

Documents T Brussels Vol. II

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**PROBABILITY**  
*of an*  
**Outbreak of War**  
**Documents J**  
**Naval Attaché**  
**BRUSSELS**

**Volume 1**  
**Documents Numbers 1 to 12**  
(20 Sept. 1939 - 22 April 1940)

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

**ATTACHE'S REPORT** C-10-f/9632-H

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From L Date Sept. 20, 1939 Serial No. 3 File No. 102-100  
(Continuation new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Italian Naval Attaché.

Subject The Italian Point of View,  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference Italy

**NOTE**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

General feeling in Italy in regard to the war demands, requirements and relations with Germany, England and France.

*Entire Report*

OCT 4 1939



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E. O. 11652, Sec. 1.35 and 1.36

OSD Letter, May 4, 1972

By SLR

MAY 21 1973

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Task Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Com. Bat. Pac.	Com. 5th. Pac.	C. in C. Asia	Com. S. E. A.	Com. AF	Attached at	Operations	Gen. Stn.	Off. Com.	P. T.	State	Com. Service	Return by Route No.				

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From: L

Date: September 20, 1939. Serial No. 3

Source: Italian Naval Attaché.

THE ITALIAN POINT OF VIEW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCT 9 1939



Colonel Borelli, the Italian Military Attaché, stated:

"From such orders as I have received I am led to believe that Italy has no intention of going to war in the coming weeks. The entire European situation being what it is, it is naturally impossible to predict what course Italy may be forced to adopt in the more distant future. We feel, as does the United States, that we will keep out of the conflict if it lies in our power. As far as Germany is concerned, she does no more want us in it, than she does other neutral states. It is her wish to limit the conflict as far as possible. We have reassembled various connections throughout the world, as for instance send out our finest merchantmen to your country. We certainly should not risk England and France seizing them had we any thought of being drawn into the conflict on the side of Germany. Mussolini is keenly alive to Italian public opinion. He knows that a war would not only be unpopular with the great masses of Italians but would still further impoverish a very poor country. England made her great mistake two years ago when we attempted to make her understand how difficult was our position. It was naturally impossible for us in France to deal with a government similar to that of M. Blum. It ought to prove easier now, particularly if England saw the wisdom of attempting to influence the French in our justifiable demands as to the Djibouti Railroad, the Suez Canal directorate and the Libyan frontier. All three questions should be trivial to France in comparison to gaining Italian friendship. If ever skilful French and English diplomats were needed in Rome, it is now. We have clearly in mind how difficult would be Italy's position in Europe should Germany prove the conqueror in the present war, and some of us realize that she has not the respect for our fighting qualities which she should

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DIVISION

have.

All that Italy really wants is that the Italian's standard of living should be more commensurate with that of the American, Englishman or Frenchman. It is actually way below all three of them. We are, however, no longer the nation we were twenty-five years ago. We have grown greatly in stature and self-consciousness under Fascist rule. We feel that states, similar to England, have no right to possess so overwhelmingly large a proportion of the world's supply of what is needed for a country in order to develop normally and prosper. We are particularly in need of steel and oil. We became part of the axis in order to better our lot economically. England and France refused to listen to our reasonable demands in this respect, so we felt we might obtain it through our own might, by joining our cause to Germany's. The last of the points raised by President Roosevelt last winter mentioned a more equitable distribution of rawstuffs as essential. The German-Russian pact is unquestionably unpopular and misunderstood in Italy, where everything to do with Communism is anathema. It has probably to a certain extent strained Italian-German relations. It probably will merely last until the victors have divided the spoils. I believe Mussolini and Hitler, however, are still in perfect accord. Should Germany and Russia, after dividing Poland, look further afield towards the richer parts of the Balkans, that and its consequences might alter Italy's position at the other end of the Berlin-Rome axis. Apart from all the miseries incident to war, Italy can naturally draw considerable economic advantages through her foreign trade, as long as she remains neutral. The merchant marine can be responsible for much foreign exchange which we so cryingly need.

Mussolini's popularity with the Italian people at large has never been greater than it is at present. His keeping it out of war, has added to it.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By S.I.R.

Date

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**ATTACHÉ'S REPORT** F-6-e/22862

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From L Date Oct. 3, 1939 Serial No. 15 File No. 103  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Taxand

Subject Holland  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

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A Belgian General Officer discusses the possible coming military events and Germany's attempt to attack England by invasion of Holland.

*Entire Report*

Oct 24



Navy

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6. G. 11652, Sec. 50E) and 501A or (b)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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B-1, B-2, B-3, B-4, B-11, B-12, B-13, B-14, B-15, B-16																				
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From L

Serial No. 15

Date: October 3, 1939.

FUTURE GERMAN PLANS.

Discussing the present military situation with one of the superior officers of the Belgian Army he stated:

"It now looks to us as if Germany would shortly attempt a major attack on her western front rather than to assume a defensive attitude. It is of course much more difficult, even taking Russian help into consideration, for Germany to stand a long, drawn-out war, than for the Allies. Germany will have to force the issue. I cannot believe it will be through the Maginot line, that would be too long and far too costly. It will, in other words, be by crossing one of the neutrals, Switzerland, Holland or Belgium, and the Staff here believe it will be by crossing Holland. Though the Dutch may flood portions of their Eastern frontier, we believe it easier for the enemy to cope with that, than our own Eastern fortifications and better prepared and equipped defensive Army. If Germany invades Holland, the Dutch water front will of course prove of the greatest possible value to her, and much more than the Belgian Channel front, without sizeable harbors. She may or she may not decide, at least for the time being, not to enter Belgium, but leave this as a buffer state between her and France. We are, in all cases, moving quite a few troops north to our Dutch frontier so as to prepare for all eventualities.

I believe October will not pass without our having had the answer to the riddle I have mentioned."

