

PSF: War Dept. - Gen. Douglas Mac Arthur

1944 + 1945

Box 104

PSF; MacArthur folder 2-44
War file OK

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 24, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Frank McCarthy telephoned to say that the War Department had been considering an additional citation of the Oak Leaf Cluster for the D.S.M. which General MacArthur already has and, as tomorrow is his birthday, they would like to have it cleared so they can get it to him on his birthday. The following is the citation for your approval:

"General Douglas MacArthur, United States Army, for exceptional distinguished service as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific since March, 1942.

Under extremely difficult conditions of terrain, climate and limited forces and material, he expelled the enemy from Eastern New Guinea, secured lodgments on the Island of New Britain, and gave strategical direction to coordinated operations resulting in the conquest of New Georgia and the establishment of U. S. group

Army and Navy forces on Bougainville Island. He has inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and established his forces in positions highly favorable for the continuation of offensive operations."

*PSF; MacArthur folder 2-00
War*

WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON


22 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference your note regarding the Medal of Honor which was awarded to General MacArthur, the citation was drafted by me personally and publicized at the time he came out of the Philippines. This action was taken, among other things, to offset any propaganda by the enemy directed against his leaving his command and proceeding to Australia in compliance with your orders. I cleared it with the Secretary of War and then with you at the time.

I attach a message from his Chief of Staff, General Sutherland, recommending the award.

The citation recently submitted for your signature was merely to give MacArthur a copy signed by you personally.


Chief of Staff.

Incl.

*Citation signed and handed
to Major Butler, 8/28/44.*

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- *Carl F. Spicer*

in Marshall
SECRET

C O P Y

March 16, 1942

To: The Secretary of War
From: General Sutherland

Fort Mills

I am sure, in the opinion of every officer and man here, no officer has ever more richly deserved the award of the Medal of Honor than General MacArthur. No more appropriate occasion could be found for its award to the General than the time of his arrival in Australia. Such an award would receive the enthusiastic and unanimous approval of both the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East and of the entire Filipino people.

I would suggest the possibility of the citation being written in Washington due to the certainty of compromising the only code available to us en route if I send a citation before our arrival in Australia. It is suggested that such a citation written in Washington be based upon his utter contempt of danger under terrific aerial bombardments during one of which a two hundred kilogram/^{bomb} exploded within thirty feet of him in the open except for momentary shelter taken in a shallow drain beside a sidewalk. His refusal to take cover and his complete calm on this and many other occasions had a tremendous effect upon the morale of his troops among whom his personal valor was the subject of constant comment; and upon the magnificent leadership and vision that enabled the General to conduct a defense with a partially mobilized and equipped citizen Army that has merited the acclaim of the world and that enabled him to galvanize the spirit of resistance of sixteen million Filipinos.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

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DOD DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 3-18-59

Signature- *Carl S. Spector*

SECRET

Gen Marshall folder
2-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

**PRIVATE AND
CONFIDENTIAL**

August 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

Before I sign this I want
to talk with you personally.
I would have no hesitation in
signing this for Douglas
MacArthur but I would like to
know what the wording is
based on.

F. D. R.

Citation awarding Medal of
Honor to General MacArthur.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED

PSF; mac arthur folder 2-44
War

MEDAL OF HONOR

Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, commanding, United States Army Forces in the Far East. For conspicuous leadership in preparing the Philippine Islands to resist conquest, for gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against invading Japanese forces, and for the heroic conduct of defensive and offensive operations on the Bataan Peninsula. He mobilized, trained, and led an army which has received world acclaim for its gallant defense against a tremendous superiority of enemy forces in men and arms. His utter disregard of personal danger under heavy fire and aerial bombardment, his calm judgment in each crisis, inspired his troops, galvanized the spirit of resistance of the Filipino people, and confirmed the faith of the American people in their armed forces.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

AUG 28 1944

Published in W.D. General Order No. 16, 1 April 1942.

Date of Award: 25 March, 1942.

Born: Arkansas.

Residence at appointment: Wisconsin.

PSF: MacArthur folder
2-44

file
personal

Quebec
September 15, 1944

Dear Douglas:-

It is good to get your letter of August twenty-fifth up here in Quebec. I wish you could be here because you know so much of what we are talking about in regard to the plans of the British for the Southwest Pacific. There is no question that Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff want to send all they can to the Malay Peninsula, etc. -- Army and Navy and Air -- as soon as the German war ends.

In regard to our own force, the situation is just as we left it at Hawaii though there seem to be efforts to do a little bypassing which you would not like. I still have the situation in hand.

I formally received our old friend, Osmena, and his Staff about a week ago. He wants to go out -- with about a dozen others -- as soon as we get a permanent foothold. I will wire you a little later to ask what your thought is on this.

I wish I could hope to come out myself for the great event but we all know there is a lot of this "in the lap of the gods stuff"!

Take care of yourself and give my warm regards to your wife and youngster.

