January 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PATTERSON

Distribution between the Army and the Navy of objective on airplane production.

The distribution of combat aircraft for 1942 and 1943 recommended by the Army and the Navy is approved.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Distribution between the Army and the Navy of objective on airplane production.

In accordance with the President's directive of January 3, 1942, the target production figure of 45,000 combat type planes for 1942 and 100,000 for 1943 has been distributed between the Army and the Navy as follows:

**1942**

**Letter of January 3, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Range, Heavy and Medium Bombers</td>
<td>11,300</td>
<td>9,780</td>
<td>1,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light, Dive, Torpedo and Scout Bombers</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>7,270</td>
<td>3,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuits</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>14,350</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation &amp; Transports</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>3,430</td>
<td>3,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>34,830</strong></td>
<td>10,170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1943**

**Letter of January 3, 1942**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Total No.</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Range, Heavy and Medium Bombers</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>26,190</td>
<td>3,810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light, Dive, Torpedo and Scout Bombers</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>9,160</td>
<td>7,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuits</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>30,600</td>
<td>7,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation &amp; Transports</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>12,260</td>
<td>2,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>100,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>78,210</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,790</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The directive of January 3, 1942 gives to the Army and the Navy the right to readjust as between types. British contracts and Defense Aid contracts for Army types and their special types have necessarily been absorbed in the above figures. Consequently, the allocation by types of planes of the Army's share of the total production figure will have to be made later in the light of strategic needs for the combined effort. This distribution will be made as soon as possible.

The approval of the President on the agreed distribution between the Army and the Navy is requested.

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Robert P. Patterson
Under Secretary of War.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
U. CLASSIFIED
500 DIII. 5509.3 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-9-57
Signature- Carl I. Spicer
Miss Tully:

I think the original of the paper from Judge Patterson must be in the President's basket. It came to Mr. Hopkins and I believe he gave it to the President. In any case it is not here now.

When the original turns up may I have this carbon copy back?

Lois Berney
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I have talked to Arnold and Bob Lovett about this distribution of aircraft.

You will recall that you authorized them to divide the 45,000 combat planes for 1942 and the 100,000 for 1943 between them.

This proposal is the result of a joint conference between the Army and Navy and has the full approval of both services.

I am attaching a letter for your signature.

HARRY L. HOPKINS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE & CONFIDENTIAL

February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

H. L. S.

What did you do about Lieutenant Colonel Wedemeyer? You will remember that there was a bit of a question last September as to whether he had anything to do with the leak to the Chicago paper.

F. D. R.
Publication in Chicago Tribune and Washington Times-Herald of "Army and Navy Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements"

In the Washington Times-Herald and in the Chicago Tribune of December 4, 1941, there appeared detailed excerpts from the secret Army and Navy Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements. Upon the instructions of the Attorney General, and at the request of the Secretary of the Navy, an investigation was initiated by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The results of these inquiries are set out hereinafter.

BACKGROUND

On July 9, 1941, the President addressed to the Secretaries of War and Navy a letter requesting a joint report on the over-all production requirements required to defeat potential enemies of the United States. In a subsequent communication to the Secretary of War, the President requested expeditious attention to this matter and a deadline was set at the War Department for the submission of the report on September 10, 1941. In the War Department, separate requests for preparation of appropriate data were made of the War Plans Division and of the Air Corps. Through these Divisions, other branches of the War Department were requested to submit appropriate estimates. The Navy Department undertook the preparation of an independent Naval estimate which was to be submitted and incorporated in the joint report.

Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner of the Navy Department prepared the final draft of the Navy estimates, which draft consisted of some fifteen pages. Admiral Turner furnished five copies of the Navy draft to Colonel W. P. Scobey, Secretary of the Joint Planning Board.

Lieutenant Colonel A. C. Wedemeyer, under the immediate supervision of Colonel Bundy of the War Plans Division, prepared the ground force estimates of the War Department, which plans were considered by other officers of the War Plans Division.
Section. Simultaneously, other units of the War Department were preparing their estimates. On September 10, 1941, Colonel Wedemeyer succeeded in obtaining the consolidated estimates of the various units of the War Department which had been incorporated into approximately five independent documents with appropriate charts, schedules, and maps. Colonel Wedemeyer obtained through appropriate liaison with the Navy Department, five copies of the Navy estimates and attached these estimates to the five copies of the War Department estimates. On September 10, 1941, Colonel Wedemeyer furnished Colonel Bundy a copy of these estimates, which copy was taken by Colonel Bundy to Assistant Secretary of War McCloy. The other copies were disposed of as follows: One to General Marshall, Chief of Staff; one to General Gerow; one to the Joint Planning Board; and the fifth copy being returned by Colonel Wedemeyer as the "work copy."

During the period between September 10th and September 25th, it is difficult to determine just who handled the five copies of the report or the chronological use which was made of them. There was, however, considerable discussion among various officers as to the contents of the report. Question was raised as to various factors and at one point it was discovered that no plans had been made to include the Hawaiian Islands and the estimates had to be considerably revised. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy had some discussion with staff officers on the general policy of the program, Mr. McCloy contending that the basic program should be one of "out producing" the German war effort, while the staff officers considered the problem primarily from the viewpoint of number and distribution of troops. This matter was adjusted as were other items discussed, it being noted that at no time was the plan submitted to the Joint Army and Navy Planning Board.

On September 25th, according to Lieutenant Colonel Wedemeyer, he, Wedemeyer, carried to the office of the Secretary of War, and delivered to Mr. Stimson, one of the five final drafts of the so-called Joint Plan. Colonel Wedemeyer carried on this occasion a letter addressed to the President to which was affixed the signature of Secretary of War Stimson and Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal. According to
Colonel Wedemeyer, and his recollection is supported by the recollections of other staff officers, the report which accompanied the joint letter to the President did not consist of one entirely assembled and indexed report, but rather consisted of at least six separate studies, all held together by a large clip or other binding. In the late afternoon Colonel Wedemeyer was in Secretary Stimson's office when the Secretary prepared to take the letter and study to the White House. Colonel Wedemeyer recalls that Secretary Stimson's briefcase was crowded, and that he, Wedemeyer, personally assisted in forcing the sections of the report into the Secretary's briefcase. According to Mr. McCloy, the Secretary took the copies of the report to the President on September 25th and in accord with a notation appearing on a copy of the letter in the Secretary's safe, discussed the survey with the President on that date. According to Mr. McCloy, Secretary Stimson returned to the War Department all items which went to make up the transmitted report except the Air Corps study, which the Secretary indicated the President had retained. At the time of the dictation of this report, it is reported by Mr. McCloy and other officials of the War Department that all of these sections of the report, except the Air Corps section, were in Secretary Stimson's safe.

Colonel Wedemeyer reported that the other copies of this first report were returned to him by the persons to whom they were issued and were placed in the "burn box" which is the term used to describe the recesses in the various offices in which material is placed for burning under the supervision of an officer. Colonel Wedemeyer states that three copies of the report were destroyed, the "work copy" being retained by Colonel Wedemeyer. Investigating Agent was advised by Lieutenant Colonel Clark that on December 4th Colonel Wedemeyer had stated that he had furnished to Colonel Scobey, Secretary of the Joint Board, a copy of this report for preparation for the use of the Joint Board. Colonel Scobey states that this is not true and there is no way to substantiate or disprove this statement. Thereafter, and probably some time early in October, Colonel Scobey had prepared, because of his official position as Secretary of the Joint Board, a mimeographed report intended to be an exact reproduction of the report initially sent to the President. Colonel Scobey obtained the stencils for the preparation of this report from the various units of
the War Department who had submitted the initial estimates sent to the President, and in fact took some steps to revise the general form and size of the maps of the Air Corps exhibit in order to fit it into the joint report. Thereafter, in accord with the established procedure at the War Department, thirty-five copies of the complete report were prepared. The stencils, mutilated pages, etc., were returned to Colonel Scobey in customary form and burned under officers' supervision.

The distribution of the thirty-five copies of the mimeographed report were reported by Colonel Scobey as follows:

Copy No. 1 - File copy for the Joint Board - This copy has been in Colonel Scobey's possession and has not been loaned out and has been in the locked safe when not in his use.

Copy No. 2 - This copy has been in the possession of War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, since it was produced and has been kept in a locked safe.

Copy No. 3 - This copy issued to General Gerow.

Copy No. 4 - This copy issued to Lt. Col. A. C. Wedemeyer, October 23, 1941.

Copy No. 5 - Surplus copy in Colonel Scobey's possession now on temporary loan to Lt. Col. C. L. Bissell, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff.

Copy No. 6 - Surplus copy in Colonel Scobey's possession now on temporary loan to Major E. J. Rogers, WPD, War Department General Staff.

Copy No. 7 - Issued by War Plans Division to Chief of Staff, GHQ.

Copy No. 8 - Issued to C-I, War Department General Staff, October 25, 1941.

Copy No. 9 - Issued to Col. C. W. Bundy, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff on October 23, 1941.
Copy No. 10 - Issued to Lt. Col. R. H. Tate, Office Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, on October 23, 1941.

Copy No. 11 - Issued to Lt. Col. R. H. Tate, Office Assistant Secretary of War, Mr. McCloy, on October 23, 1941.

Copy No. 12 - Issued to G-2, War Department General Staff October 25, 1941.

Copy No. 13 - Issued to G-3, War Department General Staff, October 25, 1941.

Copy No. 14 - Issued to G-4, War Department General Staff, October 25, 1941.

Copy No. 15 - Issued to G-4, War Department, General Staff, October 25, 1941.

Copy Nos. 16-25 both inclusive - Issued to Office Naval Operations, October 23, 1941, and receipt signed by Commander L. R. McDowell.


These ten copies distributed as follows:

Copy No. 26 in the possession of A/4 Army Air Forces.
Copy No. 27 in the possession of WPD Army Air Forces.
Copy No. 28 in the possession of WPD Army Air Forces.
Copy No. 29 in the possession of A/3 Army Air Forces.
Copy No. 30 in the possession of Major M. L. Harding GSC, Air Section G-2.
Copy No. 31 in the possession of A/2 Army Air Forces.
Copy No. 32 in the possession of A/1 Army Air Forces.
Copy No. 33 in the possession of WPD Army Air Forces.
Copy No. 34 in the possession of Office Chief of Air Corps.
Copy No. 35 in the possession of AG, Army Air Forces.
Colonel Scobey advised that he had personally checked on the afternoon of December 4, 1941, and determined that each of the thirty-five copies was in the place it was supposed to be. In addition, it may be noted that in the late afternoon of December 4th, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and an assistant personally saw in the safe of Admiral Turner the ten copies of the mimeographed report which had been transmitted to the Navy Department. It may be noted that the majority of these copies of the report had been issued to various officers in the Navy Department, but had been recalled on December 4th as a result of the publicity ensuing in this case.

A study of the system employed in the War and Navy Departments indicates that there is no positive way of determining the identity of officers who may have had possession of this report for limited or extended periods. The practice, according to various officers interviewed, is for an officer to whom a secret document is initially issued to sign a receipt but no restraint is placed on the officer thereafter in transferring the secret document to other officers. Officers interviewed stated that particularly in the War Plans Division of the War Department it is customary for the officers to freely exchange secret documents among themselves, particularly when they are working on joint or collateral enterprises.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Assistant Secretary McCoy pointed out that when this survey was initiated the War Department dispatched officers to England and that the British were fully and completely advised as to the nature and extent of the plans ultimately incorporated in this report. Mr. McCoy stated further that the War Department intended to bring officers from Great Britain, probably from the War Plans Division of the British Army, to study the progress and the results made from the undertaking of this program.

