MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Suggested U.S. Policy toward Latin America

We are now preparing for the forthcoming Latin American conference which you have approved for February. As a guide to our preparation we have restated our Latin-American policy as follows:

In our best self-interests from the point of view of the future security of our country and well-being of our people, it is the policy of the United States to collaborate with and assist the other American republics in the development of basic economic and social factors which contribute to the security and welfare and the opportunity of the peoples of this Hemisphere.

To accomplish this long-term cooperation is required in the fields of: public health, nutrition and food supply, education, science, culture, information, transportation, economic development including industrialization and modernization of agriculture.

These are the basic factors which contribute to the development and dignity of the individual, a rising standard of living and the growth of democracy. Only in this way can we hope to have economic, social and political stability among the nations of this Hemisphere--without which we can never realize the permanent unity of the Americas.

Will you be good enough to let me know if this statement is in line with your thinking on the subject.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 6, 1945

Subject: Latest Opinion Trends in the U. S. A.

I. U. S. Policy on Liberated Areas

On balance, opinion seems to favor a policy of non-interference in the politics of liberated countries. However, opinion is not firmly crystallized, according to polling results just received.

A positive and clarifying statement unfolding this Government's position would tend to find support and furnish a frame of reference, which the public clearly desires.

II. Attitudes Toward Britain and Russia

A. New evidence confirms that --

(1) The public widely believes that both Britain and Russia actively support factions of their own choice in liberated countries.

(2) The public disapproves of such unilateral action.

B. Greater dissatisfaction "with the way in which Russia, Britain and the United States are cooperating with each other" exists among the best informed and most influential
influential groups than among the public as a whole.

National Total........... 28% "felt dissatisfied"
College educated........... 37% " "
Upper economic group....... 43% " "

(1) However, the public, when taking a longer perspective, is not so much disturbed over the prospects of post-war cooperation with Britain and Russia.

C. Press and radio comment, however, has begun to excuse British actions in Europe -- in contrast to previous sharp disapproval -- while criticizing U. S. policy.

III. Information and Attitudes on Dumbarton Oaks

A. Estimates are more pessimistic than formerly respecting Congressional acceptance of the Proposals unless present political differences among the Allies are quickly smoothed over.

B. After several months of publicity,

Only 43% of the public have even heard of the Proposals. Among these, about half have no opinion as to whether the Proposals provide a "real and practical basis for setting up an international organization to maintain world peace". They were deemed "practical" by a 2 to 1 ratio of those with opinions. The well-educated are no more favorable than the poorly educated.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Memorandum from Dr. Bowman

Attached is a copy of a statement drafted by Dr. Isaiah Bowman, which speaks for itself. Something along this line I feel would be most useful either in one of your statements or in one of the State Department statements.

Enclosure:

Copy of a statement drafted by Dr. Isaiah Bowman.

Given to Judge Rosenman 3/10/45 for speech material.
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Isaiah Bowman

The world is fast losing faith in generalities about a bright future. This is increasing our already superhuman tasks of reconstruction.

To counter this tendency, a speed-up is needed in plans for world organization. Can the time for a world conference of United Nations be fixed at the impending meeting of the "Big Three"? An adopted plan of world organization would stem the present growing tendency on the part of Britain and Russia to take unilateral action. It would be the greatest fear-remover the world could devise. Fear of economic and political chaos is now almost as great as the recent fear of the Nazis.

To secure unanimity of agreement on world organization by the "Big Three" and to win acceptance by our public and by the United Nations (including liberated countries), a stand should be taken on a sound principle which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once applied to the law. He said that the law defines a line of "minimum social conduct," below which one went at one's peril. The law does not preach, nor does it indicate maximum behavior. It deals with minima of conduct. It is not an instrument for religious devotion or for character building. It establishes rules and provides penalties.

Religious orators are already saying that we must practice "total Christianity." This is as if we intended to start a fight for a Christian peace as against a Moslem peace or a Hindu peace. The
point is missed that our need is for an agreement on rules of conduct and action. Moral ideas that lie in impracticable areas are lifeless. No one nation can impose its brand of morality upon the world.

There is not time, even if there were the will, in which to convert the world to a single creed. What Christianity has not done in 1900 years of missionary work, it cannot now do in six months. There is much foolish talk of the danger of compromising our principles. Those who oppose compromise desire to achieve at one stroke the highest conceivable ideals of international conduct. We shall fail and draw back into isolationism if we insist on perfection.

What we need to agree upon is not a set of abstractions, but an area of practical action, the largest we can get. The Constitution of 1787 was neither perfect nor complete. It was the best that could be obtain at that time. It is attainable social conduct or "moral harness" that we are after. Below that is peril for any nation. Above it is the area of continuous future striving toward higher levels of action and morality.

January 5, 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Latest Opinion Trends in the U.S.A.

I. President's Message to Congress

The public has been reassured by the President's foreign policy statements. The reasoned philosophy and tone of moderation have won praise from most commentators, including some recent critics.

The two main reasons for liking the speech are:

1) the emphasis upon Allied unity;
2) the warning against dangers of "perfectionism".

The message was thought to have clarified U.S. policy, at least to have given a "focus" for policy— if not a "specific" program.

Despite some criticism on this score, especially by political opponents, the general disposition is to accept the President's "inability" to be more precise prior to the expected Big Three meeting.

II. The Polish Question

The recent developments concerning the Lublin Committee have brought the following reactions:

2. Many hold that neither the London nor the Lublin regime is representative of the Polish nation.

3. Russia's recognition is sharply criticized as damaging United Nations harmony.

4. While the Lublin group is still regarded as Russian-controlled, there is somewhat more disposition than heretofore to regard its claims sympathetically.

III. Lend-Lease

1. Ignorance of Reverse Lend-Lease

Despite sympathetic treatment of reverse lend-lease in the press, the latest opinion survey shows--

Only one-third of the public (32%) seem to be aware of reverse lend-lease furnished by England; and

Only one-half of the college educated (55%) and of the upper economic group (52%) are aware of reverse lend-lease.

2. Repayment of Lend-Lease

70% of the public think that England should repay us in full;

85% of those unaware of reverse lend-lease favor repayment in full; and

As many as 56% of those who know about reverse lend-lease favor repayment in full.

Acting Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Memoranda on Recent American Public Opinion Developments

I am enclosing herewith two memoranda summarizing recent American public opinion developments on International affairs which will be of interest to you.

The first memorandum contains conclusions and the other goes into supporting data on the subjects covered.

[Signature]

Acting Secretary

(Note: 2 memoranda did not come to file)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: American Public Opinion on Selected Questions

A. CONCLUSIONS

The following appraisal takes into account all major sources of articulate opinion and various public opinion surveys including a January 1945 survey conducted by Hadley Cantril of Princeton.

I. Liberated Areas (including Italy)

A. British and Russian Action

The weight of American opinion disapproves of unilateral action by Britain and Russia regarded as "interference" in the internal politics of Greece, Italy, Poland and other countries.

B. U. S. Policy

American opinion is not firmly crystallized as to the proper role of the United States. While opposed to the principle of "interference" in the politics of liberated countries, sentiment seems to prefer a "more active" U. S. policy if this be necessary to assure a fair deal for the smaller countries.

II. Poland's
II. Poland's Boundaries

The weight of American opinion apparently is not opposed to cession of former Polish territory to Russia, provided Poland is compensated. But the public wants Poland's consent to any territorial modification. While the Curzon Line has been found acceptable by much responsible opinion, accurate testing of the general public on this specific boundary is not feasible.

III. Attitudes Toward Britain and Russia

A. General

Despite much comment sympathetic to the British during the past fortnight, opinion polls show increased dissatisfaction with Big Three cooperation. The British are chiefly blamed.

B. Disturbing Effect on Security Organization

Recent British and Russian actions have disturbed the public and led to some pessimism concerning the establishment of a successful international security organization.

IV. International Peace and Security Organization

The American public, despite some criticism and pessimism concerning Dumbarton Oaks, overwhelmingly desires American participation in an international security organization.

V. Japanese Mandated Islands

American opinion strongly favors some form of U.S. control of Pacific Islands mandated to Japan. But opinion is almost evenly divided on the method of control -- slightly favoring U.S. administration under an international organization rather than outright U.S. ownership.

VI. Other
VI. Other Dependent Areas

American sentiment dislikes European imperialism and would welcome arrangements looking toward the self-government of colonial peoples.

VII. British Empire Preferences

Articulate opinion is practically unanimous that British Empire preferences should not be excepted from proposed international agreements calling for substantial reduction of trade barriers. It is increasingly felt that reduction of Empire preferences must be accompanied by reductions in U.S. tariffs.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: American Public Opinion on Selected Questions

B. SUPPORTING DATA

(All polling results refer to the Cantril survey of early January 1945, unless otherwise noted.)

I. Liberated Areas (including Italy)

A. British and Russian Action

(1) By a ratio of more than 3 to 1, "The British handling of affairs in Greece" was "disapproved" (Disapproved: 52%; Approved: 15%);

(2) By a ratio of about 2 to 1, the public deems "fair", the "recent criticism of the way Britain and Russia are conducting their relations with the Greeks, the Poles and the Italians" (Fair: 44%; Unfair: 24%; No Opinion: 32%).

B. U.S. Policy

(1) Asked whether "liberated countries such as Italy and Greece should be allowed to work out their own governmental problems without interference from the three big Allied countries -- England, Russia and the U.S. -- even if civil war results" -- 48% said YES; 41% said NO (December, third week).
(2) Asked whether "liberated countries should take a more active part in the settlement of European problems such as Greece, Italy and Poland, or should leave them to settlement by the European powers --

57% preferred to have the "U. S. take a more active part"

34% preferred to "leave settlement to European powers"

(3) But the 34% preferring a "hands-off" policy is reduced to 15% when asked whether we should leave settlement to the European powers even if it would mean that big powers like Britain and Russia would dominate the little countries.

(4) Only 1 in 3 of those with opinion on the question, felt "that the U. S. should do more than it is to help Italy get back on her feet".