Always sincerely,

General Douglas MacArthur,
General Headquarters
Southwest Pacific Area.

PSF: Mac Arthur

General Headquarters
Southwest Pacific Area

Office of the Commander-in-Chief

26 August 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

Your cordial letter of August 9 has just reached me and I cannot tell you how greatly I appreciate it. Nothing in the course of the war has given me quite as much pleasure as seeing you again. I think you know without my saying how deep is my personal affection for you and how great my admiration for your unrivalled accomplishments over the years. My visit to you brought back so keenly and inspiringly the memories of earlier days when I was your Chief of Staff of the Army when we worked so hard to lay foundations for the mighty struggle you will surely - and I believe shortly - win. Your decision to undertake the long journey to Honolulu to discuss the high aspects of the Pacific war will have a dynamic effect upon its prosecution. I delivered your message to the troops of my command and told them of your intense interest - not only for their preservation during the battle but of your determination for the preservation of their future when the battle is done. They were enthused.

You say that someday there will be a flag raising in Manila. That event will be one of great significance to our country. It will symbolize the successful reconquest of American territory that had been ravaged by the enemy and will mark the return of American prestige throughout the Far East. Its consequences will be felt in the train of political and commercial events for generations. Your decision to fulfil this great mission renews

my courage and determination. It is my considered professional opinion that the reconquest of the Philippines is the essential strategic prerequisite in the prosecution of the Pacific war. I believe, moreover, that its accomplishment will be decisive and may well bring about a successful conclusion very rapidly. The reconquest of the Philippines, however, has an even higher significance. We suffered defeat there and our flag by overwhelming force was torn down with consequent enslavement of a loyal people who were dependent upon us. The restoration of that people to a position of independence will not only revenge a terrible page of our history but will restore the prestige of the United States in the eyes of all of the peoples in the Far East and place it on a pinnacle never before attained. To do otherwise would be unthinkable.

You were good enough to say that you wanted me to raise the flag in Manila. Gratifying as that would be for me, I have an even higher and more soul filling vision. It is my fervent hope that you will come to our ranks that day and as The Commander-in-Chief preside in person at that ceremony. Your presence would enhance beyond measure the benefits that will flow in perpetuity. It would mark the highest drama of the greatest of wars. In your person that day the very touchstone of American destiny in the Far East will have been reached. I shall plan it accordingly and will take advantage of your invitation to communicate directly with you from time to time.

Mrs. MacArthur and my little boy were thrilled by your message of greeting.

With renewed thanks for giving me the opportunity to attend the Hawaiian conference,

Faithfully yours,

Douglas MacArthur

General Headquarters
Southwest Pacific Area

Office of the Commander-in-Chief

The President



MacArthur folder 2-44

File "Personal"

No envelope attached -

Perhaps the President
took it for his collection

SLV

PSF: MacArthur

1.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

URGENT	
OPNL PRIORITY	
PRIORITY	
ROUTINE	✓
DEFERRED	

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

SECRET	
CONFIDENTIAL	
RESTRICTED	
IN CLEAR	✓

Near Tacloban.
Philippine Islands.

CM

(Office)

No. Special

Oct. 20, 1944
(Date)

Dear Mr. President:

This note is written from the beach, near Tacloban, where we have just landed. It will be the first letter from the freed Philippines and I thought you might like to add it to your philatelic collection. I hope it gets through.

The operation is going smoothly and if successful will strategically as well as tactically cut the enemy forces in two. Strategically it will pierce

This is in reply to No. _____
(Insert Sig Corps No. to which this reply refers.)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

URGENT	
OPNL PRIORITY	
PRIORITY	
ROUTINE	
DEFERRED	

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

SECRET	
CONFIDENTIAL	
RESTRICTED	
IN CLEAR	

(Office)

No. _____

(Date)

the center of his defensive line extending along the coast of Asia from the Japanese Homeland to the tip of Singapore and will enable us to envelope to the north or south as we desire. It severs completely the Japanese from their great spoils in the South Seas and completely explodes their infamous propaganda slogan of the Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere. Tactically it divides his forces in the Philippines in two and by bypassing the southern half of the Islands will result in the saving of possibly 50,000 American casualties. He had

This is in reply to No.

(Insert Sig Corps No. to which this reply refers.)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

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OPML PRIORITY	
PRIORITY	
ROUTINE	
DEFERRED	

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

SECRET	
CONFIDENTIAL	
RESTRICTED	
IN CLEAR	

(Office)

No. _____

(Date)

Expected us and had prepared in Mindanao.

The Filipinos are reacting splendidly and I feel that a successful campaign of liberation if promptly followed by a dramatic granting to them of independence will place American prestige in the Far East at the highest pinnacle of all time. Once more I venture to urge on the highest plane of statesmanship that this great ceremony be presided over by you in person. Such a step will electrify the world and rebound immeasurably to the credit and honor of the United States for a thousand years. On a fast cruiser you can make the trip and return within

This is in reply to No.

(Insert Sig Corps No. to which this reply refers.)