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 302 and 307 (a)-(c)  
OSD letter, May, 4, 1972  
By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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102-100

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From L Date Oct. 5, 1939 Serial No. 20 File No. 103-106

Source of information Foreign Office (Select proper number from O. N. I. index)

Subject Italy (Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

REMARKS—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

A resumé of Count Ciano's recent visit to Berlin and Italy's present determination to stay out of the war as given by the Belgian Foreign Office.

*Edlin*

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(D) and 6(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By: SLR Date: MAY 21 1973

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Director	A-500-5			Manu- graph	Ar- chive	Index	C.N.O.	Gen- eral	War College	R.I.S.	Nav.	Off.	T.S.R.	C.S.R.	Eng.	S.S.I.	M.S.R.	Asst.	U.S. M.C.	R.O.
Yench. Div.	C. in C. U. S.	Comp. Int. Sec.	Comp. Int. Sec.	C. in C. Int. Sec.	Com. Int. Sec.	Com. Int. Sec.	Attended at	Opinions			State	Com- munications	Subject to Review No.							
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From: L

Serial No. 30

Date: October 5, 1939.

ITALY'S PRESENT DIPLOMATIC ATTITUDE.

of the Foreign Office stated:

"We have received several telegrams as well as letters during the last days from our Ambassador in Rome, the Comte de Kerchoue. Their statements may be résumé as follows:

"Mussolini was requested by Hitler to come to Germany for a conference and replied he was so occupied that it was impossible for him to come but he would be replaced by Count Ciano. The latter's visit was distinctly one for purposes of information. He was informed as to the Polish events, the Conferences with Russia and the probable steps that the Fuhrer might take in the immediate future. He was not asked if Italy would consent to act as an intermediary in proposing peace terms to Great Britain. This may not have been done, as Italy would not have consented to undertake a task, the certain failure of which would have redounded to her discredit. Count Ciano from his side informed Herr von Ribbentrop that the Italian press and all Italian propoganda stood at his disposal to further anything the Fuhrer wished to bring forward.

"Comte de Kerchoue has in recent despatches repeatedly emphasized his belief that Italy will not enter the war. Though she is not neutral, she remains in a 'state of expectancy'. She is none too convinced that Germany will ultimately prove the winner and does not propose to cast in her lot with the losing side. While the younger men and the died-in-the-wool Fascists may wish under all circumstances to join Germany in the war, wiser heads and a certain part of the superior officers advise against it. They know if Italy did go to war with Germany, the French armies would probably penetrate to the Po valley and invade Northern Italy with its busy industries. They further know that where fleet and air force are in excellent

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(a) and 5(D) of GDS  
GDS letter, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

L-20 of 5 Oct. 1939

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condition, prepared and ready, the army still lacks a considerable part of its equipment, especially light and heavy artillery, which was to be furnished by Germany.

"A different side to the question is the profits and the foreign exchange now being acquired by the impoverished Italian exchequer. The boats to America have alone during this last month brought in three million dollars worth of American exchange. During the last month as much foreign exchange has come in as during the ten previous ones. A very large amount of orders have been placed in the north Italian factories by France. It is very greatly to Italian economic advantage to stay out of the fight.

"Italy is today nearer to an understanding with England than she has been for many months and our Ambassador states very definitely that it is his belief she has no intention of going to war."

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Ex. G. (1652, Sec. 8(E) and 8(D) or (C))

OSD letter, May, 1, 1973

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, NAVY DEPARTMENT

ATTACHÉ'S REPORT E-10-n/18118-A

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From L Date Oct. 24, 1939 Serial No. 35 File No. 115

Source of information Ministry of Commerce

Subject Belgium

Reference

**NOTE**—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

**Resumé:** Belgium's present difficulties in obtaining food and rawstuffs from overseas and British and German difficulties in regard to same.



INTELLIGENCE

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (H)

OSD Letter, Max. 1 1972

By SLB Date MAY 21 1973

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From: L

Serial No. 35

Date: October 24, 1939.

THE BRITISH BLOCKADE.

The British Blockade is raising various vital questions in both Belgium and Holland. Belgium is very dependent upon what she receives from overseas, both as to foodstuffs and raw-materials for her industries.

There are today some dozen vessels held up on the Downs with cargoes bound for Belgium amounting to between sixty and seventy thousand tons. The British delay in clearing the vessels or seizing a part or all of the cargo is due to lack of men and organization and naturally is causing considerable complaint in Belgium. The British from their side state better progress in expediting the vessels could be made if the steamship companies furnished the British authorities, in advance, with lists of cargoes. If the cargoes contain no contraband there will be no difficulty, and if they do, the companies or the Belgian Government are asked to give assurances that the merchandise will not be re-exported to Germany and that the entry of the goods into Belgium will not lead to the exportation to Germany of similar stocks already in Belgium. Britain's stand will not only cause industrial hardship and increased unemployment in Belgium, but a decrease in Belgium's trade with Germany with the consequent remonstrances and claims of lack of neutrality.

In the controversy Great Britain has stated:

1. The products of Belgian soil were of no concern to Great Britain. In the last war, she took steps, such as seizing shipments of fertilizer destined to Denmark, which had inevitable results on Danish agriculture, but no such steps are contemplated today with respect to Belgium. It was, of course, to be understood that sales of such Belgian products to Germany were not to be replaced by purchases abroad.
2. Contraband goods destined for Germany in transit through Belgium would, of course, be seized.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (F)

OSP letter, May 1, 1972

By SLR

Date: MAY 21 1973

L-35 of 24 Oct. 1939

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3. With regard to raw materials, the distinction would have to be made between the normal needs for domestic consumption in Belgium and those needed for export industries. In the first place there would be no difficulty, and in the second case, there would be no difficulty if the proper guarantees were given against re-exportation. It is naturally this second point that is so troubling to Belgium, as she is forced to re-export, here, there and everywhere, in order to live.

The British state: "The blockade is the strongest weapon which France and England have at their disposal. Its use must necessarily involve certain inconveniences for the neutral countries. These inconveniences should be considered by them as really a small contribution to the cause of all democracies."

