

● PSF

War Dept.

Sept. - Dec. 1941

1
S.T.E.
Will you refer to
me about this before
the Press Conference
tomorrow?

PSF War Folder
2-41
Jill
Personal

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.


September 4th, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I understand that airplane production for August was 1,854. This is a sharp increase, nearly 400 more than our July production.

It is the practice of O.P.M. to publish monthly production of planes in the United States. The Nazis have never released their figures, nor have the British. I understand that Churchill thinks we would worry the Nazis more if we kept them in ignorance of our output.

I suggest that the figure for August be published, it being such a good figure, and that thereafter the publication of monthly figures be discontinued.


Robert P. Patterson,
Acting Secretary of War.

rpp:lm

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PSF Man Folder 9/5/41

	<u>May</u>	<u>August</u>
Airplanes	1,258	1,854 ✓
Machine Guns .30 caliber	1,855	3,598 ✓
Machine Guns .50 caliber	2,191	6,835 ✓
37 MM Guns	527	827 ✓
Height Finders	7	6 ~~~~~
Directors	14	2 ~~~~~
60 MM Mortars	604	750 ✓
81 MM Mortars	181	250 ✓
Tanks - light	211	283 ✓
Tanks - medium	22	91 ✓
Carriers - 1/2 track	92	746 ✓
.30 Cal. Rifles - Garand	22,000	31,000 ✓
Submachine Guns	20,523	26,900 ✓
.45 Cal. Pistols	1,900	3,000 ✓
Smokeless Powder	15,700,000 lbs.	28,700,000 lbs. ✓
TNT	7,100,000 lbs.	7,000,000 lbs. ~~~~~
.30 Cal. Ammunition	108,600,000 rds.	122,000,000 rds. ~~~~~
.45 Cal. Ammunition	36,900,000 rds.	35,400,000 rds. ~~~~~
.50 Cal. Ammunition	7,500,000 rds.	10,700,000 rds. ~~~~~
Machine Tools	\$65,700,000	\$70,000,000 ✓

~~MISS~~ TULLY:

Gen. Watson says these are for
the President's reading basket.

1d

*file
Confidential*

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

PSF War Folder
2-41

September 6, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Organization of the first
Army contingent for Iceland.

You may be interested in the following details incident to the removal and replacement of selectees and Reserve officers who were legally debarred from serving in the first contingent being sent to Iceland. For the entire force, eighty-two per cent of the Reserve officers volunteered, while only twenty-two per cent of the selectees did so.


The 10th Infantry regiment, less one of its three battalions, (93 officers and 2200 men) required the replacement of one-fourth of its officers and over one-third of its enlisted men, this in addition to volunteers obtained from the battalion left behind. The Field Artillery Battalion (30 officers and 520 men) required the replacement of only three of its thirty officers, but the turnover of enlisted men was in the same proportion as in the Infantry. To obtain replacements for those who would not volunteer it was necessary to comb another Infantry regiment, the Medical Battalion and remaining Artillery organizations of the Division, and a near-by General Hospital.

The specialized Services offered an even more difficult problem. One company of three officers and one hundred and fifty men necessitated transfers from nineteen different organizations. Even key instructors from special schools had to be drafted into the ranks.

As the units in the first contingent are in general parts of larger organizations of the 5th Division, the portions of the larger organizations which were left behind were drained of experienced three-year men; also they have had to absorb those men who declined to volunteer.

The organization of additional forces of this nature will require the disruption of approximately three regiments for every one sent and, even so, with small probability of securing volunteers of certain specialists essential to forces of this type. I am

instructing the Staff to see that a special effort is made between now and next spring to bring units destined for Iceland to full strength with three-year men. The difficulty in this matter is that we are only able to secure a limited number of volunteer enlistments and the high priority for these, as well as the desire of the volunteers themselves, is for the Air Corps, and to a lesser extent, the armored force--neither of which are involved in the problem of providing the additional garrison for Iceland.


Chief of Staff.

~~See~~

11 Sept '41

The Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence Division (Miles), to the Chief of Staff (Marshall), [Washington,] September 11, 1941.

Brigadier General Sherman Miles quotes a United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated Sept. 11, 1941 on the subject of political developments in Japan and suggests that Japan may find a peaceful way out of the crisis.

SEE: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1941, Vol. IV, The Far East, pages 443-444.

(copy of this letter transmitted by the War Department to President Roosevelt)



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE PANAMA CANAL
CANAL ZONE
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

PSE
War
IN REPLY REFER TO FILE

CABLE ADDRESS:
 "PANCANAL, PANAMA"

Balboa Heights, C. Z.,
 September 18, 1941.

The Honorable
 The Secretary of War
 Washington, D. C.

Mr. Secretary:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Herewith is a report showing cash balances available in The Panama Canal appropriations, financial receipts, expenditures, and commissary sales, for the month of July, 1941, as compared with July, 1940, and the monthly average for the fiscal year 1941:

	<u>July</u> <u>1941</u>	<u>July</u> <u>1940</u>	<u>Monthly Average</u> <u>Fiscal Year 1941</u>
<u>Appropriation cash balances,</u> <u>end of month:</u>			
Maintenance and Operation	\$ 32,491,709.17	32,297,921.40	
Sanitation	1,159,262.57	1,039,686.66	
Civil Government	1,305,242.24	1,244,746.93	
Postal Funds	356,165.10	191,496.08	
Repatriation - Aliens	93,865.95	95,468.20	
Goethals Memorial	156,508.58	156,508.58	
Addn'l Facilities (3rd Locks)	38,219,702.77	15,000,000.00	
Trans-Isthmian Highway	-	325,000.00	
Total	73,782,456.38	50,350,827.85	
<u>Pay Rolls:</u>			
Maintenance and Operation	2,248,086.38	1,797,856.90	1,988,335.60
Sanitation	157,410.52	124,942.04	139,531.21
Civil Government	96,864.30	76,956.36	115,888.81
Postal Service	24,319.30	18,145.24	20,135.89
Addn'l Facilities (3rd Locks)	147,579.03	-	101,658.77
Total	2,674,259.53	2,017,900.54	2,365,550.48
<u>Payments from Appropriations:</u>			
Paymaster, Isthmus	3,400,151.76	2,070,817.13	2,612,069.44
Disbursing Clerk, Washington, D. C.	2,286,628.68	1,168,510.29	1,771,203.89
Total	5,686,780.44	3,239,327.42	4,383,273.33
<u>Collections:</u>			
Collector, Isthmus			
Tolls	1,123,960.62	1,738,055.26	1,515,864.95
Postal Receipts	64,577.13	39,615.00	56,896.28
Taxes, Fees, Fines, etc.	8,726.18	7,680.01	14,237.19
Repayment to Appropriations	1,621,845.25	1,145,356.74	1,259,448.22
Public Works, Panama and Colon	-	-	7,694.10
Total	2,819,109.18	2,930,707.01	2,854,140.74
Disbursing Clerk, Washington, D. C.	13,225.76	35,936.48	47,391.87
Total	2,832,334.94	2,966,643.49	2,901,532.61



