MEMORANDUM FOR

THE PRESIDENT

Frank McCarthy telephoned to say that the War Department had been considering an additional citation of the Oak Leaf Cluster for the D.S.M. which General MacArthur already has and, as tomorrow is his birthday, they would like to have it cleared so they can get it to him on his birthday. The following is the citation for your approval:

"General Douglas MacArthur, United States Army, for exceptional distinguished service as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific since March, 1942.

Under extremely difficult conditions of terrain, climate and limited forces and material, he expelled the enemy from Eastern New Guinea, secured lodgments on the Island of New Britain, and gave strategical direction to coordinated operations resulting in the conquest of New Georgia and the establishment of U.S.
Army and Navy forces on Bougainville Island. He has inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, and established his forces in positions highly favorable for the continuation of offensive operations."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Reference your note regarding the Medal of Honor which was awarded to General MacArthur, the citation was drafted by me personally and publicized at the time he came out of the Philippines. This action was taken, among other things, to offset any propaganda by the enemy directed against his leaving his command and proceeding to Australia in compliance with your orders. I cleared it with the Secretary of War and then with you at the time.

I attach a message from his Chief of Staff, General Sutherland, recommending the award.

The citation recently submitted for your signature was merely to give MacArthur a copy signed by you personally.

Chief of Staff.

Incl.

Citation signed and handed to Major Keanie, 8/28/44.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library
DECLASSIFIED
DDO DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/58)
Date- 3-18-59
Signature- Carl G. Speer
To: The Secretary of War
From: General Sutherland

I am sure, in the opinion of every officer and man here, no officer has ever more richly deserved the award of the Medal of Honor than General MacArthur. No more appropriate occasion could be found for its award to the General than the time of his arrival in Australia. Such an award would receive the enthusiastic and unanimous approval of both the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East and of the entire Filipino people.

I would suggest the possibility of the citation being written in Washington due to the certainty of compromising the only code available to us en route if I send a citation before our arrival in Australia. It is suggested that such a citation written in Washington be based upon his utter contempt of danger under terrific aerial bombardments during bomb one of which a two hundred kilogram/exploded within thirty feet of him in the open except for momentary shelter taken in a shallow drain beside a sidewalk. His refusal to take cover and his complete calm on this and many other occasions had a tremendous effect upon the morale of his troops among whom his personal valor was the subject of constant comment; and upon the magnificent leadership and vision that enabled the General to conduct a defense with a partially mobilized and equipped citizen Army that has merited the acclaim of the world and that enabled him to galvanize the spirit of resistance of sixteen million Filipinos.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRIVATE AND
CONFIDENTIAL

August 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL MARSHALL

Before I sign this I want
to talk with you personally.
I would have no hesitation in
signing this for Douglas
MacArthur but I would like to
know what the wording is
based on.

F. D. R.

Citation awarding Medal of
Honor to General MacArthur.

RECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
Douglas MacArthur, General, United States Army, commanding, United States Army Forces in the Far East. For conspicuous leadership in preparing the Philippine Islands to resist conquest, for gallantry and intrepidity above and beyond the call of duty in action against invading Japanese forces, and for the heroic conduct of defensive and offensive operations on the Bataan Peninsula. He mobilized, trained, and led an army which has received world acclaim for its gallant defense against a tremendous superiority of enemy forces in men and arms. His utter disregard of personal danger under heavy fire and aerial bombardment, his calm judgment in each crisis, inspired his troops, galvanized the spirit of resistance of the Filipino people, and confirmed the faith of the American people in their armed forces.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AUG 28 1944

Published in W.D. General Order No. 16, 1 April 1942.
Date of Award: 25 March, 1942.
Born: Arkansas.
Residence at appointment: Wisconsin.
Quebec  
September 15, 1944

Dear Douglas:

It is good to get your letter of August twenty-fifth up here in Quebec. I wish you could be here because you know so much of what we are talking about in regard to the plans of the British for the Southwest Pacific. There is no question that Mr. Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff want to send all they can to the Malay Peninsula, etc. — Army and Navy and Air — as soon as the German war ends.

In regard to our own force, the situation is just as we left it at Hawaii though there seem to be efforts to do a little bypassing which you would not like. I still have the situation in hand.

