

Documents E Berlin Vol. I

~~SECRET~~

**ESTIMATE**  
*of*  
**Potential Military Strength**  
**Documents E**  
**Naval Attaché**  
**BERLIN**

**Volume 1**  
**Documents Numbers 1 to 63**  
(30 MARCH 1937 - 7 OCT. 1941)

~~SECRET~~ **DECLASSIFIED**

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

ATTACHE'S REPORT

P-10-j/14721-A ANA/del

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From Z Date 30 March 19 57 Serial No. R-208 File No. EF30(N)/SS

Source of information Observation  
(Composure new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject G.E.R.M.A.N.Y. Submarines New Construction  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE.**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the substance is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

New submarine construction.

10 1937

1. Recently an opportunity was afforded to pass the waterfront of the Krupp Germania Werft in Kiel. It was noted that six new submarines were on the ways. Two submarines were on each of No. 1, 2 and 3 glassed in ways. All six vessels were identical and being built as though on a quantity production system. The vessels appear to be of the 500 ton type, although possibly of 750 tons.

2. The U-18 was on a floating drydock and apparently fairly well along on its way to complete repair. With the U-18 again in service after its accident, and with the above six new vessels, the German Navy will have forty (40) submarines. It is further understood from good authority that still other submarines of 1000 tons are building for the German Navy at Bremen in the Deutsche Schiff-und Maschinenbau Gesellschaft. This rumor has not been definitely substantiated.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 8(D) or (B)  
 OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973



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0-10-a/18043 ANA/Ch.

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From Z Date 16 April, 1937 Serial No. R-271 EF30 (Navy) / Al-3  
 Source of information Observation. (Commence new series each January first) File No. (Select project number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject GERMANY. (Nation reported on) Naval Construction Program. (Index title as per index sheet) (Subject)  
 Reference

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STAGES OF COMPLETION OF GERMAN NAVAL CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM. 27 1937

1. In the summer of 1935, the German Naval Direction announced the following building program:

2 battleships	of	26,500 tons.
2 cruisers	of	10,000 tons.
16 destroyers	of	1,625 tons.
20 submarines	of	250 tons.
6 submarines	of	500 tons.
2 submarines	of	750 tons.
10 Fleet Escorts	of	600 tons.

UNCLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 5(D) or (S) OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

DATE MAY 21 1973

Since a two year period has passed since this announcement, it appears that certain conclusions can now be drawn relative to the present trend. The above two battleships were launched after ~~two~~ and one half years on the ways. One of the cruisers has been launched. The normal building period for such ships in Germany is two and one half years. This time will not be bettered. All 16 destroyers have been launched and are in varying stages of completion but only one is in commission. These vessels are normally built in just a little less than two years. It appears that these vessels will not meet the normal building times. Of the submarines, the 250 ton class were literally built over night on a mass production basis. The 500 ton and 750 ton class came along more slowly, but all were in commission by the end of nine months. The same is true of the 600 ton F-class vessels.

2. In the early part of 1936, an additional four 250 ton submarines and four 500 ton submarines were laid down. These vessels were in service in six months. Again a mass production system was used on submarine construction. At the same time, the third 10,000 ton cruiser was laid down. It has not yet been launched.

3. In the summer of 1936, the German Naval Direction announced the building of one 35,000 ton battleship, two 21,000 ton aircraft carriers, and six 1850 ton destroyers. None of these vessels has been launched.

4. It has been observed that six additional submarines of between 500 and 750 tons are under construction at the Krupp Germania plant in Kiel. It is assumed they are for Germany. Construction appears to be progressing rapidly as in the case of other submarines.

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From Z Date 16 APRIL, 1937 Serial No. R-271 EF30 (Navy) / A1-3  
 Source of information Observation. File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Subject GERMANY. Naval Construction Program.  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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page two.

5. In addition to the above naval construction, almost all commercial yards are running at capacity doing considerable commercial work both for German and foreign account. Thus it would appear that certain conclusions may be drawn relative to the present trend of naval construction. First of all, sufficient commercial work is underway to guarantee a goodly amount of foreign credit which in turn means a supply of raw materials. Secondly, small ship construction such as submarines, F-boats and R-boats were sent off the ways as quickly as possible both to be placed in service because of the scarcity of this class of vessel and also to relieve congestion on the building ways. Third major ship construction has not been speeded up over what is considered a normal rate of building in Germany. Fourth, the allowed tonnage from the British - German agreement has not been reached. In fact, it is a surprise that more construction has not been undertaken. On the whole, it may be stated that no rush is taking place to build up the new German Navy.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 2(D) or (D)

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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From Z Date 21 April, 1957 Serial No. R-278 File No. EP50(A)/A5-1  
 Source of information GERMAN PRESS ("Völkischer Beobachter") of 4/20/57  
 Subject GERMANY Aviation New Flying Organization  
(Origin reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_  
 NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Founding of a new flying organization to be known as the "Nationalsozialistische Fliegerkorps" (N.S.F.K.) (The National Socialist Flying Corps).

1. It has been noted in the Berlin newspaper "Völkischer Beobachter" of 20 April 1957 that on 19 April 1957, the German Chancellor, Adolph Hitler, promulgated the founding of a new flying organization to be known as the "Nationalsozialistische Fliegerkorps" (N.S.F.K.) (The National Socialist Flying Corps), which will be under the leadership of Major General Christiansen. The purpose of this organization, in the words of the Führer, is "to imbue and perpetuate the thought of flying in the German people, to carry out a course of flying instruction for young men prior to their compulsory military service, and to unite the various sport flying groups into one organization."

2. The "N.S.F.K." will supplant the present "Deutsche Luftsportverband" (D.L.V.) (The German Air Sport Association) and its various branches. The "N.S.F.K." is a legally incorporated organization whose leader is responsible to the Reich Minister for Air Defense. Membership in this organization is voluntary, and members of the "N.S.F.K." may not at the same time be members of the "S.A.", "S.S.", or "N.S.K.K."

3. Since membership is voluntary, reservists in the Air Force who have served as flying personnel, German citizens who have been trained as pilots, observers, balloonists or glider pilots, members in the sport flying courses of the Hitler Youth Organization over 18 years, as well as members of the flight and glider groups of the "D.L.V." who were a part of that organization before 1 April 1937, are entitled to membership in the "N.S.F.K."

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From Z Date 16 June, 1937 Serial No. R-410 File No. RF50(N)/890.

Source of information Observation and conversation

Subject GERMANY, Practice in manufacture of naval guns

Reference

INDEX.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Description of 6" guns built by the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company of Düsseldorf, Germany.

The following information obtained from engineers of the Rheinmetall-Borsig Company and from actual observation during a recent visit to that plant in Düsseldorf is quoted herewith as being reliable and of interest to the Navy Department:

a) The present 6" guns built by this company for the German Navy are mounted in twin mount turrets and have the following characteristics: 44 lands and grooves. The widths of a land and groove together are in such proportion that the land measures 2/5 and the groove 3/5 of the total space of the pair. The depth of the groove is 1/100 of the caliber of the gun, or .060 inches. This rule is followed almost religiously in the manufacture of all guns produced by Rheinmetall-Borsig.

b) The twist of the rifling varies with the caliber of the gun. In the 6" gun, the twist begins with a 4° angle and increases uniformly to a 6° angle at the muzzle. The rifling is produced by a tool having 11 cutters with a micrometer feed. The feed is so arranged that each cut is .005 of an inch. It was noted that the grooves have fillets and not right angles.

c) In guns up to 4.2", a completely welded carriage, slide and recoil cylinder is employed. In guns of larger caliber, cast carriages and mounts are used.

d) It may be stated in general that all turret structures which are classed as heavier than ordinary gun shields are bolted structures. All gun shields are welded structures.

e) The proof pressure of the 6" naval gun is 2600 atm., or converting this figure, approximately 17.37 tons per square inch.

f) The greatest angle of twist of the rifling is used on a howitzer which also has a varying twist.

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Table with columns for Director, Staff, and various departments. Includes handwritten marks and initials.

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0-10-a/18043

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From Z Date 29 June, 1957 Serial No. R-456 File No. EF50(N)  
 Source of information Personal Observation (Continuate new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject GERMANY Naval Vessels  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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Indication of slowing down the rate of construction  
of German Naval Vessels.

- References: (a) Z REPORT No. R-445 of 10 August, 1956.  
(b) Z REPORT No. R-203 of 30 March, 1957.

1. In the above mentioned references, report was made concerning five 1625 ton destroyers being built at the Krupp Germania Works in Kiel and the probability of delay in completion due to boiler troubles with the Benson boiler.
2. These same five destroyers were observed alongside the sea-wall at the Krupp Germania Works during a recent visit of the Naval Attaché to Kiel. Two of these destroyers have their stacks up and apparently some boiler or machinery work has been accomplished. The other three destroyers have their machinery space openings on deck still open, but housed over with boarding for weather protection. Little if any progress is noted on these vessels since references (a) and (b) were written. No signs of activity were apparent on these vessels or in their vicinity, which was particularly to be noted.
3. In the Deutsche Werft, Kiel, the cruiser "BLÜCHER" and the battleship "GNEISENAU", both of which have been launched, were observed alongside the sea-wall. The battleship has had part of her armour installed. It was difficult to tell what progress is being made with the cruiser, but the absence of the usual activity aboard vessels under construction was particularly noticeable.
4. It is felt that the rate of construction on German naval vessels has been considerably slowed. One hears various reasons for delays, such as boiler trouble, lack of materials and lack of skilled labor, with the probability that the first reason is the principal cause of delay.

5

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From Z Date 9 July, 1937 Serial No. R-458 File No. EF30(N)  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)

Source of information German Press

Subject GERMANY Naval Building Program  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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Status of German Naval Building Program.

6

1. According to an article appearing in the "Boersen Zeitung" on 6 July 1937, the building program started in 1935 to bring the German Navy up to the strength permitted by the terms of the Anglo-German agreement will be completed in 1941. The German Fleet will then consist of:

- 5 Battleships
- 3 Panzerschiffe of "DEUTSCHLAND" Class
- 2 Aircraft Carriers
- 14 Cruisers
- 40 Destroyers
- 25,000 tons of Submarines

Two 26,000 ton battleships have already been launched (GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST), and two 35,000 ton battleships are on the building ways. The keel of the fifth battleship is yet to be laid.

Of the 14 Cruisers mentioned above, five of 6,000 tons are in commission (NURNBERG - LEIPZIG - KOLN - KARLSRUHE - KONIGSBERG), two of the 10,000 ton cruisers have been launched (BLUCHER and VON HIPPER), and one of the 10,000 ton cruisers is on the building ways. A start has been made on one 19,500 ton Aircraft Carrier.

The three ships of the DEUTSCHLAND class (DEUTSCHLAND - ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE - ADMIRAL SCHEER) are of course in commission.

As previously reported by the Naval Attache after a recent visit to Kiel, the five destroyers, one cruiser and one battleship being built there appear to be progressing very slowly.

Attaches

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From Z Date 9 August, 1937 Serial No. R-534 File No. EF30(A)/P-11-1  
 Source of information Conversation. (Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject GERMANY. Training of Naval Aviators.  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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page two.

(not all) go through the Observers School at Parow. Any further training which this group receives, except those who go to Parow, is from the operating squadrons which they join as pilots.

(c) A third group is absorbed into the Air Force proper and thus severs all connection with the Navy.

(d) The fourth group is returned to the Navy for regular naval duties and unless recalled for flight service, either for the Navy or for the Air Corps, severs all connection with flying. This group forms a reserve pool of pilots. In view of the well known shortage of pilots in Germany at this time, it is reasonable to assume that members of this group are not too good as pilots and will be called upon to perform piloting duty only in time of emergency.

6. At all four training stations, commanding officers and other officers in charge, although now belonging to the Air Force, have been naval personnel at one time or another. Some were naval officers or naval flying officers during the World War, had retired and have been recalled to active service. Others have been regular naval officers until their transfer to the Air Corps. All, however, are pilots.

7. At the three elementary schools, most of the time in the air is devoted to the mere mechanics of flying, both in land and sea planes. A considerable amount of three-plane formation work is included in the course. Each student is required to do a small amount of fixed and free gun firing, dive bombing, photography and radio. No blind flying or navigational flights are undertaken at these schools. Ground school work, of which there is a great amount due to unfavorable flying conditions during many months of the year, consists of the theoretical treatment of the various subjects relating to aviation matters. Practical instruction is given in engines and plane structures. Radio qualification consists of taking and sending 18 five letter groups of letters per minute. Considerable practical instruction is given in the operation, disassembly and repair of machine guns. Each student is required to make one solo catapult shot.

8. At the Advanced (Observation) School at Parow, students are graduated at the end of one year after approximately 135 hours in the air. Most of the time in the air is put in in a twin engine, twin float training bomber (Focke-Wulf FW-58), and in single or two-seat fighters. Training in the twin engine plane consists of

- (a) Navigational hops to as far as the coast of Scotland.
- (b) Horizontal bombing.

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From Z Date 9 August, 1937 Serial No. R-534 File No. EF30(A)/P11-1.  
(Commence new series each January first) (Subst proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information CONVERSATION.

Subject GERMANY. Training of Naval Aviators.  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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page three.

- (c) Blind flying. Ten or twelve hops of approximately 15 minutes each.
- (d) Advanced radio, including use of direction finder and other radio navigational aides.
- (e) Free machine guns.
- (f) Night flying and night formation flying.
- (g) Photography.

9. Training in the single and two seat fighters consists of:

- (a) Radio.
- (b) Dive bombing.
- (c) Fixed machine gunnery.
- (d) Free machine gunnery.
- (e) Camera gun.
- (f) Formation flying.

10. Since all schools are new except Warnemünde, a complete syllabus has not yet been worked out for any of the schools. Apparently weather is a deciding factor between hours in the air and hours devoted to ground school.

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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																				
Yach. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sea. For.	C. in C. Asia	Com. S.S.S.	Com. Ab	Attached at	Operations				Com. Dir.	W.P.	Com. J.P. Tr.	State	Com- source	Returns to Exam. No.				

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From Z Date 17 Sept., 1937 Serial No. R-618 File No. EP80(D)/P9  
 Source of information Observations  
 Subject GERMANY Political and Military Conditions  
(Nation reported on) (Under title as per index sheet) (Subject)

Reference

NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Observations made of the political and military conditions of Germany during visit to Nürnberg on the occasion of the 9th Annual Nazi Party Congress.

R. O. 11632, Sec. 2(D) and 3(D) of G.D.  
 OSD letter, May, 1, 1932  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1937

1. All Air and Assistant Air Attaches accredited to Germany (who are actually pilots) were invited to visit Nürnberg by the German Air Ministry, to attend three days of the 9th Annual Nazi Party Congress. In addition to the Air Attaches mentioned above, the following additional officers were in the party:

- a) Italian General der Flieger Parro with Aide and two technical assistants.
- b) One Lieutenant Colonel and three Majors of the British Royal Air Force.
- c) Chief of the Switzerland Air Force, General Bandi, with Aide.
- d) The German Air Attaches to England and to Belgrade, recalled to Germany for purposes of this visit.

The party, in three special first class cars, plus dining car, left Berlin on 9 September and returned to Berlin late on 14 September.

The first event on the programme after arrival in Nürnberg was attendance at a mass formation of Hitler Youth - boys between 15 and 18 years of age. There were some 20,000 youths in the formation, the highlight of which was their taking the oath of allegiance to Herr Hitler as the Leader of the Nation. Some 60,000 spectators attended the performance.

During the afternoon of the same day, the party attended the finals of the National Socialist Competitive Games. These Games were of interest only to the extent that nearly all events were in mass. 1000 boxers took the field at the same time. A number of races were held, varying in length from one-half to two miles, in which six teams of 100 men each competed, the 'time' of the team being the time at which the last man of that team crossed the line. Uniform for practically all events was regular everyday uniform, including boots, side-arms, etc., but not packs.

Another event of interest which the group attended was the mass formation of the S.A. At this function, 80,000 S.A. members were massed on the field, listened to a speech by Herr Hitler, conducted a memorial service for the Party members who had been killed during the time the Party was striving for power, and 'consecrated' the flags of some fifty new units of the Nazi Party. The entire performance lasted about three hours. It was explained to me by a German officer that the performance was no doubt quite long for a foreigner. He further stated that the characteristics of the Italian race, for instance, were such that Mussolini could work the crowd up to the proper pitch in just a few minutes, but that it required a long time to get the German populace in the proper state of mind. Hence the length of the ceremony. Just what the proper state of mind is, is unknown to me.

Office	A	C	D	E	Other	Index	Adm.	Com.	Int.	Nav.	Ops.	Spec.	Tr.	W. F.	Y. S.	U. S.	U. S. N. C.	H. O.
Task. Div.	C. in C.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Div. For.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. S. S. S.	Com. Air	Attached at	Operations	Com. Div.	W. F.	Com. Ft. Tr.	State	Com. Course	Return to Room No.				

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From Z Date 17 Sept., 1937 Serial No. R-618 File No. EF30(G)/P9  
Source of information Observations (Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
Subject GERMANY Political and Military Conditions  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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The biggest event of the Congress was the Parade of the Defense Forces, in which 16,000 men of the Army, Navy and Air Force participated. Exercises of various kinds were executed to show the functions of the various weapons of the defense forces. Most of the exercises were of a complicated nature, particularly in the limited space within the amphitheatre. They were all performed with precision, showing not only excellent organization but in addition, the thorough manner in which all branches of the services are being trained. There were no weapons of any nature, except aircraft (see Z Report No. R-615 of 17 September 1937) which had not participated in this same exercise last year.

Participating for the first time were units of two Party organizations which have been organized during the year, viz, Nationalsozialistische Fliegerkorps (NSFK) (Sports or Reserve Flyers Corps) and the Nationalsozialistische Kraftfahrer Korps (Volunteer and Reserve Automobile and Motorcycle Corps).

2. General impressions gained during this visit, through conversation and observations, are as follows:

MILITARY:

- German military organization is excellent.
- Military forces of all branches are well trained.
- Old type airplanes are being rapidly replaced by new types.
- Authorities are well satisfied with present army and anti-aircraft weapons.
- Infantry is being stinted for money in favor of Artillery and Air Force (including anti-aircraft force).

POLITICAL

- German populace is very susceptible to spectacles, and officials of the Nazi Party use this characteristic overtime in influencing public opinion.
- Although much enthusiasm on the part of the crowds was displayed upon the appearance of Hitler, Hess and Goering, this enthusiasm appeared less spontaneous and of considerably less volume than was observed last year. This year there were far fewer people on the streets through which Hitler was going to pass than last year, and although he always obtained cheers, there was nothing prolonged about them. Cheering ceased as soon as he had left the immediate vicinity.
- Without exception, the German populace is extremely proud of their armed forces.

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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																										
Tech. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Int. Aff.	Com. Sec. Aff.	C. in C. Asia	Com. S.S.S.	Com. Air	Attached at	Operations				State		Com-mence		Returns to		Exec. No.									
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ANA/del

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From Z Date 26 October 1957 Serial No. R-690 File No. EP30(N)/S80  
 Source of information Personal Observation  
 Subject GERMANY Armament - German Navy

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

German Naval Vessels - Armament of.

UNCLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 303 of (a)

~~RESTRICTED~~

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

1. Opportunity was recently had to visit the German cruiser "LEIPZIG" in the Navy Yard at Wilhelmshaven as well as to see from close aboard the new 26,000 ton battleship "SCHARNHORST", now about 70% completed, and the Panzerschiff "ADMIRAL SCHEER", both alongside the seawall in Wilhelmshaven.

2. LEIPZIG after 3-Gun turret (15 cm guns). The distance between guns in this ship appears to be unusually great. It is estimated that the distance between turret guns is about six (6) feet. The three guns appear to be rigidly cross-connected. The breech mechanisms are of the "drop-plug" type, hand operated, similar to our 3" and 5"/25 anti-aircraft guns. The gas ejection is done by air suction rather than by air pressure as in our service. For this purpose there is a pipe or trunk of rectangular cross-section immediately over and above the breech of each turret gun. Each pipe or trunk is hooked up with an electrically operated suction blower. This suction pipe moves up and down with the gun, being pivoted at about the trunnions. When the plug is opened this suction draws the gases from the bores of the guns and discharges them outside the turret. At no time is the turret under pressure. Using semi-fixed ammunition, there is less chance of accident from "flarebacks" than when using separate ammunition.

Semi-fixed ammunition is used. Electric conveyor hoists, supplemented by hand operated hoists, are used for both powder cases and shell. Both hoists are flame proof. Loading is by hand - also hand ramming. Shell and powder (loading) trays are similar to ours.

The floor plating of the turret is metal and is made "skid" proof by irregularly arranged projections.

There is no turret officer's booth and apparently no method of or instruments for local control. No periscope or director.

The empty powder cases are cleared out of the turret to the deck through a door in the rear of the turret. This door is about 3-1/2' x 5'.

There is a hood on each side of the turret with large openings, about 12" x 24", to enable the turret officer to see outside. No rangefinders in the turret.

The turret is said to be unusually quiet with motors, blowers, hoists, etc. running.

3. PANZERSCHIFF "ADMIRAL SCHEER" was seen from close aboard but not visited. Her 26 cm turret guns were being elevated and depressed as we passed. The maximum elevation for her turret guns is estimated to be 35° with a depression of from 3 to 5°. This is confirmed by the size and shape of her turret gun ports.

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Tech. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sen. For.	C. in C. Aide	Com. S.S.S.	Com. Ab	Assigned to	Com. Staff								

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From 2 Date 26 October, 1937 Serial No. R-690 File No. EFEO(N)/S80  
 Source of information Personal Observation  
 Subject GERMANY Armament - German Navy

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

The distance between her turret guns is estimated to be about eight (8) feet between bores of adjacent guns. It is without doubt much greater than in the U.S. Navy.

4\* SCHARNHORST - New 26,000 ton battleship, with nine 28 cm guns in 5 turrets, was seen en passant. Several of her 28 cm guns were observed on deck. They did not appear to be more than 35 calibers in length and very heavily built. No opportunity was offered to go on board this ship and only a hasty view was had of her. She was stated to be about 70% completed and will probably be commissioned in the late Spring of 1938.

No opportunity was had to look in the bores of any guns on this trip to observe rifling.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. (b)(1) and (b)(7) or (b)(7)(D)

OSD letter, May 1, 1978

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

~~REDACTED~~

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ATTACHE'S REPORT A-1-i, 54874-01

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From Z Date 14 January 58 Serial No. R-54 File No. EP#30(A)/NLO  
 Source of information Conversation  
 Subject GERMANY Underground Aircraft Hangars  
(Nation reported on) (Indicate title on per indic sheet) (Subject)

Reference  
 Note:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Existence of Underground Hangars for Storage of Military Aircraft.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. For the past two or three years there have been persistent rumors of, and occasional newspaper and magazine references made, to Germany's underground hangars for the storage of military airplanes. German Air Ministry officials have consistently denied the existence or building of such hangars, usually stating that such a project was desirable but too expensive. Until this time the writer has neither seen nor heard anything during his stay in Germany which would indicate that there is any truth to the rumors.

However, the writer has been informed (authentically, it is believed) that a large German corporation which manufactures paint, has been requested by the Air Ministry to bid on supplying paint to cover the cork (?) ceilings of seven (7) underground hangars, with an option to provide paint for five (5) more hangars at a later date. Due to the fact that the order is one of considerable size, and to the curiosity of the president of the paint company, he asked and obtained permission to visit one of the hangars. The one visited is located in Lüneberger Heide, near the city of Lüneberg. The hangars are of two sizes. The ceiling of the smaller size hangars contains 4000 square meters, and the ceiling of the larger ones contains 15,000 square meters. The hangars are located on a line starting roughly at Stettin and ending at Münster and passing through the cities of Strelitz, Lüneberg, Bremen, Osnabruck.

A cross-sectional view of a hangar is shown below.



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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(K) and 3(D) or (G)

OSD Letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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	C. in C.	Com. Int. Per.	Com. Sec. Per.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. S. & S.	Com. Ab.	Attache at	Operations				Com. Sec.	Com. Tr.	State	Com. Sec.	Return to	Exec. Dir.

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A-1-i, 5484-C  
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From Z Date 15 JAN., 1938 Serial No. R-35 File No. EF30(A)/A3-1  
(Communication cover serials with January 1938) (Global account number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY New Airplanes for German Navy.  
(Station reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference (a) Z-Report, R-35, dated 15 January 1938.

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Models He-114 and Do-22 have been accepted by the Air Ministry for production.

1. A so-called competition has been held for the purpose of providing the naval arm of the German Air Forces with a suitable airplane, to be based ashore but to operate over the water for short range bombing, torpedo and scouting purposes.
2. Three companies participated in the competition:
  - a) ARADO, producing the Ar-95, a single engine, twin float sea-plane,
  - b) HEINKEL, producing the He-114, a twin float, twin engine sea-plane,
  - c) DORNIER, producing the Do-22, the characteristics of which are unknown at this time.
3. Both the He-114 and the Do-22 have been accepted by the Air Ministry for production.
4. The Ar-95 has been turned down by the Air Ministry and released for export. Yugoslavia has purchased some of this type and Sweden is considering the purchase of manufacturing rights. For characteristics and performance, see reference (a).
5. Since the three planes were designed to perform the same job, it is reasonable to assume that the performance of the Do-22 and the He-114 approximates that of the Ar-95 (see reference (a)).

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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Tech. Dir.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sea. For.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. S. S. S.	Com. At.	Attended at								
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ATTACHÉ'S REPORT **10725-A**, **A-1-g** ANAA-del

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From 2 Date 27 January, 1958 Serial No. E-66 File No. EF80(A)/QM  
(Commence new series each January first) (Subst. proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Observations and Press

Subject G E R M A N Y German Aircraft Industry Expansion of  
(Indicate reported on) (Indicate title as per Index sheet) (Substitute)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_  
 Summary: (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Expansion of the German Aircraft Industry.

1. As an indication of the unbelievable expansion of the German Aircraft Manufacturing Industry, the following information is submitted:

The Heinkel Werke GmbH, located at Oranienburg, near Berlin, has just increased its capital from five to twelve million Reichsmarks. This company was formed approximately one year ago and has started production within the past two months in a completely new and very fine factory. This factory is to be enlarged. Note: The Heinkel Werke GmbH is not the same company as the Ernst Heinkel Flugzeugwerke located at Rostock and Warnemünde.

The Bfcher Flugzeugbau GmbH, located at Rangsdorf, near Berlin, has recently increased its capital from thirty thousand to one million two hundred thousand Reichsmarks. This factory, which manufactures sport and training planes, within the past year has been tripled in size and now has a capacity of four planes per day. In flying over the factory on 25 January 1958, it was noted that additional buildings are being constructed.

12

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 303 or (S)  
 OSD letter, May, 4, 1972  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From 2 Date 28 February, 1938 Serial No. R-115 File No. EFEO/A-5

Source of information Foreign Naval (Indicate source as per footnote sheet) (Indicate report number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises - Sept. 1937. (Indicate title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Inclosure: (A) Map of Operations

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Report of the German Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises held the latter part of September, 1937. **MAR 12 1938**

1. The following report of the German joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises held the latter part of September 1937 is forwarded as of interest. These are the first exercises of this character held in Germany in recent years. They were attended by Mussolini and high Italian staff officers who were in Germany at the time and by the British Chief of the Army General Staff. The routine maneuvers and exercises in the German Navy have, since the Spanish Civil War, been somewhat curtailed due to the necessity of having ships in the Mediterranean.

2. One of the primary lessons learned from these joint exercises in September appears to be the lack of complete cooperation between the Air Force and the other forces engaged. It is not believed that the German Navy or the Army is completely satisfied with an unified and independent Air Force and that finally the Navy will have its own aviation. However, the present time with the rapid expansion of the Air Force under Field Marshal Göring, is not considered the propitious moment for the Navy to press their claims for a separate Air Force. It is felt that Field Marshal Göring with his vast amount of energy, coupled with the fact that he has tremendous influence with Herr Hitler and in the Party, can do more for aviation in general now than could be obtained if the Navy had its separate Air Force.

3. German Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises, September 1937.

a) Objectives and General Postulates: The general aim was to test joint conduct and operation of the three defensive arms and to study possibilities of effecting troop transport in the Baltic and protection of German shipping in those waters. Besides joint action with land and sea forces, the activities of the air forces were to include independent operations within the territory of the maneuvers to a very considerable extent. This territory embraced large portions of North and East Germany (East Prussia) and the waters of the South and East Baltic. The Island of Rügen was not included as it represented neutral territory. The land operations were held in Pomerania and Mecklenburg.

The general postulates were as follows: A Blue eastern power and a Red western power were engaged in war. The frontiers between Blue and Red extended from Rügen in a southerly direction as far as Magdeburg and Coburg, passing between Schwerin and Waren. East Prussia belonged to the territory of the Blue power. At the opening of the exercises on the morning of September 20th the deployment of the land forces was not yet complete. Upon receiving reinforcements from East Prussia, Blue opened an offensive, the object of which was to occupy Hamburg, an important Red harbor and industrial centre. Red, in turn, intended to advance against Blue territory north of the Elbe, anticipating Blue's expected offensive.


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OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

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ATTACHE'S REPORT F-9-a/20521

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From Z Date 28 February 1938 Serial No. R-113 File No. EF30/A5  
(Classroom use series each January issue) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Foreign Naval

Subject GERMANY Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises - Sept. 1937.  
(Station reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

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 GAO Issues: May 4, 1972  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

The premises of the naval war were as follows: The operations on both sides were confined to mine and submarine warfare. Encounters between light naval forces had taken place. A Blue transport fleet was concentrated in Königsberg. Embarkation of Blue troops had already begun.

The corresponding situation in the air was approximately equal strength on both sides (that is, neither had been able to attain supremacy). Bad weather and serious casualties on both sides had resulted in a decline of activity.

The first aim of the Blue naval forces was to transport troops from East Prussia and to protect the shipping to and from Swinemünde.

The Red land forces advanced against Blue territory to assist the Red fleet, and the principal task was to prevent Blue's land forces from receiving reinforcement by sea from East Prussia. Furthermore, Red was to carry on commercial warfare and endeavor to cut off Blue's sea connections with foreign countries.

b) Conduct of the War Maneuvers and Combined Strength: The Commander in Chief of the German Army, General Field Marshal von Blomberg. The command was vested in a General Staff on the principle of the Army General Staff in time of war. The Chief of Staff was General List. Other members of the Staff were Chief of the Army General Staff Beck, an Admiral (probably Guse) and Chief of Air Staff Stumpff. Each was under the command of his Commander in Chief (Navy - General Admiral Raeder; Army - General von Fritsch; Air - Secretary of State for Air, General Milch, the officer next in rank to General Göring). The General Headquarters during the exercises were the airfield Tretow at Demmin. The three Commanders in Chief with their staffs were stationed in New Brandenburg, Swinemünde and Gatow.

