MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You will recall that towards the close of the Moscow Conference there was presented a paper dated October 6, 1943 which was approved by you and which then represented the joint views of the United States and British Governments on the subject of the administration of civil affairs in France at the time of liberation. That formula envisaged arrangements on a strictly military level between the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces, and the French military authorities. This paper was not discussed at Moscow owing to lack of time and it was consequently referred to the European Advisory Commission at London for consideration.

As you likewise know, the subsequent draft, approved by you on March 15, is before the British Government, whose views are awaited.

We now learn that the Soviet Government has approached the British through its Embassy at London and, with reference to reports that the draft is under consideration by the British and American Governments, has inquired whether this means that the Soviet Government is to have no relation to the question of the administration of the territory of liberated France. The Soviet representations point out that if so this would be contrary to the decision of the Moscow Conference.

In view of the Soviet approach to the British, we would suggest the desirability of communicating to the Soviet Government the text of the March 15 draft. With your approval I shall telegraph it to Mr. Harriman with the request that he communicate it to the Soviet authorities and solicit their views. He can explain that we are bringing the matter to their attention directly because of the urgency of reaching agreement and because the European Advisory Commission is preoccupied with other pressing matters.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

April 17, 1944

As Telegram S-50325 from Stettinius raised the question regarding a Tripartite American-Anglo-Russian Statement to define unconditional surrender, I thought it well to send a message immediately to the effect that you are holding very strongly to the principle of unconditional surrender for Germany. I also asked for information as to whether the European Advisory Commission had progressed far enough in its study of terms to be imposed upon Germany to form a basis as to what treatment of Germany would be agreed to by the Soviets, British, and ourselves.

This subject was raised by General Eisenhower and General Smith with Stettinius, and I thought it was necessary to remind them all that no discussion as to the treatment of Germany should be carried on outside of the European Advisory Council, to which this matter was expressly referred by the three Governments. I am immediately informing them in London that no further consideration should be given to this matter without your approval.

CH
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
April 20, 1944

Subject: Telegram from Mr. Landis Regarding the Present Political Crisis in Egypt.

Reference is made to telegram no. 973, April 20, noon, addressed to you by Mr. Landis regarding the present political crisis in Egypt.

The nature of this crisis may be summarized briefly as follows:

The King of Egypt has informed the British Ambassador that he desires the dismissal of Nahas Pasha, the present Prime Minister because of alleged attempts on the part of the Prime Minister to undermine the King and on account of the alleged corruption of the present regime. The King proposed the establishment of a government headed by the present Chief of the Royal Cabinet. The British Ambassador notified his Government of this development and received a message from Mr. Churchill stating that this matter is of such importance that it must be submitted to the British Cabinet and instructing the British Ambassador to request the King not to take any action which might disturb the existing situation. As may be noted, the British Ambassador informed the King of Mr. Churchill's request.

It may be noted that, in the telegram under reference, Mr. Landis states that he assumes that this Government has given consideration to the question of consulting with the British Government in regard to the political crisis in Egypt. Egypt is within an area of primary British military responsibility. Furthermore, the British Government has a treaty of close military alliance with Egypt. In as much as the defense of Egypt is a primary British responsibility, it is considered that in view of the security angle, the present Egyptian political crisis is of primary concern to the British Government rather than to this Government. It is believed, therefore, that recent developments in Egypt, at their present stage at least, need not be discussed with the British by this Government. Since it is the primary military responsibility of the British, it is considered that the British should assume the initiative in dealing with the present crisis.

Enclosure:
Paraphrase of telegram no. 973, April 20, 1944, noon, from Cairo.

(Copies of this copy filed - Great Britain folder, 1-44)
Department of State

ENCLOSURE TO
Letter drafted

ADDRESS TO
The President,
The White House.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMLEGATION, Cairo.
TO: Secretary of State, Washington.
DATED: April 20, 1944, noon.
NUMBER: 973.

U. S. URGENT
FROM LANDIS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE.
CONFIDENTIAL AND PERSONAL.

Last night King Farouk insisted on calling on me in secret at my home in order to discuss the political crisis which has arisen in Egypt. The King has been endeavoring to get in touch with me ever since last Friday; however, I was on a visit to Iran. The King provided me with copies of his communication to the British Ambassador and the verbal reply from Mr. Churchill which the British Ambassador had given him. The King also stated that it is his determination to bring to a head the issue between the Prime Minister and himself even though it might result in the exile and forced abdication of the King.

The reply of Mr. Churchill states that the question is to be considered early in the week by a special meeting of the War Cabinet. In this reply the King is requested to refrain from any violent action in the meantime. The
reply continues to state that Mr. Churchill has instructed the British Ambassador to take all possible steps to make sure that the Egyptian Prime Minister refrain equally from action of this kind. The British Government almost assuredly would line itself up against whichever party might be the first one to strike.

As already you know it is a domestic issue which has arisen between the Prime Minister and the King. However, it is an issue which may have repercussions in the entire Middle Eastern area. The interview which I had with the King was entirely of a personal character, and the King requested deliberately nothing more than personal friendship on my part. It is assumed that as a result of reports regarding the crisis received from the Legation the question of consulting either in London or in Washington with the British Government prior to action on the part of the British Government has been considered and that the possibilities of the situation have been studied with respect to the responsibility which the Government of the United States may consider itself to assume or not to assume.

KIRK
May 10, 1944

My dear Mr. President:

The Department has been informed by the British Embassy that the British Government considers it important that Allied propaganda to the satellite states should now be reinforced, and, with special reference to Hungary and Bulgaria, in order to attain the maximum military advantage in strengthening resistance to Germany, should henceforth omit reference to the term unconditional surrender, while of course avoiding abandonment of the general principle.

You will recall in this connection my letter of April 4, and your memorandum in reply thereto, in which you directed that the general principle of unconditional surrender be retained, though exception might be made in its application in specific cases.

In making this proposal, the British Embassy has pointed out that the Soviet Government had not applied the principle to Finland, and the same could be said for Rumania, if the Rumanians should come to terms along the lines proposed for their surrender. It is supposed that the propaganda agencies will take these considerations into account in preparing their directives. As for Hungary and Bulgaria, the Department thinks that advantages can in fact be gained from energetic action at this time in propaganda operations, and I should therefore be grateful if you would indicate whether you would approve our taking parallel action with the British and the Russians in authorizing a degree of latitude for propaganda purposes, having it clearly understood that the exception is authorized to enable the propaganda services to omit reference to the term, though of course there would be no public resentment of the principle as applicable to these countries.

Faithfully yours,

Cordell Hull

The President,

The White House.
6/15/44

The President says to file.

SIR
Memo. for the President:

This seems to me good. Could it go over O.W.I. short wave?

E.R.
May 5, 1944

Dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

Recent discussions with friends on their reactions to Mr. Hull's recent general policy statement led to an attempt to reformulate these ideas in terms of what they mean to the ordinary people in enemy or occupied countries. Attached is a copy of the statement this resulted in.

While doubtless it is not exactly what such a statement should say, it does illustrate the kind of simple and direct statement which could help to reassure the common people of the enemy and occupied nations, and thereby help shorten the war and save lives as a result of splitting them from their rulers.

Sincerely,

Mordecai Ezekiel
TO THE PEOPLES ENSLAVED BY DICTATORS:

This statement is issued jointly by the leaders of England, the Soviet Union, and the United States, after consultation with one another.

To the peoples of Germany, Japan, their allies, and to all peoples of nations occupied by them, we say:

I. We are fighting to destroy the dictators who have enslaved you. We are not fighting to destroy the people whom they have enslaved and oppressed all over the world.