II. Poland's Boundaries

(1) When asked whether "Russia should be allowed to keep some Polish territory which the Russians now occupy provided that the Poles are given in exchange some German territory", 54% said YES, and 25% said NO.

(2) The 25% replying NO to the above question was reduced to 18% when asked whether they would "change their minds if the Poles who live in territory which would be given to Russia were helped to move to other parts of Poland."

III. Attitudes Toward Britain and Russia

A. General

(1) The number dissatisfied "with the way in which Russia, England and the United States are cooperating" rose from 28% in early December to 44% in early January.
The general public continues to designate England as the country "chiefly to blame" -- the early January figures being 22% England, 7% Russia; 4% U.S.A.; 11% no opinion (totaling 44% "dissatisfied").

About 7 out of 10 of the public in early January felt that Britain "was doing all it possibly can to win the war", as compared with less than 6 out of 10 in the third week of December.

8 out of 10 continued to feel that Russia was doing all it possibly can to win the war (even prior to the new Russian offensive, January 12).

B. Disturbing Effect on Security Organization

Asked whether developments in Greece, Poland and Italy would affect the success of the proposed world peace organization, 50% said that these developments "would make success more difficult", 20% thought they "would make little difference"; and 6% thought they "would make success impossible".

Confidence that Britain and Russia can be trusted to cooperate with the U. S. after the war has reached the lowest point since the Moscow conference (60% "trust" Britain and 31% are distrustful) (44% "trust" Russia and 42% are distrustful)

IV. International Peace and Security Organization

While 9 out of 10 of the public continue to support the general proposition that "the U. S. should join an international organization in an effort to prevent future wars", only 3 out of 10 say that they have some general idea of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

2 out of 10 believe that these Proposals
"provide a real and practical basis for setting up an international organization". However, of those with opinion on this question, the Proposals are considered "practical" by a ratio of 3 to 1.

(3) Confronted with the possibility that the peace settlement might not be "completely satisfactory" to Americans, about 60% say that we should join an international peace organization anyway; while about 30% say that we should not join.

V. Japanese Mandated Islands

American opinion strongly favors some form of U. S. control of Pacific Islands mandated to Japan. But no majority opinion has developed in support of either of the two following alternatives; according to a January poll:

(1) "U. S. govern them under the proposed new international organization" (47%);

(2) "U. S. own them outright" (38%).

VI. Other Dependent Areas

American sentiment dislikes European imperialism and would welcome arrangements looking toward the self-government of colonial peoples.

A. Italian African Colonies

Very little attention has been given specifically to the future of the Italian colonies. Two years ago, while the fighting was still going on in North Africa, a Gallup poll found that 61% opposed returning "all or nearly all the possessions Italy held in Africa at the start of the war". Only 17% held the contrary view (December 1942).

B. Indo-China

American opinion has not focused on the future of Indo-China.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 17, 1945.

Subject: Expenses of Participation by the United States in the Conference of American Foreign Ministers to be held at Mexico City

Participation by the United States in the forthcoming Conference of American Foreign Ministers to be held at Mexico City will necessitate certain financial obligations on the part of the United States. These obligations are considered to be within the purview of the appropriation, "International Conferences (Emergency)", contained in the State Department Appropriation Act for 1945, under which your specific approval is required for meeting expenses of participation by the United States in any international activity.

It is therefore my recommendation that the expenses in connection with the above-mentioned Conference be paid from this appropriation. May we have an indication of your wishes?

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

EXPLANATION

"C.E.
FDR"

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schumbe Date

MAR 3 1972

[Signature]
SUGGESTED AGENDA FOR CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS COLLABORATING IN THE WAR EFFORT

I. Further Cooperative Measures for the Prosecution of the War to Complete Victory.

II. Consideration of Problems of International Organization for Peace and Security.
   A. World Organization.
      1) General Support for Dumbarton Oaks.
      1) Atlantic Charter.
      2) Utilization of Inter-American System for Implementing World Organization.
      3) Annual Consultation of Foreign Ministers.
      4) Joint Guarantee of Boundaries.
      5) Consultation on Post-war Settlements.

III. Consideration of the Economic and Social Problems of the Americas.
   A. Other American Republics to Join Us in Reduction of Barriers to Free Flow of Trade and Commerce.
   B. Agreement by U.S. to Assist Them in Cushioning Shock From Termination of War Purchases and in Meeting Internal Economic and Social Problems. A Joint Insurance Policy for Next Five or Ten Years.

IV. Other Matters of General and Immediate Concern to the Participating Governments.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Italian Soldiers Detained by the German Authorities

The British Embassy has informed the Department that at the Quebec Conference you and Mr. Churchill considered the issuance of a statement with regard to the approximately 600,000 Italian soldiers detained by the German Government but not treated as prisoners of war. The British Embassy states that although this matter was not included in the joint statement made after the conference, you subsequently informed Mr. Churchill that you agreed that such a declaration should be made by the United States and British Governments.

The British note suggests that this declaration state that the two Governments consider that these Italian soldiers are entitled to full protection as prisoners of war under international law and that appropriate action will be taken against all those who mistreat these Italians. The British note leaves it to our Government to decide whether we shall issue a similar statement or whether a joint statement will be issued in the names of both Governments. It further recommends that the Soviet Government might be invited to take similar action but that the issuance of this declaration should not be made conditional on the consent of the Soviet Government. The British note also suggests that the Italian Government should be notified of any statement to be issued, as well as the Greek, Yugoslav, and French Governments, represented on the Advisory Council for Italy.

I recommend that we agree to the British Government's proposals as expressed above. May we have your approval?

[Signature]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-71
By J. Schlaible Date MAR 3 1972
January 20, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY


If you will be good enough to return these to me after they have been signed by the President we shall hold them until the agreements have been received. After that we shall turn them over to Mr. Latta in order that he may transmit them to the Senate for confirmation. In this way there will be no possibility of announcements being made until the proper time.

Enclosures:
Memorandum for the President
Nominations
Biographical sketches
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT


The agreements for these nominations have not actually been received but we hope to obtain them within the next few days. In order to save time, may we have your signature now? Of course, no announcements will be made until the proper time.

Nominations Enclosed

Herman B. Baruch, of New York, doctor of medicine and broker, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Portugal.

Wallace Murray, of Ohio, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs in the Department, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Iran.

Felix Cole, of the District of Columbia, Foreign Service Officer of Class I, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Ethiopia.

Ely E. Palmer, of Rhode Island, Foreign Service Officer of Class I, to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Afghanistan.

Enclosures: Nominations Biographical sketches
MH-787
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (Strikes through)

Tehran via Army
Dated January 21, 1945
Rec'd 1:53 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

43, January 21, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have received your message authorizing my retirement from the Foreign Service. I am profoundly touched by the commendatory terms of your communication. It has been a great privilege and honor to serve under your leadership these past years in which you have guided our nation so wisely and so well. I do not wish to retire to inactivity during the war when every valid American should be working. I hope you will consider making use of my services in any capacity that my knowledge and experience might indicate.

MORRIS

JRL
My dear Mr. President:

I attach a copy of a revised draft of the proposed Anglo American Oil Agreement. This represents the result of an extended negotiation with the oil industry, which industry effectively blocked progress on the original Agreement, and it is designed to remove the industry’s opposition. In other words, this is a revision which would have industry support.

The differences between this draft and the original Agreement are largely differences of phraseology intended to clarify and thereby eliminate some of the fears that were read into the original document by the oil industry. There is no substantial difference on any point of importance with one exception - the inclusion in this draft of a clause protective of the industry on the score of the antitrust laws.

The clause in the new draft which deals with the antitrust feature, you will note, reads as follows:

"That upon the formal approval by either Government of any specific course of action proposed by the Commission, action taken by its nationals in compliance therewith shall not be an infringement of its laws with respect to restraints of trade."

This is a good deal more narrow than the clause proposed by the oil industry; at the same time, it affords sufficient protection so that the industry is prepared to endorse the revised Agreement if included.

I think that we are in this position: If the antitrust feature is not reasonably disposed of in the Agreement, we will not have oil industry support; on the contrary, we will have an opposition which has already shown itself to be sufficiently powerful to prevent favorable reception in the Senate. On the other hand, if the protective clause is incorporated in the Agreement, it will undoubtedly excite other opposition in the Senate which likewise may thwart our purposes.

The Committee that you appointed to negotiate the original Agreement met Saturday and considered the new draft and discussed in particular the problem presented by the inclusion of the antitrust clause. There was general agreement that in asking for the protection the oil industry was not seeking an unreasonable provision. At the same time, it was recognised that the clause would have opposition in the Senate and the State Department representatives feared that such opposition would prevent ratification. It was also pointed out that an embarrassing situation would arise if the Department of Justice were opposed. I have endeavored to develop this question with the Attorney General, but I find that he is to be out of the city for the week.
SUGGESTED REVISION
OF
AGREEMENT ON PETROLEUM
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

Preamble

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, whose nationals hold, to a substantial extent jointly, rights to explore and develop petroleum resources in other countries, recognize;

1. That ample supplies of petroleum, available in international trade to meet increasing market demands, are essential for both the security and economic well-being of nations;

2. That for the foreseeable future the petroleum resources of the world are adequate to assure the availability of such supplies;

3. That the prosperity and security of all nations require the efficient and orderly development of the international petroleum trade;

4. That the orderly development of the international petroleum trade can best be promoted by international agreement among all countries interested in the petroleum trade whether as producers or consumers.

The two governments have therefore decided, as a preliminary measure to the calling of an international conference to consider the negotiation of a multilateral petroleum agreement, to conclude the following agreement.

Article I

The two Governments agree that the international petroleum trade should be conducted in an orderly manner on a world-wide basis with due
regard to the considerations set forth in the Preamble, and within the framework of applicable laws and concession contracts. To this end, and subject always to considerations of military security and to the provisions of such arrangements for the preservation of peace and prevention of aggression as may be in force, the two Governments affirm the following general principles with respect to the international petroleum trade:

1. That adequate supplies of petroleum should be accessible in international trade to the nationals of all countries on a competitive and nondiscriminatory basis;

2. That in making supplies of petroleum thus accessible in international trade, the interests of producing countries should be safeguarded with a view to their economic advancement.