Belgium feels this may all be well and good from the British point of view, and while she does not wish to create difficulties for her former allies, she has her very important neutral obligations to consider, or she will soon find herself in hot water.

While England is ready to increase the Belgian quotas for raw materials for use in manufacturing goods to be re-exported to England and France, this is little solace to Belgium, as Germany would immediately raise objections to such an agreement as being inconsistent with Belgian neutrality - Britain saying that Belgium could reply that she would be equally willing to manufacture goods for Germany, on condition that Germany furnish the necessary raw materials is, of course, absurd nonsense.

A British Cabinet Minister has recently stated that if Belgian and Dutch vessels continued to be sunk by German submarines, the British Government would not hesitate to admit them to its convoys. Germany's warning in regard to such a suggestion is considered an empty one, for neither Belgium nor Holland has at present any intention of soliciting such British aid.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973



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From: L                      Serial No. 47                      Date: November 8, 1939.

KING LEOPOLD'S VISIT TO HOLLAND.

The recent unannounced visit of King Leopold to The Hague accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Spaak, and his Military Aid, General Overstraeten, and the subsequent joint offer of mediation by him and the Queen of the Netherlands sent to the rulers in London, Paris and Berlin has been judged ill advised.

The visit of King Leopold was due to disquieting rumors about Germany's immediate intentions which have become increasingly insistent.

Recent large concentration of German troops, particularly on the Dutch frontiers, the sudden violent German press campaign during the last few days, directed against Holland and Belgium, and the recent frequent flights of German planes over Southern Belgium probably all played their part in hastening the King's departure. Both little countries have been accused in the German official publications, of un-neutral conduct, one in tolerating a free press which dares to criticize German policy, the other in acquiescing in the exercise of the British blockade. Both countries are judged by Germany, incapable of, and unwilling to defend their neutrality against the Allies.

These accusations are believed in both countries merely to be trumped-up excuses, in order to prepare the way for the intensification of the war against England by Germany using the delta of the Dutch rivers as submarine bases and the plains of Flanders as aviation fields.

In both countries it is believed that the note has considerably strengthened their moral position and their rulers have now omitted nothing in order to attempt to hinder the coming storm. It is further believed that Hitler will disregard world opinion in the matter and strike when he believes the moment opportune.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 3(D) or (B)  
OSD letter, May. 3, 1972  
By: RFR                      Date: MAY 21 1968

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Some go so far as to say that both monarchs, blinded by their desire to keep their little countries at all costs out of the war, have lost sight of the real issues and by their untimely suggestion have merely played into Hitler's hands. They have not, it is claimed, borne in mind that no lasting peace can now be negotiated which could guarantee the non-occurrence of German acts of aggression, the reconstruction of Poland and Czechoslovakia and the doing away with the Hitler regime. These being plain facts, it is a waste of time to attempt to mollify the Führer. A premature peace would merely benefit the Reich, after it has been guilty of aggressions justly condemned by the conscience of the world, and give Germany the breathing space needed before recommencing a career of spoliation.

Both monarchs have likewise been influenced by the fear of the spread of Bolshevism over Central Europe and westward, if Germany is defeated. German propaganda has made frequent use of the argument.

Belgium regards the maintenance of her neutrality as a point of honor. To her it implies rigid avoidance of any offensive undertaking and unqualified resistance to any attempt to violate it.

While Belgium may or may <sup>not</sup> have hoped that some form of military understanding might have been reached with Holland in case of German aggression, Holland has vigorously set herself against it as only conducive to German resentment. This has also shown itself to be the case by recent German statements.

Both countries will fight to maintain their independence. A German incursion in Holland would create a difficult problem for Belgium.

If Germany enters the Maastricht territory, it compromises Belgium's defensive scheme. If Germany occupies southern Holland and thus passes around and behind Belgium's eastern defences and the Albert Canal, Belgium is practically without frontier fortifications.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 205 and 207 of 201

OSD letter, May, 4, 1975

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1975

L-47 of 8 Nov. 1939

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Germany would only have to force the line of the Maas.

It is believed that as soon as German troops cross the Dutch frontiers, England will block the mouths of the Scheldt, both sides of which are Dutch.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(2) and 5(3) or (4)

OSD letgr. May, 4, 1973

SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

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From L Date Nov. 15, 1939 Serial No. 49 File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Commons new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information \_\_\_\_\_

Subject Holland and Belgium  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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Resumé: The report contains the various arguments advanced for and against the probability of a speedy invasion of German forces across the Eastern Belgian & Dutch frontiers.

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U. S. 11652, Sec. 92D and 92E

OSD letter, May, 1 1962

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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From: L

Serial No. 49

Date: November 15, 1939.

THE PROS AND CONS OF A GERMAN INVASION OF  
THE LOW COUNTRIES.

The possibility of a German invasion has been uppermost in the minds of everyone in Belgium during the last two weeks. There have been two opinions, one has held that a German invasion was certain to come, it was merely a question of time and all signs pointed to German troops shortly pouring across the Dutch frontier with the inevitable subsequent invasion of Belgium, either by the Germans or by the French-British troops. Others felt such fear was unwarranted. Colonel Requette, who is considered one of the best military critics in the country and who stated a month ago that it was his belief that a German invasion was inevitable, has now, despite the signs of invasion having greatly increased, entirely reversed himself, and stated: "I do not believe in an invasion."

To take the first point of view. It is emphasized that German aggression has always, as in the present instance, been preceded by an intense newspaper and radio campaign, against the victim, and a heavy concentration of troops and war materiel on its frontiers. Beyond this German planes have been constantly violating Belgian neutrality by flying across Southern Belgium. The German press has further emphasized that Holland and Belgium, have violated their neutrality by playing into British hands in submitting to the blockade and exporting to Germany constantly diminishing quantities of what she needs and used to receive.

The Low Countries' attitude in the matter, though not to Germany's liking, has in reality been irreproachable. Extremists feel that what Germany expects as the price of remaining the other side of the frontier, is obedience if not servitude.