I formally received our old friend, Osmena, and his Staff about a week ago. He wants to go out — with about a dozen others — as soon as we get a permanent foothold. I will wire you a little later to ask what your thought is on this.

I wish I could hope to come out myself for the great event but we all know there is a lot of this "in the lap of the gods stuff"!

Take care of yourself and give my warm regards to your wife and youngster.

Always sincerely,

General Douglas MacArthur,  
General Headquarters  
Southwest Pacific Area.
General Headquarters
Southwest Pacific Area
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

26 August 1944.

My dear Mr. President:

Your cordial letter of August 9 has just reached me and I cannot tell you how greatly I appreciate it. Nothing in the course of the war has given me quite as much pleasure as seeing you again. I think you know without my saying how deep is my personal affection for you and how great my admiration for your unrivalled accomplishments over the years. My visit to you brought back so keenly and inspiring the memories of earlier days when I was your Chief of Staff of the Army when we worked so hard to lay foundations for the mighty struggle you will surely—and I believe shortly—win. Your decision to undertake the long journey to Honolulu to discuss the high aspects of the Pacific war will have a dynamic effect upon its prosecution. I delivered your message to the troops of my command and told them of your intense interest—not only for their preservation during the battle but of your determination for the preservation of their future when the battle is done. They were enthused.

You say that someday there will be a flag raising in Manila. That event will be one of great significance to our country. It will symbolize the successful reconquest of American territory that had been ravaged by the enemy and will mark the return of American prestige throughout the Far East. Its consequences will be felt in the train of political and commercial events for generations. Your decision to fulfil this great mission renews
my courage and determination. It is my considered professional opinion that the reconquest of the Philippines is the essential strategic prerequisite in the prosecution of the Pacific war. I believe, moreover, that its accomplishment will be decisive and may well bring about a successful conclusion very rapidly. The reconquest of the Philippines, however, has an even higher significance. We suffered defeat there and our flag by overwhelming force was torn down with consequent enslavement of a loyal people who were dependent upon us. The restoration of that people to a position of independence will not only revenge a terrible page of our history but will restore the prestige of the United States in the eyes of all of the peoples in the Far East and place it on a pinnacle never before attained. To do otherwise would be unthinkable.

You were good enough to say that you wanted me to raise the flag in Manila. Gratifying as that would be for me, I have an even higher and more soul filling vision. It is my fervent hope that you will come to our ranks that day and as The Commander-in-Chief preside in person at that ceremony. Your presence would enhance beyond measure the benefits that will flow in perpetuity. It would mark the highest drama of the greatest of wars. In your person that day the very touchstone of American destiny in the Far East will have been reached. I shall plan it accordingly and will take advantage of your invitation to communicate directly with you from time to time.

Mrs. MacArthur and my little boy were thrilled by your message of greeting.

With renewed thanks for giving me the opportunity to attend the Hawaiian conference,

Faithfully yours,
General Headquarters
Southwest Pacific Area
Office of the Commander-in-Chief

The President
Title: "Personal"

No envelope attached.

Perhaps the President took it for his collection.
Dear Mr. President:

This note is written from the beach, near Tacloban, where we have just landed. It will be the first letter from the freed Philippines, and I thought you might like to add it to your philatelic collection. I hope it gets through.

The operation is going smoothly and if successful will strategically as well as technically cut the enemy forces in two. Strategically it will piece...
the center of his defensive line extending along the coast of Asia from the Japanese homeland to the tip of Singapore and will enable us to envelop to the north or south as we desire. It serves completely the Japanese from their great spots in the South Seas and completely explodes their infamous propaganda slogan of the Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere. Tactically it divides his forces in the Philippines in two and by bypassing the southern half of the islands will result in the saving of possibly 50,000 American casualties. He told

This is in reply to No. [Insert Sig Corps No. to which this reply refers.]
Expected to see and had prepared his headquarters.

The Filipinos are reacting splendidly and I feel that a successful campaign of liberation is promptly followed by a dramatic granting to them of independence will place American prestige in the Far East at the height it has never been in all time. Once more I venture to urge on the highest place of statesmanship that this great ceremony be carried out by you in person. Such a step will electrify the world and redound immeasurably to the credit and honor of the United States for a thousand years. As a fast courier you can make the trip and return within.
The month.

