Navy: Harry Roosevelt
Memo.

Col. Roosevelt asked me to bring this to your attention immediately on your return. Admiral Stanley, he says, is rather inclined to grant the request but the Col. feels that you may want matters to stand as they are and I think feels it might be just as well if you did.

Will you have the operator let me know what you want done about this.

M. H. M.

9/10/33

No change

[Signature]
FROM: COMSPECIAL
TO: OPNAV

Ø1Ø IN VIEW OF CLOSE LIAISON BETWEEN AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND
COMSPECIAL REQUEST CANCELLATION OF ORDERS CONTAINED IN OPNAV
DISPATCH 38Ø7 19ØØ IN ORDER TO AVOID AWKWARDNESS IN LOGISTIC
ADMINISTRATION OF FORCE AND IN CONNECTION WITH ACCOMPLISHING RELIEFS WITH
MAXIMUM ECONOMY. AMBASSADOR SEES NO OBJECTION WHATSOEVER TO TEM-
PORARY INCREASES OF FORCE IN HAVANA HARBOR. GENERAL POLICY OF
KEEPING FORCES IN HAVANA HARBOR TO MINIMUM ADVISED BY AMBASSADOR
WILL BE RIGIDLY ADHERED TO 143Ø

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SECONAV PRESIDENT WHITEHOUSE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1934.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT
FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Can you unofficially and very quietly pass the word along to the Carabea people that, having memories of the 1914 dinner, it would be just as well not to sing the old song again. Will you let me have J. D's. letter back when you have read it?

P.S. To A. Roosevelt. Navy
MISSY:

File confidential - "in Missy's room".

F.D.R.
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

16 March 1934

Mr. Marvin H. McIntyre,
Assistant Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. McIntyre:

I am enclosing herewith copies of letters received in the Department from Admiral F.B. Upshur, Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, which the President might be interested in.

These are extra copies and need not be returned.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

H. L. Roosevelt

Encl.
My dear Admiral:

You will remember that the object that we had in mind in evolving the simple code for inter-communication between ourselves was so that in the event of trouble arising, such as, for example any serious development of the present situation in the Fukien Province we should have at our disposal a ready means of concerting action for the protection of our respective national interests without first announcing to all the world what we intended to do.

The code might also have been used in connection with such matters as piracy, the opium traffic or the attitude which we proposed to adopt towards the recurring problem of the boarding and search of American and British ships by armed parties of Chinese purporting to represent the various self-constituted bureaux at river ports.

I am still most anxious that we should co-operate as fully as possible in these and other matters as I firmly believe that our mutual interests will be best served by preserving a uniform policy vis-a-vis the Chinese authorities.

After prolonged consideration, however, I have veered round to the opinion that perhaps there is an inherent danger that the existence of this private code, which would certainly become known eventually to other powers, might provoke suspicions of some form of pact between us which transcends the bounds of ordinary peace-time co-operation and which might conceivably give rise to international complications which I am quite certain you and I are equally anxious to avoid.

Where the will to quarrel exists a totally erroneous and damaging construction might be placed on the most harmless context and no amount of argument would convince wrong-headed people who happened to intercept one of our messages otherwise.

For these reasons I propose to suggest to you that our arrangement should be terminated and that our respective copies of the code should be destroyed. The knowledge that our personal co-operation is so frank and complete renders it so much the easier for me to make this suggestion as I feel that the arrangement could otherwise never have been conceived.
I am looking forward immensely to visiting Manila and meeting you and Mrs. Upham again.

At this moment I am on passage to Singapore. The weather is getting hotter and more sticky every minute.

With every good wish,

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ Fred. O. Dreyer

(Admiral, R.N.,
Cinc, China Station)

Admiral Frank E. Upham
Dear Standley:

I am writing you again to give you a brief outline of developments during the past month.

