ESTIMATE

of

Potential Military Strength

Documents D

Naval Attaché

ROME

Volume I

Documents Numbers 1 to 47

(22 Jan. 1937 - 14 June 1939)

DECLASSIFIED
Attache's Report

From: T
Date: 22 January 1937
Serial No.: 27
File No.: 903-150

Source of Information: Official

Subject: ITALY
Navy Personnel Strength

Reference

Note: The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention only geographical, personal, or political sections, and the gist of the report.

Enlisted Strength Italian Navy as of 1 December, 1936

1. There is enclosed herewith a table showing the enlisted strength of the Italian Navy by ratings and categories as of 1 December, 1936. The figures given therein are official.

Official of Naval Intelligence

Received

[Table of enlisted strength included]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Number of Officers</th>
<th>Number in School</th>
<th>Number of Enlisted</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seamen</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signallers</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>8,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamen Gunners</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>13,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun Factory</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towed Ranges</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunners</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>13,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunners</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>13,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricians</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>4,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Commanders</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phys. Ed. Instructors</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master of Arms</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watermeloners</td>
<td>07</td>
<td>09</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedoes</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Shop</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinist's Mate</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineman</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boatswain</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seamen</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacist's Mate</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firemen</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>7,141</td>
<td>9,987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musicians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buglers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Services</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gunner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Artilleryman</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound Signalman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 1,047 1,281 1,066 4,056 7,128 10,840 90,106 1,004 2,973
ITALY'S PREPARATION FOR THE EAST AFRICA COLONIAL CAMPAIGN

1. The MESSAGGERO of 30 March, 1937, publishes an editorial dealing with the "superb preparation" which contributed to the conquest of East Africa. Characteristically it speaks of the moral superiority of the Italian troops, the excellence of their leaders, and deals at length with their unequalled service of supply. The sanitary service, which was undoubtedly responsible for a large measure of the Italian success is casually mentioned. The activities of the Ministry of War in organizing the greatly expanded army and in conceiving and carrying out the campaign are highly eulogized. The editorial concludes:

"Comparison of the quantitative efficiency of our forces in East Africa as of 3 October, 1935, and 30 March, 1936, after less than six months of warfare- as compared to the efficiency of our army in May, 1915, has no absolute value in that each figure taken into account would require its own particular consideration in order to explain its significance and importance. Such a comparison does serve, however, to bring into evidence the fact that our military organization's capacity for development and its ability to produce results has, in the years XIII and XIV (1935 and 1936) of the Fascist Regime, has proved itself far superior to all calculations and estimates of those qualified to judge- has proved that the fervor of Fascism has multiplied the energies of the Nation as a whole to a degree passing beyond the possibilities foreseen, that even in war preparation the clear, decisive, inflexible will of the Duke has dominated and triumphed."

2. The following table is appended:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Personnel and Material</th>
<th>3 October 1935-30 March, 1936:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May, 1915</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>8,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>832,400</td>
<td>Troops</td>
<td>159,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144,500</td>
<td>Quadrupeds</td>
<td>57,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) 930,000</td>
<td>Rifles &amp; Muskets</td>
<td>297,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>8,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,120</td>
<td>Pieces of artillery</td>
<td>6,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>Artillery projectiles</td>
<td>453,816,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>690,000</td>
<td>Artillery projectiles</td>
<td>3,400,00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: (1) Soldiers and National Militia. (2) Total 991, 1,315,000 were 70/97. The Engineering Corps material sent to East Africa represent the requirement of 70 Divisions.
1. The following Italian troop movements are reported by the Suez Canal authorities during the week ending 29 March, 1937:

- Southward bound: 657,000
- Northward bound: 327,000

This leaves an approximate total of 192,000 troops and 133,000 laborers in the Italian East African colonies.
ATTACHE'S REPORT

From    T    Date    7  APR  1937

Subject    ITALY - NAVY - FLEET

Reference

Location and Organization of Italian Naval Units
As of 1 April, 1937.

Enclosure (a) List showing Organization and Location of
Italian Naval Units as of 1 April, 1937. Not received in Archives.

1. Enclosure (A), furnished by the Ministry of Marine, shows the organization
and location of Italian Naval Units as of 1 April, 1937.

2. It will be noted that the forces in Spanish waters have been reduced
to the following:

- Explorators
  - FIGAJETTA at Malaga.
  - Da MOSTA at Palma.
  - Da REDO at Tangeris.
  - NIRO at Cadiz.

3. It is seen that since the Ministry has stopped furnishing information
concerning new construction, the following new units have entered into service:

- Submarine ONICE
- TURBINE
- CORALLO
- PERLA
- GEMMA
- BERTOLO
- AMIRA
- IRIDE
- MALACITE
- ARADAM
- AXUM

- Torpedo Boat - SAGITTA

Enclosure

E.O. 11652, Sec. 352 and 5(D) or 5C
OSD letter, May 4, 1937

SLR  Date  MAY 2 1 1937

ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From: 
Date: 15 April, 1947 
Serial No. 329 
File No. 108 

Source of information: 
ITALY - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN 

Reference: 

MEDITERRANEAN EQUILIBRIUM
By Lionello Bonno.

1. The attached is a translation of an article entitled "Mediterranean Equilibrium", by Lionello Bonno, appearing in the "Mondo Militare" of February, 1937.

[Signature]

[Stamp]
MEDITERRANEAN EQUILIBRIUM

By Lionello Monno.

The "Gentlemen's Agreement" closes the unfortunate period of extreme tension in the Mediterranean and is the beginning of a revival of Anglo-Italian friendship and a lasting and balanced normalization of the spheres of action of the maritime Powers in this basin.

It was a vast and extremely delicate problem in whose solution was involved European balance and perhaps peace, which was clearly set forth and placed on a footing of reality by the Duce in his historical speech at Milan and finally solved by a frank agreement devoid of equivocal formulae which would not have served to overcome the complex situation which had developed in the Mediterranean during the sanctionalist period.

The interruption of the inter-imperial routes, vital to the interests of three powers, England, France and Italy — the critical situation in one of the nations which control the western entry into the Latin Sea — Spain — the new political cycle beginning in Egypt with the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, the rearmament of Turkey in the Eastern basin where on one side the interests of the Balkan Entente were in play and on the other the insurmountable and categorical exigencies of the Mandatory Powers — the Russian attempt to enter the Mediterranean system — all these were contrasting currents which met in the Mediterranean giving rise to friction which was rendered more dangerous by the particular strategic situation of this sea.

In order to completely evaluate the economic and political problems of the Mediterranean it must first be realised that the dangerous vicinities, for all the Powers, of their respective naval bases renders it impossible for any one of them, in case of conflict, to actuate a strategic control of this sea and guarantee its own traffic, while each of them may, in varying measure, hinder and in some cases completely interrupt the communications of its adversary.

During the last twenty years, the evolution of maritime power, the rapid affirmation and development of new means of offense — submarines, mines, long-range artillery and the air arm — have greatly modified and in some cases devaluated the importance of some strategic points on which, in the past, some nations based their Mediterranean power.

Italy's typically "insular" geographical position places her in an entirely special situation which on the one hand gives her inestimable strategic advantages but on the other renders her communications both to east and west easily interruptable, unless adequately defended, to the contrary of those of other powers which can not only deviate their traffic through other seas but also control the entrances to the Mediterranean.

The entire Mediterranean system is bound by four obligatory passages which by controlling its communications become the pivots of all strategic problems. They are:

(1) The Straits of Gibraltar which is the western entrance;
(2) The Sicilian Channel, between the Libyan and Sicilian coasts;
(3) The Straits between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean;
(4) The Suez Canal — eastern entrance — through which passes a huge traffic second in importance only to the Atlantic entrance.

The Straits of Gibraltar dominate the trans-Atlantic traffic but while for Spain, France and England this traffic could, in case of emergency, be deviated along other routes, for Italy and other Mediterranean nations the closing of these Straits would mean the cutting off of vital and irreplaceable maritime routes.
Across the western basin run the communications of the Mediterranean countries with the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic, the Black Sea and the Red Sea.

Almost all the countries in the world have vital interests in the Suez Canal (which, with Gibraltar, is comprised in the agreement which guarantees liberty of entrance to and exit from the Mediterranean) as by this route large quantities of raw materials and agricultural products are brought from East to West and then re-exported from West to East in the form of finished products.

But if the economic problems of the Mediterranean are complex, the strategic ones are no less extensive and delicate.

England has carried out in the Mediterranean (as she has in all the other seas of the world) a policy of establishing herself at strategic points in order to guarantee the integrity of her communications - in this case the Gibraltar-Suez section of the road to India. After the World War her influence was extended, through the mandates, into the eastern basin where she is greatly interested in the production of oil, "black gold", which is essential to her navy and her traffic.

Strongly fortified and defended, equipped with arsenals and large stores of fuel and munitions, Gibraltar and Malta are England's strategic pivots in the Mediterranean, supported by Caïfa in the eastern basin. The formidable efficiency of Gibraltar has been considerably devaluated in recent years owing to the evolution of offensive arms, and is without any doubt now vulnerable from land, sea and air. It is, however, indisputable that large naval forces stationed at Gibraltar can intercept the communications of Mediterranean nations with America. The advart of the air arm has also devaluated Malta which furthermore, like Gibraltar, is depreciated by its very low logistic capacity since, as both these points lack an industrial hinterland, they must depend entirely on their own reserves. This is why the English line of defence has moved to the eastern basin where, however, Caïfa is not yet fully equipped while the Egyptian ports and Cyprus offer no geographical or logistic possibility for support of large naval forces.

The precariousness of English lines of communication in the Mediterranean is undeniable since they are vulnerable in the western basin from the bases of the Balesaries, in the Toulon-Algeria-Biserta triangle, and from the Sicilian Channel, but at the same time, England may preserve her inter-imperial traffic - with the exception of that to the Levant - by sending it round the Cape of good Hope.

Spain, on its part, may threaten Mediterranean communications with the Atlantic from the Balesaries, Cartagena, Malilla and Ceuta, and still maintain her communications with Africa.

The strategic potentiality of France in the western Mediterranean is strongly based on the Toulon-Ajaccio-Biserta-Algeria-Orano strategic system, but, in the purely theoretical hypothesis of a conflict with Italy, the value of her bases would be greatly depreciated by the vicinity of the Italian bases. As Spain may be considered as the opponent of Toulon and the Sicily-Tunisia-Sardinia strategic system as that of Ajaccio, Algeria and Biserta.

In case of emergency, as we have seen, France might intercept English and Italian transatlantic communications and deviate her own trans-atlantic traffic to the Atlantic ports, but her colonial communications would be compromised; in fact, even if she could maintain her African communications by deviating them through Saint Nazaire - Casablanca, communication with Syria would be entirely cut off as well as her traffic with the Levant and the Black Sea.

Italy, as we have said, has a central position astride the two basins (with strategic advantages in the eastern basin deriving from the Aqeen, Libyan and East African bases, while in the west her condition is certainly not advantageous) but in any case it is undeniable that her irreplaceable lines of communications both to East and West are vulnerable in case of conflict.

- 2 -
Actually, while Spezia is appreciated by Toulon, the Trapani-Augusta-Tripoli system controls the Mediterranean traffic passing through the Sicilian Channel, and the Taranto-Leros-Brindisi line guarantees protection of our interests in the Aegean Sea. The bases of Cagliari and La Maddalena may intercept communications between Forti della Provenza, Algeria and Tunis, but Ajaccio and Toulon may decrease their potentiality.

The Adriatic forms a basin to itself and the bases therein have rather a local than a Mediterranean interest, but the fact remains that while we have strategic predominance in the Upper and Lower Adriatic, Yugoslavia predominates in the center.

It must, however, be remembered that though this central position places Italy at a disadvantage in regard to the vulnerability of her communications, it gives her, on the other hand, a decided superiority from the aeronautical point of view which allows her to keep the air control of the whole of the Mediterranean. Naturally, here also, it is a superiority serving more to damage the enemy than to defend our own traffic.

A fortunate geographical position gives Greece considerable strategic importance in the eastern Mediterranean as the bases at Pyrrhus, Salamis and Salonica, and the secondary ones at Argostoli, Corfu, Prevesa, Corinth, Patrasco and Suda, form a system which, supported by adequate naval forces, may effectively bar communications with Asia, Palestine, Syria, Turkey and the Black Sea. This is the explanation of England's special interest in Greek affairs and the Greek navy, particularly in everything regarding bases.

The recent rearmament of the Dardanelles, demanded and obtained by Turkey at Montreux, has given this country effective control of the communications between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, creating her a position of outstanding importance in the western basin although she does not possess great maritime power.

This brief summary shows how a normalization of the Mediterranean situation could only be achieved through a loyal and balanced policy of comprehension such as forms the basis of the clear, concise and realistic Ciano-Drummond agreement of 2 January which reads as follows:

"The Italian Government and His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom,

"Animated by the desire to contribute increasingly in the general interest of peace and security to the improvement of relations between each other and all the Mediterranean powers, and resolved to respect the rights and interests of such powers;

"Recognise that the liberty of entrance to, exit from and transit of the Mediterranean is of vital interest both to Italy and to the various parts of the British Empire and that such interests are in no way contrasting;

"Exclude all proposals of modification or, as far as they are concerned, of seizing modified the "status quo" relative to the national sovereignty of the territories in the Mediterranean basin,

"They undertake to respect their reciprocal interests in that zone;

"They agree to do everything possible to impede any activity which might be detrimental to the good relations which the present declaration has the scope of consolidating.

"The following declaration is made with the aim of maintaining peace and is not directed against any power".

The general satisfaction felt in the revival of friendly relations between
Rome and London was widely echoed in the press of all the world and especially in the British press.

The **NING POST** wrote, for example, in its leading article of 4 January:

"Diplomatic history of recent years records few acts which may be so unconditionally approved as the agreement signed on Saturday between England and Italy. This agreement is not to be confused with the innumerable pacts signed recently which have contributed to and aggravated the confusion of the situation. The agreement with Rome is simple and clear and its phrases reveal a warmth and sincerity which constitute and excellent prospect for the future. With this pact the old friendship, which should never have been broken, is restored, and the memory of a deplorable episode is cancelled. The event constitutes a triumph of realism and good sense, a triumph which is so much the greater in that only three months ago it appeared absolutely unattainable".

The **AIL MAIL** commented: "The very brief Anglo-Italian agreement published last evening demonstrates the rebirth of confidence between Italy and England and represents a success of far greater value than that of any high-sounding League pact concluded in recent years ----. The Anglo-Italian declaration signifies that the two countries will collaborate from now on in the work of peace, respecting each other's interests in the Mediterranean".

"One can only feel satisfaction in the signature of the Anglo-Italian agreement", wrote the **AIL** **AP**, "one of whose most important clauses is that regarding the maintenance of the status quo. After this declaration it would be absurd to continue to harbor doubts as to the future of the Balcanics and Spanish Morocco, while Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece must in their turn cease to fear the Italian policy in the Mediterranean".

"England must not try to find anything more in the agreement than is revealed at a first reading. In this regard, Gayda's statement that the Anglo-Italian handshake does not remove Italy from the axis of Italian-German collaboration was entirely superfluous. That England sought and has now obtained is a clear recognition of the British interests in the Mediterranean which at one time seemed to be in danger. On the other hand, that the Mediterranean represents the life of Italy noone has ever doubted and this is all the more obvious after the conquest of Ethiopia".

The favorable attitude of France was shown from the beginning by the following statement made by the Foreign Minister, Delbos, on 2 January, to the Havas Agency:

"I am happy to see the governments of Great Britain and Italy in agreement as to their friendly relations. We have always considered understanding between these two European powers which are tied to France by traditions of friendship and mutual interests, as an element of order in the Mediterranean and in general as a guarantee for the maintenance of peace".

On this occasion the PARIS SCIR wrote that "an old story is liquidated. The reborn Anglo-Italian friendship demonstrated that the past is abolished. A new era is opening in European international relations, thanks to the great spirit of comprehension of the British Government and above all to the frankness and realism which are typical of Mussolini's great speech at Milan".

The Rome correspondent of the **IS** stated that the agreement "placed Italy in a new situation in regard to Monteux, creates a new basis for the discussion of all the problems which are presented by the world in formation which is the Levant. In Africa the new agreement may contribute to the forging of a new solidarity in the Black Continent. Finally it is a great progress"
towards the solution of the difficulties which threaten Europe."

"--- A cordial understanding between Rome and London does not in any way clash with French policy. It is true that France has not collaborated in the "Gentlemen's agreement" but the status of the Mediterranean is not changed. This sea is and remains a free sea. This is essential for France as she also has in the Mediterranean her imperial route, her shortest road to her possessions in the East and Far East."

The German press also warmly and loyally commented on the enormous importance of the agreement since: (BODEN ZEITUNG) "besides its repercussions in the Spanish question, the agreement interests Germany inasmuch as, having cleared up her relations with England by the naval agreement and having launched the policy of the Rome-Berlin axis which has given good results, she is now exonerated from the necessity of choosing between one or other of the two powers towards both of which she feels equally friendly."

Some French papers attempted to diminish the importance of the agreement claiming that it would lead Italy away from the Rome-Berlin axis.

But in an interview to the VOLKSDRUCKER BODACHERE the Duke vigorously reconfirmed the obviously harmonious connection of the Rome-Berlin axis with the Anglo-Italian agreement in the European system.

"It was attempted to sabotage this agreement", stated the Chief, "but I did not tolerate it. By this means we guarantee the status quo of the Mediterranean. The world has heard my speech at Milan; in any case this agreement is the beginning of a pacification of a very tense situation. We have thus seen years of tranquil evolution before us".

"During this period we can work for peace. In regard to the rumors that the Anglo-Italian agreement may signify a slackening of relations between Rome and Berlin, I say that this is a dream of the adversaries of the Italo-German bloc which was created recently but is intangible."

"Nothing has been and nothing will be changed in this collaboration. On the contrary the agreement with England in the Mediterranean reinforces the Rome-Berlin axis. It is a logical result of our efforts and for the attainment of peace in Europe."

The extension and normalization of Anglo-Italian relations was necessarily followed by a gradual revision of certain situations regarding the neuroligic points of the Latin sea whose particular strategic situation necessitates that many lasting equilibrium must be based on general clarity. The Ciano-Buozzi meeting at Milan marked the first phase of a more vast extension of the equilibrating spirit of the Anglo-Italian agreement. In the last analysis, although the Anglo-Italian agreement opened the doors of Gibraltar and Suez and removed all apprehension in the western basin, economic and strategic factors of no little importance were still in play in the eastern basin--especially the problem of the Straits--and it is thanks to the frank meeting of the Italian and Turkish Foreign Ministers that the misunderstandings which have overshadowed Italo-Turkish relations since 1922 have been eliminated.

The official communiqué issued after the meeting is a proof of this:

"The Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Rustu was, met today at Milan and a conversation was held during which, in the spirit of the Italo-Turkish treaty of 30 May, 1928, they examined various questions of interest to the two countries and of a general nature, with special reference to the Convention of Montreux for the regime of the Straits and to their respective positions in the eastern Mediterranean."

- 5 -
N.A. Rome 209-37 of 15 April 1937

"From this friendly and detailed examination it was clearly established that no question divides Italy and Turkey and that there is no reason for any relations to exist between the two countries except sentiments of reciprocal confidence. The desire of the two governments to cooperate in the interest of Italo-Turkish relations and the general cause of peace and stability, and the advantage thereof, were also established."

"To this end the two Foreign Ministers agreed that they will maintain contact through the normal channels of their respective diplomatic chanceries in order to render practically effective the results of their exchange of views."

This Italy-Turkish contact will, without any doubt, lead to a lasting systematization of the eastern basin of the Mediterranean in whose benefic effects will participate not only the Mediterranean powers who are interested therein, but also the nations of the Balkan Entente which were highly gratified by the results of the meeting.

Although the Straits represent a vital artery of traffic for all the Mediterranean states—Italy above all—they are also a way of access into the Mediterranean for the Black Sea powers.

This problem has for centuries been of great interest to Russia which, closed in on the north and in the Far East, has frequently attempted to break through to the Latin Sea.

On various occasions, from the annexation of the Crimea in 1774, to the Montreux Conference of 1926, Russia has continually attempted to reach the Mediterranean and Asia Minor, all the more urgently after the unfortunate epilogue of the Japan war had cut her off from Vladivostok. The Mediterranean nations, and especially England, have always firmly opposed this Russian plan, rightly seeing therein the final breakdown of Mediterranean equilibrium.

In reality, the Dardanelles remained inviolate and the Russian factor never had any decisive influence in Mediterranean equilibrium, while on the other hand, Turkey was never able to exploit directly her fortunate position, mainly owing to her lack of sufficient military power. It may here be mentioned that now the government of Kemal Ataturk, the restorer and supporter of national energy, is tending decidedly towards a valorization of Turkey's military power, thus altering the terms of the age-old problem.

After the parenthesis of German rule over the Dardanelles which momentarily united England and Russia, an attempt was made at the end of the World War to find a solution of this ever vital problem, including it among the pernicious treaties which are proof that in some cases the formulae of peace are more harmful than the horrors of war.

The Allies, or rather England, remembering the disastrous results of the attempted forcing of the Straits, demanded the complete renunciation of Turkey's sovereign rights in that area, and this was accomplished by the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This treaty, however, was never ratified, and the Kemalist movement and the consequent defeat of the Turkish expedition into Asia Minor led to a revision of the problem which resulted in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 in which the principle of freedom of transit of the Straits was solemnly affirmed.

Here again the Anglo-Russian rivalry was the crucial point of the negotiations but under a new aspect in view of Russia's particular situation. On this occasion Russia, which was carrying on a far-sighted and very active philo-Kemalist policy, proposed a solution which was apparently detrimental to herself, that is, the complete closing of the Straits, for the reason that she was afraid that the granaries of the Caucasus and the oil regions of the Caspian might be attacked by the Allies while she herself was unarmed.

At last, while on one hand the new treaty (signed by Turkey, France, England, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Roumania, Jugoslavia and Russia on
N.A. Rome 209-37 of 15 April 1937

24 July, 1923) guaranteed free transit in peace and in war to ships and planes of all flags, on the other it was guaranteed that there should not be sent into the Black Sea by outside powers forces such as to compromise the equilibrium of that sea.

As a guarantee of free transit, the shores of the Dardanelles, the Bosporous, all the islands of the Sea of Marmora and the Aegean which dominate the Mediterranean entrance of the Straits were permanently demilitarized, and a Straits Commission was instituted, with headquarters at Constantinople (consisting of a delegate of each of the High Contracting Parties and presided over by the Turkish delegate) to which the execution of the rulings of the Convention was entrusted.

There is no doubt that all this could not continue indefinitely and the day was bound to come when Turkey -in a cycle of constructive renascence under the guidance of Kemal Ataturk- would claim the reintegration of her full sovereign rights, but on the other hand it was also inevitable that the economic and strategic equilibrium of the Mediterranean should in some sense call for a limitation of the full exercise of this sovereignty since the disastrous experience of the English at Gallipoli had shown how difficult it would be to force the Straits even if they were defended by only a small force and old-fashioned fortifications.