Please excuse this scrawl but at the moment I am on the combat line with no facilities except this field message pad.

Very faithfully,

[Signature]

This is in reply to No. [Insert Sig Corps No. to which this reply refers.]
General Marshall Wants a Citizen Army

By JOHN McCauley Palmer
Brigadier General, United States Army

Since the War of 1812, most of our military expenditures have been chargeable to two conflicting views as to the merits of two mutually antagonistic types of military organization. One of these may be characterized as the citizen-army type, the other as the standing-army type. In the War Department's plans for a postwar military structure, which of these two styles of architecture should the planners follow? This is a highly important question, for, in the absence of a decision on this fundamental point, the planners are almost certain to give us an incongruous hodgepodge of both systems, as they have invariably done in the past.

Fortunately, this fundamental question has been answered by Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army. In War Department Circular No. 347, dated 25 August, 1944, he has directed the General Staff and all other planning agencies under his jurisdiction to adapt their plans to the citizen-army formula. It will help us to grasp the full significance of this important decision if we will consider the origins and places of these two military types in our past history.

General Marshall is not proposing anything new. He is simply directing his planners to make a modern adaptation of the plan which President Washington submitted to the First Congress in January, 1790, as one of the essential foundations of the new American republic. This 1790 plan was prepared by Maj. Gen. Henry Knox, our first Secretary of War, and was revised to meet the President's views before it was transmitted to the Congress. It was based upon the fundamental democratic principle that every citizen in a free state should be trained to defend his country. It contained simple and economical machinery for the orderly mobilization of all or any necessary part of the nation's manpower in ample time to meet any military emergency.

Few of his countrymen realize that from the close of the Revolution to the end of his life, Washington...
gave continuous scientific study to the problem of military institutions suited to the needs of a self-governing free people. In 1785, shortly after the formal conclusion of peace with Great Britain, he transmitted his Sentiments on a Peace Establishment to the Continental Congress. This was a treatise on national military policy prepared after consultation with all the generals at his headquarters. Unfortunately, this important state paper remained in manuscript form for 147 years and was not printed until I found it among the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress and published it in a book of mine in 1930.

In this 1783 treatise Washington had written: "It may be laid down as a primary position and the basis of our system that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government owes not only a portion of his property but even of his personal services to the defense of it."

After seven years of further study and mature reflection, he made this "primary position" the "basis" of the plans which he transmitted, as President, to the First Congress in January, 1790.

In delivering his first inaugural address, nine months earlier, Washington revealed that he was deeply conscious of the world significance of the new American republic. He was a lover of peace, but as the founder of the modern democratic state, he sought to make it strong enough to maintain its just rights in its struggle toward an unknown future. Unfortunately, a great majority of his fellow countrymen preferred to make it impotent. Therein lies the fundamental cause of the present world conflict: A high barometer of militarization in the regions of lawless aggression; a low barometer of democratization in the regions of law-abiding democracy. Hence the inevitable storm. In their calculation of world conquest, the general staffs of the Axis powers counted primarily upon the continued military impotence of world democracy. They are now finding that this was a most disastrous miscalculation.

The Washington-Knox plan was very simple and may be outlined briefly as follows:

For a few weeks in their nineteenth summer, again in their twentieth summer and finally in their twenty-first summer, all young Americans were to be trained as citizen soldiers in what Knox called "Camps of Discipline." During these three years, all these citizen soldiers in each community were to be enrolled in local units of what Knox called the "Advanced Corps," of the national citizen army and held in readiness for a call to arms, if necessary.

In addition to his citizen soldiers, Washington insisted that there must also be enough highly trained Regular officers and soldiers to do those things that obviously cannot be done by citizen soldiers. In Washington's day, this meant the national military over- head, teachers in his military schools, guards for the national arsenals and troops to garrison the posts on the Indian frontier.