II. We will fight until the dictators have surrendered unconditionally.

III. After the dictators surrender, we will start at once to help you reconstruct a world in which you and your children can live with dignity, honor, prosperity, and freedom.

IV. To this end we will see that those political parties which have supported the dictators and which have preached destruction, hate, and enslavement, are rooted out and rendered harmless. All individuals in those parties who have been responsible for crimes of terrorism and destruction will be punished by courts of the invaded nations where their crimes were committed, or by courts established by the United Nations. They will be held in the custody of the armies of occupation until their trials can be held.

V. No member of the Fascist parties shall be permitted to retain property which has been looted from you. So far as possible, that property will be returned to responsible local governments for distribution among those from whom the Fascists stole it.

VI. As promptly as Fascist elements have been eradicated, you will be given the opportunity to establish local government organs by democratic processes, for municipalities, towns, villages, and counties.

VII. In due course you will be permitted to establish whatever form of national government you select as long as it is based on the will of the people, provides for free elections, free speech, and religious freedom of worship, and insures against the creation of new dictatorships.

VIII. You will be aided to reestablish your production of food and industrial products as promptly as possible after the fighting stops. Relief food will be provided to check actual starvation, but after that your future food supply will depend largely on your own efforts. We will do all that is necessary to assist you in the rehabilitation of your agriculture, industry, and trade as promptly as possible.
The United Nations will operate the Interpol and other transmises -
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1944

Memorandum from Stettinius re a proposed statement by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin addressed to German Army about further resistance. Supposed to have been sent over June 3rd.

Advise Extension 2119, State, if we received.

Not in our files.
State will submit a file draft.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM:

Memorandum dated 7/10/44 on White House stationery, reading "Memorandum from Stettinius re a proposed statement by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin addressed to German Army about further resistance. Supposed to have been sent over June 3rd. Advise Extension 2119, State, if we received", sent to Admiral Wilson Brown, as per penciled notation "Ask Admiral Brown if he has".

7/11/44
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LEAHY

What do you think?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 11, 1944

The favorable progress on the Eastern, Western and Southern fronts recalls a suggestion made in a memorandum on June 3, 1944 regarding a tripartite statement to the German Army. You and your associate heads of Government may deem it advisable to give this further consideration at this stage. For that reason a revised draft, shortened and brought up to date, is attached.

If Churchill and Stalin are agreeable to the idea, I would suggest that the views of the Russian and Anglo-American military leaders be obtained both as to timing and substance.

Enclosure:
Draft statement.
DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Soldiers of Germany, attention! Our assaults from the East, West and South continue relentlessly and with ever increasing force. New blows will fall.

Your defeat is inevitable. In your hearts you know this is true. You know that you have nothing to hope for from prolonging the struggle. Nothing you can do can change the outcome.

Your Nazi leaders led you into war to satisfy their lust for power and conquest. They told you it would be a quick and easy victory. You know now how wrong they were. You marched across Europe - to Harvik, to Bordeaux, to Stalingrad, to Alamein. That was long ago. Since then you have begun to feel the force of our overwhelming power. Your homes are smoking ruins. Your comrades have died. You who have escaped from Russia, from Africa, from Italy, from Normandy, have known the long and bitter road of defeat. Where does that road end? You know the answer. It ends in crushing, total defeat, and in your own homeland.

Every German life lost from now on, soldier or civilian, is a needless loss. You who will die will die without hope, without
without faith in your cause. For what?

Your only escape lies in unconditional surrender.

Soldiers of Germany, what fate awaits you and your country when you lay down your arms?

We promise you nothing. Germany has made terrible and disastrous mistakes. Germany must atone for the wanton destruction of lives and property she has caused. That atonement will be hard. The false philosophy of Nazism, whose falsity, evil and futility must be now be very clear to you, must be totally destroyed. I repeat, we promise you nothing, but I tell you again certain fundamental things.

The Allied leaders - Stalin, Churchill and I - have made it abundantly clear that we do not seek the destruction of the German people. I repeat, we do not seek the destruction of the German people.

We seek the goal of human freedom, for all men - a greater true liberty - intellectual, political and religious; and a greater justice, social and economic. We seek a world in which all men may live and work together in freedom and in peace. In that free and peaceful world, Germany, in due time and as she makes and proves herself worthy, will have her place.

Until
Until you cease your hopeless fight, until your leaders surrender unconditionally, the blows of the Americans, the British, the Russians and our associates will increase in number and in intensity by land, by sea and by air until our inevitable victory is complete.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 31, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

What do you think of this?

F.D.R.

Secret letter to the Pres., 5-24-44, from Elmer Davis, returning attached note from Mordecai Ezekiel, Office of Secretary of Agriculture, 5-5-44, addressed to Mrs. Roosevelt, with enclosed suggestion for statement to the peoples enslaved by dictators. Attached is comment to Mr. Davis, 5-22 from Wallace Carroll.
MEMORANDUM

To:       Mr. Elmer Davis, Director
From:    Wallace Carroll, Deputy Director, OB

May 22, 1944

There are some good points in this memorandum but it is unsuitable for our use for the following reasons:

1. It lumpes together the Germans, Japs, and our Allies in occupied countries. It would therefore cause bitter resentment among the latter.

2. It outlines a very "soft" line to the enemy countries. For instance, it promises the enemy people that they will live in "dignity, honor, prosperity, and freedom." Most of the United Nations would be unwilling to subscribe to that.

3. It draws a very sharp distinction between the enemy people and the Fascists. This is a very controversial subject and, again, it would arouse objection.

4. It promises relief as promptly as possible to enemy peoples. This runs counter to the UNRRA agreement.

5. It says that the Germans and Japs will first be allowed to reestablish their own industry and agriculture and only then will they be expected to aid in the reconstruction of devastated countries. What a howl this would raise!

There are other criticisms which I could make but I think the foregoing shows that it is not a practical matter to proceed with at the present time.
MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. ELMER DAVIS:

For your information, with no recommendation.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Statement to the German Army

Since receiving your memorandum of May 18, we have been giving constant study to the question of a statement designed to weaken the German will to resist.

We feel strongly that some such statement should be issued. General Eisenhower feels likewise. Ambassador Phillips, who has given considerable thought to it, has recently submitted a draft prepared jointly by him, Mr. Sherwood and officers of General Eisenhower's staff and placing more emphasis on military factors. We have accordingly prepared a new draft, which takes into account Mr. Phillips' and other suggestions and which is directed specifically at the German Army. A copy is enclosed herewith for your consideration.

If this statement meets with your approval, we would suggest submitting it to the Prime Minister and probably also to Stalin. We feel it would be wise to invite them to join with you in making it or to follow it with statements of their own, as they may think best. We realize, of course, that a Russian call for the German Army to surrender would not have much appeal but Stalin might consider such a message by you alone or by you and Churchill as an attempt to lighten only the task of our Armies in the west.

We believe the best timing for the statement would be as soon after D-Day as substantial progress has been made on the various fronts.

Enclosure:
Draft statement.
DRAFT STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Soldiers of Germany, attention! The first assaults from the West have begun. The assaults from the East and South continue relentlessly. New blows will fall.

Your defeat is inevitable. In your hearts you know this is true. You know that you have nothing to hope for from prolonging the struggle. Nothing you can do can change the outcome.

