General Watson

No record in General Files of a letter mentioned.

P.S.
The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

The New York Times of April 10th carried as its leading editorial (attached) the views of that paper on what it calls "The Defense Picture". In the last paragraph the writer voices a thought which has been in my mind for some time. You may recall my letter of November 29, 1938 and my memorandum of March 8, 1939 in which I suggested that you create a council to study the long-range problems of national defense. Recent events throughout the world have confirmed my conviction that the suggested action is both sound and desirable. It seems to me that the creation of such a body would meet with overwhelming popular approval throughout the country. It would appeal to all good Americans of whatever political creed or social or economic status. I believe that the press of the country would almost unanimously approve. It would inspire confidence and allay suspicion; it would be a logical step, supported by precedent and rooted in reason.

Because I feel so strongly that our defensive posture would be tremendously enhanced by such action on your part, I urge you to approve this proposal in principle after which, if you desire, I will submit suggestions for appointees and other details for your consideration and decision.

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

2 inclosures.
REASONS IN SUPPORT OF THE SUGGESTION TO CREATE A PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE TO BE KNOWN AS "THE PRESIDENT'S DEFENSE COUNCIL".

1. The subject of national defense now bulks larger in the national consciousness of the American people than ever before in our peace-time history. The annihilation of our traditional concepts of time and space by the airplane make it clear that never again will we be able to rely so complacently on our geographical situation for protection as has been our custom for over one hundred years. Accordingly, national defense must in the future play an ever-increasing role in our national development.

2. Such action as we take to strengthen our defensive posture should be based upon adequate and comprehensive studies of our entire situation with respect to the other nations of the world. Such studies do not now exist.

3. The Council should investigate and make recommendations upon our national defensive policy with respect to its broad objectives and the means and methods necessary to attain them.

4. The Council should also act as a special advisory body to investigate and report directly to the President on any phase of the defense problem which he might indicate.
5. The establishment of such a permanent Defense Council would lend desirable continuity to the study of the broad aspects of national defense.

6. Sound and comprehensive long-range plans for the future development of our defensive establishment would furnish a solid basis upon which to present estimates for funds to the Congress.

7. The Council should supervise detailed investigations of political, economic, financial and military relationships existing throughout this hemisphere; such investigations to be undertaken by qualified representatives from the various Departments of Government organized as a National Defense College. The Council might well establish maximum, minimum and intermediate defensive requirements for this country based upon (1) a policy of active assistance to the other democracies in the event of hostilities in Europe, (2) a policy of continental defense only, and (3) a policy of hemisphere defense. These investigations should embody conclusions as to how to implement each of these policies.

8. The subject of national defense touches either directly or indirectly all phases of our national life. While to our armed forces and our diplomatic agencies the problems of
national defense are of immediate and continuing concern, still
the interests of industry, labor and the general public in our
defensive policies are no less vital than those of the former
groups. The creation of a permanent Defense Council including
carefully chosen representatives of all these groups would
inspire great confidence in the public mind and would have great
public appeal.

9. There is excellent precedent for the creation of such
a body. For example, the Endicott Board (1886) and the Baker
Board (1934), although created for limited purposes, were steps
along the pathway which current events clearly indicate that we
should follow.

10. The necessity for such a group will become increas-
ingly obvious as time passes. Continuous shrinkage of the world
by progress in the fields of transportation and communication
will bring us ever closer to our neighbors and thus make almost
suicidal the policy of feverish emergency activity which has
characterized our approach to national defense crises in the past.

11. Practically every foreign nation of first rank in the
world has an organization similar to the one proposed. Hard
experience has convinced them of the practical need therefor.
THE DEFENSE PICTURE

With a remarkable degree of unanimity agreement has been expressed about the approval of the bulk of the routine and special legislation proposed by the President in his message to strengthen our defenses.

In so doing, it has emphasized, in the only language understandable to the American people, our determination to maintain the defenses of our own democracy.

Eight new battleships will soon be on the ways. The modernization and strengthening of our fleet in other types will be continued. New bases will be established, new drydocks built. A third set of locks will probably be constructed at Panama, the garrison reinforced. Some 40,000 officers and men are to be added to the army, its arms and equipment modernized. Our factories will be prepared by means of "educational orders" for wartime production, our raw material resources built up by the purchase of strategic supplies. Our air forces are to be almost trebled in strength, new types purchased, our production capacity increased, more planes and machinery trained.

The decision of Congress to provide an adequate defense is commendable in a time of crisis. Nevertheless, it must be said that there has been too little disposition to take stock of the whole present effort and to coordinate our defense activities under one comprehensive plan. What is needed first is a real picture of costs. The monetary details of the defense budgets today are complicated a 1 confusing. In the budget for 1940 there are at least three different estimates for national defense. And in addition to regular appropriations there are other special items. In some cases actual defense figures have been obscured under relief appropriations. It may well be that all the authorization and appropriation measures, now incompletely estimated to cost from $2,000,000,000 to $2,500,000,000, are needed in order to strengthen adequately our army and navy; but no very accurate analysis of the program or its future worth can be made when it is presented, debated and passed in such piecemeal fashion.

Moreover, the current defense legislation leaves much to be desired from the viewpoint of long-range planning. There are conflicts and anomalies in the defense scheme as now outlined. Some $270,000,000 is to be appropriated for the construction of new naval vessels during the coming fiscal year, yet no attempt has been made to investigate and modify the anticipated organization of the Navy Department which has been partly responsible for past delay and expensive errors in our shipbuilding program. The House rejected the naval air base at Guam, but approved a similar measure at Wake Island, which is subject to much the same political and strategic disadvantages as is Guam. The army's air force is to be increased to 6,000 planes; yet not one of the types to be purchased is capable of flying an ocean with a bombing load, and about one-third of the number are to be placed in a sort of tactical reserve, liable to
quick obsolescence. The navy is turning out scores of new ships; yet the German pocket battleships can outrun any of ours which they cannot outshoot. Our Protective Mobilization Plan calls for an "Initial Protective Force" of about 450,000 officers and men (Regular Army, National Guard and Regular Army Reserve) to be under arms within one month after a call for mobilization; yet enlistments for the Regular Army Reserve—an integral part of this plan—are lagging badly; few provisions have been made for training the "I. P. F.," as a unit, and there is considerable doubt as to whether a force of half this size could take the field within the stated time.

Thus, despite the considerable accomplishments of Congress in repairing real deficiencies in our national defense, much remains to be desired. A coordinated plan of present defense measures should be prepared, and a thorough study of our future needs should be begun at once. The best agency to conduct such a study is an expert commission, appointed by the President, the members of which should be preponderantly civilian. With the aid of members of Congress, officers of the armed services, representatives of the State and Treasury Departments and the cooperation of every Government agency, such a commission—without in any way delaying plans already approved—could do much to clarify the whole present defense program and to define our future needs in the light of modern knowledge.
April 4, 1939.

Statement to the Press--Press Conf

Re-Signing Bill for Emergency National Defense in relation to the Air Service and the purchase of a large number of additional planes.

See: Steve Early folder-Drawer 2-1939
My dear Fegan:

Your letter is most interesting and I take it that Shanghai is even more a Tower of Babel than Washington, D. C., at this moment -- and that is saying a lot.

I wish I could write you more freely but I fear some of the hands through which the mail may pass before you get this. At least I can tell you that I am glad you confirm my impression that the Japanese are suffering far more casualties than are admitted. This week we get news of some apparently severe fighting near the Mongolia-Manchukuo line, but it is difficult to sift facts as the Japanese claim to have destroyed one hundred and fifty Russian planes, with practically no loss to themselves, and the Russians claim the exact opposite.

Also I am much interested in what you say of the German invasion. I hear from North China of the arrival of a good many Italians.

Your regiment must be a fine outfit. Don't go and get the cholera, and write me again soon.

Always sincerely,

Colonel Joseph C. Fegan,
United States Marine Corps,
Headquarters, Fourth Marines,
Shanghai, China.
Dear Mr. President:

With the Japanese corralling all the nickel and copper coins to be converted into bullets, the International Settlement has gone into the hands of paper money.

There appears to be no let-up in the silly way in which the Japanese are conducting themselves in both a military and commercial way. When approached for an answer on such actions, they reply that it is due unfortunately to the fact that they have inexperienced and young men in key positions, therefore, mistakes naturally take place.

So far as their occupation of the International Settlement and French Concession is concerned, it seems to be a foregone conclusion that the Japs will eventually gain possession of them through additional representation on the Shanghai Municipal Council and the Shanghai Municipal Police. Recently, there have been occasions which might have been used as excuses by the Japs to march in and take over the Settlement. The opinion out here seems that they do not want to do this; because after they have taken over, the Chino guerrillas and gangsters would harrass their police to such an extent that their administration would result in a failure.

What the British position will be when the final terms between the Chinese and Japanese have been reached, is a matter of speculation. We hear that negotiations are under way in which the British are offering to share with the Japs their wharves located along the Yangtze, in exchange for certain trade privileges. This yield on the part of the British is but an example of what is being carried on sub rosa. There is no question but what the British are selling the Chinese out down the river.

With three ambassadors (American, British, and French) and three commanders-in-chief (same nations) all present
in Shanghai at this time, many rumors are being circulated as to the upshot of this unusual meeting.

The recent tumble taken by the Yen has been the most embarrassing thing the Japanese have faced during the last year.

There is no doubt that the progress of the Japanese military operations has been arrested. This is due principally to the stiff front being offered by the newly recruited Chinese Army and the ever disturbing effect created by the Chinese guerrilla operations.

It seems almost incredible, but along with the program of destruction conducted by the Japanese, the Chinese are carrying on an effective program of reconstruction.

Even the college professors have been turned into officers; and students, into privates. The student Chinese are deserting their arts and music in favor of military science. It is a fact too, that right in the middle of all of this calamity, Shanghai is enjoying a big real estate boom. The billet grounds occupied by the Regiment are wanted by the proprietors so they can demolish the buildings and have apartment houses erected on the sites.

As the time goes on, the Soviet aid to China seems to be manifested more, especially in the form of planes, pilots, hides, gasoline, and small military arms.

The famous Burma road is certainly not much help to the Generalissimo's service of supply. In the first place, the road is too narrow; in the second place, the road bed is too soft; and in the third place, the whole road is too vulnerable. With the most strenuous concentration on it, at least two years would be required to make it of any real military value. The Generalissimo's supplies are gotten principally through coolie packs, camel packs, and some water and rail transportation.

