

Summaries

PROBABILITY
of an
Outbreak of War
Summaries

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

BT, NARS Date MAY 21 1973

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Report entitled Probability of an Outbreak of War is composed of two sections: Summaries and Documents. In the preparation of the report a few simple devices have been incorporated to render the materials more readily available to the reader.

A series of letters is employed to indicate the provenance of the naval attaches' reports: H - London; I - Paris; J - Brussels; K - Rome; L - Berlin; M - Moscow; N - Tokyo.

The first volume of the Report, entitled Summaries, contains brief resumes, abstracts, or quotations from the original reports submitted by the naval attaches. The remaining volumes, Documents, contain photostatic reproductions of the original reports from which the summaries have been derived.

To facilitate reference to the original documents, notations have been inserted in the left margin of the volume of summaries. These notations are usually in the form of a letter followed by two numbers, indicating respectively, the attache concerned, the number of the volume, and the number of the document in the series of reports received from that attache. The documents are numbered consecutively in series, irrespective of the number of volumes. When the summary is based upon the entire report no page numbers are given; if, however, the material in the summary is derived from a portion of the original document, the pages are noted between parenthesis at the end of the summary. For example, a marginal notation (K-2-77) with (3) at the end of the summary indicates that the material in the summary came from the third page of the seventy-seventh document found in the second volume of the reports of the attache at Rome. The bound volumes of Documents have marginal

tabs to indicate the document numbers as shown in the marginal symbols in the Summaries.

In the case of material derived from dispatches, where the original obviously cannot be reproduced, the abbreviation "DIS" has been employed. A further symbol "(S)", "(C)", or "(R)" indicates respectively secret, confidential, or restricted classification of the dispatch. Where a dispatch is in plain language, "DIS" is not followed by any symbol.

In the summary from Berlin a few references are made to Diary. This refers to the War Diary of the attache in Berlin, which is reproduced in full as volumes 2 and 3 of the Berlin series ("L") in the Report on the Probability of an Outbreak of War.

SUMMARY
of
PROBABILITY of an OUTBREAK
of
WAR

H
NAVAL ATTACHE, LONDON

H-1-1 British Reaction to Change of Status of Austria,
17 March 1938

British press, even former appeasers, agree that occupation of Austria produces major crisis. Hitler's methods are universally denounced. Prime Minister has not taken clear stand and is being accused of following precedent of Sir Edward Grey. General apprehension that Hitler might use equally rapid tactics against Britain; defense preparations have been accelerated.

H-1-2 Events in Connection With Czechoslovakian Crisis,
20 September, 1938

"The German Attache had a lengthy conversation with Admiral Troup (British D.N.I.) in which he stated that no one in Germany believed that Great Britain would intervene in a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Admiral Troup then told Captain Siemens he was apparently making the same mistake which was made in 1914...When he left Captain Siemens seemed somewhat disturbed in his own mind on this question..."

"As regards other Admiralty preparations, the D.N.I. described (to U.S.N.A.) the present cruise of the Home Fleet to Scottish waters as good planning...He added that every thing was being done short of mobilization and that the Admiralty was satisfied with the readiness of the naval forces." (1)

Dis (S) Mediterranean Fleet Ready, September, 1938

Steps have been taken by the Admiralty amounting to maximum readiness for war short of mobilization. All leaves have been cancelled but few reservists have been called up. The Mediterranean Fleet has moved to Alexandria. Other naval dispositions have been made in accordance with war plans. All ship movements have been removed from the newspapers.

Dis (S) Italy Reinforcing Libya, September, 1938

No new developments have occurred on mobilization. The Mediterranean Fleet will remain as previously reported because of the possibility of Italy's joining Germany now or later. Italy is sending many reinforcements to Libya which the British consider to be a threat

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to Egypt.

Dis (C) British Navy Mobilized, September, 1938

"Full mobilization of Navy announced late 27 September. Wireless broadcasts indicate defensive mining activities. Only defensive Army units have been called up."

H-1-3 The Office of the Naval Attache, London, During the Czechoslovakia Crisis, 8 October, 1938

"War was considered a certainty on September 28 and bombing attacks a probability in government circles. All European Naval Attaches were informed of the movement of U. S. warships through the Naval Attache at London. Air raid precautions were organized in the Embassy Building." (1,2,4)

H-1-4 Emergency Expansion of Naval Attache's Office, 21 August, 1939

"The period of crisis or emergency preceding a possible European War will require an expansion of the Office of the Naval Attache, London. Such a crisis may come suddenly and before additional personnel would be available from America...it is proposed to recall to active duty certain officers of the Naval Reserve living in or near London...etc." (1)

H-1-5 Plans for Evacuating American Nationals, 23 August, 1939

"On Friday last (August 18) the job of formulating the plan for evacuation of American nationals from the United Kingdom was given to me...The political situation is considered very bad. By the time this reaches you war may be in progress - perhaps not, but it looks rather grim just now."

H-1-6 Evacuation of Aliens from United Kingdom, 24 August, 1939

This letter forwards a list received from the Admiralty of ports approved for the evacuation of aliens from the United Kingdom.

H-1-7 Basic Evacuation Plan, 27 August, 1939

"On Friday, 18 August, the Naval Attache was given the task of preparing the Basic Evacuation Plan. The first draft of this plan was issued to the responsible officers on Tuesday, the 23rd. The Ambassador returned at 1900 that date and approved the Plan. On 24 August mimeographed copies of the Plan were sent to all Consular Officers in the United Kingdom..." (1)

H-1-8 Readiness of British Fleet, 29 August, 1939

"On 25 August the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiralty, informed the Naval Attache that (1) British Navy on full war footing and ready; (2) he did not think there were any German submarines in the Western Atlantic; and (3) the Home Fleet is at Scapa Flow." (1)

H-1-9 Opinions of Dutch Naval Attache, London, 30 August, 1939

"In conversation with the Dutch Naval Attache today the following points of interest were mentioned by him: The Dutch will be neutral and will defend their neutrality; he thinks the Germans will not mine the Little Belt or Skagerrack - German officers have told him that doing so in last war was a mistake; that internal conditions in Germany were most unstable with the stress increasing daily; that there is no mistaking the determination of the general public in Great Britain not to yield again to Germany and that the armed services are fully ready to go to war at a moment's notice."

SUMMARY
of
PROBABILITY of an OUTBREAK
of
WAR

I
NAVAL ATTACHE, PARIS

I-1-1

Belgian/French Relations; German Influence with
Yugoslavia and Roumania; Franco-Soviet Pact,
9 March 1937

This report states Belgium's unsympathetic attitude toward the Locarno treaty and a military alliance with France. (2)

It also mentions Yugoslavia's and Roumania's growing rapprochement with Germany, and Czechoslovakia's doubts as to France's ability to aid her in the event of an attack. (2)

It discusses the reasons for the Franco-Soviet Pact. (3)

I-1-2

Irreconcilable Differences Between Politicals of
England and Germany - Chimerical Illusions of
Locarno No. 2, 15 March 1937

This report discusses the rumors in the French press regarding a "new proposition" from Hitler.

It states that the Rome-Berlin axis was unsuccessful in its attempt to alarm France and England with the bogey of the Bolshevik menace; and England was compelled to recognize the Franco-Soviet Pact as an essential step in her own foreign policy.

The report continues by quoting an editorial showing the "irreconcilable policies" of Germany and England and the futility of Germany's feelers for a second Locarno Pact.

It states that the French believed war would be the only answer to Germany's economic problem resulting from her armament program.

I-1-3

Italy and England, 15 March 1937

This report quotes an article from the French Royalist paper L'Action Francaise prophesying war in the spring and warning Italy that she is taking the wrong road in going counter to England in the Mediterranean. England harassed by Germany would welcome Italy providing proper spirit is displayed.

I-1-4

French Foreign Policy - Speech by M. Delbos, Minister
of Foreign Affairs, 19 April 1937

This report summarizes the speech made by M. Delbos who declared that he still believed in the possibility of understanding between nations with widely differing forms of Government.

I-1-5 French Political Items, 31 May 1937

This report is made up of various items relating to Austria's position in regard to Czechoslovakia, and to Italy's sudden development of anti-French feeling.

I-1-6 The International Situation from the Austrian Point of View, 8 September 1937

This report relates the opinion of an Austrian that the moment was propitious for Germany to attack Czechoslovakia as neither France nor Russia would come to her aid. (1-2)

I-1-7 Preparedness for War, 20 September 1937

This report recounts a wager made by Commandant Battet, Chief of Military Cabinet of Admiral Darlan (Note July 1943: Now Admiral Battet), to the effect that France would be at war inside of two years.

It also states that the French Marine Ministry and Air Ministry had bomb-proof underground quarters already prepared.

I-1-8 Franco-Soviet Treaty of May 2, 1935, 10 October 1937

This report summarizes articles by General Duchene of the French Army who stated that the treaty, from a military point of view, was a mistake for France, but that it might be defended as a political measure, if one contemplated a Russo-German rapprochement. He felt that there was a greater possibility of aggressive action by Germany against France than against Russia.

I-1-9 Franco-German Relations, 12 October 1937

This report relates a conversation with the French Liaison Officer for Naval Attaches who said that, he, personally, was in favor of returning some of Germany's former colonies, but that any situation that would put German troops in Central Africa would be a definite threat in that it would constitute a southern "front."

I-1-10 French Reaction to German Demands for South African Colonies, 18 October 1937

This report stresses France's refusal to allow

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Germany to return to a position in Africa where she could threaten the frontiers of French and British colonies.

- I-1-11 France Enters the First Zone of the Coming War.
Article by Paul Reynaud, 3 November 1937

This report contains quotations from a statement published by Reynaud upon his return from a tour of Germany and Central Europe. He warned France that the only way to avoid war was to increase armament production so that Germany would have a healthy respect for her. Labor troubles in France encouraged Germany. (1-3)

- I-1-12 Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact, 8 November 1937

This report forwards an article of the Communist paper Humanite, which comments on the right-about face of some of the most ardent supporters of the Franco-Soviet Pact. It states that Germany is ready to pick up Russia's friendship whenever France drops it.

- I-1-13 Franco-Roumanian Relations, 19 November 1937

This report makes the statement that King Carol was reported to have demanded that the pro-German, anti-Semitic, semi-Fascist leader Dr. Vaida be included in the cabinet.

- I-1-14 French Relations with Yugoslavia and Poland,
24 November 1937

This report contains the account of a lecture given in London by M. Beranger, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in which he said that, in case of a conflict, France could count on the British Empire, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and "perhaps Russia."

- I-1-15 Question of German Colonies, 10 December 1937

This report recounts the statement of the press attache of the Austrian Legation in Paris to the effect that, if Germany did not receive satisfaction on her colonial demands, she would go to war, not, however, before the spring or summer of the next year. The

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blow would be struck either at Danzig first, and then at Czechoslovakia, or directly at the latter. (2)

I-1-16 Sino-Japanese War: Extracts from French Discussion of Navy Budget for 1938, 14 December 1937

This report contains a discussion of the Japanese threat to Indo-China and concludes that France must maintain a powerful fleet to meet the problem. (2)

I-1-17 Roumania - Defection from the Little Entente, 29 December 1937

This report states that according to the American head of a large American oil company, the crisis in Roumania at that time constituted a most serious threat to European peace, and represented a definite break away from the French orbit and an alignment on the side of the Fascist States.

I-1-18 Far Eastern Situation, 4 January 1938

This report states that it is the opinion of military writers that, if the United States remained aloof, France and England would be helpless in the face of Japanese aggression and expansion, as England would not dare remove her fleet from the Mediterranean for fear of Italian and German aggression there. (2)

I-1-19 Question of French Colonies, 4 January 1938

This report presents excerpts from an article in the Brest Depeche which agreed with Admiral Castex's theory that France should relinquish her Asiatic colonies as impossible to defend and should concentrate on her African ones.

I-1-20 Possible French Reaction to an Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 15 March 1938

This report summarizes press comments inferring that an invasion of Czechoslovakia would mean a declaration of war by France. (1)

I-1-21 Items Compiled During Week Following Invasion of Austria by Germany, 22 March 1938

This report contains items on the mailing of

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mobilization cards, the possibility of Italian action in the Mediterranean and the lack of cooperation between British and French.

I-1-22 France/Czechoslovakia: Doubt of French Aid if Attacked, 24 March 1938

This report summarizes press comments to the effect that France would be mad to attempt to fight on behalf of Czechoslovakia.

I-1-23 The Importance of North Africa's Maritime Role in France's National Defense, 25 March 1938

This report reviews an article which appeared in the Journal de la Marine Marchande of 10 March 1938. Assuming that there will be war between France and Italy, the author pointed out the very strong possibility that one of the principal theaters of action would be North Africa.

I-1-24 Editorial Appearing in French Newspaper L'Action Francaise, 25 March 1938

This report quotes the editorial which stated that M. Delbos had said that France could not isolate herself to practice a policy of abstention.

I-1-25 Spanish War and Rearmament, 5 April 1938

This report points out that the majority of the French press was becoming anti-Republican as the Spanish conflict was drawing to a close. (2)

Premier Blum stated that rearmament was the watchword of the day, and absolutely essential to the national interests. (5)

I-1-26 Czechoslovakia and Daladier's Attitude, 12 April 1938

This report mentions that the French Foreign Minister had instructed the Ministers to Prague, Bucharest, Moscow, and Warsaw to try to ascertain these countries' position in case of an act of aggression by Germany against Czechoslovakia. (2)

It describes Daladier as in favor of taking a more aggressive attitude in front of the dictators, at the same time that he favors friendship with Italy and an understanding with Germany. (6)

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I-1-27 Article by General de Cugnac (Illustration of the Present Feelings of a Majority of the French), 10 June 1938

This report quotes General de Cugnac's article in which he stated that the question of Czechoslovakia was only a part of the larger question as to Europe's willingness to allow Germany to become supreme on the continent.

I-1-28 French Support of Czechoslovakia, 13 June 1938

This report declares that it was impossible to determine whether France really intended to carry out her agreement with Czechoslovakia or if she was carrying the bluff to the extreme limit.

I-1-29 Franco-Japanese Relations, 28 June 1938

This report states that press comments indicated that the French will not use force to prevent the Japanese occupation of the island of Hainan for fear of international complications. (2)

I-1-30 Feeling of Unrest, 18 July 1938

This report summarizes rumors current among the French that a new German coup could be expected.

I-1-31 France (Czechoslovakia) - German Relations, 5 August 1938

This report contains quotations from a report made by Mr. Knickerbocker, Hearst correspondent that the Sudeten and Czechs accepted war as inevitable, that Czechoslovakia would fight, no matter what France or England did.

I-1-32 German-Franco-Czech Relations, 16 August 1938

This report advises that the French doubted that Hitler would risk a war over a few million Czech-Germans, and the Government was advising the Czech Government to cede everything possible in order to come to a peaceful solution of the problem. (1)

I-1-33 Tension of Week of 29 August, 2 September 1938

This report describes the feeling that war was

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imminent, but by 2 September, the tension had lessened, due to the impression that the British proposal would be accepted.

It also discusses the French plans for action if war were declared.

I-1-34 Franco-Czech Question, 6 September 1938

This report quotes official utterances to the effect that France would fulfil her treaty obligations in the event of an unprovoked attack on Czechoslovakia.

I-1-35 German Ambassador's View of Czech Situation, 9 September 1938

This report advises that the German Ambassador stated in an interview with the Hungarian Charge d'Affaires, that while he, the Ambassador, was convinced that France would go to the aid of Czechoslovakia, there were many in Germany who believed that France and England were bluffing.

I-1-36 German-American Relations, 12 September 1938

This report advises that at a dinner for Attaches, the Germans made the statement that the United States would never send another army to Europe, thus there could never be another war between Germany and the United States. They implied that Germany could act as she pleased in Europe regardless of the opinion of the United States.

I-1-37 Reaction to Hitler's Speech, 13 September 1938

This report expresses the general relief felt by the French that war had been avoided. It also remarks that the French Navy admitted that Hitler was just biding his time until a favorable moment would arrive to issue an ultimatum.

I-1-38 Reaction to the Chamberlain-Hitler Agreement, 20 September 1938

This report states that the general reaction was one of relief that war had been postponed, but that there was a minority that felt Hitler, having won a diplomatic victory, would soon be making more demands.

I-1-39

Reaction to the Chamberlain-Hitler Agreement,
27 September 1938

This report remarks on the mixed feelings of the French. The Government was continuing mobilization and taking more measures for passive defense.

I-1-40

Munich Agreement, 4 October 1938

This report discusses reactions attendant upon the Munich conference and notes that even while the conference was going on, French preparation for war continued.

I-1-41

Munich Agreement, 11 October 1938

This report states that French army officers said that the truce could not last more than six months. (1)

I-1-42

Excerpt of Article by General de Cugnac, 17 October 1938

This report quotes General de Cugnac as saying that war was not averted, but only postponed. (2)

I-1-43

Russia, 28 December 1938

This report forwards information received from the Italian Embassy Staff to the effect that Germany would move against Russia in the spring.

I-1-44

Franco-Italian Relations, 10 January 1939

This report quotes an article from L'Humanite which accused the Italians of attempting to establish an atmosphere of war menace in their violent anti-French propaganda.

I-1-45

Hungary-Czech Relations and Germany's Proposal for Increased Submarine Tonnage, 10 January 1939

This report states that the Carpatho-Ukrainian sector has become the most dangerous powder barrel in Europe. It also mentions the unfavorable comments in the French press regarding Germany's desire to increase her submarine tonnage.

I-1-46

Franco-Italian Relations, 16 January 1939

This report recounts the rumor that, because of the negative results of the Italo-British conversation, an Italian note, almost in the nature of an ultimatum was to be presented to the French. (1)

I-1-47

Franco-Italian Relations, 24 January 1939

This report discusses the possible demands to be made by Italy on France, and states that it is rumored that mobilization may be expected around the middle of February when there might be a statement from either Hitler or Mussolini regarding Italy's aspirations in the Mediterranean. (2)

I-1-48

Franco-Italian Relations, 31 January 1939

This report relates a conversation with the Italian Naval Attache in which the latter stated that Italy did not wish war, but that she wished to settle her differences while the Rome-Berlin Axis was still strong.

I-1-49

Conversation with Captain de Vilaine, Chief of the 2nd Bureau of the Ministry of Marine, 31 January 1939

This report states that Captain de Vilaine said that he did not envisage a war between France and Italy, but that if there should be one, France would win. However, even a victory would weaken France and leave her an easy prey for Germany.

I-1-50

Japanese Situation, 14 February 1939

This report discusses France's inability to do anything but despatch a note to Japan in regard to her occupation of Hainan. (1)

I-1-51

Franco-Italian Relations, 28 February 1939

This report tells of the uneasiness felt in France concerning the rumors that reservists had been called up in Italy. (1)

I-1-52 Reaction to German Occupation of Czechoslovakia,
21 March 1939

This report gives the gist of the military and economic measures decreed by Daladier consequent to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia.

I-1-53 Germany's Intentions, 11 April 1939

This report quotes an article by an expatriated German who stated that the plans outlined in Mein Kampf would be executed, that Hitler would not wait for any peaceful method of establishing German domination in Europe.

DIS (C) French-British Reaction, April 1939

The outlook is alarming and quite uncertain since the French and British seem unable to reconcile their views as to what action should be taken in the present situation.

I-1-54 Military Movements, 18 April 1939

This report advises that the French had ordered the Toulon squadron to cruise in the vicinity of Bizerte and the Brest squadron to Tangier, that rumors were current that Germany intended to incorporate Danzig into the Reich, and that Army and Navy officers were unanimous in their feeling that there would be war soon.

I-1-55 British Conscription, 2 May 1939

This report states that the feeling among French Army officers was still pessimistic, that war was imminent in spite of British conscription.

I-1-56 Anglo-Franco-Russian Relations, 16 May 1939

This report discusses the demands and counter-demands made by Russia, England, and France in regard to the Baltic States, Poland, Roumania, and the Far East.

I-1-57 Polish Situation (Courier Notes), 6 June 1939

This report forwards notes indicating that Poland

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was taking an aggressive stand with the attitude that she had nothing to lose by a war and much to gain.

I-1-58 Report of Official Trip to Berlin, 13 June 1939

This report states that it was the consensus in the Embassy that war was not likely to break out at least until after the harvests. (2)

I-1-59 Polish Situation, 22 August 1939

This report forwards the information that it was believed that, following publication of the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, Germany would act against Poland around 25 August.

DIS (C) Possibility of Invasion of Poland, 22 August 1939

The tension is increasing rapidly. According to indications, Germany may possibly invade Poland toward the end of the week. It is the opinion of the Chief of French Naval Intelligence that conflict is not imminent, although a lack of agreement among the German high command makes an early outbreak possible by an accident. There is a full mobilization of the French fleet at the normal bases with the units in the Mediterranean concentrated at Toulon. With the possibility of a general mobilization tomorrow, the French Army has called up additional reserves. The European situation is at present extremely grave.

I-1-60 American Participation in War and Make-up of French Government, 27 September 1939

This report states that the French believed that the President's address to Congress on the neutrality law was a demand for American participation in the war.

It also states that the French were in favor of a "military" man at the head of the government to handle the situation which called for strong military and economic measures.

I-1-61 Possible Invasion of Holland and Belgium, 3 November 1939

This report advises that the French Command accepted as a fact the future occupation of Holland by Germany, either by peaceful means or by invasion, and also considered it probable that Belgium would be invaded. (1-2)

I-1-62

Possible Russian Actions, 15 November 1939

This report mentions the possibility of a Russian military alliance with Germany, and also of a combined Soviet-Bulgar demarche against Roumania. (2)

I-1-63

Political Forces, 27 November 1939

This report suggests that the Russians were conducting a war of nerves to induce the Finns to capitulate without fighting, that Russia was looking toward a move against Roumania, and that Mussolini's announcement that Italy's status was that of a non-belligerent and not a neutral did not mean Italy's participation in the war as Germany's ally.

I-1-64

Germany's Future Plans of Action, 1 February 1940

This report advises that the French Army General Staff believed Germany would move next, not in the West, but in the East.

