Adlai E. Stevenson
WINOCOUR, Jacob
214 Broome St., New York, N.Y.

Born Brooklyn, N.Y. October 6, 1913. Presently a waterfront delegate for the Marine Division of the American Communications Association at New York. Holds F.C.C. Radio Telegraph First T-2-1150 issued at New York 12/2/41 and valid for five years. No military service indicated. Subject is brother of MURRAY WINOCUR disapproved for employment as radio operator on American vessels by order of SECNAV 2/19/42.

Rating "A"

Reliable source reveals that subject is a "dangerous Communist radio operator," and an official of the Communist controlled Marine Division of the A.C.A. at New York.

Jacob WINOCUR's C.P. membership has been established beyond question due to his long and consistent record of Communist activities in the A.R.T.A.-A.C.A. Subject joined the A.R.T.A. in 1936 during the general maritime strike of that year and immediately became closely identified with the Communist Fraction in that union, indicating that he was already a Communist and therefore trusted and acceptable without having to serve the usual probationary apprenticeship required of new and unknown recruits to the Party.

From the very day of his joining the A.R.T.A. to the present date, subject has acted as a sort of parliamentary whip or floor leader for the C.P. fraction in A.R.T.A. and later A.C.A. meetings. Subject was an active defender of one P. W. ROBINSON, N.Y. Local Secretary of the A.R.T.A. when the latter was on trial charged with Communist activity in January, 1937. During the succeeding years subject introduced various C.P. motions and resolutions denouncing the Maritime Commission in connection with the ALGIC mutiny case, protesting a New York State Law which would bar civil service jobs to Communists, demanding repeal of the New York State criminal anarchy law, endorsing the "pilgrimage" of the American Youth Congress to Washington, (which booted and hissed the President on the White House steps), denounced the Department of Justice as a "tool of the bosses," and a great many others of no interest or pertinency now but which all indicated an undeviating adherence to Communist Party line through a period of many years. As recently as December 30, 1941, subject supported debate in favor of a "demand" that President Roosevelt free EARL BROWDER before a regular meeting of Marine Division Local #2 at New York.
WINOCUR, Jacob  (Continued)

Rating "C"

Subject is reliably reported to carry a camera and to be fond of photographing waterfront activities in New York. Subject holds a permanent permit issued by the Coast Guard to board all vessels at New York as a union delegate.

In a letter dated April 5, 1942, to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Lt. (jg) Alexander Vadas, U.S.N.R., Manager for the Radiomarine Corporation of America at Miami, Florida, and a member of the American Radio Telegraphists Association - American Communications Association from 1931 to 1941, makes the following charges against Subject: "I have personally known Murray and Jacob Winocur since 1935 and from that time until 1940 I have personally heard both these men denounce our American system and everything connected with the capitalistic system of government. Both these men were greatly against the Naval Reserve and anyone connected with it. Jacob Winocur in October, 1940, aboard the SS AMERICA, where I was employed as Radio Operator, denounced the Naval Reserve in a most violent manner calling it "Scabs for the capitalists" and that "anyone was a fool who would fight for the present American capitalistic system."

CUSTODIAL DETENTION MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT HAS BEEN SUBMITTED.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Several weeks ago, you asked me to look into the matter of the projected silent submarine destroyer, the brainchild of Commander Dam. I turned the matter over to the proper committee of scientists who handle matters of this sort, headed by Dr. Bush, and have just received from him a report on this subject.

The conclusion reached was that the silent destroyer does not appear sufficiently promising to justify further research. I am attaching the findings of the Board in case you want to read them over.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Frank Knox

The President
The White House

Enclosure

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-9-59
Signature- Carl S. Spear
May 15, 1942

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In your letter of March 6, 1942, you stated the view of the Navy Department regarding the proposal of Lt. Commander Dam for a "silent" submarine destroyer, and indicated that the Navy Department had no objections to this Office investigating the matter. The pertinent files from the Navy Department have been made available to me by Admiral Van Keuren.

I have gone over the data, and, in accordance with the attached memorandum, I have come to the conclusion that the proposal does not appear sufficiently promising to justify any action on the part of this Office in initiating research and development work in connection with this scheme.

Very sincerely yours,

V. Bush, Director

The Honorable Frank Knox
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

cc Admiral A. H. VanKeuren
In reviewing the "silent destroyer" proposal made by Lt. Commander A. C. Dam, Retired, the available data have been studied carefully and advice on the more important technical matters has been obtained from recognized authorities in the OSRD and NACA. Lt. Commander Dam called and went over the proposal rather thoroughly.

Attention has been given to the relative merits of submarine destroyers with air-screw ("silent") and water-screw ("non-silent") propulsion. The value of the small anti-submarine boat as such was not considered to be in doubt.

The proposed air-screw drive for the small anti-submarine boat presents a number of attractive features:

1. It appears well established that the air-driven boat would not be detected with standard underwater listening equipment except at very short range.

2. It appears that if this boat were provided with a fully sound-proofed housing for its detection personnel, the range of detecting submerged submarines underway would be greater than for boats with water-screw propulsion.

3. It appears therefore that under favorable conditions this boat should be able to locate the submarine, approach it, and perhaps attack it before the submarine learns of its danger and takes evasive action.

4. The location and approach tactics would not be handicapped by certain limitations which have been associated with echo ranging. Thus the presence of the anti-submarine boat and its direction from the submarine would not be revealed by the echo-ranging signal; confusing echoes from ocean floor, irregularities and submerged wrecks would not occur; temperature variations, salinity variations, and surface roughness would be of reduced importance.
5. The attack itself would be less handicapped by certain limitations which have been associated with depth charge attacks on evading submarines. Thus the submarine could be attacked when it was near the surface and before it took evasive action. The slow descent of the depth charges, or uncertainties as to the proper depth-setting of the fuze would be of less importance.

6. There would be the psychological advantage that sound-free surroundings would be no guarantee of safety for the submarine.

On the other hand there are the following long-standing limitations of air-screw-driven anti-submarine boats:

1. Low air-screw efficiency at speeds of 10 to 20 miles per hour. Speed, maneuverability, and range will therefore be reduced. Fuel consumption and fuel storage capacity will be increased. The top speed of the surfaced submarine is such that it might very well lose the silent destroyer, especially in rough water. If the submarine should be fortunate enough to see the silent destroyer approaching, and if the latter's top speed and maneuverability were inferior to top speed and maneuverability of a water-screw driven boat, it would be relatively simpler for the submarine to sink the boat by gunfire.

2. The air-screw cannot be used satisfactorily in very rough seas. An auxiliary water-screw-drive is therefore, necessary, using a separate engine and "free-wheeling" propeller. Operation more than 50 miles from shore is not envisioned in the proposal.

3. Any advances by the enemy in designing quieter submarines will reduce the effectiveness of the silent destroyer, which relies entirely on listening for detection and location.

4. Windage is increased.

5. Conspicuousness is increased, especially if the propeller is surrounded with a guard. If the submarine periscope is above water, the pursuing boat will be unable to approach undetected.

6. Deck space is reduced. Arc of AA fire is restricted.
7. Silent listening provides no straightforward range data. Echo-ranging equipment would probably have to be carried for occasional use in range determination or in locating a submerged motionless submarine.

8. The high level of air-borne noise may lower the efficiency of personnel not located inside the housing.

9. The air-screw presents a danger to personnel, and its use near docks presents a problem. In any case a propeller guard would be needed.

At the present time the following additional points must be considered in evaluating the proposal:

1. Advances in echo-ranging equipment are such that the submarine -- even when taking evasive action -- will be located with greater accuracy than was formerly possible. Thus the advantage of a silent locating procedure is diminishing.

2. Improvements being made in depth charges and in methods of projecting depth charges are increasing the effectiveness of attacks on submarines which are submerged and practicing evasion. Thus the advantage of a silent stalking procedure is diminishing.

3. Recent developments in equipment suggest that small anti-submarine boats would be somewhat heavier than thought necessary earlier. Radio locators, depth charge throwers, etc., will probably require increases in personnel and displacement. Larger engines and propellers would probably be required.

4. Suitable new or used 1000 to 2000 Hp airplane engines probably will not be available in the near future. Also, there may be a scarcity of high-octane fuel and of personnel and facilities for servicing airplane engines.

**Time Factor**

There are a number of design items which, while not representing real obstacles, would require the attention of skilled personnel and would delay any construction program. The more important items are:
Special propellers of low pitch, low tip speed, small diameter, and probably 6 blades.

Engine supports, propeller guard, and perhaps an air rudder.

Auxiliary water-screw drive.

Aircraft engine cooling system unaffected by spray.

Sound-proof housing for detection personnel.

On the other hand, the construction program on water-screw-drive anti-submarine boats appears to be in an advanced stage.
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

May 22, 1942.

I wish you and Admiral King would talk with me about this proposed new building program, to be started in 1943 and 1944.

I should like especially to talk over the desirability of building 45,000 ton aircraft carriers; the possibility of cutting the size of 27,000 ton aircraft carriers by four or five thousand tons and putting the saved tonnage into aircraft carriers of approximately twelve to fourteen thousand tons.

Also, I should like to discuss the relative advantages of 13,600 ton heavy cruisers vs. the 11,000 ton heavy cruisers. I am inclined to go along without further ado with the program for the small light cruisers, the destroyers and the escort vessels.

F. D. R.
May 19, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Please note the attached memorandum from Admiral King dealing with the Combatant Ship Building Program for 1943 and 1944.

If this suggested outline meets with your approval, may I have your authority to initiate legislation for this program.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President
The White House

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

You have approved the 1943-1944 Combatant Ship Building Program. Congressional authorization for this program is necessary at an early date in order to occupy shipbuilding ways becoming available in 1943 and 1944. The program consists of the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Unit Tonnage</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total Tonnage</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CV Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>180,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>CV Aircraft Carriers</td>
<td>27,100</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>271,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA Heavy Cruisers</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>231,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Light Cruisers</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>176,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CL Light Cruisers</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>DD Destroyers</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>210,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE Escort Vessels</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,674,200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Authorization for 200,000 tons of Naval construction has been obtained by Public Law No. 551, signed by the President on May 13, 1942. This tonnage is intended for submarines and is to occupy all submarine ways becoming available in 1943 and 1944.

The above ship building program contemplates merely a continuation of the present ship building program at the peak rate and not an increase in the peak rate of Naval ship building.

It is considered advisable that Presidential authority be obtained for initiating legislation for this combatant ship building program.
CONFIDENTIAL

May 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Please note the attached memorandum from Admiral King dealing with the Combatant Ship Building Program for 1943 and 1944.

If this suggested outline meets with your approval, may I have your authority to initiate legislation for this program.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX

The President
The White House

Enclosure

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 8200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-7-59
Signature- Carl S. Spa.

This is President's copy

Original with us, fwd. 5/10/47.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

May 30, 1942.  

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  

Will you speak to me  
about this?  

F. D. R.  

Letter to the President from  
the Under Secretary of the Navy,  
dated May 8, 1942, enclosing memo-  
randum prepared by Admiral King  
re the President's Directive  
regarding Priorities for the War  
Effort.
My dear Mr. President:

Following our telephone conversation yesterday concerning the possibility of two certain newspaper gentlemen being granted permission to go to Alaska, I took the necessary steps to prevent any such privilege being granted by the Navy. I have also, as you directed, called up Bob Patterson and passed along your instructions for the Army in the same manner. Mr. Patterson assured me that the matter would be taken care of.

I also had a conference with Admiral Hepburn of our Navy Office of Public Relations, and explained to him the idea of sending only one man hereafter with any expedition and that man, no matter whom he represented, to be required to provide his story to all three of the services and all of the newspapers desiring it, regardless of the fact that he was employed by only one newspaper or one press association. Hepburn naturally replied by asking if this would be applied to both Army and Navy and I assured him I was certain that was your intention. He then said that if such were the case, a directive should issue from your office to this effect, directing both Army and Navy to follow the same procedure. Such a course is obviously the proper one to pursue since the Army would naturally want a directive from the Commander-in-Chief of both services in such an important matter.

In case you approve of this, I am enclosing a suggested letter to go to both Army and Navy on the matter, this for your use if it suits your convenience and fits your ideas.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure

The President

The White House
June 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I think this is important enough for you to take up with Harry Stimson, and possibly with Sumner Welles.

F. D. R.

Letter to Frank Knox, with enclosure, from Allen Haden, c/o Natl. City Bank of NY, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, marked confidential re: Brazil and its situation as concerns the U.S. (need for defense of same, Panama Canal, etc.)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Reports keep coming in with great insistence and repetition that the Navy is asking recruits and even apprentices whether they were in favor of Loyalist Spain and also whether they think we should cooperate with Russia. The stories all say that if they answer yes, they are either not accepted or some excuse is made to release them from the Navy.

I would not call this to your attention were it not for the fact that these allegations come from so many different sources. You and I know that this is a possibility among un-thinking officers, warrant officers or chief petty officers. The "sea lawyer" of a century ago is not extinct!

F. D. R.
MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I am told that the Navy is asking seamen whether they were in favor of Loyalist Spain and also whether they are in sympathy with the Soviets. If they answer "yes" they are taken off the ships.

E.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What do you think?

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

During my recent visit to Rio de Janeiro and in my talks with Vargas and Aranha, both of them expressed repeatedly a desire to be helpful in other directions than merely aiding in the patrol of their coasts, and coincidental with this conversation, there was quite a little discussion of the influence they could wield with Portugal and they professed very great willingness to undertake anything in that direction.

For your personal and confidential consideration, and in connection with certain operations now in progress, it will be a manifest advantage if the allied nations could occupy and use a base on one or more of the islands in the area involved. Do you think it would be worthwhile to suggest to Brazil that she could be greatly helpful to the allied nations if she employed her great influence in Portugal toward that end? If the political situation in Portugal was such that she could acquiesce, it is also possible that such resistance as was encountered would only be a token resistance, especially if the spearhead of the occupation forces were Brazilian. I rather believe that they would undertake this if we asked them.

They are definitely keen to have some part in the war outside of their immediate area. I submit this for what it may be worth.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
BOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 8-5-66
Signature-
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

November 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR  

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I have changed my mind about what I said over the telephone about the General Board and I am inclined to agree with your proposal. There is no reason for keeping any of the four retired officers who are now members of the Board. I also see no reason for keeping Rowcliff. I think you could go about this, filling all five vacancies from officers who have had sea command since December 7, 1941, picking those officers who are overdue for shore duty or who have physically not been able to stand the strain of active sea command. In the latter category, for example, I would place Ghormley who is, in my judgment, a very fine officer but who could not stand only two hours of sleep out of the twenty-four in the Southwest Pacific.

Also, I like your idea of at least one Marine officer on the Board.

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
-2-

I assume also that you will get at least one member who thoroughly understand the importance of aviation.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

I have been giving a great deal of thought lately to a complete reorganization of the General Board of the Navy. Before I undertake to propose any changes to the Navy people, I should like to submit my thought to you for your reaction and comment because I know what I am proposing, and upon which I am asking your advice, will provoke a lot of discussion in the Department and may encounter some opposition.

As I understand it, the General Board was established by a Navy Department General Order forty-two years ago. The members are appointed by the Secretary of the Navy from officers with the rank of Captain and higher. The Board shall have not less than five members. Its duties consist of advising the Secretary of the Navy solely. It has no administrative nor executive powers. The Board at the present time is composed of:

- Admiral A. J. Hepburn, Chairman 65 years of age
- Admiral Thomas C. Hart 65 years of age
- Admiral C. C. Bloch 64 years of age
- Rear Admiral W. R. Sexton 66 years of age
- Rear Admiral G. J. Rowcliffe 61 years of age

The first four of these officers are all on the retired list. The one member who has not yet reached retirement age, Rowcliffe, is not a man in whose judgment I have any confidence. He was sent before the Physical Examining Board recently, together with all other officers over fifty-eight, and was found unsatisfactory by that Board for sea duty, but when his case came before the Retiring Board, that Board voted not to retire him.
What I am thinking of doing, and I am submitting it to you for your consideration, is to retire the entire Board and find some other employment for Rowcliffe or furlough him. I would then fill the places on the Board with younger officers, but officers who have actually seen service at sea since we entered the war. After this new Board was established, a rotation system might be started which would take one man off the Board every three months and put another on fresh from sea duty, the idea being to have someone on the Board constantly who can bring to its consideration the very latest lessons learned in active service. Since the amphibious operation is going to be constantly employed and the size of the Marine Corps has been so greatly increased, my idea would be to have at least one Marine officer on the Board and he an officer who has had experience in actual amphibious operations. Because of the swift development of the sea-air arm, one or two members should be men whose services have been with the air arm of the fleet.

As the official advisors of a civilian secretary, I believe that a General Board so constituted would be invaluable in the service it could render. Certainly, I would feel that such a Board would be of great assistance to me. What do you think of this?

[Signature]

The President

The White House
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. FRANK KHOX

I am somewhat concerned in regard to the reorganization of Procurement Procedures. It sets up a flock of different procedures together with a flock of separate law offices.

They wanted me to try this in the old days and I tested it out in one or two places and quickly abolished it. It did not work.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date.....
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Reorganization of Procurement Procedures and Coordination of Procurement Legal Services.

Reference: Circular letter, unnumbered, dated December 13, 1942, with subject as above.

1. The reference has been brought to my attention.

2. I request reconsideration of the reference, inasmuch as its effect is to discard long-established procedure and to decentralize procedures which would best continue to be unified through one agency of the Navy Department, namely, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts.

3. Paragraph 8 of the reference requires setting up of additional agencies - with additional personnel - which emphasizes the point made in the preceding paragraph, namely, that there will now be six agencies dealing with procurement contracts instead of the one which has long been established by regulation and adapted by experience to the needs of the service.

/s/ E. J. KING

Copy for JAG
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D.C.

December 13, 1942.

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: All Bureaus and Offices, Navy Department.
     The Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps.
     The Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.

Subject: Reorganization of Procurement Procedures and
         Coordination of Procurement Legal Services.

1. From and after the date hereof, the Chief of each
   Bureau having technical cognizance of the material and services to
   be procured shall determine, in his discretion, the extent to which
   written contracts embodying the terms of negotiated deals or arrange-
   ments for such procurement will be negotiated, prepared and executed
   in each such Bureau and the extent, if any, to which the services of
   the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts will be available for the negoti-
   ation, preparation and execution of such contracts.

2. The Chief of each such technical Bureau may exercise
   such discretion from time to time in respect of classes of material
   or services, or specific contracts or types of contracts, provided,
   however, that on or before March 1, 1943, the Chief of each techni-
   cal Bureau shall have completed a survey of the purchases and ar-
   rangements originating in each such Bureau and shall have determined
   which contracts will be negotiated, prepared and executed in each
   such Bureau and which contracts will be negotiated, prepared and exe-
   cuted in the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. Such determination
   shall be reduced to writing and forwarded to the Vice Chief of Naval
   Operations. Modifications and changes therein may, however, be made
   from time to time upon the application of the Chiefs of the respective
   technical Bureaus and the approval of the Vice Chief of Naval Opera-
   tions.

3. All provisions in orders and directives requiring the
   respective technical Bureaus or any of them to transmit, by requisici-
   tion or otherwise, negotiated deals or arrangements for the procure-
   ment of material or services to the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
   for the negotiation, preparation or execution of written contracts or
   orders in respect thereof are hereby canceled and rescinded.

4. The Chief of each technical Bureau is hereby authorized
   to negotiate, prepare and execute all contracts which he shall have
determined are to be negotiated, prepared and executed in his Bureau
and he is further authorized to delegate such authority to execute contracts on behalf of the United States to such person or persons as may be selected by such Bureau Chief. Contracts so executed shall be designated by such appropriate symbols as are now in use in each such Bureau with respect to the contracts executed by the Chief of such Bureau.

5. Appropriate arrangements for the transfer of necessary personnel from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to such technical Bureaus may be made from time to time under the supervision and direction of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

6. The Negotiation Section of the Negotiation Branch of the Bureau of Naval Personnel is hereby transferred to the Office of Procurement and Material in the Office of the Under Secretary and shall be under the immediate direction of the Assistant Chief in Charge of Procurement. The negotiating personnel of such Section will be made available to the various Bureaus to assist in the negotiation of contracts.

7. In order that all legal advice and services relating to procurement, including those relating to patents, may be coordinated in each Bureau and in the Navy Department, there shall be a single legal division in each Bureau to render such advice and perform such services.

8. The head of each legal division in respect of each Bureau shall be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Counsel for the Bureau of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Edward G. Chandler</td>
<td>War and Flags</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James A. Fowler, Jr.</td>
<td>Naval Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Randall Compton</td>
<td>Ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard S. Kyle</td>
<td>Supplies and Accounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuart N. Scott</td>
<td>Aeronautics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrick H. Hodgson</td>
<td>Ships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Counsel for each such Bureau shall forthwith set up the division, selecting the lawyers and other personnel deemed by him to be necessary for the performance of the duties and functions of such division, subject to the approval of the Chief of each such Bureau. In addition to reporting directly to the Chief of each such Bureau, Counsel for each Bureau shall also report to the Under Secretary of the Navy.
9. Contracts and amendments thereto and modifications thereof prepared in a Bureau under the supervision or with the approval of Counsel for that Bureau may be signed by the Chief of such Bureau or the person or persons to whom such authority shall have been delegated without securing the approval of any other person as to form or legality. All provisions in orders and directives requiring that contracts must be sent to the Office of the Judge Advocate General before the execution thereof are hereby canceled and rescinded.

10. The legal services to be rendered by the Counsel for each Bureau will be coordinated and generally supervised on behalf of the Under Secretary of the Navy through the central office of the Procurement Legal Division, of which Division H. Struve Hensel shall be the Chief, T. John Kenney shall be the Assistant Chief, and Richard Spencer shall be the Assistant Chief in Charge of Patents. The central office of the Procurement Legal Division shall act as counsel to the Office of Procurement and Material, The Patents and Tex Amortization Sections of the Procurement Legal Division and the cognizance thereof shall be continued as heretofore established.