As you know the Fukien rebellion collapsed with the disintegration of the Nineteenth Route Army, and Eugene Chen and his disgruntled clique were left out on a limb with sympathy from no one. Had the revolution been better advised at its inception, the goodwill and perhaps even the active assistance of the Canton faction, which is inherently anti-Japanese in everything, might have been secured; but the leaders of the revolution, impetuous and purposeless, only succeeded in antagonizing Chen Chi-tong and Hu Han-min in their clumsy maneuvers for favor, so that the sympathy of the southern group, for once, was on the side of their proverbial enemy, and thus the revolutionists were isolated from all outside support. Were it not for the grandiloquent and pompous phrases from the silver tongue of Eugene Chen, the revolution would have scarcely won notice from the foreign world. As has always been the case in the many internal conflicts of this sort which have characterized the last two decades of Republican China, the nation as a whole suffers humiliation in the eyes of other nations, and years of successful rehabilitation measures must elapse before the material loss is repaired.

Of considerable interest to those of us who are concerned with the matter of foreign interests in the Orient, is the address made before the Japanese Diet by Foreign Minister Hirota on January twenty third, in which he announced the forthcoming enthronement of Henry Pu-yi as Emperor of Manchukuo, and in addition dwell at some length on the "surprising and disappointing ways of China" in her attitude toward Japan, thus indicating that sino-Japanese questions are far from being liquidated. The general tenor of the Foreign Minister's speech indicated that the present Japanese Government is advancing steadily along the "Kingly Way" toward a bold "Asia for the Asians" policy so ably propounded by the late Kaku Mori in the summer of 1932. The Foreign Minister wasted no words in justification of Japanese claims for recognition of her position; rather he assumed as a matter of course the righteousness of the stand his country has taken without raising the question of right or wrong, and jumped to the conclusion that China, and the western world as well, must recognize Japan as the supreme arbiter and court of last resort as far as Far Eastern affairs are concerned. While no direct reference to a Monroe Doctrine for the East was made, the Foreign Minister's speech was one more reminder that Japan will insist upon world recognition of her responsibilities for the maintenance of peace in the East, and that she will brook no interference from anyone as she assumes the role of chief stabilizer of all of Eastern Asia.
As Japan's strangle on the trade of the East tightens, the
bolder become her pronouncements respecting her Far Eastern policy. The
Japanese boycott in China has long since run its course, and Japan now
finds herself more firmly entrenched than ever in the Yangtze Valley and
in North China; moreover, new strides have been taken in her southern
economic penetration throughout the coastwise districts from Shanghai to
Hong Kong. Her penetration throughout the Philippines, especially in the
Southern Islands was reported upon at some length as a result of Admiral
Taylor's inspection last March. In addition, the local manager of the
Dollar Steamship Company has suggested the possibility of his company's
withdrawal from the Japan-China-Philippine freight competition should Japan's
present rate of progress continue for another five years.

American trade, moreover, is not the only sufferer from
Japanese economic penetration in the Far East; British, and even the French
with all their astute bargaining, are coming to realize the futility of
trying to cope with the situation without taking some decisive measures to
curb the Japanese. Rumor has it that the British are contemplating giving
up Hong Kong and retiring to Singapore for their last stand in the Far East.
Although nothing definite has been planned, or at least announced, the mere
fact that the British are considering such a turn-about policy is momentous
and indicates the true predicament in which foreigners of all nationalities
will soon find themselves if something is not done about it. An event
which lends color to this rumor regarding the proposed British withdrawal
from Hong Kong is the British naval conference held aboard H.M.S. KENT at
Singapore on January twenty third and twenty fourth. Admirals of the British,
Australian, and New Zealand navies participated in the conference, the key-
ote of which apparently was the matter of the Singapore naval base. Though
unconfirmed, reports state that plans are afoot to complete the Singapore base
two years ahead of schedule, i.e., by 1938 or 1939, as a means of alleviating
anxiety felt in England, Australia, and New Zealand over Japanese ambitions
and aggressions in the East. Other reasons given for proceeding with the
base were the apparent collapse of world efforts toward disarmament, and
the probable imminence of Philippine independence and the resulting decline
of the U.S., as a naval factor in the Far East.