The Commander in Chief of the Blue land forces was the Commander in Chief of Army Corps I, General von Runstadt. Admiral Carls was Commander in Chief of Blue's naval forces.

The Commander in Chief of Red land forces was Commander in Chief of the X Army Corps, Lieutenant General von Knochenhauer. The Commander in Chief of Red's navy was Vice-Admiral Boehm, Commander in Chief of the Scouting Forces. It is not known who was the Commander in Chief of the Air Forces.

The strength of the forces engaged was as follows:

- BLUE  
 (Army) - II Army Corps, 1 division.  
 III Army Corps, 1 motorized unit and 1 division of militia.

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Tech. Div.	C. in C.	Com. Sec. For.	Com.	C. & C. Aide	Com. S.S.R.	Com. Air	Attached at				Operations				State	Com. Sec.	Returns to: Exam. No.					
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From 2 Date 28 February, 1938 Serial No. E-115 File No. EF50/A5  
 Source of information Foreign Naval  
 Subject G E R M A N Y Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises - Sept. 1937.

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 MAY 21 1943

BLUE (Continued)

(Navy) - Armored battleship GRAF SPEE; cruisers LEIPZIG, KARLSRUHE; destroyers, submarines, convoy ships, minesweepers, mine-layers, 8 merchantships armed with A.A. guns of different calibers, for troop transportation.

(Bases) - Swinemünde, Pillau and Königsberg.

RED

(Army) - I Army Corps, 5 divisions, 5 armored divisions and 1 division of militia.

(Navy) - Armored battleships DEUTSCHLAND which promised greater strength but had considerably lower speed than Blue's flagship; cruiser NUREMBERG; surface torpedo craft; submarines; and minesweepers.

Bombers, scouting and pursuit planes also participated in the maneuvers as well as torpedo planes (probably) and some divisions of parachute infantry.

c) Course of Maneuvers: Blue forces. Protection for troop transports. These troops consisted of 1 infantry regiment and 1 field artillery division. Detached commands for Blue naval forces, 2 cruisers, an unknown number of destroyers and convoy ships, 1 minesweeping flotilla. 1 battleship and a cruiser formed protection for convoys.

Blue's submarines were concentrated west of Rügen and Red's main fleet was awaiting orders.

It is likely that at the opening of the maneuvers, Blue's main fleet was located in Swinemünde from which place it was able to learn Red's intentions. Red forces took off northwards to seek contact with the main Red forces. On the afternoon of the 20th, the main Blue forces were located between Gotland and Oland, taking a southerly course.

The disposition of the Red forces. The aim of Red's naval forces was to regard prohibition of troop reinforcements from East Prussia to the Reich. Information concerning this was communicated to the Red command through agents and air scouting planes. Therefore the Red command despatched a number of submarines into positions for observation off Pillau and the main channels of commerce, and laid some mines. Mine blockades and the Coast Battery Erhardt Schmidt were to prevent enemy vessels entering the Mecklenburg Bays through the Belt.

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Director	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																	
Yech. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Int. For.	Com. Sea. For.	C. in C. Asia	Com. S.S.A.	Com. Air	Attached at		Operations				State	Com-merce	Return to			
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From Z Date 28 February, 1958 Serial No. R-115 File No. EF50/A5  
(Commons new series each January first) (Index paper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Source of information Foreign Naval  
 Subject GERMANY Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises - Sept. 1957  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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 E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 303 or (S)  
 ON 01 Jan. 1978  
 Date MAY 21 1973  
 By SLB

The following gives an account of the commercial warfare and the aircraft operations in connection therewith.

September 20th. Weather. During the day, poor visibility with low flying conditions, rendered air scouting difficult. At night, the weather cleared off and there was moonlight. The Red forces, which learned of the landing of troops in Königsberg by means of its air scouting forces, left Kiel in the morning and cruised through Bornholm Narrows past Oland's banks eastward, to attack the convoy which had left by night for Swinemünde. Between Oland and Gotland they encountered the Blue forces. From about 1600 until morning, there was an artillery battle at long range between the two battleships, which then moved off in a southerly direction. At nightfall both forces steamed off to the south, the Red forces towards southeast Bornholm to come up with the convoys, the Blue forces to units with the latter. The battle caused no appreciable losses or damage to either side.

The troop landings which took place at night were completed at day-break. The convoys concentrated at Pillau from whence they departed at nightfall. Merchant ships were formed in single columns. The convoy forces were grouped as follows: mine protection by minesweepers - guard, 1 flotilla of minesweepers; submarine convoy - fleet tenders which, in view of their relatively strong A.A. defense, furnished good air protection; cruisers and destroyers formed flank protection on convoy's starboard bow. Directly after the convoys left Pillau the convoys were subjected to an air attack. Airplanes were reflected sharply against the western horizon while it was yet light - a circumstance which proved to be very fatal. Good scouting work by the air pilots of the attacking forces enabled a submarine to sink the two front transports. Another sortie at night resulted in a submarine attack on the convoys. The convoys managed to get out of the way and were protected in the meantime by the smoke screens laid by the convoy vessels.

In the morning, Red forces bombarded the harbor works in Pillau and Königsberg but were driven off by A.A. and pursuit planes. In spite of the continuous bad weather during the forenoon and afternoon there was lively activity on both sides which cleared the situation for the commands of both forces. Blue's air forces bombarded Hamburg both during the day and at night.

September 21. The convoys left at night, close to the German coast. Limited visibility after nightfall and the fog increased. Meanwhile, in spite of this good luck, Red scouting planes (undetected by the Blue convoys) established the latter's position. At about dawn, three groups of very low flying bombers attacked the convoys, making a total of five attacks in succession and from different altitudes. The first was a complete surprise. Hits were made by explosives, incendiary and gas bombs. One transport was sunk and one other disabled. About 1100 the Blue scouting planes sighted the Red forces to starboard. Convoys moved out of the way, protected by a very thick smoke screen from the guard forces.

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From Z Date 28 February, 1938 Serial No. R-115 File No. EP50/A5  
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(b) and (d) or (g)  
 OSD Letter, May, 4, 1972  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

An encounter took place shortly afterwards between the main forces which resulted in Red's flagship being seriously damaged by a torpedo. In point of fact the umpire expressed the wish that for the sake of practice the convoy be given the chance to continue its course to Swinemünde.

Red's command now summoned air forces (torpedo planes among them) which attacked the convoys with the result that the transport was adjudged sunk by a torpedo. Some of the torpedoes failed to function. At the same time, the Red motor torpedoboats attacked the convoys with great success, concerning which the British Air Attache who witnessed the attack from the GRILLE said to me that the guard forces as well as a catapulted Blue plane, had laid smoke screens very skillfully. In the meantime the Red forces had been successful and in some cases had made use of the Blue smoke screen for their attack.

The convoys could then unite with the main Blue forces and continue their course to Swinemünde. There was a delay in the meantime on account of the mines so that the transports did not reach Swinemünde roads until 2100 where they probably waited until the visibility was better before dropping anchor. About 2230 the weather suddenly cleared and the coast batteries and harbor of Swinemünde were then subjected simultaneously to a very severe bombardment from the air which lasted until after midnight when the convoys were able to enter the harbor.

The night air raids caused considerable damage which was very ably simulated so that a correspondent described the city as looking like a flaming sheet of fire. Bombing tactics were practiced in the night air raids, the planes attacking from different altitudes. Massed, that is, in group formation, air raids at night are prohibited in Germany, at least under the Peace Treaty. The fact was established that by using very strong searchlights the flyers can be completely blinded.

22 September. The Blue naval forces occupied the whole day in Swinemünde for refueling. At night a Ble commercial convoy set out, with course eastward, probably for the neutral land of Rügen. As to its fate, nothing is known.

For a greater portion of the day the coast batteries, harbor works and shipping in the harbor of Swinemünde were subjected to heavy bombardment in which powerful bombers played an important role. The harbor of Stettin was also attacked from the air. Artificial fog was used here in A.A. defense.

23-24 September. At night, between the 23rd and 24th, Blue submarines successfully bombarded Red bases in Mecklenburg. One submarine was lost. The rest limited their activities to commercial war in conjunction with the other naval forces.

24 September. In the forenoon a strong Blue bombing division bom-

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Subject G. E. R. M. A. N. Y. Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises - Sept. 1937.  
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R. O. 13612, Sec. 3(F) and 3(D) or (E)  
 GOI Issues, May, 1, 1972  
 By SLR Date NOV 21 1973

barded Kiel, doing principal damage to the dockyards and shipping. The loss was considerable.

25 September. The Red naval forces set out in the forenoon and sank one Blue commercial convoy north of Rügen which was reported by air scouts. Thereupon the Red naval forces left for Swinemünde in order to cut off Blue's connections with East Prussia and foreign countries. The Red air forces caused such great damage to Swinemünde's coast batteries that a bombardment from the sea was no longer considered as involving heavy risks. Departing Red forces silenced the coast batteries and then blockaded the entrance to the harbor. This close the war maneuvers.

d) Experiences and Lessons of the War Maneuvers: Preliminary studies in the staff organizations furnished the basis for the maneuvers. Nothing is known regarding the extent of the actual experience applied in the maneuvers but from what could be determined from a conversation with an officer in the War Ministry, the conduct of the maneuvers did not function entirely satisfactorily. Disagreements are supposed to have arisen between the air and other commands regarding the use of the air forces. For example, the command of the Blue naval forces claims that on the day of the 21st they demanded pursuit planes for the protection of convoys but it was impossible to obtain them for the reason that the air forces necessary for this work were occupied with other duties. The convoys therefore had no air protection, a circumstance which probably contributed to the heavy losses.

The aforesaid high naval command in Germany desired that the naval air forces, like those in England and France, work in close cooperation with the Fleet. Maybe the experiences gained in the annual maneuvers will contribute to that realization in the future when Germany's air force is increased to full strength. That the centralization of the air force command at set periods would be to the advantage of the navy, also was conditionally admitted by naval circles.

Blue's naval command was faced by a much more difficult problem. The land forces demanded the immediate transfer of all troops from East Prussia, for instance, one infantry regiment with an artillery division and a field artillery division. The Blue naval command had to see that direct connections were established as well as providing the convoys, setting the time of departures, and settle the question of the size of the convoys. In the meantime the naval forces had no provisions for transporting so many troops. The general situation was such that at the time in question it involved an extraordinary great risk to send troops by water. Blue did not command the sea routes between East Prussia and the Reich. The Red naval forces were almost completely intact and had stronger armament than the Blue forces. This did not prevent the Red forces from being considerably restricted in their freedom of movement through the activities of a Blue submarine or eventually by Blue mines laid out on the route of the Red forces. In view of the restricted territory of the operations and the circumstances

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Subject G E R M A N Y Joint Army, Navy, Air Force Exercises - Sept. 1937.  
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 303 or (B)  
 OSD Letter, May, 1, 1973

By SLR Date 10/21/93

that Blue's command was limited to Königsberg and Pillau for the embarkation of troops, there was very little prospect of properly preparing the enterprise and keeping it, and the time of the convoys departure secret.

The maneuvers had confirmed the correctness of the above viewpoint. Experiences regarding the submarines and air forces showed that there was a great possibility of success even if the convoy was well protected. Subsequent activities, however, did not live up to expectations in view of the fact that the convoy had no air escort. The press praised the submarines very highly for their contribution to the maneuvers and for fulfilling all demands placed on them. There participated in the maneuvers the first and second submarine flotillas, the first consisting of twelve 250 ton submarines and the latter of twelve 700 and 500 ton vessels. The development of the German submarine weapon within the relatively short space of two years was considered a notable performance.

The naval air forces were also warmly praised for the fine manner in which they accomplished their tasks in the maneuvers. This year saw the participating of the intelligence corps consisting of naval officers and of those holding the highest positions in the Air Force (VI Air Corps). In recapitulation it can be said that the experiences gained in the maneuvers largely refuted the idea that troop transport within the Baltic was combined with high risk in event of insufficient protection. According to what an officer in the Oberkommando expressly said to me, even the German military command already drew this conclusion from the maneuvers.

The situation visualized by the 1937 maneuvers was that which would arise in a war between Russia and Germany in which Poland was neutral. In the event that Estonia and other Baltic states had an alliance with Germany, the premises would remain the same though cutting off of the sea connections would render them liable to enemy attack, and troop movements would be very complicated and combined with very great risks. It is true that the German Navy, in the future, will be considerably superior to the Russian, but on the other hand, Germany must reckon with a two front war at sea which would divide the naval strength.

The naval forces which would be at disposition to convoy and protect commercial shipping, etc. in the Baltic would be very limited under these circumstances, though the German military authorities would probably endeavor to neutralize this condition by laying a blockade across the outlet of the Finnish Gulf. Experiences in the World War have shown, however, that such blockades can never be fully effective against submarines, of which type of vessel the Russian Fleet, for example, could place not less than sixty units in the Baltic. The prospects of crippling the Russian Fleet would therefore be very slight and the transport of troops to East Prussia or the Baltic states would be combined with serious risks. The transport of troops, for various reasons, would be better by land than by sea, and as far as Germany is concerned, in the case of war or the danger of war, it would be obliged sooner or later to transport such troops through the Polish corri-

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NA-del

ATTACHE'S REPORT

20533-E  
C-10-

Personnel names, titles, and addresses; this report is necessary because of the limited personnel in O. N. I. and because of the urgency for quickly disseminating information from attachés. These copies will be distributed by O. N. I. as per instructions or otherwise, according to subject matter.

From Z Date 22 July 1938 Serial No. E-440 File No. EF80/P81  
 Source of information Reliable Conversation  
 Subject GERMANY Military and Naval Activities  
 Reference (a) Z Report E-554 of 1 July, 1938. => 20533-7

Summary: (The review, analysis, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the information gathered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Increased military and naval activities, presumably related to the Czecho-Slovakian question.

1. I have gathered from reliable sources in conversations and otherwise:

a) The work on the counter-Maginot line along the French border is being pushed to the utmost. Ten thousand masons and concrete workers have been sent recently to this work, together with Autobahn laborers and others from all parts of Germany. A large number of Pioneer (Engineer) divisions have been detailed there.

b) At Kiel. Day and night shifts were observed on the aircraft carrier, at present about half completed.  
 Day and night shifts observed on one large cruiser in the floating dock, name not known.  
 One 10,000 ton cruiser, not named - probably "I" - on ways, ready for launching.

c) Navy, general. Destroyers are going into commission more frequently than in the past.  
 Rumors of a large reserve of submarine machinery and periscopes on hand, for which the necessary hulls could be built in a very short time.

d) Reserve divisions being called to active duty 15 August, after harvest is over, presumably for Fall maneuvers.

2. It has been breathed that in event of war with England, Germany will establish a submarine and seaplane base at the northwest corner of Spain (Cormuna or Vigo) to operate against British commerce.

5. With her back secured by the counter-Maginot line, Germany will feel safer about a push to the East, in the belief that France and England will not consider Czecho-Slovakia worth the lives, time and money required to break through the line of fortifications.

4. It is not believed that Germany, Government or people, want war. The building up of the armed forces is primarily for a show of German strength at diplomatic conferences, either to force the Czechs to grant very favorable terms to the Sudeten Germans or to hold the British and French back if and when the Germans take forcible measures in Czecho-Slovakia.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) of (SR)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

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ATTACHE'S REPORT A-1-2/20814-A

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From 2 Date 30 Sept., 1938. Serial No. R-529. File No. 2250/PS-1 119.

Source of Information Observation. (Indicate proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject Germany. (Date reported on) Nuremberg National Party Day. (Indicate title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

Note:—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

Defense Demonstration at Nuremberg during National Party Week, September, 1938.

1972, Sec. 3(2) and 3(3) 300 Index, May 1, 1972

22541

SLR Date MAY 21 1973

- References: (a) 2-Report, R-529, dated 16 September 1938. (b) M.A. Berlin Report, No. 16, 151, dated 27 September, 1938.

- 1. Supplementing references (a) and (b), the following is submitted to record the "first impressions" of the writer on the first occasion to witness a demonstration of the state of development of German air and military forces.
2. As indicated in reference (b), the flight of the latest models of airplanes past the reviewing stand was so brief and in such rapid succession that none except very general observations was possible. No opportunity was offered for inspection of any of the airplanes on the ground. The model designations were unknown to the writer and reference is therefore invited to the descriptions submitted in reference (b) representing subsequently developed particulars.
3. From a technical viewpoint, the outstanding items of interest were: (a) the twin-fuselage, twin-engine scout, (Focke-Wulf 189); (b) the unsymmetrical scout having its single engine in line with a very narrow fuselage and an off-center nacelle for the pilot, observer and gunner, (Blohm & Voss Ha 141) - both of these designs representing the unusual experiments being tried to obtain better vision, accommodation and arrangement for pilot and crew than is usually obtainable in the smaller models with conventional "in-line" lay-out; (c) the two heavy fighters, Messerschmidt BF 110, and Focke-Wulf 187, both of which appeared very fast and clean; (d) the Heinkel single seat fighter He 112, similar to the Messerschmidt BF 109, which is alleged to be capable of a top speed of 700 Km/hr (437 m.p.h.), though admission was obtained from a very reliable source that German performance figures are based on a 1-minute rating of the engine; and (e) the Focke-Wulf helicopter, the characteristics of which have by now been widely publicized, but which when seen for the first time presents a convincing demonstration that a development hitherto never attained either by airplanes or autogyro is already well underway and gives great future promise for the special purposes for which this type is intended.
4. From an operating viewpoint, it was apparent that the flying, both as regards individual pilot technique and as regards the training in section, squadron and wing operations of the kind which normally are presented at demonstrations and parades, was of a better-than-average order. The low ceiling prevailing during the show effectively limited the extent and variety of the maneuvers which could be attempted. In consequence, it was not possible for

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From Z Date 30 Sept., 1938 Serial No. R-553 File No. EE30/P9-1/ A19.  
(Commence new series each January first) (Indicate proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Observation.

Subject GERMANY. Nuremberg National Party Day.  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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page two. E. O. 11642, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (E)

GSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

example, to draw any valid conclusions regarding service tactics from the simulated dive-bombing attacks which generally consisted of shallow dives from a push-over approach with only an occasional individual exception of short dives of about a 60° angle. The timing and precision with which individual airplanes, sections and squadrons executed their various parts of the program indicated not only a meticulously planned but also a faultlessly executed schedule. In this connection, it should be noted that the total number of airplanes involved in all of the exercises was between 250 and 300, and that, of necessity, they were based at several outlying fields, making the coordinated operations on a crowded program especially noteworthy.

5. The air items of the program, after the parade of the new models, were:
  - (a) a stunting demonstration by nine training planes;
  - (b) an exhibition of stunting over, and precision landing on, the field by 3 sail planes towed to the starting point by airplanes;
  - (c) landing on the field of a section of 4 Fieseler Storch planes, led by General Udet - these planes have slow landing, short take-off and rapid climb characteristics, similar to the American McDonald airplane, demonstrated and tested at the N.A.C.A. Langley Field laboratory a few years ago;
  - (d) attack of dive-bombers and attack-planes resisted by anti-aircraft ground batteries in the course of which there was much firing from the ground and streaming of blue smoke from the airplanes - the rapidity with which anti-aircraft batteries were placed, made ready for action and fired was very impressive - cf. reference "a";
  - (e) take-off of the Fieseler Storchs within the bowl of the grandstand with unusually short run and very steep climb after take-off.

6. The preparations made for the group of air attachés such as special sleeper train, serving as hotel accommodations, sightseeing tours in Nuremberg, Bamberg and surrounding country, inspection of troop camps and lunch at officers' mess tent, tea at the Pommerfeld Schloss of the Schoeneberg family, attendance at the memorial services of Sunday, the defense demonstrations of Monday and the midnight tribute to Der Fuehrer, closing the Party Week, together with excellent service and open-handed hospitality throughout, offered a very full and very enjoyable program from the time of departure from Berlin Saturday evening, September 10th, until the return Tuesday noon, September 13th.

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F-6-d, 4459

Encl to Z-663 of Nov. 23  
1938

G-2 Report

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6800

GERMANY (Combat)

Subject: The German Army in the Czech Crisis.

DECLASSIFIED

I. EVALUATION

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (4)

GSD letter, May 1, 1973

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

The following report which attempts to reconstruct the German plan for the attack on Czechoslovakia and to estimate the strength of the army which Germany could have put into the field upon general mobilization, is based upon information obtained from a variety of sources. Because of the measures of secrecy which the German Army maintains, the report is naturally incomplete. It is believed, however, that in substance it is correct.

It is hoped that this report may be of interest as a study of a plan of campaign of an army which today has no equal in Europe in its ability to act swiftly and powerfully and as a possible key in evaluation of future military operations of the German Army.

II. SUMMARY

Germany commenced concentrating troops on the Czechoslovakian frontier about Sept. 22nd in anticipation of a general attack scheduled for Oct. 1st.

These troop concentrations consisted of active units only, assembled to form the framework around which the army would have been built upon general mobilization.

For the attack against Czechoslovakia, the German Army was organized into 5 Army Groups which included 10 Corps and 30 Divisions.

Army Group 1 under command of Generaloberst von Bundstedt, consisting of the VIII Corps 8th, 18th and 28th Divisions, and 3rd Armored Division and the III Corps with the 30 and 25rd Divisions, was to attack from southeastern Silesia, making its main effort on its left. The 3rd Armored Division attacking on the left of the VIII Corps through Ratibor was to form a junction with Army Group 5 attacking from Austria, thus cutting Czechoslovakia in two. With Army Group 1 were the Regiment General Goering A.C. and an Army Parachute Battalion, as well as the bulk of the heavy artillery.

Army Group 5, under Generaloberst v. List, consisting of the XVII Corps with the 2nd Armored, 4th Light, 29th, 44th and 3rd Mountain Divisions, was to attack from north of Vienna, making its main effort on its right with the 2nd Armored and 4th Light Divisions and effect a junction with Army Group 1.

Army Group 2, under Generaloberst Bock, consisting of the IV Corps with the 4th and 24th Divisions and the SS Standarte "Totenkopf", on the right of Army Group 1, was to attack from north against the area Aussig - Melnick - Reichenberg which, information in the possession of the German General Staff indicated, was only lightly fortified.

Army Group 4, under command of Generaloberst v. Reichenau, consisting of the XVI Corps, 1st Armored and 1st Light Divisions, XIV Corps 15th and 2nd Divisions (mot.) and the XIII Corps 17th and 35th Divisions, was to attack the gap in the Czech fortifications which it was believed existed between Pilsen and Rakowitz.

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Army Groups "E.B.V." (Zur Besonderen Verwendung - "Special Service") under Generaloberst v. Leeb, consisting of the IX Corps, 45th and 9th Divisions. VII Corps, 1st Mtn. and 7th Div., V Corps, 10th Div. and SS Standarte "Germania", was to attack against the line of the River Moldau, making its main effort with the 1st Mountain Division in the direction of Wallern, where Czech defenses were supposed to be weak.

For this operation Germany expected to mobilize, both for protection of her western frontier and for the attack against Czechoslovakia her entire available trained man power.

It was stated that mobilization would have taken from two to three days after the general mobilization order was published, when the framework of the army concentrated on the Czechoslovakian frontier would have been filled out.

IN HER MOBILIZATION PLANS, GERMANY CONTEMPLATED A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM THE TRADITIONAL ARMY OF ACTIVE, RESERVE AND LANDWEHR DIVISIONS. IN GENERAL, EACH ACTIVE DIVISION, EXCEPT MECHANIZED DIVISIONS, WOULD HAVE CONSISTED OF TWO ACTIVE REGIMENTS AND ONE RESERVE REGIMENT AND EACH RESERVE DIVISION OF ONE ACTIVE REGIMENT AND TWO RESERVE REGIMENTS, WHILE EACH ACTIVE REGIMENT WOULD HAVE HAD ONE RESERVE BATTALION AND EACH RESERVE REGIMENT ONE ACTIVE BATTALION. IN THIS MANNER THE ACTIVE ARMY WOULD BE DOUBLED, THE OLD DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND LINE DIVISIONS ABOLISHED, AND ALL TROOPS BROUGHT TO COMPARATIVE COMBAT EQUALITY.

The strength of the army which Germany could have mobilized was approximately 91 divisions or about 1, 700,000 men, exclusive of Air Corps and Navy.

### III. PLAN OF OPERATIONS

The military preparations for the reduction of Czechoslovakia commenced as early as May 1, 1938. Of first importance was the work of completing the fortifications on the western front to provide security against France and through that security to insure freedom of action, either political or military, against Czechoslovakia. At the same time work on the detailed plan of operations against Czechoslovakia was commenced and the number and nature of the troops to be employed and the method of general mobilization determined. Czechoslovakian training regulations were issued to all troops and training was definitely pointed towards combat with the Czech army. During the summer months special exercises were held in the reduction of pill boxes and in attack of fortified lines.

During the months of August and September between two hundred and two hundred and fifty thousand reservists and Landwehr including many who had received only the eight weeks Ergaenzungs courses were put through a two weeks period of training in Training Divisions under the instruction of training cadre from the active Army; an extension of the training program previously prescribed for the autumn maneuvers. At the same time the registration and inspection of civilian motor vehicles was brought up to date and many vehicles were commandeered not only for work on fortifications but for use of the Army in its training exercises.

As stated in Report No. 16,176 these preparations were not in the nature of a mobilization nor were the Training Divisions tactical units designed to be used in active operations. In fact, all evidence continued to point to the fact that the largest reserve or Landwehr unit formed was the regiment.

About the middle of September, all active units of the Army were brought to war strength, the combat units for the most part with reserves and the trains with Landwehr personnel. In addition, many corps and army technical units were organized and a number of anti-aircraft regiments formed from reserve and Landwehr personnel. It is also believed that practically all of the Landwehr fortress regiments and certain reserve border units were called to active service.

Actual troop concentrations on the Czechoslovak frontier commenced about Sept. 22nd but were confined, with the exception of certain anti-aircraft regiments and technical corps and army troops to active organizations brought to war strength by reserve and Landwehr personnel.

Although it is believed that a general European war was not anticipated, General Staff plans were prepared to take care of such an emergency. In view of the general European situation and in order to insure overcoming Czechoslovakian resistance in the minimum time, it was planned to mobilize the entire man power and resources of the nation before any military action was taken. The invasion of Czechoslovakia was set for Oct. 1st and it is believed that regardless of what might have occurred, the German Army would have marched on that date.

The troops, therefore, which had been concentrated on the Czechoslovakian frontier between Sept. 22nd and Sept. 28th, formed only the framework for the force which it was intended to employ. Germany expected to complete her mobilization within two or three days after the general mobilization order had been issued, when the framework of the army, already concentrated, would have been filled by additional reserve and Landwehr units and the attack launched. According to the highest authority, Germany would have put between ninety and one hundred divisions in the field, expanding the force concentrated for the attack on Czechoslovakia to around eight hundred thousand men and bringing the total strength of the field army to close to two million.

Based upon information in possession of the General Staff on the strength of the Czech fortifications and relying on a breakdown of Czech morale, it was anticipated that even were two, or perhaps three, of the five Army Groups to fail to penetrate the fortified line, Germany would be able to crush Czechoslovakian resistance within two weeks, when, if France entered the war, the entire military strength of Germany could be turned against her.

In preparation of the plan of attack against Czechoslovakia, very complete information in possession of the General Staff indicated that there were few Czech fortifications in the area Aussig - Melnick - Reichenberg; that a gap in the line of fortifications existed between Rakowitz and Pilsen; and that the line of the river Moldau near Wallern was only lightly fortified (see overlay attached). The whole German information on the Czech fortification line was exact and complete down to the most minute details as the fortifications had been largely constructed by Sudeten German labor.

Upon this information and upon information of the strength, disposition and morale of the Czech Army, the plan of attack was based.

Naturally complete information as to the strength and composition of the forces concentrated for the attack on Czechoslovakia is lacking. However, from identifications of actual units present, and from a knowledge of German organization backed by a statement issued to the German press by the head of the press group of the Wehrmacht General Staff, a fairly accurate estimate of the strength, composition and order of battle of the five Army Groups has been constructed.

In a statement to the press of October 26th, Major v. Fedel, Chief of the Press Section of the Wehrmacht Staff said that Five Army Groups were ready to attack Czechoslovakia from various sides. That these five Army Groups included ten Army Corps and around 30 Divisions, about one-half of which were motorized or armored. That around 500 airplanes had been concentrated around the frontier and that thousands of anti-aircraft guns of all calibers ringed the border.

Positive identifications check with this statement very closely. Ten Army Corps Headquarters and elements of 30 Divisions have been positively identified from various sources.

✦

The following is the order of battle of the German Army concentration for the attack of Czechoslovakia.

The German forces for the attack of Czechoslovakia were organized into five Army Groups as follows (See overlay attached).

1. Army Group I

- a. Commander: Generaloberst von Rundstedt.  
Headquarters: Oppeln.
- b. Order of battle from right to left Army Group I.  
18th Div.)  
28th Div.) VIII Corps  
8 Div. )  
3rd Armored Division.
- c. Reserve: III Corps, 30 Div. and elements of 22nd, 3rd and 23rd Div.
- d. Army Troops: Regt. General Goering A.C., Parachute Bn, Smoke Bn 2,  
Naval Art. Regt. 19, Kiel.

2. Army Group 5.

- a. Commander: General of Inf. List.  
Headquarters: Vienna.
- b. Order of battle right to left.  
2nd Armored Div. and 4th Light Div.  
29th Div. (mot.)  
3rd Mtn Div.  
44th Div.
- c. Reserves: Elements of 1st and 11th Div.

Note: The XVII Corps H.Q. was positively identified in this group, and it is possible that the XVIII Corps H.Q. was also present.

3. Army Group 2.

- a. Commander: Generaloberst von Bock.  
Headquarters: Dresden.
- b. Order of battle from right to left:  
24th Div. )  
SS Standarte Totenkopf ) IV Corps  
4th Div. )

4. Army Group 4.

- a. Commander: Generaloberst v. Reichenau.  
Headquarters: Hof.  
Chief of Staff: General Bernard.
- b. Order of battle right to left:  
17th Div. ) XIII Corps  
35th Div. )  
13th Div. (Mot.) ) XIV Corps  
2nd Div. )

b. Order of battle right to left (continued):

1st Light Div.    )  
1st Armored Div. ) XVI Corps.

c. Reserve: Elements 1st Div., Elements 32nd Div., Elements 21st Div.

5. Army Group Z.B.V.

a. Commander: Generaloberst Ritter v. Leeb.  
Chief of Staff: General von Manstein.  
1a (Operations Officer): Oberst Blumenstratt.  
Headquarters: Passau.

b. Order of battle from right to left.

45th Div.    )  
9th Div.     ) IX Corps.

1st Mountain Div. )  
7th Division       ) VII Corps.

10th Division        )  
SS Standarte Germania ) V Corps

c. Reserve: I.R. 43 of 1st Div.

