PSF State Department Jan. 1942 - May 1943

War File

file personal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 1, 1942.

I told the Secretary of State I thought it inadvisable to resiscitake this question by making a statement; that the French Admiral has already declined to leave the St. Pierre-Miquelon; that we cannot afford to send an expedition to bomb him out; and that Sumner Welles could best bandle this situation verablly when he gets to Rio on the above basis.

F. D. R.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

If an adjustment of the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident should be worked out by which the Free French are allowed to remain in occupation, I think it very important to issue the attached statement in view of the wide-spread misrepresentations which have been circulated everywhere by organized propagandists.

CH

PSF: State Folder

DRAFT

January 1, 1942

The significance of the recent seizure of the islands of St. Pierre-Miquelon has, because of the high tension incident to the war, been greatly exaggerated. Prior to the seizure last week, the main question of interest in this connection to Great Britain, Canada and the United States related to possible dangers to shipping from the operation of a wireless station originally installed to benefit French fishing vessels off the Great Banks of Newfoundland. There had been, during recent months, exchanges of views among these three interested Governments. The Government of the United States had been officially notified that an agreement had been reached with the Free French forces that no approach to these islands by force would be undertaken by the Free French. On December 24, however, the Free French proceeded, by force, to seize and occupy the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon and to take charge of their entire affairs.

This

This act was committed without the knowledge or the consent in any sense of the United States Government. This Government immediately thereafter made clear that it was not a party to this action. This Government then proceeded to approach the British and the Canadians on the one hand and the Government at Vichy on the other and to urge a fair arrangement between all parties concerned which would safeguard Great Britain, Canada and the United States against danger to their shipping from the operation of the wireless station in question. This proposal would make all the more logical the prompt retirement of the Free French forces occupying these islands. No material progress has yet been made with this proposal.

The United States Government was actuated in its course of opposition to the forcible seizure of these islands by its treaty obligations expressed in the Habana Convention and by other important policies, agreements and plans relating to vitally important international phases of the war situation. For purposes of

hemispheric

hemispheric defense, these Habana agreements specifically outlawed the use of force to effect "any transfer or attempted transfer of the sovereignty, jurisdiction, possession or any interest in or control over" any of the territories or possessions in the Americas which any of the belligerent nations abroad may possess. The seizure of the islands of St. Pierre-Miquelon fall within these prohibitions.

It has been and still is the view of the Government of the United States that this matter pertaining to the operation of the wireless station in question could and should be settled amicably to the satisfaction of all persons and parties concerned, and that this course would definitely facilitate the conduct of the war.

S:CH:mdm

1

War File

PSF: State Folder

file Personal

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 2, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Referring to the conversation between you and the British Prime Minister and myself today in regard to a communique by you and the Prime Minister in order to quiet steadily spreading rumors and reports very damaging to the British-American situation, some of the gentlemen here in the Department prepared the enclosed memorandum in the hope that it might be of possible aid to you.

I may say that the French Ambassador has just left my office and I went after him very strongly about simply closing down the wireless station and agreeing for a Canadian citizen to be about the premises at all times to see that it is kept closed down, and also to change Governors - all of this to be done if and as the Free French who are occupying the islands make their departure, thereby restoring the status quo. He committed himself strongly to a promise to communicate tonight with his Government and arrange for such concurring action.

If he should succeed, the question again arises as

to

to whether the Prime Minister will cooperate with us to see that the Free French, having thus made their contribution to clearing up this wireless situation, move out, with the thanks of their friends interested. This proposed communique that I am attaching hereto would be a suitable prelude to such possible settlement as I have just outlined.

C H

S:CH:AR

file personal

The President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have had under consideration the St. Pierre-Miquelon incident and have been studying this problem with a view to working it out in complete cooperation. They are in entire agreement that an arrangement satisfactory to all concerned should not be difficult and the matter is receiving further attention, having in mind the commitments of the Government of the United States under the Habana Treaty of 1940 and other international policies and agreements of great importance to the conduct of the war. Meanwhile in the light of the relevant facts there should be no occasion for confusion or misunderstanding since there is no divergence of policy, but complete cooperation and understanding between the United States, Great Britain and Canada in this as in other matters.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 22, 1942

Dear Miss Tully:

Referring to your memorandum to Mr. Sale, the telegrams which the President wrote out in long hand on Christmas Day have finally turned up and I am very glad to be able to return them to you herewith.

O. W. Gray

State Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. WILLIAM J. SALE
State Department

I understand from Miss Tully that the telegrams which I wrote out in longhand on Christmas Day to the King and Queen of England, to King Haakon and the Queen of the Netherlands were delivered to you to be sent to them. I would appreciate it ever so much if you would return those originals to me to complete my file.

F.D.R.

Returns to Miss Tully

Mrs R gave
messages to the
usher ~~to return to~~
~~[illegible]~~

MCT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 26, 1941.

Dear Malvina:-

The President thought Mrs. Roosevelt would like to see the enclosed messages. Will you please return them for our files and also the longhand messages the President gave to Mrs. Roosevelt to send to King Haakon and the King and Queen of England?

Note I gave Eleanor

Many thanks,

Affectionately,

Grace

this document
was originally
declassified
March 3, 1972.
and has been
stamped incorrectly
(except. p. 1)
SKD
4-13-73

PSF, State [redacted]

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMBERS

JAMES LAWRENCE FLY, CHAIRMAN
DAWSON OLMSTEAD
JOSEPH R. REDMAN
BRECKINRIDGE LONG
HERBERT E. GASTON, SECRETARY

May 14, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

[redacted]

Dear Mr. President

The Defense Communications Board today unanimously adopted the following resolution:

> "The Defense Communications Board favors the early establishment of a unified American system for world-wide communications under such degree of Government control as to insure that it will be operated in the national interest."

We shall much appreciate your advising the Board as to your approval or disapproval of this policy.

Very sincerely yours

James Lawrence Fly
Chairman

The President
The White House

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
F.C.C. letter 1-19-73
By RT NARS Date APR 10 1973

[redacted]

[redacted]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

July 15, 1942.

[redacted] JUL 16 AM 10:11

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
Secretary of War
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of Commerce
Postmaster General

Please read enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of State, dated June 29th, and let me have your confidential opinions.

Please note the Secretary of State's suggestion of entire secrecy.

I wish also that you would consider the possibility of a worldwide communication system by radio which would be owned or controlled by no single government, but rather by a worldwide corporation owned by all governments and administered by an international board of trustees for the equal benefit of all nations.

F.D.R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By RT
Date APR 10 1973

[redacted]

SP 676 (7-15-42)

(1)

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

June 29. 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Returned herewith is the note from the Chairman of the War Communications Board (formerly D.C.B.) quoting a resolution of that Board to provide a unified American system of world-wide communication under certain conditions.

The matter has been very carefully studied in the Department in so far as are concerned the foreign policies of the United States Government. There is an intimate relationship between the means of communication and the execution of American foreign policies. In addition, there is the fact that other governments have adopted national policies which they are applying in foreign fields in regard to their own communicating systems.

The memorandum expressing the thought of the Department is attached.

In so far as it relates to foreign policy it has my endorsement. Other branches of the Government may be directly interested in it even as regards the foreign aspects of the matter. The Secretary of Commerce has many

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

Incl

[redacted]

many interests in the communicating system and might have in a communications policy because of the relationship between American industry and foreign markets.

The Postmaster General may have a definite interest because of mails and the similarity of telecommunication to mail in that they both carry intelligence abroad as well as being competitors of one another.

It is probable that you may care to obtain the advice of the Secretary of Commerce and of the Postmaster General, and because of the existence of the state of war and present military control over telecommunications you may desire to obtain the thought of the Secretary of War and of the Secretary of the Navy.

The approval of the Chairman of the War Communications Board is manifest from his letter.

May I add that while I endorse the formulation of a policy along the lines suggested in the resolution I have not attempted to cover the manner in which that policy should be executed, i.e., through Government ownership, Government control of a private corporation, Government control of a public corporation, Government control of a number of American corporations, Government membership on a Board of Directors, or otherwise. Those matters would seem to remain for future determination if you should approve the proposed objective.

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

You

You probably will care to suggest to the persons with whom you consult that the matter ought to be kept entirely secret until such time after the determination of policy as you may care to let the matter be known.

C H

Enclosures:
From James Lawrence Fly,
Chairman,
War Communications Board,
May 14, 1942.
Memorandum.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

[redacted]

[redacted]

American system of world-wide communications.

The establishment of a unified American system for world-wide communications under such degree of Government control as to insure that it will be operated in the national interest contemplates the establishment of a national communications policy.

In considering the advisability of establishing a national policy it seems pertinent to include the post-war period along with the present, and to incorporate economic factors in connection with political ones.

Before the war each of the principal governments of the world had developed systems of international communication which controlled the instruments of communication - radio, land wires crossing their borders and cables touching

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By R. H. Parks Date APR 1 0 1973

[redacted]

[redacted]

touching their shores. Their respective control was exclusive over those instruments, transmitters, keys, the physical ends (if not the entire length) of wires and cables.

Through control of these instrumentalities each of these governments controlled the messages entering or transiting their respective jurisdictions and became intimately advised of the intelligence contained in the texts of the messages. Equally they could use these facilities for the transmission or interruption of intelligence to serve the national purpose.

England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan each in varying degree exercised control of the character indicated, and each used that control to further its own ideas of temporary or long-range policy, political, economic or military.

This condition having existed for many years before the present war, before even the First World War, and having gradually developed during a long period into a pattern of more definite and intricate design, it seems highly improbable that a different condition would develop suddenly at the close of the present hostilities. Consequently it seems we should anticipate no diminution in degree of national control over international communications but might even look for an intensification of

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By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

[redacted] effort

effort along that line.

Consequently, it is fairly deducible that in the future, as in the present, we will face a world in which the instrumentalities of international communication will be exclusively controlled and used to carry out commercial, industrial, political and other national policies in the special interest of the controlling power whether or not that may be in harmony with the rights, interests or policies of the United States.

This national expression of authority is not always confined to control over the instrumentalities within the jurisdiction of the single government. You will immediately recall the very definite efforts we have made since we became a belligerent to bring to an end direct radiotelegraphic communications between Berlin, Rome and Tokyo respectively with Buenos Aires and Santiago. Fortunately, those efforts now seem to be nearing fruition, but the situation serves to elucidate the point that political or commercial causes may permit a nationally controlled system to find contacts abroad which effectually extend the field of operations of the system to our detriment.

This national control is single. It may be and sometimes is control over several units but the control itself is single in that it is centralized in one authority acting

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By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

acting for the government.

In the United States the situation is quite different. During the history of telecommunications, in which, incidentally, Americans have been the leaders, the instruments and systems of international communication have been developed in an entire absence of governmental control.

In consequence twelve American companies compete for international radio and cable business. There is no single controlled pool of all facilities nor any unified flexible organization available to the nation's constantly changing needs.

If cable facilities were at any time overburdened, and radio were not, a single authority could reroute excess traffic to radio or vice versa.

If a cable is severed or when atmospheric conditions cause long fadeouts in a radio channel, traffic could be easily shuttled to the other.

As the map changes under the impact of war, the necessary rearrangements of communication, the establishment of immediate radio connections after bombings, and the setting up of new direct circuits could all be more easily and effectively accomplished by a single authority.

In peace time as well as in war a single authority could operate far more effectively and could translate into

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

into action our national interest. With twelve different companies establishing connections abroad each is at a disadvantage in dealing with the foreign unified systems they encounter. The typical foreign company is either administered directly by the foreign government, or is a monopoly strongly backed by the government. This single foreign interest exploits American disunity to foreign advantage in all the areas of competition. This process involves playing one American company against the other in competition for a circuit, and works to decrease the over-all American participation in world-wide communications. So long as this condition continues, American participation can never be equal to America's aggregate contribution and strength.

An important economic factor becomes necessary in the consideration. The development of the communication systems of the world has demonstrated that in the long range view the comparison, in terms of utility, between cables and radio is solved in favor of the radiotelegraph and against the cable. Compared to radio the cable is inflexible (it travels only from a given fixed point to a given fixed point), it is expensive to manufacture, to lay, to maintain and to operate. By comparison the radiotelegraph makes for flexibility and is inexpensive to manufacture and to operate.

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By R. H. Parker Date APR 10 1973

Cables,

Cables, however, do exist and are important means of communication. They furnish needed traffic capacity, offer secrecy in transmission and because they are less susceptible to electrical interference offer a high degree of stability.

It seems appropriate to mention here that because of the cost of establishment and operation of cables the rates are necessarily high. Conversely, the rates of the radiotelegraph can be low. However, they compete one against the other, and in the effort of the cable to meet the traffic rate of the radio the economic consequences are dire and must eventually result either in a loss of profit or in very substantial loss of business.

A unified control over radiotelegraph and cable communications would seem to offer interchangeability between the two; an elimination of the disadvantage at which individual companies work when competing against one another with a foreign national unit for extension of circuits; a fixation of rates which would preserve the cable system and conserve the physical equipment of cables for needed traffic; and would permit the further extension of our international communication system to the point it would be complete in the service of our national purpose and become an instrumentality capable of protecting and advancing the economic interests of the country and the political

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State Dept. Letter, 1-19-73
By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

political objectives of the Government.

In these considerations no allusion is intended to censorship in peace time nor is any thought directed at the communication systems and facilities of the military and naval establishments. Each of these subjects is excluded.

With them excluded, looking at the complicated situation in the world around us and ahead of us and having in mind the political, economic and social objectives of the United States, it is the conclusion that a strong, comprehensive, and unified system of world-wide communication under such degree of Government control as to insure that it will be operated in the national interest would be advantageous for the United States.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date APR 10 1973

File

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

answered by telephone

May 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Stanley Woodward called this morning to say that the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg and Prince Felix will arrive in Washington this evening at 8:05. They are to be here for a few days and will stay at the Luxembourg Embassy.

Mr. Woodward suggested that perhaps you would like to put a White House car at her disposal, have her met at the train, etc. They have not yet asked for an appointment to see you. Perhaps you would want them to tea tomorrow and if so I could tell Mr. Woodward.

G.

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BF State Dept Folder 2-42

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

The Minister of Luxembourg has requested me to inform the President that Her Royal Highness the Grand Duchess of Luxembourg, accompanied by her husband, Prince Felix, will arrive in Washington today at 8:05 p.m., to remain for several days at the Luxembourg Legation before proceeding to Canada. A representative of the Secretary of State will meet the Grand Duchess on arrival this evening, and I suggest that it would be appropriate for him to accompany her in a White House car to the Legation.

GTS

George T. Summerlin.

file with Luxembourg papers

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Do you wish the Crown Princess of Norway invited through the Norwegian Embassy as is the procedure if the State Department handles it, or would you prefer that I call her and extend the invitation?

Mrs. Roosevelt says tea would be better than lunch as she has a number of odd people coming for lunch.

G.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

file
personal

THE SECRETARY

July 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

I am sending the attached telegram to the President by this means in view of its importance.

With kind regards,

John [illegible] Stone

PSF State Dept

AF
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Cairo

Dated July 6, 1942

Rec'd 9:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1169, July 6, 8 a.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

The following estimate of the present military situation is based on my conversation this morning with Major General C. L. Scott who has just returned from the front and I ask that the views expressed be communicated forthwith to the highest quarters.

The reverses hitherto experienced by the British in the desert have been due principally to the defective tactics on their part in attempting to attack and destroy the German 88 millimeter gun chiefly with tanks instead of by coordinated action with all arms including infantry, artillery, armored units, and air. On July 3rd the British adopted this coordinated procedure for the first time and Rommel was stopped. Rommel must now halt, bring up his supplies and refit. If, however, spirited aggressive action is taken at this moment with special emphasis

on mass

on mass air attacks his further advance may be rendered impossible and the situation saved. To that end every method that can be improvised and every measure conceivable must be insisted upon and instantly adopted to fly in from every quarter all available air and other support for immediate use against Rommel before the Axis can reinforce him for further advance. This supreme effort on our side must be made without a moment's delay for mechanized material cannot arrive in time to stop him and in this particular operation it is all a question of air. Rommel never intended to advance so far but having succeeded the German Command may have to make a supreme effort on its side to reinforce him and now is the moment when we must anticipate any such move by cutting him off.

I fear that I can still detect a certain attitude of laxness on our side here and I am convinced that only instant and inspired support from without can generate a determined will to win.

KIRK

NPL

State Folder 2-42
7-15-42

file personnel

Return to SD
Room 212--Winder

In reply refer to
SD

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Honorable the Secretary of the Navy and refers to a conversation between Captain McCrea and an officer of the Department of State regarding the Far Eastern exchange of American and Japanese nationals.

The United States and Japanese Governments provide vessels to carry persons to be exchanged to Lourenço Marques where the Portuguese Government will act as guarantor of the exchange. The exchange vessels proceed unarmed, without convoy but protected by assurances of safe conduct given by all belligerent powers.

All official personnel and dependents, non-permanent residents and dependents, the wives and children of permanent residents and permanent residents having special reasons to return home, who are in Japan, Manchuria, occupied China, Hong Kong, Thailand and French Indochina, who are nationals of the United States, or of the other American Republics which have broken relations with Japan, or of Canada, and in the aforementioned countries of the Western Hemisphere, including Hawaii, who are nationals of Japan or of Thailand, may be embarked on the exchange vessels subject to the limitations of the exchange vessels. The Japanese Government has stated that in principle the exchange does not cover the Philippine Islands, Guam, Wake or other territory formerly under the United States flag.