What were the strong lines of Turkish foreign policy during the period between the Treaty of Lausanne and that of Montreux?

First of all it was dominated by the Russian friendship on whose altar the pan-Turkish dream was sacrificed and by an intense revisionist spirit, while its incomprehension of Italy's loyal attitude was the source of misunderstandings between the two nations.

In any case the clarifying action of Italy was fully demonstrated by the conclusion of the Italo-Turkish, Italo-Greek, Greco-Turkish treaties concluded in 1928 thanks to Rome's supporting attitude.

The Italo-Turkish 5 year accord of 1932 which sprang from the meeting of Rustu Aresa and the Duce at Milan on 3 April, 1928, normalized the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean but did not produce the results hoped for by Italy.

It must be frankly said, however, that Italy's valuable assistance in 1928 and her constantly loyal policy in the Balkans and the Levant were not fully appreciated by Turkey. The causes of this incomprehension -it must be admitted- are to be sought not in Turkey's ill will but in an extensive propaganda carried on against us by Mediterranean powers which led amakara to regard our valorization of our Aegean possessions as a menace to its security.

The tension in the Mediterranean during the period of sanctions gave Turkey the opportunity of realizing her revisionist tendencies and by her note of 10 April, 1926, to the signatory powers of the Lausanne treaty, she definitely placed on the carpet the immediate revision of the regime of the Straits.

On June 22 the Conference was opened at Montreux which led to the new agreement in which all the signatory powers of the previous treaty participated with the expection of Italy who, victim of isolation, logically abstained from any agreement which would limit her liberty or action. Naturally the treaty of Montreux establishes Turkey's full sovereignty over the Straits with consequent immediate repealment but- what is more serious- some of its clauses open the way for Russian penetration into the Mediterranean.

There was a moment when the Montreux conference was threatened with collapse owing to the bitter contrast between the Russian and the English contentions.

Moscow, in fact, claimed free transit for her ships in case of a Mediterranean conflict without, however, permission being given for the Mediterranean belligerents to enter the Black Sea. England, in her turn, firmly opposed this, rightly considering such an arrangement an open violation of Turkish duties of neutrality.

A hybrid and very dangerous compromise was reached which partially modified the Russian contention by recognizing the right of exit through the Straits to Moscow's battleships in the case that they were obliged to render assistance in force of pacts stipulated under the League of Nations, thus tying up the Montreux treaty to the deprecated Franco-Soviet pact.

The Russian plan called for an encirclement of the Mediterranean to be affected by the establishment of Bolshevism in Spain on the west and by a privileged position in the Straits on the east.

It was thus intended to destroy the Mediterranean equilibrium, the only guarantee of lasting peace and profitable trade, a mad dream which was to cancel with one stroke thousands of years of history.

Apart from the Turco-Russian friendship, the government of Kemal-Ataturk, instigator of constructive activity, gerarchy and discipline, cannot fail to clash with the subversive spirit of Russia, especially now when the first phase of the plan—the Spanish Revolution—is being played out in all its sanguinary and dramatic reality, while the sanguinary storm is still devastating Russia.

On the other hand, as she cordially admitted at the Milan meeting, Turkey has nothing to fear from Italy, whose clarifying action in the Balkans characterized by the firm maintenance of the status quo, is the most unequivocal documentation—if such were required—of her loyal spirit of collaboration, while the vicissitudes of her allies to our negative base cannot and must not lead to arbitrary conclusions on the function of the latter which is strictly defensive. European political circles, and particularly Balkan circles, followed the Ciano-Khatun meeting with the greatest attention, and Belgrade, Athens and Ankara—particularly—were highly satisfied with its results.

The meeting of the two eminent statesmen will be followed by much work in the two chanceries and it is to be expected that the contrasting forces in the eastern basin will be finally systematized very shortly.

The Rome-Berlin axis and the "Gentlemen's Agreement" are without any doubt the main lines which will determine the new European equilibrium through gradual phases of organization, one of which is the return to a cordial Italo-Turkish understanding.

Characterized by serene realism, the normalizing work of Mussolini's Italy makes a valuable contribution to European equilibrium.
1. In the discussion of the Italian Naval Budget before the Senate on 15 May, 1937, the Undersecretary of State for the Navy, Admiral Cavagnari, made the following comments concerning the Naval Program:

(a) "Construction of the Battleships LITTORIO and VITTORIO VENETO is progressing rapidly."

Note: The Assistant Naval Attaché recently observed the LITTORIO under construction at the San Marco Yard and noted intensive work in progress preparing for her launching on 25 July, 1937. Reliable sources report that similar intensive work is in progress on the VITTORIO VENETO.

(b) "The Modernized Battleships CAVOUR and CESARE will enter service early in the summer."

Note: This agrees with the Naval Attaché's previous estimates.

(c) "The modernization of the old battleships JULIO and DORIA has been started."

Note: The Naval Attaché has definite confirmation of this work having been started on the DORIA at Trieste, and has good reason to believe that it also has been started on the JULIO at Genoa.

(d) "The Light Cruisers GANZALDO and LUIGI DI SAVOIA will enter commission within the next few months."

Note: This conforms to the Naval Attaché's previous estimates.

(e) "A new squadron of four ORIANI type destroyers will be commissioned within the next few months."

Note: This agrees with the Naval Attaché's estimates.

(f) "Before the end of this fiscal year 10 - 600-ton torpedo boats and 16 submarines will have been added to the Fleet and 4 CESAR type Escort Patrol Ships will have been launched."

Note: The Naval Attaché has previously reported to the C.N.I. that 10 - 600-ton torpedo boats and 16 submarines have already joined the Fleet during this fiscal year and that the four CESARs have already been launched. The following named ships are known definitely to have joined the Fleet during the present fiscal year:
ATTACHE'S REPORT

Forward area series (tenth and six-ninth); this number is necessary because of the limited personnel in O. N. I. and because of the urgency for quickly disseminating information from Europe. These reports will be acknowledged by O. N. I. as per form 104 or otherwise, according to subject matter.

From... 7 Date... 19 May... 19... 37 Serial No... 985 File No... 918

Source of information

Subject

Reference

Becase... (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading paragraphs, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TORPEDO BOATS</th>
<th>SUBMARINES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAGITTA LIO</td>
<td>ALT AIR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERA</td>
<td>ALEKSEERAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANDROMEDA</td>
<td>CIGMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANTARES</td>
<td>CANOA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASTORE</td>
<td>CASSIOPEA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There will be no more torpedo boats completed before the end of the fiscal year, but it is probable that the remaining four submarines of the AML class may join the fleet before 1 July.

(g) "Besides units mentioned above, the following will have been laid down during the fiscal year which is now closing:

18 - 1600 ton destroyers,
16 - 600 ton torpedo boats.

A considerable quantity of lesser units.

I cannot for the moment give any information as to future intentions in regard to construction."

Note: The Naval Attaché has reported the laying down of 10 destroyers of the CAMIGIA type class, giving their tonnage as 1698. The corrected tonnage of this class should be 1600, and it is assumed that there are two more of this class about which there has been no previous knowledge. One possibility is that these two have not yet been laid down but will be before the end of the fiscal year. Another possibility is that they have been laid down at Riva Trigoso, or some other small out of the way yard. The Naval Attaché will attempt to check these possibilities.

Reference (a) listed 20 - 600 ton torpedo boats suspected of being under construction or planned. In the absence of more definite information, this estimate will not be changed, being assumed that four of these 20 will not have been laid down prior to 1 July, 1937. Likewise the estimate given in reference (a) of submarines under construction will not be changed at the present time. It is thought likely that the 20 mentioned in the speech are the same 20 listed in reference (a) subsequent to the AML class.

(h) "The development of the building program has necessitated an increase in the number of officers of the various naval corps".

---
Note: The details of this increase were given in N.A. Rome's report 903-120 of 17 February, 1937.

(1) "The Naval Draft Law has been modified to enable the Navy to enroll all persons whose studies or services render them particularly suited for the Navy."

Note: The Naval Draft Law is embodied in Royal Decree No. 1365 of 28 July, 1932, modified by Royal Decree Law No. 2509 of 19 December, 1936, published May 5, 1937. The records of this office do not indicate whether or not U.N.I. was furnished with a translation of the original draft law. Since its translation will impose a considerable burden on the staff of this office, the basic law and its recent modification cannot be forwarded until a later date.

(2) "A new law is now being prepared on the status of Naval Officers which will substitute that of 11 March, 1926, which was common to the three armed services. The law regarding Naval Reserve Officers is also being brought up-to-date and modified."

Note: A translation of this new law will be forwarded as soon as the law is published.

(k) "A new codified text concerning the organization of the Navy will be compiled."

Note: A translation of this will be forwarded immediately after publication.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From: T.  Date: 22 July, 1937.  Serial No.: 298.  File No.: 901-300

Source of information: OFFICIAL.

ITALY - NAVY - ORGANIZATION - FLEETS.

Subject: ITALY - NAVY - FLEETS - STRATEGIC POLICY.

(Sources reported on)

Reference:

1. The permanent home and operating naval bases of the First and Second Squadrons of the Italian Fleet have recently been interchanged. The First Squadron, with attendant light forces, now bases on Taranto and the Second Squadron, with accompanying light forces, is based on La Spezia.

2. The two modernized battleships CAVALIERI and CERERE, which have just rejoined the Fleet, have been organized as a division which has been added to the First Squadron, thereby considerably increasing its strength.

3. The reason for this important change in the strategic distribution of Italian Naval Forces is to concentrate the principal strength of the Fleet permanently in the critical, strategic geographical triangle - Sicily-Tripoli-Sardinia. All heavy units of the Italian Fleet are now based on Taranto, and the two new battleships under construction, as well as the two under modernization, will be added to this force when they are ready to join the Fleet.

4. It is reliably reported that Taranto will be developed into the principal Italian Naval Base, some of which work has already been commenced.

5. With Taranto as a main docking, overhaul and repair base, and with the favorable location of Augusta as a fleet operating base, the effectiveness of the Italian Fleet is measurably increased in this critical strategic area.

Copy to: Ambassador, Rome.

NEAL INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED

3 1937
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT  A-1-4, 3881-G

From: T.  Date: 15 August, 19, 37  Serial No. 419
Source of information: OFFICIAL

Serial No. 419  File No. 1068-500

Subject: ITALY - AVIATION - ORGANIZATION - AIR STRENGTH

Reference: (Blank)

OCCUPATION OF TERRITORIAL AIR ZONES IN ITALY

1. There is forwarded attached hereto Monograph No. 164, a translation of a Royal Decree, showing the subdivision of the Kingdom of Italy into territorial Air Zones and Aeronautical Commands.
ANNOUNCEMENT NO. 263 (W.A. Rome No. 1293-37 of 13 Aug. 1943)

15 Aug. 1943.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF TERRITORIAL AIR ZONES IN ITALY

Notwithstanding previous legislative provision regarding territorial air zone organization of the Kingdom of Italy, the following notice has been published:

ART. 1

The territory of the Kingdom of Italy is subdivided into the following territorial air zones and aerodromes commands:

I - TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Milan - includes the territory of the provinces of Turin, Novara, Vercelli, Alessandria, Asti, Cuneo, Genova, Savona, Imperia, Liguria, Milano, Verona, Pavia, Parma, Reggio, Emilia, Mantua and Parma.

II - TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Padua - includes territory of provinces of Vicenza, Treviso, Vicenza, Padua, Belluno, Treviso, Venice, Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Rijeka, Fiume, Bolzano, Udine, Reggio, Rovigo, Verona, Vicenza, Bassano, Bassano-Triveno and Udine.

III - TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Rome - includes territory of provinces of Florence, Pistoia, Arezzo, Siena, Livorno, La spezia, Massa Carrara, Lucca, Pisa, Grosseto, Rome, Frosinone, Litoria, Viterbo, Formia, Tavullia and Rieti.

IV - TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Naples - includes territory of provinces of Salerno, Cosenza, Tarento, Matera, Potenza, Chieti, Aquila, Gargano, Taranto, Bari, Matera, Bari, Potenza, Salerno, Avellino, Gargano, Cosenza, Reggio Calabria as well as the island of Lagosta.

Aeromotor Command of Sicily with command at Palermo - includes territory of provinces of Palermo, Agrigento, Trapani, Caltanissetta, Messina, Messina, Catania, Siracusa and Ragusa.

Aeromotor Command of Sardinia, command at Cagliari - includes territory of provinces of Cagliari, Sassari and Nuoro.

Aeromotor aeromotor command, command at Anzio - includes territory of all the islands of the Dodecanese.

ART. 2.

To each Territorial Air Zone command and to each aeromotor command of Sicily and Sardinia are assigned, respectively, a general of the air squadron and a general of the air division; to the aeromotor command of the Aegon is assigned a general of the air brigade. Above assignments will be made by Royal decree upon approval of Council of Ministers.

The Territorial Air Zone and Aeromotor Commands have, as regiment troops, detachment, schools and aeromotor services stationed in the territories of their jurisdiction, the functions outlined in existing aeromotor instructions.

ART. 3.

At the dependence of every Territorial Air Zone Command are:

(a) Material and airport services director with relative shops, warehouses, etc.
(b) Aeromotor administrative director with relative shops, etc.
(c) Aeromotor Commissary director with relative shops, etc.
(d) Mobilization and recruiting center.

The above mentioned directions will have their headquarters at the headquarters of the command itself.

ART. 4.

At the dependence of every Aeromotor Command are:

-1-

[Text continues from the previous page.]

ANNEX 3.

Aeronautic construction directions are established with headquarters at Venice, Milan, Bologna and Naples.

ANNEX 4.

Territorial jurisdiction of the above directions are as follows:

(a) Venice Direction - Includes territory of provinces of Venice, Padua, Rovigo, La Spezia, Verona, Vicenza, Belluno, Treviso, Veneto and Padua.

(b) Milan Direction - Includes territory of provinces of Lombardy, Parma, Cremona, Mantova, Milan, Novara, Pavia and Varese.


(d) Naples Direction - Includes territory of provinces of Apulia, of the Amalfi, Salerno, Cilento, Foggia, Taranto, Potenza, Matera, Avellino, Benevento, Naples, Salerno, Matera, Potenza, Campobasso,阜i, Prignano, Foggia, Taranto, Matera, Potenza, Salerno, Matera, Malcesine, Taranto, Reggio Calabria, Cattolica, Termoli as well as the islands of Sicily, Sardinia and those of the Peloponnese.

ANNEX 5.

Aeronautic commands attached to the Chief Command of the Maritime Department and the Military Maritime Command of the upper Adriatic cease the designation of Aviation Command attached to the Chief Command of the Maritime Department and Military Maritime command of the upper Adriatic.

ANNEX 6.

Previous provisions of law in conflict with the present become hereby abrogated.
ATTACHE'S REPORT F-10-2 17/137-1

Forward seven copies (original and six carbon); this number is necessary because of the limited personnel in O. N. I. and because of the agency's policy of diverting information from attachages. These copies will be distributed by O. N. I. so per fixture or elsewhere, according to subject matter.

From T Date 20 August, 1937  Serial No. 483  File No. 906-100

Source of information: Official and observation

Subject: ITALY  ARMY  OPERATIONS

Reference:

*COMBINED MANEUVERS IN SICILY.*

1. The combined maneuvers of the Italian Army, Navy and Air Corps in Sicily have just been completed. In these maneuvers the Army employed 50,000 men, 3,000 motor units, 500 guns and 1,820 machine guns.

2. The part played by the Navy has received little publicity and the naval maneuvers involved are not known.

3. The forces were landed on the west coast of Sicily at Marsala and Mazara, one battalion at each place. At the beginning of the operation it was assumed that the defending naval force had been dispersed and the defending aircraft considerably weakened. Later reinforcements to the defending air force were conceded.

4. The published conclusions of the exercises are to the effect that:

   Point (1): Sicily cannot be successfully invaded by an enemy even though, as in this case, the enemy is thoroughly mechanized in the most modern way;

   Point (2): The defenses of Sicily must be increased.

   Point (3): The defending air force played a very large part in the defeat of the invaders.

4. In previous years it has been the custom of the Italian Government to invite all foreign military and air attachés to witness the annual maneuvers. This year none were invited.

---

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. (B) and (D) of (R)
On: D letter, May 1, 1972
By: SLR
Date: MAY 21, 1973
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT
19. November, 1937
Serial No. 618
File No. 502-100

From  

Date  

Serial No. 618

File No. 502-100

Subject  

Reference  

Source of information

ITALY

ANZ

PERSONNEL

(Manpower report)

STRENGTH

(Manpower report)

3131

Recent report shows that the number of men due for conscription in 1938 will be considerably under the average of 200,000 owing to the reduced birth rate in 1917, when they were born. Since the release of the 1916 class of conscripts some weeks ago many regiments have been well below normal peace-time strength.

SHORCE OF CONSSCRIPTS.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT A-1-22203

From: T, Date: 3 Dec., 1937, Serial No. 556, File No. 1008-900

Source of information: CONSULAR REPORT

ITALY - AVIATION - ORGANIZATION - AIR STRENGTH

Subject: ITALY - AVIATION - PERSONNEL - CHARACTERISTICS - LEADERS

Reference:

NOTE: (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading paragraphs, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

INCREASE IN ITALIAN AVIATION PERSONNEL IN SICILY

1. The following is quoted from a report submitted by the American Consul at Palermo, Sicily, under date of 30 November, 1937:

"The Headquarters of the air forces in Sicily is now at Palermo and Brigadier General Stampani has recently assumed command. The Aviation personnel has been greatly increased during the last few months, not only in connection with the establishment of the headquarters, but also in respect to the number of pilots and non-commissioned officers at the air field. There is, however, a great lack of planes and the flying personnel have little opportunity of getting off the ground. It may be added that with the assignment of General Stampani to Palermo it is the first time that a flying officer of this rank has been stationed here."
1. According to a report of the American Consul General, Naples, dated 7 December, 1937, a colleague had mentioned the fact that anyone driving through Sicily with their eyes open would learn that there are ten new and large aviation fields on the island, ranging from 1 to 2 square kilometers in area.

2. This would seem to confirm a remark recently made by an Italian aviation officer now on duty in Sicily, in which the information slipped that there were a number of new airports being constructed on the island.

3. Effort will be made to determine the location of these reported new airports.
ITALIAN INTERVENTION IN SPAIN

1. The same informant who supplied the information contained in Serial #13 has confirmed the accuracy of that report from a separate source. He also adds that some 2000 to 3000 native troops have been despatched from Libya to Spain recently.

2. The following extract from the report of the Consul General, Naples, of 18 January, 1936, also tends towards confirmation:

"I have the honor to report that the head of a large concern which handles a great deal of bunker "oil" informs me very positively that his company has been bunkering Italian transports (or vessels used as transports) and that they have been carrying large numbers of troops and military supplies to Spain since the Tarvel battle commenced -- particularly within the last 10 days."

"It seems quite well established from other and independent sources that it is quite common belief -- perhaps knowledge -- among persons connected with port activities that a good many troops have been leaving Naples and (according to some) Geita. These latter informants however say in effect that it is impossible to tell whether these troops go to Africa, or to Spain."
1. JAPAN REPRESENTED AT FUNERAL OF SANDRO SANDRI: Popolo d'Italia, 22 Jan.
The Japanese Naval Attaché, Mose, and the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy went
to Venice to represent Japan at the funeral of Sandro Sandri, Italian journalist
killed in China.

2. ECONOMIC COUNCIL, LITTLE ENTENTE: Osservatore Romano, 22 January.
Prague: The Economic Council of the Little Entente will open its next session
on 23 February at Bucharest. The Commission is to establish a plan of commercial
exchange between Yugoslavia and Rumania and Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It
will also discuss Yugoslav-Rumanian economic relations, collaboration in communi-
cations and economic collaboration among the Danubian States (Hodza plan). The
Conference of the States of the Little Entente which was to have met on 9 February
at Ankara has been postponed to the latter half of that month. It will be pre-
sided over by Metaxas, President of the Balkan Council, Moustakis will
arrive at Ankara some days before the opening of the Conference in order to
meet the President of the Turkish Republic. The Rumanian Foreign Minister is
also expected before the Conference opens to carry out negotiations with the
Turkish Foreign Minister.

3. LATVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VISITED ITALY: Popolo d'Italia, 22 January.
The Latvian Foreign Minister was received by the King on 21 January. He was
received by the Duce on the same day. He later visited the Istituto Forlanini
and the Foro Mussolini.

4. VISIT ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO FRANCE: Messaggero, 24 January.
A dispatch from Cannes states that the Romanian Foreign Minister, Mosec, arrived there on 23 January. During the day he had various conversations with
Colonel Beck, Polish Foreign Minister. Colonel Beck, M. Mosec, and M. Crete-
za, Director of Political Affairs at the Romanian Foreign Ministry, lunched
informally together. Mr. Winston Churchill was to have attended the luncheon
but sent his excuses. The Romanian Minister left Cannes the same evening.

5. BRITISH LOAN TO FRANCE: Messaggero, 24 January. A report quotes a
statement by the Sunday Chronicle that the new French Ministry has already
informed the British Treasury unofficially that it will request a loan of 50
million pounds sterling very shortly. According to the Sunday Chronicle several
big English banks are willing to subscribe to this loan. The loan will probably
be guaranteed by the returns from the French State Railways.

6. ITALIAN FASCIST MISSION TO JAPAN: Messaggero, 25 January. It is an-
ounced that Aldo Poliato who was to represent the Fascist Confederation of
Industrial Workers in the Fascist Mission to Japan, has been substituted by the
Hon. Rodolfo Vecchini. The mission will leave Genoa on the Italianic on 18
February.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From  T  Date  27 Jan. 1933  Serial No. 51
Source of information  

Subject  (Name reported as)  (Name title as per Indian sheet)  

Reference  

Page Two


8. BENGAL PLANS IN FAR EAST: Daily Telegraph, 29 January. A British commercial traveler who has returned to Hong Kong from the Far Eastern provinces of Siberia reported that the Russians are making extensive military preparations in that area. They are, he stated, building aeroplanes and submarine bases; already they have about 100 submarines at Vladivostok and 500 aeroplanes concentrated near that city.

9. ITALY SHIPMENTS AYASSINIA FORCES: Daily Telegraph, 29 January. More Italian troops are on their way to Abyssinia. Today the steamer Umbria, 10,128 tons, left Naples with 60 officers and 1,800 troops on board. Nearly 3,000 Italian troops left Naples for Abyssinia last Saturday. Recently there have been reports of renewed disorders in various parts of the country.

10. ITALIAN MILITARY ACTIVITY AGAINST AYASSINIA: New York Herald Tribune, Paris Edition, 27 January. Important action against Ethiopian Tribesmen during the rainy season are reported. They add Amsa-Chibouti railroad is said to have been kept open during the big rains only by constant aerial activity. 115 planes have been used. Squadrons based on Dire-Dawa undertook operations more than 900 miles from their bases, dropping quantities of supplies and munitions to ground troops in difficulties.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT R-8-1, 9108-C

Forward seven copies (original and six carbon) this number to necessary because of the limited personnel in O. M. I. and because of the urgency for quickly disseminating information from attache. These copies will be distributed by O. M. I. as per instance of ciphers, according to normal procedure.