In the event of an Indian war or other emergency requiring a temporary reinforcement of the normal Regular Army, each community was to furnish its equivalent officers and soldiers to meet the needs of the new American nation. His plan was rejected not because it was bad from a military standpoint, but because it was obviously too good. The majority in Congress was influenced by a curious antimilitary complex which most American politicians had inherited from their English forebears. Back in the seventeenth century, Parliament had given Oliver Cromwell an effective army. Since then, everything savoring of military efficiency was regarded by most Englishmen with suspicion. And so, at the beginning of our Revolutionary War, their descendants in the Continental Congress were careful not to authorize an intelligent manpower policy for the Continental Army. If too easily victorious over King George, Washington might be tempted to follow Cromwell's example. This was the principal cause of an unduly prolonged war, with all its attendant economic and social distresses. On the whole, the commander in chief of the Continental Army encountered much more serious opposition from obstructionists in the Continental Congress than he did from King George's army.

After the adoption of the Constitution, the traditional antipathy to military efficiency took on a new form. Suspicion was now directed not against Washington, but against the government that he headed. Obviously, if the new Federal Union was to give effective military power in any form, it would be strong enough to nullify the divine right of secession. After the Constitutional Convention, a strong isolationist party had sprung up in each of the thirteen states. The isolationists of that day regarded the proposed American Union much as their political descendants of the twentieth century regarded the League of Nations. They therefore did all they could to keep their respective states out of it. Failing in that, they entered the new government with their fingers crossed. They feared that the interests of a majority of the states might become fatal to the interests of a minority. They believed that, in that event, the minority could and should secede from the Union.

While large numbers of men, North as well as South, believed in the divine right of secession, they were not ready to dispose of the new Federal Government any effective military power. It might be used to preserve the Union as well as for national defense. It thus appeared that the establishment of an effective military system, in any form, was not politically feasible in the United States until after interstate isolationism was finally wiped out in the Civil War. By that time, Washington's legacy of military wisdom had long been forgotten by his countrymen.

It was the untrained militia of the Act of 1792 that failed in the War of 1812. It may therefore be interesting to consider what the issue might have been if Congress had accepted Washington's plan for a citizen army composed of trained citizen soldiers under trained leaders. By 1812, his organized Advanced Corps would have numbered about 127,000. All able-bodied American citizens under the age of forty—about 600,000 in all—would have been graduates of Washington's Camps of Discipline. Thus, by the end of the American Revolution, the old veterans of the Revolution would have passed the military age, but they would have been replaced by the new men who had been trained in his plan for the future peace and welfare of the new American nation. His plan was rejected not

Because in World War I, awkward youths like these, many of whom had never fired a gun, made history—despite too little preparation—at Château-Thierry, the Argonne Forest.
At both ends!

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General Marshall Wants a Citizen Army

(Continued from Page 12)

Every company and higher unit would have a company commander accustomed to lend it in field maneuver. Every division commander would have been familiar with the team play of infantry supported by artillery and cavalry. Could a little British raiding force have been able to defeat a nation like this? If Washington had had his way, Britain might have hesitated before entering a second war against her wayward American daughter.

When Marshall came out, the regular Army came in. In 1821, the regular Army had been increased to 6800 and again in 1822. Under leaders like Brown and Ripley and Winfield Scott, the regulars became highly disciplined soldiers. At Chippewa and Lundy's Lane they themselves a match for the best British troops. It was the gallantry of this regular Army and the bravery of the officers of our Navy that redeemed some of the generals and general of the war. The history of our modern regular Army begins with the War of 1812. Since then, it has never failed to give a good account of itself.

After the War of 1812, the War Department became the headquarters for this new regular Army. Its leaders became the sole military advisors to the Secretary of War. They were not the military philosophers or critic historians. They were hard-bitten, practical soldiers. To them, the lesson of the recent war was simple. The militia was utterly worthless. They had no knowledge of Washington's scientific plan to make it the source of an effective citizen body. In their minds there could be no other military organization except with hired soldiers under professional officers. When Monroe became President, in 1817, he made John C. Calhoun his Secretary of War. The new secretary was fully indoctrinated by his generals. He therefore agreed with them that the citizen militia was worthless. But instead of seeking to reform it, he proposed to punish by what he called an 

expansible standing army. There was a plan that Washington and his generals never heard of. One that was the very antithesis of everything they ever advocated.