During the course of the investigation, General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff in Charge of the Military Intelligence Division, and Assistant Secretary of War J. J. McCoy, pointed out that the present incident was
by no means the first occasion when publicity had resulted from the completion of a secret plan within the War Department. These officers of the War Department pointed out that early in July, Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana had issued a public statement concerning an expedition which the War Department had contemplated sending to Iceland. They stated that on July 3, 1941, at a press conference Senator Wheeler had stated that he was "reliably informed" that an American expedition was to go to Iceland. These officers indicated that Senator Wheeler had accurate and detailed information relative to this contemplated War Department maneuver and that although there had been an effort made to publicly discredit Senator Wheeler's statement, there was in fact an accurate and complete statement of a War Department project. Investigating Agent, accordingly, made inquiry concerning this matter through Colonel W. P. Scobey, Secretary of the Joint Planning Board, and ascertained that the Iceland move had been the subject of a Joint Board study and report. It was determined that the Joint Board had submitted a comprehensive study of the Iceland program and that twenty mimeographed copies of this report had been prepared and distributed through various official channels. It was believed that some light might be thrown upon the present situation if it could be determined that certain officers who had possession of the report under current investigation had possession also of the Iceland report. An examination of Colonel Stimson's records indicated that the prepared copies of the Joint Board study on the Iceland situation had been numbered in sequence and distributed as follows:

The President
The Army Planning Division
The Army Planning Division
Admiral Turner, Navy Department
General Gerow
Admiral Towers
Chief of Naval Operations
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations
Director of War Plans Division, Navy Department
Chief of Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff
Joint Board
Navy Section, Joint Planning Commission
Navy Section, Joint Planning Commission
General Arnold  
Colonel Naiden (Air Corps)  
Lieutenant Colonel L. S. Gerow  
Major Lemitzer  
Joint Planning file

As indicated above, there is no positive way of determining the identity of the officers to whom these documents were issued subsequent to their initial issuance to the officer executing the receipt.

Mr. McCloy and General Miles further pointed out that on July 12, 1941, General Robert E. Wood, in a press conference at Salt Lake City, Utah, disclosed details concerning a plan for the occupation of the Azores Islands which had been carefully worked out by the Joint War and Navy Department Board. A study was made of the records of the Joint Board through the courtesy of Colonel Scobey in an effort to determine whether any significance could be attached to the nature of the distribution of the copies of this report. It was determined, however, that one hundred copies of this secret report had been prepared and had been distributed not only through the War and Navy Departments in Washington, but also among certain field forces of the Army. It was impossible, therefore, to make any comparative study of the identity of the officers having copies of all three of these reports for the purpose of isolating the possible disclosure of the reports' contents to outside sources.

Some doubt was expressed by Mr. McCloy and General Miles as to the reliability of General Westervelt, who had been retired from the Army some time heretofore. According to General Miles, the Military Intelligence Section had conducted an investigation during the past summer into General Westervelt's movements for the purpose of determining whether he could have been the source of information within the War Department who had disclosed to General Wood the details concerning the Azores plan. General Miles indicated that the Military Intelligence inquiries had failed to establish Westervelt's responsibility for the disclosure of the details of this plan. It was pointed out that General Westervelt, although retired, was presently employed in a civilian capacity under Vice President Wallace. During the course of the inquiries conducted, it was impossible to establish any connection
of General Westervelt with the disclosure of the contents of the joint over-all production report.

A careful comparison was made of the printed excerpts of the production requirement document with the actual document itself. Almost one hundred differences were noted between the publicized excerpts and the original document itself. The newspaper reports indicated that considerable editing had been done by the press. A typical factor was observed in the revision of the President's letter of July 9, 1941. Through a typographical error it was noted that the letter addressed by the President to the Secretary of War asked him to "join with the Secretary of War and his representatives" in preparing this joint plan. The wording of the Presidential letter to the Secretary of the Navy was identical in this respect, and it follows consequently that a typographical error appeared in the letter to the Secretary of War. Despite this fact, however, the newspaper dispatch corrected this error and indicated that the letter of the President to the Secretary of War asked him to cooperate with the Secretary of the Navy.

A report was prevalent during the course of these inquiries that Mr. Drew Pearson, co-writer of the "Washington Merry Go Round" column, had stated to other representatives that a War Department clerk had been paid the sum of $400 for information concerning the contents of the secret survey.

The press dispatches indicated that the joint report had been approved by the Joint Planning Board of the War and Navy Departments. The records of Colonel Scobey indicate that the plan was not submitted to the Joint Board prior to its submission to the President. As pointed out heretofore, the initial report was submitted to the President on September 25, 1941, by Secretary of War Stimson. The minutes of the Joint Board disclose that on October 22, 1941, the Secretary of the Board, at a meeting of the Board, advised that "serial 707," which is the survey and report under investigation, had been approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and submitted to the President. Upon motion, the Joint Board adopted a resolution to change the title of this project from a Joint Board Report to an "Army and Navy Estimate" and the matter recorded as closed in the records of the Joint Board.
Inquiries were made concerning prevalent rumors that ranking officials of the War Department are opposed to the administration policy of assigning to England quantities of airplanes, tanks and other war equipment. The majority of the officers interviewed stated that most War Department officials are opposed generally to the Lend-Lease Program in so far as it necessitates divergence to Great Britain of materials considered vital and necessary to the establishment and maintenance of a large Army in the United States. This attitude is so prevalent as to be a matter of general knowledge and discussion among ranking officials of the War Department. It may be noted, however, that according to Assistant Secretary of War MacClay the officers of the War Plans Division and the Air Corps of the War Department, to whom this project was initially assigned for survey, were enthusiastic in undertaking their work and had an attitude of satisfaction that the project of outlining a potential warfare program against Germany had at last been initiated.

CONCLUSIONS

The interviews and investigation conducted disclosed that from the method of transferring secret documents among officers of the War Department staff, it would be impossible, regardless of the extent of any investigation, to definitely fix the responsibility for the disclosure of this information to any one officer or corporation of officers. The practice of transferring secret documents among various officers after one officer has initially executed a receipt, is believed by War Department officials to be impossible of correction. Various officers interviewed expressed the opinion that any system of requiring a separate receipt for each secret document exchanged between officers would necessitate the officer staff devoting most of their time to preparing or signing receipts. In the situation under investigation thirty-five mimeographed copies of the secret document were in the hands of a variety of officials and officers of the War and Navy Departments. They were utilized by subordinate officers in connection with the study and consideration not only of the project under investigation, but of a variety of collateral assignments. The result is that it is impossible to prepare any all-inclusive list of the officers or other personnel who either had possession of this document or access
to its contents. Inquiries to make some comparative study of the identity of officers having access to the possession of this secret plan with officers having previous plans which had been the subject of unauthorized publicity, was of no avail due to the fact that the very system outlined above precludes any positive determination of a particular secret document from the date of its preparation to the present time. It is concluded, however, from all of the facts ascertained, that a copy of the "Army and Navy Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements" was available to at least one outside source for a sufficient period of time to permit either a detailed copying of the contents of this report, or a possible photostatic or other reproduction of the actual contents of the report.
March 2, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

Colonel Wedemeyer is one of the very best officers we have in the General Staff. He is the right hand man of the Chief of the War Plans Division and has the confidence of everybody from Marshall down. He helped me with the secret Victory Parade estimate and I would bet my hat that he had nothing to do with the leak. He was a student at the German Staff School from 1936 to 1938 and has furnished our Staff with much valuable information about German methods. I have found that among certain gossips in Washington such a connection is enough to make a man suspected; but without such first hand information as to what the Germans are doing, we should be badly off indeed.

So far as that leak was concerned, I had a conference only the other day about it with Mr. Joseph A. Genau of the FBI and two officers of this Department who have been helping him with the investigation. They feel that they have got pretty close to locating the responsibility and they told me all about it. But the line of responsibility ran in quite a different direction from that of Colonel Wedemeyer.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
March 2, 1942.

Confidential

Dear Mr. President:

I return to you herewith the letter from Justice Douglas and its enclosure, together with a memorandum I received from the Chief of Staff on the proposal.

Although I agree that the proposal has merit, I also agree with Marshall that at present all our strength and available materiel should be concentrated in organizing the expanded regular forces which we have planned for this year. The demands upon our materiel for Lease-Lend purposes have produced an acute shortage in this work. If the time ever comes when we have complied with those demands and when the task forces immediately facing us are raised and trained, we may be able to arm and supervise such a force of irregulars as Justice Douglas suggests. At present it would be in my opinion merely an unwarranted dispersion of our available strength.

The only way at present to get such a force would be through the States and even then we should be short of arms to equip them.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Inspection of defense installations on Long Island.

Reason. At the Cabinet meeting held on February 13, 1942, you called attention to reports being published by the magazine PM relative to laxity in the guard duty being performed at various installations and Army posts on Long Island, New York.

Findings. The Inspector General had inspections made of two air installations, three port facilities, two railway freight terminals, eighteen manufacturing plants, two radio stations and three military posts. Most of these installations were on Long Island but some were in Greater New York and contiguous New Jersey. He found that military guards and civilian guards were alert and efficient, but that their effectiveness was handicapped by lack of protective aids such as fences; also that the proper guarding of piers and warehouses is difficult because of the presence of thousands of workers.

Action. Arrangements are now being made for the Commanding General of the Second Corps Area to:

1. Take steps to remove inland, rubber and tin stored at warehouses of the New York Dock Company.

2. Initiate a survey of all piers and waterfront warehouses with a view to removing inland defense materials not marked for shipment, staging of incoming rail shipments at inland points until they are needed at the docks for shipment, and providing for coordination of effort in guarding vital warehouses and pier areas occupied by more than one firm.

3. Make arrangements with the Radio Corporation of America and the Bush Terminal Company to provide adequate fencing to protect their installations.

4. Designate a military commander to supervise and coordinate the military and civilian protective activities at the Newark Airport and the Port Newark area.

Secretary of War.

CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 3, 1942

Lights, Inc.
Alhambra, Calif.

Attention: President
Subject: "Special Blackout Procedure"

Dear Sir:

Under war conditions, it is expected that the enemy will direct at least sporadic air raids on military and industrial targets near the seaboard.

The War Department feels that blackouts must be complete, even though temporary stoppage of plant operations may result. Certain plants or portions thereof cannot discontinue operations because of the vital nature of their product or manufacturing process. Plants in this category must comply with the necessary passive defense measures listed in paragraph 14, Circular 55.

Your plant has been designated by the Office of the Under Secretary of War as one which must continue operations during blackouts.

A representative of the Supply Arm or Service responsible for the Plant Protection Inspection of your plant will call upon you to make recommendations for measures to be taken to accomplish blackout installations.

Very truly yours,

H. S. Reynolds
Lt. Col., Ord. Dept.,
Procurement Branch
Chief, Plant Protection Div.

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U. S. C., 31 and 32. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following two messages were just received from the Message Center, War Department:

From Honolulu:

"Stand by in Code Room. We are now under air raid."

(Radio then faded out)

From San Francisco:

An immediate check was made in San Francisco and the following message was received:

"We have just been told by Honolulu that they are undergoing an air raid now. That is all information available."

