

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TABLE B**

**BIOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PSYCHIATRIC CASES**

*(Based on 89 cases)*

<b>EDUCATION:</b>	<b>NO.</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>CIVILIAN OCCUPATION:</b>	<b>NO.</b>	<b>%</b>
Grade school . . . . .	39	45	Professional . . . . .	0	0
Some high school . . . . .	28	32	Clerical . . . . .	15	19
High school . . . . .	18	21	Service . . . . .	1	1
College . . . . .	2	2	Agriculture . . . . .	13	16
<b>TOTAL MEN §</b> . . . . .	<b>87</b>	<b>100</b>	Skilled trade . . . . .	21	26
			Semi-skilled trade . . . . .	19	23
			Unskilled trade . . . . .	11	14
			Managerial . . . . .	0	0
			Student . . . . .	1	1
			<b>TOTAL MEN §</b> . . . . .	<b>81</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>AGE:</b>			<b>LENGTH OF ARMY SERVICE:</b>		
18 . . . . .	0	0	3 months or less . . . . .	0	0
19 . . . . .	0	0	4-6 months . . . . .	0	0
20 . . . . .	0	0	7-9 months . . . . .	0	0
21-24 . . . . .	35	39	10-12 months . . . . .	2	2
25-29 . . . . .	34	38	13-18 months . . . . .	20	23
30-34 . . . . .	12	14	19-24 months . . . . .	20	23
Over 35 . . . . .	8	9	Over 24 months . . . . .	46	52
<b>TOTAL MEN</b> . . . . .	<b>89</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>TOTAL MEN §</b> . . . . .	<b>88</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>BRANCH:</b>			<b>COMBAT EXPERIENCE:</b>		
Engineers . . . . .	3	3	Less than 1 day . . . . .	5	7
Field Artillery . . . . .	9	10	1-4 days . . . . .	5	7
Quartermaster . . . . .	0	0	4-8 days . . . . .	5	7
Infantry . . . . .	55	63	8-15 days . . . . .	6	8
Medical . . . . .	5	6	15-31 days . . . . .	19	26
Armored Force . . . . .	10	11	Over 31 days . . . . .	32	45
Signal Corps . . . . .	0	0	<b>TOTAL MEN §</b> . . . . .	<b>72</b>	<b>100</b>
Coast Artillery . . . . .	0	0			
Air Corps . . . . .	1	1			
Ordnance . . . . .	4	5			
Others . . . . .	1	1			
<b>TOTAL MEN §</b> . . . . .	<b>88</b>	<b>100</b>			

§Totals are somewhat less than 89, the number of men surveyed. The discrepancy between the total and 89, in each table, depends on the number of cases for which no data were available.

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON  
THE FRIGHTENINGNESS OF WEAPONS

The table opposite parallels the chart given on page 5 of the preceding text, in which the percentages of men exposed to each weapon rating it as most frightening are presented. Table C (1), at the left of the opposite page, differs from the previously given data only in that it includes answers given by some men who rated two weapons to be 'most frightening', as well as by those men who followed the instruction strictly and named only one. Table C (2), at the right, is compiled from answers given by men who were exposed to all five of the most frequently employed German weapons (*see explanation, page 4*). It is to be noted that the weapons most often feared hold similar ranks, and even differ little in their exact percentage values, in terms of all three indices of frighteningness. For example, the 88 mm. gun and mortar occupy first and third place, respectively, and together account for a large number of the ratings of frighteningness by all three methods of presentation.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**TABLE C**

**RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: "What enemy weapon used against you seemed most frightening to you?"**

(1) Data compiled from frequency of responses, including answers for men who named two weapons as "most frightening."

WEAPON	NUMBER OF RATINGS	NUMBER OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON	PERCENTAGE RATING WEAPON MOST FRIGHTENING
88 mm. gun. . .	260	519	50
Bombing . . . . (Dive bomber, horizontal bomber)	135	492	27
Mortar. . . . .	82	438	19
Light machine gun . .	34	446	8
Strafing. . . . .	33	527	6
Land mines. . . .	14	491	3
Tank attack . . .	9	367	2
Machine pistol. . . . .	4	192	2
Booby traps . . .	7	437	2
Heavy machine gun . .	6	422	1
Bayonets. . . . .	1	93	1
Other artillery . . .	3	475	1
Grenades. . . . .	1	235	•
Rifle fire. . . . .	1	302	•
Sniping . . . . .	0	440	0

\*Less than 0.5%

(2) Data compiled from responses made by 329 men exposed to all five of the most frequently used German weapons.