If Holland should, for instance, refuse to have her vessels call

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(E) and 5(D) or (B)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1973

L-49 of 15 Nov. 1939

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at the Downs or Kirkwall, Great Britain would probably seize them on the high seas, and bring them in, just the same, for examination. What then? Germany would claim that she would have to defend poor, little, threatened Holland as she evidently was unable to do so herself.

It is further claimed that even if German soldiers do not cross the frontiers, Germany is attempting a war of nerves on Holland and Belgium, this being augmented by the press, the radio, the movement of troops and by thinly veiled threats. It is asked: Does Germany intend to force upon Holland and Belgium a counter-blockade policy? She certainly has succeeded in giving little Belgium "the jitters". The question on all lips is: "When are the Germans coming?" "How many days of peace remain?" In the present lull, before the expected storm, it seemed to many that a campaign of intimidation may have been initiated in place of one of aggression - and that increased pressure is being exerted in order to force upon Holland and Belgium a renunciation of a portion of their trade with England. It is further felt that Germany is hesitating, uncertain which way to turn and what means might prove most useful to the purpose she has in view. Hitler cannot wait indefinitely in impressing popular opinion in Germany. Naturally, even if Belgians are strictly neutral in their attitude, their sympathies cannot be belied, nor can the past be forgotten. In international wrongs, bygones can seldom be bygones. Belgians feel that.

To turn to the second point of view - the one that cannot believe in a movement of German troops into the Low Countries.

Belgium has today called some 600,000 men to the colors, so-called "general mobilization" would merely mean 100,000 additional men, of inferior fighting qualities. Holland has some 400,000 men under arms. There would thus be added a million soldiers to the Allied armies already facing the Germans. Neither country has, it is true, any aviation worth

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(C) and 3(D) or (E)

OSD Jettor, May, 3, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

L-49 of 15 Nov.1939

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mentioning, but the little Belgian army is well trained and equipped, her fortifications and defences, though limited, are not to be despised, and the Dutch put considerable faith in their inundating the portions of the country to be crossed by the Germans, claiming it would be next to impossible for tanks, heavy materiel and guns to reach their block houses and defensive lines.

The Germans must reflect when they consider all these factors, as also, the determination of both countries to defend themselves to the bitter end. Germany likewise realizes that if Holland is on the side of England that Dutch harbors would be most convenient for English men-of-war wishing to reach German naval bases.

Germany can attack the Allies by four routes; through the Low Countries, through Lorraine, through the Bale district or in either a military or economic manner, through Southeastern Europe. The Low Countries do not seem the most likely.

A Belgian Government economic mission is in these days in Berlin studying with German experts the present trade difficulties. Germany naturally hopes the conversations may result in Brussels agreeing to maintain the pre-war rate of exports and imports to and from Germany.

This is of course impossible, as many of the previous exports were re-exports of foreign goods, which no longer arrive, or manufactured articles from rawstuffs, now lacking. It is urged that Germany would scarcely be wasting her time, even as "a bluff" on such negotiations, if she was about to march into the country.

It is further believed that various rumors of invasion are partly due to foreign press and radio messages, some of which has wilfully been spread by the Allies.

The utmost pressure has been brought to bear by the French and British military representatives, and particularly the latter, upon the Belgian war office in order to make this see the reason and necessity

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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of studying jointly and secretly where in case of war, help might first be needed, as well as by what arms, and where. The German representatives are aware of this as well as Belgium's refusal even to listen to any such siren voices, luring it from its strict neutrality.

Surprise is a great essential of war. This element is now lacking in an attack on Holland and Belgium, where every possible precautionary measure has been taken. Again, it is urged would not Germany strike, where least expected, in other words, not on Belgian or Dutch frontiers?

Say Germany was able to cross a section of the flooded Dutch territories and to rapidly cross northern Brabant in the direction of the Zeeland Islands which would be of the greatest value as a submarine base. It would, however, seem impossible for Germany to take these, if one takes into account the Dutch naval forces and their immediate strengthening by British men-of-war. Looking at it from the most favorable German point-of-view, namely that the Germans would take the western and eastern islands, with the mouths of the rivers remaining in the hands of the defenders. If this were the case, the exits from the bases would be in the hands of the English and instead of bases, they would merely prove traps.

During the world-war the British Admiralty considered several times seizing Borkum, the German island nearest to Holland. She gave up the idea as too risky. A German invasion of Holland would give England the opportunity and means of permitting her to attack, with good chances of success German North-Sea ports, the enemy fleet and the bases where German submarines are being built. From the Frisian Islands to Wilhelmshafen is only 94 miles, while from Scapa Flow it is 625. The mouth of the Elbe is only 148 miles from the Zuider Sea.

Taking these factors into consideration, experts believe that the first consequence of a German invasion of Holland would be the tight blockade of German ports.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(F) and 3(D) or (G)  
OSD letter, May, 1, 1972

By SLR

Date

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L-49 of 15 Nov.1939

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This would prove of great advantage to the Allied powers. If Holland and Belgium are attacked, Germany's western frontiers open to attack will be more than doubled, running right up to the North Sea, the Northern portion without any Siegfried line of fortification.

And last of all, though Germany might to a certain extent profit by such foodstuffs and rawstuffs as she might seize in Holland and Belgium, the present, appreciable commerce between the countries would all be destroyed and the western blockade would become hermetic.

Such are the thoughts of those who do not believe in a speedy invasion of the Low Countries.

Both sides believe that while the period of alarm is not over, the situation is clearer and the passing of every day of peace, makes it less liable that Holland and Belgium will be invaded this winter.

The British Ambassador to Belgium, Sir Robert Clive, in discussing the subject stated:

"I received absolutely reliable information that the German army intended to invade Holland and Belgium on the 12th of November. The idea was abandoned in the last moment, owing to the German General Staff insisting that the inundations in Holland and the previously unsuspected difficulties in crossing the Albert Canal territory made the task too costly. I felt so certain of what was about to happen that I had told my wife to have our bags packed."