	<u>July</u> <u>1941</u>	<u>July</u> <u>1940</u>	<u>Monthly Average</u> <u>Fiscal Year 1941</u>
U. S. Purchase Requisitions	\$ 2,339,862.04	2,168,561.05	2,782,349.97
<u>Canal Zone and Miscellaneous Funds:</u>			
<u>Receipts-</u>			
Money Orders	1,072,824.02	394,506.78	672,554.78
Interest	3,750.00	3,758.75	6,399.68
Clubhouse Funds	267,975.24	157,286.47	197,217.74
Total	<u>1,344,549.26</u>	<u>555,552.00</u>	<u>876,172.20</u>
<u>Disbursements-</u>			
Money Orders	749,651.84	364,934.35	497,595.48
Interest	3,433.16	4,963.49	3,315.19
Clubhouse Funds	253,947.83	138,618.35	176,911.84
Total	<u>1,007,032.83</u>	<u>508,516.19</u>	<u>677,822.51</u>
Sale of Commissary Supplies	<u>2,393,209.65</u>	<u>1,476,271.32</u>	<u>1,646,263.21</u>

Respectfully,


GLEN E. EDGERTON,
Governor.

In duplicate

Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

9/22/41

PART 15 PAGES 1636-
1639

ROUTING SLIP (RL)

TO: GWR

FROM: WJN

DATE: 2/2/41

Approval	Prepare Report	
Call Me	See Me	
Circulate	Signature	
Comment	Suggestions	
Information	Urgent	
Necessary Action	File	
Noted	Hold	
Prepare Reply	Return	

Dr. Corn says this belongs
in the 1941 (Sept.) set of
PSF. It was in the Marshall,
George C. (1942) folder. It has
been published incidentally in Pearl

Not to be used for remarks that should
be made a matter of record. For economy
purposes, use both sides.

*NA Form 203 (7-48)

Harbor Investigation
1/1/41

Research Report
DATE:

INDEXING SLIP (RL)

~~SECRET~~

PSF
War Box

[Sept. 22, 1941]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Ground Forces.

I. Basic Considerations.

a. National Policy.

Defense of Western Hemisphere.
Preservation of war effort of Britain, Russia
and associated powers.
Curb of Japanese aggression.
Eventual defeat of Germany.

b. Requirements.

Germany cannot be defeated by supply of munitions to friendly powers, and air and naval operations alone. Large ground forces will be required.

(1) Western Hemisphere Security.

Provide minimum garrisons necessary to hold outlying bases in event of sudden collapse of United Kingdom.
Prepare task forces for prompt employment against Atlantic islands and Natal region of Brazil.

(2) Western Pacific Theater.

Rush build-up of air power to Philippines, together with small increases in modern ground army equipment and personnel to restrain Japan from advance into Malaysia or Eastern Siberia.

(3) European Theater.

Prepare security forces for air and naval bases in the British Isles and Ireland.
Prepare task forces to secure, when opportunity offers, additional bases encircling Germany. Britain is reaching limit of usable man power. We must supplement her forces.
Prepare framework for forces eventually to defeat Germany. Time is required to organize, train and equip these.

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2. Immediate Requirements.

As long as Britain stands and her fleet remains intact.

a. ATLANTIC BASES.

(1) Greenland. Authorized 2,500; Now there only construction troops and local guards. Base for staging aircraft to Britain and patrol base for North Atlantic. Secure defense of bases and cryolite mines essential. Forces must be dispatched earliest moment.

(2) Newfoundland. Authorized 5,500; now there 2,500. Naval and air bases for protection of Great Circle Route, and to assist Canadians in defense of Newfoundland. Dispatch of approximately 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these must be equipped and available in United States.

(3) Bermuda. Authorized 4,000; now there 800. Air and naval base. Contribute to defense of Atlantic Seaboard. Dispatch of about 1,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but these forces must be available in United States.

(4) Jamaica. Authorized 876; now there 14. Essential staging field. Ground forces of 350 men required for protection United States installations. Dispatch of remainder can be deferred.

(5) Puerto Rico. Authorized and present garrison 21,000. Advanced air and naval base. New naval base under development. Covers approaches to Panama Canal. From military point of view, reduction in garrison by demobilization of Puerto Rican National Guard is feasible. Demobilization would have adverse political reaction and serious economic repercussions.

(6) Trinidad. Authorized 16,000; now there 1,800. Naval anchorage. Major air base for protection Southeast approaches to Caribbean. Jumping off point for prompt movement into South America. Ground forces required for protection and mobile reserve for prompt movement. Dispatch of about 4,000 men of the total force can be deferred, but this remainder must be immediately available in United States.

(7) British Guiana, St. Lucia, Antigua. Authorized and present 350 men each. Essential air and naval bases and staging fields.

(8) Panama. Authorized and present 33,000. Ground forces essential to protect locks and utilities, and for ship guards and small reserve for use in South and Central America. Air defense demands continuous alert, necessitating forces occupying over 300 scattered positions. Ground forces cannot be safely reduced.

b. PACIFIC BASES.

(1) Alaska. Authorized 24,000; now there 16,000. Air and naval bases covering Great Circle Route to Far East. Isolated.

1500 Total
this fall
41500 Total
this fall
2000 Total
this fall
350 Total
this fall
leave
12,000
Total this fall
OK
OK
OK

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Poor communications. Great distances. Fleet in Pacific reduces threat. Authorized garrison essential to reasonable security.

(2) Hawaii. Authorized and present 41,000. Naval installations (Kaneohe Bay) being expanded, requiring additional defenses. Presence of Fleet reduces threat of major attack. Reinforcements can be deferred as long as Fleet remains in Pacific. Reinforcements must be available in United States to give Fleet freedom of action.