An expandable-standing-army bill was transmitted to the Congress by Secretary Calhoun in December, 1819. It was based upon a radical conception entirely new in American history and foreign to American tradition. In time of emergency, instead of reinforcing the Regular Army by the mobilization of organized military units composed of citizen officers and soldiers, the government in peace time to defend their country, we should expand the Regular Army, as such, by drawing the national manpower into its ranks, there to serve under a permanent class of professional officers.

Looking at the Calhoun plan in the lage of 120 years, we are amazed that any great and intelligent military men proposed an arrangement so utterly futile from a political standpoint. We are also amazed at the fact that for all its inefficacy, this plan was acceptable to the American people or their Congress. The trouble was that Calhoun's military philosophy—like many other distinguished practical soldiers since their time—totally ignored the fact that there is a politics as well as a dynamic aspect of military institutions. They were the expression of a type of military organization, which later attained a high degree of efficiency in autocratic Germany and Japan. But they were unable to see that it was not applicable to a democratic state such as the United States of America. Wise military statesmen like Washington are always inclined to improve or perfect existing institutions to meet new or alien threats. They appreciate that a national institution is a living organism, like a growing tree deep rooted in the nation's customs, history and tradition. It can be pruned gently or stimulated as it grows, but it cannot be replaced by a lifeless, artificial substance such as a post driven in. If trouble with the post that, instead of taking root, it will rot where it enters the soil.

In other culture, the Scott-Brown-Calhoun conception of an expandable standing army became orthodoxy in the Regular Army for many years. It completely displaced the Washingtonian military policy. As late as 1876, General Sherman worked out a modern improvement of Calhoun's scheme. But he visualized it as a peace time Regular Army of about 27,000 men and a standing army, the Regular Army, of about 213,000. General Upton's coefficient of efficiency was quite so big. He proposed to stretch a peace establishment of about 23,000 into a war establishment of about 140,000. Under such a system, expansion for a great war would be impossible.

NEXT DOOR

By VIRGINIA SCOTT MINER

The young man nearly seven
Has gone in next door
To call upon the maiden
From four.
One lollipop between them,
One posy in his hand—
But any who have seen them
In his footsteps flitting.
The doorstep which it mounts—
At any age of woman
To be chosen is what counts!

sible under the volunteer system, and none of the advocates of the expandable standing army ever dared to propose that the National Guard be filled by conscription.

While we officers of the "old Army" never again can say just how we proposed to expand our expandable standing army, we were all agreed that there was one infallible practical formula for national preparedness: Increase the Regular Army whenever you can. If Congress won't give you enough Regulars, get as many as you can. We submitted this plan to our panes of Congress and it made the themes of learning, political and magazine articles whenever we could find them. As General Pershing once said of his early days in the Army: "Every Army officer carried an Army organization bill in his vest pocket." I wrote one myself when I was a second lieutenant. I gave cogent reasons for a dollar per capita increase to make me a captain of infantry. But while that highly commendable object would have added $4,000,000 a year to the national budget, I can see now that my request would have added a penn
toworth to the solution of our national defense problem.

a reason that there was one marked difference between the old Army's military policy and Washington's. In the old Army as many professional officers and soldiers as were needed for certain specific purposes, but no more. We disciples of Calhoun and Scott and

Sherman wanted just as many as we could persuade Congress to give us. And we couldn't persuade them. We had been bred in the doctrine that citizen soldiers are worthless and that they could not serve.

This, of course, was due to a defect in military education. There was a serious deficiency in the curriculum at West Point. We had more mathematics than history and it was considered as all part of the history of our national military institutions. How different our subsequent education is to our old superintendent of the Military Academy's opinion about a century ago—when General Sherman was a cadet. This is one of his bright young instructors to prepare for other course of lectures on that theme.