Taking it all in all the general tendency, based upon both
rumor and fact, warrants the assumption that the end of foreign influence in
this part of the world is now in sight unless the powers can get together
somehow and call Japan's bluff by force. Japan has repeatedly announced,
and her actions have borne her out, that she intends to be master here, and
the sooner that foreign nations realize that she cannot be swayed by words
alone, and that their own policies must be revised accordingly, the better
it will be for the ultimate peace of all nations concerned; but nothing
short of war, or at least a very real threat of war by a combination of
powers, will call her bluff. Whether or not our stake in the Orient is suf-
ficient to justify a show of force, either alone or in combination with other
nations (assuming we could get together), is questionable. Our Asia trade
at present is on the decline, and if our policy is to remain indifferent
toward economic expansion in the future as we have done in the past, the risk
is certainly not worth while; if we continue to drift without boosting things
along a bit, all of our trade will soon be absorbed by the Japanese, and
then there will be little use of maintaining our present Asiatic force. At present, the Standard Oil and our missionaries seem to be the two major recipients of any benefit our armed forces out here are able to render; the former, because of inroads made by the Rising Sun Petroleum Ltd., and other lesser companies, is gradually losing its grip; and the missionaries, while not openly antipathetic, have never especially welcomed the presence of gunboats to support the gospel. Hence the wisdom of continuing our present naval policy in the face of Japanese economic encroachments without at least some sort of struggle to regain what we have lost in something worthy of careful study.

Incidentally, certain Japanese military and naval leaders are going on with their sword rattling as if in support of the Foreign Minister's declarations. Your interview with the Yomiuri's Washington correspondent regarding Suetsugu's outburst was prominently displayed in the Japanese press; the Japan Advertiser, for instance, carried the story under a three column headline, and the Yomiuri spread it over half the front page.

As time goes on I hope to get away from generalizations and give you more concrete facts which tend to bear out my opinion, i.e., that we had better take decisive measures soon to call Japan's bluff, or else give up all claims to being a commercial factor out here.

Yours,

/s/ Upham

However, when all is said, public opinion at home, in time of stress, will demand that we put up a scrap rather than turn tail and run. Were we to defend this island as we are prepared to do in Hawaii, the possibility of war will be appreciably removed.

Admiral W.H. Standley, USN,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Standley,

Hereewith enclosed are two communications, both of interest as bearing on the general situation.

The one from Wainwright telling of friction between British and Japanese flag officers indicates some strain of relations. A similar incident took place between them some months ago, but I then looked upon it as being perhaps a misunderstanding. With this repetition, however, it does not look to be so innocent.

You have perhaps heard the British definition of an English gentleman --- one who is never unintentionally rude or offensive.

Yours,

/s/ Upham.

Admiral W.H. Standley, U.S.N.
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington
My dear Admiral:

There has been little of any moment going on in the River and there has been no indication of any active communist disturbances. As a matter of fact the rumors, and there are plenty of them, indicate nothing more than what the average bamboo telegraph affords. The River is very low.

Early this month it was arranged among us here to fire the customary salute for the calendar year. The arrangements were made between Rear Admiral Sugisaka, Captain Syfred of the CARADOC, and myself. It was arranged that the CARADOC should fire a salute to Admiral Sugisaka and to be returned by him, then a salute to me which I would return, and then the Japanese cruiser TOSHIMA to fire a salute to me. All this was to begin at 0800 on a given morning. I do not know what occasioned it but the CARADOC started out with a salute but with the U.S. ensign at the fore whereupon we promptly returned it. We waited a few minutes and as nothing happened we fired a salute to Admiral Sugisaka and it was returned. Then the rest went according to schedule. The curious part of all this is that Admiral Sugisaka sent an officer to the CARADOC to ask why he had not been saluted first. I do not know the answer. Yesterday Admiral Chilton returned on the BKE and fired a salute to me which we began to return before the echo of his last gun had died away. I like to see salutes returned that way as it indicates we do not suffer suffocation from the effects of Chinese miasma. Admiral Sugisaka did not salute Admiral Chilton. A little later in the day Admiral Chilton's flag lieutenant came over to see McCoy and told him that Admiral Chilton had suggested to Admiral Sugisaka to consider official calls made and exchanged. He asked the same of me and I agreed to it. But the Japanese admiral declined and insisted that calls be made and asked if Admiral Chilton would salute him when he made his call. Admiral Chilton told him that as he had gone behind the pontoon he would not be able to do so, whereupon the Japanese admiral asked why the CARADOC, which was anchored in the stream, could not do the saluting and the answer to this was that it was against the British regulations.