WEAPON	NUMBER OF MEN RATING WEAPON	PERCENTAGE RATING WEAPON MOST FRIGHTENING †
88 mm. gun. . . . .	149	45
Bombing . . . . . (Dive bomber, horizontal bomber)	57	17
Mortar. . . . .	56	17
Light machine gun . . . .	22	7
Land mines. . . . .	7	2

†Percentages add to only 88 per cent since 12 per cent of the men rated some other weapon to be most frightening.

**SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON THE MEN'S ESTIMATES  
OF DANGEROUSNESS OF WEAPONS**

The table opposite parallels the chart given on page 6 of the preceding text, in which the percentages of men exposed to each weapon rating it as most dangerous are given. Table D (1), at the left of the opposite page differs from the previously mentioned chart only in that it includes answers given by some men who rated two weapons to be most dangerous as well as by those men who followed the instruction strictly and named only one. Table D (2), at the right, is compiled from answers given by men who were exposed to all five of the most frequently employed German weapons (*see explanation page 4*). Again, it is to be noted that the weapons rated most dangerous hold similar ranks, and even differ little in their exact percentage values, in terms of all three indices of dangerousness. For example, the 88 mm. gun and the mortar occupy first and second place respectively, and together account for a large part of the ratings of dangerousness by all three methods of presentation.

TABLE D

**RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: "Judging from what you yourself saw, what weapon used by the enemy caused the most casualties (killed and wounded) among our men?"**

(1) Data compiled from frequency of responses including answers for men who named two weapons as "most dangerous."				(2) Data compiled from responses made by 329 men exposed to all five of the most frequently used German weapons.		
WEAPON	NUMBER OF RATINGS	NUMBER OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON	PERCENTAGE RATING WEAPON MOST DANGEROUS	WEAPON	NUMBER OF MEN RATING WEAPON	PERCENTAGE RATING WEAPON MOST DANGEROUS †
88 mm. gun. . .	302	519	58	88 mm. gun. . . . .	168	51
Mortar. . . . .	117	438	27	Mortar. . . . .	80	24
Light machine gun . .	40	446	9	Light machine gun . . . . .	24	7
Bombing . . . . .	29	382	8	Land mines. . . . .	12	4
(Dive bomber, horizontal bomber)				Bombing . . . . .	6	2
Strafing. . . . .	32	527	6	(Dive bomber, horizontal bomber)		
Land mines. . .	25	491	5			
Booby traps . .	12	437	3			
Rifle fire. . .	6	302	2			
Tank attack . .	5	367	1			
Heavy machine gun . .	5	422	1			
Other artillery . . .	5	475	1			
Sniping . . . . .	4	440	1			
Machine pistol. . . . .	1	192	1			
Grenades. . . . .	0	235	0			
Bayonets. . . . .	0	93	0			

† Percentages add to only 88 per cent since 12 per cent of the men rated some other weapon to be most dangerous.

**SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON  
THE CASUALTY-INFLICTING EFFECTIVENESS OF WEAPONS**

Exact data on the actual effectiveness of weapons are difficult to obtain. The following data indicating which weapons wounded the men used in the present study provide the best information available to the writers on the real effectiveness of the weapons mentioned below for the theater and period being covered. The table shows the number of men wounded among those exposed to each weapon.

TABLE E

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: "By what weapon were you wounded?"

WEAPON	NUMBER OF MEN WOUNDED BY WEAPON	NUMBER OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON	PERCENTAGE OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON WHO WERE WOUNDED BY IT
88 mm. gun. . . . .	104	505	21
Light machine gun . . . . .	50	429	12
Land mines. . . . .	44	477	9
Mortar. . . . .	42	423	10
Rifle fire. . . . .	16	290	6
Horizontal bombing. . . . .	15	396	4
Other artillery . . . . .	14	462	3
Machine pistol. . . . .	4	182	2
Dive bombing. . . . .	7	522	1
Strafing. . . . .	7	514	1
Grenades. . . . .	5	225	2
Booby traps . . . . .	3	422	1
Tank attack . . . . .	4	356	1
Heavy machine gun . . . . .	2	409	1
Sniping . . . . .	1	429	*
Bayonets. . . . .	0	90	0

\*Less than 0.5%

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE MEN'S RATINGS  
OF FRIGHTENINGNESS OF WEAPONS  
AND THE WEAPONS WHICH WOUNDED THEM

That the men's ratings of frighteningness were not primarily determined by what weapon wounded them can be shown by computing the percentages for each weapon on the basis of responses of those men who were wounded by a weapon other than that weapon. This may be seen in the table following. Table F shows the percentage of men who rate each weapon as most frightening when each percentage is computed after excluding from the data all the men who rated the particular weapon which wounded them as most frightening. A comparison of these results with the results based on all the men (as shown in the chart on page 5 and duplicated in the last column of the present table) reveals a high degree of similarity. The results presented in the previous pages are seen to remain relatively unaltered when statistical allowance is made for any tendency the men may have to rate most frightening the weapon that wounded them.

