

● PSF

State Department

Jan. - Mar. 1941

PSF: *State file*

THE WHITE HOUSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <sup>WASHINGTON</sup> MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT  
FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

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I had a confidential report that White may resign as Minister to Czechoslovakia in the near future. In case he does, will you remind me to speak to you about the possibility of promoting Messersmith as a reward for his excellent work as Consul General in Berlin.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 2, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think this information  
should be given to the British  
Ambassador.

F. D. R.

Dispatch from the Minister to  
Yugoslavia, Arthur Bliss Lane, dated  
December 30, 1940, re information he  
received that Italian aviators are being  
trained to bomb Vatican City in event  
British aircraft make attempt to bomb  
Rome, with view to creating impression  
that British would be responsible for  
bombing of Vatican City.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

January 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you personally prepare  
a reply for my signature?

F. D. R.

Letter addressed to the  
President, dated December 14,  
1940, from Ambassador Grew.

TELEGRAM

4P  
The White House

Washington

34WUAB 14 Cable 7:37 p.m.

Lisboa, Jan. 5 1941

THE PRESIDENT:

Thanks. Please arrange Switzerland. Speak all three languages

Bertie Pell.

PSF: State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Call  
Pres. mail*

January 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR MRS. ROOSEVELT:

TO READ AND RETURN.

F.D.R.

*Return to the President Road  
E.P.*

Memorandum  
PSF: State


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a memorandum on the refugee activities of the Department in the thought that you may desire the information which it presents. The memorandum is a factual review of the activities of the Department during the six-months' period, July 1st to December 31st, 1940--the period during which the problem became very acute and assumed a considerable importance.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Memorandum.  
Press Release, No. 549,  
December 18, 1940.

The President,  
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

A-L

January 6, 1941.

S

Mr. Secretary:

Refugees

This is a statement of the refugee visa work of the Department of State for the six months' period, July 1 to December 31 (1940). It was during these months the problem assumed emergency proportions.

Visas have been issued to 22,508

Visas authorized and outstanding but action on which not yet reported 2,432

Visas brought to Consul's attention for 1941 quotas (Russian territory)

GRAND TOTAL

1,500  
26,430

- Not including 10,000 visas provided for British children, of which 3,500 were used.

Including British children 3,500  
ren 29,930

The figure 22,508 represents visas actually issued and is correct in Department's information as of December 31, 1940. More than that have been issued but reports of them had not been received in the Department up to December 31, 1940.

Some

Some of the 2,432 visas have also been issued but are unreported. The Quota Control officers collect the information from local officers in their respective jurisdictions with whom communication is usually delayed. On account of war conditions transmission of this information is frequently interrupted for periods. Consequently it is not possible for them to receive promptly the information so they can report the exact status on any given day. For that reason some reports are incomplete as to some Consulates for a period of weeks preceding the date of the control officer's statement. Therefore it is practically certain that some hundreds of the 2,432 authorized but unreported cases have been issued. However, the information in the Department as of December 31 is that 22,508 visas had been actually issued to persons, practically every one of whom is a refugee from German, Italian or Russian oppression and who originated in territory east of the Rhine.

These refugees

These refugees are geographically allocated as indicated below:

German (controlled, occupied or dominated) territory -	<u>Immigrant</u>	<u>Visitors and Transits</u>
Germany	13,685.....	339
Czechoslovakia	1,437.....	76
Norway	61.....	69
1/2 Poland	1,681.....	86
Denmark	65.....	71
Hungary	435.....	49
Rumania	188..17552....	22 712

Russian (controlled, occupied)

U.S.S.R.	256.....	63
1/2 Poland	1681.....	86
Lithuania	31.....	6
Latvia	2.....	1
Finland	67...2097....	109 265
Italy.....	199.....	66
Switzerland.....	<u>235.....</u>	<u>206</u>

Immigrant total.....	20,023.....	1,249
Visitors and transit in regular course.....	1,249	
Recommended as in particular danger for special consideration - analyzed on next page - authorized 3,268 of which reported issued.....	<u>1,236</u> <u>22,508</u>	

Organizations Sponsoring Refugees

A number of organizations interested in refugees have recommended the names of political refugees in particular danger for special consideration in the issuance of visas. The following groups have been especially interested:

President's

	<u>Issued</u>	<u>Authorized</u>
<u>President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees</u>		1224
Names received to Dec. 31, 1940 (Of about 750 names submitted up to Nov. 15th, Consuls have reported issuance of visas as follows - Names submitted later, reports not received as of 12/31/40):		
Visitors'.....	266	
Immigration.....	87	
Transit Certificates...	22	
Type of visa not stated	27	
Total	402.....	402
(Reports have not yet been received from several offices)		
<u>American Federation of Labor</u>		705
Names recommended (closed Oct. 1)		
Reports indicate issued to	413.....	413
<u>Catholic Organizations</u>		58
Names recommended		
Reports indicate issued to approximately all	58.....	58
<u>Jewish Organizations</u>		
American Jewish Congress Agudas Chasidei Chabad Agudath Israel Youth Congress and other organizations, mostly in Russian controlled territory where many difficulties to exit, total		1,143
(The organizations are highly responsible and have selected the names from a much larger number as outstanding in their religion and in special danger. Many are in Soviet-occupied Lithuania and Poland and are experiencing difficulty in traveling.) Reports indicate issuance of visas to about	250.....	250
<u>American Unitarian Association</u>		50
Names recommended		
Visas have been issued to at least	25.....	25
<u>Dominican Republic Settlement Association (transit certificates)</u>	88	88
	1236	3268
	The persons	

The persons to whom these visas have been issued originated in the territories specified, though many of them, including practically all of those on the lists of the President's Committee, and on that of the A. F. of L., were, at the time, in France, Portugal or Africa. Under the law they are chargeable to the country of their origin and are so indicated in this summary.

Many of these persons originated in Germany, fewer in Italy and Poland and retreated into France, either directly during the past few years or through Holland and Belgium where they remained temporarily until the German advance.

Others were still in Germany at the time they received visas.

Many of those whose visas have been authorized originated in Poland and retreated to the Baltic States or originated in the Baltic States. When those countries were absorbed into the military jurisdiction of Russia it became practically impossible for them to travel and consequently they are unable for the time being to claim the visas to which they are entitled. That situation largely accounts for the fact that of 1143 persons recommended by Jewish Organizations only 250 have actually received visas. We had only one Consulate in Russia during this period. It was at Moscow and intending emigrants have encountered

many

many difficulties to prevent travel to Moscow to approach the American Consulate. Conversely, the Russian Government refuses the privilege to Consular officers to visit other parts of the country to exercise the Consular function.

Likewise, a number of persons recommended by the President's Committee are under assumed names, or hiding from the Gestapo, or have moved out of the Consular district, or for similar reasons are either afraid to or prevented from approaching the American Consul in order to obtain their visas.


In addition to granting immigrant visas to persons originating east of the Rhine, there have been issued, within the quota, visas to persons originating in Belgium, France, Luxemburg and the Netherlands. The factual information in the Department is too fragmentary as regards those four territories to permit a factual statement in connection with them, but an estimate based on the best information available is submitted herewith:

Belgium.....	500	(estimated)
France.....	1543	(estimated)
Luxemburg.....	50	(estimated)
Netherlands.....	1100	(estimated)
Total - Western Europe.....	3193	
Total - East of Rhine.....	26430	
GRAND TOTAL	29623	

The policy

The policy of the Department of State and the procedure adopted by it for dealing with the refugee immigrant problem was summarized in a press release issued on December 18, 1940.

Although the laws relating to the entry of aliens do not provide preferential treatment for refugees as such, administrative measures have been taken to meet the emergency. Consuls have been instructed to be as liberal as the law allows and to expedite action in the cases of qualified applicants when satisfied that they will not engage in activities inimical to the interests of the United States. In view of reports indicating that Nazi and other totalitarian agents are endeavoring to enter the United States in the guise of refugees, it has been considered essential in the national interest to scrutinize all applications carefully.



B. L.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

DECEMBER 18, 1940  
No. 549

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 9 P.M., E.S.T.,  
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1940. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY  
PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

POLITICAL REFUGEES

The refugee problem is inextricably involved with the question of visas.

Persons desiring to come to the United States under the immigration laws must first obtain a visa from a Consul of the United States abroad.

Persons coming for permanent residence must under this law secure Immigrant Visas; those coming for a temporary stay, Visitors' Visas; those who desire to pass through the country en route to another country, Transit Visas. The granting of visas is under the jurisdiction of the Department of State.

Persons arriving on Visitors' Visas are under the law permitted to remain a temporary period. Those arriving as transients are limited to sixty days. If the privilege is not extended the person is supposed to leave the United States or be deported. The extension of privilege and the steps looking to departure or deportation are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice.

Refugees developed into a definite problem after the invasion of France. Many persons had previously arrived in France to find asylum from persecution at the hands of the totalitarian states. To these were added several millions who fled from Holland and Belgium. They all became migrants again and their numbers were doubled or trebled by residents of France--all in flight before the advancing German armies and the Gestapo which followed in its wake. Most of these unfortunates, persons persecuted because of adherence to their political or religious beliefs, desired to come to the United States.

Obviously

Obviously it was legally impossible to accept them all. The laws of this country prescribe the number of persons to be admitted as immigrants. Applications far in excess of the legal limit had already been made by other persons and from only a few countries of Europe were immigrant visas available. That, however, did not prevent the demand, but it did add to the congestion.

The American Consulates in Southern France, at Bordeaux, Marseille and Nice were swamped with applicants. The staffs were increased but even as enlarged were unable to deal with the crowding multitude of daily supplicants for admission to a haven of refuge. Branch offices of our Consulates were opened closer to the Spanish border as the horde moved south frenzied at the near approach of the hostile army and the agents of the Gestapo. Then Spain closed its border. Portugal apprehensive lest the food supply in Portugal and the accommodations available would be insufficient for the mass threatening to arrive, closed its own border. Conditions were imposed upon travel, transportation became disorganized, communications were interrupted. Fear, hunger, privation and over-crowding threatened disaster.

From Spain and the French Mediterranean ports many poor unfortunates escaped to North Africa and besieged our Consulates there. Casablanca in Africa and Lisbon in Portugal became eventually the places from which it was hoped passage might be obtained for America and consequently developed into the centers of the largest groups of refugees, though many, many thousands were caught in France behind the closed borders and many found themselves in Spain. Some reached Switzerland and a comparatively few reached Sweden.

In this mass of people were many men and women of intellectual superiority, persons of education, of culture, of character--brave men and women who had stood by their convictions and had, by reason of determined action, antagonized the totalitarian states to the point their lives were in danger.

Spontaneously there developed in this country movements to save to the world the brains, the character and the spirit which motivated these distraught persons and to facilitate their departure for this country. The names of some were well known to the American public because of their literary, musical or artistic achievements, their political doctrines, their scientific contributions or their capacity for organization--but there were many others whose names were not known who had been leaders of thought and directors of movements in entire accord with American social and political philosophies. The sentiment to save these persons from becoming derelicts or from death developed into committees organized by sympathetic and understanding Americans.

There were various of these committees among the members of which were persons well known to the public. They recommended lists of names to the Department of State with the view that visas of some kind be issued to the persons on them to come to this country and be safe.

At this point it becomes necessary to recall that the law prescribes how many immigrants shall be admitted and that it prohibits admission for certain specified reasons.

The law also establishes standards prerequisite to the issuance of Visitors' Visas and Transit Visas.

Visitors' Visas are granted provided the person can return to the country of his origin or can leave for a third country; provided further that the person intends to do so-- for otherwise he would be an immigrant intending to live here; and that he will not become a public charge while here.

Consequently, the Committees requesting visas for certain persons were required to give assurances to the Department of State that they would make every effort to arrange for the departure of the person if admitted and that he would not become a public charge while here.

Transit Visas are granted to permit a leisurely stay in the United States while traveling to or awaiting accommodations to travel to another country and with similar conditions.

Consequently the Committees asking visas of that character were requested to give those assurances before the visa could be issued.

Those assurances were satisfactorily given in each case and the name and other essential data were telegraphed to the Consuls abroad. The various Committees recommended a total of about 2000 names. Each name was checked against official Government information lists and only about one dozen of those names were found to be of persons whose presence here would be prejudicial to the best interests of the United States. For the rest, visas were authorized. About 1000 have actually been issued abroad. Of the balance--some have been only recently dispatched, some applicants are in hiding or under assumed names for their own protection, some are inaccessible to the Consuls and some have removed from the Consular district to another district and are still being sought.

The Consul, under the law, is the official who must exercise the function of interviewing the applicant to determine his fitness to receive a visa considering, among other things, whether that particular person's entrance into the United States would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States.

It was necessary for the Department of State to be satisfied about these persons, particularly about their intentions while in the United States and their ability to leave this country for another place because if they could not leave the country they would be permanent residents and should come as immigrants--not as visitors--and the immigrant quotas were then full. And to admit them wholesale would be to set aside the immigration laws.