**Article II**

In furtherance of the purposes of this Agreement, the two Governments will so direct their efforts:

1. That with regard to the acquisition of exploration and development rights the principle of equal opportunity shall be respected;

2. That all valid concession contracts and lawfully acquired rights shall be respected, and that no effort to interfere directly or indirectly with such contracts or rights shall be made;

3. That the exploration for and development of petroleum resources, the construction and operation of refineries and other facilities, and the distribution of petroleum shall not be hampered by restrictions inconsistent with the purposes of this Agreement.

**ARTICLE III**

With a view to the wider adoption of the principles embodied in this Agreement, the two Governments agree that as soon as practicable they will propose to the governments of other interested producing and
consuming countries an International Petroleum Agreement, which inter
alia would establish a permanent International Petroleum Council composed
of representatives of all signatory countries.

To this end the two Governments agree to formulate plans for an in-
ternational conference to consider the negotiation of such a multilateral
petroleum agreement. They will consult with other interested governments
with a view to taking whatever action is necessary to prepare for the pro-
posed conference.

ARTICLE IV

Numerous problems of joint immediate interest to the two Governments
with respect to the international petroleum trade must be discussed and
resolved on a cooperative interim basis if the general petroleum supply
situation is not to deteriorate.

With this end in view, the two Governments agree to establish an
International Petroleum Commission to be composed of eight members, four
members to be appointed immediately by each Government. To enable the
Commission to maintain close contact with the operations of the petroleum
industry, each Government will facilitate full and adequate consultation
with its nationals engaged in the petroleum industry.

In furtherance of and in accordance with the purposes of this Agree-
ment, the Commission shall consider problems of mutual interest to both
Governments and their nationals, and with a view to the equitable disposi-
tion of such problems it shall be charged with the following duties and
responsibilities:

1. To study the problems of the international
   petroleum trade caused by dislocations
   resulting from war;
2. To study past and current trends in the international petroleum trade;

3. To study the effects of changing technology upon the international petroleum trade;

4. To prepare periodic estimates of world demands for petroleum and of the supplies available for meeting the demands, and to report as to means by which such demands and supplies may be correlated so as to further the efficient and orderly conduct of the international petroleum trade;

5. To make such additional reports as may be appropriate for achieving the purposes of this Agreement and for the broader general understanding of the problems of the international petroleum trade.

The Commission shall have power to regulate its procedure and shall establish such organization as may be necessary to carry out its functions under this Agreement. The expenses of the Commission shall be shared equally by the two Governments.

**Article V**

The two Governments agree:

1. That they will seek to obtain the collaboration of the governments of other producing and consuming countries for the realization of the purposes of this Agreement, and to consult with such governments in connection with activities of the Commission;

2. That they will endeavor to make available to the Commission such information as may be required for the discharge of its functions.

**Article VI**

The Two Governments agree:

1. That the reports of the International Petroleum Commission shall be published by each of the two
Governments, unless in any particular case the two Governments decide otherwise;

2. That upon the formal approval by either Government of any specific course of action proposed by the Commission, action taken by its nationals in compliance therewith shall not be an infringement of its laws with respect to restraints of trade;

3. That no provision in this Agreement shall be construed to require either Government to act upon any report or proposal made by the Commission, or to require the nationals of either Government to comply with any report or proposal made by the Commission, whether or not it is approved.

**Article VII**

The two Governments agree:

1. That the general purpose of this Agreement is to facilitate the orderly development of the international petroleum trade, and no provision in this Agreement, with the exception of Article II, is to be construed to apply to the operation of the domestic petroleum industry within either country;

2. That no provision in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent either of the two Governments from taking such action as it may desire to limit the amount of petroleum which may be imported into its country.

**Article VIII**

The two Governments agree that for the purposes of this Agreement:

1. The words "country" or "territories"

(a) in relation to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, shall mean the United Kingdom and the British colonies, overseas territories, protectorates, protected states, and mandated territories administered by that Government which are named in the attached list; and
(b) in relation to the Government of the United States of America shall mean the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands;

2. The word "petroleum" means crude petroleum and its derivatives.

Article IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon a date to be agreed upon after each Government shall have notified the other of its readiness to bring the Agreement into force and shall continue in force until three months after notice of termination has been given by either Government or until it is superseded by the International Petroleum Agreement contemplated in Article III.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, have signed this Agreement.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

February 17, 1945

Subject: Departure of the Queen Mother and Her Children, Including the Boy King, from Bulgaria

In his telegram no. 393 February 14 (copy attached) Ambassador Kirk reports from Rome that King Victor Emanuel has asked that the President, together with Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill, intercede to ensure the safety of the Queen Mother of Bulgaria, who was an Italian princess, and her two children.

Mr. Barnes reported from Sofia on February 5 that the Bulgarian Prime Minister had assured him that he would personally interest himself in the safety of the Queen Mother and her two children, whose security was "a question of national honor". Mr. Barnes added that the Queen does not share the Prime Minister's confidence in her security, and reported that she had just raised with the Regents the question of her immediate departure for a month's visit in Italy with her children.

The question of permitting the departure of the Queen Mother and her family is thus before the Bulgarian Government, and may be referred to the Allied Control Commission. The Department thinks that it would be advisable to learn whether favorable action cannot be effected on that level, and has therefore instructed Mr. Barnes to make further inquiries and to request General Crane to inform the Control Commission that this Government would concur in favorable action, if the question comes before the Control Commission.

Mr. Harriman has also been authorized, if informed by Mr. Barnes that the Control Commission is considering the question, to apprise Mr. Molotov of our attitude, and request that appropriate instructions be sent to the Soviet chairman of the Control Commission.

Enclosure: 
Telegram no. 393, from Rome.

Acting Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

February 17, 1945

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Enclosure: Telegram no. 393, from Rome.

Acting Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Latest Opinion Trends in The United States

I enclose herewith a memorandum dated February 23rd summarizing the latest opinion trends in the United States.

Acting Secretary
February 23, 1945

LATEST OPINION TRENDS IN THE U.S.A.

Cooperation Among the Allies

Before announcement of the final results of the Crimea Conference, public "satisfaction" with cooperation among the Big Three had registered a marked increase--from less than a majority to nearly two-thirds of a national cross-section, according to a comparison of opinion surveys taken in early January and early February by the Princeton University Office of Public Opinion Research.

"Do you feel satisfied or dissatisfied with the way in which Russia, England and the United States are cooperating with each other at the present time?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Dissatisfaction" with Allied cooperation dropped from 43% to 25%, press and radio criticism of both Britain and Russia having sharply declined since the slackening of attention to the Greek crisis and the focus of headlines on the Russian offensive. However, the minority blaming Britain remains larger than that blaming Russia; and belief that Britain "is doing all she can to win the war" has also declined somewhat (72% to 66%).

Those "dissatisfied" with Allied cooperation were asked:

"Which country do you think is CHIEFLY to blame?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England and Russia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As to postwar cooperation, popular trust has also risen. The increase respecting Britain is slight, and the figure continues to be relatively high. In the case of Russia, the rise to 54% approximates the peak figures of 55% noted in November 1943 (Moscow Conference) and August 1944.

"Do you think "Russia (England) can be trusted to cooperate with us when the war is over?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interests Abroad Well Cared For

An increase of 7% since January results in a 5 to 3 ratio of those who think that "this country's interests abroad are being well taken care of", according to an unpublished Princeton survey taken before conclusion of the Crimea Conference.

"Do you think that this country's interests abroad are being well taken care of by the President and other government officials, or do you think other countries are taking advantage of us?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January</th>
<th>February</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well taken care of</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries take advantage</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Active Part in European Settlement

An overwhelming majority of Americans feel that
the United States should have "as much to say as our British and Russian allies in the settlement of various European problems growing out of the war".

According to a Princeton survey of early February:

- 69% think the U. S. should have "as much to say";
- 17% think the U. S. should have "more to say";
- 9% think the U. S. should have "less to say"; and
- 5% expressed no opinion.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 26, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Mr. George T. Summerlin.

For preparation of reply.

F. D. R.

Attachments:

Letter to the President, 2-6-45, from Mr. C. E. Gauss, re his retirement from Diplomatic Service.

Mr. Gauss's address is Villa Riviera,
Long Beach 2, Calif.
Respectfully referred to

Mr. McCormack

Very respectfully,

Brock Hays

M. C., .......... District.
March 3, 1945

My dear Mr. Bloom:

Thank you for bringing to our attention House Concurrent Resolution 3, submitted by Mr. Hays on January 3, 1945 and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, proposing "that all legislation pertaining to the participation by the United States in international agreements and machinery to establish and to maintain peace shall be the joint responsibility of the majority and minority parties."

It is our understanding that this Resolution stands for the proposition that legislation on the subjects mentioned should be considered on a non-partisan basis. You will recall that in his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last December, the Secretary of State spoke of the necessity of working "in full cooperation with the Congress" in continuing to build, together with the other United Nations, "the foundation of a secure and lasting peace in which there will be wider freedom and opportunity for our own people and for all peoples."

Full cooperation with the Congress to achieve this high purpose requires that party lines be submerged in the consideration of issues pertaining to it. The State Department acts upon this principle. Both before and since the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, the Department has consulted with members of the Senate and House of Representatives and other leaders of both major parties on matters relating to the establishment of a general international organization. These discussions, which throughout have been frank and fruitful, supported the belief that the American people are increasingly aware of the great responsibility of this nation in world affairs.

To rid the world of war and to achieve international cooperation in solving problems of common concern to all peoples are tasks worthy of the best and sincerest effort of all peace-loving nations. The United States Government can share constructively in the accomplishment of these purposes only as the American people give it strength by standing united for the establishment and effective operation of international machinery to advance human welfare and maintain peace and security.