The order of priority to be followed in selecting non-official persons or categories of non-official persons to travel on the first and subsequent voyages of the exchange vessels will be in accordance with the wishes of the United States Government transmitted to the Japanese Government through Swiss channels and of the Japanese Government transmitted to the United States Government through Spanish channels.

At

At the present time, the exchange vessels are not scheduled to stop at the Philippine Islands which are, as stated, not included by the Japanese Government in the exchange, nor, so far as is known to the United States Government, are any Filipinos being repatriated from Japan to the Islands. There is, however, one naturalized Filipino being repatriated to the United States on the first voyage of the exchange vessel. Furthermore, all Filipinos are entitled to relief payments on the same basis as American citizens; should such persons wish to return to the United States, they are entitled to do so.

SD:WBW:MHS 7/18

file personal + confidential

Hull Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Secretary Hull dictated the following message for the President:

"The President will recall that he saw the Polish Ambassador some days ago, in which the Ambassador urged the President to take up directly with the Russian Government the matter of relief for certain Polish citizens and workers in the Soviet Union. The upshot of the conversation was that the President said he would acquaint Mr. Harriman with the facts as he was about to leave for Moscow and when there could present the matter to the Soviet Government. It now develops that Mr. Harriman has already gone to Moscow.

"The question is whether the President, in accordance with his conversation with the Polish Ambassador, desires a cable to be sent to Mr. Harriman at Moscow, in order that he may take up this matter with the Soviet Government."

I put it up to C.H. 8/14/42

TELEGRAM

BF State Dept Folder

file

The White House
Washington

ROYALSTON MASS August 16 1942

Aide to the President

Received letter Mr. Summerlin August 14th. Empress Zita of Austria will be delighted to come to luncheon Hyde Park Wednesday August 19th. If convenient to the President the Empress' elder daughter Archduchess Adelaide, with her in New York, would accompanyHer Majesty, instead of me. Shall telephone you Tuesday about time of arrival.

Countess Theresa Schnising Kerssenbrock,
Lady in Waiting.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I talked with Mrs. Roosevelt in regard to luncheon on the 18th for the Empress Zita. Mrs. Roosevelt said she plans to go to New Milford that afternoon, but could be there for luncheon and leave after the guests go.

She said to remind you that you and she would have to pay a call on the Dutch to say goodbye and if you are leaving Hyde Park Tuesday night, she is furious at your having the Empress on Tuesday. If you are staying over Wednesday, perhaps you could call on the Dutch then.

GGT

8-12-42

Respectfully referred to
the President.

MHM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF PROTOCOL

file

August 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McINTYRE:

I am enclosing for your attention a copy of a letter dated August 8, 1942 from Countess Teresa Schmising-Kerssenbrock, Lady in Waiting to the former Empress Zita, in regard to the desire of the former Empress to be received by the President.

Will you kindly let me know the President's wishes in this matter.

G. T. Summerlin

George T. Summerlin

Enclosure:

From Countess Teresa
Schmising-Kerssenbrock,
August 8, 1942.

Department of State

BUREAU / DIVISION PR

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted 8-11-42

ADDRESSED TO

The Honorable

Marvin H. McIntyre

(COPY:PR:FB)

Royalston, Massachusetts, August 8, 1942
Tel. Nr.: Athol (Mass.) 11 M.

Sir,

Her Majesty Empress Zita of Austria, spending a few weeks in the United States, would like to greet the President.

After August 18th, the Empress who is recovering from an operation undergone in spring, is obliged to go to New York for a few days to see her physicians. Her Majesty would like to take this opportunity to pay a visit and talk to the President in Washington or, if possible, in Hyde Park.

Will you, dear Mr. Summerlin, be kind enough to ask the President which place and day would be convenient for him.

It would also be a great pleasure for the Empress to see Mrs. Roosevelt.

Thanking you in advance and looking forward to your reply,

Yours sincerely

COUNTESS TERESA SCHMISING-KERSSENBROCK
Lady in Waiting to Her Majesty
Empress Zita of Austria

To Mr. George T. Summerlin
Chief of Protocol
Department of State
Washington D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF PROTOCOL

file coming to lunch on Tuesday — State Folder

August 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

The Minister of Luxembourg called on me this morning and said that some time ago the President had mentioned to Grand Duchess Charlotte the possibility of her driving up to Hyde Park with her children for luncheon, if she was to be at her farm near Trenton, New Jersey, this summer.

The Minister asked me to convey to the President the information that the Grand Duchess will have her children with her at the farm until about the second of September, when they will return to their studies in Quebec.

The address of Her Royal Highness is as follows:

De Clervaux Farm
Newton, Pennsylvania
Telephone - Langhorn, Pennsylvania, 3769

I understand that the farm is in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, a few miles above Trenton, New Jersey.

G.T.S.

George T. Summerlin

State Folder

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Confidential

File

September 7, 1942

Memorandum

Mr. President:

The attached memorandum explains itself.

If the matter has not come to your attention, it plainly should. I expect Mr. Hull may wish to take this up with you.

A. A. Berle, Jr.

Attachment:

Copy of memorandum to Mr. Hull re appointment of British diplomatic officer to head General Eisenhower's political section.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73

By J. Schamble Date MAR 3 1972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

September 7, 1942

URGENT

S - Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Murphy tells me that at the Office of Strategic Services he was informed that General Eisenhower had appointed a head of his (General Eisenhower's) Political Section to act as political adviser in respect of any military operations, and presumably in respect to problems arising out of re-occupation of any territory which Eisenhower may contemplate occupying. The name of this adviser is W. H. B. Mack, and he is a British diplomatic officer assigned by the Foreign Office. At the Office of Strategic Services there is a copy of the order from Anthony Eden assigning Mack to this duty.

This should be taken in connection with the War Department's statement the other day that a man would be appointed to the staff of any General who might be re-occupying territory; such person to be in charge of the civil government of the occupied territory. It is plain to me that Mack is this person.

If this matter has your approval and the President's, of course that settles the affair. If not, may I strongly urge that you promptly take this up with the President and ascertain what steps should be taken. If I am right, this appointment means, in substance, that a British temporary government will be set up in whatever territory General Eisenhower may occupy.

aab
A.A.B., Jr.

(Copy for the President)

file personal

State file
2-42

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

October 8, 1942.

URGENT

MEMORANDUM

Mr. President:

Last night, on telegraphic orders from Washington

(1) 27 diplomatic pouches were taken off the Spanish steamer Magallanes, outward bound;

(2) All outgoing diplomatic pouches were taken from a number of couriers outward bound by plane from Miami.

At Miami it is reported thus far that this was done on orders from Navy in Washington to Navy in Miami; pick-up was done by Navy Customs.

FBI was keeping the vessel under surveillance. Navy requested them to suspend surveillance because the pouches were to be "stolen".

We later intercepted a telephone call from the Spanish Vice Consul reporting to his Embassy that Navy men had taken his pouches away, and a later one in which Coast Guard advised him to consult Navy.

The Spanish Ambassador has already come in protesting; we can expect reprisals within a few hours. A number of other countries appear to be likewise involved. Reprisals might be very serious. As you know, our own pouches are used to distribute Army and Navy codes, and bring material especially out of Sweden and Switzerland which we should not like to have fall into enemy hands.

Last Saturday Secretary Morgenthau initiated a movement with the Acting Secretary of the Navy to cut off all diplomatic immunity of pouch and code privileges. This was referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and subsequently to the Chiefs of Staff. Both bodies recommended against the

move

move on the ground that our own situation would be endangered thereby. Admiral Leahy presided at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on Tuesday dealing with this subject.

The FBI tell me that 48 hours ago a general order went out to the Customs officials at all ports in the United States, directing them to hold up couriers of all kinds. As a result, a considerable number of State Department and Army and other couriers of all nationalities - incoming and outgoing - were held up. Some of this was straightened out this morning when the American, State Department and other couriers were permitted to go forward with their pouches. I believe the order is still in force.

If you have previously been consulted and cleared such an arrangement, that is that. But if someone has undertaken to hold up all communications without prior approval, we shall have to face the consequences of a good many documents in transit being opened and made generally available to the Axis. We shall also probably have no lines of communication anywhere except to our Allies for some time to come. If approval has not been given, may I express the urgent hope that you promptly communicate with the ~~Acting~~ Secretary of the Treasury ~~the Navy~~ so that we can get this promptly cleared up. If they have acted on their own responsibility it is obvious that it will take an order from you to straighten things out.

As I have said, the Spanish protest has already come in and I suppose we shall have more during the night.

A.A.B., Jr.

Note:

Directly FBI told me that Navy men had participated in stopping all outward bound communications, I called Jim Forrestal. He said that Secretary Morgenthau had asked such an order. They had disposed of it by referring it to the Chiefs of Staff. They had recommended against it. He would, however, find out. He rang up five minutes later and had talked to Admiral Horn and Admiral King. They said that such an order was in effect, that it had been sent through the Customs at behest of the Secretary of the Treasury. They were told the President had approved it.

I told the Acting Secretary of the Navy that I would at once try to get in touch with you. Meantime, I said, if the matter were not untangled the Navy had best take such curative measures as it could to cover the situation in the event any of its own documents which might be afloat were intercepted by way of reprisal.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file personal!

October 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

TO NOTE AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY PERSONAL FILES.

G. C. T.

EMW.

State folder
2-42

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 17, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you this telegram from Long in Quito with regard to the visit to the United States of the President of Ecuador. As soon as I get from Long the definite date when President Arroyo can leave Ecuador to come to Washington, I shall inform you.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure:
No. 850, October 15,
from Quito.

The President,

The White House.

JMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC)

Quito

Dated October 15, 1942

Rec'd 1:28 a.m., 16th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

850, October 15, 9 p.m.

FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.

President Arroyo expressed warm appreciation of the cordial message from President Roosevelt, which I delivered in compliance with Department's 742, October 13, 2 p.m. saying that when he wrote Ambassador Alfaro it looked as though Congress would adjourn October 30. Now, however, there are indications that it may continue possibly until November 8. In which event, he will not be able to arrive by November 12.

He will need a few days after Congress adjourns to prepare, hence thought it well to defer announcement until this item is cleared when he will advise me with respect to publicity, whereupon I will promptly inform the Department.

The President of Ecuador seemed pleased with the general plans and concurs in the belief that it will be most helpful for him to have the opportunity personally to confer with President Roosevelt.

The meeting was most cordial.

PEG

LONG.

file personal

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I am inclined to think that this matter of getting food to the people of Norway via Swedish vessels to a Swedish port is something which should be pursued further.

While it is not an exact parallel, we are getting food to the people in Greece via Turkey.

I do not think we should go nearly as far as the large scale proposal of the Norwegian Government, but I see no reason why we should not make a test run of enough food for, let us say, a province of Norway for distribution by the Swedish Red Cross. If we from this experience believe that the distribution can be extended to other parts of Norway

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

without being stolen by the Germans, we can proceed further.

Will you please talk with Norman Davis about this and let me know what you think?

F. D. R.

State folder
2-42

NORWEGIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Washington, D.C., October 30,1942.

Excellency:

With reference to my note of October 8,1942, I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that the Royal Norwegian Authorities have on various occasions communicated with the British authorities on the question of sending minor supplies of food to Norway. These communications have hitherto not led to any results, as it has been asserted from British quarters that the realization of such plans would constitute a violation of the principle of the blockade, which would

entail

His Excellency
Mr. Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

entail serious consequences.

The food situation in Norway has for a long time been very difficult, but not until the spring of 1942 could it be described as so critical as to present an immediate danger of famine. It must now be taken into account, however, that, for a very great part of the population, a change for the worse has taken place in the course of the summer and autumn, and that it is, therefore, necessary to procure some supplies of food products for the coming winter. All the reports which the Norwegian Government regularly receive from the most reliable sources, indicate that the position is extremely serious

./. and that it will become unbearable, cf. the attached short expose of the food conditions in the autumn of 1942. It would seem obvious that a relief action will be more easily and effectively carried out if it is taken before the situation becomes so bad that people actually starve.

It is not

It is not necessary to develop the reasons of a humanitarian nature which plead for relief before it is too late to prevent famine. On the other hand, the Norwegian Government desire to stress certain factors of another nature which play an important part in the appreciation of the situation. First of all the morale among the many thousand Norwegian seamen whose active part in the war effort is sufficiently known and appreciated by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and other United Nations as well. They are all men who have numbers of their nearest family in Norway, and the thought of the welfare of these relatives weigh very heavily on them. The Norwegian Government have received a great number of representations concerning this question from the delegates of the seamen, and during the journey which Prime Minister Nygaardsvold recently made to the United States of America it was made clear to him that the feelings among

the seamen

the seamen are now such that it must be considered essential that something is done to meet their demands for relief to Norway. It was clearly pointed out that the seamen cannot in the long run be expected to transport food between other countries while their own families face starvation. In this connection it should be mentioned that the German propaganda of course continuously stress this point and that the effect which this propaganda may also have on the morale of the home front in Norway proper must not be underrated.

Still more serious than the propaganda effect the Germans may obtain, is, however, the physical weakening of the Norwegian people which gradually will develop as an unescapable consequence of the situation. It is unnecessary to point out that the considerable military value contained in a physically fairly strong and an ardently anti-German population will gradually disappear as the effects of the undernourishment proceed.

proceed. It is highly significant that during the last months a growing number of the Norwegian refugees coming over to Sweden from Norway state as their main reason for leaving the country that they can no longer obtain the necessary food. There is hardly any reason to doubt that the Germans - having in vain tried terror and murder to break the Norwegian home front - are now trying a means which has admittedly a slower but all the more certain effect: starvation.

The question how the transport of food supplies should take place and how the distribution could be controlled would of course have to be discussed further by the competent authrities. The Norwegian Government hopes that effective assistance to this end will be rendered from Swedish quarters. In this connection it should not be overlooked that the geographical position of Norway is highly favourable for a supply of goods and also makes it possible to control effectively

the distribution

the distribution of them. Norway has a neutral country as one of her neighbours, a country with a coastline which is open for supplies from overseas and wherefrom goods can without difficulty be sent on to their destination. To prevent the danger that the dispatch of food to Norway should benefit the enemy, the Norwegian Government are of the opinion that a small quantity should be sent at first and in such a way as to make the control, extending even to the consumer, as easy as possible, and, at the same time, in such a way that the enemy neither directly nor indirectly - by the cutting of rations etc. - could practically benefit therefrom.

With reference to the above the Norwegian Government propose the following plan to be carried out as soon as possible, preferably in December this year:

A standardized box of the following contents should be sent to each household in Norway (in all approximately

750.000

750.000 households):

1. Dried Milk	1½	kilogramme
2. White flour	1	"
3. Tinned butter or fats	2	"
4. Tinned meat (or pork)	1½	"
5. Dried meat (or Pemmican)	½	"
6. Dried eggs	½	"
7. Cheese	½	"
8. Dried fruits	½	"
9. Chocolate	½	"
10. Coffee	½	"
11. Soap	½	"
12. Vitamin tablets	½	"
Total weight	10	kilogrammes

A case of these contents would mean little when the needs of a family over a longer period is considered. Estimating on an average household of 4 persons (corresponding to the 750.000 households in the country) the contents of the box will give each person approximately 10.000 calories. If a family of 4 persons should live on the food products contained in the box, this would mean food for only 4 to 6 days. Calculation must, however, be based on the presumption that those who receive the boxes are allowed to retain their rations. If approximately 500 calories were consumed every day from

the contents

the contents of the box, in addition to the rations, this would mean a not unimportant addition to the food supply during 20 days. The vitamin preparations would secure the members of a family a sufficient supply of important vitamins during 2 months.

Compared with the fact that the suggested articles of food aim at supplying food stuffs of which there is a particular scarcity today, fats and animal protein, a box of this type, distributed to all the households in the country, would probably be the simplest method of improving the food situation for a shorter period.

The arrangement must be made in such a way that every Norwegian family would know that they would receive a box. As such an arrangement can be carried out only with German consent, this must be made known through legal channels in Norway. As a safety precaution it might also be broadcast by

the London

the London and Boston radios. All Norwegian families would thereby realize that if they did not receive a box it had been stolen from them by the Germans. The propaganda effect of such a theft would be very great.

The food products should probably be shipped to a Swedish port in Swedish ships with safe conduct either in portions or in one or two special shipments. The total weight of the whole shipment would be only 7.500 tons. The packing, in specially made solid wooden boxes, should take place in Sweden where also the addresses on the boxes would have to be written out. The packing, addressing and distribution in Norway should take place under the control of the newly established "donator" committee. This committee must guarantee that the boxes do not contain any other food products than those mentioned, so that the Germans on their side would declare themselves willing to let the boxes pass through without inspection.

inspection.

If the German authorities refused to carry out the plan, the whole question of the food blockade etc. would suddenly take a new aspect. A propaganda offensive could then be launched in forms which would strengthen the Norwegian fronts both at home and abroad.

It would of course be a drawback that families with traitors (quislings) would also receive this gift. As plans of this kind must be carried out with German consent, it would hardly be possible to avoid this, irrespective of the procedure chosen.

The box must appear as a gift to the Norwegian people from Norwegian-American friends, or from friends of Norway in Sweden.

The boxes should be shipped from the United States of America in the middle or towards the end of November so that

the distribution

the distribution in Norway could start in December.

I have been instructed by my Government to request Your Excellency's good offices to bring the above to the attention of the United States Government and at the same time strongly to stress the necessity of an immediate relief to the starving Norwegian people, in order that a catastrophy of unpredictable dimensions and of serious consequences to the common war effort be averted.

On behalf of my Government I beg to urge the kind and necessary assistance of the United States Government in order that the plan as outlined above be permitted carried out in the immediate near future.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

J. Galbe.
Charge d'Affaires a. i.

JG/DD

COPY.