11. In view of the changes in contracting procedure hereby made, it is deemed advisable that a comprehensive and detailed study of the contracting procedure in each Bureau with a view to simplifying, expediting and standardizing such procedure be made by the central office of the Procurement Legal Division and the Counsel for each Bureau for and under the supervision of the Chief of each such Bureau, and recommendations with respect thereto shall be forwarded by the Chief of each Bureau as promptly as possible to the Under Secretary and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

/s/ Forrestal
Acting
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

I have yours of January fourth in regard to a group of young officers in the Navy Department. Why not order them all to sea?

F. D. R.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

January 4, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

Recently when I had my last talk with you, you gave me the names of a group of young officers who are serving in the Navy, with the request that I discover just what their duties were and why they were retained in Washington. I have just received the enclosed comments on all of them and I pass this report along for your information.

On the whole, I do not think that much criticism can be appropriately directed at any of these men. They all seem to be doing a pretty good job and several of them have already been ordered to sea.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House

Enclosure
January 2, 1943.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

There follows hereinafter the details concerning the young officers listed in your memorandum dated December 31, 1942, which followed a conference you had had with the President:

Lieutenant Commander Bernard P. Day, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.
First commissioned November 14, 1938.
Ordered to active duty February 21, 1941, Third Naval District.
Ordered to Director Shore Establishment, Navy Department, orders dated February 11, 1942, following request of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (SOSED) in letter dated January 17, 1942.
Age 43. Married, three minor children.

Lieutenant Clarence Douglas Dillon, A-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Formerly Vice President and Director Dillon, Read Co., New York.
Appointed Ensign D-V(S) November 12, 1940.
Ordered to active duty May 19, 1941, Third Naval District. Ordered to Naval Operations for duty in the Office of the Coordinator of Information on request of the Under Secretary, memorandum as follows: "Colonel Donovan called me to say he would like to have Ensign Douglas Dillon, now on duty in the Office of the Commandant, Third Naval District, assigned to his office. He states that this has the approval of the President. Signed J.V.F."
Memorandum dated August 15, 1941.
Transferred to class A-V(S) January 22, 1942.
Ordered Naval Air Station, Quonset for temporary duty under instruction (indoctrination). Orders dated February 3, 1942.
Ordered to Chief of the Office of Procurement and Material for duty, orders dated April 8, 1942.
Ordered to Opnav for duty, orders dated July 22, 1942.
Ordered to report Commander Fleet Air, Seattle, for duty, orders dated October 21, 1942. Now Aide and Flag Secretary, Staff Rear Admiral Frank D. Wagner, USN, Commander Fleet Air, Seattle.
Age 33. Married, two minor children.
Lieutenant Ernest Dupont, Jr., D-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Appointed Ensign I-V(S) November 8, 1933.
Ordered to active duty Tenth Naval District, San Juan, Puerto Rico, under orders dated April 24, 1941.
Ordered to Opnav for duty in Plant Inspection Service, orders dated July 24, 1941, on request of Chief of Naval Operations.
Ordered to duty in the Office of Chief Cable Censor, Washington, D.C., orders dated April 14, 1942. Transferred to Class D-V(S), May 2, 1942.
Age 39. Married, 1 minor child.

Lieutenant Leonard K. Firestone, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Appointed Lieutenant D-V(S) February 2, 1942.
Ordered to Opnav for duty at the request of the Chief of Naval Operations, orders dated February 4, 1942.
Ordered to the Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department, orders dated February 26, 1942.
Age 35. Married, 3 children.

Lieutenant (jg) Randall H. Hagner, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Application rejected on grounds of failure to meet educational and physical standards. Defects waived on urgent representations of Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson.
Appointed Ensign I-V(S) May 15, 1940.
Ordered to active duty Opnav December 8, 1941.
Age 27. Married, no children.

Lieutenant Commander Henry S. Morgan, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Appointed Lieutenant D-V(S) November 1, 1940.
Ordered to Opnav for active duty September 22, 1941, at the request of Opnav.
Appointed Lieutenant Commander January 19, 1942, following recommendation of Under Secretary of the Navy.
Ordered to Office of Procurement and Material, Navy Department, under date February 23, 1942.
Requested sea duty, following a course of indoctrination, in letter dated May 1, 1942. Chief of OP&M recommended disapproval. Not ordered to sea duty.
Age 42. Married, no children.
Lieutenant Frederick S. Moseley, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Ordered to Opnav for duty duty with the Army
Navy Munitions Board.
Ordered to Sub Chaser Training Center, Miami, for duty under instruction. Orders dated December 9, 1942, following his request for sea duty in letter dated November 19, 1942.

Ensign Robert W. Sarnoff, D-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Appointed Ensign, February 28, 1942, D-V(S).
Personally known to Colonel Donovan.
Ordered to Opnav for duty March 3, 1942.
Has requested postgraduate instruction in Communications at U.S. Naval Academy in a class scheduled to commence in March, 1943.
Age 24. Married.

Lieutenant Oakleigh L. Thorne, A-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Appointed Lieutenant (jg) A-V(S), March 27, 1941.
Ordered to Bureau of Aeronautics for duty on request of Chief of Bureau of Aeronautics.
Ordered to Staff, Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet, under orders dated October 13, 1942.
Age 32. Married, 3 minor children.

Lieutenant Louis E. Walker, A-V(S), U.S.N.R.
Appointed Lieutenant (jg) March 13, 1941.
Ordered to Bureau of Aeronautics.
Appointed Lieutenant June 15, 1942.
Age 33. Bachelor.
My dear Mr. President:

Recently you wrote me a little memorandum about the legal handling of contracts.

When you have time, the attached memorandum which was prepared by Jim Forrestal will give you a quick review of just how this matter has been handled. I think it is going along in a way satisfactory to you and I have already suggested to Forrestal the rotation of these lawyers in the various bureaus, as you suggested.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

The President

The White House

Enclosure
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

January 4, 1943

Subject: PROCUREMENT LEGAL SERVICES

1. TheProcurement Legal Division was set up as a part of the Office of the Under Secretary in accordance with the following three principles:

   (a) Selection and control of personnel centralized in the Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy;
   (b) Availability of legal services on the spot at the inception, throughout the negotiation, and at the execution of, the procurement contracts; and
   (c) Civilian personnel in so far as possible to avoid the restrictions of naval channels and echelons.

2. The Division is controlled through a supervisory legal office located in the Office of the Under Secretary, with branch offices physically located in all the contracting Bureaus headed by civilian lawyers with substantial commercial experience, responsible directly to the Under Secretary. In addition, a branch patent law office and a tax amortization (certificates of necessity) office were set up as parts of the supervisory office. The supervisory office also acts as counsel for the Office of Procurement and Material.

3. Immediately after the outbreak of war, review, before execution, of all contracts over $200,000 by members of the Procurement Legal Division was made mandatory. By the directive of December 13, 1942, all procurement legal services were brought under the supervision of such Division, and the separate and uncoordinated contracts and legal divisions in the various Bureaus were transferred to such Division.

4. Procurement legal services in the Navy Department are now rendered by men forming a part of the Office of the Under Secretary and directly responsible to the Under Secretary. The fact that the men in the branch offices also report directly to the respective Bureau Chiefs (and not to any subordinate Bureau officers) will not diminish their responsibility to the Under Secretary but is intended only to advise the Bureau Chiefs directly of the work being performed in their respective Bureaus.

5. Prior to the establishment of the Procurement Legal Division, procurement legal services had been jointly rendered by contracts divisions responsible only to Chiefs of Bureaus and men in the Office of the Judge Advocate General physically located away from the Bureaus and reviewing contracts in the main only after completion of all negotiations and without intimate knowledge of the progress of the negotiations.
6. The establishment of the Division has enabled the Under Secretary to free himself from the clerical work of signing innumerable contracts (through delegation of such authority to the Bureau Chiefs) with the assurance that control of policy and details was being maintained through examination of contracts by direct representatives.

7. The key personnel of this Division were selected by the Under Secretary from the field of business lawyers and their names are --

In the supervisory office, H. Struve Hensel (formerly a partner of Milbank, Tweed & Hope, New York City) is Chief of the Division and W. John Kenney (formerly practicing alone in Los Angeles) is Assistant Chief;

In the branch offices, Patrick H. Hodgson (formerly a partner of Kenefick, Cooke, Mitchell, Bass & Letchworth in Buffalo) is counsel for the Bureau of Ships; Richard S. Kyle (formerly a partner of Hawkins, Delafield and Longfellow in New York) is counsel for the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts; W. Randall Compton (formerly a partner of Semmes, Bowen & Semmes in Baltimore) is counsel for the Bureau of Ordnance; Edward G. Chandler (formerly a partner of Athearn, Farmer & Chandler in San Francisco) is counsel for the Bureau of Yards and Docks; Stuart N. Scott (formerly a partner of Root, Clark, Buckner & Ballantine in New York City) is counsel for the Bureau of Aeronautics; James A. Fowler, Jr. (formerly a partner of Wright, Gordon, Zachry, Parlin and Cahill in New York City) is counsel for the Bureau of Naval Personnel; and Lt. Comdr. Richard Spencer (formerly a partner of Spencer, Marzall, Johnson & Cook in Chicago) is in charge of the Patents Branch.

A number of the lawyers now in the branch offices were originally employed in the supervisory office and that practice can continue. W. John Kenney was at one time counsel for the Bureau of Ordnance and H. Struve Hensel and Richard S. Kyle were formerly in charge of the Tax Certification work. Further rotation of personnel is possible but must be tempered by the necessity of not interfering with the progress of the work or the familiarity of the lawyers with the personnel and particular problems of the Bureaus for which they have acted for considerable periods.

James Forrestal
Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
165 West 46th Street
New York 29, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Morgenthau:

A friend of mine in the Navy Department in Washington recently happened to see in the files of the Secretary of the Navy a penciled note written by President Roosevelt to Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. Although the note is undated, it was apparently written by the President in February, 1943.

He has sent me a photostatic copy of the note, and as it is an item of some interest and concerns you, I have enclosed a photostatic copy which you may wish to keep. We had no copy of this note in the Library, and I am retaining another photostatic copy here. The note reads as follows:

F.K.

The last Lockheed plane we gave to
H M. Jr. was 3 years ago - Since then it
has gone through a tree - So did Henry -
Will you please take it back & send him a
new air taxi - one of the new 80 Lockheeds
you are getting this Spring.

FDR

You will recall that the last time you were in this Library you asked me to look into the possibility of having duplicates made of the Kodachrome print of President Roosevelt which hangs in my office. I have consulted with several photographers concerning this
matter, and they tell me that this print is apparently made from a
dhand retouched negative which is presumably still in the possession
of the photographer. They say that it would be impossible to
duplicate the quality of this print without using the original
negative. All that I can suggest, therefore, if you care to pursue
the matter further, is that you have an inquiry sent to Mr. B. Movin-
Hermes, photographer to the King of Sweden, Stockholm, Sweden, concerning
the possibility of obtaining additional prints from this negative.

Sincerely yours,

Herman Kahn
Director

Enclosure

HK: nvn
This seems
probably written
by President
in February
1943.

P. Yeager
F. X.

The last scheduled plane we gave to H. M. J. was 3 years ago. Since then it has been through a T& S.  Did Honey—will you have take it back a send him a new air taxi—one of the new 80 and he thinks you are getting the thing.

F. X.

12-11-22
I find from the Morgenthau Diary that HM Jr was in a near-crashup of his personal plane on Oct. 3, 1938 somewhere in Dutchess County, the plane grazing several trees, so that the FDR reference in the attached memo is doubtless to the word "tree." There is no copy of this memo of 1943 among the HM papers for that period, though there is a letter from Knox advising HM that a new plane would be placed at his disposal. The Knox letter is dated Feb. 26, 1943.

GWR
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 23, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

WILLIAM D. HASSELT:

Will you check up and see if you can get a line on the type and kind of story written by John Hersey, Associate Editor of Time Incorporated?

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 22, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The President.

I recommend approval.

Mr. Hersey assisted in the care and removal of wounded under fire on two separate occasions.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

W. D. Brown
MEMORANDUM FOR NAVAL AIDS TO THE PRESIDENT.

There is forwarded herewith a recommendation for the award of the Silver Star Medal to John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated, a civilian, in recognition of his conduct during combat operations against the enemy in Guadalcanal Area on October 7 and 8, 1942.

The President has indicated his desire that awards of this kind to civilians be submitted to him for final approval.

[Signature]

Frank Knox
SEVENTH ENDORSEMENT

From: The Secretary of the Navy.

To: Senior Member of the Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals.

Subject: Commentatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. Returned. I approve the recommendation of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, that John Hersey be awarded the Silver Star Medal.

Frank Knox
SIXTH ENDORSEMENT to
CO, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv
FMP, In the Field, ltr. 1740
MAR 9/43
Adm (313) of October 22, 1942.

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate
Editor, Time Incorporated.

FORWARDED, concurring in the recommendation
of the Commanding General, First Marine Division.

R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.
FIFTH ENDORSEMENT to
CO, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv
FMF, In the Field, ltr. 1740

1943 MAR 5
9 05

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor,
Time Incorporated.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Board of
Decorations and Medals.

L. E. Denfeld
The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel

Copy to:
Bi of Dec & Medals
Secy Files
Coominck
NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Fourth Endorsement

to CO, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv
FMF, In the Field, ltr. 1740

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: (1) The Chief of Naval Personnel.
(2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor,
Time Incorporated.

Reference: (a) CO, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv, FMF, In the Field, ltr. 1740
AIS-34 (3113) dated Oct. 22, 1942, with forwarding ends.

1. Considered at the meeting of the Board of Awards held Feb. 25, 1943.

2. Recommendation: That John Hersey, Associate Editor of Time Incorporated, be addressed a Letter of Commendation by the Secretary of the Navy in recognition of his conduct during combat operations against the enemy in Guadalcanal Area on October 7 and 8, 1942, as set forth in reference (a).

A. E. WATSON
Senior Member

Copy to:
Ed of Dec & Medals
Secy Files
Cominich
Third Endorsement  17 December, 1942.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER, SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

From:  The Commander South Pacific Area and
South Pacific Force.
To :  The Secretary of the Navy.
Via :  The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subject:  Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate
Editor, Time Incorporated.

1.  Forwarded, recommending approval.  S02 18  70

W. F. HALSEY.

W. F. HALSEY.
1st Endorsement. 28 October, 1942.
First Marine Division, M.A., c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: (1) The Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force and Area.
(2) The Commander, South Pacific Force and Area.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. Forwarded, recommending award of the Silver Star Medal for the action set forth in the basic correspondence.

2. Mr. Hersey was serving in the capacity of a war correspondent with the U.S. Navy at the time of the actions described.

A. A. VANDERGRIFT.

2nd Endorsement 7 December, 1942.
HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commander, South Pacific Force and Area.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval.

CAPTAIN B. D. D.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, First Marine Division.
Subject: Commentatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. The following facts are forwarded for appropriate consideration and action.

(a) On 7 October John Hersey, an Associate Editor of Time Incorporated accompanied the Headquarters and Service Company, 7th Marines to the Regimental Command Post located east of the Matanikau River, at (71.6-195.2) see Guadalcanal Map 104, to observe combat operations against the enemy which took place in that vicinity on 7 and 8 October, 1942.

(b) Late on the afternoon of 7 October Mr. Hersey desiring to secure first hand information on the progress of the operation, descended a ravine located at (71.2-199.1) to a point where the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines was encountering enemy resistance to their front. The 3rd Battalion then being under heavy machine gun and mortar fire suffered several casualties. Mr. Hersey without regard for his own safety, and over and above his assignment, while under fire helped remove the wounded out of the ravine to an aid station.

(c) On 8 October Mr. Hersey followed the operation very closely from the 7th Marines forward Command Post at (70.9-199.1). Early in the afternoon of that day Mr. Hersey left the Command Post to go forward and witness the crossing of the Matanikau River by the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. In the sector where the crossing was taking place enemy fire was encountered. Just north of the crossing along the Matanikau River "G" Company, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines was mopping up a group of enemy mortars and machine guns. Mr. Hersey went into this area to witness the mopping up. "G" Company had some casualties including their battalion commander. Mr. Hersey without regard to his own safety, and disregarding enemy fire, helped to evacuate the wounded out of the ravine to an aid station where the casualties were treated.

(d) Mr. Hersey's actions are commendable for his disregard of enemy fire and the safety of his own life. His conduct was outstandingly conspicuous by reason of his being an observer and therefore not required to undergo the dangers which he subjected himself to.
SIXTH ENDORSEMENT to
CO, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv
FMF, In the Field, ltr. 1740
ALS-1d (3113) of October 22,
1942.

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate
Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation
of the Commanding General, First Marine Division.

R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.
Third Endorsement

17 December, 1942.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER, SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

From: The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval.

W. F. Halsey.
1st Endorsement.

First Marine Division, PMF, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Via:
(1) The Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force and Area.
(2) The Commander, South Pacific Force and Area.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. Forwarded, recommending award of the Silver Star Medal for the action set forth in the basic correspondence.

2. Mr. Hersey was serving in the capacity of a war correspondent with the U.S. Navy at the time of the actions described.

A. A. Vandegrift.

2nd Endorsement 7 December, 1942.
HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MARINE AMPHIBIOUS CORPS.

From: The Commanding General.
To: The Commander, South Pacific Force and Area.

1. Forwarded, recommending approval.

CLAYTON B. VOGEL.
MEMORANDUM FOR NAVAL AID TO THE PRESIDENT.

March 16, 1943

There is forwarded herewith a recommendation for the award of the Silver Star Medal to John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated, a civilian, in recognition of his conduct during combat operations against the enemy in Guadalcanal Area on October 7 and 8, 1942.

The President has indicated his desire to be advised when awards of this kind are made. May we have his approval?

/s/ FRANK Knox

Copy for White House File
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON

March 8, 1943

SEVENTH ENDORSEMENT

S0-2-18-70

From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Senior Member of the Navy Department Board
of Decorations and Medals.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate
Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. Returned. I approve the recommendation of
the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, that John Hersey
be awarded the Silver Star Medal.

/s/ FRANK KNOX
SIXTH ENDORSEMENT to
GC, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv
HM, In the Field, 1tr 1740
AL3-1d (3113) of October 22, 1942.

From: The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Commanding General, First Marine Division.

/s/ R. S. EDWARDS,
Chief of Staff.
FIFTH ENDORSEMENT to 1943 MAR 5
Co, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv
PMF, in the Field, ltr. 1740
ALS-jd (21113) dated Oct. 22, 1942.

From: The Chief of Naval Personnel.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Via: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

Subject: Commandatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor,
Time Incorporated.

1. Forwarded, concurring in the recommendation of the Board of
Decorations and Medals.

/s/ L.E. Denfeld
The Assistant Chief of Naval Personnel

Copy to:
Bd of Dec & Medals
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Fourth Endorsement

to CO, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv
FMF, In the Field, ltr. 1740

From: The Senior Member of the Navy Department Board of Decorations and Medals.

To: The Secretary of the Navy

Via: (1) The Chief of Naval Personnel.
(2) The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet

Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

Reference: (a) CO, 7th Marines, 1st MarDiv, FMF, In the Field, ltr. 1740
ALS-jd (3113) dated Oct. 22, 1942, with forwarding ends.

1. Considered at the meeting of the Board of Awards held Feb. 25, 1943.

2. Recommendation: That John Hersey, Associate Editor of Time Incorporated, be addressed a Letter of Commendation by the Secretary of the Navy in recognition of his conduct during combat operations against the enemy in Guadalcanal Area on October 7 and 8, 1942, as set forth in reference (a).

A. E. WATSON
Senior Member

/s/ H. G. Patrick
By direction

Copy to:
Bd of Dec & Medals
Secy Files
Cominich
Third Endorsement  17 December, 1942.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER, SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE
OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

From:  The Commander South Pacific Area and
        South Pacific Force.
To:    The Secretary of the Navy.
Via:  The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Commentatory actions of John Hersey, Associate
        Editor, Time Incorporated.

1.         Forwarded, recommending approval.  S02 18 70

                             /s/ W. F. Halsey
1st Endorsement. 28 October, 1942.
From: The Commanding General.  
To: The Secretary of the Navy.  
Via: (1) The Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific Force and Area.  
(2) The Commander, South Pacific Force and Area.  
Subject: Comedatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.  

1. Forwarded, recommending award of the Silver Star Medal for the action set forth in the basic correspondence.  

2. Mr. Hersey was serving in the capacity of a war correspondent with the U.S. Navy at the time of the actions described.

2nd Endorsement 7 December, 1942.
From: The Commanding General.  
To: The Commander, South Pacific Force and Area.  

1. Forwarded, recommending approval.
7th Marines, First Marine Division,
Fleet Marine Force,
In the Field.
22 October, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commanding General, First Marine Division.
Subject: Commendatory actions of John Hersey, Associate Editor, Time Incorporated.

1. The following facts are forwarded for appropriate consideration and action.

(a) On 7 October John Hersey, an Associate Editor of Time Incorporated accompanied the Headquarters and Service Company, 7th Marines to the Regimental Command Post located east of the Matanikau River, at (71.1-199.2) see Quadrangle Map 104, to observe combat operations against the enemy which took place in that vicinity on 7 and 8 October, 1942.

(b) Late on the afternoon of 7 October Mr. Hersey desiring to secure first hand information on the progress of the operation, descended a ravine located at (71.2-199)-(71.6-199.1) to a point where the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines was encountering enemy resistance to their front. The 3rd Battalion then being under heavy machine gun and mortar fire suffered several casualties. Mr. Hersey without regard for his own safety, and over and above his assignment, while under fire helped remove the wounded out of the ravine to an aid station.

(c) On 8 October Mr. Hersey followed the operation very closely from the 7th Marines Forward Command Post at (70.9-199.1). Early in the afternoon of that day Mr. Hersey left the Command Post to go forward and witness the crossing of the Matanikau River by the 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. In the sector where the crossing was taking place enemy fire was encountered. Just north of the crossing along the Matanikau River "G" Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines was mopping up a group of enemy mortars and machine guns. Mr. Hersey went into this area to witness the mopping up. "G" Company had some casualties including their battalion commander. Mr. Hersey without regard to his own safety, and disregarding enemy fire, helped to evacuate the wounded out of the ravine to an aid station where the casualties were treated.

