

The fact of the matter is that almost every profession is pushed forward by the men who do not belong to it and know nothing about it, because they ask the ignorant questions which it would not occur to the professional man to ask at all; he supposes that they have been answered, whereas it may be that most of them had not been answered at all. The naïveté of the point of view, the whole approach of the mind that has had nothing to do with the question creates an entirely different atmosphere."

This philosophy - and who will challenge it - would justify civilian participation in the consideration of service problems even if the service effort constituted a larger percentage of war effort. In the same speech, President Wilson went on to say that "this is an unprecedented war and therefore it is a war in one sense for amateurs." He thought that "because of the novelty of the instruments used" and because "nobody ever before fought a war like this," experience in previous wars would count for little. That is even truer of the present war. The British Field Service Regulations anticipated it. They recognized that high command in war demands: "the broadest possible outlook and knowledge of social as well as of military questions." They declared that "a major war affects the whole of the national life and every class of citizen and there is a corresponding civil influence on the conduct of military operations." In the United States there are insufficient opportunities for civil influence to affect military policy and defence preparations.

PSF War Dept  
1940

EMERGENCY ADMINISTRATION

by

Lindsay Rogers

My terms of reference were so broad that to meet them completely I should have to present a book. In these memoranda, therefore, I attempt to select certain important phases of Great Britain's preparations (or lack of preparations) for the more efficient conduct of (a) the White War in which she was engaged until September 1; and (b) for the actual war in which she has been engaged since that date. I deal principally with Great Britain. France takes her cue from Great Britain and a repetition of certain matters in a Gallic setting would be tedious. Moreover in France, before September, all preparations were effected by ministerial decree: the parliament simply did not function; and since September the country has been under a "state of siege" (very roughly corresponding to our martial law) and hence, if there were a similar emergency here, impossible under our constitutional jurisprudence. "Pleins pouvoirs," such as M. Daladier has had, the American Congress assuredly would never grant to the President until Washington was a target and the Senate and House chambers had to be evacuated. Hence it has not seemed wise to discuss France with the same emphasis and detail that I use for Great Britain.

In Great Britain during the period between Prague and Danzig (that is from March to September 1939), preparations to meet the crisis of the White War and to be better equipped for the crisis

of actual war proceeded rather slowly. The delay was in the face of severe criticism from a certain section of the Tory Party and general criticism from the Opposition -- the Laborites and the Liberals. What preparations there were may be described under two headings:

(I) Organization and Personnel

(II) Legislation

(I) Organization and Personnel. In creating or remodeling its administrative machinery, the British Government has rather extraordinary advantages. Its system is extremely flexible. A great deal of reconstruction can be done by the simple device of Treasury Minutes. Any proposals that a Prime Minister makes to the House of Commons for a more efficient administrative machine -- an increase in the number of departments, a transfer of duties from one Minister to another, the addition to a Cabinet of Ministers without Portfolio -- are accepted without serious question. The theory in Great Britain is that responsibility for formulating policies and administering the law is definitely fixed on the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and that they should be permitted to have the organizational scheme which they think is best suited for the fulfillment of their purposes. This theory is, of course, in sharp contrast with the theory maintained by Congress. The British Parliament, however, (this is true of the French parliament as well)

can be more easy in mind in giving the executive a free hand than could the American Congress. Ministers must answer to the House of Commons for their acts; they can be criticized and checked, and they work through permanent officials who presumably are extremely efficient. In the past, at least, ministerial responsibility and the traditions of the administrative class of the British civil service have encouraged the House of Commons to permit successive British Governments to have the management organizations that they thought best. There are no such encouragements in Washington. In short, the British executive flexes its administrative organization and Parliament approves as a matter of course. The American executive must appeal to Congress for authority to act, and stupid insistences on trying to limit the authority sometimes have lamentable consequences.

In England, before the declaration of a state of war in the early days of September, not much was done in the direction of streamlining the Government. A new Minister for the Coordination of Defence (the office had been created in 1936 and is discussed in a special memorandum) showed greater energy, and certain members of Mr. Chamberlain's Cabinet were charged with special duties in respect of air raid precautions, food storage and supply. These activities were not spectacular but on the contrary seemed rather feeble.

That duties in respect of air raid precautions and the storing of food could be placed upon two Cabinet members whose jobs were sinecures is a good illustration of the flexibility of the British Government. These two Ministers were the Lord Privy Seal and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and for almost the first time in the history of their offices, these two office holders had powers delegated to them by Parliament and, by Order in Council, had large staffs at their disposal, and functioned in so far as administrative importance was concerned on a parity with the usually more active Ministers.

The Lord Privy Seal (this is his title, it is said, because the holder of the office is neither a lord nor a privy nor a seal) was Sir John Anderson, an ex-civil servant of high attainments, who upon retirement from the civil service a few years ago did some excellent work in India, came back to Great Britain, was elected to the House of Commons, and then put into the Cabinet. Preparations looking toward air raid precautions had broken down pretty badly while they were under the jurisdiction of the Home Office and Sir John Anderson was brought into the Cabinet to speed them up. The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Mr. W. S. Morrison, was charged with the matter of food supplies. Little else was done in the way of organizational preparation nor was anything done in a more important respect; namely, a general strengthening of the Cabinet -- strengthening which might make

the Cabinet more respected by the British electorate and a more efficient administrative machine and thereby an earnest to foreign states that Great Britain was seriously preparing for and did not shrink from the eventuality of war.

In his Saarbrücken speech, shortly after Munich, Herr Hitler had given an arrogant warning to the apostle of appeasement not to take Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden or Duff Cooper into his Cabinet -- a warning to which Palmerston, Disraeli, or Lloyd George might have replied by their immediate inclusion. During the summer of 1939, there was a very general newspaper campaign in Great Britain urging that Winston Churchill and Mr. Eden be put into the Cabinet. This Mr. Chamberlain refused to do. His declination showed how feeble the Parliamentary and press opposition to him was. It was not able to accomplish the first duty of an Opposition -- to require the Government to put its first string team on the field. Mr. Chamberlain could show his contempt by continuing to use scrubs.

When war actually came, Churchill and Eden went into the War Cabinet, the organization of which will be commented on below. Historians may discuss the question of whether the inclusion of Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty or in another office during the early summer of 1939 might not have been such an indication to Russia of the seriousness of British intentions as to make more possible a conclusion of an agreement that would

have brought Russia into the peace front which Great Britain was then attempting to construct. Historians will also discuss whether the inclusion of such persons in the Cabinet would not have convinced Hitler that Great Britain was really preparing to fight. They will discuss whether, if Hitler himself did not miscalculate, the German people were unaware that Britain might this time be meaning what she seemed to be saying and that their unawareness permitted Der Führer to make his gamble. In their speeches and in Foreign Office notes, British Ministers eschewed such words as "war" and "fight." Diplomatic formulae such as we shall not "fail to live up to our obligations"; the issue cannot be considered as "a purely local matter"; we shall "give Poland assistance"; "we are prepared to resist aggression" were not calculated to make England's intentions translucently clear. Sir Neville Henderson may have thought (July 15) that "His Majesty's Government could never be reproached this time, as they had been in 1914, for not having made their position clear beyond all doubt" but perhaps what seemed clarity to the British was only cloudiness to Germans whose minds were stunted by every device of propaganda. It may not have seemed clarity to Hitler whose will to believe ignores truth and upon whom an entourage did not impress unpleasant facts even if they were guiltless of the not infrequent charge that they kept them from him. By reshaping his Cabinet, Mr. Chamberlain could have helped to prevent clarity

from becoming cloudiness and would have recognized the ever more important truth that, in modern war, strategy must be totalitarian.

This memorandum is not the place for an extended discussion of why British policy was laggard. In so far as organization and personnel were concerned, the fundamental reason probably lay in Mr. Chamberlain's character --- in his obstinacy. He and his small inner cabinet (Lord Halifax, Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare, the last two of whom were ex-Foreign Secretaries driven from their offices by hostile public opinion and dissatisfaction with their policies) did not want to admit that they were not up to the task of leadership and needed the support of new Ministers. Lord Salisbury once said that nothing was more fatal to a statesman than to stick to the carcasses of dead policies. Well, after Prague, Mr. Chamberlain could not stick to the dead policy of appeasement, but he did continue to stick to the team which had tried that policy and had seen it fail.

Another reason why British preparations were laggard was in a sense laudable. There was considerable reluctance to put Britain frankly on a war basis because to do so would have required the use of Fascist methods and the setting up of Fascist controls. In his book, Security: Can We Retrieve It?, Sir Arthur Salter argued during the spring of 1939 that Great Britain should be put under a regime which, in so far as emergency powers over economic life were concerned, should go much of the distance that had been

hesitated to do that. It would have been bad for trade. Furthermore, there would have been extended debates in Parliament. After Prague, Mr. Chamberlain could probably have secured a grant of power permitting the Cabinet to enact much legislation by Orders in Council. His party majority was sufficiently disciplined for that and the Opposition which had been clamoring for action would have been embarrassed in objecting. Mr. Chamberlain did not ask for such authority. In moving slowly, he showed that he still hoped it would not be necessary to move far. In France, as will appear later, emergency legislation subsequent to March 15 was by executive decree.

To be sure Mr. Chamberlain could not maintain that his Munich policy was still a success and, for one of the few times in the history of cabinet government in Great Britain, a ministry stayed in office after its principal policy had failed completely and began to carry out policies which had been advocated by the Opposition and with which, down to the failure of its own policy, it would have no truck at all. The incident will undoubtedly be discussed by future writers on the British constitution -- if there is the same kind of a constitution to write about. I mention the point here because, although in respect of substance the policy had changed, in respect of procedure -- that is organization and personnel to implement the new policy -- Mr. Chamberlain was adamant.

Little of the laggardliness was due to Parliamentary opposition. Debates in the Commons and the Lords did question whether safeguards in the emergency legislation were adequate. Thus, for example, the peers demanded that the Ministry of Supply Bill be changed so as to make it impossible for state enterprise to continue after the emergency had passed. They feared that the Ministry of Supply Bill might be used as the thin edge of the wedge of nationalization. But most of the delay was due to Mr. Chamberlain's reluctance to admit, save gradually, that his policy had failed. To set up a Ministry of Supply, to spend huge sums for anti-air raid precautions and to mobilize for civilian defence would have shown spectacularly that "peace in our time" was gravely threatened. But before the adjournment of Parliament on August 4, 1939, a great deal of legislation was on the statute books. When he was Prime Minister, the Right Honorable Earl Baldwin of Bewdley lamented the "fact" that democracies always lag two years behind the dictatorships and he himself did not try to do anything about it. But, when they do not have weak executives or when they face emergencies, democracies can act quickly. The British Parliament demonstrated that in late August. It demonstrated it even more vividly when war was declared.

Before the war of 1914 only one statute had ever gone through all its stages of consideration and had been passed by Parliament in one day. That was the Explosives Act of 1833 when, following the discovery of a bomb in St. Stephen's, a Fenian

conspiracy was feared. On August 3, 1914, Parliament passed through all its stages a Postponement of Payments Act providing for a moratorium. On August 24, 1939, when Parliament was summoned in extraordinary session, the Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill passed through all stages and received royal assent. That gave to the Government rather extraordinary ordinance-making authority and, under a liberal interpretation of the authority thus conferred, the Government -- that is, the Ministers functioning legally through the King in Council -- could see that the state took no harm. But on Friday, September 1, when Parliament met again, no less than sixteen bills, some of them extremely important, passed through all their stages and received royal assent in one day. A consolidated fund appropriation bill; a currency (defence) bill; a prize bill; Government of India act (amendment); a courts (emergency power) act; an armed force (conditions of service) act; an import, export and customs powers (defence) act; a ships and aircraft (transfer restriction) act; a rent and mortgage interest restrictions act; a landlord and tenant (war damage) act; a housing (emergency powers) act; an essential buildings and plant (repair of war damage) act; a compensation (defence) act; a regional commissioners act; a Ministers of Crown (emergency appointment) act; a war damage to land (Scotland) act. I include the descriptions of each statute in parenthesis because they indicate how adept the British are in

having short titles which disclose the purpose of their legislative enactments. Of course one reason why Great Britain could do this was because of the excellence of her Parliamentary draftsmen, and some of these measures had been under preparation for a considerable time.