From T Number 2

Date 8 February, 1938

Serial No. 76

Source No. 20

File No. 915-1000

Subject: ITALY, NAVAL OPERATION

Date reported on:

Special reports copied

Drafted from:

Reference:

Note—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly simplified if a brief summary of the contents is inserted in the space. Mention leading paragraphs, personnel, or political issues, and the gist of the report.

NEW TORPEDO BOATS AND SUBMARINE LAUNCHED.

1. The Italian press of 6 February, 1938, reports the successful launching at Genoa, Destri Fornace yards, of the torpedo boat AETERNA of the same class as the recently launched ALICIONE and AIRONE.

2. The submarine TELADEN was launched on the same date at the Muggiano yards, La Spezia.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From: [Redacted]
Date: 11 February 1936
Serial No.: 86
File No.: 102-100
Source of information: Press
Subject: EUROPEAN POWERS INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

REFERENCE

1. PIRATE SUBMARINES OPERATING FROM MAJORCA. The London "Daily Telegraph" of 7 February, 1936, writes: "It is believed that the pirate submarines (at present operating in the Mediterranean) are operating from the new Nationalist naval base at Pollesa in Majorca, Balearic Islands."

2. ITALIAN AND GERMAN AIRMEN IN TETUAN. The London "Daily Telegraph" of 7 February published a dispatch from Gibraltar stating that several hundred Italian and German airmen are billeted in hotels in Tétouan, according to reliable information from Ceuta. The dispatch further states that naval authorities are unable to confirm the report that some of the airmen escorted a convoy of Italian steamers to Cadiz.

3. JAPANESE OFFICIALS TO BE SENT TO ROME AND BERLIN. The Rome "Messaggero" reports from Tokyo that the Minister of War made an interesting report to the Budget Board on the military preparation of various Powers in the Far East. Later the Minister of the Interior revealed that the Japanese Government intends to send officials to Rome and Berlin with the exclusive task of achieving the speedy exchange of information in regard to the activities of international Communism between the signatories of the Anti-Comintern Pact.

4. CHILEAN CRUISE AT THE BUILT AHEAD. The "Messaggero" of 10 February publishes a dispatch from Santiago, Chile, stating that the Chilean Ministry for National Defense has asked for bids, through the Embassies and Legations, from shipyards in the United States, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, France and Sweden for the construction of two armored cruisers of 8,000 tons each. It is not yet known whether these ships will be armed with 6" or 8" guns.

5. RUSSIAN AND JAPANESE MILITARY MISSIONS RECALLED. The "Messaggero" reports from Berne on 9 February that it is learned that the recent friction between Russia and Japan has resulted in the breaking of a diplomatic agreement between the two countries which provided for the presence of an official Soviet delegation of observers with a Japanese regiment, and reciprocally, a Japanese delegation with the Soviet Russian Army. In consequence four Japanese officers assigned to Moscow are on their way out of Russia and four Soviet officers assigned to a regiment at Seikawa are returning to Russia. In diplomatic circles this act is considered rather grave and a prelude to more important events.

6. NEW MINISTER OF NICARAGUA PRESENTS CREDENTIALS TO ITALIAN KING AND PREMIER. The new Minister of Nicaragua, H.E. Don Tomas Francisco Medina, was received in audience on 8 February at the Quirinale where he presented his credentials as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Nicaragua to H.M. the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia.
### CONFIDENTIAL

**ATTACHE'S REPORT**

**SUMMARY OF ITALIAN NAVAL VESSELS UNDER CONSTRUCTION OR PROJECTED—1 MARCH, 1959**

**OSD Issued, May 1, 1959**

**By SLR**

**Date: MAY 24 1959**

The following is a summary of Italian Naval Vessels under construction or projected on 1 March, 1959:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>YARD</th>
<th>LAID DOWN</th>
<th>LAUNCHED</th>
<th>TRIALS</th>
<th>COMPLETION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vittorio Veneto</td>
<td>'34</td>
<td>San Marco</td>
<td>10-34</td>
<td>7-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Luciole</td>
<td>'34</td>
<td>San Marco</td>
<td>10-34</td>
<td>8-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empero</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attilio Brolo</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>O.T.O. Livorno</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gato Maria</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sputnik AFRICANO</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coriolis Silla</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>Ansaldo, Genoa</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capo Brittio</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>C.R.P. Ancona</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piuma Augusto</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>Riva Trigoso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gato Bruno</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>Riva Trigoso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tittaro Aquila</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>O.T.O. Maggiano</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giulio Genarico</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>C.R.P. Naples</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ettico Tinello</td>
<td>'38</td>
<td>C.R.P. Palermo</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**D**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>YARD</th>
<th>LAID DOWN</th>
<th>LAUNCHED</th>
<th>TRIALS</th>
<th>COMPLETION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name Nero</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>O.T.O. Livorno</td>
<td>1-37</td>
<td>9-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grillo</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>O.T.O. Livorno</td>
<td>10-37</td>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geniere</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9-37</td>
<td>2-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sardine</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>9-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attillino</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>O.T.O. Ancona</td>
<td>1-37</td>
<td>12-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspero</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>O.T.O. Ancona</td>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>4-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mufliero</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4-37</td>
<td>about 4-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venerinio</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>Palermo</td>
<td>4-37</td>
<td>about 4-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Granatino</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>Palermo</td>
<td>7-37</td>
<td>about 4-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gradienio</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>Riva Trigoso</td>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>about 5-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancia</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**T**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>YARD</th>
<th>LAID DOWN</th>
<th>LAUNCHED</th>
<th>TRIALS</th>
<th>COMPLETION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salone</td>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>10-36</td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atorne</td>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>10-36</td>
<td>1-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atene</td>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>10-36</td>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atenea</td>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>10-36</td>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atenea</td>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>11-36</td>
<td>3-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atenea</td>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>11-36</td>
<td>3-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atenea</td>
<td>'36</td>
<td>Ansaldo</td>
<td>11-36</td>
<td>3-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Notes:**
- The report includes the summary of Italian Naval Vessels under construction or projected as of 1 March, 1959.
- The report is issued by the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.
- The report is marked as CONFIDENTIAL.
- The report is dated 24 May 1959.

---

**Reference:**
- The report includes a summary of Italian Naval Vessels under construction or projected as of 1 March, 1959.
### ATTACHE'S REPORT

**From:** [Name]  
**Date:** 5 [Month], 19 [Year]  
**Serial No.:** 123  
**File No.:** 202-100

**Subject:** [Subject]  
**Reference:** [Reference]

---

**List of Ships:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHIP</th>
<th>PROGRAM</th>
<th>YARD</th>
<th>LAID DOWN</th>
<th>LAUNCHED</th>
<th>TRIALS</th>
<th>COMPLETION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LINA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Quarnaro</td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>9-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIRA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>10-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>11-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIRIL</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>1-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALLADE</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>P.S.N. Naples</td>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>12-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAPENDREZ</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>8-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PALLADE</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-37</td>
<td>10-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLLOC</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-37</td>
<td>10-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVVISCI SORCI</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Palermo</td>
<td>4-36</td>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSTRO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>4-35</td>
<td>4-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PICASSO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>P.S.N. Naples</td>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>12-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCTER</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>1-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORCELLO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Monfalcone</td>
<td>11-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATTI</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARBARO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENIERO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>11-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANZANELLO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>11-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOROSINI</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>11-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOCENICO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>11-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOLO</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>Tosi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOSI</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TULLIPANOTTI</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCIRE</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>O.T.D. La Spezia</td>
<td>1-38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TROMBONE</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUREO</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAULO</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECNO</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOLDAR</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOLOANNI</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATREVO</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Tosi</td>
<td>7-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOGA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-36</td>
<td>6-37</td>
<td>10-37</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOGA</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>12-37</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Notes:**

- Additional in #27 Program.

---

This report includes information on the status and progress of various ships, particularly those related to naval operations. The data provided includes the ship's name, program, yard, dates of various stages such as laid down, launched, trials, and completion, along with estimated completion dates. The report is part of the regular intelligence and operational communications between the Intelligence Division and the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. The Italian Ministry of Marine has confirmed the dates of launching of submarines given above, but has declined to give any dates of laying down. The Ministry, in reply to a request for information concerning names and dates of laying down of the submarines listed above as Nos. 1 to 6, stated on 28 February, 1938, that "They are of the 1937 program and on 1 January, 1936, had not yet been laid down." Likewise the Ministry stated that it was not possible to give any information concerning the 1938 submarine program. As previously reported, the Naval Attache estimates this program to be 20 submarines of about 1000 tons each.

ENCL.

E. O. 11662, Sec. 3(D) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1972
ATTACHÉ’S REPORT

TRAPANI

Seen from nearby Monte San Giuliano, not much progress appears to have been made during the past year on the military airport at Trapani. There are now two smaller hangars, one new, and construction appears to be still in progress on an administration building and small barracks. No planes were seen. About one kilometer west of the field, shielded from the sea by Monte San Giuliano are three large underground tanks.

CATANIA

No changes apparent since the submission of Naval Attaché Report Serial No. 149, File 608, 603, of 25 March, 1937.

CONFIDENTIAL

AIR STATIONS IN SICILY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11650, Sec. 3(3) and 5(3) or (5)
OSD letter, May 3, 1972
By SILR Data: May 2, 1973
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT  C-9/21555-H

From  T  Date  11 March., 1939  Serial No.  143  File No.  102-106

Source of information  PRESS

Subject  POWERS  INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Reference

1. GERMAN CONSULATES IN RUSSIA CLOSED: Popolo D'Italia, 5 Mar., Berlin. All German Consulates in Russia have been closed.

2. FOREIGNERS IN CHINESE AIR FORCE: Giornale D'Italia, 5 Mar., Shanghai. The Chinese Air Force is comprised primarily of two foreign formations. The first and largest is composed exclusively of Soviet aviators; the second is commanded by the American, Vincent Schmidt, soldier of fortune formerly in Mexico, Ethiopia and Spain. Altogether there are with the Chinese Forces 400 aviators, mostly Russian, American and French.

3. VENEZUELAN NAVAL MISSION VISITS ROME: Giornale D'Italia, 6 Mar. The Venezuelan Naval Mission which is in Italy to take delivery of the two old Italian Mine Sweepers for the Venezuelan Government is visiting Rome, where its members have been received by the Duke and the Undersecretary of State for the Navy.

4. ITALIAN NAVAL VESSELS VISIT PORTUGAL: Vose D'Italia, 6 Mar., Lisbon. The new Italian Cruisers, D.C.A. LEOI ABBAGLI and CARBONARI are making a five day visit of friendship to Lisbon during which the Admiral and Officers will be received by the President of Portugal. Note: this is presumably a shakedown cruise.

5. POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS ROME: 7 March. Colonel Beck, Polish Foreign Minister, arrived in Rome for conversations to last for several days.

6. BRITISH AMBASSADOR ARRIVES FOR ROME TALKS: 7 March. The British Ambassador to Rome, accompanied by Mr. Maurice Ingram, formerly Counselor of British Embassy, arrived in Rome for the Anglo-Italian conference.

7. HUNGARIAN RE-ARMAMENT: Vose D'Italia, 6 Mar. Prime Minister Daranyi of Hungary announced that Hungary claimed the right to rearm and would spend one billion Pengo in a five year National Defense Program.

8. ROMANIA RECOGNIZES ITALIAN EMPIRE: Popolo D'Italia, 8 Mar., Bucharest. A new Romanian Minister to Rome has been appointed with letters of credit addressed to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.

9. POLAND RECOGNIZES ITALIAN EMPIRE: 7 March. Poland's recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia was signified when the Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck, at an official banquet tendered in his honor by the Italian Foreign Minister, proposed a toast to the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia.
ATTACHE'S REPORT

From: T. Date: 25 March, 1928 Serial No. 480

Source of information: OFFICIAL

ITALY - NAVY - POLICY - NAVAL POLICY - ITALY - NAVY - OPERATIONS

Subject: ITALY - NAVY - ORGANIZATION - FLEET

ITALIAN FLEET ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES

1. In presenting the 1928-29 naval budget to the Chamber of Deputies, the
   President of the general board of the budget stated as follows in regard to
   Italian Fleet Organization and Activities:

   "After a period of uncertainty due more to economic and political
   considerations than to operative and technical factors, the battleship
   has resumed its place as the principal factor of maritime power in all
   the great navies. Thus the four new Italian battleships, LUSSORO,
   VITTORIO VENETO, EMAIO, EUGENIO have their counterparts in similar
   units planned or under construction by the other powers as follows:

   France - 4 or perhaps 6 units;
   England - 5 or perhaps 10 units;
   United States - 4 or perhaps 6 units;
   Germany - 4 units;
   Japan - an unknown number of units; and if information is reliable,
   U.S.S.R. - has also decided to build 2 units of maximum tonnage.

   The work of modernization already completed on the two ships
   CERARE and CANOVAR, that at present is in course on the ships of the
   same type DOUGA and DULLIT, the entry into service of the 4 LUSSORO
   type will give Italy two homogeneous divisions of 4 battleships, a
   number considered to be the most convenient number for a rational and
   profitable tactical employment of this type of ship."

   "No international treaty or other agreement at present binds Italy
   to a limitation of armaments; nevertheless, in regard to battleships,
   Italy has remained quantitatively and qualitatively at a ratio within
   the limits of the Washington and London treaties by which, however, as
   said above, she is not bound."

   "The 12 new exploratori which will bear the glorious names of the
   Captains of Rome, represent an indispensable and valid addition to the
   large and excellent group of our light modern forces. They are also
   the natural and logical complement to the group of larger ships, the
   big units can stay at sea for long periods and move at high speeds,
   the escort and scouting services which they could not nowadays discharge,
   could not be performed by the existing light units both for reasons
   of autonomy and owing to their possibilities of employment which
   are often subordinated to the condition of the sea."

   "Annunciation or substitution of the light units in the course of
   a mission would cause a crisis among the naval forces which must at all
   costs be avoided; the new large exploratori have excellent sea-going quali-
   ties capable of maintaining high offensive power and will guarantee
   the continuity of operation even in adverse weather conditions."
"It has been necessary to increase the submarine fleet in proportion to the surface fleet."

"The new submarines will have a wide range, excellent sea-going qualities and good armament; they can remain at sea for long periods to guard our vital lines of communication, both in the Mediterranean and in the oceans. The new units are an improvement on the type already in use which have performed long and satisfactory service."

"The present naval program does not comprise units of the cruiser and smaller torpedo boat classes. Although other powers are intensifying their construction of cruisers, the Navy does not at present consider urgent the increase of the excellent and modern group of cruisers now in commission."

"Similarly it has been decided not to increase for the present the group of smaller light units, also in view of the fact that 14 new destroyers and 16 torpedo boats of the 1935-36 program will join the fleet during the year."

"The Navy has given particular care to the study of the improvement and more profitable utilization of the existing auxiliary fleet. This work of adaptation must necessarily be complemented by a quantitative increase in these units which are indispensable for the auxiliary services of the fleet and naval bases."

"In the year 1936-37 the greater part of our Naval Forces, that is, all the most modern war units, were organized into the two bodies which have for a long time served as the basis of the constitution of our naval forces; the 1st and 2nd naval squadrons, however the aspect of our fleet has been considerably altered by the entry into service of the Battleship CONTRE DI CAYVOUR and the GIULIO CESARE after their radical modernization; the presence of these battleships endows our naval forces with the big battle units it formerly lacked."

"Almost all the submarines are in four groups under the Submarine Command with headquarters in Rome."

"During 1936-37 intensive training was carried out and, as usual, exercises in firing and employment of arms, tactical-strategic maneuvers with opposed forces, and aero-naval exercises were held."

"The year's training was concluded with the special exercises carried out under the control of the Ministerial Commission which is appointed each year to ascertain the grade of efficiency attained by the units of the fleet."

---

(For the rest of the document, please refer to the original source as it contains detailed information and statistics about the naval forces and their operations.)
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From T Date 25 March 1938 Serial No. 169
Source of information

Reference

Recon—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly simplified if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

SAGE THESE

"The gunboat LEWIS, stationed in the Far East, effected a cruise during July and August, 1937, during which it touched at Tsingtao, Chinwangtao, Peitien, Dar'es and Wuahaiwei."

"During the year the Spanish situation has necessitated missions by cruisers and exploratory in the Spanish and African waters participating in the Mediterranean patrol service and under the Nyon Agreement."

"In the preparation of the units of the fleet, particular care has been devoted to anti-aircraft defense on board and the respective training. The problem has been faced not only from the point of view of anti-aircraft arms with which each unit is equipped, but also with regard to the general organization of the various services, and to the forms of employment and maneuver of the naval forces liable or subject to air attack."

"The auxiliary aviation for the navy comprising the embarked planes and the naval reconnaissance squadrons has carried out intensified training and attained a satisfactory grade of efficiency. Detachments of the air arm have also frequently taken part in combined exercises with the naval forces."
1. The following is quoted from the Italian press of 30 March, 1936:

"During the discussion of the budgets at the Senate on March 29, Senator Duci mentioned certain problems in connection with the navy. After justifying Imperial Italy's need for an oceanic navy, he examined the balance of European naval forces in regard to units and tonnage.

The tonnage of the Italian navy is subdivided in relation to the technical problems which may arise. The size of the submarine fleet, 105 units, may appear enormous if account is taken of the number of specialists required for this service; but it must be considered that in view of the war and the fear of men and machinery in case of war, only one-third could be counted upon in full efficiency.

Besides the 16 oceanic submarines in commission there are 12 with a range which would enable them to reach Chisinao via Gibraltar without refueling, and which therefore should be able to transport a considerable quantity of fuel and munitions.

The Senator alluded to Japan's construction of 10 motor-tankers, which are already in service, with a speed of 30 miles an hour and a capacity of over 10,000 tons of oil. This is a cause of anxiety to the United States as with such ships the Japanese could accompany a battle squadron and refuel at sea in case of attack on Hawaii or the Pacific coast.

Each theater of operations presents special problems, such as the Red Sea and the tropical zone for Italy. It is therefore necessary to study each detail of construction in order to get the best results from men and materials.

The Senator recalled the Navy's performance during the Ethiopian war, its perfect organization for transport and coast defense equipment. The Italian Navy merits all the trust that is placed in it.

The coastal equipment of naval bases is a matter for which it is difficult to find a perfect solution in view of the new means of air offense. The announcement of the work to be done at the Naples basin is highly satisfactory but there is nevertheless some doubt as to the defense which can be provided for ships in a town dock. The construction of a third big dock in southern Italy is indispensable.

The dredging of the port of Desna to a depth of 10 meters is an excellent step and the same should be done at Tobruk. A glance at the coastline of Libya shows that the port of Bengasi is also in a particularly good strategic position.

In the Red Sea, Massaua serves many military requirements; if the Bay of Dahlia should be found insufficient, Massaua could be used as an auxiliary port.

The port of Assab stands guard over the entry into the Red Sea. In the Indian Ocean the only natural ports are Chisminao and Afum. Assab and Afum together can perform a highly important strategic function.

New Italy will know where best to choose the port for the oceanic navy which the Duke is creating."
2. The discussion given above is of interest chiefly for two reasons:

(a) The mention of Chisinao and Afum as potential bases, particularly for submarines, in Jordan. It is recommended that charts of these ports be obtained through the Hydrographic Office.

(b) The mention of the necessity for constructing a third large dock in Southern Italy; in Southern Italy large docks are now built or being built at Naples and Taranto. Augusta Bay is considered the most likely place for such new construction.
1. The following extracts from an article appearing in the "Vie dell'Aria" of 18 April, 1936, are of interest in connection with the contemplated re-organization of certain of the tactical units of the Italian Air Corps:

The announcement made by General Valli to the Chamber of Deputies of the imminent constitution of two Air Units greater than the Division, was immediately put into effect in truly Fascist manner. As the Under-secretary announced, an Air Squadron has already been constituted and is in full efficiency and will perform in the presence of the Führer.

This new development of our aeronautical organization merits attention. It is of the greatest importance since it gives to the Air Arm a better defined organization and the best possibility for exploiting its essential characteristic - mobility.

... The Air Squadron said General Valli, "will have a certain number of bombing and combat divisions; it will be released from the slavery of land bases, constituting a war arm of exceptional offensive power, exceedingly mobile, consisting of hundreds of planes which can be taken in twenty-four hours from one sector to another wherever the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces wishes to make the maximum effort."

... The Squadron will consist of a variable number of Divisions and minor units with a predominance of bombers over pursuit planes or vice versa, according to the strategical importance of the sector. But whatever the number of units and whatever their war characteristics may be, the essential purpose of the Squadron is to ensure to the entire organization the possibility of speedy maneuver.

Experiments are to be made with two new units, but their number may be increased later; in any case, the number and location of the squadrons can only be decided according to the war to be fought and the theater of operations involved.

... The Commander of the Air Squadron will be charged with the study and preparation of the conduct of the war. As we have said above, this unit may be called upon to act on very short notice in one sector or another, but as a rule the pre-disposition of air preparations for each Big Unit will regard its own sector. The detailed examination of enemy territory to be made by the Squadron; the selection, determination and classification of objectives on the basis of their location and defensive possibilities and especially in connection with their strategic importance and contribution to the resistance of the enemy nation; the knowledge and study of the location, size and organization of the enemy forces; all these will be the main elements in accordance with which the Squadron Commander will dispose of the units according to the characteristics of the material and the efficiency of the airports and services of the Territorial Air Zone Commands under the General Staff. It thus seems evident that the forces may be profitably employed after they have reached a high standard of war training in their annual exercises corresponding to the actual situations in which the Squadron might eventually be engaged.
The plans of each Squadron Command will be approved by the Office of the General Staff and sent for examination by the other Commands so that they may be informed of the operative possibilities of the various units in the different sectors.

"... After the first experiments, the number of Air Squadrons will undoubtedly be increased; and perhaps it may soon be necessary to establish still larger units, that is, Air Armies, which may be constituted, in case of war, by uniting a certain number of Squadrons. After which the Air Force of Fascist Italy will have completed its cycle of formation and will devote all its efforts to consolidating its power and glory."
ITALIAN AIR CORPS - ORGANIZATION OF, LOCATION OF UNITS.

JUN 21 1929

1. There are attached hereto 15 charts showing the estimated organization of the Italian Air Corps as of 1 June, 1929, together with the assigned permanent bases of and the types of planes comprising the various units.