As soon as the necessity for such action arose, the procedure as regards the immigrant quota lists was revised and the quotas are not full--except as to Germany and Poland, and even they will be open in a comparatively short time (about two months).

This has been accomplished by "unblocking" the quotas as fixed by law. By "unblocking" is meant that when a person's name is reached on the quota list he is given his visa if he has travel documents and an exit permit to allow him to leave that country so he can use the visa. Otherwise his name is passed and the next name is reached of the person on the list who has travel documents and an exit permit so he can use the visa. The applicant gets a visa. Under former practice the name at the top of the list stayed there even though he could not use the visa and the names below him on the list were "blocked".

However, quotas are now "unblocked". Refugees can now obtain Immigrant Visas if they want to come to America and if they are acceptable under the laws. In exceptional circumstances Visitors' Visas may still be useful in saving persons of exceptional merit, those of superior intellectual attainment, of indomitable spirit, experienced in vigorous support of the principles of liberal government and who are in danger of persecution or death at the hands of autocracy.

During this whole period the Department of State has given sympathetic assistance to these unfortunate people, has been fully conscious of the limitations imposed by law and has been careful and deliberate in its acts to prevent enemies without from becoming enemies within.

The procedure for recommending, checking and forwarding all these cases has been changed from time to time as the result of conferences between the Departments of State and Justice. The present procedure is, in order to facilitate the orderly consideration of cases of political refugees recommended by any committees operating in this country on their behalf, that an inter-departmental committee acts under an agreement between the Departments of State and Justice. For the primary purpose of having available all secret information in the possession of all departments of the Government, this committee is composed of representatives of the Departments of State and Justice and of the Army and the Navy. To it are referred the names of such political refugees. The Committee will check the names of such persons against Governmental lists in these Departments for the single purpose of discovering whether there is any objection already in the possession of any Department of the Government to the entry of such persons. The names passed by the Committee will be telegraphed by the Department of State to its consuls abroad for the consideration of applications for appropriate visas. In the event of refusals to grant visas the consul will report to the Department of State, submitting his reasons for such refusals. These reports will be submitted to the committee for its consideration.

The Department of State's representative on this committee is Mr. Avra M. Warren, Chief of the Visa Division of the Department.

No cases received from any committee are pending in the Department of State. It requires several days to check, study, draft cables concerning, card and index the names but there is no delay and cases are current.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 9, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
and THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

Hopkins telephoned in confirmation of this. Pell prefers Hungary to Egypt. Therefore, put it through the original way.

F.D.R.

Referring to confidential dispatch from Pell, Lisbon, dated Jan. 8, 1941 For the President and Hull from Hopkins "Confirming our telephone conversation Pell very much prefers Hungary and he would appreciate early confirmation of that".

*file*

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PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL

Hyde Park, N. Y.,  
January 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I think you have seen a copy of this message from Churchill which I got on January second. I really ought to send some answer.

1. The situation in regard to British payments for materials already ordered in this country is not clear.

2. The situation in regard to the payment for future orders would be clear if Congress passes the proposed legislation and follows it up with an appropriation.

In regard to No. 1, the question of total British assets is involved. I do not know who told you that they amount to 18 billion dollars all over the world. In my judgment that figure is altogether too high because what we are referring to are obviously British assets which they cannot either (a) sell or (b) pledge through the Government of Great Britain. My

REGRADED  
UNCLASSIFIED

figure would be 9 or 10 billion dollars instead of 18 billion dollars.

Still speaking of No. 1, it seems probable to me that through the investment trust method, in New York, and with the aid of Jesse Jones, perhaps the British can raise about one billion dollars in the next few weeks. I do not think their total assets in this country amount to more than a total of one billion five hundred million -- and the last five hundred million dollars is not of a character on which to raise cash quickly except at a very heavy and unwarranted loss.

In regard to British assets outside the United States, it is clear that in many cases they have to be used in the locality in which they exist, i.e., Canada, to pay for munitions and food; Argentina, to pay for beef, wheat, etc., and other South American countries in the same way.

Assets in South Africa are probably already earmarked to pay for things they are getting from South Africa. Assets in India, ~~straight~~ settlements, China, etc., may be of some value to them to put up with us as security but there is real doubt as to how much value such assets would have for us ultimately -- as, for instance,

**British property in Shanghai.**

In regard to No. 2, i.e., putting up some form of security for the future program of orders, I need not assure you that I am wholly sympathetic in doing something like this in order to get the bill through. But, again, I am skeptical as to the value of British owned properties which could be put up as security.

There is always the possibility of their putting up their sovereignty to and over certain colonies, such as Bermuda, the British West Indies, British Honduras and British Guinea. I am not yet clear in my mind, however, as to whether the United States should consider American sovereignty over these islands and their populations and the two mainland colonies as something worthwhile or as a distinct liability. If we can get our naval bases why, for example, should we buy with them two million headaches, consisting of that number of human beings who would be a definite economic drag on this country, and who would stir up questions of racial stocks by virtue of their new status as American citizens?

In the Pacific there are certain small British Islands which not from the population or economic point of view, but from the military and naval point of view, might be a distinct asset, and, at the same time, might be a definite liability. These are

the Islands south of Hawaii (Canton, Enderberry, Christmas, the Phoenix group, etc., and down to Somoa) and the Islands southwest of Hawaii and south of the Japanese mandated Islands (the Gilbert and Ellice groups). If we owned them they would be valuable as stepping stones in the control of the central Pacific area, but, at the same time, they would be difficult to defend against Japan or a combination of Japan with some other naval power.

You see the difficulties of all this -- the dangerous over-estimates which have been made of British assets and the problem of finding other substitutes.

We might talk it over when I get back on Tuesday.

F. D. R.

*Bullet*

*ASF STATE*  
*file personal*  
*State folder*

Derwen  
Pennlyn, Pennsylvania

January 11, 1941.

Personal.

Dear Mr. President:

I return herewith Cordell's letter about Foreign Service appointments which you sent me for comment on January 7th. A different appointment is in my mind at this moment.

You will remember that when I told you that Offie had been transferred to Bogota last November, you reached for the telephone to have the transfer cancelled, and that I asked you not to intervene at that time because it seemed unnecessary since Offie had more than six months' leave due and could take leave until I should again be in a government post. Offie has now been ordered to leave for Bogota on January 19th and as I have no connection with the government, I can not ask to have him as an assistant. If, as you said to me, the other day, you intend to put me on the "hurry up wagon" immediately after Inauguration, I shall, of course, want Offie as my assistant.

Will you, therefore, please pick up

The Honorable  
Franklin Delano Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

the telephone now and tell Breck Leng that you want Offie detailed to the Department of State as there will be work for him in Washington. Please find time to do this before the nineteenth as otherwise it will be too late.

My comments on the names submitted in Cordell's letter are the following:

Pierre Boal, Counselor of Embassy, Mexico City: A gentleman and a competent officer.

Eugene H. Dooman: An excellent man for a post in the Far East.

Wesley Frost: Honest but thoroughly mediocre.

Alexander C. Kirk: Brilliant but of strange personality. He is capable of handling difficult and delicate tasks and during the past two years has become much more serious in his attitude toward life.

Leland B. Morris: Discreet, solid and hard-working, but no great political experience.


George Wadsworth: Energetic, active, first-rate. An exceptionally competent officer.

Thomas M. Wilson: An old maid whose rise in the Service was due to the fact that he was the pet of Wilbur J. Carr. He does not speak Spanish, French or German or, in fact, any foreign language.

Robert Murphy, who is also a Class One officer, is in my opinion a better all-around man than anyone on this list.

Good luck.

Yours affectionately,

  
William C. Bullitt.

*Hold File*

Memo TO THE P.S. "WILL YOU ASK BILL BULLITT FOR HIS  
CONFIDENTIAL SLANT ON THIS?"

Sent to Bullitt at The Anchorage - Jan. 8, 1941

Letter to the President from Cordell Hull dated Dec. 27, 1940  
in which is transmitted a list of foreign service officers  
who have demonstrated special capacity for promotion to  
the grade of Minister.

PSF: State folder

*file personal*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

January 14, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Through Harold R. Moskovit of the Affiliated Young Democrats, I have a copy of the letter from Philip G. Brady of the Young Democrats of Massachusetts. It is interesting because it relates to a conversation with Joe Kennedy, Jr. According to Brady:

"I sounded out Joe Jr., about his father's plans and the reply I received was not too encouraging.

"The Ambassador's campaign is scheduled to start sometime during February, and will mostly be a series of addresses and radio talks. It is feared that it may mean a break with the Administration so the principals involved are hesitant about accepting the support of political organizations, such as we proposed.

. . . . .

"At this writing, the Ambassador expects to remain in Florida for the month, as far as I can learn. . . . Kennedy, frankly, is going out after public opinion, and those associated with him feel that an aroused public voice will be sufficient to forestall government action."

At the same time it develops that Verne Marshall's committee is enlisting the support of a number of the so-called Democratic leaders in New York City. The leader, in consequence, signed the names of his district captains

to

-2-

to Verne Marshall's pronouncement, apparently without their knowledge.

The committee is likewise canvassing for candidates in the Brooklyn district with the intent of starting now their campaigns for Congress in '42. Apparently in that region the Verne Marshall crowd and Father Coughlin's crowd have come together.

*act*  
A. A. B., Jr.

A-B:AAB:GMH

State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What answer was made  
to this?

F. D. R.

State Department dispatch  
from London, No. 117, re message to  
Petain from Former Naval Person,  
offering assistance in the event of  
the French Government deciding to  
cross to North Africa.

State Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CODE ROOM  
STATE DEPARTMENT

Many thanks for your messages. My best information is that Bill at present has safe majority in both Houses. No accurate guess as to date of final passage can be made but I hope for February 15th. A Senate filibuster might delay this.

I got a report from Switzerland, from a usually reliable source, that invasion will be attempted in near future -- sometime prior February 15th. Further, that if unsuccessful, Germany might seek an inconclusive peace, retaining Belgium and part French coasts; that if England will not agree and hostilities continue, Germany will have to find food for the occupied countries and will move definitely into Balkans and possibly into Ukraine; also that Germany would occupy Portuguese ports to cut off communication with United States.

I have no verification of this and merely send it to you for what it may be worth.

Warmest regards

ROOSEVELT

State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The report in Section two of #65 from Leahy, dated January seventeenth, speaks of the request to our Battle Monuments Commission to remove fifteen thousand graves from Romagne Cemetery near Montfaucon before February fifteenth. The Commission correctly replied that such a thing was impossible.

The area is apparently to be used by the German military authorities as a bombing practice area. This means that the graves of American soldiers of the World War would be torn apart and the whole cemetery desecrated by the Germans if this were carried out.

I suggest that this report be brought to the attention of the German Government and a protest against such action be made if such action is contemplated.

I suggest also that this be given wide publicity through the press.

F. D. R.

PSF; State folder

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 1, 1941.

file 71

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

Thanks  
CH



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

January 28, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

Here is an unusually good memorandum from Alfred Bergman, which I thought you might like to see.

Sincerely yours,

*Harold I. Ickes*

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,  
The White House.

Enc.

INTERIOR DEPT  
\* RECEIVED \*  
JAN 27 1941  
\* OFFICE \*  
THE SECRETARY

SUPPLEMENT NO. 55

New York,  
January 24, 1941.

"RUSSIA"

In a talk last evening with Henri de Kerillis, who is, no doubt, one of the ablest living statesmen, he brought the following to my attention.

First, I should like to call to your attention that Henri de Kerillis, called the Churchill of France, was one of the leaders of the Catholic Party in France, and was a member of the Chamber of Deputies, of the extreme Right. He was independent enough, however, to be the only member of the Chamber of Deputies to vote against Munich, with the exception of the Communists, and he is now very popular in France for his stand, which in nearly every case has proven very accurate, as the events show.

He is convinced that the change in England from Halifax to Eden is for one main reason: "Russia". Eden realizes that Russia must be brought into the struggle for the British Empire and by all means possible be weaned away from Germany. For a successful War, Russia is necessary. Russia's interests are often similar to England's and America's, no matter how much we all hate Communism, as she fears mostly Germany and Japan. Perhaps we must conceive a new, audacious policy toward Russia; perhaps, as regrettable as it is, concessions of spheres of influence must be offered Russia, and other help.

I asked him, "And if all this is done and Russia still backs

what?" He answered that "if Britain were lost, they would lose much more, and in every War or in politics one must take risks."

It must be a bold counterpart to Hitler's daring. Germany is crossing Russia's interest in Scandinavia, in the Baltic Sea, in the Black Sea, and in the Balkans, which is a story I have covered in "America Next". Russia is probably still too weak to stand against Germany, in spite of the advantages which she would have strategically in an aerial War. But this situation can be changed -- don't forget the surprise of the Italian War -- and she will be on Germany's side until she sticks the dagger in Germany's back.