But the second reason was that the minority was no longer a minority simply to obstruct and oppose. It had been pressing the Government to make more effective preparations for the coming of an emergency it saw more clearly than did the Government. Another reason was that, while it may not be true that inter arma silent leges, certainly inter arma the Opposition is silent when it is in agreement with the Government that a state of war should be entered upon.

Something of the same sort happened in the United States during the banking crisis immediately after Mr. Roosevelt's inauguration in March 1933. Then, however, the draftsmen were not so fully prepared. There was more haste in that the bills were not even printed for the scrutiny of Congressmen when they voted upon them. British preparations in these technical respects were much better. Great Britain, moreover, pays much more attention to the drafting of, to publicity for, and, when mistakes are pointed out, to the amendment of, administrative legislation than does the United States. Carelessness in these respects accelerated the reaction which in any case was inevitable.

In his Chicago speech of 1936, President Roosevelt reminded his hearers that in the spring of 1933 "Washington did not look like a dangerous bureaucracy to them then. Oh, no! It looked like an emergency hospital. All of the distinguished patients wanted two things -- a quick hypodermic to end the pain and a course of treatment to cure the disease. They wanted them in a hurry; we gave them both. And now most of the patients seem to be doing very nicely. Some of them are even well enough to throw their crutches at the doctor."

Already in Great Britain the Opposition (mid-November 1939) is being much more critical of the Government than it was in the tense days before September 1 and in the fevered days when there was great uncertainty concerning the way in which the war would develop.

But there may have been another reason why British preparations were laggard. It was generally said during the summer of 1939 that the much vaunted administrative class of the British civil service was lacking in imagination. It may be unfair to say that the permanent officials were weighed in the balance and found wanting, but certainly, when they were weighed, they did not tip the balance so decisively that there was general applause. Perhaps the weighing was not altogether fair. Ministers were assuredly lethargic and when this lethargy was mated with the inertia that bureaucracies always display -- particularly when faced by novel tasks -- the marriage was naturally barren.

The tasks were new ones and experience counted for little. What was needed was imagination rather than soundness, dash rather than doubt. The last war demonstrated that forty years of service with troops did not train officers for higher commands. Years of routine duties are not calculated to train civil servants energetically and successfully to tackle tasks which are novel to them. To be sure, they might have borrowed ideas and copied devices from the totalitarian states but they apparently hesitated to imitate such techniques. Moreover, there was a personal factor.

The British civil service had been under a Permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury -- the head of His Majesty's civil service establishment. To some students of administration, this linking of civil service to a government department whose primary function is to effect economies has seemed to raise serious questions of policy. Whether the Treasury influence -- the Treasury "blight" as it is frequently called -- resulted in making civil servants routiners rather than inventors is a matter that will be argued about. Certainly, however, the personality of the man who was for some years head of the civil service cannot be dismissed as of no importance. Able he certainly was. He apparently was a man who liked deference and was most attracted to those of his underlings who deferred. Consequently, there was a tendency for him to spread through the other departments men who not only had the Treasury mind but who had also clicked with him -- that

is, who were deferential. Bagehot once said that Parliamentary government could work only in a nation large sections of whose population were deferential. Subsequent developments made that verdict a Scotch one — "not proven." Key men in a civil service cannot meet the demands of a crisis if they have spent a large part of their youths in being deferential. The more highly placed civil servants are old and tired and approaching retirement. Save in exceptional cases, they were too young to have had any real chance during the last war. During the twenty years of peace, they have been taught to prevent rather than to invent, to do as little as possible, but to do that very well. General education, judgment, honesty, integrity, a concern for office orderliness and a gift for efficient routineing are all well but they are not well enough. Promotions have been tedious even when abilities are outstanding. In short, the performance (or lack of performance) of the British civil service during the last eighteen months is a subject that the historians will not ignore. What I say here about it is based not on Parliamentary opposition or newspaper criticism. It comes in some measure from members of the civil service who were not charged with the war tasks and from persons who either have been in the civil service or closely associated with many of its members.

When the war broke out in 1914, England was governed by a Liberal Cabinet under Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister. For two

years there were few formal changes of organization. The Committee of Imperial Defence was supposed to coördinate strategical efforts but within the Cabinet there soon came into being a War Committee on which served the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of the Admiralty, and other Ministers. This Committee began to supplant the Committee of Imperial Defence. Some of the resulting difficulties are discussed in a separate memorandum, Civil Control of Military Authority.

Mr. Lloyd George, as is well known, effected fundamental changes in this organization. He set up a War Cabinet composed of five members — himself as Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, and Lord Milner, Lord Curzon and Mr. Arthur Henderson as Ministers without Portfolio. Mr. Bonar Law, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer, was a nominal member of the War Cabinet, but was not supposed to attend its meetings regularly. He was described by Lloyd George as the "sentinel outside the Cabinet" to settle as much business as he could without the necessity of bringing it inside. This personnel changed slightly from time to time. Mr. Barnes succeeded Mr. Henderson. General Smuts was a member of the War Cabinet during his stays in England and performed special missions for it.

The main outlines and theories underlying this organization are well known. Its members were all free from routine departmental duties. Their task was primarily to consult on and to discuss war policies and the measures which should be taken to

carry those policies out. The Cabinet was aided by an extremely able secretariat which, under Sir Maurice Hankey's direction:

(a) prevented business from going before the War Cabinet until it was in shape for speedy consideration and decision — that is, properly documented and with the appropriate persons either presenting it personally or being in attendance if the War Cabinet wished to interrogate them;

(b) kept minutes of the meetings of the War Cabinet (in summary form), recorded the decisions taken, and, after having the minutes vetted by the members of the War Cabinet, circulated the appropriate parts of them to the Ministers of the departments who were particularly concerned; and

(c) furnished secretarial service to all subcommittees of the War Cabinet and to any interdepartmental committees (if important) which function at a level below that of the War Cabinet. In this role, the Cabinet secretariat:

(1) provided a channel through which the War Cabinet received complete information on everything which was under way and could then decide whether it wished to participate directly; and

(2) permitted things to be done without ever going to the War Cabinet with the result that the War Cabinet did not loom in the ministerial or popular mind as a great devourer of all discretion.

It is worth while noting -- in view of the fears that are occasionally apparent in Washington -- that the head of this Cabinet secretariat prevented himself from being thought of as a contender for power or as an assistant Prime Minister. He kept Ministers from being jealous of him because he confined his duties to secretarial ones: agenda matters, etc. He had no administrative tasks. He did not even inquire as to whether the Cabinet's decisions were carried out. That was the responsibility of the Minister concerned. Influence, the Secretary of the Cabinet unquestionably had -- an influence which indubitably became greater as his experience lengthened and his knowledge increased. With a Prime Minister like Lloyd George, however, that kind of influence could never have become ominous. Sir Maurice Hankey would have been too shrewd to permit it to become ominous with a Prime Minister who was an amiable incompetent.

It was said that the War Cabinet had to spend a good deal of its time in composing differences between departmental Ministers who were not members of the Cabinet. Every executive, however, who is at the head of things has to spend time in composing differences between his subordinates. It was said, also, that Ministers without routine departmental duties were likely to get out of touch with administrative business and that, therefore, their general views might be divorced from reality. Policy, the argument is, emerges from the routine decisions which have to be made and which

impress themselves on the Minister who makes them. But if this is true of peace policy -- I think it is doubtful -- it is not true of war policy. The expedient of the War Cabinet, it has been said, is built upon "the possibility of separating policy from administration which is unworkable except under the pressure of such an urgency as war." All considerations are then subordinated to the single issue of victory and "the usual processes of opposition are normally suspended." Are there valid reasons why considerations cannot be subordinated to a single peace issue, say of victory over unemployment?

But, by and large, Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet was an extremely efficient piece of governmental organization. As soon as it was instituted, England's administrative record improved. Even its critics would not have abolished it. In 1936, when discussions concerning Mr. Stanley Baldwin's ineffectiveness were outspoken and when it was seen that Great Britain was going to face a more continuous crisis than she had been facing before, proposals were made in the press and elsewhere for the organization of a war directory like Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet. Nothing was done. Again in the summer of 1939, Sir Arthur Salter urged that the British Cabinet be reshaped so as to be like the Lloyd George war organization. Nothing was done. I have already discussed the reluctance, indeed the refusal, of Mr. Chamberlain to include Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden in his Cabinet when

popular pressure for their inclusion was very severe during the summer of 1939.

Immediately upon the declaration of a state of war between Great Britain and Germany, however, Mr. Chamberlain set up a War Cabinet. All his Ministers placed their resignations in his hands. The War Cabinet was to be composed of nine members -- Mr. Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, and First Lord of the Treasury; Sir John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Viscount Halifax, Foreign Secretary; Lord Chatfield, Minister for the Coördination of Defence; Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty; Mr. Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War; Sir Kingsley Wood, Secretary of State for Air; Sir Samuel Hoare, Lord Privy Seal; and a Minister without Portfolio, Lord Hankey. It was announced that Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for the Dominions, would attend the War Cabinet and keep the Dominions informed.

Mr. Chamberlain's War Cabinet, as is evident, differs very materially from the kind of organization that Mr. Lloyd George set up. For one thing, it is on strict party lines. Mr. Lloyd George ignored such divisions. Mr Chamberlain is reported to have offered the Opposition a place or places in his Government, if not in the War Cabinet, and met with declinations. They did not mean that the Opposition would not support the Government. They meant that the Opposition was unwilling to abandon its role of Parliamentary critic. It thought -- in all probability correctly so --

that it could be more useful as a prod to the Chamberlain Government than it could be as a sharer of administrative responsibilities. This might have been a wise decision, no matter who was Prime Minister. Its wisdom was the clearer because the Opposition was lacking in confidence in Mr. Chamberlain's energy and even intentions.

Again, there is the difference of size. Ten as against five seems to make the Cabinet much too large a body for the informal discussion and the quick decision which were possible in Mr. Lloyd George's group. Furthermore, in Mr. Chamberlain's Cabinet, save for himself, there is only one member who is a Minister without Portfolio and who is entirely free from departmental duties. All the others have important departments. The one Minister without Portfolio is Lord Hankey who was head of the British Cabinet secretariat from 1916 down to his retirement in 1938. Sir Samuel Hoare shifted from the Home Secretaryship to the office of Lord Privy Seal, but in the latter office he is charged with special responsibility for the Ministry of Information and for censorship -- a problem which as recent discussions in the newspapers have shown is so far from settled as probably to require all of his time. (The former Lord Privy Seal, Sir John Anderson, shifted to the Home Office and took with him his special duties in respect of air raid precaution.)

