COPY

May 15, 1940.

Milattache. Your 2286. Telephone me nine A M Eastern Standard time tomorrow or cable full details.

Miles.

C

C O P Y

Number 2289 May 16th.

Hold action on request contained our 2286. Will keep you informed.

Bullitt.

D

C O P Y

Paris No. 2294, May 18, 1940.

Our 2286. Ambassador has approved my recommendation Waite be retained due to conditions here. Original recommendation result Waite's indiscreet conversation with you to which formal protest was made by Prime Minister France. Events now too critical for change.

Bullitt.

E

C O P Y

May 20, 1940.

Milattache. Your 2294. Today I explained at length to French Military Attache purpose our telephone conversations was solely rapid receipt of situation exclusive of information of direct value to Germans and that I had discontinued conversations primarily because French might not approve of them. Also stated that after examining record of conversation with Waite I considered only possible indiscretions resulted from my questions. I accepted full responsibility and deeply regretted incident. Please inform Ambassador and with his approval French War Office.

MILES.

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PSF
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G-2
J M

G-2/2657-234

June 8, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF (No. 33):

Subject: Messages from Military Attaches.

Following are paraphrased messages received from the Military Attaches as shown:

Berlin, Filed 19.40, June 7. German forces have reached Oisemont--Poix--Roye and the Aisne on both sides of Soissons. At Eu a bridgehead has been established Peyton.

Moscow, Filed 15.58, June 7. It has been stated by the Military Attache of the Japanese Embassy that the movement of troops of the Red Army has been completed. It is predicted that Rumania will give up Bessarabia as a result of negotiations now in progress. Ammunition and supplies of Class I are still being sent to the Kiev Military District. Yeaton.

Costa Rica, Filed 19.05, June 7. I have informed the Commanding General, Panama Canal Department, that the FELLA, an Italian vessel, will remain at Puntarenas until notified otherwise. Pate.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

td

Copies to: General Watson
State Dept.
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Date- 7-29-76
Signature-

June 10, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF (No. 34):

Subject: Messages from Military Attaches.

Following are paraphrased messages received from the Military Attaches as shown:

Mexico City, Filed 12.16, June 8. Cardenas is confidentially reported to be preparing to call Congress into extraordinary session before July 7. Reason unknown and action most unusual. Possibly has reference to a dark horse. According to reliable information, the army and people will approve any candidate supported by the U. S. Government. McCoy.

Mexico City, Filed 13.00, June 8. General Nunez has been moved to command the Chihuahua Zone. He is highly trusted by the administration and headed the police of the Federal District. The 36th Cavalry is now at Maiz, San Luis Potosi, and the 31st Cavalry is destined for Casa Grande, Chihuahua. In the south there is considerable other troop movement. McCoy.

Paris, Filed 16.00, June 8. The Germans are using a total of 47 divisions (including 7 armored) on the Channel--Laon front, in what is considered to be the start of the main drive. The front held by the Allies runs along the Bresle River--Senamont--Hornoy--Poix--Ailly. Between Ailly and Noyon the situation is not definitely known. The Allied front east of the Oise runs in general eastward along the Aisne River from Compeigne. German tank losses in two days are estimated at a minimum of 400. In the French rear areas German tanks are advancing toward Beauvais and Rouen setting fire to French towns.

The German air forces are displaying great activity, bombing a number of places especially the rail net leading to Paris.

On her German border Italy is increasing her frontier defenses. Fuller.

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Berlin, Filed 16.50, June 8. Breteuil has been reached and Noyon captured. East of Soissons having crossed the Aisne slight progress has been made. Peyton.

Paris, Filed 18.00, June 9. The Allies are withdrawing their left flank to the Seine River, and have taken the following action in the city of Rouen and vicinity: (1) destroyed remaining fuel reserves in Rouen early this date; (2) according to reports received have prepared the Seine bridges in the Rouen region for destruction.

On the evening of June 8 armored German units reached the regions of Fismes, Beauvais and Rouen.

The military situation is considered extremely critical and quite a number of governmental offices are leaving Paris. The front line cannot be designated at the present time.

I have forwarded by pouch the plans of the Somua tank. Fuller.

Berlin, Filed 18.55, June 9. Information indicates that France is using her general reserves. Forces of motorized troops are approaching Rouen and St. Just. At other points a general advance has been made of about 6 miles. Peyton.

Beyoglu, Filed 19.30, June 8. Most high government officials in Sofia fear possible German invasion according to a British official recently arrived from Sofia. The country is overrun with three to five thousand agents and would capitulate if attacked.

Heavy Soviet troop movements by sea to Poti and Batum reported May 17-20. Soviet now has 11 divisions in the Caucasus. Foreign ships were ordered out of these ports during debarkation.

Three German ships are unloading machinery and boxed goods of unknown content at same ports and two more which just arrived are discharging artillery and other war materiel thought to be consigned to Iran. Kluse.

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Date- 7-29-70
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Signature- [redacted]

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copies to: General Watson
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G-2/2657-235 RESTRICTED

M.I.D., W.D.
Tentative Lessons Bulletin No. 4
June 8, 1940.

TENTATIVE LESSONS FROM THE RECENT ACTIVE CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE

The information contained in this series of Bulletins will be restricted to items from official sources which are reasonably confirmed. The lessons necessarily are tentative and in no sense mature studies.

1. German Coordination of All Arms.

The Military Attache, Berlin, attributes the success of the Germans to a high degree of coordination in the use of arms perfectly balanced, but noted that the most important single element was supremacy in the air. Horse cavalry tactics are being used by mechanized groups to sever communications covering forward movements of infantry units on foot and to hold regions of importance until the arrival of troops of the motorized divisions. Tanks, air forces and artillery are coordinated in the reduction of enemy points of strength.

2. German Mobilization.

An estimate of the strength of the German Army as of May 10, 1940, made by the Military Attache, Berlin, states that between 6,000,000 and 7,000,000 men were then under arms. Older officers and those retired or partly disabled were trained as specialists in administration and mobilization. They took over the great task of administering the execution of the mobilization in a highly efficient manner and thus released for field service almost all active officers.

3. Physical Stamina of German Troops.

A German general officer, in discussing the Norwegian Campaign with our Military Attache in Berlin, contrasted unfavorably the physical stamina of the British troops in Norway with that of the Germans. He stated that the German troops with their simple but substantial diet and the new anti-fatigue tablets were able to march and

fight continuously for seven days without sleeping, and that at the end of this time they were tired but far from exhausted and showed no ill effects from the tablets.

While the claims recorded above are doubtless extreme, there is additional evidence of extraordinary stamina on the part of German troops. During the Polish Campaign, German infantry was said to have marched 44 miles in 24 hours. A march of 30 miles is not considered by German officers to be excessive.

Artificial vitamins are used to a large extent in Germany. Certain of them are supplied free for children under 14 years of age. It is not therefore altogether incredible that German chemists have developed a food drug or chemical which speeds up the natural processes of recuperation.

4. Tactics of Attack on Modern Permanent Fortifications.

A report from our Military Attache in Berlin adds some details to the information previously reported in our Bulletin No. 1 on the subject of the German capture of the Belgian fort at Eben Emael. He states that this fort was one of the most modern and strongest in the Belgian defensive system and protected an important strategic point on the nose of the Maas (Meuse) River--King Albert Canal defensive line. The Canal provided a water barrier 500 meters wide around two sides of the fortification. The sides of the fort are almost vertical and approximately 40 meters in height. It is irregularly shaped to conform to its position and its east-west and north-south dimensions are about 2 kilometers. All-around defense was provided. The defensive works were disposed around the perimeter of the fort and the center or interior was left clear. The fort was gas proof, and there was an overhead cover of 2 meters of reinforced concrete and 5 meters of earth. All entrances from the outside of the fort had been closed.