The Japanese are suffering far more casualties than the world will ever learn. These casualties are due mainly to dysentery, drugs, cholera, and exhausted man power.

So far as the Japanese joining the Rome-Berlin axis is concerned, it is the popular belief out here that if
they do join—it will be with reservations, such reservations hinging on the retention of her Mandates and other Asiatic possessions.

A country that has to pull up man-hole covers, fences, and salvage parts of public utilities, in order to gather metal for munitions, is certainly on thin ice.

There is much dissension over policy between the younger school of officers and the older school of officers, both in the Japanese Army and Navy. You would be amazed at the lip the youngsters give their admirals during joint conferences.

"Where is the Japanese Navy?" They are tied up in the Inland Sea, various naval stations, and sea ports, because the Navy has not sufficient funds to cruise, or carry on decent gunnery exercises. The cost of operations of the Army is exhausting their national defense budget.

There is much speculation rife as to what the map of China will resemble after the final clean up of the present invasion. The most heralded estimate is one that the Japanese will retain control of the principal coastal and river ports and move the entire export trade of China in Japanese bottoms.

Everybody agrees that the original Japanese campaign, calling for the driving of a spearhead along the southern Soviet border in order to establish a puppet controlled strip, was cleverly distorted by the Chinese. This cunning maneuver caused the Japanese to over extend their lines and operating cost so greatly that the whole Japanese military campaign will go down in history as a terrible military blunder.

It is interesting to note, that whenever occasion arises the Japanese who were imported to colonize the occupied spots in China are slipping back to their own country. They complain that the high cost of poor living and lack of housing in China are ruining the health of their families and themselves.

It is well known, Mr. President, that the Japs are scared to death of you, but not so of "10 Downing Street." As a matter of fact they are saying that the British "life line" to Asia has a couple of bad gashes in it. The terrible licking the British are taking out here is most
amusing to Americans, especially those of us who were out here in the olden days. Notwithstanding, I must say that they are carrying on in traditional British fashion. Your friendly attitude toward the British King and Queen certainly has brought American and British Colonies close together. Russia still remains poison ivy to the Japs.

All of a sudden and with constant increase in numbers, young German business men have appeared in the coastal ports of China. Apparently, they are representing German business firms of strength as they have money to do the things that put them in the fore. These young men are going into the shipping business, principally.

With the introduction of some five-thousand German-Jew emigres into the already over populated Settlement, cholera has reappeared. Consequently, coolie Chinese are dying like rats. So many are dying that the health authorities have had to burn them during the night on the outskirts of the town. Every effort has been made to conceal the epidemic. However, so far as your Americans are concerned, there is no cause for anxiety.

Admiral Yarnell's departure has been a matter of deep regret to all nationalities. It is common talk that he is by far the most popular Yankee admiral who has ever served out here. Even his popularity has penetrated the moss-backed British Country Club. For the first time in the history of the Club, it has feted an American admiral or displayed the American Flag. There is no question about it, he has done a grand job. Even the Japs say that he is a "hard nut to crack." I understand that the American business men are asking our Ambassador to recommend that special recognition be given the Admiral for his distinguished service out here—he certainly rates it.

So far as the military performance of your Marine Regiment, numbering a thousand men, is concerned, I can say we are taking no back talk from any of the other military outfits.

The fact that you answered my letter and radio, was deeply appreciated and gave me an added inspiration to carry on. Many thanks!

Shortly, I will mail you a Chinese product with the
hope that it will be of some comfort to you.

I see that Jimmy continues to travel. Certainly the experience he is gathering will stand him well in life. I still have hopes of him coming out and taking his annual training with this Regiment.

May this find you and Mrs. Roosevelt well.

With my usual admiration and loyalty,

Your friend,

His Excellency
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.
July 13, 1939

Memo to President
From T.G. C.

In re: John Lewis' thoughts on McNutt appt.

See: Tommy Corcoran folder-Drawer 2-1939
General Services Administration
National Archives and Records Service
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Williams.

Dear Sir:

The following document, a photostat copy of which is inclosed, has been declassified:

Memorandum from the Secretary of War to the President, August 1939, and two attachments, totaling three pages.

Sincerely yours,

HERBERT M. JONES
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
Memorandum from Secretary of War to the President dated August 1939 with two attachments
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

August 1939.

In the event of war in Europe certain military measures in preparation for our own defense appear advisable.

There are herewith submitted to you two charts outlining those measures that are considered of first importance.

On one chart there is presented Immediate Action Measures which can be initiated by you without Congressional action, although some of these measures will incur deficits amounting in all to approximately $62,000,000 for the Fiscal Year 1940. These deficits must be met by appropriations within a period of about 5 months.

On the second chart are presented Measures Requiring Congressional Authorization or Appropriation.

The purpose of these measures as a whole is to place the Regular Army and the National Guard in a condition of preparedness suitable to the present disturbed world situation. They do not contemplate mobilization at this time but proceed only to the extent of completing in its most important features, the organization of our Regular Army (at peace strength throughout) and increasing the strength of the National Guard organizations to the minimum at which we believe such organizations can effectively undertake field operations.

The effect of these measures will be to make available for prompt mobilization and employment a Regular Army and a National Guard with a combined strength of approximately 560,000 men (excluding overseas garrisons). These measures will provide for special corps and army troops that are now lacking and which are vitally necessary for operations of large units. They will provide equipment for all of the above forces and a supply of ammunition sufficient for a period of one year.

Secretary of War.

2 Incls.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>MEASURE</th>
<th>Time Req'd for Execution of Measure</th>
<th>Approximate Cost of Execution</th>
<th>Probable Deficit June 30, 1940</th>
<th>PURPOSE OF THE MEASURE OR REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Secure appropriations to cover deficiencies for FY 1940</td>
<td>$62,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>These deficiencies should be met as early as possible. Some of them must be covered by appropriations not later than March 1, 1940.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Secure appropriation for the procurement of additional Critical items of equipment for the forces to be raised under the Protective Mobilization Plan.</td>
<td>$500,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A portion of this equipment is needed properly to equip the Regular Army and active National Guard at proposed strength. All of this equipment will be required upon mobilization under the Protective Mobilization Plan. It includes guns, ammunition, tanks, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Secure appropriation for the procurement of essential (non-critical) items of equipment and one year's supply of munitions for forces raised in the Initial Protective Force.</td>
<td>$317,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This equipment and munitions is essential to the proper functioning and preparedness for action of the Regular Army and active National Guard when raised to the peace strength authorized in the National Defense Act. It includes additional ammunition reserve, clothing and equipment and motor transportation, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Secure appropriations for 500 airplanes including accessories, Signal and Ordnance equipment, and bombs.</td>
<td>$100,000,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>These would complete the 6,000 airplanes now authorized by law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Secure appropriations to increase National Guard emergency drills from 1 to 2 per week and provide 1 ration for 1 week-end training period per month.</td>
<td>$2,400,000 per month.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To facilitate intensive training of the National Guard without separating men from civil occupations. It is an essential preliminary step to actual concentration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Secure appropriations to further increase the National Guard to include the activation of inactive elements of troops included in the Protective Mobilization Plan.</td>
<td>Initial Cost $1,800,000. Monthly Cost $200,000.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This requires an increase of about 17,000 in the strength of the National Guard. It is an important step toward expediting the availability of major units mobilized under the Protective Mobilization Plan. The funds would not be expended until mobilization appeared to be imminent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Secure legislation to provide that, notwithstanding the limitations imposed in the current appropriation Acts, the President may call additional Reserve officers to extended active duty, and to provide the necessary funds.</td>
<td>$2,000,000 per month.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>About 6,000 Reserve Officers should be employed at once for training on extended active duty with the Regular Army, which increased under &quot;immediate action&quot; measures, would be 8,000 officers short.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Secure legislation to authorize and provide pay for the employment of retired officers, nurses, warrant officers and enlisted men on active duty.</td>
<td>$150,000 per month.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Essential to make available qualified personnel of appropriate grade for administrative duties, - ROTC, Military Academy, Recruiting, Staffs, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Secure authorization and appropriation to meet miscellaneous civilian personnel needs.</td>
<td>$250,000 per month.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily to permit the release from administrative duties of officer, warrant officer and enlisted personnel that are needed for use with combat units. To provide for additional nurses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Secure appropriation to meet cost of transfer of Regular Army officers from present duties to duty with troop units and essential installations.</td>
<td>$650,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>To provide part of the additional personnel required with troop units and installations by withdrawing experienced officers from less essential duties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE ABOVE MEASURES REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION OR APPROPRIATION
## Industrial Mobilization Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>To Be Initiated By Whom</th>
<th>Purpose of Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Presidential proclamation (Draft prepared by ARB)</td>
<td>Gives additional Presidential power to coordinate and expedite production of munitions and for the economic mobilization of our national resources, in connection with power, fuel, transportation, communication and radio control, shipping, wages and hours, security exchanges, real estate, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Presidential executive orders.</td>
<td>Any restrictions detrimental to rapid war procurement can be suspended. See 1 above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Presidential proclamation. (Draft prepared by ARB)</td>
<td>Will provide initial setup for economic control of the country, which can be expanded at a later date by additional enabling legislation, if so desired.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>War Resources Administration. (Draft being prepared by War Resources Board)</td>
<td>Prevent dislocation of price structure due to the declaration of an emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Army and Navy Munitions Board Clearance Committees.</td>
<td>War orders placed by friendly foreign powers must be coordinated with our proposed allocated loads and definite priorities set up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Supply Arms and Services.</td>
<td>Puts us in a position of readiness in case of a declaration of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Supply Arms and Services.</td>
<td>To have estimates available for immediate action by Congress in case of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Supply Arms and Services.</td>
<td>Will shorten time in attaining our maximum war effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Supply Arms and Services, and Army and Navy Munitions Board.</td>
<td>Will assist in eliminating bottlenecks in our war program, if started early in any war emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Army and Navy Munitions Board. (Draft already prepared)</td>
<td>To have the necessary legislation available for prompt submission to the Congress. This will provide for complete control of our economic structure and allows removal of any remaining restrictive legislation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Supply Arms and Services.</td>
<td>Will assist materially in case of a major effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure</td>
<td>New Initiation</td>
<td>Time Need for Completion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. General Security Proclamation, Subsequent Proclamations and Executive Orders</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reinforcement of Army responsibilities under Security Proclamation</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reinforce the Federal Security Forces</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Supplement Military for Operation in Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Allocate Army to the Federal Security Forces</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Adopt New Military Plan for Operation in Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
</tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Immediate Military Action Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>New Initiation</th>
<th>Time Need for Completion</th>
<th>Appropriate Unit</th>
<th>Restate / Class</th>
<th>Purpose of the Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General Security Proclamation, Subsequent Proclamations and Executive Orders</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reinforcement of Army responsibilities under Security Proclamation</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reinforce the Federal Security Forces</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Presidential Order</td>
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<td>None</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Allocate Army to the Federal Security Forces</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
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<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Immediate Industrial Mobilization Measures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>New Initiation</th>
<th>Time Need for Completion</th>
<th>Appropriate Unit</th>
<th>Restate / Class</th>
<th>Purpose of the Measure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. General Security Proclamation, Subsequent Proclamations and Executive Orders</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reinforcement of Army responsibilities under Security Proclamation</td>
<td>Presidential Proclamation</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reinforce the Federal Security Forces</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Supplement Military for Operation in Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Allocate Army to the Federal Security Forces</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Adopt New Military Plan for Operation in Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Adopt New Military Plan for Operation in Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Adopt New Military Plan for Operation in Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Adopt New Military Plan for Operation in Puerto Rico</td>
<td>Presidential Order</td>
<td>30 days</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>State Department responsibility. New formulated and agreed to in essentials by Sec. and Army Departments.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