2. The estimated organization shows a total of 240 combat squadrons (plus approximately 97 training, utility and miscellaneous squadrons) summarized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Sicily</th>
<th>Sardinia</th>
<th>Peloponnesus</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>E. Africa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter land</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter sea</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb, land</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb, sea</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub totals</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNITED WITH R. ARMY

Obs. land 22 1 1

UNITED WITH R. NAVY

Obs. sea 9 4 4 1 1

COLONIAL AFRICA

Mixed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Sicily</th>
<th>Sardinia</th>
<th>Peloponnesus</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>E. Africa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter land</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub totals</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GRAND TOTALS: 145 9 15 6 23 45 240
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

Forward from source (original and its entirety); this number is necessary because of the limited personnel in O.M.I. and because of the urgency for quickly disseminating information from attaches. These copies will be distributed by O.M.I. as per instructions or otherwise, according to original source.

From: [Blank]  Date: 6 June 19... Serial No.: 210 File No.: 1004-200

Source of information:

Subject: (Mention reported on) (Subject title on per incident sheet) (Subdivision)

Reference: (See report for D.M.O. above)

Note: (The review, editing, and distribution of reports by O.M.I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Page 2. CONFIDENTIAL

5. Due to the fact that the Italian Ministry of Aeronautics gives out no information relative to the organization or composition of the Air Corps, and due to the press censorship as regards military matters, the above estimates are based on observation and contacts. Although the designation and location of units is in some cases incomplete and may be slightly in error, it is believed that the general organization, composition and total number of squadrons is fairly accurate.

DECASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 5(D), or (F)

OSD letter: May 4, 1972

By SLR  Date: MAY 21, 1973
CHART 2.

2nd Division
(Torino)

2nd Brigade
(Torino)

3rd Wing
(Mirafiori)

55th Wing
(Casselae Tor.)

11th Group
(Mirafiori)

22nd Group
(Mirafiori)

150th Group
(Casselae Tor.)

151st Group
(Casselae Tor.)

4th Group
(Lonate P.)

6th Group
(Lonate P.)

11th Group
(Lonate P.)

48th Group
(Lonate P.)

Squadrons
85-85-85
(Or 52's)

Squadrons
70-74-75
(Or 52's)

Squadrons
554-564-565
(Or 52's)

Squadrons
566-567-568
(Or 52's)

Squadrons
14-16
(Br 20's)

Squadrons
9-9
(Br 20's)

Squadrons
1-1
(Br 20's)

Squadrons
2-2
(Br 20's)
CHART III

3rd Division
(Bologna)

1st Brigade
(Bologna)

8th Wing
(Bologna)

27th Group
(Bologna)

Squadrons
1V-18
(6 81's)

28th Group
(Bologna)

Squadrons
10-19
(6 81's)

6th Wing
(Campoformido)

2nd Group
(Campoformido)

Squadrons
150-151-152
(or 82's)

87th Group
(Forli)

Squadrons
198-199
(6 81's)

90th Group
(Forli)

Squadrons
104-105
(6 81's)

52nd Wing
(Ghedi)

3rd Group
(Ghedi)

Squadrons
587-588-589
(or 82's)

22nd Group
(Ghedi)

Squadrons
560-561-562
(or 82's)

24th Group

Squadrons

560-561-562
(or 82's)
CHART 4

5th Brigade (Giampino)

5th Wing (Giampino) 80th Wing (Giampino)

7th Group (Giampino) 19th Group (Giampino) 18th Group (Giampino) 16th Group (Giampino)

Squadrons 106-107-108 (Ma 65's) 186-187-189 (Ma 65's) 167-168-169 (Ma 65's)

8th Wing (Viterbo) 20th Wing (Brescia)

26th Group (Viterbo) 29th Group (Brescia)

Squadrons 11-13 56-57

59-62 (S 79's) (S 81's)
MISCELLANEOUS WINGS

18th Wing  
(Montecelio)

18th Group  
(Montecelio)

Squadrons  
485-487  
(8 79's)

16th Wing  
(Ariano)

58th Group  
(Ariano)

Squadrons  
194-197  
(8 81's)

33rd Wing  
(Napoli)

59th Group  
(Napoli)

Squadrons  
48-44  
(8 81's)

61st Wing  
(Orbetello)

58th Group  
(Orbetello)

Squadrons  
198-199  
(2-506's)

Excl. to H.A. Note No. 299-36  
of 8 June 1938
MISCELLANEOUS WING

55th Wing (Brindisi)

- 86th Group (Brindisi)
  - Squadrons 190-191 (2 506's)

- 88th Group (Vigna di Valle)
  - Squadrons 162-166 (9 80's)

- Wing (Spezia)
  - 92nd Group (Spezia)
    - Squadrons 170-171 (2 506's)
  - Group (Barl)
    - Squadrons (5 81's)
### Dodekanese

#### 39th Wing (Rodí)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>92nd Group (Rodí)</th>
<th>56th Group (Rodí)</th>
<th>Group (Zero)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Squadrons 200-201</td>
<td>Squadrons 222-223</td>
<td>Squadrons 165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2-79's)</td>
<td>(2-79's)</td>
<td>(CR 52's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Squadrons 161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Ro 44's)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**
- 2-79 Squadrons of 6 operating plus 1 reserve planes.
- CR 22 and Ro 44 Squadrons of 9 operating plus 1 reserve planes.
- Total: 48 planes.

*Revised to N/A* Ross No. 299-39

Rel. of 3 June 1945

On 30 and 675 in 1945

21 MAY 1945

E. O. 1150, Sec. 633 and 630 of 600
UNITS WITH E. ARMY.

19th Wing
(Venaria Reale)

5th Group
(Venaria Reale)

Squadrons
81-89-40
(Ro 57's)

61st Group
(Bressa)

Squadrons
35 Bressa-54 Farna
(Ro 27's)

69th Group
(Novi Ligure)

Squadrons
118 Novi-119 Mondovi
(Ro 27's)

20th Wing
(Centocelle)

1st Group
(Centocelle)

Squadrons
27-121
(Ro 27's)

62nd Group
(Pisa)

Squadrons
28-89
(Ro 27's)

66th Group
(Cepodichino)

Squadrons
42 Foggia-181 Capo
(Ro 27's)

21st Wing
(Marina)

15th Group
(Verona)

Squadrons
52 Bolsano-55 Verona
75 Marina-115 Udine
(Ro 27's)

63rd Group
(Udine)

Squadrons
80 Udine-80 Davo
(Ro 27's)

67th Group
(Bologna)

Squadrons
25 Loreto-116 Logna
(Ro 27's)

71st Group
(Marina)

Squadrons
36-116
UNIT WITH THE R. ARMY IN SICILY

30th Squadron
(Catania)
(Re 57's)

UNIT WITH THE R. ARMY IN SARDINIA

124th Squadron
(Elmas)
(Re 57's)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Squadrons</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>91st Group</td>
<td>141-187 Spesia</td>
<td>184-186 Augusta (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Spesia)</td>
<td>144 Livorno</td>
<td>182 Siracusa (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>149 Marsala (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Group</td>
<td>161-187 Spesia</td>
<td>184-186 Augusta (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Taranto)</td>
<td>148 Taranto</td>
<td>182 Siracusa (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>145 Brindisi</td>
<td>149 Marsala (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Group</td>
<td>161-187 Spesia</td>
<td>184-186 Augusta (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Elmas)</td>
<td>148 Taranto</td>
<td>182 Siracusa (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>145 Brindisi</td>
<td>149 Marsala (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86th Group</td>
<td>161-187 Spesia</td>
<td>184-186 Augusta (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Augusta)</td>
<td>148 Taranto</td>
<td>182 Siracusa (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>145 Brindisi</td>
<td>149 Marsala (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th Group</td>
<td>161-187 Spesia</td>
<td>184-186 Augusta (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Napoli)</td>
<td>148 Taranto</td>
<td>182 Siracusa (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>145 Brindisi</td>
<td>149 Marsala (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th Group</td>
<td>161-187 Spesia</td>
<td>184-186 Augusta (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Venosa)</td>
<td>148 Taranto</td>
<td>182 Siracusa (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>145 Brindisi</td>
<td>149 Marsala (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Group</td>
<td>161-187 Spesia</td>
<td>184-186 Augusta (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Napoli)</td>
<td>148 Taranto</td>
<td>182 Siracusa (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>145 Brindisi</td>
<td>149 Marsala (Z 501's)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On board ships approximately 100 Ro 45's and Ro 44's.
### Colonel Garrison in Libya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>EAST SECTOR</strong></th>
<th><strong>WEST SECTOR</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2nd Group (El Adem)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1st Group (Tripoli)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Squadrons</strong></td>
<td><strong>Squadrons</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 (Derka) Ghibli</td>
<td>12 (Tripoli) Ghibli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 (El Adem)</td>
<td>69 (Sirte)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 (Cufra)</td>
<td>99 (Horn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127 (Derka) Ro-37</td>
<td>104 (Tripoli) Ro-37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All squadrons of 9 operating plus 1 reserve planes. All flights of 5 operating planes.

**Total:** 100 planes.
### Colonial Garrison in East Africa

#### North Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Squadrons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gondar</td>
<td>41 (Ca 155's)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### West Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Squadrons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>6-7 (Ca 125's)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### South Sector

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Squadrons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mogadiscio</td>
<td>8 (Ca 111's)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Ca 111, Ca 155 and Ca 125 Squadrons of 6 operating plus 1 reserve planes. OR 58 and Ro-1 bis Squadrons of 9 operating and 1 reserve planes. Total: 815 planes.
ATTACHE’S REPORT

From... T... Date... 1 August, 19...
Serial No.... 369...
File No.... 2007-600...

Subject... ITALY... AVIATION... ORGANIZATION... AIR STRENGTH...

Reference...

1. N.A. Monograph No. 164 dated 13 August, 1937, reported on the organization of Territorial Air Zones in Italy.

2. N.A. Serial No. 285 dated 21 April, 1938, discussed the contemplated reorganization of the Italian Air Force and the establishment of Air Fleets.

3. Monograph No. 213 is attached hereto and contains a translation of a Ministerial Decree enacted 1 July, 1938, which establishes and outlines the duties, dependency etc. of the Air Fleets.

4. N.A. Serial No. 299 dated 8 June, 1938, gave the estimated organization of the Italian Air Force, together with the assigned permanent bases of and the types of planes comprising the various units. The provisions of the attached monograph will result in certain changes in this listed organization.

(Monograph No.213)
N.A. Rome No. 369-38 of 1 Aug. 1938

MONOGRAPH No. 315

1 August, 1938

ITALY-aviation-Organization-Air Strength.

ORGANIZATION, DUTIES AND DEPENDENCY OF THE AIR FleETS, AIR DIVISIONS, AIR BRIGADES AND TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE HEADQUARTERS.

1. The following translation of a Ministerial Decree enacted 1 July, 1938, provides for the establishment of two Air Fleets in the Italian Air Force and outlines the duties, dependency etc. of the Air Fleets, Air Divisions, Air Brigades, and Territorial Air Zones.

2. As of 15 July 1938, the 4th Air Division was organized, with headquarters at Novara. As of the same date the 2nd and newly formed 4th Divisions were organized into the 1st Air Fleet. Similarly the 1st and 3rd Divisions of the 2nd Territorial Zone were organized into the 2nd Air Fleet.

3. It is the probable intention of the Air Ministry to eventually organize one Air Fleet (consisting of two Air Divisions each) in each of the four Territorial Air Zones.

4. The Italian text of this Decree which is "For Official Use Only" in the R. Aeronautica, was furnished as a special courtesy.

Air Fleets

Organization

The Air Fleet includes:
- 1 Air Fleet Headquarters;
- 2 or more Homogeneous Pursuit or Bombardment Air Divisions or Air Brigades;
- a variable number of Squadrons of strategical reconnaissance.

For the logistic necessities of its units the Air Fleet Headquarters has direct supervision over the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters in the territory of which the Air Fleet is normally stationed.

The Air Fleet Headquarters is organized as follows:

a) Headquarters office
b) Operations, Training and Mobilization office
c) Organization and Services office
d) Personnel office
e) Radio communication office
f) Flying section

Strength

The strength of personnel of the Air Fleet Headquarters and the number of planes in the Flying section are given in the attached Tables A and B.

Duties

The Air Fleet Headquarters:

a) in accordance with instructions from the General Staff of the R. Aeronautica, studies the possible operations of the Air Fleet in relation to given sectors and well determined hypotheses of aerial warfare;
b) studies the actual possibilities of employment of available aircraft of the Air Fleet;
o) supervises the training of the Large Aerial Units and of the dependent units, issuing general instructions for the employment of the various specialties (pursuit, bombardment and reconnaissance) and coordinating their action of reciprocal support;

q) issues general instructions and supervises the exercises of the dependent Large Aerial Units and the map problems for officers of said Large Aerial Units, well combining the various activities of the units, so as to reciprocally balance up the different characteristics of employment;

e) improve the cultural and professional knowledge of dependent personnel by organizing special lectures dealing with cooperation of the specialties;

f) upon instructions from the General Staff of the R. Aeronautics, issues orders concerning the preparation of plans of mobilization of Large Aerial Units and of the dependent units;

g) checks the preparation of said plans;

h) studies special problems of employment, functioning of services, mobilization, organization;

i) studies and indicates to the General Staff of the R. Aeronautics eventual changes to be introduced into aircraft and equipment;

l) studies and takes the necessary measures for insuring constant efficiency of aircraft, engines, armament, aircraft equipment and radio sets;

m) studies and suggests to the General Staff of the R. Aeronautics the eventual changes in the personnel and material of the units, both in peace and war time, suggested by practical employment;

n) supervises the entire organization for aerial warfare of the territory, prepared by the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters, in compliance with instructions issued by Higher Authorities, and suggests to the General Staff of the R. Aeronautics the measures considered necessary for the improvement of such organization;

o) checks the full efficiency of airports and other fields within the zone, where units are stationed or will be stationed in the event of war, and issues orders to the dependent Territorial Air Zone Headquarters in connection with the satisfactory functioning of logistic services, the efficiency of dependent units and the rapid execution of the mobilization plans;

p) suggests to the Air Ministry the transfers of officers from one to another of the dependent units, when considered advisable for a more efficient service;

it has the right to transfer within the Air Fleet NOCs and enlisted men from one unit to another and to transfer Lieutenants, even if the transfer implies a change of residence of the officer concerned;

q) deals directly with the Air Ministry and with the Territorial offices in connection with questions concerning dependent personnel and with technical questions concerning material assigned to the dependent units.

The Air Fleet Hq has no administration of its own.

The personnel of the Hq is administered by the closest military airport.

The Commander of the Air Fleet is no case shall be in command of the airport or of the aeronautical garrison.

Dependancy

The Air Fleet Hq comes under the Aerial Army Hq if an Aerial Army is organized. If not, it comes under the General Staff office of the R. Aeronautics (within the Air Ministry) for all questions concerning training and employment, while it deals directly with other organizations of the Air Ministry and with Territorial organizations for all other questions described under "Duties" above.
Air Divisions and Air Brigades

Organization

The Air Divisions and Air Brigades are Large Units of the Aerial Army, each including two or more Wings of the same speciality:
- 3 or more homogeneous Wings form an Air Division;
- 2 homogeneous Wings form an Air Brigade.

The duties and dependency are the same for both Large Units.

The Air Division and Air Brigade Headquarters is organized as follows:

a) Headquarters office
b) Operations and Training office
c) Personnel office
d) Radio communication office
e) Flying section.

Strength

The strength of personnel of the Air Division and Air Brigade Headquarters and the number of planes in the Flying Section are given in the attached Tables C, D and E.

Duties

The Air Division or Air Brigade Headquarters:

a) directs the training of dependent Wings, studying and improving their preparation for warfare, according to their speciality and in compliance with general instructions issued by the Air Fleet Headquarters under which they come;
b) supervises maneuvers and combined exercises of dependent Wings;
c) in accordance with instructions of the Air Fleet Commander, improves the cultural and professional knowledge of dependent personnel, by organizing special courses of instruction for each speciality, and by daily individual and collective flying training of a military character of all personnel concerned.
d) studies and submits to the Air Fleet Headquarters the improvements on questions concerning the employment of the speciality, the characteristics and efficiency of aircraft, engines, armament, equipment and radio sets;
e) checks the efficiency of airports where units are stationed and suggests to the Air Fleet Headquarters the improvements considered necessary;
f) proposes to the Air Fleet Headquarters movements of personnel between dependent Wings, considered necessary to keep fully efficient the units which form the Air Division or the Air Brigade;
g) The Air Division or Air Brigade Commander takes command of the aeronautical garrison in the locality where he resides, provided that there is no Territorial Air Zone Headquarters or the Headquarters of another Air Division or Air Brigade whose Commander is higher in rank or in seniority;
h) in no case shall he be in command of the airport.

Dependency

The Air Division or Air Brigade Hq comes under the Air Fleet Hq to which it belongs, to which it is responsible for the efficiency, training, employment and flying discipline of dependent Wings and for all questions in connection with discipline, status and promotion of dependent personnel.
Territorial Air Zones

Organization

The Territorial Air Zone Headquarters is organized as follows:

a) Headquarters office
b) Organization and Mobilization office
c) Personal office
d) Training, school and pre-aeronautical office
e) Medical office
f) Military Police office
g) Garrison office

For carrying out technical and administrative services the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters supervises:

a) a Directing office of aircraft and airport servicing
b) a Directing office of ground property
c) a Directing office of aeronautical commissariat
d) an office of tele-communications and assistance to flyers
e) a recruiting and mobilization center

For the flying training of navigating personnel assigned to territorial organizations and offices stationed in the same locality as the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters, each Headquarters has a Flying section. The number of planes and personnel in this section are established by separate orders.

Strength

The strength of personnel of the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters is given in the attached Table F.

Duties

The Territorial Air Zone Headquarters:

a) is the Organization charged with the preparation for aerial warfare of the territory over which it has jurisdiction, and of the troops and services of the R.A. Aeronautics residing in said territory;
b) within the limits of the territory over which it has jurisdiction, is responsible for the organization and functioning of all logistic services both for the Air Fleet and the Territorial Air Zone;
c) supervise all mobilization operations of the Territorial organizations within the zone not dependent from the central organizations or from the Headquarters of Large Aerial Units;
d) receives all requests for new constructions and improvements to be made within the zones of military aeronautical interest and forwards them to the Air Fleet Headquarters for final decision, if approved;
e) for all disciplinary and territorial questions it has full authority over territorial Headquarters, offices and organizations as well as over airports, plants and military personnel residing within the Zone, except for those organizations and units directly under the Air Ministry, General Staff of the R. Aeronautics, Air Fleet Headquarters, as established by special rules and except for the units assigned to the R. Army and R. Navy as far as their training and employment are concerned;
f) has full authority over the schools located within its own territory and is responsible for their efficient operation to the Inspectorate of schools from which it receives instructions;
g) checks that organizations not under the R. Aeronautics and private citizens do not make use of uniforms similar to that of the R. Aeronautics and notifies the Air Ministry if such uniforms are found;
h) carries out the various duties through the Chiefs of Services of the Zone and through the subordinate Headquarters and organizations;
i) keeps the Air Ministry and the Air Fleet Headquarters informed of events of exceptional importance within the zone;
j) for carrying out its duties, corresponds directly with the
N.A. Rome No. 369-38 of 1 Aug. 1938

military authorities of the other Armed Forces of the State. With the Central Organizations of such Armed Forces, however, it may correspond only through the Air Ministry;

m) proposes to the Air Ministry the movements of officers of subordinate organizations which are considered necessary;

n) it may, within the Zone, transfer NCOs and enlisted men from one to the other of subordinate organizations or from one airport to another; it may also authorize transfer of Captains and Lieutenants within the subordinate organizations;

c) it supervises the service of Aeronautical Garrison within the Zone.

Dependency

The Territorial Air Zone Headquarters comes directly under the Air Fleet Headquarters, normally located within the Zone, for all questions concerning the services and airports, their efficiency and functioning, for the purpose of employment and mobilization of units.

Should units of another Air Fleet be transferred within the territory of the Zone, provided the strength of such units is less than that of the Air Fleet normally residing in the Zone, the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters shall take the necessary measures for the logistic necessities of such units, in compliance with instructions from the Air Fleet Headquarters under which it comes.

Should the strength of the transferred units be superior to that of the Air Fleet normally residing in the Zone, if no Air Army Headquarters is organised, the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters shall take to the orders of that of the two Air Fleet Headquarters whose commander is higher in rank or seniority and shall take care of the logistic necessities of both Air Fleets in compliance with orders issued by the new Commander.

The Territorial Air Zone Headquarters comes under the Central Organizations of the Air Ministry as far as the preparation for warfare of the territory of the Zone is concerned and for all questions concerning efficiency, discipline and employment of territorial organizations, troops and services located within the Zone.

It is responsible for the administration of material and personnel stationed within the Zone even if belonging to units and organizations not directly under the Territorial Air Zone Headquarters.

Temporary Rules

Until the time when all Air Fleets foreseen by the present expansion program shall be organised, the rules contained in this Decree shall apply only to the I and II Territorial Air Zones. In the III and IV Zones the regulations which have been in force up to the present date shall continue to be operative, without change.

Until the time when the Inspectorates of the Air Force for the R. Army and of the Air Force for the R. Navy shall be organised, the Headquarters of the I and II Territorial Air Zones shall also be charged with the technical-training administration of the units assigned to the R. Army and R. Navy located within the two zones. For employment and disciplinary questions these units are under the competent Commands of the R. Army and R. Navy as heretofore.

* * * * * * *
# TABLE A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Fleet General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Brigade Gen. (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.Col. or Major</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riggers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armorers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Operators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport duty</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. mechanics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riggers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. riggers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armorers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. Armorers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Operators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asst. radio operators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport duty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Chief of Staff

# TABLE B

No of planes in the Flying Section of the Air Fleet Hq.

- Pursuit planes: 3
- Bombardment planes: 1
- Training planes: 4
### TABLE C

**Military personnel assigned to the Air Division Hq.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Division General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Brigade General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel or Major Captains and Lieuts.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riggers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio operators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanicis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riggers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armorers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio operators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport duty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE D

**Military personnel assigned to the Air Brigade Hq.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Brigade General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel or Major Captains and Lieuts.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riggers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Operators</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riggers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armorers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio operators</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport duty</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE II

No. of planes in the Flying Section of the Air Division Hq or Air Brigade Hq.

a) for Large Pursuit Units:
   - Pursuit planes: 3
   - Training planes: 4

b) for Large Bombardment Units:
   - Bombardment planes: 1
   - Training planes: 4

TABLE III

Military and civilian personnel assigned to the Territorial Air Zone Hq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Eq and Hq office</th>
<th>Organis. Mobiliz. office</th>
<th>Personal office</th>
<th>Training schools office</th>
<th>Medical office</th>
<th>pre-argon office</th>
<th>Milit. office</th>
<th>Garrison office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Division General</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel (Chief of S.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. or Major (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. and Lieuts. (1)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonels or Majors (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. and Lieuts. (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Col. or Major (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. and Lieuts. (3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieut, R.Carabinieri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO nurse</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air port duty R.Carabinieri</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport duty</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counsellor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filing clerks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprentices</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messengers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 8 -
Visits have recently been made to the greater part of the more important aeroplane establishments in Northern Italy. The following miscellaneous general observations were submitted, some in amplification of previous reports, some in reply to inquiries received from the Department. Detailed reports of individual visits are being prepared.