(d) Mr. Hersey's actions are commendable for his disregard of enemy fire and the safety of his own life. His conduct was outstandingly conspicuous by reason of his being an observer and therefore not required to undergo the dangers which he subjected himself to.
March 24, 1943

Mr. William D. Haggart
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Bill:

Here is a memorandum handed to me by Chester Kerr, who is the chief of our book division and in whose judgment I have complete confidence. Of course he is, as you will note, a friend of John Hersey, but that doesn't bother me at all as he would not dream of letting that influence him in drafting a statement for your use. His opinion of Mr. Hersey checks with my own but if you want me to go further and get other opinions I can naturally do so.

Sincerely yours,

Henry F. Pringle
Memorandum to Henry Pringle
From Chester Kerr

John Hersey was born in China in 1914, where his father was a missionary. He lived there until he was about twelve, when the family returned to this country. The father subsequently developed sleeping sickness and has been an invalid ever since. John and his two brothers earned their way through school.

He attended Hotchkiss on scholarships, was outstanding there in studies, athletics, and leadership, and easily won scholarships to Yale, where he supported himself throughout. He graduated from Yale in 1936, as one of the leading men in his class. He was Phi Beta Kappa, he was vice-chairman of the News, chairman of the prom, class secretary, football letterman, and a member of a fraternity and senior society. Two months before he graduated, he was awarded, on merit, without application (as distinct from Rhodes scholarships), a year's scholarship at Cambridge. He spent the next year in England, relaxing from Yale competition, writing and destroying a novel, and maturing considerably.

Upon his return in 1937 he spent four months as private secretary to Sinclair Lewis. He then took and passed Time's test for writers, refusing to draw on his Yale pull for a job there. He began work for Time that fall and has remained with them ever since.

He has written for almost every department of the magazine, but in the past three years has been writing on foreign affairs. Time sent him to China in 1940 and into the Pacific with a Navy task force in the fall of 1942, as part of their policy of sending their war writers into the field. Today he is writing and editing a substantial part of their "World Battlefronts" section.

In the spring of 1942, his first book, MEN ON BATAAN, was published by Knopf. It was written out of his firsthand knowledge of MacArthur and the region and out of Time dispatches and research. It had a moderate success.

In January 1943 his book INTO THE VALLEY, an account of a Marine skirmish on Guadalcanal, which he took part in, was published by Knopf and instantly received wide critical acclaim. It has just been chosen as the second "Imperative" by the Council on Books in Wartime.

John was my room-mate at Yale. I think he will inherit Henry Luce's mantle, and in general I believe that will be a fine thing for the country and for Time.
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

March 25, 1943.

This matter of a decoration for John Hersey, Associate Editor of "TIME", does raise an interesting point.

From all that I can make out, Hersey is a pretty decent fellow and has done good work for TIME magazine for six years. All that I hear of him is entirely favorable. The point is, however, whether a correspondent serving on a fighting front of the Army or Navy should receive a decoration for bringing in wounded in the midst of a fight. I have no doubt that any man, whether in service uniform or correspondent's uniform, who had red blood in his veins, would do the same thing.

As far as I can make out, lots of other people among the Marines

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By F. J. Stewart Date MAR 1, 1972
at Guadalcanal did the same thing and have not been decorated for it. And equally I have no doubt that on the Tunis front more than one correspondent has helped to bring wounded men to the rear. Any fellow — in or out of uniform — would instinctively help in a time of emergency like that.

Please think this over and talk with me about it.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I made inquiry of the Office of War Information upon receipt of your memorandum of March twenty-third and find that John Hersey, Associate Editor of Time, is today writing and editing a substantial part of the Time feature, "World Battlefronts". Last January he brought out his second book "Into the Valley", based on his experiences as a correspondent for Time on Guadalcanal, which I am informed was favorably received. I am attaching herewith tear sheets comprising the section "World Battlefronts" from five issues of Time for March and February this year.

Attached also is a confidential memorandum on Hersey from the Office of War Information. Please let me know if you desire to have the inquiry carried further.

V.D.H.
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC
Here They Come
There was reason to believe last week that a U-boat fleet, bigger and more dangerous than ever, was moving westward from the middle Atlantic.
► Canada's Air Minister C. G. Power announced four recent attacks by R.C.A.F. patrol planes on Axis U-boats close to Canadian shores. Said he: "There seems little doubt that enemy submarines will return in force to this side of the Atlantic with the coming of warmer weather."
► In Berlin, the German High Command pointed up the prospects with an ecstatic communiqué: "In the snowstorms of the North Atlantic, the glaring sun of the Equator and the autumnal storms at the Cape of Good Hope, German submarines have sunk in the last five days, in fierce, tendacious fighting, 23 ships totaling 134,000 tons. A further six ships were torpedoed."
► Marine underwriters reduced their rates on 70 major world routes, noticeably did not reduce them for Allied shipping on the North Atlantic runs.

BATTLE OF AFRICA
The Plotters of Souk-el-Spaatz
[See Cover]
In the evening, Tin Pan Alley tunes, thumped and wheezed from a piano and an accordion, split the African darkness. The racket came from a rocco Moorish villa which soldiers in the area call "Souk-el-Spaatz." But the concerts are only occasional. Most of the time Souk-el-Spaatz is a silent hive of conspiring and conferring men. It is the headquarters of the air war being waged by the Allies in Tunisia.

The principal conferences are four: shrewd, jut-eared Sir Arthur Tedder, dined-up, taciturn Carl ("Toosey") Spaatz, wiry, ebullient Jimmy Doolittle and handsome Arthur ("Mary") Coningham. They are a quartet of British and U.S. airmen who have one plan: to let loose a thunderbolt on the enemy.

Correspondents were allowed to cable strong hints that the thunderbolt might fall soon. Last week the Allied Commander-in-Chief, U.S. General Dwight Eisenhower, said: "For the immediate future I know that each of us has no other thought than to do his full duty and more in clearing Tunisia." Eisenhower's "immediate future" started a flurry of newspaper speculation. For reasons best known to the Allied staffs, they were clearly telegraphing the punch.

Four months and seven days after U.S. and British forces had landed in French North Africa, the Tunisian theater was in a state of suspense. Rommel, beaten and hurt (see p. 25), ground at the British Eighth Army with his artillery, snapped at British and French patrols which had run around the southern end of the Mareth Line to get in on his flank.

In the central sector, U.S. and French patrols cautiously tested the Axis lines from Gaia to Faid Pass, North, the British First Army, which had repulsed two weeks of savage German jabs, now showed signs of taking a limited offensive. Something was imminent. The possibilities were too explosive for any comparative quiet to last very long. Said Eisenhower: "Possibly be [the enemy] will make further and desperate efforts, but I know that the troops of our field armies will, with the continued effective support of our naval and air forces, inexorably push him back to the sea and destruction."

It will be up to the planners and plotters of Souk-el-Spaatz to defeat the Luftwaffe, support their own troops while they mauled the Axis and block the enemy's evacuation from Tunisia. Their thunderbolt is an air weapon, but they have designed it to strike when & where it will best aid the men and weapons on the ground. This integration was the great achievement of Spaatz & Co.; how to achieve it was something they had learned the hard way.

The Freshmen. One day last November, three weeks after the Allied landing on the coast, a group of sweating U.S. tankmen halted their 750-mile dash from Oran, near the crest of a hill overlooking Tunisia. The time was fourteen miles away. They had paused for orders from the officer commanding the shoestring force of British infantry behind them. As they waited, two German fighter planes swooped over the hills and strafed the British infantry, whose commander had belatedly decided to wait for air support. The support never came in time. Rushing German strong men stopped the Allied dash.

The first convoys did not bring enough fighter planes, Advanced airfields were scarce and ha'penny size. The Luftwaffe, with its shuttle service from Sicily, got there first. The Allies backed up into the hills of northern Tunisia and the Allied campaign mired down in the mud of North Africa's winter, while Axis reinforcements, ferried partly by air, poured in from Sicily.

When U.S. airmen finally got their planes, they were not too sure how to use them. Actual combat held surprises which no amount of maneuvers had trained them.
to meet. SOP (standard operating procedure) did not cover the reality of battle. There were tragic and vexatious blunders, U.S. pilots in fighters and hedgehopping bombers strafed and bombed U.S. tanks. In self-defense—and sometimes in panic and ignorance—tankmen turned their swift, deadly fire on their own planes. The bungles could hardly be blamed on Jimmy Doolittle, who then commanded the Twelfth U.S. Air Force, or on anyone else in particular. All U.S. troops made errors in those frantic, frenzied days of combat, when the Allied armies were struggling across the muddy, mountainous country between Algeria and the coast of Tunisia.

The vexous thing was that U.S. and British troops outnumbered the Axis. But the veteran Germans, working with the coordination of a meat grinder, cut them off and chewed them up, while Rommel, retreating from Tripoli, established himself strongly along the coast, reached out and joined hands with Colonel General Jürgen von Arnim.

The Heroic. It was not all a tale of Allied confusion and ineptness. There were plenty of stories of smart improvisation, reckless courage. Overnight, during the December days of the drive to the coast, engineers felled clumps of trees to make makeshift roads. Armored units did battle on roads made of argybolag and rice straw. Bombers and fighters sprayed their landing fields with the muddy hollows of Tunisia’s sharp ridges. Pup-tent bases sprang up like fungi. Overworked and weary crews serviced their own planes, nightly refueled their Fortresses by hand from five-gallon tins (fuel capacity of a Fortress: over 2,000 gallons), then crawled under pup tents to sleep a few hours.

One P-40 squadron carried on a single-handed guerrilla warfare in support of U.S. and French troops. Unofficial leader of the squadron: Major (now Lieut. Colonel) Philip Cochran, the original “Flip Corkin” of Milton Caniff’s Terry and the Pirates comic strip. He dashed one early morning to the holy city of Kairouan, swooped at low level and dropped a bomb smack on to a building where the German staff was meeting. There was many another story of luck and heroism. But U.S. air and ground units, blundering through the complexities of coordinated operation, were about ready to declare war on each other when Tooney Spaatz was ordered from England to act as air adviser to Eisenhower.

The Graduates. Allied officers had compiled a fat, black book of errors which Spaatz and they hastened to correct. Instead of trying to identify each other in the heat of action, commanders of the various units would have to know in advance where and how each arm intended to operate at a given, precise time. Spaatz learned the Germans’ science of establishing local air supremacy. He learned that, overnight, in an area where experience and reconnaissance indicated he would oppose 50 enemy fighters, the German strength would become suddenly 100 fighters. He learned that when the Germans intended to go somewhere on the ground, Nazi dive-bombers would abruptly take command.

The Allies worked doggedly to overcome the difficulties of supplying forward bases. Reinforcements arrived. Long-range, multipurpose P-38 Lightnings, flew from England with extra fuel tanks strapped to their bellies, fought back Messerschmitt 109s and Focke-Wulf 190s, which thus far had reigned supreme. Tropicalized Spitfires arrived, Marauders, Mitchells, Bostons, Airacobras, Hurri-bombers, Hurricanes carrying tank-busting cannon. In late January the British Eighth Army drew up in the south with its powerful Allied Western Desert air forces.

Axis air strength grew too. Estimates, probably exaggerated, were that one-fifth of Germany’s Luftwaffe was concentrated in the area, almost the entire Italian air force. German veterans from France and Russia appeared. P-38 pilots developed a “Messerschmitt twitch,” a nervous glance back over the shoulder. Axis anti-aircraft fire intensified, caught many an unlucky medium bomber before the high command realized that these planes were better suited to sweeps against shipping.

But, except for fewer & fewer occasions when the Germans seized local command, the Allies won ascendancy and held it. During the first four months the Allies destroyed 750 Axis planes over North-west Africa, lost 533. During the past six weeks U.S. pilots have scored 2-1. They had come far since the awkward, learning days of early winter.

The Doctrine. Pale, birdlike Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, who had
planned the strategy for cracking Rommel's Luftwaffe in Egypt, had become Spaatz's boss by then. The Casablanca conference had given Sir Arthur command of Allied air from North Africa's west coast throughout the Mediterranean area. Spaatz's air arm had been made his chief of operations in Tunisia. Under Spaatz, the jobs were carefully subdivided. One job was the bombing of Axis ports and supply lines; the other was the operation of fighter planes and attack bombers in coordination with ground activities. Spaatz's deputy to run the long-range bombing was Jimmy Doolittle, who had been none too happy with the mass of administrative detail which his original command had involved. His deputy to command the ground support: Arthur Coningham, the tall, genial expert who had run Tedder's Egyptian show (see map, p. 29).

Spaatz and Tedder see eye to eye. They have the same airmen's view of how air power should be used. Ground staffs conceived of it too often merely as "field artillery." This was not the way airmen saw it. Tedder spelled out their doctrine: "Air war is a separate war, though linked to those on land & sea... Command of the air determines what happens on land & sea... The essential lesson learned in the Middle East is that an air force is a separate offensive entity, striking at the enemy in cooperation with the army."

The U.S. Air Forces do not have the R.A.F.'s complete independence, but they do have operational autonomy. In Africa Spaatz's airmen found themselves operating with the same freedom enjoyed by the R.A.F. Said one U.S. officer at Souk-el-

Doolittle & Friends
They corrected a fat, black book of errors.

Spaatz: "The high command merely says The air force will take care of that," and by God we do."

Spaatz and Tedder would not argue that they are fighting an unconnected war. Their main objective is the same as the ground troops. Teddy and Spaatz confer often with Eisenhowcr and General Sir Harold Alexander, General of ground operations. They compose the tune, coordinated in the third phase, Coningham's bombers pounded rear lines while his fighters strafed the front. All through the long desert chase Coningham and Montgomery were hand in glove.

Last week the Tunisian air campaign was in Phase No. 1—the strategic bombing of Axis bases and land & water supply routes. Phase No. 2 will come when the ground forces are ready, or almost ready, to start their drive. Then "Mary" Coningham's short-range planes will try to liquidate the Luftwaffe. The whole execution is in the hands of Tooey Spaatz. For the Allies win on the ground, he must first win the air. In Phase No. 3 will come the pay-off.

The Troubadour. The man in whose hands rests the thunderbolt has had a typical veteran U.S. air commander's career. It varied from the norm only in details. In 1899—at the age of eight—redheaded Carl Spaatz (later changed to Spatz) was the youngest linotype operator in Pennsylvania. He operated the machine in the Elysian Fields, Pa., print shop where his Pennsylvania Dutch father and grandfather published the Berks County Democrat. Carl had a happier time playing the guitar, which Father Spatz taught him in the evening. Father Spatz, who became a state senator, got him an appointment to West Point, so off he went in 1910, lugging his guitar.

He strummed his way through without scholarly distinction, but with plenty of friends and a new nickname, Tooey. He caught a glimpse one day of Glenn Curtiss making his record-breaking flight from Albany to New York. That day Tooey had a glimpse of his own career. The army, he figured, was at least the place where he could learn to fly.

In Mexico with Pershing's Punitive Expedition, he played his guitar, collaborated on a composition called the Punitive Rag, and when World War I came along sailed for France. There to his chagrin he was assigned to a pilot-training job at Issoudun.

The legend is that he went AWOL from the school in order to get in a few personal licks at the Germans and narrowly escaped serious disciplining. The fact is he was decorated with a Distinguished Service Cross for his exploits in France.

During the postwar days of aviation Tooey Spaatz (who added the extra "a" because frequent mispronunciations of Spatz as "Spats" instead of "Spats" sent him into a fury) became one of the faithful around Billy Mitchell. In 1942 he was serving as Chief of the Air Force Combat Command, when he was suddenly yanked out and sent to England as command and train the Eighth Army Air Force.

The Veteran. The British approved him. Blunt as a hammer, he remarked to Sir Sholto Douglas, then chief of the Fighter Command: "Sir Sholto, I hear you are a son-of-a-bitch and that I'm not going to get along with you at all. Is that right?"

They got along like a thumb and a first
finger. At a military demonstration he sat next to King George for half an hour, exchanged only a how-do-you-do and a good-by. Spaatz's verdict on the equally reserved King of England: "A wonderful man." When the Queen paid a visit to the U.S. Air Force and it began to shower, quiet, grayed Spaatz wrapped his raincoat around her Majesty. Another man might have preserved the coat as a relic. Spaatz wore it all the time. It is as torn and stained as his old pancake cap with the ripped-out lining.

His own men learned to venerate the old-line, wind-beaten, open-cockpit veteran of the Air Corps. They told each other the story of the night he stood on a London rooftop observing a German air raid. The Nazis' aim was wild, the bombs fell helter-skelter. Spaatz began to fume and curse, suddenly roared: "The damn fools are setting air power back 20 years."

Early last December he was sent to North Africa. There he learned, last week, that he had been made a lieutenant general. Spaatz has few relaxations: squash, fishing, poker, which he plays with a sometimes wild abandon, betting, according to his wife, "on anything." But at Soviet Spaatz, he plays less & less. His habitual tension has increased. Recently he wrote to Mrs. Spaatz: "I'm looking forward to the day when we can reoccupy our shack... own a boat on the Potomac and float up & down on the tide." The "shack" is the comfortable, 133-year-old home in Alexandria which Tooey bought one week before Dec. 7.

Tooey Spaatz was probably kidding himself. He looks forward to action. After Tunisia is cleared out, Axis bases on Pantelleria and Lampedusa must be blasted off the face of the Mediterranean, the great Axis strongholds on Sicily and Sardinia reduced, Italy or the Balkans—whatever the route—pummeled and softened for the inevitable invasion. It will be a long time before Tooey Spaatz floats up & down on the tidewater of the Potomac.

Graveyard

Rommel hoped he might throw his old enemy off balance. In the fine, slanting rain of an early Tunisian morning he sent the tanks charging south toward the little town of Medéine, which the Eighth Army had occupied. From the foothills of the Matmata Mountains, nest of the Mareth Line fortifications, Rommel's cannon laid down a barrage to cover the advance. British artillery was in position before Medéine. Some of their guns emplaced were on two hillocks, dubbed Elephant Hill and Edinburgh Castle, which stuck up like two pimples in the plain. Others were on the ridge, behind, where Time's Correspondent Jack Belden also stood and watched one phase of one day's battle. Belden wrote in his notebook:

"As the Germans land shells stop Edinburgh Castle. Dark, black streamers of smoke suddenly appear in the sky over us."

The Germans are using air-burst antipersonnel shells.

11:30—There is a buzzing above our heads. Someone shouts: "They're ours." and there are 20 Kittyhawks and Spitfires above us. Eight German planes are seen flying above our left flank.

13:00—Guns on our side are so far silent. Then the right opens up. The Germans reply with shells which explode near the highway, up which ammunition trucks are unperturbedly traveling.

13:25—A loud roaring noise of planes in a dive. Someone shouts: "Those aren't ours." Out of the sun across the battlefield sweep three planes toward Edinburgh Castle. A loud series of crumps rends the air, huge clouds of blackish-grey smoke spring up at the foot of Edinburgh. Ma-

BATTLE OF RUSSIA

Little Shaver

Treetop level is the favorite operational height for Russian flyers; their favorite plane for bombing attacks is the U.S.-built, cannon-carrying Airacobra. Russians call such flying "shaving"; the Airacobas they have affectionately nicknamed "Little Shaver."

Counter-Attack

In Russia the spotlight was on the south again, but this time the whole aspect of the front was importantly changed.

The Germans, not the Russians, were on the march. In a fortnight, German forces pressed the Russians back some 80 miles along a 200-mile front (see map, p. 26).

Below Kharkov the line was pushed right back to the Donets River. Strong forces moved to attack Kharkov itself.

The question was no longer whether the Germans would be able to hold the line of the Dnieper, or keep the Ukraine. The question now was whether the Germans would have the strength or the desire to mount another huge offensive in Russia this spring and summer.

Winter is a Traitor. Since November and Stalingrad, the Russians had been moving forward. Winter had enlisted in the Russian services of supply, which depended, in winter, on three things—rails, wheeled vehicles, and above all, snow vehicles; snows had helped sleighs, had favored horseflesh over motors, the wooden ski over the steel half-track. The Russians had learned how to move mechanized armies through the snow. The Russians' hope, they knew, was to keep moving and to keep the Germans off balance. This they could do—and did impressively well—until they had to pause to regroup their forces and until they ran ahead of supplies.

Then, just as winter betrayed Hitler in 1941, it deserted the Russians this year. Thaws came early. And they came...
Limited Attack

When the Germans last week abandoned Vyazma on the Smolensk front (see map), they said that they were merely shortening their lines. That had been the explanation for withdrawals in the Donets area, too, and yet last week the Germans had lengthened their lines there (see p. 25). "Line-shortening" could no longer be taken seriously as an excuse for retreats.

The departure from Vyazma was evidently imposed on the Germans. The Russians claimed to have found in the town 83 tanks, 69 guns, 222 machine guns, 565 trucks and tractors, 57 locomotives, 515 wagons. The Germans admitted leaving 59 burned-out broad-gauge locomotives, two motor vehicle "cemeteries" and 200 destroyed freight cars—all said to be Russian.

As for the Russians, they had not developed any vast strategy of offense in the Smolensk area. They advanced frontally. Towns fell in order. No big encirclements seemed to be going on.

The Russian objective on this front apparently was to push the Germans back from their springboards before Moscow.

just at the time when the Russians had crossed the Donets into the area where the Germans had adjusted the gauge of rail lines (in white on map). The Russians were suddenly deprived of two of their three methods of transport and were dependent on wheels and muddy roads.

At the very moment when the Red attackers reached the tensile limit of their supply lines, the Germans threw twelve fresh tank and infantry divisions into the fight. Moscow said that the arrival of these forces involved a lessening of the German forces in France—hence renewed Russian complaints about bearing the whole weight of war.

The Germans attacked at an opportune time and a crucial place. The Russians were shifting their attention northward (see col. 3). The Russian excuse for the southern reverses—"unequal engagement," "numerically superior enemy"—disregarded the fact that it is the business of generalship never to be out-concentrated. The place of attack made the most of the Russian transport difficulties. The Russians, though unable to use Germans' narrower rail lines, had advanced just beyond three important rail junctions, Krassno-grad, Lozovaya and Pavlograd, and the Germans recovered them early in the counter-drive.

Kharkov Is a Hinge. The Germans did not encircle and destroy the Red Armies which had been moving toward the Dnieper. On the Russian side, what had been vanguard became rearguard and fought as severely going backward as it had going forward. What was to have been the arms of a German pincer west of the Donets embraced emptiness, converged, and drove frontally on Kharkov. Kharkov was of supreme importance. Without it, the German salient reaching eastward into the Donets basin would be vulnerable to flank attack from the north. The German north-south lines would be seriously interrupted. With it, the Germans would be in the best position for an advance (if advance the Germans can) into the soft area between Stalingrad and Moscow. Early this week the Russians admitted that they had lost Kharkov.