I-1-65

Inactivity on Western Front, 9 February 1940

This report gives as the growing sentiment that since Germany had given no indication of making an offensive in the West, the Allies must attack in the West in order that Germany might not have the opportunity to consolidate her gains in the East. (2)

I-1-66

Franco-Italian Relations, 4 April 1940

This report comments on the lack of improvement in relations between France and Italy, and on the impossibility of France's acceding to any demands of Italy. (2)

I-1-67

Offensive Action in the West and Italian Moves, 18 April 1940

This report states that the French Army expected a German offensive through Belgium and Holland very soon. It also states that it was believed that the war would spread to the Balkans, either because of Russian-German action against Roumania or because of an Italian grab for the island of Corfu or a slice of Yugoslavia. (1-2)

I-1-68

Italian Entrance into the War, 24 April 1940

This report declares that despite the opposition of the majority of the Italian people, the Pope and the Royal Family, Mussolini was preparing to push Italy into the war on the side of the Germans. (1)

I-1-69

Franco-Italian Relations, 27 April 1940

This report quotes an article in the Brest Depeche to the effect that Italy had no intention of limiting her demands, but was awaiting a moment when the Allies would be in a bad position to press them.

I-1-70

Spread of the War, 2 May 1940

This report recounts a conversation of General Gamelin's in which he stated that after Norway was eliminated, Germany would spread out like "a spot of oil" over southeastern Europe, and remarked on the uncertainty in regard to Italy's future actions and the possibility of German entry into Holland and Belgium. (2-3)

I-1-71

Italy and Turkey, 14 May 1940

This report states that Italian preparations for war were going forward, and also that Turkey appeared to be ready to honor her agreement with the British and the French and would fight to the best of her ability. (2 & 4)

I-1-72

Hostility Between France and England and Japan's Reaction, 6 August 1940

This report comments on the French Council's decision, carried by one vote, not to declare war on England as a result of the English action at Oran.

It also states that the Japanese Attache showed pleasure over this hostility between France and England as it would give Japan a free hand in the Far East since even the United States would now be forced to take too much interest in European affairs to bother about the Far East. (4)

DIS (S)

Political Situation, June 1941

Although a Vichy conference is being held by the governors of all the African colonies, the French Fleet to the present time has made no unusual preparations for any reconquest of colonies. According to the Army an adequate force cannot be prepared before August. The Germans are urging the French to make such an attempt now, being desirous of embittering Franco-British relations still further.

DIS (S)

Political Situation, December 1941

The Naval Attache recently discussed the possibility of the invasion of French North Africa with the chiefs of air and naval intelligence. Masnou, an Air Colonel stated: "If Americans arrive with force, including armored units and planes which we consider sufficiently strong to resist Germans, I do not believe landing would be opposed. This matter must, however, be arranged with the French government beforehand as otherwise a surprise landing would no doubt be opposed. Our present North African forces and aircraft are considered sufficient for 15 days operation and believed capable of holding at the Spanish Moroccan frontier while landing is made."

When Captain Sansonof of the Navy was consulted he was more guarded but implied that in order that regrettable incidents be avoided the French should be given previous notice of any proposed landing. He stated that France's only assets were her fleet, her African Empire and her Diplomatic relations with the United States. If relations with the United States were broken then France would be completely thrown into Germany's hands.

DIS (S)

Political Situation, June 1942

Mussolini requested the French territories Nice, Tunisia and Corsica at the Salzburg meeting in May. Hitler either did not reply or gave an evasive answer. Thinking that Hitler had agreed tacitly, Mussolini carried on an intense press campaign for the return of these places to Italy and even sent out the Italian Fleet's main body to Corsican waters. When the French discovered this they started preparations and ordered the Navy to stand-by condition. An Italian attack was expected by the French on May 25 but by this time

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the ominous political silence of the French and Germans made the Italians somewhat suspicious so they refrained from any action.

DIS (C)

Germans Suspect United Nations Attack on Dakar,
October 1942

French officer attached to German Armistice Commission reports Germans convinced Americans will take Dakar as preliminary step to Agadir and other Moroccan points and that Germans have told French they can give no aid re Dakar but will come in at once in event Moroccan invasion and are counting on aid of Spanish troops in Spanish Morocco. Chief of S.O.L. for France, Capitaine Darlan (Darnand), has ordered new Moroccan leader Max Picault to support the present government of Petain and Laval and to fight off with all means in their power. German Commission shortly to go to Dakar. German Consul General Auer at Casa has been notified of Laval's flat refusal for German consular representation in Dakar.

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J
NAVAL ATTACHE, BRUSSELS

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J-1-1 The Italian Point of View, 20 September 1939

This report quotes the opinion of Colonel Borelli, that Italy will not soon enter the war and is not wanted to do so by Germany. He adds that mass sentiment is against it for fear of greater impoverishment.

J-1-2 Future German Plans, 3 October 1939

This report quotes a superior officer of the Belgian Army as saying that he believes the Germans will shortly move through Belgium and Holland en route to France. Thus, troops are being moved north to the Dutch frontier.

J-1-3 Italy's Present Diplomatic Attitude, 5 October 1939

This report quotes Comte de Kerchove, Belgian Ambassador in Rome, as saying that Italy has no intention of entering the war, though she is in a "state of expectancy". She does not want to cast her lot with the losing side.

J-1-4 The British Blockade, 24 October 1939

This report states that Belgium was making every effort to maintain her neutrality despite the hardships of the blockade.

J-1-5 King Leopold's Visit to Holland, 8 November 1939

This report reveals a Dutch-Belgian offer of mediation to London because of increased pressure and threats from Germany. Belgium will insist on keeping her neutrality.

J-1-6 The Pros and Cons of a German Invasion of the Low Countries, 15 November 1939

This report gives both sides of the discussion on whether the Germans would invade Holland and Belgium. It would seem that Germany would not provoke the two countries with their considerable defenses. Rumors of invasion are thought to be, in part, propaganda.

J-1-7 Belgian Point of View, 1 December 1939

This report quotes a well-informed Belgian who believes that the threats of German invasion were merely a means of diverting Belgian trade solely to the Reich. He expresses regret that Belgian and Holland do not work together in defense.

J-1-8 The Crisis of 11 November 1939, 10 January 1940

This report records the pledging of Belgian aid in case of invasion of Holland and subsequent abstaining from such by the Germans. The alarm of 11 November was apparently started to test the policy of surrounding countries.

J-1-9 The Recent Belgian Crisis, 16 January 1940

This report relates the series of threatening German moves and Belgian defense precautions. The King took over command of the Army on the 14th, but the German Embassy made no move to send its personnel home. The feeling persists that Germany is still trying to determine the steps other countries might take in the face of invasion.

J-1-10 Finland - Comments Regarding Possible German Invasion of Belgium and Holland, 23 February 1940

This report contains the statement of General Wahlenius that the German army would never undertake the risks and losses involved in invading Holland and Belgium, but that no one could predict what the Fuehrer might order.

J-1-11 German Relations with her Neighbors, 14 March 1940

This report gives the opinions of an important German industrial leader that military and economic reasons would both deter Germany from invading Belgium and that Germany would not make any out-and-out agreement with Russia.

J-1-12 Numbers of Foreigners in Belgium, 22 April 1940

This report speaks of the large numbers of Germans in Belgium under various pretenses but possibly acting as Nazi agents.

SUMMARY
of
PROBABILITY of an OUTBREAK
of
WAR

K
NAVAL ATTACHE, ROME

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K-1-1 Signing of Mediterranean Agreement, 5 January 1937

This report is a resume of an agreement signed 2 January 1937 between Italy and Great Britain whereby both powers agreed to no territorial aggrandizement as a result of the Spanish War.

K-1-2 Analysis of Mediterranean Agreement, 8 January 1937

This report gives a positive criticism of the British-Italian Mediterranean Accord. (1)

K-1-3 Italo-German Relations, 22 January 1937

This report concerns the Spanish situation as discussed by Goering with Mussolini subsequent to signing of Italo-British accord.

K-1-4 Press Comments on Eden Speech, 5 February 1937

This report indicates how press comments on British official's statements in reference to the rearmament program were used by the Italians to justify their actions.

K-1-5 British Armament Policy, 9 February 1937

This report tells of government spokesman Gayda's comments on the significance of the British building program and how it will affect Italy's future activities.

K-1-6 Variations in 1937 Budget, 11 February 1937

This report states the amount of increased appropriations for the Ministry of Marine and the amount allotted to the Air Ministry for the current year.

K-1-7 Central European Situation, 5 March 1937

This report names activities undertaken by Italy and Germany that were motivated by fear of Franco-British rearmament. (1)

K-1-8 The Italo-Yugoslav Treaty, 26 March 1937

This report is a resume of the terms of subject treaty, a step in Italy's war or peace program, as it

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secures for her the necessary raw materials. It is also a step towards replacing France in the Little Entente.

K-1-9 Rome Protocols. Meeting of Italian and Austrian Chiefs of Government, 23 April 1937

This report states that close cooperation between Hungary, Italy and Austria within the bounds of the Rome Protocols would offer the best assurance for peace in Central Europe.

K-1-10 Middle Europe - Rome Protocols - Danube Basin, 28 April 1937

This report concerns reactions of Italy's Protocol partners and the plight of Austria especially all brought about by Italy's treaties with Yugoslavia.

K-1-11 Italian Precautionary Military Measures, 30 April 1937

This report indicates the measures of readiness taken by the American consul at Palermo and other officers as a result of the delicate Spanish situation.

K-1-12 Press Comments on Conditions in England, 13 May 1937

This report shows how the press interprets the decadent position of England and France. The press states that it is now Italy's turn to develop and progress.

K-1-13 German-Italian Relations, 13 May 1937

This report tells how Mussolini justified his alliance with Germany in view of England's actions.

K-1-14 Anglo-Italian Relations, 14 May 1937

This report explains the cause for the existing conflict between the British Empire and the growing Italian Empire.

K-1-15 Anglo-Italian Relations, 21 May 1937

This report mentions a few incidents that indicate the growing friction between England and Italy.

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K-1-16 Speech of Count Ciano, 21 May 1937

This is a complete resume of Italy's foreign policy which seems to be very conciliatory in tone.

K-1-17 Interview with Mussolini, 28 May 1937

This report shows that Mussolini realizes the serious state Italy is in and he suggests various steps to be taken for Italy's economic recovery.

K-1-18 British-Italian Relations, 23 July 1937

This report summarizes Italy's attitude toward England. The Italians want action regardless of Eden's verbal offers. The British are aware of Italian propaganda activities in Palestine.

K-1-19 Visit of British Fleet to Venice, 20 August 1937

This report states that the visit by the British 1st Cruiser Squadron (the first in two years) gives evidence of improved relations.

K-1-20 Italian Relations with European States, 10 September 1937

This report reveals incidents indicative of Italo-Russian relationship and also points out the solidarity of the Axis.

K-1-21 The Nyon Conference, 24 September 1937

This report tells of Italy's reaction to the results obtained at the Nyon conference. It also stresses the point that Italy must be treated as a first class naval power by Britain. (7)

K-1-22 Mussolini's Visit to Germany, 1 October 1937

This report asserts that Rome-Berlin Pact is not a bloc but open to any nation. Then the report mentions four facts which are to be the bases of their "envisaged peace."

K-1-23 International Relations, 8 October 1937

This report by the British Naval Attache gives

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two reasons for the possibility of a first-class crisis between France and Italy. (2)

K-1-24 Anti-Comintern Pact: Germany/Italy and Japan,
5 November 1937

This report points out how Italy's adherence to the above assures definite German support for her activities in Mediterranean and Spain.

K-1-25 South American Interest in Italian Military Affairs,
8 November 1937

This report states that five new military attaches have been accredited to Italy from South American countries.

K-1-26 Italian Editorial Comment on Italo-German-Japanese Pact, 8 November 1937

This report gives an explanation and the purpose of the above Pact which the weakened democracies will not be able to resist.

K-1-27 Visit of German Minister Hess to Sicily, 12 November 1937

This report reveals discrimination against the American Naval Attache who was refused, whereas German officers were permitted to visit strategic points in Sicily.

K-1-28 Italian Reaction to U. S. Naval Expansion Program,
4 February 1938

This report states surprise for the above, yet disappointment in not having received the anticipated naval support from Japan she expected as a result of joining the Anti-Comintern Pact.

K-1-29 Italian Reaction to Admiral Leahy's Testimony Before Congressional Committee, 4 February 1938

This report is a violent criticism of Leahy's interpretation of the objective and the purpose of the Anti-Comintern Pact. (2)

K-1-30 Italian Press Campaign Regarding U. S. Naval Expansion, 18 February 1938

This report contains press comments condemning the United States Naval expansion, and brings out the press's positive stand for Japanese interests. (1)

K-1-31 Anglo-Italian Relations, 25 February 1938

This report indicates Italy's enthusiastic approval for Eden's elimination from the cabinet. (1)

K-1-32 Italy Joins London Naval Treaty, 2 December 1938

This report affirms that Italy will officially adhere to the 1936 London Naval Treaty on 2 December.

K-1-33 Repatriation of Italian Citizens Residing in France, 30 December 1938

This report tells of Italy's desire to repatriate Italian citizens employed in France and describes the effect of such an act on the French aeronautical industries where almost 6,500 are presently engaged.

K-1-34 Loyalty of Sicilians, 27 January 1939

This report states that the Sicilians will not be loyal to the Axis cause should a war breakout. Yet, a revolt seems to be unlikely.

K-1-35 Conversation with British Naval Attache, 3 May 1939

This report by the British Naval Attache tells of the steps (mentioning places) the British will take should a war break out with Italy.

K-1-36 Miscellaneous Items of Current Interest from Italian Press, 18 August 1939

This report consists of three translations, the first by Virginio Gayda, and the second by Giovanni Ansaldo. Their discussion of Italy's foreign policy and the purpose of German-Italian alliance is based on the Salzburg meeting. (3-4-5)

The third translation concerns an article entitled, "Roosevelt and Japan" as it appeared in an Italian Periodical. In it the denouncement of 1911 Trade Treaty is discussed. (5-8)

K-1-37

Italian Political Activities, 24 August 1939

This report states that there exists a slight split in the Fascist Party between the pro- and anti-war elements.

K-1-38

British Naval Attache's Conversation with Admiral Odoardo Somigli, 1 September 1939

This report gives the Admiral's views on what the Italian people think concerning the probability of war. He states that war is inevitable should Germany attack Poland.

K-1-39

French Naval Attache's Conversation with Admiral Odoardo Somigli, 4 September 1939

This report is a comparison, by means of statements, of the naval strength and war preparations of England, France, Italy, and Germany.

K-1-40

Conversation with German Naval Attache, 4 September 1939

This report mentions the sinking of the British liner, ATHENIA, an act that the German Naval Attache denies. The United States Naval Attache infers that such continued actions will cause the United States to enter into the war. (1)

K-1-41

Current Events and Comments, 2 - 7 Sept. 1939, 7 September 1939

This report mentions the following precautions as being among the many steps taken by Italy should she be involved in war: The manning of Sicilian defenses, the closing of Naples' harbor, and the conversion of the liner REX to a troopship. Additional information concerns the attitude of the Italian press toward Britain and France. (1-3)

K-1-42

Conversation with British Naval Attache, 10 September 1939

This report gives the views of the British Naval Attache on Italy's probability of declaring war against England and her possibility of joining Germany. All the views were the opposite of what has actually taken place.

DIS (C)

Germany to Assume Offensive if Peace Proposals of
Fuehrer are Turned Down, October 1939

Philip Johnson states that he was informed at the Berlin Foreign Office before leaving Germany on 5 October that Germany would assume offensive if peace proposals of the Fuehrer were turned down. Getting mastery of air over Britain was the first act in their plan of action, then bombing all ports of England, which they aspire to demolish in a five-month period, and finally to employ subs and airplanes to destroy the blockade.

K-1-43 Movements of Military Attaches Restricted, 13 February 1940

This report describes areas of military and naval activities that are restricted.

K-1-44 Current Events and Comment, 23 Feb. - 1 March 1940,
1 March 1940

This report discusses the negative relationship between England and Italy and the somewhat friendly relationship between United States and the latter. (1)

K-1-45 "In the Framework of the Alliance," 21 March 1940

This report is a translation of an article by Virginio Gayda on the Brenner Meeting. The article states that in view of the Allies' attitude, the only way out for Italy in order to protect her interests is to adhere to Italo-German solidarity.

K-1-46 Italy's Present Position, 12 April 1940

This report is a detailed account of Italy's political position and relationship to England, France, Turkey, Bulgaria, Roumania. Also mentioned and discussed in the report is Italy's material potentialities as a factor in limiting the role she will play in case of a war.

K-1-47 Report of Conversation with Count Vitetti, 17 April 1940

This report reveals Count Leonardo Vitetti's (important official in Italian Foreign Office) anxiety as to Italy's future should Germany win in Scandinavia. He fears Italy will be involved should England and the United States not help defeat Germany in Scandinavia.

K-1-48

Conversation with Spanish Naval Attache, 17 April 1940

This report expresses the opinions of the Spanish Naval Attache who believes Italy will keep out of war because of her lack of natural resources.

K-1-49

Ansaldo's Radio Speech to the Armed Forces, 18 April 1940

This report contains a warning by Ansaldo to the Italian people that the idea of isolationism and all that it signifies must be abandoned in view of what has taken place in Norway. (Invasion). (1)

K-2-50

Italy's Present position, 25 April 1940

This report indicates Italy's unpreparedness for war. It also reveals the reaction of many Italians toward the pro-German comments in the Italian Press and mentions the attitude assumed by the anti-English group. (1)

K-2-51

Unpublished Speech by Mussolini on 21 April 1940 and Speech by Grandi on 27 April, 4 May 1940

This report contains speeches made by Mussolini and Grandi. Mussolini indicates he is aware of a forthcoming war and asks the Italian people to prepare. Grandi, in turn asks that absolute loyalty and obedience be pledged to "Il Duce."

K-2-52

Italian Reaction to Reported Anglo-French Naval Concentration in Mediterranean, 6 May 1940

This report states (Gayda speaking) that Italy is not intimidated by the concentration of Anglo-French forces, for she is and always will be ready to safeguard and defend her vital interests.

K-2-53

Conversation with German Naval Attache, 10 May 1940

This report concerns a discussion held by the United States and German Naval Attaches. The German Naval Attache claims we should expel all thoughts of Germany ever invading South America, and that Italy will not be a belligerent unless actions by the Allies force her.

DIS (S)

Possibilities of Italy Entering War on Axis Side,
May 1940

A source thought to be reliable reports that Mussolini has decided to enter war as partner of Germany. However, immediate action not indicated as no troop movements have been noted.

Informant believes first move of Italians will be directed against Malta, Bizerte and Corsica and they may move against Switzerland. Latter part of June is probable date of Italy entering war, but it may be before this date depending on French developments.

No action in Balkans contemplated by Italy.

Information from two additional sources indicates (a) Movement against Egypt may be first Italian action; (b) Italy may enter on Axis side very shortly and Switzerland may be direction of attack.

K-2-54

Conversation with British Naval Attache, 24 May 1940

This report tells of cancellation of Italian ship movements; the British view as to where Italy will attack; and the British Naval Attache report on the activities of the Japanese commission head in Rome whose mission was to get the Italian reaction as to possible Japanese occupation of Dutch East Indies.

K-2-55

Italy's Present Position, 25 May 1940

This report describes the reaction toward revival of Rome-Berlin Pact. It also tells of Italy's war preparations, including the names of the first objectives to be attacked.

K-2-56

Organization of the Nation for War, 27 May 1940

This report is a translation of Law 21 May 1940, No. 415 on the "Organization of the Nation for War" published in Official Gazette of 24 May 1940.

K-2-57

Organization of the Supreme Defense Commission,
27 May 1940

This report is a translation of Law 21 May 1940, No. 416 on "The Organization and Functions of the Supreme Commission of Defense" published in Official Gazette of 24 May 1940.

K-2-58

Italy's Intentions in Regard to War, 7 June 1940

This report from a translated Italian article entitled, "Relazioni Internazionali" reflects justification for Italy joining up with Germany and mentions the territorial objectives which she hopes to obtain from France.

K-2-59

Italy's Present Position, 10 June 1940

This report gives information as to the localities where Italian troops have been sent. It also states, "rumors are that fighting has already begun in Libya."

DIS (C)

Possible Evacuation Naval Attache's Office, Rome, June 1940

"If necessary, evacuate office personnel and effects. Full authority granted to incur expenses." To the foregoing from Opnav, Alusna Rome answers that evacuation is not necessary.

K-2-60

Conversation with Official of Italian Foreign Office, 17 June 1940

This report concerns the element of time on the subject of war. Italy joined, despite Hitler's protest, because she felt war would soon be over; Hitler's guess as a terminating date was August, subject to change if United States or Russia entered.

K-2-61

Italy's Present Position, 20 June 1940

This report shows how Churchill's speech modified the Italians' conception as to the duration of the war with France.

K-2-62

Italy's Present Position, 25 June 1940

This report tells of granting clearance to American Export S.S. EXERMONT in advance of arrival at Messina. (2)

K-2-63

Conversation with Spanish Naval Attache, 25 June 1940

This report says the Spanish Naval Attache feels Spain will eventually go to war.

K-2-64

Italy's Present Position, 5 July 1940

This report states no changes since last report. It also adds that Ciano is quite interested in the attitude of the United States.

K-2-65

Italy's Present Position, 31 July 1940

This report asserts that Italy is putting pressure on Spain to declare war.

DIS (S)

Hitler States he Will Make Landing at Hastings, August 1940

Source considered reliable reports Hitler stated that a personal landing at Hastings would be made by him.

K-2-66

Italy's Present Position, 23 August 1940

This report tells of the military preparations aimed at Alexandria and Suez Canal. It also indicates Italy's attitude about sending shipments to the United States in view of the fact the United States is assisting England. Mentioned also in the report is Italy's desire to draw Spain into the war. (1-2)

K-2-67

Italy's Present Position, 27 September 1940

This report states that Germany is acting as a restraining influence in reference to Italy attacking Yugoslavia or Greece at the first opportunity. (4)

K-2-68

Conversation with Swedish Naval Attache, 3 October 1940

This report gives the Naval Attache's warning that the United States must act immediately to prevent Japanese expansion southward. (2)

K-2-69

Possible Japanese Move, 14 October 1940

This report is based on statements made by Head of Domei Agency in Rome who reveals what Japan will do once the United States declares war.

K-2-70

Attempts to Bring Russia into War on Axis Side, 18 October 1940

This report reveals immense interest displayed by

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Axis to win over Russia. Mentioned also in this report is the Axis activity against re-election of President Roosevelt.

K-2-71 Italian Attack on Corfu, 22 October 1940

This report tells of plans disclosing the place of assembling troops and possible dates (25 or 28 October) for attack on Corfu. (Note: Attack did take place 28 October.)

K-2-72 Reported Future Axis Moves, 4 November 1940

This report mentions countries in consecutive order that are on the Axis conquest list.

DIS (S) Italian Agents in Greece. Observations of German Agent Returning from Albania, December 1940

British bought up Italian agents in Greece. The following statements were made by a German agent recently returned from Albania: Nothing can be done in that country by Italians and intervention there may have to be by Germany.