(3) Philippines. Present garrison or enroute 31,000 (12,000 native troops). Critical situation. Japan wavering. Strong air and naval forces on her flank may deter her or wean her from Axis. If Japan moves, forces in position to assist Associated Powers. No reduction possible, on the contrary reinforcements of about 12,000 troops, including air complements, in prospect. Philippine Army in process of organization;- 80,000 by January 1, 1942.

c. TASK FORCES.

(1) Organized forces for overseas expeditions.
Two forces especially trained for landing attacks. Complete equipment and ammunition reserves necessary.

(a) East Coast Task Force with amphibious training.
One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. Possible use; Azores, Cape Verdes, Martinique.

(b) West Coast Task Force with amphibious training.
One division (reinforced) 27,000 men. For use in Pacific or west coast South or Central America. Available for use in Atlantic.

(c) Relief Forces. For Azores, Cape Verdes, one division (reinforced) 27,000 men. After taking Azores, Cape Verdes, specially trained amphibious task force should be relieved and quickly reconstituted for additional operations.

(d) Expeditionary Force. Reinforced Corps (3 divisions foot; two divisions armored; reinforcing units) - 154,000. For use as required; Brazil, Africa, Philippines, England, Middle East. Essential to security Western Hemisphere, for exploiting success of task forces and for carrying out commitments of ABC-1.

(e) Iceland Force. One division (reinforced) 28,000 men. 5,000 now in Iceland. Remainder to relieve Marines and British in spring of 1942.

d. REMAINDER OF ARMY.

(1) Ground Forces.

(a) GHQ Reserve (4 armored, 2 cavalry divisions, antiaircraft) 115,000

(b) Two field armies (20 infantry divisions) 465,000

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(2)	<u>Air Forces.</u>	
	(a) Combat	60,000
	(b) Maintenance	40,000
	(c) Schools	150,000
(3)	<u>Additional personnel.</u>	
	(a) Harbor Defenses	45,000
	(b) Administrative overhead	125,000
	(c) Trainees not assigned to units and instructors	150,000
	<u>Total</u>	<u>1,150,000</u>

(4) The Ground and Air Combat Forces are essential:

- (a) For reinforcement of expeditionary forces -- always unpredictable and to meet the unexpected.
- (b) To permit rapid expansion.
- (c) For training of new units and reserves.

(5) Armored Forces included are difficult to train. Approximately 9 months required. Large number of specialists. Cannot be readily created by conversion of other forces. Any operations against Axis will require high percentage of armored forces. First two armored divisions about 90% equipped, with 95% proposed by April 1, 1942. Second two divisions recently organized, about 45% equipped. Equipment for third two divisions 20% or less. By spring of 1942, four armored divisions will be 85% or better equipped and trained. The remaining two cannot be ready for operations before the late summer of 1942. No reduction in armored units should be made.

3. Effect on Defense Aid of reducing Ground Forces.

- a. Policy of Defense Aid should be based on:
 - (1) Task forces equipped 100%.
 - (2) Overseas forces equipped 100%.
 - (3) Remaining Army Forces equipped 50%.
- b. Task forces require 100% equipment for combat. Any reduction in strength will reduce Tasks which can be undertaken.
- c. A reduction of 25% in the personnel of overseas departments would have no effect on antiaircraft materiel and combat vehicles and only minor effect on infantry and artillery materiel. Similar reduction in strength of Base Forces would not materially increase the amounts of Defense Aid releases. Excluding the Philippines, the saving in shipping would amount to some 32,000 tons annually.
- d. Reduction of equipment of Remaining Army Forces below 50% is impossible without seriously lowering morale and retarding development of new units. Additional Defense Aid materiel from this source can be obtained only by reduction in number of units.

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e. Summarizing, no appreciable increase in Defense Aid items desired by the British can be realized except by eliminating units of Remainder of Army.

4. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS.

By 1943, Nazis may dominate Europe from Urals to Iberian Peninsula and from Scandinavia to North Africa. Germany's war machine may comprise 400 divisions. Collapse of Russia, England, offensive tactics by Japan and belligerent attitude in Latin America are possibilities. We must prepare to meet these eventualities.

Our broad concept of encircling Germany and closing in on her step by step is the only practical way of wearing down her war potential by military and economic pressure. In the final decisive phase we must come to grips with and annihilate the German military machine. Forces deemed necessary at this time to accomplish role of ground units in supreme effort to defeat Germany comprise five field armies of about 215 divisions (infantry foot, armored, motorized, airborne, mountain and cavalry). If the United States remains committed to the policy of defeating Germany, making an all-out effort mandatory, then we must build toward these forces as rapidly as possible. To seize and hold the initiative we must have forces available for employment at the time and place of our own choosing, not Hitler's. Any reduction of our present forces may result in fatal delay. Time is required for the training of forces in the technique of modern war. We are already late. We must not abandon present gains and we should push on with unremitting effort. Furthermore, sudden basic changes of policy are seldom justified in prolonged efforts, and are devastating to organized effort. The "long view" is essential to our interests. In other words, to shift our national objectives by the reduction of our army at the present time, might well be disastrous. Certainly the momentary encouragement it would give the Russian and British governments, would be far outweighed by the positive indications it would give to the German government, that they need not fear an eventual onslaught of ground forces.

5. Conclusions.

No appreciable increase in items of equipment especially needed by the British (AA guns, armored vehicles and ships) will result from any reduction of Army ground forces, which can be justified by the present international situation.

Chief of Staff.

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PROPOSED UNITED STATES DELIVERIES OF LIGHT TANKS, M3

OCTOBER 1, 1941 TO COMPLETION OF CONTRACTS

NOTE: No English Contracts Scheduled

MONTHS	TOTAL PRODUCTIONS	ALLOCATIONS TO	
		Other Nations	United States
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
October	290	183	107
November	300	180	120
December	310	180	130
January	330	100	230
February	360	110	250
March	400	300	100
April	400	300	100
May	400	300	100
June	400	300	100
Sub total	3190	1953	1237
July	400	300	100
August	400	300	100
September	400	300	100
October	130	98	32
TOTALS	4520	2951	1569

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Published in
Pearl Harbor
Hearings

PART 20 PAGES 4430-4435

SF - WAW

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WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

BF
War

September 22, 1941

The President,

The White House.

Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your letter of September 18 an estimate has been made to indicate the total number of American built aircraft produced between October 1, 1941 and July 1, 1942 which, in my opinion, could be given up for export to other nations without too dangerously reducing the defensive strength of our vital outposts and task forces. That estimate is presented in the form of a table, and is attached as Tab A. It is based upon minimum allocations to the Army and Navy to fulfill their most urgent needs.