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE F

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: "What enemy weapon used against you seemed most frightening to you?"

WEAPON	RESULTS, OMITTING MEN WHO RATE AS MOST FRIGHTENING THE WEAPON WHICH WOUNDED THEM			RESULTS, BASED ON ALL MEN †
	NUMBER OF MEN RATING WEAPON MOST FRIGHTENING	NUMBER OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON	PERCENTAGE OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON RATING IT MOST FRIGHTENING	PERCENTAGE OF MEN EXPOSED TO WEAPON RATING IT MOST FRIGHTENING
88 mm. gun. . . . .	89	203	44	48
Dive bomber . . . . .	40	257	16	20
Mortar. . . . .	24	217	11	13
Horizontal bomber . . . . .	9	165	5	12
Light machine gun . . . . .	12	191	6	7
Strafing. . . . .	7	255	3	5
Land mines. . . . .	1	221	.	2
Tank. . . . .	6	198	3	2
Machine pistol. . . . .	1	111	1	1
Heavy machine gun . . . . .	1	207	.	1
Booby traps . . . . .	1	217	.	1
Other artillery . . . . .	1	243	.	.
Rifle fire. . . . .	0	136	0	0
Grenades. . . . .	0	118	0	0
Sniping . . . . .	0	227	0	0

\*Less than 0.5%

† Figures in this column based on all men, including those who rate as most frightening the weapon which wounded them. (Data presented on page 5 of this report.)

SUPPLEMENTARY DATA ON  
THE REASONS FOR FEARING WEAPONS

The table below shows, systematically, how reasons for fearing weapons tie in with the discrepancy between men's ratings of dangerousness and frighteningness of weapons. The mortar, for example, is rated to be dangerous by more men than rate it frightening. It is feared for its accuracy and failure to give any warning, or for reasons that are probably related to its casualty inflicting effectiveness. The dive bomber, on the other hand, is rated by more men to be frightening than rate it dangerous. It is feared for its siren and noise, or for reasons that have little bearing on its effectiveness as defined above. According to the table, then, weapons rated more dangerous than frightening tend to be feared more frequently for "appropriate" reasons and weapons rated more frightening than dangerous tend to be feared more frequently for "inappropriate" reasons.

TABLE 6

RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: "What was there about this particular [most frightening] weapon that made it frightening?"

REASONS FOR FEARING WEAPON SHOWN IN PERCENTAGES—READING ACROSS

Weapons rated by more men to be effective than to be frightening.	— APPROPRIATE REASONS —			— INAPPROPRIATE REASONS —					TOTAL
	ACCU- RACY	NO WARN- ING	RAPID RATE OF FIRE	NOISE	SIREN	SEEMS TO BE COMING RIGHT AT YOU	NO WAY TO FIGHT BACK	OTHER	
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Mortar . . . . .	24	19	8	4	7	13	1	24	100
88 mm. gun. . . . .	21	11	7	11	8	10	2	30	100
Light machine gun . . . . .	8	15	42	4	2	8	0	21	100
Weapons rated by more men to be frightening than to be effective.									
Dive bomber . . . . .	3	5	0	16	32	8	4	32	100
Horizontal bomber . . . . .	5	11	1	7	14	18	14	30	100

DIFFERENCES IN THE WAY MEN  
IN DIFFERENT ARMS OF THE SERVICE  
EVALUATE AMERICAN AND GERMAN EQUIPMENT

In answer to the question as to how German fighting equipment measured up to their expectations, more Infantrymen found German weapons better than they expected, than did men in the Armored Force. A still smaller proportion of Air Force personnel found enemy equipment better than they had thought.