A very thorough and complete inspection was permitted of all factories visited. However, information relative to the number of employees, hours worked and capacity of production was, in general, withheld. This withholding was not variance with practice which was in effect during previous visits to factories. It was confirmed that all establishments had received instructions from the Ministry of Aeronautics that such features of the industry were to be considered as confidential.

It is estimated that the total production of military (and military training) planes is approximately the same as at the time of previous visits to factories, when production figures were freely given, namely 100-150 planes per month. Several of the factories have been, and are being enlarged, however the number of employees is approximately the same. There has been no apparent rapid or great increase in aeronautical production, although it was generally admitted that the present and near future is a critical period as regards the peace of Europe.

The AV/7 (6 engine bomber) remains the most favored heavy bomber, and is in production at three factories visited.

The 8 year old AV/8 (fighter) is still in production and, it was freely admitted, is being manufactured for service in Spain.

The Nacchi 0-2000 (all metal single engine fighter) is in production at Nacchi. Details of the planes were not given, but it was stated that the top speed was "well over 900 km/hr". This plane was reported to have successfully passed all tests and will probably go into production at other factories.

Three experimental 4 engine bombers (F-70) were under construction at Mecchi. The use of wooden construction, one with four air cooled 1200 HP engines in the leading edge of the wing, one with two pairs of water-cooled engines mounted in tandem. The other (in early stage of construction) is to be all metal and equipped with 4 1200 HP Faure air cooled engines (engine still experimental) mounted in the leading edge of the wing.

The Nacchi 0-8 (designated as a 4 engine fighter) with a speed of 840 km/hr in production at the Nacchi plant. 100-150 planes were noted in various stages of production. 0-80 was reported to have been already
[Attache's report]

Delivered to the service, with 30-65 more practically completed.

Aviola has 13 2-65's in the final stage of production. This is a 3 engine dive bomber, equipped with Hispano 7-cylinder 480 HP. engines. It is of interest that this is the first dive bomber to be designed and produced for service in Italy. An on-site inspection of the plane was permitted; performance data, bomb loadings, etc., was not disclosed. The plane is of typical Aviola wooden construction. It was stated that a previous plane of this type had successfully completed all dive and pull-out tests.

[Attached report]

No Italian planes are equipped with guns larger than the 13.7. It was stated on several occasions that the present school of thought is that large guns are impractical, due to mounting difficulties, and are not liked because of danger of fire.

Aviola claims to have developed a much simpler, easier jam-clearing machine gun which is now standard. This gun is being equipped (so stated) in 20 by 65's which have been purchased by Chile. The first of these planes were being created for shipment.

[Attached report]

No existing Italian planes are equipped with armor protection for pilots or vital parts. It was stated that specifications for new planes call for pilot protection, but that no practical, sufficiently light, arrangement had been developed. Specifications call for a protective device which will repel a 7.7 bullet fired at a distance of 80 meters and with a 90° angle of impact.

[Attached report]

No Italian military planes are at present equipped with any wing de-icing devices. It was stated that the general atmospheric conditions prevailing in Italian latitudes, together with wooden and mixed construction, make such devices unnecessary. Specifications for the new four engine all metal bomber call for an efficient de-icing installation, but the type has not as yet been seriously considered.

[Attached report]

All planes are painted in camouflage at the factory. A new scheme of painting has recently been adopted. Army brown and matte dark blue-green is used on the fuselage and top of wings, with the bottom of the fuselage and wings painted a light blue.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From:  
Date: 12 Oct, 19...  Serial No. 515  File No. 1092-900

Subject: ITALY - AVIATION - ORGANIZATION - AIR STRENGTH / STATUS

Reference: H.M. Rome's Serial 138 of 8 April, 19... in their file.

1. A reliable contact reports having been informed by an officer of the air Ministry that the peace-time allocation of air units to Pantelleria is 36 seaplanes and 48 military planes; which is to be increased in war-time to a total of 300 planes.

2. Reference indicated the military air base is to accommodate 140 planes. It would seem that 90 seaplanes are contemplated as a war-time complement for the seaplane base.

OCT 27, 19...

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. (2)(E) and (5)(D) or (B)

By SLR  Date: May 2, 1973
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From     T                Date     25 Oct., 1938          Serial No. 543.               File No. 1004-800
Source of information: ITALY - AVIATION - ORGANIZATION - AIR STRENGTH.
Subject: ITALY - AVIATION - MATERIAL - PRODUCTION.

1. Monograph No. 248, treating of the Material Readiness and Efficiency of the Italian Air Force, is forwarded herewith.

MATERIAL READYNESS AND EFFICIENCY OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

CONFIDENTIAL

MONOGRAPH NO. 248.

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 5(D) or (2)

By SLR
Date: MAY 21 1973
MATERIAL READINESS AND EFFICIENCY OF THE ITALIAN AIR FORCE

I. INTRODUCTORY

The Italian Government maintains a separate Air Force and although certain units are assigned to the army, to the Navy and to Colonial aviation for operation, all such units, personnel and equipment, remain, in effect, under the Ministry of Aeronautics. Under the present organization of the Italian Government, where the Chief of Government is in addition the Minister of War, Minister of Marine and Minister of Air, such an arrangement which entails certain division of authority will probably function smoothly and efficiently. The Chief of the Supreme General Staff (at present Marshal Badoglio) assisted by six senior officers from the three armed Services, acts as councillor and general advisor to the Chief of Government in military matters. By law, in time of peace the Chief of the Supreme General Staff has no direct authority over the armed Services, but is charged with the responsibility of making recommendations to the Chief of Government in matters pertaining to the Coordination of the Defensive Organization of the State, preparation of War Plans, Budgetary matters, the creation of adequate War Reserves, etc. In time of war the Chief of the Supreme General Staff will, by law, function as directed by the Government. It would seem probable that, in time of war, the Chief of the Supreme General Staff would be charged with the collection and analysis of all military matters, would submit recommendations to the Chief of Government and would, in turn, communicate decisions or and directives from the Chief of Government direct to the Undersecretaries at the Heads of the three armed Services, but with the responsibility of execution resting on the Head of the armed Service concerned.

In the following discussion of the Material Readiness and Efficiency of the air Force, emphasis has been placed on present strength and effectiveness of the aerial army, together with the capabilities of the Aeronautical Industry to maintain or to augment this strength, rather than to treat, except lightly, of the administrative organization of the Ministry of Aeronautics and the organization and ground administration of the Air Force.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF AERONAUTICS

The Department is headed by the Minister of Air (at present Mussolini), with an Under Secretary of State (General Valle) as the acting (and actual) head of the Ministry.

The organization of the Ministry presents nothing unusual or radically different from that of other countries having a separate air Force, except possibly for the fact that all civil as well as military aviation is under the jurisdiction of the one Ministry. Twenty departments or divisions are established for the administration of the various functions of the Ministry.

Note: N.A. Serial No. 617 dated 22 November, 1937, lists the latest detailed organization.

Aeronautical subjects of major importance are acted on by three Councils (or Committees) as follows:

[The rest of the document is not visible in the image provided.]

THE AIR COUNCIL (consisting of the Minister, Undersecretary and all Air Marshals, all Generals of the Aerial Army and all Generals of the Air Division) which deals with the more important matters in connection with military and civil aviation.

THE SUPREME AERONAUTICAL COMMITTEE (consisting of four Air Corps Generals, one General of the Aeronautical Construction Corps and a Colonel of the Aeronautical Supply Corps) which deals with aeronautical organization, programs for new ground establishments and certain non-technical design features.

THE DESIGN COMMITTEE (consisting of two Generals of the Air Corps, one General of the Engineering Corps and four senior officers of the Aeronautical Construction Corps) which deals with all technical matters in connection with the design, equipment and armament of aircraft.

III. GENERAL ORGANIZATION OF THE AERIAL ARMY.

For purposes of administration (particularly ground administration) continental Italy has been divided into four Air Zones, with additional Air Zones for outlying possessions.

The Aerial Army is divided into Air Fleets, Air Divisions, Air Brigades, Air Wings, Air Groups and Squadrons. Squadrons of light aircraft consist of 9 planes; heavy bomber squadrons of 6 planes.

Monograph No. 213 dated 1 August, 1938, contains details of the Organization, Duties and Dependency of the Air Fleets, Air Divisions, Air Brigades and Territorial Air Zones. Accordingly in this discussion such duties and dependencies will be treated only in a very general way.

In general the Air Zone Commander is responsible for the ground facilities and organization within the areas comprising his Zone. The more important items being:

a) Organization and functioning of all logistic services to the Aerial Army units.

b) Construction, maintenance and improvement of ground facilities.

c) Mobilization plans and execution.

d) Training, including aeronautical schools.

e) Liaison with authorities of the other Armed Forces.

The Commander of the Aerial Army unit is, in general, responsible for the efficiency and training of the units under his command. This includes:

a) Training and cooperation among all Aerial Army Units.

b) Preparation of war plans for air defense and for best employment of all air forces.

c) Practical and service tests of aircraft and equipment.

IV. DETAILED ORGANIZATION OF THE AERIAL ARMY.

N. A. Serial No. 299 dated 8 June, 1938, contained 15 diagrams showing the estimated organization of the Aerial Army together with the location of units. This organization is believed to still exist, with the exception that on 15 July, 1938, the much talked of Air Fleets were...
first established. In this new organization the 1st and 3rd Air
Divisions (shown on diagrams contained in Serial No. 299) were
formed into the 2nd Air Fleet, and a 1st Air Fleet was organized
consisting of the 2nd and a new 4th Air Divisions.

Inasmuch as the detailed organization of the units of the
Aerial Army, together with their location, is subject to frequent
change, no attempt will be made to reproduce the diagrams forwarded
in the above-mentioned serial and a general organization only will be
given here.

Squadrons are at present assigned in continental Italy and
possessions as listed below:

Aerial Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location and number of squadrons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Note: 9 planes per squadron of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fighter, Attack and Obs. types.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 * * * Heavy Bomber type.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy Sicily Sardinia Dodekaness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Land</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighter Sea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack Land</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb. Land</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb. Sea</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-totals</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units with A.Amy

| Obser. Land    | 22 |
| Obser. Sea     | 9  |
| Mixed          |    |
| Fighter Land   |    |
| GRAND TOTALS   | 143|

Y. TYPES, NUMBERS AND GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF AIRCRAFT

There is tabulated below an estimate of the types, number and
general characteristics of all first line combat planes in the Air Force.
Detailed characteristics are given in the Joint MID-OHII Aviation Statistics
Report dated 1 July, 1936.

Note: The total number of first line combat planes on hand as given below
will not check with the following number of organized Squadrons on the basis
of 9 of the smaller types and 6 of the larger types per squadron. This is
due to the assignment of reserve and training planes to squadrons, plus the
assignment of planes to training schools, plus a large number of planes at
present on independent duty (chiefly in Spain).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year of</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>On order</th>
<th>Max. Speed</th>
<th>Bomb carrying capacity</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GR-32</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>2 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ro-41</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>240</td>
<td></td>
<td>211</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>2 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-50</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>2 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma-200</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
<td>315</td>
<td>212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca-185</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gr-42</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>913</td>
<td>407</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ATTACK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year of</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>On order</th>
<th>Max. Speed</th>
<th>Bomb carrying capacity</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ca-AFL</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>4 - 7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bas65</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>265</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>240</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OBSERVATION (STRATEGIC)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year of</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>On order</th>
<th>Max. Speed</th>
<th>Bomb carrying capacity</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ba-88</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR-25</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 - 7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POLICING**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year of</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>On order</th>
<th>Max. Speed</th>
<th>Bomb carrying capacity</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S-81</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>4 - 7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-79</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Br-20</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cant Z 506</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-32</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca 135</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cant Z 508</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 - 12.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cant Z 1007</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-30</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>872</td>
<td>259</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DIVE BOMBERS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year of</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>On order</th>
<th>Max. Speed</th>
<th>Bomb carrying capacity</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ca 310</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>215</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-65</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SHIP BASED**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year of</th>
<th>On hand</th>
<th>On order</th>
<th>Max. Speed</th>
<th>Bomb carrying capacity</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ro 43</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>2 - 7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DECLASSIFIED**

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 5(D) or (X)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

CONFIDENTIAL
The above gives a grand total of 2701 first line combat aircraft on hand, with a total of 1125 additional planes on contract and not yet delivered.

In addition to the above there is a grand total of 540 planes assigned to the Colonial Forces. These planes are in general of obsolete types and should not at present be included in any estimate of first line strength. Since the acquisition of Ethiopia, Italy's essential lines of air communication have been lengthened greatly. It would appear that a large force of modern planes should be maintained at the far end of her Empire, and that the calibre of planes assigned there will probably be improved.

Italy is unfortunate in that it has but a very limited number of commercial and privately owned aircraft which could be adapted to military uses.

VI. AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRY (NORMAL CAPACITY).

Inasmuch as the capability of the Aeronautical Industry to maintain or to augment fighting strength in the event of war, lies very definitely with the efficiency of an Air Force, a resume of the Italian Aircraft Manufacturing Industry will be listed.

In the following figures on Capacity of Production no attempt has been made to estimate present factory out turn on a common "unit" basis. There is listed types of planes which are known, or believed to be, under production at the present time together with an estimate as to the number of planes by types which are being turned out by the individual factories.

The Italian Aeronautical Industry has during the past year employed approximately the same number of workmen and the total production of planes per month has been maintained at a very nearly constant figure. Accordingly the figures given below are believed to vary closely give what may be considered an average peace time production.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AERIAL FACTORIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Savoia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caproni (Milano)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentiere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

K. O. 1166/2, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (2) OGD letter, May 1, 1972
By GLN date MAY 21 1972

CONFIDENTIAL
The above figures total 190 military planes now being produced per month, employing a total of 37,000 workmen. Commercial plane production is small. Obviously total production figures vary and are directly affected by the types of planes to which priority of production is given. However, a good check is considered to have been had on actual factory production during the past twelve months period and the following is a resume by types which are believed to have been produced.

**TOTAL FACTORY PRODUCTION, OCTOBER 1937 - SEPTEMBER, 1938.**

**Fighters**
- CR 32, Ba 65, C 50, Ba 88, C 200

**Bombers (Heavy)**
- S 79, Br 20, P 32, Ca 135, Z 1007

**Bombers (Light, Dive)**
- Ca 310, S 65

**Observation**
- Ro 37, Ro 45, Z 501

**Flying Boats**
- Z 506

**Miscellaneous, Training**

**TOTAL ........ 2,260**

**AIRCRAFT ENGINES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory</th>
<th>Employees</th>
<th>Main types in production</th>
<th>Estimated monthly production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Piaggio</td>
<td>4200</td>
<td>P XI, Rg 40, VII C 16</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isotta-Fraschini</td>
<td>3900</td>
<td>Asso XI, Rg 40, Alfa 125, P XI Rg 45</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiat</td>
<td>3800</td>
<td>A-80, A-74</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Factory    Employees    Main types in production    Estimated monthly production
---    ---    ---    ---
Alfa Romeo    3000    Alfa 125    95
          Alfa 186
Baggiane    1000    A-74    25
          A-80

Total per month    454
Total per year    5,448

Note: The above figures do not include some small engines produced, but only include those types of engines being installed in standard first line aircraft.

In considering the above production estimates for the past twelve months period, and in line with consideration as to possible future peace time production, cognizance must be taken of the following factors:

1. Italy has lost a large number of planes in Spain and may have maintained production on the scale as indicated in order to offset these losses.

2. Italy has made serious effort to create foreign markets for her aircraft and engines. This has probably been done equally for the purpose of training manufacturing personnel, in order to build up a reserve of skilled and experienced mechanics, as for the purpose of obtaining foreign credits.

Accordingly it is believed that, unless a strong foreign market can be maintained, and when the Italian participation in the Spanish affair is finished, the aviation industry will suffer a considerable let down in activity. Italy is not believed to be financially capable of alone maintaining a 2500 airplane, 5400 engine industry.

### VII. AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRY (CAPACITY FOR WAR EXPANSION?)

It is difficult to make any estimate, which could not be shot full of holes, as to Capacity for War Expansion, due to the following factors:

1. Difficulty in the procurement of raw materials, which would be greatly augmented in the event of a major war. Little reserve stock is believed to be on hand at present. Aluminum is the only one of the more important metals of which Italy has a sufficiency.

2. Doubt as to Italy's ability to find sufficient properly trained employees to fully utilize the factory spaces and facilities which are available. This problem has been ever present, but has been greatly improved in the past few years. As a further remedy, apprentice schools are maintained in all of the more important factories, but it is doubtful if as yet any large reserve of trained workers has been created.

3. Vulnerability of practically all factories to attack, due to location, concentration and type of construction. Approximately 70% of the aeronautical industry, and most of the more important factories, are located in a small section of North Western Italy (the Milan-Turin area). Buildings are in general of construction which would offer little protection against air attacks.
Space and equipment is available in most of the factories for considerable rapid expansion in production; however, considering the factors mentioned above, it is estimated that Italy would be fortunate if she could expand 100% over the present factory production. Accordingly, and assuming that all commercial aircraft production would be suspended, the following is an estimate as to the probable maximum of planes and engines which could be produced if the industry went to maximum war expansion:

Aircraft ............... 5,000 per year.
Engines ................. 12,000 per year.

VIII. AIR FORCE PERSONNEL (FLYING)

Italy is estimated to have at present a total of approximately 10,000 qualified and experienced pilots with military brevet. This total is comprised as follows:

Regulars in Air Force:

Officers .................. 2,258
NCO's .................... 1,666

Temporary or Reserves in Air Force:

Officers .................. 2,000
NCO's .................... 4,000

Of the 6000 Temporary or Reserves in Air Force, 1800 officers and 1800 NCO's are estimated to be on active duty, which gives a total of 4,056 officer pilots and 3,666 NCO pilots (Grand Total: 7,722 pilots) on active duty.

The remainder of the Temporary or Reserve Force is on inactive duty, all officer pilots having completed at least 18 months of active service in the Air Force, all NCO pilots having completed at least 4 years such service. All such pilots in inactive status are required to take a refresher training course yearly.

In addition to the above total of experienced pilots available for duty, 3,547 student pilots were given flight training in the past year. Certain of these have received no more than 25 hours of training, others, who were initially qualified in previous years, have had approximately 100 hours of training and this group would form excellent pilot material in the event of an emergency. Qualification of pilots has received and will continue to be given much emphasis.

There are at present 900 aviation cadets at the Aeronautical Academy. Of these 600 have had from 25 to 50 hours of flight training.

Accordingly, Italy's number of qualified pilots may be summarized as follows:

Pilots on active duty ............... 7,722
Experienced pilots on inactive duty . 3,840
Student pilots trained in last year . 3,547
qualified Aviation cadets ............. 600

Total ............... 14,873
N.A. Rome No. 514-38 of 25 Oct. 1948

XX. AIR FORCE PERSONNEL (NON-FLYING)

The following is an estimate of the non-flying personnel of the Air Force:

On Active Duty:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular officers</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary officers</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular enlisted men</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary enlisted men</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>91,550</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On Inactive Duty - Reserves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Enlisted Men</td>
<td>322,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>322,700</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Reserve Enlisted Men are those who have completed enlistment or compulsory military service in the Air Force.

X. BASE FACILITIES

Italy possesses an excellent network of large, well-equipped landplane bases and adequate seaplane bases to accommodate its small force of seaborne aircraft. The latest Aeronautical Map of Italy was forwarded in N.A. Serial No. 202 of 6 April, 1938, on which was shown known existing landing and basing facilities in Continental Italy, Sicily and Sardinia, as well as additional fields known to be under construction. The base facilities will be discussed here in a general way only.

**Continental Italy.**

Approximately 46 main military land plane bases are established. An additional 34 fields are equipped with all necessary basing facilities. Some 150-175 emergency landing fields have been constructed, several equipped with servicing facilities. Many of these last mentioned fields are unlisted and are maintained in an attempt at secracy. Without doubt, in the event of an emergency, these small uncharted fields would be used for bases. A large fleet of portable machine shops, radio and photographic laboratories, gas trucks, etc., is available for furnishing service at such of these fields as are lacking in base facilities.

There is a total of 28 seaplane bases, of which approximately 19 are equipped with adequate servicing facilities.

Sufficient bases, both landplane and seaplane, are available for the concentration of the greater part of the Aerial Army in any part of Italy desired. Of special significance is the fact that, owing to the comparatively small size of Continental Italy, such a concentration could be accomplished in but a very few hours.

**Sicily.**

4 landplane and 3 seaplane bases are established, with at least 3 additional landing fields believed to be in existence. In addition, the Island of Pantelleria is but a short distance south west of Sicily, and a reportedly large and efficient landplane and seaplane base have
been established there. These bases, together with those in Southern Continental Italy and in Sardinia provide adequate basing facilities for concentration in the south.

Sardinia.

2 landplane and 2 seaplane bases are known to be established. Little information is available as to the extent of facilities in Sardinia. Permission to visit the island has been refused. It is a matter of common knowledge that Sardinia has been used as a base for air operations in Spain. Without doubt extensive basing, servicing and repair facilities have been constructed of which this office has no information.

Libya.

Monograph No. 196 dated 18 January 1938, contains a description of aircraft basing facilities in Libya, and therefore such will be discussed here only generally.

2 new, large, modern and well equipped main bases have been established, with approximately 18 additional smaller fields available for use.

2 excellent, one fair and a limited number of useable harbors are available as seaplane bases.

Dodekanese.

1 landplane and 1 seaplane base is known to have been established, and additional facilities are believed to exist.

In connection with the subject of Italian Base Facilities, the lack of any bases in the Western Mediterranean is of strategic significance. Certainly Italy would welcome the opportunity of acquiring a foothold in the Sardinia Islands or in other parts of the Western Mediterranean.

XI. STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS FACTORS OF THE AIR FORCE.

There are certain strength and certain weakness factors of the Italian Air Force which have been summarized as follows:

**Strength**

1. Italy's geographical position puts in nicely for air offense against any enemy fleet in the Mediterranean, and to a certain extent offsets her lack of aircraft carriers.

2. An excellent network of landplane and seaplane bases is available, many undisclosed fields are known to have been constructed.

3. A large fleet of fast, long-range heavy bombers, capable of carrying a total bomb load of approximately 3,000 tons, has been provided.

**Weakness**

1. Her lack of aircraft carriers seriously restricts the possible range of air operations, particularly in support of a naval campaign.

2. The proximity of numerous main military bases to the frontiers of possible enemies make such bases vulnerable to attack.

3. Fighter types of planes are of very short endurance. Range has been sacrificed for speed. As a result, long range bombing attacks would lack fighter protection and ship-based gunnery observation planes would lack necessary fighter support.
4. A large reserve of experienced pilots has been created, many with actual war experience. The esprit de corps, morale and enthusiasm of the Italian aviator is excellent.

5. An excellent pilot training system is in existence and will create a fertile source from which war pilots can be drawn.