It will be seen from this table that the exports granted in each class except that of four-engine bombers, as well as in the total of all classes, far exceeds the rule of thumb of 50 percent mentioned in your letter. After most careful consideration, I have concluded that I can not approve of the application of that rule to the four-engine bomber class on which we have already taken such heavy deferments. The following table shows these deferments, including the further contributions which we feel we can make now.

To go further would, in my opinion, impose a risk upon the defense of our vital outposts which would be excessive.

<u>Normal Re-</u> <u>quirements</u>	<u>Reduced Allotment</u> <u>Agreed to 9/10/41</u>	<u>Status After Exports</u> <u>Now Contemplated</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
4	2	2	Philippine Islands
3	2	2	Hawaii
2	1	1	Panama
1	1	1	Newfoundland
2	1	1	Alaska
2	1	1	Iceland-Greenland
1	0	0	Puerto Rico
5	1	1	U. S.
6	2	1	South America
1	0	0	Mexico
3	0	0	ABC-1 (England)
<u>30</u> Groups	<u>11</u> Groups	<u>10</u> Groups	

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No airplanes are available for training of four-engine pilots, for reserve, for ABC-1, or for Puerto Rico, under the proposed Army allotment.

I invite your particular attention to Tab B and Tab C which indicate, respectively, the basis for the Army's requirements and the comparison of production with requirements.

The majority of all bombers, heavy and medium, available for export, cannot be equipped with Sperry bomb sights or automatic flight control equipment. There are on order, for the Army, less than one hundred and fifty sets of this equipment. Bombardment airplanes in addition to this number must be delivered without bomb sights and automatic flight equipment unless the Norden equipment, which is standard on our planes, is released for export.

Respectfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson

Secretary of War

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ESTIMATED TOTAL AIRPLANE PRODUCTION, ARMY AND NAVY ALLOCATIONS, AND AIRPLANES FOR EXPORT (October, 1941 through June, 1942)

ARMY AND NAVY TYPES	1941									1942									TOTAL												
	OCT			NOV			DEC			JAN			FEB			MAR						APR			MAY			JUNE			
	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT	NATIONAL MONTHLY PRODUCTION	ARMY AND NAVY MONTHLY ALLOCATIONS	MONTHLY EXPORT				
HEAVY BOMBERS																															
ARMY - 4 Engine	28	3	25	44	12	32	69	33	36	107	70	37	100	85	15	118	100	18	126	107	19	117	90	28	101	82	19	810	961	219	
NAVY - Patrol 4 Engine													1	1	-							2	2	-	3	3	-	6	6	-	
TOTAL	28	3	25	44	12	32	69	33	36	107	70	37	101	86	15	118	100	18	126	107	19	119	92	28	104	85	19	816	967	219	
MEDIUM BOMBERS																															
ARMY - 2 Engine	66	55	11	53	32	21	85	30	55	144	43	101	230	71	159	326	114	212	794	181	205	311	142	169	305	179	126	1814	875	939	
NAVY - Patrol 2 Engine	29	0	29	27	4	23	71	47	24	34	22	12	36	25	11	28	28	-	52	26	26	60	20	40	70	30	40	407	202	205	
TOTAL	95	55	40	80	36	44	156	77	79	178	65	113	266	96	170	354	142	212	846	207	231	371	162	189	375	209	166	2221	1077	1144	
LIGHT AND DIVE BOMBERS																															
ARMY	239	14	225	270	1	269	311	2	309	354	9	345	285	22	263	313	41	272	308	75	233	312	108	204	343	126	217	2765	394	1367	
NAVY	29	19	10	60	29	31	87	25	62	133	20	90	134	34	90	139	49	90	130	54	96	166	76	90	272	114	88	1067	420	647	
- Torpedo				1	1	-	3	3	-	7	7	-	10	10	-	17	17	-	20	20	-	30	30	-	30	30	-	118	118	-	
TOTAL	268	33	235	331	31	300	401	30	371	441	36	405	419	56	353	449	107	362	438	129	329	548	214	334	595	270	325	3950	936	2014	
INTERCEPTOR AND FIGHTER																															
ARMY	496	149	347	738	209	529	835	354	481	800	305	495	844	353	491	1027	364	663	826	305	521	771	336	435	840	479	411	7177	2884	4273	
NAVY	96	59	37	60	40	20	75	40	35	65	40	25	60	40	20	61	41	20	54	64	20	67	47	20	73	53	20	641	424	217	
TOTAL	592	208	384	798	249	549	910	394	516	865	345	520	904	393	511	1088	405	683	880	369	541	838	383	455	913	532	431	7818	3308	4490	
TOTAL COMBAT TYPES																															
ARMY	829	221	608	1105	254	851	1300	419	881	1375	427	947	1459	531	928	1784	619	1245	1554	676	878	1551	705	616	1609	816	793	17,566	4,668	7998	
NAVY	154	78	76	148	74	74	236	115	121	216	89	127	231	110	125	245	135	110	306	164	147	325	175	150	378	230	148	2429	1170	1249	
TOTAL	983	299	684	1253	328	925	1536	534	1002	1591	516	1074	1690	641	1053	2029	754	1355	1860	840	1025	1876	880	966	1987	1046	941	20,005	5838	9247	
OBSERVATION																															
ARMY	35	35	-	40	40	-	54	54	-	143	66	79	132	36	96	148	43	105	68	43	25	48	43	5	44	34	10	711	374	337	
NAVY	60	54	6	71	65	6	73	67	6	95	95	-	130	130	-	155	155	-	165	165	-	150	150	-	132	132	-	1031	1013	18	
TOTAL	95	89	6	111	105	6	127	121	6	140	141	79	162	166	96	203	198	105	233	208	25	198	193	5	176	166	10	1742	1407	355	
AMPHIBIAN																															
ARMY																			11	11	-	54	54	-	9	9	-	74	74	-	
NAVY	27	27	-	29	29	-	20	18	2	24	20	4	24	20	4	24	20	4	24	20	4	11	7	4	4	4	-	4	177	151	25
TOTAL	27	27	-	29	29	-	20	18	2	24	20	4	24	20	4	24	20	4	24	20	4	25	12	4	13	9	4	78	228	176	

TAB B

BASIS FOR THE ARMY'S ALLOCATION
FOR HEAVY BOMBERS

Requirements in Heavy bombers are most critical. An immediate minimum requirement of 11 groups (748 airplanes) exists. After deducting 15% of Army Production, the heavy bombers allotted to the Army between October 1941, and July 1941 will only provide 597 airplanes. These, together with 100 on hand October 1st will make possible activation of the following units:

136	(2 Groups)	for the Philippine Islands
68	(1 Group)	Newfoundland
68	(1 Group)	Iceland or Greenland
68	(1 Group)	Panama
136	(2 Groups)	Hawaii
68	(1 Group)	Alaska
68	(1 Group)	United States
68	(1 Group)	British Guiana and Brazil
<u>680</u>	<u>(10 Groups)</u>	with a small reserve of 17 airplanes to provide for normal attrition.