Your Nazi leaders led you into war to satisfy their lust for power and conquest. They told you it would be a quick and easy victory. You know now how wrong they were. Your Nazi leaders caused you to bomb unprotected and unprotected peoples. For what? You have begun to learn what our bombs, which Goering and Hitler boasted could never touch the Reich, mean to you and to your loved ones. You marched across Europe - to Narvik, to Bordeaux, to Stalingrad, to Alamein. For what? Your comrades have died. For what? You who have escaped from Russia, from Africa, from Italy, have known the long and bitter road of defeat. You have begun to tread the same road back from the West. Where does that road end? You know the answer. It ends in crushing, total defeat,
defeat, and in your own homeland.

Your leaders foolishly believed that they could conquer the free countries one by one before we could unite to forge our overwhelming strength. You have only begun to feel the weight of that limitless strength. It grows day by day while that of Germany is shattered and bled away.

Your leaders have one remaining hope. It is that they can get a compromise peace if you can be made to resist long enough. How utterly senseless. The Allied leaders - Churchill, Stalin and I -- have said again and again that we will accept from Germany nothing less than unconditional surrender. I say it again. The leaders of the German army must surrender unconditionally.

Every German life lost from now on, soldier or civilian, is a needless loss. You who will die will die without hope, without faith in your cause. For what?

Afflicted life, too, will be lost, but our men will die strong in the certainty that their cause is just and that their sacrifice brings nearer the day of certain, overwhelming victory.

Soldiers,
Soldiers of Germany, what fate awaits you and your country when you lay down your arms?

We promise you nothing. Germany made terrible and disastrous mistakes. Germany must atone for the wanton destruction of lives and property she has caused. That atonement will be hard. The false philosophy of Naziism, whose falsity, evil and futility must by now be very clear to you, must be totally destroyed. I repeat, we promise you nothing, but I tell you again certain fundamental things.

The Allied leaders - Stalin, Churchill and I, have made it abundantly clear that we do not seek the destruction of the German people. I repeat, we do not seek the destruction of the German people.

We seek the goal of human freedom, for all men - a greater true liberty - intellectual, political and religious; and a greater justice, social and economic. We seek a world in which all men may live and work together in freedom and in peace. In that free and peaceful world, Germany, in due time and as she makes and proves herself worthy, will have her place.

Until
Until you cease your hopeless fight, until your leaders surrender unconditionally, the blows of the Americans, the British, the Russians and our associates will increase in number and in intensity by land, by sea and by air until our inevitable victory is complete.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 3, 1944

Subject: Possible Statement to the German Army

Since receiving your memorandum of May 19, we have been giving constant study to the question of a statement designed to weaken the German will to resist.

We feel strongly that some such statement should be issued. General Eisenhower feels likewise. Ambassador Phillips, who has given considerable thought to it, has recently submitted a draft prepared jointly by him, Mr. Sherwood and officers of General Eisenhower's staff and placing more emphasis on military factors. We have accordingly prepared a new draft, which takes into account Mr. Phillips' and other suggestions and which is directed specifically at the German Army. A copy is enclosed herewith for your consideration.

If this statement meets with your approval, we would suggest submitting it to the Prime Minister and probably also to Stalin. We feel it would be wise to invite them to join with you in making it or to follow it with statements of their own, as they may think best. We realize, of course, that a Russian call for the German Army to surrender would not have such appeal but Stalin might consider such a message by you alone or by you and Churchill as an attempt to lighten only the task of our Armies in the west.

We believe the best timing for the statement would be as soon after D-Day as substantial progress has been made on the various fronts.

Enclosure:
Draft statement.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible Statement to Germany

Before Mr. Hull left yesterday he handed me your memorandum of May 31 enclosing Elmer Davis' letter of the 24th and the statement prepared by Mr. Ezekiel, all of which I return herewith. While there are some good points in this statement, we are inclined to agree with the points of criticism made by the OWI officials. In addition, in view of our understanding of the British reaction to the statement recently submitted to the Prime Minister, it would seem to be clear that they would consider this statement "too soft".

We have for some time been giving serious thought to the whole question of a statement to Germany and I will be sending you almost immediately a separate memorandum on this subject.

Enclosures:
As stated above.
Racial Discrimination

TURKEY—Sadak in Akkah, May 16: Racial discrimination within a nation makes of that nation most primitive of human societies. Racialism is in itself enemy of democracy and whenever it extends beyond national boundaries it becomes tool of imperialism. Turkish nation within its boundaries is closely attached to ideal of freedom and equality without subjecting blood of its citizens to microscopic test. This nation won't allow itself to be lured into internationalism or Turanianism; Our national ideal is to elevate Turkish Republic. Atsey in Ulus, May 16: In midst of Arabism, Albanianism, Armenianism and Greekism of Ottoman Empire we were Turks. We founded present Turkish state in those territories of Ottoman Empire which were Turkish and called it Turkey. According to fundamental principles of constitution and of people's Republican Party Turks of Turkey are nationalists. They are neither Turanianists nor racialists. From the viewpoint of foreign policy Turanianism is great threat to Turkey. Similarly from viewpoint of internal policy racialism would serve no other end than to insure partition and disintegration of united Turkey. We are proud of being Turks and nationalists. There is no need for us to fabricate lies. Racialism means internal and Turanianism external war. It has become art to harp upon sufferings of people and conceal leftist anarchy under marks of justice. But it has also become fine art to disguise dangers inherent in rightist tendencies by attacking anarchy. Any connection which racialism and Turanianism have with outside is flagrant criminal offense, but even if they had no connection with outside, even when they don their most innocent guise, they are factors of intrigue and discord within and provocation and distrust without country. We can be sure of our independence, freedom and territorial integrity only so long as we remain attached to our principles without making distinction between them and without weakening them to detriment of each other, and only so long as we succeed in making popular masses and youth of country espouse these principles with as great faith as our own. We cannot allow youth of Turkey to become unconscious instrument of unidentified greedy ambitions. Turkey is our mother land, Turks is name of all her citizens and Turks have faith only in nationalism.

Olemański's Trip

RUSSIA—Pravda for May 16 publishes New York items regarding Olemański. First item reports defense of Olemański by radio commentators Pearson, Dorothy Thompson, Leland Stowe, Kingdon and Steele. Majority of commentators cited contrast of church's treatment of Olemański and the "pro-Fascist priest Coughlin". Thompson reportedly praised Olemański's journey as one of the most remarkable contemporary diplomatic missions securing Stalin's statement regarding collaboration with the Pope against persecution of the Catholic Church. Also reported are Stowe's statement that Olemański's trip was justified since good relations between the Soviet Union and the church increase change for firm peace. Kingdon's statement that treatment of Olemański means that church does not wish to cooperate with Soviets and Steele's opinion that majority of American Poles support Olemański. Second item reports that after receiving Olemański's letter of excuses Bishop O'Leary rescinded Olemański's suspension.

ILO Conference

ENGLAND—Lead editorial, May 17, in Times commending accomplishments of recent International Labor Conference in Philadelphia, says
ILO is certain to have a great part to play in shaping future of world after war. Editorial states that organization, preponderantly unofficial in character, is now reaching into wider but closely related fields of activity and aspires to make its voice heard in all matters of economic policy it adds: "This is a natural and welcome development since the welfare of the workers and their prospects of employment depend on the state's manlike handling of these issues. The attainment of full employment and the provision of a minimum standard of living for all, now formally recognized as prime objectives of international policy, raise complex domestic and international issues which can only be solved by the cooperation of all classes and interests on a broad international basis. Exactly how the ILO will be fitted into the framework of future international organization cannot yet be foreseen.