Again, Mr. Chamberlain's Cabinet differs from a Lloyd George organization in not having brought into its midst any outstanding personalities or British statesmen who had made names for themselves in particular fields of administration. Mr. Chamberlain included Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare -- both members of his so-called inner cabinet, who bear with him responsibility for the failure of the policy to keep England out of the war. This is probably more serious from the psychological side than it is from the administrative side. One can sympathize with Mr. Chamberlain, however. Having had to see the country enter the war, he did not want to separate himself from the friends who for years had labored with him, even though mistakenly, on the theory that they were making war unlikely. Mr. Chamberlain is not the type of man that Mr. Lloyd George was -- so sure of himself that he is willing to bring into his council men of independent political judgment and great reputation, knowing that if he is right he can persuade them to his way of thinking, and if they are right that he will be clever enough to see rather quickly the rightness of their policy and thereafter agree with them.

Mr. Lloyd George's War Cabinet was criticized on the ground that it did not include the heads of the two services and the Foreign Secretary. The War Cabinet was attended many times by these persons when matters of importance to them were being discussed. It was attended also by the chiefs of staff and Mr. Lloyd

George and his associates dealt directly with the chiefs of staff without bothering to take the War Secretary or the First Lord of the Admiralty away from their routine departmental duties. Now the Minister for the Coördination of Defence and the three Ministers are in the Cabinet. The three latter bear heavy burdens in their departments and it is doubtful whether they can drop those departmental responsibilities and their thinking about the responsibilities for the task of devoting their minds to large-range problems of the war. As Sir William Beveridge once put it, a successful war cabinet must "be a group of unencumbered minds in continuous session." The Chamberlain Cabinet certainly cannot be that.

The Cabinet has been criticized because it contains no member who is known to have general economic information and an adequate appreciation of the economic problems of the war. Mr. Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons on October 9 that economic questions -- that is, economic planning of the nation's war efforts: finance, commodities, economic warfare, etc. -- were to be dealt with by the Cabinet which would work through a committee of the Ministers directly concerned. He said that Lord Stamp had been asked to assist this committee by becoming a (part-time!) adviser on economic coördination. Presumably, however, this committee will be composed for the most part of Ministers who are not members of the War Cabinet. Hence, Lord Stamp will not be in touch with the members of the War Cabinet and one may guess that the proposed efforts will not be crowned with immediate success.

But if this organization does not work, it will be very easy, as I have said, to effect changes. It can be done by the Prime Minister alone, with the assent of the King. The Treasury will then carry the necessary expenses on its vote. One of the bits of extraordinary legislation passed by Parliament was an amendment of the Ministers and Secretaries Act. That statute provides that only a certain number of the secretaries of state and the under-secretaries of state can sit in the House of Commons or the House of Lords. The purpose of the statute was to make it certain that each department is represented adequately in both branches of the British Parliament. The amendment of the statute enables the Government for the period of the war to disregard such limitations. New ministries can be created whenever a necessity for them appears. Thus almost at once there was a Minister of Information and a Minister of Economic Warfare, and then on October 14, a Minister of Shipping.

(II) Legislation. By mid-September, forty-seven Acts of Parliament, many Orders in Council and innumerable departmental regulations had given Great Britain a wartime legal and administrative framework. I mention a few of the statutes.

There was the Military Training Act of 1939, specifying the classes of persons liable to be registered, exempting certain classes of persons, providing machinery for the determination

of who were conscientious objectors, and so on. A good deal of discussion in Parliament was stirred up over section eleven, which gave to His Majesty power by Order in Council to make provisions "for such consequential matters as it appears to Him expedient to provide for by reason of the passing of this Act" and by any such Order to "modify any enactment relating to such matters." Innumerable questions were asked in Parliament about the militiamen's rent when they were called for military service. Would that be cared for by the Government? How about their installment buying contracts, which in Great Britain are called "hire purchase agreements"? How about their family allowances and their health and unemployment allowances, etc.? Consequential Orders in Council will have to deal with these points. Manifestly, as the ambit of government interference and as the control of economic life increase -- as status supplants contract -- more matters have to be dealt with and thought of by governments when men are conscripted into an army than was the case before.

An innocent looking statute entitled "an Act to promote and facilitate the construction, maintenance and management of camps of a permanent character" passed in May 1939. The Government -- partly because of the imagination of the Parliamentary draftsmen -- was making one bite at two cherries. This Act was a telescoping of two motives: (a) physical fitness -- that is, getting the children to the seaside, the children of parents who could not afford

to take them, and providing for folk who are likely to want accommodations under the new holiday-with-pay act which the British Parliament had passed. Also there has been a problem in respect of "staggering" the holidays of industrial workers. The second motive was to care for (b) evacuation arrangements from towns exposed to air bombardment. Here, therefore, was an example of a statute which was pressed forward because of the emergency of preparing for the eventuality of war, but which might have not been brought forward until later had it not been necessary to care for a more general nonwar problem.

This was true also in respect of an amendment to the Public Health (Scotland) Act of 1897 relating to coal mine refuse liable to spontaneous combustion. That statute came into Parliament as a public health proposal -- to get purer atmosphere. A secondary object was to improve the amenities and to remove the eyesores of slag heaps -- to turn them into recreation grounds, etc. In all probability this statute would not have got itself passed if there had not been, also, a question of national security -- to prevent smouldering slag heaps (which for some reason seemed to be permanently aglow) from being a beacon for air raiders at night. A similar bill for England was dropped because under the Civil Defence (vi) Act the Cabinet can, by Order in Council, care for the problem.

Parliament made further and temporary provisions "for enabling the reserve and auxiliary forces of the Crown to be called

out for service as may be found necessary." That was due to crisis conditions. Section two dealt with reinstatement in civil occupations and provided that it should be the duty of any employer whose employee was called for service to reinstate him in his employment at the termination of that service in a job and under conditions not less favorable than those which he would have had, had he not been called out. If the employer did not do this, he was liable to a fine unless successful in offering one of the various defences which the Act allowed. But the upshot of the Act was to put the burden on the employer to take his men back or else submit to a prosecution. Special provision had to be made for contracts of service or apprenticeship and the Minister of Labor was given the power to "make regulations relieving the parties to such contracts of all or any of their obligations thereunder in respect of the period of that military service." The Military Training Act which was also passed to facilitate this matter made a similar proviso in respect of reinstatement in civil employment. A Control of Employment Act empowers the Minister of Labor to make an Order forbidding employers to advertise for certain classes of workers specified in the Order, or to engage or re-engage such workers without the consent of the Minister. The Permanent Under-Secretary of the Treasury told a friend of mine in Great Britain the other day that it would not be long before the bureaucracy was telling every British citizen where and at what job he could work and in most cases fixing his compensation.

These examples show the general trend of legislation. Further details are not necessary for present purposes. If given they would disclose how totalitarian in its coverage modern legislation must be. The details would also be interesting because of the problem on which I harp frequently -- namely, efficient legislative drafting. In preparing this legislation the British draftsmen showed awareness of a great many niceties.

But there is one statute that I should mention and which I used to cite to friends who in August wondered whether the British Government was really serious in its intentions and thought that war was likely to come. This statute is the Clergy (National Emergency Precautions) Measure of 1939. Its purpose is to enable the Archbishops of Canterbury and York "to make regulations for the more effective exercise of the cure of souls in the event of war" etc. It provides inter alia that the Bishop can give directions from time to time "after consultation if possible with the rural dean of the deanery concerned as to the use or disuse of any church, chapel or other place of public worship" within the diocese; to grant unlimited leave of absence to any incumbent within his diocese; to require any clerk in holy orders serving in any parish to serve in some other parish "where the Bishop after consultation if possible with the Archdeacons of the diocese may be of the opinion that his help is more needed." And then the Act proceeds to give powers to change financial legislation so that the expenses of such

transfer and of such precautions in respect of the clergy for the more effective cure of souls can be paid for.

When the war broke out twenty-five years ago, both France and England immediately went under emergency regimes. Normal constitutional life was in abeyance. Important constitutional guarantees had to be suspended. In effect, parliaments granted to executives authority to see that the state took no harm. France established a "state of siege." This regime, long familiar on the Continent, was foreign to the legal system of Great Britain. There Parliament passed a Defence of the Realm Act (popularly called DORA) and gave the executive broad powers to issue defence regulations which would have the force of law. A quarter of a century later, the pattern of the emergency regimes in France and England is in broad outlines the same. There are, however, two essential differences.

In 1914, the suspension of normal constitutional life came suddenly. Not until the outbreak of hostilities did the two parliaments give to their executives quasi-dictatorial powers, and they gave them all at once. Their voluntary abdication was almost unprecedented. Since the Peace Conference, however, both the French and British parliaments have been compelled on occasion to give their executives enormous ordinance-making authority, and, on certain subjects at least, to cease legislating themselves.

Thus in France, since Poincaré stabilized the franc in 1926, a number of Cabinets have had what the French call "pleins pouvoirs" to deal with financial and economic problems, and the powers granted have differed only in the extent to which they were complete. Since March last, M. Daladier by grant from the French parliament has had greater authority than that possessed by any French executive since Napoleon. He has been able, by decrees taken in the Council of Ministers, to enact any legislation which the French parliament itself could enact. He attained the apotheosis of that power during the summer when he issued a decree pro-roguing the powers of the parliament for two years and postponing the elections scheduled for next May until May 1942. In France, therefore, the declaration of a state of siege does not mean anything like the transfer of power which it meant in August 1914. It is necessary in order to regularize relations between the civil and military authorities and to put certain areas of the country under military governors. Military operations would be handicapped unless they are backed by completely coöperative civil operations -- e.g., against espionage and internal disorders. In 1914, France could not take such measures until after the state of siege was declared. In 1939, M. Daladier had by decree put many of those measures into effect.

British law has never known anything resembling the state of siege, and Great Britain has had an extreme distaste for anything

approaching martial law. Since the conclusion of the war and since DORA (save for a few remnants) was put into the legislative storehouse, Parliament has a number of times been compelled to give the executive extraordinary authority which, before 1914, had never been necessary. Thus, in 1920, Parliament passed the Emergency Powers Act. The emergency contemplated was the cessation of the supply of any essential commodity or interference with the means of transport or of communication -- that is, through strikes. When an emergency was threatened, the King could by proclamation declare that it existed and thereafter, by Order in Council, the Cabinet could take measures to deal with the emergency. Parliament set up safeguards: the Royal Proclamation automatically summoned Parliament if Parliament was in recess; the executive had to redeclare the emergency every month and the House of Commons could annul its decrees. On several occasions the Act has been effective without serious complaints that the enormous power which it transferred had been abused. In 1931, when England went off gold, Parliament gave the National Government unprecedented authority to legislate economies and, indeed, to impose certain forms of taxation.

After September 1938 (Munich) and particularly after March 1939 (Prague), Parliament debated and passed a series of statutes whose purpose was to permit more effective preparations for the conduct of the "white" war and to mobilize all possible resources for a possible "red" war. These of necessity had to be

in broad terms. They had to confer large powers on the executive to fill in gaps, to make administrative regulations having the force of law -- in short, to legislate.

This delegation of authority to the executive since last March has been tedious and piecemeal but, when war came, Parliament at once passed the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act -- the modern counterpart of the last war's DORA. His Majesty may by Order in Council make such Regulations "as appear to him to be necessary for securing the public safety, the defence of the realm, the maintenance of public order and the efficient conduct of any war in which His Majesty may be engaged, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community."

The authority conferred could hardly have been in broader terms. Almost at once, 104 Regulations were issued. Moreover, the statute has legislative grandchildren as well as children, which is a departure for England. Orders in Council, that is to say, confer powers on ministerial departments and authorize them to enact further sub-sublegislation. The Regulations made are valid even though they contravene previous Acts of Parliament. Individual liberties and constitutional rights must yield to the necessities of national safety. But even though the executive can (with a few exceptions: e.g., industrial conscription) do what it thinks necessary, it is using its power sparingly and as said above has sought formal Parliamentary approval for a good many statutes.