From a military point of view, it is probably impossible to have a defeat of Germany except by military force on the Continent and that means no military defeat of Germany without Russia. Eden apparently realizes all this.

I personally am not confident that the Russians will help until England and ourselves have gone far to defeat Germany and eventually Japan.

On the other side, Hitler fears Russia. Napoleon did very much as Hitler has done, and Hitler is a great student of Napoleon. Napoleon tried hard to come to terms with Russia and did sign a Treaty of Tilsit which, however, did not prevent him from being forced later to march on Moscow to defeat England after Russia, but he failed there. Hitler knows he must move

toward invasion of England, which will not be easy and will be costly, or toward Gibraltar, which would be a Spanish Campaign, which also helped to defeat Napoleon.

History is on the march! Will it repeat itself? England knows her history and the history of Europe and is figuring on it. She has failed in knowing today's history on the Continent. I feel we are the England of Napoleon's time and will shortly play England's former part, but we must understand Russia's value, even at terribly great risks, which perhaps are not so great if we consider that all is lost if she is on the other side or not with us. It is realistic, but we must be realistic now.

ALFRED BERGMAN

P. S. Attached is a copy of the "Readers' Choice of Best Books", published by the H. W. Wilson Company for all libraries in America, with "AMERICA NEXT" in its selection.

Bishop James Walsh to Frank C. Walker, Jan. 27, 1941

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 17-18.

15F-State

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75 F. State



MARYKNOLL : : NEW YORK

January 27th,  
1941

Mr. Frank C. Walker  
Wardman Park Hotel  
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Walker:

Today we received word by cable that the \_\_\_\_\_ Government are now ready to send a trusted representative to discuss the terms of a projected agreement.

The man selected is the one who acted for that Government previous to the Disarmament Conference of 1922. We, however, still think it would be better if a representative went from here.

Of even more significance is the fact that the most recent statements from \_\_\_\_\_ are exactly in accordance with the plan which we worked out with those people before leaving their country. Their very statements are intended to indicate their consent. The harsh talk is for home consumption, lest that Government be supplanted by a group of Extremists. A bid for friendly settlement is being clearly made.

Mr. Frank C. Walker - 1/27/41 - Page #2

I have thought it might be helpful if Father Drought were to spend a week or so in Washington to remain on call. That Government has now given clear indications that a quick move along the lines proposed would be successful. Father Drought knows their plan and could interpret the day-to-day developments accordingly; whereas, their moves may otherwise puzzle, or completely deceive, any one not previously informed of their true character.

These recent developments incline us to feel that we should at least stand ready to be of immediate assistance, if our cooperation is desired. But, for this, we will rely completely on your own judgment. I would be very grateful if, without taking the trouble to write, you would indicate your opinion by 'phone or telegram.

Very sincerely yours,

x *James E. Walsh*

Superior General - Maryknoll

Hill Memo for FDR, Feb. 5, 1941

(State Dept copy)

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 21-22.

RF-State

RS 1/10/56

State

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

February 3, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

What should I do next?

F. D. R.

Letter to Frank Walker from  
Father Walsh, Superior General at  
Maryknoll, dated January 27th, re  
cable sent stating that the  
Governments are now ready to send  
a trusted representative to discuss  
the terms of a projected agreement.

RECEIVED  
JAN 11 1941  
JAN 11 1941

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of January 26, forwarding the memorandum that was handed to you several days ago by Bishop Walsh on the subject of a possible procedure in relations with Japan, I have studied the matter carefully and I give detailed comments in the memorandum immediately hereunder.

I doubt the practicability of proceeding on any such line at this time. It seems to me that there is little or no likelihood that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people would in good faith accept any such arrangement -- at this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good offices of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in China, the likelihood would be that Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that Japan would change

change her present course of aggression to one of peaceful procedures. ~~At~~ At the same time, I feel that we should not discourage those Japanese who may be working toward bringing about a change in the course which their country is following. Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-designate to the United States, is expected here soon. Upon his arrival he may have some proposals and suggestions to offer. We shall of course wish to listen carefully to what he has to say and we can try to convince him that Japan's own best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. We should not, I think, resort to other agents and channels before we have even talked with the Ambassador and while we can work through Mr. Grew at Tokyo.

The memorandum left with you by the Bishop is returned herewith. I am also returning to you, separately, the letter sent by the Bishop to Mr. Walker.

Enclosure:

Memorandum giving  
detailed comment  
and memorandum by  
Bishop Walsh.

CH

Secy State to FDR, Feb. 5, 1941

State Dept copy Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 22-27.

RF. State

81 7/14/46

Department of State

BUREAU  
DIVISION

FE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the strictly confidential memorandum relating to the Far Eastern situation which was left with you several days ago by Bishop Walsh, it seems to me that we can best approach the question presented in the memorandum by mentioning briefly certain facts fundamental in the Far Eastern situation and then examining the proposed plan of procedure in the light of those fundamentals.

The first fundamental is that since 1931 Japan has been dominated more and more by the military group -- a group which finds adherents in all classes of Japanese society, the soldier, the sailor, the merchant, the industrialist, the farmer, et cetera, et cetera. This group sets a peculiarly high value on the use of force as an instrument both in national and in international affairs.

affairs. As Japan's military adventuring on the Asiatic mainland and southward has proceeded, the unmistakable trend in Japan has been toward an authoritarian control with the military group coming more and more to the front. During this process, there have been some elements in Japanese society which have felt that the course being followed by their country was a mistaken one. On the whole, these elements have had, up to the announcement on September 27, 1940, of the alignment by Japan with Germany and Italy in the tripartite alliance, less and less voice in Japan's affairs. The reaction of the United States to the three power alliance, the statements made by you in your fireside chat of December 29 and in your message of January 8 to Congress, the statements made by me on January 15 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and on January 27 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the increasing manifestations that this country is rearming at a steadily accelerating rate of speed and that this Government and this country are determined to assist Great Britain and other countries which are protecting themselves against aggression, and the British and Greek successes against the Italians, -- all these have probably caused many Japanese to feel that their course of  
action

action may bring them into conflict with the United States and that their course is more fraught with serious risk to Japan than had previously been estimated.

If events are permitted to take their course, it seems probable that Japan will for the time being become more and more authoritarian and more and more military-controlled. In view of the big strides already made by Japan in those directions, it would be extremely difficult to check or to change the direction at this time. It seems clear that Japan's military leaders are bent on conquest -- just as are Germany's. They demand that this country make concessions: that we give up principles, rights, interests: that we stand aside while Japan proceeds by force to subjugate neighboring areas and, working in partnership with Germany, contributes to the establishing of a new "world order": even that we facilitate their efforts by promising to give them financial assistance for the exploitation of areas which they expect to conquer. Is there anything that can stop this aggressively moving force -- other than the resistance of a stronger obstacle or the resistance of a greater force?

Another fundamental fact is that the Chinese are fighting for their existence, against forces of  
aggression

aggression which, if successful, will probably increasingly menace the interests of the United States.

Ever since Japan's military leaders embarked on their present course in 1931, various efforts have been made by Japanese leaders to persuade the Government of the United States to conclude some sort of new political arrangement with the Japanese Government. This effort has been motivated largely by a desire on Japan's part to make it appear to the world, and especially to their own people and to the Chinese, that the United States was prepared to acquiesce in -- and even to assent to -- the results of Japan's program of conquest. Japanese leaders have undoubtedly hoped by the conclusion of such an arrangement to discourage the Chinese and cause the Chinese leaders to make peace with Japan on Japan's terms.

Many of Japan's leaders earnestly desire now to extricate Japan from its present involvement in China in order that Japan may be in better position than it is at this time to embark on conquest to the southward in areas which are richer in natural resources than is China and from which Japan might, if successful in conquering these areas, enrich herself more rapidly than she can in and from China. Any arrangement which would help

help Japan to extricate herself temporarily from her involvement in China would be of doubtful soundness from point of view of the best interests of the United States -- and of the world -- unless it also made effective provision that Japan desist from her program of conquest.

Turning now to the plan suggested in the memorandum under reference: An effort has been made to consider the proposed plan in its broad aspects, to evaluate the ideas which underlie the plan, and to appraise the plan in perspective. There are a number of statements in the proposed plan which, as they stand, are definitely not practicable. Comments in regard to some of these are contained in an annex to this memorandum. As indicated, the discussion in this memorandum is restricted to comment upon the plan as a whole.

With regard to section "I. LEGAL", it might be feasible for the Japanese Government to make, as a unilateral action, a declaration somewhat along the lines of Article III of the three power alliance to the effect that in view of the agreement between the United States and Japan relating to various aspects of the Far Eastern situation the Japanese Government would agree, should the United States be attacked by a power at present involved in the European war, to assist the United States with

with all political, economic, and military means. I doubt, however, that Japan would give such a unilateral commitment. I am sure that it would not be feasible for this Government to undertake to give Japan a reciprocal commitment.

With regard to section "II. POLITIC", subsection A, this Government would, it is assumed, be prepared to cooperate toward bringing about a settlement of the Chinese-Japanese conflict -- were Japan and China both to indicate willingness to negotiate on a basis reasonably fair and just to all concerned.

Referring to the statement in this subsection that "China and Japan could . . . unite to fight Communism in China and in the Far East", it needs to be remembered that the Chinese have repeatedly rejected offers of the Japanese to assist in fighting communism in China and have declared such offers to be merely a mask for Japanese military operations of occupation. Experience shows that the working out of any arrangement on this matter which would be acceptable both to Japan and to China would be extremely difficult if not impossible under present circumstances.

With regard to subsection B -- in which it is suggested that there be recognition of a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" and that provision be made with regard to the  
political

political status of the Philippine Islands, Hong Kong, Malaya, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies -- it might be feasible to work out something along the lines indicated. However, a Far Eastern "Monroe Doctrine" would be difficult to define either as to terms or as to area. As to terms, there would need be recognition of the legal equality of each of the areas (countries) included in the doctrine. As to area, the Far East is not readily delineated as a geographical area. For example, questions would arise whether countries such as India and Australia should or should not be included. There is also the question of Eastern Siberia. In one sense, such geographical questions are not important. In another sense, however, they raise further questions: whether the ties, historical, cultural, commercial, and racial, among the various regions of the Far Eastern area (Pacific area) are such as to make it feasible for there to be adopted with regard to the area any doctrine which is regional in character. We of course would not wish to be doctrinaire on this point, but at the same time it seems essential that thought be given to all important aspects of the matter.

With regard to subsections C and D, no comment would seem to be needed.

With

With regard to section "III. ECONOMIC", we have long believed that there are many constructive lines open to Japan and to the United States in the realm of economic and financial matters provided that Japan desists from the course of conquest on which she has been engaged since 1931.

In general, I am skeptical whether the plan offered is a practicable one at this time. It seems to me that there is little or no likelihood that the Japanese Government and the Japanese people would in good faith accept any such arrangement at this stage. It also seems to me that, if through the good offices of this Government an arrangement were worked out which would extricate Japan from its present involvement in China, the likelihood would be that Japan would extend and accelerate her aggressions to the southward rather than that Japan would change her present course of aggression to one of peaceful procedures. At the same time, I feel that we should not discourage those Japanese who may be working toward bringing about a change in the course which their country is following. As I said in my statement before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, this Government has, notwithstanding the course which Japan has followed during recent years, made

repeated

repeated efforts to persuade the Japanese Government that Japan's best interests lie in the development of friendly relations with the United States and with other countries which believe in orderly and peaceful processes among nations. You have worked hard at that. I have worked hard at it. Mr. Grew has worked hard at it.

Admiral Nomura, Japanese Ambassador-designate to the United States, is expected here soon. Upon his arrival he may have some proposals and suggestions to offer. We shall of course wish to listen carefully to what he has to say and we can try to convince him that Japan's own best interests lie along lines other than that she is now pursuing. Should we succeed in convincing him, the next question will be can he convince his own Government and people?

**Annex:**  
Comments on Subordinate  
Aspects of the Proposed  
Plan.

**Enclosure:**  
Memorandum by Bishop  
Walsh returned.

ANNEX

COMMENTS ON SUBORDINATE ASPECTS  
OF THE PROPOSED PLAN

One. The plan itself is not new. Various of its aspects have been presented at one time or another, sometimes by Americans, sometimes by Japanese.

Two. In section "II. POLITICAL", subsection B, there is a statement in regard to a "Japanese-American guarantee". It would be contrary to long-standing policy of the United States to undertake to give such "guarantee". However, in view of the fact that many Americans believe that this Government in the Washington Conference Nine Power Treaty gave a "guarantee" in regard to China's independence, whereas this Government in that treaty simply promised to respect China's independence, et cetera, it may be that the drafters of the phrase in question had in mind nothing more than some agreement whereby this Government and other governments would pledge themselves anew to respect the independence and the status of the areas mentioned.