French Recognition

ENGLAND—An editorial in May 17 News Chronicle criticizes the Allied attitude toward the French Committee. Commenting on the note that an upsurge of national confidence has followed the magnificent fighting of the French Army in Italy the article says that the French Committee has given form to this new found confidence by officially declaring itself the provisional government of the French Republic. "Those who regret that it should have done so without awaiting the agreement of London and Washington should remember how long the delay has lasted and how persistent has been the demand in our own country for a formal recognition of the Committee. Side by side with this unwillingness to give formal recognition to the Committee has gone an apparent reluctance to complete an agreement with the Committee for the civil administration of French territory as it becomes liberated. Such agreements have been reached with the representatives of the other Allies. It is not surprising that this should be causing impatience in Algiers" the article continues "to fail to recognize the Committee, to postpone an accord on the subject of civil administration, is to wound this pride, and so to feed the flames of xenophobia which spread only too readily in such conditions. Especially is it an invitation to General de Gaulle to fan those flames by posing as a martyr. The very thing which London and Washington presumably wish to avoid -- an unnatural aggregation of power in the hands of one Frenchman -- they run by this policy a serious risk of assisting" in conclusion the editorial criticizes, describing it as an affront to the French, the refusal to permit French radio and newspaper men to accompany the Allied armies as accredited war correspondents.

Anglo-American Economy

SWEDEN—Swedish editorial in Allehanda, May 16, reviews London economist article regarding Anglo-American differences vis a vis postwar economic policy. Allehanda notes that the economist statement of a percent currency agreement was possible owing to British conciliation towards the American proposal and states that paradoxically enough American demands regarding free trade worry the traditionally free-trade British journal which apparently believes that free trade blessings are questionable in an imperfect world not enjoying full employment. Economist judges American prospects pessimistically.

Finland's Position

SWEDEN--Posten, May 16: The Leningrad radio probably correctly foresees an early American-Finnish break as a consequence of the Allied Ultimatum to vassal states because Hull's peace exhortation to Finland already contains such threat. Allied declarations' tone is entirely unlike what Finns are accustomed to hear from America. Great bitterness is evidently felt against Finland because the earlier advice ignored.
May 24, 1944

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

I return the enclosed suggestion with the comments of the head of our European propaganda, in which I concur. However, while this program seems unsuitable, I thoroughly agree with Mr. Ezekiel as to the urgent need of some statement to the German people, telling them as precisely as possible what would and what would not be done to them after the unconditional surrender of their armies. No matter how severe it might be, if it were only precise it would be likely to shorten the war in some degree, and thereby save un unpredictable but probably considerable number of American lives.

I recognize that it might be easy to shorten the war by soft terms which would save thousands of lives now, at the cost of hundreds of thousands in the next war which soft terms would make inevitable; and that no such solution would serve the national interest. Nevertheless I am convinced that even hard terms, if clearly stated, would go far to counteract Goebbels' propaganda of strength through fear. The cry in the fall of 1918, you remember, was "Better a terrible end than endless terror." There must be Germans, and they will increase in number, who would feel that way again if they were assured that the end, though terrible enough and final so far as their military power was concerned, would be something else than the complete obliteration which Goebbels predicts.

Very respectfully,

Elmer Davis
Director

Attachment
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested Diversion of a Meat Boat from the Argentine

The Department has been considering a plan as an off-set to the initiation of the purchase of corn in the Argentine whereby a meat boat would leave the Plate without a cargo. Mr. Hull, in view of the importance of this proposal in our relations with the Argentine, has felt you should approve the suggested action. I have talked to Mr. Hull on the telephone about this since his departure and at his suggestion I am sending this memorandum along to you.

This action would occur without previous announcement. It is not designed as a sanction but simply to impress the Argentines that we are not as dependent upon them as they may believe.

Briefly, the proposal is as follows: The next, or an early, refrigerated ship bound from London to Buenos Aires would discharge her general cargo at Buenos Aires in the usual manner. However, instead of reloading with meat as would be expected, she would embark for Montevideo.

In Montevideo she would partially load miscellaneous cargo, including some high revenue freight so that the Ministry of War Transport would lose no revenue by the diversion. The vessel would complete loading by calling at successive Brazilian ports, picking up cargoes that would be previously determined in Washington. On arrival at New York she would discharge the miscellaneous cargo and load beef made available by the War Food Administration.

The diversion could result in lifting certain cargoes that have been requested by our friends in Uruguay and Brazil. It would be well known in the Plate after the boat had left empty. It should serve as a useful warning to the Argentines and would certainly raise questions in their minds. If desirable, this type of voyage could be arranged from time to time.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 17, 1944

In accordance with your request that you be consulted before final determination was made of the problem raised by the Secretaries of War and Navy in regard to assignment by Great Britain to foreign nations of items similar to those furnished by us, I enclose a proposed note to the British Ambassador and copies of letters which I propose to send to the Secretaries of War and Navy.

If the solution suggested meets with your approval, you may wish to suggest to the Secretary of War that his staff on the London Committee of the Munitions Assignment Board be appropriately strengthened.

I may add that, if you approve this solution in the case of the British, it is my intention to present a similar proposal to the Soviet Government, since the question of Soviet transfers of articles similar to those furnished by us has also arisen.

Enclosures:
Draft note to British Ambassador.
Copies of letters to Secretaries of War and Navy.
Excellency:

The Secretaries of War and Navy have called to my attention certain problems with regard to the assignment of munitions by the Washington and London Munitions Assignment Boards and the transfer thereof to third countries. I have discussed these problems with the President.

As you recall, the Munitions Assignment Boards were set up by the Prime Minister and the President in the following terms:

"1. The entire munitions resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool, about which the fullest information will be interchanged.

"2. Committees will be formed in Washington and London under the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a manner similar to the South-West Pacific Agreement."

His Excellency

The Right Honorable

the Viscount Halifax, K. G.,

Ambassador of Great Britain.
These Committees will advise on all assignments both in quantity and priority whether to Great Britain and the United States or other of the United Nations in accordance with strategic needs."

In the assignment of munitions the objective as seen by the President and the Prime Minister was clearly to utilize all available resources, regardless of origin, for the most effective prosecution of the war. To do this they established the Munitions Assignment Boards. It is my understanding, however, that United Kingdom representatives on the Munitions Assignment Board have taken the position that their Government is free, without obtaining the concurrence of the United States, to dispose of any weapons having United Kingdom origin, even though the availability of such weapons for disposition resulted directly from the transfer on Land-lease of substantial amounts of identical or similar articles.

In order to settle the question of interpretation and procedure which have arisen, it is the policy of the American Government that:

1. The
1. The two governments shall consult and concert their actions before making transfers of munitions to other countries.

2. Transfers to third countries of munitions of a kind which either government has received from the other shall be by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two governments.

The Munitions Assignment Boards in London and Washington would appear to be the appropriate machinery for carrying out the foregoing.

I should appreciate being informed that the policy of this Government as stated above is concurred in by the Government of Great Britain.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.
In reply refer to

BC

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received and carefully considered the letter signed by you and the late Secretary Knox on March 22, concerning the disposition of weapons of United Kingdom origin similar to those obtained from the United States on lend-lease.

I fully agree that the agreement of this Government should be obtained concerning the disposition of such articles to other countries. I do not believe, however, that we should emphasize our interest in such similar weapons to a point indicating a lack of interest in the disposition of other weapons of United Kingdom production. With the President's approval, I have accordingly sent a note, of which a copy is attached, in this sense to the British Ambassador.