At the Cabinet meeting on August 4, 1939, you indicated the possibility of Army replacements for Marines on foreign shore stations, exclusive of China and the Philippines, with a view to the creation of Marine Base Defense Battalions for use elsewhere. Also, the necessity for the loan by the War Department to the Marine Corps of such special equipment as is not available from naval sources for the equipment of the Base Defense Battalions to be organized.

Information has been obtained from the Major General Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps as to the personnel and equipment that would be required. Arrangements have been made by the War Department to meet these requirements when you so direct.

Respectfully yours,

Secretary of War.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
August 22, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I am enclosing for your information a chart showing the immediate measures now planned to be initiated by the War Department in the event of war in Europe.

Upon your return to Washington I will submit a similar chart showing the measures to be initiated in the event you decide a national emergency exists, in accordance with Section 120 of the National Defense Act.

Enclosure:
Chart

[Signature]

Louis Johnson
8-26-39

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This information comes from the Army, Chief of Military Intelligence, re the report of Russian vessels passing through the Panama Canal.

E. M. W.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Subject: Movements of Russian Naval Vessels.

1. According to very reliable information, on July 17th the following Russian ships sailed from Balboa, C.Z.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ship</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Tonnage</th>
<th>Destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tros</td>
<td>Minelayer &amp; Sweeper</td>
<td>383-500</td>
<td>Vladivostok, via San Francisco &amp; Dutch Harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straela</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>383-500</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podeskatel</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>383-500</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provodnik</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>383-500</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zarja</td>
<td>Tug</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troujenik</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republika</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svir</td>
<td>Freighter</td>
<td>2328</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ladoga</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>2332</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volkho</td>
<td>do</td>
<td>2289</td>
<td>do</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The vessels bound via San Francisco arrived at that port between July 24th - 28th. Press reports today indicate that some or all of the ships recently have arrived at Vladivostok.

E. R. W. McCabe,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WATSON:

Mr. Early asks that you send the attached to the War Department for a check, and also get a report from the Canal Authority about these vessels and give the information to the President.

Roberta

Report from G2
(Col. McBane) expected
MOSCOW.--NEW SOVIET NAVAL VESSELS, THE NUMBER AND TYPE OF WHICH WAS NOT REVEALED, ARRIVED AT VLADIVOSTOK "AFTER PASSING ENGLAND AND AMERICA," AN ANNOUNCEMENT SAID.

THE VESSELS WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE SAILED FROM KRONSTADT, RUSSIA'S WESTERN SEAPORT ON THE GULF OF FINLAND, THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL AND ACROSS THE PACIFIC TO RUSSIA'S IBERIAN BASE.

THE SHIPS ARE RUSSIAN BUILT.

8/25--R9A
August 26, 1939

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In your great task of guiding the United States in the difficult days ahead, the Department of Agriculture stands ready, of course, to render all possible service in planning for the proper production and distribution of food. There is no prospect of immediate shortage. Quite the contrary. But if war really comes we may want to lay plans for a Food Administration which might be put into action later when need arises.

My Father and myself both worked with the Food Administration in the field in the World War. The County Agents set up farm committees to increase wheat acreage, save extra wheat by special threshing methods, etc. When we set up County Committees in AAA in 1933, I couldn't help thinking what a splendid mechanism we would have, if we ever got into a war, to meet the food problem not only on the production side but to some extent on the distribution side as well. Again when we set up the Ever Normal Granary system, I thought how marvelously this mechanism with its reserve supplies would help the country in case of war. There are other powers of almost equal importance which have been given to the Department by Congress which can be used to solve the possible eventual food problem to the best advantage in case worse comes to worst.
I am hoping it will not be necessary for me to return to Washington till September 5. Whenever I do return, I shall appreciate the opportunity of talking with you about the eventual food situation. There is certainly no cause for immediate concern about food but we should consider thoughtful and calm planning for possible eventual action.

---

I have been following your great peace efforts with deepest sympathy. No one with boys of fighting age can fail to respond to your high endeavours.

Respectfully yours

(signed) Henry A. Wallace

P.S. I can't help wondering what the Vandals will be demanding a year hence
Aug. 26, 1939.

Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the U.S.

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Respectfully yours,

Henry A. Wallace

P. S. I can't help wondering what the Vandals will be demanding a year hence.
August 29, 1939

Excerpt from memo to the President
From Lauchlin Currie

"I am having material on food reserves in case of war worked up. You mentioned before you left that you intended to take this matter up with me. I am also interesting myself in the problem of potential bottlenecks in the event of an expansion of productive activity."

My dear Mr. President:

Apropos of our conversation this morning, I am attaching hereto copy of the report we have just made to the Department of Justice in connection with the ability of the Federal Works Agency to wheel into war preparations.

Sincerely,

John M. Carney
Administrator

Enclosure

The Honorable Franklin D. Roosevelt
The White House
Washington, D. C.
August 31, 1939

Hon. Newman A. Townsend
Acting Solicitor General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Townsend:

In accordance with your request I am suggesting some of the contributions which the Federal Works Agency and the five agencies under its general supervision can make toward cushioning the effect on the United States of a European war.

Because the outbreak of a European war might well be followed by intensive national efforts to strengthen the defenses of the United States, I am also suggesting constructive contributions to national defense which our agencies could effectively make.

1. To meet the problem of increasing unemployment, in the event that it resulted from the impact of war, the Federal Works Agency could step up public employment in those localities where it was most needed.

If the national administration judges that this increased unemployment will be of relatively short duration, much of it can be absorbed by drawing on the reserve of Work Projects Administration projects. The resulting increase in public employment can be supplemented by a rapid acceleration of the current program of the Public Roads Administration, which is fairly flexible.

Assistance to industry in creating private employment can be provided by speeding up existing construction programs and urging contractors to immediately place substantial material orders for the $1,542,000,000 of construction under contract in the current construction programs of the Public Buildings Administration, the Public Roads Administration, the Public Works Administration, and the United States Housing Authority.

If the national administration judges that this increased unemployment will be of relatively long duration, then the increased employment provided by stepping up the highly flexible program of
the Work Projects Administration can be materially supplemented by making available additional funds for the Public Works Administration, with its backlog of $700,000,000 of approved public projects, funds for the Public Buildings Administration with its backlog of $166,000,000 of approved buildings awaiting funds for construction, funds for the Public Roads Administration for its labor-absorbing elastic highway program, funds for continuing the building of needed housing under the supervision of the United States Housing Authority, with its backlog of $977,000,000 of applications.

2. To meet a situation of increasing employment, in the event that it developed during the course of the war, would be relatively easy for the Federal Works Agency. The Work Projects Administration is prepared to release immediately any skilled or unskilled workers who may be needed in industrial plants or elsewhere. The present program of the Public Works Administration has reached its peak, and with a weekly average of 140 projects being completed, its workers will be available for other employment. The tempo and volume of construction of Public Buildings, Public Roads, and the Housing Authority can be so controlled that their programs will not contribute to a labor shortage.

3. National defense could be materially strengthened by the activities of the Federal Works Agency.

The Federal Works Agency, through a staff of over 50,000 trained employees, directs man power totaling 2,500,000 and supervises construction by over 25,000 contractors. This staff, with its engineers, architects, and inspectors, is capable of planning and directing most types of construction contributing to national defense. It is well acquainted with the personnel, capacities, methods and abilities of these 25,000 contractors.

An orderly transition from the Federal Works Agency's present activities to projects strengthening national defense would permit the Federal Works Agency and its units to make the maximum contribution to our national well-being with a minimum of friction.

The activities of this Agency and its units could be channeled so as to assist in:

(a) **Improvement of Transportation Facilities**

   Highway, rail and air transportation facilities essential to military requirements can be improved. It
will be recalled that bottle-necks and inadequate facilities hampered essential industrial activity and the moving of supplies to the seaboard during the last great war.

The Public Roads Administration, in cooperation with State highway officials and the War Department, has studied a network of 60,000 miles of highways of military importance and are now able to select immediately most of these sections requiring improvement or rebuilding. This road construction and that required to relieve traffic congestion in population centers on the military network can be started in sixty days. It could be accelerated by applying man power of the Work Projects Administration and the Public Works Administration to supplement that of the Public Roads Administration and its contractors.

The railroads of the United States are reported to have a deferred maintenance of approximately $900,000,000. This would be dangerous in the event of war. Legislation permitting, Work Projects Administration labor could place roadbeds and tracks in a safe condition.

Modern planes require larger and better airports. The Work Projects Administration and the Public Works Administration can plan, construct, and improve both commercial and military airports. The road building experience of the Public Roads Administration can assist materially in constructing enduring runways.

(b) The construction of warehouse facilities and docks essential for war supplies

These can be planned and constructed by the Work Projects Administration, the Public Works Administration, and the Public Buildings Administration.