The need for long range land based bombers in the critical North Atlantic theater is imperative due to the fact that water based patrol planes may not be able to operate in that area in the winter.

The two groups in the Philippines is the smallest force that can have any real influence in that theatre. A larger force is needed if Japanese aggression in the Far East is to be retarded.

Attention is invited to the fact that, in the above allotment, no heavy bombers have been provided for ABC 1 although in the Joint Staff Conversations it was specifically agreed to have available three full groups with reserves (255 airplanes) for employment in England.

The other requirements have been reduced to a single group at such vital points as Panama, Alaska, and the South American Theater.

This allotment does not meet the minimum requirements of the Army.

Tab
B

Tab
C

Tab
D

TAB C

COMPARISON OF PRODUCTION, EXPORT, REQUIREMENTS
OF
COMBAT TYPE AIRCRAFT
October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942

Types	:Total :Produc- :tion :Schedule :9/1/41 to :7/1/42 :	:Recom- :mended :for Ex- :port :	:Balance :Retained :by Army & Navy :	:Army & :Navy Re- :quire- :ments :	:Defi- :ciencies :in Army & Navy :Require- :ments :	:Army & :Navy Im- :mediate :Require- :ments :	:Deficiencies :in Army & Navy :Immediate Re- :quirements :
(A) Heavy Bomber	: 810	: 219	: 591	:: 2550 (2)	: 2160	: 748 (3)	: 358
(N) Patrol Bomber	: 6	: 0	: 6	:: 6	: 0	: 6	: 0
(A) Medium Bomber	: 1814	: 939	: 875	:: 85 (2)	: 0	: 1360 (3)	: 485
(N) Patrol Bomber 2 Eng.	: 407	: 205	: 202	:: 202	: 0	: 202	: 0
(A) Light & Dive Bomber	: 2765	: 2367	: 398	:: 837	: 439	: 770 (3)	: 372
(N) Torpedo Bomber	: 118	: 0	: 118	:: 118	: 0	: 118	: 0
(N) Dive Bomber	: 1067	: 647	: 420	:: 420	: 0	: 420	: 0
(A) Pursuit	: 7177	: 4373	: 2804	:: 6662 (2)	: 3858	: 3510 (3)	: 706
(N) Fighter	: 641	: 217	: 424	:: 424	: 0	: 424	: 0
(A) Observation	: 711	: 317	: 394	:: 2043	: 1649	: 1635 (3)	: 1241
(N) Scout	: 1031	: 18	: 1013	:: 1013	: 0	: 1013	: 0
Totals	: 16547	: 9302	: 7245	:: 14360	: 8106	: 10206	: 3162
Army Requirements	: -	: -	: -	:: 12177	: 8106	: 8023	: 3162
Army on hand 10/1/41	: -	: -	: -	::	: 2220	:	: 2220
Not Army Deficiency	:	:	:	::	: 5886	:	: 942

Notes (1) No allowances have been made for attrition.

(2) Includes ABC 1 commitments of: 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
1 Medium Bomb Group plus 1 Squadron
3 Pursuit Groups plus 1 Squadron

(3) Do not include ABC 1 commitments or Depot Reserve

(A) Army
(N) Navy

TAB
"C"

TAB
"D"

TAB D

BASIS OF COMPUTATION OF ARMY
AND NAVY REQUIREMENTS

Strategic Defense in Asia
Hemisphere Defense
Provision of Initial Units for ABC 1

Column A

ARMY - REQUIREMENTS

	Groups	Airplanes with reserves
Heavy Bombers		
Hemisphere Defense	23	1955
U.S. Possessions in Asia	4	340
ABC 1 (England)	<u>3</u>	<u>255</u>
	30	2550
Medium Bombers		
ABC 1	1 † 1 squadron	85
Pursuit		
Hemisphere Defense	36	5850
Strategic Defense in Asia	2	325
ABC 1	<u>3 † 1 squadron</u>	<u>487</u>
	41 † 1 squadron	6662

NAVY

Same as shown in Tab A

Column B

ARMY IMMEDIATE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS

	Groups	Airplanes
Heavy Bombers		
Hemisphere Defense	9	612
U.S. Possessions in Asia	2	136
ABC 1 (England)		<u>0</u>
		748
Medium Bombers		
Hemisphere Defense	20	1360
Pursuit		
Hemisphere Defense	27	3510
U.S. Possessions in Asia	4	<u>424</u>
		3934

This immediate minimum requirement does not provide for our commitments under ABC 1, nor does it provide for any reserves.

Tab
"D"

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WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

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PSF

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PSF

Date- 7-30-70

Signature- *WB*

September 23, 1941

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

There is presented herewith The Anglo-American Consolidated Statement--a balance sheet showing stocks of major items of war material as of June 30, 1941, and expected quarterly production to the end of 1942 for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada.

As our interests are so linked with those of England, the necessity for some overall statement of combined British and American production seemed to me to be essential if we were to plan intelligently our production and our strategy. Accordingly I arranged to obtain from the British authorities a statement of their production figures for their war effort and to combine them with our own. The work has been conducted in the War Department by a group headed by Mr. Stacy May who has been lent to us by the Office of Production Management for this purpose. Mr. May has recently returned from London where he was given every consideration and assistance by the British authorities.

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Plans have been perfected to give these figures continuing value through periodic revision, so that they may serve as reference points for the development of joint plans. There will be a monthly exchange of actual production achievement for the several categories of materiel covered by the report, and a quarterly revision of advance production estimates and inventory data. There will likewise be a continuing effort to improve our knowledge of Axis production through the joint efforts of our Intelligence Services.