German troops marched across Dutch territory and captured Maastricht late in the afternoon of May 10. The Belgian whose duty it was to destroy two bridges over the King Albert Canal just north of Eben Emael was killed before he could carry out this duty and the bridges remained intact. German forces crossed the Canal and attacked the fort from the rear. At the same time troops from German planes landed inside the fort and attacked from within. There has been no verification of the use of any secret weapon. The Commanding Officer and 1,000 men were taken prisoners.

It appears that this fort, although constructed for all-around defense, had no provision made for defense from within.

Confirmatory evidence of the use of both gliders and parachutists in this operation is contained in a report from a London official source. An air photograph taken after capture revealed that the ground area within the fort walls is pitted with a number of large bomb craters. Ten gliders, of which three were completely destroyed and one had lost a wing, were scattered about the interior of the fort. There appeared to be six parachutes on the ground near the center. The shadow cast by the wings of the gliders suggests that they are probably large gliders without undercarriage. It is supposed that they carry a crew of 10 to 20 men and that after being towed to a certain height by power-driven aircraft they are released and piloted to the relatively small area available on top of the fort.

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RESTRICTED

M.I.D., W.D.
June 10, 1940.
12:00 M.

No. 117 SITUATION REPORT

This military situation report is issued by the Military Intelligence Division, General Staff. In view of the occasional inclusion of political information and of opinion it is classified as Restricted.

I. Western Theater of War.

1. Ground Operations.

a. Somme-Aisne Front. Without mentioning the names of towns, the German High Command said today that German armies advancing on a 210 mile front into France had shattered all counterattacks and were advancing in the direction of the lower Seine, on the western end of the line; farther east toward the Valley of the Marne; and toward Champagne. At some points the operations had turned into a pursuit.

The French communique stated simply that "from the sea to the Argonne the battle continues more and more violently."

German motorized forces are approaching Rouen and are reported to be at Pont De L'Arche (on the Seine) and Gisors. Breteuil has been reached and Noyon captured. The Germans have crossed the Aisne on both sides of Soissons.

In Champagne, between Chateau Porcien and the Argonne, the French yesterday checked great German attacks. The Germans crossed the Aisne only at two points. North of Vouziers, German parachute troops were encircled, according to French reports.

2. Air Force Operations.

German air operations have consisted of close support of the ground forces, particularly north of the Seine in the west and of strategic bombing. Cherbourg, airdromes in the Paris area and communications northwest of Paris have been heavily attacked. German air superiority is now such that their air force is believed to have achieved great freedom of action over the zone of the Allied Armies.

Under the stress of battle and within the limits imposed by German pressure, Allied attempts at daylight operations have increased. The center of Allied night bombing has shifted from the German rear areas to the combat zone.

3. Naval Operations.

The Admiralty announced on June 8th that the armed cruiser CARINTHIA, 20,277 tons, had been torpedoed by an enemy submarine and sunk.

An official German communique stated on June 9th that "German naval units, including two battleships, the GNEISENAU and the SCHARNHORST, operating in Norwegian waters, had sunk the British aircraft carrier GLORIOUS and a destroyer."

II. The Mediterranean.

Italy declared war on France and Great Britain at 4:30 p.m. (European time), June 10th.

III. Scandinavian Theater of War.

Hostilities between the Germans and Norwegians ceased on June 9, and negotiations for capitulation are now under way. King Haakon VII and members of his government are now in London. Part of the Norwegian forces /probably a negligible number/ have been withdrawn from Norway to fight on other fronts. The Germans have taken over Narvik after Allied land, air and naval forces had been withdrawn from this area.

PSF: War Dept

Natl. Defense #93.

RECORDED C & R DIV., W.S.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 13, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F. D. R.

JUN 13 1940

11:11 W

WAR DEPARTMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE
ASSISTANT

RECEIVED
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A. G. O.

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STATE OF NEW MEXICO

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

JOHN E. MILES
GOVERNOR

GUY SHEPARD
SECRETARY

SANTA FE

June 10, 1940

THE WHITE HOUSE
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Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. President:

Due to the situation in Europe and the unsettled condition in Mexico, I am taking the liberty of making some suggestions which I think would warrant your consideration at this time.

El Paso, Texas has, due to its strategic location, ever been a center of international plots and counterplots and the headquarters for espionage activities of all sorts. El Paso is the key point of the fertile and strategically important Rio Grande valley should any trouble come from below the border in the way of fifth column activities in the southwestern part of the United States.

New Mexico has four large dams - Elephant Butte and El Vado on the Rio Grande, Conchas on the Canadian and Alamogordo on the Pecos. If either of these dams were destroyed, it would have most serious consequences in loss of life, destruction of property and general demoralization of this area of the United States. Elephant Butte Dam is 120 miles from the border of Mexico. If this dam were destroyed, it would mean the destruction of the entire Rio Grande valley thru New Mexico and for a great distance into Texas, and I believe the situation now warrants some special action for the protection of these dams, particularly Elephant Butte.

The area along the Mexican border between Fort Bliss, Texas, and the western border of New Mexico is without a regular army garrison of any kind, leaving the towns in New Mexico adjacent thereto liable to border incidents such as occurred in 1916 when the bandit, Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico. I therefore recommend for your consideration the placing of a regular army garrison in the vicinity of Deming, New Mexico, for in that locality it would be strategically located from the standpoint of improved highways to almost any point on the border, as well as protection for a trunk line transcontinental railroad.

(11) N.B. 381 Nat'l Def. (6-10-40)

I wish to commend you for your sturdy and courageous action regarding the national defense problem and assure you that I am thoroughly in support of your program.

Trusting that you will give some consideration to placing a regular army garrison near Deming and arrange for protection for the four big dams of New Mexico, I am,

Respectfully,

John E. Miles.

JOHN E. MILES
Governor.

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G-2
J M

July 13, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Japanese Policy.

1. Attached hereto is a memorandum containing recommendations as to Japanese foreign policy by the Japanese diplomatic representatives in Vienna and Budapest, respectively. This information is from a highly reliable source. These recommendations are obviously the expression of personal views by the individuals and indicate a current of Japanese official thought rather than a fixed national policy. Yamaji in Vienna advocates early rapprochement with Germany; Inoue in Budapest would approach Russia for a nonaggression agreement and cement Japanese relations with Italy and Germany as well. Both plans contemplate arrangements inimical to the United States.