The Food Situation in Norway autumn 1942.

Summary.

In order to give a representative picture on the basis of the material at hand of the food situation of the Norwegian people as it appeared to be in the autumn 1942, the simplest way is to take the rationed food products as the starting point.

The daily rations for an adult was in september 1942:

		Protein Grammes	Fats Grammes	Carbohydrates Grammes	Calories
Skimmed milk	1/4 litre	9	0,5	12	90
Meat	7 grammes	1	1	0	10
Cheese	6 "	2	0,8	0	15
Bread	260 "	20	2,5	120	600
Butter	29,4 "	0	24,4	0	221
Sugar	29 "	0	0	29	116
	Total	32	29,2	161	1052

Even if these rations could always have been obtained in full they do not altogether give sufficient nourishment to preserve life through any longer space of time under the climatic conditions in Norway and far less to maintain reasonably health and power of resistance.

As to the food products mentioned it has been impossible in great parts of the country, especially in towns and urban districts, to procure full rations of milk and butter, and as a rule it has been even more difficult to get meat and cheese. To avoid death by starvation the great majority of the population is therefore dependent upon the additional food products they can procure in the open market.

These products are, in particular the following,

given in quantities which it would be possible for an adult to obtain daily under favourable circumstances:

		Protein Grammes	Fats Grammes	Carbohydrates Grammes	Calories
Potatoes	250 grammes	5	0	48	210
Swede turnip	100 "	1,2	0	3,7	20
Carrots	100 "	0,7	0	5,2	24
Fish	100 "	10	0,3	0	43
Fats	50 "	5,5	4	0	58
Codliver oil	1,5"	0,	1,5	0,	14
	Total	22,4	5,8	56,9	369

All these articles of food have been difficult to obtain regularly, and shortages of sometimes one, sometimes another of them must be taken into account. It was for instance impossible to get potatoes in June and July 1942 in Oslo, and in other towns a potato-rationing of 1 kilogramme per person a week was introduced, corresponding to only 150 grammes per person a day. It is reported from many parts of the country that for several weeks at a time the margarine ration was not available. In many places it has not been possible to buy turnips, carrots or fish.

Even if the particularly optimistic and ostensibly incorrect presumption that all the mentioned rationed and not-rationed food articles could be obtained regularly in the quantities as stated above was taken for granted, they would still not amount to more than 35 grammes of fats and 1421 calories per adult a day. And, even if it was assumed that it had been possible to procure further 200 grammes of potatoes and 100 grammes of fish (cod-type) a day for adults, the figures would not reach more than 35,3 grammes of fats and 1622 calories.

This is presumably the maximum any average family

without special connections and without a farmstead of their own can obtain under favorable circumstances. It indicates among other things a desperate shortage of fats and a high degree of caloritic undernourishment, and it is insufficient through a longer period.

On several points, however, the situation is modified in the case of families who find themselves in a more favourable position. The farmers have additional food products in what they - legally and illegaly - can retain of their own production (milk, meat, potatoes, vegetables). There was in Norway in 1939 a total of little more than 328.000 farms of various sizes, and it was calculated that approximately 30% of the population lived on farming, commercial gardening and forestry. The fishermen, who with their families represent about 7% of the population, will often find it somewhat easier to obtain fish and fish-products, but at the same time often more difficult to procure potatoes. Many families have also tried to get something extra besides the rations, by keeping small gardens or by rearing rabbits etc.-

Finally the black-market must be taken into account where it is still possible either through special connections or by high prices to buy small amounts of articles of food. These irregular transactions have, however, gradually decreased so that they do not play any part in the daily food consumption of the great majority of families.

That the doctors' prerogative of prescribing special articles of food for their patients has gradually been seriously curtailed, is an indication of how desperate the food situation is. Definite and very strict rules were first established, stating the diseases which entitled patients to

have eggs, cream, whole milk, bacon etc.- Further restrictions were later enforced. According to the regulations at present in force, the doctors have no longer any right to make prescriptions for cream, cocoa, chocolate for cooking, wheat-flour or ordinary flour. In the latest regulations it is stated that bacon can only be prescribed by the doctors "in serious cases of diabetes and obvious undernourishment". The Ministry of Supply made known in August 1942 that eggs could not be procured even for such patients who were entitled to them according to the regulations.

Undernourishment of this scope cannot fail to have effects. It is significant that many of the Norwegian refugees who in an increasing number have gone to Sweden since the summer of 1942, have given the shortage of food as a direct reason for their leaving. A peculiar feature which will only be understood by those who know the character of the Norwegian people is that the population do not like to complain about the shortage of food. The people seem to a certain extent to find it degrading to receive food as gifts and consider it as something like becoming public charges. The violent fighting spirit directed against the Germans makes people inclined to pull through without help, and they do not like to bewail something they consider minor inconveniences compared to the great evil which must be fought with all means. This fact also explains, at least to a certain extent, why many Norwegians who have left the country to take part in the fight against the Germans from abroad picture the food situation more favourable than it really is. The critical development in 1942 has, however, to a great extent done away with the desire to find motives for not complaining about food. The people begin to understand what a

powerful weapon the systematic undernourishment constitute for the German oppressors, and a constantly growing number of reports from the home-front mention the food question. It is more and more understood that, from a given point, the capacity of the individual for physical and mental resistance is a direct function of his physical condition. It has now also been realised that the Germans are scraping the bones and draw from Norway all the food products they can possibly lay their hands on without literally starving people to death. Special experts as well as laymen expect insupportable conditions this winter.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file personal

November 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

Pa

To have Welles and Norman Davis come in next Monday or Tuesday for ten minutes.

Give me this when they come in.

F. D. R.

State folder 2-42 23

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Your memorandum of November 16 with regard to the possibility of getting food to the people of Norway by way of a Swedish vessel to a Swedish port for distribution by the Swedish Red Cross raises a problem in which I am deeply interested. You suggest for consideration making a test run of enough food for a province of Norway and that if experience shows that the Swedish Red Cross can actually distribute this food in such a way that the inhabitants of Norway actually get it without interference by the Germans, we could go further in arranging for the distribution of food through the same agency in other parts of Norway.

As you desired, I have talked this matter over with Norman Davis.

Clearly, the carrying out of this plan even in a limited way would modify the control at present exercised by the maintenance of the British blockade.

The British are having increasingly serious difficulties in this regard. The Norwegian Government, the British

The President,

The White House.

inform us, are threatening to make the continued operation of Norwegian ships under British control contingent upon the agreement of the British Government to make possible mass relief to the people of Norway. Likewise, the Belgians have confronted the British very recently with a demand for mass feeding in Belgium under the threat of publicly withdrawing the support of the Belgian Government from the British blockade policy.

A short time ago it became clear that this Government and the British Government were pursuing completely different policies with regard to relief to the civilian populations in the occupied countries and in order to avoid what was threatening to become a highly unhealthy situation, we have agreed with the British to follow similar courses in this regard based on the principle that food to be supplied to the civilian populations in the occupied countries must originate within the blockaded area, namely, Portugal, since neither Sweden nor Switzerland have more than enough food supplies for their own domestic needs.

If we undertake to do as you suggest, this general principle will clearly have to be set aside and it will also inevitably mean the renewed and, I think, logical demand on the part of the Dutch and Belgian Governments, and undoubtedly on the part of the Polish, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav Governments, that identical treatment be

given them through the agency of the Swedish or the International Red Cross.

There is no doubt that the people of Norway during the coming winter months are going to be in a desperate situation. From the larger standpoint it may in fact be desirable that some modification of the blockade policy be agreed upon in order to save the lives of many thousands of individuals in Norway and in Holland and Belgium provided initial experiments prove that the Swedish Red Cross can actually distribute food supplies without having these supplies stolen by the local German authorities.

But I think you will agree that the decision to be reached involves the determination of a very broad and farreaching question of policy and that we should not take action in this Norwegian case until this question of major policy has been settled.

I would therefore like to suggest that you let Norman Davis and myself come in to see you together and talk the matter over and to obtain your decision on the broad policy involved. Once you decide this issue, we can then talk immediately with the British and go ahead without delay.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF PROTOCOL

November 21, 1942.

General Watson:

For the President's information.

George T. Summerlin

Division of
PROTOCOL
NOV 21 1942
Department of State

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE UNDER SECRETARY

November 21, 1942

PR
Mr. Summerlin:

Please see that this material is available to the President before the visit of the President of Ecuador.

U:SW:BMK

Division of
PROTOCOL
NOV 21 1942
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

November 20, 1942

U - Mr. Welles:

Attached are two memoranda, one of which gives certain biographical data concerning President Arroyo, and the other describes the topics which President Arroyo may be expected to discuss. It is Mr. Duggan's suggestion, with which I heartily concur, that these be made available to the President.

PWB

Philip W. Bonsal

RA:PWB:GBA

PSF State Dept folder 2-42
file personal 1

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

MEMORANDUM

President Carlos Arroyo del Rio of Ecuador

President Arroyo was born November 27, 1893 in Guayaquil. His lineage is Colombian of Spanish descent and he was educated at the University of Guayaquil as a lawyer. He speaks some French and has a slight knowledge of English. His recreation is study and he has a considerable reputation as a poet. He is married and has one son. Though a Catholic, he belongs to the Anti-Clerical Party. Professionally, he is considered the ablest lawyer in Ecuador and has represented influential clients, including American companies, and through his law practice has become very wealthy. His political affiliations are Liberal Radical. He was inaugurated President in September 1940 for a five year term.

He has held a number of municipal, judicial, and government positions, was President of the Chamber of Deputies, a Senator, Professor of Law, and dean of the faculty of the University of Guayaquil, Ecuadoran delegate to the Arbitration Congress at Washington in 1928, official nominee of the Liberal Radical Party for the Presidency in 1935 and again in 1938.

Within the limitations imposed by his relatively weak political position he has done all within his power to cooperate loyally and faithfully with the United States in the prosecution of the war. He has willingly made all facilities available for the establishment of American air and naval bases at Salinas and on the Galapagos Islands under the terms of the general military agreement with Ecuador.

It is believed that President Arroyo would appreciate references to the cooperation which Ecuador has given in the prosecution of the war but that at the same time he should have impressed upon him the extent of sacrifices which all free peoples must make in order to maintain their liberties, that it is not enough to be satisfied with what has been done, that the process must be a continuing one. The start which Ecuador has made in controlling Axis activities and in furnishing its part of the raw materials of war is excellent but, if the result is to

be

be certain, greater efforts must yet be made by all countries participating in the effort.

The financial assistance which the United States has, in the past two years, given Ecuador consists of the following: $2,000,000 being spent by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs for health and sanitation work; $500,000 for the rehabilitation of the province of El Oro; a $5,000,000 credit is available for the Ecuadoran Development Corporation and an $8,000,000 credit has been promised for waterworks as soon as materials are available. The Treasury has committed itself to a $2,000,000 stabilization fund. $1,300,000 has been used for the construction of roads and railway rolling stock. Rubber Reserve has made available $500,000 for rubber development.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS

MEMORANDUM

Topics which President Arroyo may be Expected to Discuss

1. Peru-Ecuador Boundary.

President Arroyo will almost certainly refer to Ecuador's boundary controversy with Peru. There have been differences of opinion in the demarcation of this boundary as provided in the Rio Protocol of January, 1942. Peru has taken the stand that all differences should be treated on a global basis after those parts which are agreed upon have been marked while Ecuador has been insisting on the working out of a method of procedure and the handling of each difference as it arises. The Department feels that the demarcation should continue on a basis of direct negotiation between the two parties concerned with later assistance by the guarantors of the boundary, should this seem advisable. It is felt that great progress has been made in the demarcation and that with time and understanding on the part of all concerned all problems which may arise can be worked out amicably.

2. Military Bases in Ecuador.

President Arroyo is convinced that Ecuador was the first American Republic to establish a continental defense zone. He is very proud of this point and will deeply appreciate references to it.

3. Additional Credits for Road Building.

President Arroyo is interested in credits for three highways.

a. The final link in the Pan American Highway. This will involve a credit of approximately $800,000 from the Export Import Bank. Road building equipment for this project is available in Ecuador. The road would be 130 kilometers long. The project is desirable because it is part of the Pan American Highway and the Department understands that the Export Import Bank is disposed to give favorable consideration.

b. A

b. A road which would link Guayaquil with the Pan American Highway, 116 kilometers long. Ecuador claims to have half ($400,000) of the money needed for this road and all the equipment. It is believed that this road would be useful in the development of Ecuadoran economy.

c. A road, 200 kilometers long, from Guayaquil to the seaport of Salinas where the American naval base is located. It does not seem desirable to encourage this project at this time and the War Department is not interested from strategic reasons.

4. Construction of Military Barracks.

Members of the President's Cabinet have expressed interest on several occasions in credits for the construction of military barracks. No economic or military justification for the project is perceived.

5. Mineral Survey.

Many Ecuadorans have long been convinced that the country is a great storehouse of mineral wealth which needs only to be developed. All surveys so far fail to substantiate this belief. While a comprehensive survey might well be justified after the war, it is not believed that experts are available at present nor that the possibility of mineral deposits is sufficiently great to warrant the diversion of many technical experts during the war.

6. Scholarships.

Ecuador is interested in scholarships. As in the past, this government will continue to render all possible assistance for scholarships to qualified Ecuadoran students along the lines most calculated to assist the development of the country and to boys who will be a credit to their people. The applications should be handled through the usual channels in our Embassy in Quito. It is believed that scholarships in soil conservation, agriculture, economics, and various branches of engineering will be most useful for the country.

122 scholarships have been awarded since August, 1940,

to

to Ecuadorans in the following lines: aviation, military training, agriculture, public health, medicine, and general university work. The grants range in duration from three months to two years.

7. Military Supplies.

President Arroyo may mention military supplies under lend-lease. The Ecuadoran Military Attaché in Washington has kept in close touch with the War Department and is fully informed. Within the limitations of the war needs and shipping difficulties, deliveries to Ecuador have been on schedule. The President may ask specifically for coast artillery, anti-aircraft guns, planes, and a military mission. The first two are exceedingly difficult to obtain. Ecuador has already received, or will receive shortly, twenty-five planes. It might be well to increase the present air mission, and the War Department states that it will be glad to consider a formal request for an increase.

8. Telecommunications.

Ecuador is most desirous of securing improved telephone service. While agreeing in principle, our position has been that it is impossible to obtain additional equipment until after the war. It is believed that President Arroyo should understand the impossibility of obtaining telephone equipment from any source at present. At the same time, it is believed that, in view of the present confused world situation, he might well be urged on a confidential basis to avoid making any commitment with a non-American source for later development.

9. Waterworks for Guayaquil and Quito.

This government has committed itself to Ecuador to credits not exceeding $8,000,000 for improving the very bad water systems in Guayaquil and Quito. It will, however, be impossible to implement this commitment until after the war because of the large amounts of materials involved. President Arroyo has been informed of the present difficulty of implementing the commitment and of the possibility that some preparatory work might be done.

10. The Province of El Oro.

This government made a grant of $500,000 to Ecuador

for

for the rehabilitation of the province of El Oro which was occupied by Peru during hostilities with that country last year. Since the project is just getting under way, there should be no question of a further commitment.

The President of Ecuador, and most Ecuadorans, believes that the United States has been treating Peru better than Ecuador. A review of the facts demonstrates that this is not true.

11. Health and Sanitation.

This government is already spending $2,000,000 for health and sanitation in Guayaquil and Quito and $500,000 for general social and welfare purposes in the province of El Oro. If President Arroyo brings up the question of an additional allotment for general health and sanitation, the Department understands that the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs would be disposed to consider a moderate sum.

Mention might well be made of control of Axis activities in Ecuador. Ecuadoran legislation on this subject is in the main excellent as concerns economic and political activities of Axis nationals or sympathizers. It should be stressed to President Arroyo, however, that the true meaning of any legislation necessarily comes in its enforcement, that the whole course of the war has proven conclusively the great advantages to be obtained from rigid control of non-American activities, and that progressive action in this respect is still necessary if the ultimate aims are to be achieved.

PWS

RA:JFM:MEG

(274)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Will you be good enough to acknowledge the enclosed letter from Mr. Jacques Stern?

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Letter and translation of same from Jacques Stern, 87 Library Place, Princeton, New Jersey, 11/19/42, to the President. Copy of translation has been retained for our files.

State Dept file
2-42

[TRANSLATION]

HOTEL WEYLAN
Madison Ave. & 54th St.
New York, N.Y.

November 19, 1942
87 Library Place
Princeton, N.J.

Mr. President:

You will certainly remember our conversation in the autumn of 1937, in the presence of Jules Henry, in regard to the situation of Indochina in time of war, if the fleet of the United States should not come to its aid! You did me the honor to share my opinion. Singapore and Burma have, alas, proved us right.

Mr. Sumner Welles must have in his archives some trace of the report which I made to him, in the name of the French Government, on the day after my call at the White House, on this matter.

I am writing to you today, respectfully to communicate to you another experience.

In 1929, as Under-Secretary of State for the Navy, I installed at Bonifacio (Corsica) a battery of 380s intended to cover the Island of Maddalena, an Italian submarine base.

This battery is, along with the whole Island, now in the hands of the enemy.

If the Germans or Italians take possession of Port Mahon (Balearic Islands), which faces Corsica and which is the most sheltered port of this region, we may consider the southern coast of France as double-locked against an invasion coming from North Africa.

For seven years I attended naval manoeuvers, on board the Saguor [?], in this part of the Mediterranean.