K-2-73 Current Events and Comment, 13 December 1940

This report reveals discrimination against American correspondents when all correspondents were invited to inspect warships. Americans weren't invited until the last moment. (3)

DIS (C) Possible Occupation of Nice by Italians, January 1941

According to good source, Italian troops and equipment are being concentrated in the western part of Liguria, near French border for the occupation of Nice. Another source stated that General Garibaldi said at Montone 21 December that he planned to take Nice about 15 January.

K-2-74 Yugoslavia Refuses Italy's Request for Trucks. Anti-French Feeling, Italian Press, 10 January 1941

This report confirms Yugoslavia's refusal to permit Italy's sending material from Trieste to Albania. Report also indicates Italian press is arousing anti-French feeling. (2 & 5)

K-2-75

Italy and Germany Contemplating Surprise Attack on Corsica and Tunis, 13 January 1941

This report reveals Germany's and Italy's plans for the surprise attack to be made on Tunis and Corsica.

K-2-76

Translation of Unsigned Note Left at American Consulate, Rome, 16 January 1941

This report says that Mussolini and Hitler have planned and ordered the murdering of Roosevelt in addition to sabotage activities in America, especially New York.

K-2-77

Attitude of Press, 31 January 1941

This report states that Gayda feels the Hitler-Mussolini meeting to be of great importance, for war plans were established as to England, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean. (3)

K-2-78

Italy's Present Position, 3 February 1941

This report discloses the activities imposed by Mussolini on Italy regardless of military unpreparedness and the low morale of the troops. (2 & 8)

DIS (C)

Italy/Yugoslavia, March 1941

Political circles here believe Yugoslavia will attempt to resist pressure.

K-2-79

Italian Intelligence Items, 10 March 1941

This report states that Yugoslavia will try to resist the Axis. (2)

K-2-80

Japanese Naval Mission to Italy, 13 March 1941

This report shows how the Italian Ministry of Marine appeared to be rather embarrassed when asked by United States Naval Attache the purpose of the Japanese Naval Mission in Rome.

K-2-81

Yugoslavia Will Resist Invasion, 17 March 1941

This report gives reasons advanced to a Swiss diplomat by a high Yugoslav official why Yugoslavia will resist invasion.

K-2-82

German-Japanese Relations, 24 March 1941

This report tells how the Germans are trying to impress Matsuoka with their military strength. It seems that the Germans fear Japan might stage a coup in the Pacific, thereby bringing the United States into the war. A supplementary note in the report concerns the Russo-Japanese relationship. (4)

DIS (S)

Contemplated Nazi Operations in Balkans, April 1941

Operations by Nazis in Balkans contemplated after 15 April. Same tactics used in Holland and Belgium to be used here; Fifth Columns already present.

K-2-83

Germany Will Attack in Balkans, 7 April 1941

This report tells of Germany's contemplated moves for Salonika in Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey, and Asia Minor. (1)

DIS (C)

Italian Hostilities Against Yugoslavia, April 1941

According to two reliable sources, the Italian Government did not wish to commence hostilities against Yugoslavia but did so at insistence of the Germans. Everyone here worried about fate of Italian soldiers in Albania.

DIS (C)

Italians Believe European War Practically Won, April 1941

As a result of Axis victories in Greece and British retreat, Italians now believe European war practically won and North African campaign sure of success. Avoids criticism of United States public but uses recent victories and Gallup Poll in attempt to drive a wedge between President and American public. Believed too late for United States to go to war on side of England.

DIS (C) Propaganda Spread Re Invasion of Portugal, April 1941

Recurring rumors of early invasion of Portugal. No invasion in near future but official circles want to spread propaganda according to reliable contacts.

DIS (C) Axis People Believe United States will not Enter War Unless Directly Threatened, May 1941

Great change in the minds of Italian people and Europeans in Italy as to the chances of a successful end of war in Europe by Axis before autumn. Axis people believe United States will resist but not combat the aggressors by early war unless United States directly threatened. They think even more aid to Britain will not be enough, because it will be too late. Axis governments feel that by being careful in preventing acts to arouse people, they can keep United States from entering war.

DIS (C) Increased Tension Between Italian Government and Spanish Falangist Party, May 1941

Increasing tension between Italian Government and Spanish Falangist Party. Spanish have closed consulates at Bari, Palermo and Naples on account of Italian resentment at Spanish refusal to cooperate satisfactorily with the Axis. Contact says Spain will resist any entry of Axis powers into Spain for any purpose.

DIS (C) Friction Reported Between Germany and Russia, June 1941

Quirinale contact reports that at present there is very strong friction between Germany and Russia.

DIS (C) Italy Forming French-Speaking Force - Tunis, June 1941

Italy reported forming French-Speaking Force for duty in Tunis

DIS (C) Sabotage Reported Planned Against United States Army, American Codes Believed to Have Been Broken, June 1941

Contact states a major act of sabotage is planned against United States Army sometime during August. Place and character not stated.

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American codes believed to have been broken in that it has been stated that copies of all code despatches from United States Embassy at Rome are being forwarded to Berlin.

DIS (C) Hitler's Plans Concerning Russia, June 1941

Information from source formerly considered reliable indicates that when German Army reaches objective in Russia, Hitler will broadcast to world announcing the end of Bolshevism and he then will make peace proposals and suggest all parties concerned attend conference.

K-2-84 Current Events and Comment, 1 July 1941

This report discloses future plans of the German General Staff in dealing with dismemberment of European Russia, Roumanian oil fields, German forces in Finland, and the invasion of England. Another point of interest revealed in same report is the German discouragement over Libyan Campaign. (3-4)

DIS (C) Reported Intention Sabotage British Warships Repairing in New York, July 1941

Contact credits German Naval Attache Rome with statement that British warships repairing in New York will never leave harbor due to sabotage.

K-2-85 Current Events and Comment, 22 July 1941

This report shows that Japan expects some move or other (place unknown) since she has at her immediate disposal of over 100,000 troops and transports loaded with heavy equipment. (3)

DIS (C) German Pressure on Turks for Passage of Troops, August 1941

Germans putting pressure on Turks for passage of troops for attack on British through Iran and Syria.

K-2-86 Current Events and Comments, 5 August 1941

This report states that Japanese troops referred to (See report of 22 July) have not yet left (30 July) and are aimed at the Dutch East Indies.

DIS (C)

Sicily Expected to be Occupied by British Sooner or Later, August 1941

Italians expect British offensive in about a month and some think they will take everything including Tunisia.

Sicilian population increasingly dissatisfied with regime. Hate Germans. Expect Sicily to be occupied by British sooner or later.

DIS (C)

Conference in Berlin by Chiefs of German Gestapo in South America, August 1941

Conference held in Berlin last week by chiefs of German Gestapo in South America. Five are travelling on Brazilian passports. Chief of group located in Buenos Aires.

K-2-87

Current Events and Comment, 2 September 1941

This report contains the fact that General Messe is commanding the Italian Army in Russia, and secondly, warns Italy of German invasion within 24 hours should she attempt to overthrow Fascist Regime. (3)

DIS (C)

Possibility German War Against Turkey, September 1941

Russian Duke recently returned from Germany believes Germany will begin war against Turkey toward end of September.

K-2-88

Sicilian Officials Being Moved to Italy, 9 September 1941

This report reveals the number of Sicilian born functionaries being transferred from Sicily to Italian peninsula because of their known pro-British tendencies. (7)

DIS (C)

Reported Demands by Hitler on Italy, September 1941

Italian born in Russia, who was interpreter at recent meeting between Mussolini and Hitler, states Hitler demanded Italy prepare use of Navy to force Dardanelles to render support Black Sea Front. Mussolini admitted Navy not strong enough to comply. Could not risk fleet in such action and absence from home waters leaving coastal cities unprotected would create unfavorable reaction among the people.

Mussolini told he must supply 1,000,000 men for Russian front. Four Italian divisions now in Russia.

K-2-89

Hitler's Demand for Use of Italian Fleet Refused,
16 September 1941

This report gives reasons why Mussolini refused Hitler's demand for use of Italian Fleet to force Dardanelles and support Black Sea Front. (3)

K-2-90

Report on German Plans, 23 September 1941

This report reveals information as to the German plans for winter line in Russia, and the condition on which Germany will move into Portugal. (2)


DIS (C)

German Victory Over Russia Considered Hopeless by
German High Command - Hope for Draw, November 1941

German High Command considers German victory over Russia hopeless but hopes for a draw with the war finished at end of 1942. Stated definitely no invasion of England. High Command also believes no break with the United States prior to June and will endeavor to avoid incidents.

SUMMARY
of
PROBABILITY of an OUTBREAK
of
WAR

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NAVAL ATTACHE, BERLIN



SECRET

PROBABILITY OF AN OUTBREAK OF WAR
(Reports received from Naval Attache, Berlin)

L-1-1

GERMANY - Cabinet Changes - Significance of, 7 Feb., 1938

It is the considered opinion of the undersigned that the present crisis in Germany is very serious. Internally, it is capable of further serious repercussions if the Army group refuses to accept their defeat at the hands of the Party and also externally, in foreign policy, now that the Army has lost its position as the "balance wheel" to radical Nazi Party politicians who may be tempted to try any external adventure, however wise or unwise.

L-1-2

GERMANY - German-Austrian Relations, 19 Feb., 1938

For the moment, the developments in Austria appear as another victory for the totalitarian States and their methods. It yet remains to be seen whether the majority of the Austrian people are satisfied with the developments, their implications and whether and in what manner they will voice their opposition, if they do in fact, disapprove.

When it is remembered that Italy mobilized her Army on the Austrian border after Chancellor Dollfuss's assassination in 1934 to forestall a possible invasion of that country by Germany, Italy's present attitude represents a complete about-face and shows the rapid changes recently made in the policies and alignments of European countries - particularly the so-called "dictatorial countries." It is maintained in both the German and Italian press that Italy was fully consulted prior to the Berchtesgaden conference and approves of all measures taken. Of course, the anti-Nazi press in foreign countries maintains that in return for Italy's approval of German action in Austria, one reads between the lines a certain uneasiness regarding the future and direction in which the Rome-Berlin axis is pointing. Italy is somewhat "on the spot" because of her close hook-up with Germany and is not in a position to voice publicly any opposition she may have to German aspirations in Central Europe in general, and in Austria, in particular. Any sign of discord between Rome and Berlin would be made the most of by the other countries of different form of Government. Nothing worse could happen to the solidarity of the Rome-Berlin entente, to the prestige of the

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so-called "totalitarian states" and their vaunted methods of direct action, than signs of discord between the two leading exponents of this system of government.

Should active opposition in Austria itself, leading to violent internal disturbances, result from the recent Berchtesgaden agreements, one can foresee active intervention on the part of Germany to support the newly formed Government of Austria. Herein lies a potential and possible source of danger to the peace of Europe.

The successful carrying out of German aspirations in Austria will further isolate Czechoslovakia.

The upheaval of 4 February in the High Commands of the German Army and in the Foreign Service cannot be entirely disassociated from present events in Austria. As a result the many changes in the Army and Foreign Service announced on 4 February, there are many who predicted a more aggressive foreign policy along Nazi lines. This shake-up was generally conceded to be a "Party" victory, with increased power for it and a decrease of the influence hitherto exercised by the Army in foreign affairs. It is generally believed that the Army has previously opposed many of the aggressive foreign policies of the Nazi politicians in power, for example, they have opposed a too active participation in the Spanish Civil War by German troops; they are said to have opposed the occupation of the Rhineland by German troops at the particular time that it was done. In addition, there was said to be opposition in the Army to many of the internal policies of the Party, for example, the doing away with Chaplains in the Army and the Party attitude to the Churches; the doing away with the old military salute and the substitution therefor of the National-Socialist salute; the introduction of Commissars in the Army in the form of political instructors; the desire that officers be recruited only from the youth who had gone through the National-Socialist Cadet Corps; the opposition to the introduction of politics in the Army; the opposition to the expenditure of so much money and material for Party buildings and public works to the detriment of the Military, Naval and Air Forces; and finally, there was said to be strenuous opposition to any attempts to transform the Army into a National Socialist Army with the attendant dangers of losing its age old traditions and independence.

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A more aggressive foreign policy has certainly appeared as predicted and while it is not known whether the Army was consulted before the present developments in German/Austrian relations, or whether, they approved or disapproved, and if any of the conjectures above are true, it appears reasonable to believe that the Army shake-up of 4 February cannot be entirely disassociated from the events of today. The writer was not long ago informed by an intelligent German that the German High Command recently opposed the proposal to send approximately 30,000 regular German troops to Spain, which was favored in influential Nazi circles. This opposition on the part of the Army, coupled with other oppositions to the Nazi Foreign Policy, was the real cause of the shake-up of 4 February. Still further retirements in the Army, in addition to those reported and announced, are expected to take place shortly.

The German Navy has so far remained completely unaffected by the recent changes. It is understood that at the beginning of the present regime in Germany, the Commander in Chief, in conference with officers of the Navy, made it distinctly understood that the Navy would go along hand and glove with the National Socialist Party and that those officers who would not do so could ask for immediate retirement which would be granted without question. Thus the Navy, in contrast to the Army, has become entirely National Socialist and as such could not be expected to be involved in such political changes as took place on 4 February.

DIS (C)

GERMANY - Possible Territorial Adjustments, March, 1938

Important developments can momentarily be expected involving Germany, Poland and Lithuania whereby it is probable that Danzig and Polish Corridor may be returned to Germany in compensation for Memel to Poland.

L-1-3

EUROPE - Political Situation, 18 March, 1938

Events in Central Europe have developed rapidly in the past week and the trend and results of these events give reason to predict future events. The world has been confronted with one "fait accompli" after another, after the manner of the Dictator-ruled countries. There has never been much doubt as to Germany's real and final intentions in regard to Austria. Opinion differed as to the time and methods to be employed by Germany. As usual,

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a propitious moment was chosen for the "coup".

It is, of course, difficult to predict the next moves of the totalitarian states, as it is their practice to act suddenly and announce later. However, past events and the known aspirations of the Nazi Government point in three directions as follows:

(a) Czechoslovakia, where there is a considerable German minority, the Sudeten Deutsche, who are daily, particularly since the Austrian annexation, becoming more vociferous and bold in their opposition to the Czechoslovakian Government. Several incidents have already occurred on the German/Czechoslovakian border, resulting in riots and disorder between the Czech authorities and the Sudeten Deutsche. There seems little doubt that the Sudeten Deutsche under their leader Herr Henlein are controlled and motivated by the Nazi Party in Germany. One may look for increased agitation in Czechoslovakia by the German minority. In view of the constant threats in speeches made by Herr Hitler, Field Marshal Göring and other prominent Nazis, that Germany will find or provoke the incident considered necessary for drastic action against Czechoslovakia following the lines of their recent annexation of Austria. The territorial ambitions of Nazi Germany in Central and Eastern Europe have been the subject of much writing by authorities on international affairs, in fact it is difficult to read Herr Hitler's book "Mein Kampf" without immediately seeing that territorial expansion in Europe itself takes precedence over expansion at a distance, as for example, the return of Germany's far distant colonies. With Czechoslovakia annexed to Germany, Germany's ambitions in regard to Ukraine would be made immeasurably easier of accomplishment.

(b) The second direction in which Nazi aspirations point is to Hungary. One hears a little of this except that it is always stated that Hungary is much more friendly and susceptible to National Socialism than was Austria and that when Germany was ready and the time propitious, the absorption of Hungary could easily be accomplished.

(c) The third direction of future German aspirations points to Poland - Polish Corridor - Lithuania. Incidents are daily occurring on the Polish/Lithuanian border. The Polish Foreign Minister Beck recently hurried back to Warsaw from a four day visit to Rome where he had been in conference with Signors Mussolini and Ciano on account of the

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tense situation (as announced in the German Press) between Poland and Lithuania. Field Marshal Goering has just returned from a "hunting trip" in Poland. There have been numerous exchanges of visits between a statesmen of Germany and Poland in recent months. The recent visit of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to Poland is generally believed to have been a failure. The Poland - Polish Corridor - Lithuanian situation and its possibilities were not discussed in Berlin two weeks ago, but now it is heard on every side. Some are positive in their declarations as to future events. These declarations take the general line that Poland, with the assistance of Germany, will take Lithuania or that part of it containing the seaport of Memel. In return for German assistance, Germany will get back the Polish Corridor and Danzig.

L-1-4

GERMANY - Erection of Fortifications, 1 July, 1938

A recent decree promulgated by the Commissioner of the German Four Year Plan (General Goering), conscripts all German labor. This order compels all citizens of the Reich to work on any task assigned them. In this manner labor may be "given leave" (taken) from present employment and put to work on specified work. The exact nature of "specified work" is not known, however, it may be reasonably assumed that it is closely related to the brewing Czechoslovakian situation.

In conversations with German sources, it has been stated that Germany has been undertaking the erection of fortifications along the Western German/French border, paralleling the French Maginot line, with an initial view of completing same in the normal time of a year or so. The continued tense German/Czechoslovak situation which, temporarily at least, seems to have halted the Nazis "Drang nach Osten" (Drive to the East) as a result of Germany's uncertainty as to France's course of action in the event Czechoslovakia is invaded (with the likelihood of involving England), has spurred the Nazis to completion of their counterline fortifications with all possible speed. It is understood that Dr. Todt President of the V.D.I. (Association of German Engineers) and who is charged with supervision of Reichsautobahnen construction, was recently approached by General Goering to hurry the completion of the fortifications, and that Dr. Todt pointed out that it was a physical impossibility to complete the project within

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the year with the labor available to him, but that if he were given a free hand with labor, the undertaking could be pushed to completion. Hence the issuance of the labor conscripting decree through which, it was stated, the fortifications will be completed within three to four months.

In Berlin a tremendous building program has been underway for the past few months - erection of numerous new state buildings, construction of new streets, new underground communications (subways), etc. Since the promulgation of the above decree, it has been observed that there has been an appreciable diminution in the labor employed on these projects, which would appear to indicate that labor is being diverted to works of a far more important nature - of military import.

The numerous daily German press articles dealing with the Czechoslovakian situation clearly emphasize Germany's intention not to allow the Sudeten problem to escape solution advantageous to Germany, and that she is biding time until the propitious moment arrives.

L-1-5

GERMANY - Military and Naval Activities, 22 July, 1938

I have gathered from reliable sources in conversations and other wise:

(a) The work on the counter-Maginot line along the French border is being pushed to the utmost. Ten thousand masons and concrete workers have been sent recently to this work, together with Autobahn laborers and others from all parts of Germany. A large number of Pioneer (Engineer) divisions have been detailed there.

(b) At Kiel. Day and night shifts were observed on the aircraft carrier, at present about half completed.

Day and night shifts observed on one large cruiser in the floating dock, name not known.

One 10,000 ton cruiser, not named - probably "I" on ways, ready for launching.

(c) Navy - general. Destroyers are going into commission more frequently than in the past.

Rumors of a large reserve of submarine machinery and periscopes on hand, for which the necessary hulls could be built in a very short time.

[REDACTED]

(d) Reserve divisions being called to active duty 15 August, after harvest is over, presumably for Fall maneuvers.

It has been breathed that in event of war with England, Germany will establish a submarine and seaplane base at the northwest corner of Spain (Corunna or Vigo) to operate against British Commerce.

With her back secured by the counter-Maginot line, Germany will feel safer about a push to the East, in the belief that France and England will not consider Czechoslovakia worth the lives, time and money required to break through the lines of fortification.

It is not believed that Germany, Government or people, want war. The building up of the armed forces is primarily for a show of German strength at diplomatic conferences, wither to force the Czechs to grant very favorable terms to the Sudeten Germans or to hold the British and French back if and when the Germans take forcible measures in Czechoslovakia.

L-1-6

GERMANY - Complement of German Ships, 12 Dec., 1938

The Naval Attache recently learned from a reliable source that ships of the German Navy carry a full war-time complement at all times. The crew of a 1600 ton destroyer is 270 men.

The Engineer's Force is sufficient to provide a watch in three under all conditions, including full power. One section is on watch, one sleeping, one at the anti-aircraft guns or in magazines.

L-1-7

GERMANY - "Push" to the Northeast, 10 March, 1939

In conversation with a reliable source, I learned that the German "push", when it came, would be directed toward the northeast instead of toward the Southeast and Ukraine. My informant stated that he had obtained this information from one who was present when the expansion was discussed with Mr. Hitler. The General Staff had considered the Ukraine drive, but Herr Hitler stated that history showed that whenever Germans moved to southern and more favorable lands and climates, the race deteriorated. Consequently, he

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advocated pushing up to the Northeast, to the vicinity of Moscow. Poland's loss of the Corridor is to be appensed by delivery of or assisting her in taking a hunk out of the Ukraine with a Black Sea port.

There is no time schedule for this push. It is just one of the steps which have been laid out for any advance in the outline for a bigger and better Germany.

L-1-8

GERMANY - Acquisition of Czechoslovakia, 17 March, 1939

On Tuesday morning, 15 March, all foreign Military and Naval Attaches were informed that a closed zone of 120 kilometers (75 miles) depth was established around the German-Czech borders. This includes that part of Silesia which was not made a "Sperrgebiet" in the summer of 1938, reaching to the northwest almost to Leipzig, including Dresden and the Autobahn between Leipzig and Nuernberg, and also Vienna. The Naval Attache had contemplated a trip to Vienna, via Prag on 17 March, to attend a technical fair. The trip was, of course, postponed. It is not believed that this newly created "Sperrgebiet" will be of any long duration. The closing of the Silesian Peninsula and the known fact that German troops had gone into that area on March 13th, may indicate a concentration against possible unfavorable Polish reaction toward German occupation of Czecho, and it may be the initial move against Poland. The former is apparently out of the question now.