PSF: MacArthur

4

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

URGENT	
OPNL PRIORITY	
PRIORITY	
ROUTINE	
DEFERRED	

SIGNAL CORPS MESSAGE

SECRET	
CONFIDENTIAL	
RESTRICTED	
IN CLEAR	

No. _____

(Office)

(Date)

the month.

Please excuse this scribble but at the moment
I am on the combat line with no facilities except
this field message pad.

Very faithfully.

Douglas MacArthur

This is in reply to No. _____
(Insert Sig Corps No. to which this reply refers.)

THE SATURDAY
EVENING
POST

Published by
1722 20

By *Franklin D. Roosevelt*



The author (left) confers with General Marshall, who advocates a modern adaptation of George Washington's plan—that every citizen be trained under competent leadership to defend his country.

General Marshall Wants a Citizen Army

By **JOHN MCAULEY PALMER**

Brigadier General, United States Army

ENDORSEMENT BY THE CHIEF OF STAFF

The author of this article, Brig. Gen. John McAuley Palmer, is the Army's leading authority on the subject of American military policy. The conclusions at which he arrives are solidly founded on research and study extending over the past half century, and are worthy of the consideration of every thinking American.

GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.

SINCE the War of 1812, most of our military unpreparedness and most of our enormous military expenditures have been chargeable to two conflicting views as to the merits of two mutually antagonistic types of military organization. One of these may be characterized as the citizen-army type, the other as the standing-army type. In the War Department's plans for a postwar military structure, which of these two styles of architecture should the planners follow? This is a highly important question, for, in the absence of a decision on this fundamental point, the planners are almost certain to give us an incongruous hodgepodge of both systems, as they have invariably done in the past.

Fortunately, this fundamental question has been answered by Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff

The War Department
states its position on our Army
after the war.

of the Army. In War Department Circular No. 347, dated 25 August, 1944, he has directed the General Staff and all other planning agencies under his jurisdiction to adapt their plans to the citizen-army formula. It will help us to grasp the full significance of this important decision if we will consider the origins and places of these two military types in our past history.

General Marshall is not proposing anything new. He is simply directing his planners to make a modern adaptation of the plan which President Washington submitted to the First Congress in January, 1790, as one of the essential foundations of the new American republic. This 1790 plan was prepared by Maj. Gen. Henry Knox, our first Secretary of War, and was revised to meet the President's views before he transmitted it to the Congress. It was based upon the fundamental democratic principle that every citizen in a free state should be trained to defend his country. It contained simple and economical machinery for the orderly mobilization of all or any necessary part of the nation's manpower in ample time to meet any military emergency.

Few of his countrymen realize that from the close of the Revolution to the end of his life, Washington

gave continuous scientific study to the problem of military institutions suited to the needs of a self-governing free people. In 1783, shortly after the formal conclusion of peace with Great Britain, he transmitted his Sentiments on a Peace Establishment to the Continental Congress. This was a treatise on national military policy prepared after consultation with all the generals at his headquarters. Unfortunately, this important state paper remained in manuscript form for 147 years and was not printed until I found it among the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress and published it in a book of mine in 1930.

In this 1783 treatise Washington had written: "It may be laid down as a primary position and the basis of our system that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government owes not only a portion of his property but even of his personal services to the defense of it."

After seven years of further study and mature reflection, he made this "primary position" the "basis" of the plans which he transmitted, as President, to the First Congress in January, 1790.

In delivering his first inaugural address, nine months earlier, Washington revealed that he was deeply conscious of the world significance of the new American republic. He was a lover of peace, but as the founder of the modern democratic state, he sought to make it always strong enough to maintain its just rights in its cruise toward an unknown future. Unfortunately, a great majority of his fellow countrymen preferred to make it impotent. Therein lies the fundamental cause of the present world cyclone: A high barometer of over-militarization in the regions of lawless aggression; a low barometer of undermilitarization in the regions of law-abiding democracy. Hence the inevitable storm. In their calculation of world conquest, the general staffs of the Axis powers counted primarily upon the continued military impotence of world democracy. They are now finding that this was a most disastrous miscalculation.

The Washington-Knox plan was very simple and may be outlined briefly as follows:

For a few weeks in their nineteenth summer, again in their twentieth summer and finally in their twenty-first summer, all young Americans were to be trained as citizen soldiers in what Knox called "Camps of Discipline." During these three years, all these citizen soldiers in each community were to be enrolled in local units of what Knox called the "Advanced Corps" of the national citizen army and held in readiness for a call to arms, if necessary.

In addition to his citizen soldiers, Washington insisted that there must also be enough highly trained Regular officers and soldiers to do those things that obviously cannot be done by citizen soldiers. In Washington's day, this meant the national military overhead, teachers in his military schools, guards for the national arsenals and troops to garrison the posts on the Indian frontier.