Donets for Defense? If the Germans do succeed in re-establishing the Donets line, the net result of the Russian drive in the south will have been a great victory; Hitler's advances of a year will have been erased—almost. The Germans still hold all of the Crimea and the Novorossiisk beachhead in the Caucasus, which they did not have at the beginning of the 1942 offensive. But the net result will be disappointing, if only because hopes for the Russians had gone so high.

The German drive in southern Russia was essentially defensive; it did not inaugurate another great offensive in 1943. But it was a none-the-less startling reminder that the Germans are still capable of fast, massive, admirably executed offensive moves.
and the great system of rail, highway and water communications which radiates from the capital. The eventual importance of this drive depended more on German plans than on the immediate scale of the Russian attacks. If the Wehrmacht hoped to strike again at Moscow and central Russia this year, the Red Army's gain and the German loss were enormous. If the Germans had already abandoned such hopes and intended only to hold some tenable line in central Russia, the successive losses of Rzhev and Vyazma, and even the looming threat to Smolensk, did not matter so much to them.

Any vastly ambitious Russian scheme on the Smolensk front would probably entail strong flanking rushes—logically in the Staraya Russia and Orel areas. Although there had been local offensives at those two points for some weeks, they seemed to be spent.

**BATTLE OF EUROPE**

**How Much Is Enough?**

Berlin, Munich, Nürnberg, Stuttgart, Essen—everywhere the wings of the R.A.F. shadowed the moon and destruction followed for the Kerenskoff below.

Essen, city of some 700,000 people which turned out precise and coldly beautiful machinery of war, was gassing with a thousand wounds. A single lightning raid, the R.A.F. reported, had razed the entire center of the city early last week, wrecked 75% of the giant Krupp arms factories (Time, March 15). More than 450 acres of buildings, plants, machinery and dwellings were in ruins. A week later the bombers came again, hit even harder with more than 1,000 tons of bombs.

Nürnberg, the ancient walled town of Cobbler-Poet Hans Sachs and Painter Albrecht Dürer, is ringed with war plants. Historic buildings, including Dürer's home (see cut), airplane factories, U-boat engine works, tank factories and railroad centers, crumbled under R.A.F. bombs.

Dürer's House in Nürnberg

To the bombs, all things were equal.

**Munich** is Naziism's birthplace and an old city of art treasures and Nazi Party shrines. But in its suburbs are Messerschmitt plane factories, the Bayerische Motorenwerke (aircraft engines and motor vehicles), many other war factories. In their fifth raid on the Bavarian capital, the R.A.F. shattered its museums and arms industries alike.

**Stuttgart** is the old city where, in the heyday of the Nazi Party's rise to world power, the Auslandsdeutschen—Germans living abroad—met each year to plan their five-column tactics. Last week a half-hour's raid left extensive areas of Stuttgart afire, presumably including the Daimler-Benz motor plants, the Bosch ignition works, the mass-production auto factory of Opel and many other war-important industries.

**The Bitter Score.** For German propaganda there was one refuge: in the cultural monuments and historic buildings which were ruined, together with the military objectives. The Nazis played this theme for what it was worth—and it was undoubtedly worth as much to sentimental German citizens as it had been to Britons, who had been hardened in bitterness and vengeance by the Luftwaffe's blitzes. But bitterness and anger, even if they balanced fraying nerves, could not undo the destruction. Munich's twin-spired Frauenkirche might be wrecked, Hans Sachs' Nürnberg gone forever, Stuttgart's fine baroque palaces burned out, but there was another score, and Germans knew more of it than the British told;

- Thirty key German towns attacked, 2,000 factories or installations of importance seriously damaged;
- Eighty-six raids by 100 aircraft or more during 1943; 37 major attacks in the first months of 1943;
- 7,000 tons of bombs dropped on Germany in 1944; 10,000 tons dropped in February 1943 alone; 4,000 tons dropped in the first ten days of March;
- More than a million Germans rendered homeless.

**The Fortress Europe was being softened.** Perhaps the most pertinent comment on bombing, on the scale and in the manner practiced to date, was that after so many months of softening, Hitler's Fortress was still uncracked.

**BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC**

**Hero into Soldier**

A hint of waxing Jap air power appeared in the South Pacific last week. For months only handfuls of Japanese raiders had slung Allied bases in New Guinea and the Solomons. Suddenly they swarmed out in force. Twenty-six bombers and eleven fighters struck at Wau, the airfield closest to Jap-held Salamaua. Forty raiders attacked Oro Bay south of Buna. Jap air strength, waning at the end of 1942, seemed to be surging back.

Two Jap convoys moved south through
BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

In Which We Swerve

If you want to start a fight in a British pub, just step up to the bar, next to a Scot of the Gordon Highlanders, and ask the barmaid for a half pint of broken soldiers' whisky dusted with salt. But some of the Axis admirals might be to ask a seaman off H.M.S. Churchill about the Battle of Lascas Island.

In August 1941, Prime Minister Churchill had visited his namesake vessel a vast, four-stack destroyer, and promised to come aboard again if the Churchill ever sank a U-boat. The destroyer’s crew did not forget. One night last June, as the Churchill patrolled off Venezuela, a dark shape loomed ahead. The battle signal sounded. Men sprang to action stations. The Churchill swerved, tried to ram the foe. Luckily, she missed. What looked like a bulking U-boat turned out to be tiny Lasca Island, ten feet high, two feet long.

From Better to Worse

For the last three months, the Allied anti-submarine campaign has gone quite well. For the next three, the worst is feared. Tonnage Up. Britain’s First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. Alexander said last week: “In February we believe we have achieved the best results against the U-boat yet experienced. There is still probably a larger output of U-boats than the total numbers being killed, but the gap is being reduced.” Thanks to increased production and reduced sinkings, there has been a net gain in Allied shipping since last August of some 1,250,000 tons.

Requirements Up. Sir Arthur Salter, chief of the British Shipping Mission in Washington, said last week that U-boats cannot be beaten, and the war cannot be won, simply by building merchant ships a little faster than the U-boats are sunk. The past few months have been good ones largely because U-boats cannot operate efficiently in midwinter seas, and spring is apt to make Allied ships and hearts sink fast. The past few months have also seen vast extensions of Allied military lines, and campaigns of spring and summer are apt to stretch them farther yet. New construction is not outstripping new sinkings by a great enough margin to carry accumulating stocks of war and meet all the new demands. Result: much potential U.S. striking power may be immobilized on U.S. docks.

United We Float. In this black outlook there is at least one brightening spot. Cooperation between Britain and the U.S. on their most acute mutual problem is now very nearly complete. Integration on U.S. and British anti-submarine command has improved and an effective joint command

is evolving. Both countries have decided: 1) to build as many merchant ships as possible, without trying to concentrate on fast ships only; 2) to build more and better escorts.

Faster Means Fewer. Britain’s War Transport Minister Lord Leathers explained last week why the idea of concentrating exclusively on fast ships had been discarded: “Faster ships mean fewer ships. To build a 15-knot vessel takes half as long again as an 11-knot vessel of the same carrying capacity, and the faster ship requires 50% more labor and material.” To increase speed by one-third, power must be trebled.

Destroyer Escorts. The Royal Navy apparently now recognizes that its 200 or so corvettes have proved inadequate as transatlantic escorts. They are too small (200-600 tons), too slow (under 12 knots). Britain is building larger, faster escorts which will be called frigates.

Without sacrificing its output of cargo ships, the U.S. also is putting emphasis on a new class of escort vessels which are smaller than modern destroyers, bigger and faster than corvettes.

These U.S. “destroyer escorts” have been at least indirectly delayed by superiorities on: 1) carriers; 2) merchant ships; 3) invasion barges. Now they are in the clear, and urgent. Last week Secretary Knox announced that “several score”

As the cruisers of sailing-ship days, frigates were also used to convey merchantmen. They lasted until armor-clad warships were introduced.

were in the water—which did not mean that they were fighting yet. He released pictures and told newsmen that DEs would be about 300 ft. long, would displace about 1,300 tons (more than the displacement of World War I four-stacker destroyers), would cost $3,500,000 (about half the cost of a new destroyer), can be built in four months (compared with nine for a destroyer), and will release destroyers for all-round naval jobs. He said that “several hundred” would be built.

Until these spirited little chari- rones begin to go out in effective numbers, there will be trouble for Allied ships. That trouble will probably be concentrated, as it was last year, in the months of spring and summer.

BATTLE OF AFRICA

Behind the Front

While the fighting in rain-swept Tunisia made news last week, the battle which will decide the issue was being fought behind the lines. It was the struggle to get in reinforcements and supplies.

The Axis’ problem was simple compared to the Allies’ (see map). Axis ships from Italy ran the Royal Navy’s gallant by night and air transports flew back & forth from Sicily over a shuttle that took little more than an hour’s flying time. German and Italian troops have arrived since Dec. 1 at the estimated rate of 2,400 a day, with topnot equipment and plenty of it. At least 90 Axis ships have been sunk in

SUPPLY: The Long & the Short of It

TIME, March 15, 1943

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the central Mediterranean during the last four months: many more have probably been sunk. Royal Navy submarines sank the majority of them. Allied fighters have harassed the air transport lines. Allied bombers from Malta and the African mainland have incessantly bombed Axis ports, transhipment points and railroads in Italy, Sicily and on the receiving end in Tunisia. Since they lost Tripoli, Rommel's forces in southern Tunisia have been supplied by the overworked coastal railroad between Bizerte and Gabès, and this too has often been bombed. But Allied attacks have neither closed the ports nor cut the coastal railways and air and sea lanes; it has only made Axis supply expensive.

Supplies for the South. To sustain themselves the Allies have had to move supplies under heavy convoy across thousands of miles of ocean, and then over hundreds of miles of muddy mountain highways and desert trails.

Supplies for the Eighth Army on the southern front have to be shipped from Britain, the U.S. and Canada around the tip of South Afirca, through the Red Sea and Suez to Alexandria (see map). A desert railroad and coastal shipping, now almost free of Axis air attack in the eastern Mediterranean, move material from Alexandria to Bengasi. At Bengasi supplies are picked up and transported by a fast fleet of more than 100,000 motor lorries, which move some 2,400 tons a day along a 600-mile ribbon of road across Libya to Tripoli. To keep the lorries running is in itself a major problem. Every day 2,000 tires must be replaced.

As fast as they can the British are clearing the wrecks out of Tripoli's harbor, and rebuilding docks destroyed by Allied bombers and Axis sabotage. When Tripoli is in full operation as a port, the overtaxed highway will be relieved by Mediterranean convoys from Alexandria, and

the cost of Axis supply increased.

the stream of supply will become a river. The first sign that this has been accomplished will come when the Eighth Army attacks in force.

Supplies for the North. From primary bases in the United Kingdom and the U.S. it is 1,400-3,700 miles to west North African ports. It is from there that the central and northern Tunisian fronts are fed. Supplies are landed chiefly at Casablanca on the Atlantic and carried 1,100 miles overland, or at Algiers on the Mediterranean and hauled 450 miles overland.

In the first days of the invasion Allied engineers struggled with antiquated French locomotives which huffed & puffed along the dilapidated, single-track railway which starts at Casablanca, touches Algiers and runs on to Tunis. With U.S. rolling stock, U.S. railroad men were able to double the road's capacity.

Supplementary carriers are trucks, thousands of which were landed safely a fortnight ago, and transport planes operating from west-coast bases.

Supplies for All Fronts. Toughest problem is fuel, all of which has to be imported—coal from England, gasoline from the U.S.

Britons have learned to husband all supplies, which U.S. soldiers are still careless about. Inexperienced officers send truck convoys close to the front lines in daylight, lose them in strafing attacks by the Luftwaffe. Doughboys use gasoline to dry-clean their pants. A recent U.S. Headquarters order clamped down on gasoline waste, tabooed idling motors, pouring gas without funnels, etc. Before that wasteful U.S. troops had been using two or three times as much gas daily as the British.

The Allied armies have never lacked supplies. Huge reserves are piled in west North Africa. The difficulty has been in getting matériel to the right place at the right time. The Allies so far have won the battle of supply. Their lines are longer, the traffic is much slower, but it moves in volume and with scarcely any interruption. But unless they maintain a margin of superiority and halt the increase of Axis strength, the campaign will not be won in time for an invasion of Southern Europe this year.

The Trap

Last week the Axis armies in Tunisia showed their strength and weakness. They beat at the Allied trap in the north. They thrust heavily at Montgomery's Eighth Army in the south. But they had to give way in the middle; their weakness was that they were unable to strike and stand on all three fronts at once.

In the central sector Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's suddenly withered forces offered no resistance. Their plentiful sowing of land mines and booby traps delayed but did not halt the advance of U.S. troops, who overran Fériana and the Roman ruins of Beqitla, jogged on past Sidi bou Zid and regained virtually all the ground which they had lost during Rommel's savage attempt to crack the middle of the Allied ring three weeks ago. Rommel clung to Gafsa, which gave him a springboard for another attempt. But his hold was precarious. He was in danger of being outflanked by French troops moving up from the south.

Rommel's attack had been successful on one important score. He had destroyed much Allied matériel and had pulled out with few casualties, capturing more tanks than he lost. This was his strength: handy bases, his agility and his ability to strike hard, gravelly weakening the Allies and disrupting their plans. The Allied trap had not been broken, but for the moment Rommel had effectively blunted its jaws.
The Animal. Rommel, having earned a breather on the central front, had to turn south toward the so-called Mareth Line, where pillbox fortifications, barbedwire entanglements, gun emplacements and land mines are sprinkled thickly through the Matmata Mountains. Only ten miles away was the Afrika Korps' old enemy, General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery, gazing up at the 2,000-ft. heights of the range, patiently waiting the day when stores, ammunition, artillery, men were all accumulated to his taste and he was ready to make his massive assault. Already assembled were probably 100,000 fresh reserves and veterans of the desert march from Egypt.

Rommel made a thrust through the narrow corridor between the eastern end of the Matmatas and the Mediterranean. It was an effort to keep Montgomery off balance, break up any gathering attack and wreak more destruction. Rommel's tanks and infantry hurtled along the corridor. But Montgomery was ready for them. He smashed the first attack. He smashed wave after wave with his armor and artillery. Rommel finally retired, bruised, having lost 33 tanks and suffered heavy infantry casualties in the fruitless engagement.

North around Tunis and Bizerte was the Marshal's colleague, Colonel General Jürgen von Armin, at whose heavy face the U.S. got its first look last week (see cut). Armin might find a soft spot in the positions of the entrenched British First Army, be able to bend back the upper jaws of the trap. Like Rommel, Armin hoped to hamper Allied concentration, demolish Allied equipment—anything to delay the showdown. After hot hand-to-hand fighting he pushed the British out of the one village (Sedjenane), lost 3,000 men, 30 tanks. The British said that their losses were light. They still held Béja and Medjez-el-Bab—and Armin was frustrated until he could take those two key points. If he could capture Béja with its pretty, tile-roofed houses and its oft-bombed rubble, the whole Allied line would have to fall back; the final Allied offensive might be set back many weeks.

The trapped Axis animal was still strong. It had already mauled its enemy and would maul him again. Nevertheless the trap was slowly closing. At the fronts, along the supply lines in the rear (see p. 22), the Allies pressed on, knowing full well that victory in Tunisia by summer may mean invasion of southern Europe by fall.

**RED MACHINE GUNNERS IN A SNOWSTORM**

*The center of gravity moved north with the weather.*

**BATTLE OF RUSSIA**

**Axle War**

The Red Army's capture of Rzhev last week freed the 160-mile railway between Velikie Luki and Moscow. Soviet engineers immediately began to broaden the gauge to the Russian size. For the Germans this "axle war" had involved moving the wheels of captured rolling stock slightly toward the center of the axle. The Russians are now having to return the wheels to the ends of the axle.

**Heart to Heart**

Russian blood donors, if they choose, may have their names and addresses pasted on the bottles. Blood receivers often send thanks. From Moscow last week came a typically Russian tale of one such exchange:

Post Office Worker Lydia Gardieva of Moscow sent a note with her blood: "Dear Soldier, I do not know you, but if my blood gives you life and strength to fight the enemy, I will be happy." After a while one Lieut. Colonel Vinogradov replied, with thanks. Then there was a silence so long that Lydia thought he must be dead.

Lydia gave some more blood, got another note of thanks: "Your name, my sister, whose blood flows in my veins, was spoken with that love which one can only know when one is at the front." Again it was Lieut. Colonel Vinogradov; twice he had been saved by Lydia's blood.

**Victory in the North**

Last week the Red Army greatly improved its chances to win the war against Germany, greatly lessened the Germans' chances to come back this spring and summer. What had happened in south Russia, after the relief of Stalingrad, was now happening in the north. The Germans were retreating along most of a 700-mile front from Leningrad to Orel.

The northern retreat began in the
FRESH AIR CAMP

This was a “camp”—for prisoners. Into this enclosure in the steppe country before Stalingrad the Germans herded both civilian and military prisoners. The Russians say that 4,500 died here of torture, starvation, exposure. Among the corpses left behind when the area was recaptured were 59 headless bodies. The German sign says: “Camp Headquarters.”

Demiansk swamps south of Lake Ilmen, where Marshal Semion Timoshenko climax ed an offensive with a great breakthrough (TIME, March 8). For 18 months the Germans had clung doggedly to the western part of the railway junction town. In the warm months these marshlands form one of the best natural barriers in Russia. Last year this barrier served the Germans; this year it will serve the Red Army and hamper any German counteroffensive in the north. In late November the swamps passable, and Timoshenko used the waning weeks of winter to smash through so fast that the Nazis left behind enough equipment for a full army corps. At week’s end Timoshenko’s army was threatening Staraya Russia, Nazi-held fortress just south of Lake Ilmen.

Two days after Timoshenko’s breakthrough, the Russians won an even bigger victory—the capture of Rechov. It was from Rechov, 140 miles northwest of Moscow, that the Germans began the powerful drive on Russia’s capital in the autumn of 1941 which almost landed Adolf Hitler inside the Kremlin. It was the city which, above all others, Hitler had to hold if he hoped to try again.

In the Wehrmacht’s scheme of defense Rechov was the main forward hedgehog protecting the Germans in north or central Russia. For 14 months Red armies had hammered the city, until last week had never managed to break its defenses. According to the Russians, Hitler himself once told his generals that Rechov’s fall would be equal to the “loss of half of Berlin.”

Southeast of Rechov other Russian columns captured Gzhatsk, the German position nearest (125 miles) to Moscow, and converged on the railway junction town of Vyazma. Its fall would enable all the Red armies on the Central Front to combine for a drive toward Smolensk. The whole German position in central Russia was crumbling away.

Strategically, the Russian victories last week were as big as any that have been won in the entire winter offensive, save that at Stalingrad. But comparatively few German troops were killed or captured. This suggested that the Germans had previously withdrawn the bulk of their forces, and that they were still “shortening the line,” sacrificing precious geography in order to save their armies.

Berlin had assured the German people that Adolf Hitler intends to strike again at the Russians this year. His armies in the north last week were acting as though they hoped only to find a line where they could stand and hold the Russians beyond the borders of the Greater Reich.

Stalemate in the South

As the center of gravity of Russian effort moved north with the weather (see above) the Germans counterattacked in the south. For the time being they and the mud stabilized the southern front. Berlin claimed that the Germans were on the offensive along a 155-mile front in the middle and upper Donets River regions, presumably near Izum. Troops operating in the “area of Kharkov,” Berlin said, had encircled the Soviet Third Tank Army. Other forces were said to have “stormed” Slavyansk, an important railroad north of Stalino, which the Russians had recaptured in mid-February. The Germans were evidently bent on holding the Donets salient as long as they could, regardless of what happened in north Russia.

West of Kursk, where the snow was still deep, the Russians still pushed ahead. One column drove to within 25 miles of the Bryansk-Kiev railway, which links the German armies in the Ukraine with those on the northern front. If this drive between the fronts succeeds in cutting that line, the Russians will have made it less easy for the Germans to shift forces laterally from south to north. That would hamper the Germans in their effort to counterattack eventually in the north as they did last week in the south.

Thanks Wanted

The U.S. spoke last week to Joseph Stalin, who had said a fortnight ago (TIME, March 1): “The Red Army alone is bearing the whole weight of the war.”

At a press conference in Moscow, U.S. Ambassador Admiral William H. Standley said: “I have carefully looked for an admission in the Russian press that [the Russians] receive material aid from America, yet I have failed to find any real acknowledgment of it.... The Russian people have no opportunity to know they are being helped by the American people....”

The Ambassador pointedly remarked that a new Lend-Lease bill was before Congress. “The American Congress,” he said, “is big-hearted and generous, but if you give it the impression that their help means nothing, there might be a different story.”

* At the end of 1942, the U.S. and Britain had consigned 8,600 tanks and 6,714 planes to Russia—the U.S. had sent 85,000 trucks.
WORLD BATTLEFRONTS

STRATEGY

The Race for Initiative

A swarm of bees in May
A swarm of bees in June
Is worth a silver spoon.

A swarm of bees in July
Is not worth a fly.

This ditty, roared out by gruff Lord Beaverbrook in Britain's August house of Lords, made a rosy impression on the foreign press; but it did not quite capture the essence of the new development: a race for the initiative on Germany's western and southern fronts.

Catchpenny Clamor. The urgency was obvious. Therefore it was not surprising that Lord Beaverbrook terms "a process of emphatic stimulation"—was not as significant as its reception. Lord Trenchard criticized Lord Beaverbrook for arousing the British people, who could not be told the true facts just now. The Earl of Lismor accused the Beaver of doing "a positive disservice to the country" by bringing the matter up at this juncture. Winston Simon said that the discussion was "absolutely dangerous," called the term second front a "catchpenny phrase," based on ill-informed clamors.

The inference was that the strategy makers were well aware of the urgency, that they were in fact doing all they could about it. The Lords, like everyone else, were admittedly a little bewildered as to just what was going to be done; but they believed that what could be done, would be done.