The Department has been informed by the Bureau of the Budget that there is no objection to the submission of this report.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew
Acting Secretary
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 3, 1945

Mr. HAYS submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas it is the sense of the Congress that measures involved in the establishment of a peace to follow the present hostilities should be considered without reference to partisanship:

Therefore be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That all legislation pertaining to the participation by the United States in international agreements and machinery to establish and to maintain peace shall be the joint responsibility of the majority and minority parties.
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Establishing the joint responsibility for the peace.

By Mr. Hays

JANUARY 3, 1945

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

March 5, 1945


Attached herewith is a memorandum which has just been prepared on Latest Opinion Trends in the United States.

Acting Secretary
LATEST OPINION TRENDS IN THE U. S. A.

I. Demilitarization Treaty

(1) Both Roosevelt and Dewey voters give overwhelming support (89%) to the proposition that "Germany and Japan be kept permanently disarmed", according to final results of a Gallup poll -- published on March 2.

(2) Similarly, majorities in both parties favor negotiation now of demilitarization treaties (Roosevelt voters, 56%; Dewey voters, 53%).

(3) Who Should Dispatch U. S. Forces? Opinion is not now well crystallized on the issue whether or not the President should obtain the approval of Congress before ordering U. S. armed forces to participate in putting down a violation of the demilitarization treaty.

Following Gallup's report (Jan. 31) that a slight majority (54%) preferred Congressional approval to a simple Presidential order, further experimentation was initiated, working with a small but well-constructed sample of the public.

The unfixed state of public sentiment is demonstrated by the fact that sizable majorities in favor of Presidential authorization were obtained, when the Princeton questions made it clear to the respondent that --

1) Legislative assent is required for the approval of treaties, and
2) "Need" for military action would be urgent.

Another insight into current opinion on this issue is given by Gallup's report (March 2) that a majority of those voting for President Roosevelt in
1944 favor giving such power to the President, while a large majority of those voting for Governor Dewey are opposed. The Gallup question and results follow:

"If it becomes necessary to use force to keep Germany and Japan from arming again, should the President have the right to order the use of American force immediately, or should the approval of Congress be obtained first?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Roosevelt Voters</th>
<th>Dewey Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President should have right</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should first obtain approval</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. Unconditional Surrender of Germany

In early February, popular opinion continued to be overwhelmingly in favor (81%) of the "unconditional surrender" of Germany -- according to a Princeton poll -- even though political leaders and commentators had been calling for an elaboration of that formula.

Moreover, the public generally appears to be much less concerned than press and radio critics with the question of whether the German people have been adequately informed by the Allies as to "how they will be treated after they surrender."

When questioned,

62% said they "didn't know" whether the German people had been told how they will be treated,
27% thought that they had been told, and
11% thought that they had not been told.
III. Transfer of "Polish" Territory

No change was registered in the month preceding the Crimea Conference in the majority of 2 to 1 (of those with opinions) who said "Russia should be allowed to keep some Polish territory which the Russians now occupy provided that the Poles are given in exchange some German territory".

Aid to France and Italy

According to an early February opinion poll (Princeton), a majority of the public thinks that --
1) The U.S. should do all it can to help these countries,
2) The U.S. is doing all it can at the present time.

Only 15% feel that the U.S. is not doing all it can for France; only 20% for Italy.

Sentiment is much stronger for aid to France (84%) than for Italy (55%).

Early February Results:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Do you think the U.S. should do all it can at the present time to help France (Italy) get back on its feet?&quot;</td>
<td>Yes 84% 9 7</td>
<td>No 31 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No op.</td>
<td>100% 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Do you think the U.S. is doing all it can at the present time?&quot;</td>
<td>Yes 66% 15</td>
<td>No 53% 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No op. 19</td>
<td>100% 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(All polling results above, except the Gallup poll in section (I. Demilitarization Treaty), are confidential.)
1. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State, 12/28/44 Re: Deteriorating Economic Situation in Italy - Italy folder, 1-44.

2. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State, 12/18/44 re: Soviet-Iranian Relations. - Russia folder, 1-44

3. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/1/45 re: Letter from Myron Taylor concerning food situation in Italy. - Myron Taylor folder, 1-44

4. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/12/45 re: reaction in Iraq to Congressional Resolutions regarding Palestine. - Palestine folder, 1-45

5. Memo for Pres. from Acting Secy of State Grew 1/12/45 re: Soviet Foreign Policy. - Russia folder, 1-45

6. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/9/45 re: Memorandum from Dr. Isaiah Bowman. - State Dept folder, 2-45

7. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/8/45 re: Czech Attitude toward the Lublin Government. - Russia folder, 1-45

8. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/6/45 re: Soviet request for Long-Term credits. - Russia folder, 1-45

9. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/6/45 re: Latest opinion trends in the USA. - State Dept folder, 2-45

10. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/4/45 re: Resolution of Polish American Democratic Organization of Chicago. - Poland folder, 1-45

11. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/4/45 re: Lowdermilk Project for Palestine. - Palestine folder, 1-45

12. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 12/29/44 re: Reply to letter from Catholic Archbishops. - Stillman folder, 2-44


15. Memo for Pres. from J.C. Grew 1/7/45 enclosing copy of telegram from Ambassador Patterson reporting that King Peter of Yugoslavia requesting that Pres. send a telegram to Churchill supporting King Peter's position in discussions now in progress in London concerning an agreement between P.M. Subasic and Marshal Tito. - Yugoslavia folder, 1-45

16. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/1/45 re: French participation in the control of Germany. - Germany folder, 1-45

17. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/10/45 re: Argentine Meat - Churchill folder, 1-45

18. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/9/45 re: Attitude of Ibn Saud toward Arab Union and Palestine. - Saudi Arabia folder, 1-45
/19. Memo to the Pres. from the Secy. of State 1/17/45 re: Message from the Queen of the Netherlands.- Netherlands folder, 1/45

/20. Memo to the Pres. from the Secy. of State 1/17/45 re: The Iranian Question.- Churchill folder, 1/45 (or give to St. Eiley?)

/21. Memo to the Pres. from the Secy. of State 1/19/45 re: Political matters for discussion at the forthcoming meeting.- China folder, 1/45

/22. Memo to the Pres. from the Secy. of State 1/22/45 re: Communism-Kuomintang Relations.- China folder, 1/45

/23. Memo to the Pres. from the Secy. of State 1/19/45 re: French Request for Participation in Big Three Meeting.- France folder, 1/45


/25. Memo for Pres. from Secy. of State 1/16/45 re: American Public Opinion on Selected Questions (2 memos).- State Dept. folder, 1/45

/26. Cable from London complete version of Prime Minister's speech in House of Commons 1/19/45.- Churchill folder, 1/45

/27. Cable from London text of Mr. Eden's speech 1/19/45.- Great Britain folder, 1/45

1. Top Secret. Cable from Hurley to President 1/2/45

2. Personal letter from Cong. Emanuel Celler to the Pres. 12/15/44 and the President's reply. 1/16/45


4. Report from J.F. Byrnes as Director of War Mobilization & Reconversion - Jan. 1, 1945


6. Letter from the Attorney General, with suggested message to Congress on the Petrillo matter, 1/10/45

7. Article by Jesse Jones, together with his note to the Pres. 1/11/45

8. Printed article "Preamble to Post War Shipping".

9. Note to the Pres. from Prince Mohamed Ali, Heir Presumptive to Throne of Egypt 1/8/45

10. Letter from Cong. Mike Mansfield which contains lengthy report on his findings and recommendations as a result of his mission to China - 1/3/45

11. FBI report 1/6/45 re Soviet Govt. Purchasing Commission had endeavored to kidnap an employee of theirs and place him aboard a Soviet vessel bound for the USSR.

12. Letter from Ben Cohen attaching copy of letter with comments on Dumbarton Oaks proposals prepared by a small group working with Manley Hudson, addressed to the Secy. of State. 12/22/44


14. Mystery novel "5 Murderers".
17. Memo from L. Currie enclosing brief notes from Leon Henderson sent to him in confidence 1/19/45

18. Letter from Sen. McKellar enclosing short speech on foreign situation - 1/18/45

19. Memo from L. Currie enclosing some notes for this conference 1/19

20. Cable from Vatican City for the Pres. 1/18/45 from Myron Taylor

21. Letter to the Pres. from Herbert H. Lehman 1/19/45 re UHRRA.

22. Letter to the Pres. from Leo Crowley 1/19/45 re Lend-Lease to Russia

23. Memo on Post-War Germany

24. Memo to the Pres. from Leo Crowley re lend-lease to France.
December 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Deteriorating Economic Situation in Italy

I am becoming increasingly alarmed about the plight of Italians in liberated Italy during the next several months. I have seen Marshal Alexander's very sobering telegram of December 21 (NAF 830) containing a final urgent request for a decision on the bread ration for the Italian people. I asked Admiral Leahy yesterday to send you a copy of NAF 830 if you had not already seen it.

Reports from Myron Taylor and Alexander Kirk during the past several weeks and months have reflected the increasing gravity of the food situation particularly north of the Garigliano River. It is generally conceded that a ration of at least three hundred grams per day of bread and "pasta" is required to maintain the populace on any kind of a standard approaching normal subsistence. Thus far the Allied authorities have not been able to achieve this ration north of the Garigliano.

To implement your instructions of October 31 to the War Department to increase the bread ration to three hundred grams throughout all of liberated Italy I am informed that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (CCS) is working on a directive to Marshal Alexander. I believe there is considerable reluctance on the British side to concur in a directive to Alexander to use food reserves for north Italy to relieve the present acute situation in liberated Italy. There is of course complete unanimity on the American side in its desire to carry out the spirit and letter of your request of October 31.
This difficult problem can be solved eventually only by an increase in the shipping allocation to the Mediterranean theater. I hope that this situation will be kept under constant review for the purpose of increasing the Mediterranean shipping allocation at the expense of any less urgent demands, other than operational, on world shipping.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Scheuble Date MAR 3 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet-Iranian Relations

Your memorandum of December 8, 1944 suggested that Harriman take up with Stalin the question of difficulties between the Soviet Union and Iran. Fortunately, a telegram from Ambassador Morris in Tehran dated December 8, reports that since the Iranian Government resigned last month, Morris has heard of no action by the Russians which could clearly be construed as further undue interference in internal Iranian affairs.