The Germans hold, temporarily, I hope, Bizerte, another key-point. Do not, I beg you, let the enemy take Port Mahon. Admiral Leahy is certainly of my opinion.

Respectfully yours,

Jacques Stern [?]
Ex-Under-Secretary of State for the Navy
Reporter for seven years for the Finance Committee of the Naval Budget
Ex-Minister for the Merchant Marine
Ex-Minister for the Colonies

TR:MSM:JMC

State folder 2-42

file

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I think it is important that you understand that the War Shipping Administration has from the beginning been willing to give the Norwegians ten ships for which they have crews. The Norwegians have been unwilling up to the present time to take the kind of ships we could give them and they are insisting on getting exceptional favors and very scarce ships, including tankers.

It seems to me that the Norwegians cannot make out a case for insisting on particular types of ships.

There is another complication in this in that the Norwegians are unwilling to put their merchant marine on the same basis as the rest of us. They prefer to run their own free ships where and when they want to run them. There is a feeling around town that they want to protect their post war interests. I do not think they should be encouraged in this ambition.

HLH

H.L.H.

State Dept folder 2-43
File
personal
confidential

PMW
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Asmara

Dated January 6, 1943

Rec'd 5:52 p.m., 8th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

3, January 6, 11 a.m.

I have been requested to forward the following telegram to President Roosevelt.

"I thank you for your wishes which I reciprocate and am grateful Mr. Talbot Smith, your consul, informing me that you have made Ethiopia eligible for Lease-Lend assistance. I wish to assure you that every possible wish will be made that Lease-Lend assistance should be used to the best interest of the United Nations towards the war effort. We are expecting Mr. Talbot Smith to visit us at Addis Ababa shortly in order to discuss fully Lease-Lend arrangements. Haile Selassie".

See my telegrams December 12, 11 a.m., January 1, noon.

CLARK

WWC

State folder
file 2-43
personal

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 13, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

GRACE

Dr. Rowe phoned to say that he has had his conference with Nelson Rockefeller re the Ernest Galaraza matter (Bolivia) and that the matter is apparently being worked out now which Dr. Rowe thinks will result satisfactorily. Just as soon as a definite conclusion is reached, Dr. Rowe will report to the President.

TOI

State Dept. folder
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. L. S. ROWE

I feel rather badly about this Galarza matter. In case the Pan American cannot do anything, I suggest you talk with Nelson Rockefeller -- if you think Dr. Galarza would be useful there.

Please return enclosures for my files.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972

F. D. R.

Letter from Hon. Sumner Welles, The Under Secretary of State, 1/7/43, to Miss Tully, regarding the matter of the resignation of Ernesto Galarza, letter from Hon. Garnder Jackson, 1/4/43 marked "Personal and Confidential", in re Ernesto Galarza and the Bolivian situation, together with a "Memorandum Regarding Ernesto Galarza, Chief, Division of Labor and Social Information Pan American Union".

State Dept. folder
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

December 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please check up on this and speak to me about it.

Will you be good enough to return the enclosures for my files?

F. D. R.

Letter from Gardner Jackson, Department of Agriculture, 12/24/42, to the President marked "Personal and Confidential", attached to which is carbon of letter addressed to the Under Secretary of State by Ernest Galarza under date of 12/21/42, concerning U.S. Ambassador Pierre Boal and the mining situation in Bolivia.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 3 1972

State Dept folder
2-43

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MEMORANDUM

file
1-13-43

December 30, 1942.

S--The Secretary:

In connection with the conversation with the President which he has requested regarding the Bolivian situation, there are attached the following documents which you may wish to have with you during the interview:

(a) The statement you made at the press conference on Monday, December 28;

(b) The background statement which Mr. Bucknell read to the correspondents on Monday, December 28;

(c) A copy of Ambassador Boal's telegram commenting on the allegation that he had taken steps to diminish prospects of adoption of the labor code;

(d) A copy of my memorandum of conversation with the Bolivian Ambassador this morning, in which the Bolivian Government denies that Ambassador Boal in any way intervened in connection with the Bolivian labor code;

(e) A copy of my memorandum of conversation with the Bolivian Ambassador this morning reporting his invitation to this Government to join with his Government in a joint study of labor conditions.

LD
Laurence Duggan

OK
EH

PA/LD:DMZ

A

STATEMENT MADE BY SECRETARY HULL AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1942.

"Our Ambassador to Bolivia cables that he did not engage in any acts or utterances which could be construed at all as an attempt to influence the labor plans and proposals and programs that were pending in Bolivia; that he once made inquiry about the effect of the proposed labor code on production costs of the strategic materials that we were securing from Bolivia; that there was nothing in that inquiry which was not in line with his duty to report all economic facts to his Government or that could be construed in any unfavorable light and nothing was so intended.

"I think the fact of our Good Neighbor policy with all of its philosophies and principles and programs as enunciated at Montevideo and carried forward with most every kind of cooperation with each country in the Americas--political, economic, social, moral and cultural--I think the progress that has been made steadily in that straight course of cooperation with noticeable improvement in the welfare and the betterment of the people here and everywhere is sufficient witness to what we have always stood for during these ten years and what we shall continue to stand for."

B

The allegation has been made that the United States Ambassador in Bolivia made certain observations to the President of Bolivia intended to diminish the prospects of passage of a labor code now in force which would have created procedures under which labor in Bolivia could improve its status.

This charge, which is an extremely serious one, was made without any endeavor to check its accuracy with either the Department or the United States Ambassador to Bolivia. As soon as it was brought to the Department's attention it was thoroughly investigated, and the Department is in a position to state categorically that the allegation is totally without foundation.

Those observers who have been following the development over a decade of the Good-Neighbor Policy must have rejected immediately the idea that this Government would ever have instructed its Ambassador in Bolivia to intervene in Bolivia's internal affairs. The basic tenet of the Good-Neighbor Policy is noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. This policy, now embodied in treaty, has been at all times scrupulously adhered to. In fact, on December 2, 1942 the Department specifically instructed Mr. Boal, United States Ambassador in Bolivia, to avoid carefully any statements or actions which might be construed as an attempt to influence Bolivian legislation.

It has also been a fundamental principle of our policy to give all assistance possible to the other American republics to raise the standard of living, particularly to improve the living standards of labor. This has been done time and time again on a cooperative basis and, of course, without unilateral interference by this Government. In this regard, a United States economic mission, in agreement with the Bolivian Government, made a study of ways in which the Bolivian economy might be improved. As a result of the recommendations of that mission arrangements are being completed for the granting of specific financial and technical assistance which will enable certain vitally important public works and agricultural and industrial development to be carried out. It is our hope that as a result of this cooperative

activity

activity the production of foodstuffs and other essential products in Bolivia will be stimulated for the benefit of Bolivian agriculturists and laborers.

Although it was never doubted for a minute that Ambassador Boal had strictly adhered to this Government's basic policies he was immediately asked for a report on the charges made that he had taken action to diminish the prospects of passage of the labor code.

Ambassador Boal has replied that he has never at any time taken any action that could be considered as intended to influence action on the labor code. He did not discuss with the President, as charged, or with any other Bolivian official, the new administrative expenses that would be imposed upon the companies under the decree, the question of paying earned wages on time, collective bargaining, or any other procedure for handling labor problems in connection with the mining industry. Mr. Boal did not make any suggestion regarding the approval of the bill by the President or with respect to its enforcement. Since it was obvious that the new code would increase the production cost of metals, rubber, and other products being bought by the United States Government in furtherance of the war effort, Ambassador Boal asked the President the simple question of what he thought the effect of the code would be on these costs. This entirely proper question was designed to gather information that would be useful to the various Government agencies concerned in the purchase of strategic materials.

Although the prices to be paid by this Government for strategic materials are primarily for decision by the appropriate United States Government agencies concerned, it is of record that this Government has favored the payment of generous prices for materials produced in Bolivia on account of the rising cost of living and shortage of goods in Bolivia and that prices of tin and tungsten have been revised upward by agreement of the Bolivian and United States Governments.

It is unfortunate that this unfounded allegation should have been spread broadcast over the country without any attempt having been made to verify the true situation. The last ten years of the Good-Neighbor Policy should be convincing proof, first, that this Government long ago gave up meddling in the internal

affairs

affairs of other countries, and, secondly, that this Government reflects in its foreign policy the objective of the Administration's domestic policy, namely, an improvement in the standard of living in which all elements will participate, particularly those heretofore illy clothed, housed, and fed.

C

HRL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

La Paz

Dated December 24, 1942

Rec'd 6 p.m., 25th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1262, December 24, 9 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

[redacted] FROM THE AMBASSADOR

Reference Department's 965, December 23, 11 p.m.

My conversation with President Penaranda on November 30 was reported to the Department in my telegram 1130, November 30, 11 p.m. It was limited to asking the President what he thought the effect of the code would be on production costs of metals, rubber and other products bought by the United States in furtherance of the war effort. The code had already been passed by Congress and I did not suggest or bring up in any way the question of whether it would or would not be vetoed by the President but he himself in explaining the general situation regarding the code expressed the intention of approving it and his reasons therefor. I did not (repeat not) make any kind of suggestions regarding the approval of the bill or its enforcement.

It was entirely on his own motion that he stated he would

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972

he would like to have our views respecting any particular articles of the bill insofar as they would affect production costs and he indicated in any event he was considering suspension or modification of some articles.

BOAL

BB

HEL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

La Paz

Dated December 24, 1942

Rec'd 1:25 p.m., 26th

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1262, December 24, 9 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

We did not discuss administrative expenses, the undesirability of paying earned wages on time nor was any reference made to higher prices which would have to be obtained for strategic materials. Collective bargaining was not mentioned nor was anything said regarding methods of dealing with labor at the mines. My 1130 of November 30 accurately reported the conversation and the President's statements in no way prompted by me are contained from "the President considers" to "the articles might be suspended". The remainder of the telegram consisted of observations I made to the Department on the situations and did not (repeat not) reflect my conversation with the President.

It so happens that my conversation with the President was in accord with the Department's 890 of December 2, 6 p.m. I took the next opportunity after receipt of that telegram to speak briefly with the President in accordance with the telegram but this made no reversal

in the

in the attitude already taken with the President since it simply confirmed the line already taken and reinforced it somewhat. I have not discussed the subject with other Bolivian officials excepting simply informing the Foreign Minister that the President and I had talked about it.

BOAL

CSB

JMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

La Paz

Dated December 24, 1942

Rec'd 1:15 a.m., 26th.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

1262, December 24, 9 p.m. (SECTION THREE).

In my airgram 187, December 18 I stressed the need for having experts here to assist in improving living standards of miners and other workers and it is still my view we should assist in this and that improvement in this standard should not be unduly held down by a rigid attitude in the future with regard to the prices we pay for metals. It may be recalled also in my telegram No. 555, July 18 I suggested that in increasing metals prices a certain part of the increase be set aside for direct use in the improvement of working conditions for the laborers. No reply was received to this and the price of wolfram was increased without any seaboard provision.

As stated in my telegram No. 1130, I consider the purposes of the labor code as flexible and beneficial and at the same time I deemed it helpful to explain to the Department the probable effects of the enforcement of the code as regards production and costs of production so that it might have all data before it so that it will

be aware

be aware of time and other elements in the event it desired to express any views.

I have the honor to request that the Department telegraph me the source of the allegations contained in No. 965 in order that I may have opportunity to determine the causes of these misrepresentations.

BOAL

EDA

D

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 30, 1942.

SUBJECT: Statement of Ernesto Galarza relating to the Bolivian labor code.

PARTICIPANTS: Señor Dr. Don Luis Fernando Guachalla, Bolivian Ambassador;

Mr. Laurence Duggan, Adviser on Political Relations.

COPIES TO: U, S, RA, CI, and American Embassy at La Paz.

The Ambassador stated that he had read in the newspapers the statement of Mr. Galarza relating to the Bolivian labor code. He was unable to determine from these articles whether the code was in effect or not. He therefore telegraphed his Government for information. His Government replied that the code, called the Busch Labor Code, had been approved by Congress and promulgated by the Executive authority. The cable from his Government went on to deny categorically that Ambassador Boal had intervened with any official of the Bolivian Government with regard to this matter.

The Ambassador stated that he would like this information brought to the attention of the Secretary and the Under Secretary, who should feel free to use it if they thought it would be helpful.

PA/LD:DMZ

E

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: December 30, 1942.

SUBJECT: Desire of Bolivian Government that study be made to determine actual labor conditions in Bolivian mining industry.

PARTICIPANTS: Señor Dr. Don Luis Fernando Guachalla, Bolivian Ambassador;

Mr. Laurence Duggan, Adviser on Political Relations.

COPIES TO: RA, EO, DM, and American Embassy at La Paz.

The Ambassador recalled that about two weeks ago he had mentioned the desirability of a study being made to determine what the actual labor conditions were in the Bolivian mining industry. At about the same time he recalled that he had sent Mr. William T. Stone, BEW, a letter indicating the interest of the Bolivian Government in ascertaining these conditions.

The Ambassador stated that yesterday, through the intermediacy of Señor de Lozada, he had called upon the Vice President, as Chairman of the Board of Economic Warfare, to inform him officially that the Government of Bolivia would be very pleased if two or three qualified officials of the United States Government would proceed to Bolivia to make, in conjunction with a similar number of officials of the Bolivian Ministry of Labor, a joint study to determine what was at the bottom of the present labor difficulties. Several reasons were advanced. Some thought it was because of low wages. Others thought that it was because the purchasing power of wages had diminished on account of rising prices. Others thought that it was because of inadequate internal transport. The Ambassador thought that it was probably a combination of factors, of which inadequacy of internal transport was the most

important.

important. In any case, to proceed intelligently to attack this problem it was first necessary to agree upon the facts. His Government therefore hoped that early in January two or three United States Government officials could proceed to Bolivia to make this joint study.

I told the Ambassador that the problems of labor and of labor conditions in Bolivia interested this Government because of the bearing that they had on the productivity of labor. We did not feel, however, that it was proper and consistent with our policy to volunteer suggestions to the Bolivian Government unless that Government had requested them. The desire of the Bolivian Government that a joint study be undertaken appealed to me very much. It seemed to me that this would enable the two Governments cooperatively to study a problem of admitted complexity and together to agree upon appropriate steps to be taken.

The Ambassador stated that he understood clearly the policy of this Government and that he fully agreed that any unilateral intrusion by the United States would not be welcome. He thought that the cooperative study of this problem by the two Governments might be very helpful and, furthermore, might have the effect of suggesting to other countries the desirability of their also inviting the United States to make similar studies of labor problems.

I told the Ambassador that I would lay his proposal before a meeting that was to be held this afternoon of interested Government agencies with regard to this general question.

PA/LD:DMZ

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

PA/LD

Mr. Duggan

ADVISER ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
DEC 29 1942
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[redacted]

December 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Please check up on this and speak to me about it.

Will you be good enough to return the enclosures for my files?

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By KT
Date APR 10 1973

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 24, 1942

PERSONAL AND [redacted]

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House

ATTENTION: General Edwin M. Watson

Dear Mr. President:

The attached letter concerning United States Ambassador Pierre Boal and the mining situation in Bolivia springs from personal observations made by Ernesto Galarza when he was on his Latin-American trip early this year and from commitments made by him to the Bolivian workers at that time.

I have no doubt whatever of Ernesto's complete integrity in taking this step and other steps he has taken in the past. He is absolutely convinced of his facts. He talked with two or three of his closest friends, including me, about his letter to Sumner Welles and we persuaded him to rephrase it somewhat and not to make it public at this time. He sent copies of a memo summarizing the situation as he sees it to various trade union leaders and that memo has received a certain amount of publicity through the trade unions.

Ernesto, as you will recall I have written you before, is the man whose recommendation that Henry Wallace place a wreath on the Cadets' Monument in Mexico City two years ago you so readily agreed to while talking with me. He is one of the most intimate friends our family has and one of the most trusted. His action in this case, which one or two of us have tried to temper, springs from deep emotional and intellectual sincerity developed from experiences as a child in a peon's hovel in Mexico, where his first formative years were spent.

He has been forthright and above-board with the director of the Pan American Union, Dr. Leo Rowe, throughout his building of the Division of Labor and Social Information into what promises to be an effective agency in promoting the kind of inter-American relationships which you, H.A. and Sumner Welles himself have espoused in public utterances. I am sure you will find this to be so upon inquiry of Dr. Rowe.

DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 5(B) and 5(D) or (E)
Agriculture Dept. Letter, 11-8-72
By RT NARS Date APR 10 1973

May the Christmas of you and your family be as satisfactory as possible in a world so torn by un-Christian forces.

Sincerely yours,

Gardner Jackson

Gardner Jackson

[redacted]

Washington, D. C.
December 21, 1942

Mr. Sumner Welles
Under Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

The declaration of a state of siege in the Republic of Bolivia last week brings to a head a fundamental issue with regard to the policy of the State Department toward the people of Latin America which can no longer be ignored. I address this letter to you because the formulation and application of this policy has been mainly in your hands during the past eight years.

The state of siege declared in Bolivia, in my judgment, is the result of popular resentment against certain practices of corporations, especially in the mining industry, toward the workers. It is also the result of mass discontent amounting almost to despair because of rapidly increasing living costs and the scarcity of basic foods.

You are aware that for many years the Bolivian workers have sought relief from a condition which kept ninety per cent or more of the people of that country in a state of chronic misery and economic degradation, by seeking the enactment of a labor code which would open legal avenues for the improvement of these conditions. The code, enacted three years ago, was being revised by the Bolivian Congress and was to have been enacted by December 8 of this year. The nature of this code is indicated by the fact that through its operation the Bolivian workers hoped to obtain the payment of wages on time, the right of collective bargaining, minimum wages, and the strengthening of mediation and arbitration.