The general plan of attack which follows is based upon information obtained from reliable sources and upon the order of battle given in the preceding paragraphs.

Army Group 1.

The terrain over which this army group was to attack was extremely difficult. All roads had been blocked and all bridges destroyed by the Czechs. The Czech fortifications, although not completed in this area, were formidable.

Making its main effort on its left, Army Group 1 was to attack southwest from Ratibor and Leobschuetz in conjunction with the Polish army, employing siege operations if necessary, to reduce the Czech defenses and using the Regiment General Goring and the army parachute battalion to make a landing in rear of the Czech line. The 3rd Armored Division, holding its tanks in reserve until a break through occurred, was to attack on the left of the VIII Corps through Ratibor, continue the attack southwest and effect a junction with Army Group 5, to cut off Slovakia from Prague and prevent the retirement of the Czech Army to its final defensive line.

That the bulk of the heavy artillery was assigned to this army group has been fairly well established, and information from various sources points to the conclusion that this was intended to be the main effort.

Army Group 5.

Army Group 5, with its two mechanized and one motorized division, was to attack northeast from Vienna, to effect a junction with Army Group 1. On the left flank the attacks of the 3rd Mountain Division and the 44th Division would be coordinated with that of the IX Corps.

Army Group "Z.B.V."

Army Group "Z.B.V." attacking along the entire front was to advance on six roads, with the 1st Mountain Division advancing on two roads, making the main effort against the line of the Moldau towards Wallern where the Czech fortifications were believed to be weak.

Army Group 4.

Making its main effort on its left with the XVI Corps through Karlsbad and Marienbad, Army Group 4 was to advance over seven roads against the gap which was known to exist in the Czech line between Pilsen and Rakowitz and then push on rapidly to Prague. In this army group as well as in Army Group "Z.B.V.", all reserves were provided with motor transport.

Army Group 2.

Army Group 2 was to attack from the North the area Aussig-Melmick-Reichenberg, where there were believed to be few Czech fortifications. This attack had to pass over difficult mountain country and, while it could be regarded chiefly as a holding attack to contain as many Czech troops as possible, any success made in this area would contribute directly to the success of the principal attacks.

While the attack, as planned, was never carried out, and, in fact, had never reached the stage of general mobilization, still, the occupation of Sudetendeutsch territory had, of necessity, to follow the general plan which had been prepared and offers many interesting observations which have been obtained from actual observers of the operations.

a. Although the German officers admitted that the Czech fortifications were stronger than had been anticipated, the opinion that Czech morale would not have been equal to a sustained resistance was strengthened and confirmed by the disorganization which the Czech Army demonstrated in its withdrawal. In one case, gasoline was lacking to move the Czech motor transport 30 kilometers, while in other cases, the Germans had to hold up their scheduled advance to allow the Czechs additional time to retire.

b. In each Army Group, German officers expressed entire satisfaction with the preparations and execution of the operation. The General Staff feels that it was a great improvement over the Austrian occupation and the occupation of the Sudeten-Deutsch territory was a complete success. General Rundstedt, Commander of Army Group 1, stated that the morale of the German Army is raised and that it now feels itself to be a perfect machine.

c. Both during the concentration of the troops and the advance into Czechoslovakia, motor failures were conspicuous by their absence. It is believed, and this belief is supported by other observers, that not over one percent motor failures occurred in any unit. It was observed that the Reconnaissance Battalion now has an organic motor repair shop.

d. During this operation, unlike the occupation of Austria, all SS and SA were placed under orders of the Army. It is significant to note that at least two SS Standarten took part in the operation as infantry units. One was known to have been motorized and each was equipped and armed in identically the same manner as the infantry regiments. How many regiments each Standarte formed is not known, but it is suspected that each furnished the three infantry regiments of a division. The SA which were present, were used as police in the occupied area under Army control.

e. In each Army Group at least one battalion of Arbeitsdienst were employed as engineers, to erect tank barriers and to install obstacles and wire. They carried on the left arm a yellow armband on which was inscribed "Wehrmacht" in black letters. They used their own motor transportation.

f. All Grenzschutz or border police were placed under the Army and wore army uniforms without insignia.

g. In each of the army groups "Z.B.V.", 4 and 1 a railroad regiment was observed. From their appearance it is believed that an entire unit of the state railroad service had been drafted into the army.

h. On the staff of each of the army groups commanders were one or more counter-espionage officers.

i. In the eastern section of the Austrian - Czechoslovakian frontier, Austrian Landwehr were observed. It is believed that these probably belonged to a Border or Grenz Unit.

k. It was observed that Signal Battalion 37 had an engineer platoon.

l. During the first three days of the occupation, all identifying insignia had been removed from personnel and vehicles.

m. In the advance in each army group, the tanks of armored divisions were held in reserve. In Army Group 4, the 1st Light Division, followed by the motorized infantry of the 1st Armored Division, led the way. The tanks did not advance beyond Karlsbad.

n. In Army Group 1, a battalion of infantry completely equipped, was landed by plane, in rear of the Czech frontier line, when it was found that the roads and bridges had been so badly damaged that troops could not arrive on schedule any other way.

#### IV. MOBILIZATION AND STRENGTH

Perhaps the most important lesson which can be learned from the concentration on the Czechoslovakian frontier and from the subsequent occupation of the Sudetendeutsch areas is the manner in which Germany intended to mobilize for war and the strength of the army which she would have been able to put in the field.

Naturally, positive identification of units assembled on the Czechoslovakian frontier is far from complete. Nothing, either official or unofficial, has been published on this subject. The greatest secrecy was employed in protecting troop movements from observation and from Sept. 28th to Oct. 1st the assembly areas were barred to foreigners. During the occupation, no military observers except those officially engaged on the boundary commission were permitted.

A comparatively large number of positive troop identifications have been obtained from various sources in spite of these restrictions and have been listed in a table attached as Appendix A.

In addition to these troop identifications, certain additional positive information has been obtained which, coupled with the troop identifications, furnishes sufficient evidence to draw definite conclusions in regard to the method which it was proposed to employ in mobilizing the Army for war and to the strength to which the Army would have been raised had general mobilization gone into effect. These facts are given in succeeding paragraphs as follows:

a. In the Army Group "Z.B.V.", under Generaloberst Leaf, the following facts have been established:

1. The army staff consisting of 32 officers, was assembled at Passau on Sept. 28th as advanced elements of the Army Staff, which was to have been completed upon general mobilization.

2. In the troops of this army group which were concentrated on the Czechoslovakian frontier between Sept. 22nd and Sept. 28th, there were only two divisions in each Army Corps. In the divisions, only the 1st Mountain Division was complete. In each of the other divisions one, and in one division two, infantry regiments were missing. In each infantry regiment including those of the 1st Mountain Division, one battalion was missing.
  3. Upon inquiry as to why these units were missing, Generaloberst Leeb stated that they had been left in the rear to form the nucleus of reserve formations.
- b.
1. In Army Group 1 under General Rundstedt, identification of troop units made between Sept. 22nd and Sept. 28th during the Reconnaissance of the Silesian Area, showed that in the VIII Corps, only the 8th Division was complete, while in both the 28th and 18th Divisions one regiment was missing, and that in each regiment observed, only two battalions were present.
  2. Later in the occupation of the Sudetendeutsch area, one battalion of the 38th Infantry was observed, composed of reserve personnel, in old uniforms and equipped with the old type heavy and light machine gun.
- c. At no time has any reserve or Landwehr formation larger than a regiment been identified.
- d. Information indicates that the armored and light divisions concentrated on the Czechoslovakian frontier were at full strength.
- e. Identifications also revealed that the peace-time territorial assignment of divisions to Army Corps was not followed in the concentration but that Corps Headquarters were used as tactical commands under which divisions were placed according to the tactical situation.
- f. The headquarters of 3 Army Groups and 10 Army Corps, 3 Armored Divisions, 4 Light Divisions, and elements of 2 Mountain Divisions and 22nd Infantry Divisions were positively identified as concentrated on the Czechoslovakian frontier.

To sum up then, we find that in the preparation for attack against Czechoslovakia:

1. An average of one regiment was missing from each infantry or mountain division.
2. Each infantry or mountain regiment lacked one battalion.
3. All armored and light divisions were complete.

From this the conclusion can be made that upon general mobilization each active infantry division would have been composed of two active and one reserve regiment, and reserve divisions of one active and two reserve regiments and that each active regiment would have been composed of two active and one reserve battalion and each reserve regiment of one active and two reserve battalions. Using the reinforced regiment as a basis for this procedure, we find that in this manner the number of infantry and mountain divisions would be at once doubled upon mobilization.

Calculating the strength of the army which Germany could have been able to put into the field on this basis, we find that her active army which consists of 38 Infantry Divisions, 3 Mountain Division, 3 Armored Divisions, 4 Light Divisions and 1 Cavalry Brigade, would, upon mobilization, expand to

76 infantry, 6 mountain, 4 armored (another armored division which is now in the process of formation would unquestionably have been completed), 4 light divisions and 1 cavalry division, or a total of 91 divisions exclusive of fortress and border troops.

Curiously enough this figure tallies exactly with a statement which, it was learned from a confidential source, had been made by the highest authority, to the effect that Germany could have put into the field between 90 and 100 divisions.

A rough calculation on this basis gives the strength of the army upon mobilization in round numbers as follows:

76 Infantry Divs.	1, 354, 000
6 Mountain Divs.	90, 000
4 Light Divs.	44, 000
4 Armored Divs.	52, 000
1 Cav. Div.	10, 000
Border and Fortress Units	150, 000
Unorganized in depots	<u>600, 000</u>

Total: . . . . . 2, 300, 000

IF THIS CONCLUSION IS CORRECT ON THE MANNER IN WHICH GERMANY INTENDED TO MOBILIZE IN THE RECENT CRISIS, IT IS A RADICAL DEPARTURE FROM ALL PRECONCEIVED IDEAS. THE LANDWEHR AND RESERVE DIVISIONS OF 1914 HAVE DISAPPEARED AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN FIRST AND SECOND LINE TROOPS HAS BEEN ABOLISHED. NOW WE FIND THE ACTIVE ARMY ITSELF EXPANDED BY MEANS OF THE RESERVE AND LANDWEHR PERSONNEL SO THAT ALL UNITS ARE EQUAL IN FIGHTING QUALITY.

Percy G. Black,  
Major, F. A.,  
Assistant Military Attache.

1st End.

It is evident from the above report dealing with the German concentration against Czechoslovakia in September 1938, that there has been a very radical change in the German mobilization system since 1914.

Germany planned in September 1938 to place in the field in case of war:

Standard (Einheits) Divisions of mixed active and reserve units and not to repeat her 1914 procedure of mobilizing active and reserve divisions of varying quality and of different equipment.

Whether this policy will be followed in the future or whether it was an emergency measure which was adopted for this particular emergency because of the lack of trained reserves at present available, is a matter of conjecture.

It is interesting to remember that Graf Schoffen in his 1900 to 1904 General Staff recommendations dealing with reserve formations, advocated just such a policy, but failed to accomplish his purpose due to opposition of the War Ministry.

Whether or not the measures adopted in 1938 will be permanent or were initiated for this emergency only, this method of mobilization must be of interest to any nation which possesses troops of different qualities and which must use both types immediately upon a declaration of war. It is of particular interest to the United States in view of our own reliance on just such differing categories of troops for an emergency; the Regular Army and the National Guard.

Truman Smith,  
Lieut.Colonel, G.S.,  
Military Attache.

APPENDIX A.

Positive identification of units concentrated on the  
Czechoslovakian frontier between Sept. 22 and Sept. 28.

Army Group 1

Headquarters: Oppeln  
Commander: General v. Fundstedt.

1. Army Troops.

Regiment General G6ering A.C.  
Parachute Bn, Army  
Naval Artillery, Bn 19  
Chemical Warfare Bn 2  
Machine Gun Bn 5  
Tank Regiment 15  
Schuetzen Regiment 10

2. Corps Troops.

- a. Hq VIII Corps  
1st Bn. Cav. Regt. 8  
Sig. Bn. 48  
Reconn. Bn. 28
- b. Hq III Corps  
Sig. Bn. 43  
Eng. Bn. 45  
Reconn. Bn. 9

3. Divisions.

- a. 3rd Armored Division  
Reconn. Bn. 3  
Sign. Bn. 39  
Eng. Bn. 39  
Anti-Tank Bn. 39  
Schuetzen Rgt. 3  
Tank Regt. 5  
Tank Regt. 6  
Art. Rgt.  
Reported complete  
individual unit not  
actually observed, but  
included.
- b. 8th Div.  
Sig. Bn. 8  
Eng. Bn. 8  
Anti-Tank Bn. 8  
F. A. ROT. 8  
F. A. Rgt. 44  
I.S. 28  
I.S. 39  
I.S. 84  
Units actually identified.
- c. 18th Div.  
Eng. Bn. 18  
Inf. Rgt. 20  
Inf. Rgt. 51

- d. 28th Div.  
Anti-Tank Bn 28  
A. R. 28  
A. R. 64  
I. R. 7  
I. R. 49
- e. 30th Div.  
A. R. 30  
I. R. 26  
I. R. 6
- f. 22nd Div.  
I. R. 18
- g. 3rd Div.  
I. R. 8
- h. 23rd Div.  
Eng. Bn. 23  
Art. Regt. 59

Recapitulation of Army Group No. 1.

Identified:

Hq. and Hq. troops of 2 Army Corps.  
Elements of 7 infantry divisions and 1 armored division.  
Infantry Regiments 11.

Army Group 2

Headquarters: Dresden  
Commander: General Bock.

1. Army Troops.

None identified.

2. Corps Troops.

Hq IV Corps

3. Divisions.

- a. 4th Div.  
Eng. Bn. 13  
A. R. 40  
I. R. 10  
I. R. 52  
I. R. 101
- b. 24th Div.  
A. R. 60  
I. R. 103
- c. SS Standart Totenkopf.

Recapitulation of identifications:

1 Corps Hq.  
Elements of 2 Divs.  
Inf. Regts. 4

Army Group "Z.B.V."

Headquarters: Passau  
Commander: Gen. v. Leeb

1. Army Troops

None identified.

2. Corps Troops

Hq IX Corps  
Hq VII Corps Recon. Bn. 7  
Hq V Corps

3. Divisions

- a. 45th Div.  
Eng. Bn. 45  
I. R. 130  
I. R. 333
- b. 9th Div.  
Eng. Bn. 9  
Obs. Bn. 9  
I. R. 57
- c. 1st Mountain Div.                      Reported complete  
Sig. Bn. 54  
Eng. Bn. 54  
Anti-Tank Bn. 54  
A. R. 79  
I. R. 98  
I. R. 99  
I. R. 100
- d. 7th Div.  
I. R. 61
- e. 10th Div.  
I. R. 20  
I. R. 42
- f. I. R. 43                      1st Div. reported in rear of area.
- g. S.S. Standarte Germania

Recapitulation:

Corps Headquarters 3  
Inf. Divisions 1 Mountain, 4 Inf.  
Inf. Regts. 10

Army Group 4:

Headquarters: Hof  
Commander: Gen. v. Reichenau

1. Army Troops

Sig. School Bn.  
Cav. Regt. 13  
Sig. Bn. 46  
Sig. Bn. 25  
Sig. Bn. 35  
Sig. Bn. 5

2. Corps Troops

- a. Hq. XVI Corps  
Sig. Bn. 62  
Eng. Bn. 62
- b. Hq. XIII Corps  
Sig. Bn. 53
- c. Hq. XIV Corps

3. Divisions

- a. 1st Armored Div. Reported complete  
Reconn. Bn. 4  
Eng. Bn. 37  
Sig. Bn. 37  
Anti-Tank Bn. 37  
F. A. Rgt. 73  
Schuetzen Regt. 1  
Tank Rgt. 1  
Tank Rgt. 2
- b. 1st Light Div. Reported complete  
Reconn. Regt. 6  
Sig. Bn. 40  
Eng. Bn. 57  
Anti-Tank Bn. 41  
Art. Regt. 78  
Schuetzen Regt. 4  
Tank Bn. 65
- c. 2nd Div. Mot.  
Reconn. Bn. 2  
Anti-Tank Bn. 2  
Art. Regt. 2  
I. R. 5  
I. R. 25
- d. 15th Div. mot.  
Reconn. Bn. 13  
I. R. 33
- e. 35th Div.  
Sig. Bn. 35  
I. R. 111

- f. 17th Div.  
F. A. Regt. 17  
F. A. Regt. 53
- g. 1st Div.                   As reserve in rear of area  
Eng. Bn. 1  
I. R. 45
- h. 32nd Div.  
Anti-Tank Bn. 32  
I. R. 3

Recapitulation of identifications:

Army Corps H.Q. 3  
Divisions: 1 armored, 1 light, 6 infantry  
Inf. Regts. 5

Army Group 5

Headquarters: Vienna  
Commander: Gen. v. List

1. Army Troops

None identified.

2. Corps Troops

Eng. Bn. 66  
Eng. Bn. 70  
Eng. Bn. 86  
Sig. Bn. 64  
Sig. Bn. 79  
Sanitary Cq. 30

These identifications were made  
in Vienna. Some may be divisional  
units.

3. Divisions

- a. 2nd Armored Div.                   Reported complete  
Reconn. Bn. 5  
Sig. Bn. 38  
Eng. Bn. 38  
Anti-Tank Bn. 38  
Art. Regt. 74  
Schuetzen Regt. 2  
Tank Regt. 3  
Tank Rgt. No. 4
- b. 4th Light Division  
Schuetzen Regt. 12
- c. 3rd Mountain Div.  
Anti-Tank Bn. 49  
I. R. 139
- d. 29th Div. (Mot.)  
Anti-Tank Bn. 29  
Obs. Bn. 29  
F. A. Regt. 29  
F. A. Regt. 85  
I. R. 86  
I. R. 71

e. 44th Div.  
Sig. Bn. 72  
Anti-Tank Bn. 50  
F. A. Sgt. 97  
I. R. 131  
I. R. 132

f. 11th Div.                      In reserve  
Anti-Tank Bn. 11  
I. R. 2

I. R. 1 of 1st Div.

Recapitulation:

Army Corps 1  
Divisions 7 Armored, 1 Light, 1 Mountain, 3 Inf.  
Inf. Sgts. 7

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From Z Date 10 January, 1959 Serial No. R-11 File No. EF/A14-7  
(Commence new series each January term) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Observations & Press

Subject EUROPE Recent Naval Agreements  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

INDEX.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the plot of the report.)

Anglo/German and Anglo/Scandinavian Naval Agreements.

JAN 27 1959

1. A British Naval Delegation visited the Navy Ministry, Berlin during the last days of December in response to a German official announcement that Germany would avail herself of the 1955 and 1957 treaty provisions to build submarines up to 100% of British submarine tonnage. Britain interposed no objections. So much of the discussions have been made public. There are strong rumors that Germany also announced intentions of building two additional 10,000 ton cruisers ("Hipper" class) to offset two reported additional Soviet cruisers. The total tonnage will not exceed 35% of British total tonnage nor class tonnage except in submarines. At present the German Foreign Office is drawing up a written note covering the new agreement, which will be transmitted shortly to the British Foreign Office.

2. The meat of the Anglo/Scandinavian Naval Treaty is that each - Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland - is permitted to build up to 24,000 tons of Coast Defense ships, not over 8000 tons per ship, mounting guns of not over ten inches.

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EX. O. 12622, Sec. 222 and 223 of 22

CLASS. Letter, May, 1952

By ST/R Date MAY 21 1973

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	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>																					
Task. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Sec. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. R. S. R.	Com. Ad.	Attended at	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.	Chm.	R. T.	State	Com- munic.	Return to Excess No.								

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ATTACHE'S REPORT E-6-e/12966-A NA-del 18

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From 7 Date 12 January, 1952 Serial No. E-25 File No. EFO/PL6  
 Source of information CONFIDENTIAL Conversation and Press  
 Subject GERMANY Navy  
 Reference

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- (1) Shortage of technical officers
- (2) Abolishment of designation "(E)" after names of retired officers recalled to active duty.

1. It has been heard from a reliable source that the next class of midshipmen entering the naval school at Murwik will consist of 850 Fähnrliche which will mark a big increase over the past few classes.

2. It has also been learned that the shortage of technical officers in engineering and construction work is rather acute. An article has recently appeared in the local press offering opportunities for trained technical mechanical men to be taken up in the "Ergänzungsoffizier" branch of the officer corps.

3. The designation "(E)" after the names of retired officers recalled to active duty has been abolished as is shown in the following translation taken from the local press:

"ABOLITION OF (E) DESIGNATION. THE ERGÄNZUNGSOFFIZIERE (RETIRED OFFICERS) RECALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY OF OUR ARMED FORCES.

"The Führer has decreed, as announced in the Marine-Verordnungsblatt" that although the use and employment of the Ergänzungsoffiziere will be continued, the practice of designating them as (E) officers will be abolished.

"No one in the armed forces will regret the doing away with this designation as it was never popular. The rapid and sudden building up of the Army and Navy and the creation of the Air Force with its enormous officer demand, made it necessary to recall to active duty the thousands of former officers who, due to the limitations placed upon the armed forces, had had to relinquish their officer status and return to civilian life.

"At the beginning of the building up of the armed forces the officers who were recalled were designated 'Landesverteidigungsoffiziere' or 'national defense officers'. This designation was soon changed to 'E-Offiziere' and now that they have fulfilled the original purpose, this designation has also disappeared. The development of the armed forces has made the designation unnecessary. It will never be necessary to attempt to find out who had the larger share in the work of rebuilding the armed forces - whether it was the active officers who had to contend with the limitations of a small army and the political confusions of the transition period, or to the quiet working recalled officers, since there has always been only one German officer corps. This proud corps is a unit as it has but one root and one future."

RELEASABLE

E. O. 11652, Sec. (b)(1) and (b)(7) of (C)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 1 1973

A-B-C-D-E		Mans. group		S. index		G. N. I.		Gen'l. Board		War College		E. I. R.		Nav.		Col.		I. & S.		C. & S.		Eng.		R. & A.		M. & S.		A. S.		U. S. M. C.		H. Q.	
1-11	2-11	3-11	4-11	5-11	6-11	7-11	8-11	9-11	10-11	11-11	12-11	13-11	14-11	15-11	16-11	17-11	18-11	19-11	20-11	21-11	22-11	23-11	24-11	25-11	26-11	27-11	28-11	29-11	30-11	31-11	32-11		
1-11	2-11	3-11	4-11	5-11	6-11	7-11	8-11	9-11	10-11	11-11	12-11	13-11	14-11	15-11	16-11	17-11	18-11	19-11	20-11	21-11	22-11	23-11	24-11	25-11	26-11	27-11	28-11	29-11	30-11	31-11			

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From Z Date 12 February 1939 Serial No. M-101 File No. 1000-1-2-3-4

Source of information Observations, Conversations, Press and Publications

Subject GERMANY Air Force

Reference

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Forwarding Monograph Report M-101 covering the German Air Force - Organization Changes and Present Status.

- Inclosures: A) Organization Chart.
- B) Publication "Die Wehrmacht" of 1 February 1939.
- C) Monograph Report M-101 of 12 February 1939.

*Archives*

1. Inclosures as noted are forwarded herewith.

20

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(D) and 6(D) or (S)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

Director	A-1-C-D-E	Manu. Insp.	Arch. Insp.	Budget	C. & G.	C. & I.	War College	H. I. S.	Nav.	Ord.	T. S. B.	C. S. R.	Eng.	S. S. A.	M. S. S.	Avn.	U. S. M. C.	H. Q.
Yank. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Ins. Per.	Com. Insp. Per.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. S. S. S.	Com. Air	Headed at	Col. Gen.	Brig. Gen.	Com. Insp.	Com. Insp.							

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NA-BERLIN

M-101

18 February 1958

(G-E-R-M-A-N-Y)

1000 - Aviation  
 1001 - Policy  
 1002 - Organization  
 1003 - Personnel  
 1004 - Material

GERMAN AIR FORCE - ORGANIZATION CHANGES AND PRESENT STATUS

Introduction.

Soon after the Munich conference it became known that an extensive re-organization of the German Air Force was about to be effected. The need for this was to be found in the broader operating requirements imposed on the Air Force for future, presumably larger scale, tasks, as opposed to the previous specific task of preparation for possible action against Austria and Czechoslovakia. The developments have finally reached the stage where general indications of the principal brackets of the new organization have just now been released to the press. While not stated in any press releases, the indications are that the principle underlying the new setup is one of general correspondence with the GHQ idea in the U.S. Army Air Corps, that is the incorporation of all operating units into a tactical organization which will be related to territorial factors only to the necessary extent of peace-time considerations but, chiefly, will be immediately assignable for the most flexible employment in any probable future sphere of action. In this connection, it should also be noted that, especially in the Air Force, the German tendency is predominantly to shape its organization around its leading individuals and their individual capabilities with frequent revisions as dictated by personal factors, rather than attempting to set up a formal ideal organization and then seeking to assort its individuals to suit the organization.

Operating Organization.

Effective as of 1 February 1958, the organization introduces three new units, known as Air Fleets which take the place of the three Air Groups previously existing as the top operating brackets of the Air Force. This new designation, for one thing, removes the ambiguity of terminology which formerly obtained, since the word Group was also, and is still, used for a lower bracket, that is, a unit intermediate between the Wing (Geschwader) and the Squadron (Staffel). The designations of the three new Air Fleet Commanders are:

Chief of Air Fleet 1 and Commander East - Headquarters, Berlin - General of the Fliers REISELRIEG.

This was formerly Air Group 1 (East).

Chief of Air Fleet 2 and Commander North - Headquarters, Braunschweig - General of the Fliers FRANKE.

This was formerly Air Group 2 (East).

Chief of Air Fleet 3 and Commander West - Headquarters, München - General of the Fliers SPERLKE.

This was formerly Air Group 3 (South).

Next under the Air Fleet bracket is a new bracket, the Air Division. It has been reported that at least six (6) Air Divisions have been formed, each consists of four (4) to six (6) Wings (Geschwader), with headquarters in Berlin, Dresden, Münster, München, Wehrberg, and Braunschweig. The release to the press confirms the foregoing, in part, as follows:

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May. 1 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 2 1973

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Air Division

Commanding General

1	-
2	Major General Leerser
3	Colonel Putzier
4	Lieutenant General Keller*
5	Major General Ritter von Grein
6	Major General Bessloch

\* General Keller was formerly the Commanding General of the Air Force in East Prussia with headquarters Königsberg. The new order states that he retains his rank of Commanding General while assuming new duties as Commander of Air Division 4.

The designations of lower brackets remain unchanged. For purposes of general perspective of these, they are reviewed in inverse order:

a) The section (Kette) of three (3) airplanes is the smallest element of the tactical organization.

b) The squadron (Staffel) of nine (9) airplanes is the smallest organizational, or command, element, corresponding roughly with a company in the Army. A squadron is generally commanded by a Captain.

c) The group (Gruppe) of three (3) squadrons, i.e., twenty-seven (27) airplanes. A group is generally commanded by a Major and is usually assigned its own air station. A special category of group, peculiar to the German Air Force is the expert or model group (Lehrgruppe). This is a group of picked personnel whose special mission is both to develop the full uses of their equipment (in tactics, general operating, and maintenance) and also to instruct other service units from their advanced experience. There are two such Lehr Gruppen for pursuit, three for bombing, and two for long-range scouting, each equipped with the latest models pertaining to their branch.

d) The wing (Geschwader) of two (2) - four (4) groups, i.e., fifty-four (54) - one hundred and eight (108) operating airplanes, but normally three (3) groups or eighty-one (81) airplanes. By liberal translation "Geschwader" means "squadron", but in comparison of size and employment, and as translated in official Air Force texts, it corresponds with the term "wing" as used in the United States. A wing is generally commanded by a Colonel or Lieutenant-Colonel.

e) The air division (Fliegerdivision), if comprising four (4) - six (6) wings, as reported, would number from two hundred and sixteen (216) to six hundred and forty-eight (648) operating airplanes, but it is to be expected that the normal strength, for the present, will be about five hundred (500) operating airplanes.

For purposes of cooperation and liaison with the Army, there has for some time been assigned to the High Command of the Army a General of the Air Force, but a separate command called the Commanding General of the Air Force, Sea has exercised direction over naval air matters. The latter designation has now been superseded by the assignment of an Air Force General to the Higher Command of the Navy. Following a recent announcement, Major General Bornath has taken up duties with the Army, vice General of the Fliers Klinge, and Major General Ritter has assumed corresponding duties with the Navy.

From several sources in the Navy and the Air Force, it has been gathered that the situation as to naval aviation has by no means crystallized, as yet. It is receiving intensive consideration in anticipation of the commencement of aircraft

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 509 or (b)

OSD letter, May 1, 1972

By SLR

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carrier operations. One group (27 airplanes) is already organized and engaged in carrier landing practice on a platform believed to be located near Kiel. A second group is in process of formation. Eventually it is expected that two (2) groups (54 airplanes) will be assigned to each carrier. It is also understood that several naval officers are being trained as aviators for assignment to these carrier groups. Since the former command, i.e., Commanding General of the Air Force, Sea, included all seaplane and flying boat units together with coastal defense activities, it appears that the new shift involves a probable release of these activities to the Air Force proper and that the Navy will in the future take over the operation of the carrier units as part of the Fleet with the expert advice of the Air Force liaison officer, General Atter. General London who was formerly the Commanding General of the Air Force, Sea, is reported to be coming to Berlin to become the President of the Aero Club, an important quasi-official position.

A chart is appended, (Inclosure A), which shows the general administrative and tactical setup according to the new organization, insofar as it is possible at this time to delineate it.

While only meagre information is, as yet, available on the distribution of squadrons by types in the new Air Divisions, it is generally understood that the latter will comprise a mixture of types according to principal missions of each division. Omitting, for the present, this phase of the operating organization, a review of the general composition of the whole Air Force, by types, can be attempted.

A process of renumbering and also, in some instances, naming of wings and groups is now underway in connection with the new divisional organization. In addition to the usual likely errors of omission, there are therefore now possible errors of duplication, also. Allowing for these, the following summary, derived from numerous official sources making reference to specific units, etc., is presented as an estimate of the composition and strength of the present units of the Air Force:

#### Short Range Scouting Units

7 Groups of 3 squadrons (Staffel), each - total 21 squadrons.  
21 squadrons @ 9 airplanes --- 189 operating airplanes.

#### Long Range Scouting Units

8 Groups of 3 squadrons, each ----- total 24 squadrons.  
24 squadrons @ 9 airplanes --- 216 operating airplanes.  
(Note: 2 of these groups are expert groups (Lehrgruppen), see above).

#### Coastal Observation Units

3 Groups of 3 squadrons, each -  
plus 3 squadrons not identified with  
definite groups ----- total 12 squadrons.  
12 squadrons @ 9 airplanes --- 108 operating airplanes.

#### Pursuit Units

27 Groups of 3 squadrons, each ----- total 81 squadrons.  
81 squadrons @ 9 airplanes - 729 operating airplanes.  
(Note: 2 of these groups are expert groups, see above).