I shall send further reports to the White House as they are received.

J.R. DEANE,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM:

To: The President

Subject: Report of air raid alarm in Hawaii.

The War Department reports that the recent alarm was a false one.

The Commander in Chief's office reports that the alert was sounded at 1022 Honolulu time, and that "all clear" was sounded at 1128. There was no attack.

There is no information as to what the alarm was based on.

Respectfully,

G.A. Leahey Jr.

1945/7 March
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Lee talked to the Commanding General in Honolulu about 7:15 P.M. and was informed by him that an air raid alarm was sounded in Honolulu today but that there was no attack. The source of the report received here earlier is now being checked.

C.V. ALLAN,
Lt. Col., General Staff,
Assistant Secretary, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Signal Corps has just heard that the "All Clear" signal has been given in Hawaii. A radio has been sent asking for the facts. It is not known whether the air alarm was the result of an attack or for practice.

J.R. Deane,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 20, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

General Marshall thought you would be interested in the following:

"Reports have just come in that two B-17's caught a submarine lying on the bottom, off Hatteras, and destroyed it. Wreckage came to the surface."

E.M.W.
4:10 p.m.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3-26-42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I thought you might be interested in these pictures of proposed trans-African ferry routes.

The photographs are part of a collection now in the War Department Ferry Command of G-2.

E.M.W.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 7, 1942.

OPD 381 (3-24-42)
(4-3-42)

Personal and

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL and
ADmiral KING

For your confidential
information.

F.D.R.

To

Phenix Station

Op

1942

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JUN 6 1972

Ind # 21
MEMORANDUM
FOR THE PRESIDENT
March 24, 1942

From Alexander W. Weddell, American Ambassador to Spain.

When I had the pleasure of being received by the President on March 9 he instructed me to weigh in my mind the elements which might be taken into account were an expeditionary force sent to effect a landing "either in Algeria or on the northwest coast of Africa."

The following is the result of my consideration of this important subject:

1. I would earnestly recommend consideration of debarking forces on the coast of French Morocco or Rio de Oro, or on both coasts simultaneously.

2. Simultaneously the Azores, the Canaries and the Cape Verde Islands, should be occupied.

3. Such activities should coincide with a real or feigned attack through France by a British Expeditionary Force.

There is now to be considered the probable effect of such action on our part:

1. In the Axis countries, in Spain and in Portugal, a howl would go up of moral indignation. 2. This in the case of the Axis countries should be ignored. 3. In the case of Spain, that country has lent and is lending sufficient aid to the Axis cause to warrant our action, while those majority elements hostile to the Franco government would welcome any move which would embarrass that administration. 4. As regards Portugal and perhaps also in the case of Spain, protest might be adequately met by solemn declaration that territories seized would be handed back following peace.

The adverse effect of such action would very likely be

(a) The entry into Spain and Portugal, with or without their consent, of Axis forces. (b) The immediate siege of Gibraltar, the enforced departure therefrom of United Nations' vessels, and the loss of that port as an assembly point for convoys. (c) Germany would hold ports extending from Narvik to Dakkar, as well as additional Mediterranean ports. (d) The blocking of the straits at least during daylight hours. Favorable results to be anticipated would be (1) the encouraging of anti-Axis elements in the Peninsula. (2) To bring out elements in Northwest Africa who favor the Allied cause. (3) To provide a base from which Europe might be invaded. (4) To place hostile elements in North Africa between United Nations' forces in East and West.

A.W.W.
Confidentially to
The President

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Policy Relating to State Guards.

Pursuant to your instructions, a survey has been made of the status of coordination of State Guards and Federal forces.

Coordination.

All Corps Area Commanders have been called upon in connection with the Emergency Plan WHITE (Domestic Disturbance) and the Counter Fifth Columnist Plan to draw and submit plans for the coordination of the State Guards and Federal forces. These plans have been received and reviewed in the office of The Provost Marshal General. The status of the participation of the State Guards varies widely and is in accordance with the degree of preparedness of the Guards from a fairly efficient organization, as in the State of New York, to zero in some others where no State Guard is maintained. The Provost Marshal General is charged with the supervision of such plans and is assuring the effectiveness of their operation. A discussion with the Chief of Staff of the Second Corps Area reveals that there is the closest coordination between the state forces in New York and the Federal forces under the command of Governors Island.

Training.

The War Department has furnished a training program to be used as a guide in training State Guard units. It has also directed the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Corps Area Commanders to make such inspections as they deem necessary in connection with the training of State Guard units. General Williams, head of the National Guard Bureau, has been in the field for a large part of his time and these inspections are being carried out vigorously to insure compliance with the training program. There is no question but that we can improve the status in regard to the training of these units, and steps are being initiated to do so.
Direction.

Major General J. P. Smith has been charged with the duty of coordinating all these activities and will follow through to see that the best results are obtained.

BREHON SOMERVELL
Lieutenant General
Commanding

Date- 3-9-57
Signature- [Signature]
MEMORANDUM FOR

MAJ. GEN. JOS. T. McMARNEY
Acting Chief of Staff

I have yours of April 16th quoting the Generalissimo and telling me that General Arnold wanted me informed.

At this stage, I consider any change in plans impossible. I think you and Admiral King will agree. It is impossible and inadvisable not to take risks. Please talk this over with Admiral King. Unless you both disagree with my thought, carry on.

F.D.R.
April 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for General Edwin Watson,
Secretary to the President:

I have talked this over with Admiral King, and we both agree with the President that the project should be carried on. If you think best will you please inform the President?

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Major General U.S. Army
Acting Chief of Staff.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)
Date- 3-7-59
Signature- Carl T. Spencer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Increase in strength of Army.

Reference your note on attached memorandum, there is shown below the schedule of increases of personnel:

Under Column a - as already recorded for January-April and as anticipated for May to December under the proposed authorized 3,600,000.

Under Column b - as already recorded for January to April, and as recommended for May to December under the desired 4,350,000 total.

The figures in red indicate the monthly over-drafts on the 3,600,000 authorization which were necessary in order to provide the special units for the various island task forces.

(Enlisted strength January 1, 1942, 1,566,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Months</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,600,000</td>
<td>4,350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>193,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>February</td>
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<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>217,000</td>
<td>217,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>210,000</td>
<td>210,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>213,000</td>
<td>213,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>280,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>275,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>240,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>195,000</td>
<td>195,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total          3,600,000   4,350,000

MAY 1942 AM
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Increase in strength of Army.

On January 13th last, you authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of the Army to 3,600,000 by December 31, 1942. Plans then visualized limited overseas movement during the year. Volume production of many items of critical equipment during 1942 was not firmly scheduled. Authorization for additional men in 1942 is now essential to our plans.

In the intervening four months our war effort has taken more definite form. It has been necessary to secure our lines of communication to Australia by numerous garrisons, and to rush reinforcements to Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama. The enemy interference problem has expanded greatly, as have the requirements regarding anti-sabotage measures, particularly where Japanese are involved. The "Sedro" plan requires a material increase in special troops, eventually requiring some 500,000 men for the ground forces alone to meet the special problems of that operation.

Combat and other units now in training should not be emasculated to furnish men for these new requirements in personnel. The need of 750,000 additional men for the Army during 1942 is now evident, making a strength objective of 4,350,000 by next January, instead of the 3,600,000 authorized last January 13th.

I recommend that you give your approval to this essential increase as an urgent war necessity.

[Signature]
II.

EIGHTEEN YEAR OLD LEGISLATION

Overage problem.

Age of Army - 26 years 2½ months.
Age of Navy - 21 years (including Reserve)

See Morgenthau's figures at Camp Dix.

Out of 100 men taken at random 50% were
35 and over. More than 25% were in the
40's. See figures.

Most of the 40 year olds must be replaced by
younger men regardless of size of Army.

Present shortage in Army - 550,000 men.

Critical shortages in units shown by following
strengths of divisions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal Division</td>
<td>14,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th Division</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>31st Division</td>
<td>9,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>33rd Division</td>
<td>8,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>78th Division</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83rd Division</td>
<td>1,600</td>
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<tr>
<td>88th Division</td>
<td>9,900</td>
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<tr>
<td>89th Division</td>
<td>8,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>91st Division</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th Division</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

May 28, 1942

With respect to the attached memorandum which you referred to me, I have had several talks with Colonel Solbert of G-2, who is handling this matter for the Chief of Staff.

I think it is a very good plan for tying all forms of psychological warfare and civilian subversive activities into actual military plans and strategy.

As the memorandum states, the various governmental agencies which now conduct psychological warfare include ODI. Before it can really become effective, however, ODI itself must be reorganized into an overall information and propaganda agency along the lines of the Executive Order which you have. Of course, I know the difficulties of finding the man.

After the information order has been signed and set up, the attached memorandum outlines the next appropriate step, to wit: tying it into actual military strategy.

SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Col. Earle Looker brought the attached memorandum in to me this morning and asked that I give it to you. He said Col. Solbert was very anxious that you see it. Looker is being transferred to this particular department in G-2.

G. [Signature]

In recommendation
In considering any change in the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the planning and coordinating of the execution of military psychological warfare activities and its integration with military strategy, there are two important factors:

(a) Military psychological warfare is an auxiliary weapon to military operations and should be directly conducted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff through an agency of its own, composed of representatives of the Army, Navy, State Department, C.O.I, and Board of Economic Warfare, the agencies primarily involved in the execution of tasks for psychological warfare.

(b) To safeguard the important secrets of war plans, this subordinate agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should coordinate both the planning and execution of psychological warfare activities.

The following definition has been accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Psychological warfare includes propaganda and subversive activities and all forms of activity and operations outside of organized military action, calculated to cause a deterioration of enemy morale and military effectiveness, or to improve the morale and position of non-belligerent countries toward the United States. All military psychological warfare should be integrated with military strategy.

The agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for coordinating psychological warfare does not conduct psychological warfare, it does not disseminate propaganda, nor does it carry out tasks of subversive activities. It simply coordinates the planning and execution of the tasks that a psychological warfare plan is divided into.

As a tentative suggestion, the agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the coordination of psychological warfare could be composed of representatives of those government agencies primarily involved in psychological warfare activities, the Army, Navy, State Department, C.O.I, and Economic Warfare.

This would make a small compact committee for this purpose. As a "pick and shovel" organization for this committee would be the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S. (both Army and Navy representatives) on which could be added representatives from the other government agencies represented on the J.C.S. agency.

This psychological warfare committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for the planning of tasks and coordination of the execution of psychological warfare activities by the various government agencies. The Army and Navy officers would contribute particularly to the necessary function of integration of psychological warfare with military strategy.
STUDY OF J.C.S. AGENCY RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE.

In considering any change in the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the planning and coordinating of the execution of military psychological warfare activities and its integration with military strategy, there are two important factors—

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The agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for coordinating psychological warfare does not conduct psychological warfare, it does not disseminate propaganda, nor does it carry out tasks of subversive activities. It simply coordinates the planning and execution of the tasks that a psychological warfare plan is divided into. These tasks are both planned as to scope and objectives, and executed as to timing by those agencies of the government that have the facilities and that usually execute such projects, but in the particular case of military psychological warfare are coordinated from the high command (J.C.S.) so as to fit into future military operations.

For instance, the State Department handles all diplomatic matters and with its foreign, political intelligence will furnish important advice and help on plans and can, through its diplomatic personnel, give special services and obtain intelligence on particular questions.