This statement will, no doubt, be useful in many ways, and the uses to which it may best be put are now being studied. In the meantime, however, certain conclusions can be readily drawn from the facts set forth in the report. The statement affords a ready means of comparison between the production planned over the next eighteen months by the United States, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and Canada on the other, first in absolute terms and second in terms of the proportion of total resources that each is proposing to marshal for armament production.

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I. Comparison of U.S. and U.K.-Canadian Production Schedules in Absolute Terms.

The overall comparisons have been effected by assigning approximate dollar valuations to the several procurement items in the balance sheet, thus reducing all of the listed schedules to a common denominator. For the eighteen month period covered in this report, from July 1, 1941, through December 31, 1942, the production of airplanes, ordnance items and naval and merchant vessels scheduled for production by the United Kingdom and Canada will exceed that presently scheduled by the United States by approximately four per cent.

For the current quarter, which ends September 30, 1941, U.S. production will be less than two-thirds that of the British-Canadian. By the second quarter of 1942, the production of the United States will be about level with that of the U.K.-Canadian total, and in the last quarter of 1942 it will have forged ahead by approximately thirty per cent. The advantage of the U.S. in the final quarter is exaggerated somewhat by the fact that British production of naval vessels in that period is scheduled to taper off sharply from previously achieved

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levels. If the last quarter comparison is limited to planes and ordnance items, the advantage of the United States is reduced to twenty per cent.

For ordnance items alone, which account for almost one-half of the total value of the listed items, the United States production for the six quarters is about one-eighth lower than the U.K.-Canadian aggregate. In the current quarter, the United States total is less than sixty per cent of that of the United Kingdom and Canada. The second half of 1942 shows the two schedules approximately equal.

In aircraft, United States output is less than three-fourths of the British-Canadian total in the current quarter, but moves ahead in the final three-months of 1942. In the last quarter of 1942 it is fifty per cent above the U.K.-Canadian output. In all classes of planes except heavy bombers, American production moves ahead of the British level by the middle of 1942. British production of heavy bombers has been increased apparently at the expense of medium bomber production.

The following figures indicate the relative levels of production:

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RATIO OF VALUE OF U. S. PRODUCTION TO U.K.-CANADIAN PRODUCTION*

	Ordnance	Aircraft	Vessels	Total
July-Sept 1941	58	72	58	61
Oct.-Dec. 1941	72	101	60	75
Jan.-Mar. 1942	83	120	72	89
Apr.-June 1942	91	130	77	97
July-Sept 1942	97	139	106	113
Oct.-Dec. 1942	103	149	181	131
July 1941-Dec.1942	88	122	86	96

*Includes all major items of armament and ammunition, military aircraft, naval vessels and merchant vessels. Excluded are some signal equipment, all quartermaster items, military construction, and industrial equipment and facilities.

It is of interest to compare the items in which one group or the other holds the relative advantage. The output of the United States will be greater than the U.K.-Canadian output in medium and light bombers, merchant ships, light tanks, army artillery, 20mm. guns, rifles and small arms ammunition. The two productions will be approximately equal for fighter aircraft, machine guns, and anti-aircraft gun ammunition. U.K.-Canadian production will exceed for heavy bombers,

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heavy and medium tanks, tank and anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns, and army artillery ammunition.

The production of merchant ships in the United States, a vitally important factor in any victory program, is planned on an impressive scale exceeding joint British and Canadian output by more than 100 per cent. On the other hand, the British output of several of the most difficult and essential war materiel items is greater than ours. For example, the British output of heavy bombers over the eighteen months period exceeds ours by 75 per cent. United States heavy bomber production as planned is well behind the British planned production even in the last quarter of 1942. Similarly, the British are to produce over 2,000 heavy tanks by the end of 1942 whereas we have as yet no production scheduled, and the British-Canadian production schedule for medium tanks over the eighteen months period exceeds ours by more than ten per cent. The British advantage in anti-tank guns is over fifty per cent and in anti-aircraft guns about one-third. The record for the sixth quarter shows that, upon the basis of present schedules, not only shall we still be behind British production in most of these items, but in several of them we shall not be appreciably accelerating production

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at the end of the period.

II. U. S. vs. U.K.-Canadian Production Relative to Comparative Resources.

Considering the head start which the British have had over us, and considering the all-out character of their effort due to the realities of actual warfare, the fact that this country is planning to produce only slightly less of the major items of war equipment than will be produced by the United Kingdom and Canada through the year 1942 is a most substantial achievement.

On the other hand, our resources are much greater than those of the British, both our population and national income is approximately two and a half times that of the United Kingdom and Canada combined, and even when allowance is made for our very substantial exports to the United Kingdom and Canada, our supply of vital raw materials such as steel, copper, zinc, tin and rubber, is from two to six times that available to the British. Moreover, although the stimulus of actual warfare is great, the extent to which England has been bombed from the air and has suffered losses in materiel necessarily has had a deterrent effect on her production. Interruptions and delays and inefficiencies have resulted from outright

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destruction, from improvised and hasty planning and the inability to concentrate her manufacturing processes.

Whether our effort has been commendable or not, the fact remains that the extent of our production roughly only approximates that of the United Kingdom and Canada. The British production is not alone great enough to supply its own forces. Large deficits will exist in this respect even if the new Lend-Lease appropriations are passed. On top of this the War Department is receiving constant demands to supply the Russians, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Latin Americans, and there is constantly before us the necessity of equipping our own armed forces to meet situations which can develop with great rapidity. Furthermore, the requirements necessary to the achievement of victory are far larger than those needed merely to avert defeat. The War Department, as you know, is conducting studies to determine the over-all necessities in order to accomplish a victory over the Axis powers; and not only am I engaged in discussions on this subject at the present time, but the Mission sent recently to England has been instructed to obtain from the British and Russian governments their estimates of their requirements for this purpose. It is

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inevitable that the conclusions which will result from these studies and discussions as well as from our present commitments must lead to the necessity for increased production in this country of war equipment. How much this production will have to be increased remains to be decided, but the enclosed Statement of the British and American Production should prove most useful in arriving at our decisions.

Sincerely yours
Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War

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DDU DPL 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 7-30-70

Signature- *YB*

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NOTE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSOLIDATED
STATEMENT OF THE POSITION AT 30TH JUNE, 1941.

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The Anglo-American Consolidated Statement which accompanies this report shows the present stock and expected output of war equipment quarter by quarter to the end of 1942 for U.S.A., United Kingdom and Canada.

The summary attached hereto compares present stocks of major items or groups of items with output for the first and last quarter of the survey, and with the total that will be produced between now and the end of 1942.