TABLE H

ARM OF SERVICE	PERCENTAGES OF MEN RATING GERMAN EQUIPMENT BETTER THAN ANTICIPATED
Infantry. . . . .	62
Armored Force . . . . .	52
Air Corps . . . . .	31
Other . . . . .	54

WAR DEPARTMENT  
ARMY SERVICE FORCES  
Office of the Director, Special Service Division  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D. C.

*PSF  
War*

11 Oct 43

(Date)

Received from the Research Branch, Special Service Division, the following confidential report(s):

†1 - Fear of German Weapons B-66

Please sign and return this receipt to The White House,  
the Research Branch, Special Service  
Division, 1E 609, The Pentagon. Washington, D.C.

War Dept folder 2-43

PSF

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR

When you spoke to me about the Union activities at the Laboratory at the University of California, I took it up at once and was assured by Phil Murray that this would end at once.

I will check again.

F. D. R.

(Copies of copies attached - filed "Gen Cones R", 4-43)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Oct. 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MRS. ANNA ROSENBERG:

Will you check on this again?

F.D.R.

**SECRET**

WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON

October 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: Union organizational activities in the  
Radiation Laboratory at the University  
of California.

The Army officers in charge of an important and secret project are inquiring as to the status of the Unionization activities at the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California and the possibility of the cessation of such activity. I enclose herewith a copy of my memorandum to you of September 9th and would greatly appreciate it if you could advise me whether results can be accomplished along this line in order that the security of the project may be protected.

*You will remember that I explained to you personally the seriousness of this danger and the extreme urgency of action*

*Henry L. Stimson*  
Secretary of War.

Encl: Copy memo. to the President,  
9/9/43.

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-16-59

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

C  
O  
P  
Y.

September 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: FAECT Organizational Activities in the  
Radiation Laboratory.

1. There has been a marked increase recently in union organizing activity in the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California in Berkeley which is engaged upon one of the most important phases of the work on uranium fission. This organizational activity is being carried on by the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians (CIO) Local No. 25. In the furtherance of their organizational activity this union is assembling lists of the scientific and technical personnel of the laboratory, and necessarily acquiring considerable information with respect to the work being carried on there.
2. The paid organizer of Local No. 25, Rose Segure, and the local FAECT International Vice-President, David E. Adelson, are definitely Communists. They are close associates of and receive the constant counsel of one Steve Nelson, who is a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, U.S.A., and the head of the Communist Party in Alameda County, California. Nelson induced Joseph Weinberg, a member of the staff of the Radiation Laboratory, to furnish him secret information concerning the work with the announced intention of transmitting it to the U.S.S.R. and it is believed he has done so.
3. Lists of the persons employed upon this Project are classified as secret because information as to the nature and extent of the work could be deduced therefrom. The security of the work has already been compromised by the activities of the union. Continued union activities will be extremely dangerous not only to security but to the speedy completion of the work and it is unquestionable that the union organization will be used to further espionage activity of agents of a foreign power.
4. It is urgently recommended that at the earliest opportunity you have a personal conference with Mr. Philip Murray, the head of the CIO, and request him in the strongest terms to take such steps as are necessary to ensure that the FAECT immediately cease, for the duration of the war, all union activity whatsoever with respect to the Radiation Laboratory, University of California, at Berkeley. This should include disbanding the laboratory organization of Local No. 25. There is no objection, however, to employees of the laboratory retaining membership in the union, provided it is in a wholly inactive status during the war.

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**DOD DIR.** 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-16-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spicer*

Respectfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON

Secretary of War.

~~SECRET~~

[Original in Map Room files.]

*War Dept folder*  
*PSF* 243  
✓

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

TO READ AND RETURN.

F.D.R.

*Thank you*  
*HZS*

1943 NOV 9 AM 10:35

WAR DEPARTMENT  
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

MYNINWELDK  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Anna Marie Rosenberg  
November 2, 1943


THE WHITE HOUSE  
Nov 3 11 36 AM '43  
RECEIVED

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with Secretary Stinson's memorandum of October 20, subject: Union organizational activities in the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California, which you referred to me, I have just spoken to Philip Murray in Philadelphia, who will immediately instruct the union concerned to stop efforts to organize. I had spoken to him about this matter previously, but I am sure he will take vigorous action now.

If there is any further trouble, I would appreciate your letting me know immediately, so that I can keep Murray informed.

Respectfully yours,



The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

(2093)

*hms*

*War Dept. folder  
2-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

TO READ AND RETURN.

F.D.R.

Letter from Anna Marie Rosenberg, 11/2/43, to the President, in connection with Secretary Stimson's memorandum of 10/20, in re Union organizational activities in the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California.