In this same subsection there is reference to the establishment of autonomous governments in Indochina and in the Dutch East Indies, with the further statement that in the Dutch East Indies Queen Wilhelmina could be accepted as sovereign. The problem of working out arrangements in accordance with the statements made in the  
proposed

proposed plan would present obvious difficulties. However, both French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies are at the present time operating in many respects as at least semi-autonomous regions.

Three. The Chinese, having in mind past Japanese failures to honor contractual obligations, have consistently insisted that they cannot and will not begin negotiations with Japan until, as evidence of Japan's good faith, Japanese troops have first been withdrawn from China. It may be assumed that this specification on the part of the Chinese need not be regarded as absolute: a complete withdrawal by Japan of her forces need not be regarded as the condition precedent; but some clear indication of a change of heart and of intention on Japan's part would seem to be a sine qua non.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 19 PAGES 3442 -  
3444

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation  
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DATE: February 7,  
1941.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

file →  
SUBJECT:

The Far Eastern Situation

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. W. M. Butler,  
Counselor of the  
British Embassy,  
and  
Mr. Hamilton

COPIES TO:

In leaving with me the attached aide-memoire of February 7 marked "very confidential", Mr. Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, said that the Embassy had just received two telegrams from the British Foreign Office containing confidential information which the Embassy was instructed to communicate to the American Government. Mr. Butler said that the information was as follows:

The first telegram, dated February 6, was to the effect that according to reliable information the Japanese Embassy in London on February 4 received instructions to reduce to a minimum its contacts with the British and to be prepared to leave on short notice; that these instructions were discussed at the Japanese Embassy in London; that some members of the Embassy

were

were dismayed by the instructions while others were not; that it was believed at the Japanese Embassy that the instructions had reference to some scheme of cooperation with Germany advocated by the Japanese military party.

The second telegram, also dated February 6, was to the effect that the notification date referred to in the first telegram was either February 9 or February 18 (the telegram as received by the British Embassy was garbled and the Embassy had not yet worked out whether the correct date was February 9 or February 18); that there was some indefinite reference to the plan in question being linked up with the Soviet Government and Chinese Communists; that the proposed action was being carefully planned so as not to appear to affect United States interests; that the movement of the United States Fleet was regarded as of a routine character; and that there was a good deal of talk at the Japanese Embassy in London about war.

Mr. Butler added that it was possible that the British Ambassador might ask to talk to the Secretary of State and to the President in regard to the information set forth in the two telegrams under reference.

FE:MMH:HEB

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Evidence is accumulating that the Japanese may already have decided to push on Southward even if this means war. Press reports indicate that Japan is using her position as mediator between Thailand and Indo China to gain, besides a preferential economic position, a Naval Base at Camranh Bay, Air Bases in Southern Indo-China and control of the Indo China customs. There is also reason to suppose that some military agreement with Thailand, directed against our territories and the Netherlands East Indies is under consideration.

The following are a few "straws in the wind":

(a) His Majesty's Ambassador in Tokyo reports a general feeling amongst the Japanese that a crisis in the Far East will come within the next few weeks.

(b) Cancellation of sailings of Japanese ships to the United States and the commandeering of ships by the Japanese Government have been reported. These reports have not so far been confirmed by the British Naval authorities in Singapore.

(c) Japan is continuing to supply munitions to Thailand. For instance, a Japanese steamer arrived at Bangkok on January 29th with the following war material for the Thai Government: 8,000 bombs, 20 tanks and 10,000 cases containing unspecified arms and ammunition.

(d) A telephone conversation was intercepted between two Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang to the effect that the Japanese attack would take place

on/

on February 10th. The Netherlands authorities attach no undue importance to the conversation but think that it cannot be disregarded.

(e) A Japanese Naval Officer recently stated to students of the Malay languages that time was very short indeed.

(f) The time-table of the "Asaka Maru" which is taking a Naval Mission to Berlin and may be bringing back machinery and certain metals, seems to indicate that action is not contemplated until the middle of March.

(g) A French source in Indo China reports concentrations in Formosa and Hainan.

While none of these indications may be conclusive in themselves, their accumulative effect is to suggest that a further movement is impending. Most of this information has already been given to the United States Naval Attache in London.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

February 7th 1941.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4284-4293

Memo of Bishop Walsh to FDR published also, in  
Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1941, Vol. IV, the Far East,  
pp. 14-16.

RLJ 11/156

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*file  
personal*

February 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
GENERAL WATSON

Will you show this correspondence to the Postmaster General but don't give it to him?

F. D. R.

Approved by Post  
WASHINGTON  
LIVE WHILE HORSE

**Department of State**

BUREAU  
DIVISION

**FE**

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

**The President**

no. FDR, Feb. 5, 1941 (State Dept copy)

Published in

Foreign Relations of the United States

1941 Vol. IV The Far East

pp. 21.

RF-Stat

RS 4/1/62



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

*State Folder*

February 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to your memorandum of February 3, covering a letter from Bishop Walsh to the Postmaster General, and to the memorandum which I am sending to you, separately, in comment upon possible procedure suggested by the Bishop in regard to relations with Japan, --

In as much as the Japanese Government is sending a new Ambassador, who is due to arrive here shortly, would it not seem desirable to await arrival of and contact with that Ambassador before taking any action regarding any suggestions offered through indirect channels?

The letter from Bishop Walsh to the Postmaster General is returned herewith.

Enclosure:  
From Bishop Walsh,  
January 27, 1941.

*CH*

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4295-4296

February 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
PRESIDENT

There is attached a memorandum containing suggestions of statements which might be made orally to the Japanese Ambassador when he calls on you.

Attachment:  
Memorandum.

FE:MMH:HEG

(Original in State Folder)  
(Copy in Japan Folder)

SUGGESTIONS FOR INTERVIEW WITH  
THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

There is offered for consideration the suggestion that in the initial conversation with Admiral Nomura following presentation of his credentials the issues between the United States and Japan be not discussed in such a way as to cause Admiral Nomura to feel that this Government is closing the door to any diplomatic efforts which he may make as Ambassador. Reference might, however, be made to the assumption that he, as a seafaring man, would welcome frank speaking, and the following points might then be touched upon:

1. There is no disguising the fact that relations between the United States and Japan are not good. These relations have deteriorated for the reason, as we see it, that Japan has embarked upon a course of expansion by force. There is no need at this time to dwell upon the fact that Japan's course has been attended by more than 250 instances of the bombing by Japanese planes of American mission and other properties in China, by the sinking of the Panay and the burning or sinking of three other American vessels with loss of American life, and by the disruption of the normal and legitimate activities of thousands of Americans.

2. With reference to the alliance entered into by Japan with Germany and Italy, some Japanese statesmen

say

say that Japan has retained freedom of action. Japan is aware of our policy of assisting those countries which are resisting aggression. In these circumstances, the question naturally arises whether Japan's actions will demonstrate that Japan in fact retains liberty of action or that Japan has pledged itself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things which this country is committed to support, things which it always has supported and which it forever will support.

3. The Government of the United States has noted repeated statements by Japanese leaders to the effect that the United States is moving toward involvement in the European war and that such involvement would constitute a world calamity. Do not these statements, in view of happenings in the Far East, give rise to the warrantable and corollary question whether Japan itself, through its military activities toward the south and through its commitments to Germany and Italy, is not drifting toward involvement in the European war and whether such involvement would not be, in the words of Japan's leaders, a "world calamity"? There comes to mind in connection with this question Japan's military occupation of or military activities in north China, central China, south China, the Hainan Island, the Spratly Islands, and, thus far, parts of French Indochina. It appears to those on

this

this side of the Pacific that there is in the public utterances of Japanese leaders and in the Japanese press undue emphasis upon the asserted responsibility of other nations and not sufficient consideration of the possible consequences of Japan's own presentation of constantly expanding aims at the expense of other countries.

4. Our two countries have drifted apart from that friendly and reciprocally advantageous attitude which in general had previously characterized their relations with one another. Some very acute questions are now presented to each country. Without going into these at the moment, it is suggested that, if Japan has a desire to examine the points of divergence with a view to talking over the situation fully and frankly, the time has arisen when that should be done. If the Japanese Ambassador feels that he would like to discuss such questions, the appropriate officers of this Government are of course available for such discussion. This does not mean a negotiation; it means a discussion of attitudes, policies, objectives.

5. These are some of the thoughts which honesty and candor require to be frankly expressed. In expressing them, we are not unmindful of the circumstances attending the appointment of Admiral Nomura as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. The press has reported that he repeatedly declined this assignment. The fact that Admiral Nomura,

with

with his high character, his statesmanship, and his well-known friendship for the United States, finally accepted the responsibilities of the position of Japanese Ambassador to the United States, indicates to us that there is still desire on the part of Japan that progress toward improving relations between the United States and Japan may be made.

Note: With reference to the question of "tone" in the opening stages of our contacts with the new Japanese Ambassador, it is believed that it may be advisable -- in the light of indications from the Far East -- to "speak softly" (carefully avoiding any word that might to a wishful thinker imply that we would consider offers of "compromise"), while simultaneously giving by our acts in the Pacific new glimpses of diplomatic, economic, and naval "big sticks".

*State  
P.S.F. State*

*file  
Confidential*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

February 19, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Vincent Astor came in, by reference from the White House. He thought there ought to be passport control between here and Bermuda, so that there should not be too much espionage at the new naval base. He also thought the F.B.I. ought to be taking measures to combat espionage among the workmen employed to build the naval base.

(1) I took this up with the State Department. We are putting passport control into effect between the United States and Bermuda -- and other places where naval bases have been acquired and are being built.

(2) I took up with the Committee (F.B.I., O.N.I., M.I.D.) the question of taking care of the civilians imported to build the Bermuda naval base. The Director of O.N.I. assumed jurisdiction and is arranging with F.B.I. to check all government civilian employees; to cover mail; etc. If the British request, they are willing that F.B.I. men may circulate among the civilian employees during

PSF: *State*

- 2 -

during building. This last question I am taking up with the British Embassy.

Attached, a copy of the memorandum of Captain James, O.N.I., covering the matter.

*A.A.B.*  
A.A.B., Jr.

Attachment

PSF: State Dept

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to No.

Op-16  
Fl3-5/RF13-4  
Serial No. 0115916

FEB 18 1941



MEMORANDUM for Mr. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State:

Regarding the protection of the British in Bermuda against espionage, sabotage, etc., referred to me at your conference with M.I.D., F.B.I., and O.N.I. on February 12, the following is reported:

Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence will immediately request bureaus or divisions concerned to furnish lists of government civilian employees to be sent to Bermuda and to have contractors furnish similar lists of non-government employees. These lists will be cleared through F.B.I.

Until the leases are signed and the United States assumes jurisdiction over the territory to be used as bases, all security in Bermuda, including censorship, is beyond our province and is the responsibility of the British. However, pending completion of the formal leases, working arrangements have been made in Bermuda between the Commanding Officer of U. S. Naval Vessels and the local authorities regarding censorship, which, it is understood, are satisfactory to all concerned.

After the leases are signed and the United States assumes jurisdiction over the territory to be used as bases, the Army and the Navy will furnish the necessary security thereon against sabotage, secret radio sets, etc.

The Army, Navy, and Post Office authorities already have reached an agreement whereby, as soon as United States post offices are established on these bases, the mail of U. S. military and naval forces will be examined prior to mailing, and the mail of other personnel will be likewise treated, or they will be denied the use of the U. S. post offices located on the bases.

Respectfully,

Jules James,  
Acting Director of Naval Intelligence.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

OSD letter, May 3, 1972

By RT, NARS Date APR 10 1973

*File  
Personal  
Confidential* State  
2-41

Plymouth, Connecticut,  
21 February 1941.

Dear Miss Lehland:

I am writing to express the hope that the President may see fit to encourage Wendell Willkie to make a trip to China. My reasons are these:


a) The internal situation in China is extremely critical. The Chinese Communist Party has at last bowed its back and taken a firm stand against the persecutions of the Chungking government. The task of restoring mutual confidence and arranging a modus operandi by which the two parties can work together until the war is over is most difficult. I believe that American influence - which means the influence of the President - can turn the trick. This would consist of impressing the Chungking government with American conviction that the united front must be maintained until Japan has been defeated, and also of conveying to the Chungking government that our government does not desire the liquidation of the Chinese communist armies. (The Chungking officials think that we do favor this last point.)

b) The major problem is to convey the wishes of the American government directly to the Generalissimo in a manner that will leave him in no doubt as to their validity. In other words, the wall of bureaucracy around the Generalissimo must be penetrated.

I do not know, of course, the nature of the mission of Mr. Currie, but if he carried a specific message to Chiang Kai-shek from the President it was precisely the correct move and should go far towards advancing the cause of unity in China. If that could be followed by a trip by Mr. Willkie I believe the result would be to strengthen whatever case Mr. Currie presented. As Mr. Willkie has recently made a trip to Britain a trip to China so soon thereafter would be tantamount to a gesture of recognizing Chiang Kai-shek and China as a partner in the democratic cause of equal rank with Britain. Knowing the Chinese as I do I am sure it would be so regarded. And Mr. Willkie would receive corresponding attention and respect. If he also could carry a message from the President, so much the better.