An approach by us to the Russians at this moment might aggravate the situation, causing the Russians to flare up with a harder policy against Iran than ever. I believe it would be a mistake for Harriman to approach Stalin at the moment, as long as there is a possibility that the tension in Iran is easing. We are following the developments minutely, and are keeping Harriman posted. If you concur, we will instruct him to stand by, to be ready to act when the proper moment comes.

I should like to talk with you about the free port-railway trusteeship plan at one of our early meetings.

Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
January 1, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Letter from Myron Taylor Concerning Food Situation in Italy

Thank you for letting me see Mr. Taylor's letter of November 11, 1944 and attached plan for improving the Italian food situation. These are being returned for your files in accordance with your memorandum of December 7.

The application of Mr. Taylor's recommendations depends upon a solution of the critical shipping and internal transportation problem. As to crop pooling, his plan is also based on the assumption of rigorous harvest control machinery which so far has not materialized. I feel that Mr. Taylor's plan is sound and that you might wish to give it consideration when the present obstacles are removed.

Enclosure:
Letter from Mr. Taylor together with its enclosure.
January 12, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reaction in Iraq to Congressional Resolutions Regarding Palestine.

I think you will want to note these two airgrams from our Minister at Baghdad, the first of which outlines the reaction in Iraq to the revival of the Palestine resolutions in Congress, while the second gives the text of a note from the Iraqi Foreign Office to our Minister summarizing the position of Iraq and the other Arab countries in this regard.

These airgrams show quite clearly that the Arabs regard, and will continue to regard, the Palestine question with the utmost concern. Zionist activities in this country will remain the gravest threat to friendly relations between the United States and the countries of the Near East until a solution to the problem is reached.

We are sending copies of the Iraqi note to Tom Connally and Sol Bloom.

Enclosures:

1. Airgram no. A-75, December 19, 6 p.m. 1944, from Baghdad.
2. Airgram no. A-77, December 21, 9 p.m., from Baghdad.

Acting Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 12, 1945

Subject: Soviet Foreign Policy

While you may not have time to read in full the enclosed lengthy interpretive report from Harriman on developments in Soviet policy derived from the attitudes of the Russian press, I believe that, in view of your forthcoming meeting, you will find it worthwhile to look over at least the first two paragraphs of the report which summarize the Ambassador's conclusions in regard to the main lines of Soviet foreign policy at the present time.

(Signed) Joseph C. Grew
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 90 from Moscow, January 10, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaus MAR 3 1972
January 9, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Memorandum from Dr. Bowman

Attached is a copy of a statement drafted by Dr. Isaiah Bowman, which speaks for itself.

Something along this line I feel would be most useful either in one of your statements or in one of the State Department statements.

Enclosure:

Copy of a statement drafted by Dr. Isaiah Bowman.
January 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Czech Attitude toward the Lublin "Government"

You may be interested in the enclosed telegram from Harriman indicating that Benes may have made some commitment to the Russians in regard to the recognition of the Lublin group and also suggesting that the disposition of Czech Ruthenia has not yet been finally determined.

E. B. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 63 from Moscow, January 6, 1945.
January 8, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Soviet Request for Long-Term Credits

Molotov has presented to Harriman an aide-memoire requesting from the United States six billion dollars in post-war credits to run for thirty years at an interest rate of two and one-half percent. In transmitting the text of the aide-memoire, Harriman has also in the enclosed telegram submitted his own reactions thereto which I believe you would be interested in reading in full.

Harriman indicates his belief that the Russians will expect this subject to be discussed at the forthcoming meeting and states his view that (1) it is to our interest to assist in the development of the economy of the Soviet Union, (2) the Russians should be given to understand that our cooperation in this respect will depend upon their behavior in international matters, and (3) the discussion of these long-term credits should be wholly divorced from the current lend-lease negotiations.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 61 from Moscow,
January 6, 1945.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 4/1772
By J. Schauble Date 3/1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 6, 1945

Subject: Latest Opinion Trends in the U. S. A.

I. U. S. Policy on Liberated Areas

On balance, opinion seems to favor a policy of non-interference in the politics of liberated countries. However, opinion is not firmly crystallized, according to polling results just received.

A positive and clarifying statement unfolding this Government's position would tend to find support and furnish a frame of reference, which the public clearly desires.

II. Attitudes Toward Britain and Russia

A. New evidence confirms that --

(1) The public widely believes that both Britain and Russia actively support factions of their own choice in liberated countries.

(2) The public disapproves of such unilateral action.

B. Greater dissatisfaction "with the way in which Russia, Britain and the United States are cooperating with each other" exists among the best informed and most influential
influential groups than among the public as a whole.

National Total............ 28% "felt dissatisfied"
College educated............ 37% " "
Upper economic group........ 43% " "

(1) However, the public, when taking a longer perspective, is not so much disturbed over the prospects of post-war cooperation with Britain and Russia.

C. Press and radio comment, however, has begun to excuse British actions in Europe -- in contrast to previous sharp disapproval -- while criticizing U.S. policy.

III. Information and Attitudes on Dumbarton Oaks

A. Estimates are more pessimistic than formerly respecting Congressional acceptance of the Proposals unless present political differences among the Allies are quickly smoothed over.

B. After several months of publicity,

Only 43% of the public have even heard of the Proposals. Among these, about half have no opinion as to whether the Proposals provide a "real and practical basis for setting up an international organization to maintain world peace". They were deemed "practical" by a 2 to 1 ratio of those with opinions. The well-educated are no more favorable than the poorly educated.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
January 4, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Lowdermilk Project for Palestine.

Information has reached us that the Zionists intend to ask you to endorse the so-called Lowdermilk project for the development of Palestine. This project, which is described in a recent book entitled Palestine, Land of Promise by Dr. Walter Clay Lowdermilk of the United States Department of Agriculture, proposes the establishment of a Jordan Valley Authority on the model of the TVA, with the object of making it possible for Palestine to absorb at least four million Jewish refugees. The author, who is Assistant Chief of the Soil Conservation Service of the Department of Agriculture, has made it plain that his plan represents his own personal views and does not have the backing of the Government. The project has, however, been heartily endorsed by the Zionists, who have not failed to stress the fact that the author is prominent in our own Government's reclamation work.

Quite apart from the foreign policy implications, we have some interesting comments regarding the Lowdermilk project, based on the view of scientists resident in Palestine, from one of our officers in the field, showing that from a purely technical standpoint there are serious obstacles to the plan. I thought that you would want to know this.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Scheuble Date  MAR 3 1972
December 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Reply to letter from Catholic Archbishops

Reference is made to my memorandum of December 15, 1944, outlining the conversation I had with Archbishops Mooney, Stritch and Spellman during which they expressed apprehension concerning developments in the international field.

There is attached for your consideration a suggested reply to the letter addressed to you which the Archbishops left with me. Their letter is also enclosed.

Enclosure:

Reply to letter of December 13 from Archbishops.
December 22, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposals for the Extension of Long Range Financial Assistance to Saudi Arabia

In a memorandum from the Secretary of State dated April 3, 1944, which you approved, it was recommended that lend-lease funds be used for the extension of increased economic assistance to Saudi Arabia and that subsequently Congressional approval be sought for the provision of direct financial aid.

Largely because of wartime conditions, Saudi Arabia is experiencing budgetary deficits. These may be expected to continue for the next few years until oil royalties and a revival of normal trade provide sufficient sources of revenue to meet essential governmental expenditures. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia is dependent for survival upon help from abroad. If such help is not provided by this Government, undoubtedly it will be supplied by some other nation which might thus acquire a dominant position in that country inimical to the welfare of Saudi Arabia and to the national interest of the United States.

An American national interest, basically strategic in character, exists in Saudi Arabia for the following reasons:

1. A strong and independent Saudi Arabian Government in the Near East, where
two great world powers come in contact, is less likely to fall victim to war-breeding aggression than a weak and disintegrating state vulnerable to economic and political penetration.

2. The vast oil resources of Saudi Arabia, now in American hands under a concession held by American nationals, should be safeguarded and developed in order to supplement Western Hemisphere oil reserves as a source of world supply.

3. The military authorities urgently desire certain facilities in Saudi Arabia for the prosecution of the war, such as the right to construct military airfields and flight privileges for military aircraft en route to the Pacific war theater.

King Ibn Saud has indicated that he prefers to rely upon the United States for the assistance his country needs and that he would adopt a much more independent attitude toward third countries if he were assured that this Government will extend adequate aid on a long-range basis. This cannot be done through lend-lease (a) because the Foreign Economic Administration is unwilling to continue it beyond the present fiscal year; and (b) because there is no assurance in any case that lend-lease would be available on a long-range basis.

Your approval is requested of the following steps to be taken in order to enable this Government to extend adequate long-range assistance to Saudi Arabia for the purpose of affording protection to the American national interest in that country and of obtaining wartime facilities urgently needed there:

1. That
1. That the Congress be requested to appropriate funds for use in meeting the urgent financial requirements of Saudi Arabia to the extent deemed necessary by the Secretary of State;

2. That the Secretary of State inform the President of the Export-Import Bank that you desire the Bank to make a commitment in principle of its intention to extend, after the necessary study, development loans to finance long-range projects for the improvement of economic conditions and living standards in Saudi Arabia;

3. That the military authorities, after consultation with the Department of State, give immediate consideration to such projects as it may be advisable for them to undertake promptly in Saudi Arabia in order to provide interim assistance by means of such measures as the construction of airfields and related installations, the dispatch of training missions and equipment, and the construction of strategic roads, together with other facilities.

The Secretaries of War and the Navy concur in the foregoing proposals.
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE TO MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT ENTITLED "PROPOSALS FOR THE EXTENSION OF LONG RANGE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO SAUDI ARABIA."