(c) The preparation of cantonment sites, the provision of necessary facilities, and the construction of cantonment buildings

The Work Projects Administration, the Public Works Administration, and the Public Buildings Administration are well equipped to plan and construct complete cantonments.
(d) **Rehabilitation of existing army and navy bases**

This could be carried forward by the Work Projects Administration, which might draw on the Public Works Administration and the Public Buildings Administration for engineering and technical assistance.

(e) **Construction of workers' housing in important munitions and manufacturing centers**

The United States Housing Authority, in cooperation with local housing authorities and with a staff which might be increased by drawing on the technical resources of the Public Works Administration and the Public Buildings Administration, could reduce the danger of a severe housing shortage in such industrial centers by initiating an extensive new housing construction program which would produce housing built so as to be socially useful and desirable after the crisis is past.

(f) **First aid instruction and the making of hospital supplies**

The Work Projects Administration can supplement the work of the Red Cross in teaching first aid, and the sewing projects of the Work Projects Administration can make bandages and other hospital supplies.

(g) **Camouflage and posters**

Camouflaging and the designing and reproducing of defense posters can be done by Work Projects Administration artists.

The foregoing are some of the many ways in which the Federal Works Agency could assist in strengthening our national defense. If it is desired, studies can be launched immediately to determine and outline in detail the most effective means of rapidly diverting present work and construction programs into national defense channels. In making these suggestions it has been assumed that the outbreak of a European war would result in an extra session of Congress which, to meet the emergency, would make available the required funds and clear away any existing legislative impediments to the suggested lines of action.
August 31, 1939

In the event of a European war, under existing legislation our organizations apparently would have no major duties in preserving the neutrality of the United States.

Please do not hesitate to call upon me for further details regarding any of the suggestions offered in this letter, or for information relative to our organizations and programs.

Sincerely,

Signed – John M. Carmody
Administrator

Sec. 606. War powers of President

(a) During the continuance of a war in which the United States is engaged, the President is authorized, if he finds it necessary for the national defense and security, to direct that such communications as in his judgment may be essential to the national defense and security shall have preference or priority with any carrier subject to this chapter. He may give these directions at and for such times as he may determine, and may modify, change, suspend, or annul them and for any such purpose he is hereby authorized to issue orders directly, or through such person or persons as he designates for the purpose, or through the Commission. Any carrier complying with any such order or direction for preference or priority herein authorized shall be exempt from any and all provisions in existing law imposing civil or criminal penalties, obligations, or liabilities upon carriers by reason of giving preference or priority in compliance with such order or direction.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person during any war in which the United States is engaged, knowingly or willfully, by physical force or intimidation by threats of physical force, obstruct or retard or aid in obstructing or retarding interstate or foreign communication by radio or wire. The President is hereby authorized, whenever in his judgment the public interest requires, to employ the armed forces of the United States to prevent any such obstruction or retardation of communications: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to repeal, modify, or affect either section 17 of Title 15 or section 52 of Title 29.

(c) Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a threat of war or a state of public peril or disaster or other national emergency, or in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States, the President may suspend or amend, for such time as he may see fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all stations within the jurisdiction of the United States as prescribed by the Commission, and may cause the closing of any station for radio communication and the removal therefrom of its apparatus and equipment, or he may authorize the use or control of any such station and/or its apparatus and equipment by any department of the Government under such regulations as he may prescribe, upon just compensation to the owners.

(d) The President shall ascertain the just compensation for such use or control and certify the amount ascertained to Congress for appropriation and payment to the person entitled thereto. If the amount so certified is unsatisfactory to the person entitled thereto, such person shall be paid only 75 per centum of the amount and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum as added to such payment of 75 per centum will make such amount as will be just compensation for the use and control. Such suit shall be brought in the manner provided by paragraph 20 of section 41 of Title 28, or by section 250 of
September 1-1939

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

John Pelley, of the Association of American Railroads, dropped in and wanted to assure you that the railroads are all set to function in any way that you think best, and if you want to discuss it with him he is at your service at any time.

E.M.W.

Edwin M. Watson
The following information has been received informally from the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department:

The Military Attaché at Paris reported at 3:15 Paris Time this afternoon that 600 British soldiers, the first British contingent, landed at Le Havre at noon today.

The Military Attaché at Paris further reported that General Gamelin stated in the course of the day that there are now 3,000,000 men with the colors in France and that general mobilization will bring this number to between five and six million. General Gamelin continued that two-thirds of the German army and one-third of the air force are on the Polish front, with one-third of the army and two-thirds of the air force of Germany available for operations in the west.

Military Attaché at Paris reported further that a British army mission and British air force mission are now in Paris. He stated further that he has received information to the effect that Italian forces are finding it necessary to operate against dissidents in Abyssinia.
Sept 17, 1939

In re-Secret code Radiogram received at War Dept and sent to Cordell Hull by Johnson for the President.

In re-unjustified bombing of three villages in Poland

See: Cordell Hull folder-Drawer 1-1939
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

After hearing your discussion with Senator Downey I phoned the Chief of the Air Corps to give me data on our latest and most powerful bomber, which is the B-17.

Without bombs - range 3,000 miles.  
Without bombs - radius 1,100 miles.  
(This has a 25% factor of safety).

With maximum load of bombs, 8,800 miles.  
Range 1,000  
Radius 400.

With the normal load of 4,000 bombs,  
Range 1,800  
Radius 750.
October 27, 1939

Memorandum for the President from Capt Callaghan

Re-attached letter about which he thinks Admiral Stark talked to the President, especially enclosure about distribution of Army planes. Also wants the President to note that the instructions to the Naval District Commandants refer to preliminary organization for a projected inner coastal patrol which has not yet been established.

Attached is memo from Marshall, Chief of Staff, to Stark the subject of which is—COOPERATION WITH THE NAVY IN AIR COASTAL PATROL OPERATIONS.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1939
ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD

Report--No 4

November 1, 1939.

Memorandum for the Asst Secretary of War--Louis Johnson
From Col. Charles Hines--U.S. Army

Subject--FOREIGN INQUIRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS
FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES:

Finland
Canada
Belgium
Mexico
France

See: Raw File-(War Dept folder) Drawer 4-1939
November 24, 1939.

Report—No 6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASST SECRETARY OF WAR—Louis Johnson
From Col Charles Hines—U.S. Army

Subject: FOREIGN INQUIRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF Munitions
FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES

Great Britain
Canada
France
Latvia
Union of South Africa
Rumania
Tabulation on Searchlight Orders

See: Raw File—(War Dept folder) Drawer 4—1939
December 1, 1939.

Report--No 8

Memorandum for The Asst Secretary of War--Louis Johnson
From Col Charles Hines-U.S. Army

Subject: FOREIGN INQUIRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES

Finland
Lockheed Aircraft Corp
Remington Arms Co
Dupont Company
Exports of Steel

Report--No 7 FOREIGN INQUIRIES FROM THE FOLLOWING:

Great Britain
France
Canada
Mexico
Netherlands
Finland
Brazil
Union of South Africa
Scrap Iron
Reports from Embassies on Orders Placed
Export Licenses
December 5, 1939.

Report—No 10

Memorandum for the Asst Secretary of War--Louis Johnson
From Col. Charles Hines—U. S. Army

Subject: FOREIGN INQUIRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS
FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES

    Irish Free State
    France
    China
    Finland
    Yugoslavia
    Embargo on Airplanes
    Conf with Pratt & Whitney Representatives

See: Raw File (War Dept folder) Drawer 4-1939
Memorandum for the Asst Secretary of War-Louis Johnson
From Col. Charles Hines-U.S. Army

Subject: FOREIGN INQUIRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES:

- Belgium
- Canada
- Finland
- Great Britain
- Netherlands
- Turkey
- Union of South Africa
- Yugoslavia

See: Raw File (War Dept folder) Drawer 4-1939
Memorandum for the Asst Secretary of War—Louis Johnson
From Col. Charles Hines—U.S. Army

Subject—Foreign inquiries for production of munitions
from the following countries

Finland
Belgium
Sweden
Argentina
Brasil
Norway

See: Raw File (War Dept folder) Drawer 4-1939
Memorandum for the Asst Secretary of War—Louis Johnson
From Col. Charles Hines—U.S. Army

Subject: FOREIGN INQUIRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS
FROM THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES:

Belgium
Brasil
Canada
Chile
Finland
Haiti
Norway
Yugoslavia
Export of Airplanes
Export of Industrial Furnaces

See: Raw File (War Dept folder) Drawer 4-1939
December 7, 1939.

Memorandum for Director of the Budget—Harold Smith from the President, asking him to speak to him about the enclosed memorandum from Louis Johnson regarding funds necessary to be included in the budget for a well balanced program of National Defense.

See: War Department folder—Raw File—Drawer 4—1939
MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT

SHOULD THIS GO BY POUCH OR REGULAR MAIL.

By Pouch
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 12, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F. D. R.

[Handwritten note: Thomas, CH]
My dear Mr. President:

Many thanks for your kind note dated 13 September, 1939. It was grand!

The Chinos have bogged down the Japanese invasion all over China. The Jap Gendarmery continues its heavy hand over all foreign trade in China. Its impossible demands are destroying the decent things their Navy is attempting. Shanghai continues as the hot bed of China politics. The International Settlement area (extended) negotiations have collapsed—both military and civic.

We have sat in conferences for three months—no soap.

Washington-London-Tokyo action only solution. Japs are moving in Tientsin in a methodical way. They have run the famous rug industry down to Shanghai along with many smaller foreign concerns.

Quaint old Peking is crowded with Jap soldiers who are ruining the famous buildings and clubs and looting the temples.

The Chinese still support Chiang Kai-shek despite the efforts of the Japs to push over their traitorous Chino-Reformed Government Program. South, Central, and North China can never be brought on a common ground by the Japs' Reformed Government. All this is costing Japan's treasury tons of money. True enough, Japan is making China foot some of the bills, but China has not come through very much. This winter will be a tough one on the Japs, both in China and at home.

The British want the Yangtze River open and are willing to swap their Northern China interests. Regarding the Dutch East Indies, the Japs are watching them like hawks. The Jap likes warm weather—so many people overlook that fact. The Jap people as a mass have not the least idea what is going on in China, especially the inland population.
Official Jap shivers when your name is mentioned. Their Admirals and Generals (after the second K.T.) tell us that "you cannot be studied."