In both countries, to repeat, the setting up of executive dictatorships had partial precedents in the expedients which post-Peace Conference crises required and had been prepared for. They did not come suddenly as in 1914. But in another important respect there is a great difference between the situation now and the situation a quarter of a century ago. Then the Channel kept the British Isles from being a theatre of military operations save during occasional bombings. So in France military effort was pretty well confined to the actual battlefields. Now however, there is a problem of civil defence which may well be more crucial than the problem of military and naval defence.

The last war gradually became more totalitarian in the sense that a greater and greater part of the national effort had to be directed toward its successful prosecution and that no activity could be permitted to impede its prosecution. Now war is totalitarian in the sense that civilian populations -- women and children -- will contribute to the casualty lists. This means that the civilian population will have to accept orders from civilian commanders and obey them just as implicitly as the soldier or sailor must obey orders from his commander. Under these circumstances individuals put a lower value on liberty and constitutional rights. Life is more important.

To an extent the French state of siege has always contemplated such a result. Its imposition, as I have said, means that

the maintenance of order and the enforcement of regulations are shared between the civil and military authorities. If powers are granted to the military authorities, the civil officials retain discretion in respect of all other matters. During the last war, collaboration gradually supplanted substitution. Regulations were sometimes signed by both the military and civil authorities -- that is, by the prefects and by the regional military commanders. The state of siege does not, as its name might indicate, create a military dictatorship. The civil government is supreme over the military commanders. It appoints and dismisses them; it controls them in questions of strategy as distinguished from tactics; and it can limit their competence insofar as concerns authority ordinarily exercised by civil officials.

The state of siege has always contemplated the suspension of fundamental rights. Under it the authorities can enter individual premises without a search warrant; they may limit circulation of persons in any district; they may forbid subversive publications or any act threatening the public order; they may confiscate arms and ammunition or other articles of military importance; they can take over the property which they need and the question of compensation will be determined later. In France, the declaration of a state of siege automatically summons parliament which has the power to set it aside. The executive can determine the areas in which the state of siege will be effective and the

extent to which it will supplant civil procedures. In France, therefore, the command of the civilian population will be shared by civilian Ministers and officials and by military commanders, but the former will remain supreme. In Great Britain, the command of the civilian population has been made possible by numerous statutes in addition to the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act and the authority which it gives to servants of the King who are really Parliamentary agents.

The freer a government is in normal times, the greater the shock when a crisis comes and necessitates unusual measures and weapons. When a despotic government is confronted by a special emergency, it need only become slightly more despotic. A free government must undergo something of a metamorphosis. It is a tragic irony that when popular institutions fight for preservation they must use the methods of their enemies. In 1914, British lawyers lamented the fact that the common law was under the iron heel of militarism -- "a militarism of the same genus that we are endeavouring to destroy on the plains of Flanders" and could prophesy alarmingly that, if militarism gained the upper hand in the conflict with the common law, it would "tend to grow to the same evil proportions which it had attained in Germany." In both England and France after the Peace Conference, executives gave up the powers which they had been exercising. Constitutional life became normal and showed few effects of its experience. Can we have similar hopes now?

Perhaps, but not too confidently. England Moves toward Fascism, the title of an article published a year ago, was then prophetic rather than descriptive. Now it is true and the movement is bound to continue. Conscripted, the direction of civilian activity into the paths that lead to greater national strength for war had had their effect even before September. A writer in The Round Table declared that they "have produced an entirely new economic order of things" and prophesied that they "may well produce a new social order."

In the past, English economy depended on the state of the world market. For the past year, it has depended on armament expenditures. It is doubtful whether the reservoir of unemployed can furnish enough men for the reoriented national effort. Even if the reservoir includes enough employables, they will have to be trained. Meanwhile, necessary labor is drawn from other industries -- those which produce for export, for civilian consumption. As yet the choice is not between guns and butter but it is between guns and luxuries, between war essentials and commodities that are not essential. Tragic also is the fact that if peace suddenly broke out -- and it was a genuine peace -- economic distress would be severe. Unemployment figures in England are not now looked on as an index of business slackening or revival or of economic distress that might develop into social malaise. They are an index of capacity to meet the needs of national defence and when those needs cease to be met

unemployment will be catastrophic. Had the Assembly of the League of Nations met in September, it would have had before it a report declaring that "whatever the final outcome of the state of political tension may be, society will have to readjust itself sooner or later (sic) to a peace-time economy." Then, in masterful understatement, the report declared that "a difficult period of adaptation must be foreseen on account of the present devolution of supply and labor to armament needs and the growing dependence of business on government spending." The governments of the League were told that they cannot begin too soon to concern themselves "with the problems to which that transition must give rise." It is too much to expect, however, that ministers engrossed by war problems will pay much attention to problems of such a remote future.

British and French Fascist measures differ from the real article in the sense that their necessity is regretted and their early abandonment is hoped for. So long as this spirit continues, democracies are totalitarian only in method. They had to be that way during the last war. Indeed, they too quickly removed the harness they had worn during that conflict. Such harness never has grave dangers.

Before September, Daladier did not use his "pleins pouvoirs" to put any curb on freedom of discussion. Indeed, he seemed far more indifferent to criticism than did the British Prime Minister. In the Munich debates, Mr. Chamberlain appeared to admire Germany

and Italy because they did not permit political "nests to be fouled" by critics. Obviously chafing under the criticism implied in the movement for the broadening of his Cabinet, he resented the fact that dissensions should be advertised. He had to take that line in fine disregard of his intention to hold a general election in the autumn when dissensions would be made more prominent than at any other time and when in making them prominent his Government would take the initiative. But the war, as I have said, backed by the Liberal and Labor Parties, did away with opposition. England was well nigh unanimous.

The censorship there seems to be largely on news and not on criticism. That is voiced in Parliament, in the press, in letters to the press, and the censor does not object. In France, the censorship is strict --- on criticism as well as on news which might interest the enemy.

The other day there was a letter in the London Times complaining bitterly that the British Government had ordered the evacuation of the building of a school without any notice to the Board of Directors or the principal of the school. The order was an unpublished one, as a few of the bits of administrative legislation in Great Britain have to be. If an area is to be used as a camp or a factory, why advertise to the enemy the location of the honey? In the case of this school, however, the Times' correspondent complained, information concerning the Government's action reached the

school authorities by way of an English language broadcast from Berlin and when the letter was written the evacuated buildings were still standing idle. I refrain from drawing any moral from this incident of Britain under crisis government, nor in this memorandum do I mention the plight of the neutrals. Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark -- all are in a "white" war. The costs are terrific. They face a "new economic order of things" and perhaps "a new social order."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD  
MUNITIONS BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-29-70 *WJ*

Signature-  
February 7, 1940.

*PSF  
War Dept.*

Report No. 23

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of War  
The Assistant Secretary of War  
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
The Deputy Chief of Staff  
The Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Inquiries for Production of Munitions.

1. In accordance with instructions to submit from time to time a brief report on foreign inquiries for military equipment, the following notes are made:

FINLAND

An order for 3,030 miles of field wire has been placed by the Government of Finland with the General Cable Corporation.

A conference was held with the Representatives of Finland concerning the use of cast metal in place of forged steel in the manufacture of 81 mm trench mortar shell. The advantages of forged steel over cast metal were pointed out but we were informed that cast metal shells are now used in the Finnish Army and are considered satisfactory. In addition the price is at least \$1.00 less than for forged steel. The saving of \$1.00 per shell is considered important because of the financial situation of Finland.

Discussions have also revealed that the Finns will have difficulty in procuring T.N.T. for their ammunition orders. The capacity for the production of T.N.T. is already fully obligated and it seems probable that the next step of the Finns will be to request a priority over United States orders for the quantity necessary to fill their contemplated orders. However it is also known that the Government of Finland will have a continuing requirement of about 400 tons a month as long as the war lasts. This requirement is mainly for tank mines. They have been informed that such a large quantity will require the creation of a new plant since it can hardly be hoped that the United States Government would step aside for an indefinite period and allow the Finnish Government to obtain T.N.T. which is also vitally required for our own armament program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt  
DECLASSIFIED  
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/82)

Date- 7-29-70 *me*

SWEDEN

Signature-  
Conferences have been held with the Swedish Mission in both the War and Navy Departments and a list of requirements has been canvassed with the Swedish Representatives. The principal requirements include wire, searchlights, range finders, gas masks, ammunition, radio equipment, machine guns, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, mines, paravanes, torpedo boats (60 foot), and hydrophones.

The Mission has its offices at the Mayflower Hotel and is receiving a large number of prospective bidders.

The Auto Ordnance Corporation advises that it has received an order for 500 Thompson submachine guns.

GREAT BRITAIN

It is understood that the British Embassy is discussing the purchase of 750 Thompson submachine guns from the Auto Ordnance Corporation. As noted in a previous report, this corporation has an order with Savage Arms Company for approximately 10,000 of these guns.

FRANCE

The Winchester Representative informs us that the French Mission is discussing an order for 15,000,000 caliber .45 cartridges with that firm.

Commercial visitors indicate that two corporations are discussing the lease of the Pencoyd plant of the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation as a plant which might be suitable for the production of 75 mm and 155 mm gun tubes for the French. This plant is now closed but its equipment is considered to be adaptable for the production contemplated.

TRAFFIC IN ARMS - CALENDAR YEAR 1939

There is attached hereto a tabulation based on press release No. 47 of the State Department. This shows the export licenses and actual exports for implements of war in the calendar year 1939. It will be observed that the export licenses for aircraft involve about 93% of the total money value and that the actual exports indicate that aircraft exports are 96% of the total.

*Chas. Hines*  
CHAS. HINES

Colonel, U. S. Army,  
Chairman, Clearance Committee,  
Army and Navy Munitions Board.

1 Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## TRAFFIC IN ARMS - FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1939

COUNTRIES	EXPORT LICENSES			EXPORTS		
	AIRCRAFT	OTHER CATEGORIES	TOTAL	AIRCRAFT	OTHER CATEGORIES	TOTAL
FRANCE	\$121,043,211.18	\$1,077,066.24	\$122,120,277.42	\$38,017,570.14	\$ 3,362.04	\$ 38,020,932.18
GREAT BRITAIN	20,814,051.17	176,416.55	20,991,067.72	31,058,428.58	377,891.00	31,436,389.58
AUSTRALIA	11,455,704.68	14,230.15	11,469,934.84	1,859,080.05	13,335.37	1,873,024.32
CANADA	5,408,754.50	592,044.00	6,001,308.50	2,487,238.63	483,562.30	2,970,800.93
FINLAND	4,276,906.00	210,094.26	4,487,000.26	331,714.00	15,734.67	347,448.67
CHINA	4,217,006.17	845,611.38	5,062,617.55	1,423,519.68	500,204.03	2,012,724.61
U.S.S.R.	1,178,062.23	0	1,178,062.23	1,007,015.78	0	1,007,015.78
JAPAN	761,684.60	0	761,684.60	902,210.00	5,300.00	908,500.00
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA	81,161.86	17,981.05	99,162.91	78,679.36	18,649.59	98,220.05
GERMANY	12,000.00	2,144.55	14,144.55	20,300.00	2,304.94	22,684.94
OTHER COUNTRIES	29,765,884.23	2,603,755.40	32,369,639.63	20,767,051.47	2,352,845.03	23,420,496.50
TOTALS	\$199,015,346.62	\$8,539,933.79	\$204,555,780.41	\$98,135,077.59	\$4,163,220.92	\$102,298,298.61

Source - Division of Controls, State Department  
Press Release No. 47 - January 26, 1940

Note: Licenses include items to be exported in 1940  
Exports include items licensed in 1938



PSF  
War 7-1-40

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR  
WASHINGTON

February 10, 1940

Dear Pa,

Enclosed for the President's information is Report No. 23 on the subject of "Foreign Inquiries for Production of Munitions."