At this writing there has been no call exchanged between the British and Japanese rear admirals for this calendar year. This is just River gossip but it has its reverberation from Chung-king to Tokyo. I had exchanged New Year calls with Admiral Sugisaka before Admiral Chilton arrived.

The other night Admiral Sugisaka and staff gave a dinner to us in the LUXON at a shore restaurant, Japanese. It was profusely decorated not only with two largest size U.S. ensigns and Japanese ensigns but also with red white and blue streamers and red white and blue lights. In addition to this the little stage, similar to the one where we dined at Shanghai, was likewise decorated with U.S. and Japanese ensigns. A noticeable effort is being made to
increase friendly relations and just what is behind it I do not know.
It may be the naval appropriation bill, or it may be a growing antipathy
toward Great Britain due to the commercial cotton business and general trade
situation. I am merely giving the only reasons I can think of.

A new consul turned up here, as a part of the Consulate, by
the name of Chamberlain. He has just come from Harbin and knows nothing
about the River. He came down to see me in behalf of Mr. Adams and told
me that Mr. Yongeh, the representative of the Y.H. Company here, had
approached Mr. Adams as to the advisability and practicability of one of the
Y.H. boats carrying ammunition belonging to the government to Chungking.
Mr. Adams' view in the matter was that inasmuch as it was properly certified
and that no civil war was in progress that it could be done but wanted to
know what I thought about it. My answer to Mr. Chamberlain was quite
definite and positive following out strictly the policy that in the event
of any carrying of troops or ammunition all protection would be removed.
This just indicates how the pot is kept boiling in the Yangtze Valley. The
Consul General here has been very cordial and both he and Mrs. Adams came
down to the ship to call, which I thought a very nice thing to do.

I have talked to the captains of our coal burners and when
conditions in the River permit they will tie up to the oil burners and get
steam from them. We have found by experiment that this saves a few dollars
a day and also gives the coal burners an excellent chance to overhaul their
boilers.

I write you this letter merely to let you know little things
that go on and may possibly be of interest to you.

With assurance of my highest regard,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ John D. Wainwright.
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON
San Francisco, Calif.,
10 May 1935.

My dear Miss LeHand:

I am sending the enclosed important letter to The President in your care.

I saw in the papers today that he was going to the Woodmont Club, but the despatch was delayed, so that I did not have time to warn him about taking the Army with him. Perhaps, however, the well-known Colonel will have learned to catch fish by this time so that he will not have to appropriate the fish that are caught by real fishermen.

We have been having a strenuous time on the trip thus far and are headed south tomorrow.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

H. L. Roosevelt.

Miss Marguerite LeHand,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
From: Colonel Roosevelt (H.L., not T.R.).
To: The President.
Subject: Trout.

1. The undersigned acknowledges with gratification the letter from The President on the above subject dated May 2, 1935, and appreciates the eminently just findings of the Court of Inquiry.

2. With reference to paragraph 6, of the above letter, the undersigned does not deny that he has a serious ear defect and is probably deficient in geography, but he cannot admit that he could ever mistake Cotocotin for Patuxent, either over the telephone or due to his acknowledged deficiency.

3. Furthermore, the undersigned is of the opinion that all fish originally contained in the waters in the vicinity of Cotocotin were transferred during the last administration to Rapidan.

4. The undersigned will be delighted to comply with instructions contained in paragraph 7 and will submit himself immediately upon return to Washington to an examination by Captain McIntire, USN (MC), with the definite understanding that no defects of his hearing will be found.

5. It is respectfully requested that in the event Captain McIntire finds the hearing of the undersigned not deficient, that the undersigned be authorized to appoint the firing squad to operate on Colonel Watson and he be further authorized to appoint himself as the leader of such squad.