2. More significance is given to these advocacies of policy by the fact that considerable radio traffic is now in progress between Berlin and Tokyo in a code of such extreme secrecy as to permit the deduction that highly important negotiations are in progress.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

td

Enclosure

Copies to: General Watson
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MEMORANDUM

On June 26, 1940, the Japanese Minister in Vienna advised the Foreign Office in Tokyo as follows:

1. Germany is now fast preparing for an attack upon the British Isles and it is rumored that the aerial force which was concentrated in Austria has taken a position along the Cherbourg front preparatory to flying over to south England. However, with regard to these developments, I have just procured a spy report to the effect that the Yugoslav Minister reported to his Home Government on the 17th that:

1. Churchill has been advocating plans for defense including the use of poison gas to which King George is adamantly opposed. On the 16th these two men had a quarrel. The majority of British Foreign Office officials favor pursuing the war to the bitter end, and many who are well versed say that they are sure that the United States and Russia are soon going to join the Allies. It seems that President Roosevelt is already frequently writing Churchill letters of encouragement and that in both Moscow and London, Anglo-Soviet negotiations are taking place in the course of which both sides are reaching agreement. There are articles appearing now saying that Russia's military venture into the Baltic nations is one evidence of the success of the Anglo-Soviet talks.

2. Thus, in order for us to realize our illustrious mission it is essential that we profoundly and fundamentally review our foreign policy up to the present day. It behooves us particularly to proceed to directly adjust our policy toward Germany which I have recommended all along and which has been neglected. The reasons are as follows:

a. This war is going to be won by Germany and is going to end quickly, by autumn at the latest. Therefore, now is the time.

b. After the war Germany is going to have immense power, but at the same time England and her cohorts will play no small role in Europe and the world at large.

c. England, United States, France and the Soviet have all along displayed an attitude hostile to the establishment

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of our New Order in East Asia, but Germany is now advocating the equitable distribution of colonies, including the establishment of our New Order in East Asia on the basis of her Lebensraum formula and Berlin now stands in a favorable position to assist us more than ever in this aspiration.

d. Hereafter Tokyo and Berlin are going to have a greater mutual interest than ever before in their relations particularly with the United States and the Soviet.

e. Not only will Germany soon have the preeminent right of direct speech concerning the return to herself of some of our mandated islands in the South Seas, but also she will have the right of indirect interference in French, Netherlandish, and British colonies.

f. The United States is for the present at least in no position to interfere militarily in Europe or Asia.

3. Now that there is a possibility of the Soviet Union taking direct measures against Germany and in view of the fact that evidently the political basis of Japanese-German amicable relations has been shaken since the conclusion of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact, we must with all speed restrengthen this basis and restore its one time virility to the anti-Communism agreement, and in addition I believe it extremely urgent to conclude separately with the Reich a general doctrinal alliance. Last year I proposed this sort of a doctrinal agreement but you told me that when negotiations were opened for the anti-Communism agreement such a thing had already been proposed. Well, now if ever the time has come to go back to this proposal and I think it would be advisable to bring it up immediately. If you all can now agree to rush this through, judging from the friendly feelings of high German authorities, I do not think it will be at all hard to achieve our object. Not only is the Reich now fast approaching the zero hour for her attack upon the British Isles, which is expected to put an end to this war, but the future attitude of the United States and the Soviet require careful deliberation, so I think the time has come to open the above mentioned talks which will be extremely profitable to the parties concerned.

4. Now as soon as we have rushed this doctrinal agreement through, we ought to publish it because, in so doing, we would reap political benefits from the mere fact. We should at least contract with Germany to the following effect:

a. The recognition of the position of leadership of the Japanese Empire throughout East Asia including the South Seas.

b. The China question.

c. The restoration of territorial rights to ourselves over our South Seas mandated territories and former German New Guinea.

d. Germany will at every opportunity assist us to the limit of her abilities in our southern course of the Empire.

5. Now when we stop to consider our actions since the conclusion of the Berlin-Moscow nonaggression pact, we find that we have warmed up to Italy and have been giving Germany the cold shoulder. This after all is a childish way to act, so hereafter we ought to first of all show the Germans that our hearts are with them and this will help us both in our relations with the United States and the Soviet.

On July 6, 1940, the Japanese Ambassador in Budapest informed the Japanese Ambassador in Washington as follows:

I am in receipt of Your Excellency's statement with regard to the Empire's necessity to expand southward under the "New Order" program. This statement recalled to my mind a statement Your Excellency had made at the time you were Ambassador to Belgium in which you advocated the splitting of the world in three parts.

I wish to express at this time my hearty approval of your program. I would like also to express my undying hope that a nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union be entered into and at the same time that you tackle the problems of choosing an opportune moment to enter the war on the side of Germany and Italy, thus aiding in the termination of the "Incident," and also to clear up the various southwestern Pacific problems (see note below.).

I shall attempt herewith to outline my reasons for hoping that the above is brought about.

1. Under present circumstances, the only ones who could oppose - and back up their opposition with actual force - our southward expansion are only the two countries, Soviet Russia and the United States.

In view of the fact that the Soviet Union is still engaged in domestic reorganization, and moreover, if our armed preparedness on the continent is maintained or strengthened, it is highly doubtful that we shall encounter any strong interference from that source.

It, therefore, remains for us to build our program with the attitude of the United States as the main consideration and for this purpose it is vitally necessary for us to keep a close watch on United States' movements.

For the purpose of establishing conditions which would guarantee our right to exist, we must be prepared to face the worst eventuality which would be the coming to a show-down with the United States. While steeling ourselves against such an eventuality, we must do everything in our power to prevent its occurrence.

2. To my mind there are four factors which would restrain the United States from using her armed forces to interfere with our program. They are:

a. Japan's armed forces. We must have confidence in our land and sea fighting forces. Domestically, we should reorganize our economic structure to fall in line with totalitarianism. Accompanying this, the spirit of the people to serve must be further developed.

b. The removal of any other forces restraining the Empire. For the purpose of smashing the Chiang regime as well as for the purpose of completing our preparation for a determined southward expansion, I believe it necessary that our relations with the Soviet Union be fundamentally readjusted.

c. The elimination of the powers from the above named areas. With Germany engaging Great Britain in a battle to the finish, our only armed opposition in the areas involved will be the colonial forces of Britain, France, and others, and therefore, the United States cannot look for much assistance from outside sources.

d. Restriction of United States action by Germany and Italy. First of all, the United States would hesitate before she used force to interfere with our program in view of European developments. However, should she decide to fight us, we would find it much to our advantage if Germany, Italy and Japan were to act jointly.

3. There are indications that Russia is already prepared to discuss nonaggression terms with us. Moreover, after the Western European conflict is settled, it is apparent that Italo-German pressure against the Soviet Union will be redoubled. In view of these facts, I believe that it is well within the realm of possibility that a Soviet-Japanese nonaggression accord may be reached at the present time. The fact that border disputes have been and may be yet further settled will make it easier.

4. Next, I wish to outline the conclusions I have reached concerning the advisability of our entering the war on the side of Germany and Italy, after considering the problem from all angles.

a. Advantages of entering the war:

(1) Our entrance would be of big help to Germany and Italy both from the standpoint of military strategy and in the bolstering of their spirits. We shall cooperate with Germany and Italy in bringing about an earlier settlement with England, at the same time placing us in a more advantageous position in our own activities.

(2) At the peace conference, we shall be in possession of a strong right to voice our opinions, if we are in the war. Moreover, by agreement with Germany and Italy in advance, our new territories will be guaranteed to us at the conclusion of hostilities. This would make it impossible for Germany and Italy to alone sign a peace treaty with England and France. (In other words, they wouldn't be able to forget all about East Asia.)

(3) The United States would hesitate before interfering with us in our own program should we be acting jointly with Germany and Italy.

(4) Domestically, the aims of our "holy war" will become even more clear cut to the people, and would tend to unite the whole people to the common cause.