Sincerely yours,

Louis Johnson

General E. M. Watson  
Secretary to the President  
The White House

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 7, 1940.

Signature - *pub*

Date - 7-25-70

Doc. Lit. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
ENCLOSURE

Report No. 23

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of War  
The Assistant Secretary of War  
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy  
The Deputy Chief of Staff  
The Chief of Naval Operations

SUBJECT: Foreign Inquiries for Production of Munitions.

1. In accordance with instructions to submit from time to time a brief report on foreign inquiries for military equipment, the following notes are made:

FINLAND

An order for 3,030 miles of field wire has been placed by the Government of Finland with the General Cable Corporation.

A conference was held with the Representatives of Finland concerning the use of cast metal in place of forged steel in the manufacture of 81 mm trench mortar shell. The advantages of forged steel over cast metal were pointed out but we were informed that cast metal shells are now used in the Finnish Army and are considered satisfactory. In addition the price is at least \$1.00 less than for forged steel. The saving of \$1.00 per shell is considered important because of the financial situation of Finland.

Discussions have also revealed that the Finns will have difficulty in procuring T.N.T. for their ammunition orders. The capacity for the production of T.N.T. is already fully obligated and it seems probable that the next step of the Finns will be to request a priority over United States orders for the quantity necessary to fill their contemplated orders. However it is also known that the Government of Finland will have a continuing requirement of about 400 tons a month as long as the war lasts. This requirement is mainly for tank mines. They have been informed that such a large quantity will require the creation of a new plant since it can hardly be hoped that the United States Government would step aside for an indefinite period and allow the Finnish Government to obtain T.N.T. which is also vitally required for our own armament program.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR. 5200.2 (9/27/88)

Date - 7-29-70

Signature - [Signature]

SWEDEN

Conferences have been held with the Swedish Mission in both the War and Navy Departments and a list of requirements has been canvassed with the Swedish Representatives. The principal requirements include wire, searchlights, range finders, gas masks, ammunition, radio equipment, machine guns, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, mines, paravanes, torpedo boats (60 foot), and hydrophones.

The Mission has its offices at the Mayflower Hotel and is receiving a large number of prospective bidders.

The Auto Ordnance Corporation advises that it has received an order for 500 Thompson submachine guns.

GREAT BRITAIN

It is understood that the British Embassy is discussing the purchase of 750 Thompson submachine guns from the Auto Ordnance Corporation. As noted in a previous report, this corporation has an order with Savage Arms Company for approximately 10,000 of these guns.

FRANCE

The Winchester Representative informs us that the French Mission is discussing an order for 15,000,000 caliber .45 cartridges with that firm.

Commercial visitors indicate that two corporations are discussing the lease of the Pencoed plant of the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation as a plant which might be suitable for the production of 75 mm and 155 mm gun tubes for the French. This plant is now closed but its equipment is considered to be adaptable for the production contemplated.

TRAFFIC IN ARMS - CALENDAR YEAR 1939

There is attached hereto a tabulation based on press release No. 47 of the State Department. This shows the export licenses and actual exports for implements of war in the calendar year 1939. It will be observed that the export licenses for aircraft involve about 93% of the total money value and that the actual exports indicate that aircraft exports are 96% of the total.

1 Enclosure

CHAS. HINES  
Colonel, U. S. Army,  
Chairman, Clearance Committee,  
Army and Navy Munitions Board.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## TRAFFIC IN ARMS - FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1939

COUNTRIES	EXPORT LICENSES			EXPORTS		
	AIRCRAFT	OTHER CATEGORIES	TOTAL	AIRCRAFT	OTHER CATEGORIES	TOTAL
FRANCE	\$121,043,211.19	\$1,077,066.44	\$122,120,207.62	\$36,017,570.14	\$ 3,352.01	\$ 36,020,922.08
GREAT BRITAIN	20,814,651.17	176,416.55	20,991,067.72	31,058,408.58	377,891.00	31,436,300.58
AUSTRALIA	11,455,704.68	14,230.16	11,469,934.84	1,859,680.05	13,335.37	1,873,024.32
CANADA	5,498,754.50	582,644.00	6,001,398.50	2,487,238.63	485,562.35	2,970,800.98
FINLAND	4,276,906.00	210,094.26	4,487,000.26	351,714.00	15,754.67	367,468.67
CHINA	4,217,006.17	845,611.38	5,062,617.55	1,423,510.89	550,204.03	2,012,724.61
U.S.S.R.	1,178,032.23	0	1,178,032.23	1,007,015.78	0	1,007,015.78
JAPAN	761,684.60	0	761,684.60	922,210.00	6,300.00	928,500.00
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA	61,181.86	17,981.05	99,162.91	79,670.36	18,649.60	98,320.05
GERMANY	12,800.00	2,144.55	14,944.55	20,000.00	2,364.94	22,364.94
OTHER COUNTRIES	29,755,894.23	2,303,755.40	32,059,639.63	20,767,651.47	2,652,345.03	23,420,496.50
TOTALS	\$199,018,346.62	\$5,539,933.79	\$204,558,280.41	\$98,135,077.59	\$4,163,220.92	\$102,298,298.51

Source - Division of Controls, State Department  
Press Release No. 47 - January 26, 1940

Note:-Licenses include items to be exported in 1940  
Exports include items licensed in 1939

COPY

March 8, 1940.

*PSF 7102  
War*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY  
THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS  
GENERAL BOARD, U.S. NAVY  
JOINT BOARD ARMY-NAVY

I enclose:

1. Orders from Commander-in-Chief setting up board of investigation to inquire into suitability of Cocos Island as an advanced operating area for tender-based patrol planes.
2. Record of proceedings and opinion of said board.

Furthermore, I discussed with the Senior Officers of the Army and Navy at a conference on U.S.S. Tuscaloosa, while transiting the Canal, the special problem of scouting against enemy planes or ships at a considerable distance from the Canal Zone. I think this phase of the general defense of the Canal and of the distant approaches to it should receive special attention by the Navy General Board and by the Army-Navy Joint Board.

I think also that it would be well for the Senior Officers of both Services stationed in the Canal Zone to familiarize themselves by such personal visits as may be desirable to the outlying points where defense patrol plane bases would be located. This covers, of course, not only protected anchorages for Naval planes operating from tenders but also land fields beyond the limits of the Republic of Panama.

It is intended in no way that the United States should acquire or lease in peace time any Islands, anchorages or landing fields because it is believed that in the event of war independent Republics bordering the Caribbean would be on the side of the United States in a common defense.

F. D. R.

*In original of this - Sec. Navy - Warman 1 - 1940*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

BF  
WV

March 9, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In accordance with your instructions when we were coming back from the Horse Show at Fort Myer, I asked for a study to be made of railroad bridges across the Potomac, in case the one now in existence should be blown up.

I attach the War Department's study.

*E. M. W.*  
E. M. W.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

*file  
Ranfile*

April 12, 1940.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/56)

The President,

The White House.

Date- 7-29-70

Dear Mr. President:

Signature- *JWB*

In compliance with your memorandum of March 11, 1940, I have had further study made for an emergency railroad crossing of the Potomac River at Washington if the existing railroad bridge should be destroyed.

The Key Bridge, the Arlington Memorial Bridge and the 14th Street Highway Bridge were designed for an H-20 highway load, and the Arlington Memorial Bridge was designed for a 40-ton tank load in addition. Steam railway locomotive loads involve weights from about 75 tons upward, most of which is concentrated on the drivers, and railway bridges must be designed therefor. The three highway bridges could therefore not carry safely steam railway locomotives. Railroad artillery requires bridge design similar to that for locomotives. It appears that the design of these highway bridges is such that standard loaded freight cars could, with care, be transported on rails over them except that a more extensive investigation of the 14th Street Bridge, which is more than 35 years old, would probably show it to be unsafe even for this load. The traffic problem, therefore, reduces itself to a consideration of motive power. The lightest of the Diesel electric switch engines used in yard service could probably be used for this purpose. Since switch engines are designed for low speed work in level railway yards and, as a consequence, necessitate considerable reduction in the weight of trains moved on grades, it is proper in this study to consider grades not in excess of one per cent. Caterpillar type tractors could also be used to take "cuts" of trains across the bridges on grades not exceeding one per cent. Highway bridges have a considerable camber and therefore a one per cent grade limitation involves reducing the resulting slopes on the bridge by trestles or otherwise as well as designing special approaches to the bridge.

At the District of Columbia end of the Key Bridge, the difference in elevation between the bridge approach and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad spur passing below the bridge at that side of the river is about 58 feet. An excessive amount of track would be necessary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Hand*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

to connect these two levels. On the Virginia end of the bridge, no difficulty would be found in connecting the truck across the bridge with the Pennsylvania Railroad yard in Rosslyn. Attention is invited to the inclosed data for possible expedients for this bridge.

Considering next the Memorial Bridge, connection on the District of Columbia side could most conveniently be made from the Pennsylvania Railroad yard at 14th and D Streets, Southwest, opposite the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (point "A" on the inclosed map). Construction of track and elevation of approaches from this point across the bridge, connecting with the Pennsylvania Railroad spur in the United States Experimental Farm in Virginia, would involve considerable time, particularly for the trestle required to overpass 14th Street and attain the grade of the existing tracks at 14th and D Streets. Data for this work are also indicated in the inclosure herewith. If the Virginia end of the railway bridge were destroyed and therefore could not be used as a switchback to the main line of the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad Company, still further construction, line F-G on the inclosed map, would be required as a connection with the main line.

The 14th Street Highway Bridge offers a much shorter emergency connection than either of the other two bridges. However the northern approach, whether connected to the existing tracks at 14th and D Streets or at some point nearer the bridge, would involve extensive and time-consuming trestle construction. Again attention is invited to the inclosure which also gives data for this connection.

Materials for the necessary construction work are available at Norfolk and to a lesser extent at Baltimore and Philadelphia.

The time necessary for wood pile restoration of the existing railroad bridge, it is estimated, would vary from about 10 days for one fixed span to about one month for the entire structure, working from both ends on a three-shift basis. This restoration would be made in any event and could be accomplished in less time than even the simplest of the highway bridge connections. Temporary detouring of traffic via Harpers Ferry would be necessary pending reestablishment of a rail connection at Washington.

Respectfully yours,



HARRY H. WOODRING,  
Secretary of War.

to consider systems from 1950s...  
CONFIDENTIAL

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library  
DECLASSIFIED  
000 DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATA FOR POSSIBLE EXPEDIENTS

Date- 7. 29-70

Signature- *JRD*

KEY BRIDGE

Location of D. C. railroad connection: B & O Railroad spur below bridge.

This spur is unsuitable for heavy traffic and railroad artillery.

Elevation of track above M.L.W. at Washington Navy Yard: 17 feet.

Elevation of D. C. end of bridge: 75 feet.

Method of connection:

- (1) Switch-back from Water Street to M Street, N.W., a survey would be required to determine the mileage.
- (2) "Shoo-fly" track about 2-1/2 miles long laid via K Street, Pennsylvania Avenue and M Street, N.W.  
Note: K Street overpass over Parkway not yet completed.
- (3) Track about 4-1/2 miles long laid via Conduit Road from vicinity of crossing near Dalecarlia Reservoir (not shown on map).

Grades on bridge: Excessive at both ends. Tracks would have to be elevated above roadway surface of bridge except at center.

Location of Virginia railroad connection: Pennsylvania Railroad Rosslyn yard. Spur connecting this yard to main line is suitable for any traffic.