With kind regards, I am,

Sincerely,



Miss Marguerite Lehland,  
The White House,

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 19 PAGEX 3454

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*Dispatches  
Hull folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Poughkeepsie, N. Y.  
February 22, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Renshaw in Secretary Hull's office phoned the following paraphrase of a message for the President from the Former Naval Person:

"Have received better news concerning Japan. It seems Jap Foreign Minister is shortly going to Moscow, Berlin and Rome for the purpose of covering the failure of action against us. The fear of the U. S. appears to have postponed attack which seemed imminent. While completely understanding your situation pending enactment of Bill on which our hopes depend, the more these fears can be aroused the better.

"Appreciation given in my last message to you of naval consequences subsequent to Jap attack against us remains the same in all circumstances."

The message is dated February 20, 1941.

file  
Confidential

State  
2-41

February 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

I have given further consideration to the matter of controlling assets and properties owned by foreigners within the United States. I am sure that this is a matter that needs to be prosecuted at once and, after considering the various proposals, it seems to me the most satisfactory one is to have a Committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to approve of any actions that are to be taken by the Treasury.

It is clear to me that all three Departments are vitally involved, and I should like, therefore, to have the approval of all the Departments prior to any recommendation for action whenever a specific proposal is submitted to me for approval.

Inasmuch as the Treasury is responsible for the actual issuance of the orders, I believe that it would be advisable to have the Secretary of the Committee chosen from the Treasury staff.

F. D. R.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

OK  
to prepare

DRAFT OF MEMORANDUM TO THE FOLLOWING:

The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Attorney General

I have given further consideration to the matter of controlling assets and properties within the United States owned by foreigners. I am sure that this is a matter that needs to be prosecuted at once and, after considering the various proposals, it seems to me the most satisfactory one is to have a Committee composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General to approve of any actions that are to be taken by the Treasury.

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Inasmuch as the Treasury is responsible ~~with~~ for the actual issuance of the orders, I believe that it would be advisable to have the Secretary of the Committee chosen from the Treasury staff.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In reply to your memorandum with regard to the freezing of foreign funds, the attached statement prepared by the experts of the Department of State is self-explanatory. May I commend it to your consideration as a constructive suggestion for meeting an extremely difficult and important problem with full effectiveness and with a minimum of undesirable complications at home and abroad?

CH

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY


THE SECRETARY  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Private

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

C.H.

Any news on a method  
of freezing foreign  
funds? H. W. J. gets  
back today & will  
doubtless ask



MEMORANDUM ON THE FREEZING OF FOREIGN FUNDS

The questions before us are to what extent and by what methods this Government should extend its control over assets and properties within the United States owned by foreigners.

Our freezing system as applied at the present time was adopted for the definite purpose of conserving for their rightful owners the assets of the nationals of certain invaded countries and, incidentally, of keeping such assets out of the hands of the invaders. It is a system under which not alone the movement of frozen funds across our boundaries but also their use within the country are forbidden, except under license.

The question now under consideration concerns methods of extending such control for the purpose of preventing, so far as that is possible through financial means, first, subversive and other hostile acts by foreign interests in this country, and, second, the use of foreign funds for purposes prejudicial to our policy of aid to Great Britain.

To serve these important ends, it is essential to have knowledge as to the extent, control and use of foreign-owned funds and properties in this country, and mobility of action. The initial step indicated is to  
require

require registration of foreign financial interests, with full disclosure of their actual ownership and control. The second step is requirement for such reporting thereafter of transactions in specific accounts as the officials responsible may require. The third step is the creation and exercise of power to freeze any account, individual, corporate or governmental, which is found to be used either in subversive activities or in purchases or other transactions which it is desired to regulate and which are not subject to other controls.

A universal freezing order or one directed geographically against the funds of particular countries, raises the dangers of reprisals (American investments in Axis controlled areas probably exceed Axis assets here by over three to one) and of possible complications of our relations with the countries selected for freezing. At the same time, it does not even provide a sufficiently flexible instrument of control. Freezing of specific accounts provides far greater mobility of action and minimizes international complications. Moreover, to the extent that it may be used as an aid to the British blockade of the Axis Powers, it would operate effectively for this purpose without publicly advertising the fact.

General freezing applied to specific countries would be conducted through close collaboration between the

Treasury,

PROPERTY OF THE  
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

create complications with respect to South American relations and relations with friendly European nations (Switzerland, Portugal, Sweden), the harmful effects of which would far outweigh any benefits obtained. This would both permit evasion and do unnecessary harm. An example of the latter would be general freezing applied to Swiss interests. The effect of this might well be to throw Swiss economy into such confusion that financial collapse might do what neither German military pressure nor German propaganda has yet been able to achieve. An example of the former would be that freezing applied to the Axis Powers, even with Russia added, would still make it possible by transactions through South American and other countries whose interests could not be wisely frozen to achieve by the Axis Powers the object which the order would intend to prevent. Whenever, in the opinion of the authorities in control of freezing, mobility of action requires that the authorities know the facts, continually keep abreast of them, and have authority to freeze specific accounts used for purposes which this Government desires to prevent. In the exercise of such mobile powers the authorities should not be limited to the nationals of any country, but should be free to proceed wherever the necessity may arise. The exercise of such power should be conducted through close collaboration between the

Treasury,



Since last June I have been urging the extension of freezing control to cover at least the property of the Axis powers in this country. Here are a few examples that have come to my attention in the last couple of days, which show the need of action and the danger of delay.

1. Since the first of the year Italian agents have withdrawn from a single bank in New York over \$6 million in U. S. currency, with old bills always specified.

2. The Italian Government has built up a \$10 million account with the Bank of Brazil.

3. In the past month alone the Yokohama Specie Bank in New York has transferred to Brazil over \$6 million, and we have just received word that the Yokohama Specie Bank is negotiating with the National Bank of Haiti to take over all the New York accounts of the Yokohama Specie Bank and to handle all its Western Hemisphere business from Haiti.

4. Companies ostensibly of Swiss and Swedish ownership have been creating dummy corporations in Haiti and Panama to hold American securities.

5. Mitsubishi is planning to deposit all of its dollar notes with the New York branch of a Brazilian bank.

PSF, State, 1941

The Postmaster General (Walker) to President Roosevelt, [Washington] February 25, 1941. States that a representative of the Japanese Government is in Washington to negotiate terms for a settlement of Far Eastern questions.

Major General Edwin M. Watson wrote to FDR, February 27, 1941 that Frank Walker had brought in this memorandum and wished FDR to see it.

see Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, page 54.

[Document bears the State Dept file number 711.94/1973 2/3]

RLJ

11/28/56

## DEMOKRATISCHE FLÜCHTLINGSFÜRSORGE

Überweisungen erbeten an  
Böhmische Escompte-Bank und Kredit-Anstalt auf Konto  
Demokratische Flüchtlingsfürsorge

TELEFON 30271.

PRAG,  
L. PRAKOPY 17.

193

Kurt Grossman  
159 West 102 Street  
New York City

March 1, 1941

In the capacity of executive secretary of the Democratic Refugee Relief Committee (Demokratische Flüchtlingsfürsorge) I wish to make the following statement about Mr. Hans Tittel whom I knew very well.

The above-named committee had official relations with the Czechoslovakian government and had to pass on the identity and vouch for the reliability of each refugee in Czechoslovakia before the refugee was granted legal permission to reside in that country. The case of Hans Tittel was thoroughly investigated by our organization and the Czechoslovakian police independently investigated Mr. Tittel's background. It was then established that Hans Tittel was an authentic refugee from Germany who had proven his opposition to all forms of dictatorship. Mr. Tittel was then granted permanent asylum in Czechoslovakia as an anti-fascist political refugee.

Because of the imminent danger of invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Nazis, Mr. Tittel left for France late in July, 1938. Every foreigner who left Czechoslovakia had to register his departure with the police and this registration for Mr. Tittel was done by my committee under my direct supervision at the end of July, 1938. Mr. Tittel was also in possession of a Czechoslovakian non-citizen's passport issued according to the Czechoslovakian Alien Law of March 28, 1928, Article 5. Such passports were issued only after a thorough, prolonged police investigation of the reliability of the recipient. Mr. Tittel was so investigated and also was eligible for this passport because he was not in possession of any other passport since he had fled from Germany shortly after Hitler came to power.

I, personally, wish to state that I have the utmost regard for Mr. Tittel and am convinced that he is a staunch defender of democracy and liberty. When he resided in Asch he was consulted by my organization and exchanged information with us on the reliability of other refugees.

*Helen Beyer*

Helen Beyer, Notary Public  
N. Y. Co. CD, No. 1059, Reg. No. 1230  
Ex. Co. No. 1059, Reg. No. 1230  
Notary Public, New York City

*Kurt Grossman*  
Kurt Grossman  
159 West 102 St., N.Y.C.

ДАН  
СЪСТАВИТЕЛСТВО  
ДЕМОКРАТИЧЕ СЪЦИЛ



6

Siegmund Hoffer  
600 Hope Street  
Providence, R.I.

March 1, 1941

I, Siegmund Hoffer, residing now in Providence, Rhode Island, emigrated from Czechoslovakia to the United States in 1938. Until I left Czechoslovakia I was for many years a member and local executive officer of the Social Democratic Party in Gablonz and as such became acquainted with Mr. Hans Tittel. As early as 1935 and for three years thereafter I had frequent contact with Mr. Tittel. He was a devoted worker for the unity of all the trade unions, was very active in the cooperative movement and proved through his activity and behavior that he is a strong defender of democratic freedom and opposed to all kinds of totalitarianism. Mr. Tittel resided in the city of Asch and fought there for the maintenance of democratic principles in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. Tittel was neither a member of the Communist Party nor of the Trotskyist organization and was attacked by the Communists as well as by the Nazis.

I found in Mr. Tittel an upright and honorable man who detested every act of violence and was in full harmony with what the democratic elements in Czechoslovakia worked for.

I was for many years a member of the old firm of H. Nordlinger Sons, Inc. in New York and Providence and founded in 1925 the firm of Hoffer-Ashley, Inc. in Providence which firm I left at the end of 1938. I was a resident of Gablonz, Czechoslovakia and was in charge of the European interests of these firms. Since December, 1940 I have been treasurer and secretary of E. Max Weiss, Inc. in Providence.

*Siegmund Hoffer*

Siegmund Hoffer  
600 Hope Street  
Providence, R.I.

*Rubin Beyer*

RUBIN BEYER, Notary Public  
N. Y. Co. Clk. No. 1639, Reg. No. 12957  
Ex. Co. Clk. No. 300, Reg. No. 312B41  
Term expires March 30, 1941

10

Solomon Monossohn-Schwarz  
51 West 92 Street  
New York City

I, Solomon Monossohn-Schwarz, doctor of law, writer, 51 West 92 Street, New York City, came to the United States as a refugee on an emergency visitor's visa. I am a member of the Russian Socialdemocratic Labor Party. Under the Republican Government of Kerensky in 1917 I was Director of the Department of Social Security in the Ministry of Labor. I lived as a refugee first in Germany and then in Paris, France, from 1933 till 1940.

I met there Siegfried Pfeffer and became friends with him. I knew him for years as a genuine and honorable anti-Nazi refugee. He was affiliated first with the German Socialdemocratic Youth Movement and afterwards with the German Socialist Worker's Party.

He never was a member either of the Communist or of the Trotzkyist party.

As Pfeffer opposed the Communists he was frequently attacked by them as well as by the Nazis.

The charges made against Pfeffer by the Police of the Vichy Government cannot have any other base than slander leveled against him by the Communists or Nazis.

March 4, 1941

*Solomon Monossohn-Schwarz*

Solomon Monossohn-Schwarz  
51 West 92 Street  
New York City

*Rubin Beyer*

RUBIN BEYER, Notary Public  
N. Y. Co. Clk. No. 1659, Reg. No. 1B957  
Ex. Co. Clk. No. 300, Reg. No. 312B41  
Term expires March 30, 1941



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

February 28, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

I have a telegram from Dr. Frank Kingdon in re my "smelly" refugees in France, in which he acknowledges receipt of my letter, a copy of which I sent to you. He assures me that he is making a full investigation on which he will report to me early next week.

Sincerely yours,

*Harold I. Fisher*

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,  
The White House.

78107  
Lester

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. I.

What shall I tell  
Cordell? I don't like the  
smell of your friends in  
France.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 25, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

On January 24 you requested us to intercede with the French Government in behalf of four persons. Your request was predicated on a note to you from Mr. Ickes. The persons concerned were Maurice Pfeffer, Jean (Hans) Tittel, Fritz Lamm and Francois Boegler, and the request was that they be transferred from Camp Vernet where it was alleged they were to be turned over to the Germans to Camp Milles where the refugees with American visas are collected.