In the event of an Indian war or other emergency requiring a temporary reinforcement of the normal Regular Army, each community was to furnish its equitable quota of citizen officers and soldiers. If any community should fail to fill its quota with volunteers,

the shortage would be filled by what we would call a selective draft within that community.

In the event of a great national emergency, all citizen soldiers under the age of twenty-two would be mobilized immediately in their local units of the Advanced Corps.

Washington attached great importance to trained leadership. In an address to the Congress, less than four months after his inauguration, he urged that war-experienced veterans of the Continental Army should form the original officer corps of his new citizen army. These war veterans were to be gradually replaced by the graduates of a system of military schools. In his treatise of 1783, he proposed the establishment of "one or more" military academies. A year later, he endorsed General Steuben's proposal that there should be three such academies, one in New England, one in the middle states and one south of the Potomac—and this when our total population was less than 4,000,000. Later, Knox incorporated this proposal of Steuben's in his own plan. It is obvious that these three military academies would train many more officers than would be needed for the little Regular Army of about 2500 men with which Washington proposed to guard the Indian frontier. A great majority of their graduates would therefore return to their homes to become the trained leaders of his citizen army.

A Mishandled Legacy

WASHINGTON believed as a fundamental political principle that, in a free state, military promotion should be open to able citizen soldiers as well as to professionals—but subject to the imperative condition that no officer—professional or nonprofessional—should be entrusted with the command of any body of American soldiers, small or great, until he had demonstrated definite and positive qualification for that great responsibility.

If the First Congress had adopted the Washingtonian plan, and if subsequent Congresses had gradually adapted its detailed organization, armament and training requirements to meet gradual changes in population, modes of transportation and scientific progress, we would have been prepared for all our subsequent wars. To use Washington's language, it would have made us so "respectable in the Eyes of our friends" and so "formidable to those who would otherwise become our enemies" that most of these wars—including the present global holocaust—probably could not have occurred.

But this was not to be. After two years of debate and agitation, the Congress finally adopted Washington's scheme for a nation-wide citizen army, but not until after it had carefully eliminated every provision for training its soldiers and for providing it with qualified officers. Washington had proposed a national citizen army in terms of gilt-edged bonds. Congress issued it in terms of watered stock. This is the origin of the notorious Militia Act of 1792, which got its inglorious tryout twenty years later in the War of 1812.

So Washington failed to secure the adoption of his most cherished plan for the future peace and welfare of the new American nation. His plan was rejected not

because it was bad from a military standpoint, but because it was obviously too good. The majority in Congress was influenced by a curious antimilitary complex which most American politicians had inherited from their English forebears. Back in the seventeenth century, Parliament had given Oliver Cromwell an effective army. Since then, anything savoring of military efficiency was regarded by most Englishmen with suspicion. And so, at the beginning of our Revolutionary War, their descendants in the Continental Congress were careful not to authorize an intelligent manpower policy for the Continental Army. If too easily victorious over King George, Washington might be tempted to follow Cromwell's example. This was the principal cause of an unduly prolonged war, with all its attendant economic and social distresses. On the whole, the commander in chief of the Continental Army encountered much more serious opposition from obstructionists in the Continental Congress than he did from King George's army.

After the adoption of the Constitution, the traditional antipathy to military efficiency took on a new form. Suspicion was now directed not against Washington, but against the government that he headed. Obviously, if the new Federal Union should be given effective military power in any form, it would be strong enough to nullify the divine right of secession. After the Constitutional Convention, a strong isolationist party had sprung up in each of the thirteen states. The isolationists of that day regarded the proposed American Union much as their political descendants of the twentieth century regarded the League of Nations. They therefore did all they could to keep their respective states out of it. Failing in that, they entered the new government with their fingers crossed. They feared that the interests of a majority of the states might become fatal to the interests of a minority. They believed that, in that event, the minority could and should secede from the Union.

While large numbers of men, North as well as South, believed in the divine right of secession, they were not disposed to give the new Federal Government any effective military power. It might be used to preserve the Union as well as for national defense. It thus appears that the establishment of an effective military system, in any form, was not politically feasible in the United States until after interstate isolationism was finally wiped out in the Civil War. But by that time, Washington's legacy of military wisdom had long been forgotten by his countrymen.

It was the untrained militia of the Act of 1792 that failed in the War of 1812. It may therefore be interesting to consider what the issue might have been if Congress had accepted Washington's plan for a citizen army composed of trained citizen soldiers under trained leaders. By 1812, his organized Advanced Corps would have numbered about 117,000. All able-bodied American citizens under the age of forty—about 600,000 in all—would have been graduates of Washington's Camps of Discipline. Practically all the veterans of the Revolution would have passed the military age, but they would have been replaced by younger officers who had been tested for each step in the ladder of promotion. (Continued on Page 36)

Secretary of War Stimson is blindfolded preparatory to drawing a number from the draft bowl, October 29, 1910.



In World War I, awkward youths like these, many of whom had never fired a gun, made history—despite too little preparation—at Château-Thierry, the Argonne Forest.