Method of connection: Track through Rosslyn Streets.

Remarks: This construction for the Key Bridge would require the longest time to complete of any expedient discussed herein, unless the proposed switch-back were provided in time of peace. The Capital Transit Company street railway tracks, while standard gauge, are not readily adaptable to railway traffic.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/88)

Date- 7-29-70

Signature- *gvd*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORIAL BRIDGE

Location of D. C. railroad connection: Pennsylvania Railroad yard at 14th and D Streets, S.W. (point "A" on map). This trackage is suitable for any traffic.

Elevation of track: 23 feet.

Method of D. C. connection: "Shoo-fly" track laid via street skirting northeast side of Tidal Basin and through West Potomac Park.

Elevation of street and ground: about 15 feet.

Elevation of center of bridge: 45 feet.

Method of overcoming excessive grades: by elevation of track on line A-B, 830 feet, and from point "C" in West Potomac Park to center of bridge, 3000 feet, by fill or trestles, or both.

Location of Virginia railroad connection: Pennsylvania Railroad Rosslyn spur through United States Experimental Farm at about point "E". This spur is suitable for any traffic.

Elevation of track: 35 feet.

Method of Virginia connection: "Shoo-fly" track from center of bridge to point "D", then by a long curve involving some grading through the farm. Connection F-G would also be required.

Elevation of street: about 35 feet. The track laid from the center of the bridge toward point "D" would have to be elevated for about 1000 feet.

Total length of "shoo-fly" construction: Line A-E: approximately 2.6 miles.  
Line A-E plus line F-G: approximately 3 miles.

Remarks: This expedient would take less time to provide than those for the Key Bridge, but probably more time than those for the 14th Street bridge.

14TH STREET BRIDGE

Date- 7-29-70

Location of D. C. railroad connection:

Signature- *W.D.*

- (1) Pennsylvania Railroad yard at 14th and D Streets, S.W., point "A".

This trackage is suitable for any traffic. Elevation of track: 23 feet.

- (2) Main line of Pennsylvania Railroad at point "B" near overpass. This trackage is suitable for any traffic. Elevation of track: 25 feet.

Method of D. C. connection:

Line A-H: "Shoo-fly" track via bridge over Tidal Basin outlet and intervening park.

Line K-H: Trestle from "K" to end of bridge, point "H".

Intervening elevations:

Street and park: about 12 feet.

Bridge over Tidal Basin outlet: 18 feet.

Method of overcoming excessive grades:

Line A-H: Practically continuous fill or trestle, or both.

Line K-H: Trestle.

Location of Virginia railroad connection: main line of R. F. & P. Railroad, at point "L".

Method of Virginia connection: "Shoo-fly" track via highway and ground.

Grades: not excessive.

Total length of "shoo-fly" construction:

Line AHL: approximately 2 miles.

Line KHL: approximately 1-1/2 miles.

Remarks: If detailed examination of the 14th Street Bridge indicated it to be safe for loaded railway rolling stock, the construction of the line KHL would require less time than any of the other proposed methods.

3-22-40

GENERAL WATSON:

This letter was sent to his personal file  
by the President.

Mrs. Larrabee thought you might want to  
keep it available, if it is a continuing matter

(Dec 26-1939 letter attached)

*file  
Rusomal*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*RSF*

March 16, 1940

Dear "Pa":

In response to our conference and your memorandum of March 13, 1940, in which you indicated that the President had been informed, in substance, that I had apparently been instrumental in persuading the Hercules Powder Company not to enlarge its smokeless powder capacity, the following is submitted:

Inasmuch as I did not know what the above was about, I asked Mr. Ellis of the Hercules Powder Company to confer with me in Washington. After a preliminary conference we called upon you, and he stated to us in substance the following:

- (a) That the Hercules Powder Company has been negotiating with the British Purchasing Commission for some four months with reference to the expansion of its powder capacity in order to manufacture some 600,000 pounds per month of smokeless rifle powder for the British.
- (b) That the delay in completing the negotiations has been caused by a very serious income tax situation which has not yet been removed.
- (c) That, because of the relatively small size of the tax liability, the company recently decided to proceed with the contract and early conclusion of negotiations is in prospect.
- (d) That neither I nor any other officer of the War Department has been antagonistic to this proposed contract but that exactly the opposite has been true.
- (e) That the income tax question is a very serious one, especially when new large scale plant capacity must be created for the purpose of manufacturing munitions for foreign buyers.
- (f) That he has no criticism to offer as to persons or organizations inside or outside of the Government. He realizes there are complicated questions involved which require time for their solution.
- (g) A letter from Mr. Ellis is attached.

Inasmuch as my attitude on the general question of munitions sales has been raised, I think it is only fair to you and to me that I explain it. I have been involved in the munitions phases of national defense for some thirty years. That experience convinces me that the rate at which America is able to produce munitions is, in the final analysis, the real criterion of the country's ability to fight. Therefore, any action that will shorten the time factor is of pronounced benefit to national defense. Within the law, and the policies of the President and the War Department, I do everything within my power to assist in the creation and retention of a munitions industry, which of course includes aircraft. I favor a liberal attitude in the release of designs, in tax arrangements, or in any of the other phases of the question, in order to accomplish the above objective.



J. H. Burns,  
Colonel, Ordnance Department,  
Executive

Brigadier General Edwin M. Watson  
Secretary to the President  
The White House

1 Encl.

**HERCULES POWDER COMPANY**  
INCORPORATED



WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

EXPLOSIVES DEPARTMENT

March 15, 1940

Colonel James H. Burns (2)  
Office of Assistant Secretary of War  
Munitions Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Confirming our conversation of yesterday afternoon with General Watson at the White House, for your confidential information I am pleased to advise that we expect next week to conclude negotiations begun in December with the British Purchasing Commission for the manufacture of 600,000 pounds of Smokeless Rifle Powder per month. During the progress of these negotiations, we have been faced with what appears to us to be a very serious income tax situation which has caused considerable delay. Although this tax problem has not yet been removed, we have decided to proceed with this contract since the plant investment required for the manufacture of the amount of powder involved is relatively small.

We appreciate the desire that you and other officers of the War Department have expressed, that a way be found to conclude these negotiations, and I take this opportunity to thank you and your staff for your encouragement and assistance.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "W. P. Ellis".

WREllis:CM

GENERAL MANAGER

*file  
not used* *BSF  
War* *Not used*  
*May 1940*

EXECUTIVE ORDER

APPOINTING A BOARD ON MOBILIZATION OF INDUSTRIES  
ESSENTIAL FOR MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AND PROVIDING  
FOR ITS FUNCTIONS.

By virtue of and pursuant to the authority vested in me by the last paragraph of section 120 of an Act entitled, "An Act for making further and more effectual provision for the national defense, and for other purposes", approved June 3, 1916 (39 Stat. 166, 214), I hereby appoint a Board on Mobilization of Industries Essential for Military Preparedness consisting of \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_, Chairman; \_\_\_\_\_;  
\_\_\_\_\_; \_\_\_\_\_;  
\_\_\_\_\_; \_\_\_\_\_;

(herein called the "Board") and authorize the Board to perform functions under said Act as hereinafter provided:

1. The Board shall prepare, organize, direct, and otherwise effectuate a comprehensive program of national defense, with a view to increasing quickly the production and procurement of essential equipment and matériel needed for such program, and shall take all necessary steps to provide for such clerical assistance as may be necessary to organize and coordinate such work.

2. The Board may establish committees and subcommittees to advise and to aid it in carrying out its functions by furnishing

such information, material, and technical assistance, as the Board may request; and the Board may reimburse the members of any such committee or subcommittees for their actual expenses of travel and subsistence, including the expense of attendance at meetings of the Board.

3. In carrying out its functions the Board is authorized and directed to avail itself of the services of departments, bureaus and agencies of the Government, and to accept voluntary and uncompensated services of such departments, bureaus and agencies or to pay the administrative expenses incurred thereby. All accounting and administrative functions of the Board shall be performed by the Department of the Treasury.

4. The Board shall have power to make rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of said Act and this Order and to do all other things reasonably necessary to perform its functions.

THE WHITE HOUSE,

May , 1940.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

*file  
confidential*

*PSP  
War*

*1940*

Prepared By

STATISTICS BRANCH

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF WAR

*Mr. President -  
May you find this  
little handbook of the  
Army useful  
Louis Johnson  
May 10-1940*

I  
N  
D  
E  
X

## C O N T E N T S

<u>AIR CORPS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
<u>Adequacy</u>	<u>2</u>
Advantages	
Disadvantages	
Employment	
Value to U.S.	
Combat Aviation, status of	3
Funds required, a/c War	36
Status Reports - crit. items	A.C.
<u>AMMUNITION</u>	
<u>Shortage in \$ Value</u>	13
<u>ANTITANK DEFENSE</u>	
<u>Organization, present and proposed</u>	6
<u>APPROPRIATIONS</u>	
<u>Account of European War, Con-</u> <u>gressional action</u>	36
<u>Field Exercises, RA &amp; NG,</u> <u>1937-40 inclusive</u>	30
<u>ARMY CORPS</u>	
<u>Cost of one (1) complete</u>	37
<u>ARTILLERY</u>	
<u>Hvy-Mobile, Availability of</u>	5
<u>Modernizing, 75 mm</u>	7
<u>CAVALRY - HORSE</u>	
<u>Value of Hemisphere Defense</u>	41
Advantage	
Employment	

CHEMICAL WARFARE

Edgewood Arsenal 4  
Essential Items - shortage in \$ Value 25  
Status Report, Critical Items CWS

COMBAT AVIATION

Status of 3

CONCENTRATION (Troop)

Cost, concentration & return 29

CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

A/C of European War 36

CRITICAL ITEMS

	Br. Index.
Status Report	
Amm., Shortage in \$ Value	13
Expenditures 1931-40 incl.	10
Funds Required a/c War	36
Materiel Shortage in \$ Value	14
RA Peace Strength, statistics	22
Shortages in \$ Value	12

DEFENSE

Anti-tank Present & Proposed Org. 6  
Seacoast Projects 11

ENGINEERS

Essential Items - Shortage \$ Value 15  
Status Report, Critical Items Eng.

ENLISTED RESERVE CORPS  
Comparison w/ Reg. Army Reserve 25

ESSENTIAL ITEMS  
Funds required a/c War 36  
Items Included by S.A.S. 16  
Shortages in \$ Value 12  
Shortages in \$ Value by S.A.S. 15

EXPENDITURES  
Critical Items, 1931-40, Incl. 10  
Seacoast Defense, 1931-40 Incl. 11

FIELD TRAINING (Exercise)  
Appropriation RA & NG, 1937 to  
1940 incl 30

HORSE TRANSPORTATION  
Costs vs Motor Transportation 42

INFANTRY DRILL (New)  
Estimate of time saved 32

I.P.F. (462,000 men)  
Composition 1  
Essential Items - Shortage in  
\$ Value, by SAS 15

MATERIEL  
Shortage in \$ Value 14

MECHANIZED FORCES

Comparison, U.S. vs Germany	38
" " " "	40

MEDICAL CORPS

Essential Items, Shortage in \$ Value	15
Status Report, Critical Items	Med

MOTORS

Costs vs Horse Transportation	42
Equipment, Essential Items, (\$12,000,000)	17

NATIONAL GUARD

Allotments of Units	27
Conversion to Corps, Army & GHQ	24
Field Training, Appropriations, 1937-1940, inclusive	30
Funds Required a/c War	36
Organization Plan (320,000)	23
Recurrent charges a/c Increased Strength	34
Recurrent Costs for Army	35
Training Costs, Increase of	31

ORDNANCE

Ammunition, Shortage in \$ Value	13
Artillery, Hvy-Mobile, Availability	5
Essential Items, Shortage in \$ Value	15
Materiel, Shortage in \$ Value	14
Rifles, Comparison of Johnson vs Gerrand	8
Seacoast Defense Projects	11
Status Report of Critical Items	Ord
75 mm., Reason for modernizing	7

ORGANIZATION

Anti-tank Defense, Present and Proposed	6
Increase (17,000) of Present Strength, Assignment of	26

ORGANIZED RESERVE

Training Cost, Increase of	31
----------------------------	----

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

Combat Troop, Withdrawal	28
--------------------------	----

P.M.P.