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OGD letter, May 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

C-9-C/2233-D

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From L Date Dec. 1, 1938 Serial No. 57 File No. 102-100  
(Continues new series each January 1st) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Colonel R.

Subject Belgium  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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Resumé: Belgian neutrality and fear of giving offence to Germany. Belgian-Dutch relations and the effects of the blockade upon Holland and Belgium.

DEC 18 1938



OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(a) and 8(b) or (c)  
 OSD letter, May, 1, 1972  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From: L

Serial No. 57

Date: December 1, 1939.

BELGIAN POINTS OF VIEW

In discussing the present situation with an intelligent and well-informed Belgian authority he stated:

"Our greatest endeavor is naturally now to do all in our power to keep out of the conflict and afford Germany no possible opportunity to question or condemn our neutrality. I feel we have gone too far in the matter, having almost assumed an attitude of subserviency. Dealing with Germans, I believe we might have gained a bit more of their respect if we had stood up a little more strongly in our dealings with them. You state His Majesty was unwilling to meet here in Brussels secretly and privately one of the most prominent British figures of today - that may have been prudent, but surely His Majesty might have learned much by doing so. You further state that in the "deuxième bureau" the officer in charge of the liaison between foreign attachés and the General Staff, has requested even officers of neutral powers no longer to call. That I consider a grave and unnecessary step. I further consider it scarcely compatible with our dignity to allow the German Embassy to receive diplomatic privileges and status for dozens and dozens of Germans, some of which are known to be spies. Holland had the courage to refuse such "a staffing" of the German Legation in The Hague.

You are as aware as I am, how constant and insistent has been the pressure of the British and French Military Attachés upon our Office of National Defence, to come to some understanding as to how best to come to Belgium's defence in case of a sudden German attack. I believe it exaggerated and reckless neutrality when we refuse to listen to anything these officers have to say in the matter. The day may come when we may regret lack of forethought and provision. Everyone

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OSD Letter, May, 1, 1972

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By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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knows we will need, most of all, immediate and powerful air support, and here neither England nor France are acquainted with the simplest and most necessary facts as to our own Air Service, its fields and sub-terranean shelters.

Take the matter of the blockade. There are eight million Belgians. I feel convinced that three quarters of them believe that the steps England and France have recently taken are both justified and necessary and that they are to a certain extent also fighting our battle. The industrials, large importers and the business men in general, are naturally those who will be worst hit. The howl in the press and the remonstrances by our Government are due to the fact that these men control the one and have brought pressure to bear on the other. The press, in other words, does not reflect public opinion. Belgium will not be nearly as badly hit by the new blockade regulations as will Holland. There the pinch will be more seriously felt, owing to the large quantities of commodities exported by Germany through the port of Rotterdam. A certain amount of what we Belgians received of German manufactures we can probably manufacture ourselves.

For a number of years we have time and again urged upon Holland a closer cooperation, which Holland has invariably rejected. While our Sovereigns at present undoubtedly see eye to eye, the governments and politicians do not, and Holland follows her time-honored position of isolation, which proved so successful during the World War.

I know that an officer of the General Staff recently approached the Dutch Military Attaché, <sup>Major</sup> Colonel Van Voorst Ewijk, urging certain common studies in regard to frontier protection. The Dutch officer replied that were he to suggest the matter to his superiors in Holland he would at once be recalled and be replaced by one who might not be as friendly to Belgium as he was.

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1973

By S.L.R. Date MAY 21 1973

L-57 of 1 Dec. 1939

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Throughout this country there is now a highly organized and widely developed system of German espionage and agents, in close touch with Germans in various vital Belgian centers as well as by radio with Germany. The Foreign Office forces our "Service de Sureté Publique" to keep their hands off them, when for the good of the country, and particularly at this hour, the German service should be broken up and the worst of the spies escorted across the border.

German planes are constantly violating our neutrality by flying over our country, and I have good reason to believe, have of late photographed our Eastern line of fortifications. Not wishing to pick a quarrel, even in justifiable defence, we shoot at them half-heartedly, and by the time our pursuit planes are up in the heights, where the Germans were observed, they are already back across their border. We never chance to bring one down.

I cannot believe with popular opinion that the Germans actually intended to come across either the Dutch or Belgian frontiers on November 11th-12th. I believe such steps as they took were undertaken so as to intimidate us both and force us into taking a more vigorous attitude against the British blockade. They surely would consider the seriousness of having an additional million soldiers arrayed against them (600,000 Belgians and 400,000 Dutch) and uniting the Allied-Dutch fleets in the Frisian Islands, facilitating greatly attacking north-western German bases.

The threat of German invasion is, I believe, only part and parcel of the German campaign of intimidation directed against the Low Countries, principally aimed at diverting their trade solely to Germany. The objective is to attempt to cut off all the sea routes between the continental neutrals and Great Britain across the North Sea. Holland, Belgium and Scandinavia are to be forced merely to trade with the Reich. Several times of late this has hinted that Belgian and Dutch shipping might be completely cut off by the mine warfare. <sup>with that</sup> It might thus be wiser for these to restrict themselves to commerce on the continent."

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date

MAY 21 1972

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ATTACHÉ'S REPORT

C-10-n/16258-A

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From L Date Jan. 10, 1940 Serial No. 11 File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
(Commence new series each January first) (Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information \_\_\_\_\_

Subject Belgium  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference \_\_\_\_\_

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Résumé: Two differing versions relating to the Dutch-Belgian Crisis of November 1939.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(c) and 6(c) or (d)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From: L

Serial No. 11

Date: January 10, 1940.

THE CRISIS OF NOVEMBER 11, 1939.

Two versions have been given of the happenings of the eleventh of last November.