The question of what steps should be taken to strengthen American representation on the London Committee in order both to carry out the policy of this proposal, and adequately to implement the views of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the disposition of other weapons, seems a matter primarily for determination by you and the Secretary of the Navy. Nevertheless, the disposition to third countries of weapons of whatever origin involves political questions which will become increasingly important in the near future. I accordingly would be grateful if steps could be taken to consult this Department concerning the transfer of munitions, of whatever origin, whose disposition may be determined by

The Honorable

Henry L. Stimson,

Secretary of War.
the Washington Committee, to countries other than those of the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union or China and that similar steps be taken to obtain the views of the American Ambassador in London concerning the transfer, as determined by the London Committee, of weapons to countries other than those mentioned above. I am prepared to have the advice of this Department and of the Embassy in London made available expeditiously to the American members of the two committees on such questions.

A similar letter has been sent to the Secretary of the Navy.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

Copy, draft letter to British Ambassador.
In reply refer to
BC

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have received and carefully considered the letter signed by the late Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson on March 22, concerning the disposition of weapons of United Kingdom origin similar to those obtained from the United States on lend-lease.

I fully agree that the agreement of this Government should be obtained concerning the disposition of such articles to other countries. I do not believe, however, that we should emphasize our interest in such similar weapons to a point indicating a lack of interest in the disposition of other weapons of United Kingdom production. With the President's approval, I have accordingly sent a note, of which a copy is attached, in this sense to the British Ambassador.

The question of what steps should be taken to strengthen American representation on the London Committee in order both to carry out the policy of this proposal, and adequately to implement the views of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the disposition of other weapons, seems a matter primarily for determination by you and the Secretary of War. Nevertheless, the disposition to third countries of weapons of whatever origin involves political questions which will become increasingly important in the near future. Accordingly would be grateful if steps could be taken to consult this Department concerning the transfer of munitions, of whatever origin, whose disposition may be determined by the

The Honorable
James V. Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.
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A similar letter has been sent to the Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure:

Copy, draft letter to British Ambassador.
JUDGE LATTA:

Please find out if a copy of this statement has gone to the Secretary of War. If not, the President would like a copy sent to him.

G. G. T.

[Handwritten note: Thorne implied that he [have sent]...]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Before final determination of the problem, please let me talk with you about the recommendation from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy in regard to assignments by Britain to foreign nations of items similar to those furnished by us.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

March 31, 1944

Grace,

The attached concerns a rather important matter of policy. If Harry were here I am sure he would talk to the President about it. The purpose of my memorandum is to forewarn the President, so that he can think over the matter concerned in anticipation of the receipt of the memorandum from the State Department.

Lube
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: REASSIGNMENT OF MUNITIONS OF WAR

The War and Navy Departments have been pressing for a radical change in policy in the assignment of munitions.

The general policy followed by the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington has been in accordance with the policy laid down when you and the Prime Minister created the Board. We, in Washington, have been assigning the munitions made in the United States. The London Board (on which we have representation) has been assigning the munitions made in Great Britain.

Our Army people have recently raised the question as to the authority of Great Britain to assign certain types of British-made products to other countries. For example, they question the right of Great Britain to assign British-made trucks to other countries through the London Board. They insist that our giving Great Britain American-made trucks makes it possible for Britain to give away British-made trucks. In other words, they claim that in the last analysis, Great Britain is really giving away American goods because if we had not furnished her with trucks, she would have no surplus of British-made trucks to make available to others.

A similar incident has arisen relative to torpedo boats. We have built and assigned eighty-three American-built torpedo boats to Great Britain. Britain, however, has undertaken to assign to the Dutch five torpedo boats made in the United Kingdom. Our Navy holds that since Great Britain's ability to take care of the Dutch out of United Kingdom production was the direct result of our having built eighty-three torpedo boats for her in the United States, Great Britain was in effect making assignments of United States production. Indeed, the Navy now wants to cut down our assignment of torpedo boats to Great Britain by five to offset those that have gone to the Dutch.

It is the contention of our Army and Navy that no assignment of British-made goods, of a type similar to what we are giving to...
Great Britain, should be made without the approval and consent of the Washington Board.

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have asked the Secretary of State to inform the British that hereafter all assignments by Great Britain to foreign nations, which involve items similar to those furnished to the United Kingdom by the United States, should be approved here in Washington. (Under the Lend-Lease master agreement the British do not make any reassignments of lend-lease items made in the United States without our consent.)

The State Department is going to send you a memorandum on this matter and ask for your advice. It is my confirmed opinion that we will get into all sorts of trouble if we attempt to pass on assignments of British-made war items which are of types similar to what we are furnishing Great Britain under Lend-Lease. I personally feel that this government ought to go on with the policies that have been in effect with great success for more than two years.

After all, what we are trying to do is get war materials to the right people and the right places. We are already protected against the reassignment of American-made goods. Such assignments are all approved here. I can see no reason why we should go further than that.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of the Treasury spoke to me the other day about the attached memorandum which you okayed. The Secretary tells me he discussed this subject with you sometime ago and I think he suggested to you that the currency in these countries be used, then repay them afterwards. He thought this would be a good bargaining point for you at the peace table. He tells me you liked the idea at the time, and he does not know what made you change your mind.

He asks that in matters of this kind that he be given a chance to either discuss it with you or send a memorandum giving the Treasury's point of view when it has to do with currency.

Nothing further can be done about this now, I understand, because the Secretary of State has already informed the governments of these countries of your approval of handling it in the way suggested by the Secretary of State.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

1) In February you decided that the Treasury should propose currency agreements to the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway. Under these agreements the foreign governments would supply our forces such local currency as was required by the course of operations. The settlement of any financial obligations under these agreements, including those in respect of local currency used for the pay of American troops, would be postponed until the picture of various claims and counter-claims between the United States and the particular government should become clearer. The Treasury has proposed such agreements to the countries in question, and is having similar conversations with representatives of the French Committee.

2) The Governments of Belgium and the Netherlands have refused to sign the proposed agreements. They have filed formal protests with this Government, insisting that the principle of reimbursement for troop pay is covered by our earlier Reciprocal Aid Agreements with them. Pending resolution of the controversy they have, however, furnished ample quantities of their currencies to General Eisenhower so that military operations are not being hampered.

3) Furthermore, it is now contemplated that these governments will be asked to reimburse us promptly in dollars for the civilian supplies taken into their territories during the military period by the Army.

4) Our
4) Our proposed treatment of these countries is thus one-sided in that we seek prompt reimbursement of our principal claim while postponing settlement of their principal claim.

5) Our proposed treatment is, moreover, inconsistent with our practice in other United Nations. In the United Kingdom, China, and French North Africa we purchase the local currency required for the pay of our troops with dollars.

6. It is therefore recommended that the proposed currency agreements be modified to provide current reimbursement for troop pay.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 14, 1944

This is for your use in connection with the matters I discussed with you at luncheon the other day.
MEMORANDUM TO MISS TULLY:

I am attaching several wires sent by the State Department.

1) Liberian Government gratified over Rome and Invasion.

2) Sforza grateful for President's generous words on Italy.

3) Report from Ambassador Bowers in Chile stating formal homage paid United Nations in Chilean Congress. Demonstrations and numerous congratulatory wires received in Embassy from all parts of Chile, evidencing real general enthusiasm over invasion. President Rios made official statement pledging Chile to definite cooperation policy with other United Nations. Press gives unusual space to invasion news with very favorable editorials. PRETHER carried in full and commented on favorably by Catholic paper.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 8, 1944

T. D. B.
June 23, 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have seen and concur with Secretary Hull’s letter to you of June 20, 1944 and his note to the British Ambassador of the same date, concerning the disposition of weapons of United Kingdom origin similar to those obtained from the United States on Lend-Lease.