There is no question about it - the "younger officer group" are running state, military, and naval affairs in Japan. The Jap bankers are about out of patience with this group. The Japan Naval personnel is far superior to their military personnel, and the two do not get along at all.

Our Consul General here (Gauss) certainly is carrying a load! Tricky British and persistent Japs are both tough customers to handle. The French say little, but carry on smoothly in all their departments. The Italians fall right in line with the Japs in all situations. The Germans have all taken to cover.

Jimmy wrote me about Mac - terrible luck! Poor Mac, my heart goes out to him.

This will be my last letter to you as I will leave shortly for Washington to turn myself over to Ross McIntire for general overhaul in January. If, I may, I shall call and pay my respects.

Wishing you and Mrs. Roosevelt the happiest holidays ever

I am

Loyally yours,

The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President
White House
Washington, D. C.
The Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
The President
White House
Washington, D. C.

VIA DIPLOMATIC POUCH.
September 13, 1939.

Dear Joe:

I am sorry for the long delay in writing to thank you for that handsome Chinese dressing robe. It is a beauty. These are hectic days for us all.

My best wishes to you,

Always sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Colonel Joseph C. Fegan,
Fourth Regiment,
United States Marines,
Shanghai,
China.

Note: Joe, see that it goes to Paris.
December 13, 1939.

Dear Frank:-

It is grand to have yours of November first and to know of the splendid reception given you and the good start you have made. I am glad, too, that Grant and Smellie are working well with you.

It is just as well to suggest putting on the brakes on spending by the Commonwealth Government. You might tell President Quezon that I, too, am deferring desirable though not essential expenditures because of the new expenditures caused by the neutrality needs.

No human being can tell what the Russians are going to do next, and I think the Japanese actions will depend much on what Russia decides to do both in Europe and the Far East -- especially in Europe. Later on I hope you will be able to take a little holiday in Japan and talk things over with Grew. Johnson I take it cannot get even to Hong Kong from Chungking, but I hope you will keep in touch with him and if he is able to get say to Saigon, you might run over there and see him.

Things are not changing here politically to any great extent, though the pressure by the Republicans and conservative Democrats continues in relation to the political future! The general economic conditions are extra-ordinarily good even though British and French orders have not come through in any great volume.
The Republicans will raise every particular
kind of cane when Congress meets but I am inclined
to think that they will be, as usual, so extrain-
gant in their statements and so glitteringly
general in their policies that they will acquire
little new confidence in the country.

Keep on writing me and I hope all goes
well. My best to Mrs. Sayre.

As ever yours,

The Honorable
The United States High Commissioner,
Manila,
Philippine Islands.
The United States High Commissioner
Manila

November 1, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

The last time I saw you, you said that you wanted me to drop you a line from time to time to let you know how things are proceeding in Manila. I shall therefore send you personal and confidential letters every now and again if I may.

We reached Manila ten days ago and were given a rousing reception. Never before in my life have I been so enthusiastically received. The welcome seemed spontaneous and enthusiastic on the part of both Filipinos and Americans. President Quezon came down to the waterside to greet me and to introduce me in a welcoming speech to the Filipino people waiting in crowds to greet us. I think we have gotten off to a very good start. The first thing I tackled at the office was the problem of neutrality enforcement here in the Islands. As a result of conferences with Admiral Smeallie, General Grant and myself, we worked out a draft executive order which we sent to the State Department last week. Doubtless it is already in your hands. The draft had the thorough and hearty concurrence and approval of both Admiral Smeallie and General Grant. Each of these are first-rate officers wanting to cooperate in every way and the three of us will work together closely and in thorough harmony.

Yesterday I had a long heart-to-heart talk with President Quezon principally about the expenditure of funds from the coconut oil and sugar excise taxes. The Commonwealth Government has been spending this money, in my opinion, too freely and it is necessary to put on the brakes, as we are empowered to do under the new law passed last August. I explained to President Quezon the need of this and, although I feared that he might hit the ceiling, he saw the truth of what I was saying and the need for more careful expenditure and has agreed to cooperate fully in this matter. I enclose a memorandum of my interview with him. Of course, this is only the opening gun and it remains to be seen whether he will adhere to the views he expressed to me yesterday and what course future developments will take.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
I also enclose a copy of a letter which I received a few days ago from Nelson Johnson in China, giving the picture in China as he sees it. The letter is so interesting that I thought you might like to see it also.

The work here promises to be as interesting as it is important and I am looking forward to my tour here with real pleasure.

I think that President Quezon thoroughly appreciates the great things which you have done for the Philippines and feels that you are a true friend to the Filipino people.

I feel very happy over your victory in the fight in Congress over the neutrality bill. It is a splendid victory indeed.

With admiration and affectionate regards,

Ever sincerely yours,

Enclosures:

Memorandum of conversation with President Quezon of October 31, 1939;

Copy of letter from Ambassador Johnson of October 20, 1939.
Dear Mr. Sayre,

Welcome back to the Far East.

Major James McHugh, Assistant Naval Attache of this Embassy expects to leave here today for Hongkong and as there is a chance that you may be passing through Hongkong while he is there I have thought that you might like to see and talk with him about conditions in this part of the world for he is well informed.

The conviction is growing upon me that the position of the Japanese here in China has begun to deteriorate. I am persuaded that their position at the end of this year will be worse, morally and from a military point of view, than it was when the year began. The peak of the Japanese military effort in China has, I believe, been reached unless they are prepared to put into the field at least as many more men as they now have. They have sufficient to hold what they have but not sufficient to extend their holdings. In the military field they have suffered severe defeats at the Nomonhan, at the hands of the Russians, in Shansi and in Southern Honan and Northern Hupeh and more recently in Northern Hunan at the hands of the much despised Chinese. The defeats at Nomonhan and in Hunan have been very severe with serious results. The Nomonhan defeat presented Japan with a Russia, recently successful in her efforts to retrieve lost positions in Europe, with a renewed interest in retrieving her prestige in Eastern Asia. The defeat in Northern Hunan of a Japanese force that was sent in to take Changsha and present it to the much talked of unified Japanese controlled Government which was to have been established at Nanking with General Kishi as its protector, has cast a somewhat lurid light on the collapse of efforts at unity under Wang Ching Wei and left the Japanese with a Chinese government and military much restored in confidence in its ability ultimately to defeat the Japanese. The Japanese must either retrieve the ground lost by this defeat or abandon further attempts to extend their control into the interior.

In the field of foreign affairs the denunciation of our commercial treaty was a blow to a people who were truculently confident that they could go their merry way and that we would do nothing about it. It is bringing home to the people of Japan the realization that the bungling methods of their military controlled foreign policy threaten the friendship of their most valued customer. The German Russian Non-Aggression pact was a staggering blow to the Japanese military. It cost them prestige at home as well as abroad. They do not yet know what to do about it. I
am convinced that the recent revolt in the Japanese Foreign Office was symptomatic of the revolt in civilian circles in and out of the Government against the Military domination of Japanese foreign affairs in the East and in the rest of the world for they are beginning to realize at home that this domination has resulted in ruining Japan's best markets abroad, and has cost her friendships which she will have difficulty in restoring.

Thus I believe that Japan's position here is deteriorating and that we will see efforts at appeasement in fields which Japan thought were hers.

Perhaps you would not mind if I wrote now and then to you personally to air my views somewhat as I have done above. It helps me for one has few to talk with here.

I certainly hope that you are going to have a successful and pleasant tour of duty in the Philippines.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely,

NELSON TRUSLER JOHNSON
October 31, 1939.

Memorandum of Interview between Mr. Sayre and President Quezon at the High Commissioner's Residence in Pasay at 4:00 p.m.

President Quezon called at my house at my request to discuss one or two matters which were on my mind.

I began by asking President Quezon what his purposes are in connection with the Immigration Act. I said to him that the Immigration Act as drafted has been given the tacit approval of the State Department and that it seems to me a sound piece of legislation and one which would be advantageous to the Commonwealth Government. President Quezon replied that he also believed the legislation to be sound and that he had it in his mind to recommend its passage at the beginning of the first regular session of the Assembly. He said that it had not been passed before because approval from Washington had not come until almost at the very end of the last regular session. I replied that I was glad to hear of this and would welcome its passage at the next regular session of the Assembly.

I then changed the subject to the expenditure of moneys derived from American excise taxes on coconut oil and sugar. I began by pointing out the necessity of careful financial planning if the Philippine Government is to make good in its
its independence. I said that I assumed we must all go forward with the independence program unless and until the Filipino people should, by popular and governmental action, make known to Congress their desire to renounce the independence program. President Quezon said they never would do this and that he was in thorough sympathy with going forward with the independence program. He said that he could not afford to choke off discussion of this matter but that he felt confident the movement for reconsideration would die a natural death.

Assuming that the independence program is to go forward, I went on to explain the large cost of necessary economic readjustments necessitated by independence and pointed out that without funds available the independence program could not succeed. I added that I saw no practicable and available sources for such large funds as would be needed except through the excise payments. President Quezon agreed. I then went on to say that I felt it very necessary not to allow the funds derived from the excise tax payments to be frittered away for expenditures other than those necessitated by the independence program. Again President Quezon agreed.

I next brought to President Quezon's attention the provisions of the Act of August 7 requiring that expenditures must be "for the purpose of meeting new or additional expenditures"
expenditures which will be necessary in adjusting Philippine economy to a position independent of trade preferences in the United States and in preparing the Philippines for the assumption of the responsibilities of an independent state”. I explained that this provision of the new law was retroactive in its effect and applied to moneys collected on or after January 1, 1939 and accrued prior to July 4, 1946. I said that the President would naturally expect me, as High Commissioner, to advise him as to whether or not appropriations of moneys accrued after January first were for the purposes specified in the law.

President Quezon said that the appropriations thus far made were for purposes of preparing for independence with the single exception of the appropriation for the transfer of the University. As to this, he explained to me at some length why the transfer of the University is necessary and why it should be carried out. I agreed with him that it was probably a wise measure but also pointed out that the merits of the measure had nothing to do with whether or not the appropriation fell within the limits of the new law. I asked him whether the appropriation for the University was from moneys accrued prior or subsequent to January 1, 1939. He said that frankly he did not know. He realized at once the importance of finding out and said that he would ask Secretary
Secretary Roxas and find out within half an hour.