"The U.S.S.R. Expects," There was a difference between the British second-front clamor of last year and this voice crying in the wilderness. The outcry last year was usually popular. It was based on a widespread impression that the U.S. and British leaders had no plan and were doing nothing. It was in response to pleas from a Russia which seemed to be in real danger of collapse. The argument then was actually more moral than military.

Now the shoe was on the other foot. Now there had been a Casablanca. More important, the Red Army* had risen on the front of Rome and was mighty by the hour. The Red Army rallied few cheerleaders in the U.S. (for news of one, see p. 36). How far the U.S. was from Britain in outward appreciation of Russia was suggested by when Colonial West- brook Paget wrote three days after Red Army Day: "Communism is, for a fact, a menace to the United States.... But Hitler happens to be the military enemy of the moment and first things come first." No.

laboring the German adversary. That greatest of propagandists, Stalin, had got up from a suppliant position and was now using the second-front issue as something very like a threat. Last week London turned out an emphatically to a reception in honor of the Red Army at Amb- bassador Ivan Maisky's house that one of the guests said: "We could easily open a second front right now if we just turned all these fellows loose." Turning this enthusiasm to good use, Ambassador Maisky spoke as a partner, not a beggar: "It is natural... that the U.S.S.R. expects an early realization of the military decisions taken at Casablanca."

What those decisions were, only the campaigns of 1943 can tell. If they are

new bunkers. Minaker Zeitung, a German paper in Occupied Russia, featured stories about mighty new fortifications on the Aegean islands, including Crete. In Yugoslavia, the SS division Prince Eugen was last week winding up a month's campaign in which it claimed to have recovered half of the Partisan-free territory, including the capital, Belgrade. The south of France was being additionally fortified (see note).

The Risk of Spain. In order to deny the Allies free communications through the Mediterranean, Germany must keep positions in Africa close to opposite positions in Europe. Tunisia and Sicily afford such positions. Gibraltar and Spanish Morocco could also afford them, and Spain itself could close the narrow way from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean. Last week a sudden spurt of activity in and near Spain focused the world's attention there. Most of the activity was political (see p. 27), but 400 German troop trains were reported to have moved recently toward France's Spanish border. Eleven divisions were said to be massed on the Mediterranean end of the frontier. Germany closed the border area as a military zone.

But these preparations may have been solely defensive. Occupation of Spain by Hitler would entail a heavy risk. The adventure would probably require 25 divisions. The Iberian Peninsula would earn Hitler some 1,800 miles of vulnerable coastline. Since most Spanish railways are broad gauge and already taxed for internal needs, it would give Hitler a logistical headache. But above all, it would disperse his forces to duplicate a job already being

GERMANS BUILDING FORTIFICATIONS IN SOUTHERN FRANCE

Europe's soft belly is getting harder.

*The Red Army rallied few cheerleaders in the U.S. (for news of one, see p. 36). How far the U.S. was from Britain in outward appreciation of Russia was suggested by when Colonial West- brook Paget wrote three days after Red Army Day: "Communism is, for a fact, a menace to the United States.... But Hitler happens to be the military enemy of the moment and first things come first."
done at the Tunisia-Sicily bottleneck.

Audacity or Smoke Screen? A report from Le Havre to the Swiss Tribune de Genève last week said that German reconnaissance over England had led to this conclusion: "We are on the eve of an English attempt of unsuspected audacity." Considering the source and the channels, this message could mean one of two opposites: 1) the British were preparing an invasion force; 2) they or the Germans were setting up a smoke screen. Either could be true.

Germans fear an Allied blow at Norway. A German military writer, retired Rear Admiral Richard Gadow—the first German to disclose, in 1935, that the Nazis were building submarines—wrote recently in Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung: "A successful Allied invasion of Norway would be a catastrophe for Germany. Norway in the hands of the enemy would mean great economy in the protection of Anglo-Saxon convoys—and would constitute a dangerous threat to the Finnish northern flank."—to say nothing, eventually, of the German northern flank.

Germans are certainly prepared for, and have recently begun talking about, an Allied attack on the Lowlands or the French submarine coast from Brest to the south. The Germans themselves might take the great gamble of trying to knock Britain out. Success would not win the war for Germany (there would still be Russia), but the same sort of reasoning which impelled Hitler to turn on his Russian rear in 1941 might impel him to turn on his British rear in 1945.

Britain now is not the Britain which Hitler might have crushed in 1940; its defensive air power, which saved Britain then, is now the strongest concentration of sky-might anywhere. After Dunkirk, Britain virtually had no army in 1940; it has forces for land & sea defense in 1943. And Britain keeps great defensive forces at home precisely because attack on Britain, however remote it may seem to others, is always a possibility to Britons.

Need for Speed. Time is short for the Allies. For good weather from Norway's North Cape to Cairo, they must strike Europe decisively before October. Just as Rommel shook the Americans out of offensive positions in Tunisia, the Germans might daringly attempt to disrupt the faster forces of an incipient invasion, either in Africa or Britain. Or they may choose to carry out Hitler's published intent, solidify the defenses of western and southern Europe, and prepare yet another summer blow at Russia, where they are still within 125 miles of Moscow (see below). In any one of these events, time, for a change is on the side of the Germans.

BATTLE OF RUSSIA

Victory Must Wait

Warm winds from the southwest blew across the southern Ukraine last week. From Kharkov to the Sea of Azov the snow began to melt and the rich black earth steamed. Red Army men took off their cloth helmets and marched bareheaded. Tankers lifted their turrets and breathed lungfuls of the fresh, clean air.

A little ahead of time, the weather of spring had come, and it was lovely. Perhaps it had come too soon for the Russians. In three months the Red Army had performed near miracles by driving the Wehrmacht back into the Ukraine and smashing the Kursk-Kharkov line—achievements which in themselves may prevent the Germans fromagain striking deep into Russia's southern heart. Nevertheless the Russians had still not reached the objectives—stated only last week—of their present offensive: 1) to complete the Dnieper drive; 2) to prevent the Wehrmacht from consolidating new lines; 3) to clear the last Germans from the Caucasus.

Pause in the South. For the first time since the siege of Stalingrad was lifted, the Russians last week could report no sizable gains on their southern fronts (see map). And this week they admitted a serious German effort to split their front between the Donets and the Dnieper Rivers—a front which had to be kept intact if the Red Army hoped to bear down heavily on the German salient in the Eastern Ukraine.

If the Russians fail to reach their winter objectives, they may have another chance when the ground dries in about two months. But the longer the Russians are delayed the more meaningless any eventual victory in the Donets-Dnieper salient would become. As in Tunisia, the Germans in south Russia—whether they eventually lose the campaign or not—have everything to gain by upsetting the Red Army's timetable. They would be better able to consolidate new positions, train much-needed reserves, replace some of their lost matériel. The next few weeks may well determine the outcome of the Russian war.

Peril in the North. The Soviet High Command this week announced a full-scale offensive in the north, below Leningrad. Led by Marshal Semion Timoshenko, the Russians—taking full advantage of the remaining weeks of winter—were attacking the entire German 19th Army near Lake Ilmen. Moscow said that over 500 towns and settlements had been re-taken, that 11,000 Germans were killed or captured. Success would mean that the Germans would be outflanked on the approaches of Leningrad. Then, especially
WILL RUSSIA REAP?

Blows & Counterblows. Like three great scythes, Red Armies were trying to slash their way through and behind the German positions in south Russia last week. Sputtering Moscow's Red Star: "By strengthening our blows we will be in a position to surround new masses and inflict new losses. The harvest will be great if we can reap it in time."

But time was favoring the Germans. Bogged in the mud 30 miles east of Dniepropetrovsk was the crucial drive of Colonel General Nikolai Vatutin's armies, striving to reach the Dnieper and cut off the Germans in the Donets Basin.

The most serious Russian setback came in the Donets Basin itself, where the Red Army has been trying for two weeks to smash south against the main German armies. The Germans halted the drive with heavy counterattacks against the Russian right flank northwest of Stalino. This week Berlin claimed that other forces crossed the Donets River near Izum. If this report was true, it meant that the Germans may succeed in breaking up the Red Army's drives through the Donets and toward the Dnieper.

West of Rostov, along the Sea of Azov coast, the Russians were doing better. Tank and infantry forces were pounding hard against the German defenses covering Taganrog and Mariupol. Said Moscow: "All indications are that the battle here is moving toward a climax."

BATTLE OF AFRICA

The Python

General Dwight Eisenhower and General Sir Harold Alexander arrived on the battlefront—Eisenhower to confer with his Allied officers, Sir Harold to take personal command of the Allied troops retreating across central Tunisia. The situation early last week was that critical.

From Kasserine Pass, Major General Lloyd Fredendall's weary young U.S. infantrymen, artillerymen and tankmen had fled across the valley. They had lost their swagger. They had abandoned their dead and their good equipment along the muddy, bloody roads. They had been handicapped by a lack of motor vehicles. Some

if the Finns managed to make peace (see p. 27), the whole Nazi position in the north would be in peril.

But the most urgent reason for a northern offensive—and a fact which had been all but forgotten in the gladiators of victory in the south—was that the Germans on the central front were still less than 125 miles from Moscow. At Gzhatsk, on the Moscow-Smolensk railway, the Germans reported one attack. The Russians had been intermittently assaulting the Germans' powerfully defended Smolensk-Rahev-Vyazma triangle since last summer, they had stepped up the assaults at the start of the winter drives—yet the Germans still held a position which could be the starting point of another stab at Russia's heart. The Russians were at once trying to forestall this possibility and perhaps pinning down forces which might have been shifted South.

Both Moscow and Berlin reported violent action near Orel, the hinge on which the German central and southern lines swung. Several Red columns, partly equipped with U.S. and British-made tanks, converged on the city from three sides. The battles were fought in one of the heaviest snow storms in years. At night, if they were not fighting, Red Army men huddled into little roadside houses. They slept on their feet, each edging to the brick stove to thaw out his boots. They had won great victories, but this week they had yet to win The Victory.

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of them fought blindly in small, isolated groups. For all of them it had been a humiliating retreat. On their heels came the triumphant troops of the Axis, driving westward and northward in three columns. Foul weather held most of the Allied air forces ground-bound. There appeared to be no stopping the Germans and their Italian allies.

A great opportunist, like all good soldiers, Rommel was ready to exploit any gain. And he was a gambler. If he were lucky and could crack Thala, he would have access to the Kremamsa Plateau, could pour troops onto that flatland, could drive against the flank of the British First Army which sprawled across the top of Tunisia. Then the whole Allied strategy in North Africa would have to be recast.

This was the crisis when the weary young men braced themselves and Allied reinforcements rushed up to give them aid. 

Lost Ditch. The story of the next few days was the story of a desperate Allied stand. British artillery and lumbering new Churchill tanks rolled up to block the pass at Sbiba, in the area of Tebessa—the Allied base for Central Tunisia—U.S. cannon and armor, supported by strong air units operating in dubious flying weather, pounded and slashed at the German onrush. In the critical Thala sector British armor, probably drawn from the First Army's reserves, and fresh U.S. artillery fought through the afternoon and into the night.

Watching the Thala battle, Drew Midleton of the New York Times wrote:

"British [tank] units sustained the first shock, then counterattacked heavily. All this time the American guns in the hills were sounding a somber song of frustration for the enemy. Supported by infantry that had been heavily bombed on its way to the front, the Germans continued their efforts to break through until night fell. . . . Broken guns and burned-out tanks were strewn across the sandy plain and the knobby hills. The ground was dotted with the bodies of men. . . . By this morning the fighting had died down."

On that morning, as suddenly as they had started their drive ten days before from Faid Pass (TIME, Feb. 27), the Germans turned tail and withdrew.

In the Bottleneck. Rommel had met more resistance than he had apparently bargained for. His troops had become exhausted, overextended and overstayed. The Eighth Army in the south was showing signs of opening its assault. And perhaps there was another explanation for the turnabout: Frederick's young men had learned their lessons fast. Said Eisenhower of the U.S. troops: "All complacency has now been dropped."

Back across the littered valley they went. Allied planes, capitalizing on a momentary break in Tunisia's rain-swept skies, swarmed into the air. The Luftwaffe failed to fend them off. Anything in Major General Carl Spaatz's command that would fly took to its wings to strafe Axis columns, bomb the bottleneck of Kasserine Pass through which the Germans had to make their withdrawal. Flying Fortresses and fighter bombers were loaded with bombs and sent soaring through the mists of the Pass, sowing their explosives helter-skelter, certain of hitting something as the Axis troops squeezed through. Artillery pounded the retreating Axis forces.

Rommel left Italians to fight a rear-guard action, pulled his precious Panzer troops out and south along the road to Fétiana and Gafsa, east towards Faid Pass—the roads over which Frederick's U.S. troops had beat a hasty retreat northward only two weeks before.

At week's end the Axis was still in flight. Rommel was reported to be evacuating Fétiana and plowing up the Allied airfield at Sbeitla which he had seized the week before.

Eyes South. Rommel had lost his gauntlet. In overextended Tunisia, Colonel General Jürgen von Arnim staggered at Liet. General Kenneth A. N. Anderson's mud-stuck front, apparently hoping to divert Allied strength from Rommel's hard-pressed front. Two savage attacks, made in a driving rain, wrested crucial positions facing Mateur. Another attack was aimed at the Allied supply port of Medjez el Bab. Others, further south, sprang from Bou Arid. All but the Mateur attacks came to grief on muddy roads which impeded enemy tanks. The Mateur action continued to blaze at week's end.

It was plain that there was still plenty
of flexibility and daring in the enemy. To trap and crush him in Tunisia would be, in the words of one military strategist, "like trying to box a python." It was a python with at least two heads (Rommel and von Arnim), with eyes along its whole length.

This week some of those eyes must have been turned south, where the Eighth Army was edging closer & closer to the Mareth Line. Rommel might choose to abandon the Line, make his stand in the narrow neck between the Chott Djerid (salt lake) and the coast at Gabes. It was up to the veteran troops of General Sir Bernard Law Montgomery to close the trap on the python at that end.

Eisenhower had more supplies, particularly motor vehicles, than he had when Rommel broke through at Falz. When he had clear skies overhead and firm footing on the ground, the British First Army in the north, the Americans and British at the center could be expected to close all the sides and end the python's convulsive resistance. But not before.

BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC

In Blanche Bay

A bomber's moon on four successive nights guided aircraft of General Douglas MacArthur's command over the jungle-clothed mountains of New Guinea to Rabaul. On one raid a Jap cruiser was hit. On another a warship was driven aground. Two other warships and numerous cargo vessels also felt the sting of night raiders striking at the best deep-water harbor in the New Guinea-New Britain area.

Since January 1942 the Japanese had held Rabaul on Blanche Bay, the flooded crater of an extinct volcano which gives deep water almost to the shore. In peacetime Rabaul's tiny harbor was used chiefly by island trading ships of two companies, W. R. Carpenter & Co. and Burns Philp & Co. Now the harbor is a great Japanese naval and troop-transport center. From it, short and efficient supply lines radiate to forward bases above both shoulders of Australia—a score of spots such as Kupang on Timor and Gizo in the Solomons. From those forward bases, which like Rabaul have come in for a dose of heavy bombing (see cut), the Japs would launch any fresh offensive or organize any firm defenses in the Southwest Pacific Area.

This week Douglas MacArthur's headquarters issued this communiqué: "Our air reconnaissance over the past weeks report a constant and growing reinforcement in all categories of enemy strength in the island perimeter enveloping the upper half of Australia. The enemy seems to be concentrating his main effort in preparation on this front.

General MacArthur's raiders, flying through sulfur fumes and corrosive dust from Rabaul's volcanoes, were bent on disorganizing this concentration. Their record: in Blanche Bay were the hulls of 58 ships; 26 others had been bombed out of service.

Rum for the Crew

A trail of phosphorescence bubbled whitely across the black sea off Guadalcanal. A New Zealand patrol boat, spotting the glow in the night, changed her course, ran down the telltale trail and dropped a pattern of depth bombs.

Below the surface a Japanese submarine faltered. The patrol boat circled, dropped more charges. Hurt this time, the Jap came up. With its deck guns it blazed away furiously at its attacker. The patrol boat fired back, turned on her searchlight. The little New Zealander was only 150 feet long; nevertheless she pointed her bow at the sub and charged forward.

Japs began spilling out of the conning tower. The New Zealand gunners peppered them. The Jap commander toppled off the bridge. His men tried to shoot out the patrol boat's light, mortally wounded the seaman operating it. The two vessels crashed.

The New Zealander backed away, guns still blazing. Jap soldiers with full packs poured out of the conning tower and tried frantically to unleash life rafts. Again the patrol boat rammed, sharring off one of the sub's hydroplanes. And once again—said the skipper: "This time we climbed clear over her top and rode her piggyback." They got off by giving the engines full astern.

Smoke billowed out from the Jap's
ONE DOWN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The panic-stricken crew of the Italian submarine Emo leaped overboard when the British trawler Lord Nuffield shelled and shattered the raider's conning tower. Down went the Emo to the bottom of the Mediterranean. The Italians had better luck than did Japanese similarly trapped when their submarine was rammed in the Pacific (see p. 23); the Lord Nuffield picked up all survivors.

BATTLE OF EUROPE

What Price Bombing?

By day U.S. Fortresses and Liberators precisely planted bombs in Wilhelmshaven and Brest. By night R.A.F. Sterlings and Lancasters pattern-bombed Cologne and St. Nazaire. German targets, were getting a round-the-clock pounding such as they had never had before.

The why of round-the-clock raids, instead of more massive but sporadic attacks, had been best set forth by Major General Ira C. Eaker, commander of the U.S. Eighth Air Force in Britain. His reasons: 1) to inflict maximum damage; 2) to keep enemy defenses on a 24-hour alert; 3) to force maintenance of both day & night fighters in Western Europe.

Necessity also lay behind such reasoning. U.S. heavy bombers, with high speed, great defensive firepower and small bomb capacity (two and four tons), are best suited to daylight precision bombing. British bombers, slower, with less armament and greater bomb capacity (eight and nine tons), are best suited to night operations.

On these facts the U.S. and Britain had agreed. Each had tried the other's methods. Each had found them unfeasible to its own aircraft. That was settled, but the total record of air operations raised a far more important question: had large-scale bombing really proved its worth?

Slowdown for Knockout. A substantial section of the Luftwaffe has been pinned in Western Europe. The catalogue of German factories, shipyards, railway centers and power plants smashed by the R.A.F. is impressive. Damage to morale in such often-visited cities as Hamburg, Bremer and Cologne must have been severe. Still German fighter-bombers persist.

To disable a factory permanently, bombs must usually score a direct hit on irreplaceable machinery. Otherwise a few weeks' reconstruction may bring a vital plant back into service. Oft-bombed Düsseldorf, after a one month's work stoppage, is again a manufacturing center. The R.A.F.'s return last week to Cologne, as thoroughly blitzed as any German city, implied acknowledgement either that reconstruction had been effective or that worthwhile targets remained intact. Net conclusion: a general slowdown of Germany's total war effort was as much as could be credited to heavy bombing, and it was probably worth the effort expended. To expect more, from the number of available planes, was to expect too much.

Round-the-clock preoccupation with Cologne (submarines, ports), Wilhelmshaven, St. Nazaire and Brest (U-boat bases) bore out reports that one major Casablanca decision was to interrupt or abandon indiscriminate bombing of industrial targets. The chosen alternative centers of submarine building and ports, thus easing the U-boat strain from United Nations supply lines.

BATTLE OF ASIA

The Dragons

Life was getting dull for the fighter boys in Assam. They had been stationed there since last summer to protect the air supply line to China.

Aside from easy strafing missions against locomotives and bridges in Burma, there was not much to do except play badminton, lounge on big airy porches in the old stilted tea planters' houses, and stare out across the endless sultry tea fields. The enlisted men took to teaching Assamese kids American. They all wished the Japs would attack. Their CO, Colonel Homer Leroy Sanders, had said: "If the Japs come over, all they will need is a one-way ticket."

One day last week the bungalow where Homer Sanders has his headquarters was quiet except for the routine chatter of typewriters. Suddenly a sergeant rushed upstairs shouting: "Red alert!" Men clattered downstairs. Telephones jangled. The radio in the control room crackled.

Well camouflaged, lazy-looking spots became busy, alert shack, anti-aircraft pits, airplanes. On the flanks of planes could be seen the pilots' emblem—a droopy-tailed dragon with the motto: "Our Assam Dragglin."

To each fighter strip by nickname went orders: "Gin Fizz take off... Bottoms Up take off... What's Cooking take off..."

In the air the Fighting Dragons met 18 Jap bombers, 25 fighters. They shot down nine positives, 20 probables. They themselves all came home safely, and for a few hours life did not seem quite so dull to the fighter boys in Assam.

WORLD BATTLEFRONTS

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BATTLE OF RUSSIA

How Many Rivers to Cross?

[See Cover]

New victories are imminent after the fall of Rostov and Voroshilovgrad. The Red Army is already far west of the line between these two cities. In its irresistible sustained drive it has encircled large parts of Hitler's Army.—Moscow Radio.

It was hard to conceive what new victories would seem epic at the end of last week. For last week was the greatest, the happiest week of the war for Russia's armies. The triumphs of the week were dizzying. New possibilities were unfolded which a month ago would have seemed fantastic. The focus of war had suddenly moved westward. Men's eyes turned toward the Dnieper, toward the old borders of Russia—toward Berlin.

Success in Snow. What a young Russian general (Filip Ivanovich Golikov) accomplished on a limited Russian sector (Kursk) as the week opened seemed at first to be another wonderful but local success. Actually the way Kursk was captured and the consequences of its fall shed much light on Russian potentialities.

A snowstorm had been raging for several days. On the day when Colonel General Golikov's campaign opened there was such a whirling blizzard that a Russian correspondent's car took three hours to negotiate a quarter-mile. The Germans, sure that human beings would not fight on such a day, crawled into their dugouts and turned their backs on war.

The Russians advanced. They staggered forward, blinded by snow and bending over their green-lit compasses. In the forests they felt for tree trunks for guidance and support. Their frozen greatcoats cracked like splitting boards. When the Russians reached the napping defenders far east of Kursk, they charged and quickly captured batteries that fired not a shell.