I have received information to the effect that while the new labor code was under discussion, the American Ambassador to Bolivia, Mr. Pierre Boal, communicated to the President of Bolivia, General Peñaranda, the views of the American Embassy with regard to the legislation then pending before Congress.

In these conversations Ambassador Boal did not venture to give instructions to President Peñaranda, but it is clear that the Ambassador's observations were intended to diminish the prospects of passage of the labor code. The Ambassador clearly agreed with the position of the large mine operators

that the new code would impose disagreeable administrative expenses on the companies; that it was desirable not to pay earned wages on time in order to compel the workers to remain on the job; that the enactment of the code would compel the companies to demand higher prices from the United States Government for tin and other essential materials; that collective bargaining would be detrimental rather than helpful to production.

Given the circumstances under which Bolivia finds itself, the position taken by the Ambassador of the United States amounts to nothing less than connivance to frustrate the petition of the workers. The practical result of this cooperation between the representative of this country and the mine operators is the further weakening of the labor movement in whose ranks there are to be found the most sincere and courageous defenders of democracy.

More than this, the attitude and the conduct of the Ambassador fall in the category of secret economic diplomacy at its worst, by which the means of livelihood of millions of workers are determined without representation, without discussion, without publicity, and without a sense of responsibility to the people by those who make the decisions.

This is nothing less than a tourniquet applied to the arteries of democracy in the American continent. The strikes in Bolivia and in other Latin American republics since Pearl Harbor clearly show where this policy will lead.

I believe that democracy and production must go up or down together. The contrary is the thesis of totalitarianism. For this reason I am prepared to state that the attitude and point of view represented by Ambassador Boal will lead to a further decline of production in Bolivia and in other parts of Latin America as well. The physical reserves of the Latin American workers, especially in the vital industries, are already so low that the systematic opposition to better housing, higher wages, adequate medical attention, efficient training, collective bargaining and proper representation before public administrative bodies will drive the workers to adopt every form of active and passive resistance. In my judgment, they will be justified in so doing.

The war production program in Latin America involves fundamental questions of physical well being, of morale, of effective use of all the human and technical resources of the Americas. I submit that the policy of Ambassador Boal has made it impossible to attack some of these questions through the use of agencies of the United States and through the use of means and methods in behalf of the common welfare which many Latin American governments have already tested and applied. It is also my deeply held conviction that as long as the present policy continues, the economic development of Latin America through industrialization wherever possible,

the stabilization of Latin American economy through agricultural progress, and other measures which have been amply discussed in inter-American conferences will not be attained.

I feel impelled to dissent vigorously from the present policy of this Government in Bolivia for another reason. Statements have been made in the press and on the radio in this country to the effect that the strikes in Bolivia are caused by Nazi agents. What is the result, if we allow this interpretation to gain currency among the American people? First, attention will be diverted from the real causes of unrest, namely, bad housing, lack of food, disease and poverty. Second, it will be easier to label all dissenters and the genuine representatives of popular sentiment as "Nazis." I assert that the Nazi agents are not causing something which has its roots in basic economic maladjustment. The Nazis are merely taking clever advantage of something which they hope to use to discredit democracy.

This is attained by the simple process of contrasting the public statements of President Roosevelt and Vice President Wallace with the everyday, practical, and immediate effects of American policy in the Latin American countries. There has been established in the minds of the Latin American workers an identity, a cause and effect relationship, between the suppression of the right of free speech, the negation of the right of collective bargaining, the dispossession of small farmers, the freezing of wages, the soaring cost of living and the courageous doctrine of the Four Freedoms enunciated by the President of the United States, reiterated by the Vice President, and stressed by you in several important speeches in recent months. I cannot believe that the discrepancy between your public statements regarding the welfare of the common people and what is now happening in the American Embassy in La Paz will fail to deserve your immediate attention.

This is where we stand today in the matter of good relations between the people of this hemisphere. For the accuracy of these statements I am willing to answer.

In consequence, as an American citizen of Mexican birth; as one who is profoundly disturbed by the increasing dislocation of production of essential raw materials attributable directly to antiquated and narrow interests; as one who believes that the Chief Executive of this government, the Congress of the United States, and the people of this country are entitled to decide whether continental solidarity must be bought at the price being currently paid by the workers of Bolivia - for these reasons I protest formally against the conduct of Ambassador Boal.

This protest is filed with you by me on my personal and individual responsibility. My position as chief of the Division of Labor and Social Information of the Pan American Union does not in any way imply that my statement reflects any opinion except my own.

Sincerely yours,

Ernesto Galarza

(205) — PSF State Dept. folder

hw

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

SECRETARY OF STATE:

I have never heard of Major William Vance, nor is he any cousin of mine.

F.D.R.

Mimeographed copy of cable which the Secretary of State received from "Messersmith", dated 4/1/43, in re a Major William Vance, who says he is a cousin of the President, and who is now in Mexico endeavoring to interest Mexican Govt. officials in using him for selling coffee, tungsten, zinc and other strategic materials. Major Vance is also reported to have stated that he is a special undercover intestigator for either the Senate or House Military Affairs Committee and that he has been sent to Mexico to investigate the activities of Mr. Floyd Hanson, special representative of the RFC. Mr. Messersmith asks information concerning Major Vance.

State Dept. folder

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 7, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

S.T.E.

The President had a dispatch from Messersmith in regard to Major William Vance. He sent the Secretary of State a memorandum saying that he had never heard of Major Vance and that he was not a cousin of the President.

G.G.T.

Confidential memo, 4-2-43 to Mr. Early from Mr. Summerlin re Major Vance and his activities in Mexico City - says he is a cousin of the Pres. and is trying to interest Mexican govt. officials in using him for selling strategic materials

Hull April 9, 1943

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Our note to Japan did not threaten retaliation — but punishment of Jap officers guilty of executing U.S. prisoners of war.

State Dept. folder

April 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

I am deeply stirred and horrified by the execution of American aviators by the Japanese Government.

I approve the proposed message to the Japanese Government through the Swiss Government.

In view of the severe tone of this note and especially of the warning in the last paragraph that we propose to retaliate on Japanese prisoners in our hands, I can see no reason for delaying a public announcement on my part.

The note to the Japanese Government is so strong that it will not further hurt the persons of Americans now in their custody -- civilians and members of the armed forces if I give out the full facts, together with a copy or paraphrase of the note.

I suggest, therefore, that on Tuesday next I make a public announcement expressing the horror of this nation at the killing of prisoners of war, and at the same time giving a simple short factual statement covering the whole subject.

I do not think that the proposed public announcement is sufficiently strong or comprehensive.

Please let me have a redraft of it which will be less official and more human.

F.D.R.

Enclosure.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

April 7, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attached is a very important telegram to Japan. I am sorry to intrude it upon your attention at this moment.

The Japanese Government had notified us that they executed some of our aviators who bombed Japan.

The attached is our proposed reply. Questions of retaliation had been considered and discarded with the consent of the War and Navy Departments.

The supporting memorandum and the green telegram raise questions of the highest policy in the conduct of war and I must submit it to you for your consideration and approval.

C. H.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

X

PLAIN

April 5, 1943.

AMERICAN LEGATION,
BERN.

Please request the Swiss Government to have its Minister at Tokyo deliver verbatim the following statement to the Japanese Government from the Government of the United States.

The Government of the United States has received the reply of the Japanese Government conveyed under date of February 17, 1943, to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo to the inquiry made by the Minister on behalf of the Government of the United States concerning the correctness of reports broadcast by Japanese radio stations that the Japanese authorities intended to try before military tribunals American prisoners of war, for military operations, and to impose upon them severe penalties including even the death penalty.

The Japanese Government states that it has tried the members of the crews of American planes who fell into Japanese hands after the raid on Japan on April 18 last,

last, that they were sentenced to death and that, following commutation of the sentence for the larger number of them, the sentence of death was applied to certain of the accused.

The Government of the United States has subsequently been informed of the refusal of the Japanese Government to treat the remaining American aviators as prisoners of war, to divulge their names, to state the sentences imposed upon them or to permit visits to them by the Swiss Minister as representative of the protecting Power for American interests.

The Japanese Government alleges that it has subjected the American aviators to this treatment because they intentionally bombed non-military installations and deliberately fired on civilians, and that the aviators admitted these acts.

The Government of the United States informs the Japanese Government that instructions to American armed forces have always ordered those forces to direct their attacks upon military objectives. The

American

American forces participating in the attack on Japan had such instructions and it is known that they did not deviate therefrom. The Government of the United States brands as false the charge that American aviators intentionally have attacked non-combatants anywhere.

With regard to the allegation of the Japanese Government that the American aviators admitted the acts of which the Japanese Government accuses them, there are numberous known instances in which Japanese official agencies have employed brutal and bestial methods in extorting alleged confessions from persons in their power. It is customary for those agencies to use statements obtained under torture, or alleged statements, in proceedings against the victims.

If the admissions alleged by the Japanese Government to have been made by the American aviators were in fact made, they could only have been extorted fabrications.

Moreover, the Japanese Government entered into a solemn obligation by agreement with the Government of

the

the United States to observe the terms of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention. Article 1 of that Convention provides for treatment as prisoners of war of members of armies and of persons captured in the course of military operations at sea or in the air. Article 60 provides that upon the opening of a judicial proceeding directed against a prisoner of war, the representative of the protecting Power shall be given notice thereof at least three weeks prior to the trial and of the names and charges against the prisoners who are to be tried. Article 61 provides that no prisoner may be obliged to admit himself guilty of the act of which he is accused. Article 62 provides that the accused shall have the assistance of qualified counsel of his choice and that a representative of the protecting Power shall be permitted to attend the trial. Article 65 provides that sentence pronounced against the prisoners shall be communicated to the protecting Power immediately. Article 66 provides, in the event that the death penalty is pronounced, that the details as to the nature and

circumstances

circumstances of the offense shall be communicated to the protecting Power, for transmission to the Power in whose forces the prisoner served, and that the sentence shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of at least three months after such communication. The Japanese Government has not complied with any of these provisions of the Convention in its treatment of the captured American aviators.

The Government of the United States calls again upon the Japanese Government to carry out its agreement to observe the provisions of the Convention by communicating to the Swiss Minister at Tokyo the charges and sentences imposed upon the American aviators, by permitting the Swiss representatives to visit those now held in prison, by restoring to those aviators the full rights to which they are entitled under the Prisoners of War Convention, and by informing the Minister of the names and disposition or place of burial of the bodies of any of the aviators against whom sentence of death has been carried out.

If,

If, as would appear from its communication under reference, the Japanese Government has descended to such acts of barbarity and manifestations of depravity as to murder in cold blood uniformed members of the American armed forces made prisoners as an incident of warfare, the American Government will hold personally and officially responsible for those deliberate crimes all of those officers of the Japanese Government who have participated in their commitment and will in due course bring those officers to justice.

The American Government also solemnly warns the Japanese Government that for any other violations of its undertakings as regards American prisoners of war or for any other acts of criminal barbarity inflicted upon American prisoners in violation of the rules of warfare accepted and practiced by civilized nations, as military operations now in progress draw to their inexorable and inevitable conclusion, the American Government will visit upon the officers of the Japanese

Government

Government responsible for such uncivilized and inhumane acts the punishment they deserve.

OK
FDR

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

file Brazil

April 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

With reference to the attached file, I enclose a copy of a secret message we sent to Helsinki on April ninth. In the circumstances, we do not think that any answer is required to the message from Mr. Churchill.

CH

State Dept. file

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

April 9, 1943, 8 P.M.

[redacted]

American Legation

Helsinki

U.S. Urgent

58. We have confined our efforts regarding a possible Soviet-Finnish treaty of peace merely to a suggestion looking to the effecting of direct contact between the Finnish and Soviet governments so that they might negotiate direct. Being an intermediary to transmit information as to possible terms has at no time been considered by us; therefore, Ramsay's condition for his consideration of our proposal, which was reported in your telegram No. 470 of March 24th, cannot be satisfied by us.

You should accordingly prepare a reply in the sense of the foregoing to the communication of Dr. Ramsay under reference.

THE FOLLOWING IS SOLELY FOR YOUR GUIDANCE AND [redacted] INFORMATION

In our opinion it would be most inadvisable if you led the Finns to expect terms much better than those in the Moscow Peace of 1940 to be offered by the Soviets. You must try to combat the strong German pressure on the Finns by means other than holding out to them the possibility that the Soviets may be willing to negotiate a peace, and the chances are that this can be done only, in our opinion, by being guided by our telegram of April 8th, No. 55.

HULL

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. letter, 1-11-72
By RT Date APR 10 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Does this need any answer?

F.D.R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have received this morning from Sir Ronald Campbell the text of a telegraphic message about Finland which he has received from Mr. Churchill with instructions to convey the information contained in it to you and to myself at an early opportunity.

I am enclosing herewith the text of this message.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

FINLAND

On March 15th Stalin telegraphed the Prime Minister informing him that on March 12th the United States Ambassador in Moscow had conveyed message to Molotov to the effect that Government of the United States offered its good offices as intermediary for exploring the possibility of peace between the U.S.S.R. and Finland. In reply to the question whether the United States Government had information that Finland desired peace and what her real position was, the Ambassador replied that he could say nothing.

2. Stalin said he was informing the Prime Minister in conformity with the Anglo-Soviet treaty and asked his opinion. He added that he had no reason to believe that Finland really desired peace and was in any case hardly in position to escape from the German clutches.

3. Prime Minister replied on March 20th to the effect that while Stalin could best judge military value of getting Finland out of the war, it was to be supposed that it would release more Soviet than German divisions and might have considerable effect on other satellites. Composition of the new Finnish Government might denote preparation for new Finnish policy and though the Finns were probably not yet ripe for negotiations the issue would be decided by events on the Russian front in the next few months. Finns could probably get on without German food supplies after May. In these circumstances it seemed that the United States Government might usefully be invited to try to discover without disclosing Soviet interest what terms the Finns would be prepared to accept.

State Dept folder 2-48

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Does this need any answer?

F.D.R.

Letter, 4-3, from Sumner Welles enclosing text of telegraphic message which Sir Ronald Campbell received from Mr. Churchill about Finland and possibility of peace between Finland and U.S.S.R.

PSF: State Dept

file

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL WATSON

I want to see Joe Grew sometime -- no hurry -- and will you give this to me when he comes in?

F. D. R.

The President saw Grew June 2 1943

OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mary 10

PSF: State Dept. folder
2-43

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1943

Dear Miss Tully:

Not wishing to take up the President's time with an interview, I hope that you will be good enough to lay the enclosed letter before him personally as I think he will be interested in its contents.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Miss Grace Tully,
Private Secretary to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BONDS AND STAMPS

AL COMMUNICATIONS TO
SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Sumner Welles and I both feel that you will wish to read the enclosed copy of a confidential letter of March 12 from William Howard Gardiner which presents a viewpoint concerning post-war problems more important than the material generally set forth in books or articles. Mr. Gardiner, as you know, was the sometime president of the Navy League.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Enclosure.

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

FOR VICTORY BUY UNITED STATES DEFENSE BONDS AND STAMPS

~~SECRET~~

COPY

WILLIAM HOWARD GARDINER,
333 East 57th Street,
New York, New York.

12 March, 1943.

The Honorable Joseph C. Grew,
2840 Woodland Drive,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Grew:

1.
There should be no question, as it seems to me, but what you are entirely right in saying that the military caste in Japan must be utterly crushed, and thus completely discredited in the eyes of the Japanese nation. That is an essential preliminary to Japan's becoming tolerable and to her becoming of any use to us in helping to solve future Asian problems.

2.
I regret to have to say, however, that such a desirable aim appears to me to be confronted by very much greater difficulties, international as well as domestic, than I have heard indicated. But I am confident that you will agree to the necessity of fully studying the obstacles ahead in order best to circumvent or overcome them.

3.
Having had much to do with some of our major transpacific and transatlantic problems for over twenty years, I am venturing to submit to you the following outline of the situation as it appears to me. To be of any value, such a statement must be explicit. But that means that many things said hereunder should be kept restricted to those American circles accustomed to dealing with official matters of a very confidential nature.

4.
While I want to examine your problem from the point of view (a) of domestic politics and (b) of international politics -- so as to see what steps may seem to give promise of attaining your aims -- the present situation and the problem appear to me to be greatly clarified if we first look at them in the light of terms long accepted as sound among students of warfare.

"LIMITED" AND "UNLIMITED" OBJECTS IN WARFARE

5.

War between the United States and Japan falls into a very definite classification, inevitably disadvantageous to us, first made by the Prussian general, Carl von Clausewitz, who died in 1831. That led me to describe the situation in the following necessarily restrained terms in an article that I contributed to the "United States Naval Institute Proceedings" for February of 1926:

6.

"Any consideration of the principles of war should distinguish between what Clausewitz designated as "unlimited" and "limited" warfare. "Unlimited" war aims at the complete overthrow of the enemy in his home country, and consequently arouses his utmost resistance. By contrast, "limited" warfare seeks merely to obtain some dependency, concession, or other "limited" object while it abstains from any really serious threat to overwhelm the enemy's home country; so his combativeness is not aroused to the utmost and he is the more likely to yield the "limited" concession rather than continue the war.

7.