Would you kindly take appropriate steps to strengthen your representation on the London Committee of the Munitions Assignment Board in order that this proposal may be adequately implemented.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
James V. Forrestal,
Secretary of the Navy.
June 23, 1944

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have seen and concur with Secretary Hull's letter to you of June 20, 1944 and his note to the British Ambassador of the same date, concerning the disposition of weapons of United Kingdom origin similar to those obtained from the United States on Lend-Lease.

Would you kindly take appropriate steps to strengthen your representation on the London Committee of the Munitions Assignment Board in order that this proposal may be adequately implemented.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.
June 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On June 20 I received your approval of my memorandum of June 17, which enclosed a proposed note to the British Ambassador and letters to the Secretaries of War and Navy concerning the assignment by Great Britain to foreign nations of items similar to those furnished by us on Lend-Lease, and have accordingly sent the note and the two letters.

In the same memorandum I suggested that you might wish to ask the War and Navy Departments appropriately to strengthen their staff on the London Committee of the Munitions Assignment Board. I accordingly enclose draft letters to Secretaries Stimson and Forrestal for your signature.

Enclosures:
1. To Secretary of War.
2. To Secretary of the Navy.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 1, 1944.

Subject: Disposition by United Kingdom of military materials similar to those received under Lend-Lease.

I transmit a copy of the note on the above subject which was recently sent the British Ambassador with your approval. The essence of that note is in the following sentence:

"It is the policy of the American Government that transfers to third countries of munitions of a kind which either Government has received from the other shall be by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two Governments."

The note represents the considered views of the State, War and Navy Departments. The policy set forth is designed not to meet a theoretical situation but to prevent actual abuses.

I am informed that Dr. Isador Lubin communicated with Mr. Stettinius on June 23 and expressed the view that "the British would probably object to the proposed arrangement", and in that event he felt the question should be reopened. Dr. Lubin called later to say that he had meanwhile discussed the matter with you; that you had misunderstood the significance of the note to Lord Halifax; and that if the British make a counter-proposal you would be willing to adjust the position we have taken in the note in question.

I think it would be a serious mistake to retreat from the position which we have taken. The policy set forth in the note to Lord Halifax is designed to put an end to specific abuses and for the protection of vital American interests. I do not believe that we could justify, from a domestic political point of view, a procedure whereby the British, without our agreement, transfer to third powers, often for political purposes, military items similar to those which they have received from us under Lend-Lease. Moreover, I feel that there is no sound reason why our point of view should not be accepted by the British particularly since the procedure suggested is reciprocal.

I think, therefore, that we should stand firm on the policy set forth in that note and make every effort to induce the British Government to accept it.

Enlosure: Note to British Ambassador.
June 20, 1944.

Excellency:

The Secretaries of War and Navy have called to my attention certain problems with regard to the assignment of munitions by the Washington and London Munitions Assignment Boards and the transfer thereof to third countries. I have discussed these problems with the President.

As you recall, the Munitions Assignment Boards were set up by the Prime Minister and the President in the following terms:

"1. The entire munitions resources of Great Britain and the United States will be deemed to be in a common pool, about which the fullest information will be interchanged.

"2. Committees will be formed in Washington and London under the Combined Chiefs of Staff in a manner similar to the South-West Pacific Agreement. These Committees will advise on all assignments both in quantity and priority whether to Great Britain and the United States or other of the United Nations in accordance with strategic needs."

In the assignment of munitions the objective as seen by the President and the Prime Minister was clearly to utilize all available resources, regardless of origin, for the most effective prosecution of the war. To do this they established the Munitions Assignment Boards. It is my understanding, however, that United Kingdom representatives on the Munitions Assignment Board have taken the position that their Government is free, without obtaining the concurrence of the United States, to dispose of any weapons having United Kingdom origin, even though the availability of such weapons for disposition resulted directly from the transfer on Lend-Lease of substantial amounts of identical or similar articles.

In order to settle the questions of interpretation and procedure which have arisen, it is the policy of the American Government that:

1. The two governments shall consult and concert their actions before making transfers of munitions to other countries.

His Excellency
The Right Honorable
the Viscount Halifax, K. G.,
Ambassador of Great Britain.
2. Transfers to third countries of munitions of a kind which either government has received from the other shall be by agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two governments.

The Munitions Assignment Boards in London and Washington would appear to be the appropriate machinery for carrying out the foregoing.

I should appreciate being informed that the policy of this Government as stated above is concurred in by the Government of Great Britain.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CORDELL HULL
The President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of 23 June 1944 in which you request that appropriate steps be taken to strengthen the War Department representation on the London Munitions Assignments Board in order to carry out the recently announced policy of the Government with regard to the disposition of weapons of United Kingdom origin similar to those obtained from the United States on lend lease.

War Department representation on the London Munitions Assignments Board will be strengthened as requested. It is intended to add a well qualified officer of the Army Air Forces to the present War Department membership. The staff of the United States members is being strengthened by the assignment of an officer of special qualifications for the work and will also be augmented in the future as required by the demands upon the members and staff.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Acting Secretary of War.
The letter of June 23 was
sent to:
- The Sec. of War
- The Sec. of the Navy

at the suggestion of the Sec. of State.
Miss Turner has the file.
My dear Mr. President:

The Department of State Appropriation Act, 1945, approved June 28, 1944, provides an appropriation of $1,500,000 for all necessary expenses of participation by the United States, upon your approval, in international activities which arise from time to time in the conduct of foreign affairs and for which specific appropriations have not been provided. During the past year the United States has been participating in the War Crimes Commission and the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education, both in London, and has made contribution to and participated in the work of the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture in Washington, including the employment of necessary personnel, and expenses of participation in these activities have been defrayed from allocations made to the Department from your Emergency Fund. These projects are typical of the international undertakings which it was anticipated would be financed from this appropriation.

The President,

The White House.
It is therefore recommended that you indicate your approval of the continuation during the fiscal year 1945 of the above-mentioned activities, and of meeting expenses in connection therewith from the appropriation for International Conferences (Emergency).

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
Mr. Miller:

This is the communication about which Mr. Lindholm spoke to you a few days ago. Anything you can do to expedite approval will be greatly appreciated. Upon returning it, will you please mark the envelope "Attention Mrs. Logsdon, Room 401 Walker-Johnson Building".
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. CORDELL HULL:

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

[Handwritten note: Copy of the Forrestal Letter]
My dear Mr. President:

In reply to your note of 23 June 1944 stating that you concur with Secretary Hall's letter to me of 20 June 1944, and his note to the British Ambassador of the same date concerning the disposition of weapons of United Kingdom origin similar to those obtained from the United States on lend-lease, and requesting me to take appropriate steps to strengthen the Navy representation on the London Munitions Assignment Board, I am glad to inform you that such steps have already been taken in a letter dated 23 May 1944 addressed to Admiral Stark.

At present the Navy has one representative on the London Board, Captain W. R. Willis, who is a line officer. In the letter of 23 May, Admiral Stark was requested to detail an additional officer from his staff as a member of the London Board, and it was suggested that he appoint Captain H. B. Miller, who is a naval aviator. We have now been informed that this appointment has been confirmed. This will give the Navy two representatives on the London Board.

Very sincerely yours,

James Forrestal

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

At the present time, I suggest the following to fill vacancies in diplomatic posts:

POLAND
Arthur Bliss Lane, now Ambassador to Colombia.