The Naval Attache hesitates to make comments or predictions on matters which he feels fall properly within the province of the Embassy and the Military Attache, but offers his firm conviction that Germany will continue her "push to the east", probably with an accelerated tempo now that Czechoslovakia has been seized with so little ado. Hungary and Roumania are both pretty much honeycombed with pro-Nazi organizations, and while there would probably be some resistance to a German invasion I do not think that it would be whole-hearted or of long duration. Poland, on the other hand, will be inclined to offer all the resistance that she can muster. Lithuania has a considerable sprinkling of German agitators but I believe that Latvia and Esthonia are not Nazi nests. With the Siegfried Line at their backs in the West, the Baltic (a German lake) on their left flank, and Italy controlling the Mediterranean to guard their right flank, it is a matter of but a short

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time before Germany would over-run Poland and possibly a good section of Russia as well. I believe that in time the German Empire will be bounded, roughly, on the north by the Baltic - up to Leningrad; on the east by a line roughly Leningrad-Moscow-Mouth of the Don River; on the south by the Black Sea, Bulgaria, Jugoslavia, Italy and Switzerland; and the present boundaries on the west. Many variables enter into the picture which may prevent its fulfillment. One of the major of these is the swallowing of indigestible masses of non-Germanic and contrary-minded peoples. A further possibility is an economic crack-up due to absorption of industrial nations before getting around to the agricultural and mineral lands. A third factor which would badly upset the itinerary is the very remote possibility of Rome changing its polarity to a Rome-Paris-London Axis. While the official and service feeling between Germans and Italians has always been extremely cordial as big brothers of the Axis, my impression is that Italians have no love for Germans, and the Germans have riverted in their minds that Italy sold out in 1914. Further, der Fuehrer completely pushed Il Duce off the front page some time ago and has not let him return.

The German method, as borne out by their conquest of Austria, Sudetenland, and now Czechoslovakia, is the dispatching of Nazi "missionaries" or professional agitators into the coveted territory well in advance, who finally proceed to get themselves talked about in the German papers as an "oppressed minority" of German blood which must be protected. There are such groups in Hungary and Roumania at present, and, when the right time comes, if not already, they will doubtless be found also in Poland, Ukraine, Letvia and Esthonia. It is known that each member of the Nazi Party pays 75 pfennige (30 cents) monthly dues to the "Verband für die Deutsche in Ausland" (Society for Germans abroad) which is, in effect a society for the propagation of the faith. Since there are roughly four million party members, this represents a very tidy sum for propaganda and agitation. It is not believed that Belgium, Holland or the Scandinavian countries fall within the limits outlined for the Greater Germany, as they are probably of more use to Germany as neutrals than they would be as semi-rebellious subject states. (5) (6)

L-1-9

GERMANY - Navy General Notes, 17 July, 1939

Information was received in this office to the effect

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that several trawlers in Hamburg were being taken over by the Navy, that they were being renovated, guns installed, and that there were naval ratings on board. Accordingly, the writer visited Hamburg over the past week-end and made a tour of the harbor on one of the pleasure steamers. At the two shipyards - Stülacken Werft and Deutsche Werft (Reihersteig branch) - which are adjacent to each other, six trawlers were observed undergoing overhaul and being painted war color. A naval sailor was seen on one of them. There was no evidence of guns being installed as far as the writer could determine.

While in Hamburg, another source was contacted who confirmed the information that these ships were being taken over by the Navy. It was further stated that they would be used as minesweepers. It was also added that this was the beginning of the conversion of all merchant ships to the naval service which had been previously designated for that purpose.

L-1-10

GERMANY - Merchant ships, 10 Aug., 1939

It has been noted in German shipping literature that while German private shipping companies purchased only three merchant ships (tankers and freighters) from foreign firms during the months of January and February of this year, the number of ships bought from foreign firms during March and April 1939 was twenty-three (23). Figures for the later months are not yet available. This recent spurt in the purchase of merchant vessels was discussed with another attache who stated that his government was aware of this situation and regarded it as an attempt by Germany to acquire a "war reserve" of shipping.

DIS (S)

GERMANY - Naval Attaches Restrictions, Aug., 1939

General mobilization is in progress. All naval attaches and attached officers have been requested by the German navy not to leave the city of Berlin without special permission.

L-1-11

GERMANY - Restriction of Foreign Military Attache to Limits of Berlin, 29 Aug., 1939

The German Navy Ministry on 26 August 1939 issued the following order:

"In view of the international situation the Naval Attaches

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are requested not to make trips or rides of their own outside of Greater Berlin as well as trips by their assistants or other officers of their armed forces with our previous inquiry at the Naval Attache Group. All prior authorizations to visit firms outside of Greater Berlin are hereby withdrawn."

Similar letters were sent out by the War and Air Ministries. The War Ministry letter stated merely "Berlin" instead of "Gross Berlin". The Air Ministry letter (which was not sent to this office not to that of the U.S. Military Attache), used the expression "forbidden to make trips".

This restriction was reported to our Charge d'Affaires and to the Navy Department.

A canvass of other Attaches in Berlin disclosed that all had reported the matter to their home departments and to their embassies. Several suggested that like restrictions be placed on the German Attaches in their home capitals. One case of protest by an Air Attache to the Air Ministry on account of the wording used drew the response that the notification was hastily drawn and that "request not to make trips" was intended.

L-1-12

GERMANY - Conversion of Merchant Ships into Hospital Ships,
30 Aug., 1939

The steamships Berlin, Stuttgart and General Osorio are reliably reported to have been converted into Hospital ships and to have sailed for the Baltic on August 25.

The "Berlin" is the 15,286 B.R.T. North German Lloyd ship that recently had a boiler explosion. It is listed as being able to make 16.0 knots. The "Stuttgart" is a 13,387 B.R.T. "K.D.F." (Strength through Joy) ship. Its speed is also listed as 16.0 knots. The "General Osorio" is a 11,590 B.R.T. motorship of the Hamburg-Südamerika Dampfaschiff.-Ges. Its speed is given as 15.0 knots.

L-1-13

GERMANY - U-Boat Practices in Right of Visit and Search,
17 Oct., 1939

According to a report from the American Consul General, Hamburg (13 October 1939), the following information concerning the application by U-Boat commanders of the German Prize Law emanates from what is believed to be a responsible source within the active submarine fleet:

[REDACTED]

a) It is true that a special order personally issued by Hitler to U-Boat commanders at the outbreak of war enjoined the latter to comply most strictly with the present Prize Law, especially with those portions providing for the warning and rescue of crews of torpedoed vessels. The reason given for the strict injunction is that it is better for forego the capture of many thousands of tons of shipping than to involve the Reich in diplomatic difficulties with neutral countries.

b) The S.S. ATHENIA is believed by at least several German U-boat commanders to have been sunk on the unfortunate order of some over-zealous German commander who had been ordered to sea prior to the outbreak of war, and who, therefore, had not seen the new Prize Law of Hitler's special order.

c) It was further stated that U-boat commanders are finding it extremely difficult to comply with the provisions of the Prize Law for warning vessels before destruction and for bringing crews to safety. The vulnerability of a submarine's hull to fire from the smallest calibre guns and the alleged British practice of arming and disguising merchant vessels often places the commander in the unhappy position of choosing between the safety of his vessel and crew and the observation of the restrictive provisions of the Prize Law. It was stated that U-boat commanders often welcomed violations of their orders to heave to and cease use of the wireless apparatus inasmuch as such violations can be construed as aid to the enemy which can be countered by force, and make vessels liable to immediate destruction.

d) As a result of these legal restrictions the effectiveness of submarine activity has been seriously curtailed. It is the opinion of responsible U-boat commanders that the near future will see either a considerable relaxation of the Law or the inauguration of unlimited submarine warfare.

Diary p. 28

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 15 Oct., 1939

My Swedish colleague had supper with me tonight. The Russo-Finnish situation has him very obviously worried. He expected Sweden to be involved in war in two weeks at most if Russia attacks Finland.

Diary p. 35

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 2 Nov., 1939

A call on my Swedish colleague found him still considerably agitated over the prospect of Russia and Finland

becoming involved in difficulties. He is convinced that Sweden will go to the aid of Finland and the Germans will back Russia, either quietly or openly.

Diary p. 37

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 7 Nov., 1939

I talked with Commander Schulte-Monting, Admiral Raeder's Chief of Staff, who was uncommunicative as to details or definite statements, but remarked that 1), the submarines were not attacking the British Navy right now, 2), that they were specializing in their commerce war, 3), that German harbors were chockfull of prizes brought in, 4), that he didn't anticipate much big action until next spring, when some "new surprises" would be brought out, and 5), in response to my remark that there hadn't been much going on since the end of the Polish campaign, he stated that they had done a tremendous amount of work at the Navy Ministry.

Diary p. 39

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 10-12 Nov., 1939

The press and radio of both sides are full of the Munich bombing. The original reward of a half-million marks has been upped to six hundred thousand, and three hundred thousand marks in foreign exchange, should the perpetrators have escaped abroad. The "Gestapo" has made a great show of following the trail out of the country, but failed to state over which border it led. Probably that will come out later for blackmail purposes or grounds for an invasion. Holland and Belgium, beware.

The Germans did not invade Holland over the week-end, so the next "magic date", 15 November, will have to be closely watched.

L-1-14

GERMANY - War Preparation for and Conduct of War, 25 Nov., 1939

Through conversation with German soldiers, both directly and indirectly through their relatives, the writer has learned that the German troops on the west front are being fitted out with light summer or tropical uniforms. The impression prevails amongst them that they are bound for Spain. How they are to get there is purely conjecture to them.

Previously the writer was informed that German submarine crews have been sent to Italy. This information was

[REDACTED]

not as well authenticated as that given in (1). However, the two facts may fit in together and it may all be part of a German plan to carry the war into the Mediterranean and cut the important Allied lines of communication through the Mediterranean and to the Atlantic. It must be done with the secret, or open, assistance of Italy and Spain.

The advantages of such a plan are obvious. If German-Spanish forces could gain control of the Straits of Gibraltar, they could throttle the Allied trade to and from the Mediterranean. If the Germans could establish a submarine base at Coruna, it would be of great assistance in cutting the important Allied lines of communication to North and South America and Africa. It is believed that this was one of the benefits the Germans hoped to gain when they assisted the Nationalists in the Spanish Civil War.

The difficulty of transferring sufficient German troops to Spain is apparent and the attendant dangers are great, but also the advantages to the German cause are obvious. At first glance such plans appear to be fantastic but under certain conditions can be realizable. At any rate, Germany has little to lose by such a course and much to gain, provided of course that she can gain the necessary cooperation from Italy and Spain.

Diary p. 44

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 27 Nov., 1939

According to reports, the Japanese have announced that they will investigate thoroughly the recent sinking of one of their merchant ships off the English East Coast and demand reparations from the Government responsible for the mine. Failing to get satisfaction, they will take it in their home waters. It seems that the Japs are building up a perfect case to get into the war on whichever side they want to, undoubtedly on the German side.

Diary p. 46

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 28 Nov., 1939

German/Swedish relations are none of the best on account of differences over the extent of territorial waters. The Swedes claim a four mile zone, the Germans want to mine themselves, or make Sweden lay minefields up to the three mile mark. The field in question is that in the vicinity of Falsterbo, the Southwest tip of Sweden. The channel within the three mile zone is only 5 meters (16.4 feet) deep; that between the three and four mile

lines is 8 meters (26.24 feet) deep. The Swedes, quite naturally prefer not to transit German or their own minefields with their deep draft ships, including warships, in coastwise traffic. The Germans are putting on whatever bullying pressure they can. While the situation may not lead to war, it is not out of the realm of probability, especially if the Bolshevik buddies start turning the heat on Finland.

Diary p. 47

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 30 Nov., 1939

The Japanese are beginning to come out in the open. They now threaten reprisals against England on account of her export embargo. The technique may vary, but the tune is the same, whether played by Germany or Russia, or now, Japan. It appears as if Germany is insuring our keeping out of this war by getting and keeping our attention focused on Japan. England has not yet declared war on Russia, who dismembered Poland as much as Germany, undoubtedly through fear of losing India and Mesopotamia. Russia is having her way in the Baltic as an active partner of Germany without having war declared by or against her. Japan is about to collect in the Far East without such opposition from England. With the U.S. stymied by Japan, and England's possession threatened by Russia and Japan, Germany has a fair chance of coming out of the European war with no worse than a draw.

Diary p. 53

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 8 Dec., 1939

The evening "D.A.Z." carried a leading article growling at Sweden for her stand with regard to the 4-mile zone and Sweden's conduct for neutrality so far. I wonder if this is the opening gun in an agitation campaign against Sweden.

Diary p. 56

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 12 Dec., 1939

The German press and radio state that the Japanese have decided to take retaliatory measures against British merchant ships in the Far East for every piece of goods seized destined for Japan. If this is true, it will lead to either Japan's entry into the war against England, or England walking back the cat entirely on her export blockade.

L-1-15

DENMARK - Visit to Copenhagen - Observations during,
14 Dec., 1939

Many rumors were floating around that the Germans were

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building pontoons and barges in great number at the North Sea shipyards, especially around Hamburg. Numerous persons sought information relative thereto. The impression seemed to be that the pontoons and barges were intended for a German attack on Holland; perhaps and an attack on some outlying Dutch island, such as Tessel, which would enable the establishment of a German air base within striking distance of England.

L-1-16

GERMANY - Military Mission to Train Russian Army, 20 Dec., 1939

From various sources it has been learned that German army officers and non-commissioned officers have recently been sent to Soviet Russia. Their whereabouts in that country is unknown to their relatives and the latter assume that they have been sent to assist the Russians in organizing, equipping, and training their military forces.

L-1-17

GERMANY - Conduct of War, Miscellaneous Notes, 2 Jan., 1940

Quoted hereunder as matters of interest are two reports of 24 November and 1 December 1939, respectively, rendered by the American Consul Hamburg to the Charge d'Affaires of this Embassy:

"I have the honor to refer to the last sentence of the paragraph headed 'Poland' on page 2 of my strictly confidential communication No. 146 of October 20, 1939, and to elucidate Mr. Chase's necessarily veiled telephonic conversation of this morning with you.

"Yesterday we learned that the 20th Division (based on Hamburg) had suddenly received orders during that afternoon to prepare to depart with all equipment the following (this) morning for the West Front. So far as we can ascertain this destination was to be reached by this evening. Information available, although not conclusive, leads us to believe that this abrupt move is not one for the relief of troops in position, but rather one of reinforcement--perhaps in preparation for a surprise attack on the Netherlands/Belgium frontier. The fact that the order to prepare for immediate departure was given within a few hours of yesterday morning's general staff meeting with the Führer in Berlin would seem to make this belief less fantastic. We were further informed that the discontent in Germany is increasing so rapidly that 'something' has to be done and, therefore, that a surprise attack on the Belgian/Netherlands frontier within a few days would not be out of the question.

[REDACTED]

"Another fact that lends support to the theory that the attack upon the Netherlands/Belgian frontier was not abandoned, but only postponed, at the end of the week of the München 'Attentat', is that during the last ten days men from this area have been suddenly (less than 24 hours notice) drafted into the army, apparently for the sole reason that they possess a good knowledge of the Netherlands language. One such case, known to us, is that of a man in his forties, father of three children, holding an important position in a factory making an essential product, and for whom, it is understood, an exemption from service has been previously obtained. This man was given only a few hours before he was sent off to the West Front.

"Requisitioning of Autos. It is stated reliably that the requisitioning of automobiles has commenced again on a large scale in this area.

"Parachute Mine Laying. Yesterday (Thursday) afternoon the English radio announced that there was evidence that many mines had been recently laid along the English east coast by parachuting them from airplanes. This announcement recalled, what at that time has seemed just another extravagant story, told by a well-known Hamburg German in a conversation which he had had some 30 hours earlier with one of our officers. In this conversation of the preceding day the German was commenting on the large number of ships which had been sunk by mines off the southeast coast of England during the immediately foregoing days and stated that he had been informed that German airplanes had been parachuting mines into this area in order to sever the channels of communication. This statement having been proved to have been not as extravagant as was originally believed to be the case, it may be worth while to repeat another one made by the same man, one which, when doubt was expressed by the auditor, was repeated with confident vigor. This man maintained that he knew to be a fact that the German general staff plans to invade, perhaps not until the spring, perhaps before then, England with a land army from bases in the low countries. It may be added that variations of this plan imputed to the general staff have been current here for several weeks, but that it has been heretofore impossible to trace them down to what might be considered an at least half-way reliable prophet.

"München 'Attentat': The above-mentioned well-known Hamburg also expressed his opinion about the explosion in the

Nazi sanctuary at München. He stated that he knew enough about the inner party feud, especially as it has manifested itself on the part of the 'better' Nazis against the Von Ribbentrop wing since the 'sell-out' to Russia, to feel certain that the 'Attentat' was a well planned attempt to 'get' the Führer and that wing of the party which in recent months has been riding high by this other wing."

"From trustworthy sources we have just learned that the concentration of troops and material on the Belgian Netherlands, frontier is dense and deep and the remaining elements of the 20th Division, which left Hamburg a week ago, were, as already stated, very probably reinforcements rather than relief.

"Among the troops concentrated in the Belgian/Netherlands frontier area the feeling of boredom and dissatisfaction has grown so rapidly that, added to the disinclination (acquired during the Polish campaign) to engage in further combat, army circles are said to believe that an early German offensive will be necessary if the dissatisfaction is not to take a more serious turn.

"Our informants, who have just returned from the above-mentioned area, state that the civilian population in the cities and villages are undergoing privations, chiefly with regard to food, that make Hamburg, upon return here, seem like paradise. The population is said to have tolerated thus far these privations because they have readily accepted the explanation that it is all the fault of England. Transportation difficulties are said to be enormous in northwest Germany, with factories in the Ruhr experiencing great delay in obtaining supplies and the necessary empty freight cars to haul away their finished products. Reliable estimates indicate that the movement of loaded and empty freight cars has so slowed down that it is the equivalent of a 25 percent reduction in the quantity of cars available for use. In this connection it should be added that trustworthy sources of information state that normal, and even larger than normal, quantities of coal can now be brought up to the mine heads in Polish Silesia, but that there is a serious shortage of cars to move them.

"Drafting of Interpreters. During the past two weeks some 350 to 400 men with a good knowledge of the Netherlands and French languages have been drafted into the army. These men are generally from 40 to 55 years of age.

"München Attentat. Among the soldiers on the Netherlands/Belgian frontier roughly 60 percent, so it is estimated, believe that Strasser organized the explosion at München, while roughly 40 percent are, to say the very least, extremely skeptical of the official explanation of the affair.

"Nazi Penetration into Armed Forces. Among the troops in northwest Germany, so it is reliably stated, the result of efforts to plant party spies have been often ineffectual. As soon as one is discovered the officers manage to get rid of him; some of them have even been given military prison sentences.

"Gasoline and Oil. Of unknown accuracy is the statement of a member of the anti-aircraft force to the effect that there is an adequate supply of gasoline for the immediate needs of the mechanized forces, but that the situation is not nearly as favorable with respect to lubricating oils.

"German-Russian Conquest of India. On the afternoon of the 24th of November Reichsstatthalter Kaufmann gave a 'pop' talk in the Atlantic Hotel to a large gathering of Hamburg's leading businessmen, who had assembled by 'command' invitation from him. The meeting was reported in the local paper, but the contents of the speech were not made public. One of the men present recounted to one of our officers that, in an effort to rally the waning enthusiasm of the local business community, the Reichsstatthalter described to his audience how a Russian army with German officers was being prepared to undertake an invasion of British India."

Diary p. 67

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 1 Jan., 1940

They realize that war on the land along the West Wall will be a senseless slaughter; the submarine war on commerce is going on well enough, but it is unspectacular and they don't let themselves think of the fact that by the time England is reduced to Germany's living standard, Germany will be subsisting on roots, berries and bark. The propaganda tries to keep them whopped up with the thought of what their big buddy Russia is going to give them, but Russia hasn't delivered yet, and little Finland's "Jack-the-Giant-Killer" performance isn't helping Russia's stock in the average mind.

The Air Force is big and it is good, but for all the fanfare of trumpets that have been sounding off about it for a year or more, it hasn't accomplished much more than the British Reconnaissance flights and occasional

bombing raids. The North Sea patrol has been good. However, to one who has been accepting the U.S. Naval Air Force as part of the daily life for the past twenty years, the Germans are not stupendous. So far, they have been on air "fleet in being". Maybe they're just waiting for Spring when they will have their 2000 latest Ju-88 bombers and a base on the Dutch islands and all the other things that are rumored from time to time. Should the German Air Force then meet with stiff resistance on the part of the Allies, I anticipate the German morale to crack, for they have been fed too long on its invincibility. After such a failure, I expect Hitler, in blind rage, to hit with everything he has - poison gas, microbes, God knows what in one last wild fling of the dice. He will have to "shoot the works", as I do not believe that Germany can absorb any punishment on top of morale breaking boredom of the Western Front and the steadily lowering living standard. A small item, but one to conjure with, is the expected reduction of the hop content in beer to 3%, and making an "einheit bier" (unity beer). They already have an "einheit soap", and not much of that as becomes apparent when one rides the trams or gets into crowds.

L-1-18

GERMANY - Conduct of the War, 19 Jan., 1940

Germany is believed to intend to wage totalitarian warfare in the Spring, staking everything on a tremendous campaign. The statement by an informed German officer that there has taken place in the last two months a change in the attitude of the people toward the war which now makes it possible for intensive warfare to be waged on all fronts, whereas the country last autumn would not have tolerated the necessary sacrifice of life, is not borne out by what one hears and observes in Bavaria. No appreciable change is discernible in the attitude toward the war or the Government of the rank and file. Bavarian intellectuals hope that the war will go into a stalemate while the Reich is still strong enough to resist communist influence on the one hand, and to exact a just peace from the Allies on the other. They believe that the best interests of the State require the removal of Herr Hitler at the proper moment and his replacement by a man strong enough to hold the country together thereafter. In this connection their thoughts run at present to Field Marshal Goering. (1)

Diary, p. 71

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 22 Jan., 1940

On the whole, there was very little additional news to be gleaned in Copenhagen over what is obtainable in Berlin. The Danes are justifiably nervous over their future. Right now there is much applause, and also aid, for Finland, but always underlying is the fear that Germany may take them over, with or without warning.

Diary p. 74

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 22 Jan., 1940

The Dutch have again been considerably stirred up over reports and rumors of an invasion of the Low Countries by the Germans. It is understood that leaves have been cancelled in Holland, Belgium, and in the British Expeditionary Force. No one seems to know anything definite but there is a highly tense atmosphere everywhere.

Diary p. 76

EUROPE - War Diary- Continuation of, 22 Jan., 1940

An American Newspaper correspondent reported that the expected German attack through the Low Countries last week-end was held up when the General Staff warned that such an invasion would result eventually in a peace treaty worse for Germany than that of Versailles (Evidently, then, they don't think they can win with that line of attack).

I recently heard that the 10/11 November invasion of Holland was cancelled because Field Marshal Goering stated his defenses in the Ruhr district were not yet completed and, until they were, he could not risk offensive action.

Diary p. 90

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 21 Feb., 1940

It is believed that Public Dissemination of the below information would very seriously impair my future usefulness here. I was summoned by Admiral Raeder who said that he was greatly upset by remarks of Senator Pitman which he believed was the result of misunderstanding of foreign office press conference. He stated Germany realized her mistakes of last war and desired to avoid all possible friction with U.S. Therefore upon United States Declaration of combat area he instructed submarines not only to torpedo U.S. ships but to refrain from molesting them entirely not even making entitled visit and search. For obvious reasons he especially requested

SECRET
[REDACTED]

information be not published. Said it might be given in confidence to Senator Pitman.