Composition	1
Production Progress	Br. Index

QUARTERMASTER CORPS

Essential Items, Shortage in \$ Value	15
Motor Equipment Essential Items (\$12,000,000)	17
Status Report, Critical Items	QMC

RECURRENT CHARGES

For Army (R.A. & N.G.)	35
For Increase in Strength of Army	34

REGULAR ARMY

Assignment of 17,000 increase	26
Combat troops, P.I., withdrawal of	28
Distribution of (227,000)	20
Field Training, Appropriation 1937-1940 incl.	30
Plans for (proposed) (242,000)	21
Funds Required a/c War	36
Recurrent Charges a/c of Increased Strength	34



TRANSPORTATION  
Horse vs Motor

42

TRIANGULAR DIVISION

Comparative w/ Square Division 19

" costs, horse transp., 42  
vs, Motor transp.

WAR DEPT. OBJECTIVE (600,000 men)

Essential Items, Shortage in  
\$ Value by SAS 15



0221562

1

IPF - COMPOSITION (\*)

Units having on 30M the strength, organization, equipment and training, necessary for use in initial operations

Includes:

GHQ Hq.  
GHQ Res - GHQAF; 5 Cav. Divs; 1 Moz  
Brig, 9½ AA Rgts; HD Trps &  
unassigned Rgts.  
2 Army Hq plus ½ of essential troops  
2 Corps - peace strength  
2 Corps with only ¼ of essential trps.  
23 Inf. Divs - peace strength

Does Not Include:

4 Inf. Divs., RA, partially active  
1 Cav. Div., RA, partially active  
2 Inf. Rgts, colored.  
2 Cav. Rgts, colored.  
War Dept & Corps Area overhead

---

✓ PMP - COMPOSITION

The military program for initial protection of the U.S., ie., the IPF, balanced, supplemented and filled to a war organization.

Additional Personnel of PMP:

Completes essential trps for 2 Fld Armies  
Completes 4 additional RA Divs  
Rounds out GHQ Res - adds 17 AA Rgts  
Augments HD troops to 58,000  
Provides 175,000 replacements and  
80,000 for Service Commands  
Brings units to war strength

---

(\*) For equipment planning the IPF includes all existing units of RA and NG.

1

## AIR FORCE

### EMPLOYMENT:

Support ground forces, as long range arty.  
Reconnaissance, observation & mapping.  
Defense against: hostile air or naval  
attack and landing operations.  
Destruction of aircraft bases & factories  
Destroy civilian morale—attack cities.

### ADVANTAGES:

Speed, surprise, range & patrol of sea.

### DISADVANTAGES:

Cannot seize ground; weather; ground  
defense vitiates close support of attack;  
defensive value of pursuit depends on  
warning — High cost.

### ORGANIZATION: To provide - -

Support of ground force, tactically and  
strategically;

Reinforce overseas possessions;  
Deny hostile air bases within striking  
distance of vital areas;  
Air defense against raids.

### VALUE TO U.S.:

Particularly to Panama, Hawaii & Philippine  
and support of ground force.

Hemisphere defense - limited by few air  
objectives other than hostile air bases.

In Europe - Great value in destruction of  
hostile aircraft factories and bases to  
obviate attack of cities.

### ADEQUACY:

5500 planes sufficient, unless operating  
in Europe.

Reserve planes available for expansion  
when personnel becomes available - Large  
reserve of planes not sound because of  
obsolescence.

# STATUS OF COMBAT AVIATION 3

1940


CATEGORIES —

- GHQ Aviation
  - Striking force
  - Defense force
  - Support force
- Overseas Aviation
- Army, Corps and Division Reconnaissance
- Observation and Liaison
- Training and special purpose

} Overlap

## M-DAY OPERATING FORCES

0% 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%



LEGEND.

No. of standard planes on hand.
 
 Number required

(%) No. of substitute planes on hand.

H

EDGEWOOD ARSENAL, MD.

Only C.W. research, manufacturing and chemical storage installation in U.S.

Plants (except Gas Mask Assembly Plant) are experimental type — not suitable, or sufficient in capacity to meet peace or IPF needs. (\$855,000 in FY 1941 Estimates to initiate rehabilitation.)

Dangerous materials (gas, explosives, inflammables) in improper storage and contiguous to offices and quarters. Serious hazard. Cost to correct — \$1,115,000 (\$919,000 in FY 1941 Est.)


Construction & Maintenance Costs since 1917 . . . . .	\$42,600,000
Deterioration due to budgetary limitations . . . . .	29,100,000
Present value facilities	14,500,000
Value existing stocks. . .	31,300,000
Cost to move stocks to new Arsenal — approx. . . . .	5,000,000

Present plants can be rounded out to meet peacetime and IPF needs at cost of \$5,400,000 (approx. cost to move stocks).

Cost of new arsenal of equivalent capacity . . . . . \$21,000,000.  
(Plus cost of land, of from \$8,000,000 to \$10,000,000)

Building up existing installation on basis proposed most economical way of solving problem.

# ARTILLERY - HVY. MOBILE AVAILABILITY



Considered sufficient for two field armies.

Limited quantities of ammunition.

(\*) Including 8 in Hawaii.

(\*) 24 more now being procured.

6

ANTITANK DEFENSE

PRESENT ORGANIZATION:

<u>Weapon:</u>	<u>37 mm.AT Gun</u>	<u>Cal..50 MG</u>
Inf.Rgt.	6	6
Corps Trps.	42	0
Army	0	0
Type Fld Army	324	198

Based on recent study, G-3 now believes:  
37 mm AT guns Inf.Rgt, should be increased  
to 8.

One battalion of 36 guns should be in-  
cluded in Army, resulting in

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION:

Inf. Rgt.	8	6
Corps Trps.	42	0
Type Corps	130	66
Army	36	0
Type Fld Army	426	198

While proposed organization is below  
European, it is designed primarily for  
hemisphere purposes on this continent.

Stopping comparatively small groups of  
mechanization, over widely dispersed areas.

NOT against mass attacks in restricted  
zones of action.

Believed adequate for needs under present  
conditions.

6

REASONS FOR MODERNIZING 75 mm. GUN 7

105 mm. Howitzer vs 75 mm. Gun

ON HAND: Approximately 3,000 guns and  
6,000,000 rounds of ammunition.

Modernized 75 is markedly superior to  
battle-proven World War type.

Its modern ammunition makes of it, in  
effect, a gun-howitzer.

Particularly effective against mech-  
anized targets and unsheltered  
personnel due to its wide traverse  
and modern sighting equipment.

COST: Replacement by 105 mm. Hows. will  
cost \$75,000,000 and require several  
years.

Unit cost: 105 mm. = \$25,000  
75 mm. = \$ 8,000

Trend in foreign armies to 105 mm. How.,  
(concrete fortifications - masonry  
villages). Our purposes require  
weapon of 75 caliber as well. Suit-  
ability of howitzer alone in division  
not yet proven in war.

PLANS: Provide for 120 105mm. Hows.

JOHNSON GARRAND

1

DISCUSSION

ALTERNATIVES

Method and reliable in operation  
(Note: Johnson-Garrand: 1903-1904; 1905-1906)

Easier to manufacture (Garrand's design)  
Fitted without production study.

(Garrand's design) unsatisfactory without  
production study.

Hand separated. Advantage desirable.

Hand separated. Can be removed for  
cleaning in a few seconds.

Leading. With cartridges in chamber,  
cartridges can be loaded in the magazine.

DISCUSSION

Designed in shape. Usually long receiver.

Receiver too. Not well suited to this use.

Developed after long standardized use.

Weight. Slightly more than 10 lbs. (M1)  
Weights 9-1/2 lbs.

After proving ground tests, Chief of Inf.  
and Cav. do not desire Service tests.

COMPARISON BETWEEN  
JOHNSON & GARRAND RIFLES

(see reverse)

JOHNSON versus

JOHNSON

ADVANTAGES

Rugged and reliable in operation  
(more parts: Johnson-110; M1903-101;  
M1-74)

Easier to manufacture (Claim unsubstan-  
tiated without production study).

Cheaper (Claim unsubstantiated without  
production study)

Recoil operated. Advantage debatable.

Barrel Removable. Can be removed for  
cleaning in a few seconds.

Loading. With cartridge in chamber,  
cartridge can be loaded in the magazine.

DISADVANTAGES

Awkward in shape. Unduly long receiver.

Bayonet Use. Not well suited to this use.

Developed after Army standardized M1.

Weight. Slightly more than 10 lbs. (M1  
weighs 9-1/2 lbs.)

After Proving Ground Tests, Chief of Inf.,  
and Cav. do not desire Service tests.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD  
SUBJECT: JOHNSON VERSUS M1

(Reverted to)

GARRAND RIFLES. 9

GARRAND:

ADVANTAGES

M1 met demands of service. (Johnson not subjected to service tests.)

Production progress satisfactory: (Govt. 200 per day - 8 hr. basis; comm'l 200 per day)

Thoroughly tested.

Proved reliable and satisfactory.

Shorter, handier and better balanced.

DISADVANTAGES.

Cost: (\$100 each arsenals.  
116 " commercial (which includes tooling with order of 65,000.)

Expensive tooling necessary.


Hope to reduce cost to \$80 each arsenal.

RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS  
JOHNSON GARRAND & COMPANY

(see reverse)

10


## CRITICAL ITEMS EXPENDITURES, 1931-1940 IN MILLIONS



1. Expenditures in early days for AA materiel, tanks — to get things started.
2. Expenditures 1939 and 1940: antitank guns, 37 mm. AA guns, M-1 rifle, M-2 75's, 8" Ry (20), gas masks.

# SEACOAST DEFENSE PROJECTS

IN \$ THOUSANDS



1931-1937  
1936 U.S.  
1938  
1939  
1940  
1941 (Est)

Atl Coast    Pac. Coast    Hawaii    Panama


(\*) 3,368 included in Deficiency 1940

12

# CRITICAL & ESSENTIAL ITEMS

## SHORTAGES IN \$ THOUSANDS

### AFTER EXPENDITURE OF 1940 FUNDS




\* FOR 600,000 MEN ONLY

12

# AMMUNITION

## SHORTAGES IN $\frac{1}{2}$ THOUSANDS

### AFTER EXPENDITURE OF 1940 FUNDS




NOTE: BARS NOT TO SCALE.

# MATERIEL SHORTAGES


CRITICAL ITEMS (LESS AMM. & SEACOAST  
ARTILLERY)


(AFTER EXPENDITURE OF F.Y. 1940 APPROPRIATIONS)



NOTE: BARS NOT TO SCALE.