This increase-the-Regular-Army complex was characteristic of the Regular officers who tended to vitiate their thought on national military policy for many years. According to General Grant, the superiority of the Confederate armies at the Battle of Shiloh was due to the fact that the North did have a standing army. The Regular Army did not have its traditional citizen army as soon as possible. The Confederacy concentrated most of its forces at Shiloh, while almost all the Southern graduates of West Point were in the officers who resigned from the old Army when its services were no longer needed as leaders as and staff officers were therefore retained in new Regular regiments, too few and too small in total strength to exert any material influence upon the progress of the war. It is well known that Calhoun's political disciples in the South were powerful advocates of secession, but it is not so well known that his military disciples in the North almost made it impossible for Lincoln to save the Union.

Thirty years after the Civil War, for the first time in our history, the Congress made a constructive effort to build a sound military system. Now that we REPLACES the old Army which had been suspended, this had finally become fixed as a national political standpoint. A joint congressional committee of 21 senators and 4 representatives, was therefore appointed. All seven of its members had commanded citizen soldiers in the recent war, two in the Confederate Army and five in the Union Army. A jury of seven soldier statesmen, highly competent to take up the light that had failed in Washington's Administration. And but for an unfortunate accident, Washington, the one man who had come to their hands. In preparing his Military Policy of the United States, General Upton had just finished a student of Washington's Writings of Washington. Unfortunately, he overlooked the highly significant footnote in Volume 8 which directed him to Washington's correspondence. Gen

December 23, 1944
Lacking Washington's own remedy, he substituted his own, which was no small version of Calhoun's ex-
itable standing army. In this way, Calhoun made the principal ex-
rit witness for a military policy which never heard of and one which was the logical "everything he ever pro-
Strongly endorsed by General
arma, then commanding general of
army, was the gist of the military
they that the War Department
itted to the Burnside Commission.
that Washington was acting with
of the Burnside Commission. They had all seven American citizen soldiers doing

lively, in a great war. As to the Reg-
rs being the whole show, the two Con-
regulars—Generals Butler and
Dibrell—probably recalled that Lee and
Stonewall Jackson had managed to do
fairly well without any Regulars at all.

And so another great opportunity passed
with nothing done.

After the Spanish-American War, the War Department again had an opportu-
ity to present a solution of our national military problem to a receptive Congress.
The result was a material increase of the Regular Army, but no effective step to-
ward the improvement of our traditional citizen army. In 1903, upon the recom-
mandation of Secretary Root, Congress authorized a new planning agency known
as the General Staff and a new education program for the training of pros-
pective General Staff officers. But
unfortunately, just as he was launching his new planning agency, Mr. Root gave it
a bad start by publishing Upton's Mil-
itary Policy of the United States, in an
official War Department document, as a
"crude and excellent study of our na-
tional military system since Washing-
ton's administration."

In a message to the Congress shortly
after the outbreak of World War I, Pres-
ident Wilson proclaimed that the tradi-
tional foundation of our military system was
a "citizen army... trained and accustomed
to arms."

This pregnant hint from the commander in chief made no perceptible
impression upon the General Staff, for it
immediately proceeded to open plans for
an expandable standing army on a large
scale. As a result, when a great war army
of citizen soldiers was required a little
later, it had to be extermined, as in the
prevalence of the belief at the beginning of the
Civil War, many trained professional
officers who should have become leaders in
the new citizen army were tied up in new Regular Army
military training.

After World War I, there was a wide-
spread popular opinion that the citizen army was no substitute for an
army of regularsoldiers. During the recent war, should be per-
severed as a permanent national institu-
tion through a system of universal mun-
tary training. This policy was advocated by the citizen-army veterans who were
then establishing the American Legion, and was endorsed by many Regular
Army officers, including General Pers-
ham. Unfortunately, the War Depart-
ment recommended another policy based
upon a large standing army, with no
provision for the development of our tradi-
tional citizen army. But for these divided
counsels, the National Defense Act of 1920
would have contained a com-
plete legislative solution of our national
military problem based upon universal
military training.