President Quezon then went on to give me a definite and positive assurance that henceforth no appropriation would be made "or even discussed in the Assembly" until after he and I had discussed each specific appropriation and were in entire approval of it. I said that I welcomed that assurance and felt confident that by following such a procedure it would avoid undue publicity and prevent unhappy and unnecessary conflicts. He said he wanted to follow this course because he had agreed to the Act of August 7th and he wanted to carry out loyally all its provisions.

He next suggested that he ask Secretary Roxas to wait upon me to explain the whole financial program of the Commonwealth Government, particularly with relation to financing the adjustments necessary for the independence program. I brought up the question of the appropriation for the Bank and he said that that clearly does fall within the purposes prescribed by the Act of August 7th and that he would have Secretary Roxas explain this to me in detail.

I read to President Quezon the letter of October 3, 1939 from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Secretary of the Interior with regard to appropriations of proceeds from the excise taxes under the Act of August 7th. I read aloud to President Quezon the pertinent parts and explained
explained to him that this letter seemed the best method for carrying out the arrangements which both he and I agreed to. He agreed. He took the copy of the letter which I gave him with him.

The whole interview went off very smoothly and happily. President Quezon raised no objection whatever to anything which I said. He told me that if the appropriation of funds necessary for the transfer of the University covered moneys accrued after January 1, 1939, he would find the moneys from some other fund so as not to violate the provisions of the Act of August 7th.

Our talk was in the friendliest spirit possible and I never allowed it to relax from the basis on which I began of entire cooperation between the two of us for a common end in which we both believe.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR.

Subject: Foreign purchases in United States.

1. One of the most important questions to be solved, if this government really desires to assist foreign countries in large scale purchases of munitions in the United States and through such purchases to create and maintain munitions productive capacity in support of national defense, is that pertaining to taxes on additional facilities needed for these purposes.

2. You will recall that you arranged a conference with representatives of the Treasury, Commerce, State, Navy, and War Departments at which this question was discussed and that as a result of this discussion the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Hayne, obtained an approved policy from the Chief Executive - copy attached - which had as its objective the achievement of the aims outlined in paragraph one, but only in so far as aircraft engines are concerned. This policy is believed to be sound but it is not sufficiently comprehensive.

3. A recent secret cablegram received by the State Department from Mr. Bullitt - Ambassador to France - indicates the French Government now desires to procure in this country vast quantities of complete aircraft. If such a program is initiated, or if any appreciable increase in foreign purchases of aircraft is arranged, additional plant capacity must be erected for both aircraft engines and bodies and perhaps even for aircraft instruments.

4. Furthermore, the Governments of England and France are now very desirous of obtaining relatively large quantities of smokeless powder and military high explosives in this country. The plant capacity therefore does not exist and new plants will have to be constructed and equipped. Such plants, in all probability, will be practically useless except for the sole purpose of munitions production.
5. We now have a specific case. The British Government desires to place a contract with the Hercules Powder Company for some 7,200,000 pounds of military smokeless powder which will require the creation of facilities costing some $1,500,000. Unless some satisfactory closing agreement is promptly approved by the United States Government, it is our information that the investments will not be made in the United States. In such a case, American national defense and American industry would both be the losers. The neutrality embargo would in effect be replaced by a tax embargo. A more detailed exposition of this case is attached.

6. If this war even approximates the last World War in the consumption of munitions it is quite certain that England and France must procure in this country other forms of munitions for which plant capacity will have to be created, such as guns and particularly complete rounds of ammunition.

7. It seems to be imperative that an immediate round-up of this whole question be made and that a comprehensive policy be approved which includes not only aircraft engines but also all other parts of aircraft and also all other kinds of munitions and parts thereof.

8. While tax questions are primarily the responsibility of the Treasury Department, this question is really one of national policy and is so important that it is believed the President himself should call a conference to be attended by

Representative of the State Department
Representative of the Treasury Department
Representative of the Commerce Department
Representative of the Navy Department
Representative of the War Department

to establish such a policy.

Inclosures.
Copy White House Memo 11-9-39
Memo 12-23-39 re Hercules

CONFIDENTIAL
THE WHITE HOUSE

November 9, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY:

One of the obstacles to the proper equipment of our country for national defense is the disparity between the rate of production of airplane motors and that of the airplanes themselves. This must be synchronized as soon as possible.

You are hereby directed to work out a policy of depreciation allowance by which the abnormal investment in plant expansion that will be required of the airplane manufacturers will be absorbed over the life of the contracts or during the emergency period.

You are further directed to consult with the appropriate committees of the Congress for the purpose of devising a permanent program whereby the facilities thus created will become a permanent part of the national defense.

(Initialed) - F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM:

The Hercules Powder Company has received an inquiry from the British Purchasing Commission involving the construction of a plant, at a probable cost of $1,500,000, and having an annual capacity of 7,200,000 pounds per year of straight nitro-cellulose rifle and/or cannon powder.

The tax treatment by the Treasury Department of the $1,500,000 which would be paid to the Hercules Powder Company by the British for the construction cost of the plant is a vital factor in determining whether or not it would be prudent for Hercules to undertake such a contract. The company has proposed to the Treasury Department that they enter into a closing agreement definitely establishing at this time the income tax treatment of this payment for plant construction. Briefly the provisions of this proposed agreement are as follows:

(1) That any money received by Hercules from the British in payment of the cost of the plant should not constitute taxable income.

(2) In determining the profit on the sale of any product made with such plant facilities, Hercules would not be entitled to include in the cost of such production any amount whatsoever for depreciation or amortization of such facilities.
(3) Upon said plant's having ceased to be used for the manufacture of military powders, Hercules would take up in its taxable income the estimated salvage value of said plant.

(4) If Hercules should later find a peace-time use for such facilities, it would take up in taxable income the fair utility value of the same at that time.

In other tax cases where customers of a business have contributed money for the construction of additional facilities designed to give the customer a needed service, the Treasury, after first claiming that such contribution constituted taxable income, and after losing the issue in the Board of Tax Appeals, formally published its acquiescence in the Board's holding that no taxable income results. See the following cases:

Liberty Light & Power Company, 4 B.T.A. 155 (Acq., VI-I C.B., p. 4)

Great Northern Railway Company, 8 B.T.A. 225 at pages 247 and 271-273 (Acq., VII-2 C.B., p. 16)


Kansas City Southern Railway Company, 16 B.T.A. 665, at page 687 (The Commissioner conceded error on the "Donation" point.)

In these cases the facilities furnished were expected to be useful until worn out; the result is all the clearer where, as here, the usefulness of the facilities is obviously limited to the present emergency.
Unless it can be promptly settled by a closing agreement that the principle of the above cases will be followed here, it is our opinion that these investments will not be made in the United States, and that their value in our preparedness program will be lost.

The British are urging a prompt decision from Hercules in the matter, being anxious to get their powder procurement program under way, and it is therefore extremely important to obtain an immediate disposition of this tax problem.
January

From General Marshall

Message to Admiral Stark in January

Re-Joint Army and Navy Operations.

See: Navy folder- Drawer 1-1940
ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD

All reports from the Above Board, which forms part of the General Board, on the following subject:
FOREIGN INQUIRIES FOR PRODUCTION OF MUNITIONS outlined by Col. Charles Hines, Chairman, Clearance Commission for Louis Johnson.

See: Raw File (War Dept. folder) Drawer 4-1939
MEMORANDUM for The President.

1. For your information: with a view to later quantity production of more efficient Pursuit Aircraft, on a competitive basis, I have recently entered into the experimental contracts appearing below for Single Engine Pursuit Aircraft having the indicated high speeds:

   Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corporation,
   425 miles at 25,000 feet.

   Curtiss-Wright Corporation,
   410 miles at 15,000 feet.

   Republic Aviation Corporation,
   400 miles at 15,000 feet.

2. A contract is likewise in process as indicated below for a Two-Engine Pursuit Airplane:

   Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
   473 miles at 20,000 feet.

3. All of the above airplanes have substantially increased fire power over that presently available as well as protective armor plate for the pilot and protective rubberized fuel tank coverings installed for the purpose of preventing conflagration resulting from incendiary bullets.

Louis Johnson,
The Assistant Secretary of War.
Memorandum to General Watson from Marshall-War Dept- Jan 29, 1940

Re-Message which he meant for Admiral Stark which went to
Admiral Byrd having been relayed wrongly by operator who read
Stark as Stork and stork being a bird, he sent it to Admiral
Byrd in Little America.

See: Navy folder-Drawer 1-1940 (Dan Callaghan's memo of Feb 7-40)
CIVIL CONTROL OF MILITARY AUTHORITY

by

Lindsay Rogers
Civil Control of Military Authority

"War," declared Clemenceau, "is much too important a business to be left to the soldiers." In principle few statesmen or generals would now dissent. In practice there have been and are great difficulties in determining how and to what extent civilian control should be exerted. During the War, Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, thought that only twenty-five per cent of the national effort was being exerted by the services. He then saw more clearly than many what the preparations for and course of the present war have made plain to everyone: that international conflict is now totalitarian. Hence, in addition to naval and military operations, strategy must comprehend diplomatic manoeuvres, propaganda, the protection of the home front, the maintenance of morale, the speeding up of industrial production, the strengthening of financial sinews, the control of prices, the rationing of food, and a myriad of other matters. But Sir William Robertson and the British Cabinet disagreed over the subordination of the twenty-five per cent effort and the civilian direction of it.

Similarly, Sir Frederick Maurice, as chief of military operations, clashed with Lloyd George and resigned his post. Sir Frederick Maurice, the biographer of Lord Haldane, one of the ablest Secretaries of State for War that Great Britain ever had, declares that since war now "means the direction for a special purpose of the whole power and resources of the nation," it is "clearly not a matter to be left to soldiers or sailors, nor would any responsible soldier
or sailor desire it to be so left." He adds the lament that principal and agent have failed to think through and agree upon the manner in which the control should be exerted.