L-1-19

GERMANY - Submarine Warfare - Conduct of, 21 Feb., 1940

Official statement of German Navy Ministry relative to the conduct of submarine warfare, as derived in personal interviews with Grand Admiral Raeder on 20 February 1940.

Official German statement that U-boats have been instructed that when making contact with American ships, not only not to torpedo them, but to leave them alone entirely, not even to perform the customary visit and search to which Germany is entitled. Desire of Admiral Raeder that no publicity whatever be attached to this matter for obvious reasons.

On Friday, 16 February, 1940, at the request of the Embassy, the following two questions were put to Capt. Mirow, Chief of the German Naval Attache Group in Berlin:

- a) Is an American ship in danger of being torpedoed upon entering or leaving Gibraltar?
- b) Is an American ship in danger of being torpedoed upon entering or leaving an English (Scottish) port?

In reply thereto, Capt. Mirow stated that it seemed to him personally that an American ship entering or leaving Gibraltar was in no danger, but that the case seemed different for a ship entering a port on the main island of England. However, he added that he would talk the matter over with someone and give me his answer later. On Saturday, 17 February, he sent his written reply, the original of which, together with translation thereof is appended as inclosure (A). This information was immediately turned over to the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy. It will be noted therefrom that the answer conforms with the German Prize Rules.

On Monday, 19 February, Captain Mirow called me on the telephone to say that Grand Admiral Raeder wished to see me at 1030, 20 February, in connection with the matter previously discussed. Accordingly, the call was made.

[REDACTED]

Admiral Raeder was pleasant, spoke fairly rapidly, and at some length. His chief of Staff, Commander Schulte Monting, and Captain Mirow, were present, and after the interview, they repeated the points for the Admiral's conversation, set forth hereunder:

Grand Admiral Raeder stated that he had recently been very much upset by the remarks of Senator Pittman, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, concerning the possible torpedoing of American ships by German submarines; that Germany, now realizing the mistakes which were made in the last war, wished to avoid at all costs getting the United States involved in the present one, and that they were avoiding all possible sources of friction. From the date that the United States had proclaimed a combat area around the belligerent nations and had forbidden U.S. ships to enter their zone, he had, following the Fuehrer's desire, issued instruction to the U-boats, that whenever they might make contact, not only not to torpedo American ships, but to leave them alone entirely, not even to perform the customary visit and search to which Germany is legally entitled. He requested particularly, that this information not be broadcast over radio and published in the press, adding that it might be transmitted confidentially to all my superiors and that it might be given confidentially to Senator Pittman, but quite obviously such a thing could not be made public because, first, ships of other nations might thereupon sail under the American flag and it might possibly cause other neutral nations to take offense. He remarked further that he thought the original matter of the discussion following the "Burgerdijk" case at the Press Conference, had been a misunderstanding, on which point he was informed that I also took it to be a misunderstanding because one of the Embassy Secretaries had compared the information which the Embassy transmitted with the stenographic record of Baron von Stumm's press conference at the Foreign office, and that the two accounts were in agreement. It was after leaving Admiral Raeder that occasion was had to stop for a moment to chat with his Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Attache Group, who reviewed the conversation to assist me in having it straight and, in effect, repeated the foregoing, which I fully understood. The Chief of Staff remarked that it would be quite to their liking if other neutrals followed the U.S. precedent and proclaimed the same forbidden zone.

[REDACTED]

On leaving Captain Mirow he told me that when sending his written reply on 17 February (Inclosure A), he had to abide by the promulgated rules of submarine warfare, and that a statement as important as the one which had just been made to me could naturally only come from the responsible Commander of the Navy.

Admiral Raeder impressed me as being absolutely honest and sincere in his statements that Germany is trying to avoid all possible friction with the United States, and that he had actually issued these instructions.

Admiral Raeder did not specifically mention the "Iroquois" case when he spoke of having his name publicized, but he gave me a knowing smile and said that as a military man he preferred not to be publicly mentioned. The Naval Attache believes that any public dissemination of this information would react very favorably toward his present cordial personal and official relations with the German Navy.

Diary pp,89-90

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 18 Feb., 1940

The "Altmark" case has been the main theme of conversation. The general consensus is that England seriously violated Norway's neutrality and that the Germans now have a sufficient cause, to their way of thinking at least, for retaliatory measures. Further, it has tended to nullify whatever success Mr. Welles' visit would have otherwise had for peace.

The Germans may not be able to make reprisals until a month after this eight weeks crop of snow and ice has melted, but remembering Almeria, I venture they will, with no holds barred.

Diary p, 101

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 31 March, 1940

My Swedish colleague was very much upset when he called on me this afternoon. He says he has excellent information that the Germans have gathered 200,000 tons of shipping, vast numbers of troops, tanks, horses and parachute jumpers at Stettin, Danzig and Memel, principally the former. Now that the Finnish war is over, they can be used only against Sweden. He anticipates that England and Germany will come to blows in the Swedish iron ore district, the British to deny Germany the ore, the Germans to keep their supplies coming in. Turned this information over to the Military Attache and the Charge d' Affaires.

Diary p, 104

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 5 April, 1940

In the evening I attended, in company with all military, naval and air attaches accredited here, the world premier of the Air Force film, "Feuertaufe" (Baptism of Fire), which recorded most inartistically and horribly the air force operations in Poland. For aviation photography, any one of our "Flying Fleet", "Wings", "Dawn Patrol", etc. is indescribably superior. The illustrated lecture which the Air Force General Staff delivered 24 November (Report R-754 of 1 Dec. 1939) contained a great amount of technical information, whereas this film had none. It merely glorified the horrors of war and tossed a threat at England for a finale. Considering that all Chiefs of Missions attended, I believe that the sole object of displacing the bloody, mutilated corpse of Poland was to intimidate small surrounding neutrals. The picture is to run 6-12 April at the Ufa Palast, Berlin, after which it will be shown in 150 theaters throughout Germany. I shall follow the reactions with interest. It should be a terrific boomerang to German propaganda, if not, if the German populace enjoy their horrors raw they are not worth saving.

Diary pp,104-05

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 6-7 April, 1940

An American news correspondent told the Charge d'Affaires that the German Expeditionary Force (Diary 31 March) had left Stettin on 4 April.

Saw my Swedish colleague for a few minutes at noon today. He stated that he had heard the G.E.F. had anchored off Swinemuende. Practically all military, naval and air attaches accredited in Berlin left at 1930 for a personally conducted tour of the West Wall as guests of the German Army. Colonel Juhlin-Daunfelt (Sweden), Captain Pecori-Giraldi (Italy) and I, were the only known stay-at-homes.

Diary p, 107

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 12 April, 1940

The coming week-end is another one of the "magic dates" which I have been experiencing almost weekly for the past two years. Opinion is divided as to whether the blow will fall on the Low Countries or on the Balkans. If the prospective invasion comes true, I believe it will

be the Low Countries, as Mr. Hitler has nothing to gain and everything to lose by an advance into the Balkans. His disposition is fluid enough to permit of an attack either way. The bulk of his troops are lined up against the West, but General Blaskowitz has an army of 20-25 divisions stretching from Austria into Southern Poland, which is sufficient to counteract anything King Carol can muster plus help from General Weygand down in Syria.

Diary p, 108

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 13 April, 1940

A young lieutenant of the armored car troops (diary 17 November) visited our house last evening. He is in from the West front on three days leave. He doesn't know when the attack through the Low Countries is starting, but he is sure it will come, and that the Germans will not have any great difficulty in rolling up the opposition.

Diary p, 116

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 11 May, 1940

The Greek naval attache called on me today. He said that last week had been terribly dangerous in the Mediterranean and Balkans, that the situation had eased somewhat, but that it was still very ticklish. He expects an Italian attack on Greece through Albania by land, and on the islands by Navy and Air, with or without good reason. He feels that the presence of the British fleet in Alexandria is a sobering influence on the Italians, but it may not be sufficient to keep them "honest" forever.

This is the general opinion of Italy, that she will climb aboard the German bandwagon and start beating the drum just as soon as she feels sure Germany is winning in the West.

Diary p, 122

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 20 May, 1940

The Italian plunge into this war mess is a question of "when", not "if", as it was for a long time. "Magic dates" and almost "magic hours" are set for Benito's entry into the lion's den. It's getting to be almost as much of a nerve war as were our precious speculations on Hitler's next move. The Germans aren't particularly anxious for the Italians to join - they feel they have the war won without their southern partners and see no reason to share the glory.

Saw my Swedish colleague a few minutes at noon today. He had nothing new on the special situation, but with regard to the general situation he told me of a map of the Pax Germanica which was based on reliable information obtained by a Swedish journalist. The map has been sent to Stockholm.

Portugal as is. Spain to get Gibraltar and a larger slice of Morocco. France to cede to Germany the German speaking parts of Alsace-Lorraine, to gain Wallonian Belgium and the French speaking section of Switzerland. Ireland to be independent. England to be shorn of colonies. Holland, Denmark, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia to disappear, incorporated into Germany.

Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland to be welded into a Northern Confederation, governed from Stockholm, with Germany retaining Kristiansand, Bergen, Stavanger, and Reykjavik. Finland to expand eastward at Russia's expense to the White Sea. Lake Onega and Lake Ladoga. Finnish, Russian and German borders meet at Leningrad, which is to remain Russian.

Russia is to be shorn by military conquest of all Western Russia, including the Ukraine, roughly from Leningrad to the Sea of Azov, as a punishment for her lack of support in the current war.

Turkey as is. Roumania and Yugoslavia to disappear from the map. Bulgaria expands north to Transylvania at Roumania's expense, and westward at Yugoslavia's. Hungary expands east to Transylvania, ex-Roumania, and south ex-Yugoslavia. Switzerland disappears into France and Germany. Germany will incorporate Flemish part of Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Baltic States, Western Russia including Ukraine, all of Poland, eastern part of Switzerland, German speaking parts of Alsace and Lorraine, and Bessarabia from Roumania.

Italy to get Corsica from France, a westward expansion of Tunisia, a large part of Yugoslavia, and dominion over (if not actual possession) of Greece.

Egypt and India to be fully independent (diary 15 May) (Z Report R-293, 23 May)

Diary p, 118

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 15 May, 1940

Called on the Greek Naval Attache to hear his view on the Italian situation, which is seemingly getting ready to boil over. He had nothing new. He believes Italy will enter the war not more than fifteen days before the finish, as they can't hold out materially, economically, or against the opposition of Church and Royal Family much longer than that.

The Greek has an ever present fear that the Italians will launch an attack on Greece via Albania and the islands (diary 11 May), and that Italian air forces, submarines and motor torpedoboats will operate against the Allied fleet now in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Diary p, 119

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 16 May, 1940

I still feel that Italy will come in 1) when the end is definitely in sight, or 2) should the German attack in the West bog down and the diversion of Allied troops necessary to hold off Italy would be sufficient to turn the tide.

Diary p, 126

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 25 May, 1940

Captain Pecori told me that the only reason for Italy coming into the war was to be able to act as a restraining influence on the Germans at the peace conference after the war. Both he and his wife were afraid that the U.S. would come into the war if Italy did.

DIS (S)

GERMANY - Departure from Berlin, no necessity of, June, 1940

There is no need of leaving Berlin unless the United States enters the present war.

Diary p, 133

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 8 June, 1940

The German radio, in German, last night stated that Italy had ordered all Italian ships held in home ports, those at sea were to make immediately for home or neutral ports. This item was not carried in the English translation, nor by the B.B.C. If true, and I believe it is, it means that Mussolini is putting on the finishing touches for his entry into the war.

Diary p. 141

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 28 June, 1940

German and Italian radios have very little to say about the Russian land grab, probably waiting for their leads from Goebbels and Gayda. I feel positive it doesn't sit well, but they're too occupied to do something about it now. It's just another black mark in the book against Russia, whose account will be adjusted after the show is over in the West.

Diary p. 147

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 11 July, 1940

Rumors are circulating that numerous troop trains and material and equipment therefor, are headed Eastward. I wonder if they are headed towards a campaign against the Russians, or whether they are intended for transit through Russia enroute to the British Indian Dominion, with a way-stop at Iran (Persia) for more oil? That would be one method of obtaining colonies without the aid of a Navy. So very little has appeared in the German press recently regarding the House of Stalin, that one suspects that mischief is afoot - whether Stalin is to be sold down the river, else a barter deal has been worked up among Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin, at British expense - the latter arrangement might furnish the German chariot of aggression with a Russian Visa for a sweep for the Far East, where the Germans could collaborate more closely with the Japs. The near future is filled with forebodings.

L-1-20

GERMANY - Fifth Column preparations, 28 Aug., 1940

A reliable source told me that the German "Auslands Organization" recently submitted a lengthy questionnaire to all Germans who had ever lived in or visited the United States. Special inquiries were made if they could talk "American" without betraying their origin; what dialects - Yankee, Southern, Midwest, etc., - they could talk; what U. S. cities were they familiar with; could they get a job in any particular plant in the U.S.?

A similar, but more general questionnaire, is said to have been circulated in the Army, covering ability to act as interpreter, or to give commands in various foreign languages.

Diary p. 189

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 7 Oct., 1940

The Russian Naval Attache called on me this afternoon.

I think he was after finding out what I knew of the Russo/German situation. He was ready to go promptly when I told him the B. B. C. had just announced that a division of German troops had moved into Rumania, but stayed a few minutes longer.

His crop of rumors were 1) Hitler and the Duce had had differences of opinion at the last Brenner Meeting - Hitler urging Mussolini to turn to in Egypt, and Mussolini exhorting Hitler to put more pep into the attack on England; 2) Germany would not be ready to attack Russia for two or three years as they had plenty of unfinished business with England to straighten out first; 3) Italy was having difficulties in providing fuel oil for her navy as Germany was taking the major part of the Rumanian export and Russia was supplying only Germany and only gasoline at that.

Diary p. 193

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 21 Oct., 1940

The Greek Naval Attache called on me today and gave me the following information which I turned over to the Charge:

There will be nothing greater than present intensity in the West. His sources did not point to an invasion.

What happened at the Brenner meeting has not yet fully come out, but apparently it is to operate against Egypt. The Germans have three routes to the Southeast - one overland by Turkey which is very difficult in the winter time due to there being only one rail connection and one road across; further, the country is very sparsely settled and is usually under water in winter time; the second route is via the Greek islands, which Hitler is opposed to since he does not want to bring the war into that land of "ancient culture" (this is the second source from whom I have heard that quotation; the third route is via Italy, Sicily, Tripoli and Libya, this seems to be the most probable route.

What Syria's reaction will be seems to be a big question mark as although they have their orders from the Vichy Government, the local people are strongly de Gaulle.

Relations between Turkey and Russia are much better than they have ever been.

The 3-Power Pact was directed against Russia solely. The Russian Naval Attache told him twice in the same conversation, very seriously, that the Russian Government will deliver a strong note of protest to Berlin this week concerning the German troop movements in the Balkans, especially in Rumania.

DIS (S)

GERMANY - Potential Declaration of War on U.S., Nov., 1940

It is desired that the following rumor be reported to the State Department. There is rumor that the high German officers are considering the advisability of an immediate declaration of war on the United States Government in an effort to divert the present aid to Britain to the needs of the United States. This would enable Germany to deliver a knockout blow against England.

L-1-21

GERMANY - Political Forces, 3 Nov., 1940

There is a fairly current rumor at present in Berlin to the effect that high officers in the German Wehrmacht (Armed Forces) have recommended an immediate declaration of war on the United States in order to stop all help to Great Britain, assuming that as soon as the U.S. gets into the war, the production of military equipment would be diverted to our own purposes. It is rumored that Ribbentrop opposes the plan. Nothing is known or rumored as to what Mr. Hitler thinks about it.

L-1-22

GERMANY - German Policy towards African Colonies, 6 Dec., 1940

Having been invited to attend the meetings of the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure on colonial and engineering problems in the tropics, I was fortunate enough to be a participant in hearing the future German plans for Africa. I believe I was the only foreigner present, and the meeting was dominated and permeated by the National Socialist Party. Reichs Commissar Todt was in charge of the meeting and General Ritter von Epp made the political speech. Army, Navy and high ranking Party members were among the honored guests. The German Navy had a Rear Admiral, two Line Captains and two Engineering Commanders present. There were about 700 engineering members present, plus 50 leaders of the Hitler Youth movement, who I was informed were to be the leaders in the new colonies. The newspapers had considerable propaganda regarding the African colonies. A considerable number of books were available on the various African languages and dialects.

General Ritter von Epp, in his speech, stressed the fact that Germany was the dominant nation in the world and the best, and was therefore best qualified to take and hold Africa. He said: "Africa belongs to us. If we cannot get it in a negotiable manner, we will take it." From his speech I deduced that he meant Germany would control all of Africa except the Union of South Africa, which would become a sovereign state under the economic domination of Germany. General Epp continued: "Now is the time to get engineers and doctors ready to take over that which belongs to us, and then we will show the world how a colony should be run." He further stressed the importance of members of the Party obtaining sufficient training for African duty, and went into details from his personal experience regarding the problems in Africa confronting the white men. He insinuated that it might be necessary to draft the best possible people for African service.

It is interesting that in a number of the speeches it was pointed out that the railroads in Africa have been built by private concerns and each railroad has a different gauge. There are now 10 different gauges in Africa. It was stated that from now on only one gauge would be used - the German gauge - and that particular stress would be made to have the new railroads run on the German size and that the new lines of communication would be Berlin-Rome-Africa. This obviously was to avoid having to make and protect a sea route.

Considerable concern was evinced among the various speakers as to the labor problem in Africa. It was stated that in the old German colonies there were only 4 people per square kilometer, that a German worker could produce 8 times as much as a native laborer, and that this must be taken into consideration in planning the exploitation of the land.

The following additional points were brought out:

- 1) The greater percentage of labor will be supplied from Europe.
- 2) Machine tools must be built simple and efficient enough to suit the labor problem
- 3) Ships should be built to use cheap transportation, possibly using the native wood of Africa as fuel.

4) As German industry is built to handle certain types of wood, these trees should be planted in the African forests, and industry should now adapt itself to use the other woods available. There are only 20 to 30 types of wood in Germany and there are 600 types in Africa.

5) Farming in the colonies must be accomplished by machines simply enough for native workers. It is the problem of German industry to supply these items.

6) Motors, cables, engines must be built especially for tropical duty. It is not possible to take European electrical equipment and expect it to do the work required in the tropics.

7) Coal in Africa is good but transportation is very expensive, so that boilers must be produced to use the waste products of farms, such as sugar cane, rice coffee shells, cotton waste, wood shavings, etc.

8) It is recommended that windmills be built for farm use and small factory use. To take care of the various wind intensities, batteries of 2000 ampere hour capacity will be supplied so that a constant electrical output can be obtained.

9) Heavy trucks, catapillar tractors and towing cars must be standardized for efficient use of spare parts and overhauls.

The problems of clean air, water, gas, and oil were discussed.

After one speaker had extolled the virtues of German automobiles as being the best made, a heated discussion followed in which the engineers from Africa stated that the old American Ford automobile was the only practical private car for tropical duty, and that the present German automobiles were of no use in the colonies; that German automobiles industry would have to produce a car equal or better than the Ford. Another speaker said: "Our main opponents in Africa are not the English, French or Belgians, but the U.S. At the present time Alis Chalmers and Catapillar Tractor control the economic market. It is necessary for Germany to economically defeat the U.S. in Africa." In various other lectures Alis Chalmers and Catapillar were quoted by African engineers as dominating the market, particularly from the spare part angle and cost.

The medical profession will be organized to take care of the problems in the colonies. Doctors, hospitals

[REDACTED]

and nurses are to be organized and sent to Africa at the same time as industrial plants are set up. Considerable comment was made of the success the U.S. had in building the Panama Canal, particularly of the coordination of the Medical and industrial forces.

L-1-23

EUROPE - General Situation (Conduct of the War) Estimates of, 18 Dec., 1940

It is conceivable that Germany, if not able to beat down England by Air and Commerce War, will keep nominal pressure there, but direct her main military effort toward the conquest of the Ukraine and Trans-Caucasia. With this area in her possession, delivering food and fuel to Germany, she would be in an infinitely stronger position to propose a peace and the sharing of the world dominion.

The conquest would not take long, but the organization time necessary and the two or three years necessary for crops to grow, be harvested and distributed, must be sufficient for England to put more effective power into her offensive, especially so if Russian resistance and sniping were to be serious. (10)

Diary p. 225

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 10 Jan., 1941

A headline in today's issue of the Volkischer Beobachter, date-lined Tokio, reads: "Roosevelt's Catastrophical Policy Must Be Rejected By The Whole World" the item, quoting from Japanese news organs, sharply criticizes Roosevelt's message to Congress.

The German man in the street, who has no voice in his country's politics, and who has but scant opportunity to obtain information other than from German propaganda sources, is rapidly becoming resigned to the belief that America is definitely coming in this war.

L-1-24

GERMANY - Letter to Director of Naval Intelligence, 4 Feb., 1941

Since this Government (German Government) is so fond of the word "retaliation", you might put these same screws on Vice Admiral Witthoefft:

Restrict his U.S. Navy contacts to you, Captain Bode, Captain Moore and Admiral Stark's Aide. Have the FBI shadow all his movements.

[REDACTED]

Give him no information other than that which appears in a very carefully censored press.

Restrict his activities to a radius of 75 miles around Washington, except with a special pass, to obtain which he has to state the nature of his business and the hours of departure and arrival; and make him go by train. He might see something if he went by car or plane.

One of the things that has given me a great deal of concern since the Athenia case in September 1939, is gauging the right instant to apply the torch to codes and files. I have written and sent work home about this, but the best answer is to keep my ear to the ground. I don't expect any gentlemanly chivalry out of this crew of gangsters, and if the Gestapo does beat me to the Embassy door some morning, I want to be able to laugh in their faces. I realize that there might be a case of breaking the code, so just send me "Remember Dewey" and I'll be ready right now to fire. "Chicago 1871" or "Till the boys come home" would go right over their heads.

L-1-25

GERMANY - Political Forces; Policy; Foreign. 15 Feb., 1941

According to the Swedish Military Attache, a high German Party member said that after England has been conquered they intend to take Africa and then exploit South America. The U.S. will then have to join the Axis party. The war from now on is not against England, which is merely a stepping stone to world domination, but against the U.S., which is the only strong force left in the world against the new order.