Failure to establish a sound system of
defenses for a standing army had been
foresawed as the beginning of World War II. Again it became necessary to exterminize the
standing army with which we have
ought all our great wars. In accomplishing
this tremendous constructive task, General Marshall and his assistants were
proving on battlefields through-
out the world that the American army of

In the eyes of childhood... the vision of later years

Just look at the eyes of that
youngster of yours. Then think
of this: Nature never intended
human eyes to cope with the
tiny images of reading and writing and sewing,
indoors. Instead, they were designed for far seeing in the bountiful
light of the open sky. That's why it's so important to give young
eyes every care for indoor seeing, especially the protection of
good lighting. Westinghouse has a word for it—See-ability. That
stands for plenty of well-diffused, shadowless, glareless light—
the right light in the right place. And Westinghouse Mazda stands
for bright, long-lasting lamp bulbs. So look for the Westinghouse name
on the bulbs you buy. Westinghouse Electric & Manu-
facturing Company, Bloomfield, New Jersey.
January 20, 1945

My dear Douglas:

This letter will be carried by my old friend, Robert Sherwood, who was largely responsible for the organization of our psychological warfare activities in this war. Although he is no longer associated with the Office of War Information, Mr. Sherwood is doing special work for this Government with a view to bringing home to the American people, and to the peoples of Allied Nations, the vital importance of the continuing operations in the war against Japan.

I hope that you will have time for a talk with him during his visit to the Philippines.

All of us are eternally proud of your great achievements and know there will be many more of them.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

General Douglas MacArthur
Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area

(copy of this letter is filed - Sherwood folder, 4-45)
MEMORANDUM to the President
Copies to the Under Secretary and the
Assistant Secretary of War

FROM Walter White

SUBJECT: Interview with General Douglas
MacArthur re utilization of Negro combat troops

8 March 1945

It is respectfully requested that this memorandum be made a supplement to my memorandum of 12 February 1945 relative to the 93rd Division and other Negro combat troops in the Pacific Theatres of Operations.

On 1 March 1945 I discussed with General MacArthur at his headquarters at San Miguel the use of Negro combat troops. His statements may be summarized as follows:

1. That the 93rd Division is and will remain a combat one and will not be transformed into a service division.

2. The 93rd will be used in combat provided circumstances warrant.

3. That the stories being circulated in the Pacific that the 93rd broke and failed in a beachhead operation at Bougainville or elsewhere are false and ridiculous.

4. That he knows from experience with the 25th Infantry and the Filipino Army he commanded that race or color have nothing whatever to do with fighting ability.

5. That lack of ships have prevented moving the 93rd and other divisions to forward areas.

6. That the 93rd will shortly be moved from Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea to Morotai. The impression was gained that the division will be brought together as a unit for the first time since leaving the United States in February, 1944.
7. That General MacArthur had had one of his officers to inspect the 93rd recently and his report had not been favorable. When queried as to the specific items of criticism, General MacArthur stated it was chiefly that the men of the 93rd wanted to go home. He added, laughing, that that is true and natural of all divisions overseas, regardless of race.

8. With respect to the transformation of numerous Negro anti-aircraft units to port battalion and other service status, General MacArthur stated that such action was due to the changing character of the war in the Pacific. When some of these units first came over the enemy had control of the air; that now we have control so that anti-aircraft batteries are not as needed; that not enough service troops had been sent over to the Pacific to meet the needs of a swiftly moving war and thus these and other combat units had to be used to unload ships and do other such work. However, the General did not explain why two Negro anti-aircraft units with nearly three years of training and service had been notified on arrival at Hollandia as late as 13 February 1945 that they were to be port battalion units instead of combat units.

Attached hereto is copy of memorandum sent General MacArthur today.

Respectfully,

Walter White
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(6) That consideration be given to the present total absence of qualified Negro officers on the Division General Staff and of field grade on regimental staffs throughout the Division. In making such a recommendation, permit me to repeat here what we both agreed on in our conference—that these and all other assignments be made wholly and solely on a rigid yardstick of ability, efficiency and experience.

Your action in bringing the Division together in one island for the first time since the 93rd left the States will undoubtedly have immediate effect in improvement of efficiency and a sense of unity. The Commanding General will be able to devote his full time to training and leading the Division instead of spending so much of his time and energy travelling to various islands over which the 93rd has been scattered since coming overseas.

It is my hope that neither you nor the War Department will think these recommendations by a layman presumptuous. Be assured that they are made solely with the desire that the zeal of the overwhelming majority of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 93rd to contribute to the speediest winning of complete victory may be utilized to the fullest degree.

Respectfully,

Walter White.