We immediately made the representation to the French Government and are now in receipt of its reply. Considering the nature of the reply I feel it necessary to present the matter to you for your re-consideration with the thought that you may have some directions to give me in the premises.

The Embassy at Vichy informs us that the names of

none

The President,

The White House.

none of these four persons appear on the list of political refugees which are claimed by the German Government and that consequently the fears which were entertained for their safety here were probably not well founded. The Embassy further advises us that the French Government has responded favorably in the case of Maurice Pfeffer and Jean (Hans) Tittel and has transferred them to Camp Milles, which, we are advised, implies a consent to the departure of these persons from France. But the Embassy reports that both of these persons have belonged to the Trotskyist branch of the Communist Party in Germany. As Communists they are, of course, inadmissible to the United States.

In addition to that, they state that they have nothing specific against Pfeffer except that he has been considered by them politically undesirable and was once ordered deported.

However, Tittel's record, as reported by the French Government, is such as to cause us some consternation. The Vichy Embassy advises us that his record shows a considerable political activity of a subversive nature; that he has been brought on several occasions to the attention of the police; that he has used both Polish and German identity papers, the German papers being false; that he was in possession and use for purposes

of

of communicating with Germany, and as late as 1938, of a secret radio transmitter; that he was in possession of explosives and of seditious tracts of the Fourth International in such circumstances as to lead to the suspicion that he was implicated in the Etoile bombing outrage; et cetera.

We find ourselves in just a little embarrassment because of these revelations. In the first place, Tittel was given a visa to come to the United States on the recommendation of one of the committees recommending persons to whom visas should be issued. A visitor's visa was issued to him in September 1940 on such recommendation. In the light of the information now come to hand it seems it will be wise for us to withdraw that visa.


But the French have acceded to our suggestion and transferred these two persons, one of them with a very bad record and the other apparently not only undesirable but inadmissible, to a camp which implies a consent of the French Government to their departure from France, presumably for the United States. However, we are unable to admit these people to the United States. To admit them temporarily might be dangerous to our national defense, but it would also include an undertaking for them

them to leave for another country, presumably one of the American Republics. I doubt very much that it is consistent with our policy to have persons of that type infiltrated into other American countries and consequently feel that we should not admit them to this country for that purpose.

Admiral Leahy adds to his telegram that the Foreign Office indicated some surprise that the American Government would interest itself in these men.

Considering that these two men are inadmissible into the United States as Communists, and considering our laws on the subject and our practices under the present circumstances, I think you may want to direct that our intercessions with the French Government on their behalf be withdrawn. I am attaching a telegram which would carry that out and if you will indicate your approval I will see that it is dispatched. I recommend it to your favorable consideration.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Telegram to American  
Embassy, Vichy, France.

PREPARING OFFICE  
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED  
CONFIDENTIAL CODE  
NONCONFIDENTIAL CODE  
PARTAIR  
PLAIN

Collect { Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Department of State

Charge Department:

Full rate  
Day letter  
Night letter

Washington,

Charge to

February 21, 1941.

\$

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

VICHY,

Department's 78, January 25, 5 p.m.

Your 197, February 15, 2 p.m.

In view of the statements as to the reputation  
and records of Pfeffer and Tittel, which were not known  
to the American Government, you are authorized to with-  
draw intercession in their behalf.

UK

A-L: BL: SRW

SRW

Enciphered by \_\_\_\_\_

Sent by operator \_\_\_\_\_ M. \_\_\_\_\_ 19 \_\_\_\_\_

15F State Dept Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 7, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I enclose letter from Secretary Iokes and letter from Dr. Frank Kingdon in regard to the people interned in France whom you wrote to me about on January 28th.

Please read. *Send back.* It does not seem wholly to go along with State Department information.

F. D. R.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior, 3/5/41 to the President, referring to papers forwarded to him (the Secretary) last week, from the Secretary of State, in re certain persons in behalf of whom, at the President's instance, representations had been made to the French Govt. by our State Dept. The Secretary at once communicated with Dr. Frank Kingdon, Chairman of the Emergency Rescue Committee, who had furnished the Secretary with the original information which he had forwarded to the President. Encloses reply from Dr. Kingdon, 3/4/41, with attached affidavits from Kurt Grossman, NYC, 3/1/41 in re Hans Tittel; Siegaund Hoffer, Providence, R.I., (over)



in re Mr. Tittel; Conrad Reiser, NYC, in re Hans Tittel and Siegfried Pfeffer; Solomon Monosohn-Schwarz, NYC, in re Siegfried Pfeffer; A.R.L. Gurland, NYC, in re Siegfried Pfeffer. The Secretary of the Interior, in his letter, states that the burden is distinctly upon those who hold these men in France at the risk of their health and in danger of their lives.

Also attached is White House file, consisting of carbon of President's memorandum of 1/24/41 to the Secretary of State, "For necessary action. Let the Secretary of the Interior know", attached to which was note from the Secretary of the Interior 1/22/41 with accompanying memo to Harold Oram from Paul Hagen, brought to the Secretary's attention by Frank Kingdon, asking aid for Francois Boegler, Jean Tittel, Fritz Lamm, and Pfeffer, radiogram from Fry, Marseilles, 1/19/41 in re above; letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, 1/28/41 to the President in re above, letter from Secretary of the Interior, 2/26/41, in reply to President's memorandum of 2/26/41 to the Secretary of the Interior, with which was transmitted copy of a letter from Secy. of State, 2/25/41, "What shall I tell Cordell? I don't like the smell of your friends in France", copy of Secy. Ickes' letter of 2/8/41 to Dr. Kingdon, telegram prepared by State to be sent to American Embassy at Vichy, dated 2/21/41, but which was not sent, and letter from Secy. Interior, 2/28/41 advising that Dr. Kingdon is making a full investigation of the matter.

Letter from the Secretary of the Interior to the President, relating to matters referred to him (the Secretary) last week, from the Secretary of State, in re certain persons in behalf of whom, at the President's instance, representations had been made to the French Govt. by our State Dept. The Secretary at once consulted with Dr. Frank Kingdon, Chairman of the Emergency Rescue Committee, who had provided the Secretary with the original information which he had forwarded to the President. Enclosed



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR  
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1941.

My dear Mr. President:

You will remember that you forwarded to me last week a copy of the letter from the Secretary of State, with a personal inquiry attached, with reference to certain persons in behalf of whom, at your instance, representations had been made to the French Government by our State Department. I communicated at once with Dr. Frank Kingdon, Chairman of the Emergency Rescue Committee, who had furnished me with the original information which I forwarded to you. I now enclose his reply with attached affidavits. It would seem to me that on the face of the record as it now stands, the burden is distinctly upon those who hold these men in France at the risk of their health and in danger of their lives.

Sincerely yours,

*Harold I. Gehes*

Secretary of the Interior.


The President,  
The White House.

Enc.

Emergency Rescue Committee  
*Incorporated*

122 EAST 42nd STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y.

MURRAY HILL 3-4590



**Chairman**

Frank Kingdon

**Vice Chairman**

L. Hollingsworth Wood

**Treasurer**

David F. Seiferheld

**Secretary**

Mildred Adams

**Executive Assistant to Chairman**

Ingrid Warburg

**National Committee**

Mrs. Emmons Blaine

Elmer Davis

Dr. Robert Hutchins

Dr. Alvin Johnson

Mrs. Henry Goddard Leach

Dr. William Allen Neilson

Dr. Charles Seymour

Dr. George Shuster

Raymond Gram Swing

Dorothy Thompson

March 4, 1941

The Hon. Harold L. Ickes  
Department of the Interior  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

In accordance with the promise which I made you in the telegram sent to you last week, I am now able to give you the first results of my inquiry into the case of the four people in whose behalf I sought your help. The main criticism seems to be of the case of Jean (Hans) Tittel whose record, as reported by the French Government, was assumed to be "bad." As far as I can discover the basis of this judgment is inadequate. Let me tax your patience with an examination of the charges against him.

First, the French records say, as you wrote me, that Tittel "was in possession of explosives and of seditious tracts of the Fourth International in such circumstances as to lead to the suspicion that he was implicated in the Etoile bombing outrage." This bombing, according to the best information that I can get, was the work of cagouleurs in September, 1937. I am enclosing with this letter two affidavits, both proving that Mr. Tittel was living in Asch, Czechoslovakia in 1937, that he was a respectable anti-Nazi immigrant and was there with the special permission of the Czechoslovakian Government and under the control of the Czech governmental refugee institutions supported by them. He did not leave Czechoslovakia before the end of July, 1938, thus he could not have been affiliated with the bombing of the Etoile. As far as I can discover, he has never been under any investigation of an accusation of having been connected with this crime.

Tittel applied for a French visa from Czechoslovakia in the early summer of 1938. At that time the inquiries about the bombing had already been closed in France. He certainly would not have been granted a visa to France if there had been any suspicion of his connection with that crime. At that time visitors' visas for German exiles

from Czechoslovakia to France were granted only to persons with especial permission from the French Foreign Office. The French Consulate in Prague had no general permission to grant such visas without authorization from Paris. Tittel, like all of the exiles in the same case, was carefully investigated before being granted the visa.

Secondly, I enclose an affidavit signed by Siegmund Hoffer who attests Tittel's political activities in Czechoslovakia. Further inquiry among the German exiles whom I trust informs me that Tittel was the object of attack by Nazis, Communists and Trotskyites because of his democratic beliefs. He was connected with the local unions in the Sudetenland village of Asch where he was under the public control of the local labor movement and the Czech authorities who apparently liked him for his courageous stand against the growing Nazi and Henlein influence.

Thirdly, as far as I can discover, Tittel never used "Polish and German identity papers", the German papers being forged. Tittel, in fact, travelled from Czechoslovakia to France on a Czechoslovakian refugee passport. This fact is attested by the enclosed statement from Kurt Grossmann whose office obtained this passport. Concerning these passports Mr. Grossmann states "Such passports were issued only after a thorough prolonged police investigation of the reliability of the recipient."

Fourthly, I should question seriously the charge that Tittel was in possession of a secret radio transmitter in France as stated by the French police records. As a matter of fact, the stories of such secret transmitters were mostly bluff. During the summer of 1938, up to the beginning of the war in 1939, French authorities carefully controlled French territories and such a transmitter would have been found if in operation, but we have no evidence that Tittel was ever accused of using such an instrument.

Before the war Tittel was not molested by the French authorities. During the war, as you and I know, all German emigrants were under supervision. If Tittel had been under the slightest suspicion, he would have been sent to prison and not with other refugees to a detention camp. It looks to me as though the accusations against Tittel are a species of smoke screen, set up by police officers now under control of the very capogulards upon whom rested the chief responsibility for the 1937 bombing of the Etoile. I should add that the fact that Tittel has been transferred to the camp in Millés and that the French Government is ready to give him an exit permit is itself an indication that the accusations are doubtful.

Now a few words about the other three men. Your letter makes no reference to any bad record in their cases. I realize that the French authorities may keep certain other accusations in other files, but failing their production, I think we should continue our insistence that the French authorities allow these people to depart. I am glad to hear that

none of them is on the extradition list. I gathered the information from your letter that this might be a point against them, perhaps as an indication of their not being "famous" enough. We have some difficulty in explaining why certain outstanding people among the thousands of Germans in France are on the list while others are not, but at any rate, we should be happy to get our friends out even though they do not bear the accolade of Nazi vengeance. These men whose names I have submitted to you have at least achieved the degree of fame that belongs to those who were the first to get out of France through the united efforts of our rescue organizations by boarding a boat in Marseilles, in company with certain respectable French and Belgian officers. They had the misfortune to be recaptured and sent back to the camp. For this attempted escape they were tried and acquitted but told that they must stay in camp for the duration of the war.

Franz Boegler was Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party in the Palatinate. He was a member of the Diet. He also escaped to Czechoslovakia and was, like Tittel, under the control of the Czech Government and came to France under similar conditions. He is backed here by the American Friends of German Freedom. His wife and child are already in this country so that it is unusually cruel to hold him in camp in France.

Fritz Lamm, backed by both the American Friends of German Freedom and the International Relief Association, used to be a youth leader in the Social Democratic Movement of Germany and has never been connected or affiliated or in sympathy with the Communist Party movement. Some of his friends are already here. He is not in good health and has been in the camp hospital most of the time so that his detention for the duration of the war would probably mean his death.

Siegfried Pfeffer was an organizer of the Social Democratic Youth Movement in Chemnitz. Information has just come to me that it is possible that the charges preferred against Tittel are in fact based on a dossier against Pfeffer. If there has been this confusion, let me say that certain charges were made against Pfeffer by the Communist group and in order to clear this matter up I am enclosing documents attesting the character and activities of Pfeffer during the period for which he was under fire.