The Board of Economic Warfare in its far-flung operations of blockades in special areas carries out commercial tasks against the enemy, or in favor of neutrals, as well as a number of things for psychological warfare that this board alone can do.

The C.O.I. disseminates foreign propaganda with the help of other government agencies established for this purpose, and carries out various subversive activities.

The Army and Navy also carry out tasks of subversive activities, particularly in theaters of operation where all psychological warfare is a function of command, directed by the theater commander.

If all the tasks for psychological warfare are planned and executed by one non-military agency, both the planning and the execution of these tasks will
point towards the probable future war plans that they are designed to assist. The slightest leak of information to the enemy's general staff may divulge enough for their experts, backed by their own military intelligence, to figure out our plans which would spell defeat and disaster in their execution.

That part of psychological warfare known as propaganda is entirely an activity outside the military services and should be carried out by those agencies of the government set up for publicity purposes. But propaganda should give the utmost aid and assistance in supporting military strategy, and where this purpose these agencies should receive their guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff through this agency responsible for the coordination of psychological warfare activities.

Since military psychological warfare is a weapon to assist future military operations it should be coordinated and integrated with war plans by the high command, the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are responsible for the conduct of war.

Again, in a theater of operations, psychological warfare is a function of command and all assistance to the theater commanders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff should flow through its own agency, both for the safety of information and promptness of action in the Army and Navy Departments.

As a tentative suggestion, the agency under the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for the coordination of psychological warfare could be composed of representatives of those government agencies primarily involved in psychological warfare activities, the Army, Navy, State Department, C.O.I. and Economic Warfare.

This would make a small compact committee for this purpose. As a "pick and shovel" organization for this committee would be the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S. (both Army and Navy representatives) on which could be added representatives from the other government agencies represented on the J.C.S. agency.

This psychological warfare committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be responsible for the planning of tasks and coordination of the execution of psychological warfare activities by the various government agencies. The Army and Navy officers would contribute particularly to the necessary function of integration of psychological warfare with military strategy.

O.M. Solbert
Col. J.S.
### JUNE PRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>2302</td>
<td>2162</td>
<td>+160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainer</td>
<td>1617</td>
<td>1234</td>
<td>-383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3919</td>
<td>3696</td>
<td>-223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Change from May

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Engine Heavy Bomber</td>
<td>+19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Engine Medium Bomber</td>
<td>+27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Engine Light Bomber</td>
<td>-113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engine Bomber</td>
<td>+53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Engine Fighter</td>
<td>+38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engine Fighter</td>
<td>+111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Reconnaissance</td>
<td>+9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications (Incl. Liaison)</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Engine Advanced Trainer</td>
<td>-136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Engine Advanced Trainer</td>
<td>+35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Trainer</td>
<td>-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Trainer</td>
<td>-261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>-223</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Troubles

- (G.F.E. & V.F.E.)
- (Beech-undetermined; Curtiss, St. L.-completed contract in May)
- (Ryan exceeded Schedule in May, VFE; No Piper Trainers)

### COMPARISON WITH SCHEDULE

- 6 Experimental models - not completed
- 12 models - late in getting started on production
- 7 models - G.F.E. & V.F.E. troubles
- 5 models - causes not determined
- 1 model - completed contract in May
- 25 models - close to schedule
- 9 models - over schedule
- **TOTAL**

**67 models**

### AIRFRAME WEIGHT ACCEPTED (excluding spares)

- **June** 20,306,000 pounds
- **May** 19,142,000 pounds
- **Increase May - June** 854,000 pounds (4.44%)

Copy for the President

**DECLASSIFIED**

**DOE DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)**

**Date** 3-9-59

**Signature** Carl J. Spencer
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I approve authorization and
money for Army peak strength at
5,323,047 men at this time, but
I do not approve the figure of
8,900,000 men by December 31,
1943, or the figure of 10,400,000
men during 1944. We will take
that question up again this
Autumn.

In regard to the estimates
for equipment, I approve only
enough money at this time to
place orders for beyond December
31, 1943 in those items which
have to be ordered in the next
six months. This should not
include items which can be pro-
cured in a much shorter space of
time. In other words, a clear
line must be drawn between
critical items and those that
can be easily acquired in six
months or less.

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. The following is in response to the questions raised in your memorandum of June 8, 1942 to the Director of the Budget.

1. Why is it necessary at this time to get the money to maintain and operate an Army with a peak strength of 5,323,247?

I have submitted from time to time requests for increases in the enlisted strength of the Army. The last of these was approved by you on June 8, 1942 for a total of 4,350,000 enlisted men to be reached on December 31st of this year. A strategic estimate previously prepared by the Department indicates that in order to assure the defeat of the Axis powers, the following forces would be needed:

By December 31, 1942, 4.2 million men
By December 31, 1943, 8.9 million men, and
During 1944, 10,400,000 men.

A later estimate indicated that due to the critical shipping situation 2,250,000 men represented the probable maximum which could be transported and sustained overseas by December 31, 1943. With this number overseas, facilities will exist in the United States for the training of approximately 4,000,000 men and at the same time provide for the continental defense of the United States and the expedient flow of trained reinforcements overseas during the early months of 1944. Because of the fact that the estimates are on a fiscal year basis, the rate of increase which you have already authorized was projected to the end of the fiscal year reaching a total on June 30, 1943 of 4,800,000 enlisted men. With this number of enlisted men and the addition of warrant officers, nurses and officers, the total strength at that date will reach 5,323,247.

In other words, the estimates provide for an orderly increase at the rate demanded by the strategic situation and in consonance with your prior decisions and the available facilities for training within the United States. Actually the estimates provide for an average strength of only 3,821,000 which is less than enough for what you have already authorized.
2. "Why is it necessary to get money now to maintain industry at maximum production levels until December 31, 1943?"

The present production program has been worked out in conjunction with the War Production Board, in line with the objectives which you have set for certain specific weapons, the increasing strength of the Army to which reference has been made, and the necessity for providing complementary weapons to those specified by you in order to have a well balanced force. The procedure which has always been followed in requesting appropriations has been to ask for enough to carry the Army and other departments until the end of the fiscal year which will be on June 30, 1943. During times of peace, in addition to the actual money appropriated, contract authorizations were given to permit carryovers and the initiation of work which could not be completed by the end of the fiscal year. This method has proved cumbersome and unworkable during the stress of the present emergency. Unless funds are provided which will permit the Department to place orders after June 30, 1943, it will be necessary to go back to Congress during the fall for such additional funds so that all work will not be terminated abruptly at the end of the fiscal year. This entails additional administrative detail and will not provide for the continuity of effort on the part of industry which is so necessary to maximum production. For many items of equipment delivery does not begin for six months to a year after funds are in hand. The manufacturer must have this time to arrange for raw materials and to provide an orderly organization of his production processes. This is especially necessary for items of Ordnance and fire control equipment, for tanks, airplanes and other difficult items. It is likewise extremely important for all industries which are devoted to mass production, as is the case from almost all of those now supplying the Army. If it be decided to provide funds only until June 30, 1943 at this time, additional funds to carry the program beyond that date should become available early in the fall. To revise the program and process the estimates by that time, a start would have to be made immediately with no better data than we now have. It is strongly urged that no change be made in the present request.

3. "Why is it necessary to get money for critical items of equipment for an Army of 8,900,000, and I suggest that at this time we ask only for critical items of equipment for 6,230,000 by June 30, 1943."

Critical items of equipment are items of especial military design not available in the market and requiring considerable time for their manufacture and delivery. Such items include tanks, airplanes,
SECRET

cannon, fire control equipment and other items of that character. Critical items do not include clothing, food, motor transportation and other equipment which can be obtained in the market or within a reasonable time. The budget submitted by the Department is in line with the objectives which you have fixed for certain of these critical items and merely asks for funds to provide for the other complementary weapons which are almost equally difficult to obtain and almost equally important. For the reasons stated above, in order to assure an orderly continuation of the production program, funds should be provided for the expansion required. I hardly need to call your attention to the tremendous handicap which the Army has been under up to the present time because of the lack of equipment especially in these critical items. The military effort in northern climes must necessarily be carried on at a peak during the better months of the year, namely from March to December, and consequently the flow of supplies should be based on this season rather than on the calendar year or fiscal year. From the production point of view for the reasons previously given, critical items for delivery in the fall of 1943 should be financed at this time rather than in a supplemental estimate early this fall. The strategic situation is not such as to justify any relaxation in our production campaign. Advance planning in such volume requires consideration not only of the completion of end products but extends throughout our entire industrial system back to the production of raw materials. A long time is necessary to thoroughly correlate all processes from raw materials to the finished product.

5. Consideration of effect of shipping.

This problem is with us daily and hourly. The carrying capacity of our shipping is a controlling factor in all strategic plans upon which equipment and other items are based. It must be assumed that the present losses by submarines will be overcome and plans for equipment must be predicated upon this probability. Under no circumstances should the Government be placed in a position where its military effort overseas will be curtailed by a lack of equipment and supplies. The calculations on which the estimates are based are in keeping with the man power, productive capacity, and shipping of the country. Help which may be obtained from Great Britain has been taken into consideration. Operating costs are tied in firmly with current authorized strengths. If future strengths do not attain the planned figures, the equipment and supplies will permit future estimates to be reduced. If future strengths must exceed planned strength, the department will be in a better position to cope with that situation if the lag in procurement is minimized.

I strongly urge the approval of the estimates as they now stand.

[Signature]

Chief of Staff.

James Somervile can make a very convincing explanation of the necessity to the action and approved. I am sure
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

June 8, 1942.

I am returning the War Department estimates for the fiscal year 1943. There are certain items which I think should be lessened:

1. I cannot see why it is necessary at this time to get the money to maintain and operate an Army with a peak strength of strength of 5,323,247 men because we have less than 3,000,000 today and cannot tell how many we shall have to have by the end of the fiscal year — June 30, 1943. However, this is not as serious a matter as Item No. 3.

2. Why is it necessary to get money now to maintain industry at maximum production level until December 31, 1943? Why not June 30, 1943? If we find next November or December that the maximum output must continue to December 31, 1943, we can easily get the authorization then and that should be time enough.

3. I think it is much too early to get money for critical items of equipment for an Army of 8,900,000, and I suggest that at this time we ask only for critical items of equipment for 6,230,000 men by June 30, 1943 instead of December 31, 1943. If the personnel continues to increase by next Fall, we can order more. What I want to avoid is charges already circulated that we are buying more equipment than we can see the use for at this time — for example, the newspaper charge that we have on hand or have ordered enough uniforms for 50,000,000 men. I realize that we need wholly adequate reserves and that some items of equipment have to be ordered a year ahead of time, but, taking into consideration the needs of our Allies, we should only appropriate now for what we can see definite use for at the end of the time required for their manufacture.
4. Items 4, 5 and 6 are, of course, all right.

5. In this connection I think the following should be taken into consideration:

The amount of equipment and material which can be shipped out of the continental United States is limited by the carrying capacity of our shipping. For example, after continental defense requirements are taken care of, careful scrutiny should be made as to whether the total tonnage of equipment does not greatly exceed shipping possibilities.

s/ F.D.R.