Very respectfully,

H.L. Roosevelt
From: The Assistant Secretary of the Navy
To: The President

1. In view of the fact that the blood pressure of the undersigned was recorded at somewhere between 230 and 235 while he was in Honolulu, but has since been reduced to 162, it is presumed that no further tests will be required at the present time.

2. The undersigned will not admit, however, nor does he think the doctors will certify, that this rise in blood pressure was in any way connected with the incident of the photograph mentioned in reference.

3. Attention is respectfully invited to the fact that the question of the fish - presented to the President by his Military Aide - does not appear to be satisfactorily cleared up.

[Signature]

H.L. ROOSEVELT
MEMORANDUM for Secretary McIntyre:

While I was in Honolulu, the Chief Justice of the Territory of Hawaii, Judge Coke, called on me and in the course of the conversation stated as follows:

1. In his opinion "the Territory of Hawaii is not ready for statehood.

2. The present government can stand only as long as the racial question is kept out of politics in the Territory. The minute that racial groups begin to assert their influence, as such, in the island government, the elective offices will immediately fall into the hands of the larger racial group, thus creating an intolerable situation. When and if this occurs, a commission form of government will be the only practicable recourse."

H. L. Roosevelt
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

August 22, 1935.

In reference to your letter of August 20th — establishment of squadron of planes at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, I think we should proceed as fast as possible.

In regard to plane types, I suggest that no land planes be sent. Adequate harbor anchorages are available at St. Thomas. In regard to housing of these planes, to avoid hurricanes, I suggest a project out of the four billion dollar fund to erect immediately at least a temporary hangar and runway strongly enough built to withstand hurricanes. Such a project would cost but little, would give work, and could probably be put through to completion in two months. The personnel involved will be so small for this coming winter that they can doubtless find adequate accommodations at St. Thomas.

F. D. R.
By dear Mr. President:

The Navy Department has been requested by the Secretary of the Interior, presumably in accordance with your views, to send a squadron of planes on a reconnaissance mission in the West Indies, with the eventual purpose of establishing such squadron, together with its supporting ground personnel, at the former naval station at St. Thomas, Virgin Islands.

Examination of the proposal indicates the necessity for the following operations:

1. To employ marine aircraft from the East Coast contingent, Fleet Marine Force; and to use the USS ANTARES (unarmed auxiliary) for servicing the plane squadron. One squadron of six (6) observation planes has been selected.

2. To base this squadron first on Puerto Rico, by flying down via Cuba and Haiti.

3. After suitable interval at Puerto Rico, to extend the scope of the reconnaissance to the Virgin Islands.

4. To base the squadron upon the site of the former naval station at St. Thomas, and the ANTARES in the harbor of St. Thomas.

5. To continue reconnaissance operations in the Virgin Island Area as long as may be necessary.

The Navy Department considers certain features of these proposed operations undesirable and therefore should be brought to your notice; namely:

[Signature]

[Date] 01/27/59

[Location] Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

[Document Type] DECLASSIFIED

[Directorate] DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
(1) The squadron of planes will have very limited powers to maintain itself. Their landing fields or anchorages, their gasoline supplies and repair facilities, their quarters and accessories all require adequate safeguarding and protection at all times.

(2) The landing field facilities are inadequate in the Virgin Islands, although the anchorages are satisfactory in St. Thomas Harbor.

(3) This is the hurricane season and planes parked in the open, or moored on the water, are badly exposed everywhere in the West Indies.

(4) Former naval station buildings at St. Thomas are now occupied by local governmental activities.

I am referring this matter to you requesting your consideration of this Department's views of this project prior to making your final decision and giving your approval.

Sincerely yours,

H. L. ROOSEVELT

The President,
The White House.

Acting Secretary of the Navy.
Memo from M. A. L. to
Asst. Sec. Navy
Attaching memo prepared by Creed F. Cox for Sec.
Subject: Future policy of U.S. regarding
retention of naval bases in the Philippines after independence.

SEE--War File--(S) Drawer 1--1936