The pursuit units are grouped in 9 identified wings, some with 1 group, some with 2 groups, and some with 3 groups. At least two of the wings bear names, viz. the famous Richthofen Wing, headquarters at Döberitz, and the Horst Wessel Wing, headquarters at Dortmund.

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OSD letter, May. 6, 1973

By SLR

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 205 and 207 of (b)

and letter, May 1, 1975

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1975

Bombing (Attack) Units

41 Groups of 3 squadrons, each ----- total 123 squadrons,  
123 squadrons @ 9 airplanes --- 1107 operating airplanes.  
(Note: 3 of these groups are expert groups, see above).

The bombing or attack units are grouped in 11 identified wings, two of which contain 4 groups, the remainder 3 groups, each. Two of the wings are named the Hindenburg and the General Bever Wings.

Dive Bombing Units

10 Groups of 3 squadrons, each ----- total 30 squadrons  
30 squadrons @ 9 airplanes --- 270 operating airplanes.

The dive bombing units are grouped in 4 identified wings.

OPERATING AIRPLANE SUMMARY

Short Range Scouting	21 squadrons	189 airplanes
Long Range Scouting	24 "	216 "
Coastal Observation	12 "	108 "
Pursuit	21 "	729 "
Bombing (Attack)	123 "	1107 "
Dive Bombing	30 "	270 "
	<u>291 squadrons</u>	<u>2619 airplanes</u>
T-3-t-a-1		
	291 squadrons	2619 airplanes

To the foregoing, belong an estimated fifty percent (50%) spare and reserve airplanes, or a total of 1800. The combined strength, operating and spare airplanes, therefore is computed at this time at 4,000 airplanes. This is, as indicated, wholly exclusive of training, transport, school, utility, and special-purpose airplanes. An estimate of these will be presented later in this report. In connection with the operating strength, it is interesting to note that an Italian estimate in November 1938, quoted in the German Press without comment or dispute, placed the first-line strength at 3,000 airplanes.

As part of the Air Force, are the important, closely related branches of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery (Flak), the Air Communication and Signal Service, and the Parachute Troops. It is estimated from a growing file of official references and reports from reliable sources that the Anti-Aircraft Artillery numbers forty (40) regiments, the Air Communication Service some fifteen (15) companies, and the Parachute Troops are organized in three (3) Regiments. The Air Force also has its own Transport Service, consisting both of motorized ground equipment and a large number of transport planes.

Territorial Organization.

In general, the organization of the Air Ministry remains as recently published in the German Aircraft Year Book 1938 (Die Deutsche Luftfahrt) and in the 1938 edition of Jane's All the World's Aircraft (see pp 22b and 23b). The principal changes effected as of 1 February 1939 are specific illustrations of the point made in the introduction to this report, that the organization is frequently shaped or revised around the available individuals and their demonstrated individual capabilities.

The principal Air Ministry changes are:

a) The Secretary of State for Air and direct agent of General Field Marshal Goring, as Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Colonel General Hilsh, has taken over additional duties as the Inspector General of the Air Force. This assignment was formerly held by Lieutenant General Wahl. The activities under the cognizance of the Inspector General remain unchanged as listed in Jane's, p. 23b.

Enlist

b) An enlargement of the authority of the Office for Air Defense. General of the Fliers Stammff has been appointed to this position. This appears to be a "kick upstairs", as General Stammff was formerly the Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force and has been succeeded in this position by a Colonel - Colonel Jacobson who was formerly head of the Operations Division of the General Staff. The latter enjoys an excellent reputation as a capable organizer and operations chief.

c) The creation of the office of Chief of Training to which Lieutenant General Kuhl has been appointed. He was formerly Inspector General.

d) The creation of a new Air Armaments Commission to which General of the Anti-Aircraft Medel has been appointed as President. He was formerly the Chief of Air Defense (see b) above).

e) The enlargement of the position occupied by Lieutenant General Weg. He was formerly head of the Technical Bureau of the Air Ministry. Now his title has been changed to Generalleutnant which means that he will be in charge of all material matters pertaining to aircraft, that is design, procurement, and maintenance. General Weg is very highly regarded, both in the Air Force, as evidenced by his rapid promotions, and in the aircraft industry. He has proven himself an excellent administrator of the manifold technical and material agencies pertaining to the rapid growth of the Air Force and the industry. It is therefore not unusual to find his authority and responsibility further enlarged.

So far as can be determined, the Reich is still partitioned, as before, in air districts. The latest official information, released in January, lists the districts (Luftgau) and their headquarters as follows (See also Enclosure A):

<u>District</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
I (East Prussia)	Königsberg
III	Berlin
IV	Breslau
VI	Münster
VII	München
VIII	Breslau
IX	Hannover
XIII	Niesbaden
XVIII	Nürnberg
XVII (Austria)	Wien

The foregoing correspond with army corps areas or our own naval districts. A similar administrative cognizance over operating units, while physically located within the geographical limits of any district, is exercised. The significance of the non-consecutive numbering of the districts has not yet been determined.

An important element in the territorial organization, to which considerable recent press notice has been given, is the Western Air Defense Zone (Luftverteidigungszone West). This is the air supplement to the "Siegfried Line" with the assigned task of intercepting hostile air missions before they attain their objectives. This zone is commanded by Lieutenant General Katzenberger. It is reported to be elaborately equipped with mechanized A.A. forces, A.A. guns and searchlight batteries, listening gears, and fire control stations, together

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Date: 11/11/2009

with special communication service, underground protection and depots, balloon and kite barrages, a network of new roads and other ground facilities, and a number of strategically located fighter squadrons, - in fact every device necessary to the erection of an impenetrable air barrier. A lengthy description of this same, with map, has been published in the press and in the February 1, 1939 issue of the German magazine "Wehrmacht" (see Enclosure B). (Note: A composite map of Germany showing all air activities, commercial and military, the Eastern Defense Zone, forbidden areas, etc. regarding which it has been possible to obtain any reliable information from a multiplicity of scattered sources is now in preparation and will be forwarded at an early date).

The net of Air Force fields in use for military purposes, or available for such use, is striking for its extensive ramifications. The Italian estimate, previously mentioned, has placed the number of established fields (that is, actually prepared for aviation use and equipped with facilities therefor) as high as 750. The figure appears high but not greatly exaggerated. It undoubtedly includes a number of the auxiliary fields, on which only meager information is obtainable because of their confidential status. They are known to exist in appreciable numbers, however, and are obviously readily arranged in consideration of the characteristics of most of the terrain within the boundaries of Germany. It is also known that in anticipation of probable action against Austria and Czecho-Slovakia a thorough program of preparation of auxiliary landing fields was put through and many such fields were actually occupied by various air units in the operations incidental to annexation of Austrian and Sudeten territories.

In general, the auxiliary landing fields are arranged as follows: located in sparsely inhabited districts, adjoining woods if possible in which parked airplanes and ground facilities may be concealed, a small number of buildings chiefly for attendants and servicing purposes, probably with underground or concealed storage for fuel and bombs, provided with spur tracks from main rail-ways or with newly built roads connecting with the highway system, and with level landing areas of 2500 - 3500 feet in all directions. Several such fields sighted by the writer answer the foregoing description in every particular. They have been difficult to find from the air, even when approximate location was fairly well known, because of the effective camouflage both from vegetation and from the apparently innocuous location. Once sighted however they were found to have the usual wind marker, boundary markers, miscellaneous small buildings, and indications (from roads, etc.) of hidden facilities in the woods.

Based on a file which the writer has built up and which will shortly be reported upon, he submits, at this time, an estimate of at least 500 air fields in Germany, classified about as follows:

Air Force fields, occupied by operating units .....	175
Miscellaneous Air Force Fields, schools, depots, aircraft factories, etc.....	50
Seaplane ports (generally with field) .....	50
Commercial fields .....	75
Auxiliary fields .....	100
Fields under construction .....	50
T-o-t-a-l .....	500

The important auxiliary services to the Air Force such as air depots, airplane pools (parks), overhaul stations, and ammunition depots are correspondingly provided in an imposing network. The writer has accumulated a list, believed to be reasonably accurate, of ammunition depots, alone, numbering 51 of which two (at Neustrelitz and Langens) are main depots (Hauptmagazine). There are reported to be 19 airplane and anti-aircraft pools, or parks, and 15 overhaul and supply depots, distributed over Germany so that each air district has at least one, and frequently more, of these activities.

Before concluding a discussion of the territorial organization, notice should be taken of the ~~Stabsabteilungen~~ ~~Reservierung~~ Divisions (Reserveabteilungen) and of the

various schools and training centers. It is understood that it is the intention to have at least one Air Force Recruiting Division, with attached flight training schools, in each air district of Germany. At present, eight such Recruiting Divisions have been identified and accounted for.

The schools are far more numerous. In the flight training schools, alone, there are 19 far non-commissioned officers and enlisted men and 4 for officers. A recent report indicates that these will shortly be increased to 24 and 7, respectively. The average training capacity of present schools is estimated at 800 per year, or a total of 8000 per year. In addition to the foregoing there are 3 blind flying schools at Brandis, Quadlinberg, and Passendorf. To the foregoing must be added, also, a whole array of special branch schools, such as

2 pursuit schools, at Kermoochen and Schleielsenheim.

5 scouting and observation schools, of which 1 at Amblin is primarily for navigation, 2 at Seng and Pauer are for aerial activities, and 1 at Hildesheim is for aerial photography.

2 bombing schools, at Tabor, Lebnfeld, and Passberg.

4 A.A. schools, at Tustrow, Kolberg-Depp, Bratstrow and Schulzende

The 7 expert groups (Lehrgruppen), mentioned earlier in this report also serve as operating schools for their particular models and types.

Attached to the foregoing numerous schools, together with the Air Force Academy at Berlin-Gatow, and the 2 Higher Air Force Schools (altogether, about 40 in number) as well as the miscellaneous units of air depots, overhaul stations, airplane pools or parks (in which up to an estimated 80% additional new reserves of airplanes is kept), test and research units, etc. etc., are a conservatively estimated total of 8000 airplanes, over and above the operating force. The grand total of Air Force airplanes is therefore estimated, at this time, at 9000.

#### Personnel Strength.

From personal observations and numerous other sources, it is strikingly apparent at present that the airplane strength exceeds the qualified pilot strength. While the relatively small amount of flying man-combined by the writer and other observers, is undoubtedly partially attributable both to very unfavorable flying conditions during the winter in most of Germany and to a policy of conservation of valuable fuel, it apparently also reflects the present lack of pilots to man all airplanes. Two factors, pertinent hereto, merit not be overlooked, however. The first is that this shortage should be overcome by about 1941, at the rate of training previously described, even allowing for further airplane increases enabled by the present manufacturing capacity of the industry. The second is that there exists a large reserve, available now at the cost of very little additional training in the case of an immediate war, in the National Socialist Flying Corps, or so-called NSFK, which will be more fully described below.

Apart from the foregoing general observations, attention is called to the difficulties, peculiar to Germany, which attend to the derivation of any estimate of actual personnel strength. No rank list or directory of officers is released. Accident reports, death notices, transfers, or routine notices are not published, except in the case of high-ranking or notable personnel. Accordingly, it is possible to write the composition of the top ranks, only, as revealed by press and other accounts, in which their official and personal reports are somewhat more publicly.

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ORIN Editor, May. 5, 1978

By SIKR

Date MAY 9 1978

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Until January 1939, the writer had gathered a list of some 70 Generals in the Air Force on which official confirmation had been obtained. As of 1 February 1939, however, a whole new list of promotions in the Air Force was released to the press, which increases the identified General officers to 100. The distribution of these is about as follows:

General Field Marshal	1
Colonel General	1
General of the Fliers (including General of Anti-Aircraft)	13
Lieutenant General	15
Major General	<u>52</u>
Active List	83
Reserves on Active Duty	<u>17</u>
TOTAL Air Force Generals	100

The list of names of the foregoing, with available data, will shortly be forwarded to the Department by separate report.

The commissioned ranks of the Air Force and their correspondence with the ranks of the U.S. Navy are:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Translation</u>	<u>U.S.N.</u>
Lieutenant	Lieutenant	Ensign
Oberlieutenant	Senior Lieutenant	Lieutenant (jg)
Hauptmann	Captain	Lieutenant
Major	Major	Lieut. Commander
Oberlieutenant	Lieutenant Colonel	Commander
Oberst	Colonel	Captain
Generalmajor	Major General	(Commodore)
Generalleutnant	Lieutenant General	Rear Admiral
General der Flieger (General der Flakartillerie)	General of the Fliers (General of the A.A.)	Vice Admiral
Generaloberst	Colonel General	Admiral
Generalfeldmarschall	General Field Marshal	

No information has been obtainable on the distribution of officers in the various ranks. In fact, it is doubted, during the expansion and reorganization which has obtained in these early years of the Air Force, that any fixed proportions between various grades has existed or has yet been determined. It is therefore a pure guess to attempt estimation of the commissioned strength from the fairly known quantity of 100 General officers. As such, the writer ventures to submit for future revision the figure of 8,000 officers, of whom about 25% are non-fliers and another 25% are on duty in the Air Ministry and Berlin activities. Of the remaining 50% only about a half, again, are available for manning combatant units and the balance are required for the miscellaneous test, training, ground organization and similar activities. The enlisted strength is roughly estimated at 200,000.

#### Reserve Personnel.

As previously indicated, the NSFK constitutes a significant reserve immediately, and increasingly in the future, available to the Air Force. General of the Fliers Christiansen (recently promoted from Lieutenant General) heads this organization to which more publicity is naturally allowed than to the Air Force. From a recent press account, the following is quoted: "The present structure of the organization includes 18 complete groups of 80 'Standarten' (sub-divisions) and 600 StBrenn (smaller elements). The Corps has 62,000 active adult members, 78,000 Hitler Youth (14 - 18 years), 23,000 'Jungfolk' (10 - 14 years) and 250,000 promoters. Transportation equipment numbering 1900 is provided for the 5000 gliders and 600 aircraft within the organization. Training is provided by 22 glider and

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7 aircraft training schools. These are augmented by 485 glider hangars and approximately 1000 practice fields." The article continues with an impressive recital of the activities of recent years and the elaborate program of aircraft and glider competitions and races planned for 1938. It closes with a significant statement: "..... it may be expected that during 1938 the NSFK will produce more and more performance -- in conformity with the position Germany has gained for herself today after six short but successful years since the combining of all branches of aeronautics into the Air Ministry in 1933".

Allowing for possible boasting in the foregoing accounts, it must be emphasized that the most vivid impression gained by any aeronautical observer coming to Germany at this time, is the active, popular, and effective training currently underway in this field, affecting a huge number of the youth of Germany.

As additional reserves both in personnel and aircraft, the Luft Heere air transport monopoly, directly under governmental control, must also be considered. A summary of the activities and composition of this organization is given in Jane's 1938 pp 87a and 89a.

Material Equipment.

Until 1936, most of the production of the aircraft industry for the Air Force was represented in the large numbers of Junkers three-engine transports, model Ju-52. These were put into all sorts of units of the Air Force as scouts, bombers, trainers, transports, in fact for any purpose for which they could conceivably be used on the basis that they could be supplied quickly in quantity. These are now almost wholly retired from Air Force units, but by no means scrapped. Some are in use for blind flying training and the remainder are being kept in a state of preservation for many miscellaneous uses, especially for transport, to which they could be put in case of emergency.

The principal models now in use by the operating squadrons, on which data is believed to be fairly complete in the Army and Navy Department files (see also Jane's 1938), are as follows:

Short Range Scouts:

- Heinkel He 46
- Henschel He 126

Long Range Scouts:

- Dornier Do 17
- Heinkel He 70

Recon:

- Messerschmidt BV 109
- Heinkel He 51

Bombing:

- Junkers Ju 88
- Heinkel He 111
- Dornier Do 17

Dive Bombing:

- Junkers Ju-87
- Henschel He 125

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 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

The foregoing compare favorably with the service equipment of any of the important air powers. A well-rounded experimental program is underway to ensure the timely replacement of these, as required by obsolescence and the advance of design.

Conclusions:

The principal conclusions derived by the writer in his first six months contact with the German Air Force are that a remarkable structure has been set up, well and numerously implemented with airplanes, not yet adequately filled with pilots, backed by an industry capable of higher production at this moment than probably any

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other in the world, and with a reserve and training organization which is remarkable both for its immediate and future capabilities. The present air status in Germany is such that it can only be met either by a marked increase in pace of production, expansion, and training on the part of its possible opponents or by an effective air limitation agreement at a not-too-distant date.

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
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OSD letter, May, 1, 1973

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973



ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

NA-361

ATTACHE'S REPORT E-6-e/8713-A

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Subject GERMANY Navy Organization and Status  
(Citation required on) (Cite title or par index above) (Subject)

Reference

NOTE.—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

Organization and Status of the German Navy.

APR // 1939

1. The following article, appearing in the German publication "Die Räder" of 16 February 1939, was written by a Lieutenant M. A. Giese of the German Navy. It is submitted as a matter of interest in that it presents a concise picture of the organization of the German Navy, showing jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander (Admiral Raeder), Navy Department, Commander in Chief of the Fleet, Commanding Admirals of the Baltic and North Sea districts, etc. It also details the present status of the German fleet by types and numbers, and also the new construction building and projected.

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"THE GERMAN NAVY

"With the renaissance of German armaments through the Führer, Adolph Hitler, the time came for a new and free development of the German Navy. The foundation of the rebuilding of the Navy is the German/English Naval Treaty of 18 July 1935, which was supplemented by the Treaty of July 1937. According to this, the ratio of the British Navy to the German, is 100 : 55, except that Germany has the right to parity in submarine tonnage with England.

The organization of the German Navy to-day, is as follows:

At the head of the German Navy is the Supreme Commander, General Admiral Dr. h.c. Raeder. Directly under him are:

- The Navy Department in Berlin;
- The Navy Group Commander East, in Kiel;
- The Commander in Chief of the Fleet, with administration headquarters in Kiel;
- The Commanding Admiral of the Baltic district, with headquarters in Kiel;
- The Commanding Admiral of the North Sea district, with headquarters at Wilhelmshaven;
- The Naval Arsenal, Kiel;
- The Navy Yard at Wilhelmshaven; as well as
- A number of Naval Units in various localities.

The Navy Department, as the directing head, is divided into numerous departments and offices for the administration of the many tasks imposed. Some of these are: the Navy Personnel Office, Operations Office, Defense Section, General Office, Ordnance Office, Supply Office, and Naval Construction Office.

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From Z Date 21 March, 1952 Serial No. R-195 File No. EF50/AS-1  
(Commence new series each January 2nd) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information German Publication

Subject GERMANY Navy Organization and Status  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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The center of gravity of the Navy is always the fleet. The German fleet consists of units which are indispensable for modern naval operations. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet has directly under him:

First,

The Commander of the Armored Ships, with the armored vessels ADMIRAL GRAF SPEE, ADMIRAL SCHEER, and DEUTSCHLAND; The battleships GNEISENAU and SCHARNHORST.

Second,

The Commander of the Scouting Forces, with the cruisers NURNBERG, LEIPZIG and KÖLN; The Leader of Torpedoboats; The Leader of Minesweepers; The Destroyer Flotillas, Torpedoboat Flotillas, High Speed Motor Torpedoboat Flotillas, Escort Flotillas, Minesweeper Flotillas and Raumboote Flotillas which come under the Leader of Torpedoboats and Leader of Minesweepers.

and finally,

The Leader of Submarines with the Submarine Flotillas attached thereto.

In detail, these are:

- 1st to 4th Destroyer Flotillas;
- 5th Destroyer Division;
- 4th, 5th and 6th Torpedoboat flotillas;
- 1st and 2nd High Speed Motor Torpedoboat Flotillas;
- Escort Flotillas;
- 1st and 2nd Minesweeper Flotillas;
- 1st and 2nd Raumboote Flotillas;
- The Submarine Flotillas: WEDDIGEN (1st Submarine Flotilla)
- SALZWEDEL (2nd " " )
- LOHS (3rd " " )
- ENSMANN (5th " " )
- HUNDIUS (6th " " )
- WEGENER (7th " " )

While the seagoing forces are under the command of the Fleet Commander, the command of all Coastal and Land Forces of the Navy rests in the hands of the Commanding Admirals of the geographical divisions, North Sea and Baltic, located at Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, respectively.

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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																						
Y. Div.	C. in C.	C. in C.	Comp. Sec. Pen.	Comp. Sec. Pen.	C. in C.	Comp. Sec. Pen.	Comp. Sec. Pen.	Comp. Sec. Pen.	Attended at	Operations												Return to	
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From Z Date 21 March, 1939 Serial No. R-195 File No. EF80/A5-1  
(Communications copy series each January issue) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information German Publication

Subject GERMANY Navy Organization & Status  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subject)

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The Commanding Admiral of the Baltic district, with headquarters in Kiel, has under him:

- The Coast Defenses of the Western Baltic, with the First Naval Gunnery Division in Kiel;
- The Coast Defenses of the Pommeranian Coast, with the Third Naval Gunnery Division in Swinemünde;
- The Coast Defenses of Pillau, with the 5th Naval Gunnery Division in Pillau.

Further, the Commander for the Security of the Baltic and the 2nd Admiral of the Baltic, along with the:

- 1st Ships' Base Regiment, Kiel;
- 3rd " " " " , Kiel
- 5th " " " " , Eckernförde,
- 1st " " " " , Stralsund,
- 7th " " " " , Stralsund,
- 9th " " " " , Stralsund,
- 11th " " " " , Stralsund,
- 15th " " " " , Sassnitz.

In the Baltic, as well as in the North Sea area, there are a number of inspection groups and main offices of the Navy which come under the Commanding Admirals of the Baltic or North Sea.

The Commanding Admiral of the Baltic has under him:

- The Training Division, with headquarters in Kiel;
- The Naval Academy, the Steersman School and the Navy Athletic School, in Mürwik;
- The Naval Specialty and Experimental Schools in various localities;
- The three Navy Petty Officers' Schools in Friedrichsort, Weseraende, and Plön;
- The Line School Training Ships SCHLESSEN, SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and cruiser EMDEN;
- The Sailing Schoolships GORCH FOCK, HORST WESSEL and ALBERT LEO SCHLAGETER.

Further,

- The Torpedo Division at Kiel, with the Torpedo School and Torpedo Training Flotilla in Mürwik;
- The Submarine School and Submarine Training Flotilla and Anti-Aircraft Section at Neustadt;

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Director	A-B-C-D-E												Misc-graph	Ar-arms	Judge	C.N.O.	Gen'l Staff	War College	N.I.R.	Nav.	Ovt.	I.S.R.	C.S.R.	Eng.	S.S.A.	M.S.R.	Ass.	U.S. M.C.	R.G.
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Subject GERMANY Navy Organisation and Status  
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The Naval Gas Defense School in Kiel;  
 The Torpedo Experimental Station in Eckernförde;  
 The Naval Physics and Chemistry Experimental Station in Kiel;  
 The Naval Communication Section in Kiel, with the Communication Experimental Station at Kiel, and the Communication Schools at Mürwik and Aurich;  
 The Blockade Division in Kiel, with the Blockade School and Experimental Blockading Station and the various Blockading Offices.

Finally,

The Headquarters for Naval Gunnery at Kiel, with the cruiser KOENIGSBERG;  
 The Naval Gunnery School and the Gunnery Schoolship BREMSE as well as the Gunnery Boats JAGUAR, DRACHE, EDUARD JUNGSMANN and FUCHS; and  
 The Naval Anti-Aircraft and Coast Artillery School, and the Gunnery Schoolship BRUMMER and the Gunnery School Boat DELPHIN.

The jurisdictional scope of the Commanding Admiral of the North Sea district, headquarters at Wilhelmshaven, is similarly organized. He has command of:

The Coast Defenses of the North Sea;  
 Defenses of East Friesland with the 2nd and 6th Naval Gunnery Divisions in Wilhelmshaven and Emden, respectively;  
 Defenses of North Friesland, with headquarters in Cuxhaven, with the 4th Naval Gunnery Division in Cuxhaven; and  
 The Commandant at Wesermünde.

Further, the Commanding Admiral of the North Sea has a similar number of headquarters and main offices under him, such as the:

Ships' Machinery Section at Wilhelmshaven, with the Navy Schools in Kiel and Wesermünde, and the Apprentice Shops in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven;  
 The Naval Ordnance at Wilhelmshaven, with the Naval Ordnance Offices in Borkum, Wilhelmshaven, Pillau, Swinemünde, Kiel-Dietrichsdorf, Jessenitz and Cuxhaven;  
 The Auxiliary Ordnance Offices in Sylt, Wesermünde, Bränsbüttelekoog, Wilhelmshaven, Helgoland, Segeberg and Nordernsey; and

Finally,

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	B-1	B-2	B-3	B-4																	
Tech. Div.	C. N. C.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	C. N. C.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.	Com. Div.
	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.
	Operations											State	Com. Div.	Return to	Return to	Return to					
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The Buoyage and Pilot system of the Jade, and  
 The Naval Observatory in Wilhelmshaven.

STATUS OF THE GERMAN FLEET

There is given herewith the present status of the German fleet and its projected building for the coming years:

At present, the fleet consists of:

- 2 Battleships, each of 26,000 tons, with nine 11 inch guns.
- ✓ 3 Pocket Battleships, each of 10,000 tons, with six 11 inch guns.
- 6 Light Cruisers, each of 6,000 tons, with nine 6 inch guns  
 (except EMDEN which is of 5,400 tons, with 8-6 inch guns.
- 19 Destroyers of 1811 and 1625 tons.
- 12 Torpedoboats, each of 600 tons.
- 41 Submarines of between 250 and 700 tons.
- 24 Minesweepers.
- 52 RUmboote.
- 14 High Speed Motor Torpedoboats,  
 as well as a number of additional minor fighting craft,  
 schoolships and experimental vessels of various types and uses.

Building or projected, are:

- 2 Battleships, each of 35,000 tons (a third is planned), with eight 15 inch guns.
- 2 Aircraft Carriers, each of 19,250 tons (the first was launched on 8 December 1936 and christened "GRAF ZEPPELIN").
- 5 Heavy Cruisers, each of 10,000 tons, with eight 8 inch guns  
 (Four of these have, in the meantime, been launched: BLUCHER - ADMIRAL HIPPER - PRINZ EUGEN - SEYDLITZ).
- 4 Light Cruisers, each of 7,000 tons (projected).
- 7 Destroyers of 1625 and 1811 tons.
- 27 Submarines, between 250 and 700 tons.
- 11 High Speed Motor Torpedoboats.
- 18 Torpedoboats, each of 600 tons.
- 22 Minesweepers.
- 10 RUmboote, as well as  
 Various Escort Ships and Experimental Vessels. "

Yank. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Nav. For.	Com. Nav. For.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. S. & S.	Com. Air	Attended at	Operations	State	Com. R. T.	Com. R. T.	Return to Home No.
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ATTACHE'S REPORT 0-10-a/20140rA

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From N. A. BERLIN Date 10 June 39 Serial No. R-558 File No. EF50/NB  
 Source of information Reliable Conversation  
 Subject GERMANY Naval Bases Funds for Construction of  
(Nation reported on) (Index title or per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

Note:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Nine billion Reichsmarks (\$3,600,000,000) demanded by the Navy for four year program of naval base construction.

- References: a) Z Report R-888 of 6 December 1938.  
 b) Z Report R-235 of 5 April 1939.  
 c) Z Report R-297 of 6 May 1939.

Inclosure: A) Tourist map of Rügen.

1. It was learned from a reliable source that the German financial system which is already sailing very close to the wind, is on the point of being further strained by a very extensive demand of the Navy for nine billion Reichsmarks (three billion, six hundred million dollars) for a four year building program, the bulk of which is to be spent on the construction of naval bases. This demand was apparently made after the budget had already been worked out and, if acceded to, may do considerable damage to the country's financial structure.

2. It was learned from the same source that the city of Eschhafen at the mouth of the Ems River has increased in population from 20,000 to 90,000 inhabitants in the course of the past year. Reference a) indicated that an increase in the size of Wilhelmshaven was to be expected. It is probable that some of the money will be spent in enlarging the navy yard facilities at Kiel (reference "b" reported the combining of the Howaldt Yard with the Naval Arsenal to form the Navy Yard Kiel). Whether or not part of this money will be used to pay for new coast fortifications such as underway at Memel (see reference "c") is not known.

3. It was learned from a reliable informant, who had just returned from a Whitsun vacation at Rügen, that considerable activity has just started there to build a submarine base. A channel about one kilometer (1100 yards) long is to be cut through the low sand spit at the northwest corner of Jasmund and the Grosser Jasmunder Badden is being dredged out to a depth of 8 meters (26.24 feet). The Schiffsstammabteilung XIII has its barracks just southwest of the ferry harbor. A summer resort with a capacity of 20,000 Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) tourists is being erected on the east beach of Rügen.

4. The Naval Attache and Assistant Naval Attache intend to visit Kiel on 17 June in connection with the annual meeting of the Hamburg Society of Shipbuilders and Marine Engineers. Later in the month the Assistant Naval Attache also plans to visit various naval activities on the Baltic. The Assistant Naval Attache for Air will pass through this area on 17 June, enroute to Sweden.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 305 and 307 of 68  
 OSD letter, May, 3, 1973  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From N. A. BERLIN Date 14 July, 1959 Serial No. R-458 File No. EF80/841  
 Source of information Reliable Conversation  
 Subject GERMANY Navy New Battleships  
 Reference MM-24-1039

Note—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is attached to this report. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Machinery Installation and Armament of New German Battleships



U. S. OFFICE OF  
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- References: a) Z Report R-245 of 25 April 1958.  
 b) Z Report R-556 of 10 June 1958.  
 c) Z Report R-546 of 28 September 1958.

1. In the series of reports listed in the references, it was at first stated and then contradicted, that the machinery installation for the two new 35,000 ton German battleships would be Diesel engines. When the original report was submitted, the writer was reasonably certain that the information was correct. It now appears that it was partially correct, for although the information as given was said to apply to the 35,000 ton ships then on the ways, it has now been heard from a most reliable source that it really applies to the two new battleships "H" and "J" which will shortly be laid down. These ships will be of 40,000 tons and the main engines will be Diesels of 100,000 horsepower. A speed of 28 knots is expected. The informant did not know whether the installation would be Diesel electric or not, or what firm would supply the engines.

2. It was further stated that these ships will carry eight 16 inch guns.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(e) and 5(2) or (3)  
 OSD dated May 4, 1973  
 Date MAY 21 1973  
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From N. A. BERLIN Date 18 July 1959 Serial No. R-448 File No. EF50(N)/575  
 Source of information Conversation. (Classification) (Original proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject GERMANY Navy Guns  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Replacement of Guns on German Battleships with Larger Caliber in time of War.