(5) Mutual aid could be offered in the reconstruction work subsequent to the conclusion of the war.

b. Disadvantages of entering the war:

(1) Should future developments in Western Europe place Germany and Italy in a disadvantageous position, we would find ourselves in a difficult spot. However, judging from present circumstances, this seems very unlikely.

(2) Because we will have agreed to cooperate with Germany and Italy in the war against Great Britain, should the European war become a prolonged one, we would find ourselves involved in a long-term war. Also, there is the danger that the war would become larger in scope than is necessary to us for our own purposes.

(3) Our entrance at this time would contradict our statements to the effect that we would not become involved in it.

(4) It is not impossible to picture the United States' involvement in the European war at some future date. By our declaration of entrance into the war, we may not only restrain the United States from becoming involved over there, but might, under extreme circumstances, give the United States the excuse to concentrate her entire strength on Japan. (The fact that the United States Fleet is still in the Pacific may be an endorsement of this possibility.)

Although it is impossible to ascertain the real motives of the United States from this distance, it seems unlikely that having delayed her entrance into the European war this long, she would now plunge into it after it has become evident that she would be backing a beaten horse. We are of the opinion that her assistance will not extend beyond the supplying of materials.

Realistically speaking armed interference on the part of the United States against the pursuance of our program will have little bearing on the outcome of the conflict in Europe. It is doubtful whether Americans will tolerate the destruction of their ancestral countries in Europe while the United States herself engages in a war in the Orient.

Areas which will be involved in Japan's southward expansion include only colonies of other countries and the United States does not stand to suffer any direct losses. Moreover, should the United States, through some unexpected development, crush Japan, the United States would next be faced with a situation she least of all desires: that of having the Soviet Union, which would not have Japan to restrain her, overrun China and become the sole dominant factor in Asia.

(5) In view of the fact that Germany and Italy have no desire of making the United States an enemy belligerent, Germany and Italy may insist on our taking on the United States by ourselves.

In considering the comparisons between the above list of advantages and disadvantages, the crux of the situation seems to be whether the United States can be sufficiently restrained or not.

At present, the United States is undecided whether or not to attempt interference in our Far Eastern program. If, at this time, we clearly declare our entrance into the European war, we believe that it would restrain the United States from wanting to interfere with us.

On the other hand, should we attempt to pursue our program in the Far East through use of arms without first declaring our intention of entering the European war, there is a danger that any subsequent declaration to that effect would assume the proportions of only a supplementary act on our part.

If the above be true, it is clear that after having checked our positions thoroughly, it would be to our advantage if we were to clearly declare ourselves in on the European war and, moreover, give clear evidence of our aims and determination.

5. To the United States, we should offer a clear and detailed explanation of our aims, proving to them that we have no political ambitions for the Philippine Islands. Moreover, should the United States desire it, we could show them that we are prepared to sign a mutual nonaggression pact with her as well as to agree again that we shall mutually respect each other's territories.

There is a need to do this in an attempt to ease the tension between the two countries.

6. There are some within our country who advocate that settlement of the China incident should be our only goal and that an armed aggression into the southwest Pacific area should be put off until another day. Moreover, there are probably those in our country who are against Germany and Italy because of their ruthlessness in international affairs. They are probably in favor of breaking off with them and going separate ways. However,

a. It is impossible to establish a condition which would guarantee our right to exist without first resorting to force of arms.

b. Settlement of the China incident and our securing the right to exist are part and parcel of one thing and cannot be treated as two separate things.

c. Any acts perpetrated and carried out by Germany and Italy in the past which may be utilized by Japan, must be utilized by Japan to the fullest extent.

d. At a time when the New Order is about to be born it is miraculous that the present world condition has developed. Should we refuse to take this opportunity which comes to a nation but once in a millenium, it is impossible to say when or in what world another opportunity will be given us.

It is my firm belief that now is the time for great diplomacy abroad, and to assume an unshakable determination at home. It is our duty to our country for high and low to join together at this time to see the thing through.

For these reasons, I felt that I had to air my humble opinions to you.

Footnote:

1. Complete acquisition of territorial rights in mandated territories in the South Seas.

2. French Indo-China's independence and its future guarantees.

3. The possession of territories in the Malayan Peninsula, Dutch East Indies, Australia, New Zealand, New Caledonia, as well as British and French islands and mandated lands. (Great care will have to be exercised in the time and method in the cases of Australia and other sections because of relations with the United States.)

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Date-

Signature-

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

file confidential

8-2-40 August 2 - 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

We were all a little vague the other day about the characteristics of this new 90-mm anti-aircraft gun, so I have had the Army prepare pictures and data on the four outstanding anti-aircraft weapons employed by the Army: *

90 mm

75 mm

37 mm

.50 caliber machine gun.

You will also note the number on hand, on order, and approved and pending in each category.

EMW.

E.M.W.

* x - file x — Paste File.

(came to file Aug 16-1940 file PSF War)

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT

Additional Skilled Personnel Required at Manufacturing Arsenals for Maximum Production, Working three 8-hour Shifts, only 6 days a week.

DESIGNATIONS	ROCK-ISLAND	WATER-VLIET	WATER-TOWN	SPRING-FIELD	PICA-TINNY	FRANK-FORD	TOTAL
Assembler (Tank &Tractor)	25						25
Barrel Rifler				14			14
Barrel Straightener				16			16
Barrel Turner				50			50
Diesinker	10			8			18
Drop Forger				6			6
Gage Checker		6		12		14	32
Gage Maker				40			40
Grinders	50		23			35	108
Instrument Maker	11					450	461
Lens Grinder						436	436
Machine Adjuster	100			45		321	466
Machine Operator (Auto. Screw)	42		1	10	81	195	329
" " (Turret Lathe)	280		15				295
" " (General)	688						688
" " (Lapping)	85						85
Machinist	1457	600	141	25	50	811	3084
" (Erecting)			60				60
" (Heavy Machine Tool)			21				21
" (Recuperating Assembly)	123						123
Millwright					50		50
Pipefitter					20		20
Tool Designer	43	40	5	30	15	15	148
Tool Dresser				33			33
Toolmaker	250	500	21	64	100	751	1686
Welder					10		10
TOTAL	3164	1146	287	353	326	3026	8304

RESTRICTED

PSF War

G-2
J M

G-2/2657-234

August 16, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF (No. 73):

Subject: Messages from Military Attaches.

Following is a paraphrased message received from the Military Attache as shown:

London, Filed 10:56, August 16. Situation twenty-four hours ending midnight 15th marked by greatly increased air attacks. Over 1,000 aircraft attacked during afternoon from Plymouth on south to Tyneside north. Croydon airfield twenty miles south of London heavily bombed; this is closest to London bombing has occurred. Confirmed German losses 144 planes, British 26. Military effectiveness bombing very low. Practically all damages and casualties civilians. No panic anywhere. Indications are this is forerunner more extensive and violent air attacks. Am forced to conclude Germans believe they inflict more damage than is actually the case. Lee.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

emb

Distribution outside War Dept.:
General Watson
State Dept.
Sec. Treasury
ONI

RESTRICTED

(came to file - Aug 20 - 1940) → PSF War 1

file confidential

Sunday Noon

Dear Pa -

Radio from Raymond Lee (London), received yesterday afternoon, gives results up to 6. am Friday. British military authorities optomistic over results of German air attacks so far. They had expected much more serious results. They expect more intensive raids, however.