F. D. R.
June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

I do not quite agree with your memorandum of June eleventh in regard to Budget estimates based on the basic strength of the Army. Let me give you an example:

Suppose, for the sake of argument, the Army expects to have five million men by the end of the fiscal year, 1943. These five million men will require two types of equipment:

(a) They will include three million men now in the service who are equipped with clothing, rifles, etc., etc., and are either now equipped or will shortly be equipped with all of the necessary equipment which it takes a long time to make, such as planes, tanks, trucks, ammunition, etc., etc. This last category has been appropriated for and ordered and we need not concern ourselves any more about it except in one respect: that relates to reserves or replenishment. A percentage for new uniforms and new shoes, a percentage for rifles and ammunition, and a percentage for planes, tanks, heavy guns, etc., all on the assumption that there will be wear and tear or military destruction of all of the items in varying degrees.

(b) Now we come down to the next two million men who will be added to the Army in the next twelve months -- and part of the total of five million. It is, of course, a fact that nearly all of their equipment also is either on hand or is under order and will be delivered to them as they come into the service. These items have been appropriated for as well as replacement items to cover the needs of these two million men.
Now we come to the problem of an approval by the Commander-in-Chief for an Army of eight million men by July 1, 1944 -- an addition of three million men more. What I want to provide for them is the ordering of such items now as cannot be delivered in an orderly way during the fiscal year 1944 unless they are placed on order now. These items would include only the equipment which it takes one year or more to turn out. I am willing to authorize money for these orders now.

However, there is a vast amount of equipment for men who will enter the Army between July 1, 1943 and July 1, 1944, which can be quickly turned out with existing facilities if they are placed on order next January, February or March. These items include, for example, shoes, clothing and food. These items I do not want appropriations made for at this time, nor do I want them ordered until such time as the ordering becomes necessary. In other words, I do not want them either appropriated for or ordered until late this Autumn or, in some cases, next Spring.

The point of it is this: We must continue to build up the strength of the Army but if, for example, peace should come next December or January, I do not want the money or the ordering for a whole lot of items -- running into the billions -- for men who would be called into the service six or seven months later, at the earliest, and running to the recruits called into the service in June, 1944 -- unless -- and unless only -- such items take a full year to make and must be ordered now.

Is the above clear?

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

While the Chief of Staff of the Army has replied to the questions raised in your memorandum to me dated June 8, 1942, with respect to the War Department estimates for the fiscal year 1943, and I have read your reply to his memorandum, I feel that I should give you some explanation.

You will recall that when the estimates were presented to you last Saturday noon, you had some hesitancy in signing the transmittal to the Speaker because of (1) the size of the Army as projected in the estimates and (2) the extent of the production program reflected by the estimates. After some discussion, you did sign the estimates, and it was my understanding that expenditures for critical items beyond those required for an Army of 6,200,000 men would be controlled by establishing budget reserves which would be released to the Army only with your approval. I think this action was sound in view of the impossibility of the War Department's revising their estimates, submitting them to the Congress, and receiving favorable action by the Congress before the beginning of the 1943 fiscal year.

The handling of the War Department estimates has created a rather unfortunate situation. The base used by the War Department in preparing its estimates - namely, the strength of the Army - was accepted without question by the Bureau of the Budget. We had assumed there was a clear understanding between the Chief of Staff and the President. However, as a result of the situation which has developed, the Bureau has had an understanding with General Somervell of the War Department that hereafter War Department estimates will not be prepared in the War Department until there has been clearance with the Commander in Chief as to the basic strength of the Army, a condition precedent to the preparation of budgetary requirements. So far as the Bureau is concerned, it is hoped that such understanding as to the basic strength of the Army for any fiscal year will be reduced to writing so that the Bureau will have a clear knowledge of the base upon which fiscal requirements of the Army are being prepared.

The Bureau's contribution to the present confusion about the War Department's estimates for 1943 is that we did not challenge the Army's figure on basic strength.

The War Department is presenting its estimate today and for the next week to the Military Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee. Their presentation will be upon the basis of their understanding of your memorandum to the Chief of Staff dated June 10.
When the appropriation has passed the Congress, the Bureau of the Budget will give you a summary and ask for instructions from you as to the establishment of reserves.

[Signature]

Please see my note on telephone conversation with Chief of Staff. Kindly return note to me.

[Handwritten note]
The following memorandum, dictated by the Director, covers his telephone conversation today with General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, concerning current Army estimates:

I referred to the President's memorandum of June 8, 1942 to me and of June 10, 1942 to the Chief of Staff.

I pointed out to General Marshall that while a technical interpretation and reconciliation of these two memorandums left an apparently small area of disagreement, chiefly concerning items which would be financed in 1944, yet I felt certain that the President's real point of concern went to the whole problem of the ultimate strength of the Army. I reported to General Marshall on the conversation which Wayne Coy and I had with the President on Saturday, June 6 about the Army estimates, in which the President, under some pressure from us on account of the time element, reluctantly signed the estimate with the understanding that we would set up reserves for the items of disagreement. I told the General that so far as current estimates were concerned, after careful canvassing of the situation, we felt that a presentation could be made by the War Department to the Appropriations Committees in such a way that the items to which the President had objected could be minimized, and that we felt that even the appearance of disagreement before the Congress would be very unfortunate.

I indicated to General Marshall that I felt very unhappy about what had developed, and that we had the right to assume that the question of the strength of the Army had been cleared with the President. General Marshall indicated that he was equally unhappy and that he would try to
clear up the whole problem with the President at the earliest opportunity. I further told General Marshall that I was becoming very uneasy that now, with authorizations totaling nearly 200 billion dollars for the conduct of the war and with the great spread between expenditures and authorizations, the program was becoming almost incomprehensible. General Marshall admitted that it had gotten away from him and that he was very much concerned, that no man could keep in mind the parts of such a huge program.

I recounted to the General that our small staff was not in a position adequately to deal with such a huge program and that we had to rely upon the Army and the War Department to a very great extent. I explained that I felt that from here on out very careful consideration and balancing of any new requests against what had already been authorized should be given.

I thought that the War Department had not done this too well and that neither have we, in view of the immensity of the program.

From the conversation, I gathered the impression that General Marshall was just as concerned as I was. He promised to talk the issues out with the President and he agreed with me that with respect to any future requests more time should be available for a careful digest of them in relation to what had already been authorized and in relation to strategic plans.
Major General Edwin M. Watson,
Military Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Dear General Watson:

The War Department desires to transfer the 60th Pursuit Squadron now at Bolling Field to the Beltsville Airport, Beltsville, Maryland, approximately twelve miles from Washington.

The crowded conditions at Bolling Field make it difficult to maintain a high state of training, and the congestion at that airport is such that in the event of an air raid interference with the proper operation of a fighter squadron there would result.

The location of the Beltsville Airport, some miles from the locality which must be protected, permits fighter planes operating from it to arrive at a height at which to engage enemy planes more rapidly and more efficiently than from Bolling Field which is located adjacent to the City of Washington.

Since the primary mission of this Squadron is the protection of the City of Washington, an expression of approval from the Office of the President is requested before the move is directed.

Sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
Secretary, General Staff.

DECASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59

Signature- Carl I. Spencer
July 27th, 1942.

Memorandum for the President:

I feel that certain recent events that will operate to the prejudice of war production should be called to your notice.

Production and victory. We cannot win the war unless our resources in full force are directed to winning the war. Our entire industrial strength must be devoted to producing the airplanes, tanks, trucks and other weapons needed by the Army and the Navy.

Single command over resources. Six months ago you appointed Mr. Nelson head of the War Production Board, with authority over the use of our resources toward the effective prosecution of the war. The single direction thus given over the industrial effort was a strong step forward and ended a system of split control.

Shortages of materials and other resources. Recently shortages in materials have been encountered. Steel, copper, nickel, rubber are examples. Mills producing munitions have actually been forced to cut down operations because of such shortages. These shortages make it all the more necessary that the use of our own materials, tools, and labor be directed by a single command, with a control over the country's resources that is completely flexible and that can make production respond to the strategic needs of the war as those needs will vary from time to time.

Recent developments. With so strong a need for unfettered use of our resources toward the immediate war effort and so strong a need for unity of command on the production front, we are now faced with developments that will impair our ability to use our full resources for the war and also will break down the unity of command on the production front.
Memorandum for the President

July 27th, 1942.

1. A bill has passed both houses of Congress that calls for a rubber "czar" and gives him authority to demand whatever materials he deems necessary to build and operate plants for production of synthetic rubber in any quantity deemed necessary by him. It does not matter how badly steel, copper and other materials may be needed for tanks, ships or guns. The rubber "czar" may demand and get these materials to provide tires for civilians to use for pleasure. If this bill becomes law, it will be as bad a disaster as a heavy defeat of our soldiers on the fighting front. We strongly recommend that the bill be vetoed.

2. The War Department has been asked by the Budget to prepare a letter to you, recommending immediate expenditure of $50,000,000 to commence construction of the St. Lawrence waterway. We believe this to be a meritorious project, but no benefit can accrue from it for four years. Material, equipment and labor will be diverted from immediate use in the war effort, and our ability to wage effective war now will be crippled to a certain extent. We recommend that construction be deferred. This is in line with the policy laid down in your letter to Mr. Nelson of May 1st, 1942 on war production, directing that facilities not needed for the war effort in 1942 be deferred until their construction can be undertaken without detriment to the immediate effort.

Recommendations. It is recommended (1) that the rubber bill be disapproved; (2) that the St. Lawrence project be not initiated at this time; (3) that you urge the leaders in Congress to oppose all bills for special projects that require expenditure of materials essential to the waging of war and also all bills that place control of materials essential to the war effort in the hands of persons other than the Chairman of the War Production Board.

Robert P. Patterson,
Under Secretary of War.

I earnestly join in these recommendations, and ask that Judge Patterson be heard on the "czar"
Memorandum for the President: July 30, 1942.

With reference to your comments yesterday regarding a certain officer which included an incident concerned with General Woodcock in New York, I found the attached memorandum on my desk when I returned to the War Department. You will see that it includes General Woodcock. This was the result of an order of General Somervell — not the party you were discussing — in an effort to reduce the number of high-ranking officers holding minor jobs in the Corps Areas. They had been placed there after having been found unsuited for combat duty.

Chief of Staff.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
July 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Changes in status of general officers.

The following changes have occurred since the report of July 25, 1942:

1. By confidential letter orders to Corps Area Commanders concerned, dated July 23, 1942:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. William A. March</td>
<td>1st Service Command</td>
<td>Directed that officers listed be placed on terminal leave status, effective August 1, 1942, and relieved from active duty at expiration of all accrued leave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Preston A. Weathered</td>
<td>4th Service Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Gen. Clifford Ross Powell</td>
<td>8th Service Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. William Lloyd Marin</td>
<td>7th Service Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Albert L. Colburn</td>
<td>8th Service Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Lewis Manning Means</td>
<td>9th Service Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Joseph Hughes Lewis</td>
<td>9th Service Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. By restricted letter order dated July 25, 1942:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Gen. Frank S. Clark</td>
<td>Southwest Pacific Area.</td>
<td>Having been relieved from assignment in the Southwest Pacific Area, is assigned to command the 43rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA), Camp Davis, N.C., and upon his arrival at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Ft. Mason, Calif., will proceed to that station.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

G-2

Sometime ago it was reported that a man named Dohm, a forty year old native of Germany, was in Augusta, Georgia, as an instructor in aviation. He is reported to be strongly pro-German, though a very good instructor. He is the brother of two Nazi fliers and was permitted to leave Germany because of the serious illness of his wife who is an American.

Also I have heard that a Mrs. James Forkner of Augusta is very pro-German and is the wife of a civilian pilot instructor at Georgia Tech.