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MAICO

GENERAL MARSHALL WANTS A CITIZEN ARMY

(Continued from Page 10)

Every company and higher unit would have had a commander accustomed to lead it in field maneuvers. Every divisional commander would have been familiar with the team play of infantry supported by artillery and cavalry. Could a little British raiding force have burned the Capitol of a nation organized like this? If Washington had had his way, Britannia might have hesitated before entering a second war against her wayward American daughter.

But if the untrained 1792 militia failed completely in the War of 1812, our little Regular Army came out of it with the highest credit and prestige. Before the war, it had been little more than a widely scattered constabulary on the Indian frontier. As war threatened, it was increased in 1808 and again in 1812. Under capable leaders like Brown and Ripley and Winfield Scott, the Regulars became highly disciplined soldiers. At Chippewa and Lundy's Lane, they proved themselves a match for the best British troops. It was the gallantry of this new Regular Army and the brilliant exploits of our Navy that redeemed some of the general disgrace of the war. The history of our modern Regular Army really begins with the War of 1812. Since then, it has never failed to give a good account of itself.

After the War of 1812, the War Department became the headquarters of this new Regular Army. Its leaders became the sole military advisers of the Secretary of War. They were neither military philosophers nor practical tacticians. They were hard-boiled, practical soldiers. To them, the lesson of the recent war was simple. The militia was utterly worthless. They had no knowledge of Washington's scientific plan to make it the source of an effective citizen army. In their minds there could be no effective military organization except with hired soldiers under professional officers.

When Monroe became President, in 1817, he made John C. Calhoun his Secretary of War. The new secretary was fully indoctrinated by his generals. He therefore agreed with them that the existing militia was worthless. But instead of seeking to reform it, he proposed to replace it by what he called an expandable standing army. Here was a plan that Washington and his generals never heard of, and one that was the very antithesis of everything they ever advocated.

An expandable-standing-army bill was transmitted to the Congress by Secretary Calhoun in December, 1820. It was based upon a radical conception entirely new in American history and foreign to American tradition. In time of emergency, instead of reinforcing the Regular Army by the mobilization of organized military units composed of citizen officers and soldiers trained in peacetime to defend their country, we should expand the Regular Army, as such, by drawing the national manpower into its lower ranks, there to serve under a permanent class or caste of professional officers.

Looking at the Calhoun plan after the lapse of 120 years, we are amazed that any group of intelligent men could have proposed an arrangement so utterly futile from a political standpoint. There was never a chance that it would be acceptable to the American people or their Congress. The trouble was that Calhoun's military planners—like many other distinguished practical soldiers since their time—were totally ignorant of the fact there is a political as well as a dynamic aspect of military institutions. They were proposing a type of military organization which later attained a high degree of

efficiency in autocratic Germany and Japan. But they were unable to see that it was totally inapplicable to a democratic state such as the United States of America. Wise military statesmen like Washington are always inclined to improve or perfect existing institutions rather than to propose new or alien types. They appreciate that a national institution is a living organism, like a growing tree deeply rooted in the soil of national history and tradition. It can be pruned or guided or stimulated as it grows, but it cannot be replaced by a lifeless, artificial substitute such as a post driven in the ground. The trouble with the post is that, instead of taking root, it will rot where it enters the soil.

Notwithstanding its utter futility, the Scott-Brown-Calhoun conception of an expandable standing army became orthodox in the Regular Army for many years. It completely displaced the Washingtonian military policy. As late as 1876, General Sherman worked out a modern improvement of Calhoun's scheme. But he suggested a much greater coefficient of dilution. He proposed to expand a peacetime Regular Army of about 27,000 men into a wartime Regular Army of about 213,000. General Upton's coefficient of dilution was not quite so big. He proposed to stretch a peace establishment of about 23,000 into a war establishment of about 140,000. Under such a system, expansion for a great war would be impos-

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

NEXT DOOR

By VIRGINIA SCOTT MINER

The young man nearly seven

Has just gone in next door

To call upon the maiden

Who isn't far from four.

One lollipop between them,

One posy in his hand—

But any who have seen them

Must smile and understand.

His very footstep flatters

The doorstep which it mounts—

At any age of woman

To be chosen is what counts!

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

sible under the volunteer system, and none of the advocates of the expandable standing army ever dared to propose that its ranks should be filled by conscription.

While we officers of the "old Army" were never able to say just how we proposed to expand our expandable standing army, we were all agreed that there was one infallible practical formula for national preparedness: Increase the Regular Army whenever you can. If Congress won't give you enough Regulars, get as many as you can. We submitted this panacea to our friends in Congress and made it the theme of learned books and magazine articles whenever we could find a publisher. As General Pershing once said of his early days in the Army: "Every Army officer carried an Army organization bill in his vest pocket." I wrote one myself when I was a second lieutenant. I gave cogent reasons for a sufficient legislative increase to make me a captain of infantry. But while that highly commendable objective would have added \$40,000,000 a year to the national budget, I can see now that my scheme would not have added a pennyworth to the solution of our national-defense problem.