Having won the first round by surprise, the Russians pressed their advantages. Sticking to the roads, they pushed through to the northwest of Kursk, and moved into positions to the northeast and southeast. Planes dropped pamphlets showing pictures of the captured Field Marshal von Paulus at Stalingrad and describing the slow strangulation there. The three groups attacked concentrically. Kursk fell so fast that even the Russians must have been surprised.

Success in Bulk. That was the signal for a general crumbling of what had been for over a year a rigid, unbreakable line. On both Colonel General Golikov's front and that to the south under Nikolai Vatutin, who was last week promoted from Colonel General to Army General, the Reds exploited their advantage. Belgorod fell. So did Lozovaya, Voroshilovsky, Voroshilovgrad, Likhaya. The attackers rolled around Kharkov, which like Kursk had been one of the main fortresses on Germany's great wall of last winter. Russians crept early this week to within seven miles of Kharkov, and the city's fall seemed
WORLD BATTLEFRONTS

imminent. It was all surprisingly easy. The hedgehogs seemed to be walking away in the snow, shedding only a few barbed quills.

Success in Fire. As a climax to a week of climaxes, Rostov, the southern anchor of the whole German line and a bitterly defended place, burst into flames and fell to the attacker. Thus the Germans lost the one sure foothold for an attack in the Caucasus in the spring. Rostov's loss was the clearest indication yet that there might not be another German offensive in Russia, since any offensive would have to start all over again on a program which had once failed.

Success in Fluidity? All this suggested that the Germans on the southern front had been forced to go over (as Rommel did when he left El Alamein) from rigid to elastic defense. They had been forced to do so because of the Russian mastery of winter tactics and because of their own fear of encirclement.

Elastic defense can be masterful, as Rommel's retreat to Tunisia was, or merely chaotic. The Russians had two chances of making it chaotic—they could drive south through Stalin to the Sea of Azov, pocketing the outflung defenders of Rostov, and west from Loozovaya to the Dnieper bend at Dniepropetrovsk, cutting the Cauca- casian remnant and Crimean garrisons off from convenient retreat by rail or good roads.

If the Germans succeeded in some masterful withdrawals, it was possible that they might have small reserves at some line of their choosing—perhaps along the Dnie- per—and counterstrike at the then extended Russians. Since the Russians had again done their best work in their worst winter weather, and since the thaws of southern Russia produce a mud which is beyond description, the Germans probably look forward to a slackening of Russian momentum in a month or six weeks.

Fears. This uncertainty as to how far the Russians might be able to go gave rise to a curious reaction in Britain and the U.S. Many voices, some nervously, some skeptically, asked the question: Just what kind of victory does Russia want?

The question arose from two mutually contradictory fears. One group seemed to fear that the Red advance would sweep to Russia's old borders and stop, leaving the German fox still dangerously alive, the Allies holding a still-empty bag. The other group feared that the Red advance would sweep to and perhaps beyond the Rhine, that all Europe would be Bolshevized.

The first school thinks Joseph Stalin may be playing a sly, lone, isolationist hand. It points out parallels, such as Kutuzov's reply to the British observer Wilson when the latter urged the Russian to destroy Napoleon instead of only pursuing him. "Kutuzov told him bready," says Eugene Tarle (Napoleon's Invasion of Russia), "that his aim was to

eject Napoleon from Russia and that he did not see why Russia should waste her forces on the complete destruction of Napoleon, since the harvest of such a victory would be reaped by England, not Russia."

The other (Red-menace) school is exemplified by a recent editorial in the New York Daily News: "It is a cinch bet that the much discussed postwar policing of Germany will be done by the Russians... Stalin will accomplish what Hitler tried to do—dominate all Europe. The effect of all this on us will be to leave us in as much danger from Europe as we were before this war."

Which, if either of the apprehensive schools is within a light-year of the truth? What kind of victory does Russia want? The only way even to approximate an answer at this stage, besides examining the nature of the Red successes and their potentialities, is to estimate what Stalin and his Army want, review the known facts as to what Stalin's Government has said it wants.

Front Commander. In trying to gauge how far the Russians can go, it is im- portant to try to see what her military men want. They all seem to want: terrible punishment of the Nazis.

Filip Ivanovich Golikov, a typical front

defined being repaired by Nazis

Hitlerites will be found, prosecuted and sternly punished.
commander, seems to want that. He is young: 45. He fought in the revolution. He is a product of Frunze Military Academy. He is one of few Red generals who have firsthand knowledge of Russia's allies. Just after the war broke out, he was sent to Britain and the U.S. for staff talks on supply problems. In the U.S. Golikov was treated (and behaved) more like a mystery man than a visiting celebrity. He was observed to be a muscular man with a head which seemed to have been carved from pink glass, to be so short that the handkerchief in Sumner Welles's pocket showed above his clean-shaven crown. Beyond that nothing was known. He disappeared after a brief visit.

Back in Russia he was given command of one of the seven armies that saved Moscow. There he saw what the Germans were capable of doing—but also what his own men could do. Golikov's army defeated two divisions of much-touted Heinz Guderian's Second Tank Army and took the towns of Mikhailov and Yefipan. This year he was promoted from army commander to commander of the Voronezh front. What he has done there, culminating last week in the crushing of the Germans' rigid southern line, suggests that he personally burns for total destruction of the enemy.

Commander in Excelis. But the key to Russia's military determination is the man who is key to everything in Russia. If Russia's allies knew as much about Joseph Stalin as he knows about them, they would have a much clearer idea of where he stands. The few U.S. and British diplomats and officers who have talked with Stalin say that he knows more than most Washington and London officials about Allied performance, personalities, and weaknesses. He has on the end of his blunt tongue the exact dates and of reasons for the fall of Bataan, Corregidor, Singapore, Hong Kong, Rangoon. He says: "Timoshenko is my George Washington" (because Washington retired from Philadelphia to Valley Forge but still won the Revolutionary War); and: "Zhukov, he is my George B. McClellan—except that he has never lost a battle" (McClellan always bumbled for more men, more weapons, more supply, more cavalry—but he lost the Seven Days' Battles, June 1862).

Responsible men who have talked with Stalin all come away with the conviction that he has the fixed determination to destroy Hitler's Army and to punish, man by man, Hitler's henchmen. He has, they say, a fanatical desire to keep hammering the Germans, to keep them rolling, never to let them get set for a counteroffensive. Some say he wants to raze Berlin, as so many Russian cities have been razed. They are unanimous in believing that there is no thought of a negotiated peace in his stubborn mind. They are satisfied that the reason he did not attend the Casablanca conference was that he was busy at his desk directing the crucial stages of his offensive—and last week's news seemed to bear out that convention.

The Record. Since Stalin has been Russia's dictator, Russia has made much of abiding by signed agreements and official promises. The occupation of the Baltic States was accomplished by diplomatic pressure. The military occupation of part of Poland, the Russian argument runs, took place after the Government of Poland with which Russia had a nonaggression pact had ceased to exist. Finland was attacked on the somewhat flimsy grounds that the Finns allegedly fired first. Nevertheless, Russia's efforts to keep the peace of Europe were stronger than most. She tried to give the League vitality. She led the way in making bilateral pacts.

The Russians themselves point to these promises as the definition of their war aims. Last week Pravda quoted Joseph Stalin's speech of Nov. 6, 1941: "We have not nor can we have, such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories or the conquest of other peoples. . . . Our first aim is to free our territories and our peoples from the German Nazi yoke. We have not, nor can we have such war aims as the imposition of our will and our regime on the Slavic and other enslaved peoples of Europe who are waiting for our help. Our aim is to help these peoples in their struggle for liberation from Hitler's tyranny."

Other Russian declarations:

"The Russian border demands, Stalin said in the May Day order of 1942: "We want to liberate our Soviet land—our brothers the Ukrainians [including Besarabia], Moldavians, White Russians [perhaps including those in its Polish sections], Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, and Byelorussians..."

"Soviet Ambassador Ivan Malisky said to the Inter-Allied Meeting, London, Sept. 14, 1941: "The Soviet Union defends the right of every nation to independence and territorial integrity... and its right to establish such a social order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and necessary..."

"The Anglo-Soviet Treaty of May 18, 1942, says "Britain and Russia wish to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the postwar period."

"On the punishment of Nazis, Foreign Commissar Molotov's Declaration for War Crime Trials, Oct. 14, 1943 (urging the immediate trial of Rudolf Hess): "The Soviet Government... expects that all interested States will mutually assist each other in searching for extradition, prosecution and stern punishment of the Hitlerites and their accomplices guilty of the organization, encouragement, or perpetration of crimes on occupied territory."

A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet setting up a committee to list Axis crimes against Russia (Nov. 1943) specifies: "It calls for trial of German Army commanders...

"On the clashing ideologies of the Soviet-American coalition (from Stalin's address on the eve of the 5th anniversary of the October Revolution, Nov. 6, 1943):..."
"It would be ridiculous to deny the differences in ideologies and social systems of these countries. [This does not] preclude the possibility of joint action on the part of the members of this coalition against the common enemy..."

Bitter Tuts. These declarations are specific—perhaps more specific than the published postwar aims of the U.S. and Britain. But they leave many a forward-looking question unanswered. They omit any reference to Japan, with which Russia has a non-aggression pact. Some of the phraseology of these declarations is ambiguous and, to the Allied way of thinking, at least open to debate: e.g., the inclusion of Bessarabia and the Baltic States ("our brothers") in "Soviet lands"; government, self-chosen or not, which is "opportune and necessary."

On their part, the Russians might well have some uncertainties about the intentions and desires of Britain and the U.S. toward Europe. Their main clue is the Atlantic Charter, which is not notable for its reinforced-concrete qualities. To this Russia has subscribed. If the record of Allied politics in North Africa has caused certain British and U.S. citizens qualms, it had certainly not been reassuring to the Reds. They cannot be any more certain of the Allied game in Yugoslavia than the Allies can of theirs. The Russians, who consider that they have a right to the Baltic States and Bessarabia, do not like to hear Americans question that right. When Columnist Constantine Brown did just that last week, Pravda answered angrily: "Why should he not make a generous present of California or Alaska to the United States? Do there not exist curious people who are ready to present to the Soviet Union parts of the latter's own territory?"

Mutual uncertainty might develop into one of the great tragedies of World War II: that, having won a victory over an enemy who was certainly common, the victors might not be able to negotiate a common future. The thing which made this tragedy a real danger was the tendency of people at large and even some statesmen to speak in vague, fearful clichés without attempt to find out even what the Russians want.

The Russians are conscious of this danger. It was a danger which U.S. citizens, as wartime partners in a United Nations not yet efficiently united, would have to face and think about, not in vague and fearful clichés nor in sentimental idealistics, but as citizens of the postwar world.

BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC

They Came, They Saw

Reports of a major naval engagement in the South Pacific, current for the past three weeks, dissolved into a story of when they came, they saw, they changed their minds.

Early this month U.S. warships in the Solomons were ordered to prepare for a knockdown, drag-out fight.

The Japs attacked a U.S. convoy south of the Solomons Jan. 29-30. Feb. 4, U.S. planes flying north attacked a force of 20 Jap destroyers near New Georgia. Seventeen Zeros, ten U.S. planes were shot down in the encounter. One Jap destroyer was sunk. The others raced on toward Guadalcanal. Their motive was not offensive. They merely wanted to evacuate officers and badly needed technicians from that hot corner. A second aerial assault by U.S. planes sank two more destroyers, badly damaged four others.

The main part of the big Jap fleet remained discreetly below the horizon, while Tokyo hinted at a great, running sea battle. The only explanation of why it never developed: the formidable appearance of the South Pacific fleet frightened the Japanese off. Said an official bulletin to the disappointed crew of a U.S. warship last.
week: “After finding out what they were up against, they withdrew.”

At week’s end the war became predominantly a war in the air. U.S. bombers ranged the whole South Pacific area, unloosed one of the greatest mass raids yet on Rabaul, Japan's biggest base in the southwest Pacific.

Clean Sweep

A well-used broom at the masthead has been symbolic of naval victory since the 17th Century, when Dutch Admiral Martin Tromp was supposed to have lashed a broom to the masthead of his flagship to signify that he had swept the British from the seas. Last week the U.S.S. Wahoo, a submarine of the Pacific Fleet, sported the symbolic broom, and none had a better right.

Scouting Jap activities at Wewak, where a new enemy base is being built to compensate for the loss of Buna and Gona, the Wahoo had made a find. Anchored in a narrow inlet of Musubu Island was a Japanese destroyer. The Wahoo’s first torpedo, fired at long range, missed. The destroyer weighed anchor, bore down on the submarine. Once more the Wahoo launched a torpedo. This time the shot went home, blasted the destroyer in half.

Two days later, lurking in the same waters, the Wahoo sighted a fat Jap convoy. First a freighter was sunk, next a troop-jammed transport, then a tanker; finally, with the Wahoo’s last torpedo, a second freighter. The sweep was clean. Later the Wahoo, its supply of torpedoes gone, had to let another convoy pass unharmed. Said Lieut. Commander Dudley W. Morten, skipper of the broom-flaunting Wahoo: “When you have no torpedoes you sure feel naked.”

Blotted Out

The Japs on Guadalcanal did not give in; they gave out. Said Captain Miles Browning, chief of staff to Admiral William F. Halsey: “It was not a definite surrender. Our flanking forces closed the pinchers on the enemy and a blot-out took place. There was no more space for the Japs to occupy.”

The campaign had cost the Japs at least one battleship, 13 cruisers, 22 destroyers, twelve troop transports, at least eight cargo vessels, 797 planes destroyed, hundreds more crippled and possibly destroyed, some 8,000 men killed in action; an unknown number dead of disease; 30,000 drowned when transports were sunk.

Announced U.S. losses (not including those in naval actions during the last fortnight—see p. 23): two carriers (Hornet, Wasp), six cruisers, 13 destroyers, five transports, “hundreds” of men, an undisclosed number of airplanes.

BATTLE OF EUROPE

Doenitz Prepares

Twelve feet of reinforced concrete protect Admiral Karl Dönitz’ U-boats when they put into Lorient and Brest for rest, repairs and refueling. Some Allied sources say that constant air raids, by smashing more poorly protected surface ships and power stations, have lowered the efficiency of Lorient and Brest as much as 75%, but the U-boats in packs still prowl forth into the Atlantic.

Last week there were signs that Admiral Dönitz, newly upped to command of all Hitler’s naval forces, may fear a bold attempt to seize the coast of Brittany, smash the submarines at their source, just as Allied air raids on Germany have attempted to choke off submarine construction. German broadcasts announced that civilians had been ordered out of Brest and Lorient. From Brest alone the evacuation of 22,000 nonessential civilians already was under way.

Other sources reported that a huge section of Marseille’s Old Port area, also cleared of civilians (TIME, Feb. 8), was being converted hastily into a new U-boat lair. Marseille would have the advantage of distance from British airfields and relative safety from sea assault. If the Allies invaded Europe’s soft underside, Marseille-based submarines would be in a position to make the Mediterranean even more perilous than the torpedo-infected Atlantic.

BATTLE OF AFRICA

R.S.V.P.

“Your prime and main duty will be to take your destroy at the earliest opportunity the German-Italian army commanded by Rommel,” Winston Churchill last summer informed General Sir Harold Alexander, his Commander in the Middle East.

“Sir: Orders you gave me on Aug. 15, 1942 have been fulfilled,” recently replied Sir Harold, “His Majesty’s enemies, together with their impediments, have been eliminated from Egypt, Cyrenaica, Libya and Tripolitania. I now await your further instructions.”

“Obviously we shall have to think of some,” Mr. Churchill told a laughing House of Commons last week. “Indeed this was one of the more detailed matters which we discussed at the conference at Casablanca.”

They had not been literally fulfilled. Rommel’s army still exists (see p. 23).

CARDINAL CONVOY

To the French the battleship Richelieu was once a proud symbol of naval power. In Royal Navy archives it was a foe that had been bested but not beaten. In U.S. Navy code last week, she was designated merely as Cardinal Convoy.

Into fog-bound New York Harbor the Richelieu slipped, after sailing secretly from Dakar, dodging U-boats in mid-Atlantic and, riding out a winter gale. Not until the great battleship had been in port four days and the red topknots of French marins had become increasingly noticeable on Manhattan streets was the Richelieu’s presence made public.

Naval forces of the United Nations had acquired a formidable warship, but one that would need considerable overhaul. A 40-foot gash, a bent keel, damaged guns were reminders of the British-De Gaulist failure in September 1940 to capture Dakar, where the Richelieu was anchored. To make the Richelieu battleworthy a supply problem must be solved, since its guns will not take U.S. or British ammunition.

Said the Richelieu’s captain, Marcel Deramond: “Our coming will show the American people that France still has a navy ... that our sailors are anxious and eager to fight.”
The Rim

The veteran troops defending the last Axis-held corner of North Africa jabbed out furiously last week and cracked the Allied ring. Panzer divisions, probably some of Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps, surged against inexperienced artillery and U.S. armored troops holding the westward end of Faid Pass (see map). Despite ceaseless rains which have impeded Allied operations, more than 100 Axis tanks with dive-bomber support broke the U.S. line, split into two columns and advanced northwest toward Sidi bou Zid and south toward Gafsa.

Rommel was improving a position in which he already held all the advantage. He and Colonel General Jürgen von Arnim, commander of the Axis forces in the north, occupied a rim of commanding heights from Mateur south to the Mareth Line. Behind them was the flat coastal plain over which they could move rapidly against any vulnerable Allied point. General Dwight Eisenhower was forced to operate across a muddy terrain at the tough end of supply lines some 400 miles long.

Poses & Pillboxes. Eisenhower’s problem, complicated by the Axis attack, was to break through the Axis rim of defense on to the faster, smoother track of the plain. There were a number of roads through: the Ousseltia Valley, Sennel, Faid Pass. Until Rommel’s determined Panzers can be rolled back, Faid Pass was now effectively closed to the Allies.

The Axis’ southern position was guarded by the pillbox fortifications of the Mareth Line, built by the French atop high, naturally defensible escarpments. But the south appeared to be a likelier route for an Allied plunge into the coastal flatlands. The weather was wet, but the footing was better over sandy soil. And in the Allies’ southern sector were the battle-smart veterans of the seasoned Eighth Army. With a strong show of artillery and tanks, Rommel tried to delay them. They edged on.

Bases & Battlefields. Air forces, in the prelude to the final struggle, hammered at each other’s bases and communication lines. The score in the air: 645 Axis planes downed; 265 Allied. Both sides continued to pour men and matériel into the constricted, crowded battlefield. Axis forces already numbered 250,000 men, according to Mr. Churchill. Allied forces on the front line were undisclosed, although Mr. Churchill said 500,000 had been landed in Northwest Africa.

Rommel’s thrust may seriously upset all of Eisenhower’s plans. The capture of Gafsa would mean the loss of the Allies’ most important central Tunisian base. If Rommel (variously reported wounded and nearly captured) widens his assault, he will seriously disrupt Allied communication lines. The decision might be delayed even beyond the first weeks of summer, the time now apparently set for victory and a push toward southern Europe.

Time, February 22, 1943
STRATEGY

For Good or Ill

We have now a complete plan . . . and this plan we are going to carry out according to our policy during the next months, before the end of which we will make efforts to meet again. . . . For good or ill we know our minds.—Winston Churchill.

Last week Mr. Churchill and his collaborator, Franklin Roosevelt, in separate but carefully correlated accounts, reported on the war and some of its problems. Mr. Churchill dealt mostly with immediate problems and gains; Mr. Roosevelt, with the grand objectives (see p. 15). Doubtless the Prime Minister and the President did not intend to sound words to hoodwink the enemy. But they also gave the Allied world some information and much encouragement.

The first necessity, according to Mr. Churchill, is to overcome the U-boats—the "prelude to all efficient aggressive operations." The second objective, according to Mr. Roosevelt, is to drive the enemy from Tunisia into the sea—the "prelude to invasion of continental Europe.

Somber Panorama. In the U-boat war, said Mr. Churchill, "we shall be definitely better off . . . at the end of 1943." U.S. and Canadian shipbuilding exceeded losses by 1,250,000 tons in the last half of 1942 ("It is not much but it is something"). In the past two months sinkings were the lowest they have been in over a year. Every U-boat afloat in the first year of war averaged 19 sinkings; in the second, twelve; in the third, only seven and a half. In the same period, on the other hand, have steadily increased. But they do not yet equal Germany's production of new submarines, and at the present rate will not before 1943's end Nevertheless, said Mr. Churchill, the war at sea constitutes a "repugnant and somber panorama." Shipping losses must be reduced by the production of more escort vessels, even if production of merchantmen has to be decreased. Said the Prime Minister: "The more sinkings are reduced, the more vehement our Anglo-American war effort can be. . . . The greater the weight we can take off Russia and how quickly the war will end will all depend upon the margin of new building and forging ahead over losses which are, although improving, still lamentable and grievous."

Tunisia. "I do not wish to encourage the House or the country to look for speedy new results," Mr. Churchill warned.

On the eve of the Tunisian battle Mr. Churchill last November: "I hold it perfectly justifiable to deceive the enemy, even if at the same time your own people are for awhile misled."

Mr. Churchill's figures were in gross tons. U.S. shipbuilding in that period totaled some 4,000,000 deadweight tons, or 1,250,000 gross tons. Net losses, therefore, were half of U.S. production. British production in the same period is unrevealed. "They may come or may not come." The harbor of Tripoli must be cleaned up so that it can be used as a supply base for the Eighth Army, of which Mr. Churchill said: "I have never seen troops march with the style and air of this desert army. Talk about spit & polish! The Highland and New Zealand divisions paraded after their ordeal in the desert as though they had come out of Wellington Barracks, and there was an air on the face of every private of a look that just and sober pride which comes from victory after toil."

General Montgomery, that "vehement, formidable, austere, severe, accomplished Cromwellian figure," is now 1,500 miles beyond his starting point in Egypt. British and U.S. forces in central and northern Tunisia are many long sea-miles from home. The Germans must operate across the Mediterranean, and they are losing one-fourth to one-third of everything they try to transport. But they have nearly a quarter of a million Axis troops (the rest estimated to be) the line only 30 to 40 miles from their immediate bases.