I. About November eighth the Queen of the Netherlands telephoned King Leopold asking if it would be convenient for him to see her if she came the following morning to Brussels to consult with him in a very difficult matter which had suddenly arisen. King Leopold replied he would motor to the Hague to call on her and would be at the Queen's service. In arriving at the Hague, the Queen informed him that a Nazi cabal had been formed by a number of higher Army officers who proposed upon the entry of the Germans, a couple of days later, to facilitate their occupation of the Dutch Channel coast, the Escaut and various concrete gun emplacements throughout the country.

The King of the Belgians immediately instructed General Denis, the Belgian Minister of National Defence, to proceed to the Belgian-French frontier, after requesting the French and British commanders in that region to meet him. This General Denis did, informing them of what had happened, as also that the Belgian Army would cooperate with them the moment they crossed Belgium's frontiers, after Germany's invasion of Holland.

King Leopold informed Queen Wilhelmina of the instructions he had given General Denis as also that Belgium would at once rally to Holland's assistance if the Germans crossed its frontiers and England would probably occupy, in cooperation with the Dutch Navy, the Dutch Channel ports and Islands. Germany being informed of all this abstained from crossing the Dutch frontier. A number of the Dutch officers involved were dismissed from the Army.

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E.O. 11652, Sec. 5(1) and 5(2) of GDS

(GDS) Action, May 4, 1972

By NSR

Date MAY 21 1973

L-11 of 10 Jan.1940

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II. "Reconnaissance concentrations" and European scares are part of German tactics. They are arranged with the object of discovering military and political reactions. In the case of the alarm of November 11th over Holland there can be no doubt that this was deliberately started by Germany in order to test the military policy of France, Great Britain and Belgium. There was no question of a real offensive, but the trick half worked and the German High Command derived a great deal of extremely important military information as a result. They did not, however, find out what they most wanted to know, namely, what the disposition of the British Air Force would be in the case of such an invasion, nor did they discover anything about British air tactics or strategy. The British authorities were most astute and did not fall into what was a deliberate trap. It is believed the Germans were very chagrined.

The truth of what really took place or was in the mind of the German High Command probably lies somewhere between these two differing versions of events.

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GSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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
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FEB 5 1940

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From L Date JAN. 16, 1940 Serial No. 16  
 Source of information \_\_\_\_\_  
 Subject Belgium  
 Reference \_\_\_\_\_



NOTE:—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Résumé: The crisis was brought about by false information telephoned from Berlin and prepared by Hitler so as to ascertain Belgium's first moves in case of a German invasion.

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[REDACTED]

From: L

Serial No. 16

Date: January 16, 1940.

THE RECENT BELGIAN CRISIS

Belgium is once more experiencing a fear similar to that which seized her on the 8th of last November. Though general mobilization has not as yet been called, the three additional classes ("D" phase of evacuation), which have just been called to the colors, are the last ones prior to such mobilization. A German aeroplane was forced down by engine trouble in the north-eastern part of the country and the officer on board was found to possess papers reported to instruct him to photograph various vital eastern lines of Belgian defence. In addition to this, numbers of German planes have during the past week been sighted, presumably occupied in similar tasks.

Larger bodies of German troops have been moved from various points along the Dutch-German frontier to vulnerable points along the Belgian-German frontier.

The inhabitants of various sections along the eastern frontier have received instructions to evacuate their homes, and all leaves of absence have been suspended in the Army.

It has long always been planned, in case of critical necessity, to move a large part of the machinery in the Fabrique Nationale d'Armes de Guerre at Herstal as also in some of the Liège arms and ammunition factories (and notably the Cockerill works) to similar factories in Bruges and Ghent, where the requisite concrete foundations for same are ready at once to receive the machinery. It is stated that this is now being undertaken.

The British and French Ambassadors were called by the Foreign Office in the middle of the night of the 13-14th, and informed by the Foreign Minister, Mr. Spaak, that the Belgian Ambassador in Berlin had telephoned him that the German Army would move on Belgium on the 14th.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (G)

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By STR

Date MAY 21 1973

[REDACTED]

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L-16 of 16 Jan. 1940

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The Belgian Constitution provides that the King will in times of war take over the active command of the Army from the Minister of National Defence. This was done by His Majesty at 4 p.m. on the 14th, and all defences along the Belgian roads and fields, blocking the way for any entrance of French troops were removed.

It is to be noted that during all this excitement, the German Embassy in Brussels took none of the steps for the departure of its personnel that were taken by it during the critical days of last November.

Various well-informed Intelligence Officers here have come to the conclusion that Germany neither intended to invade Holland in November nor Belgium this week.

Following are the conclusions to which they have come: The Viscount Davignon called upon M. von Ribbentrop in order not only to complain as to the German aeroplane that had been flying over north-eastern Belgium, and had been forced to land there, but remonstrated vigorously at the contents of the papers that had been taken by the Belgian authorities from the observer. The Viscount Davignon was received most discourteously, informed the papers had probably been trumped up by the Belgians so as to pick a quarrel, which they certainly would find Germany not only ready to give them, but the following morning, if so desired. After various acrimonious statements on both sides, the Belgian Ambassador left with the impression that Germany was preparing to attack the next day and so telephoned the Foreign Office in Brussels without qualifying his statement.

This was exactly what Germany desired, as anxious then as in November to put up a trial balloon in order to ascertain the Belgian reaction. In November, Hitler had acquired the information that in case of a German attack/Holland, Belgium would come to her rescue, now he acquired the information that in case of a German attack on

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLB

Date MAY 21 1973

L-16 of 16 Jan. 1940

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Belgium, Holland would not come to her aid, but England and France would immediately be appealed to, and the road to France cleared in order to allow Allied forces to enter immediately.

Hitler attained his object.

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E. O. 11652, Sec. 8(E) and 9(D) or 1287

OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

By SLR

Date MAY 21 1973

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MAR 13 1940  
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From L.S. Date Feb. 23, 1940 Serial No. 61  
 Source of information Lieut. Commander W. Hallam Tuck, U.S.N.R.  
 Subject Finland.  
 Reference



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Resume: Lieut. Comdr. Tuck has just returned from a 6 weeks' visit to Finland. Comments of General Valenius, relating to Germany, the Finnish Jager Corps and the leaders it created.