1. A Naval Attache of another country has informed the writer that his office has heard from several sources that in time of war the Germans will replace the nine 11 inch guns on the "Gneisenau" and "Scharnhorst" with nine 15 inch guns and the six 11 inch guns of the "Deutschland" class with four 15 inch guns. This Attache claimed that in view of the structural changes necessary, he was loath to believe this information but that it had been heard from several sources and, as yet, they had been unable to ascertain anything to contradict the report.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 3(d) of (b)  
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972  
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From Z Date 18 August, 1939 Serial No. R-512 File No. EF50(N)  
 Source of information German press and publications  
 Subject GERMANY Navy Commissionings & Conversions  
 (Citations reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Index title as per index sheet)

Reference

Note:—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is placed in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political issues, and the gist of the report.

(1) Commissioning of Submarines U-49 and U-61;  
 (2) Characteristics of converted motorship "Königin Luise, and potential minelayers "Cobra" and "Kaiser"

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References: a) Z Report R-375 of 22 June 1939. — *In this folder.*  
 b) Z Report R-494 of 7 August 1939. — *14193 (K-2-b)*

1. Two submarines were placed in commission in Kiel on 12 August 1939 — the U-49 and U-61. According to the records of this office, this makes a total of 55 submarines known to be in commission.

2. In reference a), report was made on the conversion of the motorship "Königin Luise" to a minelayer in case of emergency. This ship is one of three which operate between Hamburg, Helgoland and Sylt. Reference b), submitted a week ago, reported that this service had been discontinued for "technical reasons". It is believed that the other two ships — "Cobra" and "Kaiser" — are also potential minelayers. The "Cobra" was built in 1926 by the Vulcan Werke A.G. in Stettin; the "Kaiser" was built in 1905 by the same firm. Characteristics of these ships are:

(\*Cobra\*)

(\*Kaiser\*)

Length - 82.41 meters (270 feet)  
 Breadth - 12.22 " (40 " )  
 Moulded Depth - 7.01 m. (23 " )  
 B.R.T. - 2152  
 Horsepower - 5,600  
 Speed - 17.0 knots  
 Main Drive - Geared turbines

Length - 92.59 meters (302 feet)  
 Breadth - 11.69 " (38.5 " )  
 Moulded Depth - 4.8 m. (15.8 " )  
 B.R.T. - 1912  
 Horsepower - 5,000  
 Speed - 16.0 knots  
 Main Drive - Geared turbines

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From Z Date 18 August, 1939 Serial No. 515 File No. EF50(Navy)  
 Source of information RESTRICTED  
 Subject GERMANY Navy Depot Ships 8FP 2 1939  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_

Note.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary is furnished in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

German Navy Depot Ships (Tenders) for Submarines, Motor Torpedoboats and RSubboats.

**RESTRICTED**  
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- Reference: a) NA-London X-Report 614 dated 6 July 1939.  
 b) NA-Berlin Z-Report R-462 of 21 July 1939.  
 c) NA-Berlin Z-Report R-494 of 7 August 1939.

1. Reference a), submitted to this office for comment, states that Germany is to have 17 depot ships for submarines. Based on the information gathered and submitted by this office, this figure appears entirely reasonable. At present the list of tenders is as follows:

- Saar - - - - - Built for service as a submarine tender.
  - Memel - - - - - ex-Merchant Ship.
  - Weichsel - - - - - "
  - Mosel - - - - - "
  - Donau - - - - - "
  - Warnow - - - - - "
  - Lech - - - - - "
  - Isar - - - - - "
  - Erwin Wasser - - - - - "
  - Dahme - - - - - "
  - Knurrhahn - - - - - "
- (at Submarine School)  
(characteristics unknown but probably an ex-Merchant ship).

**RESTRICTED**  
 E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 303 of 489  
 OSD Letter, May, 1, 1939  
 Date MAY 21 1973  
 by SLR

Two submarine tenders recently launched are the:

- Wilhelm Bauer
- Waldemar Kophamel

Two more submarine tenders are projected and are probably already on the building ways.

In addition to the foregoing, the following are listed as submarine tenders but as they are rather small they are not deemed suited for distant overseas operations:

- Havel - - - - - (ex-M boat)
- Acheron - - - - - "
- Spree - - - - - (ex-fishing steamer, at submarine school).

In addition, the following two ships have appeared in ship movement reports in the local press as submarine tenders:

- Odin
- Hertha

No information is available to this office concerning the above-named ships but there is a possibility that the Odin was incorrectly listed as there is an auxiliary...

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From 7 Date 18 August, 1959 Serial No. R-515 File No. EP30(Navy)  
 Source of information Files and Publications (Classify source material each January 31st) (Classify source material from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject GERMANY Navy Depot Ships  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_ (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subject)

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ary minesweeper by that name.

2. It has also been heard from good authority that in time of war several whaling ships are destined to be converted into submarine tenders. Two already mentioned are the "Walter Rau" and the "Jan Wellem". Another large whaling ship recently observed in Hamburg was the "Unitas", a ship of 21,846 B.R.T. No rumors have been previously heard about this ship as a potential submarine tender but the fact that she is undergoing overhaul in Hamburg at this particular time has induced this office to keep it under observation.

3. There are three motor torpedo-boat tenders in commission, namely,  
 Tsingtau - built as a motor torpedo-boat tender.  
 Samoa - - an ex-merchant ship.  
 Tanga - - a ship that was supposedly destined for China and later taken over and converted into a motor torpedo-boat tender. This may or may not be true as the writer was informed on his visit to the Neptun Werft in Rostock that this ship is a sister ship to the two motor torpedo-boat tenders which are being built at that yard, namely, "Carl Peters" and "Adolph Luderitz".

4. The three known RAmboat tenders are old converted war-time minesweepers. They are the  
 Brommy  
 Nettlebeck  
 von der Groeben

5. It is more than likely that several merchant ships are in the process of being converted into tenders of some description. Some of the ships recently purchased (see reference C), may be slated for that purpose.

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 E.O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 304  
 OSD letter, May 1 1972  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From Z Date 18 Sept., 1959 Serial No. R-569 File No. EF50/SS  
Source of information Conversation, reliable

Subject GERMANY Navy Submarine in Commission  
(Nation reported on) (Under title as per Index show) (Subsidiary)

Reference

Note:—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.  
Indication that number of German submarines in commission exceeds 55 definitely known about.



NAVY GENCOE

1. It was reported by a reliable source that the German submarine U-71 was seen in Warnemunde this past week-end. The source of information claimed that there was no doubt as to the number seen. If this be true, and unless German submarines have been renumbered, it indicates that there are many more submarines in commission than the 55 previously definitely known about.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and (D) or (G)  
OSD letter, May, 4, 1972  
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From Z Date 22 Sept., 1939 Serial No. R-590 File No. EF50/SS  
 Source of information Observations (Classify here unless (unless proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject GERMANY Submarine Building Capacity (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference: a) OPNAV dispatch 0021 - 1030 (September 1939).

Summary, including, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. (Indicate leading geographical, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Germany's Submarine Building Capacity.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (S)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

DATE MAY 21 1973

small, the common complaint was that they did not have enough men to accomplish all the work they had ahead of them. In wartime, with men being called to the front and the demand for construction being increased, it can be appreciated that this problem will be considerably aggravated. It is not believed that a lack of material will be felt at first.

5. The following is a list of shipyards which could be used for submarine construction, with the building facilities of each:

(Shipyard)	(Building Ways)	(Notes)
Howaldt, Hamburg (formerly Vulkan)	4	This yard has been erecting new buildings and expanding in general for the past year.
Blohm & Voss, Hamburg	5 large 4 small	Probably only the smaller ways would be used for submarines as this yard has only built large ships since the war.
Krupp-Germania, Kiel	8 1 drydock	Four (4) of the ways are housed over for all-weather work.
Deschimag, Wesermünde and Bremerhaven	11 drydocks	This firm has built many of the new boats since the war. No information can be obtained as to the number of building slips. It may be that all of the construction work is done in the drydocks.
Danziger Werft, Danzig	3	This yard has room for expansion on an island that lies in the river just opposite.
Bremer, Vulkan, Vegesack	7	This yard is erecting new ways. It still has room for expansion.
Wilhelshaven	??	This yard built no submarines during the war, or since, but its building facilities are believed to be ample.
Kiel Navy Yard (formerly Howaldt's)	9 or 11	Not listed as having built any submarines.

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Director	A-B-C-D-E											Misc. graph	In. files	Budget	C. N. O.	Gen'l. Serv.	War College	N. I. R.	Nav.	Ord.	T. S. R.	C. S. R.	Eng.	S. S. A.	M. S. R.	Aer.	U. S. M. C.	H. O.
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Tech. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. S. S. R.	Com. Air		Con. Sts.	W. P. Com.	N. T.	State	Cons.		Return to Source No.														

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From Z Date 22 Sept., 1959 Serial No. R-580 File No. EF50/SS

Source of information Observations (Common use series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY Submarine Building Capacity  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference: a) OPNAV dispatch 0021 - 1030 (September 1959).

NOTE.—The review, indexing and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

Germany's Submarine Building Capacity. E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(D) and 3(D) (30)  
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

DECLASSIFIED

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

(Shipyard)

(Building Ways)

(Notes)

Deutsche Werke, Kiel 6 drydocks This yard has built many of the present 250 ton boats. No information is available as to number of building slips so it is probable that the construction work is done in the drydocks.

Deschimag, Bremen 6 Four (4) of these ways are smaller and could be devoted to submarine construction.

The following smaller yards are estimated as the ones which could be most advantageously used for construction of submarines:

Stettiner Oderwerke 3 This yard is undergoing a tremendous expansion.

Schichau Werft, Danzig 4 This plant is adjacent to the Danziger Werft and also owns property on the same island which is opposite both yards.

Lubecker Flenderwerke A.G. 4

Deutsche Werft, Hamburg: (Finkenwärder 6 It is believed that there are more than 2 ways at the Reiherstieg yard. (Reiherstieg 2

H. C. Stülcken, Hamburg 3

Neptun Werft, Rostock 4

Lindenau, Memel ? Recently acquired.

There are other yards which have ways that could be used for submarine construction. The two (2) Schichau Werfts at Elbing and Königsberg have a total of seven (7) building ways, but the one at Elbing will probably still concentrate on "M"-boats, and the other on repair work. The Vulkan Werft at Stettin has been recently put in to operation. It has only one building way now, but it has ample space for four or five more. The other possible yards are the Rickmers Yard in Wesermünde (2), Norderwerft A.G., Hamburg (1), Lübecker Maschinenbau A.G. Lübeck (5), the Atlas Werke, Bremen (2), and the Norderwerke, Emden (4).

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A-B-C-D-E		Message	In-Index	Index	C. N. O.	Gen'l Board	War College	N. I. R.	Nav.	Ost.	I. & B.	C. & S.	Eng.	S. & A.	M. & S.	Aero.	U. S. M. C.	H. Q.							
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Yach. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Inf. Div.	Com. Sec. Div.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. S. & S.	Com. Air	Assigned to											Operations		Status		Comments		Referred to	

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From Z Date 22 September, 1939 Serial No. R-580 File No. EF30/SS

Source of information Observations (Consult new series each January first) (Subject proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY Submarine Building Capacity (Classify title as per Index shown) (Subject)

Reference: a) OPNAV dispatch 0021 - 1030 (September 1939).

Note:—The privacy, including classification of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. (Specify location, geographical, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Germany's Submarine Building Capacity.

6. The present known seventy-one (71) submarines built or building consist of thirty-two (32) 250 tonners, of which twenty-four (24) were built by Deutsche Werft, Kiel, and eight (8) by Krupp-Germania Werft; twenty-four (24) 500 tonners, of which eighteen (18) were built by Krupp-Germania Werft, and six (6) by Deschimag, Bremen; fifteen (15) 740 tonners, all built by Deschimag, Bremen. The two (2) 1000 ton Turkish submarines, which undoubtedly have been commandeered, were built by Krupp-Germania.

7. As in the last war, once the British anti-submarine measures have become effective, and although Germany will still be able to build submarines faster than the British can sink them, Germany's greatest deficiency will be in providing experienced submarine crews.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) or (F)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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P-10-2

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From Z Date 26 Sept., 1939 Serial No. R-582 File No. EF30/SS  
 Source of information Reliable Conversation CONFIDENTIAL  
 Subject GERMANY Anti-Submarine Measures Test of   
(Station reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Sub-title)

Reference

NOTE—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading paragraphs, persons, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Test of Effectiveness of Anti-Submarine Measures

1. It was learned in conversation with a reliable source that the German Navy had sent out the experimental listening device ship "STRAHL" with divers and special gear to locate three British submarines which had been reported sunk by German depth charges. These submarines were not found after a long search.
2. A German minesweeper depth-charged a Polish submarine at Gdynia early in September and at the same time the Air Force bombed another in the same port. Both were firmly believed to have been sunk at the time. Both submarines later interned at SANDHAMN (Sweden).
3. The British radio occasionally reports the sinking of another German submarine, total bag to date at least seven (7). Only one (1) German submarine is at present overdue and unreported.
4. Based on the above, the German Navy has doubts as to the effectiveness of depth charges versus submarines. Their opinion of British anti-submarine listening gear is very poor.

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 OSD letter, May, 1, 1972  
 By S1R Date MAY 21 1973



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From Z Date 26 Oct., 1939. Serial No. R-561 File No. EF30/SS  
(Common use series until January 1941) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information CONFIDENTIAL Conversation - reliable

Subject GERMANY Submarines Construction of  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference a) R-560 of 22 September 1939.

Note:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

German Submarine Construction.

1. It has been heard from a reliable source that the German opinion has been expressed that after Germany has settled down seriously to the task, they can build submarines at the rate of 20 a month. In view of the estimates made in reference a) it is believed that this figure is a little too high.

2. The same source states that Germany will soon start the construction of larger submarines, i.e., of about 1000 tons. In this connection it is worth noting that the so-called German 500-517-ton submarines have approximately the same length and breadth dimensions as our S-18 type (about 800 tons surface displacement) and that the so-called German 740-ton boats have dimensions about midway between the S-42 class (850 tons) and the S-48 as rebuilt (about 1000 tons surface). The point is that it is believed that the actual tonnage of the German submarines far exceeds the given figures. Since being in Germany the writer has only seen the German submarines at a distance and in pictures, but every view obtained of them has only confirmed the impression that the actual tonnage would greatly exceed their given tonnage.

3. Another source reports that as yet no submarine building activity is discernible in Hamburg. This may be due to several reasons. German Naval officers have informed the writer that the war would be over before Christmas. If such is the actual impression it may be that they consider that there is no use in starting an extensive building program if peace is going to come so soon. It is considered much more likely however that there will necessarily be a time lag before intensive submarine building can be started - one factor being that work on the merchant ships already on the ways will have to continue until they have reached the launching stage. It has been noted in local shipping publications that the orders given for the construction of merchant ships have dropped to practically nothing.

4. A reliable source in Hamburg claims that a mutual friend was informed by a submarine commanding officer that it was possible that an unrestricted submarine warfare might be launched at any time.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(a) and 3(c) or (d)  
 OSD letter, May, 1 1978

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1978

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E. O.

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From ..... Date ....., 19..... Serial No. .... File No. ....  
 Source of information ..... (Commence new section each January first) (Indicate proper number from O. N. I. index)  
 Subject ..... (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference .....

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4. In disagreement with the Annual Report from this office, it is stated that the Junkers Ju 88 will carry a total of only 2200 lbs of bombs, but that it can also carry an aerial torpedo, (of which one hears many rumors, but no authentic technical data) which can be released at a speed of over 100 km. per hour (62 mi. per hour). As mentioned in previous digests of press reports, the Junkers Ju 88 is also called a dive bomber. This arises from the fact that no distinction is made in press or technical reports in Germany between glide bombing (that is, angles up to 45°) and dive bombing (that is, angles considerably greater than 45°). The writer has repeatedly questioned air force personnel on this point, and feels fairly certain that the Ju 88, in its present form, is not intended to be used at angles exceeding 45° to the horizontal. Even for glide bombing, however, it is understood that the airplane has been fitted with a bomb-displacing gear and the automatic pull-out arrangement similar to that used on the standard true dive bomber, the Junkers Ju 87, which gear was described in Reports R-142 of 24 February 1939 and R-59 of 24 January 1939.

5. It is understood that the present mass production in Germany is concentrated on the following models: The Heinkel He 111 in its latest refined version, which is still the backbone of the bomber strength; the new fast Junkers Ju 88 and the Dornier equivalent of the Ju 88; the Messerschmitt Me 110 2-engine, 2-place pursuit or so-called destroyer, which was separately reported on in M-626 of 13 October 1939; and the Messerschmitt Me 109, which is still the standard single-seater pursuit. As reported in Report R-670 of 30 October 1939, it is understood that the Heinkel He 112 U is about to enter large-scale production for service as a complementary model for the Me 109.

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OSD letter, May, 1977 MAY 21 1973

By SLR Date .....

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P. 10-3

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From Z Date 20 November, 1939 Serial No. R-717 File No. EF60/88  
 Source of information Observer, Foreign Press  
 Subject GERMANY Submarine Building Capacity  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

**NOTE**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

**Estimates of Germany's Submarine Building Capacity.**

- Reference: a) Z Report R-580 of 22 September 1939.  
 b) Z Report R-601 of 15 October 1939.  
 c) Z Report R-661 of 26 October 1939.  
 d) Z Report R-708 of 17 November 1939.

1. It has been heard from various sources inside Germany, and also noted in the English press, that Germany is credited with commissioning submarines at present at the rate of two a week. In view of the information submitted in references a) and c), it is believed at this time that this is too high a figure. Rumors are also current to the effect that Germany will be able to construct submarines in a total building period of three months - from laying of keel to commissioning. This is also believed to be too optimistic. This office estimates the average initial building period as ten months, possibly shortening to eight months after a while.

2. In further analyzing the submarine question the following observations are made. As noted in reference a), Germany at the beginning of the war had 111 building ways which could be used for submarine construction. Some of the ways listed are very large and it is possible that two submarines could be built on some of them in tandem. The capacities of the drydocks are not known, and it is undoubtedly the case that more than one submarine will be built in each one. It is also assumed that new ways will be constructed as soon as possible. Considering that some ways will still be used for destroyers, minesweepers, etc. it is estimated that by 1 March 1940 there will be about 150 places available for submarine construction. It is conceded that all of the original program of 71 submarines will have been put in commission by this time, and that the additional 28 (see reference "b") have been laid down and well started.

3. The rumor has been heard from various sources that Germany has purchased ten submarines from Russia. Although there are factors casting some doubt upon this story - one being, "How would Germany pay for them?", still it must be considered as a possibility. It is also assumed that the Turkish submarines "BALDIRAY" and "YILDIRAY" have been taken over by the German Navy. It is estimated that the first is already in commission and the latter will be ready by about 1 December 1939. Such being the case, German submarine strength at that date - not counting losses - would be eighty-three (83) boats.

4. It has also been heard that Germany had some prefabricated submarines, spare parts, etc. which could be put together in less than the customary building time. The source of that unconfirmed rumor stated that he estimated seventeen (17) submarines in such a status. Assuming this to be true and that their building time will be less than for normal construction, it is conceded that these boats may be in commission by 1 April 1940, and that the submarine strength at that date - again not counting losses - would be one hundred (100) boats.

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From Z Date 20 November, 1939 Serial No. R-717 File No. EF30/SS  
(Commence new series with January first) (Indicate proper number from O. N. I. index)

Source of information Observations, Conversation, Press

Subject GERMANY Submarine Building Capacity  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

Remark—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

5. By 1 July 1940 it is estimated that the twenty-eight (28) additional submarines, as planned just before the outbreak of war (mentioned in paragraph 2), will be in service. The submarine strength then will be one hundred and twenty-eight (128) boats, losses excluded.

6. As some submarine building activity has been reported in Hamburg (see reference "d"), it may also be assumed that it has also started in other shipyards and that by January 1940, in addition to the above estimates, fifty (50) more boats will have been laid down, and figuring on the ten months building period, they should all be in commission by 1 November 1940, thus raising the number in commission at that time - excluding losses - to one hundred and seventy-eight (178).

7. By 1 March 1940 it is estimated that enough building ways will have been cleared of submarines and merchant ships, and that enough additional ways erected, so that eighty (80) more submarines can be laid down which should be commissioned by 1 January 1941, thus making the submarines strength at the end of next year - excluding losses - two hundred and fifty-eight (258) boats.

8. In regard to the losses of German submarines, there have also been many conflicting reports. As an illustration of the information available, the following is submitted. One of our colleagues here, known to be on very friendly terms with the German Attaché Group, claims that the number of submarines lost to date (as of 14 November) is five (5). However, about three weeks ago one of the Attaché Group admitted at that time that there were about five or six boats that had not been heard from. Conversations between German officers have been overheard in which they were talking of the eleven (11) submarines lost to date. (About two weeks ago). The French Naval Attaché at Copenhagen sets the figure at twelve (two weeks ago), and English sources stated that to date there have been twenty (20) boats sunk, (two weeks ago). The general opinion here among the foreign attaches seems to be that so far about twelve (12) submarines have been lost. This office also sets the losses at that number. This would make the average losses to date about five and a half (5½) per month, and it is naturally supposed that as the anti-submarine measures are improved, this average will rise to at least six (6) or seven (7) a month.

9. If the above estimates are anywhere near accurate, it will mean that the number of submarines commissioned in 1940 will be about 175, or about 15 a month. When the program is in full swing, that figure may be slightly exceeded. The Germans claim that they will build them at the rate of twenty (20) a month. The actual number, providing there are no labor troubles or shortage of raw materials, will probably be somewhere between the two estimates. If the building time is reduced below the estimated ten months, the number of submarines completed will be correspondingly increased.

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ATTACHE'S REPORT

17474-C  
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From Z Date 1 Dec 1939 Serial No. M-752 File No. 1000  
 Source of information Belgium (Commonwealth series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject G. E. R. M. A. N. Y. Long-Range Dive Bomber Ju 88 (Index title as per index sheet) (Sub-title)  
 Reference

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Forwarding Monograph Report M-752 of 1 December 1939 covering further details on the Junkers Ju 88, twin-engine, long-range, high speed dive bomber, with regard to diving brakes, bomb load, fuel supply, and armament.

Inclosure: A) Above-mentioned report.

1. Inclosure A) is transmitted herewith.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May 1 1978

by SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973



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	Monograph						Index	Budget	C.N.G.	Staff Board	War College	N.Y.S.	Nav.	Ord.	T.S.N.	C.A.E.	Sec.	S.S.A.	M.A.S.	Aers.	U.S. M.C.	H.Q.
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NA-BERLIN

(11-752)

1 December 1939

(G E R M A N Y)

1004 - 100 Planes, all types

1004 - 200 Production

1004 - 1000 Ordnance

1004 - 900 Equipment

(GERMANY - Junkers Ju 88, Long-Range, Dive Bomber).

References: a) Annual Air Report R-530 of 27 August 1939  
b) R-671 of 31 October 1939  
c) R-693 of 7 November 1939

1. A reliable informant who has had opportunity to inspect the Junkers Ju 88 dive bomber and has made a recent visit to one of the plants where it is now in mass production has furnished much of the following information, which further supplements the data already furnished in the references cited above.

2. As stated in reference b), it was understood that production, night and day, was underway in four large German aircraft factories on the Junkers Ju 88 and a new Dornier model which is either a counterpart of it or a development of it under license. It is now heard that 5 large factories are thus occupied. The informant had been allowed to make a very recent inspection of the large Heinkel plant at Oranienburg which for the last couple years has been steadily producing the Heinkel He 111 bomber. He stated that the Junkers Ju 88 has now gotten well underway in this plant and that it probably will not be long before the last of the He 111's has gone out the door and the plant will be solid with Ju 88's. Accordingly, it appears that the Junkers plant in Dessau and the Heinkel plant in Oranienburg are two identified plants of the 5 rumored. Incidentally, both of these are outstanding large scale production plants, on which data has already been presented to the Department, most recently in reference a).

3. The Ju 88 is equipped both with the Ju 87 diving brake (see Reports R-59 of 24 January 1939 and R-142 of 24 February 1939) and 90 degree slotted trailing edge flap. At present this combination restricts the diving speed to around 530 k.p.h. (329 m.p.h.) and the pull-out can be effected not lower than 400 m. (1,312 ft). Experiments are underway with a new upper-surface wing spoiler operated by a torque rod and cam which raises the spoiler to some angle less than 30 degrees. The principal characteristic of this arrangement is the quick return to battery, whereby immediately on effecting pull-out the upper surface of the wing is restored to normal profile. It is hoped with this device further to reduce the end velocity in the dive to something around 500 k.p.h. (310 m.p.h.) or less, and the minimum altitude of pull-out to 300 m. (984 ft) or less.

4. The data on bomb load is further confused by the latest information. Reference a) reported the maximum as three 500-kg (1100-lb) bombs. Reference b) put the maximum at 1000 kg or 2200 lbs of bombs. Reference c) named the same maximum of 2200 lbs and detailed this as consisting usually of two 550-lb external bombs and ten 110-lb internal bombs. The present informant states that

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

the airplane will carry two 250-kg or one 500-kg (total 1100 lbs) bomb when arranged for 2000-km. (1250-mi.) range. It has a maximum bomb capacity of 2000 kg (4400 lbs) of internal and external bombs. For external mounting it carries a maximum of two 250-kg bombs attached on the under side of the fuselage with bomb-displacing gear. The occasion for these variations in figures is probably attributable to the numerous possible combinations of bomb and fuel loads, as described later. The reason for the use of bomb-displacing gear, similar to the Ju 87, is probably to avoid contact with the long and bulbous fuselage nose or erratic flight into the propellers.

5. A unique characteristic of the internal bomb bay is the provision for interchangeable use either of bombs or of additional gasoline containers of the approximate size of the bombs. The suspension in the bomb bay is vertical with nose attachments, - and with special quick coupling devices for use when auxiliary gas tanks are carried in place of bombs. It was stated that because of the ease and rapidity with which the attachment can be effected either of bombs or of gas loads, the decision as to loading conditions to be used for any mission can be deferred until just before takeoff, when all available data as to objective has been received.

6. It is not believed that the internal bombs, when carried, can be released in a dive. The principal use of the internal bombs is for low altitude horizontal attack.

7. The plane has been specially designed in all of its features for use as an attack weapon against naval surface craft. The bomb-fuel flexibility permits a wide choice of loading combinations to suit the conditions reported in the contact reports of the surface or airplane scouts as regards composition of the objective, weather conditions in the theater of action, especially as to ceiling, and the radius of action corresponding to the location of the target relative to the home base.

8. A rear gunner's cockpit is not being provided for German air force use. Rearward fields of fire are presented by the upper rearward flexible gun manned by the radio man, located just behind the pilot, and the rear flexible tunnel gun manned by the bomber-gunner, who also has a flexible gun in the nose.

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OSD letter, May, 1, 1975

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Date MAY 21 1973



Braked wing Ju-88

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### ATTACHE'S REPORT

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From Z Date 14 Dec., 1939 Serial No. R-782 File No. EF22/A2-14  
(Commence new series each January first) (Substitute proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Personal Observations

Subject D E N M A R K Visit to Copenhagen Observations during  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference: a) Z Report R-700 of 13 November 1939

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Observations on visit to Copenhagen.

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 O. I. 11652, Sec. 303 and 5(D) of (E)  
 OSD letter, May 1972  
 MAY 2 1973

1. The writer visited Copenhagen 8-12 December, 1939, traveling by the usual route - train between Berlin and Warnemünde, ferry between there and Gjedser, and Danish train between Gjedser and Copenhagen.

2. At Warnemünde, I observed a small German submarine standing in and upon returning by ferry to this port I saw a small submarine standing out. Also, on the return to Berlin, I obtained a view previously blocked by trains on the siding and saw four destroyers and torpedoboats tied to the dock. I presume therefore that Warnemünde is used as destroyer and submarine base. The observations substantiate the belief that the small German submarines are finding employment in the Baltic.

3. Many freight cars were observed on the sidings and most of these were loaded with coal. These cars were awaiting ferry transfer to Gjedser and thence many were destined for Sweden and Norway. I was told that four ferries (two Danish and two German) were running day and night between Warnemünde and Gjedser, each making as a rule six round trips a day. Since each passage consumes about two hours, it indicates that the ferries must move with little delay at each end. I was also informed that the Sassnitz-Trelleborg ferries (also two German and two Swedish) are operating under a similar rush schedule, but due to the longer run cannot make the same fast turn-around. At Gjedser also many freight cars were awaiting ferry shipment but many were observed to be empty. It would indicate that Germany is piling up "devilsen" in the Scandinavian countries; perhaps to pay for the iron ore so largely drawn from Sweden.

4. Patrol vessels were again sighted to north-westward and also to eastward - the latter apparently patrolling the German minefield - Gjedser - Wustrow (peninsula west of Rügen).

5. In Copenhagen I interviewed Captain Pontoppidan, the director of the Danish naval intelligence service. He stated that to date they had picked up over 300 German mines which had washed up on the eastern and southern shores of Denmark. A few of these mines exploded on impact with the beach. He said that the mine cables were too weak; also they were too lightly anchored with blocks of concrete. Apparently the mines "hopped" and in instances the concrete blocks struck together and broke up. Moreover they shifted position and brought destruction to five German patrol boats guarding their minefields. About 20 British and German mines have

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Source of information Personal Observations

Subject D E N M A A R K Visit to Copenhagen Observations during  
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OSD letter, May, 3, 1978

By SI II

Date

MAY 21 1973

been picked up to date on the west coast of Jutland. Some of these mines apparently drifted eastward past Skagen and were washed up on the coast of Sweden near Vinga. A careful lookout by airplanes and patrol boats is kept for such mines which menace all shipping in the Skagerrack and Cattegat; such drifting mines are marked and guarded until they can be picked up or wash ashore. Captain Pontoppidan stated that the explosive charge of the British and German mines planted in the North Sea ran about the same as those used in the World War (about 300 lbs), while the explosive charge of the German mines in the Baltic ran somewhat lighter. This statement is at variance with that previously made to me, as noted in paragraph 4 of Reference a).

6. Captain Pontoppidan stated the German submarines were laying for the Bergen-Scapa Flow convoys and after making their attack would trail and report; German bombers would then appear and continue the attack. This explains in part the frequent flights of German bombers to the Shetlands and raids in the northern North Sea.

7. The British-German-Danish trade agreement is still operating but the Danes are being pinched more and more. Since England normally gets twice as much Danish produce as Germany, the latter allows the minimum to trickle through to the British Isles. Germany is blocking coal shipments from England to Denmark, since she wants to supply the coal. Apparently the British are not well satisfied with the deal because they are releasing fodder shipments to Denmark with great reluctance. Imported goods are growing scarcer in Denmark. Gasoline and sugar are the only two items which are rationed, and the ration of the latter is abundant. The sale of coffee and tea is limited, and the export is forbidden. Otherwise food is abundant and excellent in quality, with very little or no rise in prices.