Results of raids Thursday, 6. am to Friday, 6 am —

Losses German 180, British 31 planes

All German pilots lost, about half the British.

4 small airplane factories seriously damaged

1 large " " slightly "
(probably Handley-Page)

7 air dromes attacked -

2 had hangars slightly damaged

2 " some fires started

Civilian loss of life between 100 & 200, with many wounded, severe damage to electric power plants, water supply, etc.

The above is from my memory only, but figures quoted I am sure are approximately correct. General tone of the report was definitely optimistic.

Please convey to The President and Secretary of War.

Yours Sherman Miles

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

The President—
from
Henry L. Stimson

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

August 23, 1940.

Reasons why the Maloney Amendment should be defeated.

1. Conscription is immediately needed to fill up the present Regular Army and National Guard Divisions to full strength.

   To fill up the present units to full strength would require nearly 400,000 men.

   Even at present high rate of voluntary recruiting this would require over a year

2. In addition to filling up the present units, nearly 400,000 more men are required to create the additional necessary supporting troops in the shape of Corps troops, Army and G.H.Q. troops, which are necessary to make the Combat Divisions of the Regular Army and the National Guard function as an organized team.

   To recruit these additional 400,000 men would take more than a year more, even at the present high rate of recruiting.

3. The present maneuvers are showing how imperative these needs are. The men are willing and earnest but they are not physically hard.

   The Divisions are not trained teams. They do not know how to cooperate as a team. It will take them many months to learn.

   The success of Germany was due to the team work of the various units of her Army and the hard vigor of her infantry.

4. If the Maloney Amendment passes, the entire autumn and winter will be lost; thus practically a year will be lost in these vital measures of our preparedness.

5. We are using many new weapons and facilities with which our soldiers are still comparatively unfamiliar.

Many of these facilities are instruments in cooperation.

We are beginning to use instruments which are new to us but with which the Germans are particularly adept.

As examples of this are the portable radio sets, (Walkie-talkies); the detectors to detect approaching airplanes. These new instruments open up a wide field of cooperation between the different units of an Army which is still perfectly new to our troops and in which they must have training.

Such as cooperation between air and ground troops. In this our progress is rudimentary.

Other examples are the coordination of the Engineers and Signal troops, with the rapidly moving fighting troops.

All of this requires thorough and novel training.

6. The Army cannot practice efficiently as a team until it is filled up to full strength and until the men are physically hardened.

To inject a large number of untrained men at a later date would postpone by just that delay the effective development of the Army as a team.

7. We have now the means to take every step in training, as enumerated above. There would be no need of delaying the fundamental training awaiting the delivery of more modern materiel.

In order to coordinate the two branches of our problem, namely the development of our materiel and the development of the men who will use it, we must begin the training of the men now.

A hastily and imperfectly trained Army will not meet the speed and severity of modern warfare.

PSF

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

File

Sept 14-1940

Personal

Confidential

9-14-40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

This is General Miles' latest report on the situation in England.

E.M.W.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/80)
Date- 4-22-66
Signature- Carl J. Spencer

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Paraphrase of Code Cablegram Received at the
War Department 1:53 p.m., Sept. 12, 1940

London, Filed 12:32, September 12, 1940

The Royal Air Force last night bombed shipping concentrations in continental ports, Bremen, railroad stations in Berlin, as well as other points.

About 500 German aircraft participated in daylight operations yesterday. One major attack of about 250 planes raided the Kent and Inland areas, with about 30 reaching London. Dover was simultaneously shelled and bombed. Other raids were of a minor nature.

The principal attack last night was on London with minor attacks on Liverpool and the Midlands. Some damage was done in London but nothing comparable to that of previous nights due to the heavy continuous antiaircraft barrages over the city.

The Surrey commercial docks, the London Docks, the Central Telegraph office, and industrial plants at Greenwich, Poplar, Fins and Camberwell were all damaged. The Southern Railroad lines were blocked to all traffic from little north of the Thames River to the south. The Cunliffe-Owen aircraft factory was set on fire by dive bombers and many casualties resulted from a direct hit on an air raid shelter.

German plane losses were 89 confirmed, 34 probable and 53 damaged. The British lost 28 fighters and 17 pilots, as well as 5 coastal reconnaissance planes. Of the 89 German planes destroyed, 48 were bombers. It is estimated that about 250 German air personnel were either captured or killed. There were no British Air Force ground

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

casualties. Civilian casualties were 53 killed and 320 injured.

A British destroyer escorting a convoy was bombed and hit. The convoy was undamaged. An 8,000-ton British tanker in convoy was bombed and damaged. The British claim the sinking of 10,000 tons of German shipping and one large submarine. Six French cruisers passed through Gibraltar yesterday in a westward direction.

About 12 transports, of from 1,000-8,000 tons, have been identified in the harbor at Bremen. They are all marked with numbers forward, are equipped with paravanes and degaussing cables, and carry wooden rafts and floats on their decks. All German ship movements appear to be taking place by daylight under the protection of the German Air Force. This may possibly indicate that the attempt at invasion will also be made by day.

In Egypt one Italian division moved eastward on the 10th, halting in the Sidi-Omar (Morocco) area.

The morale of the civilian population of London is excellent, although a certain amount of interference to normal activities arises from the interruption of road and railroad communications and from the frequent air raid warnings, which delay work and interfere with the use of telephones. Also some people lose sleep owing to the continual presence of bombers overhead or to accidents such as the explosion which blew Miss McCann's bedroom door across the room. The circulation in the streets of London is slow because of the craters here and there, but more particularly because of the presence of delay action bombs. These are a considerable nuisance because the area in which they fall must be roped off until they explode.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Last night the British resorted to a heavy antiaircraft barrage without the use of searchlights. This had the double effect of discouraging low flying bombers and of encouraging the public that had seen little defensive activity during the previous nights.

LEE

Copies to: General Watson
Secretary of War
State Department
Secretary of Treasury
Asst. Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
ONI
WPD

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
OPERATIONS AND TRAINING DIVISION G-3
WASHINGTON

G-3
JDB

G-3/42550

Sept. 24, 1940.

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY, G. S.:

Subject: Balloon Barrages in defense of England.

Attached hereto is self-explanatory draft of Memorandum for the Secretary of War for signature of the Chief of Staff.

W. M. Andrews

F. M. ANDREWS,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.
Col G S C
actg

Incls.
Disp Slip OCS 21165-2, dated 9-20-40, attaching
Memo to C/S fr S/W (9-19-40)
Draft Memo to S/W for sig of C/S.

cbc

SEP 25 1940
OCS/21165-2

Paraphrase of Code Radiogram
Received at the War Department
at 1:34 P.M., September 23, 1940

London, filed September 23, 1940.

The following information is in response to your cablegram of September 21 on the subject of balloon barrages:

The Air Ministry states that the moral effect of a balloon barrage has proved to be very great. With the balloons flying at an average altitude of 4,500 feet the barrage prevents low level and dive bombing on precision targets and at the same time keeps enemy aircraft at an altitude which is most favorable for the use of fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery.

I concur in this opinion. However the balloon barrage is not well adapted for the protection of small isolated targets because it is not economical. The defense of such small targets should be vested in light antiaircraft artillery. A balloon barrage requires protection from enemy fighter aircraft and should be used only in areas where it can be protected by antiaircraft guns. In addition, friendly fighter aircraft should be available in the area in which the barrage is located.