It will be seen that there was one marked difference between the old Army's military policy and Washington's. He wanted as many professional officers and soldiers as were needed for certain specific purposes, but no more. We disciples of Calhoun and Scott and

Sherman wanted just as many as we could persuade Congress to give us. And we were perfectly sincere about it. We had been bred in the doctrine that citizen soldiers are worthless and that only professional soldiers are worth their salt.

This, of course, was due to a defect in our military education. There was a serious deficiency in the curriculum at West Point. We had more mathematics than we needed, and no instruction at all in the history of our national military institutions. How different our subsequent military history might have been if some old superintendent of the Military Academy came a century ago—when General Sherman was a cadet—had ordered one of his bright young instructors to prepare and deliver a course of lectures on that theme.

This increase-the-Regular-Army complex in the minds of many Regular Army officers tended to vitiate their thought on national military policy for many years. According to General Grant, the superiority of the Confederate armies at the beginning of the Civil War was due to the fact that the North did not have a standing army. The true problem for each side was to develop its traditional citizen army as soon as possible. The Confederacy concentrated upon this policy from the start. Almost all the Southern graduates of West Point and other trained officers who resigned from the old Army when their states seceded were absorbed as leaders and staff officers in the great citizen army of the Confederacy. As Grant said, "They leaved the whole loaf." There was little such yeast for the Federal citizen army because the Northern military authorities wasted valuable time in securing their orthodox increase of the Regular Army. Many trained and educated officers who should have gone to the Northern citizen army as leaders and staff officers were therefore retained in new Regular regiments, too few and too small in total strength to exert any material influence upon the progress of the war. It is well known that Calhoun's political disciples in the South were powerful advocates of secession, but it is not so well known that his military disciples in the North almost made it impossible for Lincoln to save the Union.

Thirteen years after the Civil War, for the first time in our history, the Congress made a constructive effort to establish a sound military system. Now that the secession heresy was finally extinguished, this had finally become feasible from a political standpoint. A joint congressional committee, popularly known as the Burnside Commission, comprising three senators and four representatives, was therefore appointed. All seven of its members had commanded citizen soldiers in the recent war, two in the Confederate Army and five in the Union Army. Here was a jury of seven soldier statesmen, highly competent to take up the light that had failed in Washington's Administration.

And but for an unfortunate accident, Washington's message might have come to their hands. In preparing his Military Policy of the United States, General Upton had just finished a study of Sparks' Writings of Washington. Unfortunately, he overlooked the highly significant footnote in Volume 8 which should have directed him to Washington's correspondence with his generals and his Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, then among the voluminous unpublished Washington Papers in the State Department. Lacking this essential key to Washington's constructive labors, he quoted most of Washington's denunciations of the untrained militia of the Revolutionary War, but failed to find any record of the scientific reforms that Washington, with the aid of his generals, had worked out after the war. In short, he found Washington's diagnosis of the national military disease without finding his sovereign cure.

Lacking Washington's own remedy, he substituted his own, which was no more than a new version of Calhoun's exorbitant standing army. In this way, Washington was made the principal exponent witness for a military policy which never heard of and one which was the thesis of everything he ever proposed. Strongly endorsed by General Sherman, then commanding general of the Army, this was the gist of the military policy that the War Department submitted to the Burnside Commission.

But even with the support of Upton's pseudo-Washington, the War Department was unable to sell its expansive standing army to the soldier statesmen of the Burnside Commission. They had all seen American citizen soldiers doing pretty well in a great war. As to the Regulars being the whole show, the two Confederate veterans—Generals Butler and Dibrell—probably recalled that Lee and Stonewall Jackson had managed to do fairly well without any Regulars at all. And so another great opportunity passed with nothing done.

After the Spanish-American War, the War Department again had an opportunity to present a solution of our national military problem to a receptive Congress. The result was a material increase of the Regular Army, but no effective step toward the development of our traditional citizen army. In 1903, upon the recommendation of Secretary Root, Congress authorized a new planning agency known as the General Staff and a new educational system for the training of prospective General Staff officers. But unfortunately, just as he was launching his new planning agency, Mr. Root gave it a bad start by publishing Upton's Military Policy of the United States, in an official War Department document, as a critical and exhaustive study of our national military system since Washington's Administration.

In a message to the Congress shortly after the outbreak of World War I, President Wilson proclaimed that the traditional foundation of our military system was a "citizenry trained and accustomed to arms." This pregnant hint from its commander in chief made no perceptible impression upon the General Staff, for it immediately proceeded to make plans for an expansive standing army on a large scale. As a result, when a great war army of citizen soldiers was required a little later, it had to be extemporized, as in the past. Again, as at the beginning of the Civil War, many trained professional officers who should have become leaders and staff officers in the wartime citizen army were tied up in new Regular Army regiments.