10

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 E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 6(D) or (E)  
 OSD letter, May, 4, 1972  
 By SLR Date MAY 21 1973

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From: L

Serial No. 61

Date: February 23, 1940.

FINNISH-GERMAN RELATIONS AND COMMENTS THEREON

A. On January 27, 1940, as Hoover representative of the Finnish Relief Fund, I visited Rovaniemi, capital of Lapland. Our party, guests of Governor Hillila of Lapland, consisted of Dorsey Stephens, whom I was replacing, Minister of Education Hannula, General Walenius, commanding the Lapland Front, and Colonel Vilamo.

In a conversation I had with General Walenius, he made the following statement:

"Shortly after the declaration of hostilities, I went to Germany as guest of Army G.H.Q. and was shown the Siegfried Line from Aachen to Basel. It was a very impressive sight; although a certain amount of work remained to be completed and certain reinforcements were under consideration."

At this point I advised General Walenius that my home lay a hundred miles on the western side of the Siegfried Line, and that my sympathies were also deeply rooted with the Allies. This statement did not disturb him in the least for since Germany's treachery with Russia, most Finns consider that they need show no sympathy or allegiance towards that nation.

I told General Walenius that I had been concerned quite recently with the news of a further alarm, which had caused Belgium and Holland to believe that Germany contemplated an attack along their frontiers. I asked him what he thought, from a soldier's point of view, of the probability of such an attack. He replied immediately that such an attack would not be made if the army had the final say. Holland had very much improved her equipment and defenses, and while the fighting ability of the Dutch was yet to be proved, Germany was fully aware that a well-equipped fighting force of over 650,000 men, whose morale was excellent, awaited them in Belgium. Moreover they realized on November 11, 1939, that an attack on Holland was paramount to an attack

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on Belgium, and that Belgium's entry would be immediately followed by the full strength of Franco-British Forces. Such a move would not be dictated by sound military strategy. What might be forced upon the army by party politics, or a quick decision of the Fuhrer, was another matter, on which he felt unable to comment in any useful way whatever.

B. An important and active Member of Parliament made the following statement:

"Not long ago we had the visit in Finland of a Swede, who is whole-heartedly espousing our cause. He is Baron von Rosen, a brother-in-law of General Goering (by Goering's first wife). Baron von Rosen made the following statement to this Member of Parliament:

"I have very recently seen General Goering, with whom I am still on good terms. I asked him what his attitude was with regard to Swedish unofficial aid to Finland. His reply was: "You would be a very poor lot if you did not go to their aid".

In the course of the conversation I told him how much this statement meant to me, and then asked him what Goering's personal strength in Germany was today. His reply was to the effect that he was the strongest man in that country, and that what he told me could be considered with that in mind.

COMMENT

Recent events which were certainly not palatable to General Goering, took place regardless of his undoubted opposition. This does not tend to confirm the premier position which the General attributes to himself. I refer to the alliance with Russia, and more recently to the incident connected with the stopping of a shipment of aeroplanes from Italy, destined to Finland via Germany. Goering was undoubtedly in favor of this aid, but von Ribbentrop and Himmler are credited with having this shipment stopped and returned to Italy, although their move was strongly opposed by Goering.

C. The Finnish Army and its Commerce.

In 1917 some 2500 young Finns, filled with the desire to fight

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against Russia, left on one of the most interesting minor crusades of history. They crossed on skis the Gulf of Bothnia at its narrowest point, where some of them lost their lives. They continued through Sweden into Germany.

In Germany they formed the Twenty-Second Jager Battalion, and fought to the end of the war, solely on the eastern front against Russia.

They returned, after the war, with relatively small losses, and were available as magnificent officer material to form a cadre of today's splendid Finnish Forces.

These men have staff and line commands. The Finnish soldiers are what I think might be described as "natural gentlemen who turn into wildcats in their magnificent anger." This is a wonderful combination.

The generals commanding are by this time known to the world, Oesch, Osterman, Oquist, Sihvo, Valve, Malmberg, etc., to whom should be added the name of General Walenius, the hard man of the North Sala Front.

The three generals first mentioned have had staff training in Germany, and two of them in France as well.

Above all these stands the great figure of Mannerheim, whose magnificent record now, and at the time of Finland's independence is well known. Possibly less is known of that very interesting period in his history when he led the Czarist troops against Germany in the world war. It is interesting to think that at times the 27th Finnish Jager Battalion on Germany's eastern front, fought against Mannerheim's troops.

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 Source of information V. B. (Commence new series each January first) (Subject proper number from O. N. I. Index)  
 Subject Germany (Index title as per Index sheet) (Abbreviate)  
 Reference NAVAL

REMARKS.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Resume: German point of view as to Poland and Czechoslovakia, German-belgian commercial dependence. The danger of the Allies striking in the Near East.

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From: L

Serial No. 78

Date: March 14, 1940.

GERMAN RELATIONS WITH HER NEIGHBORS

In a discussion with one of the important German industrial leaders, he stated:

Neither the Polish or Czechoslovak questions stand in the way of peace with the Allies, as the Allies know very well that any governments these former states now could set up would be pretty worthless.

The Allies have been told that the reconstruction of Poland of 1914 with some eastern and southern provinces added would prove acceptable to the Reich.

Czechoslovakia could never be recreated in its former shape, for three-fourths of its citizens are not partisans of Benes. Any fair plebiscite would prove it.

The majority of the Czechs work loyally with Germany as do the greater portion of the Dutch.

Berlin considers our relations with Belgium eminently satisfactory and very largely due to Messrs. Pierlot and Spaak.