Mr. Churchill did not specifically in- dorse Mr. Roosevelt's North African po- litical policy—as a policy. But he ap- proved in results:

The Allied armies enjoy a tranquil countryside, Mr. Churchill said. Their land communications, though hard- impeded. Their power of reinforcement is far greater than the enemy's. The Allies have landed half a million men. The Axis forces are "no longer than two planes to every one of the Allies'. Even if it were the other way around, "it would pay us . . . to wear down the German Air Force and draw it away from the Russian front.

Mr. Churchill once more pointed out that North Africa was Mr. Roosevelt's "enterprise" with Fine Churchillian sarcasm, he said: "It is indeed remarkable that the Germans should have shown themselves ready to run the risk and pay the price required of them by their struggle to hold the Tunisian tip. While I have always hesitated to say anything which might afterwards look like overconfidence, I cannot resist the remark that one sees in this policy the touch of a master hand, the same master hand that planned the attack on Stalingrad."

The Southern Door. Of troubled Tur- key, tettering on the Allies' southern door- step into Axis Europe, Winston Churchill said:

"It is no part of our policy to get Tur- key into trouble. . . . Disaster to Turkey would be disaster to Britain, to the United Nations. Hitherto, Turkey has maintained a solid barrier against aggres- sion from any quarter, and by doing so even in the darkest days, she rendered us invaluable service. . . . It is of important interest to the United Nations and espe- cially Britain that Turkey should become well armed in all the apparatus of a mod- ern army, and her brave infantry shall not lack the essential weapons which play a decisive part on the battlefield today. These weapons we and the United States are now, for the first time, in a position to supply. . . . We can give them as much as they are able to take, and we can give them these weapons as fast or faster than Turkish troops can be trained to use them."

I am sure it would not be profitable to pay more closely into this part of our affairs. Turkey is our ally, Turkey is our friend. We wish to conserve her territories, rights and interests effectively preserved, and we wish to see in particular warm and friendly relations established between Tur- key and our great Russian ally to the northward to whom we are bound by a solemn treaty."

Asia and the Pacific. Messrs. Church- ill and Roosevelt know that the Pacific is primarily a U.S. theater. Mr. Roosevelt said that the U.S. no longer expects to inch its way from island to island across the Pacific ("It would take too many years") and that air action in China will be stepped up.

Military men know that an effectual air force, much less a large ground army, in China cannot be supplied by air alone, and that really "important actions" may have to wait the reconquest of Burma and the development of overland routes of supply. But the Churchill-Roosevelt statements, and Mr. Churchill's talk of General Field Marshal Dill in Chungking, sug- gest that positive action is in prospect. Said Mr. Churchill: "The Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-shek] also concurs in the plans for future action in the Far East, which we have submitted to him as a result of our deliberations." Nothing less than a campaign to reopen the Burma route to China could satisfy the Generalissimo.

Who Are the Allies? Messrs. Roose- velt and Churchill paid due tribute to Russia's armies, Mr. Churchill recalled that Joseph Stalin had said that the North African campaign was "militarily correct."

Mr. Roosevelt said: "Remember there are many roads that lead right to Tokyo and we are not going to neglect any of them"—a reference which could be read as a bid for access to Russia's Vladivostok area, only 700 air miles from Tokyo. The Mos- cow press featured the Roosevelt speech— a sure sign of the Kremlin's approval. But the accounts of Generalissimo and the Prime Minister, there was more warmth toward the Russians than certainty about Russia's future as an ally.

Two Allies. Said Mr. Churchill: In the event we knock Germany and Italy out first, all forces of the British Empire will be moved to the Far Eastern area, until unconditional surrender is forced upon Ja- pan.

Said Mr. Roosevelt: You can be quite sure that if Japan should be the first of the Axis partners to fall, the total efforts and resources of all the United Nations would be concentrated on the job of crushing Germany.

TIME, February 22, 1943
BATTLE OF RUSSIA

The Losers

Nazi propaganda has taught the world to think of Hitler's armies as inhumanly efficient masses. Last week in mourning Germany (see p. 37), Berlin's propagandists changed key, began trying to humanize the combat soldier of the Wehrmacht.

In doing so, they allowed one Bert Naegle to speak for the young men in the winter snows:

"It's a long time when you're young, full of plans and burning to 'mold life' with your own hands. Years are flying past us; we are getting older. There's a big hole in our lives.

"War is a reality we have come to know intimately in three long years. It made us hard in distress, danger and enemy fire. But not hard enough. It can't keep that boiling hot fear from us over us that the past is gone and irrevocable, that when we finally lay down our guns youth shall be gone, wasted in the flames of battlefields, blown away by the breath of death, trod down by the implacable march of time.

"We measure in our minds the span which will remain to us after the end of the war and always find it too small to pack into it all we precious saved of unsatisfied longings, unfulfilled desires, carefully imagined plans and deeds not yet done.

"When we talk about these things with one another we try to laugh them off and tell how we will live all the more intensely afterwards. But the casualness is not genuine. Secretly inside we doubt. Fear is bored deep in our hearts that we are losing the race with life."

Retreat to Where?

Adolf Hitler's armies in southern Russia were in full retreat last week.

In all of World War II, no single fact had held such enormous possibilities. Napoleon's retreat from Moscow in 1812, Rommel's retreat from Egypt in 1942, involved the fate of continents; the Wehrmacht's retreat involves the fate of the world. When the full extent and meaning of the retreat are clear, the world will be better able to judge the winner of World War II, better able to gauge its length.

Battles in the Dust. Beyond doubt the Wehrmacht had suffered far more than a grave defeat. It had met a disaster that grew hourly. Point after point along the 700-mile front from Orel to Novorossisk fell like tenspits before the Russian avalanche. In ten weeks (less on some fronts) the Red Armies had advanced from 100 to 350 miles, often through deep snows, often in areas well suited for defense. At no point were they slowed down by the necessity of regrouping. The Russians said that they had already killed, wounded or captured near a million German and satellite troops since the winter offensives began, and that another 500,000 were in immediate peril.

But as of this week not enough was known of the nature of the fighting or of the strategies employed to tell where the Wehrmacht's disaster might lead. The outer world did not see the battles; it saw only the permitted accounts of the battles. Moscow correspondents could not visit the fronts. Where the Red Army had to fight for its gains, and where it had only to march in after the retreating Germans, the dispatches did not clearly say. If the battles were bitter, neither Moscow nor Berlin said much about them. What might well be the most significant retreat in history could be viewed only in half light.

Retreat to the Reich? Moscow said that the Germans were rushing up reserves and new equipment to stop the Russians. Berlin talked of "elastic German defenses leading to further withdrawals." Perhaps the Germans were withdrawing under duress. Perhaps the Russians were pursuing more than attacking but wanted to make their gains loom as large as possible. Perhaps the Germans' "further withdrawals" may eventually take them out of Russia. If so, these circumstances explained in part the speed of the Red Army's offensive.

Adolf Hitler's retreat to elastic defenses may have been too late for anything less than the complete failure of his Russian campaign. If so, his only hope is to withdraw to the Reich and convert it (and Western Europe) into an impregnable fortress (TIME, Feb. 8). But that remained to be proved. What had been proved was that the Red Army was giving his Wehrmacht no rest or resting place.

Over the Donets. Save only at Stalingrad, the Germans have not made a determined stand in south Russia or fought lengthy delaying actions since they failed to relieve the forces on the Volga.

At the least, if they intended to fight for southern Russia, they might have been expected to stick doggedly to the Donets line running southeast from Kharkov through Voroshilovgrad (see map, p. 22). But last week Colonel General Nikolai Vatutin's armies crossed the Donets and captured Izyum on the railway between Kharkov and Rostov. The fall of Izyum meant: 1) that the Red Army had a springboard for a jump toward Dniepropetrovsk 125 miles southwest; 2) that Kharkov was threatened by a pincer arm from the south; 3) that Voroshilovgrad (whose capture was apparently imminent) had in effect been bypassed some 90 miles to the northwest.

This week one column of Vatutin's army, rolling south, was within 100 miles of Mariupol on the Sea of Azov, thereby threatening to block the Wehrmacht's retreat from Rostov. There is a chance that before spring the Wehrmacht may lose all of the rich Donets basin west to the Dnieper River—the last natural defense line inside Russia.

Kursk Captured. Farther north, Colonel General Filip I. Golikov's forces, completing a 125-mile thrust on skis and motorized sleds, captured Kursk, one of the main pivots of the German line in south Russia. This brilliant advance not only brought the Russians past the line from which the Germans began their 1941 offensive, but it cut Kharkov off from all its northern Nazi supply bases. The fall of Kursk also enables Colonel General Golikov's armies to swing south and close on Kharkov itself.

Other forces under Golikov, operating in River, surrounded a "death pocket" of 25,000 Germans—all that remained of
BATTLE OF AFRICA

Full Measure of Blood

Backed into their corner of North Africa, Axis troops hacked and jabbed at Allied armies which were slowly, slowly closing in. The action was "minor," but it flared along the whole 500-mile front. Small opposing forces fought for position, struggled bitternly for mountain passes, railroad stations, strategic heights.

Typical was the fighting in central Tunisia, near Sennel, where battle-green U.S. troops got a fiery baptism. Their objective was the Sennel railroad station, 50 miles from the coast. As their half-tracks and anti-tank guns advanced through a sandy valley, German 75s and 88-mm.s in the hills opened up. German planes dive-bombed them, strafed infantrymen as they rolled up in their tracks.

The U.S. force was inexperienced, but it quickly became less so. A Gunnem drew a bead on a dive-bomber, said: "Here's where I get one for my brother." He did. Captain Sidney Combs, of Lexington, Ky., took cover behind a tank. All at once a mine exploded under it and injured the crew. Combs amputated the tank captain's leg with a knife, crawled into a foxhole and directed the artillery fire. Poundcd by "Stukas," the U.S. force pressed on, reached its objective, destroyed enemy installations and withdrew.

Three Austrian deserters bore witness to the ferocity of fighting on both sides. They reported that U.S. planes had reduced three of their companies by 65%, said that it was their worst experience since the Russian winter.

But at week's end the Axis troops appeared to have won the preliminary skirmishes, either holding their lines intact or punching in the strategically important spots.

Soft Spot? The Allies had a preponderance of men in North Africa but they were not all in Tunisia; many of the U.S. troops in action were green, most of the French ill equipped. Against them were upward of 150,000 hardened, battle-wise troops, including the remnants of Erwin Rommel's tough if battered army, and at least one crack Panzer division—the Tenth, which had fought in Poland, France, Russia. German equipment was excellent. On to the battlefields last week rumbled the new, mighty Mark VI tank, protected with a heavy armor belt and hard to stop with 75s and 105-mm.s. Hitler had poured an estimated one-third of his entire air force into the North African area. The Allies have been unable to stop the flow of Axis reinforcements.

There might be one soft spot in the Axis defense. But no one on the Allied side knew for sure how big it was or how soft. The London News Chronicle's veteran war correspondent Philip Jordan sensed a crack-up in morale. He hazarded the guess that the Germans might be preparing to evacuate without a real fight. "I think that other than armored units,
which are the basis of defense, the enemy is removing his best troops from Tunisia and regrouping them in the men who are expected to do no more than hold the defensive positions until the main body of the Afrika Korps is got away.

But the New York Times' careful Drew Middleton discounted these reports, saw no evidence of deterioration. "There is very little cause for optimism," Middleton wrote. "The end of the Germans in Africa is inevitable but it will be accompanied by a full measure of bloody, bitter fighting."

BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

Desperate Campaign

O.W.I. reports last week that U.S. merchant-marine casualties in one year of war had reached 3,200 or 3.8% of the crews (see p. 20) underlined the gravity of the U-boat campaign—a campaign which may yet stigmatize the war and will certainly delay final Allied victory.

The greatest submarine fleet the world has known is now fighting against the lifeline of Britain, North Africa. Well-informed U.S. and British officials drew a picture of that fleet:

Modern German submarines are as far advanced over the undersea ships of 1914 as modern planes are over planes of World War 1. So modern are the long-range types that can travel 14,720 miles on a single load of fuel. Refueled and reprovisioned by undersea stations, they can remain at sea for months at a time. Monstrous metal whales, 220 ft. long with a 20-ft. beam, they carry in their bellies a dozen torpedoes, a crew of 47. When submerged they displace 882 tons (about half the displacement of a typical destroyer).

Their thick skins are double, with oil compartments between to absorb the shock of depth charges, which must explode with in 20 ft. of them to blast open their sides. They can crash dive in seconds, submerge to 100 fathoms (600 ft.), resist with safety the pressure of more than 19 tons per square foot. On the surface they can shoulder through the sea at 20 knots, driven by great 2,000-h.p. diesel engines. On their bows is a quick-firing gun big enough to enable them to engage Allied corvettes in surface action. U-boat production is at the rate of 20 to 30 a month. Hitler should have a fleet of 500-700 or more by spring, and the rate of losses now inflicted by Allied planes and ships will have to be greatly increased before the growth of the German fleet is halted.

Into this last-chance gamble Hitler has thrown many of his still vast resources. From the inland industrial centers of the Ruhr he can spawn his raiders and send them across the world. The biggest craft are launched into the Baltic and the North Sea. Smaller craft can be floated through river and canal arteries across the face of

France, spewed out into the English Channel through the Seine, into the Mediterranean through the Salime-Rhine Rivers, into the Bay of Biscay through the Loire River.

In the Air. The Allies are desperately fighting submarines with planes. Two out of every three R.A.F. bombers have been fighting the Battle of the Atlantic. Practically every German city under major attack in the last twelve months manufactures some U-boat part. Last week R.A.F. bombers, in their 112th raid on Cologne, made the heaviest attack since May 50, when 1,000 acres and 170 factories were ruined. Last week's raid was timed to flatten Cologne's burgeoning reconstruction, level factories just resuming the production of diesel engines and U-boat batteries. The British dropped 100 two-ton bombs.

Giant Lancasters, attacking the northern industrial heart of Italy, left "colossal" fires blazing at Turin and made their first sweep over Mussolini's naval base at La Spezia. R.A.F. bombers by night, U.S. Flying Fortresses and Liberators by day, flew over western Europe. They gave Hamburg its 93th plastering. They roared through the valley of the Ruhr. They swarmed over the U-boat base at Lorient, where ten acres of the naval arsenal have now been reported destroyed. Apparently unable to pierce the eleven-foot roofs of the concrete sub pens, the Allied bombers have concentrated on softer targets which are vital to maintenance and repair. Result: 75% of Lorient's headquarters buildings have been wrecked; shops, foundries, warehouses have been knocked down. Daylight precision bombing by Flying Fortresses has undoubtedly affected the morale of workers and returning U-boat crews. This week the Nazis ordered evacuation of Lorient's civilian population. On the Sea. The Allies also wage their campaign on the seas. Brightest reports:

► In seven months no U-boat has penetrated the U.S. Eastern Sea Frontier.

► The Caribbean has been cleaned up sufficiently to justify sending Rear Admiral James L. ("Sub Buster") Kaufman last week to a hotter, undisclosed area of command.

► Canada has built and put in operation some 500 warships, most of them escort craft which are doing nearly half the Atlantic convoy work.

► According to a Navy spokesman, more than 1,000,000 U.S. soldiers have been conveyed overseas without the loss of a single soldier as the result of submarine action.

► The German High Command claimed the sinking by U-boats in January of only 63 vessels of 408,000 tons—well under the rate of 630,000 tons a month which they claimed for 1942, and less than half the 1,000,000-a-month loss unofficially estimated for recent months. But January sinkings during the period of tumultuous North Atlantic storms were no index of what the rate may be during the hunting days of spring. On the extent of Allied power to stop that drive, First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. Alexander made a sadly illuminating remark: "We want the equipment to do the job properly."
WORLD BATTLEFRONTS

BATTLE OF THE PACIFIC

How Japs Fight

[See Cover]

A Japanese named Nagano had an American named Knox feeling jittery last week. Osami Nagano is Chief of Japan's Naval Staff, and last week his Navy was up to no good in the South Pacific. U.S. Navy Secretary Frank Knox, just back from the South Pacific with his cheeks full of optimism, grew a little jump on in a press conference when reporters began asking what Nagano's ships were doing.

Was a great big fight going on?

No, said the Secretary.

But the Japanese had announced sinking two battleships in an air-sea clash off Rennell Island (Time, Feb. 8). That certainly sounded like a big battle.

Said the Secretary, sharply: "A lot of preliminary dispositions are going on—but no pitched battles of any kind as yet. Any assumption that last night's communiqué indicated a tremendous battle in progress is an incorrect assumption."

But, said a reporter, the communiqué specifically suggested just that.

"Let me see the communiqué," said the Secretary. "I don't think it did." Mr. Knox then read a passage from the communiqué: "The increased activity on the part of the Japanese indicates a major effort to regain control of the entire Solomon area..." He then commented: "...indicates a major effort to regain control. Will, that may be so. But it would appear to be only an indication, only a speculative proposition. We don't know exactly what they are planning."

Knoo's Point. The difficulty of knowing what Admiral Osami Nagano has planned is far more than the usual difficulty of guessing an enemy's moves. That is partly because Nagano, in a race of incurable table men, is notoriously tight of tongue, partly because the Japanese have a mania for secrecy. It is perhaps mostly because probabilities about the Japanese in war cannot be based on the ordinary human standards. Japs fight differently.

But even taking these difficulties into consideration, even without the special information available to Mr. Knox, it was easy last week to see that something big was brewing.

► A U.S. convoy of transports, apparently going to Guadalcanal and covered by a naval task force, had been attacked twice. The first attack was 60 miles due south of Guadalcanal, off Rennell Island. The Japs claimed two battleships, three cruisers.

► According to Tokyo, a scouting task force of U.S. cruisers and destroyers was attacked by the Japs south of Santa Isabel Island—up the slot from Guadalcanal. The Japs claimed a cruiser and a destroyer.

► A.P.'s Bill Hipple reported from Guadalcanal: "Aerial observers reported tonight that a large force of Japanese warships was headed for Guadalcanal." Nothing more was announced about this contact.

► At least one Japanese carrier task force was apparently in the area. Unusually strong resistance was met by Fortresses raiding Japanese vessels in the Buin area up the slot (20 Zero's shot down three Fortresses and damaged one badly). This was interpreted in Washington as meaning that a carrier was nearby.

After the Rennell Island action, the Tokyo radio said: "It is plain that the U.S. cannot regain her sea strength."

At week's end Secretary Knox said that U.S. losses had been "minor in everything... moderate... nothing significant." Apparently no battleship was lost, and probably not much in the way of cruisers or destroyers. Even the Tokyo radio changed its tune: it said that the U.S. had ten battleships, ten aircraft carriers and 20 heavy cruisers in the Solomons area, that the Japanese fleet was "numerically inferior."

Nagano's Arc. The pattern of these skirmishes, both naval and verbal, indicated that both sides have some pretty heavy plans for the South Pacific. On the Japanese side, the man responsible for plans was the man who had Secretary Knox on the edge of his chair—Chief of Staff Osami Nagano. He must orient his plans, whatever they may be, to the situation in which Japan now finds herself. It is an excellent defensive position (see map). To the east there is a stretch of Pacific across which the U.S. would hesitate to send an all-out amphibian invasion, knowing what carrier and land-based forces were able to do to such an invasion when the Japs tried to take Midway. To the north there is a temporary security which rests on the virtual certainty that Russia would not be willing to let the U.S. move on Japan over her soil—at least until after the defeat of Hitler. To the west, the mass of China could well base hostile air and land forces, but China is of limited use to Japan's enemies until they own Burma, and the stalemated minor campaign there indicates that that is not now a danger. To the south there lies a great arc of air and naval bases, one sector of which is threatened at the Solomons.

The logic of this defensive pattern imposes on Admiral Nagano an ironclad duty: he must, either by defensive or offensive measures, make the southern arc secure. Because the U.S. now grows strong south of his arc, he will have to fight to do his duty. The only way to guess how he will fight is to know how all Japs fight.

By last week, officers returning from the South Pacific had told some of the truth about how Japs fight.

Hasamoto's Choice. Probably the greatest misconception about Japanese fighters is the belief that they will never surrender. It is true that when trapped they fight with a burning, rodent tenacity, but it is a mistake, say these officers, to credit their stubbornness to fanatic religious beliefs. It is just animal fight. Both on sea and on land, they are capable of giving up.

In the naval Battle of Guadalcanal (Nov. 12-15), Jap surface ships high-tailed it out of range of U.S. ships and planes, leaving the Jap transports and

NAGANO BENDING

He made no apologies for Pearl Harbor.

NAGANO UNBENDING

He would not concede defeat.
their thousands of soldiers to be slaughtered. U.S. aviators later confessed they were sickened at having to bomb that helpless mass.

Last week reports told how on Guadalcanal a group of Japs of the 224th Infantry Regiment, veterans of China, Borneo and the Philippines, were trapped in a heavily wooded ravine. They could hear a U.S. loud-speaker across the way urging them in Japanese to surrender. At night they talked their situation over. They voted to fight on. But next morning Private Akiyoshi Hasamoto and some of his friends marched, hands up, to the U.S. lines and surrendered. To an interpreter Private Hasamoto said: "... Finally my feelings as a true Japanese soldier disappeared. ... I had nothing to lose by surrendering. My actions were prompted primarily by thoughts of hot food, tobacco and relief from the unending shelling." Private Hasamoto said he would never be able to go back to Japan—but the fact is that he and others gave themselves up voluntarily.

**Talent for Hiding.** Marine and Army men returning from the South Pacific almost unanimously hold that, man for man, the Jap soldier is inferior in fighting qualities to the American. But in all the things to do with hiding, stealth and trickery, they give the Japs plenty of angry credit. The Japanese love night work. At sea their infiltrations to Guadalcanal were nearly all by night, and the fact that Japan has been beaten in most of the great night battles is probably due to superior U.S. detection equipment and gunnery. Almost invariably the Japanese launch their land attacks at night. They hold their fire when the enemy is not firing, so as not to give away their positions. They dig deep, stand-up foxholes, which are safe except under direct artillery fire (and which are better than U.S. slit trenches). On the defensive, they dig themselves dugouts protected by palm trunks, and then they crawl in and resist until some explosive or a human terrier kills them. Parachutist Major Harry Torgeson, who had the job of blasting Japs out of the caves on Gavutu (Time, Sept. 1), reported finding Japs firing machine guns over the horribly stinking corpses of comrades dead three days.