Mr. Latta:

The previous on  
this is in the  
personal file.  
WGN

10 Nov '43

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DDO DIR 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 9-7-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

PST  
War

OK  
for

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET  
WASHINGTON, D. C.  
November 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Troop Bases for All Services for 1944

Pursuant to your memorandum of November 10, 1943, there is given below comparisons, where possible, of the strengths recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 9 November 1943 with the presently authorized strengths for the several services.

ARMY

A strength of 7,700,000 for the calendar year 1944 is recommended. It is assumed that the recommendation envisions the attainment of this strength by January 1, 1944, and maintenance at that level through December 31, 1944. The present approved strength for the Army on January 1, 1944 is 8,286,329, or 586,329 in excess of the present recommendation.

NAVY

A strength of 2,912,000 to be reached on December 31, 1944, and 3,006,000 to be reached on June 30, 1945 (with authority to reach the latter figure by December 31, 1944, if necessary) is recommended. The present approved strength to be reached December 31, 1943 is 2,422,470. No comparisons of strengths to be reached on December 31, 1944 or June 30, 1945 can be made as there has been no previously approved strength for the Navy to be reached on those dates.

MARINE CORPS

A strength of 478,000 for the calendar year 1944 is recommended. It is assumed that the recommendation envisions the attainment of this strength by January 1, 1944 and maintenance at that level through December 31, 1944. The present approved strength for the Marine Corps on January 1, 1944 is 411,965, or 66,035 below the recommendation.

COAST GUARD

A strength of 174,000 for the calendar year 1944 is recommended. It is assumed that the recommendation envisions the attainment of this strength by January 1, 1944 and maintenance at that level through December 31, 1944. The present approved strength for the Coast Guard on June 30, 1944 is 177,434, or 3,434 in excess of the recommendation.

In obtaining your approval on a basis for the Budget estimate for the Veterans' Administration for the fiscal year 1945, I submitted to you estimates of strength through June 30, 1945 obtained from all the services. Thinking that you may wish to see your notation on that tabulation I am returning it herewith.

Rec'd  
1:10 PM  
11/13/43

**SECRET**

Director

(2132)

*Ans*

*PSF*

*war dept. folder 2-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

Will you be good enough to  
handle this?

F.D.R.

Memorandum from Hon. James F. Byrnes, 11/10/43, returning memorandum which the President had received from Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Under Secretary of War, 11/6/43, in re acquisition of certain British-owned munitions facilities in this country, which the President had sent to Mr. Byrnes on 11/9/43 asking "What do you think about this?" Mr. Byrnes was agree with the Under Secretary of War's recommendation that the acquisition of the facilities be handled through reciprocal lend-lease, and offers to talk with the Under Secretary about it.

(2109)

*lms*

*Handwritten folder 2-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

November 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

What do you think about this?

F.D.R.

Memorandum for the President from the Under Secretary of War, 11/6/43, copy of which has been retained for our files, in re acquisition of certain British-owned munitions facilities in this country.

6 November 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In 1941, in the interest of national defense, you authorized the acquisition of certain British-owned munitions facilities in this country, the particular facilities to be designated by the Secretary of War with your approval. Certain facilities were so designated.

A number of these facilities have been acquired from the British, and payment in cash has been made.

Negotiations for seven of such facilities are still pending, several at or near closing. The total sums involved amount to between \$20,000,000 and \$30,000,000. While no written agreements appear to have been entered into, it has been assumed all along by both the British and ourselves that all of these facilities would be acquired for cash.

Several Congressional committees have raised the question why these remaining facilities should not be transferred as reciprocal aid. The interdepartmental committee on gold and dollar balances, comprised of the State, War, and Treasury Departments and the Foreign Economic Administration, is of the view that we should request that the facilities be so transferred.

Some of the facilities in question are now not needed by the Army because of changes since the original authorization.

Since the time of your original authorization, as you know, the British dollar position has improved in large proportions.

In view of the above facts, I would recommend:

1. That the War Department acquire from the British only those of the remaining facilities which are now needed by the Army.
2. That the War Department be authorized to enter into discussions with the British with the aim of obtaining the latter's consent to the transfer of the needed facilities as reciprocal aid.
3. That if the British are not willing to transfer the needed facilities as reciprocal aid, the War Department purchase them for cash.

Am I authorized to proceed in that manner?

(Signed) ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Robert P. Patterson  
Under Secretary of War


WAR DEPARTMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF  
War

WD 313  
(25 Nov 43)OB-C

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Shipman.