6. Due to the compulsory military service a tremendous reserve of non-flying enlisted personnel has been created.

7. The Aeronautical Industry is well organized and produces efficient aircraft, engines and armament.

8. Sales of aeronautical products to foreign countries have enabled Italy to build up and keep in operation an extensive aeronautical industry, thus assuring a ready and trained asset in case of war.

9. The Ethiopian campaign and more especially Italian operations in Spain have afforded a rare and excellent opportunity to give practical war experience to a large number of pilots as well as to permit war tests of aircraft and armament.

10. The organization of the Aerial Army is considered to be excellent and should provide for a mobile, fast-striking air strength in the event of air support for a land campaign.

4. Due to shortage and cost of gasoline, most pilots are not permitted to fly frequently enough or long enough to develop natural ability. Junior pilots are too dependent upon flight leaders.

5. The scarcity and cost of gasoline seriously restricts the amount of instruction which should be given student pilots.

6. The lack of permanency of personnel without doubt reflects on the efficiency of the enlisted force on active duty.

7. The vulnerability to attack of factories, difficulty in procurement of raw materials and shortage of skilled aircraft mechanics, would make it most difficult for the aeronautical industry to operate long at potential wartime capacity.

8. Italy's financial condition is such that it is believed that, unless a strong foreign market can be maintained, the aeronautical industry will be forced to slow down in production.

9. Losses of planes in the Ethiopian campaign and especially in operations in Spain, has retarded contemplated expansion of the Air Force.

10. The lack of aircraft carriers, and insufficiency of aircraft tenders would result in inadequate air support for any long range naval campaign.

11. It is believed that too little emphasis has been placed on practical training in air coordination with the Navy and that in a naval campaign, even in the Mediterranean, air support and coordination would be well below that experienced in the U.S. Navy.

12. Accuracy of bombing is believed to be far behind the standards existing in the United States Naval Aviation.

13. Italy has apparently only recently recognized the possibilities of dive bombing, and is far behind other countries in this feature of aerial warfare. Such dive bombing planes as exist are of mixed construction with wood wings and are of doubtful strength.
14. Due to the lack and difficulty in procurement of essential metals, Italy has been forced to continue, to a large extent, wooden and mixed construction of aircraft.

15. Italy is unfortunate in that there are but very few commercial and privately owned aircraft available for war use.

XII. CONCLUSION.

In spite of certain existing weakness factors, the Italian Air Force is considered to be highly efficient and of sufficient size and effectiveness that it would play a most important part in any European War in which Italy might become involved.
1. Monograph 164 dated 15 August, 1937, forwarded with N.A. Serial No. 419 of the same date, gave the organization of territorial air zones in the Kingdom of Italy.

2. This organization has been modified by Royal Decree of 14 October 1938, No. 1709, translation of which is forwarded herewith (Monograph No. 243). Not received in Archives
ORGANIZATION OF TERRITORIAL AIR ZONES IN ITALY

ART. 1.

The territory of the Kingdom is subdivided into the following Territorial Air Zones and Aeronautic Commands:

I TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Milan - includes the territory of the provinces of Turin, Novara, Aosta, Vercelli, Alessandria, Asti, Cuneo, Genoa, Savona, Imperia, Milan, Varose, Como, Sondrio, Pavia, Bergamo, Cremona, Piacenza and Parma;

II TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Padova - includes the territory of the provinces of Verona, Mantova, Vicenza, Brescia, Treviso, Bolzano, Padova, Belluno, Treviso, Venetia, Udine, Gorizia, Trieste, Frua, Pieve, Bologna, Modena, Reggio Emilia, Ravenna, Ferrara, Novigo, Forli', Ancona, Macerata, Pesaro Urbino, Zara;

III TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Rome - includes the territory of the provinces of Florence, Pistoia, Arezzo, Siena, Leghorn, La Spezia, Massa Carrara, Lucca, Pisa, Grosseto, Rome, Frosinone, Littoria, Viterbo, Perugia, Terni and Rieti;

IV TERRITORIAL AIR ZONE - Command at Bari - includes the territory of the provinces of Bari, Lecce, Foggia, Brindisi, Taranto, Matera, Potenza, Chieti, Aquila degli Abruzzi, Campobasso, Taranto, Ascoli Piceno, Foggia, Naples, Benevento, Salerno, Avellino, Catanzaro, Cosenza and Reggio Calabria.

Aeronautic Command of Sicily - Command at Palermo - includes the territory of the provinces of Palermo, Agrigento, Trapani, Caltanissetta, Enna, Messina, Catania, Siracusa and Ragusa;

Aeronautic Command of Sardinia - Command at Cagliari - includes the territory of the provinces of Cagliari, Sassari and Nuoro;

Aeronautic Command of the Aegean - Command at Rhodes - includes the territory of all the islands of the Dodecanese.

ART. II.

To each Territorial Air Zone Command is assigned a General of Air Fleet or of Air Division.

To the Aeronautic Commands of Sicily and Sardinia are assigned respectively a General of Air Division.

To the Aeronautic Command of the Aegean is assigned a General of Air Brigade.

With regard to the troops, schools and aeronautical services within their respective territories, the Territorial Air Zone and Aeronautic Commands have the functions established by the aeronautical regulations in force. The dispositions of this article will come into force as on 1 July, 1936.

ART. III.

Four "Directions of Aeronautical Construction" are established at Turin, Milan, Bologna and Rome respectively.
The territorial jurisdiction of the above directions is as follows:

1) Direction of Aeronautical Construction, Turin - includes the territory of the provinces of Genoa, Imperia, Savona, La Spezia, Turin, Alessandria, Novara, Acqui, Cuneo, Vercelli, Asti;

2) Direction of Aeronautical Construction, Milan - includes the territory of the provinces of Bergamo, Brescia, Como, Cremona, Mantova, Milan, Pavie, Sondrio, Varese and Piacenza;


Previous laws in conflict with this Decree are hereby abrogated.
### ATTACHE'S REPORT

**From:** T  
**Date:** 31 Dec., 1938  
**Serial No.:** 599  
**Filed No.:** 1005  

- **Source of Information:** Press  
- **Subject:** ITALY  
  - AVIATION  
  - AIR STRENGTH  
- **Reference:** (Omitted reported on)  
  - (Index title as per index sheet) (Revised)

---

**Statement:** (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

**Bombing Range of Italian Aircraft.**

JAN 3, 1939

1. As a result of the recent establishment by an Italian S-79 heavy bomber of five international load-speed records, the Italian newspapers have published a map showing "objectives which can be reached in a little more than two hours by our bombing planes with two thousand kilograms of bombs."

2. A copy of the published map is attached hereto.

---

**Map:**

- **Area Covered:** [Map showing bombing range of Italian aircraft, labeled areas and cities like Rome, Libya, Berlin, etc.]
- **Legend:** [Legend of cities and distances, labeled with distances in kilometers.]

---

**Notes:**

- Use forms for all reports.  
- Use only forms as supplied by O. N. I. Make all sketches, etc. uniform in style with this form when practicable.  
- Submit entire copies of clippings, carbon of sketches, etc., when practicable. If practicable, submit all but sketches in outline styles for blueprinting or photostatting.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From:     Date: 12 Dec., 1939
Source of Information: OFFICIAL

ITALY - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS - LONDON TREATY PACE. (Continuation appended as Enclosure)

Subject: ITALY - NAVY - SHIPS ALL TYPES

Reference: JAN. 3 1939

ITALY TREATY, 1936 - EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

Means: (A) 2 Folders Marked SU - 1 (Ships of 1936 Program not yet laid down)
(B) 2 Folders Marked SU - 2 (Ships Entering Service after 29 July, 1937)
(C) 2 Folders Marked SU - 3 (Ships Delivered to Foreign Powers after 29 July, 1937)
(D) 2 Folders Marked SU - 4 (Ships Under Construction)
(E) 2 Folders Marked SU - 5 (Ships Under Construction For Foreign Powers)
(F) 2 Folders Marked SU - 6 (Small Warships and auxiliaries)

1. On 12 December, 1938, the Italian Foreign office delivered to the Chargé d'Affaires at Athens, American Embassy, Rome, the Naval Information applicable to Italy, as called for by subject Treaty.

2. Two translated copies of this information have been made by this office and are forwarded herewith.

3. The Department's attention is invited to the following facts noted in this report:

   (1) The Destroyer GENIERE, mentioned as "under construction" has joined the fleet since the printing of this information. Submarine ATREPO has also joined up.

   (2) New Information not previously reported:

   (a) New Submarines of 1936 Program already laid down:

   Q. MARINORI .... Sept. 1936 / R. GIBBONI .... Nov. 1936
   L. AM. VENEDONI .... Sept. 1936 / MARE DI ROMA .... Apr. 1936
   G. MARE DI ROMA .... Nov. 1936 / MARE DI ROMA .... Apr. 1936

   (b) Remaining submarines of 1936 program not yet laid down, totaling only 10. (All names not previously known or reported)

   SAINT BON
   CASTEL
   MILLE
   CARACAS
   M. BIANCHI
   N. TOSSELLI
   M. JACOB
   BELLINI
   R. TALENTI
   A. MAGNANI

   New Battleships now under construction will carry 5 planes instead of 6 as previously reported.

   (Continuation appended as Enclosure)

   E. O. 11512, Sec. 50A and 50D or 50
   OBD letter, May 4, 1939

   By SLR Date: MAY 21, 1973
ATTACHE'S REPORT

From: T  
Date: 1 Jan 1954  
Serial No: 6  
File No: 1004-802


Subject: ITALIA AVIATION MATERIAL PRODUCTION


Note: The series, including, and distribution of reports by G.H.I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is included in this space. Matters lacking paraphraphes, personal or political nature, and the part of the reports.

CONFIDENTIAL

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND ATTENTION - ITALY

1. The following is an estimate by types of aircraft production in Italy during the month of December, 1953:

Fighters
Ba 65, Ca 42, Ba 65, C 800, C 80 

Bombers (Heavy)
S 79, BR 20, Ca 139, S 1007 

Bombers (Light, Dive)
Ca 100, S 85 

Observation
S 601, Re 45 

Flying Boats
S 506 

Miscellaneous 

Total 135

2. The above production is estimated to have been absorbed as follows:

Sales to Foreign Governments 

Increase or replacements in Spain 

Replacements for obsolete types and increase in

Air Force 

Normal attrition (Gomas, etc.) 

Total

3. The figures on production are based largely on work noted in press during visits in September, 1953, to the more important of the aircraft factories.

4. Due to strict press censorship exercised by the Italian Government over military matters, and due further to the fact that the Ministry of Defense does not give out information relative to the award of contracts, sales to foreign governments, number of planes and losses in Spain, normal attrition of aircraft or organization and composition of the Italian air force, the above figures on absorption of production are estimates based on observation, contracts, foreign press articles and other sources considered to be fairly reliable.

By SLR
Date: MAY 21 1973
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT  A-1-5/3429

From: T  Date: 31 Jan 1959  Serial No. 52  File No. 1034-330

Source of information: ESTIMATE - OBSERVATIONS

Subject: ITALY AVIATION MATERIAL PRODUCTION


AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND ATTITUd - ITALY.

CONFIDENTIAL

1. The following is an estimate by types of aircraft production in Italy during the month of January, 1959:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bv 88, CR 42, Bv 55, MC 200, C-60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers (Heavy)</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S 79, Br 30, Ca 125, E-1007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers (Light, Dive)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ca 310, 8 85</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z 501, Rn 43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flying boats</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z 506</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The above production is estimated to have been absorbed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sales to Foreign Governments</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase or replacements in Spain</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacements for obsolete types and increase in Air Force</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal attrition (crashes etc.)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. The figures on production are based largely on work noted in progress during visits in September, 1958, to the more important of the aircraft factories.

4. Due to strict press censorship exercised by the Italian Government over military matters, and due further to the fact that the Ministry of Aeronautics does not give out information relative to the award of contracts, sales to foreign governments, number of planes and losses in Spain, normal attrition of aircraft or organization and composition of the Italian Air Corps, the above figures on absorption of production are estimates based on observation, contacts, foreign press articles and other sources considered to be fairly reliable.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From       Date     23 Feb., 1939    Serial No. 69    File No. 1004-300
Subject     ITALY AVIATION MATERIAL PRODUCTION

1. The following is an estimate by types of aircraft production in Italy during the month of February, 1939:

Fighters
OM 42, Ba 65, Ba 66, MD 300, 0-50

Bombard (Heavy)
Er 20, 279, Cr 135

Bombard (Light Dive)
Ca 310, 3-38

Observations:
Ca 65, MD 43s

Boats
Cant 2 506

Miscellaneous (Training)

2. The above production is estimated to have been absorbed as follows:

Sales to Foreign Governments
Increase or replacements in Spain
Replacements for obsolete types
and increase in Air Force.
Normal attrition (Crashes, etc)

3. The figures on production are based largely on work noted in progress during visits to factories in September, 1938, and monthly estimates have probably progressively become less accurate. However, the adjutant Military Attaché for air contemplates visits to the same factories in the near future and it is expected that a better check-up on present production will be had.

4. Due to strict press censorship exercised by the Italian Government over military matters, and due further to the fact that the Ministry of Aeronautics does not give out information relative to the award of contracts, sales to foreign governments, number of planes and losses in Spain, normal attrition of aircraft or organization and composition of the Italian Air Corps, the above figures on absorption of production are estimates based on observation, contacts, foreign press articles and other sources considered to be fairly reliable.

CONFIDENTIAL

Original +61
ATTACHE'S REPORT

From: [Blank]
Date: 7 March 1939
Serial No.: 76
File No.: [Blank]

Source of information: FPPB

Subject: MILITARY CIVIL AND TOOLS INDUSTRIES (studies reported on)

PRODUCTION (Index title as per index subject)

Reference:

Note: The revision, editing, and distribution of reports by O. H. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is inserted in this space. (Follow heading principles, present, or printed name, and the date of the report.)

CONTRIBUTION OF NEW AIRPLANE AND ENGINES FACTORY NEAR NAPLES.

1. It is announced that at the request of General Valle, Minister for Air, the companies controlled by the I.R.I. - Alfa Romeo and Cantieri Riuniti dell'Adriatica - have investigated the possibility of augmenting the aeronautical industry in Southern Italy by the construction of a large new establishment for experimental work and the construction of planes and engines. The establishment will have its own air field, including which it will cover an area of 300 hectares, and will employ a large number of workmen. The Duce has approved the project and has decided that the establishment is to be built between Bagniglione d'Arro and Acerra where there are good railroad communications with Naples, Caserta, Castellammare di Stabia and Torre Annunziata.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT A-1-2/17803-B

From: [Redacted] Date: 29 March, 1942
Serial No.: 117
File No.: 160-160/296

Source of Information: UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: UNCLASSIFIED

Reference: (Redacted)

1. Aviation Day was celebrated in Rome on March 20th. The official festivities consisted of the usual award of medals by the Duce, followed by a parade and the crowning of the air cadet, 1939 aviation "Legionnaires" returned from Spain, 5000 officers and men of the air force and some 8000 boys in the "precarcerarii".

2. The only item considered to be of special note was the large number of aviation legionnaires who returned from Spain. Although some of these had been invalided home during the past months it was learned that most of these 8000 had recently arrived from Spain. A very large number were wings.

3. It has been commonly known that many pilots of the Italian Air Force (both Regulars and Reserves) have been active in Spain in aircraft of the Italian Air Force. However, a large number of additional Italian pilots have been trained both in Italy and in Spain and have constituted an important Italian volunteer force. Many of these new pilots have been trained in the air force. It is reported that the outstanding pilots of this category will be enrolled in the air force. It is said that individual pilots have been instructed to write up a record of their achievements in Spain, and that selections will be largely based on these records. If such procedure is followed the Italian claim of 905 red planes shot down will probably be augmented to some 9000.

4. An unscheduled incident occurred during the parade which is reported as of possible interest. During the march-past of the "Precarcerarii" band, one of the drummers (a youth of 16 or 17 years of age) broke ranks and approached the reviewing stand and attempted to hand a letter to Il Duce. Il Duce allegedly waved him away. At this instance Sturaro (Secretary of the Fascist Party) ran down the reviewing stand, grabbed the misguided youth and forcibly escorted him to the rear of the reviewing stand. Here he was quickly seized by two black-shirted men and Sturaro, purple with rage, began questioning. The questioning was terminated by Sturaro slapping the held youth's face, after which he was escorted away.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. (S) and 5(D) or (S)
OSD letter, May 4, 1972

By: SLR

Date: [Redacted]
**ATTACHÉ'S REPORT A-1-q/13178-F**

From: T  Date: 30 March, 1939  File No. 1008-600

**Source of information**: CONTACT

**Subject**: ITALY - AVIATION ORGANIZATION AIR STRENGTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>ON MAINLAND</th>
<th>BALBOA</th>
<th>MOROCCO</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Numbers</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance (Land)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance (Sea)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. The following figures on Nationalist aircraft in Spain as of 1 February, 1939, have been received from a source considered to be reliable:

2. A large number of the above (estimated at more than 200) were stated to be Italian Air Force planes piloted by officers and NCO's of the Italian Air Force.

3. At the same time it was estimated by the same source that the Republican Air Force consisted of a total of 145 planes.

Signed: C.S. M. 17 1939

E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(B) and 6(C) of CFR

OSD letter, May 4, 1972
By: SLR  Date: MAY 21, 1973

---

*Source: The original document is a sensitive military report and contains classified information.*
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From: T  
Date: 31 March, 1949  
Serial No.: 114  
File No.: 1004-800

Subject: AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND ATTACHMENT - ITALY

1. The following is an estimate by types of aircraft production in Italy during the month of March, 1949:

- Fighters:
  - 48, 24, 60, 98, 300, 0-60

- Bombers (Heavy):
  - 20, 98, 218

- Bombers (Light, Dive):
  - 210, 2-60

- Observation:
  - 210, 45

- Recon:
  - 304

- Miscellaneous:

2. The above production is estimated to have been absorbed as follows:

- Sales to Foreign Governments: 25
- Replacement or replacements in Spain: 20
- Replacement for obsolete types: 78
- Increase in Air Force: 50
- Normal attrition: 100

3. The number of aircraft produced during the month is appreciably less than recent average production due to two factors:

   (a) Reported structural failures in the Frentrp 98, which has allowed down turn-out at the Frentrp factory.

   (b) A general, widespread reduction in activities of the aeronautical industry, amounting to approximately 30 percent.

4. The assistant military attaché for air, who recently inspected the more important aeronautical establishments, reported a general decrease in working hours, number of employees and factory activity. Similar information has been received from other sources.
6. Such a general let-down in the aviation industry is, without doubt, most distasteful to the Italian Government, particularly at the present time. However, as previously reported, it was inevitable that, upon the completion of mass Italian participation in the Spanish affair, certain reductions in the activity of the aeronautical industry would be most probable. The Italian Government is not believed to be financially capable of alone maintaining an air industry on as grand a scale as has been built up, although great effort (and expense) has been spent in an attempt to work up a large foreign market for aeronautical products it is believed that comparatively little progress has been made. Foreign sales for urgently needed ready cash are believed to be below expectations. German, and recent American competition has been a very disturbing factor.

7. The above figures on production are believed to be quite accurate. However, due to strict press censorship exercised by the Italian Government over military matters, and due further to the fact that the Ministry of Aeronautics does not give out information relative to the award of contracts, sales to foreign governments, number of planes and license in Spain, normal attrition of aircraft or organization and composition of the Italian Air Corps, the above figures on absorption of production are estimates based on observation, contacts, foreign press articles and other sources considered to be fairly reliable.
1. The following is a translation of an article appearing in "La Vie dell'Aria" of 30 March 1939:

"March 1939 - a bad month, like September 1938. The democratic countries rave wildly against the inevitable progress of history and seek in union the strength that is to support their egotism.

"Today there is talk of a United Democratic-Bolshevik Front, and calculations are being made of the military power of France, England and Russia as against that of the Axis.

"These calculations are at times optimistic and at times pessimistic according to the political wind and public opinion.

"In the aeronautical field especially, the comparisons made are often tendentious. Amongst others worth examining - both because of the notoriety of its author and because his information is taken from the documents of French and foreign experts - is a recent publication of the ex-French Air Minister, Pierre Cot, in which he discusses the efficiency of the opposed air forces - if war had broken out in September 1938.

"With the premise that it often happens that 'absurd conclusions are drawn from accurate figures' and that in comparing two air forces one must take the total number of available planes or the total number of war planes, or the number of planes actually listed as first line, Pierre Cot published the following estimate - referring to September 1938:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line Planes:</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Great Britain</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1600</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"These figures were further explained as follows:

"1) In regard to France, Henri Bouche estimated a slightly larger number: 1500 - 1600 first line planes plus 500 in first line reserve;

"2) Of the 5000 German planes, only 4500 are first line;

"3) The figure of 1500 Italian planes does not include 500 stationed in Italian East Africa and in Spain;

"4) The Russian Air Force would have to maintain a large force in the Far East and another on the Polish Front and would therefore not be able to supply more than the 8000 planes mentioned.

"So that in comparing the first line air fleet of the 'France and Allies' bloc (I) and that of the Italy-Germany bloc, the former would
have a superiority of 10% (Gis)."

"On this basis, conclusions of the same kind may be drawn in regard to March and April 1939.

"Apart from the fact that today Pierre Cot's estimate would be modified as follows:

"First line planes: France 1400
Great Britain 1600
Russia 8000
Total: 5000

German and the Czech forces 4200
Italy 1500
Total: 5700

so that even if a 10% superiority did exist, it now becomes a 10% inferiority - it is a fact that the 1939 situation may be estimated very differently from the optimistic calculations of Cot.

"The situation as reported by the undoubtedly well-informed French Minister must be modified in respect to both the time which has passed and the evaluation of the line and reserve forces of the Axis and especially of Italy; his estimate fails to take account either of the efficiency of the war planes or of the industrial productive capacity, which is another important point of comparison.

"Without calling upon the testimony of any national or foreign experts, the aeronautical situation of the United Front as against the Totalitarian Front - based upon realistic data - may be stated as follows:

"United Democratic-Bolshevik Front:

| Line planes | 5500 |
| Line Reserve planes | 8000 |
| Planes available (Line and reserve) | 8000 |
| Present daily output of military planes | 15 |

"Totalitarian Axis:

| Line planes | 7000 |
| Line Reserve planes | 3000 |
| Planes available (Line and reserve) | 15000 |
| Present daily output of military planes | 30 |

"References:

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(b) and 6(b) or (c)
OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By SLR

Date: May 21, 1973"
"The aeronautical superiority of the Axis over the Democratic-Bolshevik Front, as it appears from these figures, will be fully demonstrated if need arises."

Comment: This office has frequently submitted figures on the reported Air Forces of various European countries, with the idea that such figures might furnish a check on information received from other sources. Such reports as have been submitted on countries other than Italy have been based largely on reliable contacts and on newspaper and magazine publications.

The above quoted article is the first which has come to attention in which an Italian periodical has made reference to any local (Italian) estimate of the Air Forces of the Totalitarian Front.