**No Talent for Thinking.** The average height of Japanese soldiers and sailors is
5 ft. 3½ in. Physically they are no match for U.S. troops, and whenever the two meet hand to hand, which is seldom, the Japanese are worsted.

The myth of the Japanese sniper is exploded by returning officers. They say that Japanese snipers are an annoyance, little more. They hide excellently but their aim is poor. Sniping serves, however, to frighten men who will not deliberately ignore it. Japanese machine-gunners often set up their guns in a fixed position, and do not traverse and search. The result is that men in the line of Japs' fire can move aside and advance safely.

But the greatest handicap of the Japanese is their lack of imagination. They carry out orders to the letter and, if necessary, to death. But when things go wrong, they cannot adapt their tactics. If Jap attackers meet resistance, they advance anyhow—which accounts for the terrible slaughter to which Japanese troops submit themselves.

Energy in Training. The Japs have learned war by rote. They train endlessly, until they have memorized all they should know. Officers are unspiring in training their men, to a point which U.S. trainers would probably think insane. In 1930 naval maneuvers near Saishuto (according to a Japanese officer's article in the Spanish Revista de Aeronautica), Japan's present Commander of Combined Fleets Admiral Yamamoto, then captain of the carrier Akagi, launched 30 torpedo planes in a gale to give the men practice in heavy-weather launchings. They all launched, but not one got back to the ship.

Jap training methods are both humorless and tireless. Major Harold Doud, who served six months in 1934-35 as an observer with the 7th Infantry Regiment at Kanazawa, found the life exhausting and looked forward to the regiment's first holiday. When it came, he found that the regiment did not let the holiday interfere with the regular day's work. Reveille was at 3 a.m., and before the usual breakfast time the men had worshipped dead Japanese in three separate ceremonies, dined with bayonets, eaten some dried flounder, shouted "Banzai!" and marched up & down a mountain. Then they trained as usual.

Despair in Defeat. Consequence of this kind of training is that privates rely inordinately on their officers. They are taught to believe in success, and they do. Consequently, when they encounter failure they break down. Diaries taken from Jap soldiers in New Guinea have had their share of despair: "Where is the Imperial Fleet? . . . The end is approaching . . . We cannot endure another day of this sickness and shelling. We see nothing but American planes."

Even before they encounter failure, Jap soldiers are anything but supermen. They are notoriously hypochondriac. They carry little oily green cakes which they rub on the skin to keep mosquitoes away. Many carry white gloves which they wear when they sleep. They carry toilet waters and perfumed powders.

They do not like death any more than U.S. troops. In War and Soldier, a Japanese best-seller about the war in China, Ashihle Hino says in describing a defeat: "I actually put my revolver to my head. I thought I would cry out: 'May Great Imperial Japan live forever!"' in so loud a voice that the enemy would hear me, and then press the trigger. But the feel of the cold steel made me shudder, and I hastily replaced the weapon in my holster. I wanted to live on as long as I could. Thoughts of home brought tears to my eyes, and I put my hands in my pockets . . ."

The 5-5-3 Mentality. Unquestionably Japanese officers do fight against British Empire and U.S. troops furiously. This fury is born of resentment at having been treated as inferiors. Symbolic of that treatment was the famous 5-5-3 ratio for capital ships imposed by Britain and the U.S. on Japan. This ratio, says Japanese Expert Wilfred Fleischer, "has, in fact, played a much more important role in Japanese policy in recent years than is generally supposed abroad, and was a contributory factor in Japan's revulsion to an ultra-nationalist, militaristic policy."

Admiral Osami Nagano knew the 5-5-3 ratio well. He was instrumental in Japan's defying it.

The 5-5-3 ratio was 'invented at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22. At the Geneva conference in 1932, Japan's delegate Osami Nagano proposed the abolition of aircraft carriers, long-range submarines, limitation of large offensive capital ships. If his proposals had been accepted, Japan would have been safe from transpacific attack, and could have pursued her ambitions in the China seas without fear.

Admiral Nagano also represented Japan at the London Conference, 1935-36, and it was there that he finally blasted the 5-5-3. A Navy man primarily, narrow, native politically, he kept drumming at the theme of parity, although he knew the idea could never be accepted. Toward the end he said to a British delegate: "If I do what you like, when Nagano goes back, what!"—and he raked his fingers across his throat. The same threat a few days later intoned the death notice of the conference.

"We cannot," he said, "accept the views that a power is entitled to possess naval forces generally superior to those of others on account of the vastness of its overseas possessions and the extensiveness of the lines of communication it has to protect. If such a view were correct, how could one explain why there should be parity between Britain and the United States?"

Nagano went home, Japan completed its present fleet—on a ratio limited not by treaty, but by Japan's ability to compete industrially.

The Officer Mentality. Osami Nagano represents the most aggressive, hearty, popular officer type Japan possesses: he is a kind of Greater East Asian Halsey. He is big for a Japanese—about 5 ft. 9 in., andBuilt like a barn, he is famous for being able to roll liquor past his tongue without loosening it. He is, as all Japanese warriors should be, a good family man: at the age of 62 he is presently engaged in raising a family with his third wife. He
Watchdog of the Convoys

Today, as in 1917-18, convoys are again being shepherded by far-ranging naval airships – big brothers of the Goodyear blimps familiar to most Americans. No patrol is more feared by the undersea wolves, for the airship can see beneath the sea. It flies low enough and slow enough to spot the tell-tale shadow of a submarine skulking many fathoms deep. And once it sights the quarry, it can hover motionless above to drop depth charges with devastating effect.

The blimp fleet now joining our Navy is larger, both in number and size, than the pioneer Goodyear-built squadron of twenty-five years ago, and it is growing every day. The new ships are several times larger. They have far longer cruising range and carry a heavier bomb and fuel load – enough to remain aloft for days if necessary.

Swift production of these super-blimps is the fruit of Goodyear’s quarter-century of airship development. Throughout the long years of peace we continued to build and operate a fleet of non-rigid airships, looking toward the airship’s coming-of-age as a commercial transport. Thus when war came, Goodyear was ready with an airship squadron that could be transferred to the Navy for immediate duty – and we were ready with the manufacturing capacity and experience to produce new giants.
Sorry, the Postman says "No!"

We wish we could mail you a Four Roses Hot Toddy—just to let you know what a downright marvelous cold-weather drink it is.

We can’t. So we suggest the next best thing:

If you haven’t a bottle of Four Roses on hand, get one at the nearest liquor store and follow our recipe for the world’s finest hot toddy.

Then settle back in your favorite chair before the fire and slowly sip the warm and fragrant master-piece that you and Four Roses have created!

Recipe for the world’s finest Hot Toddy

Put a piece of sugar in the bottom of a glass and dissolve it with a little hot water. Add a twist of lemon peel (bruise it firmly)...four cloves and, if you desire, a stick of cinnamon. Pour in a generous jigger of that matchless whiskey, Four Roses...and fill the glass with steaming hot water.

Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., Louisville & Baltimore.
laughs with his belly and his guts are tough.

As little is known in the U.S. about his specific naval skills as about any Japanese officer's. It is one of the U.S. Navy's laments that they know so little about the strengths and weaknesses of top-ranking Jap officers. But in both the U.S. and British Navies, Nagano has the reputation of being with the best.

Nagano, on the other hand, knows the U.S. as well as any Japanese naval officer. He was a language officer in the U.S. in 1913 and studied law at Harvard for seven months. He even took courses at the War College. In 1923 he commanded a Japanese training squadron which visited Annapolis, was received by President Hoover. As naval attaché in Washington (1920-23), he assisted at the Washington Conference and was all tact. He always remembered Americans' birthdays, and always remembered to tell the story of the little cemetery in Japan where some shipwrecked U.S. sailors were buried, whose graves were perpetually and tenderly cared for. In 1937, with tears literally blurring his eyes, he apologized for the sinking of the Panay. "I am merely an ignorant sailor," he said, "but I want you to know that I am speaking from the depths of my heart. I am positive it was an accident."

Osami Nagano, the bluff, hearty sailor, became Chief of Naval General Staff in charge of operations on April 9, 1941. He still held the job on Dec. 7, 1941. What happened that day was not an accident.

The essence of the Japanese officer's code is attack. The essence of the Japanese fighting man's strength is stealth. What will transpire in the South Pacific is by no means certain, because the U.S. has just begun to fight there, and the U.S. may seize the initiative. But Osami Nagano, too, has just begun to fight. The only certain prognostication about the South Pacific is that Admiral Nagano will attack with all the craft of which he is capable. If he is once defeated, he will attack again, craftily again.

Experience of the South Pacific war shows that the Jap is no superman and can be beaten. Osami Nagano can be beaten, but not without one hell of a scrap.

Ordeal of Corporal Keene

High in the sky over the coast of Australia, the 13-ton Catalina flying boat suddenly twisted and dived. Zeros protecting a Jap cruiser were blazing away. The Catalina shook them off and straightened out.

Corporal Keene, flight engineer, picked up the interphone to speak to the pilot. When he got no reply, Keene climbed down from his high-hung, isolated engine compartment to see what the trouble was. First he saw the remains of the chief gunner. The others in the eight-man Australian crew slumped at their posts. Every one had been killed, struck by machine-gun bullets or cannon fire. Corporal Keene was glad to be alive, but he had never flown a plane.

"George," the automatic pilot, had been set by the human pilot before he died. The Catalina, her body riddled but her engines intact, drummed along through the sky. Keene had time to muse, stand around for "quite a while," open an after-hatch and gaze down 6,000 feet at the expanse of empty sea.

It was lucky for Keene that he did take his time. The pilotless Catalina began to drone over land. Keene did not know what land, but he did not care. He buckled on his parachute and bailed out over British New Guinea. Bush natives showed him the way to Port Moresby. The last he saw of the Catalina and her oblivious crew, she was flying steadily on.

War Over Wau

The Japs began pouring their planes into a new sinkhole last week. Its name was Wau.

In 1926 gold was discovered in a humid, fever-ridden valley on the northeast coast of New Guinea, about half way between Salamaua and Buna. Men rushed into the valley, an opposite in every way to the Yukon. To get their gold out, they built an airfield at Wau, on a plateau 3,000 feet high.

When the Japanese first took Lae and Salamaua early in 1942, an Australian garrison fell back to the Wau area, and held it all through the year, even after the Japs moved to Buna. Fortnight ago, when Jap patrols infiltrated to Wau, as they have infiltrated many areas even on the south coast of New Guinea, the Allies flew reinforcements to the little Wau field—which had suddenly become more valuable than the gold it was built to carry out. The Jap patrols were pushed back. Last week the Japs began trying to bomb Wau, and were stung for their pains. In the second largest single day's battle in the whole Australian theater. 37 U.S. Lightnings, Airacobras and Kittyhawks went up to meet 70 Japanese Zeros and twin-engined bombers. Not a single U.S. plane was shot down. The Japs lost 21 Zeros, three bombers and twelve more fighters; three more bombers were so seriously damaged as to be considered "probables." Score: 41-0-0.

Peace on Guadalcanal

The Battle of Guadalcanal is over. After six months of fighting the last Japanese on the island is either dead or evacuated. Tokyo announced the end this Tuesday. Secretary Knox confirmed it. Whatever new struggle may be brewing in the Pacific, it can hardly be another Jap attempt to reconquer Guadalcanal. That fight is over.

At the end the last 3,000 Japanese survivors were trapped on Cape Esperance on the northwest tip. For months the Americas had been fighting slowly up along the northern coast from Henderson Field 25 miles away. Last week a strong body of U.S. troops suddenly showed itself in "a strong position" near the little Melanesian Mission station of Marovo on the opposite shore. How they got there was not explained. If by land, they would have had to march overland more than 40 miles, through the harshest kind of mountains and jungle. It was possible they had come by sea, in the transports the Japs attacked off Russell Island (see p. 24). However they got there, their arrival put the Japs in a box.
INTERNATIONAL

Or Else

The peace-loving nations of the world, which had tragically demonstrated their inability to prevent World Wars I & II again showed signs of an inability to head off World War III. They had before them the bloody example of their past failure to unite on a common program. Now, facing the vital necessity for a common program, they were still unable or unwilling to unite.

The central problem was Russia. The appalling lack of political and military liaison so far established by the U.S. and Britain with the U.S.S.R. became more pronounced and embarrassing with every victory the Russian armies rolled up. It handicapped U.S.-British strategists in their plans for a continental invasion. It created worries which stemmed as much from the sins and lack of Anglo-American readyness with Russia as from the mysteries of Russian policy. The chief worries were that: 1) Stalin might withdraw from the war when the invaders were driven from Russian territory, thus leaving Hitler free to face the U.S. and Britain; 2) Stalin might let the momentum of his armies spread over the entire Continent.

Germany Loses. Germany had to be defeated first. But this defeat could be best accomplished, and quite possibly could only be accomplished, by coordinated Allied action. For that reason it was necessary for the U.S., Britain, Russia and China to get together on their war plans. Britain and the U.S., through the "unconditional-surrender" conference at Casablanca and through last week's North African High Command agreement (see p. 36), were in close liaison. The Russians still remained aloof. The Chinese, looking in the Anglo-American window, may well have moved closer to the Russians (see p. 34).

Russia was as uncommunicative about her plans for postwar Europe as she was about military details. Common assumption indicated that Russia, for her future security, would demand European concessions—possibly Petsamo in Finland, warm-water ports in the Baltic, a sphere of influence in the Balkans, access to the Black Sea straits. Common sense also indicated that, unless a general and open agreement is reached soon on joint postwar policies, the Allies' present comradeship-in-arms may turn into a barracks brawl. The first chairs were already being thrown by pro-Soviets and anti-Soviets in the Balkans.

Clear Thinking. It was unfortunate but true that this growing state of apprehension played directly into Germany's hands, and would continue to do so unless Washington and London grappled intelligently with the problem. In his weekly magazine, Das Reich, Propaganda Minister Goebbels picked up the ragged theme of recent speeches by Hitler and Göring. He predicted the end of Western civilization if Germany did not remain as a bulwark against Communism, adding slyly: "Perhaps even in London there are a few clear-thinking men who could imagine what that would mean for Britain."

Some U.S. newspapers whose sense of responsibility is confined to their comic strips echoed the Goebbels line. A section of U.S. public opinion was prepared to revive the Red menace.

Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador to Russia, gave an official version of Anglo-Russian relations. He emphasized in a speech broadcast to Europe that Germany was again "flaunting the Red peril." He said that there was a "deep-seated wish, or more, a determination to work with the Russians in peace and in the war" that German propagandists could not shake. "Let them reflect for a moment," he said, "upon the common man in Britain and Russia and China, on his way of life... a spontaneous revolt against anything for which the Fascists stand."

Blood for Blood. These were brave words, but they did not solve the problem of burgeoning Russian influence in Europe and in the Far East. Nor did they obviate the fact that many aspects of U.S. policy, including overtures to the Austrian Habsburgs, the Darlins, the Hungarian Horhys of Europe, are bound to drive Joseph Stalin even farther from any real collaboration with his nominal allies. Walter Duranty, the almost forgotten expert on Russia, last week gave his version of Russia's position in Europe:

"Joseph Stalin is fighting his own war, Russia's war, the war which he foresaw perhaps before anyone else and for which he prepared to defend his country.

"Bolshevism, it has been said, is a new religion, fanatical and iconoclastic. Such a view would present Mr. Stalin as Khaled the successor to Mohammed. Personally I doubt this. I see Mr. Stalin as the clear-

We'll make it into a stem to everyone can have all they want.
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

My dear Mr. President:

Some time ago General Holcomb discussed with me his retirement on reaching the age of 64, and expressed at that time a strong desire to retire at that time. One of the reasons he assigned for this was that he, himself, had not employed, on active duty, retired officers of the Marine Corps above that age. I agreed with him at that time as to the wisdom of his proposed course, and we discussed a possible successor agreeing that General Vandegrift, both on his war record and on his ability, seemed to be a natural selection.

My recollection is that I told you of this discussion shortly after it occurred. I now have received a letter from General Holcomb reminding me of his voluntary request for retirement and suggesting the appointment of a younger officer who has rendered distinguished service in the present war. He points out that inasmuch as he holds the rank of Lieutenant General he is not subject to automatic retirement at the age of 64, and that his term of office does not expire until 30 November 1944. Therefore, the appropriate action is for him to resign to take effect as of August 31 when he reaches his age of retirement.

I agree with this suggestion of General Holcomb's and I should like to suggest to you, for your consideration, ordering General Vandegrift to Washington in anticipation of becoming Commandant of the Marine Corps so that he may employ the time intervening from now until the end of August in thoroughly familiarizing himself with all the various activities of the Corps.

If you approve this program I will set the wheels in motion.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
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DOD INTEL 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date: 3-14-59
Signature: Carl L. Spicer
PERSONAL AND PRIVATE

January 13, 1944

Dear Harry:

I hear from Minant that permission has been given by General Ulio to allow American newspapers who can find printing facilities in England to distribute their newspapers to the troops, subject to the ruling of the General in command of the theatre.

As a result of this ruling the Chicago Tribune is planning to send papers to England and print an edition there for the American soldiers. The Chicago Sun has recently asked for similar approval and I have no doubt other newspapers will be doing the same thing.

I certainly strenuously object to the Chicago Tribune being delivered to our troops anywhere in the world in view of their attitude on the war.

I think the best way out would be to prohibit all American newspapers from being reprinted in the theatres of war.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable Henry L. Stimson
The Secretary of War
Washington, D.C.

CC - The Hon. Frank Knox
The Secretary of the Navy

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 1 1972
January 17, 1944

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL FOR WINDANT FROM HOPKINS

The President has advised Stimson that he is opposed to any American newspapers being reprinted for distribution to our troops in theatres of war.

Harry Hopkins
From: London
For: The President of the United States

No number

Personal and secret for Harry Hopkins from Winant.

Since the Daily Mail has established an edition in the United States, the Chicago Sun has asked for facilities in England to publish a paper here, limited to a circulation of 5,000.

I have also found that General Ulio, Adjutant General, made a ruling on December 18th that all American commercial papers, who were willing to provide their own paper from their PWB quota, and who could find printing facilities in England, will receive Army aid in shipping their paper to this country. The Army, according to General Ulio's ruling, will distribute their newspapers or magazines to the troops, subject to the ruling of the general in command of the theater.

As a result of this ruling, the Chicago Tribune is now planning to send paper to England and to print an edition here for the American troops. I am told that they have been successful in finding printing facilities in the British Isles.

I am told that General Barr, Chief of Staff in ETO, has protested to Washington, saying that he does not think the general in command
From: London
For: The President of the United States
No number

in a theater of operations should be asked to decide what American newspapers may or may not be printed in his area.

I am not at all certain that these suggested publications do not lend themselves to a propaganda campaign that would be detrimental rather than helpful to establishing unity of purpose to forward our primary objective of making war on a common enemy.

I would appreciate your advice and counsel and also support in such action as you feel necessary.

No sig.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 11, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS GRACE TULLY

Mr. Hopkins asked me to send the attached cable to Winant to the President for his approval, together with a draft of a letter to Secy. Stimson, with copy for Secy. Knox, for the President's signature.

I am also attaching the cable from Winant for the President's information.

D.E. Krauss
Secy. to H.L.H.

encls.
My dear Mr. President:

The question of the disposal of the U.S.S. BEAR is up for decision. The recommendations of the Bureau of Ships and of Admiral Horne are that she be disposed of as a hulk. It will cost about $225,000 to recondition her for Arctic service and it will require at least six months in drydock to do this. The only hesitation I have in doing this grows out of the fact that Admiral Byrd would like to have the ship retained as a relic. Personally, this does not have much appeal for me. The approximate value of the ship is about $60,000. Unless you object, I propose to dispose of her as a vessel unfit for further naval service.

Will you let me have your judgment in this matter?

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Washington
My dear Mr. President:

Admiral Wilson Brown has communicated to me your desire for an explanation as to how Roy Howard and several other newspaper men were granted permission to travel on one of our new aircraft carriers through the Panama Canal.

I have made an investigation in the matter and find that this trip was arranged by the Bureau of Aeronautics. The purpose of the arrangement, I am told, was to gain some favorable publicity for the Navy air arm. This was done in spite of the fact that your directive was communicated to the officers of the Navy, stating that no civilians are permitted to go into any active war theatre without the express approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before departure. Either those who arranged for this trip had forgotten their orders or, for some reason, were ignorant of them. I am satisfied that there was no deliberate intention of breaking the rules in this matter.

I have taken the necessary steps to insure that such a mistake will not occur again. I regret very much that the Navy Department in this matter failed to follow your instructions.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
The White House
Washington
April 20, 1944.

FOR MRS. FRANK KNOX FROM THE PRESIDENT. IT SEEMS SO FUTILE FOR ME TO SAY ANYTHING AT THIS MOMENT EXCEPT THAT I AM SURE YOU KNOW THAT I AM THINKING OF YOU AND THAT YOU REALIZE THAT IN THESE FOUR YEARS I HAD COME TO HAVE WITH A HIGH APPRECIATION OF HIS OUTSpoken HONESTY AND UNDYING DevOTION TO DUTY. HE HAS VERY LITERALLY GIVEN HIS LIFE IN THE CAUSE OF HIS COUNTRY. FOR ALL TIME WE CAN BE VERY PROUD OF HIM. FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

Released: William M. Slider, Lieut(jg), USN.

Not only a deep respect for Frank's ability but also a great affection for him personally.
Please relieve for following:

I announce to the nation a war
the sudden breaking out of. The function of
the Secretary of the Navy, etc. as
has a heavy bag, and
to me personally, who had come
to town on him momentarily.

He has been much for his country;
his health much to his defense
and no word writing, etc.

Finally I hope to think of his
leadership and his loyalty—only
he put his country first. He
shall freely move his ability
and his kindly chief.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
Mrs. Knox,

It seems so futile for me to say anything at this moment except that I am more than ever aware that I am thinking of you and that you realize that in the few years that I had come to have not only a deep respect for Mark Twain's integrity but also a very great affection for his gentle, amiable, honest, and trustworthiness. He has left a lasting mark on this country. I am truly deeply moved by him.

Franklin D. Roosevelt
for him personally and an admiration for his outspoken honesty and unyielding devotion to duty.

for him personally with a high appreciation of his outspoken honesty and unyielding devotion to duty.