A landing will be attempted in England after 6 weeks of intensive submarine and air warfare - not before.

If pressed this government is so ruthless that if they consider it necessary they will wage a bacillus war. (2)

L-1-26

JAPAN/GERMANY - Aviation. 17 Feb., 1941

It is apparent from the text of the editorial services and the press releases that not only has an imposing air delegation been sent from Japan but also that the German Air Force is extending to the members of the delegation opportunities for first-hand studies of organization, operations, equipment, and industry such as have not

hitherto been extended to foreign visitors, except possibly the Italians before and shortly after Italy's entry into the war. (3)

Diary p, 242

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 4 March, 1941

Closed pouch No. 512 to go out via Bern and Lisbon. It may be the last if the Lend-Lease Bill goes through and the Japs give Mr. Hitler any assurances at all. However, since August 1939, I have assumed each pouch to be the last I could get out, and the very first one, the one with the 1939 Annual Air Report, was the biggest headache of the lot.

Diary p, 244

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 9 March, 1941

In addition to our being trailed, I have heard very reliably that the Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office has issued instruction discouraging social contacts with Americans. Sould they meet us at parties, etc., they were to be polite and correct, but no more. Now the Lend-Lease Bill has passed the Senate and requires only minor adjustments with the House, I imagine it won't be long until their attitude becomes absolutely firgid.

Yesterday's papers carried an article to the effect that President Roosevelt had turned the heat on the Jugoslav Minister in Washington through Mr. Sumner Welles about 10 February, to keep Jugoslavia from joining the New Order. Today's B. B. C. reported that Germany had given Jugoslavia's a week in which to declare her position. Tough going for that little country. Even if they sign up with the Axis and the Axis wins, they're due to be carved up.

I was much eleted over the fact that the State Department has bounced the Italian Counsulates out of Detroit and Neward and has put mild restrictions on their military personnel in Washington. The only cause for complaint is that they didn't put the same screws on Germany. We have been restricted in our movements here since August 1939, made prisoners of Berlin in August 1939. Our Consulates in Breslau, Prague and Danzig have been closed. What are we waiting for?

The B. B. C. announced that Mr. Matsuoka is about to leave Tokio for a visit to Moscow and Berlin. With any definite assurances from him, Mr. Hitler will have the war on us touts de suite.

Diary p, 245

EUROPE - War Diary - Continuation of, 11 March, 1941

Captain Worourow called on Lieut. Comdr. Graubart to discuss a rumor he had heard of nine German submarines which had been shipped to Constanza on the Black Sea. The Russian appear a bit worried over present developments.

The Italian reaction to the Lend-Lease Bill is that "The U.S. will experience some unpleasant surprises in the Pacific." The German reaction is that Germany will know what to do when President Roosevelt signs the bill Wednesday. Sounds ominous.

L-1-27

GERMANY - Army - Operations, 26 March, 1941

An Argentine banker who made a recent trip to Brussels, reports that considerable numbers of troops are being transferred from the Belgian Coast to the eastern part of Germany and as yet no troops have been sent to replace them.

He stated further that there were no special indications in Belgium of a contemplated landing in England in the near future, and that the building program of barges and small special landing boats is behind schedule and will not reach any great proportion until the end of April.

L-1-28

GERMANY - Political Forces - International Relations, 5 April, 1941

In conversation with a reliable and usually well-informed foreign colleague, the following points were brought out by him:

(a) JAPAN - The situation as conclusion of Matsuoka's visit is apparently none too satisfactory, from the German point of view. It appears that no particularly impressive results were attained, especially as regards a possible U.S. - Japanese involvement to divert our attention and assistance. (There are some indications in Berlin of a desire to "plant" this impression among the attaches.)

(b) Sweden - The appreciable increased pressure applied on Sweden recently to yield further to German

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demands, if not actually to take a final position relative to the Axis and the "new-order" which was responsible for the partial mobilization measures recently abrupt reversal of position and the renewed cordiality in dealings shown by Germany were not known to my informant. (Question: -Has Sweden yielded on some important issue?)

(c) Finland - A request made by Finland to join up with the 3-power pact last fall was flatly rejected by Germany. Finland is still desirous of such a development, but as far as it is known, Germany has not yet consented. The only reason for such attitude on the part of Germany would be a continuing desire not to give direct offense to Russia on a question so pertinent to Russia's recent and present policy with regard to Northern and Baltic states.

(d) Russia - My informant is inclined to side with the growing faction which believes that preparation for military undertakings by Germany on a large scale against Russia are indicative of more than just a safeguarding of the eastern boundary against any eventuality. He cites the extensive movements of German troops in the east as if for an actual campaign, the establishment of extensive communication and supply terminals in the east which would serve such a campaign, and the rumor that all females and children are to be evacuated from the General Government by April 15th. He maintains that probable reasons for action against Russia are (1) a feeling that a decisive victory against England cannot be obtained this year, (2) that action against Russia holds promise of success in view of relative locations and strength of the forces on both sides, and (3) that acute need exists for the supplies which could thus be obtained from Russia. In respect to the last point, the objective would be a quick thrust into Russia before the new crops would be affected by the operations. The operations against England in the meantime can be continued from the air and at sea on present or even greater scale, without offering appreciable interference with such a campaign. He admits on the other hand, that such a move is replete with risk, that it does not appear logical in many respects, that the whole present confusion regarding probable intentions may be just another "diversion maneuver" just as last year's rumors relative to impending action in the Balkans, that the attitude

[REDACTED]

relative to Finland does not fit into the picture, and that the combined pressure by Germany and Japan during the visit of Matsuoka may have been largely an attempt to force Russia to join up in some more active way with the Triple Powers, perhaps, even in a military agreement.

(c) England - As indicated above, on the hypothesis that military operations against Russia are impending, the plan of action against England would be one of increasing sea and air warfare, but that no attempt at a decision would be made before July-August of this year. In the meantime some new weapons are to be brought into use, such as improved airplane models, more devastating bombs, and extensive laying of a non-sweepable type of mine.

In my personal analysis of the foregoing, the following is submitted:

- (a) England is Germany's principal enemy.
- (b) Action leading to a decision over England cannot be too long delayed by Germany without risk of serious complications produced by U.S. assistance on a tremendously expanding scale.
- (c) Action against Russia, therefore, would be logically postponed if there appear to the Germans to be any prospects of early success against England. In the absence of such prospects, or if Germany is resigned to some eventual stalemate, action against Russia now might be indicated.
- (d) The threat of offensive against Russia, on the scale of the present preparations, is the finest defense possible against any adventurous notions which Russia might entertain. It, at the same time, is an excellent diversion move, since it does not reveal intentions and can serve the dual purpose of defense and aggression.
- (e) I believe the German desire and intentions to seek a decision over England are still predominant over all other issues. The Russian issue, then, would resolve itself, not into military operation in Russia at this time but rather into pressure of all sorts to force her to join, or assist on greater scale, in the alignment against England.

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L-1-29 GERMANY - General Summary - Relations with the U.S.,
26 May, 1941

Information furnished by foreign colleague to the effect that German naval officers have written orders to be "höflich aber nicht freundlich" ("polite but not friendly") to the American naval officers stationed in Berlin.

L-1-30 GERMANY - General Summary - Relations with the U.S.,
26 May, 1941

This office previously reported the German Government's travel restriction placed upon Attaches and Officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, which confined travel to Greater Berlin, the decree taking effect 26 August 1939. For travel outside of Greater Berlin it was necessary to request special permission in each instance. On 16 November 1939, these travel restrictions were modified, permitting U.S. Attaches and Officers freedom of travel up to the area of Wittenberg, Templing and Angermunde. Travel to other localities in the German Reich required special permission which, up to a few days ago, had always been granted to the Attaches of this office. However, a recent request by the Assistant Naval Attache for Air for permission to travel from Berlin to Vienna has been refused by the local authorities with the added information that henceforth all travel of the Attaches of this office must be confined to Greater Berlin and that special permission for travel outside Berlin is not to be granted.

DIS (S) GERMANY - German demands on Denmark, June, 1941

Reliable information indicates that the German Navy has ordered the Danish Government to deliver to Germany 500 complete charts of Greenland. We have been informed that a cruiser and a large merchant ship accompanied the battleship "Bismarck". No word has been heard from the merchant vessel. The above information should be delivered to the Army and to the State Department.

L-1-31 GERMANY - General Summary (Relations with United States),
9 Sept., 1941

German press reaction to the "Greer"--U-Boat incident efforts to convince population of President Roosevelt's betrayal of U. S. by maneuvering them into the war. (1)

SECRET

L-1-32

GERMANY - Political Forces, 30 Sept., 1941

German newspaper article treating the sinking of the United States ship "Robin Moor": sinking justified by reason of ship carrying contraband, as confirmed by ship's papers; international law complied with by the U-boat. (1)

L-1-33

GERMANY - Current Conversations, Week of 25 Nov./1 Dec. 1941,
1 Dec., 1941

Attention brought to the fact that reference to colonies has not been made in German papers for sometime, indicating that German expansion is headed exclusively eastwards, possibly to Vladivostok and join with Japan. (3)

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DIS (S) Additional Alusna at Vladivostok, January 1942

In view of Soviets nervous reluctance to risk offending the Japs however slightly, it was a great concession when they consented to assigning an additional Alusna at Vladivostok.

DIS (C) Loss of Singapore, February 1942

The loss of Singapore has made the Russians uneasy. Japanese in Kuibyshev have been treated with more vigilance.

DIS (C) Japanese Propaganda to Russia, March 1942

Japanese are attempting to distribute to Soviets through the Swedish Embassy propaganda magazine "Front" printed in Russian. Other Japanese propaganda continues to come through that office. Soviets have chartered Swedish vessels to carry cargo to Persian Gulf but both countries are doubtful of the Japanese action regarding the entry of the Swedes through Vladivostok. The Japanese are maintaining a regular 2-week courier service via Manchukuo.

DIS (C) Soviet Naval Reserves, March 1942

Soviet Naval Reserves, chiefly those working on river transportation are being called to immediate duty on Russian Pacific Ocean Coast.

DIS (C) Japanese Patrols Searching Soviet Ships, March 1942

Japanese patrols stopping and boarding all Soviet ships on American run. Situation described as tense in spite of apparent good relations assumed after renewal fishing treaty.

DIS (C) Soviet Troop Movement, April 1942

Observed during past three days 6,000 green Soviet troops entrain for Vladivostok without heavy equipment.

DIS (C) Japanese Correspondents, April 1942

This dispatch states that Japanese correspondents have not been allowed to depart from Kuibyshev at any time, but that the other correspondents had just arrived at Kuibyshev from Moscow.

DIS (S)

Concern about Events in Far East, April 1942

The Soviets have great concern about the happenings in the Far East. Soviets state that passes between the Kurile Islands are not forbidden to Russian ships and are not thought to be mined.

DIS (C)

Russian and Japanese Troops on Border, April 1942

Reliable Soviet informant who just came from Soviet Far East states that Japs and Soviets massed on the border. Every movement made in deploying troops is countered by opposite country.

DIS (S)

Shipping Notice Required by Japanese, May 1942

Soviets report that Japs require 10 days' notice for Soviet vessels to proceed through La Perouse.

DIS (S)

Mined Waters, June 1942

Range mines occur in the following positions according to Soviet Naval authorities:

1. Approaches to Yokosuka and Sasebo.
2. The Tsugaru Straits.
3. Tsushima Straits.

DIS (C)

Russians Interested in U.S.-Tokio Air Raid, June 1942

The Russians are most interested in the U.S.-Tokio air raid and they are jubilant over our successes.

DIS (C)

Plane over Chukhotski Peninsula, July 1942

In reference to an unknown plane over Chukhotski Peninsula, the Astalusna, Vladivostok, states that the Russians wish to know if these were U.S. planes and adds that they do not appear to be so much worried over the fact that these might be U.S. planes as over the fact that they might belong to "some other power".

DIS (S)

Internal Situation, August 1942

Persistent reports that Soviet authorities have ordered

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all pregnant women and women with children under 14 to be evacuated from Vladivostok and proceed to Central Siberia. People give impression that war with Japan is inevitable.

DIS (S) Japanese Activity at Kamchatka, September 1942

The Deputy Chief of the Soviet Naval Staff stated that although there are no Japanese military ostensibly in Kamchatka, they are there disguised as fishermen. Russians have no evidence, however, that the Japs have landed military equipment there.

DIS (S) Border Communications, October 1942

Japanese trains run from Harbin to Suifenho. The Soviet trains run from Vladivostok to Pogranitchnaya which is the Russian border town. The Russians state, however, that there are no communications across the border between Suifenho and Pogranitchnaya.

M-1-1 Personnel of Far East Army, 30 October 1942

"According to information he could learn from fellow Russian passengers, it is understood that the greater portion of former personnel of the Soviet Far East Army have been used as replacements on the Western Front; and that that portion of the former army remaining is now being used as a training nucleus for newly mobilized conscripts. Approximately ten armored trains each connected to a locomotive under steam, and each on the alert, were seen during the last 625 miles to Vladivostok."
(1)

DIS (C) Japanese Correspondents, November 1942

The Japanese correspondents have come back to Moscow. It is believed that their Military Attache is also here. This is the first time since they were here last October.

DIS (C) Weather Conditions Vladivostok, November 1942

Excellent weather Vladivostok from August 1 to date. If military operations had begun here in the summer or early fall they could have been continued to the present without interruption.

DIS (C) Air-raid Alarm, December 1942

For an hour and a half in the early morning of December 20 an air raid alarm was held in Vladivostok.

M-1-2

Soviet Policy in Far East, 15 January 1943

"It is my personal opinion that now the Soviets are on the make, they will be hard to talk into allowing any considerable fighting units of foreign powers into the Union. Joe is simply not going to whack up the credit for victory in the west or goose the Japs in the east if he can accomplish the necessary ends otherwise. This goes double for helping China by allowing much material to get there via his domain. It is certainly not to Soviet interests to see China come out of this in any other than an exhausted condition, in fact so damn bad a condition that the foreign powers would feel "obliged" to "help them, which would of course be the go sign for the Reds to infiltrate and keep China for the Chinese (Communists). I haven't the slightest doubt that Chinese "unity" will end with Chiang Kai-shek, and he can't live forever." (3)

M-1-3

Soviet Policy in Far East, 30 January 1943

"I do not believe that we can expect a large measure of strong Soviet cooperation in the Far East unless and until military action is forced by the Japanese, and in all probability the Red information services are sufficiently good to give the advance warning of any such action. (Litvinov warned us of a surprise attack.) The principal Japanese attack could be launched only through Manchuria or Mongolia, both of which are certainly swarming with Soviet spies. If any attack is made, the initial blow would possibly be a surprise invasion of Kamchatka and the adjacent coast, to forestall American assistance and furnish a base for attack from the weaker northern flank. Kamchatka is ringed with Japanese fishing concessions and its vulnerability is unquestionable. A landing in force at the Amur River mouth would be also highly probable, with the river providing an excellent highway to the interior. The Japs carried out such an operation with great success and first-class military-naval cooperation in the summer of 1938, in the advance up the Yangtze to Hankow. (3)

M-1-3

Russian Preparedness in the Far East, 30 January 1943

"As for cooperation between the United Nations and the Soviet Union, Kostrinsky* deplored the lack of any joint

[REDACTED]

liaison or coordination of grand strategy. I pointed out that various efforts had been made so far on our part, to establish liaison and formulate plans to cover the Far Eastern theatre in case of Japanese attack. Kostrinsky replied that they had absolutely no misgivings about their ability to defend themselves in the East against the Japanese; that they matched the Japanese soldier for soldier and with some in excess; that their reserves and auxiliary services in the East had not been drawn on to help in the West; that indeed the Far Eastern Army had been STRENGTHENED since the outbreak of hostilities in the West. I suggested that the Japanese could probably manage to put a million men in Manchuria in case of war with the U.S.S.R. Kostrinsky insisted that they could match them man for man, tank for tank, plane for plane, and that after Changkufeng and Nomonhan they had no doubts about relative submarines, would be more or less restricted to the Japan Sea inasmuch as the Japanese controlled the several narrow exits into the Pacific. This would greatly restrict the influence the submarine forces might have on the routes south of Tsushima.

(2-3)

*) Capt-Lieut. Mihail Kostrinsky, Asst. Liaison Officer Foreign Naval Attaches, Moscow.

DIS (C)

Soviet Refusal to Discuss Far Eastern Situation, March 1943

Soviets still refuse to discuss the Japanese situation but their manner indicates real concern. Asst. Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Alafuzov, admitted the sinking of Soviet merchantship KOIA by Japanese.

DIS (C)

Departure of Soviet Merchant Ships from Vladivostok, April 1943

Japanese Naval Representative in Vladivostok is informed by Soviet Diplomatic Agent 12 to 15 days before Soviet merchantships pass through La Perouse Strait. While U.S. Naval Representative is informed only on the day of departure and each ship separately. Japanese Naval Officer is stationed during the fishing season at Petropavlovsk.

DIS (S)

Purpose of U.S. Consulate in Vladivostok, April 1943

Astalusna's American-born interpreter, but a Soviet citizen since 1929, in a grilling by Soviet secret police was told by the latter that because there were no American

[REDACTED]

ships or interests in Vladivostok, the U.S. Consulate was maintained only for the purpose of agitating war between the Japs and the Soviets.

DIS (C)

Sending of Russian Naval Units from Pacific Fleet Through Northern Sea Route, May 1943

Soviets intend according to reliable information to send units as yet unknown of their Far Eastern Fleet through the northern passage to augment the northern fleet.

DIS (C)

Japanese Release of Soviet Merchant Vessels, June 1943

According to the Soviets, the Japanese released today the Soviet merchant ships INGUL and KAMENETS PODOLSK.

DIS (C)

Situation at Vladivostok, June 1943

Soviet officials in Vladivostok are doing everything in their power to preserve the superficial friendship between the Russians and the Japanese. This, however, is distinctly not a Russian characteristic. Vladivostok area at present is prepared for only strategic defense. Every effort is being made to keep up the huge uninterrupted flow of supplies from the U.S.

DIS (C)

Japanese Request of Russians to Discontinue Use of 4th Kurile Strait, June 1943

The Japanese have asked the Soviets to discontinue the use of the 4th Kurile Strait (Onkotan Strait). All Russian ships which enter or leave the Sea of Okhotsk by way of Cape Lopatka pass within the Russian territorial waters.

DIS (S)

Arrival of Soviet Merchant Ships Released by Japanese, July 1943

Soviet merchant ships INGUL and KAMENETS PODOLSK after being released by Japs arrived in Vladivostok July 3, 1943. The question of ownership was the excuse for detention.

DIS (C)

Soviets to Attack Japan after Hitler is Beaten, July 1943

In conversations with Russians while traveling along the Trans-Siberian Railroad, a U. S. Naval observer reports

[REDACTED]

that the general consensus of opinion is that there is small probability that the Japanese will attack the U.S.S.R. but that the U.S.S.R. will attack Japan after Hitler is beaten.

DIS (C)

Soviet Naval Officers in Far North, Attitude on Japan, August 1943

In a conversation with Soviet naval officers in the Far North, the U.S. Naval Attache stated that there was little enthusiasm or reaction when suggestions were made of a possible Soviet attack against Japan; only one officer ventured the opinion that the Russians would furnish the U.S. bases for an attack against Japan when the Germans capitulate. There was a universal dislike of the Japanese, however.

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- N-1-1 Japanese Reaction to U.S. Navy Building Program, 1 February 1937
- "The United States has renewed her trans-Pacific designs," is the general opinion of the press.
- N-1-2 Rear-Admiral Sekine's Address, 16 February 1937
- This report quotes excerpts from Rear-Admiral Gumppei Sekine's address to the East Asia Research Council, in which he maintains that U.S. is interfering in Far East, and Britain is strengthening position at Singapore. Japan must prepare if nation is to be a sea power and develop overseas enterprises.
- N-1-3 Netherlands East Indies Relations, 25 February 1937
- Future relations of Japan with Netherlands East Indies to be characterized by an aggressive economic southward advance policy.
- N-1-4 Basic Naval Policy, 27 February 1937
- This report quotes Navy Minister Vice-Admiral Yonai's speech at opening of Diet to the effect that it is now time to call into question the qualitative restriction of naval strength agreed on by England, America, France and Italy.
- N-1-5 Vice-Admiral Yamamoto's Radio Address, 1 March 1937
- This report quotes Vice-Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's radio address in connection with the Third Replenishment Program, in which he states that "Japan has no intention of constructing a navy which will become a menace to other nations. She believes that they too should not take any steps toward instigating a naval construction race. However, Japan cannot but equip herself with the naval strength sufficient to defend herself in the event that other powers plan to expand to the extent of becoming a menace to her."
- N-1-6 Southward Advance Policy, 20 March 1937
- This report quotes Mr. Lovink, Director of Eastern Asiatic Affairs of the Dutch East Indies Government, in an interview with the Naval Attache on 3 March 1937, as expressing fear that the Japanese Naval forces might make some radical move

in the nature of taking possession of Dutch East Indian territory. This report also states that the Dutch Minister reported that he had reliable and positive information of Japan's having a well-equipped submarine and destroyer base at Palau.

N-1-7 Southward Advance Policy, 17 April 1937

This report quotes statement by newly appointed Minister to the Netherlands East Indies, Mr. Kazue Kuwashima, to the effect that he had found a feeling of nervousness throughout the Netherlands East Indies with regard to Japan's southward policy. Naval Attache's comment is that "every possible means is now being taken by Japan to wedge itself into countries in the South Pacific."

N-1-8 Soviet-Japanese Relations, 1 May 1937

This report deals with 15 April conference between Foreign Minister Sato and the Soviet Ambassador to discuss present strained Soviet-Japanese relations. The adjustment of Soviet-Japanese relations is the most urgent issue facing Japanese diplomacy.

N-1-9 North China Situation, 21 July 1937

This report comments on various Naval Attache views of recent North China clashes, and concludes with comment that "Japan has been very much concerned over the reactions of the various powers to her coup. She feared a repetition of the 1931-32 unpleasantness, but not this time instigated by us but rather by Great Britain."

N-1-10 Panay Incident, 22 December 1937

This report gives a complete report of the Panay Incident of 12 December 1937, together with the American Embassy's representations to the Foreign Office and the Foreign Office's reply.

N-1-11 Press Reactions to Panay Bombing, 6 January 1938

This report quotes vernacular press comments as expressing satisfaction and relief at the American acceptance of the Japanese notes.

N-1-12

U.S. Naval Building Plan, 14 January 1938

This report quotes press comments expressing alarm at huge new U.S. naval program, and stating the necessity of building a Japanese fleet commensurate with that of the U.S.