It cannot be stated with certainty at this time the funds which will be needed to meet the urgent financial requirements of Saudi Arabia. It is estimated, however, that the budgetary deficits of the Saudi Arabian government will continue for approximately five years. If the war should continue for several years more and if the return of normal trading conditions should be delayed unduly, the maximum sum to meet these deficits is estimated at $57,000,000. Should the war end in the near future, and should more favorable economic conditions obtain, only about $28,000,000 will be needed. A reasonable expectation, however, is that the sum of $43,000,000 will suffice to meet these budgetary deficits over a five-year period until Saudi Arabia becomes financially self-sufficient.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
January 2, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Voting in the Security Council

I enclose herewith an interesting cable just received from Harriman on this question. You will note he feels the issue is fundamental to the Soviets and that the British and ourselves may have to take a very firm stand if we are to succeed in changing their minds.

Enclosure:

Telegram no. 5043
from Moscow.
January 1, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Participation in the Control of Germany

The enclosed telegram from Winant summarizes a formal memorandum presented by the French representative on the European Advisory Commission setting forth explicitly the wishes of France in regard to participation in the German surrender instrument and the military control of Germany.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram no. 11575 from London, December 30, 1944.
January 10, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

Subject: Argentine Meat

I return herewith for your file the letter addressed to the President dated November 22, 1944 from Lord Halifax enclosing the special collection of communications exchanged between the President and the Prime Minister and others on the Argentine and British meat contracts which the President forwarded to me on November 24.

In order that that file might be complete, I am also attaching copies of three outgoing messages which are directly connected with the Argentine meat question.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.

Enclosures:

Telegrams 10178, 10004, 1761.
Letter from Halifax of November 22 and enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Attitude of Ibn Saud Toward Arab Union and Palestine.

I think that you will be particularly interested in these two telegrams from Jidda regarding King Ibn Saud's attitude toward Pan-Arab matters and the Palestine question.

We attach considerable importance to his action in signing the Protocol of Alliance between the Arab states drawn up at the recent Alexandria conference, first, because there was some question whether Saudi Arabia would sign the agreement at all, and, second, because in doing so the King has proposed certain amendments to make the Alliance more effective, with particular reference to Palestine.

Ibn Saud's statement that he regards himself as a champion of the Arabs of Palestine and would himself feel it an honor to die in battle in their cause is, of course, of the greatest significance.

Enclosures:
1. Telegram no. 8, January 4, 1 p.m., from Jidda.
2. Telegram no. 9, January 5, 4 p.m., from Jidda.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Message from the Queen of the Netherlands

I enclose for your information a message from Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands in which she states that it is now the duty of the Netherlands Government to ask for urgent military action for the purpose of driving the Germans out of Holland. The alternative request of the Netherlands Government is for immediate relief in the form either of mass evacuation or in that of food, clothing, fuel and medical supplies. The Netherlands Ambassador stated orally that the Queen has sent the same message to King George and to Prime Minister Churchill.

Enclosure:

As stated.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 17, 1945

Subject: The Iranian Question

There is enclosed in accordance with your directions a suggested reply to the Prime Minister's telegram no. 890, January 15, 1945, regarding the Iranian oil concession controversy. You will note that we in the Department feel that the subject should be discussed at the forthcoming meeting, as the Prime Minister suggests, and that the talks should be among you, Churchill and Stalin as signatories to the Declaration signed at Tehran. We do not recommend, however, that advance notice be given of an intention to discuss it, since this would give the matter undue importance.

Enclosure:
Suggested reply to Prime Minister's telegram regarding the Iranian oil concession controversy.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schumbe Date MAR 3 1972
THE IRANIAN QUESTION

1. I concur fully that the Iranian question should be discussed at our next meeting and feel that it should be with Stalin as a signatory to the Declaration signed at Tehran.

2. We have not seen sufficient evidence in Iran during recent days to demonstrate conclusively that Russia intends to insist upon an oil concession now or even upon the repeal of the Iranian law which forbids concession negotiations during the war, but Russia's continued and avowed dissatisfaction with the law arouses apprehension which should be quieted.

3. The Soviets also replied to our note on the question with a lengthy explanation of Soviet action and a reference to the American Government's "unfriendly" attitude in the matter. There seems little reason to doubt, therefore, that the Soviets are fully aware of the attitude of both our Governments. I do not think it would be advisable to single out the Iranian question by giving notice in advance of an intention to discuss it since no agenda is being planned and advance reference to this question alone would tend to accord it undue importance.

I concur that a test case may well arise in this matter which may have important bearing on the Dumbarton Oaks plans for post-war collaboration. For this reason we must make every effort, firm but conciliatory, to reach a just solution.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

January 18, 1945

Subject: Political matters for discussion at the forthcoming meeting

For your convenience I am attaching hereto an extra copy of the memorandum that I left with you in the black binder this morning covering the ten points which the State Department hopes can be satisfactorily dealt with in the forthcoming discussions.

E. R. Stettinius, Jr.
January 4, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Communist-Kuomintang Relations

Attached is a summary of a telegram from Ambassador Hurley.

The Ambassador points out that Chiang and the Communists have similar objectives -- popular government and military unity. But Chiang's promises of popular government are distrusted and his conception of unity is summed up in his statement to the Vice President: I want to cooperate with the Communists but they must obey my orders.

The Ambassador states that "the Kuomintang still hopes to keep China under one-party rule". The Communists want a coalition government. Their optimum is 1/3 Communist, 1/3 Kuomintang, and 1/3 minority party representation. Chiang is willing to concede representation which does not endanger Kuomintang control. The gap between Chiang and the Communists is wide and fundamental. It is hoped that the Ambassador can persuade Chiang and the Communists to bridge it. If they do not, civil war, as he points out, will come sooner or later.

Chiang is in a dilemma. A coalition would mean the end of conservative Kuomintang dominance and open the way for the more virile and popular Communists to extend their influence to the point perhaps of controlling
the government. Failure to settle with the Communists, who are daily growing stronger, would invite danger of an eventual overthrow of the Kuomintang. Chiang could, it is felt, rise above party selfishness and anti-Communist prejudice to head a coalition government which might bring new life into the war effort and assure unity after hostilities.

If a settlement is not reached, the alternative might be an American military command of all Chinese forces. It is understood that both Chiang and the Communists would agree to this. Such a command would make possible limited supply of ammunition and demolition material to the Communists which all observers agree could be effectively used. It would obviate political difficulties in the event of coastal landings adjacent to areas under Communist control. If Russia comes into the war in the Far East, it would be highly advantageous to have in China an over all American command, rather than a disunited Chinese command. And finally, an American command could serve as a stabilizing political influence in the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.

Attachment:

Summary of a telegram from Ambassador Hurley.
SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS IN AMBASSADOR HURLEY'S TELEGRAM OF DECEMBER 24

The Ambassador observes that the diplomats of "imperialistic nations" (British, Dutch, French and British dominions) are "planning to bring" about intervention in China. The Ambassador states that, according to his understanding, our policy in China is (1) to prevent the collapse of the national government; (2) to sustain Chiang-Kai-shek; (3) to harmonize relations between the Generalissimo and the American Commander; (4) to promote production of war supplies and prevent economic collapse; and (5) to unify all the military forces of China for the purpose of defeating Japan.

The Ambassador reports (1) that military reorganization by General Wedemeyer, with the cooperation of the Generalissimo, has had a "splendid effect on the morale of the armed forces"; (2) that Chiang "has gone quite a distance for a first step" in reorganizing his Cabinet and "will go further"; and (3) that Chinese and American military and civilian officials "are cooperating and the results of the united effort are beginning to show in the military situation".

With regard to Kuomintang-Communist relations the Ambassador states (1) that Chiang "is now convinced" that the Russian Government does not recognize or support the Chinese Communists and does not want dissension in China; (2) that T. V. Soong is going to Moscow in February or March to confer with Marshal Stalin as Chiang's personal representative; (3) that the Communists submitted through him (Hurley) a plan for a coalition government and the unification of military forces; (4) that the National Government "then had an opportunity to make a settlement with the Communists" but "they neglected or did not choose to do so at that time"; (5) that the Government submitted a counter proposal which the Communists rejected; and (6) that Chiang has appointed a new committee which is now working out a plan which he (Chiang) believes will be feasible but which will not provide for a "coalition".

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schoenbue MAR 3 1972
The Ambassador observes that the diplomats of "imperialistic nations" (British, Dutch, French and British dominions) believe that "their interests in Asia will be more definitely safeguarded if China is divided against herself". There are American officials in China, he continues, who feel that the Chinese Government is doomed to collapse and that therefore the American Government should be prepared to deal with the Chinese Communists. In conclusion, he indicates that he is not in sympathy with this point of view.
January 18, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: French Request for Participation in Big Three Meeting

I am transmitting herewith a copy of a telegram from Caffery setting forth the full text of the formal request of the French Provisional Government that it be permitted to participate in the forthcoming conference of representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

Enclosure:

Copy of telegram
no. 215 from Paris,
January 16, 1945.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 16, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN BOETTIGER

TO READ AND PLEASE RETURN
FOR MY "TRIP FILE".

F. D. R.

Memorandum on Post-War Germany.
January 17, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Voting in the Security Council

The British Embassy has informed us informally that their Government is prepared to accept the proposed compromise formula on voting which you sent to the Prime Minister some weeks ago.

They are still not entirely clear as to how this would be applied to regional arrangements but this is something which can be easily worked out with them. In communicating with us they also referred to the other open questions and requested consultation with them before invitations are actually issued to a general conference.

I presume, therefore, that you will hear from the Prime Minister on this subject shortly.

M. R. Stettinius, Jr.
January 16, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: American Public Opinion on Selected Questions

B. SUPPORTING DATA

(All polling results refer to the Cantril survey of early January 1945, unless otherwise noted.)

I. Liberated Areas (including Italy)

A. British and Russian Action

(1) By a ratio of more than 3 to 1, "The British handling of affairs in Greece" was "disapproved" (Disapproved: 52%; Approved: 15%);

(2) By a ratio of about 2 to 1, the public deems "fair", the "recent criticism of the way Britain and Russia are conducting their relations with the Greeks, the Poles and the Italians" (Fair: 44%; Unfair: 24%; No Opinion: 32%).