What reliance, if any, can be placed on the quoted figures is not known. It must be remembered that the Italian press is one hundred percent government controlled and would not publish any data unless authorized to do so. The press-declared strength of the German-Italian Air Forces compares very closely with the combined strength as reported by this office. All of which might lead to the conclusion that estimates as submitted by this office have probably been high.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

1. From a strictly military point of view Aviation played but a small part in the occupation of Albania. This can be readily accounted for inasmuch as but little opposition to the occupation could be expected, with no air or anti-aircraft opposition whatsoever. A formidable air fleet was concentrated, however, and used as a means of intimidation of the populace, for political effect, for transportation of troops and in furtherance of the always present effort of the Italians to do the spectacular.

2. On Thursday, 6 April, and during the night of 6-7 April a force of some 564 airplanes was concentrated in south-eastern Italy. Several of these units were withdrawn from Central and Northern Italy, stopping at Rome for servicing. This force was designated as "Squadra A" under the command of General Priolo and was constituted as follows:

1 Transport Division consisting of 6 wings (16 squadrons, approximately 186 planes) based at Grottaglie (near Taranto).

1 Bombardment Division consisting of 3 wings (12 squadrons, approxi-
mately 96 planes) based at Foggia.

1 Mixed Division consisting of:
    1 wing (4 squadrons, app. 52 planes) of seaplane bombers;
    1 wing (4 squadrons, app. 52 planes) of landplane bombers;
    1 wing (4-6 squadrons, app. 46 planes) of fighters;
all based on Brindisi.

Several sections (approximately 60 planes) of seaplane and landplane reconnaissance and cooperation planes.

5. On Thursday, 6 April, a flight of 32 bombers flew over the town of Tiranë. This flight was timed to arrive over the town while the Albanian government was considering the Italian demands.

4. On Friday, 7 April, during the landing operations, several flights of aircraft flew over the more important towns of Albania and dropped thousands of pamphlets, announcing the peaceful intentions of the Italian government and asking the Albanians to offer no opposition to the Italian occupation. It is understood that the participating Air forces were instructed to do no bombing and to refrain from all military measures unless anti-aircraft opposition was encountered, or unless unexpectedly strong opposition was offered the troop landing operations.

5. At daylight on Saturday, 8 April, three squadrons of fighters landed at the airport at Durazzo. At about 9.30 a.m. (8 April) the Under Secretary for Air, General Valle, landed at Tiranë. At about 10.30 a.m. the Transport Division from Grottaglie commenced landing Fremati troops at Tiranë.
11.00 a.m. the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, landed at Tirana. It should be noted that no aircraft made landing in Albania until ground opposition to the occupation had been dispersed and the naval-army forces had gained complete control of the coastal and near-coastal land areas. During the days of 8 and 9 April, additional planes were landed at various airports in the country.

From the above it can be seen that air participation was of small consequence and of little military importance. The Italian newspapers have played up the mass transportation of large numbers of troops by air from Italy to Albania. Actually the 1st Regiment of Granatieri was so transported—a reported total of 150 tons of personnel and material. This transportation was not accomplished in a single mass flight, although 126 planes of the bomber and transport types were available at Grottaglie. Such troops were landed at Tirana during a five hour period, from 10.30 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. on 8 April. No landing of troops by air took place until after Tirana was completely controlled by Italian ground forces. Accordingly this phase of air participation contributed nothing from a military strategic or tactical point of view and merely demonstrated the well-acknowledged fact that personnel can be safely transported by air from one friendly place to another friendly (or controlled) place if no air opposition is encountered. Aside from the probable intention of making the occupation as spectacular as possible, it is rumored locally that these troops were flown over in order to provide a nice-looking guard of honor at the airport upon the arrival of Ciano.
1. The following information concerning the occupation of Albania is based on reports received from two observers in Albania and from other sources considered reliable:

2. It had been rumored for several weeks prior to the occupation that Italy was interested in Albania. The exact meaning of this "interest" could not be ascertained and was not taken too seriously as Italy's general interest and influence in Albania since the World War was well known.

3. The reason for the invasion as put forward by the Italian Government "King Zog's desire to obtain a slice of Yugoslavia with the aid of Italian troops and the resultant anti-Italian acts by the King upon being refused assistance by Italy" is not generally believed. The real purpose is thought to be to take steps designed to strengthen her strategic position in the Adriatic resulting in pressure on both Yugoslavia and Greece.

4. It is considered as a move to block any further efforts to draw the Balkan states into an anti-Dictator accord. Many persons believe that every move of Masseolini is dictated or suggested by Hitler.

5. It seems that for the past six or seven weeks Italy has been leaking for an excuse to establish herself in Albania. It is reported that an Italian in Albania attempted six weeks ago to bribe an Albanian Chieftain to start a revolution. The Chieftain kept the money and reported the fact to the King. He hoped for rebel time missed and the Italian was arrested, being too late after a demand by Italy.

6. A few days prior to the occupation Italy made heavy demands on King Zog which were immediately rejected. These demands, contrary to those published in Italian papers, if accepted, would have given Italy complete domination over Albania and would have been a total loss of her independence (control of finances, army, police, training of youth, occupying air fields, practically controlling all concessions).

7. Between four and five on the afternoon of April 5th, 16 ships (merchant ships) probably landed with troops, were at sea heading supposedly for Albania when orders were received to return to Italy. It was believed that Zog had accepted the demand. Upon learning that the demands had not been accepted, the Expeditionary Force proceeded on the afternoon of the sixth. The force departed from the port of Venice and consisted of about forty ships (cruisers, destroyers, destroyers, supply ships, transports and hospital ship). This force was formed from the First Squadron stationed at Taranto and was augmented by the following ships of the Command School (CML: ENDEAVOUR, D. M. HOOD, TE AUCKLAND, TE ASHLEY, TE Aitchison, TE LIL Optimization, TE LINDA, TE LINDA, and TE LINDA) and 4 or 5 transports. The Expeditionary Force was under the command of General Alfredo Giansi and consisted of four
14. The only evidence of air bombardment were four or five small bomb holes in one of the mountain passes about 7 miles from Durazzo probably caused by bombing the small band of Albanians as they fled to the hills. The use of the 866 planes of the air force is covered in N. Rome’s Serial No. 130 of 15 April, 1949.

15. The general consensus of opinion is that the Albanians are resigned to their fate. They feel greatly let down by the flight of the King. Had he remained, they undoubtedly would have put up a stiffer resistance.

16. The publicized greeting of the Italians by the Albanian populace is an exaggeration. All pre-Italian demonstrations were undoubtedly staged by the Italians.
ATTACHE'S REPORT

From    T  Date  30 april, 1943  Serial No. 130
Source of information  CONSULAR REPORT
Subject  ITALY. CITIES & TOWNS. GOVERNMENT RANKS AND TAKES

Reference

Note. — The rerer, including, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention is also made in the usual manner of the names and dates of the report.

MILITARY PREPARATIONS AND PERSECUTIONS IN SICILY

1. The following extracts from Consular Reports regarding Italian military preparations and persecutions in Sicily are quoted as of possible interest:

   "There have been active military preparations in Sicily during the past few days. Submarines or torpedo nets have been placed at the entrance to the inner harbor (port) of Salerno."

   "The Italian authorities have begun moving the civilian population out of the danger zone of the Augusta (Sicily) naval base; also they are making arrangements to move the civilian population away from the Catania air base; further they are directing all hospitals at both places to make arrangements to care for the greatest number of patients."

---

RECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(b) and 5(d) or (f)
OSD letter, May 5, 1972
By SLR

Data  MAY 21 1973
"It is often insinuated abroad that all Italian domestic products, without exception, are inferior in quality to those formerly imported from other countries. This gives a false impression of our technical and industrial efficiency. In this regard, the 'Agenzia Economia Finanziaria' announces that all the high octane gasoline required for the Italian Air Force, a large amount of which was formerly imported, is now produced in Italy by the Azienda Nazionale Idrogenazioni Combustibili. Our Air Force is thus rendered independent of foreign supplies. This gasoline has been examined by Ministry technicians, and has been found superior in quality and performance to any foreign fuel previously imported for use of the Air Force."
1. The following is an estimate by types of aircraft production in Italy during the month of April, 1939:

- **Fighters**
  - CR 42, Ba 65, Ba 88, MD 200, O 50
  - 66

- **Bombers (Heavy)**
  - S 79, Ca 135, Br 80
  - 37

- **Bombers (Light, Dive)**
  - S 85, Ca 510
  - 27

- **Observation:**
  - He 55, Cant 501
  - 18

- **Boats:**
  - Cant E 506, Cant E 509
  - 11

- **Miscellaneous**
  - 15

- **Total:** 174

2. The above production is estimated to have been absorbed as follows:

- Sales to Foreign Governments
  - 30

- Replacements for Obsolete Types
  - 114

- Increase in Air Force
  - 50

- Total
  - 174

3. The figures on production are based largely on work noted in progress during factory visits and on information received from other reliable sources.

4. Due to strict press censorship exercised by the Italian Government over military matters, and due further to the fact that the Ministry of Aeronautics does not give out information relative to the award of contracts, sales to foreign governments, number of planes and losses in Spain, normal attrition of aircraft or organization and composition of the Italian Air Corps, the above figures on absorption of production are estimates based on observation, contacts, foreign press articles and other sources considered to be fairly reliable.

5. Due to the detachment of the assistant naval attache for air, and pending the reporting of his relief, this monthly report will be temporarily discontinued, unless special circumstances make it practical to continue its preparation.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

C-10-K/22407-A

From T Date 8 May 1939 Serial No. 168

Source of information Contact

ITALY INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BRITAIN-ITALY AGREEMENT

Subject ENGLAND-ITALY - NAVY- POLICY - STRATEGIC POLICY

Reference (a) H.M. Rome's Serial No. 158 of 17 April 1939.

CONVERSATION WITH BRITISH NAVAL ATTACHÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

1. In reference (a) was reported (1) the notification of the Italian Government to the effect that the Nyon agreement was no longer considered to be in effect, (2) the subsequent request of the Italian Government to shorten the month's notice of abrogation required by the agreement and (3) that no reply to this request had been received at that time.

2. The British Naval attaché states that when the reply was received it merely said that the Nyon agreement was based on the Spanish situation and, since that had been cleared up, the British Government had no more interest in the agreement. Briefly, the Nyon agreement designated certain areas in the Mediterranean near such bases as Spezia, Malta, etc., as operating areas for submarines. Outside of these areas submarines were required to remain on the surface and to be escorted by a surface vessel. Failure to comply subjected the submarine to sinking on sight.

3. In discussing the Mediterranean situation the British Naval attaché stated that about a year ago the British and French had agreed to divide the Mediterranean in case of trouble: the British controlling the eastern end and the French the western end. He said that at the present time the British Mediterranean Fleet is not very strong but that it includes three squadrons of destroyers fitted with the latest apparatus and equipped with depth charges, which could make it hot for submarines in that area. He considered the large number of submarines in the Italian Navy the greatest menace in the Mediterranean.

4. He said that Ethiopia would be entirely cut off from supplies of any sort and would be taken with the greatest ease. Rhodes and Crete are also more or less isolated but the latter is very strongly fortified and would have to be reduced from the air before being taken from the surface. With these islands disposed of, the British Fleet assisted by the existing air forces in Egypt, Palestine and Syria, augmented from Iraq, would have complete control of the eastern Mediterranean subject to the submarine menace, Alexandria is the only good base available in the Eastern Mediterranean until such time as those in Crete and southern Greece can be used.

5. He said that at the time of the sanctions the British plan was to attack immediately upon the outbreak of war. The first points of attack would have been Sirena and Catania on the east coast of Sicily. In discussing the bombing of ships at sea he referred to dropping a pattern of bombs on a ship or formation of ships and indicated that direct attack on individual ships, such as our dive bombing, would not be made.

6. The above information was obtained during a brief conversation with the British Naval attaché. In response to my request to tell me all he felt free to tell me regarding the Mediterranean situation, he said that he could tell me all that he knew as he was not familiar with present
plans and did not know where the first blows would fall if war came.

7. The British Naval attaché and others in the British Embassy have been much interested in what they have been told regarding my visit to Belgrade and my audience with Prince Paul. The new British Ambassador, Sir Percy Lorraine, is an old friend of Prince Paul's and expects to have a talk with him when Prince Paul comes to Rome about the middle of this month. The British Naval attaché in Athens, who is also accredited to Yugoslavia, will go to Belgrade shortly after Prince Paul returns to that city.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

O-2-L/14161-E

From: [Name]
Date: 17 May, 19...6
Serial No.: [Serial Number]
File No.: [File Number]

Source of information: [Source]

Subject: ITALY - NAVY - POLICY - BASIC POLICY/STRATEGIC POLICY

Reference: [Reference]

Notes: (The review, editing, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is enclosed in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the dates of the report.)

NAVAL ASPECTS OF THE ACT OF MILAN

1. The following article from the "Relazioni Internazionali" was written by eminigio di Divisione Reali-Sisilia who is "at the disposal of the Foreign Office" - that is, he is Liaison Officer with the Foreign Office and keeps all data relative to foreign navies - and frequently writes similar articles:

"NAVAL ASPECTS OF THE ACT OF MILAN"
(Relazioni Internazionali of 13 May)

The official communiqué announcing the conclusion of a military and political alliance between Italy and Germany affirms that the two States of the axis intend to effectively contribute to assure the peace of Europe.

Following the policy of peace, when there exist many countries strongly armed, imposes upon the contracting parties the necessity for having a force which will fully support the proposed alliance. It is, therefore, desirable that we make a brief examination, also from a naval viewpoint, of the recent Act of Milan, putting in contrast, the fleets of the signers with those of the other European States with the most extensive interests.

In this examination we will exclude the human element and place our attention principally on the question of the material of the Fleets.

According to information contained in the International Naval almanac, of recent publication, the situation of the four principal European Fleets, from the point of view of existing units, units under construction and in programs, is as indicated in the following tables:

ITALY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>In Service</th>
<th>Under construction</th>
<th>In Program</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battleships (A)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>94,458</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Car.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (A)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>79,232</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (B)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>60,918</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>129,942</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>72,827</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>464,407</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>157,216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>In Service</th>
<th>Under construction</th>
<th>In Program</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This report is made by the Nave, in accordance with the orders of the Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department.
### ATTACHE'S REPORT

**From:** T  
**Date:** 17 May, 1939  
**Serial No.:** 176  
**File No.:** (Index subject to change from O.M.I. index)

**Subject:** (Index subject to change from O.M.I. index)

**Reference:**

**Note:** The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O.M.I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

#### ATTACK TWO

### GERMANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>In Service</th>
<th>Under Construction</th>
<th>In Program</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships (A)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>106,400</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Car.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (A)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (B)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>55,500</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>131,554</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14,269</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td><strong>222,103</strong></td>
<td><strong>54</strong></td>
<td><strong>204,619</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FRANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>In Service</th>
<th>Under Construction</th>
<th>In Program</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships (A)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>162,945</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>105,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Car.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22,146</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Car (B)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (A)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (B)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>84,508</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>122,801</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>174,553</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>176</strong></td>
<td><strong>546,552</strong></td>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,779</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ENGLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>In Service</th>
<th>Under Construction</th>
<th>In Program</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Tons</strong></td>
<td><strong>No.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships (B)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>474,750</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>175,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battleships (B)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Car.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>137,550</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>115,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Car (B)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (A)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>144,370</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers (B)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>291,795</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>125,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>249,404</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>33,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55,954</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>319</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,574,083</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>484,510</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As regards the totals for the Italian and French Navies it must be pointed out that the difference of about 100,000 tons is attributable to old battleships of which France owns 5 (Gourbet - Paris - Bretagne - Provence - Lorraine), while Italy has only four (Doria - Giulio Cesare - Cavour).

The four Italian units, however, have been completely modernized and the destroys and submarines were already in the fleet on the occasion of the Great Naval Review for the Fuehrer, and they are really reformed units because their guns have been replaced and the power plants have been reconstructed according to new characteristics. The speed of these four Italian units is greater by 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Battleships</th>
<th>Cruisers</th>
<th>Destroyers</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures based on the information from O.M.I.*

---

*Figures based on the information from O.M.I.*
several knots than that of the 5 antiquated French units. It can, therefore, be said that today the two Mediterranean Navies are equal.

The reasons of the great jump which can be noted in the figures for Great Britain and Germany are well known to those who are interested in naval problems. Great Britain has, during the last three years, appropriated great sums to give a new vigorous impulse to her naval construction and the high figures of her tonnage show the results of these measures. On the other hand, only a few days ago the Reich denounced the total naval pact by which Germany was bound not to reach more than 55% of the total of the British Fleet. In any case, the German effort to reach that figure (which naturally will increase in proportion to the development of the British Navy) has been remarkable. It is enough to mention that the German Fleet in 1935, when the naval clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were denounced, had a total of 144,000 tons and that, in a little over three years, this figure has been increased to over half a million tons.

Some characteristics of the units of these fleets must be remembered:

(1) The Italian Fleet possesses the greatest number of underwater units, and this element is very important, considering the geographical location of Italy in the middle of the Mediterranean. In recent discourses by British naval authorities, it has been said that means for combating submarines have recently been greatly developed. Without denying this theory, it can be said that also submarines and their arms have made great technical progress and their use will be, as a consequence, more efficacious than in the past.

(2) The German Submarine Fleet, according to forecasts which it is possible to make, will soon equal in number that of the French. There is a very important difference in tonnage between the ships of the one nation and those of the other as can be seen from the total tonnage of the class; as regards submarines however, the difference in tonnage does not lead to the same differences in effectiveness as happens in the case of surface ships.

(3) The characteristics of the whole German Fleet are naturally of the most modern. From their beginning the three vessels of the EINSCHIET type (SCHLAPFORT and GUNKELSTUHL) England can only match them with three units (IBOD - HEMOW - REISCHT) and France with two units (DUNGER-UX and DUNGER-BLEU).

4) In fact, in battle cruisers of the most modern German type (SCHLAPFORT and GUNKELSTUHL) England can only match them with three units (IBOD - HEMOW - REISCHT) and France with two units (DUNGER-UX and DUNGER-BLEU).
(5) As regards cruisers of class "A" the five owned by Germany are of most recent construction and have, therefore, been able to take advantage of the experience gained during the lives of similar ships in other navies since 1926 (KENT type of British Navy).

(6) As regards the most modern vessels of 35,000 tons the initial advantage is with Italy, which during the first six months of 1940 will put into service the two powerful units VITTORIO VENETO and LITTORIO, while the German sister ship BISMARCK will enter service in 1941. At that time the Fleets of the axis will have in the dreadnought class equality with the British and French Fleets together, which will have the GEORGE V, PRINCE OF WALES, RICHELIEU. Progress in the meantime, and bearing in mind the dates of readiness planned for the other units of this class, it can be seen that the difference will not be a high figure.

(7) Regarding aircraft carriers, as is known, there is a decided advantage on the part of Great Britain, which has put special emphasis on the development of this type probably due to having to operate at great distances from metropolitan bases.

"From the strategic point of view an examination of the situation would be most interesting, but would not produce results except as obtainable from concrete cases.

"The are, however, certain facts which cannot be overlooked and we call attention to the most important:

(a) Due to the geographical location of the axis Powers and the distribution of their naval bases, the necessity for having twice as much force imposed upon eventual enemy states. It might be necessary for this preponderance to be increased later in the case that these states were faced with the problem of defending territories scattered in many parts of the world.

(b) Many problems relating to maritime traffic must be carefully examined because in the North Sea as well as in the Mediterranean the axis forces would make their presence felt.

(c) An objective examination of the situation, furthermore, shows the wisdom of considering and taking into account the autarchical problem as well as that of large reserves insofar as these problems have to do with the interested parties.

"These are the fundamental facts which, from the naval point of view, present themselves after the signing of the Pact of Milan. In this discussion we have limited ourselves to an examination of the European sphere, although recognizing that other interesting points might be brought up through examination of the situation with its repercussions in other seas and especially in the Pacific Ocean." "R.B."

From a table on page 4:

- Admiral
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
- C.O.
The following article is translated from the "Forze Armate" of 6 June, 1939:

The majority of the Italian nation still knows very little about the activities carried on by the Royal Navy for over 38 months in Spanish waters.

This is due to the fact that, to the contrary of the Army and Air Force which aroused the admiration of the world by their actions under the glorious banner of the Caudillo, the Navy had to act in silence and remain in the background for various reasons in connection with the political necessities of the moment.

Now that military operations are over, the Navy may set aside this reserve and give Italians some idea of its contribution to the re-birth of the new Spain.

The Italian Navy's first act of intervention in Spain arose from the inerarious necessity of protecting the prestige of our flag and the lives of our compatriots in the cities which were in the prey of revolution and anarchy. The evacuation of refugees from Barcelona was begun on 24 July 1936 and continued uninterruptedly in various places until 31 November of that year. Besides Italians many foreign refugees were evacuated including priests and clergy of all kinds who thus escaped the Red massacres.

Three large steamships and two hospital ships were employed in this work, and in four months these units made 27 voyages bringing to safety 1695 Italians and 6663 foreigners. Many other refugees were saved by various warships. Altogether 9210 lives were saved by naval vessels and chartered steamships.

Meanwhile, in the middle of August 1936, thousands of Reds made a surprise landing at Porto Cristo and threatened to occupy Majorca; this was a grave danger to the Nationalists to whom the possession of this island was essential for the conduct of war on the sea.

The Italian (Legionary) Navy was ready and cooperated effectively with war units and material so that early in September, thanks to the coordinated efforts of the Italian political counsellor, the Air Force and the Italian Naval Command, they were able not only to take over the offensive but also to occupy the neighboring island of Ibiza.

The naval operations in the Balearics had shown the advisability of a direct contribution towards the reorganization of the Nationalist Navy. This was effected by sending a Naval Mission to Cadiz at the end of September for the purpose of maintaining contact between the Spanish and Italian navies. During the 30 months of its activities, the Naval Mission rendered invaluable services, assisting the Nationalist Navy General Staff in the organization of services and the preparation of the naval forces, and organizing communications between Spain and Italy by means of two powerful radio stations installed at Cadiz and Palma operated by the personnel of the Italian (Legionary) Navy.
The extensive repercussions of the Spanish conflict soon caused a considerable increase in traffic which had to be safeguarded by a large number of naval units.

From a few steamships for the rescue of the distressed population, this traffic gradually increased, first taking supplies to the naval forces stationed in Spanish ports, and later carrying supplies and war material to the nationalists, until it assumed the character of an overseas expeditionary force of volunteer troops amounting to many thousands of men and some hundreds of guns.

This expedition was performed in particularly unfavorable weather conditions; the winter of 1936-37 was one of the worst recorded in the Mediterranean.

The persistent gales were a severe trial to the light units detailed to escort the transports, as well as to the cruisers of the 2nd Squadron which cruised between Sardinia and the Balearics giving flank strategic protection to the convoys.