In France, before Clemenceau stated the principle succinctly and implemented it effectively, the army had for three years been insisting on the opposite doctrine. Joffre, who reached supreme command of the French army because as an engineer officer he had spent some time in the Colonies (largely building barracks) and had a number of service years which counted double, refused to admit that French governments could issue instructions to him, and that he must keep them informed. He recognized only a vague responsibility to the President of the Republic. Poincaré was horrified and with not unusual sententiousness confided to his diary: "Neither the constitution nor the law has regulated the relations between the public powers in time of war. Thus experimentally, by successive adaptations which will require good-will from all, we will be led to adjust the functioning of the different organs." There was not good-will from all. Successive adaptations were not successful. Interference by parliament through its commissions was wrong in principle but did in a number of respects fill a distressing lacuna in civilian knowledge of and control over industrial preparations and conditions in the field. Experiments with generals as Ministers of War were failures. Finally Painlevé made Foch Chief of Staff alongside the government and Pétain Commander in the field. And although their respective powers were vaguely defined, mutual confidence was such that the system worked. Under Clemenceau it worked even better, partly
because of the effectiveness of the military Cabinet which as Minister of War (as well as Prime Minister) he established. The chief of this Cabinet, General Mordacq, had, curiously enough, written two years before the outbreak of the War that armed conflict could "be prepared and conducted with much greater ease in a monarchy than in a republic, merely because the principle of authority can be exercised in the former completely and with continuity." He thought it would be difficult in a democratic system "to realize effectively" unity of direction between civil power and military command. He helped Clemenceau to realize that unity.

Across the Rhine the balance was the other way. The Kaiser's Ministers had to take from him the orders which his generals persuaded him to give. The latter had the ear of the War Lord and historians of the first World War discussed the question of whether this kind of "unity of direction" did not cause Germany's defeat. "How can you have any organization when the army is managed by civilians?" the German Emperor demanded of the British military attaché in Berlin. "Look at the state they are in in France! Saturated with delation!"

The Emperor permitted the country to be managed by a soldier. Ludendorff may have been brilliant militarily but he was blind politically. He insisted on directing and controlling seventy-five or eighty-five rather than twenty-five per cent of the national effort, and he failed.

Behind civilian-military relationships and questions of control and direction there lies of course the larger problem of the position of an army in a state. "It is no easy matter," wrote the English historian Trevelyan, "to reconcile the institution of a
standing army with the genius of parliamentary and popular government, and the work was not done in a day." Trevelyan was talking of England in the age of Queen Anne, but the issue was not settled in Great Britain until the close of the nineteenth century and it raised its head again just before the outbreak of the War. Only by slow stages did the British constitution establish the principle that the army was not a royal preserve and that a Secretary of State for War should be responsible to Parliament for all of his activities. In the middle of the century, opposition to increased army appropriations resulted from fear that they would increase the influence of the Crown. Abolition of the purchase of commissions did not come until the 70's and then was put into effect in the face of royal opposition and despite warnings of disaster from an army whose officers, it was said, were too gentlemanly to learn anything about their duties. A Commander in Chief responsible to the Sovereign rather than to the nation through a Secretary of State -- the Duke of Cambridge -- stayed in office until 1895 and the post was not abolished until later. But as late as 1913 it was not possible to be certain that the army would not be averse to carrying out the orders of the Liberal Government of the day -- in enforcing the Home Rule Bill on Ulster. That crisis was successfully weathered but it raised serious questions as to whether the institution of a standing army had been completely reconciled with the genius of parliamentary institutions. Happily, the United States has never been uncertain concerning the answer to such a question. To be sure, the present Secretary of War, Mr. Woodring, when he was Assistant Secretary,
boasted that "our army happens to be the only branch of the government which is already organized and available not only to defend our territory but also to cope with social and economic problems in an emergency." But when there was an instant and violent chorus of criticism, he explained that he had not meant to say what he seemed to have said. In France there have been occasions when one might argue the existence within the Republic of a not wholly dependent state: at the time of the Boulanger crisis, the Dreyfus affair, and the February riots of 1934. But the threat was never ominous.

Much more clearly defined was the struggle in Germany. There, since there was no parliamentary government the possible incompatibility of a standing army was not a problem. But Bismarck always urged vigorously that the military machine and military aspirations must be subordinated to state policy. He warned that the army would be a dangerous thing "under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and capacity of resisting one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences." So long as William I was Emperor, Bismarck was an independent and responsible Minister and was able to keep the military machine in its place. Unlike William I who did not think of himself as a monarch who was personally in control of statecraft and the army, of diplomacy and the military machine, William II took a different view of his role and therein lay one of the causes of the War of 1914 and of Germany's defeat.

In a brilliant series of essays which he published during the War under the title, Militarism and Statecraft, the late Professor Monroe Smith pointed out that after Bismarck's fall, the decision on
conflicts between diplomacy and military strategy not only rested with the Emperor but that he was responsible for presenting the civilian or diplomatic point of view to the services. When the Emperor's Chancellor was a man of intelligence and force - for example, Hohenlohe or von Bülow - he was doubtless able to exert influence. But most of the Chancellors were really Vice-Chancellors. The Emperor valued obedience more highly than capacity. Munroe Smith argued that had Bismarck been Chancellor in 1914 and insisted, as was his wont, on interposing a counterweight "to one-sided and unjustifiable influence", the War - if it had come - would have come about in a different way, its origins more likely visible, perhaps with its effects more localized.

But after Bismarck the German army was a state within a state. Was it ever that under the Weimar Republic? At the time an answer was not of high importance because the legendary figure of Tannenberg was President of the Reich, Was the army a state within a state under the Third Reich? The facts are still obscure but it is interesting to note that Sir Nevile Henderson, former British Ambassador to Berlin, in his final report on his mission, expresses the conviction that Field Marshal von Blomberg's marriage with a typist was a disaster of the first importance. Hitler proceeded to "sack" fourteen generals who were more moderate advisers than some who remain. After this, Sir Nevile says, "Hitler became more and more shut off from external influences and a law unto himself." Did the army endeavour to restrain the Führer at the time of the Rhineland, at the time of Austria, at the time of Czechoslovakia? History will give clearer answers than any now available. For the time being, der Führer controls the army not only as the possessor of the
power of the state but as a war lord. This concentration of all civil
and military authority in his hands may invite disaster as it did when
it was in the hands of William II.

But in the democracies this problem poses itself in a different
setting. The strategy in its broad sense requires collaboration between
the civil government and the services. For this collaboration, machinery
is necessary. In a sense the problem stems from a larger one: what
should be the relations between political leaders and expert technicians?
A Chancellor of the Exchequer is not an economist or a financier and so
must have expert advice which he accepts or rejects in the light of his
conception of what the political situation permits or forbids. A War
Minister is not (and should not be) a soldier, but he must use the ex-
erts within the frame of the larger totalitarian strategy which armed
conflict now requires. There are differences, of course. A tax expert
can tell a Chancellor of the Exchequer within pretty precise limits what
the yield of a proposed impost will be. Military scientists cannot be
so certain. Problems constantly change because men's abilities are
found wanting, because enemy plans are modified, or even because the
weather takes a turn for the worse. The civil servant can remain anony-
mous; the General and the Admiral cannot. The civil servant can, at the
request of a Minister, prepare schemes in which he does not believe,
and after the schemes are accepted can share in carrying them out. The
soldier and the sailor cannot be so cynical or so servile. In their
labours they test their own expertness. The civil servant rarely does
that. He estimates the yield of a tax and its collection is a problem
of mechanical administration. Finally, complaint is frequently made
that politicians refuse to realize how much of laymen they are in economic matters and too frequently insist on substituting their judgments for the judgments of experts. In civil-military relationships, the danger is perhaps the other way: that Ministers will think strategy and tactics are far more mysterious than they really are and thus hesitate to assert control. Their excuse is greater than in the first case where the gamble is with economic well-being and not with human lives.

These are some of the considerations on the periphery of the problem with which Great Britain and France have been worrying and which they have by no means solved. The problem, to repeat, is to create machinery in order to make certain that there is (a) ministerial participation in formulating strategical plans and (b) ministerial control of the carrying-out of these plans if a state of war is entered upon. Many will maintain that the British and French machinery is well designed. Few will maintain that its operations have been as successful as they should be. The point is that the machinery has been set up and Ministers and Generals endeavour to make it work. In comparison, American thought on the problem — save by extra-governmental persons — has been almost nil. American machinery for coordination is extremely rudimentary. What are the British and French devices that are worthy of attention?

The English system endeavours to insure civilian control within the service departments. If a Minister is to be responsible in the House of Commons, he must be something more than the uncomprehending mouthpiece of a chief of staff or a sea lord. Thus since 1904 the British War Office has been under the direction of an Army Council. The Secretary of State for War is the chairman. Other civilian members
are the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War, the Financial Secretary of the War Office and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War - a civil servant - under whom functions a secretariat. The service members are the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Adjutant General to the Forces, the Quartermaster General to the Forces, the Director General of Munitions Production and the Director General of the Territorial Army. It will be noted that the Council includes no soldier specializing in anti-aircraft defence. Such an appointment was urged and Mr. Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War, was able to get this service recognized in part. He secured the appointment of a Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (anti-aircraft defence) responsible through the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to the Secretary of State for War, but the officer was not put on the Army Council. Moreover, the effectiveness of this reform was sabotaged by the designation to the new post of a general who lacked previous experience of anti-aircraft work.

In the American army, there is a familiar quip that a Board is "long, narrow and wooden." That might be true of the Army Council if the British system did not require the Secretary of State for War to accept responsibility for all of its decisions. Since his is the responsibility, he can constitutionally overrule the Army Council and substitute his judgment for its judgment. Military historians confine themselves largely to military operations and not to details of internal administrative difficulties. Hence little transpires concerning differences of opinion between the Secretary of State for War and the Council. No military critics in England, however, suggest that the
abolished. Its civilian element insures civilian knowledge of and participation in the formulation of army policy.

So with the Admiralty. The British government, it has been said, "is haunted by the ghosts of extinct offices" and every Minister presides not only over his department but also over "a legal museum." The British Admiralty illustrates this principle admirably. Control is still in the office of Lord High Admiral, but since 1708 his department has been in commission and is exercised by commissioners who together are known as the Board of Admiralty. The ministerial chairman is the First Lord, and the other civilian members are the Parliamentary and Financial Secretaries and the Civil Lord and the Permanent Secretary - a civil servant. The service members number six - the First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff, the Second Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Personnel, the Third Sea Lord and Comptroller, the Fourth Sea Lord and Chief of Supplies and Transport, the Fifth Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Air Services, and the Deputy Chief of Staff. Following rather closely the plan of the Army Council, the Air Ministry has its governing body of civilians and service men. In addition to the Secretary of State for Air, there are a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, three civil servants - a Permanent Under-Secretary, a First Deputy Under-Secretary and a Director of Production - and five officers of the Air Force: the Chief of the Air Staff and Air members for personnel, development and production, supply and organization.