"There is great importance in the fact that in a war between the United States and an Asiatic power the latter's aims would seem distinctly "limited" to many Americans, whereas, in order to maintain our position in Asiatic affairs, we might have to aim at the "unlimited" reduction of the enemy's country, though not necessarily by invasion in force. In other words, the geographic distribution of interests is such that the inauguration of a "limited" war by an Asiatic power would be likely to compel us to carry through an "unlimited" war to victory as the only alternative to accepting defeat. Consequently, the enemy's combativeness would be aroused to the utmost while some among us probably would rather yield than continue the war."

8.

The present prospect is that as long as our Fleet, based on Pearl Harbor, fully commands the Eastern Pacific, the Japanese could not carry "unlimited" warfare into North America -- although there is every probability that they would become able to do so within twenty years if allowed to retain and develop most of their recent conquests. Nor is there any prospect that Germany could bring "unlimited" warfare to America so long as the island of Great Britain holds out as a base for an adequate fleet in the Eastern Atlantic and so long as we hold Northern Africa.

9.

Consequently, there is not at present any imminent threat to Americans of "unlimited" invasion from across either ocean such as would arouse our combativeness to the utmost; and the lack of such an "unlimited" threat to us here handicaps efforts to arouse and maintain our combativeness to the point of our carrying "unlimited" war forward until both Japan and Germany surrender unconditionally.

10.

By contrast to our relative security, the island of Great Britain has manifestly been exposed to "unlimited" invasion by Germany ever since 1939; and every nation on the Continent of Europe has since then been similarly exposed, many of them having actually had their capitals seized, their resident governments destroyed, and their peoples enslaved by Germany.

11.

With such dire examples of the consequences of "unlimited" invasion by Germany close at hand, the British are naturally very, very much more anxious to crush the "unlimited" threat of Germany to them than they are to regain from the Japanese the "limited" objects the latter have recently seized from them.

12.

It seems logical, therefore, that Europeans, their propaganda here, and Europhile Americans should concentrate on the "unlimited" European situation almost to the exclusion of the comparatively "limited" one in Asia and Asian waters. And it seems equally sound to expect that if they can permanently convince our Government, and most of our people, that our primary and principal task is transatlantic, then, inevitably, we will not give adequate and persistent attention to our "limited" transpacific problem so as to turn the "limited" war the Japanese are now making against us into our making a wholly successful "unlimited" war against them that will bring about the utter destruction of the militarism by which the modern Japanese Empire has been built.

ESTIMATES OF EUROPEAN AND ASIAN PROSPECTS

13.

It now appears to be quite generally expected, in view of the present Russian counter-offensive and in view of our present position in Northern Africa, that the unconditional surrender of Germany will be brought about before 1945 -- and that that will virtually end the war in Europe.

14.

On the other hand, people who have long followed Mackinder's and Haushofer's studies in geopolitics recognize that the initial offensives of Germany to the westward in 1940 were, in a sense, merely defensives preparatory to her launching her main offensive to the eastward for the conquest of the Russo-Siberian "heartland" -- whereupon Germany would dominate what I have called the world-continent of Europe, Asia and Africa, leaving as the only other center of real power in the world what I have called mid-oceanic insular America. But the surprising measure of Russia's preparedness, now bearing fruit in her present counter-offensive, suggests a Russian grasp of geopolitics that is quite as realistic as Germany's. And present initial manifestations of Russia's strategic and tactical competence suggest that it may be well within the bounds of possibility that Russia will dictate the terms of German surrender in Berlin long before Anglo-American forces get within really effective striking distance of that capital -- whereupon the major problem of western Europe would be: How to halt the westward and southwestward drive of Russia?

15.

Such contingencies suggest urgent reasons why every possible Anglo-American effort should be made to reach Berlin before the Russians do; and the possibility of a dominant Russia at last getting a warm water outlet on the Mediterranean also suggests that very recent Anglo-Turkish conversations may lead to Turkey's soon coming in -- of course, initially against Germany.

16.

Nevertheless, present purposes herein will be better served by the comparatively simple assumption that, somehow, the unconditional surrender of Germany will be brought about by the winter of 1944-45 but that Japan cannot be utterly crushed by us for several years thereafter.

DOMESTIC POLITICS

17.

In appraising some of the more important domestic factors that influence internal interest in transatlantic or in transpacific war, it should be noted that less than 7.4% of the people in the United States live in our three Pacific Coast States whereas the overwhelming mass of our populations -- and of their votes -- is in the States east of the Rocky Mountains, that is, in the Atlantic water shed. And another noteworthy factor is that there is a minority group now influential in Washington that has especially strong reasons for concentrating on crushing the Nazi.

18.

By the time Germany capitulates, we shall have suffered several hundreds of thousands of casualties -- perhaps over a million -- across the Atlantic, the national debt will probably exceed two hundred billions, taxes will be extremely high, and the mass of the voting population will have become quite irked by rationing and by many, many other restrictions.

19.

If Germany were to collapse before our next Presidential campaign opens, less than eighteen months hence, it would not surprise me if the opposition Party were thereupon to seek election under some such slogan as "End the war and bring our boys home."

20.

As you put it very effectively, "there is not sufficient room in the area of the Pacific Ocean for a peaceful America . . . and for a swashbuckling Japan." As I see it, unless we drive the Japanese out of all of their recent conquests, they will build an empire and aerio-naval power that will cut us out of Asia, dominate the Pacific to our very shores, and eventually defeat us in America.

21.

But after having talked and written for over twenty years on the prospects of Japan's making war on us, I do not believe that any such arguments would prevail against "bring our boys home" if Germany were to collapse before our next Presidential campaign -- unless something very effective be done between now and then. For we should bear in mind that the Japanese are fighting a war against us for "limited" objects now in their hands whereas we must fight on for the "unlimited" object of utterly crushing Japan.

22.

On the other hand, if Germany does not collapse before our next Presidential campaign, then it would be most surprising if the Party out of power were to seek election on any platform that does not include the unconditional surrender of Germany. Consequently, if the defeat of Germany be delayed beyond our next Presidential election, about two more years would become available -- before our second Congressional campaign hence -- in which to build up understanding and conviction in our electorate as to why Japan must be utterly crushed.

23.

In short, the longer the war against Germany drags on, the better the chance of arousing public understanding to the necessity of utterly crushing Japan -- always provided that Russia does not first reach Berlin and the Mediterranean.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

24.

The Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill is reported as having made the following statement in his world-wide radio address of the 29 November, 1942:

25.

> "It may well be that the war in Europe will end before the war in Asia. The Atlantic may be calm while in the Pacific the hurricane rises to full pitch. If events should take such a course we should, of course, bring all our forces to the other side of the world to aid the United States, to aid China, to aid our own kith and kin in Australia and New Zealand in the struggle against the aggressions of Japan."

26.

Obviously, Great Britain's "limited" interest in reconquering her lost possessions east of India is secondary to her primary and paramount interest in ending any "unlimited" menace to her from Germany or any other Continental country. And it seems almost equally obvious that if Russia were to be the first to reach Berlin and were to threaten further intrusions to the westward, as suggested in paragraph 14 on page 4, then, quite the contrary to Great Britain's sending "all" her forces to help the United States against Japan, it would be more likely that the United States would be called on to continue to maintain forces in Europe to help Britain there.

27.

Assuming, however, that war in Europe will really end in, say, two or three years while it still will be far from ended in the Pacific, we should now try to estimate the value of Mr. Churchill's above quoted promise of help in such light as may be drawn from the record of recent American, British and Japanese relations -- we should try to estimate the weight of words in the light of deeds.

28.

This triangle of relationships is clarified by recalling the basic difference between maritime geopolitics and the territorial outlook of the Continental geopoliticians who think outward from the Russo-Siberian "heartland" of Europe, Asia and Africa, who expect most of that world-continent to come under one control, and who lay emphasis on the matchless aggregate area and possible supreme power of the resources thereof in personnel and matériel when organized. In contrast to that, American maritime thought, stemming from Mahan, recognizes two regional foci of power and one central one. First, the British Archipelago where 19th Century industrialism and world-wide trading developed such measures of sea power and naval power

that the United Kingdom was then usually able to exercise the regional balance of power in Europe. Second, the Japanese Archipelago which has similar potentialities as to Eastern Asia. And third, midoceanic North America in which the incomparable 20th Century industrialization of the United States has transformed what was substantially a self-sufficient continent into what is, in effect, a great island, dependent on over-seas imports and world-wide trading as extensive and in greater volume of exports and imports than the United Kingdom, excepting for the latter's excess imports of foodstuffs.

29.

That means, in short, that midoceanic insular America has become an incomparably greater industrial and world-wide trading base than the United Kingdom and that when, as and if the United States has the wit to develop and maintain commensurate sea, naval and air power, then the United States will be in a position to exercise trilaterally, across the Pacific, across the Atlantic, and across the Caribbean, functions such as the 19th Century United Kingdom exercised little more than unilaterally across the Channel. And in view of present conditions, it would seem superfluous to do more than say that sea power and its derivatives are the essential channels for us to use in expressing from our great central oceanic base our influences across the oceans in order to maintain or to correct the balances in the other parts of the world.

30.

There is some present interest in my having given those points of view as to America, Great Britain and Japan in 1919 to some of the Senators who were opposed to our joining the League of Nations; and I supplemented them with a three-centuries review of British foreign policy -- especially at the Congress of Vienna -- in which Britain's practice of building up a rival to her own nearest rival, and thus exercising the balance of power, was made clear. It is not generally recognized that the above indicated Senators deliberately and consciously copied, vis-à-vis the League in 1919, Castlereagh's policy of 1815 vis-à-vis the Holy Alliance.

31.

Now for some of the major incidents in recent Anglo-American relations which will help to estimate the extent to which we might rely on Mr. Churchill's promise to help us against Japan, once the war in Europe is ended.

32.

Jellicoe's failure to sink the German fleet at Jutland in 1916 prevented a close blockade of Germany's North Sea ports and thus enabled her unlimited submarine campaign. The latter brought the United States into the war just in time to save England from collapsing in 1917 -- with the result that after

the defeat of Germany in 1918, we had potentially superceded Britain as the premier power of the world and had begun, quite inadvertently, to draw some of her Dominions into our orbit.

33.

In 1916, and in part in consequence of Japan's "Twenty-one Demands" on China, we inaugurated the largest building program ever undertaken of big capital ships, specifically designed to operate in the Western Pacific and thus to overawe Japan.

34.

Consequently, one of Britain's principal post-war problems was to regain from us her pre-war primacy while Japan's principal external problem was to free herself from restraints by us so that she could pursue her plans for Asian and Pacific conquests.

35.

Although it had been the increment of American naval power that had just saved England from being starved out by the German submarine campaign, her first move, in April of 1919, was to ask us to stop our great naval building program so that the command of the seas would remain with her. ("Intimate Papers of Colonel House", Vol. IV, p. 418.)

36.

Upon our not acceding to that suggestion to help, in effect, both Britain and Japan, the British reverted quite overtly to their traditional policy of supporting a rival to their own nearest rival and called the Imperial Conference of June, 1921, to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Late in February of that "Inauguration" year, our incoming Under Secretary of State and I agreed that, in the then state of the world, that proposed renewal could not be aimed at any Power other than the United States but that the latter could not protest -- whereupon I said I believed I could get Canada to veto its renewal, which I did, the Prime Minister of Canada duly vetoing its renewal in London (to the wrath of Messrs. Lloyd George and Balfour and of Lord Curzon) and his Secretary returning to Canada via New York to report certain details to me. But failure to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in no way ended the efforts of the two regional insular sea powers, Great Britain and Japan, to cooperate, each for its own ends, against the greater centrally placed sea power, insular America.

37.

Immediately after the failure of the Imperial Conference of 1921, the British Government persuaded our new Secretary of State to call the Washington Conference "with a view to reaching a common understanding with respect to principles and policies in the Far East" such as to warrant the great naval Powers in limiting their armaments by mutual agreement. As I

had not been personally involved to any material degree in the conduct of that conference, the Coolidge Administration opened to me the secret records of it for certain purposes. So I am extensively informed about it.

38.

Here I need merely say that at the Washington Conference the British virtually attained their quantitative objective of 1919 in that they induced us to destroy almost all of the great new ships that we were building, in the main, in order to give us command of the Pacific. Their destruction, together with the Japanese stipulation for the limitation of insular fortifications and naval bases west of Hawaii but outside of Japan greatly reduced, if it did not end, our naval power to curb Japan in the Western Pacific and in Eastern Asia. So, with British help, the Japanese won their objective. And yet we took great pride unto ourselves in that -- eventually -- we got the Open Door Nine-Power Treaty by surrendering general sea supremacy to Great Britain and by sacrificing our naval ability to force Japan to respect that treaty!

39.

Within eighteen months after the close of the Washington Conference, and before the Nine-Power Treaty had been validated by complete ratification, the Japanese started moves preliminary to their going to war which took me to Eastern Asia. But the great earthquake of 1923 blocked them in that. And it was incidentally to my observing their moves that summer that I got hold of their plans to conquer Eastern Asia and all of the islands of the Pacific, as I have previously written to you.

40.

Incidentally, examination of the situation that August in Singapore, and in Java, showed that the British were undertaking the building of the Singapore Base for purposes quite different from what has been generally supposed. Both the Netherlands East Indies and Australasia had long been fearful of the Japanese and doubtful of Great Britain's ability to curb Nippon by diplomacy. American trade in the Southwest Pacific was developing and Australasia was tending toward following Canada's example of drawing nearer and nearer to the United States. Consequently, Great Britain undertook the building of the Base (with funds supplied, in the main, regionally) as a gesture of protection to both Australasia and the Netherlands East Indies, incidentally exacting from the latter priority over American trade in spite of a nominal "open door". To put it in other words, the Singapore Base was built for political and commercial effects on Australasia and the Netherlands East Indies rather than as a naval base against Japan. But the joker in the situation was that competent students of both international affairs and of naval strategy expected, as long as twenty years ago, that the Japanese would not move in force into the Southwest

until after the outbreak of a European war; that in the latter event, the British would not be able to spare an adequate naval force to base on Singapore; and that, consequently, the latter would not be an effective defense base for the region and might itself fall to the enemy. In short, the Singapore Base was a huge political bluff; and its fall a year ago was no surprise to those long intimate with the situation as to Singapore and its officials.

41.

The purpose of the Three-Power Naval Conference, held in Geneva in the summer of 1927, was to try to round out the Washington Conference of 1921-22 by agreeing on aggregate tonnages, respectively, for the American, British and Japanese categories of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. At the Washington Conference, it had been agreed that individual battleships should not exceed 35,000 tons in size nor mount guns larger than 16 inches in calibre; and that individual cruisers should not be of over 10,000 tons nor mount guns of a calibre larger than 8 inches. And if the United States were to continue to exercise, across the Pacific, any semblance of restraint over the Japanese -- as well as to continue to give our world-wide commerce a modicum of protection -- it was essential that we retain the right to build such relatively large, long-radius and heavily gunned ships.

42.

Consequently, in initially secret conversations held in London in the summer of 1926, it was explicitly agreed between the British and ourselves that, at the next Naval Conference (1927) no item agreed on at the previous Washington Conference would be subject to revision. But, unfortunately, during the winter of 1927, the British Ambassador to the United States mistakenly advised his Government that agreement at the impending Geneva Conference would be essential to the political future of President Coolidge. And investigations that I made, that April and May in London and Paris, brought to light the surprising prospect that, at the instance of a British statesman now very prominent, his Government intended to disregard the above indicated pre-Conference agreements.

43.

Those conclusions of mine proved to be only too true. For when the Geneva Conference opened, the British, believing that American acquiescence was essential to President Coolidge's political future, proposed that the size of future battleships be reduced below 30,000 tons, that that of future cruisers be reduced below 7,000 tons, and that guns of not over 6-inch calibre be permitted on such cruisers.

44.

As such reductions would, in effect, have freed Japanese imperial expansion from any American naval restraint and would have been greatly to the advantage of the British vis-à-vis us because of their many bases and larger merchant marine, we refused to agree to them and the Conference broke up without constructive results.

45.

Discussions along similar lines continued, however, in the League of Nations' Preparatory Commission for Disarmament in which we were represented. And the importance that the British attached to so reducing the sizes and gun calibres of American ships that we could not operate across the Pacific against the Japanese is emphasized by the British having made the extraordinary démarche of drawing up with the French in 1928 a secret agreement to the effect that the British would support in the Preparatory Commission certain French contentions as to armies upon the French and their allies in the Little Entente therein supporting the Anglo-Japanese efforts to reduce the sizes and gun calibres of American naval ships -- an underhanded agreement that was dropped after good intelligence work had informed us of it and we had protested.

46.

Of the London Naval Conference of 1930 it need merely be said here that where the Coolidge Administration had stood firm at Geneva in 1927 against Anglo-Japanese pressure, as above indicated, the Hoover Administration yielded in part as to gun calibres for cruisers -- with the result that the London Naval Treaty almost failed of ratification at a Special Session of the Senate.

47.

When the Japanese embarked in 1931 on the conquest of Manchuria, we would have been derelict had we not offered to cooperate with the League of Nations and had we not sought the cooperation of the British to curb Nippon; and by so doing we wrote an admirable record. But those of us who entertained hopes of British cooperation to such an end could hardly have borne in mind how the British had cooperated with the Japanese during the preceding ten years, safeguarding the Japanese from our curbing the latter.

48.

In short, the record shows that, from 1919 until after 1931, the British sought not merely to regain sea supremacy over us. For they furthermore helped Japan toward freedom from any naval restraint that we might have exercised across the Pacific. And as they knew Japan's empire-building plans, they seem to have been quite complacent toward Japan's becoming extremely powerful across the Pacific from us; for such

a powerful Japan would be a very effective counterpoise, or restraint, to the United States elsewhere and, thereby, would have helped Great Britain to regain from us her former world primacy.