N-1-13

Capital Ship Construction, 20 January 1938

This report states that the consensus of opinion of the American, British, Soviet, French and Italian Naval Attaches in Tokyo is that Japan is constructing two battleships of 35000/45000 tons.

N-1-14

Reaction of Press to Visit of U.S. Cruisers to Singapore, 2 February 1938

This report quotes press as in general considering the presence of 24 British vessels and 3 American cruisers at Singapore to mean that "England has succeeded in winning America over by crafty diplomacy...." for a joint anti-Japanese demonstration.

N-1-15

Press Reaction to Three-Power Note on Naval Construction, 15 February 1938

Vernacular press considers the Three Power Note "indiscreet and presumptuous."

N-1-16

Naval Policy, 17 February 1938

This report states that Diet interpellations reveal that the "Navy has no intention of maintaining parity in naval strength.." (1)

N-1-17

Southward Advance Policy, 4 March 1938

This report quotes Hugh Byas's article regarding Japan's Southward Advance policy, and states that Naval Attache subscribes fully to Mr. Byas's views. The article includes the statement that "National defence requires industrial development. Japan can only attain self-sufficiency in essential military and industrial materials by advancing to the South Seas where rice, iron, metal, wool, rubber and oil are produced. With abundant raw material for her cheap labor and limitless

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electric power, Japan's industrial future is secure. Japan's population problem can be relieved if Japanese industry and emigrants engage in the exploitation of the Dutch East Indies' undeveloped resources." (4)

The article further states that the Japanese Navy stands ready to implement this policy.

N-1-18

Japanese Reaction to American Naval Building Program,
13 April 1938

This report quotes press and Naval Authorities to the effect that the American Naval Building Program is clearly directed at Japan.

N-1-19

Navy Day Pamphlet, 25 May 1938

This report is a translation of a Navy Ministry pamphlet urging necessity for replenishment of Japanese Naval strength vis-a-vis British-American naval building programs; "After the World War the Powers' jealousy and antipathy against Japan due to her increase in influence in the Far East has been heightened. Whenever possible, these countries tried to interfere with Japan's increasing power. In the meantime, the antipathy of the Chinese people against foreigners in general caused by their awakened nationalism was successfully shaped by Chiang Kai-shek into anti-Japanese feeling."

N-1-20

Cabinet Reorganization, 28 May 1938

This report comments on the reorganization of the cabinet. Its significance will inevitably be a stronger international policy and mean certain internal reforms, both of which have long been the Military's objectives.

N-1-21

Japanese-American Relations, 11 July 1938

This report is an account of Naval Attache's visit to Shanghai, including the statement that: "Japan is now embarked upon the several steps towards Asiatic domination which it was not her plan to take for several years to come." Japan fears American public opinion, but that if it can be kept appeased, Japan feels that there is little to fear in attaining Asiatic domination. Japan is trying to keep the U.S. friendly by

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making no issue of our claims for damages. "But it will be a different story several years hence."

"The Japanese are going places. For the present the United States has not much to fear. But when Japan has consolidated her gains in China several years hence, a clash with her is inevitable. This will occur at the first point where our interests oppose each other. At the present moment such point appears to be the Philippines." (3)

N-1-22

Japanese Prospects in China, 14 July 1938

This report quotes statement of U.S. Embassy with regard to Japanese prospects in China. In regard to U.S. rights in China, the Naval Attache is in general agreement with the Embassy statement:

"The Japanese Foreign Office has shown a disposition to meet foreign desires when possible without jeopardy to the major objectives of the hostilities. The Japanese armed forces, on the other hand, have shown a tendency to ignore and to fail to carry out the Foreign Office's undertakings." (2)

N-1-23

Soviet-Japanese Relations, 11 August 1938

This report gives an account of Soviet-Japanese hostilities, with the comment that "present localized hostilities of the Soviet-Manchukuo border have the background possibilities of developing into major proportions."

N-1-24

Southward Expansion, 6 October 1938

This report deals with strategic value of Hainan Island. It anticipates occupation of the island by the Japanese, and emphasizes its strategic value as a jumping off place for southward expansion, and indicates that its occupation would bring the Japanese face to face with the British at Singapore.

N-1-25

Japanese Army-Navy Joint Operations, 19 October 1938

This report comments on the landing at Bias Bay as follows: "There is no question but that Japan is now making its supreme effort to crush Chiang Kai-shek and his armies. Should Hankow still remain in his hands on March 1st, even though Canton has fallen and the Japanese are advancing northward along the railway, it is my opinion that Soviet Russia

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will consider Japan to be sufficiently exhausted to make the time opportune for attack." (2)

N-1-26

Far Eastern Situation, 28 November 1938

This report is an account of Naval Attache's trip to Shanghai. It includes comment on the change in Foreign Ministry to the effect that the resignation of Ugaki and the assumption of his office by Arita presages a further surrender of the civilian powers to the military. The U.S. cannot hope to deal with new Foreign Minister. The Munich Conference has done irreparable harm to British and French prestige in the Orient. "Third Powers' trade with China is hereafter to be under Japanese domination." (5)

The report includes the following comment on Japanese military strategy: "She undoubtedly would not hesitate to undertake offensive operations, but not beyond supporting distance of her strategically excellent geographical position. By this is meant that Hongkong, Singapore, Dutch East Indies, Philippines, Borneo, Guam, the Aleutian Islands and possibly the Hawaiian Islands would be in jeopardy, depending upon who challenges her efforts at Asiatic domination." (6)

N-1-27

Speech by Lt.-General Tojo, 30 December 1938

This report submits as typical of growing civilian dissatisfaction with Army domination of National affairs an article from the Oriental Economist discussing a speech by Lt. Gen. Tojo. The article concludes: "There are two methods of settling international relations - one is by force and the other by diplomacy. In the present world situation...a nation's ability to carry out a war determines its foreign policy. In this sense we support the view that armaments must be completed. No stone should be left unturned however, to avert war....."

N-1-28

Press Reaction to British-American Aid to Chiang Kai-shek, 12 January 1939

This report gives press view that British-American financial aid to Chiang Kai-shek is viewed with growing alarm, and that Japan should take steps to see that all foreign concessions and settlements be returned to China.

N-1-29 Russo-Japanese Relations, 17 January 1939

The much-heralded Russo-Japanese conflict may be in the offing. As indications of this, mention is made of troop movements to Manchukuo and of recent shifts in the Cabinet whereby opposition to the Army has been reduced.

N-1-30 Press Reaction to Guam Fortification Issue, 25 January 1939

Press considers that proposed fortification of Guam by U.S. is a move hostile to Japan.

N-1-31 Southward Advance, 28 January 1939

This report quotes magazine article by Rear-Admiral K. Taketomi (Retired) to effect that world is divided into three sectors, one of which is composed of Japan, the Asiatic Continent, the South Sea Islands and Australia, with Japan as the heart. Naval Attache comments that Admiral Taketomi expresses a generalization of the ambitions and desires of the Japanese Navy, in stressing expansion southward rather than conquest in China.

N-1-32 Asia Promotion Board, 6 February 1939

In connection with interpellations in the Diet as to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office and the Asia Promotion Board, Naval Attache expresses belief that there is a trend "toward usurpation of powers of government by the military." (2)

N-1-33 Soviet-Japanese Relations, 6 February 1939

This report concludes with the following statement by Naval Attache: "It was the opinion here that he (German Ambassador) had instructed the Japanese not to become embroiled in a war with Russia at the present time." (2)

N-1-34 Propaganda, 13 February 1939

This report terms article in Asahigraph as "timely and exemplary of the type of propaganda that is accepted as fact by the masses. This feeling of invincibility likewise bolsters Japan's present aggressive political and naval diplomacy in rapidly increasing increments in proportion to the apparent ease with which the Japanese are riding roughshod over the powers in Asia." (1)

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N-1-35

Quam, 14 February 1939

In regard to U.S. fortification in the Pacific, this report quotes Admiral Yonai as stating: "I see no reason why the friendly relations between the U.S. and Japan should come to a rupture." (2)

N-1-36

Occupation of Hainan Island, 14 February 1939

The occupation of Hainan will "conceivably be the spark which will set off a world conflagration." (2) The occupation "points conclusively to a military alliance between Germany, Italy and Japan."

"If a halt is to be called to Japan's ambitions in the Far East it had better be done before it is too late. Every new move she makes appears to strengthen her position not only at home and in the Far East, but also internationally." (2)

N-1-37

Spy Fever, 1 March 1939

The new bill for the protection of military secrets is, in the Naval Attache's opinion, an indication of "the anti-spy fever which is particularly high now."

N-1-38

New Navy Minister, 10 April 1939

"It is within the realms of possibility that the Navy, headed by Admiral Yonai, will be the stumbling block to the Army's militaristic plans." (1)

N-1-39

Soviet-Japanese Relations, 12 April 1939

This report on Soviet fisheries concludes with the remark that Japan does not welcome her part in the contract with Germany and Italy, which is presumably to keep Russia occupied in the Far East after hostilities start in Europe.

N-1-40

New Overseas Minister, 12 April 1939

This report on the appointment of General Muniski Koiso (ret.) as new Overseas Minister includes comment that the outspoken and positive views of Gen. Koiso are expected to

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bring an immediate strengthening of Japan's continental policy.

N-1-41

Occupation of Shinan Islands, 24 April 1939

Asahi Shimbun says that America has nothing to fear in regard to the Philippines, since the occupation of the Shinan Islands was an entirely defensive move on the part of Japan.

N-1-42

Press Reactions to Pacific Cruise of U.S. Combined Fleet, 25 April 1939

Press considers the cruise a demonstration against Japan, but that it will not restrain Japan's actions.

N-1-43

Visit of U.S.S. Astoria, 26 April 1939

This report gives an account of the visit of U.S.S. Astoria bearing ashes of late Ambassador Saito, and includes reference to press items dealing with the visit.

N-1-44

Japanese-Italian-German Alliance, 27 April 1939

This report suggests existence of an agreement between Japan, Italy and Germany just short of a military alliance.

N-1-45

Return of U.S. Fleet to Pacific, 23 May 1939

The Secretary of the Navy's announcement that the U.S. Fleet is returning to the Pacific area is certain to have a restraining influence upon Japan. Favorable reaction to the visit of USS Astoria has offset considerably the normal reaction to such an announcement.

N-1-46

Japan's South Seas Development Policy, 24 May 1939

Japan recognizes necessity of explaining her South Seas development policy to U.S., Great Britain, and France.

N-1-47

Tripartite Military Alliance, 24 May 1939

This report gives an account of decision of Japanese Government not to join Germany and Italy in formal military alliance, as a result of Naval and civil opposition to Army's plan.

SECRET

N-1-48 Registration of Aliens, 26 June 1939

This report gives information about new ordinance issued by the Home Ministry, making compulsory the registration of all aliens staying in Japan more than fifteen days, etc.

N-1-49 Anglo-Japanese Relations, 5 July 1939

Anglo-Japanese relations have taken a turn for the worse, and because of U.S. dependence on Great Britain in the Far East, American interests in that area are threatened.

N-1-50 Soviet-Japanese Relations, 19 July 1939

Soviet-Japanese relations continue to show no signs of improvement, but it is clear that the Japanese army is again making capital of Soviet Russia's policy of remaining on the defensive.

N-1-51 General Intelligence Summary, 24 August 1939

During the past two years the Japanese Government has been fairly consistent in its efforts to keep the good will of the United States, or at least to avoid antagonizing the United States to such an extent that an open break might result. (1) Reason why such policy imperative to Japan: (a) all military strength needed for war in China; (b) possibility of a war with Russia or Britain before China Incident ended; (c) to prevent U.S. aid to China.

No reason for U.S. to take either pessimistic or optimistic view. Possible that Japanese authorities will change their policies and do something positive to respect American rights and interests in Far East. On the other hand, may continue to disregard these rights and interests. "The United States can be certain of one thing, and that is that if the Japanese decide on the latter course, moral embargoes and threats to use force will not be sufficient to make them change. Forceful measures, that is armed intervention in the Sino-Japanese hostilities will be necessary." European changes, however, may make Japanese more conciliatory. (2)

Because of Russo-German Pact which more or less left Japan isolated, "it would seem that the logical thing for her to do would be to try to regain the good will and friendship

of the United States and Britain - at least until there is a war in Europe." (7)

N-1-52

Probable Japanese Action in Event of a European War,
24 August 1939

Improbable that Japan will precipitate any action. Have hands full with China and have little to gain by "hasty or ill considered measures." Will certainly not enter war directly. Stresses Japan's need of foreign exchange, much of which would be cut off as a belligerent. Japan would wait to see how the European war will progress before making any move. Will also have to take into account reaction of United States.

DIS (C)

Japanese Neutrality, September, 1939

In the event of a European war, Japan will remain strictly neutral. The result of hostilities will determine her relations with the United States. Position of Combined Fleet given.

N-1-53

General Intelligence Summary, 12 September 1939

This report is part 2 of General Intelligence Summary. "For the first time in the history of Japan a cabinet in resigning gave as the reason the failure in the government's foreign policy.....The fact that Germany, long considered to be Japan's strongest ally and friend, could make a non-aggression agreement with Soviet Russia, long considered Japan's greatest enemy, was too much for the Japanese Cabinet." (1) In selecting a new cabinet it was apparently considered wise to decide on general policy first, and then select men to carry out that policy. In general this policy was to be: "(a) vigorous prosecution of the hostilities in China, (b) continued opposition to Soviet Russia and Communism, (c) non-involvement in European affairs." (1)

DIS (C)

Japanese-German Defence Alliance, September, 1939

Reliable source states that a Japanese-German Defence Alliance will be signed simultaneously in Tokyo and Berlin 27 September.

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N-1-54

Air Defence Drills, 1 November 1939

Drills, in which Army, Navy and civilian organizations participated, were efficient and well-directed.

N-1-55

Semi-Official Japanese Naval views on the New Order in East Asia and American-Japanese Relations, 1 November 1939

- 1) Great Britain has prevented China's development.
- 2) Japan has tried to assimilate her colonies, not to exploit them in the British manner.
- 3) Since the Russo-Japanese War Japan has been cheated by Great Britain and oppressed by the United States.
- 4) America pays lip service to justice and humanity, but her dominating policy is self-interest.
- 5) America's policy toward China is only exploitation thinly disguised by 'open door' and 'equal opportunity' slogans.
- 6) America will not risk war with Japan over China question because of strength of Japanese Navy.
- 7) America should take a moderate attitude and settle outstanding problems with Japan in a friendly fashion. These problems include mutual interests in China, the safety of the Philippines, etc. It would be in the interests of American-Japanese friendship if the United States were to sell Guam to Japan.
- 8) The fundamental cause of Russo-Japanese disputes is Russia's seizure of Saghalien and the Maritime Provinces of Siberia which were Japanese territory. Recovery of these stolen territories by Japan would put an end to all disputes between the two countries.

N-1-56

Anti-Japanese Element in United States Navy, 6 November 1939

Japanese Foreign Office spokesman and Japanese press comment on the existence of an anti-Japanese "die-hard" group in the United States Navy, and include Admiral Stark as one of this group.

N-1-57

Foreign Affairs Problems, 7 November 1939

Difficulties facing Japanese government are those inherited from the Konoye and Hiranuma governments intensified by hostilities with China, the outbreak of the European war and the possibility that the United States will take economic action against Japan in the very near future. (1)

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DIS (C) Japanese Naval Strategy, January, 1940

Elaborate plans are being drawn up by the Japanese Navy to cover our fleet problem. Besides submarines and destroyers, they will have tankers in the operating areas.

DIS Cabinet Change, January, 1940

Army and Navy advocate a new powerful cabinet to supplant the Abe Cabinet, whose fall is imminent.

DIS American Naval Expansion, January, 1940

Remarks of Japanese Navy spokesman are considered to be an attempt to influence American public opinion against proposed United States naval building program.

N-2-58 General Intelligence Summary, Political, 16 January 1940

This report summarizes significance of recent cabinet changes. In regard to new Government headed by Admiral Yonai, it is significant that the Army refused to allow an Army officer to assume office of Prime Minister. "This indicates that the Army declines to accept openly the responsibility for governing the country in these difficult times. General desire for peace in China."

DIS Press Comments on American Naval Program, January, 1940

Opinions of Navy Spokesman and of press are given. Press warns that Japan will not be intimidated by American policy.

N-2-59 U.S. Naval Building Program, 15 February 1940

The Japanese public has been made to feel that the United States plans to keep in a superior position in order to be able to attack Japan in her home waters.

N-2-60 General Intelligence Summary - Political, 16 February 1940

This report describes deterioration of Japan's international position.

N-2-61 International Relations, 16 February 1940

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Greater U.S. assistance to China would place a strain upon U.S.-Japanese relations, but the risk of war would be very remote. (2)

N-2-62

U.S. Naval Maneuvers, 26 April 1940

The Japanese press has taken the attitude that the U.S. Naval maneuvers are a demonstration against Japan.

N-2-63

Soviet-Japanese Relations, 13 May 1940

This report deals with information from Chinese sources that Russia has built a submarine base on Komandorski Island, and another on Possiet Bay. Japan views situation with alarm.

N-2-64

U.S. Navy, 14 May 1940

This report quotes well-known Navy writer Masanori Ito's article in "Contemporary Japan", in which he expresses following opinions:

1. The United States Navy is too big for "legitimate" defensive purposes.

2. The latest U.S. vessels have "unusual cruising power" in contrast to Japanese vessels. This shows that the U.S. Fleet is aggressive, the Japanese Fleet defensive in general character.

3. The United States should revise her naval policy and maintain a "defensive" navy.

N-2-65

Japanese Views on Naval Developments, 15 May 1940

This report stresses view of Japanese press and public that Japan is the object of U.S. Naval maneuvers.

N-2-66

Effect of European War on Far East, 6 June 1940

The opinion of retired naval officers in regard to European war is that British power and influence will be eliminated in the Far East - leaving only the United States and Soviet Russia, who will be dealt with at the proper time. (2)

SECRET

N-2-67

U.S.-Japanese Soviet Relations, 12 June 1940

This report quotes article in a reliable magazine, which expresses fear of possible American-Russian concerted naval action against Japan, and demands that Japanese Gov't. prevent this through diplomatic maneuvers if possible.

N-2-68

Public Opinion, 12 July 1920

This report includes results of a poll of parents of college students to question: "Should Japan go to war with U.S. if latter attempts to restrain Japan from securing resources in Netherlands East Indies?" Affirmative, 6,428; Negative, 1,334. (3)

N-2-69

U.S.-Japanese Relations, 5 August 1940

This report summarizes Navy Dept. pamphlet. "Traditional Far Eastern policy of America has for its true object the prevention of Japan's expansion and development, and this policy is backed by its formidable Navy and Army, as well as by its huge economic power." (7)

Japan must be resolved to meet this grave situation.

N-2-70

Second Konoye Cabinet, 7 August 1940

This report has been summarized by Naval Attache as follows: "The Second Konoye Cabinet has been organized with Army support to:

- (a) create a "national defence state" on Fascist lines;
- (b) take advantage of the present "golden opportunity" to seize French, British and Dutch possessions in the Western Pacific Area. The Cabinet is moving slowly, but is making preparations to accomplish these objectives. Much depends on the success of the expected German attack on England, since Japan feels that she must await the outcome of that struggle before taking definite action to align herself against Great Britain and the United States."

N-2-71

Dissolution of Political Parties, 3 September 1940

Japanese political parties have dissolved to make way for a new political structure with a single party. The Japanese public approves the change. It is probable that army control

of the nation will be simplified by these developments.

N-2-72

New Political Structure, 4 September 1940

The new political structure of Japan is now in the formative stage. It will, according to reports, embrace all parties and factions, and will have a close liaison with the Army, but it is still an unknown quantity.

N-2-73

U.S. Embargo, 5 September 1940

This report quotes Rear Admiral Gumpel Sekine as saying that if U.S. places embargo on Japan, U.S. will be unable to obtain rubber and tin. Clash with Britain inevitable. Japan, without hesitation, should secure position in Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China. Rumors that Japan would lose war because of lack of materials denounced.

N-2-74

Cabinet Policies, 5 September 1940

This report indicates that government proposes to make changes so that Japan will not miss the present "Golden opportunity" to create a Far-Eastern hegemony.

N-2-75

Anti-Foreign Tendencies, 5 September 1940

Under the present government, anti-foreign tendencies can be expected to increase. Foreign institutions and teachers will be forced to leave Japan or will be placed under complete Japanese control. In the new national defence state there is no place for foreign influence. U.S. must be particularly watched, for U.S. is now "Britain's Watch Dog" in Far-East. (6)

N-2-76

Japanese Foreign Policy, 6 September 1940

Japan has made no definite commitments yet, but the trend is pro-Axis, and anti-British, anti-American. When probable outcome of European war becomes clearer, Japan may act to carry out an aggressive southward advance policy. Meanwhile diplomatic pressure will be used to gain objective in Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China.

N-2-77

Japan-Thailand Treaty, 9 September 1940

The treaty of amity signed on 12 June is, according to the Japanese, "more close and friendly," than ordinary treaties

of amity. It is also the "first step toward rejecting the intervention of Western countries in the Orient."

N-2-78

German-Japanese-Italian Agreement, 7 October 1940

This report reproduces "Summary" of the Tripartite Treaty released by the Japanese Foreign Office, with the comment that "it is clear even to the Japanese people that the Tripartite Pact is directed against the United States in order to try to induce America to discontinue aiding Great Britain and China. Already there are signs that the pact has failed to accomplish this purpose." (3)

N-2-79

Cruise of United States Fleet, 12 December 1940

This report includes Domei comment that the proposed cruise of United States Fleet is "to facilitate the collaboration of the United States Fleet with the British Navy in the event of the outbreak of a Pacific war." (3)

DIS

Press Attitude toward Roosevelt Speech, January, 1941

Press takes attitude that Roosevelt is driving America into war.

DIS

Japan's Foreign Problems, January, 1941

In a message to the Army, War Minister Tojo reportedly stressed no hope of early settlement in China. A critical situation is developing in the Pacific. Press predicts British collapse and early entry of America into the war.

DIS

Views on President's Message to Congress, January, 1941

Views of authorities and press are varied: some consider President's message unimportant; others consider it as being almost a declaration of war.

DIS

Southward Expansion, January 1941

Admiral Osumi, Supreme War Councillor, maintains that Japan's expansion southward is natural but that it will not be accompanied by invasion or conquest.