A comparison to this complex operation performed in a basin of 1,000 miles in extension, in which a naval force of uncertain attitude was based not far from the landing zone, can be found only in the operations of the Great War.

In order to have some idea of the work performed by the Royal Navy between the middle of December 1936 and the middle of April 1937, which was the period of most intense activity, it is enough to record that during these four months about 100,000 men, 4070 air vehicles, 40,000 tons of material and 750 guns were transported to Spain on 92 vessels which performed a total of 132 voyages, and for the protection of which 30 war units were employed which performed 134 missions.

After the Expeditionary Corps was landed it was necessary to provide supplies and to ensure Logistic communications with Italy; this work was continued without interruption until the end of the military operations, and the Navy's activities may be summarized as follows:

| No. of steamships employed for the opening of operations for transportation of troops | 17 |
| Trips made | 55 |
| No. of steamships employed for transport of material | 68 |
| Trips made | 134 |
| No. of hospitals ships employed | 4 |
| Trips made | 29 |
| No. of sick and wounded transported | 14,558 |
| No. of war units employed | 40 |
| Missions performed | 226 |

These figures witness to the enormous amount of work performed in silence by the Royal Italian Navy in the cause of Nationalist Spain.
While the transportation of the Expeditionary Force was underway, the Nationalists began, in mid-November, the first legionary submarine actions for the purpose of damaging and obstructing the traffic in Red supplies in the Mediterranean and restricting the action of the enemy naval forces to defense of their ports.

The moral and material effect of the submarine menace was immediate; traffic at once began to diminish, freight rates and insurance soared to the skies, routes had to be changed and extended, and supplies became uncertain and difficult.

This contributed not a little to the result of the lightning offensive of February 1939 when the Italian legionaries entered Madrid.

It is not possible here to tell of the sacrifices, risks and adventures of the legionary submarines during those long winter missions when they remained at sea for weeks on end, lying near the Red ports within firing range, hunted by the enemy units and in danger of bombs and minesfields. Only the few who know what it means to live in these small vessels with their lack of space, air and light, can realize the harrowing work performed by the crews in this field.

The unceasing use of false flags, changed names and camouflage by the contraband ships rendered the test of the submarine commanders still more serious if mistakes were to be avoided. In a state of these difficulties many merchant ships were sunk; to these must be added the ill-fated CAVALLI which was lost in the military bay of Cartagena, and the destroyer CERRO PARRA, both of which were put out of service for many months.

The activity of the legionary crews did not stop here; the fast and light units patrolled the Spanish coast and the open sea and took part in many operations against enemy units, bombarded coastal fortifications and the main ports and sank steamships in the Sicilian Channel.

The contribution made by the Royal Italian Navy to the victorious outcome of the military operations in Spain was of exceptional importance. 148 naval units took a direct part therein and in less than 3 years performed 870 missions covering hundreds of thousands of miles.

Wherever necessary, the Italian sailor was ready and acted with the faith, courage and enthusiasm which he has always displayed at all times and in all the seas of the world.
1. The following article is translated from the weekly paper 'Relazioni Internazionali.' It is believed to have been written by Admiral Raineri-Biscia of the Italian Navy, although it is unsigned; it was published on 4 March, 1939.

"In a previous article we gave the situation as on 1 February of the principal naval forces of the world, indicating the fundamental characteristics of the units under construction.

An examination of the location of the various fleets, made with the view of establishing the fundamental peace-time strategic positions, may serve to add to our knowledge of the world naval problem at this interesting moment of international politics.

We will give the units by type, so that an accurate idea of the constitution of the big naval units may be had by consulting the tables in the former article (Reference (a)) where the tonnage, armament and speed of each type is shown.

LOCATION OF THE FleETS.

A) ITALY - The constitution of our Navy is undoubtedly known to all Italians; we will therefore merely state that our units are grouped roughly as follows:

1) Naval forces usually located in home ports (main bases, La Spezia and Taranto):
   a) Two Squadrons comprising: 1st, battleships and heavy cruisers; the 2nd, light cruisers. Both these squadrons have groups of light surface units adequate for training purposes and tactical employment.
   b) One Division at the disposal of the Command School.
   c) Submarines, under the Submarine Command which is governed by an Admiral.

2) Naval Forces in Italian East Africa (main bases, Massawa and Chisimaio), under the High Naval Command in Italian East Africa; normally consisting of light cruisers, 6 to 10 destroyers, 6 torpedo boats, submarines and auxiliaries.

3) Naval Forces in Far East, under a High Naval Command and consisting of light surface units (at present the cruiser COLLONDI and the gunboats LEPANTO and CARLOTTO). These units are normally located at Shanghai and on the Yangtsze-kiang. The large unit frequently visits other ports in China, Japan and the Philippines and often goes to the Dutch Sonda Islands.

Of the Italian islands in the Aegean, Leros is well equipped as a base, while in Libya, naval forces can best be accommodated at Tripoli and Tobruk. In both the Aegean and Libya, light surface units and submarines are permanently located; these zones are also frequently visited by other..."
ATTACHER’S REPORT

Forward seven copies (original and sixcarbon); this number is necessary because of the limited personnel in O. N. I. and because of the urgency for quickly disseminating information internationally. These copies will be distributed by O. N. I. as per facsimile or otherwise, according to subject matter.

From T  Date 14 June 1939 Serial No. 219 File No. 602-700

Source of information

Subject (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

Notes: (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention reading geographical, personal, or political names, and the date of the report.)

page 2.

naval units during their normal exercises.

"Even this schematic description demonstrates the importance to us of the Suez Canal, and in the Anglo-Italian Agreement now in force the principle of the 1888 Constantinople Convention that the Canal is open to all, in peace and in war time, is confirmed.

B) ENGLAND — The forces of the British Navy are divided as follows:

1) Mediterranean Fleet (main bases, Malta and Gibraltar) consisting of:
   Battle Squadron with 5 QUEEN ELIZABETH type units.
   Battle Cruiser Division with 3 HOOD and KEPLER type units.
   Heavy Cruiser Division with 4 LONDON type units.
   Light Cruiser Division with 2 AMETHYST type units.
   One aircraft carrier (Glorious) with 50 planes.
   Destroyer Division of 7 squadrons with a total of 35 units of the APHRAID, GRAFFTON, HUNTER and INTREPID types. (In the tables in Reference (a), these are referred to as types A, G, H, 1).
   One submarine flotilla of 7 units.
   One motorboat flotilla.
   Auxiliaries.

2) Home Fleet (main bases, Portsmouth, Devonport, Chatham) consisting of:
   Battle Squadron with 7 units (2 NELSON type and 5 REVENGE type)
   Light Cruiser Division (SOUTHAMPTON type)
   3 aircraft carriers with 154 planes.
   Destroyer Division of 6 squadrons with a total of 26 units of the BULLDOG, ELECTRA and FORESTER types (B,E,F types).
   One submarine flotilla of 5 units.
   Auxiliaries.

3) Reserve Fleet consisting of less modern units and located at the English metropolitan bases. It comprises:
   24 cruisers,
   3 aircraft carriers,
   1 aircraft tender,
   56 destroyers,
   tenders,
   supply ships,
   various auxiliaries.

4) Departmental Forces comprising a certain number of destroyers, submarines and other units at the disposal of the Schools.
5) Naval Forces in the Americas and West Indies (main bases, Bermuda, Trinidad and Halifax) consisting of:
5 Cruisers (YORK, KENT and LEANDER types).
2 sloops.
1 minesweeper.

6) Canadian Navy (main base, Halifax) consisting of:
3 destroyers (A, B and C types).
3 minesweepers.

7) Naval Forces in China (main bases, Hong Kong and Singapore but in peace time mainly located at Shanghai and Hankow), consisting of:
One aircraft carrier (EAGLE).
One cruiser squadron of 7 units (KENT and SOUTHWARK types).
One flotilla destroyers of 9 units (D type).
One flotilla submarines of 15 units (G type).
19 river gunboats.
A certain number of destroyers and minesweepers stationed at Hong-Kong and Singapore.

8) Australian Navy (main base, Sydney) as follows:
6 cruisers CANBERRA and SYDNEY type,
5 destroyers,
hydrographic ships and sloops.

9) Naval Forces of New Zealand (main base, Auckland) as follows:
2 cruisers (ACHILLIS and LEANDER),
2 sloops,
2 trawlers.

10) Naval Forces in East Indies (main base, Colombo) as follows:
3 cruisers (MANCHESTER type),
8 sloops.

11) INDIAN NAVY, comprising a number of sloops, a hydrographic ship and other small units.

12) Naval Forces in South Africa (main base, Simonstown) consisting of one cruiser (NEPTUNE) and 5 sloops.

* C) FRANCE - The French Naval Forces are located as follows:

1) Mediterranean Squadron (main bases, Toulon and Bizerta, secondary base, Ajaccio), consisting of:
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

One light squadron of 2 Divisions; total, 8 cruisers (4 of 10,000 tons, 3 of 7,600 tons, 1 of 5,800 tons).
One light squadron of 5 Divisions of squadron leaders (total, 15 units VERDUN type of about 2,400 tons) and 2 Divisions of destroyers TRAMONTANE type (total, 6 units of about 1,400 tons).
One flotilla submarines divided into 2 squadrons of 12 units each.

2) Training Squadrons:
One training ship Division as follows:
4 old battleships,
1 light cruiser,
auxiliaries.

One cruiser Division of 3 units SUFFREN type, 10,600 tons.
One Division squadron leaders of 2 units VAUHAN type, 2,400 tons. One Division destroyers TRAMONTANE type of 3 units, of 1,319 tons. Light surface units and submarines are at the disposal of the Naval Commands of Toulon and Bizerta.

3) Atlantic Squadron (main bases, Brest, Cherbourg, Lorient)
comprising:
4 battleships (one new DUNKERQUE type and 3 LORRAIN type).
3 cruisers GOLINE type, 7,600 tons.
9 squadron leaders VOLTA and MALIN types, 2,500 - 3,000 tons.
1 flotilla destroyers of 15 units, BOUGRASQUE type of 1,500 tons.
1 flotilla submarines of 29 units plus one submarine tender.
1 aircraft carrier (BREAST). Light surface units and submarines are at the disposal of the Naval Commands of Cherbourg and Brest.

4) Naval Forces Overseas as follows:
a) Far East:
2 PRIMAUGUET type cruisers of 7,800 tons.
2 colonial scouts, 1,969 tons, SAVIGNON DE BRIAIZA type.
4 river gunboats.
1 fast scout.
b) Levant Division, with one KENVELIER type squadron leader and one colonial scout.
c) One colonial scout stationed in Indian Ocean.
d) Two colonial scouts stationed in the Pacific.
e) One colonial scout stationed in the Atlantic.
f) Various units stationed at Saigon (Indochina).
g) Various units stationed at Casablanca.
ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

From: T Date: 14 June 1939 Serial No. 219 File No. 602-700

Source of information

Subject

Reference

Note: (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is inserted in this space. Mention sealing postscripts, personal, or political names, and the get of the report.)

Page 5.

D) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA — Up to October 1938, the Naval Forces of the United States were united in a single fleet consisting of a group of 15 battleships supported by the so-called "Scouting Force" together with the necessary destroyers, submarines and aircraft carriers.

These forces were stationed mainly in the Pacific at the bases of San Pedro, San Diego, San Francisco and Seattle. This location was directly connected with events in the Far East.

During the Grand Maneuvers the fleet generally goes beyond Hawaii where the United States possesses the fortified base of Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu. Points susceptible of development are Guam in the Marianas and Pago-Pago in Samoas, while Wake, Midway and Dutch Harbor (Alaska) are better suited for aero-naval support.

It is held that the Atlantic Fleet was constituted in order to give concrete evidence of the well-known friendly tendency of the American Government towards the democratic powers.

For various reasons, the American naval forces were also in the past located alternately in one ocean or the other; and the passage of the Panama Canal is regarded by the United States Navy as an important maneuver everything being done to facilitate and speed it up. Tests have shown that it takes about 40 hours for the big units of the fleet to go through the Canal.

It is obvious that the Canal is of the greatest importance in enabling the forces to reach the various zones of action. The United States General Staff has given the most careful consideration to the security of the Panama Canal and has taken numerous measures for its defense. The entries into the Canal from both Oceans and the approaches to these entries are well fortified and the problem of meeting an attack on the Canal from East or West has often been the theme of the annual Fleet Maneuvers.

Even recently, in his report on the measures required to improve the defense of the United States' coast and Oceanic possessions, Admiral Hepburn stressed the need for further measures to render this indispensable way of communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific invulnerable.

At the present time the units of the United States Navy are constituted as follows:

1) Battle Force comprising:
   12 battleships in four Divisions,
   A group of 14 cruisers (7 of 10,000 tons and 7 of 7,050 tons) in four Divisions.
   Two Divisions of destroyers of 4 flotillas each, each flotilla comprising 2 squadrons; total, 16 squadrons with 56 units.
   Two Divisions of aircraft carriers; total, 5 units with 430 planes.
   Mine-layers with two squadrons of minesweepers.
2) **Scouting Force:**
   4 Divisions of cruisers with 16 units of about 10,000 tons.

3) **Air Force** with 11 aircraft tenders and about 250 planes.

4) **Submarine Force** comprising 4 flotillas of 8 squadrons; total, 37 submarines, 4 destroyers and a number of tenders.

5) **Atlantic Squadron:**
   4 battleships of 26,000 - 27,000 tons.
   7 light cruisers of 10,000 tons.
   5 light cruisers of 7,000 tons.
   7 destroyers of 1,900 - 1,500 tons.
   13 destroyers of 1,100 tons.

6) **Asiatic Fleet:**
   1 cruiser, 9,060 tons.
   10 gunboats.
   18 destroyers.
   6 submarines.

**ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE.**

The unsettled political situation both in Europe and the Far East has led the interested Governments to revise their defense organizations. The Powers in possession of colonial empires or of small territories distant from the home country and of great strategic importance, have taken steps for the improvement of bases and the increase of the possibilities of subsistence and resistance of isolated points in mid-ocean.

We will summarize the measures taken in this regard by the principal Powers:

1) In **FRANCE**, the Daladier Cabinet recently voted 1 billion francs for the defense organization of the colonies. This sum was divided as follows:

   447 million for French West Africa, subdivided between Dakar (Senegal), Conakry (Guinea) and Abidjan (Ivory Coast);
   117 million for French Equatorial Africa, mainly for work at Ponte Noire;
   220 million for Madagascar (base of Diego Suarez);
   230 million for New Caledonia (base of Noumea);
   38 million for Guadalupa;
   44 million for Martinique;
   20 million for Dibouti.
"Together with other points, for which France has already provided, such as Mers-el-Kebir near Oran and Casablanca in Morocco, the system of French bases is of indisputable strategic importance. Port de France on the route to Panama; Dakar and Douala on the route to the Cape of Good Hope; Diego Suarez on the Aden-Cape Colony lines; Camrahn have way between Singapore and Hong-Kong; Thaïti in the middle of the Southern Pacific on the Panama-Australia route.

"From the point of view of the assistance which could be given by France and her colonies to operations of an essentially naval character, France is a valuable associate. The system however would become fragile if the single bases should be unable to survive without the aid of the home country. This justifies the decreed appropriations.

"The Daladier Government has also decided to increase the forces of the French Colonial Army by 70,000 men (50,000 in West and Equatorial Africa and 20,000 in Indochina).

"As regards the Bay of Camrahn which is an excellent natural harbor, its importance derives also from the fact that Saigon and Kao-hsiung are too far from the direct Singapore-Hong-Kong route. It is of natural strategic importance due to its geographical position, since it lies equidistant from Singapore, Hong-Kong, Manila and (in air-line) from Bangkok.

"From the viewpoint of the Franco-British political group, Camrahn Bay is a base lying considerably north of Singapore and could, if necessary, replace Hong-Kong which, since the Japanese occupation of Hainan, has greatly depreciated in value owing to its position between Hainan and Formosa.

"2) GREAT BRITAIN has long held first place in regard to bases located along the main routes of world traffic.

"After the failure of the disarmament conference and the decision to re-arm, Great Britain decided to increase her fleet and bring her bases up to date. We will mention the most important:

"In the Mediterranean, besides Malta and Gibraltar, work is under way at Cæsarea, Cyprus and also Alexandria since, under the Anglo-Egyptian treaty, England shares in the coastal defense of Egypt.

"The defense of the Suez Canal is also being reinforced and the organization assigned to England under the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 is being developed.

"Other points which guarantee the defense of the route to the East are: Port Sudan, Perim, Aden, Mombasa, Bombay, Colombo, Trincomalee, the island of Mauritius, Port Darwin (which it seems is to be made into a major naval base), Singapore and Hong Kong.

"Admiral Chatfield, formerly First Lord of the Admiralty, has recently been appointed President of a Commission sent to India to study the defense of this part of the British Empire.

"In the Pacific, the British Empire has the main bases of Sydney, Auckland and Equinault."
**ATTACHE'S REPORT**

Forward seven copies (original and six carbon) - this number is necessary because of the limited personnel in G. N. I. and because of the urgency for quickly disseminating information from attachés. These copies will be distributed by G. N. I. as per instructions of attachés, according to subject matter.

**From:** [Blank]  
**Date:** 14 June, 1939  
**Serial No.:** 819  
**File No.:** 608-700  
**Source of information:** [Blank]  
**Subject:** [Blank]  
**Reference:** [Blank]

---

**Note:** (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by G. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

---

**Page 8.**

"In the Atlantic there are the bases of Halifax, Kingston (Jamaica), Bridgetown and Port Stanley (Falkland Islands).

Following the tension in the Mediterranean in 1935-36, Great Britain devoted her attention to reinforcing points along the so-called "reserve route" to India which, instead of passing through the Mediterranean, reaches the Indian Ocean by going round the Cape of Good Hope. Along this route work is being done to improve the ports of Freetown (Sierra Leone), Capetown, Simonstown and Durban (Cape Colony), Mauritius and Colombo. A new Government has been created comprising the British South Atlantic islands: St. Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha.

There is already some idea of establishing permanent communications between England and Australia round the Cape by fast mail lines. The new motorship DOMINION MONARCH left London on its maiden voyage on 16 February. This line will run from London to Australia via Capetown.

In order to complete our glance at the possibilities of supporting bases for the British fleet, we should mention that recently the Union of South Africa, Australia and Canada (to a lesser extent) voted funds for reinforcing their defenses. There is also the Anglo-Portuguese alliance to be taken into account, so that Lisbon, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, Angola and Mozambique may be regarded as important points in the British naval defense system.

Finally, as regards possessions in the Near and Far East, England's strong political position in the Persian Gulf should be noted.

It is impossible to ignore the disproportion which exists between the importance and wealth of the Dutch Colonial Empire and that nation's means of defending it. This situation naturally gives rise to the belief that, in case of threat to their common interests, Holland would enter the orbit of the British Empire.

The press has often reported exchanges of visits between the naval authorities of Singapore and Java, especially in period preceding the periodical concentrations in Singapore of the Commands of the Naval Forces of the East Indies, Far East, Australia and New Zealand.

**3) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.** The oscillations of American naval policy under the alternating influence of the isolationists or interventionists are well-known, and it will suffice if we illustrate here the present situation. After the denouncement of the Treaty of Washington, Article 19 of that instrument which called for the "status quo" of the naval bases comprised between the Hawaiian meridian and meridian 110° immediately east of Singapore became inoperative. Under this disposition, no modifications to the bases in this enormous zone were made for 10 years, from 1922 to 1936.

This provision appeared to be the compensation given to Japan for the renunciations imposed upon her by that treaty. Injunctions, however, have not been lacking in regard to Japan's reinforcement of naval bases in the islands granted under mandate to the
Japanese Empire by the League of Nations.

Since the building of the Panama Canal, the United States have always desired to increase its defenses. But recently, President Roosevelt's favorable policy towards increase of armaments has given rise to the problem of how to utilize the liberty gained upon the terminations of the Washington treaty. In fact, a special Commission under Admiral Hepburn has published a report upon the logistic requirements of the United States Fleet in relation to land bases.

Congress has examined the report and the Naval Commissions of the House of Representatives and the Senate have investigated the question, interrogating both naval and political experts.

The press has recently published the final decisions in regard to the completion or creation of 10 new bases in the Atlantic and Pacific. The preliminary funds voted amount to 44 million dollars and, since the larger vessels depend less on the bases, steps are to be taken to create supporting bases for planes, submarines and torpedo boats. The funds are to be used for the Atlantic bases in the States of Virginia and Florida, the central bases of Guantanamo (Cuba), St. Thomas (Virgin Islands) and Coco-Solo in the Canal Zone.

These measures are closely connected with the above-mentioned formation of the Atlantic Fleet. As regards the Pacific area, where no international contractual relations exist, it is interesting to record the new aero-naval work being done at Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Midway Island, Wake, Guam, and in a group of islands lying across the route from Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand which is especially suitable for air-lines between the United States and those countries.

Guam's value as an advanced sentinel for the protection of North America's Pacific interests, derives from its geographical position and the splendid port which could be built on that island.

However, neither the American policy in regard to the Philippines nor the limited funds granted (60 million dollars for work at this base) seem to indicate an intention of creating fleet-support bases in the West Pacific, and therefore strategic possibilities in regard to the Japanese positions are very limited.

4) HOLLAND has also entered the race to reinforce positions and recently voted a sum of 2,336,970,000 lire for the Ministry of Defense, an increase of 817,176,800 lire ovet last year. Of this total, 546,646,000 lire were assigned to the Navy of which 466,169,800 lire were reserved for new naval constructions and the purchase of aeronautical material.

5) It has often been said that the advantageous position held by JAPAN in the Far East, sustained by her powerful fleet, could be disputed only by a coalition of forces.
"Japan's fleet amounts to 1,102,519 tons, subdivided into the main categories as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>In service</th>
<th>Under construction</th>
<th>Total (tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12 Battleships</td>
<td>272,070</td>
<td>410,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 &quot;A&quot; Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>106,370</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 &quot;B&quot; Aircraft carriers</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>58,050</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 &quot;A&quot; Cruisers</td>
<td>107,800</td>
<td>107,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 &quot;B&quot; Cruisers</td>
<td>168,965</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142 Destroyers</td>
<td>172,756</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 Submarines</td>
<td>78,498</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We cannot give the location of the forces, but the Japanese bases are numerous and spread over a large expanse of the Western and Central Pacific. The island of Yap is very important owing to its geographical position, and serves to establish a line of Japanese bases along the meridian which cuts at right angles across the 20th parallel which joins the coast of California and the Philippines.

The forces permanently located in the Far East belonging to England, the United States, France and Holland are as follows:

- England
- United States
- France
- Holland
Battleships ...................... 2
Aircraft carriers ................ 1
"A" and "B" cruisers .......... 21
Destroyers ....................... 40
Submarines ...................... 33

"This force obviously could not dream of competing with the Japanese forces.

"It has been said in the press that when she has completed her new construction, England may station 5 battleships at Singapore. If this is done, the problem would have to be considered from a new aspect. Also, in view of the progress in aviation, the strategical situation in the Pacific has to be continually revised and brought up to date. "