British and American Supplies

Present Stock
and future
output.

1. Briefly the total output in eighteen months in the three countries together, if the estimates in the statement are realised, will compare with present stocks as follows:-

	<u>Stocks at 30th June 1941</u>	<u>Production in 18 months.</u>
Heavy Bombers	270	5,500
Medium Bombers	2,930	8,350
Fighters	8,850	27,900
Heavy & Medium Tanks	2,290	24,800
Merchant Ships (000 gross tons)	26,000	7,140
Army Artillery (field, medium and heavy)	7,880	15,100
A.A. guns (excluding 20 m.m.)	19,170	34,200
Tank & Anti-Tank Guns	5,750	57,600
Rifles	5,100,000	1,988,000
Machine Guns	394,000	875,000
Ammunition:-		
Field and Anti-tank Guns (000 rounds)	16,160	123,000
A.A. (000 rounds)	24,000	103,000
S.A.A. (millions)	2,460	15,000

No attempt has been made to calculate stocks at the end of the period. To do so would require a forecast of the rate of sinkings, operational loss or other wastage during the eighteen months. This has not yet been made.

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Rate of Growth

2. The figures in the second column will be attained by the following estimated increases in the rate of output in the three countries taken together during the eighteen months covered by the consolidated statement:-

Heavy Bombers	7 times
Medium Bombers	2 times
Fighters	30 per cent
Heavy and Medium Tanks	3½ times
Merchant Ships	3 times
A.A. Guns	3½ times
Tank and Anti-Tank Guns	2½ times
Rifles	4 times
Machine Guns	2 times
Ammunition:-	
Field and A.F. Guns	4 times
A.A.	2½ times
S.A.A.	3 times

The production of Army Artillery (Heavy, Medium and Field) is expected to show a slight decline, while light bomber aircraft will only rise by some 20 per cent.

As the United States is at an earlier stage of production than Britain and Canada, the American rate of growth will in most cases be considerably greater than that of Britain and Canada.

Comparative Output

3. The outputs of the U.S.A. and of Britain and Canada respectively during the whole period compare as follows:-

- (a) Output of the U.S.A. will exceed that of Britain and Canada in:-

Medium and light Bombers
Merchant ships
Light tanks
Army Artillery (Light, medium and heavy)

20 mm. guns
Rifles
S.A.A.

- (b) The outputs will be approximately equal in:-

Fighter Aircraft
A.A. Gun ammunition
Machine guns

- (c) British and Canadian output will exceed that of U.S.A. in:-

Heavy Bombers
Heavy and medium tanks
Tank and anti-tank guns
A.A. guns
Army artillery ammunition.

To compare the general armament effort of the three countries would require a common measure between tanks, aircraft and ships. Figures are not available of either man hours or money cost in a form that can be applied to the consolidated statement. But a rough estimate of unit prices has been applied to the items of Army equipment listed in the appended summary.

The calculation shows that estimates of production of Army equipment by Britain and Canada during the eighteen months will exceed that of the United States by about 15 per cent - the index figures being U.S.A. 100, U.K. plus Canada 115 (i.e. U.K. 95 and Canada 20). In the current quarter, Britain and Canada will be producing approximately twice as much Army equipment as the United States; the margin progressively narrows, and in the last quarter of 1942 the U.S. output in total will be roughly equal to that of Britain and Canada.

All the above comparisons are, however, subject to the important qualification that American planning is not yet complete.

Further, in comparing industrial efforts, it should be added that current British consumption of steel is being provided to the extent of 15 to 20 per cent from U.S.A. Similarly, explosive for the British filling programme is being provided from U.S.A. to the extent of 25 to 30 per cent.

British and
American
Supplies.

4. On the estimates before us, however, the combined British and Canadian production for the current quarter will be substantially larger than that of the United States for some two-thirds of the items listed on the appended summary sheet. In the sixth quarter expanding American production will have reversed the comparative production achievements. Upon the schedules presented, American production in the sixth quarter will surpass British-Canadian in about two-thirds of the listed items.

But, since British-Canadian stocks as of June 30th, 1941, were larger than those of the United States, and in most cases very substantially larger, the United Kingdom and Canada would still lead in total quantities of material made available by the end of 1942 (stocks as of June 30th, 1941) plus production for the next six quarters) for most of the listed items even though no further transfers from American production were made.

Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that British-Canadian production alone will not be sufficiently large to meet British minimum requirements for aggressive warfare. Still less will it be sufficient to allow Great Britain to make substantial contributions in military equipment to other actual and potential combatants against the Axis powers - Russia, China, the Dutch East Indies and such uprisings as might occur upon the European continent. American production must be relied upon to supplement, in important measure, Britain's armament programme, and in addition to provide the implements needed to make the efforts of other anti-Axis forces effective. Furthermore, this must be accomplished while the United States is attempting to bring its own forces to a wartime footing with the least possible delay.

Already the requisitions filed by Great Britain and other powers seeking Lease-Lend aid amount to something between one third and one half of the entire armament programs that has been planned in the United States. It seems obvious that, if its dual task is to be performed in an effective fashion, the United States must marshal for armament production an amount of its production resources proportionate to that which is devoted to this purpose in Great Britain and Canada.

German v. British and American Supplies.

5. The proposal to prepare an Anglo-American statement of armament resources included the further suggestion that these resources should be compared with those of the enemy. It has not been possible to carry the German estimating as far as the statement of our own resources; but information from the American and British Intelligence Departments has been laid on the table. The statements are approximations only and in the graphs which follow we have not thought it wise at this stage to chart any German figures on the ground that they are of quite a different order of accuracy to our own and for a number of reasons are not comparable with them.

In some respects the foreign estimates differ in coverage from the figures in the Consolidated Statement.

There is considerable doubt whether the American and British estimates include production and stocks of the same groups of Nazi allies and satellites.

The stocks on the Anglo-American statement are gross stocks; the German estimates are built up from known establishments and identified units. To reach a figure comparable with our own, it would be necessary to assume that the number of weapons based on establishments should be raised by some allowance comparable to our own for weapons in reserve, in transit or in store.

Similarly, we could only estimate Germany's supplies during the next year and a half from statements of current output by assuming that German output is at a peak and will remain at its present level.

Finally, comparative military strength is not to be judged by a single category-by-category matching of war materiel, but by a balancing of the strategic weight of one type of equipment against another to which it may be directly opposed with due regard for the terrain and conditions under which it will operate.