The commercial relations are on an excellent footing. Such German firms as Borsig, Metall-Werke, Siemens-Schuckert, Westphalische Metallgesellschaft, etc. have of late increased their Belgian business considerably. German orders to l'Union Miniere Belge, Usines Ougree-Marihaye and various Walloon industries are either developing normally or increasing.

Germans are aware of the fact that Belgium is greatly in need of Swedish iron ores and certain categories of German coal.

All these business relations prove the economic and military importance to Belgium of the Reich. Belgian work would be paralyzed the day the Allies might march into Scandinavia and cut Germany and Belgium off from maritime communications with Norway and Sweden.

Military and economic reasons would both deter Germany from the error of invading Belgium. Germany wishes on the other hand to develop its

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transport of its products through Belgium and its commerce with it.

German-Italian and Japanese relations will hinder Germany from making any out-and-out alliance with Russia and limit her relations merely to economic matters.

Germans realize their own and the Soviets' weak strategic position in the Near-East. There the Allies menace the Caucasus, the Ukraine and the Crimea, and are supported not only by large well organized British and French forces, but could also be supported by the action of their men-of-war in the Black Sea, cutting Germany and the Soviets off from both oil and wheat.

Germany feels that to be the greatest danger point. If it is menaced there, it will strike at another point, but not through Belgium. Germany believes however that Rome-Washington peace propositions will meet with success.

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OSD letter, May, 4, 1972

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(Commence new series each January first)

(Select proper number from O. N. I. Index)

Source of information Chief of Service Publique, Reliable

Subject Belgium  
(Nation reported on) (Index title as per Index sheet) (Subtitle)

Reference

BRIEF.—(The review, indexing, and distribution of reports by O. N. I. will be greatly expedited if a brief summary of the contents is entered in this space. Mention leading geographical, personal, or political names, and the gist of the report.)

Resumé: Numbers of foreigners in Belgium. The activities, training and direction of Nazi agents and the efforts being made by these to occupy positions, which would enable them in case of German invasion immediately and effectively to cooperate.

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)  
OSD letter, May, 4, 1972  
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From: L

Serial No. 118

Date: April 22, 1940

NUMBERS OF FOREIGNERS IN BELGIUM

Certain happenings in Norway have awakened Belgians to the possibility of similar dangers in their own country to which she, owing to her geographical position, next to Germany is even more vulnerable than Norway. The immediate functioning of Nazi agents and Nazi organizations throughout the country, the moment German troops cross the Belgian frontier, seems a certain fact in light of the astonishing Norwegian revelations. Enough has already been discovered by the Belgian authorities to warn them to prepare against a similar surprise and disillusionment as that of the unsuspecting, simple and trusting Norwegians.

Belgium has today some 254,000 foreigners over 15 years old, the largest number of which are Germans. They are distributed as follows throughout the nine provinces:

Antwerp	-	57,493 (particularly in business and shipping)
Brabant	-	74,711
East Flanders	-	8,865
West Flanders	-	10,761
Hainaut	-	42,282 (particularly in the mines)
Liège	-	34,598 (metal and arms factories)
Limburg	-	14,085
Luxemburg	-	4,884
Namur	-	5,408

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A large number of foreigners in Belgium are not registered. When ration cards were recently distributed some nine thousand foreigners suddenly appeared and asked to have their status regularized.

The hold of the Germans upon Antwerp business is particularly alarming.

Apart from permanent foreign residents, a great many have entered the country, under one excuse or another, during the last few weeks. The French Intelligence Service informed this office that some

6-8 German "fishermen" had daily been arriving during the last ten days, living in the German Embassy or former Czechoslovak Legation, on their way to the coast. As the Department of Justice suspected them of being German government agents, bound for various points along the coast, from where they might, with the development of events get in touch with German vessels, they are being conscientiously shadowed.

Others, throughout the country, located in all key points and disguised as farmers, laborers, business men, students, etc. are believed to be Nazi agents instructed to seize the control of key points the moment the invasion takes place. Belgium is believed to have some 10,000 Nazi shock troops, with Nazi cells in small hamlets as well as the larger cities.

Recent Norwegian events have opened the eyes of the Belgian police to a great many things and particularly the following:

All local leaders of the various cells have their special duties. They must report regularly to the central office, and inspectors call frequently to look after their activities.

Herr Bohle, from his office in Berlin, directs as head of the foreign recruiting department, the lines to be followed.

In Belgium about 82-85% of the Nazis are Germans and the remainder disgruntled nationals or genuine Nazi sympathizers. The leaders are Germans trained in Germany, learning in special schools the rudiments of their future activities.

Their training takes six months and includes languages (Flemish or French), local Belgian politics, photography, military strategy and such minor subjects as national folklore, local customs, music and literature. The teachers in Germany have spent many years in Belgium.

After completing the course, the leaders return to their various Belgian posts in the guise of commercial travellers, agents, journalists,

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diplomatic junior officers or purely as travellers. They are instructed to get unobtrusively in touch with local German residents and to organize their activities without arousing antagonism or suspicion.

In addition to this Germany has also her "propaganda soldiers", or the "nerve-wreckers" as they are called in Germany, which include various nationalities and who are supplied with such propaganda materiel as they require by the German consulates or embassy.

Their weapon is fear. They talk about the might of the German air force and invincibility of the mechanized troops. They tell all the "secrets" of the weak points of the Allies. Their task is to undermine confidence in the Allies. They work subtly - at least according to German standards and psychology, professing their own allegiance to Belgium and at first deride Nazi Germany. But they also point out the tremendous power of Hitler and the weaknesses of his opponents who, as now engaged in Norway, could not possibly divert any considerable number of troops to Belgium's assistance.

The entire movement in Belgium is led from Antwerp by ~~the~~ business man named Schultze.

The veterans association, which has been studying the above has in consequence of what it has ascertained and in connection with national events written the Government a letter. In this the association asks, in order to safeguard the country, that the Government strengthen the surveillance of foreigners, especially by a regular and permanent police control of the movements of nationals of belligerent countries, who are of fighting age.

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