After World War I, there was a widespread popular opinion that the citizen army, developed at such enormous cost during the recent war, should be perpetuated as a permanent national institution through a system of universal military training. This policy was advocated by the citizen-army veterans who were then establishing the American Legion, and was endorsed by many Regular Army officers, including General Pershing. Unfortunately, the War Department recommended another policy based upon a large standing army, with no provision for the development of our traditional citizen army. But for these divided counsels, the National Defense Act of 1920 might well have contained a complete legislative solution of our national military problem based upon universal military training.

Failure to establish a sound system after the last war found us in dire straits at the beginning of World War II. Again it became necessary to extemporize the national citizen army with which we have fought all our great wars. In accomplishing this tremendous constructive task, General Marshall and his assistants are demonstrating on battlefields throughout the world that the American army of

the people is superior in sheer military might to the much-vaunted armies of the Axis powers. In his recent War Department circular, he therefore directs all planning agencies under his jurisdiction to make that Army the basis of their plans for a future peace establishment. As Washington did before him, he bases his military policy upon the democratic principles that in a free state every able-bodied citizen should be trained to defend his country and that every citizen soldier should be eligible for promotion to any rank for which he is able to qualify under sound and equitable standards.

The Army of the future envisaged in the War Department circular would comprise a relatively small Regular Army, subject to prompt reinforcement, when necessary, from a great citizen-army reserve composed of trained citizen officers and soldiers. The officer corps of this national army as a whole would comprise relatively few professional officers and a relatively great number of citizen officers. But the efficiency of the whole would depend primarily upon the efficiency and the disinterested devotion of these professionals. There can be no effective citizen army without them. It would be their indispensable task, as General Grant expressed it, to leave the whole loaf. Within the limits of his true mission, as defined by Washington and Grant in the past and more recently by General Marshall, the highly trained professional officer would thus become one of the most invaluable servants of the modern democratic state. The plans now in preparation in the War Department contemplate that the National Guard shall continue to be an essential component of the Army of the United States. Under the provisions of Section 5 of the National Defense Act, representative officers of the National Guard are now participating with Regular Army officers in the preparation of these plans.

The citizen army advocated by General Marshall would meet our military requirements, whatever the future world organization may be. It would not be provocative of war, as great standing armies are. It would be organized for the prompt reinforcement of a relatively small Regular Army in the formation of such expeditionary forces, great or small, as would enable us to do our part in suppressing lawless aggression. It would thus assure our friends and warn our potential foes that hereafter America will be not only willing but able and ready to do her part in maintaining a peaceful world order. On the other hand, if the organization of world peace should, unfortunately, break down, it would put us in a position to mobilize all, or any necessary part, of our total manpower in a minimum of time and with maximum effectiveness for war.

It would also form the basis for a military system of maximum economy. Under a system of universal military training, the money required to maintain one officer or man on the permanent establishments of our armed forces would maintain several trained reserve officers or reservists. With such a reserve system, our peace establishment would be capable of rapid expansion and, therefore, a relatively small and inexpensive permanent establishment would meet our needs. Without such trained reserves, there would be no such power of rapid expansion, and a much larger and more expensive Regular establishment would be necessary in order to give us a reasonable degree of security. It may therefore be laid down as a fundamental principle that whenever we maintain one officer or man on the permanent establishments of our ground, sea or air forces to perform a duty that can be performed effectively and in time by trained reserve officers or reservists, we increase the per-capita cost of our national-defense system unduly and reduce its ultimate capacity to meet the nation's requirements in war.



In the eyes of childhood... the vision of later years

Just look at the eyes of that youngster of yours. Then think of this: Nature never intended



human eyes to cope with the tiny images of reading and writing and sewing, indoors. Instead, they were designed for far seeing in the bountiful light of the open sky. That's why it's so important to give young eyes every care for indoor seeing, especially the protection of good lighting. Westinghouse has a word for it—See-ability. That stands for plenty of well-diffused, shadowless, glareless light—the right light in the right place. And Westinghouse Mazda stands for bright, long-lasting lamp bulbs. So look for the Westinghouse name on the bulbs you buy. Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Company, Bloomfield, New Jersey.

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BEST AVAILABLE COPY.

PSF: *Gen. MacArthur folder*
War 2-45

January 20, 1945

My dear Douglas:

This letter will be carried by my old friend, Robert Sherwood, who was largely responsible for the organization of our psychological warfare activities in this war. Although he is no longer associated with the Office of War Information, Mr. Sherwood is doing special work for this Government with a view to bringing home to the American people, and to the peoples of Allied Nations, the vital importance of the continuing operations in the war against Japan.

I hope that you will have time for a talk with him during his visit to the Philippines.

All of us are eternally proud of your great achievements and know there will be many more of them.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

General Douglas MacArthur
Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area

(Copy of this ltr. is filed - Sherwood folder, 4-45.)