6. Such considerations need far more exhaustive study than we have been able to give them and some of them are outside of our competence. We suggest that the Intelligence Staffs of the two countries should attempt to reach an agreed estimation of the enemy's resources, not because it will afford an exact measure of requirements, but in order to give a sense of scale to the figures in the present statement.

Comments on the Programmes.

Programme
Contrasts

7. The Consolidated Statement reveals significant differences between the programmes of the United States and the United Kingdom, of which the following are examples:-

(a) Gun Ammunition

The American programme will in general produce a much lower ration per gun than the British and Canadian for artillery weapons. On the other hand, the American programme provides anti-aircraft ammunition on a much more liberal scale than the British and Canadian.

(b) Small Arms Ammunition.

The American programme is much larger than the British and Canadian.

(c) Bombers

Over 75 per cent of the heavy and medium bombers produced in the last quarter of 1942 in Britain and Canada will be heavy bombers. In the United States the proportion will be only about 35 per cent. The United States light bomber production estimate is about three times as big as the United Kingdom programme.

(d) Bombs.

The bomb programmes have not yet been finally settled. The production expected from U.K. under the revised demand of the R.A.F. is included in the Consolidated Statement. But this will leave a deficit which the U.S.A. is being asked to supply. The United States figures show the American programme prior to the receipt of this request. It shows a much larger proportion of small bombs than the British programme. The United States have, so far, no incendiary bomb programme, but one is expected shortly.

(e) Armoured Fighting Vehicles.

The United States is expected to produce large quantities of light tanks throughout 1943. No light tanks are to be produced in the United Kingdom after the end of 1941. The United States are, however, ceasing their production of scout cars whereas the British programme of Armoured Fighting Vehicles includes a large quantity of armoured cars not matched at present by a precise American equivalent.

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Raw Materials.

8. Comparable figures have been compiled for certain raw materials. The figures show that the production of aluminium is increasing in a much slower proportion than the anticipated increase in the output of aircraft. The question of the supplies which the United States of America and the United Kingdom together may be expecting to receive from Canada needs further study.

The sufficiency of supplies of magnesium will depend upon the size of the United States incendiary bomb programme, but even if the large planned increase in output comes through up to time, the danger signals are up.

British Countries East of Suez.

9. The output of British countries East of Suez is not included in these figures. A table attached to the Anglo-American Consolidated Statement shows the output during the whole period from these countries of stores which they are producing entirely or partly for the United Kingdom. In general, the contribution of these countries adds less than 10 per cent to the supplies of these stores available to the United Kingdom. In rifles, mortars, field guns, S.A.A., carriers and armoured cars, however, their contribution is appreciably greater than 10 per cent.

3rd September, 1941.

OUTPUT AND STOCKS OF WAR EQUIPMENT.

United States, United Kingdom and Canada.

	Stocks.		Output.	
	30th June 1941	1st Quarter July-Sept. 1941.	6th Quarter Oct.-Dec. 1941.	Total in 18 months.
<u>AIRCRAFT.</u>				
TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT (incl. Flying Boats).				
U.S.A.	4,250	2,750	6,720	31,760
United Kingdom & Canada.	14,780	4,020	4,330	25,140
HEAVY BOMBERS				
U.S.A.	120	55	770	1,990
United Kingdom & Canada.	150	200	1,020	3,490
MEDIUM BOMBERS				
U.S.A.	610	200	1,410	4,670
United Kingdom & Canada	2,320	720	330	3,680
LIGHT BOMBERS				
U.S.A.	1,800	980	1,530	9,840
United Kingdom & Canada	4,430	755	545	3,460
FIGHTERS				
U.S.A.	1,355	1,390	2,700	14,110
United Kingdom & Canada	7,480	2,300	2,260	13,800
<u>MERCHANT SHIPPING</u> (incl. Tankers.)				
(Th. Gross Tonn)				
U.S.A.	6,840	230	1,210	4,840
United Kingdom & Canada.	18,160*	320	440	2,300

* British Register and Allied and Neutral
on time charter to
United Kingdom.

	Stocks	Output		
	30th June 1941	1st Quarter July-Sept. 1941	6th Quarter. Oct.-Dec. 1942.	Total 18 months.
TANKS.				
HEAVY & MEDIUM TANKS.				
U.S.A.	80	450	3,000	10,790
United Kingdom & Canada.	2,210	1,250	3,030	14,040
LIGHT TANKS				
U.S.A.	350	910	1,035	6,250
United Kingdom & Canada.	1,360	40	Nil	55
ARTILLERY.				
FIELD, MEDIUM & HEAVY GUNS.				
U.S.A.	2,260	1,170	1,520	8,740
United Kingdom & Canada.	5,620	1,410	790	6,380
TANK AND ANTI-TANK				
U.S.A.	1,650	2,990	5,870	31,065
United Kingdom & Canada.	4,100	2,470	8,700	36,550
A.A. LAND AND NAVAL (ex. Cerlikons)				
U.S.A.	4,600	675	3,960	14,740
United Kingdom & Canada	14,570	1,785	4,170	19,480
GUN AMMUNITION. (Thousands of rounds)				
ARMY ARTILLERY (including tank & anti-tank)				
U.S.A.	6,130	630	9,460	37,410
United Kingdom & Canada	10,030	6,380	18,425	55,580
A.A. LAND & NAVAL (over 20 mm).				
U.S.A.	5,300	2,910	11,570	50,830
United Kingdom & Canada	18,850	6,210	9,660	51,900

	Stocks.		Output.	
	30th June 1941.	1st Quarter July-Sept. 1941.	6th Quarter Oct.-Dec. 1942.	Total 18 months
<u>20 mm GUNS</u>				
(Aircraft Cannon & Cerlikon)				
U.S.A.	8	510	20,400	67,570
United Kingdom & Canada	5,195	3,080	7,070	34,160
<u>SMALL ARMS.</u>				
MACHINE GUNS, ARMY AND AIRCRAFT.				
U.S.A.	54,720	39,020	90,860	428,480
United Kingdom & Canada	329,650	50,930	90,930	446,530
<u>RIFLES</u>				
(Thousands)				
U.S.A.	1,930	106	236	1,194
United Kingdom & Canada	3,170	11	223	794
<u>SMALL ARMS AMMUNITION</u>				
(Ball A.P. and Tracer)				
(million rounds)				
U.S.A.	690	670	2,480	9,310
United Kingdom & Canada	1,770	510	1,230	5,430

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