This is merely passed on. No further information.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

I approve your memorandum received today in regard to augmentation of the Army in 1943, providing for a total personnel of 4,350,000 on June 30, 1943, and a total personnel of 7,533,000 on June 30, 1944.

Please, however, talk this over with me and with the Director of the Budget about the first of December this year 1942, as I shall want to send the final figures to the Congress with my Annual Message in January.

F. D. R.
Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Augmentation of the Army in 1943.

It is essential that the size and structure of the Army for the next calendar year (1943) be fixed now in broad outline. Equipment, personnel and construction programs have to be initiated far in advance, and already there has been too much delay pending final decision in strategical matters which affect troop requirements.

I now propose a ground army of 111 combat divisions and an Air Force of 224 combat groups by the end of 1943. This is a modest establishment as compared with the actual and potential armies of our enemies. It is also designed to conform to the shipping capacity that present estimates indicate will be available for the movement of troops to theaters where operations are projected. The mobilization of forces beyond foreseen requirements with a consequent unnecessary dislocation of agriculture and industry is avoided. This force, together with supporting troops, will require the mobilization of seven and a half million men. It represents an increase over the full 1942 army in the amount of 37 divisions and 109 air groups, totalling 3,185,000 men. Attached Tab shows the distribution among the major categories of the Army.

Our present program for critical items of equipment for an 8,900,000-man army is adequate for this force. Procurement of essential items (clothing, tentage, motors, personal equipment) must be increased.

Estimates indicate the Selective Service can provide the man power to support the above program, but the mobilization early in 1943 of the 18-19 year old group will be necessary.
In the interests of orderly mobilization it is highly desirable that the War Department be authorized to draw on the 1943 augmentation during the remaining months of 1942, to the extent of about 650,000 men. This will permit the replacement of anticipated battle losses during this autumn without breaking up existing organizations. This number will also provide for the timely organization of cadres for the new 1943 units and the early mobilization of additional units to meet demands of the latest strategic directive. Already we have been forced to break up existing units to complete special organizations for overseas which has adversely affected the training and morale of the older units and has sent special units overseas without adequate training and stability.

I recommend that you give your approval to the above plan as a necessary step toward the complete mobilization of the resources and man power of the nation.

Inclosure:
Tab A
### Major Categories of the Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat Divisions</td>
<td>1,013,000</td>
<td>1,700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Air Forces</td>
<td>1,197,000</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antiaircraft Units</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>610,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-divisional Supporting Units</td>
<td>1,208,000</td>
<td>2,131,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overhead</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>443,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (Officer Candidates Schools,</td>
<td>332,000</td>
<td>449,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>replacement training centers, etc.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4,350,000</td>
<td>7,533,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Estimated Mobilization Rate

- **Average monthly rate for remainder of 1942:** 400,000
- **Monthly average for 1943:** 211,000
MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR

August 12, 1942

The Order of August 7, 1942 to you and the Provost Marshal with reference to the carrying out of the sentences against the eight Nazi saboteurs contained a provision that the sentences of Ernest Peter Burger and George John Dasch should be commuted to imprisonment. The United States Penitentiary at Atlanta, Georgia was designated as the place of confinement.

It was the President's intention and desire to have these two prisoners turned over by you to the Attorney General, with discretion in the Attorney General to receive them at Washington, D. C., and to place them in any Federal penitentiary or other institution, in accordance with the powers given to him under the applicable provisions of law. Your responsibility would be ended when you turn these two prisoners over to the Attorney General in the District of Columbia.

M. H. McIntyre
Secretary to the President
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Distribution of Combat Airplanes.

1. Attached as Tab "A" is a breakdown of the combat airplanes of the Army Air Forces by theaters and types.

2. These airplanes are carried in three (3) categories: in commission, out of commission, and enroute. There is a further breakdown within the United States to show combat airplanes in units of the two (2) Defense Commands, combat airplanes used in sea search, and combat airplanes in other activities, including training.

3. Transport aircraft included are only those of the Troop Carrier Command suitable for transporting air infantry or glider towing. The additional breakdown under transports includes the units of the Troop Carrier Command originally scheduled for Bolero whose movements dates have been set back to enable them to train with our new airborne divisions.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.

1 Incl.
Tab "A".

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (5/27/58)
Date- 3-9-59
Signature- Carl S. Speer

SECRET
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<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>Heavy Bombers</th>
<th>Medium Bombers</th>
<th>Light Bombers</th>
<th>Dive Bombers</th>
<th>Fighters</th>
<th>Transport**</th>
<th>Totals*</th>
<th>Recapitulation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>So. Pacific</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>India and China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Atlantic Bases</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean Bases</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>** U.S. **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Western Def Com</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>407</td>
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<td>Sea Search</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Combat Units in Training</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, including</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Training</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being Prepared for</td>
<td>258</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas Shipment</td>
<td>231</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>World TOTAL</td>
<td>1119</td>
<td>1314</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>197</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**

* Airplanes reported from foreign theaters are reported only as "in commission" or "out of commission". The assumption is here made that airplanes reported "in commission" are ready for combat.

** Transport airplanes shown are only those of the Troop Carrier Command suitable for transporting air infantry or glider towing. The departure dates of these groups scheduled for airborne movement have been set back to enable them to train with the Ground Forces.

* Includes airplanes in depots, Technical Training Command, Flying Training Command, Tow Target Detachments, etc.
August 30, 1942

Personal and Secret

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I received the Archduke Otto and the Archduke Felix the evening before last at my house. I talked over the general situation with them, emphasizing the point you had made to me that the matter in which they were interested was primarily military and not political and that, therefore, at this stage, the decisions would have to be made by the War Department.

The Archduke Otto made it clear to me that he desired to be the chairman of the committee to be created. I stressed my own belief that this would be highly unfortunate and that if and when a committee was created, the Archduke should remain in the background and not become either the chairman or a member of it.

Before I talked with the two Archdukes, I had consulted General Marshall and I consequently told The President,

The White House.
the Archduke Otto that General McNarney would be glad to talk with him and his brother. This conversation took place yesterday. I am enclosing a copy of a letter I received from General McNarney giving me a summary of the conversation which he had with the Archduke Otto. As you will see from this letter of General McNarney, the immediate issues raised are being placed before the Secretary of War for the decision of the latter.

As soon as the War Department has completed its arrangements, I shall see the Archduke again in order to try to see that the proposed committee stays within the proper limitations which you indicated to me.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.
September 30, 1942

Memorandum to the Secretary of War.

Secretary Morgenthau spent a day or two last week at Camp Dix. While there he saw a group of men at the reception center who had just arrived from the local boards under selective service. He said that the men were well along in years and very poor in appearance. He asked for a statement of the ages of 100 men taken at random from the group, and he has sent me a copy of the statement which he received. A copy is attached.

The statement shows that nearly 50% were 35 and over.

More than 25% were in the 40s.

I told him that we shared his views on the undesirability of getting so many men of the higher age group. I told him that our letter on the Gurney-Wadsworth bill to lower the selective service age to 18 was bogged down in the Budget. He said that he would make it his particular business to get the letter out of the Budget.

Robert P. Patterson
Under Secretary of War.

Enclosure: Statement.
Distribution of 100 random Selective Service Men as to age, marital status, and claimed dependency, partial or otherwise.

from See, Morganthau

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>DEPENDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>25-29</td>
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<td>30-34</td>
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<td>35-39</td>
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<td>40-44</td>
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Quality of personnel now being inducted into the Army.

With reference to the urgent desire of the War Department to have 18 and 19 year old men made available to Selective Service, the following extract from a report is quoted for your information. I sent a number of inspectors into the Task Force now being prepared for embarkation in TORCH.

"Commanders of organizations assigned to Task Force 'A' are deeply concerned over conditions involving the personnel within their units. * * *

"The type of replacements received during the past 4 months has aroused considerable resentment among unit commanders. For one reason or another (due to the expansion of the Army) they have lost most of the more desirable men and have received in return a preponderance of replacements in Classes III, IV and V. Many commanders were frank in expressing the opinion that their units are not as effective now as they were 6 months ago, because of the type of personnel received." * * *

The Inspector General concludes with this statement:

"The situation regarding personnel is not what would be expected in troops undertaking an operation of the magnitude confronting Task Force 'A' (the Casablanca operation)."
October 13, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

Last Friday you mentioned that you had noticed that there were vacancies in the troop cantonments and asked me to take steps to see whether the use of cantonments could not be staggered so as to reduce the building of new cantonments.

I sent a memorandum of the matter to General Somervell who has sent me the enclosed report which I am passing on to you.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of October 9, concerning the statement of the President at the Cabinet Meeting October 9, that he had noticed there were vacancies in troop cantonments, and requesting an investigation to determine whether there were any real vacancies, and in case there were, whether it would be possible to stagger new construction so that we would not be building unnecessary new cantonments.

2. Following are data showing the housing situation for enlisted men:

   a. Available housing, as of September 30, 1942 for enlisted men in the United States, excluding Army Air Force, Ports of Embarkation, staging areas and school troops (basis 60 square feet per man) 2,200,000

   b. Enlisted strength in the United States, excluding Army Air Force, staging areas, and Desert Training Center, on September 30, 1942. 1,994,406

   c. Total available housing for Army Air Forces, enlisted men and cadets, including hotels, cantonments, barracks, huts and tents. 1,076,884

   d. Enlisted strength in the United States for Army Air Forces, September 30, 1942. 810,706

3. In summary, the above figures indicate as follows:

   a. For enlisted men, exclusive of Army Air Forces, there is surplus housing capacity for 205,594 enlisted men in the United States, on the basis of 60 square feet per man.

   b. There is surplus housing for enlisted men of the Army Air Force in the United States for 266,178.

4. It is necessary to provide housing in advance of induction of personnel, and to insure this, it is necessary to have a certain surplus of housing available. The surplus which is available, at the present
CONFIDENTIAL

time, should be considered in the light of the following:

a. There is a shortage of about 500,000 enlisted men in ground troop units already organized, and a shortage of about 80,000 enlisted men in Air Force units already organized.

b. New units are activated each month.

c. It takes from three to nine months to provide housing for troops, after approval is granted for the construction.

d. Plans are now being devised to reduce space allotment per man to 40 square feet where such action will eliminate or reduce the necessity for additional construction.

e. The construction program has been synchronized with activation but the induction rate has lagged behind.

f. The construction program is watched very carefully to insure that only necessary housing is constructed.

[Signature]

Shirley Somervell
Lieutenant General
Commanding

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date: 3-7-57
Signature: [Signature]
October 20, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

You have asked for my comments and recommendations on that portion of Secretary Knox's letter to you of October 17, 1942, herewith returned, which refers to the Japanese situation in Hawaii.

I think that I can safely say that all persons of Japanese ancestry resident in the Hawaiian Islands who are known to be hostile to the United States have been placed under restraint in internment camps either in the islands or on the mainland. In addition, many others suspected of subversive tendencies have been so interned.

As you are aware, the question of evacuating the Japanese from Hawaii has been considered carefully on several occasions. There is a wide divergence of views in both services on the subject, but after consultation with the naval authorities it has been determined to evacuate certain Japanese and Japanese Americans to the mainland. It is intended to move approximately five thousand during the next six months as shipping facilities become available. This, General Ammons believes, will greatly simplify his problem, and considering the labor needs in the islands, is about all that he has indicated any desire to move although he has been given authority to move up to fifteen thousand.