The same conditions existed for these people as for Tittel when they went to France. All of them were carefully investigated. All of them got their visas through the Blum Government or its successor. The one or the other may have "a record" but let me say a word about French records. Among the millions of emigrants in France, thousands could not avoid getting on the record. If once a man was denounced by somebody as an enemy, the French system kept such denunciations in their files even though they were proven untrue. In some cases there was apparently no investigation. In other cases the accusation was proved untrue but the record remained. In every serious case we may be sure that there was not only an investigation but an indictment, but none of those for whom we are working was ever indicted during the time that democratic justice prevailed in France. To-day the new police facing criticism abroad and, as in these cases, facing official intervention from American sources, may be tempted to shock us and keep us

away from further rescue and help. I do not think that we should give in to them too easily.

Let me say emphatically that neither I nor the Emergency Rescue Committee will lift a finger to help any Communist to get into this country. We have a group of reliable and intelligent people who know the Europeans and their past intimately. No name is submitted for a visa or for any other action until it has been scrutinized by this group. Please believe me, my dear Mr. Secretary, when I say that I count you as one of the first fighters for democracy in our time and that I am proud to be associated with you as a colleague in the struggle for liberty and justice.

Sincerely yours,

*Frankfurter*

RECEIVED  
MARCH 11 1941  
BY  
MURPHY

A. R. L. GURLAND  
315 West 99' St.  
New York City, N.Y.

March 3, 1941

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Camp Network

This is to state that I have known Mr. Siegfried Pfeffer of Chemnitz, Germany, now in ~~prison~~ in unoccupied France, ever since I first met him at Chemnitz in 1932 when I was associate chief editor of the Chemnitz Social Democratic daily, "Volksstimme". Mr. Pfeffer had headed the Social Democratic Youth Organization (Sozialistische Arbeiter-Jugend) of the Chemnitz region until the end of 1931, and although he had severed connections with the Social Democratic Party at that time, he was spoken of as a most honorable and gifted young man, and introduced to me, by outstanding leaders of the Social Democratic movement there. I also became acquainted with the Pfeffer family, relatives of close personal friends of mine, and visited several times at the Pfeffers' home where I met Siegfried Pfeffer's father and sisters. Mr. Pfeffer's father, who had joined the German Social Democratic Party when he came to Germany in his early youth, was a well-known hosiery manufacturer in Chemnitz and President of the Jewish Community there for a long time. The family was native of that part of Austria which later became Polish, but Siegfried Pfeffer was born at Chemnitz, Germany, and always thought of himself as a German. He had applied for German citizenship prior to 1933 and was granted the citizenship as a matter of principle some time before National Socialism came to power. He had not yet been given the German passport, though, and when he had to flee Nazi persecution, he was granted a Polish passport by the Polish Consulate. Nevertheless, he said he was a German refugee, which he was right in doing, when he emigrated to France. This accounts for the charges made against him by the French police, concerning what they call his "double citizenship" or "faked identity".

When I first met him, Mr. Pfeffer was in charge of the Chemnitz Youth Organization affiliated with the Socialist Workers' Party, a small group that had split off from the Social Democratic Party. Although we were not on quite friendly terms on this account politically, I had wide opportunity to admire Siegfried Pfeffer's sincere and genuine attachment to the ideals of Democracy and Freedom and his active participation in the political struggle both against Nazis and Communists. He often was in imminent danger of persecution by Nazi Storm Troopers and proved a courageous defender of democratic rights. After having left Germany in 1933 I met Siegfried Pfeffer again in Paris, France, some time in August, 1933, and kept close contacts with him ever since. I have known Siegfried Pfeffer as an active and outstanding member of the Socialist Workers' Party organization in exile; for a long time he was in charge of their contacts inside Germany. With some friends he separated from that Party around 1937 and then devoted himself entirely to his professional activities on the staff of "Bureau International de Documentation", a press-clippings service on Germany's social and economic developments well-known in this country as a reliable source of information. He never was member of any Communist organization, neither did he participate in any Trotskyite organizations. Contrariwise, he was a target of venomous Stalinist and also Trotskyite attacks, and I have reason to believe that any charges that might be made against him by French authorities are due to Stalinist denunciations. Siegfried Pfeffer never participated in French politics, either; he never had anything to do with subversive activities directed against the French Republican Government, and the French police had never any substantiated charges against him, nor did they ever indict him on any charges whatever.

I sincerely hope that Siegfried Pfeffer will be given the opportunity to escape police persecution in France as well as the danger of being extradited to ~~the~~ authorities through being admitted to enter the United States.

*Rubin Beyer*

RUBIN BEYER, Notary Public  
N. Y. Co. Clk. No. 1659, Reg. No. 18967  
Es. Co. Clk. No. 300, Reg. No. 312241  
Term expires March 30, 1941

*A. R. L. Gurland*  
A. R. L. Gurland, Ph.D.,  
Research Associate, Institute of Social Research,  
Columbia University

PSF  
State

February 21, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

VICHY.

Department's 78, January 25, 5 p.m.

Your 197, February 15, 2 p.m.

In view of the statements as to the reputation and records of Pfeffer and Fitt el, which were not known to the American Government, you are authorized to withdraw intercession in their behalf.

A-L: BL: SRW

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Comm. JBA, Depar  
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MICHIOH ENBUWA

In re: Mr. Hans Tittel  
Hans Tittel  
1111  
1111

1 March 1941

Conrad Reisner  
839 West End Ave.  
New York City

BSF  
State 7

I, Conrad Reisner, former director of the Service Juridique et Social pour les Réfugiés Allemands, secretary of the exiled German group having on the Advisory Committee for German Refugees at the Ministry of Interior and Secretary of the Federation of German Refugees in France herewith want to declare the following:

I have been informed that several charges have been made by the French police against the German refugee Hans Tittel.

From my occupation in Paris it is known to me that similar charges are supposed to have been made against the German refugee Siegfried (not Maurice) Pfeffer, but I never heard that such charges were ever made against Hans Tittel.

Siegfried Pfeffer is known to me since 1933, when he fled from Chemnitz to Paris. I know that the French police became interested in him and I was myself in my capacity as secretary of several refugee organizations questioned about him by an inspector of the Political Police. I expressed my conviction that he is an authentic political refugee, a fighter against all forms of totalitarianism and a most honorable person. I had the impression that Pfeffer was denounced by political enemies, probably by communists who frequently used such means to involve people they hated in difficulties. Obviously none of the alleged charges could be held up, which was proven by the fact that the authorities gave Mr. Pfeffer a carte d'identite' in 1937 or 1938. This card means that he was given an extendable permit to stay in France which was valid for three years and he even was given the right to work.

The French Government issued a decree on September 17, 1936 in connection with the convention at Geneva of July 4, 1936, according to which all persons who had fled from Germany because of the advent to power of the Nazis could apply for recognition as (political) refugees and for the

Conrad Reisner  
Conrad Reisner

issuance of a so-called refugee passport. To examine these applications an Advisory Committee was founded which worked with the Minister of the Interior and with which I worked as a secretary. This committee gave its opinion after the most thorough examination. It recognized Siegfried Pfeffer as a political refugee and the ministry evidently followed this decision by issuing the above-mentioned carte d'identite.

Since the beginning of the war Mr. Pfeffer has been interned in the Camp de Vernet. Before this time he spent only one day in police custody and this was on December 6, 1938 when the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, visited Paris. A great number of German political refugees were arrested for one day at that time because the French police evidently feared demonstrations against the Nazi representative. It seems to me that there is an antagonism between this measure, which was taken against anti-Hitler refugees only and the charge that Pfeffer was not an authentic anti-Hitler emigrant.

I also want to point out, that there has never been a regular accusation against Pfeffer and that he never had to face any trial which would have been a matter of course had he really owned explosives or had he anything to do with the bombing-attempt at the Etoile etc.

It is a known fact that the bombing attempt at the Etoile has been staged by French Fascists some of whom have been arrested.

I know Siegfried Pfeffer very well and can declare with all certainty that he is a convinced and active opponent of the Nazi regime and that he never had the least bit to do with Fifth-Columnists. He also was never a member of the Communist or Trotzkyist Party but belonged to a socialist group which the Communists constantly fought against.

*Cesareo Reiser*

I made the acquaintance of Hans Tittel in Paris and he, too, is known to me to be a decided enemy of the Nazis and above all suspicion to ever have had contact with Fifth-Columnists.

March 4, 1941

*Conrad Reisner*  
Conrad Reisner  
839 West End Ave.  
New York City

*Rubin Bryer*

RUBIN BRYER, Notary Public  
N. Y. Co. Clk. No. 1669, Reg. No. 18997  
Ex. Co. Clk. No. 300, Reg. No. 312842  
Term expires March 30, 1941

*State Dept. folder*

See: Japan folder for memo of conversation on U. S.-Japanese  
Relations between Sec. Hull and Ambassador Nomura 3/8/41

*file*  
*PSF State Dept folder*  
*2-41 a-a*  
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

3-10-41

MEMORANDUM

This is in reference to the memorandum submitted by the British Embassy under date of February 27, 1941 concerning the application of section 10 of the United States Criminal Code (U.S.C. Title 18, sec. 22) to a proposed plan for securing the services of mechanics with radio training residing in the United States.

It appears from the memorandum that mechanical devices have recently been developed by the British for the location of approaching airplanes and these machines require constant and continuous servicing by specially trained radio mechanics. Moreover, since information which is regarded as secret must be made available to the mechanics servicing these machines, such mechanics are inducted into the armed forces of the British or Canadian Governments and placed under military discipline.

It is further understood that there is a present need in the United Kingdom for approximately 8,000 persons

to

to perform these functions and to secure this number it will be necessary to obtain radio experts now engaged throughout Canada and the United Kingdom in civilian activities and governmental work of a non-military nature. Such action, however, will result in a shortage of mechanics in these other fields and the proposal now being considered by the British authorities is directed at providing a solution to such a situation.

Under this plan training schools would be established throughout Canada for the purpose of training persons in various branches of radio work. Appeals would be made formally and informally to individuals residing in the United States who have had radio experience to apply for entrance into these schools. Representatives of the schools would be placed in several sections of the United States for the purpose of advising applicants of the type of training which would be given by the schools and for the purpose of examining applicants to determine whether they possess qualifications, personal and professional, deemed satisfactory to the competent authorities of the

United

United Kingdom and Canada. Where applicants are found to be satisfactory but lack the means to travel to Canada financial assistance would be provided.

Upon the completion of the training period, the length of which would depend upon the aptitude and prior experience of the individuals concerned, several alternatives hereinafter referred to in detail, would be made available to them.

In the memorandum under reference the views of the Department of State are requested with respect to the question whether the activities contemplated, in so far as they are carried on within the territory of the United States, are proscribed by Section 10 of the United States Criminal Code.

This section reads as follows:

"Whoever, within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another person to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a  
marine

marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer shall be fined not more than \$1,000 and imprisoned not more than three years: Provided, That this section shall not apply to citizens or subjects of any country engaged in war with a country with which the United States is at war, unless such citizen or subject of such foreign country shall hire or solicit a citizen of the United States to enlist or go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to enlist or enter the service of a foreign country. Enlistments under this proviso shall be under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War."

The question submitted concerns only that provision which states that whoever "within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, ... hires or retains another person to enlist or ... to go beyond the limits ... of the United States with intent to be enlisted ..." in the armed forces of any foreign government, "shall be fined not more than \$1,000 and imprisoned not more than three years."

The indicia of the act of enlisting are sufficiently well known to require no elaboration. But other aspects

of

of this provision have been the subject of litigation and merit further consideration. It has been held that the intent of the person hiring or retaining, as well as the person leaving the country, must be established in order to sustain an indictment under this statute.

United States v. Kavinski, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15508 (D.C. Mass. 1855); United States v. Hertz, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15367 (C.C. Pa. 1855). Yet it is well established that the absence of a "solemn contract of hiring in the United States" is without significance in as much as a "party may be retained by verbal promise, or by invitation, for a declared or known purpose" (7 Op. Atty. Gen. 377, 378.)

Moreover, in Gayon v. McCarthy (252 U.S. 171) the Supreme Court has held that one who induces another by a promise of a commission in the armed forces of a foreign country is guilty under the statute. As the Court said in that case (at page 174):

"The word 'retained' is used in the statute as an alternative to 'hired' and means something different from the usual employment with payment in money.

One may be retained, in the sense of engaged, to render a service as effectively by a verbal as by a written promise, by a prospect for advancement or payment in the future as by the immediate payment of cash."

As it is understood by the Department of State the proposal now being considered does not contemplate the act of enlistment within the United States in the Canadian or British armed forces; it envisages, at the most, the enrollment of individuals in training schools to be established in Canada. And these schools would be conducted by and form a part of the civilian branch as distinguished from the military branch of the Canadian or British Governments. Accordingly, it is apparent that the portion of the statute prohibiting enlistment in the United States would not be contravened.