8. With regard to the number of German submarines sunk thus far in the course of the war, I received the following information. Captain Diggle, the British naval attaché, informed me that they have bagged a total of 32 German submarines, that they have 245 U-boat prisoners taken from 23 different submarines. I got the impression that Captain Diggle is unreliable for information, not well informed, and full of wishful-thinking. In fact, Captain Diggle is a retired naval officer and is being relieved by an active officer. Captain Trigou, the French naval attaché, gave as his estimate a German loss of 25-30 submarines; he said they had over 200 U-boat prisoners - the number indicating that they had

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(Continence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS

Subject DENMARK Visit to Copenhagen Observations during  
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Reference

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come from at least 3 submarines. Captain Pontoppidan gave a more conservative estimate of 20 German submarines lost.

9. Many rumors were floating around that the Germans were building pontoons and barges in great number at the North Sea shipyards, especially around Hamburg. Numerous persons sought information relative thereto. The impression seemed to be that the pontoons and barges were intended for a German attack on Holland; perhaps an attack on some outlying Dutch island, such as Texel, which would enable the establishment of a German air base within striking distance of England.

10. Copenhagen is said to be the spy center of Europe today. Many agents of all countries may be contacted. I was reliably informed that Germany maintains 26 press attachés alone in Copenhagen. In my opinion, the U.S. should have a naval intelligence officer permanently stationed in that city.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 9(E) and (D) or (B)  
 OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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 Source of information Personal Observations (Circumstances new series (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index))  
 Subject DENMARK Visit to Copenhagen Observations during (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index office) (Subtitle)  
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Observations on visit to Copenhagen.

EVALUATION

Information given by Captain Pontoppidan is considered reliable. Other reports are to be credited only as confirmed otherwise.

SUMMARY

Copenhagen is becoming more and more the neutral center to which information comes and to which belligerent and neutral agents go for information. The United States should maintain a naval intelligence office in that city.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(e) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

Notes for 55 Line Log.

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
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From 2 Date 30 January, 1940 Serial No. R-55

Source of information Observations, Conversation and Press

Subject GERMANY Navy; Submarine Strength and Building Capacity.

Reference



Summary: (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the report is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Estimates of German Navy Submarine Strength and Building Capacity.

39

EVALUATION

Estimates of German submarine strength and building capacity as derived from local and English sources.

SUMMARIZATION

Comparative estimates of German submarine strength and building capacity; Construction believed will lag behind until the 24 ways in Hamburg shipyards are utilized; Report that twenty (20) Russian subs have been taken over by Germany, but not yet engaged in active service because of poor diving characteristics; Estimated strength at this time reckoned at about 55 boats; Losses to date estimated at about 50 boats.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 303

OSD letter, May 1, 1973

By SLR

Date

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Yank. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Sec. Per.	Com. Sec. Per.	C. in C. State	Com. A. S. I.	Com. Air	Attended at	Operations	Gen. Sec.	W. P.	Com.	R. T.	State	Com. Sec.	Public Aff.	Gen. Sec.	Gen. Sec.

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From Z Date 30 January, 1940 Serial No. R-56 File No. EF30(N)/SS  
(Comments new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Observations, Conversation and Press

Subject GERMANY Navy; Submarine Strength and Building Capacity  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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Estimates of German Navy Submarine Strength and Building Capacity.

- References: a) Z Report R-580 of 22 September 1939.  
 b) Z Report R-717 of 20 November 1939.

Inclosure: a) Article extracted from English publication "Motorship", issue of January 1940, entitled "Germany's Submarine Building Capacity".

- While it is known to this office that the above mentioned publication is available in the Bureau of Engineering, nevertheless it is desired to ensure that an article in the January 1940 issue thereof is brought to the attention of the Office of Naval Intelligence. Accordingly, the article in question is transmitted herewith as inclosure A).
- It is considered that the article will be of interest in that it affords a comparison with a similar estimate made by this office in reference a). The article gives the building berths available for submarine construction as 95; the estimate made by this office was somewhat higher - 111 - or, calculating doubling up on the larger ways and in the drydocks, 150 building places were estimated available. The article estimates nine months to construct a submarine, while the estimate of this office was ten months at first, with a possible reduction to eight months if the program proceeded smoothly. As a matter of clarification, the article speaks of the "Deutsche Werft" which was not in existence during the world war. It is believed that the author had reference to the "Deutsche Werke" at Kiel, which is now one of the main submarine construction sites. The "Deutsche Werft" is in Hamburg and is in two divisions - one at Finkenwärde and the other at Reiherstieg.
- It is believed, however, that construction will lag behind the original estimate of this office and also that set forth in the article, the reason being that if Germany is to build to capacity she will have to utilize the 24 ways that are available in the Hamburg area, and as yet, according to a very good informant, there is no evidence of any submarine construction in the Hamburg shipyards, i.e., Blohm & Voss, Deutsche Werft (both Reiherstieg and Finkenwärder), Howaldts and Stalcken.
- In reference b), this office also included 10 Russian submarines as having been reported taken over by Germany. This rumor rises and falls, sometimes being denied as entirely false and sometimes as fact. The latest information available to this office is that 20 submarines were taken over by Germany, but that they have not been put into use as yet due to their poor material condition and because of their slow diving characteristics.
- The same source who furnished the above information on Russian submarines also stated that he had it from a good source that the Germans now had about 10 submarines less, not counting Russian, than when they entered the war. Estimating that Germany, at outbreak of war, had about 65 submarines, this would make their strength at this time to be in the neighborhood of 55 boats,

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Source of information Observations, Conversation and Press

Subject GERMANY Navy; Submarine Strength and Building Capacity  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference .....

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which figure, including new construction, checks fairly well with the estimated German submarine losses to date of about thirty (30) boats.

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From Z Date 17 Feb., 1940 Serial No. R-99 File No. EF30(A)/A91  
(Commons save series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Personal Observations

Subject GERMANY Air Force and Aircraft Industry, Semi-Annual Report  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subsidiary ON)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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Semi-annual review jointly prepared by Asst. Military Attaché for Air and Asst. Naval Attaché for Air. Comments on appropriations, production, bases, organization, training, technical matters, operations, lighter-than-air, commercial planes. - Wartime restrictions eliminate authentic information.

1. Supplementing the current reports submitted to M.I.D. and O.N.I., the following is submitted jointly by Major Vanaman, A.C. U.S.A. and Lieutenant Commander P. E. Pihl, U.S.N. as a semi-annual review to summarize the present situation. The comments below will follow the index of the Annual Aviation Report for 1939.

Digest A: Appropriations.

Upon the declaration of war all budgets and all estimates were figuratively thrown out of the window and at the same time the secret status of the monetary situation was removed to the ultra secret status. The printing of money will not stand in the way of expenditures for the Air Force, the only question being that of obtaining labor and the raw materials with which to work. Money is just so much paper and ink with a standard value upheld by law, regardless of what substance exists to back the money.

Digest B: Production and Procurement.

Based solely on rumor, intuition and the general interpretation of conditions which one obtains by residence in Germany, it is submitted that the wartime production estimates presented in Exhibits B-P and C-P of Digest B (Production and Procurement) of the Annual Report are not being realized. It is still maintained that these estimates represent, as closely as the undersigned can evaluate the German aircraft industry, the capacity which could be attained, if and when the decision is taken to place the industry on its maximum productive basis, assuming availability of workers and material. For a variety of reasons, chief among which is an apparent indecision at the break of war with regard to the final design of certain types which the air force wishes to concentrate on, it is felt that the maximum production rate of all types attained at the beginning of the sixth month of the war does not exceed 1800 to 2000 airplanes per month. On that basis the total number produced since 1 September would not exceed 7800 airplanes if a straight line progression from the September 1 to March 1 production rates is assumed. This compares with a total of 12,400 airplanes which might have been produced in this period according to the estimates of the Annual Report. In fact, it is entirely conceivable and probable that the total production since September 1 1939 is even less - in the neighborhood of 8000 airplanes.

As was pointed out in the Annual Report, an acute shortage of labor actually existed in Germany and even before war was declared

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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-8, B-9, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16	C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5, C-6, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-10, C-11, C-12, C-13, C-14, C-15, C-16, C-17, C-18, C-19, C-20, C-21, C-22, C-23, C-24, C-25, C-26, C-27, C-28, C-29, C-30, C-31, C-32, C-33, C-34, C-35, C-36, C-37, C-38, C-39, C-40, C-41, C-42, C-43, C-44, C-45, C-46, C-47, C-48, C-49, C-50, C-51, C-52, C-53, C-54, C-55, C-56, C-57, C-58, C-59, C-60, C-61, C-62, C-63, C-64, C-65, C-66, C-67, C-68, C-69, C-70, C-71, C-72, C-73, C-74, C-75, C-76, C-77, C-78, C-79, C-80, C-81, C-82, C-83, C-84, C-85, C-86, C-87, C-88, C-89, C-90, C-91, C-92, C-93, C-94, C-95, C-96, C-97, C-98, C-99, C-100																										
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Source of information Personal Observations
Subject GERMANY Air Force and Aircraft Industry, Semi-Annual Report
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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3025 and 3026 of 30
May 4, 1932
MAY 21 1940

between Germany and the Allies, Germany was on a war time production status. War exaggerated this labor shortage. As to raw materials for the manufacture of airplanes, as was pointed out in the Annual Air Report 1939, immense stock piles of raw material had been accumulated before the war, but it is always dangerous to completely deplete this stock, unless replacements are within sight. Everywhere in Germany exists evidence of the shortage of raw materials.

With regard to the proportion of the various models in manufacture under this total it is impossible to present detailed estimates. All that can be said is that it is believed that the present wartime manufacture is concentrated on the models hereafter named.

The principal models of bombers are the Junkers JU 88 and a Dornier equivalent. That equivalent is believed to be a further development of the Dornier Do 215, which was intended to be the modern export version of the Do 17. It is rumored that the designation of the model intended for the Air Force is known as the Dornier Do 217.

Among the single-engine, single-seat fighters, the Messerschmitt Me 109 is still the mainstay of the Air Force. One hears rumors that improvements on this model, based on war experiences thus far gained, are being incorporated, and that the revised model will be known in the service as the Messerschmitt Me 113. Similarly there are unconfirmed indications that some production of the Heinkel He 112 U is underway. This is difficult to believe unless this model is to incorporate specific features such as unusual climb or unusual ceiling, adapting it possible for interceptor use, which would distinguish it more sharply from the Messerschmitt Me 109.

In the heavy fighter class the Messerschmitt Me 110 is still believed to be the sole service type. Again there are indefinite indications of modifications being incorporated and that a revised model might be designated the Messerschmitt Me 210. A recent British press report claims that there is "in hand, but not yet in production, a two-motor fighter, the Dornier 29. This may be compared with the Messerschmitt 110, but is likely to prove somewhat faster at about 380 m.p.h." No evidence has yet been found to substantiate this account.

As a scout, it has been heard that the Focke Wulf FW 189 is

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(E) and 5(D) of  
OSD letter, May. 4, 1972  
Date MAY 9 1972

in service on the west front. In view of the obsolescence of the other models, such as the Henschel HS 126, Heinkel He 70, and Arado 95 L, listed in this class in the Annual Report, it would not be surprising if present manufacture were being concentrated on this one model, the FW 189. The Fieseler Storch Fi 156, which can be used as an observation type, but for which a variety of other important utility functions was found in the Polish campaign, is undoubtedly also continuing under production.

Among the seaplanes it is fairly well known that the Heinkel He 114 and He 115 are being produced both for export and for own service use. No definite indication whatever is available on the flying boats which may now be under manufacture.

It is conceivable, but not authenticated, that some manufacture is continuing in the 4-engine land plane class, represented by the Junkers Ju 89 and the Focke Wulf FW 200. Manufacture of the foregoing for commercial purposes (for which the Junkers model is known as the Ju 90) was underway at the time war broke out. It would be a simple matter to convert existing stocks of commercial airplanes of this kind to their military counterparts, if such were considered desirable for long-range heavy bombing missions.

As far as could be observed, the transfer from peace to war time basis in the Air Ministry took place as planned. No new bureaus were created and no change in method of procurement was evidenced. Control remained as before and it was not necessary in any way to modify the organization materially.

It is felt that the motor production is in pace with the airplane production but that it has been found that a shortage of accessories exists and might possibly be a bottle neck. This assumption is based on the evidence of new accessory factories coming into being.

#### Digest C: Bases.

With regard to bases it is understood that a large number of new operating, or auxiliary, fields was being established until heavy winter snows interrupted the program. These fields, in general, are located to back up the west front and in the Schleswig-Holstein area in the north. Presumably the program will be continued in the spring when weather and ground conditions permit.

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Adm. Serv.																
Asst. Dir.																
Ident. Div.																
Intell. Div.																
Lab.																
Legal Coun.																
Plan. & Insp.																
Spec. Inv.																
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 OSD letter, May, 1, 1972  
 By SLR Date 08/22/93

Digest D: Organization.

The organization as shown in Exhibit A-C with only slight modifications, is believed to exist today and if any changes have been made, they are only of a minor nature.

It is known that the Corps (Fliegerkorps) has appeared as an organization entity, but it is not known where it fits into the organization scheme, for example, whether above or below the air divisions (Fliegerdivisionen) or the air fleets (Luftflotte).

As was stated in report 17,000 of November 21, 1939, it is believed that the air organization today has 480 squadrons, totalling approximately 7000 active front line airplanes in the active and active reserve status, and as stated, it is not believed that many more squadrons will be organized unless the situation changes materially and it is felt that a 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th or 5th depot reserve of airplanes will be formed from current production and that all pilots trained will be used for replacement of casualties.

Digest E: Training.

The training in the Air Force was practically on a war basis in September, but it is believed that the facilities have been expanded and that personnel of extreme ages, especially in younger brackets, are being trained in great numbers. It is known that youths of 17 are well along in their flying training. Endeavors have been made to obtain information regarding the time and nature of the training under war conditions, but this information is in the secret status and no information has been obtained except that the ground training course is of three months duration and that a student who started his flying training around January 1st, had on February 15 made 35 solo flights, was almost finished with what can be called his primary training, and was practically ready for his training on service types of airplanes. Whether or not this is an exceptional case is not known and whether the progress depends on the individual or whether all students are given the same number of hours in the air and are in school the same elapsed time is not known.

The principal source of recruits is the National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK) which was described with available data in the Annual Report.

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Task Div.	C. in C. U. A.	Com. Int. For.	Com. Sen. For.	Com. Sen. For.	C. in C. Aids	Com. S. R. S.	Com. Air	Attached at	Operations				Com. Dir.	W. P.	Com. P. T.	State	Com- mence	Return to Room No.										

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 E. O. 11652, Sec. 303 and 307 (2)  
 OSD letter, May, 4, 1937  
 By SLK Date MAY 21 1973

Digest F: Technical Matters.

It is believed that all research organizations in Germany are in the main concerned only with present day improvements of existing types and that the so-called long view in the research field has been abandoned during the emergency. It is believed that all work is being concentrated on the improvement of designs and models that had already reached the experimental service test or production status, that the designs are practically frozen except for improvements where they are found to be necessary. It is believed in many cases that load factors are being sacrificed in order to obtain range.

Digest G: Operations.

It is believed that it has been found that high altitude horizontal bombing, under conditions that obtain in Europe, or due to absence of a satisfactory bomb sight, will not produce the necessary results and it has therefore been decided that dive bombing should be utilized. It is believed that the Ju 88 was originally designed for horizontal bombing and that it has been adapted and possibly partly redesigned in order to produce a dive bomber with sufficient range to reach England. It appears that the German Air Force was never fully designed for a war against England and that this war was never contemplated by Germany. This observation is based on the inability of most of the models of German airplanes to operate successfully against England with sufficient factor of safety as to range.

SM

It is believed that in operation against enemy aircraft the 20 mm automatic cannon has proven to be an outstanding weapon.

The operations that have taken place to date by the German Air Force against the Western Powers are not of such a nature of extensive enough to enable the Air Attachés to discuss in detail methods of operations. This, of course, is coupled with the lack of information that obtains in Berlin, but it is believed that all of the operations that have taken place can be classified largely as training and reconnaissance.

Digest H: Lighter than Air.

No further information on lighter than air than that contained in basic report has become available.

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Yach. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Sub. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Adv.	Com. R. S. A.	Com. Air	Attached at	Operations				Com. Dir.	W. P.	Com. J. L. T.	Spec.	Com- mence	Returns to Exam. Rm.				

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Digest I: War Use of Commercial Airplanes.

Practically all reserve airplanes of the Deutsche Lufthansa have become military property for use in transport of personnel and for training. Most of the commercial airplanes that were privately owned have been commandeered by the military and are being used for training purposes.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)  
 OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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Tech. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Int. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. S. S. S.	Com. Ad.	Attached at		Operations				State	Com-merce	Returns to Home No.							
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Semi-annual review jointly prepared by Asst. Military Attaché for Air and Asst. Naval Attaché for Air. Comments on appropriations, production, bases, organization, training, technical matters, operations, lighter-than-air, commercial planes. - Wartime restrictions eliminate authentic information.

EVALUATION

The restrictions imposed on air attachés, which have been previously reported in detail, completely preclude the gathering of any first-hand authentic information. The undersigned are in no position to prepare a supplementary or semi-annual report on the Air Force and aircraft industry of Germany which would be anything but pure fantasy. The Annual Report submitted August 27, 1939, which in itself contained a considerable degree of estimate and guess, can in no significant measure be enlarged upon at this time. Under a continuation of present circumstances and restrictions it will be likewise impossible to present the Annual Report due next 1 July in a comparable form to that of 1939. However, it is believed advisable at this time to furnish a few comments based entirely on feel of the situation rather than on any direct evidence. In fact no direct evidence is available.

SUMMARY

Lack of information in Berlin under present severe restrictions on attachés and the national discipline with regard to security of matters related to national defense prevent submission of a semi-annual report comparable with the annual report submitted on 27 August 1939. Brief comments are submitted on each heading of the report: appropriations, production, bases, organization, training, technical matters, operations, lighter-than-air, commercial planes. Chiefly, the intent of this review is to transmit the opinion that the war time airplane production rate, estimated in the Annual Report, is probably not being realized - that only about 5000 airplanes of all types, as a maximum, have probably been produced since September 1, 1939, - and to indicate the models on which production is probably concentrated. Available details on the models named have been submitted in previous reports to M.I.D. and O.N.I.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1973

MAY 21 1973

By SLR

Date

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
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From Z Date 15 March, 1940. Serial No. R-185

Source of information Conversation, good, and English publication "Motorship"

Subject GERMANY Navy Submarine

Reference: a) Z Report R-580 of 22 September 1939.



Note:—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.

12 U-boats of 500 tons building at Blohm & Voss, Hamburg; No information as to progress being made thereon; Expectancy that this yard will launch 4 boats monthly after building program is in full swing; English magazine article on number of ways available at Wesermünde and Bremerhaven; Same article estimates 45 U-boats in commission at outbreak of war, which figure considered too low.

Inclosure: A) Article "Germany's Shipbuilding Resources" (Mono)

- It has just been heard from a good source that there are twelve (12) submarines under construction at the Blohm and Voss shipyard in Hamburg. They are being built on three of the larger ways and are being built two abreast in tandem. They were said to be 500 ton boats. The informant had no information how advanced they were or when they would be launched. The statement was made that this yard expected to launch four submarines a month after the submarine program was in full swing. It is probable that this figure will not be attained until some more of the ways at this yard, of which there are nine or ten are available for submarine construction.
- The article "Germany's Shipbuilding Resources", extracted from the October 1939 issue of "Motorship", is forwarded herewith as inclosure A), as being of possible interest. Due to the disruption of the mail services this particular number of "Motorship" has just been received in this office. The information therein on the number of ways at the various yards is supplemental to reference a). In that report it was stated that it was not known how many berths were available at the Deschimag Yard at Wesermünde and Bremerhaven. This article states that there are sixteen (16) large berths and five (5) smaller. This possibly also includes the branch of this yard at Bremen, which is listed as having six (6) ways. Reference a) listed the Deutsche Werft as having eight (8) ways, while the enclosed article says that this yard has twelve (12) ways. It has also just been learned from another source, believed to be good, that there are six (6) drydocks at the Wilhelmshaven Navy Yard and two (2) building ways. One is for battleships of the largest size and the other is somewhat smaller.
- This article gives the number of submarines in commission at the beginning of the war as forty-three (43). That figure is too low. It is known that there were fifty-six (56) definitely in commission, and it is probable that the actual number was around sixty-five (65).

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Number	A-B-C-D-E					Y	Z	C.N.O.	Int'l	Nav	M.I.S.	Nav.	Dist.	T.S.R.	C.S.R.	Exp.	S.S.A.	M.S.S.	Ann.	R.C.	R.O.
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Div.	U. S.	Est. Pm.	Est. Pm.	Est. Pm.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.	U. S.

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From Z Date 16 April, 1940 Serial No. R-239 (Classify as per instructions from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Official Communiqués and Fairly Reliable Reports. (Classify as per instructions from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY Navy Recent Developments and Present Locations of Ships. (Classify as per instructions from O. N. I. Index)

Reference a) Z Report R-195 of 31 March 1940 NAVAL INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED

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Confirmed and Unconfirmed German naval vessel losses and present status of types in commission.

- The German official communiqué of 10 April admitted the loss of the "BLUCHER" (CA) and the "KARLSRUHE" (CL).
  - In addition, there are persistent stories and some circumstantial evidence that the "LUTZOW" (ex-"DEUTSCHLAND") was badly damaged in the fighting in the Eastern SKAGERAK and has been towed to KIEL. The "KOENIGSBERG" (CL) has been reported sunk. Ten (10) destroyers, names unknown, have been reported sunk off NARVIK, which checks fairly closely with the BRITISH claim of eleven (11) sunk.
  - The "SCHAENHORST", "GNEISENAU" and "HIPPER" are reported at Wilhelmshaven. The first two have been variously reported damaged by "RENNEN", coastal batteries, mines and torpedoes. There is no report of damage to "HIPPER".
  - The "EMDEN" has been reported sunk by the Norwegian gunboat "TRYGVASON", by shore batteries, and torpedoes.
  - The British radio reports the R.A.F. sinking two German cruisers at Bergen.
  - Recapitulation of ships now in commission:
    - ✓ "SCHAENHORST" } one or both damaged } at WILHELMSHAVEN.
    - ✓ "GNEISENAU" } }
    - ✓ "HIPPER" } }
    - ^ "BLUCHER" ..... sunk off Norway
    - "ADMIRAL SCHEER" . no report
    - "LUTZOW" ..... badly damaged ----- at KIEL.
    - ^ "KARLSRUHE" .. sunk off Norway
    - "KOENIGSBERG" . reported sunk off Norway.
    - "KOELN" ..... reported sunk off ELBE, Dec. '39.
    - "LEIPZIG" .... no report } reported R.A.F. sank two CL at Bergen
    - "NUERNBERG" .. no report }
    - "EMDEN" ..... reported sunk off Norway.
    - "DD"(1 - 30).. 2 admitted lost in first 6 months of war (Z Report R-136 of 4 March 1940)
    - 10 reported sunk off Narvik.
- TORPEDOBOATS (42) .... no report
- SS (74) ..... 11 admitted lost in first six months of war (Z Report - R-143 of 9 March 1940). No further admissions, although B.B.C. frequently reports additional sinkings.

PREPARED AND FORWARDED BY: *A. P. ...* Commander, U.S.N.

Z ✓  
E ✓  
OP ✓

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From Z Date 25 April, 1940 Serial No. M-258 File No. W30/P11-1

Source of information Reliable

Subject G E R M A N Y Officer Pilot Training OR OF  
(Indicate reported on) (Indicate title as per index sheet) **NAVAL INTELLIGENCE**

Reference NAVAL INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED

Note—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Forwarding Monograph Report M-258 of 25 April 1940 regarding number of new officer pilots being trained for German Air Force.

Inclosure: A) Above-mentioned Monograph Report.

1. Inclosure A) is transmitted herewith.

44

*Final*

A-B-C-D-E		Main group	Sub group	Budget	G. N. I. (Sect)	War College	N. I. S. Nav.	Oid.	T. S. R.	C. S. R.	Esp.	R. S. A.	M. S. R.	Ann.	S. C.	M. G.
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NA-BERLIN  
22 APRIL 1940  
(GERMANY)

1003 Personnel  
1003-500 Training

(GERMANY - Officer Pilot Training)

1. The following information was obtained from a reliable and well informed neutral observer closely associated with the German Air Force.

2. Whereas at the outbreak of war there were about nine (9) primary flight training schools for new officer pilots for the Air Force, there are now supposed to be sixteen (16), each with an assignment of 150-200 students. Two of these schools are in Austria and one is in occupied Polish territory.

3. The course at first extended over a period of about 6-7 months, but this is in process of being reduced to 3-4 months as more youngsters (age 16 and above) come in who have had previous basic glider, motor glider, and even some airplane instruction in the youth organization of the National Socialist Flying Corps (NSFK).

4. On this basis, it is safe to assume that about 6000 new officer (or officer-candidate) pilots will have been trained in the first 12 months of the war, since the foregoing represents at present a maximum possible annual rate of about 12,000 pilots when the program becomes fully effective.

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378-A  
MAY 31 1940 A-1-C

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From Z Date 15 May, 1940 Serial No. R-282 File No. EF30/A3-1  
 Source of information Personal observations and conclusions  
 Subject GERMANY Air Force Organization  
 Reference a) Z Report R-281 of 15 May 1940. (5778) NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
b) Z Report R-268 of 29 April 1940. (22833-B (A-1-Z))

Note—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Discussion of Air Force organization for offense, joint action with surface troops, and defense with special reference to "Fliegerkorps" (Air Corps) as striking unit. See also Report R-281 of 15 May 1940.

EVALUATION

The conclusions reached from observations and discussions with available best informed sources are presented in amplification of the report, reference a), previously prepared, but withheld for further clarification.

SUMMARIZATION

The "Fliegerkorps" is believed to be the striking force unit drawn from available sources in the Air Force and organized for a specific task under a specially selected commander. Its size and composition are suited to the mission. Several "Fliegerkorps" may be organized, if several simultaneous missions so require. A specially large "Fliegerkorps", or more than one, may be called an Air Fleet, but it is not to be confused with the territorial Air Fleets 1, 2, 3, and 4. Other major organizational features remain about as described in the Annual Report.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)  
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972  
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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A-B-C-D-E		Map	Graph	Photo	Index	R. N.	Dist. Recd.	War Coll.	H. I. R.	Nav.	Gen.	T. A. R.	C. A. R.	Eng.	A. S. A.	M. S. A.	A. M. C.	N. C.
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1-10	2-10	3-10	4-10	5-10	6-10	7-10	8-10	9-10	10-10	11-10	12-10	13-10	14-10	15-10	16-10	17-10	18-10	19-10

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From Z Date 15 May 1940 Serial No. R-282 File No. EF30(A)/A5-1
Source of information Personal observations and com. missions
Subject GERMANY Air Force Organization
Reference

NOTE: (The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)
Discussion of Air Force organization for offense, joint action with surface troops, and defense with special reference to "Fliegerkorps" (Air Corps) as striking force unit. See also Report R-281 of 15 May 1940.

DECLASSIFIED
OSD letter, May, 4, 1973
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

- References: a) Z Report R-281 of 15 May 1940.
b) Z Report R-268 of 29 April 1940.-(22 332 - B, A-1-Z)

1. After preparation of reference a) it was withheld for further information on the subject which might clarify some of the questions raised by it. To date no authentic information has been obtainable, but it appears advisable to present the writer's personal conclusions regarding the Air Force organization which have been reached after extensive observations and several discussions with those attachés who are in the best position to know more about the subject, chiefly the Spanish, Swedish, and Italian, and with various German air officers (who, however, reveal very little except by inference and innuendo). In the meantime, also, the operations in Norway have taken place and reference b) presents reliable information which tends to illuminate the subject.

2. The principal questions in regard to the organization are: What is an Air Corps (Fliegerkorps)? Where does it stand in relation to the Air Fleets and the Commander in Chief of the Air Force? How is it organized? How is it employed, and in what relation to Army and Navy forces?

3. As is now well known, the German air assistance in Spain eventually resulted in the organization of the Condor Legion whose last commander was Major General von Richthofen. This, it appears now, can be regarded as the birth of the "Fliegerkorps" concept. By the end of the Spanish War, the air units embraced in the Condor Legion consisted of all necessary types (bombing, pursuit, scouting, liaison, and transport) for the operations at hand. The commander of these forces operated in the closest coordination with the Army command. Soon after the Polish campaign got underway, it appears that General von Richthofen was again assigned command of a similar mixed force of bombers, scouts, fighters, and transports, together with air signal service, and the idea of a "Fliegerkorps" was again tested in service. This corps is reported to have operated in the south of Poland, Krakow and Lemberg, and eventually up to Warsaw. Again, the "Fliegerkorps" commander operated in closest coordination with the Army commander in this area and his missions, at least toward the end of the campaign, were essentially those assigned to him in conformance with the general and immediate operating plans of the latter.

4. Questioning of the liaison officers of the Department of Defense regarding the press accounts of the activities of General Milch, the Secretary of State for Air, in Norway and his decoration by Hitler therefor have brought forth the following comment.

"General Milch commanded the new "Luftflotte" which he recently organized

Table with columns: Director, A-B-C-D-E, Message, Ar. Div., Budget, C.N.O., Gen'l Board, War College, N.I.D., Nav., Orl., F.S.B., C.A.R., Eng., S.A.A., M.A.S., Awa., U.S. M.C., H.O.
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From Z Date 15 May, 1940 Serial No. R-282 File No. EF50(A)/A5-1  
 Source of information Personal observations and conclusions (Common name series with January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject GERMANY Air Force Organisation  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)  
 Reference

NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(B) and 5(D) or (E)

GSD Letter, May, 4, 1967

By GLE

MAY 21 1973

for Norway and Denmark. He did this for experience and to make first-hand observations. His rank entitled him to a higher command. He bore the same relation to the commanding generals in Norway and Denmark that Field Marshal Goring bore to the commanders of army groups in the Polish campaign. He had nothing to do with land operations beyond facilitating cooperation. Air forces assigned to land forces operated directly under army commanders. General Milch assumed the mission of attacking the English fleet, air force, and lines of communication.

5. Based on the foregoing historical background and other indications an attempt can be made to deduce the probable Air Force organization. As basis for this, three fundamental phases of air activities must be kept in mind:

- A) Pure air offensive missions (striking force).
- B) Cooperation with surface forces.
- C) Defensive missions.