BELGIUM
Francis P. Murphy, former Governor of New Hampshire.

NETHERLANDS
Stanley K. Hornbeck, now Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA
George A. Gordon, now Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

YUGOSLAVIA
Richard C. Patterson, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Commerce.

NORWAY
Charles Sawyer of Cincinnati, Ohio.

COLOMBIA
John C. Wiley, former Minister to Latvia and now assigned to the Office of Strategic Services.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1944
BOLIVIA

James B. Stewart, now Ambassador to Nicaragua.

NICARAGUA

John Farr Simmons, a Foreign Service Officer of Class I and now Counselor of Embassy at Rio de Janeiro.

Our feeling in the Department is that Poland, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Bolivia, and Nicaragua should as things now stand be handled by persons of experience in the foreign affairs field.

C F
My dear Mr. President:

The forthcoming informal discussions regarding international security, which it is planned to hold in the near future with a number of the allied governments, will necessitate certain obligations on the part of the United States. These obligations are considered to be within the purview of the appropriation "International Conferences (Emergency)" contained in the State Department Appropriation Act for 1944, under which your specific approval is required for meeting expenses of participation by the United States in any international activity.

It is therefore recommended that you indicate your approval of meeting expenses in connection with these discussions from this appropriation.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 19, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR
MISS TULLY

This memorandum of July thirteenth does not show any action by the President. It evidently became attached to the other papers which were returned in the pouch received yesterday morning.

M. C. L.
My dear Mr. President:

The Department of State will have communicated to you my sincere expression of gratitude on your having offered me the post of Ambassador near the Government of Poland now in London. I should like to tell you, however, personally how much I appreciate this added sign of confidence which you have shown in me and which I deeply appreciate. You may rest assured that I will perform my duties to the best of my ability, and I am especially thankful for having an opportunity to serve at this critical moment at a post where so many important problems confront us.

President López was very much touched and enheartened by your cordial message to him on the occasion of his liberation from the military coup at Pasto. While this incident may yet have serious political implications, I am of the opinion that President López' prestige will be enhanced by the very effective way with which the Government...

The President,
The White House,
Washington.
ment put down the rebellion and proceeded to re-
store peace throughout the country.

I am anticipating the privilege of paying
my respects to you enroute to my new post, and
beg to remain, my dear Mr. President, with the
expression of my great respect and high regard,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. James B. Stewart, now Ambassador to Nicaragua, whose appointment as Ambassador to Bolivia you recently approved, has informed us that on account of the illness of his wife and certain other personal problems of a serious character he feels that he must retire from the Foreign Service. I think that his claim to retirement is well founded and I am accordingly recommending to you that Mr. H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, now on duty in the Department of State and recently Minister to Finland, be appointed as Ambassador to Bolivia. For your convenient reference, I am enclosing a biography of Mr. Schoenfeld.

Enclosure:
Biography.
SCHOENFELD, HANS FREDERICK ARTHUR. - b.
Providence, R. I., Jan. 31, 1889; Friends' Sch.
(D.C.); George Washington, A.B. 1907, A.M. 1909;
Law Sch. 1907-10; U. of Caracas, Venezuela, 1910-11;
asst. and instr. in hist., George Washington U.,
1907-10; app. cons. gt. at Caracas Sept. 17, 1910;
confidential clk. to the asst. sec. of state Jan. 4,
1912; app. 3d sec. of emb. at Constantinople Feb. 15,
1912; sec. of leg., Paraguay and Uruguay, Aug. 12,
1913; at Montevideo July 16, 1914; sec. of emb. or
leg. of class three by act approved Feb. 5, 1915;
assigned to Christiania Apr. 13, 1916; to
Bucharest Mar. 11, 1919; to Copenhagen, temp.,
Nov. 4, 1919; class two Dec. 20, 1919; assigned to
Rio de Janeiro July 29, 1920; class one Aug. 24,
1921; assigned to Vienna Oct. 22, 1921; as couns.
of emb. at Mexico City March 5, 1924; For. Ser.
officer of class one July 1, 1924; mem., Bd. of
to Bulgaria July 17, 1928 (canceled); sec. gen.,
Comm. of Inquiry and Conciliation, Bolivia and
Paraguay, Washington, 1929; E. E. and M. P. to
Costa Rica Dec. 16, 1929 (canceled); resigned
Mar. 1, 1930; with an int. electrical company to
July 1, 1931; app. E. E. and M. P. to the
Dominican Republic Aug. 1, 1931; to Finland
Apr. 22, 1937; assigned to Department of State;
moved.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reaction in Iraq to Republican Plank Regarding Palestine.

I believe that you will be interested in the attached paraphrase of a telegram from our Minister in Baghdad, Loy Henderson, summarizing conversations which he has had with members of the Iraqi Government regarding the Palestine plank in the Republican platform. (This plank is similar to that just adopted by the Democratic Convention and in effect provides for free immigration into Palestine and the creation there of a Jewish State.)

You will note that while the Iraqi Government appreciates the fact that a party platform is not the same as a Government policy, the Cabinet decided to ask Mr. Henderson to inform us that the Iraqi Government is deeply concerned lest the Zionists take advantage of the political situation in this country to commit both major parties to a course which would not be in accord with the war aims of the United Nations.

I have no doubt but that the reaction in the Arab world to the Democratic plank on Palestine will be similar, and in view of the strategic importance to us of the Near East, I believe that it would be advisable for leaders of both parties to refrain from making statements on Palestine during the campaign that might tend to arouse the Arabs or upset the precarious balance of forces in Palestine itself.

Enclosure:
Paraphrase of
telegram no. 167,
dated July 18, 1 p.m.,
from Baghdad.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

SECRET

FROM: AMLEGATION, Baghdad
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: July 16, 1944, 1 p.m.
NUMBER: 167.

On July 15 I was told by the Foreign Minister, and on July 16 by the Prime Minister, that the insertion of a Zionist plank in the platform of the Republican Party had perturbed the members of the Government of Iraq and that it was their hope that the true sentiments of the large number of United States citizens who are members of the Republican Party were not expressed in this plank. I was told by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there had been a discussion of this matter in the Iraqi Cabinet, that a decision had been reached to ban the publication of this item at least for the time being in the local press so as not to stir up any resentment and that the Cabinet had selected him to make the suggestion that I inform my Government of the Iraqi Government's deep concern lest by taking advantage of the internal political situation in the United States the Zionists might be successful in committing both of the leading American political parties to a course of action which would not conform to the principles for which the United Nations are waging war.

Although, as the Foreign Minister pointed out, it was appreciated that the political parties in the United States did not speak for the Government and that a party platform was quite another thing from a policy of the Government, it was felt that commitments made before the election might influence the Government's policies following the election.

It was the conviction of the Iraqi Government that the maintenance of truly friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States on the one hand and the Arab countries on the other was important to the development of the Arab world. It was the policy of the Government of Iraq to cultivate those relations assiduously. If, however, the American and British Governments under the pressure of Zionist schemers were to turn over Palestine to Zionist control, it would be impossible for any Iraqi Government to stem the wave of indignation which would arise spontaneously in Iraq. Speaking frankly, the Foreign Minister added, he felt that all that had been accomplished in creating friendly relations between the United States and Great Britain and Iraq would instantly be destroyed.

Since
Since there was no ground for a protest, the Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked, he was not making a protest but he felt it to be his duty to express the concern which he and his colleagues felt and to inform the Government of the United States of the serious character of the problems which the Government of Iraq would face if the Republican pro-Zionist plank were to become the policy of the Government of the United States.