PSF: MacArthur

~~San Carlos~~ 41-45

File

MEMORANDUM to the President
Copies to the Under Secretary and the
Assistant Secretary of War

FROM Walter White

SUBJECT: Interview with General Douglas
MacArthur re utilization of Negro combat troops

8 March 1945

It is respectfully requested that this memorandum be made a supplement to my memorandum of 12 February 1945 relative to the 93rd Division and other Negro combat troops in the Pacific Theatres of Operations.

On 1 March 1945 I discussed with General MacArthur at his headquarters at San Miguel the use of Negro combat troops. His statements may be summarized as follows:

1. That the 93rd Division is and will remain a combat one and will not be transformed into a service division.
2. The 93rd will be used in combat provided circumstances warrant.
3. That the stories being circulated in the Pacific that the 93rd broke and failed in a beachhead operation at Bougainville or elsewhere are false and ridiculous.
4. That he knows from experience with the 25th Infantry and the Filipino Army he commanded that race or color have nothing whatever to do with fighting ability.
5. That lack of ships have prevented moving the 93rd and other divisions to forward areas.
6. That the 93rd will shortly be moved from Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea to Morotai. The impression was gained that the division will be brought together as a unit for the first time since leaving the United States in February, 1944.

7. That General MacArthur had had one of his officers to inspect the 93rd recently and his report had not been/^{too}favorable. When queried as to the specific items of criticism, General MacArthur stated it was chiefly that the men of the 93rd wanted to go home. He added, laughing, that that is true and natural of all divisions overseas, regardless of race.

8. With respect to the transformation of numerous Negro anti-aircraft units to port battalion and other service status, General MacArthur stated that such action was due to the changing character of the war in the Pacific. When some of these units first came over the enemy had control of the air; that now we have control so that anti-aircraft batteries are not as needed; that not enough service troops had been sent over to the Pacific to meet the needs of a swiftly moving war and thus these and other combat units had to be used to unload ships and do other such work. However, the General did not explain why two Negro anti-aircraft units with nearly three years of training and service had been notified on arrival at Hollandia as late as 13 February 1945 that they were to be port battalion units instead of combat units.

Attached hereto is copy of memorandum sent General MacArthur today.

Respectfully,

Walter White

Walter White
War Correspondent
A.P.O. 93
Care PW, San Francisco, Calif.

8 March 1945

My Dear General MacArthur:

You most certainly acted promptly after our talk of 1 March regarding the 93rd Division. On my return here I found that all units in this area and, I presume, those in Birk, Fishhaven and the Solomons, have resumed drilling and have been alerted to move to their new base in a more forward area. A greatly increased morale is already evident now that it is known, to quote your statement to me, that the 93rd is and will remain a combat division."

There is attached a copy of my memorandum to the President, the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary of War on our interview which I told Brigadier General Diller I would send you.

For whatever value they may have, I would like to summarize here some observations I have made in studying the division and recommendations to bring it up to maximum fighting efficiency:

- (1) The Division is, I understand, short some 130 officers and between 1000 and 1500 men. I presume steps will be taken to bring the Division to full combat strength.
- (2) Major General Johnson has already taken some steps towards elimination of inefficient officers or those who resent serving with Negro troops. There are still some who might well be transferred to other divisions or otherwise re-assigned. It is suggested that prior to the assignment of new officers to the Division, each of them be interviewed in advance to assure the selection of only men of unbiased racial attitude.
- (3) Because the 93rd was sent directly from the states to Guadalcanal and adjoining islands and was not given in the Hawaiian Islands, Australia or other place the training in amphibious and other warfare given most other combat divisions, it is recommended that the 93rd Division be given speedily and thoroughly all necessary training in conformity with the character of the future waging of the war in the Pacific.
- (4) It is suggested that the artillery guns of the Division which you told me were still at Hunda be restored to the 93rd or other weapons given them, if the shortage of ships still prevents transportation of the guns from Hunda, in order that the artillerymen may resume training in the use of these weapons and regain their efficiency.
- (5) In the replacement of officers who may be transferred from the Division and in the assignment of officers to fill existing vacancies, it is recommended that superlatively qualified and experienced officers be assigned to the 93rd in order that whatever deficiencies in training which may now exist be corrected.

Case No. 100-10000
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Mrs. G. G. G. G.
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(6) That consideration be given to the present total absence of qualified Negro officers on the Division General Staff and of field grade on regimental staffs throughout the Division. In making such a recommendation, permit me to repeat here what we both agreed on in our conference— that these and all other assignments be made wholly and solely on a rigid yardstick of ability, efficiency and experience.

Your action in bringing the Division together in one island for the first time since the 93rd left the States will undoubtedly have immediate effect in improvement of efficiency and a sense of unity. The Commanding General will be able to devote his full time to training and leading the Division instead of spending so much of his time and energy travelling to various islands over which the 93rd has been scattered since coming overseas.

It is my hope that neither you nor the War Department will think these recommendations by a layman presumptuous. Be assured that they are made solely with the desire that the zeal of the overwhelming majority of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 93rd to contribute to the speediest winning of complete victory may be utilized to the fullest degree.

Respectfully,

Walter White.