B. U. S. Policy

(1) Asked whether "liberated countries such as Italy and Greece should be allowed to work out their own governmental problems without interference from the three big Allied countries -- England, Russia and the U. S. -- even if civil war results" -- 48% said YES; 41% said NO (December, third week).

(2) Asked
(2) Asked whether "liberated countries should take a more active part in the settlement of European problems such as Greece, Italy and Poland, or should leave them to settlement by the European powers --

57% preferred to have the "U. S. take a more active part"

34% preferred to "leave settlement to European powers"

(3) But the 34% preferring a "hands-off" policy is reduced to 15% when asked whether we should leave settlement to the European powers even if it would mean that big powers like Britain and Russia would dominate the little countries.

(4) Only 1 in 3 of those with opinion on the question, felt "that the U. S. should do more than it is to help Italy get back on her feet".

II. Poland's Boundaries

(1) When asked whether "russia should be allowed to keep some Polish territory which the Russians now occupy provided that the Poles are given in exchange some German territory", 54% said YES, and 25% said NO.

(2) The 25% replying NO to the above question was reduced to 18% when asked whether they would "change their minds if the Poles who live in territory which would be given to Russia were helped to move to other parts of Poland."

III. Attitudes Toward Britain and Russia

A. General

(1) The number dissatisfied "with the way in which Russia, England and the United States are cooperating" rose from 28% in early December to 44% in early January.

(2) The
(2) The general public continues to designate England as the country "chiefly to blame" -- the early January figures being 22% England, 7% Russia; 4% U.S.A.; 11% no opinion (totaling 44% "dissatisfied").

(3) About 7 out of 10 of the public in early January felt that Britain "was doing all it possibly can to win the war", as compared with less than 6 out of 10 in the third week of December.

(4) 8 out of 10 continued to feel that Russia was doing all it possibly can to win the war (even prior to the new Russian offensive, January 12).

B. Disturbing Effect on Security Organization

(1) Asked whether developments in Greece, Poland and Italy would affect the success of the proposed world peace organization, 50% said that these developments "would make success more difficult", 20% thought they "would make little difference"; and 6% thought they "would make success impossible".

(2) Confidence that Britain and Russia can be trusted to cooperate with the U. S. after the war has reached the lowest point since the Moscow conference (60% "trust" Britain and 31% are distrustful) (44% "trust" Russia and 42% are distrustful)

IV. International Peace and Security Organization

(1) While 9 out of 10 of the public continue to support the general proposition that "the U. S. should join an international organization in an effort to prevent future wars", only 3 out of 10 say that they have some general idea of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.

(2) 2 out of 10 believe that these Proposals "provide
"provide a real and practical basis for setting up an international organization". However, of those with opinion on this question, the Proposals are considered "practical" by a ratio of 3 to 1.

(2) Confronted with the possibility that the peace settlement might not be "completely satisfactory" to Americans, about 60% say that we should join an international peace organization anyway; while about 30% say that we should not join.

V. Japanese Mandated Islands

American opinion strongly favors some form of U. S. control of Pacific Islands mandated to Japan. But no majority opinion has developed in support of either of the two following alternatives; according to a January poll:

(1) "U. S. govern them under the proposed new international organization" (47%);

(2) "U. S. own them outright" (38%).

VI. Other Dependent Areas

American sentiment dislikes European imperialism and would welcome arrangements looking toward the self-government of colonial peoples.

A. Italian African Colonies

Very little attention has been given specifically to the future of the Italian colonies. Two years ago, while the fighting was still going on in North Africa, a Gallup poll found that 61% opposed returning "all or nearly all the possessions Italy held in Africa at the start of the war". Only 17% held the contrary view (December 1942).

B. Indo-China

American opinion has not focused on the future of Indo-China.
January 16, 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: American Public Opinion on Selected Questions

A. CONCLUSIONS

The following appraisal takes into account all major sources of articulate opinion and various public opinion surveys including a January 1945 survey conducted by Hadley Cantril of Princeton.

I. Liberated Areas (including Italy)

A. British and Russian Action

The weight of American opinion disapproves of unilateral action by Britain and Russia regarded as "interference" in the internal politics of Greece, Italy, Poland and other countries.

B. U. S. Policy

American opinion is not firmly crystallized as to the proper role of the United States. While opposed to the principle of "interference" in the politics of liberated countries, sentiment seems to prefer a "more active" U. S. policy if this be necessary to assure a fair deal for the smaller countries.

II. Poland's
II. Poland's Boundaries

The weight of American opinion apparently is not opposed to cession of former Polish territory to Russia, provided Poland is compensated. But the public wants Poland's consent to any territorial modification. While the Curzon Line has been found acceptable by much responsible opinion, accurate testing of the general public on this specific boundary is not feasible.

III. Attitudes Toward Britain and Russia

A. General

Despite much comment sympathetic to the British during the past fortnight, opinion polls show increased dissatisfaction with Big Three cooperation. The British are chiefly blamed.

B. Disturbing Effect on Security Organization

Recent British and Russian actions have disturbed the public and led to some pessimism concerning the establishment of a successful international security organization.

IV. International Peace and Security Organization

The American public, despite some criticism and pessimism concerning Dumbarton Oaks, overwhelmingly desires American participation in an international security organization.

V. Japanese Mandated Islands

American opinion strongly favors some form of U. S. control of Pacific Islands mandated to Japan. But opinion is almost evenly divided on the method of control -- slightly favoring U. S. administration under an international organization rather than outright U. S. ownership.

VI. Other
VI. Other Dependent Areas

American sentiment dislikes European imperialism and would welcome arrangements looking toward the self-government of colonial peoples.

VII. British Empire Preferences

Articulate opinion is practically unanimous that British Empire preferences should not be excepted from proposed international agreements calling for substantial reduction of trade barriers. It is increasingly felt that reduction of Empire preferences must be accompanied by reductions in U. S. tariffs.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

14 March 1945

Memorandum for

MISS TULLY

In response to the attached memorandum from Miss Schwass of the State Department, Mrs. Brady suggested, and Admiral Brown and Mr. Latta concurred, that the correspondence requested should be shown to the Office of Near Eastern Affairs.

This has been done. That Office was also informed that copies could not be provided without authorization by the President, but Miss Schwass was satisfied to be allowed to read the messages and does not wish copies.

Hence this is "finished business."

Respectfully,

[Signature]

TO: Miss Tully  
The White House

FROM:  

SUBJECT: Top Secret Telegrams

DATE: March 13, 1945

Dear Miss Tully:

Yesterday this office was apprised of an exchange of telegrams between Prime Minister Churchill and the President, dated the latter part of August 1942, with regard to a request of the United States to help the British with transportation of lend-lease aid to Russia by taking over the responsibility for operation of the Iranian railway.

This subject is now being discussed and we should greatly appreciate it if the members of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs concerned with this matter could be allowed to peruse this correspondence.

I talked with Mrs. Bonsteele of Mr. Ingling's office yesterday, and she informed me that the telegrams were top secret and that we would have to receive Mr. Latte's permission before we could be allowed to see them; and Mr. Latte suggested I write a memorandum to you.

There is also a telegram of a later date from Mr. Harriman to the President recommending that consideration be given this request, as stated above.

Thank you very kindly for your assistance in this matter.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: War Crimes

The British are urging a meeting in London between officials of this Department, the War Department, and the British Government in an effort to iron out a number of questions relating to war crimes.

On February 14 Acting Secretary Grew sent a letter to Joe Davies in New York expressing the hope that he would be able promptly to make his contemplated trip on this same subject. The next morning a letter was received from him, which crossed Mr. Grew's in the mail, stating that he would be tied up for several weeks on account of illness.

A general program for the handling of war crimes was the subject of conferences between officials of this Department, the War Department, the Attorney General, and Judge Rosenman prior to your departure for Yalta. Their recommendations were, I think, laid before you. The proposals contemplated the setting up of an international tribunal for the purpose of trying the principal German leaders and their associates for joint participation in a broad criminal enterprise and laying the foundation for subsequent trials of members of the Gestapo, SS, etc., on charges of complicity in the basic criminal plan. They also contemplated the trial of individuals for individual atrocities. The subsequent trials would take place before occupation or other appropriate tribunals. I understand this plan was not discussed at Yalta.

In
In as much as the war crimes program is more or less bogged down and in as much as we have assured the public that we have definite plans in mind, we should take prompt steps to get things moving in the right direction.

Judge Rosenman is well informed on the subject. I suggest that you authorize the Department to have him look into the whole situation in London and discuss the proposed plan and other current questions relating to war crimes with the British officials.

I also suggest that the Department be authorized to ascertain whether the Secretary of War may not desire to have someone from his Department join Judge Rosenman in the discussions.

May I have your approval.

\[Signature\]

Acting Secretary
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Latest Opinion Trends In The United States.

You will be interested in the attached memorandum on opinion trends in the United States with regard to dependent areas and the treatment of colonies.

Acting Secretary
LATEST OPINION TRENDS IN THE U.S.A.

A. Postwar Administration of Dependent Areas

The American people respond favorably to the idea that an international organization should exercise an interest in the administration of dependent areas.

This conclusion rests upon the responses to the following questions which were asked during the first half of March by the Princeton Office of Public Opinion Research.

"Do you think every nation which has colonies should make regular reports to a new international organization on how it is administering affairs inside its colonies?"

Yes 62% No 17% No opinion 21%

"Should a new international organization be given the right to make definite recommendations to nations with colonies as to how the administration in their colonies might be improved?"

Yes 70% No 11% No opinion 19%

"As you know, the U.S. has certain possessions such as Puerto Rico. Do you think the international organization should have the right to make recommendations to the U.S. as to how the administration in our own possessions might be improved?"