The evacuees from Hawaii will be received on the West Coast by the Army and then shunted through immediately to the Relocation Centers which are under the jurisdiction of War Relocation Authority. Facilities already exist for handling them.

I am writing you a separate letter on the question raised by Adm. Davis of permitting Japanese Americans to enter the Army.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STimson

Secretary of War

The President
The White House

End.

Lee - Navy folder 2-42 for complete file
October 17, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Recently you sent to the Navy Department, during my absence, copy of a letter to you from Elmer Davis dealing with the subject of Japanese, who are American citizens, and who were evacuated from the Pacific Coast. On this letter you asked for our recommendations. I would regard it as unwise and unnecessary that you make any statement on the two bills presented in Congress dealing with the evacuated Japanese, one of which proposes to deprive citizenship and the other which proposes to intern them for the duration of the war.

I do not think either of these bills has any chance of passage and I do not regard either of them of sufficient importance to warrant a statement from you.

The feeling in the Navy Department with respect to the enlistment in the Navy of citizens of Japanese descent is adverse to such action. The maximum of use which we could make in the Navy of people of this character might be in a civilian capacity in the Intelligence service.

I do not regard this particular problem set forth in Mr. Davis's letter as anywhere near as important as the problem of dealing with the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands and, concerning this latter problem, nothing, apparently, is being done despite the fact that there is a very large number of Japanese sympathizers, if not actual Japanese agents, still at large in the population of Oahu, who, in the event of an attack upon these islands, would unquestionably cooperate with our enemies. I still believe very earnestly that some steps should be taken to separate the loyal from the disloyal in that population. I think this is far more important than the other matter.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

The President

The White House
Program

SECOND CIVILIAN ORIENTATION COURSE

October-November 1942

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL PRESS
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1942
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Program
SECOND CIVILIAN ORIENTATION COURSE
October—November 1942

Details pertaining to this program will be announced in weekly schedules.

Abbreviations
- C == Conference
- Ex == Exercise
- G == Grant Hall
- ME == Map Exercise
- MM == Map Maneuver
- Schd == Schedule
- T == Theater
- TF == Training Film
- W == Wagner Hall
- 124 == Room 124
- 240 == Room 240
## Calendar 1942

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*Opening Exercises*: October 26, 1942
*Closing Exercises*: November 21, 1942
SECOND CIVILIAN ORIENTATION COURSE

October—November 1942

Summary of Program

Applicable Exercises ........................................ 86 Hours
Conferences ....................................................... 58 Hours
Total ............................................................... 144 Hours

HOURS OF INSTRUCTION BY METHOD

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<td>Organization and Detailed Functioning of the War Department Services of Supply</td>
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<td>Relations Between Service Commands and Civil Authorities</td>
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* Attend with Tenth General Staff Course.
### SECOND WEEK—2 November to 7 November, 1942.

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<td>Evaluation of Transport Facilities in the United States—Cooperation with Civilian Agencies such as Association of American Railroads</td>
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<td><strong>4 Wednesday AM</strong></td>
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<td>Construction and Utilities; Control and Responsibility, New Construction, Camp Site Layout Plans; Training Aids, Access Roads, Real Estate</td>
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<td><strong>7 Saturday AM</strong></td>
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<td>Organization and Functions of Regulating Stations</td>
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*Attend with Tenth General Staff Course.*
**THIRD WEEK—9 November to 14 November, 1942.**

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*Attend with Tenth General Staff Course.*
FOURTH WEEK—16 November to 21 November, 1942.

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* Attend with Tenth General Staff Course.
† Room assignments to be announced in weekly schedule.

BY DIRECTION OF THE ASSISTANT COMMANDANT:

H. B. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Infantry,
Assistant Secretary.
MEMO FOR FILES:

Copies of this letter were distributed on board all ships just before landing for the invasion of North Africa, Nov. 7, 1942.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO MEMBERS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY EXPEDITIONARY
FORCES:

You are a soldier of the United States Army.

You have embarked for distant places where
the war is being fought.

Upon the outcome depends the freedom of your
lives: the freedom of the lives of those you love—
your fellow-citizens—your people.

Never were the enemies of freedom more
tyrannical, more arrogant, more brutal.

Yours is a God-fearing, proud, courageous
people, which, throughout its history, has put its
freedom under God before all other purposes.

We who stay at home have our duties to
perform—duties owed in many parts to you. You will
be supported by the whole force and power of this
Nation. The victory you win will be a victory of all
the people—common to them all.

You bear with you the hope, the confidence,
the gratitude and the prayers of your family, your
fellow-citizens, and your President—

Franklin D. Roosevelt
November 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I wish the Government as a whole would talk in terms either of calendar year or fiscal year but not both!

My directions to the Budget are not in contradiction with what I had approved to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 30th.

Let me put it so clearly that there can be no misunderstanding.

For Budget purposes the strength of the Army is fixed for an AVERAGE of 6,500,000 for the calendar year 1943.

In other words, in January the strength of the Army will, in all probability, not exceed 5,000,000 and you will be lucky if it gets over 7,000,000 by December 31, 1943. That means that the AVERAGE of the Army for 1943 cannot possibly exceed 6,500,000.

In regard to the equipment for the Army, the Director of the Budget understands that by the end of the calendar year, i.e., December 31, 1943, he must allow for enough equipment for 7,500,000 men.
There is no need of saying anything about the rest of yours of November ninth, for there is no conflict of figures on my part.

If the Army and Budget people will only do what I have written they will see that there is no argument between them.

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum I sent today to General Marshall.

I have made it perfectly clear to the Army that I am approving for budget purposes an Army with an average of six and a half million men for the calendar year 1943, with a top strength of not to exceed seven and a half million by the end of 1943. I wish you would make the fiscal arrangements conform to this.

Having made up my mind regarding the average size of the Army in 1943, I do not wish it to come up again unless and until the War Department should make a request for a further increase in the Army.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I wish the Government as a whole would talk in terms either of calendar year or fiscal year but not both!

My directions to the Budget are not in contradiction with what I had approved to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 30th.

Let me put it so clearly that there can be no misunderstanding.

For Budget purposes the strength of the Army is fixed for an AVERAGE of 6,500,000 for the calendar year 1943.

In other words, in January the strength of the Army will, in all probability, not exceed 5,000,000 and you will be lucky if it gets over 7,000,000 by December 31, 1943. That means that the AVERAGE of the Army for 1943 cannot possibly exceed 6,500,000.

In regard to the equipment for the Army, the Director of the Budget understands that by the end of the calendar year, i.e., December 31, 1943, he must allow for enough equipment for 7,500,000 men.

There is no need of saying anything about the rest of yours of November 9th, for there is no conflict of figures on my part.

If the Army and Budget people will only do what I have written they will see that there is no argument between them.

F.D.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Secretary of War has informed me of the directions he has received from the Bureau of the Budget dated November 4, 1942, regarding the military estimates for the fiscal year 1944. These instructions appear to fix the strength of the Army, so far as the calendar year of 1943 is concerned, at 6,500,000, which is not in accord with your approval of the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 30, 1942, establishing 7,500,000 as the planned strength for the Army by the end of December, 1943. I have in mind your instructions regarding the presentation of estimates for pay and rations for the increased strength, but the communication from the Bureau of the Budget definitely limits the development of the Army.

Simply stated, the reduction of the Army to 6,500,000 at the end of 1943 means that there will be available in the Spring of 1944, when we should be reaching our peak strength, just 14 fewer transportable divisions for combat duty. Unless the anti-submarine and the Mediterranean campaigns are to be marked down as failures, we will have the shipping to throw these 14 divisions into combat in the Spring of 1944. Moreover, late in 1944 we would have no strategic reserve if this reduction is effected, without the possession of which in war it is impossible to meet emergencies or exploit successes as they develop.

It would also introduce in 1943 a break in our training that interrupts the development of the Army. If the training facilities which we now have are not used over a substantial period they are bound to disintegrate and cannot again be brought to efficiency overnight.

I want very much to keep the Air Force program intact and feel strongly that it is wise to do so but, with this reduction, the only alternatives I have are to break up divisions already in advanced state of training or reduce the air program in order to maintain the divisions that are now engaged in overseas combat operations.

If it is intended that at some later date new decisions may be made, I respectfully submit that the complications involved in creating a balanced military force, together with those of production, are too great and require too many months of preliminary preparations.
to permit of effective alterations in strength by a process of delayed decisions.

The morale of the hostile world must be broken, not only by aggressive fighting but as in 1918 by the vision of an overwhelming force of fresh young Americans being rapidly developed in this country.

The instructions from the Bureau of the Budget vitally affect our strategic plans for the conduct of the war. In your Executive Order of February 28, 1942, I was made responsible to you in matters pertaining to strategy, tactics, and operations. This was amplified by your letter on this subject of February 28, 1942, addressed to the Secretary of War. It is my considered opinion that the instructions of the Bureau of the Budget referred to jeopardize our success in this war and should be revoked immediately.

Attached hereto is a memorandum showing in greater detail the effect of the reduction.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.2 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-9-59
Signature- Carl F. Spaer
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Budget directive on strength of the Army for fiscal year 1944.

1. The reduction of the proposed Army strength from a total of 7,500,000 by December 31, 1943, to an "average strength" of 6,500,000 for the fiscal year 1944 will fix enlisted strengths approximately as follows:

December 31, 1942  -  4,800,000
June 30, 1943      -  5,500,000
December 31, 1943  -  6,500,000
June 30, 1944      -  7,533,000

2. If the Army Air Force program of 2,200,000 men for the calendar year 1943 is given priority, which should be done unless the airplane program is reduced, it will have the following affect on the Ground Forces and SOS establishments:

a. After air requirements are met, only a total of 125,000 men will remain available for the Ground Forces and the SOS during the first six months of 1943. Therefore the organization of all combat troops will virtually cease during this period.

b. There will be 14 fewer divisions with 12 months' training, ready for combat in the first half of 1944. If we continue to move divisions overseas to the limit of prospective shipping capacity in 1943, we will reach a position in 1944 of having troop ships available and no divisions ready to embark, and no strategic reserve of divisions available in the United States.

g. The total number of divisions for calendar year 1943 was first set at 111. This was reduced to 100 divisions in order to permit, within manpower limitations, an adequate pool of trained men for replacements. The Budget directive
further reduces the total of divisions to 86 trained, untrained and partially trained. Of these, 18 are now on the high seas or distributed in various theaters and 6 are due to sail within the next two months.

d. The training establishments for the expansion and maintenance of the Ground Army normally operate at a monthly capacity of 22,000 officer candidates and 100,000 enlisted replacements. This capacity is designed to provide a pool of trained replacements to meet normal attrition and anticipated battle casualties. With a monthly increment of but 21,000 men for the Ground Army during the first six months of calendar year 1943, this pool will fall far below the minimum level required to maintain organizations in combat theaters at effective fighting strength. We must then resort to the unfortunate expedient of stripping other units of trained men for overseas replacements. This procedure was forced upon the Army in 1942 and resulted in the emasculation of six divisions, disrupting their training and destroying their morale.

e. This training machine will slow down almost to a standstill for the period January 1 to June 30, 1943, and after that time can operate only at a greatly reduced capacity. If its idle, trained personnel are transferred to other duties, it will rapidly disintegrate and will require months to regain its present efficiency.

f. A serious shortage of supporting troops (engineer, signal, medical, quartermaster) will result from this Budget limitation. The number of trained divisions available for deployment overseas in 1943 will be adequate since these divisions will all have been organised in calendar year 1942. However, many service units needed for the support of these divisions in combat were not organised in 1942. Since they require less than a year’s training, their organization was postponed until the early months of 1943. Their scheduled organization will not be possible under the proposed Budget restrictions.
If an Axis disintegration appears imminent in the late summer of 1943 or fall of 1943, we will have sufficient divisions uncommitted to other theaters and available for ROUNDUP but we will lack the service troops to support them.