In thanking the Minister for his frankness, I pointed out that he had been quite correct in drawing a distinction between Government policies and party platforms and that I hoped his Government would bear in mind that in the United States there is no one except the Government who speaks for the Government of the United States. I also expressed the hope that neither the Iraqi press nor the Iraqi Government should become unduly excited during the coming campaign at utterances which would be made. In making this latter observation, I made it clear that I had no intention of implying that I was giving any intimation of what might eventually be the Palestine policy of the American Government. What that policy would be I did not know, and I doubted whether anyone else in the United States knew precisely. In any event, I added, at the present time Palestine policy was not being either formulated or carried out by the United States.
July 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

General Eisenhower and War Department have asked me for political adviser to a nucleus planning group now being set up by General Eisenhower for occupational period in Germany, this nucleus team to move in to Germany upon surrender or collapse. Provided we can furnish General Wilson with acceptable substitute, we would like to transfer Bob Murphy from AFHQ to SCAEF to act as your Personal Representative with his present rank to handle political questions relating to occupation of Germany. Murphy is well qualified for work in connection with Germany, having served there and he speaks German. His duties would of course be entirely apart from those now being performed by Bill Phillips, and would also be outside of any of Winant's work in the European Advisory Commission with respect to Germany.
September 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State.

Subjects: Publication in the United States Statutes at Large of Documents Agreed Upon at Teheran and Cairo.

Reference: The Secretary's Memorandum to the President, dated July 29, 1944.

1. The records of the White House Map Room do not indicate that any international agreements were reached at Teheran or at Cairo. The military agreements are part of the Joint Staff records.

2. The statements made at Cairo on November 26, 1943 and December 6, 1943, and at Teheran on December 1, 1943, were press communiqués. These statements were not part of White House Map Room records but it is understood from those who took part in the discussions that these statements, while agreed to by all parties, were not signed documents. All three statements are believed to have been released in exactly the same form as agreed upon.

WILSON BROWN,
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.,
Naval Aide to the President.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

July 20, 1944

Subject: Publication in the United States Statutes at Large of documents agreed upon at Tehran and Cairo

Publication in the United States Statutes at Large of all international agreements to which the United States is a party is required by Public Law 657, 75th Congress, approved June 16, 1938 (52 Stat. 760; 44 U.S.C., sec. 196). The Department of State is accordingly endeavoring to obtain true copies of any documents agreed upon for the United States at the conferences at Tehran and Cairo in November and December 1943 which constitute international agreements.

I should be very grateful if you could conveniently supply the Department with signed originals, certified copies, or photostats of any such documents.

[Signature]

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Arthur Schoenfeld, whom you had approved as Ambassador to Bolivia, has informed me that it would be most difficult to accept this post in view of the very serious illness of his wife. I have accordingly carefully considered other candidates and I recommend to you the appointment of Mr. Walter Thurston, at present Ambassador to El Salvador, to be Ambassador to Bolivia. As you will recall, Mr. Thurston, after rendering valuable service in Spain as Counselor of Embassy, was transferred to Moscow in a similar capacity at which post his services were outstanding. As Ambassador to El Salvador he has handled a number of delicate problems to the complete satisfaction of the Department. I have ascertained that he would be entirely agreeable to serving in Bolivia. If this recommendation meets with your approval, I would then propose to you that Mr. John Farr Simmons, whom you have approved as Ambassador to Nicaragua, be sent instead to El Salvador to take Mr. Thurston's place. Mr. James E. Stewart, who is at present Ambassador to Nicaragua and who desires to retire, will, I am sure, agree to remain at his post at least for the next few months.

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schausbe Date 2-1972
September 9, 1944

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

There has been a good deal of discussion within the several Government Departments relative to our Lend Lease policy after the collapse of Germany.

It is my wish that no Department of the Government take unilateral action in regard to any matters that concern Lend Lease, because the implications of any such action are bound to affect other Departments of the Government and, indeed, our whole national policy. I am particularly anxious that any instructions which may have been issued, or are about to be issued regarding Lend Lease material or supplies to our allies after the collapse of Germany, be immediately cancelled and withdrawn.

I intend to give instructions to all Departments relative to the Lend Lease policy of this government at an early date.

Will you be sure, therefore, that your several bureaus and divisions are advised of my position at once?

I am sending identical letters to the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Administrator of the Foreign Economic Administration and the Administrator of the War Shipping Administration.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

(copy filed - Lend-Lease folder, dr. 3-44)

(Sec. Hull's reply of 9/13 together with FDR memo 9/15 to Secy. of the Treasury filed Lend-Lease folder)
September 19, 1944.

My dear Frank:

Your letter to me of August 30 suggests special arrangements in the State Department to handle maritime affairs. This is merely to let you know that your suggestion will have full consideration.

With kind personal regards, I am

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Mr. Frank J. Taylor,
President, American Merchant
Marine Institute, Inc.,
11 Broadway,
New York, New York.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Proposed Appointment of a Special Assistant Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs

You referred Frank Taylor's letter of August 30, 1944 jointly to Admiral Land and me. Taylor, representing the shipping interests, suggested appointing a Special Assistant Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs, to handle post-war shipping settlements, the man to represent the shipping interests.

Investigation develops a deeper issue. Frank, before he wrote you, discussed this move with Land and obtained his support for it, Land agreeing to support one of his own men for the proposed job in State.

Learning this I told Jerry he had better discuss it with Secretary Hull and with you. Representatives of special interests in State don't appeal to me and possibly not to Secretary Hull. Nor do Land and Hull see eye to eye on future policy.

At your leisure you might get Admiral Land, Secretary Hull, Will Clayton, and others in your office to outline your views on shipping policy. After that the allocation of the work should be easy.

Attached is a noncommittal answer to Taylor. Jerry Land will propose a different answer, implying agreement to Taylor's idea.

Enclosure:

To Mr. Taylor.

Adolf A. Berle, Jr.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 2, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL LAND
HON. A. A. BERLE

FOR JOINT PREPARATION OF
REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

Original of this memorandum, together with
letter from Frank J. Taylor, 8/30/44, sent to
Admiral Land; copy of memorandum and copy of
letter sent to Mr. Berle; copy of letter
retained for our files.
The American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.

Dear Mr. President,

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Dear Mr. President,
After many conferences with the best informed minds in the shipping industry, wherein mature and well-considered judgment has been given, we recommend for your consideration that an appointment be made to the Department of State of one who is thoroughly grounded and well-versed in the American Merchant Marine industry.

The competent person so selected could be obtained from the shipping industry or the United States Maritime Commission or War Shipping Administration. In the latter two sources, there are several men with long Governmental career experience, well trained, highly competent, and thoroughly efficient.

We propose for your consideration and, if favorably decided, that such person appointed be known as "Special Assistant Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs."

I have conferred with Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. A. A. Berle, and Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission and Administrator of the War Shipping Administration, on this subject, and both have agreed that it would be an asset to have a person with the qualifications herein outlined connected with the Department of State.

I am very confident that your overall knowledge of maritime affairs and particularly their relation to international matters in the future will enable you to give these recommendations your careful consideration and usual wise judgment.

Very respectfully yours,

(Signed) FRANK J. TAYLOR
President
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 31, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

You will remember Frank Taylor who used to be in the Legislature and then became Comptroller of the City of New York.

He is now president of the American Merchant Marine Institute, Inc.

He has been talking to Mr. Berle and Admiral Land about having someone in the State Department designated as "Special Assistant Secretary of State for Maritime Affairs". He has written the attached letter to you which he has asked me to place before you.

S. I. R.