In the protection of convoys of shipping barrage balloons prevent low flying bombing attacks and tend to keep bombers above 2,000 feet.

The Germans have adopted the British system of the area layout of their balloon barrages. Their cable is 15 hundredweight (1,680 pounds), is not lethal, but can be flown at over 10,000 feet.

The British balloon has a 3¼-ton cable which is lethal. It is reported that the Germans are using artillery observation balloons in their Calais barrage.

During recent storms a high rate of temporary wastage was incurred but many were recovered and repaired. Fragments of antiaircraft projectiles and electrical positions damaged some balloons.

Approximately 1,500 barrage balloons are in daily use throughout Britain. These balloons cost £450 (about $1,800), exclusive of winch, truck and pouch.

I consider balloon barrages to be most valuable for the protection of vital areas such as the Navy Yard at Pearl Harbor and the locks of the Panama Canal.

LEE.

Distribution:
Military Aide to the President
Secretary of War
State Department
Secretary of Treasury
Asst. Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
WPD
ONI

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SEP 26 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Balloon Barrages in defense of England.

With reference to your memorandum of September 19, 1940 concerning the use of Balloon Barrage units in the defense of England, the following is submitted:

The attached radio from our military attache in London indicates that the Air Ministry places great faith in the morale effect of a balloon barrage. It also keeps the enemy aircraft at an altitude which is most favorable for the use of fighter aircraft and antiaircraft artillery and prevents low altitude and dive bombing attacks. Approximately 1,500 balloons are in daily use throughout Britain.

In spite of this report the Germans have on three known occasions descended through low hanging clouds and dropped bombs on London objectives from low altitudes.

All balloons used in their barrage are mobile as the winches are operated from motor trucks. The British also use Barrage Balloons in the protection of convoys to prevent low bombing attacks.

Barrage balloon squadrons in England are organized into Centers based on geographical considerations. One such Center, containing 10 squadrons is charged with balloon operations in the London area. This Center operates 500 balloons and employs 120 officers and 5380 men. Each balloon crew consists of 12 men, mostly in the age group of 38 to 50 years.

Balloons are sited in depth and scattered rather than in single or double rows about the perimeter of the defended area. One report states: "Almost every little park has one Barrage Balloon, one truck with winch, a few cylinders of gas and ten men. They are operated on days of little wind, when the sky is cloudy or overcast and are not put up on clear, cloud-

less days or nights." Kites are undergoing test, being particularly valuable when winds are too high for balloon operations. Balloons are operated from barges or rafts in water areas and from boats for convoy protection. Lightning protection has been afforded by a metallic band placed about the maximum diameter of the balloon and attached to the cable system.

We are now forming one barrage balloon squadron of 36 balloons which will be used to test organization and equipment. Funds have been allotted to procure the necessary equipment. A study is also being made to determine our requirements for the Continental United States, Panama and Hawaii.

Chief of Staff.

Incl.
Copy of Radio
fr. London Mil.
Attache.

10-2-40

PSF War

file

October 2-1940

WATERVLIET ARSENAL

Watervliet, New York

DATA FOR THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

NUMBER OF GUNS UNDER PRODUCTION AT THE ARSENAL - - 6096
(Of these 886 have been completed)

ARMY		NAVY	
1534	37 m/m Tank Guns	16	16" Guns
1469	37 m/m Anti-Tank Guns	55	5" Anti-Aircraft Guns
550	60 m/m Mortars	66	5" Guns (Reline)
93	81 m/m Mortars		
1308	75 m/m Tank Guns		
727	90 m/m Anti-Aircraft Guns		
100	3" Anti-Aircraft Guns		
29	8" Railway Guns (Reline)		
61	105 m/m Howitzers		
38	155 m/m Guns		
50	8" Howitzers		

Rate of Production per Month: Present - 185 (plus 100 barrels) Expected - 470 (plus 100 barrels)

NUMBER OF GUNS UNDER CONTRACT WITH PRIVATE INDUSTRY - 28005
(Of these 271 have been completed)

4467	37 m/m Tank Guns
3162	37 m/m Anti-Tank Guns
9212	60 m/m Mortars
3148	81 m/m Mortars
1205	75 m/m Tank Guns
452	90 m/m Anti-Aircraft Guns
2701	37 m/m Anti-Aircraft Guns
888	75 m/m Pack Howitzer
1068	37 m/m Aircraft Guns
500	105 m/m Howitzers
1202	20 m/m Aircraft Guns

Rate of Production per Month: Present - 229 Expected - 2332 (plus 217 barrels)

In addition to the above guns, there are under manufacture at the Arsenal, 3724 Tubes (Barrels) for 37 m/m Aircraft and Anti-Aircraft Guns and 4146 under contract. All of the mechanisms for these tubes are being manufactured by the Colt Company, Hartford, Connecticut.

Deliveries both from the Arsenal and from contractors, will be completed within 2 years.

A. G. Gillespie

A. G. Gillespie,
Colonel, Ord. Dept.,
Commanding.

B-F War

Letter to FDR from Morgenthau, October 3, 1940 attaching copy of report and covering letter 10/2/40 prepared by Sir Walter Layton at direction of British War Cabinet---report presents to US Gov general picture of the British Supply Position and is to supplement in detail the orders that have been transmitted to the British Purchasing Commission.

See:Morgenthau folder-Drawer 1-1940

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM

ISTHMUS OF TEHUANTEPEC

MEXICO

DECEMBER 12, 1940

Ford, Bacon & Davis
Incorporated
Engineers
PHILADELPHIA NEW YORK CHICAGO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM

ISTHMUS OF TEHUANTEPEC

MEXICO

DECEMBER 12, 1940

Ford, Bacon & Davis
Incorporated
Engineers

PHILADELPHIA NEW YORK CHICAGO

New York, December 12, 1940

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MEMORANDUM

ISTHMUS OF TEHUANTEPEC

MEXICO

Proposition

We have been asked to consider the practicability of constructing an overland shipway across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the location of which is shown in Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2 attached, designed to transport ocean-going ships in sizes up to 10,000 or 15,000 tons maximum loaded displacement.

Conclusions

Based on general engineering practice and experience and on brief studies of similar projects constructed or proposed, we are of the opinion that such a shipway is possible from the mechanical standpoint, could be constructed in a reasonable length of time and would transport ships of the size suggested, but we do not believe that this shipway should be built for the reasons set forth below.

Historical

A notable example of a similar project constructed a hundred years ago is the Allegheny Portage Railroad (see Exhibit No. 3) built by the State of Pennsylvania to connect canal terminals at Johnstown on the west and Hollidaysburg on the east, a distance of 36 miles, with a total rise over the mountains of about 1,100 feet. Canal boats, small in size and

built in sections, were carried over this shipway for 20 years.

It is of especial interest to note that in 1885 James B. Eads, an eminent American engineer, proposed to the Congress of the United States the construction of a shipway across this very Isthmus of Tehuantepec and full description of his proposal is of record. There are appended hereto copies of cuts taken from the Eads report (Exhibits Nos. 4 to 9) which clearly indicate the designs proposed. Eads planned to handle vessels of displacement tonnage, including cargo, up to 5,000 tons. The vessel was to be transferred on a large carriage or car and was to be loaded on the carriage by sinking the carriage on a floating type dry dock or pontoon which was then to be pumped out until the carriage with the vessel loaded upon it rose to the level of the rails on the shipway. Upon completion of the transit across the Isthmus the vessel was to be put into the water by reversing the method described above for lifting it out of the water.