In the interest of public safety, it is recommended that the papers on the attached list be appropriately safeguarded and restricted from public view until the termination of the present war.



JOHN W. MARTYN,  
Administrative Assistant.

1 incl.



(S) 104 79 08-C  
10 272

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE

- #20. Memo for the President, re increase in strength of Army.  
(AG 320.2 (5-8-42).)
- #24 & #25. Secret memo for General Somervell fr the President  
re shipping to Russia.  
(AG 329.5 (2-16-43).)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943

~~SECRET~~  
MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL SOMERVELL

To read on his return and  
let me have a memorandum.

F. D. R.

*Rest*

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DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 9-7-66

Signature- *Carl L. Spicer*

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

1. The attached memorandum from the War Shipping Administration on the subject of Russian aid, dated February 10th, has been studied. I agree with the statements contained therein as they reflect the January accomplishment. The Persian Gulf route is not expanding rapidly enough to overcome some serious ship delay and port congestion. The time in port for vessels engaged in this service is excessive. The ability to increase the capacity of the Persian ports is dependent upon the speed with which troops and equipment are sent to this area. Since you authorized the Persian Gulf Service Command program early last fall, we have dispatched 17,000 troops, the majority of whom have arrived at their destination. Others are scheduled to go forward in March and April. The troops will not be effective in accomplishing their mission, however, until all of their impedimenta and equipment, including trucks and rolling stock, are delivered. The non-availability of shipping for the movement of this cargo is responsible for the serious lag in this program. Although it was contemplated that five cargo ships per month would be necessary to move this equipment, only eight ships were available for the three months November - January, inclusive, and two are expected to clear in February. The War Shipping Administration indicate that they recognize the desirability of expediting the shipment of this material in order that greater quantities of cargo may be moved through the Persian ports, and have nominated a number of vessels for late February and early March. I am convinced that it is desirable to expedite the movement of this equipment, even if it is necessary to do so at the expense of Russian shipments, in order that the result will be a greater flow to Russia in the future.

2. The capacity of the Persian ports is increasing as a result of the arrival of troops. The Commanding General of the Service Command, in his latest report, indicates that the net tonnage that can be handled in February is 123,000. This figure increases, according to their estimates, to 219,000 in June. It has been estimated that March loadings for the U.S.S.R. via the Persian ports may approximate 169,000 tons, which is in excess of the total January and February shipments over this route.

3. The West Coast program has not come up to expectations. An abundance of cargo has been made available for prompt loading. In fact, there is so much Russian aid cargo on the West Coast that extreme care must be exercised in issuing releases to insure that the ports do not become congested. The Holding and Reconsignment Points, which were

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constructed for this purpose, are being utilized to make available an adequate bank of diversified supplies for loading. The U.S.S.R. ships have not become available as scheduled so that instead of maintaining a rate of 200,000 tons per month, the total for January and February is approximately 235,000 tons. The Army's Port Agencies, with the cooperation of the other interested Government agencies, are directing their full efforts to expedite the movement of Russian aid cargo through the West Coast ports. However, in addition to the failure of the ships to arrive, there has been considerable delay and confusion caused by the frequent changes of priorities that are ordered by the Russian representatives. My representatives are working with General Burns, General Hesson, and the people from the War Shipping Administration, the Office of Defense Transportation, Moore-McCormack, and the Government Purchasing Commission of the Soviet Union in the U.S.A. to devise ways and means of improving the Russian operations on the West Coast. I believe that General Belyaev and his people will respond favorably and that the result will be more expeditious loading.

4. The War Department-procured Russian aid supplies in general are available in quantities necessary to meet allocations, and can be furnished at a rate well in excess of shipping capabilities. I anticipate that with the corrective measures being taken to expand the shipping routes, shipments to the Persian Gulf and North Russia may be maintained at the level of forecast. Shipments from the West Coast can be increased only if additional ships are made available by the Russians.

5. The ports in the Persian Gulf area have been operated by the British. We have now taken over Khoramshar and Bandar Shapur. The first days operations under U. S. control at Khoramshar showed a 10% increase in efficiency. I have recently placed a General officer in specific charge of Russian supply and expect an upsurge in our results provided the anticipated increase in tonnage is realized.

BRETON ROBERTS  
Lieutenant General  
Commanding

FEB 20 43 PM



DISPATCHED MISC. DIV. AMB  
A. A. C. SECTION

Attach.