6. It is in connection with pure air offensive missions that the "Fliegerkorps" is considered to have its real application. Such missions would be attack on enemy air bases, aircraft, and establishment in the effort to achieve air supremacy, and bombing attacks on naval forces, ground establishments of naval or military importance, and industrial layouts. It is believed that for such missions the German Air Force is prepared to set up one or more "Fliegerkorps" for any situation and as the situation may demand and assign them as a striking force to a single commander. If more than one "Fliegerkorps" is set up, or for prestige reasons, the force may be called an Air Fleet ("Luftflotte"), as apparently was the case in Norway and Denmark, - but such an Air Fleet is not to be confused with, or considered the same as, the four territorial Air Fleets in Germany. The "Fliegerkorps" may consist of one or more Air Divisions, composition of which is ideally, but not necessarily actually, represented by the diagram, Inclosure B) of reference a). Again the flexibility is such that the actual composition of each division is shaped to the actual needs. Wings or Groups of the Division can be drawn from any of the four territorial Air Fleets in Germany. In this sense, it is the writer's opinion that the "Fliegerkorps" and "Fliegerkorps Commander" correspond with our naval concept of a "Task Group" and "Task Group Commander".

7. Cooperation with surface forces is obtained by the assignment of squadrons, groups, or wings to the Army as the needs of a campaign for joint action may require and to a much lesser extent, almost exclusively for scouting purposes, of smaller units or individual airplanes to the Navy. Airplanes thus assigned to the Army or Navy come directly under the command and operating control of these services for the duration of the assignment. Technical, maintenance, and some administrative matters apparently remain with the Air Force. Coordinating officers of high rank from the Air Force are assigned to the Army and Navy to act as technical advisers for air operations to the high command of

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From Z Date 15 May, 1940 Serial No. R-282 File No. EF50(A)/A5-1

Source of information Personal observations and conclusions  
(Commence new series with January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Subject GERMANY Air Force Organization  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

**Notes.**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

these services. Junior assistants may also be assigned as circumstances require to the operating staffs of principal commanders in the field.

8. The defensive missions of the Air Force are assigned to the territorial organization, that is, to the home Air Fleets 1, 2, 3, and 4, divided into the various air districts, and equipped with most of the pursuit strength, A.A. batteries, airplane warning service, transportation, communications, schools, reserves, etc. etc. not directly related to the offensive, operating forces. This defensive organization is headed by the four Fleet Commanders who are responsible to the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and who are administratively assisted by the Air Ministry with its various branches for all general material and personnel matters. In all major respects, save one, the organization chart submitted with the Annual Report (Z Report R-550 of 27 August 1939) appears still applicable and illustrates the inter-rotation of the territorial defense commands with all other branches of the Air Force.

9. Chiefly in the matter of command of the war time tactical forces does the foregoing chart require modification. Whereas it shows these forces as Air Divisions 1 to 7 (now undoubtedly more) distributed among the four Air Fleets (which is still considered pertinent in principle for general administrative purposes and for tactical training purposes up to the point where actual offensive operations require their employment), it appears now that the real striking unit is the "Fliegerkorps". When and as it is formed it is removed from the home Air Fleet command. The new commander may be drawn from any of the officers of the Air Force without regard for seniority and based solely on individual qualifications, in keeping with the well-known German characteristic of picking the man and building the organization around him, rather than erecting a theoretically ideal organization structure and then attempting to fill its billets.

10. The estimates (and rumors) presented in reference a) as to numbers of "Fliegerkorps" and included Divisions are to be regarded as the maximum which could be set up, it is believed, rather than as representing what has existed up to date. The schematic representation of line of command given in Inclosure A) of that reference would then be applicable.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(2) and 5(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From Z Date 15 May, 1940 Serial No. R-282 File No. 3178-A-1-c

Source of information Attaché colleagues

Subject G E R M A N Y Air Force Organization

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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NOTE.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Reputed organization of the Air Force comprising Air Fleets, Air Corps, and Air Divisions with associated anti-aircraft and Air Infantry units. See further discussion in R-282 of 15 May 1940.

EVALUATION

The information presented herein has been found in the hands of several of the foreign attachés resident in Berlin. It may accordingly have been "planted" by the Air Ministry.

SUMMARY

Composition of a "Fliegerkorps", or Air Corps, in divisions, groups, and squadrons of various types. Reputed to be six "Fliegerkorps", comprising 12-14 divisions. See Report R-282 for further comment, according to which "Fliegerkorps" are probably more properly to be considered as special task groups or striking units.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (D)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

BY SLR

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② Brief also P 2.  
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From Z Date 15 May, 1940. Serial No. R-281 File No. A3-1 30(A)  
(Comments new copies each January issue) (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)

Source of information Attaché colleagues

Subject G E R M A N Y Air Force Organization  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference: a) Z Report R-282 of 15 May 1940.

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Reputed organization of the Air Force comprising Air Fleets, Air Corps, and Air Divisions with associated anti-aircraft and Air Infantry units. See further discussion in R-282 of 15 May 1940.

- Incolosures: A) Diagram of Air Force Operative Lines of Command.  
 B) Schematic Organization Diagram of an Air Division.  
 C) Schematic Organization Diagram of an Air Infantry Division.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(b) and 6(D) of (C)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1978

By SLE

Date MAY 21 1973

1. The information presented herein has been found in the hands of several of the foreign attachés resident in Berlin. It may accordingly have been "planted" by the Air Ministry. On the other hand the Greek Military, Naval and Air Attaché, who volunteered the information to the writer, is known as one of the attachés who gets around in Germany probably more than any other in view of his capacity as inspector for numerous Greek contracts being executed in Germany. It is also known that the Swedish Air Attaché has submitted this information to his government without qualification.

2. In view of the German propensity for organization changes, a note of caution is considered advisable. During the entire period of the writer's presence in Germany it is known that the Air Force organization has been almost continually in a state of flux. The organization had not crystallized in September at the outbreak of the war with Poland. Undoubtedly the experiences from the Polish campaign led to some organization revisions and equally certainly the present situation of warfare against the western powers introduces new factors different from those pertaining to the war in Poland. It has been found by personal experience that when news of Air Force organization becomes fairly common knowledge among the foreign attachés it represents, generally, a situation already several months old and possibly currently undergoing entirely new revisions. The information presented herein however appears plausible, coincides with some other known or assumed factors and constitutes at least an enlargement of the information thus far available to this office regarding the organization structure.

3. So far as is known the German Air Force is still divided into 4 major units, namely, the 4 Air Fleets described in the Annual Report. It appears however that the Air Fleet is becoming more and more of a geographical and less of an operating entity. The commanders of the Air Fleets in this respect therefore are increasingly to be regarded as comparable with our naval district commandants.

4. The major operating entity is the "Fliegerkorps", that is, the Air Corps or Flying Corps. In amplification of the remarks

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 Source of information Attaché colleagues (Complete new copies each January 1st) (Select proper indicator from O. N. I. index)  
 Subject GERMANY (Nation reported on) Air Force Organization (Index title as per index sheet) (Subsidiary)  
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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

made in the semi-annual report R-99 of 17 February 1940, it now appears that the Air Corps falls directly under the Air Fleet as to geographic-administrative relationships, but otherwise is the supreme independent mobile operating unit, directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

5. There are supposed to be 6 Air Corps, of which one is a naval unit. Each Air Corps is understood to comprise at least two Air Divisions. There may be an occasional exception comprising 3 Divisions. Accordingly, the combined total of operating Air Divisions is at least 12. In addition to these there are supposed to be two Parachute or Air Infantry Divisions and one Expert (so-called "Lehr") Division, the experimental and instructional functions of which have been previously described in the Annual and other reports.

6. Of the 6 Air Corps, 4 are supposed to be assigned in the north-west with headquarters at Kassel and two in the south-east. Over and above the foregoing there are supposed to be two complete Fighter or Pursuit Divisions, the assignment of which is not known.

7. There are reputed to be three categories of Air Divisions:  
 a) the "Kampfdivision", that is, a bomber or so-called "combat" division;  
 b) the "Schwerkampfddivision", or a heavier bomber division;  
 c) the Pursuit or Fighter Division.

8. The composition of an ordinary bomber division is approximately the following:

a) At least two bomber wings, each composed of three bomber groups. In some instances a third bomber wing is included.  
 b) One dive bomber wing, comprising three groups.  
 c) One scouting wing consisting of one long-range scouting group and one battle reconnaissance or observation group.  
 d) One fighter, or heavy fighter (so-called "destroyer"), unit. It is not known whether this unit is the size of a wing or a group and its organization is likewise not given.  
 e) One anti-aircraft regiment comprising three battalions.  
 f) One transport section, combining both air transport units and the ground supply train.

9. In the foregoing every air group consists of three squadrons and each squadron numbers nine operating airplanes and three spares.

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(Continuation from series each January first) A3-1 (Index properly number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Attaché colleagues

Subject G E R M A N Y Air Force Organization  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subjct)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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OSD letter, May, 1, 1973

By SLE Date MAY 21 1973

10. Attached hereto is a schematic organization diagram of an Air Division.

11. There is also attached herewith a schematic organization diagram of an Air Infantry Division or Air Landing Force Division, of which there are reputed, as stated, to be two.

12. As will be noted from the remarks presented on the organization diagram of an Air Division and the parenthetical figures inserted for the various organization brackets the total airplane strength of an Air Division falls between 850 and 850 airplanes. Accordingly the total operating Air Force strength for six Air Corps and two Fighter Divisions, that is a total of 14 divisions, using an average strength of 700 planes per division, would be 9800 airplanes.

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
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### Organization of an Air Infantry Division



- Note 1. Some batteries are reported also to have 7.5 cm guns.
- 2. The number of tanks per company is unknown (the usual company strength comprises 18-24 tanks).


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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972  
By SLR Date MAY 9 1973

210

### Organization of an Air Division

"Kampfdivision", i.e. a Bomber, or so-called "Combat", Division



- (a) Each group has a group command flight of 3-4 planes.
- (b) Each wing has a wing command unit of about 10 planes.
- (c) Each division has a division headquarters unit of about 15 (?) planes.

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From Z Date 14 June, 1940 Serial No. R-552 File No. EF/116-5  
 Source of information German Press, 14 June 1940  
 Subject EUROPE Conduct of the War Norwegian Campaign  
(Station reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Official German statistics on Allied and German losses sustained in the Norwegian operations, 9 April to 10 June 1940.

- References: a) Z Report R-259 of 16 April 1940. — 22930-7-6-e  
 b) Z Report R-255 of 24 April 1940. — 22930-7-6-e  
 c) Z Report R-259 of 25 April 1940. — 22874-A  
 d) Z Report R-271 of 4 May 1940. — 22874-A  
 e) Z Report R-285 of 18 May 1940. — 23022-7-6-e  
 f) NA-Berlin War Diary, 19 April 1940.  
 g) Z Report R-350 of 13 June 1940.

1. The Berlin morning press of 14 June carries the Führer's final report on the operations in the Norwegian campaign, period 9 April to 10 June 1940. This report, stripped of its text and propaganda fan-flare, and reduced to actual statistics, claims:

A) SUNK BY THE GERMAN NAVY

The German Navy inflicted the following losses on the British and French Fleets:

- 1 aircraft carrier,
- 1 cruiser,
- 10 destroyers,
- 1 Sub-Chaser,
- 19 submarines,

totaling approximately 65,000 tons, and in addition,

- 1 transport and
- 1 tanker,

totaling 29,100 tons.

Further, there were destroyed

- 11 Norwegian warships,
- 2 coastal gunboats,
- 3 destroyers,
- 7 minelayers,
- 2 minesweepers,
- 14 torpedoboats and several submarines,
- also numerous smaller fishery vessels.

B) DESTROYED BY THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

- 1 English battleship in the NAMSOS area on 5 May,
- 28 warships and auxiliaries totaling some 90,000 tons,
- 71 merchantships totaling around 230,000 tons,

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Director	A-B-C-D-E										Misc. graph	In. files	Index	C. M. G.	Gen'l. Staff	War College	M. I. R.	Nav.	Oid.	I. S. R.	C. S. R.	Eng.	S. S. A.	M. S. R.	A. S. R.	S. S. M. C.	R. G.
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Yech. Div.	C. in C.	C. in S.	Com. Int. Pers.	Com. Int. Pers.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. A. S. R.	Com. Adm.	Attached at	Operations										Returns to Source No.								
									Com. Div.	W. P.	Com.	P. T.	State	Com. Div.													

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From Z Date 14 June, 1949 Serial No. R-332 File No. EF/ALC-3  
(Commence new series each January first) (Indel proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information German Press, 14 June 1949

Subject EUROPE Conduct of the War Norwegian Campaign  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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B) DESTROYED BY THE GERMAN AIR FORCE (Continued)

87 enemy aircraft, exclusive of those aboard the aircraft carrier sunk on 25 May in the OSOTEN Fjord, and those aboard the carrier sunk in the NORTH SEA on 8 June.

In addition to the foregoing, eighty (80) warships and auxiliary vessels were damaged by bomb hits

C) GERMAN LOSSES

The German Armed Force losses of officers, non-commissioned officers and men are:

Killed	-	1517
Wounded	-	1604
Missing	-	2375

The Navy sustained losses of:

3 cruisers,  
10 destroyers,  
1 torpedo boat,  
6 submarines, and about  
15 smaller warships and auxiliary vessels.

The Air Force lost:

90 aircraft as a result of enemy action and emergency landings in the sea.

27 aircraft were damaged as a result of forced landings on land and enemy ground action.

2. Regarding the three (3) German cruisers now admitted lost, they are the

"BLUCHER" and  
"KARLSRUHE",

previously admitted sunk by official German communiques, and, most likely, the

"KONIGSBERG",

reported sunk by R.A.F. bombing attack on 10 April (see reference g).

Routing copies later see for use in O. N. I. Check distribution of the various copies on all copies. Draw check around the distribution of the copy intended for the particular distribution as indicated.

Distributor	A-B-C-D-E											Micro-graph	Ar-ches	Index	C.K.G.	Gen'l Board	War College	H.I.R.	Nav.	Ond.	I.S.D.	C.A.R.	Eng.	S.S.I.	M.S.R.	Aves.	U.S.M.C.	H.G.
	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																											
Trk. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. Pen.	Com. Sea. Pen.	C. in C. Ash.	Com. R. S. S.	Com. Air	Attached at	Operations											Com. No.	W. P.   Com.   R. T.	State	Com-merce	Return by Home File					

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From Z Date 14 June, 1940 Serial No. R-552 File No. EF/A16-5  
(Commence new series each January first) (Subst. proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information German Press, 14 June 1940

Subject EUROPE Conduct of the War Norwegian Campaign  
(Station reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Sub-title)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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3. It is also strongly suspected that the German pocket battleship "LUTZOW" was sunk during the Norwegian campaign (see reference f), about which no mention is contained in the German final report.

4. Information as to the names of the German destroyers sunk during the campaign is not yet available to this office.

5. The German torpedo boat sunk is the "JAGUAR" - she was bombed by R.A.F. at BERGEN (see reference g), - or "ALBATROS", sunk at OSLO, 9 April.

6. It will be noted that the Germans claim two aircraft carriers sunk - one by bombing action 25 May in the OSOTEN Fjord, and the other by their naval forces in the NORTH SEA, 8 June; the latter was the "GLORIOUS", which has been officially admitted lost by the British Admiralty. Nothing further is known about the alleged sinking of the aircraft carrier on 25 May by bombs.

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Director	A-B-C-D-E											Memo-graph	In-Office	Budget	C. H. G.	Gen'l. Staff	War College	N. I. S.	Nav.	Oid.	I. A. R.	C. A. R.	Exp.	S. A. A.	M. A. R.	Aves.	U. S. M. C.	H. O.
	B-1	B-2	B-3	B-4	B-5	B-6	B-7	B-8	B-9	B-10	B-11																	
Task. Div.	C. in C.	U. S.	Com. Sec. Pers.	Com. Sec. Pers.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. R. & R.	Com. Adm.	Attached to	Operations				Com. Sec.	W. P.	Com.	R. T.	Stats.	Com-sec.	Return to Source File									

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From Z Date 3 July 1940 Serial No. R-354 File No. EF30/JJ4-6
Source of information Reliable
Subject GERMANY Supplies
Reference

REMARKS—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the report is returned in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Notes on present situation regarding stocks of iron, steel, motor fuels, rubber, and food fats. No shortages threatening.

1. From a generally well informed and reliable source the following notes on the present situation of available stocks of certain important materials have been gathered:

Iron and Steel It is asserted that large stocks were available even before the commencement of the war. These have since been appreciably increased and no danger of shortage exists.

Motor Fuel The situation with respect to motor fuels has appreciably improved through the occupation of the various countries, especially Holland. Large stocks were also taken over in Belgium and France. It is asserted that the available stocks are now sufficient for one year of intensive motorized warfare. In the meantime the production of synthetic fuels has greatly increased. It was stated that the requirements of the Army, but not of the Air Force, could be covered entirely by synthetic production. Synthetic diesel oil for submarines is also being produced in quantity.

Rubber There have been some setbacks in the rubber situation, but these were rescued by the occupation of the Western States. Buna has not proved entirely satisfactory or reliable. Large tire stocks have been accumulated by salvage from captured and abandoned motorized equipment of the Allies.

Food Fats The situation here is entirely secure. Twenty-five percent of total requirements is now covered by synthetic production. Large stocks of fats were acquired in Holland.

Table with columns for Distribution (A-B-C-D-E), Message group, No. copies, Budget, and various organizational units (War College, G.I.B., Nav., etc.).

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AUG 14 1940

From Z Date 6 July, 1940 Serial No. M-559 File No. EF50/P11-1  
 Source of information Reliable  
 Subject GERMANY Air Force Pilot Training  
 Reference: a) Z Monograph Report M-258 of 25 April 1940.

NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief bibliography of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Large waiting list of volunteers, little curtailment of regular course because of war exigencies, 150 hours flight time for basic flight training, full course eight to nine months.

Inclosure: A) Monograph Report M-559 of 6 July 1940.

1. Inclosure A) is transmitted herewith.

~~Handwritten marks~~

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Distributor	A-B-C-D-E											Monograph	In-Files	Judge	C.R.G.	Com'l Board	War College	R.I.R.	Nav.	Oid.	I.S.R.	C.S.R.	Esp.	S.S.I.	M.S.R.	Ann.	U.S.C.	H.G.
	B-1	B-2	B-3	B-4	B-5	B-6	B-7	B-8	B-9	B-10	B-11																	
Yach. Div.	C. in C.	U. S.	Com. Sec. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Asst.	Com. S. R. S.	Com. Ad.	Admiral of	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.	Com. Ad.		

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NA-BERLIN

(M-359)

6 July, 1940

( G E R M A N Y )

1005

1003 - 500

Personnel

Training

( GERMANY -- Air Force Pilot Training )

Reference: a) Z Monograph Report M-259 of 25 April 1940.

1. A high officer of the Air Force in commenting on B.B.C. propaganda that German pilots are sent to the front with as little as eight hours of flight training stated emphatically that the waiting lists of volunteers for flight training are so large as to be troublesome to the officials and a discouragement to the candidates concerned. As illustration, he stated that a waiting list of 5,000 applicants exists for the Air District 3 (Berlin district) alone, and that between 3,000 and 4,000 students were constantly in training in the schools of this one district. Further, he asserted that no appreciable reduction in total training time had been applied because of war demands, that the basic flight training still comprised 150 hours of flying, and that the time required for this plus the subsequent advanced training in pursuit, bombing, or scouting schools took a total of eight to nine months before a candidate was ready for entry into a service unit.

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From Z Date 3 August, 1940 Serial No. R-394 File No. EF30/A3-1  
(Classify new series each January first) (Index to new copies from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Reliable

Subject GERMANY Air Force Organization  
(Station reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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Additional information on organization of Air Force into Fleets, Corps, and Divisions enlarging previous data in referenced reports. Also on Parachutist and Air Infantry troops, gliders, transport fleet, etc.

- References: a) Annual Report R-530 of 27 August 1939.  
 b) Semi-Annual Report R-99 of 17 February 1940.  
 c) R-268 of 29 April 1940.  
 d) R-281 of 15 May 1940.  
 e) R-282 of 15 May 1940.

1. Further information, rumors, and press accounts (especially the Air Force promotions announced by Hitler on 19 July 1940) tend to shed additional light on the Air Force organization and the apparent principles on which it is based. Attention is especially invited to references (d) and (e) in this connection.

2. The first indication reported in reference (c) of the existence of a 5th Air Fleet, over and above the 4 Air Fleets in Germany which were described in reference (a), has been officially confirmed by the promotion list announced on 19 July 1940. This contains the promotion of General of Aviators Stumpff to Colonel General and mentions his present post as "Commanding General of Air Fleet 5 and Commander, North". The writer has been able to determine since this announcement that General Stumpff was relieved of his former command (Air Fleet 1, Headquarters Berlin) by General Wimmer and has been at his new post in Norway for about a couple of months.

3. Two other Air Fleet Commanders were mentioned in the promotion list with naming of their posts:

General Field Marshal Sperrle, Commanding General of Air Fleet 3 and Commander, West; and  
 General Field Marshal Kesselring, Commanding General of Air Fleet 2 and Commander, North West.

4. It is accordingly safe to assume the existence of 5 Air Fleets, as follows:

Fleet No.	Territorial Assignment	Commander
1	Germany, East	General of Aviators Wimmer
2	Germany, Northwest (plus Holland and Belgium)	General Field Marshal Kesselring
3	Germany, West (plus France)	General Field Marshal Sperrle
4	Germany, South	General of Aviators Lohr

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	E-1, E-2, E-3, E-4, E-8, E-11, E-12, E-13, E-14, E-15, E-16	U. S.	Com. Int. Sec.	Com. Sec. For.																		C. in C. Asst.
Yech. Dev.																						

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Subject G. E. R. - A. N. Y. Air Force Organization  
(Station reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

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Fleet No.                      Territorial Assignment                      Commander

5                      North (Denmark and Norway)                      Col. General Stumpff

% The continuance of General Löhr in this position is assumed in the absence of information regarding his relief.

5. For the first time official mention was made of the Air Corps (Fliegerkorps) and Anti-Aircraft Corps (Flakkorps) in the promotion list of 10 July 1940. The following units and commanders (with new ranks) were included therein:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>
I Air Corps	Col. General Grauert
II Air Corps	General of Aviators Loerzer
IV Air Corps	Col. General Keller
V Air Corps	General of Aviators Ritter von Greim
VIII Air Corps	General of Aviators von Richthofen
X Air Corps	General of Aviators Geisler
I A.A. Corps	Col. General Weise
II A.A. Corps	Lieut. General Dessloch

In connection with the foregoing, it is interesting to note that the X Air Corps was listed in reference (c) as one of the units operating in Norway, and, as is known from the press accounts of the last few months, General of Aviators Geisler (formerly Lieut. General) has commanded Air Force units in Norway, first under General Milch then under General Stumpff.

6. The promotion list contains mention of only one Air Division - Lieut. General Coeler, Commanding the IX Air Division -, but the existence of Air Divisions as an organizational bracket has been so long established as to need no further confirmation.

7. It is now clear that the operating brackets of the Air Force organization, in order of seniority, are

Air Fleet	(Luftflotte)
Air Corps, or AA Corps	(Fliegerkorps or Flakkorps)
Air Division	(Fliegerdivision)
Wing	(Geschwader)
Group	(Gruppe)
Squadron	(Staffel)

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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																				
Tech. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Int. Aff.	Com. Sec. Aff.	C. in C. Asia	Com. S.S.S.	Com. Air	Attache of	Operations				State	Com. Sec.	Returns to							
								Can. Div.	W. P.	Com. J.R. Tr.						Exec. No.					

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Subject G E R M A N Y Air Force Organization  
(Outline reported on) (Outline title or per block sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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In conversation with Air Force officers the writer has occasionally heard the term Air Brigade (Fliegerbrigade) used. The references thereto have left the impression that the Air Brigade is hardly yet a fixed concept, but rather a temporary task force of a size intermediate between the Wing and the Air Division.

8. As regards the Air Fleets, present information (partially confirmed by the new fleet titles listed in par. 4 above) indicates that 3 Air Fleets, namely 2, 3, and 5, are now so organized and emplaced that they are to be regarded as the offensive operating force for use against England. One rumor current in Berlin had it that 1 Air Fleet (No. 1) had taken over all of the home defense, including the East, thereby releasing the other 3 Air Fleets for offensive missions against England. This rumor however took no cognizance of the existence of a 5th Air Fleet, consequently the writer is inclined to believe that the assignment is rather as given above with Air Fleets 1 and 4 possibly taking over the home defense temporarily so as to permit Fleets 2, 3, and 5 to base in the occupied countries and concentrate from there on offensive operations against England.

9. Unconfirmed information indicates that the 3 Air Fleets for use against England have at their disposition the following combined forces:

- (a) 5 Air Corps, together consisting of
    - 5 Air Divisions, Heavy Combat (Schwerer Kampf)
    - 5 Air Divisions, Medium Combat (Mittlerer Kampf)
 The divisions designated as "heavy" consist of the Heinkel He 111, Dornier Do 17 (Do 215), etc. Those designated as "medium" comprise the Junkers Ju 87, Ju 86, and the latest models of dive bombers (Heinkel? and Henschel?).
  - (b) 1 Air Corps Light Pursuit
  - (c) 1 Air Corps Heavy Pursuit
- The total of (b) and (c) together is supposed to be at least 4 Divisions.
- (d) 1 Parachutist Corps
  - (e) 1 Air Infantry Corps

10. The rumor mentioned in Par. 8 above had it that the Air Fleet for home defense comprised, among others:

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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-5, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																				
Tech. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Int. Per.	Com. Gen. Per.	C. in C. Adv.	Com. S.S.R.	Com. Air	Attended at				Operations				State	Com-merce	Return to Source No.				

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Source of information Reliable

Subject GERMANY Air Force Organization  
(Station reported as) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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- 1 Air Corps, Heavy Combat
- 1 Air Division, Light Pursuit, and
- 8 light units of the various local Air Defense District Commands.

11. For some time now there have been various rumors that a Naval Aviation Corps exists as an outgrowth of the previous See-fliegerstreitkräfte (Naval Aviation Combat Forces) and, more recently, the Luftwaffenverbände im Operationsgebiet der Nordseeküste (Air Force Units in the Operating Areas on the North Sea Coast). This Naval Aviation Corps is supposed to comprise 2 seaplane Air Divisions.

12. Whereas reference (d) reported a rumored total of 6 Air Corps, the foregoing paragraphs, 8-11, plus other recent information, indicate that the total number of Air Corps is more like 10. The promotion list of 19 July 1940 identifies 6 of them, as given in Par. 5 above: I, II, IV, V, VIII, and X.

13. In view of the foregoing, the final paragraph of reference (e) is now considered due for modification. Therein it was stated: "The estimates (and rumors) presented in reference (a) (reference ((d)) of this report) as to numbers of "Fliegerkorps" and included Divisions are to be regarded as the maximum which could be set up, it is believed, rather than as representing what has existed up to date." Briefly, the estimates in question gave 6 Air Corps of about 14 Divisions, making a total of about 9800 combatant airplanes on the basis of an average strength of about 700 airplanes per Division. On the basis of the unconfirmed information given in par. 9 of this report, it might be estimated that this strength, roughly 10,000 airplanes, is available in the 3 Air Fleets basing England, alone, and the total combatant strength of the 5 Air Fleets would be appreciably greater - by 30-40%.

14. From its origin as a task group, of more or less temporary nature, the Air Corps is now to be regarded as an accepted component of the organization structure, but its employment and composition is by no means invariable. In these characteristics it is still a task group whose composition may vary from time to time in accordance with the demands of the mission assigned to it. This characteristic of organizational flexibility is still regarded by the writer in common with many other observers in Berlin as the outstanding feature of the structure of the operative German Air Force. It appears now especially to have been applied to all three of the higher organization brackets, the Air Fleet, the Air Corps, and the

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Director	A-B-C-D-E																	
	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16	Manpower	Aviation	Budget	C.N.O.	Gen'l Board	War College	M.I.R.	Nav.	Ord.	I.S.R.	C.S.R.	Exp.	S.S.A.	M.S.R.	Avn.	U.S.N.C.	H.O.
Task Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	C. in C. Staff.	Com. Staff. Per.	Com. Staff. Per.	Announced at	Operations				State	Com-mand	Returns to Bureau No. ....				
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- 5 -

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From Z Date 3 August 1940 Serial No. 3-394 File No. 3230/43-1  
(Commons new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Reliable

Subject G E R M A N Y Air Force Organization  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index Sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

**NOTE**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Air Division, for current and prospective employments against England. The diagram given in reference (d) of an Air Division, it is repeated, is to be regarded as a typical rather than a general case. The permutations in size and nature to which it is susceptible, and the consequent variations obtainable in the superior formation of the Air Corps and the Air Fleet, are apparent. The predominant principle is the shaping of these operating forces to suit the tasks to be performed and the assignment of commanders and equipment in accordance with their already demonstrated capabilities for the missions at hand.

15. With regard to the items (d) and (e) of Mar. 9, it is said that in the attacks on Holland and Belgium the air landing troops consisted in all of only 2 divisions. Since then the units have been expanded to corps, as herein listed. Reinforcement has been effected through the recruiting of volunteers. Each corps (Parachutist and Air Infantry) consists of 2 divisions, together with special transport equipment placed at their disposition. Each such division numbers 6000-7000 men, i.e. the 4 divisions together comprise 25,000-30,000 men. Each division includes 3 regiments. Each parachutist regiment has assigned to it, in addition to the ordinary troops, one shock troop unit and one pioneer unit. A parachute company consists of 144 men and each platoon numbers 36 men, for which 3 airplanes of the Ju 52 type are assigned.

16. Many rumors in the past have alleged that "transport" gliders have been used in connection with Parachutist and the Air Infantry troops. (See, especially, reports and press accounts on capture of Belgian fortress Eben Emael.) The writer's skepticism has recently been removed by reliable confirmation of the existence of large-capacity gliders, capable of carrying 12-14 men. These gliders were already built and in use for training under very secret circumstances about a year ago. Three such gliders are said to be towable behind a Ju 52 3-engine transport plane. Further use of gliders in connection with Air Infantry and Parachutist troops is therefore to be reckoned with.

17. In this connection it should be mentioned that an air transport fleet of 800 Junkers airplanes, Ju 52, is said to have been organized. This transport fleet has as mission, among others, the transport by air of 8 specially organized infantry divisions (Army). These divisions are light divisions, not over 10,000 men. Further, rumor has it that one unit with especially secret special mission (Ireland - Spain?) has been formed under the old name "Condor Legion".

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	B-1	B-2	B-3	B-4																	
Yach. Div.	C. in C.	Com. Sub. For.	Com. Sub. For.	C. in C.	Com. S.S.R.	Com. Ab	Attache at	Operations				Com. Div.	W.F.	Com. M.T.	State	Com. Sec.	Return to	Index No.			