I. H. Edwards,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.
MEMO FOR GRACE

Harry Hopkins wants to see all the correspondence re the size of the Army when it comes back from Wayne Coy and before it goes to the President.

TOI
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

May I send General Marshall's letter, together with the memorandum from Brigadier General Edwards to the Chief of Staff to Wayne Coy for his information?

He would like very much to have both your memo to General Marshall and General Marshall's to you so that he can see the picture as a whole.

Is it all right?

G.
11/11/42

SENT TO WAYNE COY THIS DATE

Secret memo dated 11/9/42 for the President from Gen. Marshall, Chief of Staff re military estimates for the fiscal year 1944.

Secret memo dated 11/8/42 for the Chief of Staff from Brig. General I. H. Edwards, Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3 re budget directive on strength of the Army for fiscal year 1944.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C.

November 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO MISS GRACE TULLY:

From: Wayne Coy

Enclosed herewith is a memorandum to the President to which is attached a revision of the draft of the President's memorandum to General Marshall, together with a copy of the President's memorandum to the Director of the Budget on October 29th.

I am also returning herewith General Marshall's memorandum to the President dated November 9th.

If the President signs the revised memorandum to General Marshall or substitutes another, it would be appreciated if the Budget can be furnished a copy.

Attachments.
November 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

In view of your memorandum to me dated October 29, a copy of which is attached, I think your memorandum to General Marshall should be revised. I am attaching herewith a suggested revision of it based entirely on my interpretation of your memorandum to me of the 29th. I am also returning the draft memorandum which you sent me under date of November 10.

[Signature]
Director

Attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

In regard to armed forces, what would you think of the following:

1. Average enlisted strength of Army for fiscal year 1944 -- 6,500,000.
   Average enlisted strength of Navy for fiscal year 1944 -- 1,500,000.
   Average enlisted strength of Marine Corps for fiscal year 1944 -- 310,000.
   Average enlisted strength of Coast Guard for fiscal year 1944 -- 160,000.

2. In regard to allocation of material and equipment and for planning purposes, I would include the necessary money for personnel about 10% above the above figures. Where material and equipment has to be ordered well in advance, we should figure on not the average for the fiscal year 1944 but for the highest point, which would be at the end of the fiscal year 1944.

This is a rule of thumb but I think you will find it will work out satisfactorily.

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I wish the Government as a whole would talk in terms either of calendar year or fiscal year but not both!

My directions to the Budget are not in contradiction with what I had approved to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 30th.

Let me put it so clearly that there can be no misunderstanding.

For Budget purposes the strength of the Army is fixed for an AVERAGE of 6,600,000 for the fiscal year 1944.

In other words, in January the strength of the Army will, in all probability, not exceed 5,000,000. My estimate is that the Army will be somewhere between 6,500,000 and 7,000,000 men by December 31, 1943, and that the average of the Army for the fiscal year 1944 should be 6,500,000 men.

In regard to the equipment for the Army, the Director of the Budget understands that by the end of the calendar year, i.e., December 31, 1943, he must allow for enough equipment for approximately 7,500,000 men. For the end of the fiscal year 1944 money should be included in the budget for material and equipment for personnel 10% above the maximum strength of 7,533,000 for June 30, 1944.
There is no need for saying anything about the rest of yours of November ninth, for there is no conflict of figures on my part.

If the Army and Budget people will only do what I have written they will see that there is no argument between them.

R. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET

I am enclosing copy of a memorandum which I shall send to General Marshall if you approve.

F. D. R.
November 10, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL

I wish the Government as a whole would talk in terms either of calendar year or fiscal year but not both!

My directions to the Budget are not in contradiction with what I had approved to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 30th.

Let me put it so clearly that there can be no misunderstanding.

For Budget purposes the strength of the Army is fixed for an AVERAGE of 6,500,000 for the calendar year 1943.

In other words, in January the strength of the Army will, in all probability, not exceed 5,000,000, and you will be lucky if it gets over 7,000,000 by December 31, 1943. That means that the AVERAGE of the Army for 1943 cannot possibly exceed 6,500,000.

In regard to the equipment for the Army, the Director of the Budget understands that by the end of the calendar year, i.e., December 31, 1943, he must allow for enough equipment for 7,500,000 men.

There is no need of saying anything about the rest of yours of November ninth, for there is no conflict of figures on my part.
8. If the Army and Budget people will only do what I have written they will see that there is no argument between them.

F. D. R.
PERSONAL

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

November 17, 1942.

I have every sympathy with your note of November thirteenth in regard to the advisability of encouraging Americanization in the Army.

Therefore, I would go along with your objections were it not for two facts:

(a) We already have a Norwegian Battalion, Filipino Units and a Japanese Battalion. Therefore, the creation of one or two small additional units would create no precedent.

(b) The memorandum to you from the Staff points out in the last paragraph that formation of such Battalions should be strictly limited to cases where political advantages are to be gained. That is why I hope the matter will be kept open and, of course, I must be the one to determine political advantages if any. It occurs to me that there are distinct and definite political advantages in the case of a Polish or Czech or Danish Battalion. These cases should be reopened for further discussion with the State Department.

I have no desire for any large unit. Even if the numbers were small enough only for a company, the objective would be served.

Most certainly I think there should be no German or Italian Unit at this time.

F. D. R.
November 13, 1942.

Dear Mr. President:

I submit herewith a memorandum from the Training Division of the General Staff in respect to the enlistment of foreign units, a subject which you have several times discussed with me. This memorandum points out that we have already begun the enlistment of several such units. But there are very distinct and serious objections to enlarging the practice.

I sincerely concur with these objections and with the compromise policy suggested by the General Staff. I have also the further reason for objecting to the enlargement of this practice arising from my own experience in the last war. By concentrating these foreign nationals into homogeneous units, they are prevented from profiting by the Americanization which is one of the remarkable features of our present system of mingling all such nationalities together in one combat unit. My observation of this process in the Seventy-seventh Division in the last war was one of the best lessons in Americanization which I myself have ever received.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.
1. The following units are now authorized:

   a. The Norwegian Battalion (99th Infantry Battalion). This unit was organized at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, in August, 1942.

   b. Filipino units - The 1st Filipino Regiment, activated in July, 1942, has recently expanded into a second Filipino Regiment. These units are stationed at Camp San Luis Obispo, California.

   c. The Japanese Battalion (100th Infantry Battalion) was organized from National Guardsmen stationed in Hawaii. This unit is undergoing training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.

2. Preliminary action has been initiated on the following foreign units:

   a. The Austrian Battalion - Mr. Sumner Welles, The Under Secretary of State, indicated that both the President and the Secretary of State approve the organization of an Austrian Battalion.

   b. The Greek Battalion - The Greek Government has made formal representation to the State Department for the organization of a Greek Battalion. The War Department will initiate action to activate this unit upon recommendation of the State Department.

   c. Numerous other requests have been received from interested individuals for the organization of foreign units (Polish, Danish, Italian, German, etc.). Each of these requests has been denied.

3. Difficulties and disadvantages in organizing foreign units:

   a. In initiating the organization of a foreign battalion, the responsibility for issuing a press release rests with the War Department. This publicity invites requests from other allied or friendly Governments and groups for similar units.

   b. The availability of sufficient volunteers must be assured. The Norwegian Battalion, activated in August, 1942, is far below its authorized strength. Recently, an order has been issued to assign all Norwegians reporting at reception centers to this unit. Although it was originally intended to fill this unit with alien volunteers, direct assignment became necessary when lack of sufficient volunteers threatened the success of the project.

   c. The difficulty arising from different political and social groups within a foreign unit has begun to present itself. Complaints have been received that individuals other than of
Scandinavian origin have been sent to the Norwegian Battalion, although these individuals are Norwegian subjects. The sponsorship of the Austrian Battalion by a Hapsburg group presents the problem of possible disagreements among the political factions within a foreign unit.

d. The employment of such units in combat is a difficult problem.

(1) Use against a common enemy in certain localities cannot be assured since not all of our allies are at war with all of our enemies.

(2) Information on the combat activity of the unit is available to the enemy, and unless it is outstanding, may become a source of counter-propaganda.

(3) The maintenance of a loss replacement pool presents a difficulty because of the limited availability of eligible individuals. In an active theater the shortage of alien replacements may require withdrawal from combat of the unit concerned until sufficient eligibles are made available.

e. The War Department has opposed the creation of these foreign units on the grounds that training facilities provided in the United States are, at best, barely sufficient for proper training and orderly development of the forces planned in current Troop Bases.

4. The following War Department opinion has been expressed to the State Department:

"The War Department is of the opinion that the organization of foreign units in the Army of the United States should be limited strictly to those whose formation is desirable because of distinct political advantages to be gained which outweigh purely military disadvantages."
MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

As you know, I had Mr. Strelein on my hands for quite some time. I thought you might be interested in reading the confidential report which Secretary Patterson sent over.

W. H. M.
Mr. Marvin McIntyre,
Secretary to the President,
The White House.

Dear Mr. McIntyre:

Enclosed is copy of memorandum from Operations Division in reference to the question of a Jewish Army in North Africa. This was prepared as a result of the question presented to this office by Mr. Alfred Strelsin.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Robert P. Patterson,  
Under Secretary of War.

Encl.
Cy of memo fr Operations Div.

P.S. This in confidential.  
RPP.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR:

Subject: Refugee Jews in North Africa who are anxious to Serve in the Armed Forces against the Axis.

1. Memorandum for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, December 4, 1942, subject Stateless Jews in North Africa, has been referred to OPD for reply.

2. A message of recent date from General Eisenhower states that there are approximately 300,000 Jews native to French North Africa, among a population containing 17,000,000 Moslems and 1,500,000 Europeans and that special legislation has insured political control to the last named group. That to give the comparatively few Jewish Semites a preferred status over the vastly more numerous Semites of Islam would almost certainly provoke an unfortunate and dangerous reaction on the part of the Moslems. That Allied headquarters are opposed at the present time to the mass release of internees due to the delicate military and political situation, particularly because of the effect on Spanish anti-Communist tendencies and of the opening given to German propaganda. That no exact figures are available of potential military manpower which might be developed from refugee Jews in this region. That arrangements have already been made by General Giraud to provide for special enlistment of Jews in such manner as to avoid Arab dissatisfaction.

3. Under the recent Presidential proclamation all enlistments are suspended and while Selective Service provides all manpower, it does not, of course, function outside of the United States and its possessions and territories. However, overseas commanders have authority to enlist residents of occupied areas whom they desire and who are needed for use in such areas.

4. In view of the delicate political and military situation in North Africa, the explosive nature of the Jewish-Moslem question and the steps already taken by the French, with the approval of General Eisenhower, in connection with Jewish volunteers, it is recommended that no further consideration be given to the organization of Jewish units under the auspices of the United States Army in North Africa.

/s/ Thos T Handy
THOS. T. HANDY,
Major General
Assistant Chief of Staff