ESSENTIAL ITEMS (NON CRIT)  
 SHORTAGES IN \$ THOUSANDS  
 AFTER EXPENDITURE OF F.Y. 1940 FUNDS



 IPF \$125,446 (462,000) strength	 WD.OBJ. \$257,092 (600,000)
---	--

ESSENTIAL ITEMS

16

- QM.-- Motor transportation - kitchen and camp equipment - tool sets - certain items of clothing - field belts - flags.
- SIG. Wire carts - tools and supplies for wire lines - photographic and meteorological equipment.
- A.C. Navigation and airplane photographic equipment - parachutes - flying clothing - equipment for flying fields - spare parts.
- MED. Non-deteriorating drugs - surgical dressings - supplies for field hospital.
- ENGR. Tools for intrenching, road and bridge repair - camouflage, map and topography equipment.
- ORD. Ammunition and target materiel for intensive training during mobilization - spare parts and accessories - cleaning and perserving material - component parts of ammunition.
- CWS. Training gas masks - training ammunition.

16

MOTOR EQUIPMENT (Essential Items) 17  
as affected by \$12,000,000  
deficit recently authorized.

---

---

PRESENT STATUS:

35% of requirements for present authorized strength (2-wheel drive). \$3,500,000 FY 1940 essentially replacements.

Training of larger units than a regiment impossible.

BENEFITS OF \$12,000,000:

1. Materially alter situation by providing transportation for 5 small RA Div and Corps Troops and 5 AA regiments. Deliveries will commence Jan. 15, - completion April 1.
2. Constitute educational orders for 4-wheel drive trucks (essential for battlefield use) for future orders (IPF \$44,400,000).
3. Enable Regular Army to carry out field training of large units - divisions and corps.

TRAINING CONCENTRATIONS

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Concen- trated by</u>	<u>Trucks Available</u>
1st Div.Ft.Benning	Nov. 25	
5th Div.Ft.McClellan	Jan. 15	Feb. 1
6th Div.Camp Jackson, So. Carolina	Jan. 15	to Apr. 1
Cav.Corps,Ft.Bliss	Jan. 15	
3d Div.Ft.Lewis,Wash.	Feb. 15	
2d Div.Ft.Sam Houston	Apr. 1	



SQUARE DIVISION

BASIC COST  
(Money Value of Equipment.)  
(In \$ Thousands)

---

Weapons & Ordnance Equipment....	\$ 3,260
Clothing & QM. Equipment.....	1,200
Motor Transportation.....	2,200
Signal, Chem., Med., & Engr. Equipment.....	<u>740</u>
TOTAL.....	7,400

ANNUAL MAINT. COST

Armory Drill Pay.....	\$ 735	-	47%
Field Training: Pay, sub- sistence, travel, etc....	270	-	17%
Ammunition.....	60	-	4%
Misol. Gas & Oil, Vehicular Maint., Supplies, etc....	<u>500</u>	-	31%
TOTAL.....	\$1,565		

ADDITIONAL COST - EXTRA DRILLS,  
EXTRA FIELD TRAINING.

(12 extra armory drills per year, and  
12 extra days field training in the  
vicinity of home station.)

Armory Drill Pay (12 days extra)....	\$ 250.
Field Training (12 days extra).....	280.
Miso. (rental, gas & oil, etc.).....	<u>400.</u>
TOTAL.....	\$ 930.

ARMORY DRILL PAY (12 DAYS EXTRA)  
FIELD TRAINING (12 DAYS EXTRA)

(See Report)

19

TRIANGULAR DIVISION

(BASIC COST)

(Money Value of Equipment.)  
(In \$ Thousands)

---

Weapons & Ordnance Equip.....	\$2,510
Clothing & QM Equip.....	1,560
Motor Transportation.....	1,500
Signal, Chnl., Med., & Engr. Equipment.....	430
TOTAL.....	\$6,000

ANNUAL MAINT. COST

Pay.....	\$5,500	- 51%
Subsistence.....	1,400	- 15%
Travel & Transp'n.....	727	- 9%
Cloth. & Equipage.....	449	- 5%
Barracks & Qtrs.....	728	- 7%
Med., Ord., & other services & supplies..	1,210	- 14%
TOTAL....	\$10,014	


ADDITIONAL COST - CONCENTRATION AT  
DIVISION CAMP

---

Rail Transp., trps & baggage....	\$ 330
Gas, Oil & Ammn.....	375
Maint. of tent camps & utilities.....	127
Rental of land.....	125
Claims, contingencies, etc.....	29
TOTAL.....	\$ 986

# DISTRIBUTION OF MEN

( 227,000 )



(\* ) Includes troops set up for foreign service.

Jan. 31, 1940

21

PLAN FOR REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT.  
(242,000)

	PRESENT 227,000	PROPOSED 242,000	PEACE 280,000
Corps Trps. 1 set compl. re- inforced		2 sets Less 1 Engr. & 2FA Rgts (NG)	2 sets compl.
	13,690	16,985	20,200
Aviation	25,100	25,100	25,100
Tri. Divs. 5-	39,430	6- 47,750	9- 74,140
Cav. Divs. 1- 60% pc strength	4,280	1- 4,280	1- 7,200
Misc'l: Cav., Inf., FA, AA, border patrol, OS. reinfo'd., oiv. train.	28,485	26,400	25,865
Mez. Div. 1- 65% pce strength	3,740	1- 5,295	1- 5,295
School Trps instruct.	12,475	13,275	13,500
Z of I: Hosp. & Depots	21,650	24,765	28,000
Harbor de- fenses, U.S.	4,850	4,850	6,700
Overseas Garrisons	73,300	73,300	74,000

15,000 additional men -  
\$19,000,000 annually.

21

22

PEACE STRENGTH ARMY

(280,000 R.A., 320,000 N.C.--Total,600,000)

---

---

Will provide for:	<u>% Pce Str.</u>	<u>% War Str.</u>
2 Army Hq & trps.	85	30
2 Corps:	85	70
1 RA Div	95	75
2 NG Divs	75	55
1 Corps Hq & trps	95	75
7 Corps:	70	55
1 RA Div	95	75
2 NG Divs	75	55
1 Corps Hq & Trps	50	35
GHQ Aviation	100	85
Overseas Garrisons	100	75
Harbor Defenses	35	45
GHQ Reserve	65	30
Overhead Z of I	75	55

---

---

CRITICAL ITEMS

	<u>IPF</u>	<u>PMP</u>
Present	34%	25%
FY '40	78%	50%
Est. '41	92%	60%

100% - IPF = \$330,000,000

100% - PMP = \$650,000,000

---

Combat Airplanes	100%	peace strength
Reserve	90%	
Reserve Amm.	85%	(for 462,000 existing)
Reserve Amm.	60%	(for 1,000,000 PMP)

22

23

PLANS FOR ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL  
GUARD  
(based on strength of 320,000)

---

---

GHQ RESERVE:

4 Cav. Divs. . . . .	17,000
17 AA Rgts. . . . .	19,000
Miscl AT., FA., Engr., Med. . . . .	35,000

ARMY TROOPS (2 armies):

6 AA Rgts . . . . .	6,000
Miscl Med., Sig., Engr., Ord. . . . .	10,000

CORPS TROOPS (7 corps):

7 AA Rgts . . . . .	7,700
7 Sig. Bns . . . . .	1,400
7 At. Bns. . . . .	1,800
7 Cav. Rec. Rgts. . . . .	4,900
7 FA. Brigs . . . . .	16,400
7 Engr. Rgts. . . . .	3,400
7 Obs. Grps . . . . .	2,400

18 INFANTRY DIVISIONS: . . . . .169,000

HARBOR DEFENSE UNITS: . . . . . 21,000

OVERSEAS GARRISONS: . . . . . 5,000

TOTAL. . . . . .320,000

AA and Sig units at 85% peace strength.

Other units at 75% peace strength. (Except Cavalry).

24

CONVERSION OF NG UNITS TO  
CORPS, ARMY AND GHQ TROOPS.

---

---

By Breaking Up:

3 Cavalry Divisions (Leaves 1)  
1 Cavalry Brigade  
5 Infantry Rgts (non-divisional)  
2 Infantry Divs (leaves 16 NG Divs)

GHQ UNITS:

	Can Organize	On Hand	Required
FA Rgts	8	6	14
AT Bns	4		4
Engr Bns	2		2
Med Bns - Org. & bring to Str.			2
Ord. Cos	2		2

---

ARMY UNITS:

Complete - 2 Army Troops  
(plus - R.A. Elements)

CORPS UNITS:

Complete - 4 Corps Troops  
(2 1/3 in NG - remainder in RA)

NG HARBOR DEFENSE

To peace strength (or provide 7 additional  
AA Rgts.)

---

---

Without Breaking Up Divisions: (or inter-  
fering with reinforcements for overseas  
garrisons)

<u>CONVERT</u>		<u>TO</u>
2 Rgts Inf	}	2 AT Bns
1 Cav Brig Hq		2 Sig Bns
2 Cav Rgts		2 FA Rgts
		1 Cav. Corps Rec. Rgt)

(This will provide only slight improvement  
in present status of GHQ, Army & Corps trps)

All units at 70% peace strength.

24

25

COMPARISON OF REGULAR ARMY RESERVE  
and ENLISTED RESERVE CORPS.

	<u>Enl. Res. Corps.</u>	<u>RA Reserve</u>
PURPOSE:	Cadres & key men for inactive units; men for special organizations needed on mobilization; opportunity to qualify for Res. Commission,	Reserve of trained men for RA. Farnmarked as fillers for RA active & inactive units to perfect IPT during period M to 30 M
ELIGIBILITY:	Men qualified for enlistment bet. 18-36 with prescribed qualifications.	Men under 36 yrs of age who have served an enlistment in RA.
AVAILABLE FOR ACTIVE DUTY.	15 days training per yr and active service in emergency declared by Congress	Not available for training. Can be called if Pres. declares emergency.
PAY:	None, except when called to active duty.	\$2 per mo while in RAR. Bonus of not to exceed \$150 when called.
COST:	\$100 per yr. for administration No training at present. If given cost approx NG	\$687,000 for FY 1940. 75,000 will cost \$1,800,000 annually
PRESENT SIZE:	Approx. 3,000. No limit on size.	Approx. 30,000 Size limited by no discharged & not reenlisting. Estimate 75,000 by 1942.

ASSIGNMENT OF 17,000 INCREASE IN REGULAR 26  
ARMY, Based on NEW DIVISION AT PEACE  
STRENGTH.

---

---

Without borrowing from  
from Air Corps authorization.

	<u>E.M.</u>
5 Infantry Divisions	40,700
1 Corps (Organic Trps)	8,000
GHQ Res (Moz Brig.)	
Tk Rgts., etc.	6,500
5 AA Rgts - (-1 Bn)	6,300

---

---

By borrowing 20,400 from  
Air Corps authorization;  
(in addition to foregoing)

	<u>E.M.</u>
4 Infantry Divisions	32,500
1 Corps (certain essential units only)	1,500
2 Antiaircraft Rgts	2,700
(Shortage—2700 E.M. for 2 AA Rgts, originally planned)	

---

---

Strength of New Division

Peace . . . . .	8,100 (*)
War . . . . .	11,000

---

---

(\*) Does not include F.A. Combat Trains.

27

NATIONAL GUARD ALLOTMENTS.

National Guard Units to be activated  
under 5,000 increase in strength  
contained in budget.

---

5 Antiaircraft Regiments (784 each) . . . . .	3,920
8 Observation Squadrons (147 each) . . . . .	<u>1,176</u>
TOTAL . . . . .	5,096

---

N.G. UNITS desired for activation in  
Puerto Rico

---

1 Engineer Battalion (combat) (Less 1 company)	
1 Battalion Coast Arty. (AA) (Less C.Th., 1 S.L.Batry, 1 Gun Batry)	
1 Battalion Coast Arty. (155 mm Gun — GPF-Trk-Drawn) (Less 1 Btry)	
1 Battalion F.A. (75 mm Gun-Trk-drawn) (Less 1 Btry)	
TOTAL STRENGTH (Approx.)	600