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From 2 Date 28 August, 19 40 Serial No. R-443 File No. EP30 (H)  
(Commence new series each January first)  
(Indicate page number from O. N. I. index)

Source of information Observation and Reliable Conversation

Subject GERMANY Navy Miscellaneous Notes NCE  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

a) Cruiser "EMDEN" at GÖTTENHAFEN (GDYNIA); b) KOLBERG, DANZIG, and KOENIGSBERG reported being used as submarine overhaul yards; c) Heavy cruiser "PRINZ EUGEN", pocketbattleship "LUTZOW", and battleship "SCHARNHORST" reported at KIEL, badly damaged by British bombs; d) 800 coastal yachts built at STETTIN, HAMBURG and BREMEN - no iron used in their construction, e) All yachts and motorboats commandeered and sent to the WEST; f) Every Army Company required to produce seven volunteers for the Navy or Parachutists.

1. The light cruiser "EMDEN" is at GÖTTENHAFEN (GDYNIA), presumably just finishing overhaul. Captain Miron, until recently head of the Attache Group, left Berlin Sunday last to assume command.
2. A reliable source reports that KOLBERG, DANZIG, and KOENIGSBERG, were being used as submarine overhaul yards, getting as far away as possible from British air raids.
3. The heavy cruiser "PRINZ EUGEN", the armored ship "LUTZOW", and the battleship "SCHARNHORST" are reported by the same source to be at KIEL, badly damaged by British bombs. The "PRINZ EUGEN" is said to have her stern blown off.
4. Eight hundred coastal yachts have been built at STETTIN, HAMBURG and BREMEN, no iron having been used in their construction. All yachts and motorboats have been commandeered and sent to the West, confirming previously heard and reported accounts.
5. Every Army Company is required to produce seven volunteers for the Navy or Parachutists.

*Handwritten notes:*  
 10-11  
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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-10, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																										
Tech. Div.	C. W. C. U. S.	Com. Sec. Per.	Com. Sec. Per.	C. W. C. U. S.	Com. Sec. Per.	Com. Sec. Per.	Attache/Staff	Operations										Com. Sec. Per.	Return to Source No.								
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
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SEP 23 1940

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From Z Date 20 August, 1940 Serial No. R-451 File No. 1112 (Navy)  
 Source of information Reliable conversation  
 Subject GERMANY Navy Miscellaneous Ship Notes  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_



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Note:—The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. M. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personnel, or political names, and the gist of the report.

a) "SCHARNHORST" and "GNEISENAU" not badly damaged; b) Damages to "PRINZ EUGEN" practically completely repaired after over two months repair period; c) Work on aircraft carrier "GRAF ZEPPELIN" proceeding at GOTENHAFEN; d) Unconfirmed report that second aircraft carrier is named "HINDENBURG", and work thereon proceeding rapidly; e) Confirmation of transfer of heavy cruiser ex-"LITZOW" to U.S.S.R.

References: a) Z Report R-445 of 28 August 1940. *7369 (0-10-a)*  
 b) Almsna-Berlin telegram 291650 (August 1940).

- The information reported in reference a) has been confirmed by two other reliable sources. One stated that the "SCHARNHORST" and "GNEISENAU" were not badly damaged and that the damages to "PRINZ EUGEN" are practically completely repaired after over two months under repair.
- Work on the aircraft carrier "GRAF ZEPPELIN" is going on at GOTENHAFEN. An unconfirmed report has it that the second aircraft carrier is called the "HINDENBURG", and work thereon is proceeding rapidly.
- The Russian Naval Attache confirmed the transfer of the heavy cruiser ex-"LITZOW" to the U.S.S.R.

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DECLASSIFIED  
 E. O. 11652, Sec. 1.5E and 1.5D or 60D  
 OSD letter, May 4 1972  
 Date MAY 21 1973  
 By SLB

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A-B-C-D-E		F-G-H-I		J-K-L-M		N-O-P-Q		R-S-T-U		V-W-X-Y		Z-AA-AB-AC	
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ATTACHE'S REPORT

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From Z Date 30 August, 1940 Serial No. P-461 File No. EF30/SS/PT  
 (Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Reliable conversation

Subject GERMANY Navy Submarines and Motor Torpedoboats in Commission  
 (Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subject)

Reference: Alusna-Berlin telegram 221830 of August 1940

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120 Submarines and 150 Motor Torpedoboats estimated in commission at present.

54

1. Conversations with three reliable sources at different times recently have set the number of submarines at 120 and motor torpedoboats at 150, in commission at present.

Handwritten marks: a large 'X' with a checkmark, and some illegible scribbles.

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	B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																											
Tech. Div.	C. in C.	Com. Sec. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. Adm.	Com. S. S. S.	Com. Adm.	Staff of	Operations										Com. Div.	W. P.	Com.	R. T.	State	Com. Sec.	Returns to Bureau No.				

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EF30/SS

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial R-597 Monograph Index Guide No. 912/1000  
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 5-80)  
(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From The Naval Attache at Berlin Date 31 October, 1940  
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or grade)  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Reference: a) Z Report R-595 of 31 October 1940  
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source Foreign Naval Attache Evaluation Reliable  
(As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.)  
(As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject GERMANY Navy; Ships; Submarines  
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

NOTE.—(Have enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

B R I E F

\*\*\*

German submarine construction: 18 at BREMERHAVEN, 18 at WILHELMSHAVEN, 21 at HAMBURG, 45 at other places, a total of 100. Building time is 4 to 5 months; 20 new submarines delivered monthly.

O-O

1. In conversation with a foreign naval attache (other than mentioned in above reference), it was learned that GERMANY has eighteen (18) submarines under construction at BREMERHAVEN, eighteen (18) at WILHELMSHAVEN, twenty-one (21) at HAMBURG, forty-three (45) at other places, a total of ONE HUNDRED (100). The building time is four to five months, and twenty (20) new submarines are delivered monthly.

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GA-16	Op-16	A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I-J										Make-up	Analysis	Budget	Gen'l Record	Sec. Serv. Off. Items	War College	M. I. D.	H. O.	
		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nav.	Adm.	T. & S.	C. & M.	Eng.	S. & S.	M. & S.	Arm.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. Fr.	Com. Sec. Fr.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Spain.	Com. Appl.	P. A. T. U.					
Attached at	Op-11	Op-12	Op-13	Op-14	Op-15	Op-16	Op-17	Op-18	Op-19	Op-20	Op-21	Op-22	Op-23	Op-24	State	Com-serve	Naval Com.			
Cmd	✓																			
Ass																				
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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 12-41 Monograph Index Guide No. 1100  
 (Short new series each year, 1, 2, 3-40, 5-40) (To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From Op-16-F-4 at Washington, D. C. Date January, 24, 1941  
 (Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference N.A. Berlin Report B-693 of December 18, 1940  
 (Dissemination, responsiveness, previous related report, etc. if applicable)

Source M.A. Berlin, Germany-Report No. 17, 783-Dec 6, 1940 Evaluation Reliable  
 (As official, personal observation, publications, press, conversation with—identify when practicable, etc.) (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)

Subject GERMANY General Summary  
 (Nation reported on) (Main title as per Index Guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

Summary.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

E. O. 11652, Sec. 505 and 507 of 60

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

BRIEF

The following comments by the U. S. Military Attache, Berlin should be read in conjunction with the Naval Attache's estimate of the general European situation-Reference(a). The conclusions are so similar that it is believed these reports should be given special consideration.

"Since being in Germany as military attaches representing the United States, we are sure we have been subject to much propaganda with the purpose of impressing us with the strength of the German Government and the power of the German Armed Forces. This is being done with the idea we will transmit this information to the United States. It is a trait of German character to show you power with the idea that you will be afraid of it. They think this applies to all nations.

Discounting fully the effect that this propaganda may have had on us, if any, we desire to make the following report.

We have travelled over a great part of Germany; have seen troops in the training areas, inspected their army schools, seen some of their operations at the front; have seen some of the work in the factories and industrial areas; and we can definitely state this is a nation at arms. The government is so organized that when anyone does not carry out implicitly the wishes of the Party he is immediately eliminated. We do not see how it is possible for any internal trouble to arise in Germany any time in the near future. The only way Germany can be put under control is by a great deal of military power and economic pressure operating against it. No passive means will ever work against these people.

The object of this report is to definitely express our opinion that Germany as a fighting nation is tremendously powerful. Under no conditions should she be underestimated."

Prepared by

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Op-16-1	A-B-C-D-E-F-G				Monograph	Appendix	Budget	Com. Staff	Sec. Nav. Off. Items	Com. Staff	M. I. D.	H. O.
Nav.	Off.	T. & D.	C. & S.	Eng.	R. & A.	M. & S.	Asst.	U. S. & C.	C. & S. Staff	Com. Staff	Com. Staff	P. A. T. U.
Intend to	Op-16	Op-16	Op-16	Op-16	Op-21	Op-21	Op-21	Op-21	Op-21	Op-21	Op-21	Op-21
Off. Ass.	Sec. Navy	Under Sec. Navy										

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E-6-2, 12966-A

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NAVY DEPARTMENT

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial **62** Monograph Index Guide No. **908-180**  
 From **The Naval Attache** of **Berlin** Date **21 January 1941**  
 Source **Estimate** Evaluation **Estimate**  
 Subject **GERMANY Navy Personnel; Numbers**

**BRIEF**

Estimate of German Navy personnel strength as of 1 January 1941, places figure at 75,000, not including the Coast Artillery which is part of the German Navy, and which accounts for another 50 to 75,000 men.

\*\*\*

1. There are no reliable figures available as to the personnel strength of the German Navy. The following approximation is made of their present strength

Crews for	2 BISMARCKES @ 2,000 each	4,000
"	2 SCHARNHORSTS @ 1,500 each	3,000
"	5 heavy cruisers (including "pocket battleships") @ 1,000 each	5,000
"	4 light cruisers @ 650 each	2,600
"	40 destroyers @ 300 each	12,000
"	30 torpedoboats @ 125 each	3,750
"	200 submarines @ 40 each	8,000
"	100 minesweepers, tugs, patrol boats, etc. @ 100 each	10,000
"	250 PT, light minesweepers, harbor craft @ 20 each	5,000
"	Replacements, shore establishments, sick, miscellaneous	11,650
"	Various schoolships and vessels of the train	10,000
	<b>T-O-T-A L</b>	<b>75,000</b>

2. Coast Artillery, which is part of the German Navy, and which is stationed along the entire occupied coast from northern NORWAY to the BAY OF BISCAY, accounts for another 50 to 75,000 men.

3. The crews for each type of ship are, in round numbers, the same as given in Jane's Fighting Ships and Weyer's Taschenbuch. The rest is pure estimate, checked with the Russian Naval Attache.

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Op. No.	Op. No. 1	A-B-C-D-E-F-G-H-I										Monograph	Archive	Budget	Gen'l. Board	Sec. Nav. (G. Inv.)	War College	M. I. D.	H. O.	
Nav.	Ord.	T. & D.	C. & R.	Est.	S. & L.	M. & S.	Arm.	U. S. M. C.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Rel. For.	Com. Sec. For.	C. in C. A. F.	Com. Spec.	Com. Adm.	F. A. T. U.					
Attached at		Op-18/11	Op-12	Op-11	Op-11	Op-11	Op-20	Op-21	Op-22	Op-21	Op-20	Op-20	State	Com. Adm.	Manning Com.					
Cmd																				
Iss																				
Auth																				






Personal Staff

of

Adolph Hitler



The various agencies work together for the total national effort under the personal leadership of Adolph Hitler.

II. ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN ARMED FORCES.

The German Armed Forces are composed of an army, a navy, and an air force. Each branch of the armed forces has its own characteristic uniforms and insignias.

The German Armed Forces are commanded personally by the Commander-in-Chief, Hitler. General Field Marshal Keitel is his Chief of Staff. General Jodel is Keitel's executive, and deals directly with Hitler on some details.

The main purpose of the highest echelon of command and organization is to coordinate the operations of the three branches of the military service and to coordinate the effort of the Armed Forces as a whole with the other branches of the Government in conformance with the national aims.

To illustrate the organization of the German Armed Forces, the following chart is presented:

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 505 and 509 of 02

OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

~~RESTRICTED~~

Commander-in-Chief

HITLER

⋮  
⋮

Armed Forces General Staff

Chief of Staff

KEITEL

⋮  
⋮

Army

Navy

Air Force

Comdr.

Comdr.

Comdr.

von BRAUCHITSCH

RAEDER

GÖRING

⋮  
⋮

⋮  
⋮

⋮  
⋮

Army General Staff

Navy General Staff

Air Force General Staff

Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff

von Holder

Scholz Meenting

Jacobsnek

The outstanding characteristic of the German military operations has been the remarkable coordination of effort of the three sister services: Army, Navy, and Air Force. This coordination is internal, as well, within each of the services and extends down to all units. Coordination is an inherent and indispensable requisite to the functioning of the German military machine.

Hitler, himself, has some background as a soldier, but he does not usually personally command the active operations. Nor does his own General Staff, which, incidentally, is quite small, exercise direct control of any operations. Hitler's principal function is to allocate the authority to insure unity of command and the purpose of the Armed Forces General Staff is to insure that the three services function smoothly together, according to the adopted plan.

In accordance with usual General Staff procedure, the German General Staff has prepared plans for every possible campaign, to cover every conceivable capability and eventuality. These plans are prepared under directions issued or, at least, approved by the Commander-in-Chief. The joint General Staff, headed by Keitel, coordinates the planning assigned to, and executed by, the Staffs of the three services. The procedure can best be illustrated by taking a hypothetical example.

Hitler, after considering the political, international, and domestic phases of a problem, assigns a mission to Keitel, his Chief of Staff. Keitel, collaborating with Hitler, prepares a directive and calls a meeting of the commanders of the three services for preliminary consultations with Hitler. Available plans, resources, and personnel are reviewed with reference to the situation and the opposition.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 2(B) and 2(D) or (2)

OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

~~RESTRICTED~~

This phase is especially interesting in that it brings out a principle which has produced exceptionally good results. It is expressed by the following quotation taken from a German publication:

"The secret of the success of the German Armed Forces depends on the fact that everywhere and always, the right man is put in the right place."

At these conferences between Hitler, Keitel, and the three service commanders, after the directive is announced, one of the first items of business is to select the superior commander to accomplish the mission. Depending on the scope, some of the principal subordinate commanders may be picked and the "team", in its major brackets, is formed. Whether these commanders will come from the Army, Navy, or Air Force depends on the nature of the mission. Because most of the campaigns where all three services have closely associated have been land campaigns, most of the commanders have been from the Army. The commander is selected with only one consideration: to select the man who is most likely to succeed. It is emphasized by the examples which can now be historically cited that seniority, compared with ability and experience, has little or no influence on the final decision.

When the commander is selected he then becomes directly responsible to Keitel and the Commander-in-Chief for the successful execution of the mission. This is probably the most important step in the entire German command and control procedure.

Another principle brought out from the German General Staff School is to assign a mission to the commander, give him the means to accomplish the mission, and then allow him the widest exercise of initiative, subject only to full utilization and coordination of all branches to insure the most effective operation. This principle is repeatedly applied in the course of development of the plans for a new campaign.

to report

The new commander is ordered to Keitel who informs him of his selection and issues the directive. The new commander is then permitted to select his personal staff. Depending on the nature of the mission, the staff will usually be composed of members of the General Staffs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The new commander then calls his own staff together for the first time. The first instruction is in regard to secrecy. Sometimes these staffs are completely isolated for several weeks so that no inkling of the contemplated plan of action will slip out.

In conformance with the directive, which is usually based on a previously prepared General Staff plan, the staff studies the problem from all angles and works out a general plan, taking into consideration all of the latest developments. Based on this revised plan, a list of means is prepared. The means are the units to be used by the commander to execute the mission.

The commander then confers with Keitel who usually makes available the means requested. In this respect, the

new commander is given the greatest latitude in selecting the actual units which are to take part in the operation. The commanders of these selected units are usually personally acquainted with the new commander and control during the preparation phase and the operation is enhanced thereby.

The units which are assigned to the command of the new commander constitute a task force. Here again, the position of this task force depends entirely on the mission and the planned method of accomplishing it.

For an explanation of the use of task forces see Army Report No. 17,825 of December 20, 1940, Subject: "German Command and Tactical Employment".

The task force having been formed, the staff of the commander then prepares a training directive. The nature of the training directive to the various elements of the task force depends on the part they are to play in the execution of the mission. The training directive is then issued by Keitel through regular channels to the various units. Meanwhile, these units are usually entirely unaware of the role they are to play in future operations. For example, motorized and mechanized units of Rommel's command, now fighting in North Africa, were transferred to East Prussia where they could be trained extensively in sandy terrain. There was reported to have been some dissatisfaction because they could not understand why they were being required to undergo what they considered unnecessary difficulties.

Having prepared and transmitted the training directive, the staff then works out the detailed plans for the operations. This is the most laborious work of all because every small detail is meticulously planned. In this respect, the German General Staff is much more detailed than our own. As a result of this careful detailed planning, many difficulties which might have otherwise been overlooked are foreseen and the execution of the plan is thereby facilitated. Also, one of the most important principles of war from the German standpoint is that of surprise. Surprise is accomplished by speed of execution. Delays in execution are eliminated by careful detailed planning.

The plan for the execution of the mission having been completed, the next step is to obtain a decision as to when the operations are to be conducted. This decision is made by Hitler in conference with Keitel and the three service commanders. That decision having been made, the task force commander prepares a time schedule of conferences with the commanders and the staffs of the units which comprise the task force.

The conferences between the task force commander and his staff and the commanders and staffs of the subordinate units from all three branches of the service are extremely important. Not only is every detail of the operation carefully explained, but here is the place where branch rivalry disappears. Hitler himself has been known to have appeared at some of these earlier conferences. It is in these conferences that the elements of the task force are welded into a united team, a team which is thoroughly indoctrinated with one idea, the execution of the assigned and planned mission. Branch jealousy over weapons is

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unknown. Any weapon is used that can best do the job. To illustrate: The use of antiaircraft and antitank weapons against land fortifications, the use of antiaircraft against tanks, the use of pioneers in assault roles, the use of aviation, both independently and in conjunction with artillery on the battlefield, and the use of the navy to support land operations.

The rest of the procedure is comparatively simple. The actual date of the execution of plan is set, march orders are issued, movements to assembly areas are made, detailed attack orders to lowest units are issued, and at the appointed hour, the attack jumps off.

In the manner outlined above, a German military plan of action is conceived, ordered, planned and executed. The description was, of course, for only one line of action. Meanwhile, similar plans are in process of formation to cover all other reasonable lines of action. For instance, in 1940, while von Falkenhorst was planning and executing the Scandinavian Campaign, von Brauchitsch was working on the plans and orders for the Western Campaign. The timing of these two operations was under Hitler's direct control. Another example, List is, at the time of writing, completing the Balkan Campaign, Rommel is conducting operations in North Africa, and von Brauchitsch is probably completing the details for the next major German military effort. At the same time Goring and Raeder are occupied with their separate undertakings, especially their joint effort in the "Battle of the Atlantic", in which it is understood that one or the other, or their selected representative has complete command. It is our impression that Raeder has direct command of the naval and air forces operating in the Atlantic.

There may be some variation in the procedure presented in this section to suit special conditions. For instance, units which have particularly difficult assignments are sometimes drilled under the identical conditions of their task. This was followed by Lt. Colonel Mikosch whose small task force captured Fort Eben Emael, May 10 and 11, 1940, in record time. Sometimes undated orders are issued in advance down as far as divisions or even regiments. Time of attack is issued later. In this way, advantage can be taken of favorable weather and other transient conditions.

In particular, the idea should not be gained that the German system is stereotyped and rigid. On the contrary, it has never been alike in any two instances. The composition of the task force itself provides a great degree of flexibility. If an organization pattern does not lend itself to a particular type of mission, the organization is changed. As an example, note the organization of the small panzer division being used in Africa and the smaller light air infantry division.

### III. SELECTION OF LEADERS.

Probably the most important phase of the German system of coordination of command is the selection of able military leaders. Germany is fortunate in having a wealth of qualified

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military leaders. This is because such a large percentage of the male military population has combat experience. It also is a result of an extensive system of military education combined with a strict method of selection at every point and in every category.

The value of leadership has long been recognized, but not always applied. Jealousy and rivalry have done much harm. In the German Armed Forces, the application of the principles of leadership is given the fullest play in the correct interpretation of the meaning of the world. Select the man who is most able to do the job, give him the means to do it, and let him do it his own way.

An illustration is the case of Lt. General Rommel, the Commander of the German Expeditionary Force in Africa. Rommel is a man of great energy for his age, well prepared to meet and overcome new conditions of warfare, a tried and proven commander of mechanized and motorized forces. He speaks Italian fluently and has many Italian friends. He has lived in Italy and understands the Italian people and their psychology. Although there were many officers senior to him in the German Armed Forces, he was selected to command the important North African Expedition.

For a more complete discussion on the subject of military leadership in Germany see Report No. 17,717 of November 18, 1940, Subject: "German Military Leadership 1940".

#### IV. PRACTICAL ILLUSTRATIONS.

In order to illustrate the application of the German principles of command and control, the organization of some of the earlier campaigns will be reviewed as we understand them.

##### A. The Polish Campaign

This was a major campaign. Inasmuch as it was primarily a land campaign, it was commanded personally by von Brauchitsch. Von Brauchitsch had command of all of the units taking part in that operation, including the elements from the air force and navy.

Following is a diagram of the organization of the German Armed Forces for the Polish Campaign.

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Commander-in-Chief

HITLER

Chief of Staff

Col. Gen. KEITEL

Field Commander

Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch

Southern Group of Armies

Col. Gen. von RUNDSTEDT

Fourteenth Army  
Col. Gen. LIST

Tenth Army  
Gen. of Artillery  
von REICHENAU

Eighth Army  
Gen. of Infantry  
von BLASKOWITZ

Air Fleet Four

General of Aviation  
LOEHR

Northern Group of Armies

Col. Gen. von BOCK

Fourth Army  
Gen. of Artillery  
von KLUGE

Third Army  
Gen. of Artillery  
von KNECHLER

Air Fleet One

General of Aviation  
KESSELRING

Naval Units

General Admiral  
ALBRECHT

Air Fleet Four, stationed in southeastern Germany, was in direct support of the Southern Group of Armies and Air Fleet One, stationed in Pomerania and East Prussia, was in direct support of the Northern Group of Armies. Naval units operated with the Third Army in taking Gdynia and Danzig, but they were under the direct control of von Brauchitsch and his staff.

A German military author recently wrote:

"The Chief of Air Fleet Four and the Air Commander in the Southeast, General Loehr, from the beginning placed the highest importance on the closest cooperation of the service posts of the air fleet with the corresponding staffs of the Army. Loehr himself maintained personal contact with the Commander of the Southern Group of Armies, General Rundstedt, in keeping with the preceding conferences of generals and admirals of the Armed Forces which had taken place in the presence of the Führer and Commander-in-Chief."

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
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B. The Scandinavian Campaign.

This was a minor campaign commanded by an Army commander. The German official communiqué of April 10, 1940, stated: "Supreme Commander of all units of the Army, Navy, and Air Force is General of Infantry von Falkenhorst."

Following is a diagram of the organization of the German Armed Forces for the Scandinavian Campaign:



Naval Commanders: General Admirals Saalwaechter, Carls, Boehm, and Admiral Luetjens

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
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C. The Western Campaign.

This was also a major land operation commanded personally by von Brauchitsch.

Following is a diagram of the organization of the first phase of the campaign in the West:




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Following is a diagram of the organization for the second phase of the Western Campaign:

Commander-in-Chief

HITLER

Chief of Staff

Col. Gen. KEITEL

Field Commander

Colonel General  
von BRAUCHITSCH

Army Group B  
von BOCK

<u>Eighteenth Army</u> Gen. of Arty. von KNECHLER	<u>Sixth Army</u> Col. Gen. von REICHENAU	<u>Fourth Army</u> Col. Gen. von KLUGE	<u>Ninth Army</u> Gen. of Inf. STRAUSS	<u>Arm'd Force</u>
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Army Group A  
Col. Gen.  
von RUNDSTEDT

<u>Second Army</u> Gen. of Cav. von WEICHS	<u>Twelfth Army</u> Col. Gen. LIST	<u>Sixteenth Army</u> Gen. of Inf. BUSCH
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Army Group C  
Col. Gen.  
von LEET

<u>First Army</u> Col. Gen. WITZLEBEN	<u>Seventh Army</u> Gen. of Arty. DOLLMAN
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
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One noteworthy feature of the Campaign in the West, and of the Polish Campaign, too, is the coordination of the air and ground forces participating. According to our conception, the German Air Force was divided into two elements, a group for purely strategic missions under the direct control of Göring, and a direct support group under the control of von Brauchitsch. The operations of the strategic group are coordinated between von Brauchitsch and Göring through Keitel. It is, in a sense, an independent air war, but the operations are coordinated with those of the other forces participating. Air elements are shifted between the two forces at will, according to the situation. For instance, initially, the bulk of the air power is in the strategic group to establish air supremacy, whereas later, more strength is added to the direct support group to reduce resistance in front of the fast-moving mechanized thrusts, as well as to neutralize counter-attack threats. The importance of the various uses of air power in these campaigns is indicated by this organizational arrangement.

The assignment of armies to a group of armies is usually fixed for a definite phase of the operations. However, depending on the tactical situation, divisions and even corps can be transferred from one corps or army to another overnight. The German command system is very flexible in this respect.

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V. CONCLUSIONS.

A. From our observation of the German military command and control system, we may deduce the following conclusions:

1. The German Armed Forces follow the principle of absolute unity of command for any particular command or operation. This includes elements of all the services assigned to the task force.
2. The commander is responsible to only one authority - the Commander-in-Chief.
3. The secret of successful leadership, from the German standpoint, is based on the selection of a leader for a particular mission who is the most qualified and the most likely to carry out the assignment to a successful conclusion.
4. The widest latitude is given the commander in the selection of his staff officers, units, and subordinate commanders.
5. The means, when available, are always granted.
6. The commander of a task force is permitted to use his own initiative and methods in accomplishing his mission.
7. The task force, a unit of all arms and services, is the basic force in the German Armed Forces. Its composition depends on the mission, the commander, and the method he and his staff devise in executing the plan. The task force will only coincidentally be the same in any two instances. The task force principle is applied in all echelons of command from the squad to the army group.
8. Greater detail in General Staff planning eliminates confusion and facilitates speed and surprise.
9. The records of German commanders should be carefully studied to determine their qualifications. A knowledge of a German commander's specialties may enable our military intelligence to deduce the enemy's line of action.
10. German commanders often operate in teams.
11. There is remarkably little service or branch rivalry in the German Armed Forces.
12. The propaganda is carefully regulated so as not to give individual commanders, or any particular arm or branch of the service too much and therefore detrimental publicity.
13. A unified command system facilitates the making of joint war plans and general staff planning work, in general.

14. The great effectiveness of the German air arm in its joint operations with the other two arms, the Army and Navy, under the direction of a high ranking commander and his general staff, is due mainly to the position this commander holds in the German Government organization. This leader has been convinced of the importance of air power and the part it should play in relation to the other arms and has had the influence and ability to translate his convictions into reality.

B. Because of the Contemplated broad scope of German military operations extending over wide areas and involving operations on land and sea and in the air, the German High Command has deemed it necessary that all branches of the military service should operate under one command in order that the efforts of the various branches of the service could be efficiently combined into a smooth-working machine of great combat efficiency. The American Military and Naval Attachés on duty in Berlin have noted many advantages to be obtained by this arrangement. Some of these observations are as follows:

1. None of the independent services, the Army, Navy, or Air Force, have lost their identity as such.
2. The commanders of these services continue to function in their normal capacities as the heads of their respective services.
3. The Air Force comprises not only powerful striking forces, but also units for operation with the Army and Navy. (Insofar as coordinated work of the latter is concerned, the system appears to function satisfactorily under the present conditions pertaining to Germany, but it is still to be noted that the question of integral naval and army air arms has not yet been completely solved.)
4. Basic training, particularly of officers, is standardized and simplified.
5. Personal friendships established in common basic training schools has made for better cooperation in later operations.
6. There is a freer exchange of technical information among the representatives of the three services.
7. Considerable economy in development and procurement has been effected.
8. Standardization of equipment and materiel for two or all three of the services has resulted in simplicity in production and supply.
9. The making of joint war plans and general staff planning in general has been facilitated.
10. An effective system of communication between all three services has been standardized. Duplication of communication systems has been eliminated.

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11. Coast defense units comprising coast artillery, naval, and air force (both air and antiaircraft) units have been formed into compact task force teams.
12. Service and branch rivalry which is detrimental to close coordination and cooperation has been eliminated.
13. Speed of execution, so essential in accomplishing surprise, has been developed to a high degree.
14. Equality of treatment to all members of the services has resulted in greater satisfaction to all concerned.
15. Single control has facilitated the use of the task force principle resulting in a higher degree of specialization and ultimately in making a more effective system of combat teams.
16. When joint operations are essential, as in the Scandinavian Campaign, the maximum number of mistakes was eliminated by the use of a system which is adapted to joint operations.
17. The united German Armed Forces command has placed an effective instrument in the hands of the leader of the nation to enable him to carry out his objectives.

#### VI. RECOMMENDATION.

In view of the fact that almost every problem dealing with the defense of the American Continent will almost surely involve the use of both the American Army and Navy, it is recommended that:

Serious study be given to the coordinated command pattern presented by the German Armed Forces in order to derive the most effective United States defense organization, applicable to United States situations and conditions.

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possess a high school education or equivalent thereto, or at least have been advanced to the eighth grade. The regulations for enrollment in officers' careers may be obtained at all enlistment offices and at the Inspection and Training Division in Kiel.

The proud deeds of our Navy point out to the youth of Greater Germany the way to the seas, where, on every sea, our U-boats, battleships and auxiliary cruisers have uninterruptedly attacked British life lines.

Following the victorious conclusion of the war the Navy, above all others, will be called upon to represent the Reich on every sea and to carry German 'wesen' (existence, state, affairs, economy) far out into the world. Big tasks lie ahead, which require excellent men."

5. The original article is attached hereto.



- d) Communications operations in connection with the activities listed under a), b) and c).
- e) Harbor defense obstacle system, booms, nets, etc.
- f) Cooperation in connection with completion of coastal fortification systems.
- g) Liaison with other units of the armed forces on technical matters.

Other duties may be added.

- 3) Further information will be given separately concerning organization, replacement and temporary details of officers.

### 3. Conclusions drawn:

At the present time it is estimated that 60% of German naval personnel is occupied in manning the coastal defenses of Germany and the occupied territorial waters held by Germany. Advertisements in local newspapers have repeatedly stated that officers and men were imperatively needed by the German navy. It is logical to assume that the formation of this new artillery corps in the navy is to release experienced sea officers for shipboard duties and to build up this new officer corps from officers of the army and air force, and from naval officers not physically fit or experienced enough for duty aboard ship. This action may be taken with a view to manning more naval vessels under the control of the German navy. This may mean that German personnel may operate all or part of the French fleet or even elements of the Italian navy.