With reference to the provision prohibiting the hiring or retention of a person to leave the country for the purpose of enlisting, it is clear that a promise of acceptance in the Canadian or British army, navy or air force

force would constitute a violation of the law under the principle enunciated in the Gayon case, (supra), provided the necessary intent were established. From the facts as stated, however, the representatives of the schools will have no authority to make such offers and it is reasonable to assume that specific instructions against such activities will be issued and strictly complied with. The purpose of having representatives interview applicants is twofold: (a) to determine whether the applicant possesses the necessary personal and professional qualifications to justify enrollment, and (b) to explain fully the purposes of the schools and the alternatives open to enrollees upon completion of the prescribed period of training.

In connection with these alternatives, it is further assumed that the representatives will make it abundantly clear to all applicants that, even though found to be satisfactorily equipped upon the termination of the training period, they will be given the definite choice of (1) returning to this country; (2) obtaining employment

in private work in Canada or the United Kingdom; (3) being placed in governmental work of a non-military nature, such as the merchant marine or the British Broadcasting Company, or (4) enlisting in the armed forces. Consequently, it follows that at the time of the enrollment, the individual concerned would not have been hired or retained to enlist in the armed forces of either Canada or the United Kingdom. He would merely be enrolled in a training school and entitled on his own volition upon the completion of the training period to proceed in any of four different directions depending on his technical qualifications and his own predilections. In view of this conclusion, payment of an enrollee's travel expenses to a designated school would be for a legitimate purpose and, therefore, entirely proper.

On the basis of the facts as stated herein and for the reasons herein set forth, the Department is therefore of the opinion that there would be no violation of the statute, so long as the activities of the representatives of the schools are confined within the boundaries described

described above and so long as the choices given to an individual upon the completion of his training period are real and not illusory.

By way of addendum, it should be noted that the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (Public No. 705, 76th Congress) and the rules and regulations issued thereunder require all American citizens between the ages of 21 and 35 and all resident aliens between such ages who have declared their intention of becoming citizens by taking out first papers to register for military training. All such persons, unless deferred pursuant to law, are required to report for 12 months' military training upon being notified by the competent authorities. Moreover, paragraph 161 of the rules and regulations provides:

The local board may issue to a registrant a permit to leave the United States (Form 351) provided that the registrant's absence is not likely to interfere with the proper administration of the selective service law.

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In the interest of those who may not be fully apprized of their obligations under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, it is suggested that before an applicant is finally accepted his attention should be directed to the above-quoted paragraph, if he is subject to the Act.

Department of State,  
Washington,

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State Dept. files  
2-41

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personal*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1941

My dear Mr. President:

Owing to the absence of Under Secretary Welles, there has been some delay in responding to your memorandum under date of March 7 which enclosed a letter from Secretary Ickes and a letter from Dr. Frank Kingdon in regard to the persons interned in France by the names of Maurice Pfeffer, Jean (Hans) Tittel, Fritz Lamm and Francois Boegler.

In the absence of the Under Secretary and in order to expedite decision in the cases, this will advise that unless you disapprove a cable is being dispatched to Vichy setting forth that the information we received through Vichy from the French Government about these persons is challenged by trustworthy and sincere persons known to us who are supported by statements of political refugees who have been admitted to  
the

The President,

The White House.


the United States on the recommendation of responsible committees which have been operating in conjunction with the Department during this trying period.

In the meantime our original telegram to the French Government under date of January 25 requesting transfer of these persons to Camp Milles still stands and the matter will be allowed to continue in that status until a report is received from Vichy covering specifically the points raised in the affidavits submitted through Secretary Ickes by Dr. Kingdon.

The Department has taken no action to negative or detract from the original request and will not take any such action until we hear further from Vichy and after submitting it again to you for instructions.

I am returning herewith the files which were enclosed in your memorandum under reference to Mr. Welles.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

Original files.

Published in  
Pearl Harbor  
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4305-4307

Published also in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941,  
Vol. IX, the Far East, pp. 75-76.

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2-41

EXCEPT OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the call which the Japanese Ambassador is to make on you this afternoon, suggestions are offered as follows:

One. Should the Ambassador bring up the question of Mr. Matsuoka's visiting the United States, you might comment to this effect: "We of course welcome visits to this country by persons occupying responsible positions in other countries. Visits at the present time by any such persons may be especially informative both to them and to us, in view of the current complexity of problems of international relations and of the tremendous changes which have occurred in the United States during recent months. If Mr. Matsuoka chooses to visit this country while proceeding from Europe to Japan, he will of course be welcomed."

Two. Should the Ambassador mention his compatriots who are here and who apparently desire to have this Government enter into discussions with them on the question of

of



of improving relations between Japan and the United States, you may care to say -- as I did to the Ambassador on March 8 -- that you very much appreciate the purpose of the Ambassador's compatriots and that of course officials of this Government charged with the conduct of foreign relations could not confer with them individually in regard to matters pending between our two Governments unless the Japanese Ambassador should assume the responsibility and the initiative to that end.

Three. Occasion or opportunity may develop, in the course of the conversation, of which you might care to take advantage for the offering of observations on lines as follows:

In view of Japan's membership in the tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy, there arises question whether Japan has retained freedom of action and whether her actions will so demonstrate, or whether Japan has committed herself in alliance with Germany to oppose the things -- principles, policies and objectives -- to the support of which this country is habituated and is committed. Can the military groups in control of the Japanese Government expect important countries like the United States to maintain silence and remain inactive while two or three nations engage in tremendous programs  
of

of military and naval expansion and move toward conquest of the rest of the earth? As long as Hitler continues his avowed course of unlimited conquest and tyrannical rule and as long as the Japanese army and navy extend their occupation by force of other and distant areas on both land and sea, the apprehensions and the concern of this country will be very real and our reactions be increasingly realistic. This country is proceeding with a program of rearmament with ever increasing speed and effectiveness, and our national effort, directed in no way toward any program of aggression, is more and more being concentrated upon the problem of perfecting our defense and supporting the resistance of other nations to movements of conquest. We wish to be friends, we are ready to be friends, with every nation in the world -- but in our concept real friendship and real cooperation can prevail only between and among nations each and all of which want peace and security for all.

(justice)

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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 17, 1941

file  
Confidential

My dear Mr. President:

Thank you for sending me with your memorandum of March 3 the memorandum sent to you by Mr. William S. Paley on United States-Latin American relations.

I have read this memorandum from Mr. Paley with a great deal of interest and I am returning it to you as you requested.

Mr. Paley's observations are on the whole, I think, exceedingly sound.

He does not, however, in my judgment, attribute sufficient importance to the danger which would result to the whole structure of inter-American cooperation if the United States undertook to determine for itself whether or not the government of some other American republic were subservient to Nazi or Fascist influence and, should it be determined that such government was in fact operating under alien influence, undertook to intervene directly in order to correct that situation. If we adopted such a policy we would, as you realize

The President,


The White House.

better than any one else, afford exactly the opportunity which the Nazi propagandists are seeking to raise the old charge of Yankee imperialism.

I firmly believe that the agreements reached at the recent inter-American gatherings give us all the leverage we need and that should a danger spot in reality exist, our neighbors would join with us to remove it. My own feeling is that the less we talk publicly about this possibility, the more probable it is that if the situation which Mr. Paley foresees arises, it will be safely taken care of by joint inter-American action.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'W. S. Paley', written in a cursive style.

Enclosure:

"Memorandum for President Roosevelt  
on United States-Latin American Relations  
Submitted by William S. Paley, January 7,  
1941."



MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

ON

UNITED STATES - LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

Submitted by William S. Paley

January 7, 1941

My trip through South America was too hurried to allow for a careful review of all the factors which bear on the relationships between the United States and Latin America, but I did gather a few rather definite impressions, and these I herewith submit.

Latin Americans on the whole now have a friendly feeling toward the United States. Our Good Neighbor Policy has, in the main, destroyed the specters of "Yankee Imperialism" and "Dollar Diplomacy" but many Latin Americans suspect that it is a policy very personal with our President and Secretary of State, and wonder whether a succeeding administration might not prefer our older brand of Latin American diplomacy. The reliance they place in our present administration is indicated by the anxiety they displayed before, and the joy they expressed after, our Presidential election in November.

Although the people of each Latin American republic have a very conscious pride in their country and seem determined to keep it free and strong as a separate entity, they are not very concerned over the Nazi threat. They tend to view us as alarmists who are determined to find a fifth columnist up every palm tree, but unfortunately, many see in our alarm an opportunity to cast

us in the role of the anxious suitor competing with the totalitarian powers for their favor.

This analysis of our position encourages some of the countries to be less cooperative in their dealings with us and also accounts, to a certain extent, for their lack of firmness in treating with local Nazi activities; for they feel that these activities keep us in the anxious seat. The great danger to our interests that arises out of the situation I have just described is, that the help we are giving to Latin American countries and the intense recent interest we are taking in them may be interpreted as simply stemming from a sense of insecurity and, therefore, as a sign of weakness. Although it is most important that we do not brandish the "big stick," it is equally important that we remain strong in their eyes. If we do not, our influence will lessen and our opponents will be encouraged. It, therefore, becomes important that our aid to Latin American countries and our interest in them be somehow balanced by reciprocal acts on their part, if only for the psychological effect. It may be difficult to maintain such a balance, but we should try to achieve it, for only as a "two-way street" can our Good Neighbor Policy establish sound and sincere relationships between us and the republics to the South.

The Nazis are efficiently organized and well financed throughout Latin America. I am submitting herewith a separate memorandum describing their activities in each of the countries I visited. The German population residing in Latin America, of course, form the core of their strength, but they are also aided by local Communists, Italians, Japanese and Spanish Falangistas.

The conservative elements in each country have been most susceptible to their efforts. In no country do the Nazis have enough strength to win political control through popular support. If they attempt such control in any country, they will do so by trying to win over the administration in power or through a revolution headed by local front men ostensibly representing a local party.

It is the judgment of some well qualified observers that a well planned revolution backed by not very many well aimed guns and a few airplanes can succeed in some of the weaker Latin American countries, countries which, unfortunately from our standpoint, are near the Canal Zone.

The question of Nazi control through subversive activities was dealt with at the Havana Conference by providing for immediate consultation "...in the event that the peace of any...is menaced by such activities..." but only in the event that "...a State directly interested wishes to request it." Prior to the Havana Conference, Edwin C. Wilson, United States Minister to Uruguay, declared that it was our avowed policy "...to cooperate fully...in crushing all activities which arise from un-American sources and which imperil our political and economic freedom...whenever such cooperation is desired."

However, if a country comes under Nazi domination by a deal made with those in power, or through a revolution headed by local stooges representing a legal party, it is not likely that the aid referred to above will be requested. There remains the possibility therefore of a Nazi dominated state within the framework of the declarations that have been made.

-4-

I point to this possibility not because I fear it has been overlooked by those close to the scene, but because I want to emphasize the desirability of considering a policy under which the Americas will not tolerate the control of any American republic by a foreign nation, irrespective of the methods used to gain and maintain such control. Nothing would so discourage the Latin American Trojan horses as such a policy, once adopted.

I recognize that the danger of urging such a policy on our sister republics is great, and that the announcement of such a policy for ourselves is even greater. Also, that the time may not be ripe for any action in this direction. However, the risks involved and the question of timing are better known to those in intimate touch with the diplomatic pulse. I put this idea forth more to accent a serious loophole than to recommend a definite course of action. I do want to add that our enemies are trading on our reluctance to take any very strong step, for they know how we shy away from anything which might cause the cry of "Yankee Imperialism" to be revived.

One of the prime reasons why many Latin Americans stay on the fence as between the United States and the totalitarian powers, is that a Nazi war victory will carry with it control of the European market; the most important market for Latin American exports. I have not had sufficient time to study the export problem of each country, but it is my impression that most of the Latin American countries are feeling less anxious about the export problem than they once did, principally because of our attitude of concern toward their difficulties, and because of the way in which we are actually cooperating with them.

The Argentine, however, remains a serious and special problem. Our economy cannot digest their exportable produce, and until they build their own internal industrial economy, they will have to depend on Europe for their economic life. However, our stubborn refusal to buy any of their beef remains a psychological hurdle in the way of any real friendliness toward us. We should buy some, even if it is a relatively very small amount. Such a purchase will act like magic in causing a more friendly attitude toward us and as a face-saver to those in Argentine political life who want to be more congenial. (Since I wrote this, a step in this direction has been taken.)

Latin Americans are extremely sensitive people, and the human element plays an important part in their dealings and decisions. It is essential that we be represented in Latin America by men who are equipped by temperament and personality to gain respect and personal friendship from those with whom they deal.

Our position in Latin America has been improved in recent years and is, with the exception of the Argentine, quite satisfactory. This does not mean, however, that we can rest at ease. The totalitarian forces will continue their well organized efforts in Latin America and they may well make greater gains in the future. Certainly their hands will be strengthened immeasurably there, if they win the European war. Careful watching, intelligent handling and courage in dealing with our sister republics must be continued by us without let-up, if we are to safeguard our position and insure continental solidarity. We are doing well, but the future is still fraught with danger.