- DIS Peiping Incident, January, 1941
 Press gives little notice to incident in Peiping cabaret between American Marines and Japanese gendarmes.
- DIS Press Reaction to Changes in United States Navy Command, January, 1941
 Aggressive spirit of American Navy characterized by replacement of Admiral Richardson by Admiral Kimmel who believes in a strong policy.
- DIS (C) Acuteness of situation in South-East Asia, January, 1941
 Gives disposition of Japanese army and air force in the South. They present threat to Singapore and Malaya.
- DIS (S) Japanese Fleet Movements, January, 1941
 Reports on movements of first and second fleets.
- DIS (C) German Raiders, January, 1941
 Names of German raiders operating in the Mandated area listed. British Ambassador protests against their presence there.
- DIS Progress of Japanese-German Collaboration, January, 1941
 Exchange of technicians to be made between Japan and Germany.
- DIS Conference on Foreign Policy, January, 1941
 Foreign Policy will be considered by members of Diet, Peers, industry and press in a four-day conference.
- N-2-80 Japan-Thailand Treaty, 14 January 1941
 This report states that the treaty contains a mutual military assistance clause. Japan is encouraging Thailand to attack French Indo-China, and is supplying her with planes and munitions.

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DIS Press Comment on U.S. Naval Budget, January, 1941

Press claims Japan is being encircled, that American attitude is overbearing, insolent.

DIS International Situation, January, 1941

Opinion in Japan is that Britain is already defeated. Japanese correspondent in America says that despite Axis threats average American will help Britain at risk of war; also that less cautious junior Army and Navy officers wish to fight Japan.

DIS Anglo-American Threat to Japan's New Order, January, 1941

Officially-inspired press comments on the urgency of a Japanese move to counteract the Anglo-American economic penetration into Indo-China, which threatens Japan's Greater East Asia economic plans.

DIS Japanese-American Relations, January, 1941

Imperial Rule Assistance Association is mobilizing Japanese opinion against the United States. Press comments that Secretary of State Hull is a seditious demagogue, and that America is to be held solely responsible if war breaks out.

N-2-81 Items pertaining to American defences which have received publicity in the Japanese press, 21 January 1941

- 1) Changes in the high command of the navy. Comments made to the effect that Admiral Kimmel is known to favor a stronger policy against Japan than Admiral Richardson.
- 5) The President's budget message which caused all the editorial writers in Japan to heap abuses on the U.S. in a frenzy of anger.

DIS Changes in the Diet, January, 1941

Need for national unity in the face of the international crisis has occasioned unprecedented changes in the Diet.

DIS Russo-Japanese Relations, January, 1941

Hope for better Russo-Japanese relations seen by Foreign Minister in preliminary negotiations for renewal of fisheries treaty.

DIS (C) Japanese Fleet Movement, January, 1941

Mizuho, Natori, Izumo located in Camranh Bay.

DIS Indo-China Crisis, January, 1941

Japan will not tolerate interference by a third party in the Indo-China mediation. Axis pact recognizes Japanese leadership in East Asia.

DIS Russo-Japanese Relations, January 1941

Foreign Minister believes that Russia is ready to begin negotiations for another important treaty.

DIS American-Japanese Relations, January, 1941

Gist of Foreign Minister's discussion of American-Japanese relations during budget hearings: In demanding that Japan renounce her continental plans and southward advance policy, America makes the basis for future negotiations impossible.

DIS Evaluation of American and Japanese Navies, January, 1941

Japan cannot keep abreast of America's huge naval program, but Japan has quality rather than quantity, according to Navy Minister.

DIS Netherlands-Japanese Relations, January, 1941

The report that the Netherlands Government has rejected Japan's invitation that the East Indies be included in the New East Asia is described by the press as the result of Anglo-American pressure. Foreign Minister, however, is optimistic about possibilities of continuing discussions.

DIS Russo-Japanese Relations, January, 1941

An important trade treaty is being negotiated with Russia,

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according to an announcement by the Cabinet Information Board.

DIS Anglo-American Joint Use of Pacific Bases, January, 1941

The Foreign Minister is gravely concerned over Anglo-American co-operation in the Pacific areas. Japan may even consider invoking Article III of Axis Pact, - which is a Japanese euphemism for declaring war.

DIS Japanese-American Relations, February, 1941

According to the Foreign Minister, America misunderstands Japan and underestimates her strength.

DIS Japanese-American Relations, February, 1941

The attitude of the press is that America misunderstands and underrates Japan; America will be held accountable if relations worsen.

DIS Press Reaction to Sec'y Hull's Speech, February, 1941

Quotes Nichi Nichi editor who takes violent exception to Secretary Hull's speech, and who says that America should not meddle with East Asiatic affairs.

DIS American Attitude toward War with Japan, February, 1941

According to Tokyo Asahi Washington correspondent, America is unprepared to risk a war, and American public opinion desires to avoid war in the Pacific until European situation is clarified.

DIS Foreign Minister Matsuoka's Views, February, 1941

Anglo-American preparations in the Pacific are unnecessary, if they are directed at Japan, since the latter does not contemplate any aggressive action southward. Japanese troops have entered Indo-China as a move against Chungking. Since this was done with the understanding of the French, America and Britain should not misinterpret the move.

DIS Guam Defences, February, 1941

The press does not consider Guam defences important.

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In formulating her plans, Japan has taken the development of Guam into consideration.

DIS Southward Advance, February, 1941

The southward advance by the Japanese Navy is the thesis of a series of lectures by the Navy Department, co-operating with the Osaka Mainichi.

DIS (C) Southward Expansion, February, 1941

Although there is no indication of an attack on the Dutch or British, Japanese forces are gradually approaching Singapore.

DIS Thai- Indo-China Dispute, February, 1941

Tokyo press charges that delay in accepting the Japanese plan has been brought about by Anglo-American maneuvers.

N-2-82 American-Japanese Relations, 27 February 1941

This report gives extracts from speeches by military officials to a mass meeting in Osaka. Gist of speeches is that U.S. has been traditional enemy of Japan, and that war is imminent. (4)

DIS (C) Japanese Army Opinion, March, 1941

Japanese army opinion appears to be that British defeat is a foregone conclusion; that the United States will therefore be forced to retain her fleet in the Atlantic. This will provide an opportunity for Japan to execute her designs in Southeast Asia unhampered. The United States is thought to be seriously disorganized and incapable of exerting decisive efforts in a war.

DIS Burmese Situation, March, 1941

With the entry of Chinese troops into Burma, Japan predicts that war will be carried into Burma. Japan regards British report of Japanese plane attacks on Singapore as a British plot designed to induce America's entry into the war.

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N-2-83

Admiral Takahashi's views on 1) inevitable defeat of Britain
2) mounting American-Japanese friction, 12 March 1941

Speaking before the Shimeikai, a private cultural society, Admiral Sankichi Takahashi predicted that the Japanese-American problem would arise when the U.S. would take charge of British interests after the inevitable defeat of Britain by German submarine warfare. The Japanese policy was firmly established when Japan became a member of the Tripartite Alliance and announced her intention to create an East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. This policy was not recognized by the U.S. or Britain. With the development and expansion of Japan the American attitude toward Japan became unfavorable.

"Japan's navy, however, is fully prepared for any eventuality. Our navy is convinced it cannot be defeated by a navy of any other nation.

"....If we are fully prepared, the Netherlands East Indies problem will be solved naturally in favor of us, even without resorting to arms." (3.4)

N-2-84

Danger of War, 12 March 1941

This report gives economic outlook for 1941, and predicts that "Japan's relations with many countries, the U.S. in particular, are fraught with much danger." (5)

N-2-85

Possibility of Air Raids, 12 March 1941

This report gives gist of Japanese naval aviators' views on possibility of air raids in event of U.S.-Japanese war to the effect that Japan would make an effort to bomb U.S. bases at Midway, Wake, Cavite, and Olongapo to discourage concentrations being made ready for possible attack upon her.

DIS

Foreign Minister's Trip to Berlin and Rome, March, 1941

Comments are made on Foreign Minister Matsuoka's projected trip. After his visit, the Foreign Minister will probably determine whether or not the spread of war to the Far East can be prevented.

DIS

Thai- Indo-China Dispute, March, 1941

In freezing Indo-China's credits, the United States has

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shown hostility to Japan's economic plans for Indo-China.

DIS Visit of American Naval vessels to New Zealand, March, 1941

The press terms America's goodwill cruise to New Zealand and Australia an ill-will demonstration against Japan.

DIS Japan's Naval Position in South Seas, March, 1941

The Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau has informed the Diet that Japan is prepared to cope with any situation which may develop in the South Seas.

DIS Currie Report, March, 1941

In reaction to the Currie Report, general comment of the press is that Japan must frustrate American policy.

N-2-86 Opinions of two Admirals on war with U.S., 24 March 1941

Possibilities and probabilities of rupture of American-Japanese relations form subject of a series of articles in a recent edition of the Tairiku Shimpō. In one of these Rear-Admiral Kunishige Taketami declared that construction of bases in the W. Pacific by the U.S. is worthy of serious attention by the Japanese. In another, Rear-Admiral Tanetsugu Sosa considers that upon outbreak of war severe naval action would occur for a period of time, "culminating in Japanese attacks on the Philippines, Hawaii, San Francisco, and Panama."

N-2-87 War Vice-Minister defies all countries aiding Chiang Kai-shek, 5 April 1941

War Vice Minister Lieut.-Gen. Korechika Anami commenting on Pres. Roosevelt's speech of 15 March declared:

"Whatever President Roosevelt may say, Japan is proceeding with the settlement of the China affair under the firm conviction that we are not an aggressive nation, and we will not blench before any foreign threat.

"That Japan will repel peremptorily all countries which try to help the Chiang Kai-shek regime, whoever they may be or whatever the measures resorted to, is the fixed policy of Japan...."

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This report also contains Rear-Admiral Oka's reply to interpellations concerning the fortifying of Pacific bases by the United States. The Admiral stated that the Japanese Navy was taking all defensive measures necessary to cope with the situation. (2)

DIS (C)

Attack on Singapore Rumored, April, 1941

Rumors are current in Tokyo of an impending attack on Singapore. One source believes that the attack will start with the return of Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

N-2-88

Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact, 16 April 1941

"Japan and Soviet Union have agreed to respect each others territorial integrity and that of Manchukuo and Mongolia, and each has agreed to remain neutral if the other power becomes an object for military action by a third power.

"The advantages to both Japan and the Soviet Union are obvious. Japan can use the forces now in Manchukuo for Operations in China or Southeast Asia, and Russia can devote her entire attention to European problems. Whether the Soviet Union has abandoned her policy of aiding China is not clear."

N-2-89

Converted Carriers; United States' "Two Ocean Navy"
25 April 1941


(A) The Kasuga Maru (17,000 tons) under construction at the Mitsubishi plant in Nagasaki is being converted to an aircraft carrier according to reports. It has also been learned that the N.Y.K.'s 27,000 ton Izumo Maru and Kashiwara Maru have been taken over by the navy for the purpose of converting them into carriers. Sources are reliable although the reports have not been verified.

(B) Naval Attache reports that a typical comment on our "Two Ocean Navy" plan is as follows: "America wants to build a two-ocean navy because she seeks to offer positive interference in Far-Eastern and European affairs....Even if such dual operations are impossible for America at the present time, it is well for Japan to bear in mind that America will soon be in a position to carry out operations in the Pacific."
(4)

DIS

Japanese-American Relations, May, 1941

The tone of the press is that there are no issues between



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Japan and the United States which cannot be settled by negotiation.

N-2-90

Anti-Spy Activities in Japan, 26 May 1941

This report reveals that Japan's growing alarm over espionage by foreign agents is characterized by the first of a series of "anti-espionage" weeks.

DIS

President Roosevelt's Speech, May, 1941

The Tokyo press believes that America's entry into the war is merely a matter of time.

DIS (C)

Location of Fleet, May, 1941

This dispatch gives the location of the major portion of the Combined Fleet as of 27 May.

DIS

Tripartite Pact, May, 1941

The Foreign Minister told the press that Japan's fundamental policy includes strict adherence to the Tripartite Pact.

N-2-91

Naval Attache report on Shipping Conditions, 2 June 1941

"Japan's commercial construction policy is directed to building vessels convertible into troop carriers or commerce raiders."

DIS

Netherlands-Japanese Relations, June, 1941

The press urges that the Government adopt a firm attitude, and discontinue talks, since the Netherlands' reply to the Japanese proposal was unsatisfactory.

DIS

Netherlands-Japanese Relations, June, 1941

With the discontinuance of trade negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies, Japan has decided not to change her policy or relations with the Netherlands East Indies.

SECRET

DIS Threat to Singapore, June, 1941

The press proposes a Japanese-Thai alliance as a basis for land attack against Singapore.

DIS Russo-German War, June, 1941

The press urges a cautious Japanese policy towards the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia.

DIS (R) Russo-German War, June, 1941

No official statement has been made regarding Japan's future policy. The Nazis are putting pressure on Japan to take action against Russia. A re-organization of the Cabinet appears likely.

DIS (C) American-Soviet Co-operation, June, 1941

The Information Board Spokesman warns that the shipment of American munitions to Russia constitutes a real threat to the peace of the Pacific.

N-2-92 Navy's view on anticipated United States entry into European war - its effect upon Japan, 27 June 1941

Hiraide, naval spokesman for the Imperial General Headquarters, broadcast a speech which was widely publicized. He anticipated U.S. entry into European war and remarked that "Japan would be directly affected because of the Tripartite Treaty." Naval Attache comments that Hiraide "did not specifically say that Japan would be obliged under that treaty to go to war with the United States." Hiraide also threatened that intensive economic pressure by United States would compel Japan to go to war in self-defense. (2)

DIS (C) Japan's Attitude Toward Russo-German War, June, 1941

General opinion is that when Germans have scored a quick victory against Russia, Japan may occupy the Maritime Provinces. Basic Japanese foreign policy, which was predicated upon close co-operation with both Germany and Russia, has now been destroyed. Extremists now urge support of Berlin.

SECRET

- DIS American Reconstruction of Chinese Air Force, July, 1941
- In response to a Domei report that large quantities of American war materials, including planes, are en route to Chungking, the Tokyo press comments that America cannot offer substantial aid to China, but that Japan must meet such acts with firmness.
- DIS (C) Occupation of Indo-China, July, 1941
- This dispatch lists naval units located in Yokohama Bay. German sources report that complete occupation of Indo-China is to begin within one week.
- DIS Failure of Negotiations with Netherlands East Indies, July, 1941
- Returning from Batavia, Kenkichi Yoshizawa says that although negotiations are now of no avail, both sides desire to improve mutual relations.
- DIS American-Japanese Relations, July, 1941
- The Tokyo press states that America is speeding up plans for a Pacific offensive.
- DIS American Occupation of Iceland, July, 1941
- Tokyo newspapers call the occupation of Iceland unjustified and an immediate step towards war.
- DIS (C) Japanese Fleet Maneuvers and Preparations, July, 1941
- This dispatch describes the recent activities of naval units. Personnel leave has been limited. Large amounts of war supplies are being sent to Manchuria.
- DIS Extraordinary Session of Diet, July, 1941
- The press expresses the view that an extraordinary session of the Diet will be called in the near future.
- DIS (C) Calling up of Reserves, July, 1941
- In order to enlarge the Manchurian forces, the Japanese Army has called up considerable numbers of reserves.

SECRET

DIS (C) Departure of Language Officers, July, 1941

The uncertainty of the present situation justifies the departure of United States Navy Language Officers.

DIS China Incident, July, 1941

The press believes that the disposition of the China Incident is urgent, in order that Japan may be prepared to face America and Britain.

DIS Third Konoye Cabinet, July, 1941

The press does not envisage any sharp revision of foreign policy following the installation of the Third Konoye Cabinet.

DIS (C) Secret Mobilization, July, 1941

Large-scale secret mobilization is being conducted, estimated at 750,000. Major portion is believed headed for China, although Manchukuo and Chosen garrisons will be strengthened.

DIS (C) Japan's Future Course of Action, July, 1941

With the new unified Cabinet, Japan is expected to make a final push against Chungking to end hostilities, and she is expected to pursue an independent course, gradually breaking away from the Axis. Occupation of all Indo-China is probable, with the offensive further south depending upon consolidation of Indo-China, which will require time.

DIS Japanese-French Agreement, July, 1941

The Privy Council approves the Japanese-French agreement for the joint defense of Indo-China.

DIS Freezing of Japanese Credits, July, 1941

America and Britain no longer want peace in the Pacific, and Japan is fully prepared. Japan's economic position is not seriously threatened, although the effect upon Japanese trade will be considerable, is the general tone of the press.

N-2-93 Policy of Third Konoye Cabinet, 29 July 1941

SECRET

Third Konoye cabinet installed 18 July. Naval Attache comments: "The domestic and foreign policies of the new government are not yet clear but at the present time it appears that there will be no drastic change in either.".... "While it is unlikely that she will break openly with Berlin and Rome, her policies will probably be independent of the Axis power, since she has learned that they are not to be trusted." Concludes that Japan will exploit European war to move north or south as long as such a move can be made without risking war with a major power.

N-2-94

Japanese Navy Spokesman denounces United States encirclement policy, 29 July 1941

Rear-Admiral Mayeda, spokesman of Navy Ministry, speaking on Anniversary of China Incident (1) accused A.B.C.D. powers of encirclement, with United States as ringleader; (2) charged that United States aid to Soviet Union would disturb peace of Pacific; (3) urged nation "not to limit their attention to the China Affair but instead to prepare themselves against a new conflagration sweeping the Pacific." (9)

DIS

National General Mobilization Law, August, 1941

Press reports that the government is considering putting all provisions of the national general mobilization law into effect. Reorganization of the political, economic, industrial and social structures is deemed necessary to enable Japan to cope with the critical situation.

DIS

American-Japanese Relations, August, 1941

Press reactions to America's protest to France over the French-Japanese defence pact call it ridiculous and an instance of America's desire to induce Chinese forces to invade Indo-China. Before Japan can dispose of the China Affair, American opposition must be met and overcome.

DIS

Thai Situation, August, 1941

Tokyo press states that British troop concentrations at Singapore have the ulterior motive of forcing Thailand to join Anglo-American group.

SECRET

DIS Pacific Situation, August, 1941

The press states generally that Japan should not hesitate to take action against Britain and America, who are blockading Japan, and who are inducing the Netherlands East Indies to join them.

DIS Anglo-American 8-Point Declaration, August, 1941

The Japanese press considers that since the 8-point declaration is based upon the status quo, it is anti-Japanese. Japan will not be alienated from the Axis.

N-2-95 Tutuila Incident, 21 August 1941

Senior aide to the Minister of the Navy called on the Naval Attache and conveying the regrets of the Minister of the Navy for the 31 July Tutuila incident said that the Japanese Navy would do everything possible to prevent war between United States and Japan. (6)

N-2-96 Pacific Crisis, 23 August 1941

Capt. Matsushima in a magazine article states that the United States is concentrating more and more ships in the Pacific, leaving the Atlantic to surveillance of Britain. The United States "is ready to commence war as soon as the orders are given.... war with America is already going on. The economic warfare has come to the extreme. There is no room for improvement in political warfare." (3)

DIS Warlike Views of East Asia Development League, September, 1941

War against the United States and Britain is urged by the influential East Asia Development League, whose views are considered semi-official.

DIS (C) Loading of Transports, September, 1941

Twelve large transports are loading supplies and troops off Yokosuka.

DIS National Defence Headquarters, September, 1941

The creation of a National Defence General Headquarters

SECRET

is announced. Its purpose is to command Army units charged with the defence of the nation.

DIS Konoye Message to Roosevelt, September, 1941

Although Japan cannot abandon her plans for East Asia, general press opinion expresses the view that improvement of Japanese-American relations will be welcome.

DIS Rear-Admiral Matsunaga's Views, September, 1941

Rear-Admiral Matsunaga says that Japan should not fear encirclement by A-B-C-D Powers, and adds that he has flown over Guam sixteen times during the year without seeing a single American plane. He concludes that American air power in the Far East is negligible.

N-2-97 Rear-Admiral Matsunaga claims United States is weak in Orient, 22 September 1941

Rear-Admiral Matsunaga tells "Hochi Shimbun" readers that A.B.C.D. powers are in a purely defensive position in the Far East, and are really overawed by Japan's strength. He says that he flew over Guam without seeing any enemy planes. Japan is not being encircled, for the A.B.C.D. powers have only 300,000 army troops, 150 warships, and 1,000 planes in this area. Inferior quality of American planes precludes their reaching Japan from Kamchatka or the Philippines. (4,5)

DIS (C) United States Naval Patrol, October, 1941

The press claims that Japan is seriously threatened by the United States Naval patrol in the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya.

DIS Netherlands-Japanese Relations, October, 1941

Japan castigates recent anti-Japanese acts by the Dutch as "outrageous".

DIS American's Approaching Entry into War, October, 1941

Commander Kondo of the Information Board broadcasts that America is approaching war, but hesitates to take the final step.

SECRET

DIS (C)

German Raiders in the Pacific, October, 1941

The German Naval Attache in Tokyo, according to British information, is in charge of all Nazi supply ships based in Japan. The German Embassy is equipped with two short-wave transmitters and receivers, and maintains a station at the entrance to Tokyo Bay.

DIS

A-B-C-D Encirclement, October, 1941

The Japan Times feels that the A-B-C-D Powers are planning the encirclement of Japan.

DIS

Captain Siraide's Speech, October, 1941

Although Japan is endeavoring to prevent the situation from becoming critical, an immediate showdown is imminent.

DIS

New Tojo Cabinet, October, 1941

The press feels that the new unified Cabinet is well-organized for peace or war.

DIS (C)

Occupation of Thailand, November, 1941

Reliable information reports that elaborate plans for joint Army-Navy occupation of Thailand have been completed. Details are given.

DIS (C)

Imminence of Japanese-American War, November, 1941

(A) An attack on Thailand is scheduled for either 15 or 30 November, or 12 December, according to different sources. Japan will attack the Philippines if the United States intervenes.

(B) Japan may risk war with the United States if the Washington conversations fail. An attack southward, in this event, may develop with such suddenness that no advance notice could be given from this office. Japan has been making preparations since July, and they are undoubtedly completed by now.

DIS

Anti-American Tone of Japanese Press, November, 1941

The press takes attitude that Colonel Knox has challenged

SECRET

Japan with his warlike speech.

DIS (C) Mining of Tokyo Bay, November, 1941

The entrance to Tokyo Bay has been closed by nets and possibly by mines.

DIS (C) Pacific Situation, November, 1941

The Foreign Minister tells the Diet that America and Britain have brought excessive pressure upon Japan.

DIS (C) Shipments to Mandated Islands, November, 1941

Personnel and supplies have been shipped in large quantities to the Mandated Islands ever since September.

DIS (S) "Boom Erang", December, 1941