Above these organizations, as a general instrument of coordination, Great Britain has had, since 1904, a Committee of Imperial
Defence. In the beginning it was laid down that the Prime Minister should be its "invariable President" and that he should have complete discretion in selecting its members. For most of its history the Committee of Imperial Defence has been a large and unwieldy body composed of the principal Ministers - eight or ten of them - the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, the head of His Majesty's Civil Services and three chiefs of staff. From time to time it has included extra-governmental members. Lord Haldane was particularly interested in its functioning and, though not a member of the Government, on occasion was co-opted for the Committee of Imperial Defence. As Secretary of State for War he had forced extensive reforms on the army and had been particularly interested in the Committee of Imperial Defence.

After the war he was still of the opinion that there are "few questions, military or constitutional, in which such obscurity prevails as in those concerned with the higher direction of war."

In characteristically British fashion the Committee of Imperial Defence was given no executive authority. Its functions were to study, to discuss and to formulate. The final decisions always rested with the Cabinet. An able secretariat prepared the subjects that went on the agenda and watched the work of subcommittees which at times were extremely numerous. In the first volume of his War Memoirs, Mr. Lloyd George paid a glowing tribute to the Committee of Imperial Defence for its success in making Britain ready for war. As Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith did not disturb its constitutional position but gradually - because the Committee of Imperial Defence was so unwieldy - its functions were taken over by a War Council of the Cabinet. This,
as the Dardanelles expedition and other incidents disclosed, did not work too well. There was considerable dubiety concerning the status of the chiefs of staff. Did they attend as experts who could not differ with their political chiefs or were they there for conference and advice? When Lloyd George formed his Government, he created his War Cabinet composed of Ministers without Portfolio. He made it clear that "the Cabinet would have the same access to the experts as their departmental chiefs; that questions could be addressed to them directly; and that they were to speak their minds freely without awaiting the permission or the opinion of their chiefs." He had "a painful recollection of the Dardanelles muddle when distinguished experts sat silent and sullen at the War Committee whilst their chief was advancing propositions with which they profoundly disagreed."

Down to the Armistice, Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet kept its hand on strategy more tightly than did the politicians of any other warring country. When peace came, the institution of the War Cabinet was abandoned and the normal Cabinet system was returned to, with the Committee of Imperial Defence again playing an active rôle. There was discussion of and decision against a single Ministry of National Defence to coordinate the three services. In 1936, when Britain began extensively to rearms, the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, appointed a Minister for the Coördination of Defence - Sir Thomas Inskip - who was to preside over the Committee when the Prime Minister could not be there and who, without any legal authority - again in characteristically British fashion - was to have "general day-to-day supervision and control on the Prime Minister's behalf of the whole organization and activity of
the Committee of Imperial Defence"; to make monthly progress reports to the Cabinet and to discern "any points which either have not been taken up or are being pursued too slowly and (in consultation with the Prime Minister or other Ministers or committees as required)" to recommend "appropriate measures for their rectification."

As subsequent events showed, the Baldwin Government was not greatly concerned about speeding rearmament. It was not intended that Sir Thomas Inskip should be too vigorous. He was to preside and to appease those who demanded action. He concerned himself with supply rather than with a more intelligent parcelling-out of the expenditures the Government was making. Down to 1938, for example, as Captain Liddell Hart points out, only one quarter of one per cent of the total appropriations for the Army were being spent on anti-aircraft defence. The strategists were ignoring the principle that they had always declared to be fundamental: that operations can be conducted only from a secure base, and they permitted the British islands to become quite insecure and to become a target without sufficient means of protection. One reason was that older departments in the services with strongly entrenched bureaucracies insisted that extra moneys be allocated to them for increased expenses. There was no one to make an effective demand that newer weapons be recognized. As Captain Hart has remarked, "the custom of the services differs from the domestic formula in that the latest born has commonly to suffer." So the Air Force was kept on short, and the anti-aircraft defence on starvation, rations. To say this is not to say that civilian participation and scrutiny was wrong in principle. It is to say that the civilian scrutiny was ineffective -
partly because of lethargy at the top and partly because of the fact that traditions, precedents and vested interests are formidable obstacles to the reconsideration and revision of old policies. After Munich, when Mr. Chamberlain pled that he had no other alternative because Britain was completely defenceless against air attack, Sir Thomas Inskip went, and his place as Minister for Coordination of Defence was taken by Viscount Chatfield. Then preparations were less laggard and vested interests were less necrosanct.

Like Great Britain, France has three service departments - War, Navy and Air - but it has attempted coördination in a different fashion. When Léon Blum formed his Government in 1936, he made his Minister of War Minister of National Defence as well and charged him with the task of coördinating the three services and preventing them from competing with each other. The results were not spectacular. M. Blum had to yield to bureaucratic demands that autonomy be not interfered with. M. Daladier, his Minister of Defence and War, could only preside and request. In France influence is more unlikely than it is across the Channel to become the equivalent of legal authority. Hence in the Chautemps Cabinet M. Daladier was given a stronger legal position. As Minister of National Defence, his countersignature was necessary for many important decisions in respect of the army, the navy and the air forces. The law on the general organization of the nation for war which the French parliament passed in July 1938 solidifies this position. It provides also for a permanent Committee on National Defence - much along the lines of the Committee of Imperial Defence - served by a secretariat from the Superior Council of National
Defence - that is, the chiefs of staff under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. The law provided that when war came, this permanent Committee of National Defence should become a war committee presided over by the President of the Republic and that this committee should assure the unity "of the military direction of the war within the frame of the government's decisions." This war committee has its secretariat from the Superior Council of National Defence. At the same time there is a chief of staff for national defence, General Gamelin, and, as a sop to the Navy, an Admiral was put in charge of the reorganized College of National Defence for the instruction of officers in higher strategy.

In comparison, American devices for effective relationships between statesmen and soldiers seem extremely rudimentary and this despite the fact that the Constitution established civilian control. The President is Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. To be sure, in 1867 through the Command of the Army Act Congress attempted to make it impossible for the President to use his constitutional powers, but the issue here was a controversy between the legislature and the Executive; To be sure also, testifying in opposition to the general staff legislation which Secretary of War Root was urging (1902), General Miles thought that the general's authority would be taken away and that he could not act "without the direction or sanction of the all-powerful general staff which, under the Bill, is only subject to the control of the Secretary of War whose knowledge of affairs military may be meagre or nil." In practice, however, the balance is the opposite of that which General Miles feared. It is notorious that with rare exceptions
American Secretaries of War and of the Navy have not seemed to dominate their Departments as have some of their fellow Cabinet members. Even when they are extraordinarily able, which happens too infrequently, they are handicapped by the absence of any machinery like the Army Council or the Admiralty Board. Their testimony when they retire is that they were only machines to parade and to sign. "I had my head full of the great things I was going to accomplish," said Victor H. Metcalf, Secretary of the Navy under Theodore Roosevelt. "I know better now. My duties consist of waiting for the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation to come in with a paper, put it down before me with his finger on a dotted line and say to me, 'Sign your name here.' It is all any Secretary of the Navy does." As establishments become larger, as mechanization proceeds, as more money is spent for more numerous purposes, the helplessness of civilian secretaries will be even more pronounced. They demonstrate it when Congressional committees consider programmes of expansion. The Secretaries cannot explain these programmes to Congressional committees but have to permit the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations to be the spokesman of the Departments. In Great Britain or France, because of the machinery of consultation and coordination which has been set up, civilian Ministers can master the business of their departments in sufficient detail to explain it to their legislatures.

So far as strategical coordination is concerned, there is an agency - The Joint Board - which is composed of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and the Assistant Chief of Staff (Air Plans Division), the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Chief and the Director of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations.
Allegations are sometimes made that The Joint Board for some of its business must confine itself to agreeing to disagree. Such allegations are probably exaggerated but in the case of the manoeuvres in the Caribbean last winter the services were unable to agree on the way they would play the games jointly and hence the Navy played by itself. The services could not do that if the country were at war.

In all probability the weaknesses of The Joint Board are exaggerated. It should be noted, however, that there is equal representation from the Army and Navy and there is no special representation for a service which in Great Britain and France is autonomous — namely, the Air Force. This is not to suggest that there should be a separate Ministry of Air in Washington. That question has been inquired into and adversely decided by several competent civilian Boards. It should be noted also that The Joint Board's secretariat is a device to record rather than an organ of study as is the case with the secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defence and its numerous subcommittees. And there is on the Board no outside civilian mediating influence — no officials from the Department of State or other branches of the government which must concern themselves with the seventy-five per cent of the national effort which in wartime is exerted by forces other than those in military and naval uniform. War colleges, seconding of officers for study at universities and for special details, great activity and much coordination in the formulation of joint plans for procurement — the progress in these directions is doubtless admirable. But the plain fact is that the important business of war is being left almost completely to the soldiers, save when the President as Commander in Chief can squeeze
it in among the tremendous demands on his time and energy by the gigantic and uncoordinated administrative machine and the terrific burden of ceremonial duties. British Prime Ministers found that they had to delegate the task of coordination and the burden on them is far less than it is on the President of the United States.

Within the services there is a good deal of questioning of present arrangements but it cannot be articulate. It is confined largely to younger men who, when they grow older and attain the higher posts, are content to do the best they can in an administrative world which they had thought should be better. But then, curiously enough - or naturally enough - when they retire the generals and admirals call for reform. Little attention is paid to them. The services ignore the wisdom of the leading members of their professions when those members cease to be on active duty. That is not the case in medicine, or in law, or in journalism. A cynic might say that the soldiers and sailors dare to criticize only when they have had to abandon their ambitions to get on. That would be unfair but it is probably an explanation of the scant heed that is paid to their admonitions.

In August 1917, Woodrow Wilson went to sea in the Mayflower, boarded an American battleship and, according to the editors of his Papers, talked to the officers like "a football coach to his team between the halves."

"I have had most of my thinking," Wilson declared, "stimulated by questions being put to me which I could not answer, and I have had a great many of my preconceived conceptions absolutely destroyed by men who had not given half the study to the subject that I myself had given."