The roadbed was to be 50 feet wide laid with rails weighing 100 to 120 pounds per yard (about twice the weight of the heaviest rails then in use). Three parallel standard-gauge tracks bedded in concrete were proposed. The road was to be built only on tangents and changes in direction were to be obtained by ingenious floating turntables at the tangent intersections. These floating turntables were to be so constructed as to provide passing facilities for ships moving over the shipway in opposite directions.

Eads estimated the cost of construction of his shipway, which would have been close to 200 miles long and reaching a maximum elevation above sea level of 738 feet, at $75,000,000 compared with his estimate of $400,000,000 for the Panama Canal and $200,000,000 for the Nicaraguan Canal.

Probable Cost of Project

We have endeavored to form some judgment of the probable cost of such a shipway today, based on published information relating to the terrain and conditions on the Isthmus, our conception of the general design and sizes of structures involved and our experience on large-scale construction jobs and conclude that for a shipway approximately 125 feet wide by 200 miles long reaching a maximum elevation above sea level of 750 feet, including equipment and harbor development at Puerto Mexico, the eastern terminus, and Salina Cruz, the western terminus, the indicated approximate costs today would be of the order of:

$525,000,000	To carry vessels having maximum loaded displacement of 10,000 gross tons
$570,000,000	To carry vessels having maximum loaded displacement of 15,000 gross tons

The period of construction under favorable conditions might be three years.

The indications are that the total operating cost per ship transported would range from four to five times the Panama Canal toll for a representative merchant freight vessel of 15,000

tons loaded displacement.

The capacity of the ship railway would depend upon the number of turntables installed and the number of dry docks provided at each terminus. Annual capacity up to 2,000 vessels per year probably could be attained with a single railway and sufficient dry docks and turntables.

Use of Ship Railway by Naval Vessels

As of June 30, 1939 only 31 out of 565 of our naval vessels (including the then laid-up destroyers) appreciably exceeded 10,000 tons displacement; the 31 vessels consisting of 15 battleships, 5 aircraft carriers, 6 auxiliary vessels and 5 unclassified. This means that 95 per cent of our naval vessels by number could be handled over the suggested shipway. We make no effort to evaluate the hazards in such overland movement of war vessels, such as hull damage, fire and vulnerability to attack from air while in transit. Probably not less than three days time would be required to effect the transfer and in order to handle 2,000 vessels per year there might be more than 20 vessels on the ways at one time. Light vessels of destroyer type might be transported two on the same carriage.

Use of Ship Railway by Commercial Vessels

An examination of the Panama Canal traffic for the year ended June 30, 1939 indicates that 35 per cent of the vessels that made the transit of the Canal had maximum loaded displacement of less than 10,000 tons, while 70 per cent were vessels of less than 15,000 tons maximum loaded displacement. The

intercoastal route between New York and San Francisco via the Isthmus of Tehuantepec is about 1,100 miles shorter than the route through the Panama Canal, which is equivalent to 70 hours steaming time for our "C" type cargo vessels at 16 knots, but this saving in steaming time would be more than offset by the slower movement on the shipway and time lost at its termini.

There are three important risks attached to ship railway transport that would affect commercial ship owners, the owners of their cargoes and their respective insurers. These are the risks of fire, hull damage and overturning; standard marine insurance policies would not cover such risks which are heavy. It seems likely that the risks to merchant shipping over the ship railway are so great that owners would not be justified in using it irrespective of the tariff charged, so long as the Panama Canal is available.

Summarization

While we see no insurmountable mechanical difficulties to constructing the ship railway, there are objections to it which are of such importance as to make it definitely undesirable, on the one hand and, it is believed less practical on the other, than other means of accomplishing the same purposes. Among the major objections to the ship railway are:

a. Vulnerability of the way, 125 ft. wide and 200 miles long

b. Vulnerability of the ships while out of water

c. Slowness of transfer by the ship railway

d. Liability of structural damage to vessels in transit

e. Liability of damage by fire to vessels in transit

f. Excessive insurance cost on merchant vessels

g. High construction cost and operating cost of the project

h. Unsoundness of the expenditure of upwards of a half billion dollars on this enterprise, the successful utilization of which is problematical when it is considered that the expenditure of such a sum would provide substantial additions to the navy or would go far toward the completion of a second canal between the oceans.

Alternatives

An alternate which would appear attractive to both Mexico and ourselves, both in peace times or war time, would be the rehabilitation of the existing railroad across the Isthmus and the construction of a pipe line on the right of way. Prior to the completion of the Panama Canal this road transported heavy tonnages of goods between the port terminals. Our knowledge of the current operation of sea trains leads us to believe that under a proper setup intercoastal service by sea train via a rehabilitated railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec could be made practical and profitable in peace times although such a project would be competitive both with our transcontinental railway lines and with intercoastal shipping now using the Panama Canal. In time of war, if the Panama Canal were closed to commercial traffic, this railroad would serve a useful purpose. It is thought that rehabilitation of and double tracking the rail-

road, providing additional rolling stock, improving the harbors of Puerto Mexico and Salina Cruz and constructing an oil pipe line on the right of way might involve an expenditure of approximately $25,000,000. It is not suggested that this development alone accomplishes the full purpose of the ship railway.

A second alternate that obviously suggests itself is the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal. The United States Army engineers reported on this project in 1931 and estimated its probable construction cost at about $700,000,000 and that about ten years time would be required to construct the Canal. Such construction could proceed without placing any important additional load on our industry and would employ large numbers of men of Latin America. Without consideration of political aspects, with which this memorandum is not concerned, it appears that even though the estimates of the construction cost of the Nicaraguan Canal be almost 50 per cent greater than of the shipway, it together with the rehabilitation of this railroad might at this time be seriously considered.

Very truly yours,

FORD, BACON & DAVIS, INC.

James F. Ford

Vice President

EXHIBIT NO. 1

PACIFIC OCEAN
ATLANTIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
CARIBBEAN
TEHUANTEPEC RAILWAY
PROPOSED NICARAGUAN CANAL
PANAMA CANAL
MAP OF
NORTH AMERICA
U-1637 12-9-40


Map of the
TEHUANTEPEC SHIP RAILWAY
FROM ATLANTIC TO PACIFIC OCEANS.
SCALE OF MILES
10 0 10 20
PACIFIC OCEAN
GULF OF MEXICO
UPPER LAGOON
LOWER LAGOON
SHIP RAILWAY
Rio Coatzacoalcos
Rio Jalapa
ISLA DE TACAMICHAPA
CERRO ENCANTADA
OAXAQUEZ
TEHUANTEPEC
JUCHITAN
ITZTEPEC
HILTEPEC
SAN MARIA DEL MAR
BOCA MARIA
ALMACRES
JALTIPAN
TEMPLOAPAN
MINATITLAN
COATZACOALCOS
ROLBACAPA
ZARATETELA

EXHIBIT NO. 2

EXHIBIT NO. 3



All aboard for Pittsburgh in 1840 from 3rd and Walnut Streets, Philadelphia. Boats were hauled through streets by horses, over the Philadelphia & Columbia and the Portage Railroads on cars, and joined for navigating canals between and beyond these roads



Crossing the Alleghenies in 1840

EXHIBIT NO. 4



Plate I.—A Steamer in Transit.