49.

Although a prospect so tragic to Britons as the waning and eclipse of their Empire might properly lead us to forgive the steps they took against us to prevent our superseding them, we would be more than simple minded were we to forget what they did in conjunction with their Japanese ex-allies against us. Consequently, their record since 1919 inevitably raises such questions as the following:

50.

Assuming that the present war ends satisfactorily in Europe before Japan is defeated, will not Great Britain then be again confronted by the problem of trying to regain from us her former world primacy?

51.

As Great Britain attained a measure of success in solving that problem by backing Japan against us after the Peace of 1919, would it be safe for us now to assume that she will not, in effect, try again to reduce us by helping the Japanese, or, at least, by saving them from eventually being utterly crushed by us (after which crushing they would be useless to her as a counterpoise to us)?

52.

It might be assumed that after a satisfactory peace is inaugurated in Europe, Great Britain would give us at least "token" aid, as a matter of making face, in our regaining for her the Asian possessions that she has lost to the Japanese. But would not the easiest way for her to regain them be to promise the Japanese that she would use her good offices with us to stop us from carrying through an offensive that would utterly crush Japan?

53.

Would not Great Britain's carrying out of such a promise serve her in the two ends of getting back her lost possessions and, at the same time, leaving a strong Japan as a counterpoise to the United States that would reduce our post-war influence not merely in the Pacific but in world affairs elsewhere?

54.

With both Great Britain and Japan proposing, say, three years hence, that the latter would make peace on substantially a basis of the status quo ante, what chance would there be of our choking off our well-meaning pacifists, and other short-sighted folks, and grimly carrying on to the utter destruction of the militarist caste in Tokyo?

55.

Whatever may be the answers to such questions, the record seems to make it crystal clear that, if a satisfactory peace be made first in Europe, we would be quite unwarranted in counting on really material help from Great Britain in the subsequent crushing of Japan. Indeed, it may be that Russia might become such a problem to Western Europe that Great Britain not only would not be able to help us in Eastern Asia but that we might be obliged to continue to help her in Europe -- even though the Nazi had precipitately surrendered unconditionally to Britain and America in the hope of saving themselves from direful invasion and conquest by the Russians.

56.

In short, it seems sound to conclude that whatever crushing of Japan is to be done will have to be done by the United States -- and with little aid, if any, from Great Britain.

REORIENTATION OF OUR WAR EFFORTS

57.

As things now are, decisions as to priorities of our supports of the transatlantic or of the transpacific campaigns are for Washington to make -- subject to the persuasiveness that the British can there exert in their intense desire to end the "unlimited" threat of Germany to Great Britain, a persuasiveness in comparison to which the Chinese seem almost voiceless. But when looked at in historical perspective, some major decisions made in Washington seem not to have taken into consideration many factors of moment.

58.

For instance, early in the winter of 1941, the great mass of the United States Fleet was based on Pearl Harbor where it was a strong deterrent against the Japanese going to war. But the British wanted to send convoys around the North Cape to Russia, convoys to which one of the great dangers would be the capital ships the Germans could base on Norway. So they persuaded Washington to transfer about a third of our capital force from the Pacific to Atlantic convoy duty, thus enabling adequate convoy escorts around the North Cape. It is safe to say that when the Japanese learnt that about a third of our capital force had been removed from the Pacific, that day they decided on war; and Mr. Saburo Kurusu's subsequent activities were merely a smoke screen to conceal that decision. Thus the Japanese struck before we were ready because we had temporarily lowered our guard in the Pacific to help in the Atlantic. And it is safe to add that if war had not broken out in the Pacific until six or more months after it did, our position there would now be incomparably better than it is.

59.

In a very much broader sense, students of war realize that the constituents of a coalition join up in it primarily because of a more or less immediate menace to their respective and individual interests or in the hope of improving them through a coalition against a common enemy. While the members of a coalition may have an enemy in common, the aims of each member of it are likely to be particularistic. And, naturally, the more sophisticated members will try to overcome the common enemy at as little cost and with as much gain to themselves as may be practicable. The aim of each will be to come out of the war in a position improved not merely vis-à-vis the common enemy but also relatively to the other members of the coalition. Consequently, a sophisticated member of a coalition might be expected to call insistently for maximum help from those other members who were most likely to be his post-war rivals while himself holding his expenditures, especially in aid of them, down to the lowest level practicable.

60.

As close adherence as possible to the practice of "pay last" is a matter of great moment -- a matter much more important in international dealings than in ward politics. For in all politics, if A wants B to do something for him and B also wants A to do something for him, A will be well advised to rig the deal in such a way that B delivers his end of the bargain first, thus enabling A to "pay last" -- perhaps. But some Americans, in their precipitate enthusiasm over crushing Germany first, don't seem to realize that we have been led into a prospect of "paying first" in Europe -- whereupon Great Britain may, or may not, "pay last" in Asia.

61.

It seems hardly practicable, in the present circumstances, to correct entirely the mistake we have made in allowing ourselves to be misled into a position of "pay first". But if we recognize clearly that we have been put in such a position, then ways may be found to correct it in part, say, by gradually curbing our transatlantic supports, even though that were to throw more of the load there on Great Britain, while we increase our transpacific activities -- including such greater help to China as now seems to be increasingly popular here.

62.

Russian realism has led Stalin to adhere strictly to the practice of "pay last". For while he has been vociferous in demanding help, he himself has helped Germany's other enemies only in ways that first helped him immeasurably more and has scrupulously abstained from revealing his real aims. His inscrutability makes it difficult to estimate his aims in more detail than to say that they surely will be entirely realistic and particularistic. It is rumored that, after the Germans have been driven out of Russia, he will move in Eastern Asia with

forces already in reserve for operations there. Russia's immemorial trends there support the surmise that his first aim will be to drive the Japanese out of the Continent of Asia, north of China proper, and to take over their present holdings in Mongolia, Manchuria and, perhaps, in Korea -- after we have put more pressure on the Nipponese. As the virtual elimination of Japan as a great Power would free Russia's hands for future moves in Eastern Asia, he might be expected to help us very materially by closing the northeastern coast of the Continent to exports to Japan and by lending us base sites for our aerial and naval operations against Japan. But that he would play a very much more active part in the actual reduction of Japan seems doubtful.

63.

Similarly, but for very different reasons, we would not seem warranted in expecting any maritime help of moment from China in the crushing of Japan. And we have already seen why we should not expect such help from Great Britain.

64.

On the other hand, it would be of very, very great post-war importance to the United States, both politically and commercially, if the war to crush Japan could be carried on, in the main, by the United States with merely such secondary help from Australasia, China and Russia, rather than as, so to speak, a "United Nations" undertaking. Let the recovery of the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines and all other islands in the Pacific, as well as the removal of the Japanese from Singapore and all of Southeastern Asia, follow as the manifest results of American naval and aerial operations, first, against Japan's maritime lines of communication and, finally, against Japan proper. For such a procedure would improve immeasurably the peace settlements we would be able to make in the region of the Pacific, our future control over the Pacific and its shores, and our future political standing and commercial opportunities in Asia and in Australasia.

THE TASK AND WHAT TO DO

65.

The task is to develop in the United States a really enduring, nation-wide conviction that militarism must be utterly discredited and destroyed in Japan. Some of the major obstacles to be overcome are:

(1) Merely about one-tenth of our population live on our Pacific water shed whereas about nine-tenths live on our Atlantic water shed and are much more interested in transatlantic matters than in transpacific problems.

(2) We are now more heavily engaged in the war across the Atlantic than in that in the Pacific.

(3) When victory is won across the Atlantic, say, in two years and after very, very great sacrifices, there may be danger that the great mass of those living east of the Rocky Mountains -- few of whom realize the great menace of militaristic Japan to the United States -- may want to compromise the war against Japan before militarism there has been utterly destroyed.

(4) In Clausewitzian terms, we must fight for the "unlimited" object of completely overthrowing the Japanese nation which will arouse their combativeness to the utmost whereas the Japanese, as yet, need fight merely for the comparatively "limited" object of retaining their recent conquests across the Pacific from us. As there is not apparent, as yet, any "unlimited" Japanese threat to our homeland, it is not to be expected that our combativeness will be aroused to the utmost to fight merely for the "limited" object of freeing from the Japanese their recent conquests, nor for the much more difficult "unlimited" object of our overthrowing the Japanese nation.

(5) If we really undertake such destruction of Japan, we are likely to be opposed in it by one of our principal present allies. (See pages 6 to 13 above)

66.
It so happens that in the misguided days of "faith, hope and parity" that followed the Washington Conference -- when anyone who advocated armaments was dubbed a militarist who wanted war, and when most magazine and newspaper editors inclined to such opinions -- I undertook an individual campaign to awaken public opinion to the prospective menace of Japan. And at the same time, I was in charge of the naval policy and publicity of the Navy League of the United States of which I later became President, activities that involved such political problems as how to influence Congress to pass each year's Navy Bill in as desirable form as might be, and usually in the face of opposition from the White House.

67.
It is after many years of such activities that I am venturing to write what follows in the hope that a general outline of the methods and developments of those nation-wide campaigns may be of some present interest to you.

68.
Let me say at the outset that I have never seen as effective an individual campaign as that which you have carried on since your return from Japan; and there are many evidences

in the press that your devoted labors are bearing fruit. To be sure, you had as a background to your campaign the white heat of indignation to which our public had been aroused by the dastardly Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, followed by the fall of Corregidor; and public interest in the Pacific has been much stimulated since then by a series of quite brilliant naval operations by scant American forces. With public interest thus aroused, you spoke with supreme authority, in dramatic circumstances, as our returning ambassador. What you have done has been grand and, most certainly, should be carried on.

69.
I am inclined to think, however, that, if public opinion and political action are to be adequately aroused for the long-term fight to completely overthrow Japanese militarism, there should be started, as a supplement to your work, an intensive, extensive and protracted campaign in which, in addition to telling our people that Japan must be crushed, they be given the many reasons why our interests demand that that be done; that they be given such a varied and comprehensive picture of the problem of Japan to us that they become both intellectually and emotionally convinced that we <u>must</u> crush Japan, cost what it may.

70.
While the usual publicity campaign aims, in the main, at getting its "releases" into the news columns of the press, we worked on very different lines and planned several co-ordinated campaigns, all working up toward so rounding out our Fleet that it would overawe the Japanese. One main thought in those campaigns was to induce the country to appreciate the position of midoceanic, insular America in the world and our dependence on overseas trade, overseas communications, and naval protection of them. Another was to awaken the country to foreign competition overseas -- which brought in the subject of Japanese expansive imperialism. And a third was our naval problem, under the naval treaties and relatively to the British and Japanese navies -- so as to get Congressional appropriations for rounding out our Fleet which was usually much under the treaty limits.

71.
It would have been of little avail to try to send out, from one source, matter on such subjects that would be generally effective. But if the minds of the leading editors could be won and could be so stimulated as to write themselves the kind of editorials we desired, such editorials would usually be expertly pitched so as to carry conviction to the readers of each paper, and far more effectively than "canned" news stories. And furthermore, if the minds of the leading newspaper owners and editors could be won, they would see to it that navy spot news was well written up, well headed, and well placed in their news columns.

72.

Consideration was also given to the fact that many of our more intelligent newspaper editors often editorialize current subjects dealt with in our better magazines. In turn, the great mass of our smaller newspapers are likely to follow the editorial policies of the larger metropolitan papers of their Party and region. And finally, editorial approbation or criticism in the newspapers from "back home" is one of the most effective arguments one can bring to bear on most Senators and Congressmen -- especially when re-election time is approaching.

73.

In view of such relationships, I began by contributing articles to such magazines as "The Atlantic Monthly," "Harper's Magazine," "The World's Work" and "The Review of Reviews," articles designed to reach the more thoughtful officials and newspaper editors. In order to assure their coming to the attention of those whom it was especially desired to reach, reprints of them were obtained from the magazine publishers in advance and sent out "for release" on whatever day each magazine issue was to appear on the news stands. These reprints were always made up as nearly as possible like the enclosed example, with a special table of contents printed on the rront page and designed to catch an editor's eye. That procedure usually worked well. For instance: The enclosed was paraphrased, reviewed or editorialized in virtually all of the larger newspapers and syndicates in the country and from them, in turn, was noticed in the lesser papers.

74.

In the course of time, and as the newspaper clippings on editorial comments showed us that we were making headway, we gradually dropped working through the leading magazines -- for that was a slow procedure -- and sent out more and more "releases" over the imprimature of the Navy League of the United States, releases that were very varied and ranged from a mere "flyer" to elaborate discussions and statistical compilations. But they all had this in common: They were not written for reproduction but, on the contrary, were merely for "editorial information". I wanted the minds of the editors -- and then for them to do their own writing.

75.

Starting with the pacifistic, anti-navy press that resulted from the Washington Conference of 1921-22, we gradually turned that into a press alive to naval subjects, from the American point of view, and that ran from 2 to 1 up to 6 to 1 in our favor at various times and in various situations. But best of all, it was an educated press that would fight on its own initiative for our Navy. That was the result of our methods of working on and through editors. And I need hardly

add that Senators and Congressmen got plenty of editorials from their individual newspapers "back home" in which they were criticized if they had spoken against the Navy -- whereupon they were quite likely to suddenly acquire a better understanding of naval affairs and to vote for the Navy.

76.

While our procedure was slow in the early anti-naval 20s, it gradually acquired a measure of influence that was never understood by the White House. Here is an amusing instance of how it worked: A big Navy Bill was in Committee and was bitterly opposed by the White House. One morning, the Chairman long-distanced me here from the Capitol and said: "I intend to introduce the Navy Bill next Tuesday and hope that you will put the press of the country back of it" -- to which I merely replied: "Can do." But I didn't have to lift a finger because the editors already had my views and, as soon as the Bill was brought onto the Floor, the editorials supporting it began pouring in. It passed both Houses by much better than 4 to 1, the White House to the contrary notwithstanding.

77.

It was by such publicity methods that we got authorizations through Congress for nineteen 10,000-ton cruisers and appropriations for most of them in spite of the President. Those cruisers have been very useful since Pearl Harbor. But what was really of much more importance was that a real understanding had been built up in the press of our naval needs and of our rivalries with the British and Japanese. So when President Roosevelt took office and reversed former President Hoover's anti-navalism, he found broad public support of his building up our Fleet. Yet the joker in our whole method of doing what really amounted to getting the editors to write for us was that, over a period of some ten years, we averaged to spend merely about $2,500 a year for printing and distributing our publicity almost all of which I wrote at no cost.

78.

As it seems to me, if there is to be built up a broad and deep-rooted determination to carry grimly on through the years until Japanese militarism shall have been utterly crushed, a somewhat similar magazine and newspaper campaign should be planned and started to supplement and diversify your wonderfully effective speaking campaign which, so far, has had only the diversification of that gem of yours, "Report from Tokyo". And what I am wondering is whether some existing organization, or organizations, could not be used to such ends. But among such I most certainly would not include any "publicity agency".

79.

If I were still able, I would gladly volunteer my services to help actively; for what you have set yourself to do seems to me to be of paramount national importance. Unfortunately, however, I am no longer able to carry on exacting executive work. But I will be more than glad to consult with you, to plan, and to give freely in any such ways, along such lines and to such ends.

80.

With great admiration for all that you have done, and with heartiest good wishes to you,

Very sincerely yours,

WILLIAM HOWARD GARDINER

State Dept. folder 2-43

file personal

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

(?) May 22 1943

My dear Mr. President:

You asked about the proposed Ottawa conference to consider the refugee problem. The suggestion came about in the following way:

On January 20 the British Government submitted an aide memoire reviewing Great Britain's activity in helping Jewish refugees, making some inquiry as to what the United States could do in addition to what it had done, and suggesting that the matter was essentially a United Nations problem which might be dealt with in a United Nations conference.

We replied under date of February 25, reviewing what the United States had done, expressing our deep interest in the problem of racial, religious and political persecution and suggesting instead of a United Nations conference that the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, which you will remember was the product of the Evian Conference, be used as the instrumentality for the work, partly because it already existed, and further suggesting that a preliminary conference between the United States and Great Britain be held in Ottawa for the purpose of developing the possible field of action of that Committee.

In suggesting such a conference it was the thought that it would be preferable to have the coordinated activity of the American and British Governments as a

guide

The President,

The White House.

FDR ltrs. 7/7/43 & 7/7/43 to Myron Taylor re his continuing to serve with Intergovtal Comm. on Refugees - are filed Mr. Taylor folder, Dr. 4-43.

guide to the contemplated work of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee.

I am enclosing copies of the British aide memoire and of our reply.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

British aide memoire,
January 20, 1943.
Department's reply,
February 25, 1943.

REFUGEE PROBLEM

The following statement was made in Parliament on January 19th in reply to questions.

His Majesty's Government's intention in associating themselves with the Allied Governments' declaration of December 17th on the German Policy of exterminating the Jews in Europe, was to help in arresting this Policy. They are at the same time conscious of the fact that the only real remedy for the consistent Nazi Policy of Racial and Religious persecution lies in an Allied victory. Every resource of all the Allied Nations must be bent towards this supreme object, measures for the rescue and relief of such refugees as succeed in escaping from German Occupied Territory cannot be exclusively British, and His Majesty's Government are now engaged in consultations with the other Governments most immediately concerned with a view to seeing what further measures it is possible to take as soon as possible to assist those who make their way to countries beyond German control. These consultations are necessarily confidential and it would not be in the interest of the refugees themselves to enter upon any discussion on them at the present juncture. His Majesty's Government's share in meeting this need has already been very substantial. They are nevertheless themselves working out certain practical proposals which they can make as a further contribution to this concerted effort by the United Nations.