Yes 59% No 27% No opinion 14%

Observations

1. It cannot be presumed that the average American has much appreciation of the potential significance either
either of "reports" to an international authority or of "recommendations" by it—nor much familiarity with the experience under the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.

2. The foregoing results indicate popular readiness to accept such proposals; but they do not indicate how great may be the public demand for such innovations in the absence of a concrete proposal from the government.

3. Articulate support has been expressed for the general idea that an international authority should exercise some interest in the welfare of dependent peoples, by outstanding leaders and organizations, especially churches and groups devoted to the promotion of an international organization such as that proposed at Dumbarton Oaks. Press and radio discussion during recent months, however, has been slight.

B. Treatment of Colonies by Leading Powers

More sentiment exists to the effect that the British treat their colonies "unfairly" than in the cases of France and the Netherlands.

This finding of the recent Princeton poll may not be unexpected in view of the relatively slight public attention focused on the French and Dutch empires, and the large proportion of the public having "no opinion" concerning them.

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<th>Unfairly</th>
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<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>56 France</td>
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<td></td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>51 Holland</td>
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<td></td>
<td>86</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10 U.S.A.</td>
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JOSEPH C. GREW

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schenble Date MAR 3 1972
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<td>29% Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>56% France</td>
</tr>
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<td>&quot;Do you think American has treated the people in its colonies fairly or unfairly?&quot;</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>51% Holland</td>
</tr>
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<td>&quot;Do you think American has treated the people in its colonies fairly or unfairly?&quot;</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10% U.S.A.</td>
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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schreiber Date MAR 3 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Latest Opinion Trends
In The U. S. A.

Attached herewith a memorandum on the latest opinion trends in the United States which will be of interest to you.

The report covers public familiarity with Dumbarton Oaks and opinion on Franco Spain.

Acting Secretary
LATEST OPINION TRENDS IN THE U.S.A.

A. Public Familiarity with Dumbarton Oaks

Nearly 4 out 10 college-educated Americans feel that they have a "good idea" of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, but only 1 out of 10 among those having merely a grade-school education. This question was asked of all those who said they had "heard" about the Proposals (52% of a national-section) when interviewed at the end of February and early March by the Office of Public Opinion Research, Princeton.

"In a general way do you feel that you have a good idea of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals?"

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<td>National</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>52%</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
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This Cantril survey found that 61% of the college-trained said they had not read a "copy or summary" of the Proposals, and that among those with a grade-school education, 94% said they had not done so.

B. Information and Opinion on Franco Spain

Although 47% of the public do not "trust" Spain to cooperate after the war, a much smaller proportion appears to favor withdrawal of recognition -- according to an unpublished Princeton poll of those correctly informed on the question of U.S. recognition of Franco's government.

However, this March survey found that 23% of a national cross-section believe that Franco is not now recognized. Only a third of the public is correctly informed as to present recognition; and half simply say they "don't know".

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schaubie Date MAR 3 1972
"Do you know whether or not the U. S. now recognizes (has diplomatic relations with) General Franco's government?"

Yes, does recognize 31%
No, does not recognize 23%
Don't know 46%

The question on future recognition policy was asked only of the 31% of the national cross-section who understood that the United States presently recognizes the Franco government.

"Do you think we should continue to recognize Franco's government or do you think we should withdraw our recognition of his government?"

Continue to recognize 15%
Withdraw recognition 12%
No opinion 31%

On the question of "trust" in postwar cooperation, more "distrust" was expressed concerning Spain (47%) than any of a dozen allied and neutral countries (Sweden, 6%; Russia, 32%), except Argentina (62%). The December question was as follows:

"Do you think Spain can be trusted to cooperate with other countries after the war?"

Yes 21% No 47% No opinion 32%

Group differences on this question are remarkably small. The proportion of those "distrusting" Spain--among those with opinions--is perceptibly greater in the upper economic group and in the college-educated group; but differences by political party and by religion are slight.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Conditions in Liberia.

The Department has for some months been making an intensive study of economic, political, and social conditions in the Republic of Liberia, which compare most unfavorably with the situation in neighboring colonial territories. The inefficiency and lack of initiative of the ruling group, the corruption in government circles, the scandalous treatment of the native inhabitants, and the lack of democratic practises in this independent republic are of particular concern to us at a time when the problem of dependent peoples is under widespread discussion.

Representatives of the Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, who recently made a tour of West Africa at your suggestion, are reported to be shocked at what they saw in Liberia in comparison with British and French colonial administrations. Whether or not we admit it, Liberia is widely regarded as a responsibility of the United States.

At the suggestion of President Tubman, the chief of the FEA mission in Liberia recently delivered a forceful speech calling attention to Liberia's shortcomings. President Tubman appears willing to undertake some housecleaning but not without "pressure" and moral support from the United States Government to enable him to face the resistance of the entrenched Americo-Liberian oligarchy. Mr. Felix Cole, our recent Chargé d'Affaires in Monrovia, has urged that plain speaking is necessary regarding conditions in Liberia, where we are advancing $12,500,000 to construct a harbor and assisting the country.
country with an economic survey, a health project and agricultural advice.

There seems little use in handling our relations with Liberia in a sentimental vein or as if the Republic represented a successful experiment in democracy. Sincere friends of Liberia, as well as intelligent Negro opinion in the United States, are, in general, highly critical of that country. On the other hand, it is unreasonable to expect Liberians, without outside assistance, to make a showing that compares favorably with colonial areas which have regular subsidies from the mother country for education, health and administrative machinery.

If the sensitivities of the French, British or Dutch should be aroused over the question of trusteeship for dependent peoples, it is not impossible that some embarrassing charges against Liberia may arise at the San Francisco conference. There are indications that the British may, at some future time, to serve their own ends, throw a spotlight on compulsory labor practises in Liberia.

The Department considers that American interests in Liberia are of sufficient importance and our responsibilities compelling enough to justify strong representations to the Liberian Government, coupled with a program of moral, economic and possibly financial support, to bring about needed reform within the structure of Liberian independence. If you approve, the Department plans to proceed along these lines.

Acting Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 3 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Latest Opinion Trends In The U. S.

Attached herewith is a memorandum on latest opinion trends in the United States which you will be interested in reading.

The report covers voting in the assembly and food for liberated Europe.

[Signature]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1945
LATEST OPINION TRENDS IN THE U.S.A.

A. Voting in the Assembly

Reaction to the Secretary's statement of April 3 has been as follows:

(1) General relief based on the feeling that much had been done to "repair damage" done by the revelation of the U.S.-Soviet "secret agreement" on voting in the Assembly;

(2) Satisfaction that the U.S. will ask for only one vote in the Assembly, and much speculation (with some expressed hope) that Russia may not present to the conference a request for three votes;

(3) Considerable satisfaction that the San Francisco conference is expected to convene on April 25 despite some misgivings at holding the conference if agreement is still lacking on major issues.

(4) Opposition from nationalistic press and radio sources unfavorable to an arrangement in which Russia will out-vote us.

(5) Speculation over the delegation's readiness to back up the President's commitment to support the Russian desire for three votes.

B. Food for liberated Europe

The President's statement on March 16 that the American people would have to "tighten their belts" precipitated considerable comment, a large majority of which was sympathetic to Allied food needs. At the end of March a Cantril survey of public opinion found that 90% said they were willing to have rationing continue in the United States "for several extra months in order to provide enough food to maintain health in countries like France and Norway which have suffered under German occupation". This represented no change of opinion since last August; although during the same period opinion favorable to feeding the Germans dropped from 70% to 60%.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Transfer of Ambassador Norweb.

I submit for your approval the transfer of Ambassador Norweb from Panama to Cuba to take the place of Ambassador Braden, whose transfer to Argentina you recently approved.
My dear Miss Tully:

At the instance of the Paraguayan Embassy at Washington, I am transmitting herewith a communication addressed to the President by His Excellency the President of Paraguay. A translation of the letter is also enclosed herewith.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
Chief of Protocol

Enclosures:
Letter, with translation.

Miss Grace G. Tully,
The White House.
GENERAL HIGINIO MORINIGO M.

President of the Republic of Paraguay

My dear friend and President:

I take great pleasure in referring to your last letter in which you praise the contribution my country has made to the allied cause and to the events which arise from this final stage of the war and from the manner in which the establishment of a world organization for security is envisioned.

Fully aware of the importance to all countries at present associated with yours of any measure which would tend to consolidate even more the concept of unity of aims between our two countries, Paraguay being desirous of increasing its cooperation with the United Nations, has decided to join the group of Sovereignties in a state of war with the Axis Powers, adopting the measures necessary thereto.

I avail myself of this opportunity to repeat to my friend the President my most cordial greetings.

Very sincerely,

(signed) H. Morinigo M.
General Higinio Morínigo
Presidente de la República del Paraguay

Mi querido amigo y Presidente:

Me es sumamente grato referirme a Vuestra última carta en la cual elogiais la contribución que mi país ha hecho en favor de la causa aliada, a los acontecimientos que emergen de esta etapa final de la guerra, y de la forma en que se encara el establecimiento de una organización mundial de seguridad.

Comprenetrado profundamente del alcance que para todos los países actualmente asociados al Vuestro tiene cualquier medida, que tienda a consolidar aún más el concepto de unidad de miras entre nuestros países, y deseando el Paraguay incrementar su cooperación con las Naciones Unidas, ha decidido incorporarse al grupo de Soberanías en estado de guerra con las potencias del Eje adoptando las medidas necesarias a ese efecto.

Aprovecho esta oportunidad para reiterar al amigo y Presidente mis más cordiales saludos,

Muy sinceramente

[Signature]
My dear Miss Tully:

At the instance of the British Embassy, I am transmitting herewith an unsealed communication addressed to the President by the British Ambassador at Washington.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Chief of Protocol

Enclosure:
Unsealed letter.

Miss Grace G. Tully,
The White House.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

April 10th, 1945.

Dear Mr. President,

I have received a telegram from Anthony asking me to thank you very warmly for the invitation to him to stay with you on his way back from San Francisco.

He is delighted to accept and looks forward very much indeed to coming.

Yours ever,

The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
The Honourable Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.