Plate III.—Perspective View of the Dock and Car.

EXH. NO. 3



Plate IV.—Details of the Lifting Dock.

Fig. 1 shows the process of running down the adjusting nut of the supports to a bearing on the plates of the cross-girders. The details of the support are shown in Fig. 4, with the hydraulic ram forcing it up to its position under the vessel. **A**, is the rod with the thread cut in it; **B**, the adjusting nut; **C**, the girder; **D**, the ram.

Fig. 2, Cross-section of the pontoon, towers and carriage. **A**, is a side support; **E**, **G**, **F**, the adjustable hinged girth; **D**, the ram; **I**, **I**, the towers for the pressure pumps which are on the top of the towers; **L**, is the pipe through which the water is withdrawn from the pontoon by the centrifugal pump; **J**, is the reservoir from which the water is taken to force a pressure through the pipes to the rams; **K**, is one of the cylinders for the hydraulic pressure

EXHIBIT NO. 6



Fig. 2.



Fig. 1.



Plate V.—DETAILS OF THE CAR.

EXHIBIT NO. 7



EXHIBIT NO. 8

Plate VI.—Perspective View of the Floating Turntable.

Fig. 1.



Fig. 2.



Plate VII.—Details of the Floating Turntable.

WHITE HOUSE
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File

Personal & Confidential

December 17, 1940

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Herewith copies No. 23 and No. 24 of Weekly Statistical Report Summary and Weekly Report No. 23 on progress of current procurement contracts.

R L P Patterson

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PSF War

ARmy

AIRPLANES 1940

		CONTRACT											
		Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
B-17B	Boeing	6	4											
B-17C	Boeing								1	1	2	2	2	3
XB-24	Consolidated	1												
B-24	Consolidated						1	3	3					
B-24A	Consolidated									1	1	2	2	3
B-23	Douglas	6	12	14										
B-25	North American							1			2	6	11	20
B-26	Martin								1			2	7	10
A-20, A-20A	Douglas					3				5	6	7	8	9
YFM-1, YFM-1A	Bell		2											
YP-38	Lockheed			1	1	1	2	2	3	3				
P-38	Lockheed							2	6	9	10	14	14	11
YP-39, YP-39A	Bell			1		2		3	3	4				
P-39C	Bell												6	• 6
P-40	Curtiss				3	15	20	30	40	45	45	45	45	45
YP-43	Republic						2			3	4	4		
P-44	Republic											2		3
O-47B	North American		4	8	12	15	15	15	2					

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Army

AIRPLANES 1940

		CONTRACT												
		Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept 1	Oct.	Nov. 2	Dec. 10
O-52	Curtiss					1						4	5	10
O-49	Stinson					1			1	1				
YO-50	Bellanca			1		2								
YO-51	Ryan	1	1	2	2	2	2	1						
C-45	Beech	2	2	2	2	1								
F-2	Beech				4	8	10	15	10	15	20	25	20	20
PT-13B	Stearman				1	1	5	5	10	10	10	10	15	18
PT-17	Stearman					1	5	5	10	10	10	10	15	17
PT-18	Stearman			1	8	10	30	40	43	43	43	43	9	
PT-19	Fairchild	1	5	10	10	4								
PT-20	Ryan			1		4	10	17	26	32	40	40	40	40
BT-13	Vultee	1		3	8	14	21	29	29	29	29	29	29	29
BT-14	North American			2	5	9	14	16	16	16	2			
BC-1A	North American		1		2	4	8	14	14	14	23	14		
AT-1	North American													

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ENGINES 1940

		CONTRACT											
		Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
				4				4	8	8	8	12	12	16
R-1820-65	Wright Aero. Corp.									8	16	11		
R-1830-33	Pratt & Whitney													
R-1830-33	Pratt & Whitney						4	4	8	12	16	16	16	20
R-2600-9	Wright Aero. Corp.		2					4	12	24	32	42	42	42
R-2800-5	Pratt & Whitney		1	1					4	14	22	44	54	58
R-2600-7	Wright Aero. Corp.	1	2										20	30
R-2600-3	Wright Aero. Corp.	1	8	15	20	25	25	35	40	40	40	40	20	10
V-1710-41	Allison Eng. Co.	2	2											
V-1710-27 RH	Allison Eng. Co.	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	1			
V-1710-29 LH	Allison Eng. Co.	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3				
V-1710-27 RH	Allison Eng. Co.					1	10	15	15	14	11			
V-1710-29 LH	Allison Eng. Co.					1	10	15	15	14	11			
V-1710-37	Allison Eng. Co.			1	2	5	6	1	1					
V-1710-35	Allison Eng. Co.		1							6	6	8	8	10
V-1710-33	Allison Eng. Co.		2	15	15	15	30	35	50	75	75	75	75	75
R-1830-35	Pratt & Whitney	2			4	5	5	5	2					
R- 680-9	Lycoming			4	15	15	15	15	15	15	6			
R- 985-21	Pratt & Whitney				8									

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Army

ENGINES 1940

		CONTRACT												
		Dec.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.
R- 985-23	Pratt & Whitney	4	4	4	4	2								
R- 985-19	Pratt & Whitney United Aircraft Div.	6	6	5		12								
R- 680-11	Lycoming	4	13	15	15	20	20	20	20	20	18			
R- 670-5	Continental Motor		1	5	8	15	15	15	15	15	15	15	19	12
R- 755-7	Jacobs Aircraft Eng. Co.	1		5	5	10	10	15	15	15	20	20	20	14
R- 985-25,-27	Pratt & Whitney		4	10	17	26	32	40	40	40	40	40	10	
R- 985-25,-27	Pratt & Whitney	11	14	21	29	29	29	29	29	29	29	1		
R-1340-49	Pratt & Whitney	6	18	37	36	36								
R-1340-49	Pratt & Whitney	2	5	9	14	14	14	14	12					

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PSF War

Nos--1, 2, 5, 24, 35, 36, 37, 38 reports were sent to W. H. by Louis Johnson's office but have not come to this file or downstairs files.

Nos--3, 9, 11 did not come to W. H. but were kept at Johnson's office.

PSF

Book prepared by Statistics Branch of the office of Asst Sec of War-Johnson. Thinks it might be useful to the President for reference on ARMY.

See:Louis Johnson folder-Drawer 1-1940

FULL OVERSIZE ITEM WAS BEEN
RETRANSFERRED TO SECTIONAL



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

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
MILITARY SITUATION
WESTERN FRONT
As Of
JUN 10, 1940.
German line May 24 to June 6, 1940
Changes in German line as of This Date
Official German Claims
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPT. GENERAL STAFF
IRISH SEA
ST GEORGES CHANNEL
ENGLISH CHANNEL
NORTH SEA
WALES
ENGLAND
LONDON
BIRMINGHAM
MANCHESTER
LIVERPOOL
LEEDS
SHEFFIELD
NOTTINGHAM
CARDIFF
BRISTOL
Portsmouth
Great Yarmouth
AMSTERDAM
THE HAGUE
BELGIUM
BRUSSELS
GHENT
Calais
Armentières
Douay
Arras
Cambrai
Namur
Charleroi
Mezières
Liège
Aachen
COLOGNE
DUESSELDORF
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Essen
Duisburg
Muenster
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FRANKFORT
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Wuerzburg
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Besançon
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BASLE
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LIECHTENSTEIN
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

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