AIDE MEMOIRE

Refugees from Nazi-Occupied Territory

Many thousands of refugees continue to crowd into neutral countries in Europe, and the situation is developing with such rapidity and in such proportions that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have become impressed with the necessity for consultation and joint effort in dealing with the problem. Certain complicating factors which accompany this development appear to His Majesty's Government to emphasize this necessity.

(a) The refugee problem cannot be treated as though it were a wholly Jewish problem which could be handled by Jewish agencies or by machinery only adapted for assisting Jews. There are so many non-Jewish refugees and there is so much acute suffering among non-Jews in Allied countries that Allied criticism would probably result if any marked preference were shown in removing Jews from territories in enemy occupation. There is also the distinct danger of stimulating anti-semitism in areas where an excessive number of foreign Jews are introduced.

(b) There is at present always a danger of raising false hopes among refugees by suggesting or announcing alternative possible destinations in excess of shipping probabilities.

(c) There is a possibility that the Germans or their satellites may change over from the policy of extermination to one of extrusion, and aim as they did before the war at embarrassing other countries by flooding them with alien immigrants.

2. His Majesty's Government, while aware of these complicating factors, find it impossible to make a merely negative response to a growing international problem, disturbing the public conscience and involving the rescue of people threatened by Germany's extermination policy. It is physically impossible on the score of shipping limitations alone for the United Kingdom or even for the United Nations as a whole, to contemplate meeting in full what may prove to be an unlimited demand. A great part of the refugees who leave German-occupied Europe will have to continue to be received in neutral countries whom His Majesty's Government wish to encourage not only by material help but by assurances (which the Swiss Government has in fact requested) that the refugee problem will be brought within the United Nations rehabilitation plans at the end of the war.

The absorptive capacity of accessible neutral countries in Europe seems however to be approaching its limit, and the Allied Governments cannot very well go on exhorting those countries not to turn any refugees back without offering co-operation in accommodating a proportion of them.

3. A detailed statement of the contributions by the United Kingdom and the Colonial Empire to the refugee problem will be found in the attached statement. It should be noticed that Great Britain, in spite of the prevailing stringency of food and housing under war conditions, is accommodating, besides Allied Forces or Merchant Seamen, nearly 100,000 refugees, while the

Colonies/

Colonies are straining their resources of food, labour and accommodation in housing many scores of thousands of refugees in addition to civilian internees, British and Allied evacuees, and prisoners of war; East Africa alone has taken in more than two and a half times its white population. Despite the substantial contribution already made by Palestine and the considerable difficulties of food, labour and accommodation which exists there, His Majesty's Government have within the last few weeks offered to take 4,800 children accompanied by 800 women from Bulgaria. Owing to the acute security problem in Palestine, the authorities are not prepared, except possibly in individual cases, to accept male adults from enemy or enemy-occupied countries; but His Majesty's Government will continue to do everything possible to facilitate the admission of children within the limits imposed by the 1939 White Paper. (A copy of the White Paper in question is enclosed for the convenience of the Department of State.)

4. His Majesty's Government are aware of the generous reception by the United States accorded to many thousands of refugees and of the action taken by the United States in finding other outlets, in particular San Domingo, after the establishment of the Evian Committee on the initiative of the President. They also appreciate that for security reasons the United States Government now scrutinizes new entrants into the country with the greatest care and that, in addition, the question of accommodation and food is influenced by the prevailing war conditions. His Majesty's Government understand, however, that the United States Government have offered to take large numbers of refugee children from France, and they enquire therefore whether,

taking/

taking all factors into consideration, food potentialities, housing accommodation and the absorptive capacity of the United States on the one hand and the margin for free action within the immigration quotas on the other, the United States Government would still find it possible to offer, as part of an international effort, homes for a proportion of the adult refugees now reaching neutral countries.

5. Considering the matter in further detail, His Majesty's Government would mention that reception in the United States has at least one vital advantage over reception in the United Kingdom, namely that all additional persons received in the British Isles not only require shipping to transport them thither but start new shipping demands for their maintenance as long as they are there. In spite of this, however, and notwithstanding the other obvious difficulties referred to at the beginning of paragraph 3 above, His Majesty's Government are prepared to consider the possibility of further effort, as part of a general endeavour by the United Nations to cope with this problem. In particular, over and above the large part already played by the Colonial Territories, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to examine the question whether there is any scope, - even though it is now bound to be very limited -, for further admissions into the Colonies. It is unlikely for reasons already indicated that any but a very limited number of refugees could in future be accepted into the United Kingdom and, if it proved practical to accept here any further refugees as part of a comprehensive inter-Allied solution, His Majesty's Government would have to reserve to themselves

the right/

the right to accommodate them in the Isle of Man, possibly under conditions of detention, and could give no guarantee at this stage as to their ultimate disposal.

6. If an understanding could be reached between His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in regard to such a cooperative offer, the way would be open for approaching the other Governments of the United Nations, for example the Latin American countries (except Mexico which has made a very considerable offer of assistance in regard to Poles from Persia), the British Dominions or even neutrals to ascertain what they would be prepared to contribute towards the solution of the most immediate problem. This would have to be done with the minimum of publicity over details, and for this reason His Majesty's Government would be inclined to deprecate any kind of formal international meeting; but some kind of private conference of Allied representatives would appear to be the most expeditious and practical procedure, and if its main result was to elicit full statements of what the various Governments were doing and any difficulties in the way of their doing more this in itself would be of great value.

7. His Majesty's Government are gratified to learn of the despatch by the State Department of officials to North Africa, and would be interested to learn the views of these officials as to the capacity of North Africa to accommodate a substantial proportion of the refugees from Spain and Portugal and the possibilities of a civil administration taking responsibility for this problem, in which administration His Majesty's Government would be ready to take their share. His Majesty's Government are also aware that cooperation between the United States and British Governments and the Embassies of the two countries

in Madrid/

in Madrid have already produced useful local results. There is, however, still danger of unfavourable action by or an appeal from the Spanish Government in connexion with the situation in Spain, and His Majesty's Government therefore feel that consideration of the general problem of refugees is too pressing to be deferred any longer and and in particular they consider that it is now necessary to get to grips with the question of alternative destinations. This is their reason for the present approach to the United States Government, on the basis that the time for unilateral and piecemeal action is passed and that combined practical measures must be taken.

8. His Majesty's Government will accordingly be grateful for the observations of the United States Government on the above considerations and, in particular -

(a) Whether the United States Government agree that combined action by the United Nations is now called for.

(b) Whether the United States Government would be prepared as part of this action to admit to the United States further adult refugees from Nazi-controlled areas and, if so, in what numbers.

(c) Whether the United States Government would be able to arrange for the further reception of refugees in San Domingo and, if so, in what numbers.

(d) What assistance in the matter of shipping would be available from the United States.

(e)/

(e) Whether the United States Government agree as to the expediency of a private and informal United Nations conference and, if so, any views they may hold as to its composition, etc.

(f) Whether the United States Government consider that assurances could now be given to neutral countries that the refugee problem will be brought within the scope of rehabilitation plans of the United Nations at the end of the war.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 20, 1943

RC:PHOB:EJT

[redacted]

REFUGEES FROM NAZI-OCCUPIED TERRITORY:
RECEPTION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
BRITISH COLONIAL TERRITORY.

(Note:- The statistics of prisoners of war are strictly confidential.)

A. GREAT BRITAIN

Great Britain at the end of September, 1942, was accommodating following additions to normal population:

99,114 refugees (including 40,368 Germans, 5,584 Austrians, 12,255 Belgians and 8,437 Poles). In addition, there are about 13,000 refugee children and 37,407 Italian prisoners of war. These figures do not include:

a) Aliens, including enemy aliens who are serving in the British and Allied forces maintained in the United Kingdom.

b) British subjects, e.g. Gibraltarians evacuated to the United Kingdom owing to war conditions.

B. COLONIAL TERRITORIES.

1) Jamaica.- Additional population maintained 3,218 (including 558 refugees and 1,500 evacuees from Gibraltar, 572 prisoners of war and 588 civilian internees.)

2) Mauritius.- 1,580 illegal immigrants from Palestine. Arrangements for food, medical supplies, etc., are being made for 1,000 Greek refugees.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

3) /

3) Cyprus.- 4,830 additional population (including 4,650 refugees from Greece).

4) East African Colonies.- (with a total pre-war European population of about 30,000) have found or are in process of finding accommodation for 90,964 additional foreign population, including 21,000 Polish refugees from Persia (distributed among Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Nyassaland), and 60,000 Italians, prisoners of war. One thousand Polish refugees are also being transferred from Persia to Southern Rhodesia.

5) Palestine's substantial contribution towards the alleviation of the problem of refugees from Central and Southeastern Europe may be summarised as follows:-

The war necessarily limited territories from which immigrants could be admitted and practically all visas authorised have been intended for refugees stranded in neutral countries. Conditions of international travel have, however, made it difficult for prospective immigrants with visas for Palestine to reach that country within the period in which their absorption into the country was intended. Nevertheless, over 18,000 legal immigrants reached Palestine between April 1, 1939, and September 30, 1942. The total number of Jewish immigrants who entered during that period including illegal immigrants was about 38,000.

The /

The immigration quota for the three months period ending December 31st, 1942, provides for 3,000 Jewish immigrants and this includes 1,000 orphan children and 200 adults from the former Vichy France. In addition, arrangements are being made to admit some 270 Jewish children from Hungary and Roumania, and approval has been given in principle to the admission to Palestine under the immigration quotas of Jewish children from any enemy-occupied territory.

A plan approved by His Majesty's Government is now under consideration for the admission to Palestine from Bulgaria under the Immigration Schedule for the first half of 1943 of 5,000 Jews in Bulgaria (4,500 children and 500 adults - mostly women). The Swiss Government have approached the Bulgarian Government for the necessary exit permits.

War conditions create difficulties of sustenance in Palestine and any immediate large influx of immigrants would place a heavy strain on food supplies. Palestine has, however, in addition to the immigrants mentioned above, provided a temporary refuge for some 4,000 people from Central Europe of whom about 40 per cent are Jews.

****

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the British Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the British Embassy's aide memoire of January 20, 1943, relating to the situation of persons fleeing from persecution for religious, racial and political reasons and to the necessity for inter-governmental relief action in their behalf.

It is evident that the problem of the refugees in question cannot be solved in a satisfactory manner by any one of the Governments of the United Nations group nor of the neutral countries. It has been, and is, the traditional policy of this country to seek every available means by which to extend to oppressed and persecuted peoples such assistance as may be found to be feasible and possible under the laws of the United States. In pursuance of that policy, this Government has been and is taking steps to extend

assistance

assistance in a large measure to those European people who have been subjected to oppression and persecution under the Hitler regime. The measures of assistance afforded have assumed several forms, as follows:

1. Joint and several declarations of official attitude of condemnation of the policies and acts of the Axis Governments and their satellites in oppression or persecution of religious, racial and political minorities;

2. The appropriation and expenditure of large amounts of public and private funds for the relief of persons in need as a result of oppression and persecution because of their racial origin or religious or political beliefs;

3. The application of the immigration laws of the United States in the utmost liberal and humane spirit of those laws;

4. The calling by the President of the United States of the first Intergovernmental Conference at Evian-London in 1938 for the purpose of seeking a solution of refugee problems. There may be repeated here the

statement

statement made in that Conference by the Honorable Myron Taylor on behalf of this Government, as follows:

"In conclusion, I need not emphasize that the discrimination and pressure against minority groups and the disregard of elementary human rights are contrary to the principles of what we have come to regard as the accepted standards of civilization. We have heard from time to time of the disruptive consequences of the dumping of merchandise upon the world's economy. How much more disturbing is the forced and chaotic dumping of unfortunate peoples in large numbers. Racial and religious problems are, in consequence, rendered more acute in all parts of the world. Economic retaliation against the countries which are responsible for this condition is encouraged. The sentiment of international mistrust and suspicion is heightened and fear, which is an important obstacle to general appeasement between nations, is accentuated.

"The problem is no longer one of purely private concern. It is a problem for intergovernmental action. If the present currents of migration are permitted to continue to push anarchically upon the receiving States and if some Governments are to continue to toss large sections of their populations lightly upon a distressed and unprepared world, then there is catastrophic human suffering ahead which can only result in general unrest and in general international strain which will not be conducive to the permanent appeasement to which all peoples earnestly aspire."

At the Evian-London Conference and through the Intergovernmental Committee which grew out of that Conference, this Government exerted its most earnest efforts to persuade the various countries represented to provide asylum for as many refugees from the Axis countries as the laws of the several countries would permit. This Government has also approached other countries for the purpose of finding places of settlement for refugees with funds of the United States origin being made available.

5. As shown

5. As shown by the records of the Department of State, from the advent of the Hitler regime in 1933 until June 30, 1942, 547,775 visas were issued by American diplomatic and consular officers to natives or nationals of the various countries now dominated by the Axis powers, the great majority of which persons were refugees from Nazi persecution. Of this number 228,964 were issued in the war years 1939-1942. Many more than that number of visas were authorized during this latter period, the aliens in whose behalf such authorizations were given having been unable to depart from their places of foreign residence to reach the United States. Yet, of the number actually issued, practically all of the aliens who received them during the war years 1939-1942 have actually arrived in the United States and have remained here, many of them having entered in a temporary status and not yet having departed.

6. Over 5,000 visas were authorized for the admission into the United States and permanent residence here of refugee children coming from France, Spain and Portugal under arrangements with certain private persons and organizations in the

United

United States for their care. Visas were also authorized for the parents accompaning them, in certain cases. This Government has sought the friendly assistance of the Government of Switzerland to effect the release from France of such of these children who have not been permitted to leave France, for entry into Spain where visas may be issued to them by the American consular officers.

7. Since the entry of the United States into the war, there have been no new restrictions placed by the Government of the United States upon the number of aliens of any nationality permitted to proceed to this country under existing laws, except for the more intensive examination of aliens required for security reasons.

8. Considerable sums of money have been made available by the American Red Cross and from other American sources to the American Ambassador at Madrid for the care of refugees now in Spain pending their evacuation. A number of these refugees have already been removed to North Africa. The continuation of this movement and its extent are dependent upon military considerations.

9. The American

9. The American Red Cross and other American organizations have provided assistance for refugees who have been able to reach other neutral countries, such as Iran, and have undertaken extended feeding among children, including refugee children, in France.

10. In evacuating refugees to neutral areas, the full influence of the United States diplomatic and consular representatives has been from time to time invoked, not only with the oppressor nations but with any Government concerned, on behalf of the refugees.

This Government understands that, in addition to the refugee classes under immediate consideration, the British Government has certain undertakings for the care of British evacuees and of prisoners of war. Likewise, the Government of the United States has certain similar undertakings, as follows:

1. For the successful prosecution of the war

and for

and for Hemispheric safety, the Government of the United States has offered to receive dangerous Axis nationals from a number of the American Republics where facilities for the internment or close safeguarding of such Axis nationals do not exist. A considerable number of such Axis nationals have thus been brought to the United States and arrangements are being made for the receipt of more of them.

2. This Government has a number of camps in the United States and more camps are under construction or planned for the internment or detention of civilian enemy aliens. There are being maintained in these camps thousands of such aliens.

3. This Government has also established other camps for prisoners of war which are now in use and in which, by arrangement, there will also be placed large numbers of United Nations prisoners. The accommodation of these prisoners in the United States will leave available abroad considerable quantities of food, clothing, etc., for refugees there which would otherwise be used by those prisoners abroad, while on the other hand, the maintenance of the prisoners in the United States will result in a considerable reduction of supplies available here.

4. There

4. There have been set up in the United States a number of relocation centers where approximately 110,000 persons of the Japanese race are being housed and maintained at public expense after removal from vital military areas.

The Government of the United States fully shares the concern expressed by the British Government for the situation of the refugees. It feels, in view of the facts set forth above, that it has been and is making every endeavor to relieve the oppressed and persecuted peoples. In affording asylum to refugees, however, it is and must be bound by legislation enacted by Congress determining the immigration policy of the United States.

The United States is of the opinion that further efforts to solve the problem may best be undertaken through the instrumentality already existing, the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. To this end it may be considered advisable in order to facilitate action by the Committee that a preliminary exploration of ways and means be undertaken informally by representatives designated by the Government of the United States and the British Government. Such exploration might be

undertaken

undertaken along the following lines:

A. The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi measures against minorities have caused the flight of persons of various races and faiths, as well as of other persons because of their political beliefs.

B. Wheresoever practicable, intergovernmental collaboration should be sought in these times of transportation difficulty, shipping shortage, and submarine menace, to the end that arrangements may be determined for temporary asylum for refugees as near as possible to the areas in which those people find themselves at the present time and from which they may be returned to their homelands with the greatest expediency on the termination of hostilities.

C. There should accordingly be considered plans for the maintenance in neutral countries in Europe of those refugees for whose removal provision may not be made. Their maintenance in neutral countries may involve the giving of assurances for their support until they can be repatriated, which support will necessarily come from the United Nations augmented by funds from private sources. It may also involve the giving of assurances in all possible cases by their Governments in exile for their

prompt

prompt return to their native countries upon the termination of hostilities.

D. The possibilities for the temporary asylum of the refugees, with a view to their repatriation upon the termination of hostilities, in countries other than neutral, and their dependencies, should be explored, together with the question of the availability of shipping to effect their movement from Europe.

It is suggested that the British and United States representatives might meet at Ottawa for this preliminary exploration.

Department of State,

Washington,

February 25, 1943.